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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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STATE OF NEVADA, DEPARTMENT  
OF MOTOR VEHICLES,

Appellant,

vs.

WILLIAM JUNGE,

Respondent.

CASE NO. 49350  
District Court Case No. A529007

FILED

DEC 30 2008

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ON APPEAL FROM THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

**APPELLANT'S RESPONSE BRIEF TO THE**  
**ACLU'S AMICUS BRIEF**

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I.

**ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW**

1. Whether the Department of Motor Vehicles has the authority to regulate the content of personalized license plates pursuant to NRS 482.3667, NRS 482.3669, NAC 482.320, and NAC 482.370.
2. Whether the Department of Motor Vehicles can regulate the issuance of its vanity license plates in a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral manner under the First Amendment.
3. Whether the district court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the administrative agency when it reversed the Department of Motor Vehicles' decision to deny the issuance of the license plate, "HOE."

II.

**PROCEDURAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

This is an appeal regarding the denial of a personalized license plate - - more commonly referred to as a vanity plate. The Department of Motor Vehicles found that William Junge's ("Junge") license plate, "HOE," was inappropriate under NRS 482.3667, NRS 482.3669, and NAC 482.320. The Administrative Law Judge upheld the decision to deny Junge the requested plate of "HOE", but District Court Judge Jessie Walsh reversed that decision. Since April 24, 2007, the date the Department filed this appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court, Junge has not filed any pleadings or briefs and, in fact, has completely walked away from this appeal. This Court has not yet, but could still, find that the Department could deny Junge the personalized plate based solely on the fact that he has not defended this appeal under NRAP 31(c)(stating that the failure of respondent to file a brief may be treated by the court as a confession of error and appropriate disposition of the appeal thereafter made).

From the appeal to district court to the appeal before this Court, Junge has not raised First Amendment concerns. However, this Court has invited an amicus brief from the American Civil Liberties Union. While the DMV understands the Court's desire to be briefed

1 in this subject, the DMV must respectfully suggest a delicate step into areas of law not  
2 pursued by the parties to the appeal.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, because the Court has raised issues  
3 not otherwise argued by Junge, and because the ACLU has wrongly concluded that there  
4 was a First Amendment violation (and also no violation by the district court judge discussed  
5 *infra* on p. 17), the DMV feels this response is necessary for the Court's full understanding  
6 of these subjects.

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III.

**ARGUMENT**

**A. THE "HOE" PLATE IS A VANITY PLATE AND NOT A SPECIALTY PLATE**

The starting point for this analysis is first an understanding of what this license plate  
is and what it is not. The license plate at issue is a request for a "personalized prestige  
license plate." It is not a request for a "special license plate." A personalized prestige  
license plate (also known as a vanity plate) is a request by one individual for a license plate  
that has a certain combination of numbers and letters that he wishes to display on the state  
manufactured plate for his vehicle. This message will be unique in the sense that no one  
else will be able to have that same combination of numbers and letters. Conversely, a  
special license plate (or specialty plate) is typically a request for an organization or a  
particular group to have a license plate generated (particular groups must show a certain  
number of applications to support a special plate).<sup>2</sup> Examples of specialty plates include

<sup>1</sup> The Court will see in the submitted transcript from the district court that Junge did not raise First Amendment  
issues before District Court Judge Walsh. In *Martin v. State, Agency of Transportation Department of Motor  
Vehicles*, 819 A.2d 742 (Vt. 2003), the court stated that when there is no direct constitutional challenge and no  
definitive or controlling law in this area, issues must still be preserved for appeal by the parties. The *Martin* court  
then cited *In re Sealed Documents*, 772 A.2d 518 523 (Vt. 2001)(stating that our tradition of addressing issues of  
constitutional significance only when they are "squarely and necessarily presented counsels restraint and  
forbearance" as to broader First Amendment questions); *Herald Ass'n, Inc. v. Ellison*, 419 A.2d 323, 326 (Vt.  
1980)(stating that although the First Amendment appears to be implicated, decisions of the United States  
Supreme Court do not clearly determine whether First Amendment violation exists; in face of such uncertainty,  
"the wisdom of our traditional rule of self-restraint – that we do not needlessly decide constitutional issues - - is all  
the more apparent" (internal citations omitted)).

<sup>2</sup> See also *Henderson v. Stalder*, 265 F.Supp.2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003), *vacated and remanded on other  
grounds*, 407 F.3d 351 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005)(noting a distinction between a "vanity plate" and a "specialty plate" by

1 collegiate license plates (NRS 482.3747), professional or volunteer firefighters (NRS  
2 482.3753, NRS 482.3754), appreciation of animals (NRS 482.379175), and support of  
3 missing or exploited children (NRS 482.3793), among others.<sup>3</sup>

4 The distinction is factually important, because much of the caselaw cited by the  
5 ACLU and much of the caselaw that exists in this arena involves the denial of specialty  
6 plates that are not at issue in this case.<sup>4</sup> While there is, of course, overlap in general First  
7 Amendment doctrine, there are different purposes for a vanity plate (a message for and by  
8 one person) versus a special plate (a message by a group). Notably, a message by one  
9 person often does not express any "view." Vanity plates may state a person's name,  
10 occupation, initials, etc. However, a special license plate sought by a particular group  
11 (much if not most of the caselaw centers on pro-life versus pro-choice applications for  
12 plates) does tend to support a particular cause or idea or "view." See *American Civil*  
13 *Liberties Union v. Bredesen*, 441 F.3d 370 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir.), *cert. denied*, 548 U.S. 906  
14 (2006)(finding that "the unstated distinction is that the "Choose Life" message is highly  
15 controversial, and that with this message there are large numbers of participants in the  
16 public discourse with an opposing view). As will be explained, this significant factual  
17 difference does assist many courts in finding that states do indeed have a rational basis for  
18 enforcing their guidelines so that plates are not offensive or inappropriate. It is, therefore,  
19 important to keep the facts of this case in mind – namely a request by one man to have the  
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23 stating, "Vanity plates are where a state will customize the arrangement of letter and numbers to create a plate  
24 for one individual and it cannot be duplicated . . . . A specialty plate is where a license plate is created to refer to  
25 a specific group like the Shriners or a school").

26 <sup>3</sup> Further, whether or not a special license plate is generated is decided by the Commission on Special  
27 License Plates (which is composed, in part, by state legislators). See NRS 482.367004(1). Notably, in  
28 determining whether to approve an application, the Commission "shall consider, without limitation, whether it  
would be **appropriate** and feasible for the Department to, as applicable, design, prepare or issue the particular  
special license plate (emphasis added)." NRS 482.367004(5)(c).

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., *Byrne v. Lunderville*, 2007 WL 2892620 n.7 (D. Vt. 2007)(recognizing the difference between  
vanity plates and special plates and stating, "A slightly different, but more developed, body of law has developed  
around specialty license plates").



word "HOE" on his license plate -- when examining issues of free speech.

**B. THE DMV IS AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE AND REGULATION TO DENY THE  
ISSUANCE OF PETITIONER'S VANITY PLATE "HOE"**

Although discussed in the DMV's Opening Brief, a brief recap of the applicable statutes and regulations governing personalized (vanity) license plates is appropriate here before turning to the issues raised by the Court concerning the First Amendment. DMV has specifically been given the authority by the state legislature to regulate and limit the letters, numbers and words that appear on personalized license plates. NRS 482.3667(5) states as follows: "The Department may limit by regulation the number of letters and numbers used and *prohibit the use of inappropriate letters or combinations of letters* and numbers (emphasis added)."

Additionally, NRS 482.3669 states: "The Department may make such regulations as are necessary to insure compliance with all applicable laws pertaining to the licensing and registration of vehicles before issuing personalized prestige license plates in lieu of the regular Nevada license plate or plates, and all applications for personalized prestige license plates must be made to the Department."

The Department has indeed established regulations. NAC 482.320 establishes a number of guidelines for regulating personalized plates:

1. The letter "O," the letter "I" and the letter "Q" must not be used alone but may be used with a combination of other letters and numbers if the combination does not create confusion between the letter "O" or "Q" and the number "0" or between the letter "I" and the number "1."

2. Only letters, numbers and spaces may be used on personalized prestige license plates. Letters, numbers and spaces may be used in any combination not prohibited by NRS 482.3667 or this section.

3. A blank plate will not be issued.

4. No letter or number may be placed on a personalized prestige license plate upside down or backwards or in other than its normal legible position.

5. No more than seven characters may be on any one personalized prestige license plate.

6. No combination of letters, numbers or spaces is allowed  
if it:

- (a) Creates confusion with any combination on other license plates.
- (b) Expresses contempt, ridicule or superiority of:

- (1) Race;
- (2) Ethnic heritage;
- (3) Religion;
- (4) Gender; or
- (5) Political affiliation.

(c) Contains any connotation that is sexual, vulgar, derogatory, profane or obscene.

(d) Contains a direct or indirect reference to a:

- (1) Drug or drug paraphernalia; or
- (2) Gang.

(e) Makes a defamatory reference to a person or group.

(f) Is determined by the Department to be inappropriate.

7. The person who first applies for a particular letter or number or combination of letters, numbers or spaces and pays the prescribed fee for registration and for the personalized prestige license plates has priority to receive plates with that particular letter or number or combination of letters, numbers or spaces once the application has been accepted by the Department.

(emphasis added).<sup>5</sup>

After Junge's request for the renewal of his "HOE" plate was brought to her attention by a technician, Supervisor Betty Shaw followed the DMV policy and commissioned input from the DMV Personalized Plate Committee (referred to in the Record on Appeal as the "Special Plate Committee"). It was a unanimous decision by the Special Plate Committee to reject the plate, because the word was inappropriate; more specific comments from the committee members noted that the word was inappropriate because the word was slang for "whore".<sup>6</sup>

After thoroughly detailing the fact that the DMV statute and regulations allow for the DMV to regulate what combination of letters and numbers appear on a government-issued personalized license plates, the ALJ stated: "There is nothing in the law that entitles the Petitioner to compel the DMV to permit a registration plate to be manufactured and displayed that conveys a message that falls outside the scope of the message that the DMV

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<sup>5</sup> NRS 233B.040(1) provides that the Nevada Administrative Code has the force of law.

<sup>6</sup> Comments from the Committee include: "Deny, meaning is 'whore.'" (Kathy Holthus); "Absolutely recall, this is short for whore!" "I say deny, contraction for whore" (Kathy Holthus). "My goodness, recall and put on the list, we have been denying anything with HO." (Duane Brunell). "Yes recall it should never have gotten out"; "Deny, this is street word for whore" (Duane Brunell). "What was issued in 1999 does not make it appropriate in 2006, it should not have been issued then. Just because he used the last 3 letters of Tahoe doesn't take the meaning out of the word. He was being sly then and got away with it, he shouldn't be allowed to get away with it now, it still says Whore . . . deny it." (Duane Brunell). "I already said deny and I still say deny. I agree it is derogatory to females" (Tomi Blevins). DMV App. pp. 51-61.

1 is willing to use in its regulatory scheme (DMV App. p. 80, ll. 16-18)." In other words,  
2 although Junge may not agree with the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, there is  
3 nothing that gives him the right to compel the DMV to issue him a plate that the Special  
4 Plate Committee in 2006 deemed inappropriate pursuant to its regulations.

5  
6 **C. THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF FREE SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST**  
7 **AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION OR OF ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9**  
8 **OF THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION**

9 **1. THE DMV CAN REGULATE VANITY PLATES UNDER THE FIRST**  
10 **AMENDMENT**

11 The ACLU has used the specialty plate case of *Arizona Life Coalition Inc. v. Stanton*,  
12 515 F.3d 956 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), *cert. denied*, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008)(a pro-life/abortion issue), to lay  
13 out a proposed framework.<sup>7</sup> It is really unnecessary to traverse a similar road of  
14 generalized First Amendment doctrine. The bottom line here is that both the ACLU and the  
15 DMV agree that license plates are not a public forum, and both agree that license plates are  
16 not a designated public forum. See ACLU's brief at pp. 9-10. The question that remains is  
17 whether a vanity plate is a nonpublic forum<sup>8</sup> or whether there is no implication of private  
18 speech at all.

19 While one circuit court has stated that a specialty license plate did not create a forum  
20 for speech,<sup>9</sup> it appears that most vanity plate cases have come to the conclusion that  
21

22 <sup>7</sup> Interestingly, the Life Coalition membership included approximately 40 organizations and 100,000  
23 individuals all of whom must subscribe to Life Coalition's statement of principles to become a member. *Id.* at  
24 961.

25 <sup>8</sup> The DMV agrees with the ACLU that the Ninth Circuit in *Stanton* discusses "limited public forum" whereas  
26 most courts simply state the license plate in question is a nonpublic forum. Whether one calls it "limited" or  
27 "nonpublic," the bottom line is that the analysis is the same: whether the statutes and regulations are 1)  
28 reasonable, and 2) viewpoint neutral. See *Choose Life Illinois, Inc. v. White*, 2008 WL 4821759 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
2008)(recognizing that *Stanton* held that the "forum was a limited one (more precisely, a nonpublic forum),  
meaning that 'any access restriction must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served by  
the forum'"). 2008 WL 4821759 at 9 (citing *Stanton*, 515 F.3d at 971).

<sup>9</sup> See *American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v. Bredesen*, 441 F.3d 370 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir.), *cert. denied*, 548  
U.S. 906 (2006), wherein the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the ACLU's interpretation that a specialty plate,

1 personalized/vanity license plates are a non-public forum and then look to see if the  
2 regulatory scheme is reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The ACLU seems to agree that  
3 whether the forum is called "limited public forum" in *Stanton* or "nonpublic" in most other  
4 courts, the resulting test is "reasonableness" and "viewpoint neutrality" (see footnote 3 on  
5 page 9 of the ACLU's brief).<sup>10</sup> However, this is where the ACLU's analysis ends. If the  
6 Nevada Supreme Court does not follow *Bredesen* in a finding of no First Amendment  
7 implications at all, then the crucial determination of this case is going to be finding if the  
8 Department's denial of "HOE" was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. To assist the court in  
9 this next level of analysis, it is important to determine what other courts have done as it  
10 specifically relates to vanity plate cases (again, a plate requested by one individual for one  
11 personal message).

12  
13 A number of courts that have examined denials of vanity plates have based those  
14 decisions on state statutes similar to the statutes and corresponding regulations in Nevada.  
15 As explained by those courts, there is no violation of the First Amendment in the non-public  
16 forum, because the state governments do in fact have a reasonable basis to regulate the  
17 policies they seek to enforce and that they are doing so in a viewpoint-neutral manner.

18  
19 For example, in *Perry v. McDonald*, 280 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001), a citizen brought an  
20 action against the DMV in Vermont alleging a First Amendment right to have the license  
21 plate bearing the letters "SHTHPNS." The Circuit Court found no First Amendment  
22 violation, because the state statute provided that vanity plates would be issued by paying an  
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24 "Choose Life", required viewpoint neutrality. The circuit court stated that the ACLU's view that a government-  
25 crafted message creates a "forum" would force the government to produce messages that fight against its  
26 policies or render unconstitutional a large swath of government actions that nearly everyone would consider  
27 desirable and legitimate. The court gave examples including plates that said "Spay or Neuter you Pets. While  
28 citizens may oppose such a view under the First Amendment, the First Amendment would not require the  
government to sell license plates that say "Spaying or Neutering your Pet is Cruel." *Id.* at 378-79.

<sup>10</sup> See *Stanton* wherein the court stated that given the overarching purpose of aiding in vehicle identification,  
expression through vanity plates and special organization plates are subject to numerous restrictions with the  
general public having only limited access. 515 F.3d at 971.

1 additional fee as long as the combination of letters and numbers was not "offensive or  
2 confusing to the general public." *Id.* at 163 (citing Vt. Stan. Ann. Title 23, sec.  
3 304(d)(emphasis added)). The Court examined the policy and practice of government and  
4 the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity. Concluding that the  
5 vanity plate was a nonpublic forum because only Vermont vehicle owners who had *obtained*  
6 *permission* could place a message of their choice on their vanity plate, the *Perry* court next  
7 examined whether the restriction was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Importantly, the  
8 court held that although the vehicle owner chose the combination of letters and numbers,  
9 the state had a legitimate interest in not communicating the message that it approves of the  
10 public display of offensive scatological terms on state license plates. The court noted that  
11 the plate owner could instead communicate a desired message on a bumper sticker. In  
12 determining that the restriction was viewpoint neutral, the court held that Vermont's policy  
13 did not oppose the plate owner's philosophical views as expressed in the vanity plate;  
14 however, the requested plate contained an offensive combination of letters which properly  
15 resulted in its denial.<sup>11</sup>

17  
18 Likewise, in *Kahn v. Department of Motor Vehicles*, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 6 (Cal. Ct. App.  
19 1993), the court held that a statute permitting the revocation of a license plate the DMV  
20 deemed *offensive to good taste and decency* (or that would also be misleading) was  
21 constitutional as it neither sought to prevent the expression of a specific viewpoint, nor  
22 promoted a particular opinion. The statute in question provided that the DMV could "cancel  
23 and order the return of any environmental license plate . . . containing any combination of  
24 letters, or numbers, or both, which the department determines carries connotations  
25 *offensive to good taste and decency or which would be misleading* (emphasis added)." *Id.*

26  
27 <sup>11</sup> Interestingly, the most recent specialty license plate case (another "Choose Life" plate) decided less than  
28 two months ago followed the *Perry* court in "the related context of vanity license plates." Following *Perry* and not

1 at 164 (*citing* Cal. Veh. Code sec. 5101). The license plate, bearing the letters "TP U BG"  
2 had been in use by a court reporter for 17 years. However, the DMV recalled the plate  
3 because the combination could also be translated in court reporting language to state the  
4 swear term, "F," "U," "K" or "CK". The court agreed that the state had a substantial interest  
5 in protecting a mechanical identification symbol such as the license plate from degradation  
6 and further that the DMV was reasonably concerned with avoiding the abusive use of its  
7 vehicle identification system and preserving the legitimacy, credibility, and reliability of its  
8 official emblem.

9  
10 In response to the driver applicant's argument that it was not enough that the  
11 translation of the court reporting symbols was offensive, but that there should be evidence  
12 that "TP U BG" in itself is offensive, the court held to have a connotation offensive to good  
13 taste and decency a word need not be understood in that manner by every addressee.  
14 Rather, the court stated that the appropriate test was what people of ordinary intelligence  
15 who know the language in question would understand from the use of the word.

16 Similarly, even in 1973, the California court in *Katz v. Department of Motor Vehicles*,  
17 108 Cal. Rptr. 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), held that the statute at issue was viewpoint neutral  
18 as it was not directed at the suppression of any specific idea or expression on a vehicle;  
19 rather, the statute simply excluded those configurations of letters and numbers from license  
20 plates that the administrative body deemed *offensive to good taste and decency*. The  
21 applicant wanted a license plate bearing the letters, "EZ LAY." The Court held that while  
22 First Amendment considerations were at best minimal, the state had an additional  
23 compelling interest in protecting a mechanical identification such as the license plate from  
24 degradation. Additionally, in *McMahon v. Iowa Department of Transportation*, 522 N.W.2d  
25 51 (Iowa 1994), the Office of Vehicle Registration ("OVR") staff would bring questionable  
26  
27

28 *Stanton*, the Seventh Circuit found it reasonable to exempt any specialty cases dealing with the abortion issue.

1 plates to the attention of the director who could approve or deny the plate. The license  
2 plate in question read "3MTA3" (which read "EATME" in a rear-view mirror). Like the  
3 procedure in Nevada, the OVR staff also used a slang dictionary in a balancing process of  
4 the driver's interest with that of offensiveness to the public. The Supreme Court of Iowa  
5 found that this procedure was reasonable, and reversed a district court which had not  
6 upheld the Department of Transportation's revocation decision.

7 Finally, there is astute guidance coming from the Supreme Court in Oregon. In  
8 *Higgins v. Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Branch*, 72 P.3d 628 (Or. 2003), the court  
9 noted the interchange between the DMV and the petitioner (the latter of whom wished to  
10 display an alcoholic reference on a license by requesting "INVINO", "VINO", and/or "WINE").  
11 Stated the court:  
12

13 DMV's customized registration plate rules permitted petitioner to participate,  
14 within defined limitations, in the selection of the numerals and letters that would  
15 appear on the registration plate for which he applied. But the limitations in DMV's  
16 rule confined the possible combinations of characters from which petitioner could  
17 select. The state did not open the process to any combination of letters and  
18 numbers that a vehicle owner might request. The state, not petitioner, retained  
19 control of the parameters within which petitioner could request characters for his  
20 customized registration plates.

21 In our view, DMV's rules allowing a vehicle owner's limited participation in the  
22 selection of characters for a customized registration plate do not alter the essential  
23 character of a registration plate. It remains a government-controlled device that  
24 carries a government-approved identification message that vehicle owners must  
25 display on their vehicle for regulatory purposes unrelated to the suppression of  
26 speech.

27 . . . .  
28 DMV's rule identified the parameters within which DMV was prepared to  
manufacture customized registration plates pursuant to applications that vehicle  
owners submitted. It is obvious from the rule that DMV was unwilling to manufacture  
a customized registration plate, as a part of its process for vehicle registration, if the  
requested characters conveyed a message about alcohol (or drug use, profanity,  
sexual terms, and the like). *Id.* at 633-34.

Like the Administrative Law Judge in the case at bar, the Oregon court found that the  
individual could not compel the DMV to manufacture a plate that fell outside the scope of

1 messages that DMV was willing to use in its regulatory parameters.

2 Therefore, following the above courts' guidance, a vanity plate can be constitutionally  
3 denied where the requested language is simply "offensive" or "offensive to good taste and  
4 decency" as they were in *Perry, Kahn, Katz, and McMahon*. See also *Martin v. State*,  
5 *Agency of Transportation Department of Motor Vehicles*, 819 A.2d 742, 747-48 & n.5 (Vt.  
6 2003) (finding that the statute disallowing vanity plates that were "offensive or confusing"  
7 was not ambiguous even though the term "offensive" could have different meanings such as  
8 aggressive or repugnant). Similarly, based on the persuasive and applicable authority cited  
9 above regarding vanity plates, a plate can be constitutionally denied when the requested  
10 language is "inappropriate." There is really no difference in stating a plate is "offensive" (or  
11 "offensive to good taste and decency") or stating a plate is "inappropriate." Both are  
12 constitutionally acceptable. Therefore, it was reasonable and certainly viewpoint-neutral to  
13 deny the request for "HOE." While the ACLU improperly states that the discretion of DMV  
14 to deny a plate is unfettered, that is simply not the case. Like the Iowa Supreme Court in  
15 *McMahon*, there is a process when examining a potential plate that requests an  
16 inappropriate combination of letters or numbers. Like *McMahon*, the Nevada DMV used a  
17 slang dictionary, wherein the term "HOE" is commonly defined as a "WHORE".<sup>12</sup> It was also  
18 not only reviewed by a technician, but also by her supervisor, and the Special Plate  
19 Committee. Obviously, there has to be some screening mechanisms, and here (like  
20 *McMahon*), it is a multi-step, multi-person process. Furthermore, Junge was entitled to  
21 have, and in fact did avail himself to, an administrative hearing wherein (through his  
22  
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25 <sup>12</sup> Slang dictionaries are an appropriate mechanism, of course, where there are other variant spellings of  
26 inappropriate words. For example, HO is in the *Merriam-Webster* on-line dictionary ([www.merriamwebster.com](http://www.merriamwebster.com))  
27 with reference to WHORE, but HOE is in the slang dictionary (DMV App. 46-50) with similar (and more sexually  
28 explicit) references. The test is not how well people spell; but as stated in *Kahn*, "[T]o have a connotation  
offensive to good taste and decency a word need not be understood in that manner by every addressee.  
Rather, the court stated that the appropriate test was what people of ordinary intelligence who know the  
language in question would understand from the use of the word." 20 Cal.Rptr.2d at 13.



1 counsel) he cross-examined witnesses, presented evidence, and even testified himself. He  
2 thereafter sought judicial review in the district court. These levels of review and  
3 presentation are in place so that there is not one decision by a DMV employee. Like the  
4 process in *McMahon*, this process is reasonable and constitutional under the First  
5 Amendment.

6 Additionally, unlike the specialty plate cases, the Nevada DMV did not deny the  
7 renewal of the plate "HOE" because of any particular view. See *Perry, supra* (finding  
8 Vermont's policy did not oppose the plate owner's philosophical views as expressed in the  
9 vanity plate; however, the requested plate contained an offensive combination of letters  
10 which properly resulted in its denial). In fact, it appeared at the district court that Junge is  
11 not really sure what he was trying to convey with "HOE." At the administrative hearing, his  
12 counsel argued Junge wanted the "HOE" language, because at the time he had a Tahoe  
13 vehicle. However, at the district court, there emerged other after-the-fact justifications: HOE  
14 is a farming tool, HOE is a prostitute, prostitution is legal in Nevada. The list went on and on.  
15 See TR at pp. 3, 5, 7. It can hardly be said that the Department denied Junge's particular  
16 view when he does not even seem set on what his "view" might be. Simply put, it was both  
17 reasonable and viewpoint-neutral to deny the request for "HOE" under the governing  
18 Nevada statutes and regulations and under the similar and persuasive authority of the  
19 courts in *Perry, McMahon, Katz, Kahn, and Higgins*.

22 Moreover, in this particular case, the DMV's actions in denying this plate were further  
23 protected because, like in the *Higgins* and *McMahon* cases, the language was inappropriate  
24 because it also specifically violated another regulation. In *Higgins* and *McMahon*, the  
25 requested language was offensive because it referred to alcohol in *Higgins* and a sexual  
26 innuendo in *McMahon*. Involving Junge's request for "HOE", it was not only "inappropriate"  
27  
28

1 under NRS 482.3667(5) and NAC 482.320(6)(f), just like the requested plates were deemed  
2 generally "offensive" in *Perry, Kahn, Katz, and McMahon*, but the committee members  
3 agreed that "HOE" was short for "whore" and was derogatory toward women. See  
4 comments from committee: "Deny, meaning is "whore" (Holthus); "Deny, this is street word  
5 for whore" (Brunell); "I agree it is derogatory to females" (Blevins) DMV App. p. 51-61.  
6 Therefore, it also more specifically violated NAC 482.320(6)(b)(4) and NAC  
7 482.320(6)(c)(e). ***Even the ACLU has pointed out that this specific rejection from the***  
8 ***Committee is legally sound.*** See ACLU's brief at p. 16 (finding that NAC 482.320(6)(a)  
9 through (6)(e) in fact "set out clear content restrictions on plate messages").  
10

11 Notably, even Junge - - the real party in interest - - agreed and conceded that the  
12 rejection of the language "HOE" by the DMV was based on the fact that it was inappropriate  
13 because it was derogatory to women.<sup>13</sup> Stated Junge's counsel at the district court  
14 argument, "Ms. Shaw determined that it was inappropriate and derogatory towards women",  
15 see TR pp. 3-4, and "[s]he [Ms. Shaw] is very concerned about women and it being  
16 derogatory against them" TR p. 5.<sup>14</sup> Since Junge agreed that the DMV's rejection was  
17 based on the determination that "HOE" is derogatory toward women, and since the ACLU  
18 said that rejection is appropriate, there should really be no issue as to the denial of the plate  
19 "HOE" by the DMV in this instance.  
20

## 21 **2. THERE WAS NO PRIOR RESTRAINT OF JUNGES PLATE AND ANY FACIAL** 22 **CHALLENGE PASSES CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER**

23 In contrast to the cases in the previous section, the ACLU next raises an alleged  
24

25  
26 <sup>13</sup> Other courts deem the word "hoe" (and spelled the same: h-o-e) offensive in a sexual harassment-hostile  
27 work environment claim. See *Wilhite v. Safelite Glass Corp.*, 2005 WL 2030487 (W.D. Okla. 2005)(stating that  
28 the use of gender-specific words such as "hoe", "bitch", and "slut" are more than mere vulgarities).

<sup>14</sup> Continued Junge's counsel, "And even if you want to go with their contention that "Hoe" is slang for whore,  
well, we're in Nevada and there is (sic) counties in Nevada where prostitution is legal." TR p. 5.

1 issue of "prior restraint" and attempts to broaden the scope of this appeal.<sup>15</sup> In this  
2 discussion, the ACLU recognizes the *Perry* case, but tries to distinguish it by stating that the  
3 statute in *Perry* was more detailed than the one at issue here. There are a number of  
4 problems with this argument. First, prior restraint is a "governmental order or action  
5 'forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such  
6 communications are to occur.'" *Perry*, 280 F.3d at 171. In the instant case involving Junge,  
7 he had the "HOE" plate since 1999 before his request for renewal was denied in 2006.  
8 DMV App. p. 26, ll. 3-4. Moreover, Junge had notice and a hearing on the issue and was  
9 entitled to drive with "HOE" during the pendency of the hearing. DMV App. p. 26, ll. 16-21  
10 (Junge's counsel noting, "We had requested that the plate not be removed or suspended  
11 and that was granted. And [it] . . . continues to be on the vehicle while we were waiting for  
12 this hearing to occur"). Junge has not been without the "HOE" plate, and is presumably still  
13 driving with this license plate. Therefore, there was no prior restraint on Junge's plate as he  
14 has been driving with this plate and still is doing so today.

16 Furthermore, the *Perry* court, in discussing the vanity plate "SHTHPNS", noted that  
17 "prior restraints in a nonpublic forum have been upheld as long as they were reasonable  
18 and viewpoint-neutral." 280 F.3d at 171. The court went on to explain:

20 A nonpublic forum by definition is characterized by "selective access," which  
21 necessarily means that the state can select or limit who may speak and what  
22 may be said *prior to its expression* as long as the restrictions meet the  
23 requirements of reasonableness and viewpoint-neutrality. Accordingly, a  
24 restriction on expression which would otherwise be deemed a prior restraint if  
25 it had been applied in a public forum is valid in a *nonpublic* forum as long as it  
26 is reasonable and viewpoint-neutral (emphasis in original)(internal citations  
27 omitted). *Id.*<sup>16</sup>

28 . . . .

<sup>15</sup> The issue is the denial of the plate, "HOE", wherein there was no issue of prior restraint. The issue for this appeal is not every possible future plate that may cross DMV's path.

<sup>16</sup> The ACLU improperly jumps to a higher standard of strict scrutiny, ignoring its own recognition that regulations on license plates need only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.

1 Because the rules governing the vanity plate program denial in *Perry* were viewpoint-  
2 neutral, there was no prior restraint. See also *Byrne v. Terrill*, 2005 WL 2043011 (D. Vt.  
3 2005) (reasoning that because the statute that excluded religious messages from vanity  
4 plates was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral, it was a permissible prior restraint); *Byrne v.*  
5 *Lunderville*, 2007 WL 2892620 (D. Vt. 2007)(stating because the DMV had a multi-step  
6 review process and access to hearings and judicial review, a claim of prior restraint based  
7 on overbreadth failed).

8 While the ACLU would like to assert that the regulatory list from *Perry* is somehow  
9 vastly different from Nevada's NRS 482.3667 and NAC 482.320, a quick comparison of the  
10 two shows the similarities. While the Nevada code may include at the end a denial of a  
11 combination of letters and numbers that is *inappropriate*, as stated above, that is simply a  
12 recitation of the *inappropriate* language found in the controlling statute NRS 482.3667. And  
13 as *Perry* and the other cases hold, it is reasonable and viewpoint-neutral to reject a plate  
14 that is *offensive*. Again, if it passes constitutional muster to reject a plate that is *offensive*,  
15 then it stands to reason that it will pass constitutional muster to reject a plate that is  
16 *inappropriate*.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, as explained above, just as "SHTHPNS" is offensive because  
17 it is a profanity, HOE is inappropriate because, as the Committee members stated, it is  
18 derogatory toward women. Since the DMV's denial of a renewal for the plate "HOE" was  
19 reasonable under the governing statutes and regulations, and was viewpoint-neutral, any  
20 possible prior restraint (even if there had been one) would have been permissible under the  
21 First Amendment.  
22  
23  
24

25 <sup>17</sup> Unlike the "offensive" language that has been held constitutional and the similar "inappropriate" language  
26 that should be upheld here, the Missouri statute in *Lewis v. Wilson*, 253 F.3d 1077 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001)(referred to by  
27 the ACLU) seemed to take an unusual stance in directing that the plate "ARYAN-1" be issued. However, the  
28 initial reason the driver was told she could not have the plate was because it was generally "contrary to public  
policy" which is much broader than a particular plate being offensive or inappropriate because it is derogatory.  
Furthermore, the same plate of ARYAN-1 would presumably properly be denied in Nevada anyway under NAC  
482.320(6)(b)(1), which expressly denies a plate showing a superiority of race.

1 **D. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE**  
2 **ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WHO UPHELD THE DMV'S DENIAL OF THE**  
3 **LICENSE PLATE "HOE"**

4 This Court additionally requested the ACLU to address the factual state law issue of  
5 District Court Judge Jessie Walsh substituting her own personal judgment during oral  
6 argument for that of the administrative agency's decision in violation of the Nevada  
7 Administrative Procedure Act. The ACLU does not go in to any real detail in their amicus  
8 brief in this area. Its restraint in that regard is proper and respected, since it is neither a  
9 party nor a representative in this matter. The DMV would like to emphasize from its  
10 Opening Brief that the district court did in fact substitute its judgment on an issue of fact.  
11 District Court Judge Walsh surmised that "HOE" was a farming tool despite the fact that  
12 Junge stated that was not his intent with the word.

13 This Court has often stated, "We shall not substitute our judgment for that of the  
14 agency in regard to questions of fact, but must determine whether the agency's decision  
15 was clearly erroneous or an arbitrary abuse of discretion." *Currier v. State Indus. Ins. Sys.*,  
16 114 Nev. 328, 956 P.2d 810 (1998). See also *Weaver v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles*,  
17 121 Nev. 494, 498, 117 P.3d 193, 196 (2005) (stating that "when reviewing an  
18 administrative decision neither this court nor the district court may . . . substitute its  
19 judgment for that of the administrative agency concerning the weight of the evidence on  
20 questions of fact"); *Clements v. Airport Authority of Washoe County*, 111 Nev. 717, 896  
21 P.2d 458 (1995). The Special Plate Committee of the DMV decided that, under the dictates  
22 of governing statutes and regulations, that the use of the word "HOE" was inappropriate and  
23 derogatory toward women. The DMV Administrative Law Judge agreed. However, the  
24 district court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the agency, deciding for itself  
25 that the word "HOE" was not inappropriate and ascribing a different meaning.  
26  
27  
28

1 During oral argument before the district court, Petitioner, through his counsel, argued  
2 repeatedly that the plate "HOE" was part of a "theme" he had for his Tahoe vehicle (TR p. 3,  
3 ll. 17-18; p. 5, ll. 24-25; p. 12, ll. 11-14). However, the district court stated, "Ms. Nelson,  
4 when I first read these papers and pleadings I thought perhaps your client was a gardener.  
5 Any response?" Ms. Nelson replied, "He's not." (TR. p. 12, ll. 3-6).<sup>18</sup> The district court  
6 continued, "I will tell you that I don't see, based on my review of the statutes and the  
7 information cited by counsel, I don't see anything inappropriate about this plate usage."  
8 (TR. p. 14, ll. 4-7). And after DMV counsel tried to persuade the district court otherwise,  
9 including the suggestion that Petitioner might not be making the same argument if Petitioner  
10 was denied his plate for the first time in 2006, the district court responded, "It might not but  
11 the word "HOE" means a gardening tool. So frankly I don't see anything offensive about  
12 it..." (TR. p. 17, ll. 5-7). Not only did the district court substitute its judgment for that of the  
13 agency, but it completely ignored the common definitions and derogatory connotations of  
14 the word "HOE" submitted by Petitioner himself and contained in the Record on Appeal  
15 (DMV App. pp. 46-50 (referring to a "HOE" as a whore)).  
16

17 Here, the district court is clearly substituting its judgment for that of the DMV and has  
18 acted contrary to established Nevada Supreme Court precedent. The DMV, through the  
19 channels of the technician, her supervisor, the Special Plate Committee, and before an  
20 Administrative Law Judge at the DMV, decided that the use of the term "HOE" was  
21 inappropriate, slang for "whore" and derogatory toward women. The DMV has the authority  
22 to carefully make such determinations under the governing statutes and regulations cited  
23 above. The district court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the agency on this  
24  
25

26 <sup>18</sup> While Petitioner asserted at the administrative hearing that the word "HOE" could be a farm implement  
27 (DMV App. p. 14, line 28; App. p. 24, ll. 25-27), and alluded to the same in his district court brief, Petitioner always  
28 maintained the purpose of the word was to relate to his Tahoe. Stated Petitioner at his hearing, "... the connection  
with the Chevrolet Tahoe and the Lake Tahoe plate was the initial connection between the plate, the truck, Lake  
Tahoe, everything. I think it ties together) (DMV App. p. 24, ll. 21-23). In 2003, Petitioner requested a different  
plate background instead of the Lake Tahoe plate (DMV App. p. 24, ll. 14-16).

1 factual issue and decided for itself that "HOE" is simply a gardening tool and not  
2 inappropriate. Incredibly, Junge never even argued that it was his intention in his  
3 application that "HOE" was meant to refer to a gardening tool; he said it was for a Tahoe  
4 (TR. p. 3, ll. 17-18; p. 5, ll. 24-25; p. 12, ll. 11-14). At oral argument, Junge did recognize  
5 the DMV's concerns and tried to discount the practical meaning of the word, "HOE," with  
6 references to the supposed loose morals of Nevada; incredibly, Junge asserted that "HOE",  
7 even if slang for whore, should be allowed because there are "counties in Nevada where  
8 prostitution is legal" and so "HOE" would be a definition for an occupation (TR. p. 5, ll. 15-  
9 20). Junge, through his counsel even stated, "Here in Nevada and in several counties it is  
10 legal to be a whore. You can go out and you can be a prostitute. We have plenty of  
11 brothels. It's no big surprise that people in other states don't view us as a real church going  
12 community." (TR. p. 12, ll. 19-24). As stated in DMV's Opening Brief, it is no big surprise,  
13 indeed, when vehicles in Nevada are allowed to be driven with inappropriate and derogatory  
14 words on state issued license plates.  
15

16 Simply put, the district court overstepped its bounds when it substituted its judgment  
17 for that of the agency pursuant to *Currier, Weaver, and Clements*, and therefore, the district  
18 court's order should be reversed.  
19

#### 20 IV.

#### 21 CONCLUSION

22 The DMV has the authority, and the duty, to regulate what is permissible language on  
23 state issued license plates. NRS 482.3667, NRS 482.3669, NAC 482.320, and NAC  
24 482.370. Statutes are presumed to be valid, and the challenger bears the burden of  
25 showing that a statute is unconstitutional. *Nevadans for Nevada v. Beers*, 122 Nev. 930,  
26 142 P.3d 339 (2006). In order to meet that burden, the challenger must make a clear  
27 showing of invalidity. 142 P.3d at 345. Here the challenger, Junge, has made no showing  
28 whatsoever that Nevada's statutes and regulations are unconstitutional. He has, in

1 essence, abandoned this appeal. And even the ACLU, as an outside entity filing an amicus  
2 brief, has made no such showing regarding this personal vanity plate of "HOE." The DMV,  
3 in a manner consistent with its statutory and regulatory scheme, denied this requested plate  
4 renewal. As explained in this brief, there is no violation of the First Amendment whether it  
5 was denied as inappropriate or as inappropriate because it is also derogatory toward  
6 women. Both are constitutionally valid and sound. Nevada's statutes and regulations, like  
7 other states, are both reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Further, the ACLU's new issue of  
8 "prior restraint" is simply a red herring, and bears no connection to this case at bar. Not  
9 only was Junge not *restrained* in any way for he has been and is still presumably driving  
10 with "HOE" on his license plate, but Nevada's statutes and regulations pass the test of  
11 reasonableness and viewpoint-neutrality. And finally, the district court impermissibly  
12 changed the underlying factual context of the case when it superimposed its own  
13 "viewpoint" on what "HOE" should mean.

14 For the reasons in the DMV's Opening Brief and for the additional reasons stated in  
15 this Response Brief, the DMV respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter an  
16 Order reversing the decision of the district court and affirming the decision of the  
17 Administrative Law Judge of the Department of Motor Vehicles.

18 DATED this 26<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2008.

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1 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

2 I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge,  
3 information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further  
4 certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in  
5 particular N.R.A.P. 28(e), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the  
6 record to be supported by a reference to the page of the transcript or appendix where the  
7 matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event  
8 that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules  
9 of Appellate Procedure.

10 Dated this 26<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2008.

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that on the 26th day of December, 2008, I served a copy of **APPELLANT'S RESPONSE BRIEF TO THE ACLU'S AMICUS BRIEF** by causing to be delivered to the Department of General Services for mailing at Las Vegas, Nevada, a true copy thereof, addressed to:

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