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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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
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MICHAEL RIPPO,
Appellant,

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.



Case No.

44094

STATE'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO RECALL REMITTITUR

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Counsel for Respondent

	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
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5	MICHAEL RIPPO,
6	Appellant, { Case No. 44094
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8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
9	Respondent.
10	STATE'S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO RECALL REMITTITUR
11	STATE'S RESPONSE TO MOTION 20
12	COMES NOW the State of Nevada, by DAVID ROGER, Clark County District
13	Attack through his Chief Deputy, STEVEN S. OWENS, and submits this Response
14	This Response is based on the following declaration
15	leadings on file herein.
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1	Pagnectfully submitted,
13	DOCED.
1	Name of Par # 002781
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2	BY (//that) Edition
	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #004352
2	Attorney for Respondent
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This closed case was an appeal from an order of the district court denying a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus in a capital case. In a published opinion filed on November 16, 2006, this Court affirmed the district court's order denying post-conviction relief. Rippo v. State, 122 Nev. ____, 146 P.3d 279 (2006). A petition for rehearing was denied on December 22, 2006, and remittitur issued on January 16, 2007.

This Court having divested itself of jurisdiction, the federal public defender was appointed in federal court to represent Defendant in federal post-conviction proceedings and a 100-page petition for writ of habeas corpus with exhibits was filed in federal court on April 18, 2007, in case number 2:07-cv-00507-ECR-PAL. The issues raised in that federal petition include a challenge to this Court's rulings on the mitigation instruction and reweighing under McConnell. Three and a half months after initiating federal habeas proceedings and nearly seven months after this Court issued its remittitur, the federal public defender now moves this Court to recall remittitur in this state appeal and again "reconsider" issues that are pending in federal court.

Initially, it must be noted that counsel of record in this appeal was Christopher Oram, but the present motion to recall remittitur was filed by federal public defender, David Anthony. SCR Rule 46 only allows for the withdrawal or change of an attorney "before judgment or final determination." See also NRAP 46(d). The rules do not permit substitution of counsel after final determination of an appeal, nor has there been any application made for change of counsel. Id. Additionally, for capital appeals SCR Rule 250(2)(d) requires the appointment of counsel who has acted as counsel in at least two appeals of felony convictions and no showing has been made

¹ This is not the first time federal public defender David Anthony has demonstrated an ignorance or unwillingness to comply with procedures for substitution of counsel and thereby build error into a case. See Donald Sherman, S.Ct. No. 47012.

that David Anthony so qualifies. Accordingly, the present motion is a nullity and should be stricken.

In the event this Court is inclined to disregard procedural rules and consider the motion on its merits, the State offers the following analysis. Ancillary to recall of remittitur, Appellant appears to be requesting yet another rehearing of his appeal. Pursuant to NRAP Rule 40, a petition for rehearing may be filed within eighteen (18) days after the filing of the court's decision unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. NRAP Rule 40(a)(1). The instant motion to recall remittitur acknowledges that the time for filing a petition for rehearing in this case has long since expired. Rippo is seeking to recall a remittitur that issued seven months ago. Pursuant to NRAP Rule 26(b), the Court may permit an act to be done after the expiration of time prescribed by the rules only upon "good cause shown."

The Motion is Untimely and Without Good Cause

The "good cause" alleged by Rippo's counsel is that certain facts concerning Justice Becker's subsequent employment by the district attorney's office were not known previously and could not have been raised in the previous petition for rehearing. Rippo's counsel points to John L. Smith's column in the Review Journal on January 5, 2007, as the first indication that Justice Becker was considering employment with the district attorney's office. Notably, the article was printed approximately seven weeks after the filing of the Court's opinion in this case and does not in any way suggest that employment discussions pre-dated Justice Becker's decision in this case. Rippo fails to set forth a single fact in support of his bald accusation that employment negotiations were ongoing during the pendency of this appeal.

Although Rippo's counsel fails to allege when he became aware of the grounds for recall of remittitur, he had constructive notice from the news article on January 5, 2007, and the official announcement made on January 16, 2007, both of which facts are acknowledged in Appellant's motion. See <u>Snyder v. Viani</u>, 112 Nev. 568, 916

P.2d 170 (1996). Becker's employment with the district attorney's office was well-known in the legal community at the time and attorneys in the special public defender's office unsuccessfully challenged Becker's bias in March of this year.² Rippo's counsel fails to establish or even allege "good cause" for the subsequent fourmonth delay once the facts giving rise to the motion for recall of remittitur became known.

Rippo's counsel references an amendment to the Commentary to Canon 3E(1) approved by this Court on December 22, 2006, as if it somehow evidences Becker's bias in anticipation of employment with the district attorney. Such an allegation demonstrates the speciousness of the claims being made against Becker. The amended language in the Commentary to Canon 3E(1) concerns only the situation where a former law clerk of a judge subsequently appears before that same judge as a litigant. It has no bearing or relevance to the facts of this case. This belies that the true intent of Rippo's counsel in bringing the current motion is not to remedy the failure of a biased judge to recuse themself, but is rather to get a rehearing on a closely divided issue in front of new justices now that the composition of the Court has changed.

The Issues Raised Are Not Cognizable in a Motion for Recall of Remittitur or Petition for Rehearing

Pursuant to NRAP Rule 40(c)(1), "no point may be raised for the first time on rehearing." Disqualification of Justice Becker and the request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing are new issues not previously raised in the pleadings on file herein. The motion to recall remittitur does not allege that this Court overlooked or misapprehended a material fact "in the record" or a material question of law "in the case" or authority directly controlling a dispositive issue "in the case." NRAP Rule 40(c)(2). A challenge to Justice Becker's bias and impartiality is a collateral issue

² See Donte Johnson, S.Ct. No. 45456, and Marlo Thomas, S.Ct. No. 46509.

unrelated to the merits of this appeal. Accordingly, the issue is not properly raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. For that reason alone, the motion to recall remittitur should be denied.

When a justice has participated in a case, NRAP Rule 35 requires that a motion to disqualify must establish that it is timely filed and that the alleged disqualifying interest amounts to "fraud or like illegal conduct." NRAP Rule 35. Rippo's counsel fails to cite this rule or make any attempt to comply with its procedures even though it directly pertains to the relief he is seeking. The mere timing of Nancy Becker's employment by the district attorney two months following publication of the opinion in this case on November 16, 2006, comes no where near the fraud or illegal conduct needed for disqualification.

While the written opinion of the Court may have been filed on November 16, 2006, this does not mean that a vote was taken and the decision was rendered that day. Briefing in the case occurred between May of 2005 and January of 2006, and the Court heard oral argument on June 13, 2006. This was well before the November election. Presumably, an informal decision on the case would have preceded the assignment to Justice Hardesty to draft the written opinion.

Although the Court's opinion in this appeal was split 4-3, the spurious allegation that Justice Becker's employment negotiations with the district attorney's office pre-dated her signing of the opinion on November 16, 2006, and influenced her vote is completely unfounded and is based on nothing more than the mere timing of her employment with the district attorney two months later. Even if this Court could engage in the kind of discovery and evidentiary hearing requested by Rippo's counsel, his bare allegations are insufficient to warrant such relief. Especially at such a late date, it is unwise to recall remittitur and reassert jurisdiction away from the federal courts where this Court's ruling has been pending review for the last three and a half months. The motion to recall remittitur serves no purpose other than to seek rehearing

on a closely divided issue in front of new justices now that the composition of the Court has changed. WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests that the Motion to Recall Remittitur be denied. Dated this 8th day of August, 2007. Respectfully submitted, DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar # 002781 BY Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #004352 Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify and affirm that I mailed a copy of the foregoing State's Opposition to Motion to Recall Remittitur to the attorney of record listed below on this 8th day of August, 2007.

FRANNY A. FORSMAN Federal Public Defender DAVID ANTHONY Assistant Federal Public Defender 411 East Bonneville Avenue, Suite 250 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

> Employee, Clark County District Attorney's Office

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