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### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Appendices Volume 1 and 2 was made on September 29, 2021, upon the appropriate parties hereto by electronical filing using the Nevada Supreme Court eFlex eFile system which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:

ALEXANDER G. CHEN CLARK COUNTY DA. 200 Lewis Avenue, 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4711 AARON D. FORD Attorney General 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701 (775) 684-1265 Attorneys for Respondent

A paper copy has been forwarded to Appellant Jack Leal at:

Mr. Jack Leal DOC 1183500 THREE LAKES VALLEY CONSERVATION CAMP (TLVCC) Southern Desert Correctional Center P.O. Box 208 Indian Springs, Nevada 89070-0208

BY /s/Diane C. Lowe
DIANE C. LOWE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar #14573

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# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JACK LEAL.

**NOAS** 

Petitioner,

JOSEPH Z. GERSTEN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 13876 The Gersten Law Firm PLLC 9680 W Tropicana Avenue # 120

Las Vegas, NV 89147

Attorney for Petitioner

Telephone (702) 857-8777

ioe@thegerstenlawfirm.com

vs.

JERRY HOWELL, Warden, Southern Desert Correctional Center

Respondent.

Case No.: C-17-322664-2

Dept. No.: XVII

#### NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that JACK LEAL, Petitioner above named, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the order denying his WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS entered in this action on the 21st day of June 2019.

By <u>Joseph 2. Gersten</u>
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1

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#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I am an employee of The Gersten Law Firm PLLC, and that on the 19<sup>th</sup> day of June 2019, I deposited a true and correct copy of the **NOTICE OF APPEAL** in the United States Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope, first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

#### JERRY HOWELL

Warden, Southern Desert Correctional Center 20825 Cold Creek Road P.O. Box 208

Indian Springs, NV 89070-0208

### STEVEN WOLFSON

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200 Lewis Avenue

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Nevada Attorney General 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701

JOSEPH Z. GERSTEN, ESQ.

A D 1 CERTIFIED, EDG.

An Employee of The Gersten Law Firm PLLC

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Jack Leal	
Appellant,	Suprem
Jerry Howell Wooden, Southern Desert Correctional	District
Respondent.	

e Court No. 79243

Court No.

DEC 3 0 2019

INSTRUCTIONS: If you are an appellant proceeding pro se (without an attorney) in the Nevada Supreme Court, you must file either (1) a brief that complies with Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure (NRAP) 28(a), or (2) a completed copy of this informal brief form, see NRAP 28(k), with the Nevada Supreme Court on or before the due date, see NRAP 31. In civil appeals, if you do not file one of these documents by the due date, the Nevada Supreme Court may dismiss your appeal. In postconviction criminal appeals, if you do not file one of these documents by the due date, the Nevada Supreme Court or Nevada Court of Appeals may decide your appeal on the record without briefing.

**HOW TO FILL OUT THIS FORM:** This form must be typed, unless you are incarcerated, in which case it must be clearly handwritten. You do not need to refer to legal authority or the district court record. If you are completing your brief on this form, write only in the space allowed on the form. Additional pages and attachments are not allowed. If typing an informal brief, you may either use the lined paper contained in this form or an equivalent number of pages of your own paper. Your brief will be stricken if you fail to follow the directions in this form and the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

WHERE TO FILE THE BRIEF: You may submit your brief for filing in person or by mail.

To file wour brief in person: Briefs may be submitted for filing Monday through riday, 8:00 and to 4:00 p.m.

Carson City: Bringshe brief to the Clerk's Office at the Supreme Court of

Nevada, 201 South Carson Street, Carson City, Nevada, 89701.

Las Vegas courtheuse for the Nevada Appellate Courts, 408 East Clark Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada, 89101.

Informal Brief Form October 2017

19-52402

To file your brief by mail: Mail the brief to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Nevada, 201 South Carson Street, Carson City, Nevada 89701. Your brief must be postmarked on or before the due date.

You must file the original brief and 1 copy with the clerk of the Nevada Supreme Court. If you want the clerk to return a file-stamped copy of your brief, you must file the original form and 2 copies and include a self-addressed, stamped envelope. Documents cannot be faxed or emailed to the Supreme Court Clerk's Office.

Copies of the brief must be mailed or delivered to the other parties to this appeal or to the parties' attorneys, if they have attorneys. You must also include a proper certificate of service or complete the certificate that is attached to the informal brief form.

CAUTION: Pro se parties are prohibited from representing other parties. A pro se party may not complete a brief on behalf of other parties. Pro se parties may collaborate on their briefs, however, provided that if one brief is submitted on behalf of multiple pro se parties, each party must sign and date the brief to confirm that he or she has participated in the preparation of the brief and, by his or her signature, joins in the arguments and representations confained therein.

Judgment or Order You Are Appealing. List the judgment or order that you are appealing from and the date that the judgment or order was filed in the district court.

Filed Date	Name of Judgment or Order
6-29-2019	Order denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
	12

Notice of Appeal. Give the date you filed your notice of appeal in the district court: 7-19-2019

Related Cases. List all other court cases related to this case. Provide the case number, title of the case and name of the court where the case was filed.

Case No.	Case Title	Name of Court

Pro Bono Counsel. Would you be interested in having pro bono counsel assigned to represent you in this appeal?

Yes □ No

\*NOTE: If the court determines that your case may be appropriate for having pro bono counsel assigned, an appropriate order will be entered. Assignment of pro bono counsel is not automatic.

Statement of Facts. Explain the facts of your case. (Your answer must be provided in the space allowed.)

Leal-had been involved in the Red Estate Feld since 2009 without any issues. In September of Milester Renal Atomory Generals (AG) office filed a civil complaint for first other. Tessica General (Garcia) who is leads carbotholant immediately retained course! Michael Brivate (Parients) to represent both Records in the civil mater. Leal was only aware of this civil complaint since there were no criminal charges filed at this point. Apprently at some point the AG decided to pursue criminal charges against Leal and Garcia and made a formal offer letter (which was contingent on both Defendents acceptance, a "package pleaded") to Pariente. Garcia somehow accepted the flee on behalf of herself and lead, without lead consorting to ar even being aware of such offer at the

time as it greatly benefited her by leaving the with only a nindersonax consistion. Due to Garcia's acceptance
of the offer, the A.G. then filed criminal charges. On Movember 35th 2016 Leal Rund art that Garria had been in
contact with Pariette without Load's knowledge so Load attended to contact Pariette directly and Garcia become involve
and physically attacked Leal. Facia was subsequently anested for Amestic bottom against Leal. This was the
beginning of a series of events against lead including 4 sourate anests. Soulcost particulous and numerous threats
all at which head to head's eventual consistion and the count issues relating to him entering a coverced and involutiony
quilty pleas. At this point in Almember of 2016 Brieste returned to further represent both Districtions
Ancie than retained Jason Viener (Veiner) to represent both Definalists. At this time load was still manage that
criminal changes had been filed although Greis was apparently owere. Use led became garne that there were
criminal changes against him the scurity of the changes, he immediately contracted Gracia who made myranous
threats about last not soming ording anything about it. On April 20th 2017 Load made his first personal appearance
in cost and planned to tell the court about the video or and threats against him and should not guilty so Views
equestion a continuance. The cost date was continued to April 24th 2017 and Leal again planned to plead not quity
but as Lood was leaving his horse for court that murning. Garcia should up and literally altadred him and make threats
that he could note see his kids again & he did not sign the gritty plea in court that day Led being completely distincted
and bailing been just physically attacked and threstoned only hours certifier ended us signing the guilty day that day
but under complete dissess and with the Fear that him not dring so would not him in immediate danger.
On August 17th 2017 Lead had a court date for sentencing. Lieizer Loss Aware of all the actual conflicts between the
Defendants which is there by the record as he attempted to withdraw as comsel due to what had become an
entrinedle conflict. The court was ensure of the totality of the softentian since veiner could not simply fell the court
the complete story since Garcia was also his dient Usines had informed lead that he was singly these to withdraw
as counsel and that the court would appoint lad independent counsel which lead believed would help him withdraw his involutory
plea hat instead the cost west forward with sectioning despite viewers alterate to withdraw, and antenced lead to 70 to 180
coulds in prices.
ign! Filed a livest appeal which the court of Appeals (COA) officered last believes the COA was unaware of the
actual conflicts and asterol states the conflict was "conflicting defenses as to why they did at pay the restitution" and
later that "led fold to downstate there was a conflict of interest because the foot that his co-defendent did extense

pay the restriction was not a describe" which is not at all what lead was alleging. However before to disclose the actual contricts to the court meant it was not on the record fir review but has since been presented to the court both in several subsequent fillings and also in leads Petition which is the subject of this affect.

On March 112 1019 Leal Filed his Petition for With at Habanas Compuse. His ist goard allows these that the changing document to add another affect of the actual changes against him. The information does not importantly, does not specify which Described made which folse as notice statements to which incitions bearing lead another court left to make blind associations which lead believes were a strong features to his scatencing hearing. I lead is 200 ground states that his coursed, weiver, was ineffective in representing him. One issue is the fact that both Described had been a signed by Leal during this 4 month period. Gencia made avaneous throats to coarse lead to enter a guilture plan against his free will all while we month period. Gencia made avaneous throats to coarse lead to enter a guilture plan against his free will all while we continued to represent high providing a providing and providing a providing a providing a providing a providing as provided as a provided as a provided as a supposition of the providing as provided as a provided as a provided as a provide

Statement of District Court Error. Explain why you believe the district court was wrong. Also state what action you want the Nevada Supreme Court to take. (Your answer must be provided in the space allowed.)

The First error lead brings is about his first dain which is that the Information by which he was charged Falled to put him on putice of the charges against him. (and retites his plea was extract into both unknowingly and involutarily. A plea count be tarly unlostry unless the Described receives real artice of the charges against him and the Information have is clearly vague and ambiguous and therefore lacks specificity. It actually does not state any specifics such as the place of the alleged crime, the specific littles of any errors of the caime, the notify that said folse statements were made (phone, in passon, email) or by by which Described the filse statements was made, and lastly, it does not allege any specific acts committed by led involving specific victims. It also clearly does not state which betandout is alleged to have done whater which Described allegedly node which filse or vatine statements to which betandout must contain "Object and and every cleared of the crime charged. It is known that the charging document must contain "Objects and

every element of the crime changed and (2) the facts straing how the particularly committed each element & the crime changed." Lead cities "Hancock 114 New 16!" which is almost identical in that the Information here simply lungs the Asterdant's together making it very difficult to decipher who is allowed to have done what. The Internation also fouls to show that two separate transactions actually occurred instead it signedy shows two or victims but more importantly it fails to show that Load himself actually had any involvement in two or more (moltide) transactions monthing found which is exactly what he is currently incorporated for. Here Load's guilty plea is invalid and stoold be meeted and declared as unid since the factual basis was not specifically stated with information about the Detendant's actual insolvement. The changing document here tails to show the particular acts alleged to have been convitted by Leal and that he was actually involved or committed any crine at all. Also, a quilty plea does not make any jurisdictional detects such as anomission or Failure to state the exsential material abovents of the offerse which are missing from the said Information. For this error land reports that the Internation used have should therefore be declared as insufficient and unid and the present changes dismissed. Shall the state then desire, Led shall be changed by means of a new charging document which charge identifies the charges against him. At a minimum, Leal Octiones be shall be re-restanced with the scattering court being made fully and specifically asme of his actual involvement. Lail respectfully requests that this court reverse and remand for one of the above options The next error (all raises is that lucion was representing both Datendant's without any conflict mains what social Par the period between Almonber of 2016 and paril & 2017 (over 4 months). This was a critical time as this is the period in which all of the issues between the Debadants, including threats and natural physical violence against Leel, began. This was also the period than the plea was being negotiated. so during this time without a conflict waiver, Land was not being properly represented. We'ver was aware of the actual conflicts (the threats and vidence cognisation) between the Describents as shown by his attempt to withdraw at Lead's sontracing. At the time Leal was manage of, both his right to independent caused, and also & his right to the appoint and coursed since rights were never distributed to him by Weiner or by the court. Hed Look known of these rights be raid have proveded to trial with the proper representation. For these arms led reacts that he be againsted independent muscles the out and he allowed to glead anow Free From any actual conflicts, threats for coercion Langkind Also with regard to this claim, the court simply

sides it sees apportions with the value that was signed (Tomoritis at 10:19-20) let does not address the fact
that there was no vainer at all in place for the 4 month privat prior to that time and that Load's signing of the
White was conced, with a which are leader actual organism. The count des reverse times refers to the COA.
Floring where they state "and failed to beam that thorough a conflict of interest" but it appears they hascal
their decision on nestitution issues as the domestic vidence issues was not on the record until led's independent
appoints counsed missed them. Look would ask the CO.A. to revisit their previous decision in light of the actual
conflicts and additional information and available and before them. Regardless of the determination as to if the
conflict pairor was valid, Louts claim that Gracin "issited domestic vidence upon the Petitiones" needs to be
Perhat examined at the cost have determined all M. " I then " and I have to have the cost have determined at M. " I then " and I have the cost have determined at M. " I then " and I have the cost have determined at M. " I then " and I have the cost have determined at M. " I then " and I have the cost have determined at M. " I then " and " a
Bether examined as the court here determined that the Editioner signed the plea agreement Fredly and relationly
and entered his from the first open three from threats (Anderdonning Petition at 4:47) which is
shearly contradicted by the deins made here and on the record.
The court next discusses the disparity between the Datastatis superces (transcripts at 10:20:24), Led in
his claim argued projudice in the punishments "negotiated" where Gordo would and use with sale a misdemonar
conviction but the court only discusses the sentences "actually received". Eva so, led received 72-180 multis
in prison which is significantly larger than Garriers 48-100 much restruce especially given Garriels numerous recent
accests and he failure to appear for nationally in this case so this issue is not not at the ount states. This
was prejudicial as lead us forced to extentisplan in order for fairing to benefit from the plan and a reduced sortence
leal requests that the court roms se and consent and Lead be sentenced to 48-100 months or less as was
given to farcia to eliminate the current disportly between lead and farcials sentences.
Looks thind argument where he do in son error is about Parlage flee Decks (Transcripts at 9:3-9) which is when one Definition
plea is contingent your another Defendants accordance of the plan deal. Since there is a greater possibility of there's
and corrien, the court is required to know if there is a joint place at the entry of place bearing so that the court may
and at a more thurses convers to resome one Definition is at pleasing against their will and to prevent easily what
eas happening here to led by Garin. The more detailed commes was not conducted here to led remests that the
out reverse and remand to praide leaf with a full hearing to determine whether leaf antered his dear due to
threats or pressures by Farria due to the padrage plea deal.
15 to Load's chain it constitute against him. His does was extended to without affective assistance of mass and warrent

industry. By the time (and estand his grafty fee on April 148 IN), he had drowly been subjected to sowed theats and instances a actual violence against him, due to his desire to not go along, with the flow neighborhous, so at that point it is strong that the plan was obtained by both actual and throstered physical have to lead which stripped the flow is a whatery and since his will was anothere. Both Unions and the A.G. Know, as should have known and district the court of the existence of species and an actual contlict between the Broadcats as Burine's correct for Bathery against /colline in her P.S.T. at subtencing.

Social's last accept prior to the changes in this case was on a 23-2009 which shows a direct correlation with the timeline of this case and the throots and violence against (and the coart birthy adherses the coercion claim (transcripts of 5-2-24) but then powers on and later conductors the coercion is one of the main claims, throughout the entire petition, and by the acut's inquiries, it appears that the court is as one of the main claims, throughout the entire petition, and by simply even informed the court due to his four that ching as would result instructed by throots and what lead since the coercion and eit involutions and each of the coercion and eit involutions and account that the chartes be bedieved as unid since it was induced by throots and which they come are it is the only way to fully address this claim and to determine it leads guilty plea was extend into Freely and understantly or it in that there was appeared and the plea was extend into Freely and understantly or it in that there was appeared and the plea was extend into Theely and understantly or it in that there was appeared and the plea was extend into Theely and understantly or it in that there was appeared and the plea was extend into Theely

DATED this 10th day of December 201	9.
-------------------------------------	----

Signature of Appellant

Print Name of Appellant

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that on the date indicated below, I served a copy of th	is
completed informal brief form upon all parties to the appeal as follows:	

By personally serving it upon him/her; or

By mailing it by first-class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address(es) (list names and address(es) of parties served):

Jerry Hovell Warden, Southern Desert Correctional Center 20825 Cold Creek Road P.D. Box 208 Findian Springs, NV 89070

Steven Wolfson Clark county District Alborney 300 Lewis Arvane Cas Vegas, NV 89101 Aaron Ford Noveda Atorney General 100 North Carson Street Carson Citys NV 89701

DATED this 20th day of December

2019.

Signature of Appellant

<u>Tack Leal</u> Print Name of Appellant

P.O. Box 208

Address

Indian Springs, NV 89070 City/State/Zip

WA

Telephone

Electronically Filed 4/28/2020 5:24 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 1	<b>IPWHC</b>	Strong
1	JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ.	Comme !
2	Nevada Bar No. 11223	
-		
3	Law Office of Jean J. Schwartzer	
	10620 Southern Highlands Parkway, Suite	110-473
⊿	Phone: (702) 979-9941	
	jean.schwartzer@gmail.com	
5	Attorney for Petitioner	
_	i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	
6		
	nic	STRICT COURT
7	Dis	orkici couki
	CLADK	COUNTY, NEVADA
8	CLARK	COUNTI, NEVADA
-	IACVIDAI	
9	JACK LEAL	A-20-814369-W
-		)
10	Petitioner,	)
		) CASE NO: <del>C-17-322664-2</del>
11	V.	) DEPT NO: XVII
	<b>'</b> '	)
12		
1		-
13	JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN,	)
	Southern Desert Correctional Center;	
14	STATE OF NEVADA	)
		)
15	Respondents.	j l
	1tospondento.	·
16	<del></del>	
17		
	· — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —	WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
18	(POS	T-CONVICTION)
19		
	1. Name of institution and county i	in which you are presently imprisoned or where and
20	how you are presently restrained	
	now you are presently restrained	of your fiberty:
21		
'	Southern Desert Correctional Cent	er, Indian Springs, Clark County Nevada
22		
	2. Name and location of court whi	ch entered the judgment of conviction under attack:
23		
	Eighth Judicial District Court, Clar	& County Nevada
24	Eighti Judiciai District Court, Ciai	k County Nevaua.
25	3. Date of judgment of conviction:	
		1
26	First JOC: Augu	ust 23, 2017
	Amended JOC: May	9, 2019
27	1	
	4. Case number: C-17	7-322664-2
28	. Once managed to	

1	5.	(a) Length of	sentence:	
3		Petitioner was sentenced as follows:		
4		COUNT 1:	MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS and a	
5			MINIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) with ZERO (0) DAYS credit for time served	
6			HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT (888) DAYS CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED.	
7			Restitution in the amount of \$757,420.00 payable to (\$70,000 LoryLee	
8			Plancarte, \$75,000 Edelyn Rudin, \$37,500 Chatty Becker, \$57,500 Irene Segura, \$98,620 Liih-Ling Yang, \$90,300 Lina Palafox, \$85,000 Adilson	
9			Gibellato, \$50,000 Juan Eloy Ramirez, \$115,000 Catherine Wyngarden, \$25,000 Shahram Bozorgnia, \$53,500 Tat Lam).	
11			On May 9, 2019, an Amended Judgment of Conviction was adding the	
12			provision that the restitution was to be paid jointly and severally between Petitioner and his co-defendant.	
13		(b) If sentence	e is death, state any date upon which execution is scheduled:	
14		N/A		
15 16	6.	Are you prese attack in this	ently serving a sentence for a conviction other than the conviction under motion?	
17		No		
18 l		If "yes," list c	rime, case number and sentence being served at this time: N/A	
20	7.	Nature of offe	ense involved in conviction being challenged:	
21		COUNT 1:	MULTIPLE TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING FRAUD OR DECEIT IN THE COURSE OF AN ENTERPRISE AND OCCUPATION (Category B	
22			Felony)(NRS 205.377)	
23	8.	What was you	ır plea?	
24		Guilty		
25	///			
26 27	///			
28	///			

1 2	9.	If you entered a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill to one count of an indictment or information, and a plea of not guilty to another count of an indictment or
3		information, or if a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill was negotiated, give details:
4	i	Petitioner entered into a Guilty Plea Agreement whereby, in exchange for a plea of guilty
5	1	by both Petitioner and his co-defendant, the Attorney General would reduce the original charges of: Count 1 - Racketeering (NRS 207.400(1)(c); Counts 2 through 13 - Theft in
6		the Amount of \$3,500 or More (NRS 205.0832; 205A.030); Count 14 - Multiple
7		Transactions Involving Fraud or Deceit in Court of Enterprise or Occupation (NRS 205.377); down to one count of Multiple Transactions Involving Fraud or Deceit in Court of Enterprise or Occupation (NRS 205.377). Additionally, if he and his co-defendant (joint
8	1	and severally liable) paid the ordered restitution prior to their sentencing date, the Attorney
9		General agreed to not oppose the imposition of a term of probation not to exceed a term of five years, with a suspended sentence of 36-90 months term of imprisonment. Petitioner
10		also agreed to pay restitution to various victims in a total amount of \$757,420. Petitioner also agreed to forfeit \$157.105.17, which was seized in relation to the instant case, with
11	ĺ	said money to be applied to the restitution requirement. Petitioner also agreed to execute
12		and file a lien agreement and lien in favor of the State of Nevada, Office of Attorney General, in the amount of \$600,314.83 against the home located at 1024 Santa Helena
13		Avenue, Henderson Nevada 89002.
14	10.	If you were found guilty or guilty but mentally ill after a plea of not guilty, was the finding made by:
15	1	
16		N/A
17		(a) Jury (b) Judge without a jury
18	11.	Did you testify at the trial?
19	ł	N/A
20	12.	
21	12.	Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?
22	1	Yes.
23	13.	If you did appeal, answer the following:  None of courts  None to Surrey Court
24		(a) Name of court: Nevada Supreme Court (b) Case number or citation: 74050
25	1	(c) Result: Conviction Affirmed (d) Date of result: November 28, 2018
26		
27	14.	If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you did not:
28	l	N/A

, ,						1
	15.	Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you previously filed any petitions, applications or motions with respect to this judgment in				
2		any court, state or federal?				
3		Yes.				
4	16	I£		. 1 <i>5</i>	the fallowing information.	1
5	16. (a)	11 you (1)	r answer to No Name of cour	• • •	the following information: Eighth Judicial District Court	ĺ
6	Ì	(2)	Nature of pro	ceeding:	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	
7		(3)	Grounds rais	ed:		1
7 8			Ground One:	Petitioner's conviction the Petitioner on not	on was invalid because the information failed to ice of the charges.	,
9 10			Ground Two:		ineffective assistance of counsel when counse aningful conflict waiver.	i
11 12			Ground Three		ineffective assistance of counsel when counse to entering a plea of guilty.	ı
13			Ground Four:	failed to inform the	ineffective assistance of counsel when counse Court of Petitioner's joint plea/package deal wi	- 1
14				his Co-Defendant		١
15						
16		(4)	Did you recei or motion?	ive an evidentiary he	aring on your petition, application No.	
17		(5)	Result:		Petition denied.	
18		(6)	Date of resul	t:	May 7, 2019 Oral Ruling	١
19					June 19, 2010 Order Filed June 21, 2029 Notice of Order Filed	
20					band in its induced of order I field	
21		(7)	If known, cit	ations of any writte	n opinion or date of orders entered pursuan	t
22		` /	to such result	•	•	
23			_	cts Conclusion of Lav		-
24			Notice of Entr	ry of Order:	June 21, 2019	
25	(b)				motion, give the same information:	1
		(1) (2)	Name of cour Nature of pro		N/A N/A	
26		(2) (3)	Grounds rais	•	N/A N/A	1
27		(4)	•	ive an evidentiary he	earing on your petition, application	
28		(5)	or motion? Result:		N/A N/A	

		(6)	Date of result:	N/A	
1	1	(7)	If known, citations of any written opinion pursuant to such result:	n or date of ore N/A	ders entered
2	[				
3	(c)		any third or subsequent additional app nation as above, list them on a separate sho		
4	ł	HIIVE	nation as above, list them on a separate sin	eet and attach.	. <b>N/A</b>
5	(d)		ou appeal to the highest state or federal contact to taken on any petition, application or moti		risdiction, the result or
6			irst petition, application or motion?		YesX No
7	ĺ	C	itation or date of decision:		Still pending.
8			econd petition, application or motion? itation or date of decision:		Yes No
9		(3) T	hird or subsequent petitions, applications itation or date of decision:	or motions?	Yes No
10	(a)	If von	did not annual from the adverse action o	- ann natition	analization or motion
11	(e )	explai	did not appeal from the adverse action on briefly why you did not. (You must reconse your response may be included on paper	elate specific f	facts in response to this
12			etition. Your response may not exceed five		
13			,		
14	}	N/A			
15					
16	17.		ny ground being raised in this petition bee court by way of petition for habeas corp		
17			onviction proceeding? If so, identify:		-
18		(2)	Which of the grounds is the same	NTana	
19		(a)	Which of the grounds is the same:	None.	
20		(b)	The proceedings in which these grounds were raised:	N/A	
21		(a)	Duisfly avalain why you are again saig	these amou	
22			Briefly explain why you are again raisi ic facts in response to this question. Your r is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the pet	esponse may b	e included on paper
23			andwritten or typewritten pages in length.)		<b>вроиме шау пое ехессы</b>
24			N/A		
25	///				
26					
27	///				
28	///				

2	18.	If any of the grounds listed in Nos. 23(a), (b), (c) and (d), or listed on any additional pages you have attached, were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, list briefly what grounds were not so presented, and give your reasons for not
3		presenting them. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the
4		petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in
5	İ	length.)
6		Petitioner was unaware of some of these issues previously. Petitioner will supplement his good cause argument in subsequent pleadings.
7		
8	19.	Are you filing this petition more than 1 year following the filing of the judgment of conviction or the filing of a decision on direct appeal? If so, state briefly the reasons
9		for the delay. (You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your
10		response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in
11		length.)
12		The instant Petition is filed over a year from the remitter on Petitioner's Direct Appeal. However, an Amended Judgment of Conviction was entered on May 9, 2019. This Petition
13		is within the one year time frame from that date.
14	20.	Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal,
15 16		as to the judgment under attack? YesX No  If yes, state what court and the case number: Nevada Supreme Court Case No. 79243
17	21.	Give the name of each attorney who represented you in the proceeding resulting in your conviction and on direct appeal:
18	ı	Trial Counsel: Jason G. Weiner, Esq.
19 20		Appellate Counsel: Lester M. Paredes, Esq.
21	22.	Do you have any future sentences to serve after you complete the sentence imposed
22	!	by the judgment under attack?
23		No
24		If yes, specify where and when it is to be served, if you know: N/A
25	///	
26	///	
27	///	
28		

23. State concisely every ground on which you claim that you are being held unlawfully. Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary you may attach pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting same.

#### I. Ground One:

Based upon information and belief, Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his right to counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution due to trial counsel's failure to present mitigation factors at sentencing, including but not limited to, the inability of Petitioner to pay the restitution prior to sentencing due to document(s) being records on the property located at located at 1024 Santa Helena Avenue, Henderson Nevada 89002 at the mandate of the Attorney General, thereby making it difficult to sell.

#### II. Ground Two:

Based upon information and belief, Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his right to counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution due to trial counsel's failure to go over or correct Petitioner's Presentence Investigation Report prior to sentencing.

#### III. Ground Three:

Based upon information and belief, Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his right to counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution due to trial counsel's failure to correct and/or explain errors in Petitioner's criminal history and nature of the instant offense.

IV. Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing pursuant to NRS 34.770.

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1 Petitioner may raise additional grounds in supplemental pleadings and/or expand on the 2 issues raised in the instant Petition. It should be noted that current counsel was only hired to file 3 the initial Petition to comply with the statue of limitations (as well as a Motion to Modify that will 4 be forthcoming). Petitioner will need the assistance of appointed counsel if current counsel is not 5 retained for the completion and supplementation of the instant Petition, which will necessitate the 6 gathering of documents, investigation, legal research and drafting of supplemental pleadings. 7 WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the court grant petitioner relief to which petitioner 8 may be entitled in this proceeding. 9 EXECUTED on the 28<sup>th</sup> day of the month of April of the year 2020. 10 11 /s/ Jean Schwartzer 12 JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 11223 13 Law Office of Jean J. Schwartzer 10620 Southern Highlands Parkway, Suite 110-473 14 Phone: (702) 979-9941 jean.schwartzer@gmail.com 15 Attorney for Petitioner 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

 MAY 2 7 2020

# IN THE Eighth JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Clark

Jack leal	A-20-814369-W Dept. 17
Petitioner,	}
vs.	Case No. C-17-32264-2
Jerry Howell Warden.	Dept. No. XVII
Southern Desert Connectional Center.	Docket
Respondent(s).	Evidentiary Hearing Roquested  (Not a Death Penalty Case)
	_) (Not a beath Penatty Case)

### PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)

#### INSTRUCTIONS:

- (1) This petition must be legibly handwritten or typewritten signed by the petitioner and verified.
- (2) Additional pages are not permitted except where noted or with respect to the facts which you rely upon to support your grounds for relief. No citation of authorities need be furnished. If briefs or arguments are submitted, they should be submitted in the form of a separate memorandum.
- (3) If you want an attorney appointed, you must complete the Affidavit in Support of Request to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. You must have an authorized officer at the prison complete the certificate as to the amount of money and securities on deposit to your credit in any account in the institution.
- (4) You must name as respondent the person by whom you are confined or restrained. If you are in a specific institution of the department of corrections, name the warden or head of the institution. If you are not in a specific institution of the department within its custody, name the director of the department of corrections.

(5) You must include all grounds or claims for relief which you may have regarding your methods and sentence.

MAY - 8 2020

Failure to raise all grounds I this petition may preclude you from filing future petitions challenging your conviction and sentence.

2

6

10

- (6) You must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition you file seeking relief from any conviction or sentence. Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed. If your petition contains a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that claim will operate to waive the attorney-client privilege for the proceeding in which you claim your counsel was ineffective.
- (7) If your petition challenges the validity of your conviction or sentence, the original and one copy must be filed with the clerk of the district court for the county in which the conviction occurred. Petitions raising any other claim must be filed with the clerk of the district court for the county in which you are incarcerated. One copy must be mailed to the respondent, one copy to the attorney general's office, and one copy to the district attorney of the county in which you were convicted or to the original prosecutor if you are challenging your original conviction or sentence. Copies must conform in all particulars to the original submitted for filing.

#### **PETITION**

11	1. Name of institution and county in which you are presently imprisoned or where and who you
12	are presently restrained of your liberty: Southern losert Correctional Center, Clark County, Heuria.
13	2. Name the location of court which entered the judgment of conviction under attack:
14	Eighth District Tudicial Court Department XVII
15	3. Date of judgment of conviction: May 9th 2019
16	4. Case number: <u>C-17-302664-2</u>
17	5. (a) Length of sentence: 72-180 months
18	(b) If sentence is death, state any date upon which execution is scheduled: N/A
19	6. Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction other than the conviction under attack in
20	this motion:
21	Yes No > If "Yes", list crime, case number and sentence being served at this time:
22	
23	7. Nature of offense involved in conviction being challenged:
24	Multiple Transactions Involving Fraud or Decet in the Course of an
25	Enterprise or Occupation
26	
27	
28	2

١	8. What was your plea? (Check one)
-2	(a) Not guilty
3	(b) Guilty 🔀
4	(c) Nolo contendere
5	9. If you entered a guilty plea to one count of an indictment or information, and a not guilty plea
6	to another count of an indictment or information, or if a guilty plea was negotiated, give details:
7	
8	
9	10. If you were found guilty after a plea of not guilty, was the finding made by: (check one)
10	(a) Jury
11	(b) Judge without a jury
12	11. Did you testify at trial? Yes No
13	12. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?
14	Yes No X
15	13. If you did appeal, answer the following:
16	(a) Name of court:
17	(b) Case number or citation:
18	(c) Result:
19	(d) Date of appeal:
20	(Attach copy of order or decision, if available).
21	14.) If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you did not:
22	Was not aware of the judgment of conviction being filed until recently
23	May 9th 2019 J.O.C.)
24	15. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you previously
25	filed any petitions, applications or motions with respect to this judgment in any court, state or
26	federal? Yes No
27	
28	3

l	16. If your answer to No 15 was "Yes", give the following information:
2	(a) (1) Name of court:
3	(2) Nature of proceedings:
4 5 6	(3) Grounds raised :
7	
8	
9	Yes No
10	(5) Result:
11	(6) Date of result:
12	(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or date of orders entered pursuant to each
13	result:
14	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15	(1) Name of Court:
16	(2) Nature of proceeding:
17	(3) Grounds raised:
18	(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion?
19	Yes No
20	(5) Result:
21	(6) Date of result:
22	(7) If known, citations or any written opinion or date of orders entered pursuant to each
23	result:
24	(c) As to any third or subsequent additional application or motions, give the same
25	information as above, list them on a separate sheet and attach.
26	
27	
28	4
e e	

1	(d) Did you appeal to the highest state or federal court having jurisdiction, the result or action
2	taken on any petition, application or motion?
3	(1) First petition, application or motion?
4	Yes No
5	Citation or date of decision:
6	(2) Second petition, application or motion?
7	Yes No
8	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
9	(e) If you did not appeal from the adverse action on any petition, application or motion,
10	explain briefly why you did not. (You may relate specific facts in response to this question. Your
11	response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response
12	may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length).
13	
14	
15	17. Has any ground being raised in this petition been previously presented to this or any other
16	court by way of petition for habeas corpus, motion or application or any other post-conviction
17	proceeding? If so, identify: No
18	(a) Which of the grounds is the same:
19	
20	(b) The proceedings in which these grounds were raised:
21	
22	(c) Briefly explain why you are again raising these grounds. (You must relate specific facts
23	in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x 11 inches
24	attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in
25	length)
26	
27	
28	5

;	18. If any of the grounds listed in Nos. 23(a), (b), (c), and (d), or listed on any additional pages
2	you have attached, were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, list briefly what
3	grounds were not so presented, and give your reasons for not presenting them. (You must relate
4	specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x
5	11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten
6	pages in length). N/A
7	<u> </u>
8	19. Are you filing this petition more than one (1) year following the filing of the judgment of
9	conviction or the filing of a decision on direct appeal? If so, state briefly the reasons for the delay.
01	(You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on
I 1	paper which is 8 ½ x 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five
12	handwritten or typewritten pages in length). No
13	
14	
15	20. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal, as to the
16	judgment under attack?
17	Yes No <u>×</u>
18	If "Yes", state what court and the case number:
19	
20	21. Give the name of each attorney who represented you in the proceeding resulting in your
21	conviction and on direct appeal: Michael Pariente Lester M. Paredes
22	Craig Mueller Jason Weiner Joseph Z. Gersten
23	
24	22. Do you have any future sentences to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the
25	judgment under attack?
26	Yes No Z If "Yes", specify where and when it is to be served, if you know:
27	
28	6

	Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary, you may attach pages stating
1	additional grounds and facts supporting same.
3	23. (a) GROUND ONE: Challenge to validity of guitty plea
4	, ·
5	
6	
7	23. (a) SUPPORTING FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law):
8	My plea was involuntary as I was coerced and it was not entered into of my
9	own Free will (See attached "Motion to Withdraw Plea")
10	
11	My plan was entered into without the effective assistance of counsel as there
12	was a clear actual conflict of interest between both Defendants who were being
13	represented by the same attorney. Jason Weiner began representing both Describints
14	but seems to have only had meaningful conversations with Garcia word not look Both
15	co-laterdants was unable to be properly represented due to an contact orders stemming from
16	domestic visionce issues related to this criminal case. Since almost all communications
17	were done solely with only Garcia as she was the one to rotain and pay for brainers
18	services, leal simply was not involved in discussions regarding the case and had I had
19	independent counsel to discuss with would have been able to procosed to trial.
20	
21	I believe I am actually imposent as each vidin signal a purchase agreement to
22	purchase the proportions which clearly stated that the proporties workering sold "Subject
23	to liens and encumbrances and boliene that a trial would show my innocence.
24	
25	My plea was also entered without any meaningful representation. (See: Ground Two)
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	23. (b) GROUND TWO: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
:	Jason Veiner - Trial Coursel
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5	23. (b) SUPPORTING FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law):
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11	- Woiner did not disclose to the court the fact that this was a "package dea
12	deal" which should have resulted in a more thorough plea convass which
13	would have prevented the issues in Ground One.
14	- Veiner did not present the inisidiational issues relating to the fast
15	that contain proporties were located and solid in Florida with Nevada having
16	no juristiction for these sales.
17	- Weiner represented both co-defendants from the period of Docember 2016
18	through April 9th 2017 with one conflict of interest major in place at all
19	while the co-detendants were involved in several actual conflicts (See Grania)
20	- Weiner did not dispate or challenge a insufficient changing document which
21	mide my plea intendingly at entered. The Intermedian by which I was
22	changed does not got me on notice of the changes as it does not contain
23	each and every element of the crime changed or the facts showing how I
24	allegedly committed the acts. It is not clear and concise and therefore
25	a Defendant comet plea to charges which do not constitute a crime.
26	- Die to all of the above, coursel's assistance was chearly ineffective
27	and in violation of my constitutional rights to effective coursel.
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 1	WHEREFORE, Jack leal , prays that the court grant Patitiona
2	relief to which he may be entitled in this proceeding.
3	EXECUTED 21 Southern Desert Correctional Center, Indian Springs, NV Clark Out
1	Neveda .
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7	Signature of Petitioner
8	VERIFICATION
9	Under penalty of perjury, pursuant to N.R.S. 208.165 et seq., the undersigned declares that he is
10	the Petitioner named in the foregoing petition and knows the contents thereof; that the pleading is
11	true and correct of his own personal knowledge, except as to those matters based on information and
12	belief, and to those matters, he believes them to be true.
13	
.14	Signature of Petitioner
15	y signature of a continue.
16	11.4
17	Attorney for Petitioner
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### CERTFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING

	2 1, Jack Loal, hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on this 15
	day of May, 20), I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing,"
	Petition for With of Habeas Corpus
	by placing document in a sealed pre-postage paid envelope and deposited said envelope in the
(	United State Mail addressed to the following:
;	
. 8	- 100 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
. 9	
10	P.S. Box 208  Corson City, NV 89701  Lodian Springs; NV 89070
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12	
13	Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue
14	Las Vegas, NV 84101
15	·
16	
17	CC:FILE
18	le:
19	DATED: this \sigma day of May, 200.
20	
21	Jack Leal # 1183500
22	An Propria Personam Post Office Box 208,S.D.C.C.
23	Post Office Box 208,S.D.C.C. <u>Indian Springs, Nevada 89018</u> <u>IN FORMA PAUPERIS</u> :
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# AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 2398.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Mille of Document)
filed in District Court Case number <u>C-17-302664-2</u>
Does not contain the social security number of any person.
-OR-
Contains the social security number of a person as required by:
A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:
(State specific law)
-or-
B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant.
Signature 5-1-20 Date
Sack Leal Print Name
Petitioner Title

**Electronically Filed** 8/12/2020 2:02 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	ANS AARON D. FORD Attorney General MICHAEL J. BONGARD (Bar No. 007997) Senior Deputy Attorney General State of Nevada Office of the Attorney General 1539 Avenue F, Suite 2 Ely, NV 89301 (775)289-1632 (phone) (775)289-1653 (fax) MBongard@ag.nv.gov Attorneys for Respondents	Oten A.			
8	DISTRICT COURT				
9	CLARK COUNTY NEVADA				
10	JACK LEAL,	) Case No.: A-20-814369-W			
11	Petitioner,	Department XVII			
12	vs.				
13	JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN, SOUTHERN DESERT CORRECTIONAL CENTER,	}			
14	Respondents.				
15		)			
16	ANSWER TO POST-CONVICTION PETITION FOR WRIT OF				
17	HABE	EAS CORPUS			
18	Respondents, by and through counsel, A	aron D. Ford, Attorney General of The State of N			
10	and Michael J. Bongard, Senior Deputy Attorne	v General, hereby submit their answer to Petition			

Nevada, er Jack Leal's (Leal) Counseled and Pro Se Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in this matter.

Respondents base this answer upon the pleadings, the legal authorities, and the pleadings on file in this case.

#### PROCEDURAL HISTORY

#### Justice Court Proceedings, Las Vegas Township Justice Court1 I.

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On November 29, 2016, the State filed a criminal complaint charging Leal with one count of Racketeering, 12 counts of Theft in the Amount of \$3500 or More, Fraud or Deceit in the Course of

Case Number: A-20-814369-W

Respondents believe that all documents with the exception of the appellate briefing, are in the district court record. Respondents attach as exhibits the appellate briefing and the documents central to resolution of the claim in the petition.

28 | *Id.* at 1.

Enterprise or Occupation, and one count of Multiple Transactions Involving Fraud or Deceit in the Course of an Enterprise and Occupation. The State filed an amended complaint on December 27, 2016, containing the same charges.

On April 11, 2017, Leal unconditionally waived his preliminary hearing, which included a conflict of interest waiver.

#### II. District Court Proceedings, Eighth Judicial District Court Case Number C-17-322664-2

On April 18, 2017, the State filed a criminal information charging Leal with one count of Multiple Transactions Involving Fraud or Deceit in the Course of an Enterprise and Occupation. On April 20, 2017, the parties continued the matter until April 24, 2017.

On April 24, 2017, the parties filed a guilty plea agreement in open court and appeared for entry of plea. Leal executed a second conflict of interest waiver. Leal pled guilty to the charge in the information and agreed to jointly and severally pay restitution in the amount of \$757,420.

The parties appeared for sentencing on August 17, 2017. The Court sentenced Leal to a maximum term of one hundred eighty (180) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections, with a minimum term of seventy-two (72) months. The clerk filed the judgment of conviction on August 23, 2017.

Leal filed a notice of appeal on September 14, 2017.

On May 9, 2019, the Court entered an amended judgment of conviction which corrected the original judgment of conviction by ordering restitution jointly and severally.

#### III. Direct Appeal Proceedings, Nevada Court of Appeals

Leal filed his opening brief on February 1, 2018. (Exhibit 1). On appeal, Leal raised the following claims:

- A. Did the District Court err by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing or inquire into the nature and materiality of the alleged breach of the guilty plea agreement?
- B. Did the District Court err by denying Appellant's motion to withdraw counsel due to an unwaiveable concurrent conflict of interest?

The State filed the answer brief on March 20, 2018. (Exhibit 2). Leal filed the reply brief on April 20, 2018. (Exhibit 3).

On September 11, 2018, the Nevada Court of Appeals Affirmed Leal's conviction.

Leal filed a petition for review by the Nevada Supreme Court on October 2, 2018. (Exhibit 4). The Nevada Supreme Court denied rehearing on November 28, 2018. (Exhibit 5).

Remittitur issued December 24, 2018. (Exhibit 10).

#### State Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Eighth Judicial District Court, C-17-322664-2

On March 21, 2019, Leal filed his post-conviction state habeas corpus petition. In his petition, Leal raised the following claims:

- Mr. Leal's conviction and sentence are invalid under the 6th and A. 14th Federal Constitutional Amendment guarantees of Due Process and Equal Protection, and under the law of Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution because the original information failed to put the petitioner on notice of the charges;
- В. Mr. Leal's conviction and sentence are invalid under the 6th and 14th Federal Constitutional Amendment guarantees of Due Process and Equal Protection, and under the law of Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution because prior counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as is mandated by Strickland [v. Washington], 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
  - Petitioner's criminal counsel's assistance was ineffective, 1.) because prior counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as is mandated by Strickland, by failing to obtain a conflict waiver;
  - Petitioner's criminal counsel's assistance was ineffective, 2.) because prior counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as is mandated by Strickland, by coercing petitioner into entering a plea.

PWHC.

Respondent filed the answer on April 23, 2019. On May 7, 2019, counsel for the parties presented argument to the Court on the petition. The Court announced findings and denied the petition. The clerk filed the order denying the petition on June 19, 2020 and filed the notice of entry of order on June 21, 2019. Leal filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2019.

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#### V. State Habeas Corpus Appellate Proceedings, Nevada Court of Appeals

Leal filed his informal brief on December 30, 2019. On May 29, 2020, the Nevada Supreme Court transferred the case to the Nevada Court of Appeals for decision. As of the date of filing, that court has not issued an opinion.

#### VI. State Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Eight Judicial District Court Case A-20-814369-W

On April 28, 2020, Leal filed a counseled state habeas petition (counseled PWHC). In that petition, Leal raises three claims: (1) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present mitigating factors at sentencing, due to the difficulty of selling property to pay restitution, (2) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to correct errors in the pre-sentence report prior to sentencing, and (3) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to correct or explain errors in Leal's criminal history prior to sentencing.

On May 27, 2020, Leal filed a pro se habeas petition (Pro Se PWHC). In that petition Leal raises the following claims: (1) the guilty plea was involuntary, (2) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel (consisting of six subclaims), (3) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise a claim that petitioner never received a copy of his pre-sentence investigation report.

Respondent now files their response to the petition.

#### **ARGUMENT AND LAW**

#### I. Applicable Law

Nevada law governs state habeas corpus proceedings. *McConnell v. State*, 212 P.3d 307, 309 (Nev. 2009).

By statute, habeas corpus proceedings permit a person to challenge that his conviction or sentence violate the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of Nevada. NRS 34.724(1). To the extent they do not conflict with habeas corpus statutes, the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure apply to habeas corpus proceedings. NRS 34.780. Appointment of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings lies with the discretion of the court. NRS 34.750. A court determines the propriety and necessity of discovery or an evidentiary hearing. NRS 34.770.

A court may dismiss a petition if the petition is untimely or contains claims that could have been litigated in previous proceedings. NRS 34.810 and NRS 34.726

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#### II. Leal's Counseled and Pro Se Petitions are Subject to Dismissal

#### A. NRS 34.726

Both the counseled and amended petitions are untimely. Nevada habeas statutes require a petitioner file a petition challenging a judgment or sentence within 1 year of the date the Nevada Supreme Court files its remittitur. NRS 34.726(1). A petitioner may demonstrate good cause and prejudice to excuse an untimely filing. NRS 34.726(1)(a) and (b).

In this case, the Nevada Supreme Court's remittitur issued on December 24, 2018. (Exhibit 6). Leal filed the counseled petition on April 28, 2020 and the pro se petition on May 27, 2020. Therefore, both petitions are subject to dismissal because they are untimely.

Leal cannot argue the May 19, 2020 amended judgment of conviction provides good cause to excuse the untimely filing. The Nevada Supreme Court held that claims that do not address the clerical correction in an amended judgment could have been previously raised in a timely petition and are therefore procedurally barred. *Sullivan v. State*, 120 Nev. 537, 541-42, 96 P.3d 761, 764-65 (2004).

None of the claims in the counseled or pro se petition address the amendment (restitution to be paid jointly and severally, instead of Leal solely responsible for restitution) in the amended judgment of conviction. Therefore, absent a showing of some other cause to excuse his late filing, the Court must apply NRS 34.726 and dismiss Leal's counseled and pro se petitions. *State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Riker)*, 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005).

#### B. NRS 34.810(2)

In addition to the untimely filing of both the counseled and pro se petitions, both petitions are procedurally defaulted because the claims in both pleadings are either successive or could have been raised in Leal's first state habeas petition. A judge must dismiss a second or successive petition if the petition raises new or different claims and a court addressed the merits of the prior petition, or if the petition raises new or different grounds that could have been raised in a prior petition. NRS 34.810(2). A petitioner may demonstrate good cause and prejudice to excuse the default of the second or successive petition. NRS 34.810(3).

In both the counseled and pro se petition, Leal raises either claims that were previously raised in his first state habeas corpus petition, or the petitions raise claims that could have been raised in his first

state habeas petition or on direct appeal. Since both petitions are successive or an abuse of the writ because the claims are previously raised or should have been raised in the first petition, Respondent requests the Court dismiss both the counseled and pro se petitions pursuant to NRS 34.810(2). Application of the bar is mandatory. State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Riker), 121 Nev. at 231, 112 P.3d at 1074.

#### C. NRS 34.810(1)(a)

A petition or claim challenging a judgment of conviction entered pursuant to a plea agreement must be dismissed if the claim does not allege the petitioner entered an unknowing or involuntary plea. NRS 34.810(1)(a). The rule essentially codifies *Tollett v. Henderson*, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). The Nevada Supreme Court held "[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process." *Webb v. State*, 91 Nev. 469, 469, 538 P.2d 164, 165 (1975) (quoting *Tollett*). The Nevada Supreme Court held "Where the defendant has pleaded guilty, the only claims that may be raised thereafter are those involving the voluntariness of the plea itself and the effectiveness of counsel. *Kirksey v. State*, 112 Nev. 980, 999, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996), citing NRS 34.810 and *Warden v. Lyons*, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984), *cert denied*, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).

In the pro se petition, Leal raises several claims that do not challenge the validity of his plea. Those claims are: (1) Counsel was ineffective for failing to present the fact that some charges involved property located in Florida, (2) Counsel did not challenge alleged infirmities in the charging document, (3) appellate counsel failed to appeal a claim that petitioner did not receive a pre-sentence investigation report.

Should the Court find that Leal entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea, Respondents request the Court dismiss the three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel listed above pursuant to NRS 34.810(1)(a), because those claims do not allege that Leal entered an unknowing or intelligent plea.

#### III. Leal's Claims in the Counseled Petition

In his Counseled Petition, Leal raises three claims — all challenging deficiencies at sentencing. Counseled PWHC at 7. These claims, if addressed on the merits and found meritorious, only provide

relief in the form of a new sentencing hearing. All claims are conclusory and do not allege sufficient facts demonstrating cause or prejudice under *Strickland*.

When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Nevada Supreme Court has held:

A claim that counsel provided constitutionally inadequate representation is subject to the two-part test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. A court need not consider both prongs of the Strickland test if a defendant makes an insufficient showing on either prong. Id. at 697. "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact, subject to independent review." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 622, 28 P.3d 498, 508 (2001).

McConnell v. State, 212 P.3d 307, 313 (Nev. 2009).

Leal's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are meritless.

#### A. Leal's First Claim

In Ground One of the Counseled Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Leal alleges that trial counsel failed to present mitigation evidence in the form of Leal's inability to pay restitution. Counseled Petition at 7. Ground One alleges counsel failed to inform the Court of documents recorded on the Henderson property making the property difficult to sell.

The transcript at sentencing reflects the following: (1) a week before sentencing, Leal had the home transferred from a trust to his name (August 17, 2017 sentencing transcript at 4-5), (2) Leal then flew to Las Vegas and recorded a lien on the property. *Id.* at 5. The State noted that the property had two liens on it from Republic Garbage. *Id.* at 5.

Should the Court reach the merits of this claim, Respondent requests the Court find the claim meritless. First, Leal placed a lien on the property to have the sale proceeds go the Attorney General's Office. If this lien is the impairment making sale of the property difficult, Leal fails to explain how a lien placed on a property one week prior to sentencing impaired the sale of the property.

Second, the additional liens on the property were apparently due to Leal not paying bills, and not the fault of anyone but Leal.

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Finally, Leal's petition fails to explain what other information counsel should have provided to the Court in addition to the information Leal personally provided to the Court.

Ground One of the Counseled Petition is Meritless.

#### B. Leal's Second and Third Claims

In Grounds Two and Three, Leal alleges that trial counsel failed to correct the pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report prior to sentencing. Ground Two alleges no errors that counsel failed to correct. Counseled PWHC at 7. Ground Three alleges trial counsel failed to correct unspecified errors in Leal's criminal history and the nature of the instant offense.

Grounds Two and Three of the counseled petition present no specific addressing the portions of the PSI that trial counsel failed to correct. Leal present no evidence the trial court relied on erroneous information when pronouncing sentence. The trial court based its sentence on the fact that the defendants had time to sell the property and victimized numerous people of over three quarters of a million dollars. August 17, 2017 sentencing transcript, at 21-22.

Leal's Ground Two and Ground Three claims fail to satisfy either the deficient conduct or the prejudice prong of Strickland. Should the Court reach the merits of Grounds Two and Three of the Counseled Petition, Respondent requests the Court find the claims meritless.

#### IV. Leal's Claims in the Pro Se Petition

#### A. Ground One

In Ground One of the Pro Se Petition, Leal alleges that his plea was unknowing and unintelligent because trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest due to the fact that counsel represented both parties. Pro Se PWHC at 7.

This Court already considered and rejected this claim, which Leal raised in his first state habeas corpus petition.<sup>2</sup> The Court found two waivers of conflict from Leal; the first entered in justice court, the second entered in district court prior to his entry of plea.<sup>3</sup> The Nevada Court of Appeals found that Leal waived the conflict. Leal v. State, NVCA Case Number 74050, 2018 WL 4408758 (Order of Affirmance, Sept. 11, 2018). This Court also found trial counsel was not ineffective when denying

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Case No. C-17-322664-1, PWHC, filed March 21, 2019, pp 9-10. <sup>3</sup> Order denying petition, C-17-322664-1, filed June 19, 2019, p. 3.

Leal's first habeas petition's allegation that trial counsel was ineffective because of a direct conflict of interest due to representation of multiple defendants.

Respondents request the Court find Ground 1 of the Pro Se Petition barred by the law of the case. See, Hsu v. County of Clark, 123 Nev. 625, 629-30, 173 P.3d 724, 728 (2007).

#### **B.** Ground Two

In Ground Two of his petition, Leal alleges several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Pro Se PWHC, at 8. The claims allege errors at sentencing (subparts 1 and 5), that if meritorious, only provide relief in the form of a new sentencing hearing.

#### 1.) Trial counsel failed to disclose a civil forfeiture case

In the first part of his Ground Two claim, Leal alleges trial counsel failed to disclose a civil forfeiture case which adversely affected Leal's ability to pay restitution. Pro Se PWHC at 8.

At sentencing, Leal explained to the Court that he was unable to pay restitution because of a non-contact order between Leal and Garcia, and how that negatively impacted Leal's ability to sell a home to provide restitution to the victims. August 17, 2017 sentencing transcript, at pp. 4-8. That transcript reflects the fact that during the week before sentencing, Leal pushed through a transfer of property in order to attempt to sell the property and placed a lien on the property to have the sale proceeds go to the Attorney General's Office. *Id.* 

Leal's petition fails to explain what else trial counsel should have told the trial court at sentencing. Pro Se PWHC at 8. Leal fails to explain how he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged failures.

Respondent requests that if the Court reaches the merits of this portion of Ground Two of the Pro Se Petition, that the Court find the claim meritless and deny relief.

#### 2.) Trial counsel failed to notify the Court of a joint plea

Leal next alleges that trial counsel failed to notify the Court of the fact that Leal and his codefendant entered a joint plea. However, the record belies this claim. The plea agreement in C-17-322664 clearly stated on page two that Leal and his codefendant were jointly and severally liable for restitution in this matter. Second, the fact that Leal executed a waiver of conflict notified the Court that

counsel also represented a co-defendant in this matter. Third, the record in this case reflects that the co-defendant entered her plea on the same day as Leal. See, State v. Jessica Garcia, C-17-322664-3.

Finally, in his petition Leal alleges that because of the "package deal" trial counsel should have notified the Court in order for the Court to conduct a more thorough plea canvass. Pro Se PWHC at 8. However, Leal fails to state what additional steps the Court should have taken in order to conduct the plea canvass. Leal bears the burden of proving counsel's conduct was deficient and he suffered prejudice. By failing to state the additional steps that should have been taken, Leal fails to satisfy his burden of demonstrating deficient conduct under Strickland. Leal's petition also alleges no prejudice. Respondent requests the Court find this portion of Leal's Ground Two claim meritless.

#### 3.) Counsel failed to present the fact that certain properties were located in Florida

Leal alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim that some of the properties involved in this case were located in Florida. Pro Se PWHC at 8. However, Leal ignores the fact that NRS 171.020 exposes Leal to criminal liability for crimes that occur in other states if Leal committed an act in furtherance of the crime in the State of Nevada. The fact that some properties are located outside Nevada is irrelevant if Leal took steps in Nevada with the intent to commit a crime.

In his petition, Leal alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim some property was located in Florida. Pro Se PWHC at 8. Leal's petition does not allege none of the acts constituting the crime did not occur in Nevada. *Id.* Because Leal's petition does not allege a defect in the prosecution, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the charges based upon the fact that some property he sold was located in Florida.

Respondent requests the Court find that Leal failed to demonstrate deficient conduct or prejudice and deny relief on this part of his Ground Two claim.

#### 4.) Counsel represented both co-defendant without a waiver of conflict in place

Leal next alleges trial counsel represented both co-defendants between December 2016 and April 2017 without a waiver of conflict. Pre Se PWHC at 8. To the extent that this claim differs from Leal's Ground One claim, he fails to establish either cause or prejudice under *Strickland*.

The Nevada Supreme Court held, "[W]hen a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives [his] right to conflict-free representation, [he] also waives [his] right to seek a mistrial arising

out of such conflicted representation. Further, the waiver is binding on the defendant throughout the trial, on appeal, and in habeas proceedings." Ryan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 419, 429, 168 P.3d 703, 710 (2007), citing Gomez v. Ahitow, 29 F.3d 1128, 1135-36 (7th Cir. 1994) (a knowing intelligent wavier of conflict precludes claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the conflict).

In this portion of Ground Two, assuming Leal can bring the claim, he fails to allege facts that he was prejudiced by the absence of a waiver of conflict during the time-period between December 2016 and April 2017. In order to demonstrate "actual prejudice" under Strickland, a petitioner must show an error worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, not that the deficient conduct created a possibility of prejudice. *State v. Eight Judicial Dist. Court (Riker)*, 121 Nev. at 232, 112 P.3d at 1075.

Leal's successive petition pleads no facts alleging prejudice under *Strickland*. Failing to demonstrate prejudice, Respondent requests the Court deny this portion of Ground Two, should the Court reach the merits of the petition.

#### 5.) Counsel failed to challenge alleged deficiencies in the charging document

In the last subclaim in Ground Two, Leal alleges trial counsel failed to challenge alleged defects in the information. Pro Se PWHC at 8. Leal alleges the information does not put him on notice of the charges and does not contain the facts supporting the charges.

The information accused Leal of violating NRS 205.377 [Effective through June 30, 2020]. That statute contains the following elements:

- 1. A person shall not, in the course of an enterprise or occupation, knowingly and with the intent to defraud, engage in an act, practice or course of business or employ a device, scheme or artifice which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a person by means of a false representation or omission of a material fact that:
- (a) The person knows to be false or omitted;
- (b) The person intends another to rely on; and
- (c) Results in a loss to any person who relied on the false representation or omission,
- →in at least two transactions that have the same or similar pattern, intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents within 4 years and in which the aggregate loss or intended loss is more than \$650.

NRS 205.377(1) [Effective through June 30, 2020].

The information alleges how Leal and his co-defendant committed the crime:

On or about March 1, 2015 through March 31, 2016, in and through the course of a real estate enterprise known at PARCELNOMICS, LLC (d/b/a INVESTMENT DEALS), Defendants knowingly and with the intent to defraud, obtained thousands of dollars from [names of 11 victims] by means of knowingly and falsely representing to said individuals that the titles to properties being sold to them by the defendants were not encumbered by liens or other security interests, intending that said individuals rely on said misrepresentations, and resulting in a loss of more than \$650.00.

Information at 2.

Leal's successive petition fails to allege which elements the information failed to contain, or what facts the State failed to allege that failed to provide notice of the charges. Leal's petition fails to explain what challenges trial counsel failed to make. Since Leal's Pro Se Petition fails to allege facts supporting claims of deficient conduct or prejudice, Respondent requests the Court find the claim meritless should the Court reach the merits of the claim.

#### C. Ground Three

In Ground Three of his petition, Leal alleges appellate counsel failed to challenge the fact that Leal never received a copy of the pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report in his case. Pro Se PWHC at 9. In the petition, Leal points out that the offense date was only over a course of 90 days, rather than one year. *Id.* Leal also alleges he does not understand the information in the offense synopsis. *Id.* 

Leal contends that the errors in the PSI will adversely affect his appearing before the parole board. Pro Se PWHC at 9. However, Leal fails to explain how a discrepancy in the date of offense or the offense synopsis will adversely affect him. Leal's petition also fails to explain what the correct offense date should be, and how the offense synopsis should be changed. *Id*.

Leal's Ground Three claim alleges only conclusory allegations that fail to demonstrate deficient conduct or prejudice under Strickland. Leal fails to allege material errors in the PSI (incorrect number of prior felonies or prior offenses that he failed to commit).

Respondent requests the Court deny Leal's conclusory Ground Three claim.

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#### CONCLUSION

The relevant Nevada authority compels dismissal of Leal's Counseled and Pro Se Petitions for writ of habeas corpus because the petitions are untimely and successive. Should the Court reach the merits of the claims in those pleadings, they are meritless.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12<sup>th</sup> day of August 2020.

AARON D. FORD Attorney General

By:

/s/ Michael Bongard
MICHAEL J. BONGARD
Senior Deputy Attorney General
Nevada Bar No. 007997
mbongard@ag.nv.gov
Post-Conviction Division
1539 Avenue F, Suite 2
Ely, Nevada 89301

#### AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that this pleading filed in the Eighth Judicial District Court does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 12th day of August 2020.

AARON D. FORD Attorney General

By: /s/ Michael Bongard
MICHAEL J. BONGARD
Senior Deputy Attorney General
Nevada Bar No. 007997
mbongard@ag.nv.gov
Post-Conviction Division
1539 Avenue F, Suite 2
Ely, Nevada 89301

#### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JACK LEAL,
Appellant,
vs.
JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN,
SOUTHERN DESERT CORRECTIONAL
CENTER,
Respondent.

No. 79243-COA

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BY CONTINUEN

#### ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Jack Leal appeals from an order of the district court denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michael Villani, Judge.

Leal argues the district court erred by denying his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in his March 21, 2019, petition. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial-level counsel sufficient to invalidate a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice resulted in that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). Both components of the inquiry must be shown. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). To warrant an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must raise claims supported by specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle him to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

District Of France

20-37180

First, Leal claimed his counsel was ineffective because counsel also represented Leal's codefendant and, thus, had a conflict of interest. On direct appeal this court concluded Leal "waived any current or potential conflicts of interest by signing two different waivers regarding actual and potential conflicts of interest." Leal v. State, Docket No. 74050-COA (Order of Affirmance, September 11, 2018). Because he waived potential conflicts of interest stemming from counsel's representation of Leal's codefendant, Leal's claim was without merit. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Second, Leal claimed his counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure his guilty plea was voluntarily entered. Leal contended his codefendant used threats and physical force to coerce him into entering a guilty plea and counsel was aware of those issues when Leal entered his guilty plea. In the written plea agreement, which Leal acknowledged having read and understood, Leal asserted that he entered his plea voluntarily and did not act under duress or coercion. At the plea canvass, Leal acknowledged that no one ferced him to plead guilty and he was acting of his own free will. In light of the written plea agreement and the plea canvass, Leal failed to demonstrate his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Leal also failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability he would have refused to plead guilty and would

To the extent Leal claims on appeal that the waiver itself was involuntary, he did not argue this point below and we decline to consider it on appeal in the first instance. *McNelton v. State*, 115 Nev. 396, 416, 990 P.2d 1263, 1276 (1999).

have insisted on proceeding to trial had counsel performed different actions regarding entry of the guilty plea. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing.<sup>2</sup>

Third, Leal appeared to claim his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the information did not provide him with proper notice of the allegations against him. Leal contended that, as a result of the defective information, he did not enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. The record demonstrates that Leal received proper notice of the allegations against him, because the information provided a plain and concise statement of the essential facts as well as a citation to the statutes discussing the crime of multiple transactions involving fraud or deceit in the course of an enterprise or occupation. See NRS 173.075(1); NRS 205.377(1). Leal did not demonstrate objectively reasonable counsel would have challenged the information on that basis. Leal also failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability he would have refused to plead guilty and would have insisted on proceeding to trial had counsel argued that the information was deficient. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, Leal claimed the information did not provide him with proper notice of the allegations against him. However, this claim was not

To the extent Leal also asserted he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea due to the alleged coercion, he failed to demonstrate withdrawal of his guilty plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. See NRS 176.165.

To the extent Leal also asserted he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea due to the allegedly improper notice of the charges against him, he failed to demonstrate withdrawal of his guilty plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. See NRS 176.165.

based on an allegation that Leal's plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that his plea was entered without the effective assistance of counsel, and therefore, this claim was not appropriately raised in Leal's petition. See NRS 34.810(1)(a). Therefore, the district court properly concluded Leal was not entitled to relief based upon this claim. Accordingly, we


ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Gibbons C.J

Tao J.

Bulla J.

ce: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge Jack Leal Attorney General/Carson City Attorney General/Ely Eighth District Court Clerk



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`	MOT JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ.	Deliner.				
2	Nevada Bar No. 11223	,				
3	LAW OFFICE OF JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, Ltd. 170 S. Green Valley Parkway #300					
4	Henderson, Nevada 89012 Phone: (702) 979-9941					
5	Email: jean.schwartzer@gmail.com Counsel for Defendant					
6	; ·					
7	IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE					
8	STATE OF NEVADA FOR TH	E COUNTY OF CLARK				
9	) Ca	se No.: C-17-322644-2				
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	ept No.: XVII				
	Plaintiff,					
11	vs.					
12	JACK LEAL,					
13	Defendant.					
14	MOTION TO MODIFY SENTENCE					
15	COMES NOW, Defendant, JACK LEAI	, by and through his attorney, JEAN J.				
16						
17		apers and pleadings on file herein, the attached				
18	•					
19						
20						
21	- <del>-</del>					
22	Respectfully su	bmitted,				
23	/s/ Jean J. Sch	wartzer				
24	JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ.					
25	Nevada Bar No. 11223 LAW OFFICE OF JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, Ltd.					
	170 S. Green Valley Parkway #300					
26	(702) 979-9941	/aua 09012				
27	Couliser for De	fendant				
28						

1	NOTICE OF MOTION					
2	TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES;					
3	TO: THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent; and					
4	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing MOTION TO					
5	MODIFY SENTENCE, on for hearing before the Eighth Judicial District Court, Dept. XVII on the					
6	day of, 2020 ata.m., or as soon thereafter as may be heard.					
7	DATED this 28th day of October, 2020.					
8						
9						
10	<u>/s/ Jean J. Schwartzer</u> JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ.					
11	Nevada Bar No. 11223					
12	LAW OFFICE OF JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, Ltd. 170 S. Green Valley Parkway #300					
13	Henderson, Nevada 89012					
14	(702) 979-9941 Counsel for Defendant					
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### **STATEMENT OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

On November 29, 2016, the State charged Jack Leal ("Leal") via a criminal complaint with the following: Count 1 – Racketeering, (Felony – (NRS 207.400(1)(c)); Counts 2 through 13 – Theft in the Amount of \$3500 or More (Felony – (NRS 205.0832; 205A.030); and Count 14 – Multiple Transactions Involving Fraud or Deceit in Course of Enterprise or Occupation (Felony – (NRS 205.377). He was charged with his co-defendant, Jessica Garcia ("Garcia"), who is his partner and mother of Leal's children.

These charges stemmed from the sale of various properties by Leal and/or Garcia to buyers without disclosing that the homes were encumbered with mortgages. They did not tell the buyers the homes were *not* encumbered but they also did not disclose the encumbrances.

As a results of these acts and prior to the charges being filed, on September 30, 2016, the Attorney General filed a Complaint for Forfeiture on two bank accounts in the name of Parcelnomics, LLC., a corporation owner by Leal and Garcia, and the real property located at 1024 Santa Helena Avenue, Henderson Nevada 89002. (See Complaint for Forfeiture, attached hereto as Exhibit 1). On this same day, the Attorney General also filed a Notice of Lis Pendens on the property. (See Notice of Lis Pendens, attached hereto as Exhibit 2).

Pursuant to negotiations, on April 18, 2017 the State filed an Information reducing the charges against Leal to one count of Multiple Transactions Involving Fraud or Deceit in Court of Enterprise or Occupation (NRS 205.377).

On April 24, 2017, Leal and Garcia entered into almost identical Guilty Plea Agreements ("GPA"). Pursuant to the GPA, Leal pleaded guilty to the charge contained in the Information.

1 Additionally, he agreed to be jointly and severally liable with Garcia for the restitution to the victims in the amount of \$757,420. Leal also agreed to forfeit \$157,105.17, which was seized in relation to the instant case, with said money to be applied to the restitution requirement leaving an outstanding balance of \$600,314.83. Finally, Leal agreed to execute and file a lien in favor of the State of Nevada, Office of Attorney General, in the amount of \$600,314.83 against the home located at 1024 Santa Helena Avenue, Henderson Nevada 89002. Also pursuant to the GPA, if the restitution, which was to come from the sale of the aforementioned home, was paid prior to their sentencing date, the Attorney General agreed to not oppose the imposition of a term of probation not to exceed five years, with a suspended sentence of 36-90 months term of imprisonment. 1

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The home was put on the market and Leal attempted to sell the property. However, due to the lis pendens recorded on the property, it became very difficult to sell the home. Additionally, due to the actions of Garcia, against whom Leal had multiple restraining orders at the time, the sale of the home was further delayed. Due to Garcia expending zero effort in selling the property, Leal requested that the trustee of the trust that owned the property (Leal and Garcia were beneficiaries) convey the property to Leal so that he could sell it without the burden of having Garcia sign off on every document. The property was finally quit claim deeded to him on July 17, 2017. (See Quit Claim Deed, attached hereto as Exhibit 5). Leal even lowered the price of the home to comply so as to comply with the GPA. Unfortunately, despite his best efforts, he was unable to sell the property prior to their scheduled sentencing date.

On August 17, 2017, Leal was sentenced to a minimum of seventy-two (72) months and a maximum of one hundred eighty (180) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); with

<sup>1</sup> Garcia's GPA differed from Leal's to the extent that if the restitution was paid prior to sentencing, 27 she received probation and was honorably discharged, she would be permitted to withdraw her plea of guilty to the charge contained in the information and enter a plea of guilty to the crime of Conspiracy 28 to Commit Theft (Gross Misdemeanor – NRS 199.480; 205.0832). (See GPA of Jack Leal, attached

1 Izero (0) days credit for time served. Restitution in the amount of \$757,420.00 to the victims (jointly and severally with Garcia) was also ordered. Garcia did not appear for sentencing and a bench warrant was issued for her arrest.

Leal, through his attorney, now files the instant Motion to Modify Sentence.

#### ARGUMENT

#### T. LEAL WAS SENTENCED BASED UPON MATERIALLY UNTRUE ASSUMPTIONS OR MISTAKES OF FACT ABOUT HIS CRIMINAL HISTORY

In general, a district court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence once the defendant has started serving it. Passanisi v. State, 108 Nev. 318, 322, 831 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1992). However, a district court does have inherent authority to correct, vacate or modify a sentence where the defendant can demonstrate the sentence violates Due Process because it is based on a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact that has worked to the defendant's extreme detriment. Edwards v. State, 112 Nev. 704, 707, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996); see also <u>Passanisi</u>, 108 Nev. at 322. Not every mistake or error during sentencing gives rise to a Due Process violation. State v. District Court, 100 Nev. 90, 97, 677 P.2d 1044, 1048 (1984). The Nevada Supreme Court has emphasized that a "motion to modify a sentence is limited in scope to sentences based on mistaken assumptions about a defendant's criminal record which work to the extreme detriment of the defendant." Edwards, 112 Nev. at 708.

#### A. Charges on September 17, 2007

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The PSI states that Leal was charged on September 17, 2007 for Forgery in Berwyn, Illinois, with the disposition being Theft by Deception and a sentence of twenty-four (24) months probation. (See PSI at page 3). The PSI states that also on that same day Leal was charged with an additional two counts of Theft by Deception and Possession of Fraudulent Identification Card in Lyons, Illinois

<sup>28</sup> hereto as Exhibit 3; <u>see also</u> GPA of Jessica Garcia, attached hereto as Exhibit 4.)

1 with a disposition of Theft by Deception and a sentence of twenty-four (24) months probation. (See Id.). These entries stem from the same act that was committed while crossing district lines, all charges were dealt together to <u>ONE</u> count of Theft by Deception and Leal only served <u>ONE</u> term of 24 months on probation. Additionally, he was honorably discharged from probation, which is not noted in his PSI.

Additionally, at Leal's sentencing, the Attorney General incorrectly argued that Leal had been convicted of two felonies: Theft by Deception and Possession of Fraudulent ID. (See Transcript of Sentencing August 17, 2017 at 3, attached hereto as Exhibit 6). This is not true. He has been convicted one felony: Theft by Deception.

#### В. Misdemeanor Charges

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The PSI states that Leal was convicted in Illinois of the misdemeanor offenses of, inter alia, Resist Peace Office [sic] in 2003 for which he received community service, and Resist Peace Officer in 2006, for which he received ten days in jail. (See PSI at page 4). These convictions are misleading. Leal was cited for a driving with a suspended license and in no way physically resisted a Resist Peace Office [sic].

#### C. Additional Charges in Illinois for Which No Disposition it Noted

The PSI states that Leal was cited in 2003 and 2009 for Retail Theft, Resist Peace Officer on four occasions, Financial Identification Theft, Forgery, and Theft by Deception. (See PSI at page 4). The additional four charges of Resist Peace Officer is duplicative and incorrect. Leal was not arrested or cited for this crime in addition to the other Resist Police Officer charges (also incorrect), discussed supra in section B of the instant Motion.

The charges of Financial Identification Theft, Forgery and Theft by Deception are all duplicative of the September 17, 2007 charges. It is important t note that the date for these duplicative

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1 Icharges appears to be 2009, which is the year Leal was discharged from probation on the same 2007 charges. The Illinois equivalent of parole and probation may enter charges differently than Nevada Parole and Probation does and Illinois may have noted the same charges in 2009 at the time Leal was honorably discharged from probation. This entry appears to have shown up as a separate set of charges, which is incorrect.

It should be noted that the Retail Theft charge was a **misdemeanor** charge.

In summary, it incorrectly appeared at sentencing that Leal had been charged with ten different crimes (seven felonies, three non-traffic misdemeanors); convicted of four crimes (two felonies and three non-traffic misdemeanors): and served two probation periods of two years and ten days in jail, all prior to the instant offense.

The reality is that Leal has been charged with a total of **FOUR** crimes felonies and one nontraffic misdemeanor), has been convicted of **ONE** non-violent felony (Theft by Deception) and **TWO** non-traffic misdemeanors; and has served **ONE** period of probation prior to the instant offense and ten days in jail.

Additionally, it should be noted that Leal viewed his PSI for the first time a year after he was sentenced. (See Written Correspondence between Jack Leal and Parole and Probation Regarding PSI, attached hereto as Exhibit 7).

It was through no fault of the Court that it believed Leal had a very checkered past at the time of sentencing. The Court received incorrect information regarding Leal's criminal history, which was used to determine Leal's sentence. Therefore, Leal's sentence was based on mistaken assumptions about his criminal record which worked to his extreme detriment. Therefore, Leal requests that this Court resentence him based upon the correct information regarding his criminal history. Edwards, 112 Nev. at 708.

### II. LEAL'S CO-DEFENDANT BENEFITTED FROM ABSCONDING AND FROM LEAL'S SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO PAY RESTITUTION

Leal's co-defendant, Garcia, received a benefit from absconding and failing to appear at her and Leal's initial sentencing. Leal appeared as ordered for his sentencing on August 17, 2017. Due to the fact that the home had not been sold and the restitution not paid, the State argued for sixty (60) to one hundred eighty (180) months. Leal was sentenced as such.

Garcia, on the other hand, absconded to Florida and failed to appear for sentencing. She was eventually apprehended in Florida and extradited to Las Vegas, Nevada. Her sentencing was continued several times as her attorney represented to the Court that she was in the process of selling properties in Florida so as to pay towards the restitution. (See March 29, 2018 Minutes, attached hereto as Exhibit 8). These Florida properties did not belong to Garcia. Instead, they belonged to Leal who, from prison, was working with his Power of Attorney to sell the properties so as to contribute funds to the ordered restitution.

On April 24, 2018, Garcia represented to this Court that she was in the process of signing documents to sell the home. (See April 24, 2018 Minutes, attached hereto as Exhibit 9). Given the fact that she was no longer the owner of the home and had not been for almost a year at his point, this appears to be a misrepresentation.

Eventually, the Court denied any further requests for continuances and sentenced Garcia on April 23, 2019. (See April 23, 2019 Minutes, attached hereto as Exhibit 10). She received the same sentence Leal did. (See Id.). However, on May 6, 2019, Garcia filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence pursuant to EDCR 3.20, which allows a defendant to request reconsideration within fifteen (15) days of sentencing. (See Motion for Reconsideration, attached hereto as Exhibit 11). In her Motion, Garcia claimed that the sale of the property was going to close on May 9, 2019 and that she had "worked hard to push for the closing to take place" on the property. (See Id. at 3). At this point,

Garcia had not owned the property in almost two years. At the time the property was sold, it was owned solely by Leal and it was he who effectuated the sale and ultimate fulfillment of their restitution obligation, not Garcia. It appears as though the Court was not made aware of these facts. Ultimately this Court granted Garcia's Motion and reduced her sentence to forty-eight (48) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections. (See July 9, 2019 Minutes, attached hereto as Exhibit 12).

Leal could not file such a motion to request a reduction in his sentence for selling the home and paying restitution to the victims because he actually appeared at the scheduled sentencing hearing, unlike Garcia. As a result, almost two years had passed between his sentencing date and the day of the sale of the house, the event that would have warranted a reduction occurred, making a Motion to Reconsider Sentence untimely pursuant to EDCR 3.20. It should also be noted that Garcia picked up three new charges prior to her sentencing date whereas Leal did not pick up any new charges. (See Exhibit 8).

In short, Garcia benefited from absconding and from Leal's efforts from prison to pay down the restitution, yet claimed his efforts as her own. She was not held accountable for absconding or picking up new charges. This is in stark contrast to Leal, who was punished for appearing at his sentencing hearing with and received no benefit for his efforts devoted to selling the home *from prison* and paying the restitution. In the spirit of fairness and justice, Leal asks that the court consider this discrepancy when ruling on the instant Motion to Modify, which is based upon a materially untrue assumption and mistake of fact about his criminal history that has worked to his extreme detriment and reduce his sentence.

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1	<u>CONCLUSION</u>	1
2	Based upon the foregoing, JACK LEAL respectfully requests that the Court vacate his sentence	
3	and schedule a new sentencing hearing so that he may be sentenced based upon correct information	
4	regarding his criminal history.	
5		
6	DATED this 28 <sup>th</sup> day of October, 2020.	
7	D CH 1 In I	
8	Respectfully submitted,	
9	/s/ Jean J. Schwartzer	
10	JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11223	
11	LAW OFFICE OF JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, Ltd.	
12	170 S. Green Valley Parkway #300 Henderson, Nevada 89012	
13	(702) 979-9941 Counsel for Defendant	
14	Counsel for Defendant	
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1 **OPPM** AARON D. FORD Attorney General Michael C. Kovac (Bar No. 11177) 2 3 Chief Deputy Attorney General State of Nevada 4 Office of the Attorney General 555 E. Washington Ave., Ste. 3900 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101-1068 P: (702) 486-3420 6 F: (702) 486-0660 mkovac@ag.nv.gov 7 Attorneys for the State of Nevada

DISTRICT COURT

#### **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

STATE OF NEVADA.

Case No.: C-17-322664-2

Plaintiff,

Dept. No.: 17

JACK LEAL,

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Defendant.

v.

### STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MODIFY SENTENCE

AARON D. FORD, Attorney General for the State of Nevada, through Chief Deputy Attorney General, Michael C. Kovac, hereby submits the State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Modify Sentence. This opposition is made and based upon the pleadings on file, the following memorandum of points and authorities, and any oral arguments the Court may allow.

Dated this 3rd day of November, 2020.

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SUBMITTED BY:

AARON D. FORD Attorney General

By: /s/ Michael C. Kovac

MICHAEL C. KOVAC (Bar No. 11177)

Chief Deputy Attorney General

Page 1 of 9

Case Number: C-17-322664-2

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#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### FACTS AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 30, 2016, the State filed in the Eighth Judicial District Court a complaint for forfeiture against, *inter alia*, property located at 1024 Santa Helena Avenue, Henderson, NV 89002 (case number A-16-744347-C). The request for forfeiture was based on the fact that the home constituted the proceeds – or replacement of the proceeds – of fraudulent real estate transactions.

On November 29, 2016, the State initiated the present, related criminal proceedings by filing a criminal complaint in the Las Vegas Township Justice Court (case number 16F19220ABC). The complaint for forfeiture and the criminal complaint were both based on the same fraudulent real estate transactions. Thus, under NRS 179.1173(2), the forfeiture proceedings were automatically stayed. On April 11, 2017, the criminal case was bound over to District Court.

On April 24, 2017, Defendant JACK LEAL and his codefendant/estranged wife, JESSICA GARCIA, pled guilty to the charge of Multiple Transactions Involving Fraud or Deceit in the Course of an Enterprise or Occupation, a category B felony, in violation of NRS 205.377, and a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed 20 years. The charges stem from LEAL and GARCIA selling various parcels of real estate to various victims on the false representation that said parcels were not subject to any security interests. LEAL and GARCIA fleeced their victims of \$757,420.

At that same time, the plea was being entered, and while being represented by attorney Jason Weiner, LEAL and GARCIA expressly and effectively waived any potential conflict of interest Weiner may have in his representation of them both.

The terms of the guilty plea agreement provided, inter alia, that:

- 6. Should I, JACK LEAL, pay restitution in full at or before the time I am sentenced in the present case, the State will not oppose the imposition of a term of probation not to exceed a term of five years, with a suspended 36- to-90 month term of imprisonment;
- 7. Should I, JACK LEAL, fail to pay restitution in full at or before the time I am sentenced in the present case, the State will retain the right to argue for the imposition of a term of imprisonment.

Immediately following the entry of plea, the undersigned deputy met with Weiner, LEAL, and GARCIA in the hallway outside of the courtroom where the plea was entered. At that time, the

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undersigned deputy stressed the importance of quickly doing what needed to be done in order to get the restitution paid prior to sentencing — with special attention being paid to the sale of a home owned by LEAL and GARCIA (through a trust) that would likely satisfy the restitution requirement (the same home that is the subject of the above-mentioned forfeiture proceedings). As part of the guilty plea agreements, LEAL and GARCIA agreed to "execute and file in the Clark County Recorder's Office a lien agreement and lien in favor of the State of Nevada, Office of the Attorney General, in the amount of \$600,314.83 against the home located at 1024 Santa Helena Avenue, Henderson, Nevada 89002, assessor parcel number 179-33-710-056, legally described as MISSION HILLS EST AMD PLAT BOOK 17 PAGE 12, LOT 223 & LOT 223A, with the proceeds of the sale of said home to be applied to my restitution requirements," in order to provide the State with assurances that any proceeds from the sale would, in fact, be applied toward the restitution obligations of LEAL and GARCIA.

Nearly four months passed, and the undersigned Deputy heard nothing from LEAL, GARCIA, or Weiner until approximately one week prior to sentencing, at which point Weiner requested a continuance of the sentencing hearing so that his clients could sell the home at 1024 Santa Helena Avenue and pay restitution with the proceeds. The State rejected the request, noting that LEAL and GARCIA failed to even execute the lien required under the terms of their GPAs, let alone make any legitimate effort to sell the home.

Weiner made vague statements about unidentified issues holding up the sale. The undersigned Deputy informed Weiner that he was well aware of the issues his clients were having, including the following:

- LEAL had no intention of complying with the terms of the guilty plea agreement and made no legitimate effort to do so;
- In March of 2017, GARCIA was arrested in Florida on felony heroin and misdemeanor battery charges (In July of 2017, GARCIA entered a nolo contendre plea to the heroin charge, and the adjudication was withheld);
- In June of 2017, GARCIA entered a guilty plea for another misdemeanor battery charge in a separate Florida case; and

4. Soon after that, GARCIA, in yet another Florida case, was convicted on charges of battery and "contempt of court violate injunction protection domestic vio."

On or about August 16, 2017 – the day before the sentencing hearing – Weiner informed the undersigned deputy that LEAL had (finally) filed the lien required under the terms of the GPA. While there is no reason to doubt that Weiner sincerely believed that to be true, it was actually another of LEAL's lies. In reality, according to a Deputy District Attorney representing the Recorder's Office (who called the undersigned deputy the day of, or day after, LEAL's sentencing), the day prior to sentencing, LEAL attempted to file the lien; however, he did not have all of the necessary documentation, and an employee of the Recorder's Office informed him that the lien filing was suspended. LEAL informed that same employee that he would not be correcting the filing because he was returning to Florida the following day.

On August 17, 2017, LEAL appeared for his sentencing hearing. At that hearing, LEAL proved himself to be a conman through and through. First, LEAL lied to this Court and stated that the property at 1024 Santa Helena Avenue was free of any liens (the exact type of misrepresentation that landed him in this mess in the first place). *Defense Exhibit 6*, at 5:11-5:12. Second, LEAL *twice* lied to this Court and stated that he properly filed a lien against that property and in favor of the State, as required by the terms of the plea agreement. *Id.* at 4:10, 5:5-5:6. As explained above, at the time LEAL made that false statement to this Court, he was well aware that his attempted filing (which took place one day prior to sentencing) was suspended.

During the sentencing, there was little discussion of LEAL's prior convictions. After the State noted the prior Illinois convictions listed in LEAL's PSI, the following exchange took place between LEAL, LEAL's attorney at the time (Jason Weiner), the Court, and the undersigned deputy:

THE COURT: How about the two prior fraud cases?

MR. WEINER: I do not believe those involved -

THE COURT: No, I want to know his past -

MR. WEINER: -- real -

THE COURT: -- record, what are those about?

MR. WEINER: I think those were how many years ago?

[Colloquy between Counsel and Defendant]

MR. WEINER: Yeah, I think it was just a theft. That's what I thought.

[Colloquy between Counsel and Defendant]

THE COURT: Well, one was forgery pled to a theft. One was theft by deception which sounds like what we have here and he pled to theft by deception and he got 20-

MR. WEINER: Right, that the one in 2007, Your Honor. They're actually from the same case. That's why the dates are the same.

THE COURT: It was a different - I mean, --

MR. WEINER: The 9/17 of 2007, the Court looked at the two convictions. They're both from the same –

THE DEFENDANT: Incident.

MR. WEINER: -- incident.

THE COURT: State, do you know anything about the facts of those cases?

MR. KOVAC: I don't know the facts. I just see that there's two separate cases listed, one with one felony, one with two felonies.

*Id.* at 10:13-11:9.

The State argued for a sentence of 60 to 180 months in prison. This Court, focusing on LEAL's conduct in the present case (as opposed to his criminal history), sentenced LEAL to a 72- to 180-month term of imprisonment. *Id.* at 21:12-21:16. A day after the sentencing, the Recorder's Office accepted documentation from the undersigned Deputy and lifted the suspension on the lien required under the terms of LEAL's GPA.<sup>1</sup>

Following his conviction, LEAL – through privately-retained counsel – made several failed attempts to obtain post-conviction relief. It is the undersigned deputy's understanding that, throughout

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Garcia failed to appear for sentencing. The Court issued a bench warrant for her arrest. Subsequently, Garcia was apprehended and sentenced separately.

the duration of the investigation, prosecution, and post-conviction proceedings, LEAL – who wants this Court to believe he could not pay any restitution as a result of his codefendant's conduct – paid for the services of the following private defense attorneys: (1) Michael Pariente; (2) Jason Weiner; (3) Craig Mueller; (4) Joseph Gersten; (5) Lester Paredes; and now (6) Jean Schwartzer.

In the Motion presently before the Court, LEAL seeks relief based on two assertions: (1) that LEAL's sentence was based on materially untrue assumptions or mistakes of fact relating to his criminal history; and (2) LEAL's co-defendant benefitted from absconding and from LEAL's successful efforts to pay restitution. For the following reasons, both arguments fail.

### **ARGUMENT**

Defense counsel correctly cites *Passanisi v. State*, 108 Nev. 318, 322, 831 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1992), for the principle that, "[i]n general, a district court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence once the defendant has started serving it." *Motion*, at 5:9-5:10. Defense counsel also correctly cites *Edwards* v. *State*, 112 Nev. 704, 707, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996) – a case that relies heavily on *Passanisi* – for the principle a "motion to modify a sentence is limited in scope to sentences based on mistaken assumptions about a defendant's criminal record which work to the extreme detriment of the defendant." *Motion*, at 5:17-5:20. Both of these opinions were based on NRS 34.724(2)(a), which provides that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "[i]s not a substitute for and does not affect any remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the trial court . . . ."

There are two fatal flaws in LEAL's arguments. First, even under the legal principles cited by the defense, this Court has no authority to consider LEAL's argument about his codefendant benefiting from his purported efforts to pay restitution. Second, and more importantly, *Passanisi* was overruled insofar as it defined NRS 34.724(2)(a)'s phrase "remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the trial court" in a manner that renders the defense's arguments – and reliance upon *Passanisi* and *Edwards* – meritless.

Specifically, in *Harris v. State*, the Nevada Supreme Court explained that "[a] post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the *exclusive remedy* for challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence aside from direct review of a judgment of conviction on appeal and 'remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the trial court." 130 Nev. 435, 437, 329 P.3d 619, 621 (2014) (quoting NRS

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34.724(2)(a)) (emphasis in the original). When examining the phrase "remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the trial court," the Nevada Supreme Court expressly overruled Passanisi insofar as it defined that phrase (the definition upon which LEAL's present arguments turn) to permit such motions to be filed after sentencing and held, instead, that "a motion is 'incident to the proceedings of the trial court' when it is filed prior to sentencing," Id. at 447, 329 P.3d, at 627-28 (emphasis added).

That is where the analysis of LEAL's present motion must begin and end; because LEAL filed the present motion after his sentencing, this Court lacks the authority to grant the relief requested. Moreover, even if the Court had the authority to address the merits of LEAL's argument, it must be noted that more than three years have passed since LEAL was sentenced, and LEAL still has not presented a shred of evidence showing that the criminal history set forth in his PSI was incorrect.

To the extent LEAL's arguments are based on the criminal history set forth in his PSI, the Nevada Supreme Court has made clear that "any objections must be resolved prior to sentencing, and, if not resolved in the defendant's favor, the objections must be raised on direct appeal." Stockmeier v. State, Bd. of Parole Com'rs, 127 Nev. 243, 250, 255 P.3d 209, 214 (2011). As the Court explained, "to allow a defendant to wait and challenge a PSI in a later action would open the courts to a flood of litigation from prisoners seeking amendments to their PSIs long after being sentenced." Id. at 251, 255 P.3d, at 214. LEAL needed to make his arguments on direct appeal; he cannot make them in this post-conviction motion.

///

To the extent LEAL's arguments are based on the sentence his codefendant received, the defense has failed to cite any legal authority that would allow this Court to entertain any such arguments – because no such authority exists. Thus, such arguments cannot serve as a basis for the relief requested.

# **CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendant's Motion to Modify Sentence.

Dated this 3rd day of November, 2020.

### SUBMITTED BY:

AARON D. FORD Attorney General

By: /s/ Michael C. Kovac
MICHAEL C. KOVAC (Bar No. 11177)
Chief Deputy Attorney General

Electronically Filed 11/9/2020 8:19 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

11	DDIV Church, Liture			
2	TEN I COMMADERED EGO			
4	Nevada Bar No. 11223			
3	LAW OFFICE OF JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, Ltd. 170 S. Green Valley Parkway #300			
4	Henderson, Nevada 89012			
_	Phone: (702) 979-9941 Email: jean.schwartzer@gmail.com			
5	Counsel for Defendant			
6	IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE			
7	STATE OF NEVADA FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK			
8				
	THE STATE OF NEVADA, Case No.: C-17-322644-2			
9	) Dent No · XVII			
10	Plaintiff,			
11	vs.			
12	JACK LEAL,			
	Defendant.			
13				
14	REPLY TO STATE'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO MODIFY SENTENCE			
15	COMES NOW, Defendant, JACK LEAL, by and through his attorney, JEAN J.			
16	SCHWARTZER, ESQ., and hereby files the instant Reply to State's Opposition to Motion to Modify			
17				
18	This Reply is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached			
19	points and authorities in support hereof, the separately filed exhibits, and oral argument at the time of			
20	hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.			
21	DATED this 9th day of November, 2020.			
22				
23	Respectfully submitted,			
24	/s/ Jean J. Schwartzer			
	JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11223			
25	LAW OFFICE OF JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, Ltd.			
26	170 S. Green Valley Parkway #300			
27	Henderson, Nevada 89012 (702) 979-9941			
28	Counsel for Defendant			

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## **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

,

I. Leal Did Not Lie to This Court at Sentencing

The State claims that Leal lied to this Court at sentencing by stating that there were no liens on the property when two nominal Republic Waste liens existed. When looking at the context of the statement, the comment about the home being "free and clear" was referencing the fact that there were was nothing that would prevent him from selling the home. Leal brought the title to court showing the two nominal liens. See Exhibit 6 at 5. 1 He was not attempting to hide these inconsequential and nominal liens from this Court.

The State also claims that Leal lied to this Court by stating that he filed a lien in the favor of the Attorney General's office when according to the State, "at the time, Leal made that false statement to this Court, he was well aware that his attempted filing was suspended." <u>See</u> State's Opposition ("OP") at 4. It is clear from the sentencing transcript that Leal filed a lien in the Attorney General's favor and provided that paperwork to the State. If the recording of the document was suspended, this is not the fault of Leal. Leal complied with the terms of the Guilty Plea Agreement by submitting the lien to the County Recorder's Office for recording. To accuse Leal of lying to this Court is disingenuous. Leal cannot be held accountable for what the County Recorder's Office chose to do with the lien after the submitted it for recording. This is especially so when Leal's attorney explained to this Court at sentencing about the issues Leal had at the County Recorder's Office due to the fact he was oddly recording a lien against himself in the Attorney General's favor. <u>See</u> Exhibit 6 at 8.

II. This Court Did Take Leal's Criminal History Into Consideration

The State claims that "[t]his Court, focusing on Leal's conduct in the present case (as opposed

1 All exhibits referred to in the instant Reply are attached to Leal's Motion to Modify Sentence.

to his criminal history), sentenced Leal to a 72 to 180 month term of imprisonment." See SO at 5

(emphases added). While the State's allegation that this Court only focused on Leal's conduct in the

present case (as opposed to his criminal history) makes it easier to argue that any mistaken assumptions about Leal's criminal record played no role in his sentence, this is clearly not true based upon the questions this Court asked of Leal's attorney:

THE COURT: What about the two prior fraud cases?
MR. WEINER: I do not believe those involved real -THE COURT: No, I want to know his past --

MR. WEINER: --real--

THE COURT: --record, what are those about?

### See Exhibit 6 at 10.

Moreover, the State conveniently fails to address the fact that it misrepresented to this Court that Leal had been convicted of three felonies. See Exhibit 6 at 3. Leal's PSI shows he was convicted of two felonies and Leal argues in his Motion to Modify he was actually convicted of one felony. Even if this Court chooses to take the PSI as is on its face, the State still misrepresented Leal's criminal history by stating that Leal had been convicted of THREE felonies. Although the State claims that Leal provides no proof of any of the other mistakes about his criminal history, it should be noted that Leal cannot prove a negative. See SO at 7.

### III. Harris has not been extended to a Motion to Modify

In its Opposition, the State claims that the Nevada Supreme Court ruled in <u>Harris v. State</u><sup>2</sup> that motions such as the Motion to Modify Sentence filed by Leal is not "incident to the proceedings of the trial court" and therefore any arguments raised in such a motion must be filed in a petition for writ of

1 habeas corpus (post-conviction). See SO at 6-7. The State then argues that the analysis of Leal's Motion to Modify Sentence begins and ends here and that this Court lacks the authority to grant the 3 relief requested. See SO at 7. This State cites to no authority in support of this new interpretation of 4 Harris. 5 In <u>Harris</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court held that after sentence has been imposed, the statutory 6 post-conviction habeas petition takes the place of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, overruling Hart 7 8 v. State, 116 Nev. 558, 1 P.3d 969 (2000). 130 Nev. at 2. At no point since Harris was decided has the Supreme Court extended the holding to a motion to modify. In fact, since Harris was decided, the 10 Supreme Court has ruled on numerous cases involving a motion to modify and/or a motion to 11 withdraw guilty plea. In these cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly chosen to apply Harris to 12 motions to withdraw guilty plea but not to motions to modify. Instead, the Supreme Court has 13 continued to hear appeals on motions to modify sentence and apply the standard enunciated in 14 15 Edwards v. State, 3 which is that a motion to modify is limited in scope to challenging sentences based 16 on mistaken assumptions about a defendant's criminal record which work to the defendant's extreme 17 detriment. 4 Leal cannot find a single case (citable or un-citable) that applies the Harris holding to a 18 motion to modify sentence despite the numerous opportunities for the Nevada Supreme Court to do so. 19 IV. Stockmeier Does Not Preclude a Defendant From Filing a Motion to Modify 20 Sentence Based Upon a Mistake Assumption About the Defendant's Criminal 21 record 22 Finally, the State argues that Leal is precluded by the ruling in Stockmeir y. State, Bd. of 23 2 130 Nev. 435 (2014). 24 3 112 Nev. 704, 708, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996). 25 4 State v. Abara, 2018 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1032 (unpublished disposition)(Sept. 13, 2018)(applying 26 Edwards standard, not Harris, to analysis of motion to modify sentence and holding that "the record does not support the district court's determination that consideration of the possession case was a

mistaken assumption about Abara's criminal record that worked to his extreme detriment").

27

28

1	Parole Com'rs from arguing that this Court sentenced him based upon mistakes about his criminal		
2	history if those mistakes are contained in his PSI. 127 Nev. 243, 250, 255 P.3d 209, 214 (2011). See		
3	SO at 7. The State fails to cite to any legal authority in support of the notion that Stockmier precludes		
5	or supersedes the standard enunciated in Edwards when arguing, in a motion to modify, that the court		
6 '	relied on mistaken assumptions about a defendant's criminal history at sentencing. There is no legal		
7	requirement, in statue or case law, mandating that the "mistakes" come from somewhere or someone		
8	other than the PSI. Leal is entitled to request a modification of sentence based upon any mistakes,		
9	from any source, about his criminal history that this Court relied upon when sentencing him. There is		
10	no case law stating otherwise. Moreover and again, one of the mistakes, that Leal has been convicted		
11 . 12	of three felonies came from the State's arguments at sentencing, not the PSI.		
13	CONCLUSION		
14	Rased upon the foregoing IACK LEAL respectfully requests that the Court vacate his centence		
15	Based upon the foregoing, JACK LEAL respectfully requests that the Court vacate his sentence and schedule a new sentencing hearing so that he may be sentenced based upon correct information		
16	regarding his criminal history.		
17	DATED this 9 <sup>th</sup> day of November, 2020.		
18	DATED this 9 day of November, 2020.		
19	Respectfully submitted,		
20			
21	<u>/s/ Jean J. Schwartzer</u> JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ.		
22	Nevada Bar No. 11223 LAW OFFICE OF JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, Ltd.		
23	170 S. Green Valley Parkway #300		
24	Henderson, Nevada 89012 (702) 979-9941		
25	Counsel for Defendant		
26			
27			
28			

# DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

November 10, 2020

C-17-322664-2

State of Nevada

**Jack Leal** 

November 10, 2020

8:30 AM

**Motion to Modify Sentence** 

**HEARD BY:** Villani, Michael

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11A

COURT CLERK: Samantha Albrecht

**RECORDER:** 

Cynthia Georgilas

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT:

Kovac, Michael C.

Schwartzer, Jean

**Attorney** 

**Attorney** 

State of Nevada

**Plaintiff** 

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Court noted it had not reviewed the reply brief. Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Kovac confirmed he had reviewed it and represented Defendant was in custody and not present due to a COVID-19 outbreak at his facility. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED for the Court to review the reply brief.

**NDC** 

...CONTINUED TO: 11/17/2020 10:15 AM

Clerk's Note: A copy of the foregoing minute order was distributed by e-mail to: Jean Schwartzer, Esq. (jean.schwartzer@gmail.com) and Michael C. Kovac, Esq. (MKovac@ag.nv.gov) notifying counsel of the correct hearing time due to Defendant being in custody. - 11/13/2020 sa

PRINT DATE: 11/13/2020

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

November 10, 2020

# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JACK LEAL,
Appellant,
vs.
JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN, SOUTHERN
DESERT CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 79243 District Court Case No. C322664

> FILED NOV 1 0 2020

**CLERK'S CERTIFICATE** 

STATE OF NEVADA, ss.

I, Elizabeth A. Brown, the duly appointed and qualified Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the following is a full, true and correct copy of the Judgment in this matter.

# **JUDGMENT**

The court being fully advised in the premises and the law, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed, as follows:

"ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED."

Judgment, as quoted above, entered this 9th day of October, 2020.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and affixed the seal of the Supreme Court at my Office in Carson City, Nevada this November 03, 2020.

Elizabeth A. Brown, Supreme Court Clerk

By: Rory Wunsch Deputy Clerk

C-17-322664-2

NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgit



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JACK LEAL,
Appellant,
vs.
JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN, SOUTHERN
DESERT CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 79243 District Court Case No. C322664

# REMITTITUR

TO: Steven D. Grierson, Eighth District Court Clerk

Pursuant to the rules of this court, enclosed are the following:

Certified copy of Judgment and Opinion/Order. Receipt for Remittitur.

DATE: November 03, 2020

Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of Court

By: Rory Wunsch Deputy Clerk

cc (without enclosures):

Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge Jack Leal Attorney General/Ely

### RECEIPT FOR REMITTITUR

Received of Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada REMITTITUR issued in the above-entitled cause, on		
HEATHER UNGERMANN		
Deputy District Court Clerk		

RECEIVED APPEALS NOV 1 0 2020

CLERKOFTHE COURT

20-40003

C-17-322664-2

### DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

November 17, 2020

C-17-322664-2

State of Nevada

vs

Jack Leal

November 17, 2020

10:15 AM

**Defendant's Motion to Modify Sentence** 

**HEARD BY:** 

Villani, Michael

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11A

COURT CLERK: Albrecht, Samantha RECORDER:

Georgilas, Cynthia

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

Jean Schwartzer

**Attorney for Defendant** 

Michael C. Kovac

**Attorney for Plaintiff** 

State of Nevada

**Plaintiff** 

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

Argument by Ms. Schwartzer and Mr. Kovac. COURT ORDERED, Motion DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, Court stated if Ms. Schwartzer can obtain the records on the other cases, it would take a look at them. Court noted its concern regarding the fradulent conduct in these cases. Court DIRECTED Mr. Kovac to prepare the Order for today's decision within THIRTY (30) days. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, matter SET for Status Check. Court noted it would not sign the Order prior to the Status Check date.

NDC

12/15/2020 10:15 AM STATUS CHECK: ORDER

Printed Date: 11/20/2020

Prepared by: Samantha Albrecht

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

November 17, 2020

Electronically Filed
12/08/2020

CLERK OF THE COURT

	Atumo Aum
	Jack Leal ID NO. 183500 CLERK OF THE COURT
1	SOUTHERN DESERT CORRECTIONAL CTN.
2	N P.O. BOX 208
3	INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89076
4	Eighth Judicial District Court
. 5	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
6	Clark County, Neumala
7	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
8	Jack Leal, Case NO: ADD-1888143Cq-111
	Petitioner, CASE NO.: A-20-1814369-W
9	v. DEPT. NO.: XV ()
10	DOCKET:
11	Jerry Howell, Wardon, Southern Desert.
12	Correctional Center: State of Nevada,
13	Respondents,
14	E 1 21. 0111 C 1111 D 111 C
, 15	Supplementato Petition for Writ of Hubeas Corpus
16	CPost-Conviction)
17	
18	COMES NOW, Petitioner, Jack Leal , herein above respectfully
19	moves this Honorable Court to grant letitimer relief to which he may
20	be entitled in this proceeding. Ground Four is being added as it was rejected
. :	due to Rule 3.70 but to not consider it would result in a miscouringe of justice.
21	This Motion is made and based upon the accompanying Memorandum of Points and
22	Authorities,
23.	DATED: this 20th day of November, 2020
24	BY:
25	Jack Leal # 1183500  Detendant In Proper Personam
26	<b>见</b> 是 Retitioner
27	Jack Leal # 1183500  Betimber In Proper Personam  Retitioner
28	

	1 23. (d) GROUND FOUR: Leal's Guilty Plea Agreement is invalid as it was
	2 Colleged into involuntarily, under divess because of undue influence and was operand all in
	3 Violation at his rights pursuant to the Fifth sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the
•	4 Constitution of the United States of America and of Article 1 of the Neurola Constitution.
:	5 23. (d) SUPPORTING FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law):
•	6 Led had been involved in Real Estate since 2009 without any issues. On September 1945 2010 the
7	Meunda Attorney General's (A.G.) affice Filed a civil complaint for forfeiture (A-1/2111247-C) 1 mls
8	constant Jessica Garcia (Garcia), immediately retained counsel Michael Paristy (D. 1)
9	the Detendents in the civil case. At some point the A.G. decided to a round of it.
10	Leaf and Garcia and made a tormal other letter which was continent con both botadatic accortion
11	to package from deal), to Parlette. This is when Gurein beaun to pressure look to accord the deal
12	as it greatly benetitied her by bearing her with only a misdemeanor conviction.
13	On Alovenhar 75 2016 Georgia Found not that Leal contacted Producte directly to discuss and
14	available to lead other-than pleading quilty and some Gorcia became irrate and an argument became
15	That energy with took of the physically attracked. Garcia was 5ubsequently anosted as this other for
10	abovestic pathery against Leal. This was the beginning of a spice of english by Garin to In
17	and introduce real into extering a quitty also for her herest including 4 songets anget
18	2 order of protections (no contact orders) at least & collection - wife and
. 19	Jan a which leas to seal 5 electual conviction due to him entering a completely fourtetons and conviction
	Same breage of Mary 91 and 1.
21	After the November 2016 incident, Pariente petised to Further represent both Defendants Cominal
22	Charges were not not filed. Garcia then retained Jason being (hoing ) to police at hith Not lite
23	the arminal charges were tiled and when lead hecame aware of the allowating and was recorded
24	or them, he immediately contracted Garda who make numerous threats about and not seven or doing
25	anything about it, all of which continued to months.
26	On April 20th 2017 lead made his First personal appearance in court and wanted to tell the court
27	about the continued violence and threats against him so weiner requested a continuance.
28	

The court date was continued to April 24th 2017 and Leal again planned to disclose these issues to to 2 the court and to dead not quitty but as Leal was loaving his house for court that marning, Barcia showed up and literally attacked Leal and made throats that he would never see his kills again It he did not sign the quity does in court that day or it he called the police again. Leal being completely distroveted and having been just physically attacked and having been threatened for months by that points signed the quilty dea agreement that day but only under complete dures and with the Fear that not doing so would got him in immediate and continued danger On August 17th 2017 leal had a court date at which Weiner was well aware at the actual conflicts between the Defendants which is shown by the record as he attempted to untilizery as course I due to what had become an unwaiseable context. The court was maware of the totality of the situation as were could not simply tell the court the complete story since Gorch was also his client. Weiner had intermed lead that he was going to withhow as coursed that morning due to the throats and conflicts and that the next would appoint Leal independent course whom Leal believed was going to help him withdraw his involvitory plea and disclose the threats and violance to the court but instead the court sentenced lead on this day, despite Weiner's attempts to withdraw as coursely By the time lead outered his guilty pleasure had already been subjected to soveral threats and instances of actual observe against him due to his desire not to go along with the plea negotiations so by that point the plea was only obstained by both artical and threatened physical harm to lead which stripped the dea of a voluntary and since his will was overborne. A.G. know and had an obligation to alert the court of the existence of operation and of an actual conflict of interest hothern the latendaries. This is made clear in the "State's opposition to defendant's motion for hail pending appeal" Filed on April 23 2018. This is shown in Page 3 where "Weiner made vague statements about unidentified is over helding (Line 21) which were the conflicts that Ligher retried to disclose in order to protect Garcia. Also in this opposition, the Depity (A.G.) stated he is well aware of the issues" (line 22) and goes on to list 3 of Garcials 4 recent arrests for battery, all of which were against Leal, clearly showing that Weiner and the A.G.

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i	W 13
1	had full knowledge but did not disclose it to the court causing leal to essentially
2	be without any meaningful representation on his side.
3	
4	Due to these issues, leal requests that his guilty plea which was entered be declared
5	as null and void since it was induced by threats and since the caercion made. It
б	involuntary and against Leal's free desire and wishes.
7	
8	At a minimum Leal requests an evidentiary bearing as it is the only may to fully
9	address this claim and to dolomine it leads guilty plea was entered into freely and
10	uduntarily, and of his own free will and free from threats, or it in fact he was
11	corred and only entored into his quilty plea agreement due to Fear and
12	under complète duress.
13	
14	
15	I have the the should be constituted to withdraw bis
16	In summary, leal asserts that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea as it was entered into industabily and due to reporcion and that
17	withdraw of the guilty plea is necessary to comed a manifest injustice.
18	which a we doubt her is messed to enter a manner info
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24 25	
26 <sub>.</sub>	•
27	
2. 23	Page <u>U</u>

. 1	CERTFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING		
2	I, Jack Leal hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on this 20th		
3	day of November, 20)0, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, "		
4	Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)"		
5	by placing document in a sealed pre-postage paid envelope and deposited said envelope in the		
6	United State Mail addressed to the following:		
7			
8	Clark Country District Atomorphis Office  Nevada Atomorphis Office  NO 16 Deth Course Street		
9	Las Vegas, NV 89101 Conson City, NV 89701		
10			
11			
12	Jerry Mondell Warden Southern Desart Conventional Center		
13 <del>14</del>	Indian Springs, W 89070		
15			
16			
17	CC:FILE		
18			
19	DATED: this 10th day of November 2010.		
20			
21	410-504		
22	Petimer /In Propria Personam Post Office Box 208, S.D.C.C.		
23	Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 IN FORMA PAUPERIS:		
24	711 749 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		
25			
26			
27			
.28	Page 5		

# AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding
Supplemental Petition for Whit of Hobeas Corpus (Post-Conviction of Document)
filed in District Court Case number A-20-814369-W
Does not contain the social security number of any person.
-OR-
☐ Contains the social security number of a person as required by:
A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:
(State specific law)
-or-
B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant.
Signature Date
Print Name
Title Petitioner

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JACK LEAL,
Appellant,
vs.
JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN,
SOUTHERN DESERT CORRECTIONAL
CENTER,
Respondent.

No. 79243-COA

FILED

DEC 18 2020

CLERK OF SUPBEME COURT
BY
DEPUTY CLERK

J.

### ORDER DENYING REHEARING

Rehearing denied. NRAP 40(c). It is so ORDERED.<sup>1</sup>

Gibbons

\_\_\_\_\_, J

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cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge

Jack Leal

Attorney General/Carson City

Attorney General/Ely

Eighth District Court Clerk

<sup>1</sup>We have reviewed Leal's November 24, 2020, motion requesting clarification as to the effective date of his judgment of conviction. We conclude no relief is warranted and deny the motion.

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA

20-45904

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JACK LEAL. Appellant,

VS.

JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN, SOUTHERN DESERT CORRECTIONAL CENTER.

Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 79243 District Court Case No. C322664

REMITTITUR

TO: Steven D. Grierson, Eighth District Court Clerk

Pursuant to the rules of this court, enclosed are the following:

Certified copy of Judgment and Opinion/Order. Receipt for Remittitur.

**DATE: January 12, 2021** 

Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of Court

By: Kaitlin Meetze

Administrative Assistant

cc (without enclosures):

Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge

Jack Leal

Attorney General/Ely \ Michael Bongard, Deputy Attorney General

### RECEIPT FOR REMITTITUR

Received of Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the JAN 1 3 2021

REMITTITUR issued in the above-entitled cause, on

Deputy District Court Clerk

APPEALS

JAN 13 2021

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21-00890

CLERKOFTHECOURT

## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JACK LEAL,
Appellant,
vs.
JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN, SOUTHERN
DESERT CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 79243 District Court Case No. C322664

# **CLERK'S CERTIFICATE**

STATE OF NEVADA, ss.

I, Elizabeth A. Brown, the duly appointed and qualified Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the following is a full, true and correct copy of the Judgment in this matter.

# **JUDGMENT**

The court being fully advised in the premises and the law, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed, as follows:

"ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED."

Judgment, as quoted above, entered this 09 day of October, 2020.

### **JUDGMENT**

The court being fully advised in the premises and the law, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed, as follows:

"Rehearing Denied."

Judgment, as quoted above, entered this 18 day of December, 2020.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and affixed the seal of the Supreme Court at my Office in Carson City, Nevada this January 12, 2021.

Elizabeth A. Brown, Supreme Court Clerk

By: Kaitlin Meetze
Administrative Assistant

1 DECL LOWE LAW, L.L.C. DIANE C. LOWE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 14573 3 7350 West Centennial Pkwy #3085 Las Vegas, Nevada 89131 (725)212-2451 – F: (702)442-0321 Email: <u>DianeLowe@LoweLawLLC.com</u> Attorney for Petitioner JACK LEAL 6 7 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY NEVADA 9 10 JACK LEAL, Case No.: A-20-814369-W 11 [NDOC 1183500] 12 DEPT NO XVII Petitioner, 13 vs. 14 [stemming from C-17-322644-2] 15 WILLIAM HUTCHINGS, WARDEN OF SOUTHERN DESERT STATE 16 **DECLARATION OF JACK LEAL PRISON** 17 Respondent. 18 19 1 I, Jack Leal, am the Petitioner. 20 21 2 I believe there is a reasonable probability, that were it not for the prejudicial 22 ineffective assistance of my attorneys as alleged in the documents filed in 23 24 this case – I would have refused the plea offer and insisted on taking this matter to trial. 26 27 28

DECLARATION OF JACK LEAL

STATE OF NEVADA)

**COUNTY OF CLARK)** 

I, JACK LEAL, the undersigned, do hereby swear that all statements, facts and events within my foregoing Affidavit are true and correct of my own knowledge, information and belief, and to those I believe them to be true and correct. Signed under penalty of perjury pursuant to NRS 208.165.

Respectfully Signed and Attested to this \_\_\_\_\_ day of MAY 2021.

JACK LEAL

NRS 208.165 Execution of instrument by prisoner. A prisoner may execute any instrument by signing his or her name immediately following a declaration "under penalty of perjury" with the same legal effect as if he or she had acknowledged it or sworn to its truth before a person authorized to administer oaths. As used in this section, "prisoner" means a person confined in any jail or prison, or any facility for the detention of juvenile offenders, in this state.

(Added to NRS by 1985, 1643)

Electronically Filed 5/20/2021 4:07 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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LOWE LAW, L.L.C.

DIANE C. LOWE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 14573

| 7350 West Centennial Pkwy #3085

Las Vegas, Nevada 89131

(725)212-2451 - F: (702)442-0321

Email: <u>DianeLowe@LoweLawLLC.com</u>

Attorney for Petitioner JACK LEAL

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

**CLARK COUNTY NEVADA** 

JACK LEAL, #1183500

Petitioner.

Case No.: A-20-814369-W

DEPT NO XVII

vs.

WILLIAM HUTCHINGS, WARDEN OF SOUTHERN DESERT STATE PRISON,

Respondent.

[Stemming from C-17-322664-2]

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S POSTCONVICTION PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

DATE OF HEARING: AUGUST 27, 2021

TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 a.m.

COMES NOW, Petitioner, JACK LEAL, by and through his counsel of

record DIANE C. LOWE, ESQ., and hereby submits his supplemental brief in

support of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

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 This Supplement is made and based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, and the Points and Authorities attached hereto, and any oral arguments adduced at the time of hearing/s on this matter. Petitioner, JACK LEAL alleges that he is being held in custody in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States of America, and Articles I and IV of the Nevada Constitution.

Dated this 20th day of May 2020.

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Diane C. Lowe
DIANE C. LOWE ESQ. Nevada Bar #14573

# **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

# I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mr. LEAL was charged November 29, 2016 with his wife JESSICA GARCIA and their company PARCELNOMICS, LLC (d/b/a Investment Deals) under three cases at the Las Vegas Justice Court for 14 felony B criminal charges: 1 Racketeering, 12 theft, and 1 Multiple transactions involving fraud or deceit in course of enterprise or occupation. Justice Court Case 16F19220B (Jack Leal), 16F19220A (Parcelnomics, LLC), 16F19220C (Jessica Garcia). 2 PA 268. Thirteen people claimed they sold them houses and did not comply with possible disclosure requirements to alert them

about liens on the properties, defrauding them of a combined amount of \$757,420.00 between March 1, 2015 and March 31, 2016. 2 PA 293-315. On December 27, 2016 Attorney Jason G. Weiner confirmed as counsel for both defendants. 2 PA 292. On April 11, 2017 Jack Leal unconditionally waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the Justice Court cases were closed and bound over to District Court. 2 PA 322, 331-2. On April 10, 2017 a Conflict-Of-Interest Waiver was signed by Mr. Leal so Attorney Leal could represent both he and his wife – per Rule 1.7 2 PA 334. Conflict of Interest Current Clients was initialed. 2 PA 335. An Information was issued April 18, 2017. 2 PA 336-8. On April 24, 2017 Mr. Leal entered a guilty plea agreement to Count 14 – Multiple transactions involving fraud or deceit in course of enterprise or occupation with all the other counts being incorporated into Count 14. PA 55-69. The chart below outlines where issues were discussed.

### PLEA FORM AND COLLOQUY AT PLEA HEARING

Page in Plea Form Signed	Page in Transcript 4/24/17 eFiled 11/20/17	Plea Agreement 1PA55 Plea Hearing Transcript 2PA234 (pdf 99)
Page 6 1PA60	2PA239-40 Page 6 line 11- 18, 21-25 Page 7 line 1-3	Guilty / No Contest Plea Questionnaire and Waiver of Rights form Read & Signed by Defendant
	2PA237-8 Page 4-5	Court Determines age and education of Defendant and whether he can speak read and write English
Page 2, 3 1PA56-7	Offense but not Max 2PA235	Form Specifies Correct Offenses and Maximum Punishments

- 11			
		2PA236-7	Restitution agreement outlined if paid before
		Page 3-4	Sentencing State will not oppose probation
		2PA242 lines 12- 25	Conflict of Interest issue Addressed
			Defendant waives reading of Information
		2PA235-6 Page 2-3	Court Explains Charges to Defendant
	Page 6	2PA239	Court ensures he has had enough time to
	1PA60	Page 6 line 16-18	speak to his attorney has received the information and understands it
	Page 6 line 12-13	2PA239 Page 6 line 19-20	Court asks defendant if he is satisfied with the representation and advise given by his
	1PA60		attorney and the answer is yes by defendant
	Pages 3 line	2PA239	Court advises Defendant that it is not bound
	19-20 1PA57	Page 6 line 7-10	by recommendations of attorneys and is free to sentence Defendant to the maximum punishment
	Page 3-4 1PA57-8	2PA238-9 Page 5 line 23-25 Page 6	Consequences of Plea are outlined.
	Page 2 1PA56	2PA239 Page 3 line 7-8	Plea form page 2 states in number 5 – I Jack Leal, and my co-conspirator, Jessica Garcia, are jointly and severally responsible for said restitution but the Judgment of Conviction does not reflect this.
	Pages 1-3 1PA55-7	2PA235-7 Page 2-4	Plea agreement outlined.
	Page 2 1PA56	2PA235 Page 2 line 16-17	Restitution Jointly and severally with co- conspirator Jessica Garcia addressed.
	Page 4 lines 8-10 1PA58	2PA239 Page 6 line 7-10	Court advises no promises as to concurrent consecutive sentences
	Page 4 line 17-22 1PA58		PSI
	Page 4 line 11-12 1PA58		Court can consider at sentencing charges not file, dismissed or dismissed pursuant to this agreement.

Page 6 lines	2PA238	Court determines that Defendant is competent
9-11 1PA60	Page 5 line 5-9	and sober
Page 8 line		
2-6 1 PA62		
Page 4 line	2PA238 lines 18-	No threats or promises other than plea
13-16	22	agreement
1PA58	2PA239	
Page 6 lines	Page 6 Line 7-10	
6-8 1PA60		
Page 1 line	2PA239	Defendant enters a plea to each charge by
16 1PA55	Page 5 line 17	actually saying "Guilty" or "No Contest"
Page 5	2PA240	Court determines that Defendant understands
1PA59	Page 7 line 4-7	that by pleading guilty that Defendant is
D (1)	20 4 2 4 0	giving up important constitutional rights:
Page 5 line	2PA240	Right to remain silent / Right against self-
9-11 1PA59	Page 7 line 4-16	incrimination
Page 5 line	2PA240	Right to confront / cross examine state's
16-17	Page 7 line 4-16	witnesses
1PA59 Page 5 line	2PA240	Dight to commol witness testing any / margut
18 1PA59	Page 7 line 4-16	Right to compel witness testimony / present evidence
Page 5 line	2PA240	Right to 12-person jury decision on guilty by
12-15	Page 7 line 4-16	unanimous verdict
1PA59	ruge / mie + 10	diaminous voidict
Page 5 line	2PA240	Right to make state prove guilty by evidence
12-15	Page 7 line 4-16	beyond reasonable doubt on each and every
1PA59		element of the crime charge
Page 5 line	2PA240	Right to testify
19 1PA59	Page 7 line 4-16	
Page 5 line	2PA240	Right to appeal the conviction
20 1PA59	Page 7 line 4-16	
Page 4 line	2PA240	Court advises Defendant that conviction may
26 1PA58	Page 7 line 8-10	subject non-citizens to deportation
Page 7 line		
11 1PA61		
Page 7-8	2PA242	Defense counsel satisfied that the plea is
1PA61-2	Page 9	knowing, intelligent and voluntary

	2PA238 Page 5 line 18-22	Court asked if anybody is forcing him to plead guilty and whether he is pleading of his own free will
	2PA240-1 Page 7 line 17-25 Page 8 line 1-24	Counsel / Defendant stipulates that actual factual basis exists for the plea.
Page 6 1PA60	2PA239 Page 6 line 16-20	My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney
	2PA241-2 Page 8 line 25 Page 9 line 1	Court Accepts Plea and Finds Defendant Guilty

He was sentenced on August 17, 2017, to a minimum initial incarceration time of 72 months and a maximum of 180 months (6 years – 15 years) with 0 credit for time served and ordered to pay restitution to the thirteen people defrauded. The Judgment of Conviction (Plea of Guilty) was filed August 23, 2017. 1 PA 47-48. An Amended Judgment of Conviction was entered by the Court which corrected the original judgment of conviction by adding the order for the restitution to be joint and several. 1 PA 49-50.

# **Actions After Conviction**

Two appeals have been filed by Mr. Leal. The first was direct appeal 74050. A Notice of Appeal was filed by Attorney Craig A. Mueller on September 14, 2017. After that, attorney Lester M. Paredes III took over and submitted the opening brief. 2 PA 208-33. (pdf 73).

 The Issues Raised in Opening Brief: 2 PA 14 (pdf 79)

- 1. Did the District Court Err by Failing to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing or Inquire into the Nature and Materiality of the alleged breach of the guilty plea agreement?
- 2. Did the District Court Err by denying appellant's motion to withdraw counsel due to an unwaiveable concurrent conflict of interest?

They lost. 2 PA 205-7. (pdf 70) A Remittitur was filed January 17, 2019.

A writ of habeas corpus petition was filed March 21, 2019, and Attorney Joseph

Gersten was assigned to represent Mr. Leal in the matter. 2 PA 193-204. (pdf 58).

The issues raised in the initial Petition which was typed and prepared by Attorney

Gerstein were:

- A. Mr. Leal's Conviction and Sentence are Invalid under the 6<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Federal Constitutional amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection and under the law of article 1 of the Nevada Constitution because the Original Information failed to put the petitioner on notice of the charges. Page 6. 2 PA 198. (pdf 63).
- B. Mr. Leal's conviction and sentence are invalid under the 6<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Federal Constitutional Amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection and under the law of article 1 of the Nevada Constitution because prior counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as is mandated by <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 2 PA 200 (pdf 65).
  - 1) Petitioner's criminal counsel's assistance was ineffective, because prior counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as mandated by <u>Strickland</u>, by <u>failing</u> to obtain a conflict waiver; 2 PA 201. (pdf 66).
  - 2) Petitioner's criminal counsel's assistance was ineffective, because prior counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as is mandated by <u>Strickland</u>, by <u>coercing petitioner into entering a plea</u>. 2 PA 203. (pdf 67).

After briefing and an evidentiary hearing the Petition was denied June 19, 2019 by Judge Michael P. Villani. 2 PA 189-92. (pdf 54). Attorney Gerstein filed the preliminary appeal documents July 19, 2019 challenging Judge Villani's ruling. He was allowed to withdraw August 7, 2019. Mr. Leal filed an Informal Brief December 30, 2019. 2 PA 180-88. (pdf 45). But relief was denied. Remittitur was filed January 27 2021. On April 28, 2020 Attorney Jean J Schwartzer filed a second Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition in order to try to preserve timeliness. 2 PA 149-56. (pdf 14). The Amended Judgment of Conviction was filed May 9, 2019. 1 PA 53-4. The original judgment of conviction was filed August 23, 2017. 1 PA 47-8.

In it she raises the following issues: 2 PA 149-56.

- 1. Based upon information and belief, Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his right to counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution due to trial counsel's failure to present mitigation factors at sentencing, including but not limited to the inability of Petitioner to pay the restitution prior to sentencing due to document(s) being records on the property located at 1024 Santa Helena Avenue, Henderson Nevada 89002 at the mandate of the Attorney General, thereby making it difficult to sell. 2 PA 155 (pdf 20).
- 2. Based upon information and belief, Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his right to counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution due to

 trial counsel's failure to go over or correct Petitioner's Presentence Investigation Report prior to sentencing. 2 PA 155 (pdf 20).

- 3. Based upon information and belief, Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his right to counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution due to trial counsel's failure to correct and/or explain errors in Petitioner's criminal history and nature of the instant offense. 2 PA 155 (pdf 20).
- 4. Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing pursuant to NRS 34.770. 2 PA 155 (pdf 20).

On May 27, 2020 Mr. Leal filed a handwritten Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

supplementing the previous one filed by Ms. Schwartzer. 2 AP 139-48. (pdf 1).

Ground 1: Challenge to validity of guilty plea. 2 PA 145 (pdf 10).

Supporting Facts: My plea was involuntary as I was coerced and it was not entered into of my own free will. My plea was entered into without the effective assistance of counsel as there was a clear actual conflict of interest between both Defendants who were being represented by the same attorney. Jason Weiner began representing both Defendants but seems to have only had meaningful conversations with Garcia and not Leal. Both co-defendants were unable to be properly represented due to no contact orders stemming from domestic violence issues related to this criminal case. Since almost all communications were done solely with only Garcia as she was the one to retain and pay for Weiner's services, Leal simply was not involved in discussions regarding the case and had I had independent counsel to discuss with would have been able to proceed to trial.

I believe I am actually innocent as each victim signed a purchase agreement to purchase the properties which clearly stated that the properties were being sold "subject to liens and encumbrances and believe that a trial would show my innocence."

My plea was also entered without any meaningful representation. (See: Ground Two).

Ground 2: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Jason Weiner – Trial Counsel 2 PA 146 (pdf 11).

Supporting Facts: Weiner failed to disclose the court of the Civil Forfeiture case which was filed by the A.G. and had a direct impact on my ability to pay any restitution as it caused a Lis Pendens to be placed against a home which was to be sold to pay restitution. Instead the A.G. argued that there was nothing done to pay anybody back but that was simply not the case – Weiner did not disclose to the court the fact that this was a "package plea deal" which should have resulted in a more thorough plea canvass which would have prevented the issues in Ground One.

Weiner did not present the jurisdictional issues relating to the fact that certain properties were located and sold in Florida with Nevada having no jurisdiction for these sales.

Weiner represented both co-defendants from the period of December 2016 through April 9 2017 with no conflict of interest waiver in place at all while the co-defendants were involved in several actual conflicts (See Ground One).

Weiner did not dispute or challenge a insufficient charging document which made my plea unknowingly entered. The Information by which I was charged does not put me on notice of the charges as it does not contain each and every element of the crime charged or the facts showing how I allegedly committed the acts. It is not clear and concise and therefore a Defendant cannot plea to charges which do not constitute a crime.

Due to all of the above, counsel's assistance was clearly ineffective and in violation of my constitutional rights to effective counsel.

Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Craig A. Mueller and Lester M. Paredes – Appellate Counsel. 2 PA 147. (pdf 12).

Supporting Facts: I was never provided a copy of my pre-sentence investigation report (P.S.I.) prior to being sentenced as required by N.R.S. 176.153.

This is a due process violation as information in his PSI was presumably used against him at sentencing and is still being used against him by N.D.O.C. for purposes of classification. This non-disclosure affects the Petitioner's rights and ability to challenge and

dispute incorrect information as per Nevada Law, the only opportunity to do so is at sentencing. Petitioner will also be prejudiced moving forward as the Nevada Parole Board has stated that the P.S.I. is the primary document used to determine eventual release. Just a few errors from my PSI are: My offense date is listed as being over a period of 1 year when it was a period of approximately 90 days. Under "Offense Synopsis" there are 7 paragraphs which I do not know what they relate to. This information appears to have come directly from the A.G.'s office and was never provided to me. It also does not list my actual limited involvement and instead refers to "an individual" in 12 separate paragraphs. The referenced "individual" is not me but it is implied that it was me and a reader without knowing this could surely not make this distinction.

Appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue as it was error that was on the record and therefore appealable.

He also filed a Ground 4 on December 8 2020 (not in Apen but attached to this document herewith Exhibit 1) stating Leal's Guilty Plea Agreement is invalid as it was entered into involuntarily, under duress, because of undue influence and was coerced in all in violation of his rights pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the USA and of Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution.

Jean Schwartzer's primary reason for being on the case was to submit a motion to Modify Sentence which she did on October 28, 2020. 2 PA 157. (pdf 22). Her Motion to Modify was Denied without Prejudice November 17, 2020. On August 12 2020 Michael J Bongard, Senior Deputy Attorney General submitted an Answer to the Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 2 PA 167-79. (pdf

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allowed to withdraw.

32). On October 28, 2020 Attorney Schwartzer filed a Motion to Modify Sentence. 2 PA 157-66. (pdf 22). No signed Order regarding the Motion to Modify the Sentence is found online but the January 28 2021 minutes state "Ms. Schwartzer advised all parties agreed on the Order the Attorney General had submitted, which denied Defendant's Motion without prejudice. Upon Ms. Schwartzer's inquiry, Court clarified that if the supporting documents were obtained that Defendant could bring his Motion to Modify before the Court again and the Court would hear it on the merits." Minutes eFiled 1/28/21. And on November 27 2020 the minutes Efiled that same day for that hearing state "Argument by Ms. Schwartzer and Mr. Kovac. COURT ORDERED, Motion DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Court stated if Ms. Schwartzer can obtain the records on the other cases, it would take a look at them. Court noted it's concern regarding the fraudulent conduct in these cases. Court directed Mr. Kovac to prepare the Order for Today's decision within 30 days. Court further ordered, matter set for Status Check. Court noted it would not sign the Order prior to the Status Check date. On January 2021 There were three subsequent Stipulations and Orders to Extend time for the briefing schedule. Then on January 14 2021 Attorney Schwartzer was

In order to ensure inclusion of the entire prior Odyssey eFiled documents for case C-17-322644-2 for consideration as part of the record in the current writ case – this counsel requested and was granted Judicial Notice by the court of that case and its contents. 1 PA 3-5.

The Amended Judgment of Conviction was filed May 9, 2019. 1 PA 49-50. The original judgment of conviction was filed August 23, 2017. 1 PA 47-8.

	ACTION 1	ACTION 2	ACTION 3	<b>ACTION 4</b>
Grounds Raised for	Direct	First Writ of	1 <sup>st</sup> Writ	2 <sup>nd</sup> / current
the 4 actions after	Appeal	Habeas	appeal	writ of
<u>conviction</u>	74050	Corpus		Habeas
	Filed	C-17-322664-	Appeal	Corpus
	9/22/17	2	79243	
				A-20-814
	Remittitur	Denied after	Filed	369-W
	issued	briefing and	7/24/19	
	1/17/19	evidentiary	172 1712	filed 4/28/20
	2, 1,, 1,	hearing	Remittitur	With
		6/19/19	was filed	additional
			1/27/21	points added
			1/2//21	directly by
				Mr. Leal
T Turbus and the		<del></del>		5/27/20
Unknowing				Leal
involuntary				Ground 1
unintelligent plea – ineffective				014
Assistance of				Ground 4 (eFiled
1				12/8/20 – not
Counsel in plea				in APEN but
				attached -
			<u> </u>	Exhibit 1)
Failure to hold	Ground 1			Ground 2
Evidentiary Hearing				Leal
on breach of plea		13		

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i					
1	agreement re if		T		
2	restitution paid in				
-	advance would	,			
3	recommend or not				
4	object to probation				
	Denying appellant's	Ground 2			Ground 2
5	motion to withdraw	}			Leal
6	counsel due to an				
7	unwaiveable	}			
	concurrent conflict				
8	of interest				
9					
	Original		Point A	Page 6	Ground 2
10	Information				Leal
11	failed to put				
12	the petitioner				
12	on notice of				
13	the charges.				
14	Conflict – waiver		Point B 1	Page 6	
.	duel representation	1	1		
15	same attorney for the				
16	2 codefendants		1		
17	Petitioner's criminal				
1	counsel's assistance		1		
18	was ineffective, by				
19	failing to obtain a		}		
20	conflict waiver;	<u> </u>	<del></del>		
20	Coercion		Point B 2	Page 7-8	Point 1
21	Petitioner's criminal				
22	counsel's assistance		}		
	was ineffective,				
23	because prior				
24	counsel's				
l	performance fell				
25	below an objective	Ì		1	
26	standard of				
27	reasonableness as is	}		1	}
	mandated by				
28	Strickland, by	<u> </u>			

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1	coercing petitioner		
2	into entering a plea.		
	Trial counsel's		Point one
3	failure to present		4/28/20
4	mitigation factors at		Atty
5	sentencing, including		Schwartzer
٦	but not limited to the		
6	inability of Petitioner		
7	to pay the restitution		
	prior to sentencing		
8	due to document(s)		
9	being records on the		
10	property located at		
10	1024 Santa Helena		
11	Avenue, Henderson		
12	Nevada 89002 at the		
	mandate of the		
13	Attorney General,		
14	thereby making it		
ا ہ.	difficult to sell.		
15	PSI		Ground 3
16			Leal
17	Due to trial counsel's		Point 2
	failure to go over or		Atty
18	correct Petitioner's		Schwartzer
19	Presentence		
20	Investigation Report		
ا 20	prior to sentencing.		D-1-4-2
21	Due to trial counsel's		Point 3
22	failure to correct		Atty
	and/or explain errors		Schwartzer
23	in Petitioner's		
24	criminal history and		
25	nature of the instant offense.		
	Petitioner requests an		Point 4
26	evidentiary hearing		Atty
27	pursuant to NRS		Schwartzer
	34.770.		Schwartzer
28	J 1.1 1 U.	15	<u> </u>
		15	

### II. FACTS

Mr. Leal and his wife Jessica Garcia were accused of using their limited liability corporation Parcelnomics, LLC (d/b/a Investment Deals) to sell to purchasers encumbered property at very low prices. They were alleged to have not told the purchasers the property was encumbered – in a manner that violated the law. He denies this and points to the language in the signed agreements with the complainants disclaiming liability for any and all liens known or unknown.

### **III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

Mr. Leal's primary argument is that his plea was done unknowingly, involuntarily, unintelligently and without effective assistance of counsel. Further that but for his counsel's errors he would have taken the matter to trial. Due to this ineffective prejudicial assistance of counsel he urges the court to find manifest injustice occurred allowing plea withdrawal or at the very least resentencing. We will address these points further in the argument section as well as talking about the preliminary bars of timeliness, successive petitions, and - issues already raised and or that could have been previously raised as argued in the State's Answer filed August 12, 2020. 2 PA 167-79. (pdf 32).

Mr. Leal states he was of the belief that he fulfilled all disclosure duties and points

GRANT, BARGAIN AND SALE DEED

to the contract language reviewed and signed by the purchasers:

 FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged do by these presents transfer, sell and convey by this deed unto grantee, without warranty whether expressed or implied, in "as-is, where-is" condition and with any faults, all grantor's interest, if any, Grantee will take title to the property, subject to any and all claims, liens, and other encumbrances, if any." 1 PA 8-37.

A simple internet search "how do you find out if a property in Nevada is encumbered" shows how easy it is to follow up with background checks. This is important to keep in mind because in order to show manifest injustice for plea withdrawal efforts you must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for the unknowing, unintelligent, involuntary plea and or ineffectiveness of counsel there is a reasonable probability that you would have declined the plea offer and taken the matter to trial. Mr. Leal has signed a Declaration asserting this. 1 PA 6-7. In determining the credibility of this Declaration, one of the things the court is to look at the strength of the case. He states he made no active representations to people by affirmatively stating that the properties were not encumbered. Further he points to the contract language which specifically states the property is being sold as is and subject to existing liens: "Grantee will take title to the property, subject to any and all claims, liens, and other encumbrances, if any." 1 PA 9, 13, 17, 21, 25, 31, 35. Though he plead guilty at the plea hearing he maintains his actual innocence in his writ of habeas petition. 2 PA 145. (pdf 10).

Both codefendants Leal and Garcia plead guilty to count 14 – Multiple transactions

involving fraud or deceit in the court of an enterprise and occupation.

Count 14 3. A person who violates subsection 1 is guilty of a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 20 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000. NRS 205.377 3/1/15-3/31/16 Plea date: 4/24/17

### NRS 205.377 Multiple transactions involving fraud or deceit in course of enterprise or occupation; penalty. [Effective through June 30, 2020.]

- 1. A person shall not, in the course of an enterprise or occupation, knowingly and with the intent to defraud, engage in an act, practice or course of business or employ a device, scheme or artifice which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a person by means of a false representation or omission of a material fact that:
  - (a) The person knows to be false or omitted;
  - (b) The person intends another to rely on; and
  - (c) Results in a loss to any person who relied on the false representation

Ê in at least two transactions that have the same or similar pattern, intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents within 4 years and in which the aggregate loss or intended loss is more than \$650.

- 2. Each act which violates subsection 1 constitutes a separate offense.
- 3. A person who violates subsection 1 is guilty of a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 20 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000.
- 4. In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order a person who violates subsection 1 to pay restitution.
- 5. A violation of this section constitutes a deceptive trade practice for the purposes of NRS 598.0903 to 598.0999, inclusive.
- 6. As used in this section, "enterprise" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 207.380.

(Added to NRS by 2009, 143; A 2011, 168)

Their sentence and criminal history:

JOC	Amended	Prior Criminal History
 	300	<u></u>

1	Leal sentencing	72 months	5/9/19	PSI page 3-4
	8/17/17	to 180	72 months to	1 felony*
2	0/1//1/	months	180 months	
3		[6 years to	[6 years to 15	
4		15 years]	years] credit	
7		credit for 0	for 0 days	
5		days	"Jointly and severally with Co- Defendant" added	
7	Leal Continued: (*S	ee Attorney Schw		in Motion to Modify Sentence 2
, l				nt see one eFiled 10/28/20 in
8	case C-17-322644-2 – as	of 5/20/21 she ha	s been unable to ge	t supporting paperwork) 2
9	Misdemeanor 0 prisor			
10				ted of theft by deception  Deception 24 months
11				ice officer community
12	service and Resist pol	ice officer 206	10 days jail Add	litionally, the defendant was
				in Illinois 2003 and 2009
13				ot pursued or charges were
14			e Officer (4), Fin	ancial Identification Theft,
15	Forgery, and Theft by		7/16/10	DGI 2 4
	Garcia absconded	72 months	7/16/19	PSI page 3-4
16	and was absent for	to 180	48 months to 120 months	
17	what was intended to	months		
.	be a joint sentencing	[6 years to 15 years]	[4 years to 10 years] with	
18	hearing. His was held August 17 2017	with 574	651 days	
19	and hers was April	days credit	credit	
20	23, 2019	Restitution	Restitution	
	23, 2019	jointly and	jointly and	
21		severally	severally with	]
22		with Co-	Co-Defendant	
23		Defendant		
				ty District Court warrant in
24				18 to await sentencing.
25	5 misdemeanors 3 jai			
26	Domestic battery Phy			
				practice M 12 months jail
27		28060 3-31-9		
28	Theft one year jail sur	spended 2009	950043740	

6/12/9 Illinois Retail theft 45 days jail 200912929520 10/27/09 Retail theft 14 days jail 17CF003125-A-0

Florida Charged with Misd Battery and Felony possession of Heroin 6/27/17 Florida Charged with Battery Misd written plea filed Additionally, the defendant was arrested, detained m- cited for the following offenses in Illinois, Wisconsin and Florida between 2007 and 2016 for which no disposition is noted, prosecution was not pursued or charges were dismissed: (IL): Domestic Battery/Bodily Harm (2), Endanger Life/Health of a Child, Neglect Child hlcludes Nonsupport a Child (2), Retail Theft (2), Violate Order of Protection; (WI): Disorderly Conduct, Battery; (FL): Battery.

### III. ARGUMENT

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[in]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." <u>Strickland v Washington</u>, 466, U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); see also <u>State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland. 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64; see also Love, 109 Nev at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for the counsel's errors there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct at 2065, 2068. Warden, Nevada State Prison v Lyons, 100 Nev 430, 432, 683 P.2d

504, 505 (1984) (adopting the <u>Strickland</u> two-part test). The Nevada Supreme Court has held "claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be reviewed under the 'reasonably effective assistance' standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in <u>Strickland v Washington</u>, requiring the petitioner to show that counsel's assistance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense." <u>Bennett v State</u>, 111 Nev. 1099, 1108, 901 P.2d 676, 682 (Nev. 1995), and <u>Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, 987, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Nev. 1966).

When seeking postconviction relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel in which a plea agreement resulted in a judgement of conviction Petitioner must demonstrate a "reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Molina v State, 120 Nev. 185, 190-91, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004). "A guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Where defendant has pleaded guilty, the only claims that may be raised thereafter are those involving the voluntariness of the plea itself and the effectiveness of counsel. Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810(1)." Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 986, 923 P.2d 1102, 1106

 (1996). A motion to withdraw a guilty plea, based upon claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, directly places in issue the scope and content of communications between the attorney and the client. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 187, 87 P.3d 533, 535 (2004)

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v State at 1012, 33 (2004).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be reviewed under the 'reasonably effective assistance' standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in <u>Strickland v Washington</u>, requiring the petitioner to show that counsel's assistance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense." <u>Bennett v State</u>, 111 Nev. 1099, 1108, 901 P.2d 676, 682 (Nev. 1995), and <u>Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, 987, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Nev. 1966). Prejudice to the defendant occurs where there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. <u>Kirksey</u> at 988, 1107.

"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a claimant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Deficient performance is representation that falls below

an objective standard of reasonableness." <u>Evans v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 609, 622, 28 P.3d 498, 508 (2001).

For plea agreements, "The plain language of NRS 34.810(1)(a), as a whole, limits cognizable claims to two types, both of which challenge the validity of the guilty plea. See Harris v. State, 130 Nev. 435, 438-39, 329 P.3d 619, 621-22 (2014) (citing NRS 34.810(1)(a) for the proposition that "the validity of a guilty plea may be challenged in a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus" and for the proposition that the issues that may be raised are limited). The first acceptable challenge is a direct attack against the validity of a guilty plea on the basis that the plea was not voluntarily or knowingly entered. See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183, 125 S. Ct. 2398, 162 L. Ed. 2d 143 (2005) .... The second acceptable challenge is an indirect attack against the validity of a guilty plea on the basis that "the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." It is the meaning of this passage that is at the crux of the issue in this appeal." Gonzales v. State, 2020 Nev. App. LEXIS 8, \*3-4, 476 P.3d 84, 87, 136 Nev. Adv. Rep. 60.

The <u>Gonzales</u> court did not allow for consideration claims that "trial-level counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the State's breach of the plea agreement at the sentencing hearing and that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the breach on appeal." Id at 90-91.

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### Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) Habeas Corpus – Petitions for Postconviction Relief

### NRS 34.810 Additional reasons for dismissal of petition. [Effective through December 31, 2019.]

- 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.
- (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:
  - (1) Presented to the trial court;
- (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus or postconviction relief; or
- (3) Raised in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure relief from the petitioner's conviction and sentence, Ê unless the court finds both cause for the failure to present the grounds and actual prejudice to the petitioner.
- 2. A second or successive petition must be dismissed if the judge or justice determines that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and that the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge or justice finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
- (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner. Ê The petitioner shall include in the petition all prior proceedings in which the petitioner challenged the same conviction or sentence.
- 4. The court may dismiss a petition that fails to include any prior proceedings of which the court has knowledge through the record of the court or through the pleadings submitted by the respondent.

(Added to NRS by 1985, 1232; A 1989, 457; 1995, 2465; 2003, 1478; 2007, 1435)

Because defendant claims alleging deficiencies that occurred after he entered his guilty plea could not have <u>affected counsel's advice regarding entering</u> the plea or the outcome of the plea negotiations, they were not permitted by Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.810(1)(a). <u>Gonzales v. State</u>, 2020 Nev. App. LEXIS 8, \*1, 476 P.3d 84, 86, 136 Nev. Adv. Rep. 60.

"...The exclusion of these claims does not abrogate a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel in post-plea proceedings. It merely highlights that the Nevada Legislature has not provided petitioners a means of collaterally challenging counsel's efficacy in post-plea proceedings at the state level. Offenders remain free to seek redress of constitutional deprivations in federal courts in the first instance. Gonzales v. State, 2020 Nev. App. LEXIS 8, \*11, 476 P.3d 84, 89, 136 Nev. Adv. Rep. 60.

A District court may only set aside a conviction post-conviction sentence in order to correct "manifest injustice". NRS 176.165.

Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) Chapter 176 Judgment and Execution - Withdrawal of Plea

NRS 176.165 When plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere may be withdrawn. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is

imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended. To correct manifest injustice, the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea.

"To establish prejudice in the context of challenging a guilty plea agreement based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Molina v State, 120 Nev. 185, 190-191, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004). Kirksey v State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996).

1. Mr. Leal's Writ of Habeas Corpus Action in this case is timely per NRS 34.726 and Nevada Caselaw.

A petition challenging a judgment of conviction's validity must be filed within one year of the judgment or within one year of the remittitur, unless there is good cause to excuse delay. NRS 34.726(1). Under Sullivan v. State the Nevada Supreme Court has ruled that entry of an Amended Judgment of Conviction can at times restart the statutory time limit for post-conviction claims. Sullivan v. State, 120 Nev. 537, 540-1, 96 P.3d 761, 764. (2004). The Senior Deputy Attorney General argues in their initial Answer to the Petition for Postconviction Petition that both petitions are untimely thus barring their claims

from this Court's consideration. State Brief, August 12, 2020 page 5 at . 2 PA 167-179 at 171. (pdf 32 at 36.). On April 28, 2020, Attorney Jean J Schwartzer filed a second Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition in order to try to preserve timeliness. 2 PA 149-56. (pdf 14). The Amended Judgment of Conviction was filed May 9, 2019. The original judgment of conviction was filed August 23, 2017. 21PA 51-52. The Remittitur for the Direct Appeal was issued January 17, 2019. On May 27, 2020, Mr. Leal filed a handwritten Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus supplementing the previous one filed by Ms. Schwartzer. 2 PA 139. (pdf 4). And another December 8, 2020. Exhibit 1 Attached. The Amended Judgment of Conviction entered by the Court May 9, 2019 corrected the original judgment of conviction by ordering restitution jointly and severally. 1 PA 49-50. Under Whitehead v. State the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that changes to the Judgement of Conviction pertaining to restitution, qualified as a substantive change which allowed the date of the Amended Judgment of Conviction to serve as the commencement time of the 1 year time period under NRS 34.726 for the purposes of filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

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"The Supreme Court of Nevada concludes that a judgment of conviction that imposes restitution but does not set an amount of restitution, in violation of Nevada statutes, is not final and therefore does not trigger the one-year time limit for filing a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Whitehead v. State, 128 Nev. 259, 260, 285 P.3d 1053, 1053 (2012). "Given the requirements in Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.105(1) that

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restitution, if appropriate, be included in the judgment of conviction and in a specific dollar amount, the Supreme Court of Nevada concludes that a judgment of conviction that imposes a restitution obligation but does not specify its terms is not a final judgment. In those circumstances, the intermediate judgment is not sufficient to trigger the one-year period under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726 for filing a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Id.

The petition for reconsideration was granted. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. In doing so they determined it did not matter that the issues raised by Petitioner did not relate to the change causing the amendment in the judgment of conviction. "In that petition, Whitehead raised 45 claims of constitutional error, none of which related to the

Therefore, the Petitions for Relief filed by Attorney Schwartzer and added to by Mr. Leal are timely and require consideration on the merits.

This though the plea form on page 2 1 PA 55-69; and the Judge on page 3 line 7-8 of the April 24 2017 plea hearing transcript 2 PA 234 (pdf 99) both advise the sentence is to be joint and several between he and Jessica Garcia. See also Sentencing Transcript August 17,

2017 'Joint and several" page 8 line 4. 2 PA 244. (pdf 109). Whitehead is clear. The judgment of conviction must reflect the full restitution terms. This is more than the clerical error issue addressed in Sullivan v. State above.

2. The Petition and Addition are not Procedurally Defaulted as Successive per NRS 34.810.(2) and (3) and should be considered on the merits.

See NRS 34.810 Additional reasons for dismissal of petition. [Effective January 1, 2020.]

- 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a <u>plea of guilty</u> or guilty but mentally ill and <u>the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.</u>
- 2. A second or successive petition must be dismissed if the judge or justice determines that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and that the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge or justice finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
  - (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.
- The petitioner shall include in the petition all prior proceedings in which the petitioner challenged the same conviction or sentence.
  - 4. The court shall dismiss a petition without prejudice if:
- (a) The petition challenges the computation of time that the petitioner has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction; and
- (b) The court determines that the petitioner did not exhaust all available administrative remedies to resolve such a challenge as required by NRS 34.724.
- 5. The court may dismiss a petition that fails to include any prior proceedings of which the court has knowledge through the record of the court or through the pleadings submitted by the respondent.

Claims that could have been considered in a prior proceeding are generally waived.

The district court must dismiss any claims that could have been raised in a prior proceeding unless the court finds

(1) Cause for the procedural default & actual prejudice NRS 34.810(1)(b); or

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(2) That failure to consider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887.

Under well-established caselaw codefendants are to be treated similarly with identical charges and no significant difference.

"A disparity in the sentences of codefendants or accomplices may be a relevant mitigating circumstance. It is not mere disparity that is significant, however, but unexplained disparity." State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 926 P.2d 468 (1996). It is manifestly unfair that she absconds – does not show up at their sentencing hearing, is picked up a month later and has a very similar criminal background -and yet her sentence is modified shortly after receiving the same sentence as Mr. Leal because by July 9 2019 all the restitution had been paid. So her sentence was changed to 4 to 10 years instead of 6 to 15. This is important new information that was not available at the time of the plea hearing or at any of the prior postconviction actions. Not just for the sentencing factor alone – we are aware of our limited ability to raise issues outside of the plea proper in this writ. But because he agreed to what she agreed to after being coerced by both his attorney and Ms. Garcia – into taking joint plea agreements - he had no intention of shouldering more of the liability for the crime than his codefendant. "By the time Leal entered his guilty plea, he had already been subjected to several threats and instances of actual violence against him due to his desire not to go along with

the plea negotiations." Exhibit 1 attached page 3. So clearly it was unknowing unintelligent involuntary and without the effective assistance of counsel. He does not have the same rights to pursue EDCR 3.29 within 15 days of sentencing. So, it seems she is being rewarded for her bad behavior.

Mr. Leal did get the short end of the stick as far as being pressured to settle and counting on her to take care of the necessary paperwork so restitution could be paid in time for the sentencing. But it wasn't.

"When a conviction is the result of a guilty plea, the second, or "prejudice," requirement . . . focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the "prejudice" requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial". Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985) (emphasis added);

see also State v. Langarica, 107 Nev. 932, 933, 822 P.2d 1110, 1111 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 924, 121 L. Ed. 2d 261, 113 S. Ct. 346 (1992). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). Mr. Leal took it from all ends of this plea agreement in a prejudicial way. First his attorney was primarily her attorney and communicated for the most part with her his codefendant not him. Then he is coerced into taking a plea agreement on incomplete information about the plea – one for all and all for

one. Even though he tried to assert his rights and to point out the contract language which he believed made him innocent. His attorney never should have stated he believed the plea was voluntary - knowing Mr. Leal had this position. It is clear there was coercion if he plead guilty though he kept trying to show his position on why he felt he was in the right. But a package deal or not at all really can put a lot of pressure on the hold out. Then his codefendant says that she will try to arrange the sale of the house and payment of the restitution and she did not. And he is denied a delay in sentencing. She absconds. 2 AA 165. (pdf 31). He gets sentenced and lashed by the prosecutor and the court for not selling the house and providing the proceeds. He tried to explain she told him he was taking care of it. And when she is picked up on a warrant in Florida a month later and is brought back she is given with the State's cooperation and in fact insistence on - extension after extension after extension until the paperwork finally goes through and all the restitution is paid – thus lowering her sentence compared to his by 2-5 years. He was bullied and cajoled and stuck around anyway and what he got as clearly revealed after all the other appeals and writ were done was not what he thought he was going to get. His plea was done unknowingly without effective assistance of counsel. Knowing is defined in Black's Law Dictionary: Having or showing awareness or understanding [Knowing page 1042, Black's Law Dictionary, Deluxe 11th Edition, 2019]; well-informed. Voluntarily is defined as Intentionally -

 without coercion [Voluntarily page 1886, Id.] Ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defined supra at 33.

His due process rights were violated under the fourteenth and sixth amendments to the US Constitution. His counsel said it was the joint deal or no deal. Had he known it was possible it was not a joint deal he would never have taken it in the first place. He could not have foreseen this, but his counsel certainly could have. And this is one of the many things that Mr. Leal has asserted which establish manifest injustice sufficient to by a preponderance of evidence and allows plea withdrawal based on the totality of the circumstances.

### **CONCLUSION**

WHEREFORE, based upon the above and foregoing Mr. Leal respectfully requests this Court grant his Petition finding he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that ineffectiveness prejudiced him on multiple levels throughout his court proceedings. Under the totality of circumstances this court should find manifest injustice and allow postconviction plea withdrawal.

DATED this  $20^{th}$  day of May 2021.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Diane C. Lowe, Esq.
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Lowe Law. L.L.C.

7350 West Centennial Pkwy #3085

Las Vegas, NV 89131

Telephone: (725)212-2451 Facsimile: (702)442-0321

Attorney for Petitioner Jack Leal

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED, by the undersigned that on this 20<sup>th</sup> day of May, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Supplement with Exhibit 1 on the parties listed on the attached service list:

**BY E-MAIL:** by transmitting a copy of the document in the format to be used for attachments to the electronic-mail address designated by the attorney or the party who has filed a written consent for such manner of service. Attorney General of Nevada at <a href="MBongard@ag.nv.gov">MBongard@ag.nv.gov</a> and wiznetfilings@ag.nv.gov.

By: /s/Diane C Lowe, Esq.
DIANE C. LOWE
LOWE LAW, L.L.C.
Attorney for Jack Leal

**APEN** 

LOWE LAW, L.L.C.

DIANE C. LOWE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 14573

7350 West Centennial Pkwy #3085

Las Vegas, Nevada 89131

(725)212-2451 - F: (702)442-0321

Email: <u>DianeLowe@LoweLawLLC.com</u>
Attorney for Petitioner JACK LEAL

### EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

### CLARK COUNTY NEVADA

JACK LEAL, #1183500

Case No.: A-20-814369-W

DEPT NO XVII

Petitioner,

VS.

[Stemming from C-17-322664-2]

WILLIAM HUTCHINGS, WARDEN OF SOUTHERN DESERT STATE PRISON,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF TO WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Order of Appointment and Judicial Notice of Criminal Case

Signed Declaration of Jack Leal

Count 3 Evidence of Notice of possible Liens Given to Complainant

Count 4 Evidence of Notice of possible Liens Given to Complainant

Count 6 Evidence of Notice of possible Liens Given to Complainant

Count 7 Evidence of Notice of possible Liens Given to Complainant

Count 10 Evidence of Notice of possible Liens Given to Complainant

Count 13 Evidence of Notice of possible Liens Given to Complainant

Transcript of June 26 2018 Motion for Bail Hearing

Judgment of Conviction Leal August 23 2017

Amended Judgment of Conviction Leal May 9 2019

Judgment of Conviction of Codefendant Garcia April 25 2019

Amended Judgment of Conviction of Garcia July 16, 2019

Guilty Plea Agreement April 24 2017 Leal

Guilty Plea Agreement Garcia

Jack Leal Redacted PSI

Jessica Garcia Redacted PSI

Sentencing Minutes of Jessica Garcia April 23 2019

Motion to Reconsider Sentence for Garcia May 6 2019

Minutes of Motion to Reconsider Sentence and Resentencing Hearing July 9 2019

Online Article Avoiding Disparities between Sentences of Codefendants

Sentencing Disparity from website AZCourts

Offer Letter

Declaration of Jessica Garcia





### PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT

The Honorable Michael P. Villani Department XVII, Clark County Eighth Judicial District Court

Date Report Prepared: July 12, 2017

Prosecutor: Michael C. Kovac, Senjor DAG \*\*
Defense Attorney: Jason G. Weiner Retained

PSI:

### L-CASE INFORMATION

Defendant: Jessica Garcia

Case: C-17-322664

ID: None

P&P Bin: \$4004370695

PCN:

Offense Date:

Pending

.On or between 03-01-15

and 03-31-16

Arrest Date: Not a
Plea Date: 04-24

Sentencing Dates 08-17-17

#### H CHARCE INFORMATION

Offense: Multiple Transactions involving Brand or Deceit in the Course of an Enterprise of Occupation (F)

NRS: 205377 Category

NOC: 55110

Penalty: By imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than I year and a maximum

term of not more than 20 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000.

PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT Page 3 JESSICA GARCIA CC#: C-17-322664-3 Military Service: Health and Medical History: Mental Health History: Gambling History: Substance Abuse History: Gang Activity/Affiliation: IV. CRIMINAL RECORD As of July 12, 2017, records of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, the National Crime Information Center and the Federal Bureau of Investigation reflect the following information: GM: 0MISD: 5 CONVICTIONS-FEL: 0 INCARCERATIONS-PRISON: 0 JAIL: 3 SUPERVISION HISTORY: Parole Terms: 0 CURRENT- Probation Terms: 0 **PRIOR TERMS:** Probation-Revoked: 0 Discharged: Honorable: 0 Other: 0 Parole-Revoked: 0 Discharged: Honorable: 0 Other: 0 Active Arrest Warrants: Warrant#: 3950705 Jurisdiction: Las Vegas Justice Court Charges: Operate Unregistered Vehicle/Trailer/Semi (M) Extraditable: Clark County, Nevada Bail Amount: \$6,480.00 Adult: Arrest Date: Offense: Disposition: Domestic Battery/Physical Contact 03-31-08 200950024910 n

Maywood, IL Cook County S.O.	(M)	04-10-08: Convicted of Domestic Battery (M); sentenced to one year in jail, suspended with 36 days jail.
05-10-08 North Riverside, IL North Riverside PD	Deceptive Practice (M)	200840046480 06-02-08: Convicted of Deceptive Practice (M): sentenced to 12 months jail, suspended.

### PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT

JESSICA GARCIA CC#: C-17-322664-3 Page 4

03-31-09 Oak Park, IL Oak Park PD	Retail Theft (M)	200940028060 04-20-09: Convicted of Retail Theft (M); sentenced to one year jail, suspended.
06-12-09 Stickney, IL Stickney PD	Retail Theft (M)	200950043740 07-28-09: Convicted of Theft (M); sentenced to 45 days jail.
10-23-09 Chicago, IL Chicago PD	Retail Theft (M)	200912929520 10-27-09: Convicted of Retail Theft (M): sentenced to 14 days jail.
11-23-16 Las Vegas, NV AG's Office	Summons: 1. Racketeering (F) 2. Theft, \$3500+ (12 counts) (F) 3. Lewdness with a Minor Under 14 (F)	Instant Offense, CC#: C-17-322664-3
00.44.45	4.75	404E SD 00444E / 0

03-11-17 1. Battery (M) 2017-CF-003125-A-0
Apopka, FL 2. Possession of Heroin (F) 06-13-17: Arraignment
Apopka Police Department 08-28-17: Trial scheduled

06-27-17 Battery (M) 512017MM003372MMAXWS
Pasco County, FL
Pasco County S.O. 06-28-17: Order of No Contact
06-28-17: Compliant
06-29-17: Written Plea filed

Additionally, the defendant was arrested, detained or cited for the following offenses in Illinois, Wisconsin and Florida between 2007 and 2016 for which no disposition is noted, prosecution was not pursued or charges were dismissed: (IL): Domestic Battery/Bodily Harm (2), Endanger Life/Health of a Child, Neglect Child Includes Nonsupport a Child (2), Retail Theft (2), Violate Order of Protection; (WI): Disorderly Conduct, Battery; (FL): Battery.

Supplemental Information: N/A

Institutional/Supervision Adjustment: N/A

Page 5

### V. OFFENSE SYNOPSIS

Records provided by the State of Nevada Attorney General's Office reflect that the instant offense occurred substantially as follows:

In March of 2015, a victim found a property being auctioned off through Ebay.com and began email communications with the Jack Leal, the seller of the property. On March 11, 2015, the victim won the auction of the property with a bid of \$50,600. After winning the bid, the victim agreed to purchase an additional property. On March 11, 2015, the victim wired a total of \$98,620 to Jack Leal's personal bank account for the purchase of both properties. On April 1, 2015, the victim contact a title insurance company with questioning regarding the properties she purchased and was informed that liens existed for both properties. She contacted the defendant regarding the liens and he stated he had discussed the liens that existed on the properties with his attorney, claiming his attorney said the liens are "clouds" on the title. In February of 2016, the victim learned the second property she purchased was in foreclosure. Since April of 2015, she has been served with two foreclosure notices on both properties that Jack Leal claimed were "free and clear" of liens.

In June of 2015, a victim found a home on a website and met with an individual of the business owned by Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia. After negotiations, the victim and individual agreed on a price of \$70,000 for the house. The individual stated to the victim that purchasing the home for cash would allow the closing to go very quickly. The victim met the individual at the Clark County Recorder's Office on August 6, 2015 where they completed the sales transaction. In exchange, the victim directly handed the individual a cashier's check totaling \$70,000. In February of 2016, the victim attempted to refinance the property and was informed by the title company that there were a first and second mortgage totaling over \$300,000. On March 2, 2016, the victim found a foreclosure notice taped to the front door of the property. The victim attempted to contact the individual numerous times but he never returned her phone calls or messages.

In August of 2015, a victim found a property she wanted to purchase on a website. On September 1, 2015, the victim met with the individual, and Jack Leal at the Clark County Recorder's Office. Mr. Leal stated he saw no liens with the property. The victim then gave the individual a cashier's check for \$60,000 and was given a signed deed which was recorded. A few days after the sale, the victim saw another property listed by the individual that she wanted to purchase. The initial price of the property was \$50,000 but eventually agreed upon \$30,300. On September 9, 2015, the victim met with the individual at the Clark County Recorder's Office. She provided the individual with a cashier's check for \$30,300 made out to Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia's business and the deed for the property was recorded. On September 22, 2015, the victim learned that both of the properties she purchased had existing bank liens. She was able to get in contact with Leal and demanded her money back. He stated he would not return her money because there was no benefit for him to do so. The victim indicated she would take the purchase price minus what the individual earned for the sale. In November of 2015, Jessica Garcia contacted the victim regarding the original property she purchased and offered to purchase it back for \$40,000. The victim rejected the offer stating she paid \$60,000 for it and wanted her money back. On March 23, 2016, the victim made her final attempt to get her money and after feeling desperate, she told Jessica Garcia she would accept \$40,000 for the property. Approximately a week later, the victim was informed that the property would be purchased for \$30,000. Jessica Garcia told the victim she would transfer the property into the name of SRT Holdings, a company located in Arizona and would fax the victim a copy of the deed regarding the purchase. When the victim saw the deed was a warranty deed, she rejected the offer and did not have any further communication with the employee, defendant or co-defendant. A foreclosure notice on the second property the victim purchased was filed on March 28, 2016.

Page 6

In August of 2015, a victim agreed to purchase a property for \$65,000 from the individual listed on the advertisement. They met at the Clark County Recorder's Office and handed him a cashier's check for that amount and received the deed. The victim agreed to purchase a second property, met the individual at the Clark County Recorder's Office again and handed him a check for \$57,500. She reported that she did not receive keys for the property and was informed the deed would be mailed to her. She attempted to contact the individual asking for the deeds and the deed and did not receive any response. The victim stated she was advised to obtain an attorney to try and resolve the title issues on her properties.

In August of 2015, a victim agreed to a purchase price. She met the individual at the Clark County Recorder's Office, handed him a cashier's check for \$87,500 and was provided the deed. Within a few weeks, the victim discovered the home's title history and saw that it had "clouded title". The victim made contact with Leal who informed her that if she deeded the property back to him, she would receive \$50,000 back. In September of 2016, the victim deeded the property back and she received a \$50,000 check.

In August of 2015, a victim located a property for sale and agreed to purchase the property for \$149,000. The victim met the individual at the Clark County Clerk's Office and handed the individual two cashier's checks totaling \$149,000. Approximately thirty to forty-five days after the purchase, the victim was notified that there was an outstanding mortgage note on the property for approximately \$404,000. The victim obtained an attorney and was advised to accept partial payment from Jack Leal who offered a return of \$27,500. The victim accepted and that amount was returned to him. Near the end of April of 2016, the victim received a foreclosure notice on the property.

In August of 2015, the victim agreed to rent a property and paid \$2,500 upfront to the individual. After two days of renting, Jessica Garcia showed up to the property and was angry the individual had rented out the property to the victim. The victim ended up making a rent to own deal with Jessica Garcia and in September of 2015, agreed to purchase the property for \$40,000. The victim met Jessica Garcia at the Clark County Recorder's Office and handed a cashier's check for \$40,000. The victim reported the deed Jessica Garcia brought was already filled out and was given to the agent at the recorder's office on September 17, 2015. It was noted that the cashier's check was made out to Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia's business, but the deed provided to the victim stated that another business name was selling the home. The victim began receiving lien notices on the property. He contacted Jessica Garcia who stated she believed they were already paid and that they were not her concern anymore. The victim ultimately paid the liens which totaled approximately \$10,000.

In September of 2015, the victim found a property for sale on the website Zillow that was located in Florida. He contacted the individual who stated his company had power of attorney from Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia's company to sell the property, indicating the company was a Nevada corporation. They agreed on a price and he met the individual at the County Recorder's Office located in Florida, handed a cashier's check for \$85,000 and the deed was recorded. Approximately three weeks after the purchase, the victim discovered the house in foreclosure.

On September 20, 2015, the victim located a property for sale and offered \$75,000 for the property and they agreed to meet later in the day at the Clark County Recorder's Office. During the signing of the documents, Jessica Garcia stated the property was free and clear of all liens. The victim brought a purchase agreement with her, and both she and Jessica Garcia signed the document; however, she decided not to use the agreement and had blackened out her signature. Instead, Jessica Garcia used her own purchase agreement. After signing the deed, the victim gave Jessica Garcia a cashier's check for \$75,000. The victim spent approximately \$25,000 in renovations and placed the property for sale in December of 2015. While the sale was in escrow, the title search revealed an existing mortgage of approximately \$186,000. In February of 2016, the property went into foreclosure and was sold at auction. Additionally, the victim had previously bought a second

Page 7

property from the Jessica Garcia for \$95,000 and in June of 2016, she received a foreclosure notice on that property. For both properties, the victim was defrauded out of \$205,000.

In October of 2015, the victim agreed to buy property for \$60,000 and on November 2, 2015, she met the individual at the Clark County Recorder's Office. She handed over a check and the deed for the property was recorded. Later on, the victim discovered that there was a mortgage for approximately \$15,000. The victim hired an attorney and through negotiations, Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia's company offered approximately half of the \$60,000 payment back. In return, the victim had to sign a non-disclosure agreement with the company.

In November of 2015, a victim couple located a property for sale and offered \$100,000. On November 22, 2016, the victims met with the individual at the Clark County Recorder's Office and handed him a cashier's check for \$100,000 and the deed was recorded. In July of 2016, the victims were notified they may or not actually own their home and would want to verify with a title company. Approximately a week later, they stated their further research of the property indicated that there was in fact an encumbrance on the property.

In November of 2015, a victim decided to purchase property totaling \$100,000. On November 24, 2015, the victim met with the individual at the Clark County Recorder's Office and gave him the remaining balance of \$50,000 in cashier's checks and he was provided the deed. In December of 2015, the victim discovered there were still previous exiting liens on the property. The victim contacted and met with both the individual and Jack Leal, stating he was aware of the fraud and demanded a full refund of \$150,000. Jack Leal told the victim he would give him a full refund but he needed some time. In February of 2016, the victim stated he received a cashier's check for \$120,000; however, he never received the remaining \$30,000.

In February of 2016, an elderly victim couple met with an individual at the Clark County Recorder's Office and handed a check in the amount of \$20,000. Additionally, the victims reported they paid the individual a cash bonus on each transaction for giving them "such great deals". For this property, they stated the individual received approximately \$2,500. The victims ended up purchasing several additional properties from the individual which they paid approximately \$317,000 and additional bonuses paid to the individual for approximately \$24,000. A police report was submitted by the victim stating he paid the defendant \$50,000 for a property. After the purchase of the property, the victim received a foreclosure notice from the bank that he was never made aware of by Jack Leal.

In March of 2016, a victim agreed to purchase property. On April 8, 2016, the victim met the individual at the Clark County Recorder's Office, handed him a check for \$124,000 and the deed was recorded. She indicated the deed was already filled out when the individual arrived. Shortly after moving in, the victim discovered there was approximately \$10,000 in delinquent HOA liens on the property, which she paid herself. Within days of moving, she had seen a foreclosure notice posted to her door but did not pay attention to it because she believed it was for the previous owner.

On March 16, 2016, the investigator contacted a bankruptcy trustee who stated he was the legal trustee for the multiple properties purchased at bankruptcy auctions by Jack Leal. The trustee stated that Jack Leal was "definitely knowledgeable" about the liens and encumbrances that stayed with the property after the purchase at the auction and that those liens are specifically highlighted in the deed that is signed after purchase. He stated that the property was sold at a telephone auction and that a list of the properties for auction would be sent to approximately fifty people. These emails contained two sections: properties to be sold free and clear and properties to be sold subject to an existing mortgage. Additionally, the trustee stated that free and clear properties sell for an average of \$100,000 and properties with mortgages sell for an average of \$5,000. The trustee provided a list of six properties Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia's business purchased from him and those

Page 8

properties matched the addresses that relate to the defrauding victims. It was appeared that Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia's business purchased these properties for pennies on the dollar and "sold" them to unsuspecting victims at a much high value without telling victims about the existing encumbrances on the property.

Based on the investigation from the investigator, Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia were fraudulently misrepresenting encumbered properties to the victims as "free and clear" of any liens or mortgages. The business Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia operated appeared on forty-nine deeds in the Clark County, Nevada, at least several properties in Florida, over twenty properties in Michigan, as well as other properties in Ohio. Large rounded dollar cashier's checks identifying at least 15-30 other possible victims have been viewed in the bank accounts owed by Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia. The new alleged owners of the properties would then receive foreclosure notices, pay other outstanding liens, and be faced with financial burdens associated from the alleged property sale. Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia would then ignore the victims after the purported sale of the home, or offer to "buy" it back for less than they receive for it. Additionally, the business's Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia owned and operated are not licensed to conduct business with Clark County and Jack Leal and Jessica Garcia are not licensed with the Nevada Division of Real Estate to sell real estate.

Based on the aforementioned circumstances, a summons to appear was issued for Mr. Leal and Ms. Garcia.

Co-Defendant Information: Jack Leal, in case C-17-322664-2, pled guilty to Multiple Transactions Involving Fraud or Deceit in the Course of an Enterprise or Occupation (F). His sentencing is scheduled for August 17, 2017 in Department 17.

### VI. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT

#### VII. VICTIM INFORMATION/STATEMENT

According to the information contained in the Attorney General's file:

Victim #1 (VC2245835) suffered a financial loss of \$70,000.

Victim #2 (VC2245836) suffered a financial loss of \$75,000

Victim #3 (VC2245837) suffered a financial loss of \$37,500

Victim #4 (VC2245838) suffered a financial loss of \$57,500.

Victim #5 (VC2245839) suffered a financial loss of \$98,620.

Victim #6 (VC2245840) suffered a financial loss of \$90,300.

Victim #7 (VC2245841) suffered a financial loss of \$85,000.

Victim #8 (VC2245842) suffered a financial loss of \$50,000.

Victim #9 (VC2245843) suffered a financial loss of \$115,000.

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Victim #10 (VC2245844) suffered a financial loss of \$25,000.

Victim #11 (VC2245845) suffered a financial loss of \$53,500.

Therefore, the Division is recommending restitution in the amount of \$757,420.00.

### VIII. CUSTODY STATUS/CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED

Custody Status: Not arrested

CTS: 0 DAYS

#### **IX. PLEA NEGOTIATIONS**

- 1. The defendant will enter a plea of GUILTY to MULTIPLE TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING FRAUD OR DECEIT IN THE COURSE OF AN ENTERPRISE OR OCCUPATION, in violation of NRS 205.377, as alleged in Count One of the Criminal Information attached hereto as Exhibit"1";
- 2. The defendant will pay restitution to the named and unnamed victims in the total amount of seven hundred fifty-seven thousand four hundred twenty dollars (\$757,420) as follows:
  - i. \$70,000 to L.P.;
  - ii. \$75,000 to E.R.;
  - iii. \$37,500 to C.B.;
  - iv. \$57,500 to I.R.;
  - v. \$98,620 to L.Y.;
  - vi. \$90,300 to L.P.;
  - vii. \$85,000 to A.G.;
  - viii. \$50,000 to J.R.;
  - ix. \$115,000 to C.W.;
  - x. \$25,000 to S.B; and
  - xi. \$53,500 to T.L..
- 3. Should any of the named victims have previously recovered any of their losses, they shall not be entitled to restitution covering any such sum; instead, the portion of the restitution covering said sum shall instead be forfeited to the State of Nevada, Office of the Attorney General;
- 4. The defendant shall pay the restitution in full at or before the time she is sentenced in the present case;
- 5. The defendant and her co-conspirator, JACK LEAL, are jointly and severally responsible for said restitution;
- 6. Should the defendant pay restitution in full at or before the time she is sentenced in the present case, the State will not oppose the imposition of a term of probation not to exceed a term of five years, with a suspended 36- to-90 month term of imprisonment;
- 7. Should the defendant fail to pay restitution in full at or before the time she is sentenced in the present case, the State will retain the right to argue for the imposition of a term of imprisonment;
- 8. The defendant agrees that the \$157,105.17 seized in relation to the present case shall be forfeited to the State of Nevada, Office of the Attorney General, with said money to be applied to my restitution requirements;
- 9. The defendant will execute and file in the Clark County Recorder's Office a lien agreement and lien in favor of the State of Nevada, Office of the Attorney General, in the amount of \$600,314.83 against the home located at 1024 Santa Helena Avenue, Henderson, Nevada 89002, assessor parcel number 179-33-710-056, legally described as MISSION HILLS EST AMD PLAT BOOK 17 PAGE 12 LOT 223 & LOT 223A, with the proceeds of the sale of said home to be applied to my restitution requirements;
- 10. The defendant will pay all fees and costs imposed by the Court;

### PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT JESSICA GARCIA

Page 10

CC#: C-17-322664-3

- 11. The defendant will submit to any and all terms and conditions imposed by the Division of Parole and Probation, if granted probation:
- 12. The defendant understands that, pursuant to NRS 176.015(3), victims so desiring will be allowed to make impact statements;
- 13. Should the defendant satisfy all of the terms set forth in this agreement, including the payment of all monies owed, and receive an honorable discharge from probation, she will be permitted to withdraw her plea of guilty to the above-stated crime and enter a plea to the crime of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THEFT, a gross misdemeanor, in violation of NRS 199.480 and 205.0832; and
- 14. The defendant understands and agrees that, if she fails to interview with the Department of Parole and Probation, fail to appear at any subsequent hearings in this case, or an independent judge or magistrate, by affidavit review or other satisfactory proof, confirms probable cause against her for new criminal charges, including reckless driving or DUI, but excluding minor traffic violations, that the State will have the unqualified right to argue for any legal sentence and term of confinement allowable for the crime(s) to which she is pleading guilty, including the use of any prior convictions she may have to increase my sentence as a habitual criminal to five (5) to twenty (20) years, life without the possibility of parole, life with the possibility of parole after ten (10) years, or a definite twenty-five (25) year term with the possibility of parole after ten (10) years. Otherwise, she is entitled to receive the benefits of these negotiations as stated in the plea agreement.

### X. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on information obtained and provided in this report, the following recommendations are submitted.

190 Day Regimental Discipline Program: N/A

Deferred Sentence Per NRS 453.3363, 458.300, 458A.200, 176A.250, 176A.280: N/A

### FEES

Administrative Assessment: \$25.00

DNA Admin Assessment: \$3.00

Chemical/Drug Analysis: N/A

DNA: \$150.00 and submit to

testing

Domestic Violence Fee: N/A

Extradition: N/A

Psychosexual Fee: N/A

### SENTENCE

Minimum Term: 24 months

Maximum Term: 120 months

Location: NDOC

Consecutive to/Concurrent With: N/A Probation Recommended: No

Probation Term: N/A

Restitution: \$757,420.00 jointly and Mandatory Probation/

Fine: \$10,000.00

severally with co-offender

Prison: N/A

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the undersigned hereby affirms this document contains the social security number of a person as required by NRS 176.145.

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the undersigned hereby affirms this document does not contain the social security number of any person.

Per the Nevada Supreme Court opinion in Stockmeier v. Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners et al., any changes to factual allegations in the Presentence Investigation Report must be made at or before sentencing. Permanent changes to Criminal History must be initiated by the defendant by submitting a written request to the Criminal History Repository in the reporting state.

### PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT JESSICA GARCIA

CC#: C-17-322664-3

Page 11

The information used in the Presentence Investigation Report may be utilized reviewed by federal, state and/or local agencies for the purpose of prison classification, program eligibility and parole consideration.

In accordance with current Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision rules and requirements, all felony convictions and certain [gross] misdemeanants are offense eligible for compact consideration. Due to Interstate Compact standards, this conviction may or may not be offense eligible for courtesy supervision in the defendant's state of residence. If not offense eligible, the Division may still authorize the offender to relocate to their home state and report by mail until the term of probation is complete and/or the case has been completely resolved.

Respectfully Submitted,

Natalie A. Wood, Chief

Report prepared by: A. Denny

DPS Parole and Probation, Specialist III

Approved by:

Kathleen Houlihan, DPS Parole and Probation Supervisor

Southern Command, Las Vegas

Original signature on file



### **RECORDING COVER PAGE**

(Must be typed or printed clearly in BLACK ink only and avoid printing in the 1" margins of document)

APN# 124-07-412-095

(11 digit Assessor's Parcel Number may be obtained at: http://redrock.co.clark.nv.us/assrrealprop/ownr.aspx)

Inst #: 20150319-0001640
Fees: \$19.00 N/C Fee: \$0.00
RPTT: \$1127.10 Ex: #
03/19/2015 12:57:30 PM
Receipt #: 2354119
Requestor:
GOLDBERRY GROUP LLC
Recorded By: CYV Pgs: 4
DEBBIE CONWAY

**CLARK COUNTY RECORDER** 

### TITLE OF DOCUMENT (DO NOT Abbreviate)

GRANT, BARGAIN and SALE DEED

GRANI, BARGAIN and SALE DEED
Document Title on cover page must appear EXACTLY as the first page of the document to be recorded.
RECORDING REQUESTED BY: Jack Leal
RETURN TO: Name_ Goldberry Group, LLC
Address 5740 Stowell Drive
City/State/Zip Frisco, TX 75035
MAIL TAX STATEMENT TO: (Applicable to documents transferring real property)  Namesame as above
Address
Clts:/State/7 in

This page provides additional information required by NRS 111.312 Sections 1-2.

An additional recording fee of \$1.00 will apply.

To print this document properly, do not use page scaling.

Using this cover page does not exclude the document from assessing a noncompliance fee.

P:\Common\Forms & Notices\Cover Page Template Feb2014

A.P.N: 124-07-412-095

R.P.T.T:

When Recorded Mail To: Mail Tax Statements To: Goldberry Group, LLC 5740 Stowell Drive Frisco, TX 75035

### **GRANT, BARGAIN and SALE DEED**

FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents transfer, sell and convey by this deed, unto grantee, without warranty whether expressed or implied, in "as-is, where-is" condition and with any faults, all grantor's interest, if any. Grantee will take title to the property, subject to any and all claims, liens, and other encumbrances, if any.

The real property situate in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, described as follows:

4326 Oasis Plains Ave, Las Vegas, NV 89085

### PARCEL I:

LOT 95 OF TETONN ALLEY NW 80 R1-60 NO.1, AS SHOWN BY MAP THEREOF ON FILE IN BOOK 121 OF PLATS, PAGE 26, IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, AND AMENDED BY CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT RECORDED JANUARY 14, 2005, IN BOOK 20050114 AS DOCUMENT NO. 041 06 AND BY CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT RECORDED JUNE 16, 2005, IN BOOK 20050616, AS DOCUMENT NO. 0001448 AND AMENDED BY CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT RECORDED SEPTEMBER 20, 2007 IN BOOK 20070920 AS DOCUMENT NO. 02819, OFFICIAL RECORDS

#### PARCEL II:

AN EASEMENT FOR INGRESS AND EGRESS OVER PRIVATE STREETS AND COMMON AREAS AS SHOWN AND DELINEATED ON SAID MAP.

#### Now therefore

#### Jack Leal

## does hereby GRANT, BARGAIN and SELL to,

Goldberry Group, LLC

Together with all tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, including easements and water rights, if any, thereto belonging or appertaining, and any reversions, remainders, rents, issues or profits thereof.

Date: March 18, 2015

STATE OF NEVADA

**COUNTY OF CLARK** 

This instrument was acknowledged before me on March 18, 2015 by:

Notary Public

My Commissions expires: 8/20/2017



#### STATE OF NEVADA DECLARATION OF VALUE

1. Assessor Parcel Number(s)	
a. 124-07-412-095	
b.	
c,	
d.	
2. Type of Property:	
a. Vacant Land b. Single Fam. Res.	FOR RECORDERS OPTIONAL USE ONLY
c. Condo/Twnhse d. 2-4 Plex	BookPage:
e. Apt. Bldg f. Comm'l/Ind'l	Date of Recording:
g. Agricultural h. Mobile Home Other	Notes:
3.a. Total Value/Sales Price of Property	\$ 50,000.00
b. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Only (value of pr	operty (
c. Transfer Tax Value:	\$ 230,814
d. Real Property Transfer Tax Due	s 1,127.10
• •	
4. If Exemption Claimed:	
a. Transfer Tax Exemption per NRS 375.090	. Section
	ng under protest-plan
to file for return	
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred:	%
The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under	<b>/</b> ♥
and NRS 375 110 that the information provided i	s correct to the best of their information and belief,
and can be supported by documentation if called a	upon to substantiate the information provided herein.
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of	apon to substantiate the information provided herein.
additional tay due may result in a negative of 10%.	of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant
to NPS 275 030, the Private and Saller shall be join	of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant thy and severally liable for any additional amount owed.
to 14KS 575.050, the Buyer and Sener shall be join	my and severally habite for any additional amount owed.
Signature	Consider Cumor
Signature	Capacity: OWNER
Simotun	C
Signature	Capacity:
CELLED (CHANTON INTONACTION	
SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION	BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION
(REQUIRED)	(REQUIRED)
Print Name: Jack Leal	Print Name: Goldberry Group, LLC
Address:3157 N Rainbow Blvd, #248	Address: 5740 Stowell Drive
City:Las Vegas	City: Frisco
State: NV Zip: 89108	State:TX Zip:75035
MARKET AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND	
COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RECOR	
Print Name:	Escrow#
Address:	
	_
City:	State: Zip:

AS A PUBLIC RECORD THIS FORM MAY BE RECORDED/MICROFILMED



RECORDING COVER PAGE

(Must be typed or printed clearly in BLACK ink only and avoid printing in the 1" margins of document)

APN# 163-26-512-005

(11 digit Assessor's Parcel Number may be obtained at: http://redrock.co.clark.nv.us/assrrealprop/ownr.aspx)

Address 5740 Stowell Drive

Name same as above

Address

City/State/Zip\_\_\_

City/State/Zip\_Frisco, TX 75035

Inst #: 20150313-0001597 Fees: \$19.00 N/C Fee: \$0.00

RPTT: \$257.55 Ex: # 03/13/2015 01:08:20 PM Receipt #: 2346866

Requestor:

**GOLDBERRY GROUP LLC** Recorded By: MJM Pgs: 4 DEBBIE CONWAY

**CLARK COUNTY RECORDER** 

	(DO NOT Abbreviate)
GRANT, BARGAIN AND SALE DEED	
Document Title on co to be recorded.	over page must appear EXACTLY as the first page of the documen
RECORDING REQU	JESTED BY:
Jack Leal	
RETURN TO: Name	Goldberry Group, LLC

TITLE OF DOCUMENT

This page provides additional information required by NRS 111.312 Sections 1-2. An additional recording fee of \$1.00 will apply. To print this document properly, do not use page scaling. Using this cover page does not exclude the document from assessing a noncompliance fee. P:\Common\Forms & Notices\Cover Page Template Feb2014

MAIL TAX STATEMENT TO: (Applicable to documents transferring real property)

A.P.N: 163-26-512-005

R.P.T.T:

When Recorded Mail To: Mail Tax Statements To: Goldberry Group, LLC 5740 Stowell Drive Frisco, TX 75035

#### GRANT, BARGAIN and SALE DEED

FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents transfer, sell and convey by this deed, unto grantee, without warranty whether expressed or implied, in "as-is, where-is" condition and with any faults, all grantor's interest, if any. Grantee will take title to the property, subject to any and all claims, liens, and other encumbrances, if any.

The real property situate in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, described as follows:

6360 Katella Ave, Las Vegas, NV 89118

LOT NINETEEN (19) IN BLOCK SIX (6) OF FOOTHILLS VILLAGES – UNIT N. 2, AS SHOWN BY MAP THEREOF ON FILE IN BOOK 19 OF PLATS, PAGE 6, IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA.

Now therefore

Jack Leal

does hereby GRANT, BARGAIN and SELL to,

Goldberry Group, LLC

Together with all tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, including easements and water rights, if any, thereto belonging or appertaining, and any reversions, remainders, rents, issues or profits thereof.

Date: March 13, 2015

Jack Leal

STATE OF NEVADA

COUNTY OF CLARK

This instrument was acknowledged before me on March 13, 2015 by:

Notary Public

My Commissions expires: 14,2017

# STATE OF NEVADA DECLARATION OF VALUE

1. Assessor Parcel Number(s)	
a. 163-26-512-005	
b	
С	
d.	
2. Type of Property:	
a. Vacant Land b. Single Fam. Res.	FOR RECORDERS OPTIONAL USE ONLY
c. Condo/Twnhse d. 2-4 Plex	BookPage:
e. Apt. Bldg f. Comm'l/Ind'l	Date of Recording:
g. Agricultural h. Mobile Home	Notes:
Other	
3.a. Total Value/Sales Price of Property	\$ 50,100.00
b. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Only (value of prope	
c. Transfer Tax Value:	\$50,100
d. Real Property Transfer Tax Due	\$ 25755
a real report, riminer and Due	***
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under p and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is c and can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of an additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of	correct to the best of their information and belief, on to substantiate the information provided herein. by claimed exemption, or other determination of
Signature	Capacity: seller
Signature	Capacity:
SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)	BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)
Print Name: Jack Leal	Print Name: Goldberry Group, LLC
Address:3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248	Address: 5740 Stowell Drive
City:Las Vegas	City: Frisco
State: NV Zip: 89108	State:TX Zip:75035
COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RECORD	ING (Required if not seller or buyer)
Print Name:	Escrow #
Address:	
City:	State: Zip:
	State. 21p.

AS A PUBLIC RECORD THIS FORM MAY BE RECORDED/MICROFILMED



TITLE OF DOCUMENT

#### **RECORDING COVER PAGE**

City/State/Zip\_

(Must be typed or printed clearly in BLACK ink only and avoid printing in the 1" margins of document)

APN#	162-06-314-028
` -	Assessor's Parcel Number may be obtained at:
http://rec	irock.co.clark.nv.us/assrrealprop/ownr.aspx)

Inst #: 20150901-0002483 Fees: \$19.00 N/C Fee: \$0.00

RPTT: \$568.65 Ex: # 09/01/2015 03:08:16 PM Receipt #: 2543126

Requestor: LINA PALAFOX

Recorded By: SHAWA Pgs: 4

**DEBBIE CONWAY** 

**CLARK COUNTY RECORDER** 

(DO NOT Abbreviate)
GRANT, BARGAIN and SALE DEED
ocument Title on cover page must appear EXACTLY as the first page of the document be recorded.
ECORDING REQUESTED BY:
ETURN TO: Name Lina Palafox
Address 1251 Bledsoe Ln
City/State/Zip Las Vegas, NV 89110
IAIL TAX STATEMENT TO: (Applicable to documents transferring real property)
Name same as above
Address

This page provides additional information required by NRS 111.312 Sections 1-2.

An additional recording fee of \$1.00 will apply.

To print this document properly, do not use page scaling.

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A.P.N: 162-06-314-028

R.P.T.T:

When Recorded Mail To: Mail Tax Statements To: Lina Palafox 1251 Bledsoe Ln. Las Vegas, NV 89110

#### GRANT, BARGAIN and SALE DEED

FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents transfer, sell and convey by this deed, unto grantee, without warranty whether expressed or implied, in "as-is, where-is" condition and with any faults, all grantor's interest, if any. Grantee will take title to the property, subject to any and all claims, liens, and other encumbrances, if any.

The real property situate in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, described as follows:

2005 Aquarius Dr, North Las Vegas, NV 89102

Lot Eight (8) In Block Two (2) of Fairacres Tract No. 2 as shown by map thereof on file in Book 12 of Plats, Page 49, in the Office of the County Recorder, Clark County, Nevada.

Now therefore

Jack Leal

does hereby GRANT, BARGAIN and SELL to,

Lina Palafox

Together with all tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, including easements and water rights, if any, thereto belonging or appertaining, and any reversions, remainders, rents, issues or profits thereof.

Date: September 1, 2015

Jack Leal

STATE OF NEVADA

**COUNTY OF CLARK** 

This instrument was acknowledged before me on September 1, 2015 by:

CARLA SPILLMAN NOTARY PUBLIC

STATE OF NEVADA

**Notary Public** 

My Commissions expires: \\U-15-15

#### STATE OF NEVADA DECLARATION OF VALUE

Assessor Parcel Number(s)	
a_ 162-06-31-028	
ė.	
c.	
d.	
2. Type of Property:	
a. Vacant Land b. Single Fam. Res.	FOR RECORDERS OPTIONAL USE ONLY
c. Condo/Twnhse d. 2-4 Plex	BookPage:
e. Apt. Bldg f. Comm'l/Ind'l	Date of Recording
g. Agricultural h. Mobile Home	Notes:
Other	
3.a. Total Value/Sales Price of Property	\$1/11,191 KB
b. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Only (value of pro	T
c. Transfer Tax Value:	\$ 111, 191 (C)
d. Real Property Transfer Tax Due	\$ 548 85 VB
d. Real Property Transfer Tax Due	3 348 - 40
4. If Exemption Claimed:	
a. Transfer Tax Exemption per NRS 375.090,	Section
b. Explain Reason for Exemption.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred:	%
The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under	
and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is	
	pon to substantiate the information provided herein.
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of	
	f the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant
	ly and severally liable for any additional amount owed.
to NRS 375.030, the buyer and Serier shall be joint	ry and severally habit for any additional amount owed.
Signature	Capacity: Owner
Signature	Capacity. Owner
Signature	Capacity:
2181mme	Capacity.
SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION	BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION
(REQUIRED)	(REQUIRED)
Print Name: Jack Leal	Print Name: Lina Palafox
	Address: 1251 Bledsoe Ln
Address:3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248 City:Las Vegas	City: Las Vegas
State: NV Zip: 89108	
State.14V Z.Ip. 69 106	State: NI/ 7in: 90110
	State: NV Zip: 89110
COMPANY/DEDGON DECLIESTING DECODE	
COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RECORD	DING (Required if not seller or buyer)
Print Name:	
	DING (Required if not seller or buyer)

AS A PUBLIC RECORD THIS FORM MAY BE RECORDED/MICROFILMED

and avoid printing in the 1" margins of document) DEBBIE CONWAY **CLARK COUNTY RECORDER** (11 digit Assessor's Parcel Number may be obtained at: http://redrock.co.clark.nv.us/assrrealprop/ownr.aspx) TITLE OF DOCUMENT (DO NOT Abbreviate) Document Title on cover page must appear EXACTLY as the first page of the document to be recorded. RECORDING REQUESTED BY: RETURN TO: Name LN a MAIL TAX STATEMENT TO: (Applicable to documents transferring real property) Address

This page provides additional information required by NRS 111.312 Sections 1-2. An additional recording fee of \$1.00 will apply. To print this document properly, do not use page scaling. Using this cover page does not exclude the document from assessing a noncompliance fee. P:\Common\Forms & Notices\Cover Page Template Feb2014

**RECORDING COVER PAGE** 

(Must be typed or printed clearly in BLACK ink only

City/State/Zip

Inst #: 20150923-0002179 Fees: \$19.00 N/C Fee: \$25.00

Recorded By: ARO Pga: 6

RPTT: \$0.00 Ex: #003 09/23/2015 01:53:31 PM Receipt #: 2560928

Requestor:

LINA PALAFOX

C(3)

Inet #: 20150909-0001199
Fece: \$18.00 N/C Fee: \$25.00
RPTT: \$328.96 Ex: #
09/09/2016 12:56:18 PM
Receipt #: 2548363
Requestor:
LINA PALAROIX
Recorded By: DHG Pge: 3
DEBBIE CONWAY
CLARK COUNTY RECORDER

A.P.N: 138-26-811-032

R.P.T.T:

When Recorded Mail To: Mail Tax Statements To: Lina Palafox 1251 Bledsoe Ln. Las Vegas, NV 89110

#### GRANT, BARGAIN and SALE DEED

FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents transfer, sell and convey by this deed, unto grantee, without warranty whether expressed or implied, in "as-is, where-is" condition and with any faults, all grantor's interest, if any. Grantee will take title to the property, subject to any and all claims, liens, and other encumbrances, if any.

The real property situate in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, described as follows:

6213 Lawton Ave, Las Vegas, NV 89107

Lot Eighty-Five (85) in Block Ten (10) of Charleston Heights Tract No. 29-A, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 8 of Plats, Page 97, in the Office of the County Recorder, Clark County, Nevada.

Now therefore

Investment Deals (Grantor)

does hereby GRANT, BARGAIN and SELL to,

Lina Palafox (Grantee)

Together with all tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, including easements and water rights, if any, thereto belonging or appertaining, and any reversions, remainders, rents, issues or profits thereof.

Date: September 9, 2015

Assica Garcia, Member of Investment Deals, A Nevada Fictitious Firm Name

STATE OF NEVADA

COUNTY OF CLARK

This instrument was acknowledged before me on September 9, 2015 by: UESSICA Garcia

Notary Public

My Commissions expires: Oct 14,20 17

# 01-10462-1

#### STATE OF NEVADA DECLARATION OF VALUE

1. Assessor Parcel Number(s)	
a. 138-26-811-032	
:	
c.	
α,	
Type of Property:	
a. Vacant Land b. Single Fam. Res.	FOR RECORDERS OPTIONAL USE ONLY
c. Condo/Twnhse d. 2-4 Plex	Book Page:
	Date of Recording:
g. Agricultural h. Mobile Home	Notes:
Other	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
3.a. Total Value/Sales Price of Property	s <u>64223°</u>
b. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Only (value of proper	ty()
c. Transfer Tax Value:	\$ 6423°
d. Real Property Transfer Tax Due	\$ 308.2
- '	
4. If Exemption Claimed:	
a. Transfer Tax Exemption per NRS 375.090, Sec	ction
b. Explain Reason for Exemption:	
b. Explain Reason for Exemption:	
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100	%
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per	% nalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is contained to the c	% nalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rrect to the best of their information and belief,
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is countried and can be supported by documentation if called upon	% nalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rrect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein.
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is cound can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any	% nalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rrect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. claimed exemption, or other determination of
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is corand can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the	% nalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rrect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is cound can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any	malty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant
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5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is contained and can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature	% nalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rrect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity: Managing Member
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is contained and can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature	% nalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rrect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity: Managing Member
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is corand can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature	malty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity: Managing Member  Capacity:
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is contained and can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature  Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)	malty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity: Managing Member  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANIEE) INFORMATION
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is contained and can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED) Print Name: Investment Deals	malty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. It claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity: Managing Member  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is contained and can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED) Print Name: Investment Deals Address:3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248	malty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. It claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity:  Managing Member  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Line Palafox  Address: 1251 Bledsoe Ln  City: Las. Vegas
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is corand can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Investment Deals  Address:3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248 City: Las Vegas	malty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. It claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity:  Managing Member  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Line Palafox  Address: 1251 Bledsoe Ln  City: Las. Vegas
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is contained and can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED) Print Name: Investment Deals Address:3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248	malty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. It claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity: Managing Member  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Lina Palafox Address: 1251 Bledsoe Ln
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is contained and can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Investment Deals  Address: 3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248  City: Las Vegas  State: NV  Zip: 89108	malty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 meet to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity: Managing Member  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Lina Palafox Address: 1251 Bledsoe Ln  City: Las Vegas  Zip:89110
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is contained and can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED) Print Name: Investment Deals Address:3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248 City: Las Vegas State: NV  Zip: 89108	malty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity:  Managing Member  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Lina Palafox  Address: 1251 Bledsoe Ln  City: Las Vegas  Zip:89110
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is contained and can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED) Print Name: Investment Deals Address:3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248 City:Las Vegas State:NV  Zip: 89108	malty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 meet to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity: Managing Member  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Lina Palafox Address: 1251 Bledsoe Ln  City: Las Vegas  Zip:89110
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100 The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per and NRS 375.110. that the information provided is contained and can be supported by documentation if called upon Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED) Print Name: Investment Deals Address:3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248 City: Las Vegas State: NV  Zip: 89108	malty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 rect to the best of their information and belief, to substantiate the information provided herein. claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity:  Managing Member  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Lina Palafox  Address: 1251 Bledsoe Ln  City: Las Vegas  Zip:89110

AS A PUBLIC RECORD THIS FORM MAY BE RECORDED/MICROFILMED

CERTIFIED COPY, THIR DOCUMENT IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE RECORDED DOCUMENT MINUS ANY REDACTAD PONTIONS

SEP. 2 3. 2015

Nebbie Linuxy

#### STATE OF NEVADA DECLARATION OF VALUE

Assessor Parcel Number(s)	
a. 138-26-811-032	
b.	
с.	
d.	
2. Type of Property:	
a. Vacant Land b. Single Fam. Res.	FOR RECORDERS OPTIONAL USE ONLY
c. Condo/Twnhse d. 2-4 Piex	Book Page:
e. Apt. Bldg f. Comm'l/Ind'l	Date of Recording:
	I I
g. Agricultural h. Mobile Home	Notes:
Other	c 11 02 0
3.a. Total Value/Sales Price of Property	5 <u>64</u> 1123
b. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Only (value of propert	ty()_
c. Transfer Tax Value:	<u> 64,223</u>
d. Real Property Transfer Tax Due	5_0
	•
4. If Exemption Claimed:	••••
a. Transfer Tax Exemption per NRS 375.090, Sec	tion
b. Explain Reason for Exemption: Cerecord	and title to sonabre line
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred:	%
The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under per	nalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060
and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is cor	
and can be supported by documentation if called upon	
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any	
additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the	
to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly a	<del>-</del>
to title 575.050, the Dayor and beller shart pagentity a	ind sovepany masse for any additional amount over
Signature	Capacity: Grantor
Signature	capacity. O 141101
Sizzativa	Compaits
Signature	_ Capacity:
CELLED (CD (NEOD) INDODA (ENON	DIVIDE OR LUMBER INFORMATION
SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION	BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION
(REQUIRED)	(REQUIRED)
Print Name: True street Deals	Print Name: Cyc Tolotox
Address: 3157 y Danbow Blw #248	Address: 1351 Bledsne in
City: [15 Years	City: Uso Vegas
State: Zip: 89108	State: NY Zip: 89116
	· ·
COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RECORDIN	
Print Name:	Escrow #
Address:	· <del></del>
City:	State: Zip:

AS A PUBLIC RECORD THIS FORM MAY BE RECORDED/MICROFILMED

RECORDING COVER PAGE

(Must be typed or printed clearly in BLACK ink only and avoid printing in the 1" margins of document)

APN# 176-10-812-018

(11 digit Assessor's Parcel Number may be obtained at: http://redrock.co.clark.nv.us/assrrealprop/ownr.aspx)

Inst #: 20160413-0002444 Fees: \$19.00 N/C Fee: \$0.00 RPTT: \$2218.50 Ex: # 04/13/2016 02:49:18 PM Receipt #: 2735012 Requestor:

SRT HOLDINGS NEVADA POOL 4 Recorded By: GLORD Pge: 4

DEBBIE CONWAY

**CLARK COUNTY RECORDER** 

(DO NOT Abbreviate)	
GRANT, BARGAIN and SALE DEED	

Document Title on cover page must appear EXACTLY as the first page of the document to be recorded.

TITLE OF DOCUMENT

## **RECORDING REQUESTED BY:**

Pham Delaware Realty, LLC

RETURN TO: Name\_\_\_Pham Delaware Realty, LLC 

MAIL TAX STATEMENT TO: (Applicable to documents transferring real property)

Name\_Pham Delaware Realty, LLC Address 7159 Iron Oak Ave

City/State/Zip Las Vegas, NV 89113

This page provides additional information required by NRS 111.312 Sections 1-2. An additional recording fee of \$1.00 will apply. To print this document properly, do not use page scaling. Using this cover page does not exclude the document from assessing a noncompliance fee. P:\Common\Forms & Notices\Cover Page Template Feb2014

A.P.N: 176-10-812-018

R.P.T.T: \$2,218.50

When Recorded Mail To: Mail Tax Statements To: Pham Delaware Realty, LLC 7159 Iron Oak Ave Las Vegas, NV 89113

#### **GRANT, BARGAIN and SALE DEED**

FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents transfer, sell and convey by this deed, unto grantee, without warranty whether expressed or implied, in "as-is, where-is" condition and with any faults, all grantor's interest, if any. Grantee will take title to the property, subject to any and all claims, liens, and other encumbrances, if any.

The real property situate in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, described as follows:

7159 Iron Oak Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89113

Nevada Trails R2-70 #12; Plat Book 111, Page 16, Lot 18 & Vac Rd

Now therefore

SRT Holdings Nevada Pool 4, LLC

does hereby GRANT, BARGAIN and SELL to,

Pham Delaware Realty, LLC

Together with all tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, including easements and water rights, if any, thereto belonging or appertaining, and any reversions, remainders, rents, issues or profits thereof.

Date: April 13, 2016

Samantha Harley, On Behalf of SRT Holdings Neyada Pool 4, LLC


STATE OF ARIZONA

COUNTY OF MARICOPA

This instrument was acknowledged before me on April 13, 2016 by:

Notary Public

My Commissions expires. 8-20-16



#### STATE OF NEVADA DECLARATION OF VALUE

1. Assessor Parcel Number(s)	
a. 176-10-812-018	
b.	
d.	
2. Type of Property:	
	FOR RECORDERS OPTIONAL USE ONLY
c. Condo/Twnhse d. 2-4 Plex	BookPage:
e. Apt. Bldg f. Comm'l/Ind'l	Date of Recording:
g. Agricultural h. Mobile Home	Notes:
Other	
3.a. Total Value/Sales Price of Property	\$ 434,780.00
b. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Only (value of propert	
* * = -	434,780.00
	3 2,218.50
u. Real Property Transfer Tax Duc	, 2,2,10,00
a. Transfer Tax Exemption per NRS 375.090, Sect     b. Explain Reason for Exemption: NA	
5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred:	%
The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under pen	
and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is con	
and can be supported by documentation if called upon	
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any	
additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the	
to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly as	
to 14K3 373.030, the buyer and series shan or jointly an	id severally made for any additional amount owed.
Simple (	Console Granter
Signature /	Capacity: Grantor
Signature	_Capacity:
SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)	BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)
Print Name: SRT Holdings Nevada Pool 4 LLC	Print Name: Pham Delaware Realty, LLC
Address: 6501 E Greenway Pkwy, #244	Address: 7159 Iron Oak Ave
City: Scottsdale	City: Las Vegas
State: AZ Zip: 85254	State: NV Zip: 89113
Diam. 72 2:p. 60204	249,00110
COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RECORDIN	
Print Name: Keun Broun.	Escrow#
Address: 6501 E Green way Parkary #34	a As a Respect
City: Scale AR.	State: A2 Zip: 85054.

AS A PUBLIC RECORD THIS FORM MAY BE RECORDED/MICROFILMED



#### RECORDING COVER PAGE

(Must be typed or printed clearly in BLACK ink only and avoid printing in the 1" margins of document)

APN# 178-01-614-035

(11 digit Assessor's Parcel Number may be obtained at: http://redrock.co.clark.nv.us/assrrealprop/ownr.aspx)

Inst #: 20150416-0002699
Fees: \$19.00 N/G Fee: \$0.00
RPTT: \$272.85 Ex: #
04/16/2015 04:47:05 PM
Receipt #: 2388260
Requestor:
TAT LAM
Recorded By: ARO Pge: 4
DEBBIE CONWAY

CLARK COUNTY RECORDER

# TITLE OF DOCUMENT (DO NOT Abbreviate)

Document Title on cover page must appear EXACTLY as the first page of the document to be recorded.

RECORDING REQUESTED BY:

Jack Leal

RETURN TO: Name

Tat Lam

Address

337 N. 4th St.

City/State/Zip

San Jose, CA 95112

MAIL TAX STATEMENT TO: (Applicable to documents transferring real property)

Name

Same as above

Address

Address

This page provides additional information required by NRS 111.312 Sections 1-2.

An additional recording fee of \$1.00 will apply.

To print this document properly, do not use page scaling.

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P:\Common\Forms & Notices\Cover Page Template Feb2014

City/State/Zip\_\_\_\_\_

A.P.N: 178-01-614-035

R.P.T.T:

When Recorded Mail To: Mail Tax Statements To: Tat Lam
337 N. 4th St.
San Jose, CA 95112

#### **GRANT, BARGAIN and SALE DEED**

FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents transfer, sell and convey by this deed, unto grantee, without warranty whether expressed or implied, in "as-is, where-is" condition and with any faults, all grantor's interest, if any. Grantee will take title to the property, subject to any and all claims, liens, and other encumbrances, if any.

The real property situate in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, described as follows:

556 Liverpool Ave, Henderson, NV 89011

LOT FORTY (40) IN BLOCK TWENTY ONE (21) OF SUMMERFIELD UNIT 6C, AS SHOWN BY MAP THEREOF ON FILE IN BOOK 36 OF PLATS, PAGE 81, IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA.

Now therefore

Jack Leal

does hereby GRANT, BARGAIN and SELL to,

Tat Lam


Together with all tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, including easements and water rights, if any, thereto belonging or appertaining, and any reversions, remainders, rents, issues or profits thereof.

Date: April 16th, 2015

Jack Leal

STATE OF NEVADA

COUNTY OF CLARK



This instrument was acknowledged before me on April 16, 2015 by:

Notary Public

My Commissions expires: Oct 14,2017

#### STATE OF NEVADA DECLARATION OF VALUE

170 04 044 005	
a. 178-01-814-035	
<b>b</b> .	
C.	
d.	
2. Type of Property:	
a. Vacant Land b. Single Fam. Res.	FOR RECORDERS OPTIONAL USE ONLY
c. Condo/Twnhse d. 2-4 Plex	Book Page:
e. Apt. Bldg f. Comm'l/Ind'l	Date of Recording:
	•
g. Agricultural h. Mobile Home Other	Notes:
	A 50 500
3.a. Total Value/Sales Price of Property	\$ 53,500
b. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Only (value of prop	
c. Transfer Tax Value:	\$ 53,500
d. Real Property Transfer Tax Due	\$ 272.85
4. If Exemption Claimed:  a. Transfer Tax Exemption per NRS 375.090, S  b. Explain Reason for Exemption:  5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred:	
The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is and can be supported by documentation if called upon the control of the	correct to the best of their information and belief,
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of a additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of	ny claimed exemption, or other determination of
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of a additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly	ny claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of a additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly	ny claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant y and severally liable for any additional amount owed.
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of a additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly Signature	ny claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant y and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity: Granto
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of a additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly Signature  Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION	ny claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant y and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity:
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of a additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)	ny claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant y and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity:  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of a additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Jack Leal	ny claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant y and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity:  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Tat Lam
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of a additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly Signature  Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Jack Leal  Address:3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248	ny claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant y and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity:  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Tat Lam  Address: 337 N. 4th St.
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of a additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Jack Leal  Address: 3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248  City: Las Vegas  State: NV Zip: 89108  COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RECORD	ny claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant y and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity:  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Tat Lam Address: 337 N. 4th St.  City: San Jose State: CA Zip: 95112
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of a additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly Signature  Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Jack Leal  Address: 3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248  City: Las Vegas  State: NV Zip: 89108  COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RECORD Print Name:	ry claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant y and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity:  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Tat Lam  Address: 337 N. 4th St.  City: San Jose  State:CA  Zip:95112
Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of a additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly Signature  SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Jack Leal  Address: 3157 N Rainbow Blvd. #248  City: Las Vegas  State: NV Zip: 89108  COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RECORD	ny claimed exemption, or other determination of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant y and severally liable for any additional amount owed.  Capacity:  Capacity:  BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)  Print Name: Tat Lam Address: 337 N. 4th St.  City: San Jose State: CA Zip: 95112

AS A PUBLIC RECORD THIS FORM MAY BE RECORDED/MICROFILMED

7/27/2021 3:46 PM Steven D. Grierson 1 **ANS** CLERK OF THE COURT AARON D. FORD Attorney General MICHAEL F. BONGARD (Bar No. 007997) 3 Senior Deputy Attorney General State of Nevada 4 Office of the Attorney General 1539 Avenue F. Suite 2 5 Ely, NV 89301 (775)289-1632 (phone) 6 (775)289-1653 (fax) MBongard@ag.nv.gov 7 Attorney for Respondents 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 10 JACK LEAL, Case No.: A-20-814369-W 11 Petitioner. Department XVII 12 VS. 13 JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN, SOUTHERN DESERT CORRECTIONAL CENTER, 14 15 Respondents. ANSWER TO POST-CONVICTION PETITION FOR WRIT OF 16 **HABEAS CORPUS** 17 Respondents, by and through counsel, Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General of The State of Nevada, 18 and Michael J. Bongard, Senior Deputy Attorney General, hereby submit their answer to Petitioner Jack 19 Leal's (Leal) Counseled and Pro Se Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in this matter. 20 Respondents base this answer upon the pleadings, the legal authorities, and the pleadings on file 21 in this case. 22 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 23 I. JUSTICE COURT PROCEEDINGS 24 25 On November 29, 2016, the State filed a criminal complaint charging Leal with: one count of Racketeering, 12 counts of Theft in the Amount of \$3500 or More; one count of Fraud or Deceit in the 26 Course of Enterprise or Occupation (Raketeering); and one count of Multiple Transactions Involving 27 111 28

Page 1 of 16

**Electronically Filed** 

Fraud or Deceit in the Course of an Enterprise and Occupation. On April 11, 2017, Leal unconditionally waived his preliminary hearing, which included a conflict of interest waiver.

#### II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS, CASE NUMBER C-17-322664-2

On April 18, 2017, the State filed a criminal information charging Leal with one count of Multiple Transactions Involving Fraud or Deceit in the Course of an Enterprise and Occupation.

On April 24, 2017, the parties filed a guilty plea agreement in open court and appeared for entry of plea. Leal executed a second conflict of interest waiver. Leal pled guilty to the charge in the information agreeing to jointly and severally pay restitution in the amount of \$757,420.

The parties appeared for sentencing on August 17, 2017. The Court sentenced Leal to a maximum term of one hundred eighty (180) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections, with a minimum term of seventy-two (72) months, ordering restitution in the amount of \$757,420.00. The clerk filed the judgment of conviction on August 23, 2017.

Leal filed a notice of appeal on September 14, 2017.

On May 9, 2019, the Court entered an amended judgment of conviction which corrected the original judgment of conviction by ordering restitution jointly and severally pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.

## III. DIRECT APPEAL PROCEEDINGS, NEVADA COURT OF APPEALS, CASE 74050

Leal filed his opening brief on February 1, 2018. (RA 1). On appeal, Leal raised the following claims:

- A. Did the District Court err by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing or inquire into the nature and materiality of the alleged breach of the guilty plea agreement?
- B. Did the District Court err by denying Appellant's motion to withdraw counsel due to an unwaiveable concurrent conflict of interest?

The State filed the answer brief on March 20, 2018. (RA 28). Leal filed he reply brief on April 20, 2018. (RA 65).

On September 11, 2018, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed Leal's conviction. (RA 75). The Nevada Supreme Court subsequently denied Leal's petitions for review and reconsideration. Remittitur issued December 24, 2018. (RA 78).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Respondents refer to items in their appendix as "RA." Respondents refer to items in petitioner's appendix as "PA."

3 ||

On March 21, 2019, Leal filed his post-conviction state habeas corpus petition. (RA 80). In his petition, Leal raised the following claims:

- A. Mr. Leal's conviction and sentence are invalid under the 6<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Federal Constitutional Amendment guarantees of Due Process and Equal Protection, and under the law of Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution because the original information failed to put petitioner on notice of the charges;
- B. Mr. Leal's conviction and sentence are invalid under the 6<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Federal Constitutional Amendment guarantees of Due Process and Equal Protection, and under the law of Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution because prior counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as is mandated by *Strickland* [v. Washington], 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
  - 1.) Petitioner's criminal counsel's assistance was ineffective, because prior counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as is mandated by Strickland, by failing to obtain a conflict waiver;
  - 2.) Petitioner's criminal counsel's assistance was ineffective, because prior counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as is manded by Strickland, by coercing petitioner into entering a plea.

Respondent filed the answer on April 23, 2019. (RA 97). On May 7, 2019, counsel for the parties presented argument to the Court on the petition. The Court announced findings and denied the petition. The clerk filed the order denying the petition on June 19, 2019. (RA 226). Leal filed a notice of appeal.

# V. STATE HABEAS APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS, NEVADA COURT OF APPEALS CASE NUMBER 79243

Leal filed his pro se informal brief on December 30, 2019. (RA 237). The Nevada Supreme Court transferred the case to the Nevada Court of Appeals for decision.

On October 9, 2020, the Nevada Court affirmed the denial of Leal's state habeas petition. (RA 246). The Court rejected Leal's claims of: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel because the plea was not voluntary; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel because the information provided inadequate notice of the charges; and (4) found procedurally defaulted a claim the information provided inadequate notice of the charges. *Id*.

After denying rehearing, the remittitur issued on January 12, 2021.

#### VI. SECOND STATE HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS, CASE A-20-814369-W

On April 28, 2020, Leal filed a Counseled State Habeas Petition (PWHC). In that petition, Leal raises three claims: (1) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present mitigating factors at sentencing, due to the difficulty of selling property to pay restitution, (2) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to correct errors in the pre-sentence report prior to sentencing, and (3) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to correct or explain errors in Leal's criminal history prior to sentencing.

On May 27, 2020, Leal filed a Pro Se Habeas Petition (Pro Se PWHC). In that petition, Leal raises the following claims: (1) the guilty plea was involuntary, (2) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel (consisting of five subclaims)<sup>2</sup>, and (3) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise a claim that petitioner never received a copy of his pre-sentence investigation report.

Respondent filed an answer to these claims on August 12, 2020.

On December 8, 2020, Leal filed a Pro Se Supplemental Petition (Pro Se Supp). In his petition, Leal raises an additional claim:

Mr. Leal's guilty plea is invalid because it was entered into involuntarily, under duress, because of undue influence and was coerced in violation of his rights pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States of America and of Article 1 of the Nevada Constitution.

On May 5, 2021, Leal filed a Counseled Supplemental Petition (Supp PWHC). In his petition, opposing counsel raises the following claims:

- A. The habeas claims raised are not procedurally barred under NRS 34.726 and NRS 34.810. and that Leal's plea was entered into involuntarily
- B. Mr. Leal's plea was entered into unknowingly, involuntarily, unintelligently and without effective assistance from counsel.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Those subclaims are: (a) counsel failed to disclose to the Court a civil forfeiture case filed by the Attorney General's Office; (b) counsel failed to disclose to the court that the plea agreement involved both defendants, which should have noticed the Court to conduct a more thorough plea canvass; (c) counsel failed to litigate a "jurisdictional defect" i.e. certain properties were located out of state, therefore prosecution could not occur in Nevada; (d) counsel represented both co-defendants for a period of time without a conflict of interest waiver; (e) counsel did not dispute an insufficient charging document.

Respondent now files the response to the petitions. All claims in Leal's pro se and counseled petitions are barred by NRS 34.724(1), NRS 34.810(1) and (2), as well as the fact that claims previously raised and decided in prior proceedings are barred by the law of the case doctrine. In the event the Court reaches the merits of any claims, those claims are meritless.

#### **ARGUMENT AND LAW**

#### I. APPLICABLE LAW

Nevada law governs state habeas corpus proceedings. *McConnell v. State*, 212 P.3d 307, 309 (Nev. 2009). To the extent they do not conflict with habeas corpus statutes, the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure apply to habeas corpus proceedings. NRS 34.780.

Pursuant to NRS 34.724(1), a person may challenge that his sentence or conviction violates the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of Nevada. NRS 34.724(1). However, untimely petitions or petitions containing claims that could have been previously litigated in previous proceedings may be dismissed by the court. NRS 34.810 and NRS 34.726.

# II. ALL PRO SE AND COUNSELED PETITIONS ARE PROCEDURALLY BARRED, OR CLAIMES PREVIOUSLY RAISED ARE BARRED BY THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE

The Nevada Supreme Court has expressly stated "the statutory rules regarding procedural default are mandatory and cannot be ignored when properly raised by the State." *State v. Eighth Judicial District Ct. (Riker)*, 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 2070, 1074 (2005). Because consideration of the habeas procedural rules is mandatory, this Court should apply the procedural rules prior to reaching the merits of Leal's claims in his petitions.

#### A. The Procedural Bars Applicable to Leal's Claims

#### 1.) NRS 34.726

Leal's petitions are untimely. NRS 34.726(1) provides that absent good cause for delay, "a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within 1 year" after the Nevada Supreme Court issues its remittitur. NRS 34.726(1). The Nevada Supreme Court has reiterated the "plain and unambiguous" mandatory provisions contained within NRS 34.726 and has gone so far as to reject state habeas petitions that were filed even two days late. *See Gonzales v. State*, 118 Nev. 590, 593-94, 53 P.3d 901, 902-03 (2002).

Here, the Nevada Supreme Court issued its remittitur on December 24, 2018. Leal filed the Counseled Petition on April 28, 2020 and the Pro Se Petition on May 27, 2020. Consequently, both petitions are subject to dismissal because they are untimely.

By statute, a petitioner may demonstrate good cause and prejudice to excuse an untimely filing. NRS 34.736(1)(a) and (b). Good cause for delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court:

- (a) That the delay is not the fault of the petitioner; and
- (b) That dismissal of the petition as untimely will unduly prejudice the petitioner. NRS 34.726(1)(a) and (b).

Leal argues that his petition is timely because he filed it within one year of the filing of the amended judgment of conviction. *See*, Supp PWHC at 26. Leal cites the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in *Sullivan v. State*, 120 Nev. 537, 96 P.3d 761 (2004), in support of his argument.

However, Leal's supplement petition ignores the fact that the Court in Sullivan held:

Absent a showing of good cause as defined by this statute, untimely post-conviction claims that arise out of the proceedings involving the initial conviction or the direct appeal and that could have been raised before the judgment of conviction was amended are procedurally barred. We emphasize, however, that the entry of an amended judgment may in and of itself provide the good cause required by the statute to present appropriate post-conviction claims relating to the amendment at issue. In other words, if the claims presented in a petition filed within one year of the entry of the amended judgment challenge the proceedings leading to a substantive amendment to the judgment and could not have been raised in prior proceedings, there may be no delay attributable to the "fault of the petitioner."

120 Nev. at 541, 96 P.3d at 764.

In other words, the amended judgment of conviction does not start a new 1-year period for the statute of limitations in NRS 34.726(1). Instead, the Court in *Sullivan* found that a claim in a habeas petition that challenged the change in the amended judgment conviction was not untimely, if raised within a year of the filing of the amended judgment of conviction. 120 Nev. at 541, 96 P.3d at 764.

The amended judgment of conviction filed in Leal's case in March of 2019 addressed only one issue: adding language ordering restitution jointly and severally with the co-defendant. See, Leal's appendix, at 47-50. None of the claims raised in the Leal's four petitions filed since April of 2020 address

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the issue of joint and several payment of restitution. Therefore, Sullivan provides no basis for cause to excuse the application of NRS 34.726(1) to Leal's petitions.

Leal's supplemental counseled petition cites *Whitehead v. State*, 128 Nev. 259, 285 P.3d 1053 (2012), as a basis for starting a new one-year limitations period. However, extending the facts in Whitehead would stand NRS 34.726(1) and the Court's decision in Sullivan on its head.

In Whitehead, the Court granted reconsideration and held that "[A] judgment of conviction that imposes restitution but does not set an amount of restitution in violation of Nevada statutes, is not final and therefore does not trigger the one-year time limit for filing a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus." 128 Nev. at 260-61, 285 P.3d at 1054. The Court differentiated Sullivan from Whitehead, finding that in Sullivan the judgment was amended to correct a clerical error—but in Whitehead's case, the Court found the judgment (absent an amount of restitution) was "not a final judgment." Id. at 263, 285 P.3d at 1055.

In Leal's case, based upon both *Whitehead* and *Sullivan*, this Court should find the original judgment of conviction a final judgment because the judgment set forth an amount of restitution and the terms of paying the restitution in accordance with Nevada law. *See*, NRS 176.105(1) and 176.033(1)(c). Leal's Appendix at 47-48. The amended judgment of conviction, changed the terms of repayment to joint and several liability from individual liability, correcting an error and conforming with the plea agreement. Leal's Appendix at 49-50. Since the record in this case reflects both a valid original judgment of conviction and an amended judgment of conviction (both of which Leal treated as final documents), *Sullivan*—rather than *Whitehead*—controls the outcome of this case.

The Court must dismiss the petitions as untimely.

## 2.) NRS 34.810(1)(a)

NRS 34.810(1)(a) limits what claims a petitioner may in a habeas corpus petition when the petitioner judgment and sentence are pursuant to a plea agreement. Where a defendant enters a guilty plea, the Nevada Supreme Court found "the only claims that may be raised thereafter are those involving the voluntariness of the plea itself and the effectiveness of counsel. *Kirksey v. State*, 112 Nev. 980, 999, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). A petition or claim challenging a judgment of conviction entered pursuant

to a plea agreement must be dismissed if the claim does not allege the petitioner entered an unknowing or involuntary plea. NRS 34.810(1)(a).

The claims not alleging the plea was not involuntary or unknowing:

- The pro se petition's claim that counsel failed to disclose to the Court a civil forfeiture case filed by the Attorney General's Office (Ground 2(a)).
- The pro se petition's claim that counsel failed to disclose to the Court that a more thorough plea canvass was necessary because the plea agreement involved both co-defendants (Ground 2(b)).
- The pro se petition's claim counsel failed to litigate a jurisdictional defect regarding out-of-state properties (Ground 2(c)).
- The pro se petition's claim counsel represented both co-defendants for a period of time without a conflict of interest waiver (Ground 2(d)).
- The pro se petition's claim counsel did not dispute an allegedly insufficient charging document (Ground 2(e)).

Respondent requests the Court find these claims subject to dismissal because they are not properly before the Court, because Leal's guilty plea created a "break in the chain of events" barring relief from antecedent events. See, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).

Leal cites the Nevada Court of Appeal's decision in *Gonzales v. State*, 476 P.3d 84, 86 (Nev. 2020),<sup>3</sup> supporting argument that his claim are properly before the Court. Supp PWHC at 25. However, the Nevada Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeal's decision on January 8, 2021, and the case is currently pending a decision from the Supreme Court.<sup>4</sup> (Exhibit 11).

For the reasons stated above, *Sullivan* provides no basis for relief because none of Leal's claims address joint and several liability for restitution—the subject of the amended judgment of conviction.

#### 3.) NRS 34.810(2)

All of Leal's pro se and counseled petitions filed in this matter are also procedurally defaulted because the claims in those pleadings are either raised for a second time or (alternatively) Leal could have raised the claims in his first state habeas petition. A second or successive petition must be dismissed if "it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and that the prior determination was made on the merits," or "if new and different grounds are alleged," this Court can dismiss the claims upon a finding that Leal's failure to raise the claim previously constitutes an abuse of the writ. NRS 34.810(2). A court

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> 136 Nev. Adv. Rep. 60 (Case Number 78152-COA).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Even if Gonzales were still law, his petitions are still untimely, successive, and claims previously raised are barred by the law of the case.

may excuse the default of the second or successive petition if there is cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice NRS 34.810(3) or that failure to consider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. *Pellegrini*, 117 Nev. at 887.

As described below, Leal fails to bring claims that were not already raised in the previous proceedings, or alternatively raises claims that he could have raised in his first state habeas petition but failed to do so.

#### a. The claims raised for the second time

- The pro se petition's claim that the guilty plea was involuntary (Ground 1).
- The pro se petition's claim that counsel represented both co-defendant "for a period of time" without a conflict of interest waiver (Ground 2(d)).<sup>5</sup>
- The pro se petition's claim that counsel did not dispute an insufficient charging document (Ground 2(e)).
- The supplemental pro se petition's claim that the plea was invalid and under duress because of undue influence and coercion.
- The supplemental counseled petition's claim that the plea was involuntary (Ground A).
- The supplemental counseled petition's claim that the plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent and entered without the effective assistance of counsel (Ground B).

#### b. New claims that could have been raised in Leal's March, 2019 petition

- The counseled petition's claim that counsel failed to present mitigating factors at sentencing regarding difficulty selling the property to pay restitution (Ground 1).
- The counseled petition's claim that counsel failed to correct errors in the pre-sentence report (Ground 2).
- The counseled petition's claim that counsel failed to correct or explain errors in Leal's criminal history prior to sentencing (Ground 3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> If this Court finds the claim "new" because representation "for a period of time" is different than the March 2019 petition's claim that counsel had a conflict of interest, then the claim is defaulted for failure to raise the claim in the March 2019 petition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> To the extent that this claim raises new ground of ineffective assistance of counsel not raised in the March 2019 petition, the claims are defaulted because Leal should have raised the claims in the March 2019 petition.

- The pro se petition's claim that counsel failed to disclose to the Court a civil forfeiture case filed by the Attorney General's Office (Ground 2(a)).
- The pro se petition's claim that counsel failed to disclose to the Court that a more thorough plea canvass was necessary because the plea agreement involved both co-defendants (Ground 2(b)).
- The pro se petition's claim counsel failed to litigate a jurisdictional defect regarding out-of-state properties (Ground 2(c)).
- The pro se petition's claim appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim that petitioner never received a copy of his pre-sentence investigative report (Ground 3).

As cause and prejudice to excuse his default, Leal asserts that the disparity in sentences that were received by Leal and his co-defendant. See, Supp PWHC at 29. This Court should reject Leal's argument for three reasons: First, the Nevada Supreme Court held that there is "no rule of law require[ing] a court to sentence codefendant's to identical terms." *Nobles v. Warden*, 106 Nev. 67, 68, 787 P.2d 390, 391 (1990) (per curiam), *citing to People v. Walford*, 716 P.2d 137 (Colo.App. 1985).

Second, Leal litigated this issue in his October 2020 motion for modification of his sentence. See, Leal's Appendix at 157. The Court denied that motion without prejudice. See, Supp PWHC at 12.

Third, Leal fails to explain how an already litigated issue regarding his sentence length provides cause to look at unrelated and previously litigated claims seeking to overturn his conviction.

This Court should apply NRS 34.810(2) and dismiss the claims in Leal's second and successive petitions.

#### B. Law of the Case Doctrine

Claims previously raised on direct appeal and rejected by the appellate court are subject to the law of the case doctrine. Under the law of the case doctrine, "[w]hen an appellate court states a principle or rule of law necessary to a decision, the principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be followed throughout its subsequent process." *Hsu v. Cty. of Clark*, 123 Nev. 625, 629–30, 173 P.3d 724, 728 (2007).

Several of the claims raised in these proceedings have previously been considered and rejected by both this Court and the Nevada Court of Appeals. Those claims include:

 Ground 1 of the pro se second petition alleging the plea was involuntary, which was rejected by the Court of Appeal. (Exhibit 10).

///

- Ground 2(d) challenging counsel's failure to obtain a waiver of conflict. Exhibits 4 and 10).
- Ground 2(e) of the pro se second petition alleging counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge an insufficient charging document. (Exhibit 10).
- The claim of coercion in the supplemental pro se petition. (Exhibit 10).
- Ground A in the supplemental counseled petition that the plea was not voluntary. (Exhibits 4 and 10).
- Ground B in the supplemental petition that the plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary and entered without the effective assistance of counsel. (Exhibit 10).

Additionally, this Court also determined Leal failed to show his trial counsel's performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness that is required to show actual prejudice under *Strickland*. Under the law of the case doctrine, this rule of law must be followed throughout the subsequent habeas process. While Nevada recognizes at least the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception to the law of the case doctrine, as well as the intervening case law exception (*see, Hsu,* 123 Nev. at 631-33, 173 P.3d at 729-31), Leal's petitions plead neither exception to avoid application of the law of the case doctrine.

Consequently, the above-listed claims contained within both the Pro Se Supplemental and Counseled Supplemental Petition are barred by the law of the case doctrine.

Should the Court address the merits of the claims in the petitions in this case, the claims are meritless based on the argument and law presented below.

#### III. CLAIM RAISED IN THE PRO SE SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION

In the Pro Se Supplemental Petition, Leal alleges that his plea was unknowing and unintelligent because there was an actual conflict of interest due to his trial attorney representing both parties. Specifically, he contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure his guilty plea was voluntarily entered because he was allegedly coerced by his co-defendant Garcia to enter into the plea agreement and that this coercion constitutes an actual conflict of interest.

However, the court already considered and rejected this claim in his first state habeas petition. On two occasions, Leal signed and submitted waivers of conflict; one entered in the justice court and the second entered in district court prior to his entry of plea. (See, RA 193, 197). In doing so, Leal waived

any current or potential conflicts of interest. The Nevada Court of Appeals reaffirmed the validity of the waivers when it found that Leal waived the conflict. (RA 75 and 226).

Additionally, Leal acknowledged in the plea agreement that he entered into the plea agreement voluntarily and not as the results of threats or promises. Leal further acknowledged at the plea canvas that no one forced him to plead guilty and that he was acting of his own free will. Leal possessed full knowledge of the terms stated in the plea agreement and therefore cannot now argue that he was forced into the agreement.

Leal's allegations regarding a conflict without a valid waiver are meritless.

#### IV. CLAIMS RAISED IN COUNSELED SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION

#### A. Ground One in the Counseled Supplemental Petition (Ineffective Trial Counsel)

In the Counseled Supplemental Petition, Leal alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that ineffectiveness prejudiced him. Again, this claim was previously raised and rejected in prior habeas proceedings. *See Leal v. Howell*, 473 P.3d 464 (Nev. App. 2020).

To the extent that this claim is any different than the previous claims already raised in Ground One of the Pro Se petition or Ground Four of the Pro Se Supplemental Petition, it nonetheless fails to satisfy either prong of *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

A claim that counsel provided constitutionally inadequate representation is subject to the two-prong test established in *Strickland*. *Id*. To succeed on a claim of ineffective counsel, a claimant must demonstrate (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. *Id*. at 687. *See Bennett v. State*, 111 Nev. 1099, 1108, 901 P.2d 676, 682 (Nev. 1995), and *Kirksey v. State*, 112 Nev. 980, 987, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Nev. 1966). Deficient performance is representation that falls below the standard of reasonableness. *Evans v. State*, 117 Nev. 609, 28 P.3d 498 (2001). Prejudice to the defendant occurs where there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. *Kirksey* at 988, 1107. However, if a defendant makes an insufficient showing on either prong, a court need not consider both. *Id*. at 697.

Assuming this claim is not procedurally barred, this claim is meritless. As previously noted, the Nevada Court of Appeals already determined that Leal failed to demonstrate his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. *See Leal v. Howell*, 473 P.3d 464 (Nev. App. 2020).

Additionally, it was further determined Leal failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability he would have refused to plead guilty and insisted on proceeding to trial due to counsel's performance. *Id.* Since the appellate court and subsequent habeas proceedings, Leal has not pleaded any new facts that would bring this determination into question. Even if he pleaded facts sufficient to show ineffective counsel, he failed to allege them in any prior proceedings and therefore cannot argue such now.

As addressed above, the Court in *Sullivan* held that an amended judgment does not start a new one-year period for filing a state habeas petition under NRS 34.726, nor does Whitehead support argument that the Amended Judgment of Conviction prevents finding Leal's petitions untimely. *See*, II(A)(1), above.

## B. This Court Previously Found Leal's Plea Knowing, Intelligent and Voluntary, Entered with the Benefit of Effective Counsel

During Leal's first state habeas proceeding, this Court found Leal entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntary, further finding counsel was effective and that the record from the plea canvass belied Leal's claims of coercion or undue influence. (RA 229). The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's findings and decision. (RA 247-48).

Leal's petitions present no additional basis for relief other than the allegations previously presented to this Court and the Court of Appeals. Respondents therefore request that the Court deny Leal's claims that his plea was coerced, or not intelligent, knowing and voluntary.

#### V. LEAL'S CLAIMS ADDRESSED BY RESPONDENTS' AUGUST 2020 ANSWER

Respondents addressed the merits of the claims in Leal's original counseled and pro se petitions in the August, 2020 answer. While those claims are procedurally defaulted or barred by the law of the case doctrine, the claims are also meritless based upon the points and authorities briefed in the answer previously filed in this matter.

Page 13 of 16

## <u>CONCLUSION</u>

The relevant Nevada authority compels dismissal of Leal's petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed in this matter based upon the fact that the petitions are untimely, successive, and the law of the case doctrine bars some claims. Should the Court reach the merits of the claims in those pleadings, they are meritless.

DATED this 27th day of July, 2020.

AARON D. FORD Attorney General

By: /s/Michael J. Bongard
MICHAEL J. BONGARD
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# AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding pleading does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 27th day of July, 2021.

AARON D. FORD Attorney General

By: /s/ Michael J. Bongard
Michael J. Bongard
Senior Deputy Attorney General
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#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing <u>ANSWER TO POST-CONVICTION</u>

<u>PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS</u> with the Clerk of the Court by using the electronic filing system on the 27th day of July, 2021.

The following participants in this case are registered electronic filing system users and will be served electronically:

U Lowe Law, L.L.C
Diane C. Lowe, Esq.
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Las Vegas, NV 89131
dianelowe@lowelawllc.com

/s/ Amanda White

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5	DISTRICT COURT	
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
7		
8	JACK LEAL,	CASE#: A-20-814369-W
9	Petitioner,	DEPT. XVII
10	vs.	
11	JERRY HOWELL,	
12	Respondent.	
13		
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE	
15	FRIDAY, AUGUST 27, 2021	
16	RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS	
17		
18	APPEARANCES: [All appearances via videoconference]	
19	For the Petitioner: DIANE L	OWE, ESQ.
20		
21	·	EL BONGARD, ESQ. Deputy Attorney General
22		
23		
24	RECORDED BY: KRISTINE SANTI, COURT RECORDER	
25		

Page 1
Case Number: A-20-814369-W

[Case called at 8:39 a.m.]

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THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Page 2 is Jack Leal.

MR. BONGARD: Your Honor, Michael Bongard from the Attorney General's Office. Bar number 7997 appearing for respondents.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. LOWE: Attorney Diane Lowe, bar number 14573 appears for petitioner, Jack Leal.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Ms. Lowe, it's your petition, go ahead.

MS. LOWE: Your Honor, we submitted a second writ petition. As you know, there had been three prior actions, a direct appeal, a writ of habeas corpus, an appeal on the writ of habeas corpus. And Your Honor, appointed me for the second writ of habeas corpus.

The first question that we have to address is whether this second writ is timely. The -- there was a judgment of conviction filed on August 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2017. There was an amended judgment of conviction filed May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2019. Now it's our position and obviously the Attorney General disagrees that the amended judgment of conviction, which is May 9th. 2019, should allow the filed second petition on April 28<sup>th</sup>, 2020 to be timely.

There are two cases primarily addressing these issues on whether it's a clerical change. Under Sullivan v. State, the clerical change isn't allowed to change the date for purposes of filing for a

second writ or another writ. And but under *Whitehead v. State*, which we argue this case falls under, there is a chance to consider if the change was substantive of had to do with restitution which in this case the language added to the amended judgment of conviction was to add the joint and severely portion of the final order for restitution. Then if that's the case, this petition is timely because the amended judgment of conviction was May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2019.

The Schwartzer second writ petition was filed April 28<sup>th</sup>. And we would also argue Mr. Leal made a supplement to that in May 2020. We don't think they should be counted as two separate petitions. Rather, he was just adding to the one that was initially filed by Ms. Schwartzer. So we have that hurdle that you would need to make a decision on.

The second issue is whether the issues raised were law of the case or whether they're allowed under a successive petition, were the issues allowable with the first writ. And if they were, does that preclude them from being issued in this next writ. So I did prepare a chart on page 13 of my supplement outlining all the actions and the issues raised.

We believe partly because there as new information clearly showing prejudice which he couldn't establish necessarily before. But the fact that his co-defendant was given an ultimate sentence of 4 to 10 years and his sentence was 6 to 15 years, there's clear prejudice showing in the actions which wasn't in existence before. So when you look at 34.812 and 34.803(b), one of the things you're to look at when considering these issues is was the claim available previously.

So we weren't able necessarily to show prejudice before. But now we can clearly establish that due to the actions of his prior counsel, for instance, not getting a stay on the sentencing hearing in sufficient time so that they could gather the information. He had to have done—the trial counsel had to have done something wrong by not contacting the Court earlier rather than just trying to address it at the sentencing hearing that hey look, we believe that because the property is tied up with this lis pendens with the Attorney General's Office it's been making it difficult to sell the property. He was under the understanding that his wife was acting to sell the property. There as a miscommunication problem and his attorney should have handled it better and addressed that in a way where he would have had ability to have the extensions that his wife did.

Your Honor, they have similar criminal backgrounds, very minimal. So even though opposing counsel Bongard cites cases which states that in Nevada you don't have to have equal sentencing for codefendants for the same crime, if you read through the cases that he cites, they're very clear that if for the particular instances where the Court made those decisions, they very clearly state the differences between the two defendants and their background as to why there was a difference in the sentencing.

So there may be some general language that leads one to believe that that's what the case is standing for, that you blanketly [sic] don't have to sentence two defendants to the same thing. But if you read further in the cases, they clearly note that because -- this is

because two co-defendants don't necessarily have the same background. And that's for each -- I read through all the sentencing cases that Mr. Bongard cited and that was for every single case.

Never in the cases that they cite do they state that it doesn't matter whether they, for instance, don't -- neither of them have a criminal record and both of them had the same amount of participation in the crime. Never is there a case like that. It's always well this one was a ring leader or this one had more of a criminal record.

But I think in this case — and the reason I'm going into this more in depth is because it has to do with prejudice. In this case when you look at the backgrounds, which I've clearly outlined in my supplement of each of the defendants, on page 19, very, very similar backgrounds. So the fact that they're given such a different sentence ultimately and the fact that his attorney—her attorney, rather, was able to get extension after extension after extension, but Mr. Leal's attorney, the same guy, obviously he didn't give him the same sort of services because he didn't get the extension that he wanted that would have been able to give him what he was looking for and that was fair, fair, fair sentence based on what his efforts were. So we also believe —

THE COURT: Did Mr. Leal just place the lien on the property just one week before sentencing? I mean, that was my concern at the time of sentencing that didn't show good faith on his part, trying to, you know, resolve the issue of restitution.

MS. LOWE: Right. And that was one of the reasons, but also he wasn't at fault, the trial attorney for not outlining the other reasons.

Well first, there was -- it was a definite communication problem. But I do believe Mr. Leal had told him in advance that -- and of course Mr. Leal did make a statement to the Court and maybe he didn't get everything in that he wanted and that's not really his fault. He's not a trained litigator and someone knows what's important or who has excellent speaking skills when it's pretty nerve racking alone to appear in court. But his attorney knew of the reasons that he was relying on his wife to do all of this. And there were some efforts on his part. But he didn't take the necessary action in advance. It shouldn't have been left to his client.

So as you note in Mr. Leal's filings, he did file some things prior to me jumping on. He does complain that his attorney was one-sided with his wife and didn't seem to pay attention to what he wanted and what he was doing and what his impressions were. And so it was the fault of his attorney to not get some sort of stay well in advance and to ensure that these things were taken care of because he knew how important that was. But he did not.

And I'm not -- I haven't outlined too all the other issues that he wanted to address. I mean, some of these factors that he raises unknowing, unintelligent plea, ineffective assistance of counsel, there as a coercion portion that was prior law of the case, but this next action four raises it in a way that's a little bit more general and I think can go to -- to go to he wasn't aware of things and that his attorney didn't shepherd him through. He treated the couple more as a couple and used the wife as the primary person of contact. And yet as we've talked to the Court about or as he has addressed with the Court there were some domestic

abuse issues of him, some intimidation. And so his position and his knowledge of the case and what should have been relayed to the Court was not.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. State.

MR. BONGARD: Thank you, Your Honor. Unless the Court has any specific questions I want to address just three areas. First is a correction on the bottom of page 12 of my answer I give the specific reporter site for Mr. Leal's first habeas case. And it refers to a Westlaw citation. That's 2020 Westlaw 6019375.

Next I wanted to address, Your Honor, the *Gonzales* case. I filed a notice of supplemental authority two weeks ago addressing *Gonzales versus State*, Nevada Supreme Court opinion. The Pacific Reporter site is 476 Pacific 3d 84. In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court over — withdrew and basically reinterpreted the decision of the Court of Appeals that discussed the interpretation or the proper interpretation and scope of NRS 34.810(1).

The Court said that in their -- they found that that statute is basically a codification of the United States Supreme Court case, which is *Tollett versus Henderson*. And they stated that the proper interpretation to give the 34.810(1) is that a petitioner waives claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. And then quoting from the decision and *Tollett*, the Court said he may only attach the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys

in criminal cases.

So the Court based on *Gonzales* can separate Mr. Leal's claims into two categories. One categories of claims that are alleging violations of constitutional rights prior to the entry of the plea which are clearly barred by *Gonzales* and its interpretation of NRS 34.810(1).

Second, claims that address things -- defects either in the plea proceeding itself, which go to the voluntary nature of the plea, or defects that occur after the change of plea. And that's what the Court of Appeals originally cut out in their original decision. But the Nevada Supreme Court restored, based on their decision in *Gonzales*. And again of the -- and I outlined in my answer the claims that are barred pursuant to 34.810 based upon that type of reading, a codification of *Tollett* versus claims that would still be viable after *Gonzales*. But that's the least procedural bars in place under 34.810(2) a successive petition and a statute of limitations.

And Ms. Lowe states that *Whitehead* provides relief. But I believe, Your Honor, the key way to address that argument it looking at *Sullivan versus State*, 120 Nevada 537. In *Sullivan* the Supreme Court stated that the goal of having finality in criminal convictions would be an absurd result if every amendment of a judgment of conviction restarted the time limit under 34.726(1).

And what the Court said is that an amended judgment doesn't restart the clock for filing of a habeas petition, rather if a claim is raised within one year of the amended judgment the fact that that new claim touches on the subject of the amendment and could not have been

raised in a prior proceeding and is no fault of the petitioner, then what you have is you have cause to excuse the untimely filing of the claim and then you address prejudice.

And if the Court looks at Mr. Leal's claims, none of his claims touch on the subject matter of the amendment of the judgment of conviction which changed the restitution from sole responsibility of Mr. Leal to joint and several responsibility based on both defendants. So Your Honor, therefore I would ask the Court to find the claims in Mr. Leal's petition untimely, successive, barred by 34.810(1) or barred by the law of the case doctrine.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

Ms. Lowe, on August 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017, when the defendant was sentenced, I did impose restitution, correct? And the amendment only dealt with joint and several. Isn't that different than the *Whitehead* case?

MS. LOWE: Well the difference being, you're right, Your Honor. And I did point that out specifically in my brief, because I didn't want to mislead you. You did state and the plea agreement did state exact amount of restitution plus joint and several. So the one change in the amended judgment of conviction was that it added the language that was already discussed by you at the hearing. So that's the tricky question you have here.

There is a line specifically in *Whitehead* -- and I want to address a point that attorney Bongard raised as far as if the issue of the amendment is not the subject of what's being raised in the petition it can't be raised. *Whitehead* specifically -- and incidentally *Whitehead* 

was 2012 case. And *Sullivan*, the case, that he's citing from is 2004. But Whitehead specifically states it doesn't matter if the claims you're raising has to do with the change in the judgment of conviction, the amended judgment of conviction. All it matters is that the amended judgment of conviction — well for instance, I think there's a line in here, relates to restitution. It puts in something about the restitution that wasn't in there before. And so that his claims do not rerelease to that is non-issue under *Whitehead*. But yes, that's the exact crux of what you're — we're asking you to decide.

You said it at the hearing at sentencing specifically. And I believe the plea agreement said that to. It was left off of the judgment of conviction. And we're arguing that under *Whitehead* there is room to interpret that cases meaning because the restitution terms were not left off, there's a specific line in the case that's directly says if the restitution terms are left out of the judgment of conviction, then the amended judgment of conviction is what you go from for tolling the limits of filing a writ of habeas corpus. So under the plain language we think that Mr. Leal should prevail as to that hurdle.

THE COURT: Well joint and several -- as you know, in joint and several liability if Ms. -- if the wife paid zero restitution, he's on the hook for the full amount, correct?

MS. LOWE: Right.

THE COURT: And if she paid all of it, he wouldn't have to pay a penny. And so me ordering restitution didn't change anything.

Actually just the joint and several just inured to his benefit in the event

 that Ms. Leal paid any restitution. The restitution amount, no matter what, is still due and owing. Let's saying I think it was 757 -- \$757,000 and change perhaps.

And so and I'm looking at Whitehead right now. It says the setting the amount of restitution at the evidentiary hearing is not analogous to correcting an error. Rather it's an integral part of the sentence. So isn't -- then I imposed the full amount of restitution, which is due and owing from him from his wife. And if she decides not to pay --

MS. LOWE: Yes, you did.

THE COURT: -- he has to pay it all.

MS. LOWE: Yes, you did.

THE COURT: Anything further, counsel?

MS. LOWE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I do find that the petition the second petition is untimely. I do not find good cause to overlook
the untimeliness nature of the petition. I also find if to be successive.
This issue could have been brought up on the first petition and well as
on appeal.

Issues of the plea, the Court does not find anything in the plea or argument that his plea was not freely knowingly and voluntarily entered. The only time he started to complain about the plea was after he received his sentence. And I think I recall this case, because at the time it was my impression as the Judge and as the fact finder that he did not show good faith effort to resolve the restitution before sentencing

and that's why I sentenced him as I did. And so for all those reasons I am denying the petition.

I am adopting the State's procedural history as set forth in their briefs. State, Mr. Bongard, I'm going to ask you to prepare formal findings of fact conclusions of law for the Court to review. And I'll set a three week status check for that. If you can just get that to the Court, if it's an order I'll sign it. If not then we'll address any issues regarding your proposed findings.

MR. BONGARD: Thank you, Your Honor. If I may ask one question regarding that?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BONGARD: The Court is finding the claims untimely and successive, no cause and prejudice. Is the Court also finding claims previously raised barred by law of the case?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BONGARD: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Have a good day, counsel.

MS. LOWE: Thank you.

MR. BONGARD: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE CLERK: Judge, the three week status check, is that on your regular calendar?

THE COURT: Let's put it on -- we're going to put that on a regular calendar. That's just so we don't forget, counsel, we -- you don't have to show -- I mean, you don't have to show up. It will just be on our

1	tickler system that, you know, we're expecting findings of fact. If it's not		
2	submitted, then we'll put it back on calendar. But I just want it on		
3	calendar just so no one forgets. So here's the date.		
4	THE CLERK: September 16, at 8:30.		
5	MR. BONGARD: That was 9-16?		
6	THE CLERK: September 16.		
7	THE COURT: 1 - 6.		
8	MR. BONGARD: Thank you.		
9	THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.		
10	MR. BONGARD: I see Ms. Lowe's not on. I will email her		
11	with that information as well as the proposed draft		
12	THE COURT: All right, thank you.		
13	MR. BONGARD: before sending it to the Court.		
14	THE COURT: Thank you.		
15	MR. BONGARD: Thank you, Your Honor.		
16	[Hearing concluded at 9:03 a.m.]		
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21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.		
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23	Jestica Kirkaatrick		
24	Jessica Kirkpatrick		
25	Court Recorder/Transcriber		

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|LOWE LAW, L.L.C.

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Attorney for Petitioner JACK LEAL

## EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

#### CLARK COUNTY NEVADA

JACK LEAL,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No.: A-20-814369-W stemming from

WARDEN CALVIN JOHNSON

Respondent.

C-17-322664-2 DEPT NO XVII

**NOTICE OF APPEAL** 

NOTICE is hereby given that JACK LEAL, Petitioner above named, hereby

appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order not yet entered but orally ordered by the Honorable District Court

Judge Michael P. Villani and from the final Judgment of Conviction entered

August 23, 2017 [Amended JOC May 9, 2019] after a plea agreement and hearing

on April 24, 2017, and August 17, 2017 Sentencing.

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
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l And to the Nevada Attorney General's Office at mbongard@ag.nv.gov and wiznetfilings@ag.net.gov I further certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing a true and correct copy thereof, post pre-paid, addressed to: Jack Leal NDOC 1183500 Southern Desert Correctional Center Three Lakes Valley Conservation Camp PO Box 208 Indian Springs, Nevada 89070-0208 /s/ Diane C Lowe, Esq Attorney for Jack Leal 

#### ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 9/6/2021 10:31 AM



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8	DISTRICT COURT	
9	CLARK COUNTY NEVADA	
10	JACK LEAL,	Case No.: A-20-814369-W Department XVII
11	Petitioner,	Department X V II
12	vs.	
13	JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN, SOUTHERN DESERT CORRECTIONAL CENTER,	
14	Respondents.	
15		
16	ORDER DIMISSING PETITIO	N FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
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On August 27, 2021, the matter came before the Court for argument on Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Supplemental Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Appearing via Bluejeans was Petitioner's Counsel, Diane C. Lowe, Esq., and Senior Deputy Attorney General Michael Bongard, representing Respondents. Mr. Leal, in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections, appeared via Bluejeans from the Clark County Detention Center.

The Court, having reviewed the claims in the counseled petition, pro se petition, and counseled and pro-se supplemental petitions, and Respondents' answer to the petition, heard argument from the parties.

#### Procedural History

The Court adopts the procedural history of the case from Respondents' answer to the petition, as set forth below:

On November 29, 2016, the State filed a criminal complaint in the Las Vegas Township Justice Court charging Leal with: one count of Racketeering, 12 counts of Theft in the Amount of \$3500 or More;

Page 1 of 8

one count of Fraud or Deceit in the Course of Enterprise or Occupation (Racketeering); and one count of Multiple Transactions Involving Fraud or Deceit in the Course of an Enterprise and Occupation. On April 11, 2017, Leal unconditionally waived his preliminary hearing, which included a conflict-of-interest waiver.

In Eighth Judicial District Court case number C-17-322664-2, the State filed a criminal information in the district court charging Leal with one count of Multiple Transactions Involving Fraud or Deceit in the Course of an Enterprise and Occupation.

On April 24, 2017, the parties filed a guilty plea agreement in open court and appeared for entry of plea. Leal executed a second conflict of interest waiver. Leal pled guilty to the charge in the information agreeing to pay restitution jointly and severally in the amount of \$757,420.

The parties appeared for sentencing on August 17, 2017. The Court sentenced Leal to a maximum term of one hundred eighty (180) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections, with a minimum term of seventy-two (72) months, ordering restitution in the amount of \$757,420.00. The clerk filed the judgment of conviction on August 23, 2017.

Leal filed a notice of appeal on September 14, 2017.

Leal filed his opening brief on February 1, 2018, in Supreme Court case number 74050. After full briefing, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed Leal's conviction. The Nevada Supreme Court subsequently denied Leal's petitions for review and reconsideration. Remittitur issued December 24, 2018.

On March 21, 2019, Leal filed his post-conviction state habeas corpus petition in case number C-17-322664-2. In that petition, Leal alleged: (1) the original information failed to put Leal on notice of the charges; (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a conflict waiver; and (3) counsel coerced petitioner into entering his plea. The Court denied the claims in the petition and Leal filed a notice of appeal.

Leal filed his pro se informal brief in case number 79243 on December 30, 2019.<sup>2</sup> The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Leal's petition and denied rehearing, Remittitur issued January 21, 2021.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Court of Appeals for disposition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Supreme Court again transferred the matter to the Court of Appeals for disposition.

On May 9, 2019, the Court entered an amended judgment of conviction which corrected the original judgment of conviction by ordering restitution be paid jointly and severally pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.

On April 28, 2020, Leal filed a counseled State Habeas Petition. In that petition, Leal raises three claims: (1) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present mitigating factors at sentencing, due to the difficulty of selling property to pay restitution, (2) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to correct errors in the pre-sentence report prior to sentencing, and (3) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to correct or explain errors in Leal's criminal history prior to sentencing.

On May 27, 2020, Leal filed a pro se State Habeas Petition. In that petition, Leal raises the following claims: (1) the guilty plea was involuntary, (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel (consisting of five subclaims), and (3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise a claim that petitioner never received a copy of his pre-sentence investigation report.

Leal then filed a Pro Se Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 8, 2020. In his supplemental petition, Leal alleged his plea was invalid because of duress, undue influence, and coercion.

Finally, on May 5, 2021, Leal filed a counseled-Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. That petition raised challenges to the voluntariness of his plea and effectiveness of trial counsel.

Respondent filed an Answer to these petitions on July 27, 2021, and a Notice of Supplemental Authority on August 11, 2021.

After hearing from the parties on August 27, 2021, the Court makes the following findings:

#### Nevada's Procedural Bars Prohibit Consideration of Leal's Claim

#### 1.) NRS 34.726

A petitioner must file their habeas corpus petition within one-year after the filing of the judgment of conviction or within one-year of the issuance of the remittitur at the conclusion of the direct appeal. NRS 34.726(1). A petition may justify filing an untimely petition if they demonstrate cause for a "delay [that] is not the fault of the petitioner" and show that "dismissal of the petition as untimely will unduly prejudice the petitioner. NRS 34.726(1)(a) and (b).

The Court finds that the Remittitur from the conclusion of Leal's direct appeal issued December 24, 2018. The Court finds that all of Leal's pro se and counseled petitions filed in this matter are subject to dismissal unless Leal demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the default.

In the supplemental counseled petition, Leal argues the May 9, 2019, Amended Judgement of Conviction either restarts the one-year time limit in NRS 34.726(1), or alternatively provides cause for his untimely filing. Leal's counseled supplemental petition cites *Whitehead v. State*, 128 Nev. 259, 285 P.3d 1053 (2012), in support of his argument.

The Court finds that the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that an amended judgment may establish cause to excuse the untimely filing of a state habeas petition. In *Sullivan v. State*, 120 Nev. 537, 96 P.3d 761 (2004), the Nevada Supreme Court established that an amended judgment of conviction does not restart the one-year time period in NRS 34.726(1). The Court in *Sullivan* first found "No specific language in NRS 34.726 expressly provides that the one-year time period restarts if the judgment of conviction is amended." 120 Nev. at 540, 96 P.3d at 764. The Court also recognized that the spirit behind the Legislature's enactment of NRS 34.726 was "one of limiting habeas petitioners to one time through the [post-conviction] system absent extraordinary circumstances." 120 Nev. at 541, 96 P.3d at 764 (citation omitted).

While finding that an amended judgment did not restart the time period in NRS 34.726(1), the Court in *Sullivan* found that "if the claims presented in a petition filed within one year of the entry of the amended judgment challenge the proceedings leading to a substantive amendment to the judgment and could not have been raised in prior proceedings, there may be no delay attributable to the 'fault of the petitioner.'" 120 Nev. 541, 96 P.3d at 764 (citation omitted).

The Court finds that Leal's citation to Whitehead is misplaced. In Whitehead, the Nevada Supreme Court found that a petitioner's state habeas petition was not untimely where the original judgment of conviction failed to comply with Nevada law. The Whitehead, the Nevada Supreme Court distinguished Sullivan. In Whitehead, the Court found the first judgment of conviction entered in Whitehead's case did not constitute a final judgment of conviction under Nevada law because that order never set a final amount for restitution. 128 Nev. at 263, 285 P.3d at 1055. The Court in Whitehead further concluded that "[an] intermediate judgment is not sufficient to trigger the one-year period under NRS 34.726 for filing a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Id.

Addressing the arguments of counsel in Leal's case, the Court finds that the Judgment of Conviction entered against Leal in Case Number C-17-322644-2 on August 23, 2017, constituted a final judgment. That judgment set forth Leal's restitution obligation in the amount of \$757.420.00. The Court also finds that the May 9, 2019, Amended Judgment merely corrected the original judgment to conform to the requirement of joint and several liability for the repayment of restitution as bargained for by the parties in the plea agreement. During argument on the petitions, Leal, through counsel, conceded the August 23, 2017, judgment complied with NRS 176.105(1). That statute requires a judgment of conviction imposing restitution set forth the amount of restitution in a specific dollar amount.

The Court further finds that the subject of the Amended Judgment of Conviction—ordering payment of restitution jointly and severally with Leal's co-defendant—corrects the original judgment to conform to the plea agreement. The Court further finds if it changed the terms of Leal's sentence in any way, such a change inured to the benefit of Leal.

In determining whether NRS 34.726(1) applies to Leal's petitions filed in this matter, the Court finds that it cannot ignore the application of NRS 34.726(1) once raised by Respondents. State v. Eighth Judicial District Ct. (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 2070, 1074 (2005). The Court also finds that none of the claims in Leal's pro se or amended petition address the subject of the Amended Judgment of Conviction—joint and several liability for the payment of restitution. The Court further finds that Leal failed to provide good cause or prejudice to excuse his untimely filing of his petitions.

Based upon the record, the facts, and the relevant law, the Court finds that all claims in Leal's petitions filed in this matter are untimely and subject to dismissal pursuant to NRS 34.726(1).

### 2.) NRS 34.810(1) and (2)

When a petitioner's judgment and sentence result from the entry of a plea, a state habeas petition may challenge only those claims "involving the voluntariness of the plea itself and the effectiveness of counsel." *Kirksey v. State*, 112 Nev. 980, 999, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996); NRS 34.810(1)(a).

Claims also subject to dismissal in a state habeas petition are those claims raised for a second time or claims that could have been raised in a prior proceeding. NRS 34.810(2)

The Nevada Supreme Court recently addressed NRS 34.810(1)(a). Gonzales v. State, \_\_\_\_ P.3d \_\_\_\_ 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 40 (July 29, 2021).

In Gonzales, the Court concluded that NRS 34.810(1)(a) essentially codified the United States Supreme Court's holding in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 265 (1973), which recognized that "[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process." 137 Nev. Ad. Op. 40, \*3, citing 411 U.S. at 267.

In Gonzales, the Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed Kirksey, concluding the entry of a plea waives constitutional claims occurring prior to the entry of the plea. Id., citing to Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 470, 538 P.2d 164, 165 (1975) and Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. at 999, 923 P.2d at 1114.<sup>3</sup>

The Court takes judicial notice of Leal's first state habeas corpus petition filed in Eighth Judicial District Court Case Number C-17-322664-2, and the Nevada Court of Appeals' affirmance of the denial of the petition in Case Number 79243.

The Court finds that if the rules in NRS 34.810(1)(a) and (2) apply, the Court must apply the default provisions of Nevada law. State v. Eighth Judicial District Ct. (Riker), 121 Nev. at 231, 112 P.3d at 1074. The Court also recognizes that a petitioner may excuse the application of the default rules by demonstrating good cause and actual prejudice. NRS 34.810(3).

As cause to excuse a default of claims, Leal again argues that the May 9, 2019, Amended Judgment constitutes a new judgment. However, for the reasons discussed above, the Amended Judgment merely corrected the existing judgment to conform with the plea agreement, which called for restitution to be paid "jointly and severally." The Court also reaffirms its finding that the August 23, 2017, judgment complied with NRS 176.105(1) by setting forth a specific dollar amount and therefore constituted a final judgment. The Court finds that Leal failed to set for good cause to excuse the application of NRS 34.810(1)(a) and (2).

Leal also argued prejudice, citing that the Court imposed different sentences for Leal and his codefendant. However, the Court finds that the difference in the sentences imposed upon Leal and his codefendant resulted in part due to Leal's inaction prior to sentencing, waiting until a week prior to sentencing to place a lien on his property to secure restitution. The Court finds that any disparity in the sentences does not constitute prejudice to overcome the default of claims in his petitions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Court in *Gonzales* also found ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising after the plea remain valid. *Id.* at \*4.

Based upon the Nevada Supreme Court's holding in *Sullivan*, the Court finds that the amended judgment of conviction did not entitle Leal to a new round of state habeas proceedings. The Court finds that the claims barred pursuant to NRS 34.810(1)(a) are: (1) the pro se petition's claim that trial counsel failed to litigate an alleged jurisdictional defect regarding property located out of state (Ground 2(c))<sup>4</sup>; (2) the pro se petition's claim that counsel represented both co-defendant for a period of time without a conflict-of-interest waiver; and (3) The pro se petition's claim that counsel was ineffective for challenging an allegedly defective charging document.

The Court finds that the claims barred pursuant to NRS 34.810(2) because Leal failed to raise them in his March 2019 petition are: (1) all grounds in Leal's first counseled petition filed in this matter; and (2) Grounds 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), and 3 of the original pro se petition.

The Court finds the following claims barred pursuant to NRS 34.810(2) because Leal raised them for a second time in this proceeding: (1) Grounds 1, 2(d), and 2(e) in the original pro se petition; (2) Leal's supplemental pro se petition; and (3) Grounds A and B in the supplemental counseled petition.

## The Law of the Case Doctrine Prevents Consideration of Those Claims Addressed in Prior Proceedings

Claims previously litigated by the parties and rejected by an appellate court are subject to the law of the case doctrine. *Hsu v. Cty. of Clark*, 123 Nev. 625, 629–30, 173 P.3d 724, 728 (2007). Nevada recognizes two exceptions to the law of the case doctrine. *Id.* at 631-33, 173 P,3d at 729-31 (recognizing a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception and an exception for intervening case law).

The Court takes notice of the appellate proceedings in the Nevada Court of Appeals, case numbers 79243 and 74050. That Court previously rejected Leal's claims: (1) that his plea was unknowing and not entered intelligently and voluntarily; (2) that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a waiver of conflict; (3) that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge an insufficient charging document; (4) that Leal's plea was coerced.

The Court finds that no intervening case law calls into question the Nevada Court of Appeals' affirmance of the denial of Leal's first state habeas petition, nor has Leal demonstrated that applying the law of the case doctrine would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Court adopts Respondents numbering of the claims in Ground 2 as set forth on pages 4 of the Answer.

## **Conclusion** 1 Based upon the pleadings and exhibits submitted in this case, as well as the record in Leal's criminal 2 and appellate cases, the Court finds Leal's petitions procedurally barred. The Court also finds that no cause 3 or prejudice exists to evade application of NRS 34.726(1) and NRS 34.810. The Court further finds that 4 Leal's claims that his plea was coerced or otherwise not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, or that counsel 5 was ineffective for failing to obtain a waiver of conflict are barred pursuant to the law of the case. 6 Therefore, good cause appearing: 7 IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT, the Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this matter is 8 DENIED. 9 , 2021. Dated this 6th day of September, 2021 DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_ 10 11 12 13 Michael Villani **District Court Judge** Submitted by: 14 15 /s/Michael J. Bongard Senior Deputy Attorney General 16 Counsel for Respondents 17 Approved as to Form: /s/Diane C. Lowe 18 Diane C. Lowe, Esq. 19 Counsel for Jack Leal 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 **CSERV** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 Jack Leal, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-20-814369-W 6 VS. DEPT. NO. Department 19 7 Jerry Howell, Defendant(s) 8 9 10 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 11 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all 12 recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: 13 Service Date: 9/6/2021 14 Amanda White awhite@ag.nv.gov 15 Michael Bongard mbongard@ag.nv.gov 16 17 Rikki Garate rgarate@ag.nv.gov 18 Michael Bongard mbongard@ag.nv.gov 19 Diane Lowe dianelowe@lowelawllc.com 20 District Attorney District Attorney motions@clarkcountyda.com 21 Attorney General wiznetfilings@ag.nv.gov 22 Lisa Clark lclark@ag.nv.gov 23 24 Kristine Santi santik@clarkcountycourts.us 25 If indicated below, a copy of the above mentioned filings were also served by mail 26 via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to the parties listed below at their last

known addresses on 9/7/2021

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Attorney for Petitioner JACK LEAL

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY NEVADA

JACK LEAL,

Case No.: A-20-814369-W stemming

Petitioner.

from C-17-322664-2 DEPT NO XVII

VS.

S. Ct. No 83451

WARDEN CALVIN JOHNSON

Respondent.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

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NOTICE is hereby given that JACK LEAL, Petitioner above named, hereby submits

this Amended Notice of Appeal per NRAP 4(a)(6)&(7) wherein he seeks to appeal

from the September 6, 2021 'Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus'

instead of what was called in the original notice of appeal the 'Findings of Fact.

Conclusions of Law and Order'. All else is the same including the case appeal

statement previously submitted whereby he appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada

from the Order by the Honorable District Court Judge Michael P. Villani and from

the final Judgment of Conviction entered August 23, 2017 [Amended JOC May 9,

2728

2019] after a plea agreement and hearing on April 24, 2017, and August 17, 2017 1 2 Sentencing. 3 4 5 The writ of habeas corpus hearing was held on the briefings August 27, 2021, and 6 an immediate oral ruling was made at the conclusion of arguments denying relief. 7 8 An evidentiary hearing was denied. 9 DATED this 10<sup>th</sup> day of September 2021. 10 Respectfully Submitted, 11 /s/ Diane C. Lowe, Esq. 12 DIANE C. LOWE, ESQ. Nevada Bar #14573 13 Lowe Law, L.L.C. 14 7350 West Centennial Pkwy #3085 Las Vegas, NV 89131 15 Telephone: (725)212-2451 16 Facsimile: (702)442-0321 17 18 19 Attorney for Petitioner Jack Leal 20 21 22 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE VIA ELECTRONIC FILING EMAIL Service 23 24 I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 10th day of 25 September 2021 by Electronic Filing email service to: District Attorney's Office 26

Email Address:

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