IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

SHAWN RUSSELL HARTE.

Appellant,

Case No. 43877

VS.

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THE STATE OF NEVADA.

Respondent.

FILED

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PETITION FOR REHEARING

COMES NOW, the Appellant, SHAWN RUSSELL HARTE, by and through his attorneys, DONALD YORK EVANS, ESQ. and THOMAS L. QUALLS, ESQ., and hereby Petitions this Court for rehearing of its Order Dismissing Appeal filed April 7, 2005.

In its Order Dismissing Appeal (ODA), this Court ruled that Harte's reliance upon the case of Matter of Application of Duong, 118 Nev. Adv. Rep. 93, 59 P.3d 1210 (2002) was misplaced. The Court reasoned that Mr. Harte's situation was different from Duong's in that <u>Duong</u> involved a collateral civil proceeding in which the appellant sought to seal his criminal records. (ODA at 2). Of course, Harte's case involves a collateral civil proceeding challenging his prior criminal proceedings. Accordingly, it is respectfully argued that the distinction is arbitrary and capricious.

In Hill v. Warden, 96 Nev. 38, 604 P.2d 807 (1980), the Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that habeas corpus proceedings were "neither civil nor criminal for all purposes." Hill, 96 Nev. at 40, 604 P.2d at 808. The Hill Court supported its conclusion by reasoning:

While our legislature has specifically provided for the application of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in cases involving writs of certiorari and mandamus, there is no similar provision for writs of habeas corpus.

Id (emphasis added). However, since 1980 when Hill was decided, the Nevada Legislature apparently answered the call of the Hill Court by enacting NRS 34.780 in 1985.

NRS 34.780(1) reads:

The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent WRS 34.360 to 34.830, inclusive, apply to proceedings pursuant to NRS 34.720 to 34\830, inclusive.

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The Nevada Legislature's subsequent enactment of a statute to guide future decisions of the courts regarding the applicability of civil rules to habeas proceedings greatly loosens the prior constraints of the Hill Court. But Hill is not left wholly without merit or weight where the instant case is concerned. Indeed, this Court is encouraged to adopt to spirit of the Hill Court in fashioning an appropriate remedy for Mr. Harte.

In <u>Hill</u>, the Court considered the issue of the effect of a premature notice of appeal in a post-conviction habeas corpus case. The Court acknowledged that the "stakes" in a habeas case are high, as the prisoner's liberty is at risk. The Court looked to the facts that the prisoner's intent to timely file an appeal was sufficiently manifested to the State and that the State was not prejudiced by the notice and thereby drafted an appropriate remedy, accepting jurisdiction. <u>Hill</u>, 96 Nev. at 40-41, 604 P.2d at 808.

Moreover, this Court should look to <u>Passanisi v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 318, 831 P.2d 1371 (1992). In <u>Passanisi</u>, the court considered whether it had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an order of the district court denying a post-conviction motion to modify a sentence. As recognized by this Court:

[I]n timing and in scope, a motion to modify a sentence is essentially the same as a motion for a new trial: both constitute direct attacks on the district court's decision and the district court's authority to consider such motions is incident to the trial court proceedings. This court concluded that "a motion to modify a sentence is the functional equivalent of a motion for a new trial." *Id. at 321, 831 P.2d at 1373*. Because an order granting or refusing a new trial is independently appealable, this court concluded that it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

Mazzan v. State, 109 Nev. 1067, 863 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (1993), *citing* Passanisi, 108 Nev. at 322, 831 P.2d at 1373. Accordingly, this situation is again strikingly similar to Harte's and this Court should find that it has jurisdiction to entertain the instant appeal.

This is a death penalty case. Surely this Court recognizes that the "stakes" are even higher than in the general habeas case. *Death is different* remains a well-recognized maxim of capital litigation. :

It is the universal experience in the administration of criminal justice that those charged with capital offenses are granted special considerations.

William v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 at 103, 90 S.Ct. 1893 at 1907, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970).

This Court, too, almost always treats death cases as a class apart. 1 2 Justice Brennan, Furman v. Georgia, 92 S.Ct. at 2751: The only explanation for the uniqueness of death is its extreme severity. Death 3 is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in it pain, in its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable to death in terms of physical and mental suffering. Although our information is not conclusive, it appears that there is no method available that guarantees and immediate 5 and painless death. 6 Justice Brennan, Furman v. Georgia, 92 S.Ct. at 2751 (1972). 7 That life is at stake is of course another important factor in creating the extraordinary situation. The difference between capital and non-capital 8 offenses is the basis of differentiation in law in diverse ways in which the 9 distinction become relevant. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391, 75 S.Ct. 814, 99 L. Ed. 1161 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.). 10 When the penalty is death, we, like state court judges, are tempted to strain the 11 evidence and even, in close cases, the law in order to give a doubtfully 12 condemned man another chance. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 1099, 97 L.Ed. 1522 (1953). 13 Mr. Justice Harlan expressed the point strongly: I do not concede that 14 whatever process is 'due' an offender faced with a fine or a prison sentence necessarily satisfies the requirements of the Constitution in a capital case. The 15 distinction is by no means novel, ... nor is it negligible, being literally that 16 between life and death. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1262, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957) (concurring in result). 17 In death cases doubts such as those presented here should be resolved in favor 18 of the accused. 19 Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752, 68 S.Ct. 880, 886, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948). 20 Additionally and alternatively, as verified by the attached Affidavit of Donald York Evans, 21 the primary reason for the motion pursuant to NRCP 59 -- which should have tolled the appeal time 22 -- was to correct the fact that Evans was not given an opportunity to review the proposed order 23 denying habeas relief prior to the order being filed. Surely Harte's counsel's good-faith attempts 24 to properly exhaust his remedies at the district court before bringing the matter to this court's 25 jurisdiction, and the fact that counsel cited to NRCP provisions which should toll the time to 26 appeal, amount to sufficient cause in a death penalty case to vest jurisdiction with this Court. 27 /// 28

Finally, Mr. Harte's appeal is meritorious, as his case falls under the authority of this Court's recent decision in McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. No. 105, 102 P.3d 606 (2004), affirmed, 121 Nev. Adv. No. 5, 107 P.3d 1287 (2005). In McConnell, this Court held:

We therefore deem it impermissible under the United States and Nevada Constitutions to base an aggravating circumstance in a capital prosecution on the felony upon which a felony murder is predicated.

McConnell, 102 P.3d at 624 (emphasis added). In Mr. Harte's case, the jury found only one aggravating circumstance: "that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery". Harte v. State, 116 Nev. 1054, 1061, 13 P.3d 420, 425 (2000). This aggravating circumstance having been invalidated by McConnell, Harte's sentence of death is illegal and must be reversed.

Conclusion.

The Court in its ODA does not explain the reason for the distinction except to state that it has "consistently and repeatedly" held accordingly. (ODA at 2). Respectfully, the Court should not allow itself the luxury to fall back upon the "this is the way we've always done it" excuse in this case in which the ultimate punishment of death is at stake. Surely the mater requires more weighty reasoning. Should a death penalty case be so casually dismissed upon what is at most the slightest of all technicalities. Hopefully the question is rhetorical.

Pursuant to decisions in <u>Duong v. State</u> and <u>Hill v. State</u>, *supra*, the notice of appeal was timely filed within 30 days of the district court's order denying HARTE's motion for relief or to amend the order.

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WHEREFORE, Mr. Harte argues that the Court either overlooked or misapprehended a material question of law set forth in his Answer to Order to Show Cause regarding the applicability of civil rules to the instant case and the instant appeal. Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that this Court find that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the denial of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at this time.

TPULLY SUBMITTED this day of April, 2005.

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SHAWN RUSSELL HARTE,

Appellant,

CASE NO. 43877

v.

District Court No. CR980074

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATE OF NEVADA) :ss.
COUNTY OF WASHOE)

- I, DONALD YORK EVANS, LTD., being first duly sworn, under penalty of perjury, depose and say:
- 1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law before all the Courts of the State of Nevada, with offices at 313 Flint Street, Reno, NV 89504, and a mailing address of P.O. Box 864, Reno, NV 89504;
- 2. I am appointed counsel for SHAWN RUSSELL HARTE, the Appellant in this matter;
- 3. When I was provided with a copy of the District Attorney's Proposed Order in the case, I was waiting delivery of the transcripts to me to review prior to filing my formal written objections to the State's Proposed Order;
- 4. Unfortunately, I was never provided with the transcripts in a timely fashion, and the matter was submitted to Judge Steinheimer without any objections being filed by the Appellant;

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- 5. I contacted the Judge's office regarding the difficulties in obtaining my transcripts after the Order had been signed;
- I was advised by Judge Steinheimer that she would not consider the Order a final order until I had a chance to lodge my formal objections and that she would entertain the Motions for Relief from Judgment in that regard:
- 7. Upon her finally deciding that her original Order would stand, I timely filed a Notice of Appeal in this case, thereby conferring, at least in my opinion, jurisdiction in this matter to the Supreme Court.

This Affidavit is offered in support of the Petition for Rehearing filed herewith.

Further Affiant Sayeth Yaught.

DATED: This day of April, 2005.

DONALO YORK EVANS, LTD.

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this \mathcal{A} day of April, 2005.

GINGER ROGERS HOWART Notary Public - State of Navada opointment Recorded in Washoe County Vo: 93-3442-2 - Expires May 3, 2005

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of DONALD YORK EVANS, ESQ., and that on this date

I
deposited for mailing, via U.S. mail
caused to be delivered, via Reno-Carson Messenger Service
delivered via facsimile machine
personally delivered
a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, addressed to:
Washoe County District Attorney's Office P.O. Box 30083 Reno, NV 89520
DATED this 25, day of April, 2004.

A712...
P.O. BOX 864
RENO, NEVADA 89504
775/348-7400 FAX 775/348-4604