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3	RONALD ROSS,) No. 52921
4	Appellant,	Electronically Filed Apr 20 2010 08:38 a.m Tracie K. Lindeman
5	V.) Tracie K. Lindeman
6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
7)
8	Respondent.	
9	APPELLANT'S APPEN	NDIX – VOLUME IV – PAGES 705-790
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TRAN 1 FILED カリピエ 2 3 JUN 26 2009 4 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CRIMINAL DIVISION 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 STATE OF NEVADA, 9 Plaintiff, 10 VS. CASE NO. C236169 11 RONALD ROSS, DEPT. XVII 12 Defendant. 13 14 15 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL P. VILLANI, 16 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 17 TRANSCRIPT RE: JURY TRIAL - VOL. II 18 19 WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2008 20 APPEARANCES: 21 22 For the Plaintiff: JESSICA WALSH, ESQ. DENA RINETTI, ESQ. 23 For the Defendant: CRAIG JORGENSON, ESQ. 24 25 C236169 STATE OF NEVADA v. ROSS 11/13/2008 TRANSCRIPT VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC 11115 N. La Canada, Suite 275, Oro Valley, Arizona 85737 (520) 219-1449

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PROCEEDINGS

(The proceedings began at 11:12:23 a.m.)

THE COURT: All right. This is Case Number C236169, State of Nevada versus Ronald Ross. Mr. Ross is present with his attorney, Mr. Jorgenson. And we have Ms. Walsh, Ms. Rinetti for the State.

We previously met in chambers to go over some of the jury instructions, and we have instructions one through 28. Does the State have any objection to the giving of those instructions?

MS. WALSH: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Does the State request any additional

instructions?

MS. WALSH: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And are you satisfied with the verdict form actually that your office prepared?

MS. WALSH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jorgenson, you're

familiar with instructions one through 28?

MR. JORGENSON: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Any objection to those instructions?

MR. JORGENSON: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Request for any additional instructions?

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1 MR. JORGENSON: No, Judge. 2 THE COURT: All right. And you're satisfied with 3 the verdict form? 4 MR. JORGENSON: Yes, Judge. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Again, I just want to just 6 double-check that you've discussed with your client the jury 7 instruction that advises the -- the jury that it is a 8 constitutional right for your client not to testify and not be 9 compelled to testify and the State cannot make any comments; you've discussed that instruction with your client? 10 11 MR. JORGENSON: Right. 12 THE COURT: And based upon your discussion with him 13 it's -- a decision has been made not to -- for the Court not to give that instruction; is that correct? 14 15 MR. JORGENSON: Right. 16 THE COURT: All right. We'll give the instructions 17 before opening. We'll come back at 1 o'clock. And like I said before please -- if there's any PowerPoints please have 18 19 those up and running, double-check with Michelle to make sure every -- everything's compatible. And then we'll start 20 21 promptly at 1 o'clock. 22 Mr. Ross, did you have a question? 23 MR. JORGENSON: He's asking about what the verdict forms look like. 24 25 THE COURT: Okay. All right.

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MS. WALSH: Thanks, Judge.

THE COURT: See everybody back at 1:00.

(Off record)

THE COURT: Everybody have a pen and notepad? All right. This is Case Number C236169, State of Nevada versus Ronald Ross. Mr. Ross is present with Mr. Jorgenson. We have Ms. Walsh, Ms. Rinetti for the State of Nevada.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is the time set to resume the trial. The presentation of the evidence was concluded yesterday, as -- as you recall. You're now ready for closing argument. Before we start the closing arguments I will read to you the jury instructions which are the -- the law and the laws that apply to this particular case.

I will identify the jury instructions and they are numbered. You can take notes regarding the jury instructions — some of the attorneys may refer you to some of the instructions — but understand you will have your own separate packet of jury instructions to take back with you to the jury room, so you don't have to — if you want to take notes that's fine, but, again, you'll have your own packet to — to go back there with you. So at this time I will read the jury instructions to you.

It is your duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts as you find them from the evidence. You must not be concerned with

the wisdom of any rule of law stated in these instructions regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be. It would be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in the instructions by the Court.

Instruction number 2: If in these instructions any rule, direction, or idea is repeated or stated in different ways no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason you are not to single out a certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in light of all the others. The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

Instruction number 3: An information is but a formal method of accusing a person of a crime and is not of itself any evidence of his guilt. In this case it is charged in an information that on or between March 17th, 2007, and March 31st, 2007, Defendant committed the offense of burglary, felony, NRS 205.060; larceny from a person, felony, NRS 205.270; possession of credit card without cardholder's consent, felony, NRS 205.690; fraudulent use of a credit card, felony, NRS 205.760; theft, felony, NRS 205.0835 and 205.0832; and conspiracy to commit larceny, gross misdemeanor, NRS 205.220, 205.222, and 199.480. It is the duty of the jury to

apply the rules of law contained in these instructions to the facts of the case and determine whether or not the Defendant is guilty of one or more of the offenses charged.

Count I, burglary: did on or about March 17, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, enter with the intent to commit larceny that certain building occupied by the Tropicana Hotel and Casino located at 3801 Las Vegas Boulevard South, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada.

Count II, larceny from the person: did on or about March 17, 2007, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, under circumstances not amounting to robbery, with intent to steal or appropriate to his own use, take from the person of another, to wit, Georgia Stathopoulos, without her consent, personal property, to wit, wallet and contents.

Count III, burglary: did on or about March 17, 2007, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, enter with the intent to commit a felony, to wit, obtaining property under false pretenses and/or felony theft and/or forgery that certain building occupied by Sheikh Shoes located at 3525 South Maryland Parkway, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada.

Count IV, possession of credit or debit card without cardholder's consent: did on or about March 17, 2007, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, have in his possession without consent of the cardholder a credit or debit

card, to wit, a Visa credit card issued in the name of Georgia Stathopoulos, with intent to circulate, use, sell, or transfer said card with the intent to defraud said Georgia Stathopoulos and/or the issuer of said credit or debit card.

Count V: did on or about March 17th, 2007, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, with intent to defraud, use a credit or debit card, to wit, by presenting a Visa credit card issued in the name of Georgia Stathopoulos to Deja Jarmin at Sheikh Shoes, 3525 South Maryland Parkway, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, for the purpose of obtaining merchandise, Defendant not being the cardholder, nor being authorised by the cardholder to use said card.

Count VI, theft: did on or about March 17, 2007, then and there knowingly, feloniously, and with -- without lawful authority, commit theft by obtaining personal property in the amount of \$250 or more, lawful money of the United States, of Sheikh Shoes, 3525 South Maryland Parkway, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, by a material misrepresentation with the intent to deprive the person of the property in the following manner, to wit, by said Defendant falsely representing that he was in lawful possession of a Visa card -- credit card and that he had authorization to use said card, thereby obtaining the personal property of Sheikh Shoes by a material misrepresentation with intent to deprive the -- deprive them of the property.

Count VII, conspiracy to commit larceny: did on or about March 17, 2007, then and there meet with another and between themselves and each of them with the other wilfully and unlawfully conspire and agree to commit a crime, to wit, larceny, and in furtherance of said conspiracy Defendant committed the acts as set forth in Counts IV through VI, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.

Instruction 4: To constitute the crime charged there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and an intent to do the act. The intent which -- with which an act is done is shown by the facts and the circumstances surrounding the case. Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done. Motive is not an element of the crime charged, and the State is not required to prove a motive on the part of the Defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case.

Instruction number 5: The Defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crimes charged and that the Defendant is the person who committed the offenses. A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is

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not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charges there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation. If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the Defendant he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.

Instruction 6: Every person who, by day or night, enters any building with the intent to commit a larceny and/or a felony therein is guilty of burglary. Force or breaking as such is not a necessary element of the crime.

Instruction 7: The intention with which entry was made is a question of fact which may be inferred from the Defendant's conduct and all other circumstances disclosed by the evidence.

Instruction number 8: Larceny is defined as the stealing, taking, and carrying away of personal goods or property of another with the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof. In the state of Nevada the following crimes are a felony: larceny from a person; fraudulent use of a credit or debit card; and theft of \$250 or more.

Instruction 9: It is not necessary that the State prove that the Defendant actually committed a larceny and/or a

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Instruction 10: A person who enters an establishment with the intent to commit a larceny and/or a felony therein is guilty of burglary even though the entry was made through the public entrance during business hours. The authority to enter a building -- a building open to the public extends only to those who enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open. An entry with intent to commit a larceny and/or a felony therein cannot be said to be within the authority granted customers of a business establishment. The fact, therefore, that the establishment is open to the general public is not a defense to the charge of burglary so long as the Defendant is shown to have made the entry with the intent to commit a larceny and/or a felony therein.

Instruction 11: Every person who, in the commission of a burglary, commits any other crime may be prosecuted for each crime separately.

Instruction 12: Every person who, under circumstances not amounting to robbery with intent to steal or

appropriate to his own use, takes from the person of another without his consent any money, property, or thing of value is guilty of larceny from the person.

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Instruction number 13: For the purpose of larceny property is deemed taken from the person of the victim if the property was within the victim's reach, inspection, observation, disposition, or control so the victim could dispose of it if the victim's willpower was not overcome.

Instruction 14: The term taking, as that term is used as an element of the crime of larceny, means that the personal goods or property of another are taken from the possession of the person who is entitled to them and into the possession of the person accused of the crime. The term carrying away, as that term is used as an element of the crime of larceny, means that the taking is followed by an asportation or carrying away of the property so as to supercede the possession of the owner. The taking element is separate and distinct, and taking, which is not followed by a carrying away or asportation, cannot itself support a larceny conviction. In order to constitute an asportation or carrying away it is not necessary that personal property be removed from the building in which it is located. But any removal of the property from its original status, such as would constitute a complete severance from the possession of the owner, constitutes an asportation or carrying away even though

the transfer of possession existed for only a brief period of time. What constitutes sufficient asportation to support a conviction for larceny is a question of fact for the jury.

Instruction 15: Any person who possesses a credit card without consent of the cardholder and with the intent to circulate, use, sell, or transfer the credit card with intent to defraud is guilty of possession of credit card without cardholder's consent.

Instruction 16: A person who, with the intent to defraud, use a credit card where the person possesses the credit card without the consent of the cardholder, is guilty of fraudulent use of credit card.

Instruction 17: Any person who, without lawful authority, knowingly obtains property of another person of a value greater than \$250 by a material misrepresentation with a specific intent to permanently deprive the other property — the other — the other — deprive the — the other of the property is guilty of theft. Material misrepresentation means the use of any pretense or the making of any promise, representation, or statement, a present, past, or future fact, which is fraudulent and which, when used or made, is instrumental in causing the wrongful control or transfer of the property. The pretense may be verbal or it may be a physical act. The amount involved in a theft shall be deemed to be the highest value by any reasonable standard of property

which is obtained.

Instruction 18: Conspiracy is an agreement or mutual understanding between two or more persons to commit a crime. To be guilty of conspiracy a Defendant must intend to commit or to aid in the commission of the specific crime agreed to. The crime is the agreement to do something unlawful. It does not matter whether it was successful or not.

Instruction 19: It is not necessary in proving a conspiracy to show a meeting of the alleged conspirators or the making of an express or formal agreement. A formation and existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from all circumstances tending to show a common intent and may be proved as the same way as any other fact may be proved either by direct testimony of the fact or by circumstantial evidence or by both direct and circumstantial evidence.

Instruction 20: Each member of a criminal conspiracy is liable for each act and bound by each declaration of every other member of the conspiracy if the act or the declaration is in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. The act of one conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of a common design of the conspiracy is the act of all the conspirators. Every conspirator is legally responsible for an act of a coconspirator that follows as one of the probable and natural consequences of the object of the

conspiracy even if it was not intended as part of the original plan and even if he was not present at the time of the commission of such act.

Instruction number 21: You are here to determine the guilt or innocence of the Defendant from the evidence in this case. You are not called upon to return a verdict as to the guilt or innocence of any other person. So if the evidence in this case convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the Defendant you should so find even though you may believe one or more persons are also guilty.

Instruction 22: The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel. There are two types of evidence: direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime which has been charged, such as an eyewitness.

Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a chain of facts and circumstances which tend to show whether a Defendant is guilty or not guilty. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict. Statements, arguments, and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case. However, if the

attorneys stipulate to the existence of a fact you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved. You must not speculate to be true any insinuation suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer. You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the Court and any evidence ordered stricken by the Court. Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

Instruction number 23: The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his manner upon the stand, his relationship to the parties, his fears, motives, interests, or feelings, his opportunity to have observed the matter to which he testified, the reasonableness of his statements, and the strength or weaknesses of his recollections. If you believe that a witness has lied about any material fact in the case you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or only a portion of his testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

Instruction number 24: Although you are to consider only the evidence in this case in reaching your verdict you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from

In your deliberations you may not discuss or consider the subject of punishment as that is a matter which lies solely with the Court. Your duty is confined to the determination of the guilt or innocence of the Defendant.

Instruction 26: When you retire to consider your verdict you must select one of your number to act as foreperson who will preside over your deliberations and will be your spokesperson here in court. During your deliberations you will have all of the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions, and forms of verdict which have been prepared for your convenience. Your verdict must be unanimous. As soon as you've agreed upon a verdict, have it signed and dated by your foreperson and then return with it to this room.

Instruction number 27: If, during your deliberations, you should desire to be further informed on any point of law or hear again portions of the testimony you must reduce your request to writing signed by the foreperson. The officer will then return you to court where the information

sought will be given to you in the presence of and after notice to the District Attorney and the Defendant and his counsel. Playbacks of testimony are time-consuming and are not encouraged unless you deem it a necessity. Should you require a playback you must carefully describe the testimony to be played back so that the court recorder can arrange her notes. Remember, the Court is not at liberty to supplement the evidence.

Now you will listen to arguments of counsel who will endeavor to aid you to reach a proper verdict, refresh in your minds the evidence, and by showing the application thereof to the law. But whatever counsel may say you will bear in mind that it is your duty to be governed in your deliberations by the evidence as you understand it and remember it to be, and by the law as given to you in these instructions with the sole fixed and steadfast purpose of doing equal and exact justice between the Defendant and the State of Nevada.

State, your closing, please.

MS. RINETTI: Please the Court, Counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. There are two things that the State must prove in every criminal trial. The first one is that a crime has been committed, and the second is that the Defendant committed that crime. So I'm going to go through each count and describe what facts have been presented -- in fact, not only the point that a crime was committed but the Defendant

committed that crime.

So let's start with burglary. Burglary. Every person who, by day or night, enters any building with the intent to commit larceny or -- and/or a felony therein is guilty of burglary. And in this case we've charged two counts of burglary: one for the Tropicana casino and one for the Sheikh shoe store. Now, what we have to prove on both of those counts both for the Tropicana casino as well as the Sheikh shoe store is that the Defendant entered that establishment with the intent to commit a larceny and/or a felony. So let's go through them.

Count I, burglary. Defendant entered the Tropicana. Well, we saw it on the video and we saw the Defendant and — and then an unidentified man approach the victim, Georgia. Detective Flenner recognized Ronald Ross, the Defendant, on that video. You also heard testimony from Georgia who on the stand point to the Defendant and said that's the man that sat next to me on that slot machine. And you saw the video of that gentleman over there sitting next to Georgia.

And it's with intent to commit a larceny. And unfortunately, we can't get into the mind of the Defendant, so we have to look at his actions and see whether or not he intended to commit a felony or a larceny when he entered the Tropicana Hotel. Well, all we have to do is look at his actions within the video. You see him approach the victim

with an unidentified man, starts distracting her, the wallet is taken, the -- the handoff is made, the unidentified male goes one direction, and the Defendant goes the other way.

And that's all about at 1 o'clock. It's interesting to note that in 40 minutes the Defendant has left the Tropicana but had shopped around in the shoe store for at least 20 to 30 minutes according to the witnesses at the shoe store and was able to purchase items at the shoe store, all within 40 minutes, which means that the Defendant left the Tropicana casino soon after taking Georgia's wallet thereby inferring that the Defendant entered the Tropicana casino with the intent to commit a larceny.

count III is with the shoe store. The Defendant entered the shoe store. We saw -- the Defendant was seen on video by Off -- Detective Flenner, and also Kevin Hancock came in and said they both reviewed the video from the shoe store, and they both recognized that it was the Defendant that entered that shoe store.

And you also have the tran -- the previous transcript of Deja Jarmin, who was actually the salesperson that dealt with the Defendant. And she said in that testimony the Defendant is the one that I helped on March 17th, 2007, and the Defendant's the one that gave me the credit card. And you also have Luis Valadez who is the -- present and working on that day and said yes, the Defendant came in and he made a

purchase.

And you also remember when Kevin got up on the stand, and he said that Deja had told him that Phillie was looking for him that day. And you heard from Detective Flenner that the Defendant is from Philadelphia. Phillie was looking for Kevin on March 17th, 2007, within that shoe store.

Then it's with the intent to commit a felony, and in this case it's fraudulent use of a credit card and theft. And again, you can't look into the mind of the Defendant, so we have to look at his actions. So what was the purpose of him entering the shoe store? Was it to get a bite to eat, was it talk (indiscernible) friends? No. The only purpose of going into that shoe store was to use the stolen credit card. And he bought \$490 worth of merchandise about 40 to 45 minutes after he stole Georgia's wallet. There was no other reason for him to go into that shoe store other than to use that stolen credit card, and he did so soon after he stole that credit card.

The other charge that we've -- that is alleged is larceny from a person. Larceny from a person. Every person who, under circumstances not amounting to robbery with the intent to steal or appropriate to his own use, takes from the person of another without his consent any money, property, or thing of value.

So what does the State have to prove?

(Indiscernible) there are circumstances not amounting to robbery. And when you think about robbery you think of, you know, some kind of a violent act. Larceny doesn't amount to robbery because there's no force used. Then we have to have the intent to steal. Taking of a -- from another, without consent, money, property, or thing of value.

So let's go through each element. Circumstances not amounting to robbery. Obviously, you all saw the video yesterday of the Defendant and the unidentified man and the —the handoff and the jacket and the wallet underneath the jacket. There was no actual force used. Georgia didn't, you know — you know, didn't say there was a struggle for the wallet.

And you saw the video; there was only some slight, you know, crouching with the -- the victim in order to kind of distract her. And Georgia didn't realize her wallet was taken until several minutes later when she went up to her room. And then again, because there wasn't any forced used it was just pickpocket.

With the intent to steal. And what you also have to do is to look at the video. What did the Defendant do? He walked towards the victim, saw her, walked past her, and then turned around and said ah, got my target, older lady, playing slot machines, this is it. And you could see as he was turning he actually put the jacket over his arm, draped it

over his arm, and then proceeded to go towards Georgia with the unidentified man.

And you heard from Detective Flenner that there was some -- they used a common distract method as far as blocking people so they couldn't see the exchange was going to be made, the fact that there's two people, the fact that they were kind of diverting Georgia's attention upwards so she wouldn't notice what was happening right at her side.

And you also heard from Georgia that when the Defendant approached her he asked two things: one, what she had won; and two, how to play the machine. But you saw in the video that soon after the handout -- handoff Defendant left. He never played the machine. It was just one of -- of his methods of distracting the victim.

The taking from another. A taking from another is defined in your jury instructions as if the property was within the victim's reach, inspection, disposition, or control. And you heard from her Georgia that her purse was right at her side and that she had her wallet -- she'd taken a dollar out to play the -- the machine, and she had laid the wallet right next to her; and that she last saw her wallet at the slot machine -- she took the money out to play the machines. So it was right in her control, her dominion and control, right next to her.

And then you have to have without consent. And, of

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course, you heard from Georgia she -- on the stand that the Defendant did not have permission to take her wallet; never said sure, go ahead, take my money and my credit cards. She never said that.

And then money, property, or thing of value. And Georgia explained it was her wallet that was taken as well as some credit cards that were in there, driver's license, and other things. I think she called her wallet her center of the purse.

Now we're going to go to Count VII. I'm going to switch it up a bit and talk about the conspiracy to commit larceny. Conspiracy. Conspiracy is an agreement or mutual understanding between two or more persons to commit a crime. To be guilty of conspiracy a Defendant must intend to commit or to aid in the commission of the specific crime agreed to. Now, conspiracy's a difficult thing because Defendants or people don't get together when they decide to commit crimes and write down a contract like we're going to do this and you're going to get 20 percent, I'm going to get 40 percent, and this other guy's going to get the rest. Doesn't happ —doesn't work like that.

So what we have to look at is their actions on that day, their actions during that incident, to see whether or not a conspiracy existed between the Defendant and the unidentified man in that video. And when you saw on the video

is those two men, the Defendant and the unidentified man -man, walk towards Georgia. You saw the Defendant see Georgia,
he took a couple of steps and then turned around adjusting his
jacket in order to use it as a prop. You saw both the
Defendant and the unidentified man approach Georgia.

And then as doctor -- Detective Flenner testified to, they used some comic -- common distract methods as far as making sure that Georgia was looking up. In fact, the unidentified man was standing kind of behind Georgia and kind of behind the Defendant in order to block passer-byers from seeing what was going on.

And you also saw the handoff. And you also saw the fact that after the handoff was made the unidentified man went one way and the Defendant went another way. Another interesting point is that 40 to 45 minutes later the Defendant and that unidentified man meet back up and are seen in that shoe store wearing the same clothing as what they were wearing at the Tropicana.

The other -- another crime that's been charged is possession of a credit card or -- a credit card or debit card without cardholder's consent, which is defined as any person who possesses a credit card without consent of the cardholder and with the intent to circulate, sell, or transfer the credit card with the intent to defraud. So let's go through the elements of possession of credit card without cardholder's

consent.

The first one is the Defendant had to have possession of the credit card. And you heard from -- through the te -- the former testimony of Deja Jarmin, who was the sales clerk at the shoe store, that the Defendant, who she positively identified, was the person that approached her and used Georgia's credit card. And I think one of the questions was did he actually physically sign in blue ink for the -- the purchases with that credit card, and Deja said yes.

And you're also going to (indiscernible) that the Defendant presented the actual credit card because there's that carbon copy and where they have to actually physically, you know, swipe the credit card. I don't think they do that much nowadays, but they swiped it back and forth so it makes the imprint of the actual card and its numbers.

And you also heard through Deja's former testimony that she physically swiped Georgia's credit card through the credit card machine and that the transaction went though, and that's how she got the -- that is how he got the credit card receipt for the Defendant to sign. So the credit card was actually presented by the Defendant to Deja.

And was -- did he possess -- did the Defendant possess that credit card without consent of Georgia? And sure enough you heard from Georgia that the Defendant, who she doesn't know, didn't have permission to have her credit card.

Then you have to have with intent to use. Well, here this is fairly easy because the Defendant actually uses Georgia's credit card at the shoe store and purchases \$490 worth of items, and, in fact, afterwards signs up for one of those VIP memberships using his name and number.

Well, it's also with the intent to defraud. Again, the Defendant misrepresented that he was the actual cardholder. And you saw when you looked at that credit card receipt that blue ink he signed his name Georgia and you heard from Georgia that's not her signature, and, in fact, her name's spelled wrong; it's spelled with a K on the credit card receipt, and there's no K in her last name.

So he intended to defraud by having that credit card because he was going to use it. He mis -- misrepresented that he was the credit card holder and would get some items from the shoe store.

The other charge -- the crime charged is fraudulent use of credit or debit card, which is defined as a person who, with the intent to defraud, uses a credit card where the person possesses the credit card without consent of cardholder. And here, again, when you -- with the intent to defraud and again within 40 min -- 40 to 45 minutes the Defendant, seen on video at the Tropicana, is seen by three people at the shoe store. Deja, Kevin, and Luis, they all see him at the shoe using the Defendant -- using Georgia's credit

card. He used that credit card and he used it as the cardholder. He signed his name as Georgia and he actually spelled it wrong. He intended to defraud because he was -- he -- he represented that he was the cardholder when, in fact, he was not.

And he actually used that credit card. And you heard through the former testimony of Deja that she positively identified the Defendant as the person that came into the shoe store, that she helped, that she rang up, and she used a Chase Visa credit card. And you also saw the carbon copy of the credit card, Georgia's credit card, that was used, as well as the credit card receipt.

And you also heard from Detective Flenner as well as the manager, Kevin Hancock, that when they reviewed the video they both could positively identify the Defendant as the person who was in the shoe store that day using the credit card.

And then without cardholder's consent. Again, Georgia testified she didn't -- she didn't allow the Defendant to have her credit card let alone use it. In fact, she went to great lengths to make sure, you know, like calling all her credit card companies to make sure that no one used her credit cards.

And then we have theft. Theft is any person who, without lawful authority, knowingly obtains property of

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another person of a value greater than \$250 by a material misrepresentation with specific intent to permanently deprive the other of the property.

First element is knowingly obtains property of another. And again, we heard through Deja's testimony it was the Defendant that went to the shoe store, bought \$400 -- \$490 worth of merchandise, and left with that merchandise. That wasn't his merchandise because it wasn't his credit card. That property belonged to the shoe store.

With a value greater than \$490. You saw the credit card receipt for \$490. And you also heard from Kevin Hancock who said yeah, I could tell this was the transaction because I'm pretty good now -- I've been at the store a while -- with all the boxes that it probably totaled about \$490.

And again, the element of by a material misrepresentation. The fact the Defendant represented to (indiscernible) that that was his credit card and then he signed the name Georgia, that he was Georgia, and that they could take the money out of the account, and then he spelled the name wrong all goes to the fact that it was a material rep — misrepresentation on the part of the Defendant when he entered that shoe store, used the credit card to take the property that belonged to the shoe store.

And finally, with the intent to permanently deprive. Defendant walks out with the -- with the items purchased. He

doesn't go oh, I'm sorry, this isn't my credit card, here you go, here's the stuff back. Actually, in fact, I think some of the -- the store employees say actually he came back a couple times later. He didn't come back with the stuff saying oh, sorry, guys, here's the stuff back, no harm no foul. No, he came back to buy more stuff.

So those are the charge -- the -- the crimes that we've alleged. And we're going to ask that now that you've seen all the evidence, heard of all -- all of them, and now all the arguments by counsel that you find the Defendant guilty of every crime charged. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Rinetti.

Mr. Jorgenson?

MR. JORGENSON: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it's now my opportunity to address you concerning what you heard yesterday and what you (indiscernible) embark on as you go back into the jury room.

And when I was talking with the detective who had viewed the videos I was asking him -- and I did at some length -- what he could see looking into the shoe store video.

That's the video we don't have. And he said because of the way it was zoomed out you couldn't discern facial features, but you could tell what the person was wearing, the gender, the skin color, clothing.

So I then ask him well then, what you're telling us

is the person who you saw at the shoe store video, even though you can't make out a face, is the same person when comparing physical shape, clothing, the hat, the jersey with a number 6 on it, and the pants, that's the same person you saw in the Tropicana video, which is the one we do have. And he said yes.

The prosecutor, when the prosecutor had a chance to follow up with some questions after I sat down, said all right, let me back you up a little bit, you know for sure that the person in the Tropicana video is, in fact, Mr. Ross; is that correct. And -- because I -- I asked the -- I asked the detective that -- what he -- what he could only really say for positive is the two people he -- the -- the person he saw is the (indiscernible) the subject of the -- of the shoe video was the same person that was the object of the Tropicana video. And the prosecutors had him add to that by saying that may be true, but also I am -- and this is the detective -- I'm positive that the person who was in the Tropicana video is, in fact, Mr. Ross, the person who's here at trial.

Well, that then asks or brings to mind the question of then what are you folks doing here. If we have the detective who is certain, positive, that Mr. Ross is the person we see in the Tropicana video and is the same person who is seen using the stolen credit card 45 minutes later then — then why have we gone through a two-day trial, why are you

12 people sitting here or you 13 people sitting here -- why do we go through all this trouble? We already know what happened.

And the answer is it doesn't make a difference ultimately if the detective knows or doesn't know. You are the group of people who will decide what is, in fact -- what -- what, in fact, happened. You're the one who have to be satisfied, not the detective, not Georgia.

Georgia said yeah, the person who was sitting next to me as I was playing that slot machine was Mr. Ross. I asked her how tall was he. She wasn't sure. I said was he wearing facial hair. She wasn't sure. How old was he look? Gave me a range. She was understandably vague as to how this person looked in terms of describing him because whoever this person was she only saw him in a matter of minutes 20 months ago. So -- but when I asked her she was positive the person who she -- who was -- the person sitting next to her was Mr. Ross.

Once again, then what's your -- what's your duty here? Well, it's not whether or not -- the question isn't whether or not the detective's convinced or whether Georgia's convinced; it's whether you folks are convinced.

Now, you have that videotape to go back in your jury room with. You watch the videotape. You'll have a chance to watch it a dozen times or more if you want to. And I would

ask you to watch that and say to yourself are you, as 12 citizens, convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the person in that videotape is, in fact, Mr. Ross.

And if you can look at that videotape and say to yourself you could be certain that it's anybody in particular then you're able to see things that I can't see in there. But that's what you have to decide. You look at that tape. That's ultimately what you're going to have to make your decision on. You have the videotape.

Now, I -- it's important to -- to remember the detective wasn't there on the Tropicana casino floor. He's not telling us yeah, at 1 o'clock on -- on March 17th of 2007 I was sitting in the Tropicana, I could see Georgia sitting down the -- down the aisle, I saw her hit the -- the -- the jackpot on the penny poker, and this videotape is an accurate representation of what I saw on the ground.

He's not saying that. He's saying he watched the videotape just like you and I watched the videotape, and he's saying from looking at that yeah, he's positive that's Mr. Ross. Well, you'll go back into the jury room, and you can decide whether or not you think he's stretching or not or whether or not that makes sense to you.

What we do know is that someone -- or -- is that someone took Georgia's wallet at the casino. We don't know how long that person had been inside the casino when it

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happened, if it was a man or a woman who took the wallet. We don't know if that person entered into the casino originally intending to steal a wallet or was there, like Georgia and her husband was there, getting something at the buffet and then saw a wallet lying on the ground that had dropped out of the purse between the buffet and the table or was sitting somehow inside an elevator that she had taken up to the elevator cart.

She personally doesn't know where the -- where the wallet came out of. She knows she -- she's pretty sure it -- she used it at the -- at the buffet, she thinks she pulled a dollar out of it when she got to the slot machine, but she doesn't know for sure that it's gone until she's in her hotel room. Well, there is quite a bit of square feet between the buffet, the slot machine, and her hotel room. She's in the elevator, she's walking to the slots, she's walking to the elevator, she's walking to her room.

So ultimately, we don't know. If you can look at that video and say to yourself you see the wallet being taken then I guess that's what you decide because you have a chance to ultimately decide that.

So what we know is a wallet was taken. Or that her credit card that was in that wallet was used about 45 minutes later about a mile away or two miles away at a shoe store.

Now, what do we know about the person who actually used that credit card? And the answer is not as much as you

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might think. We know from listening to the detective, who watched the videotape -- watched both videotapes, that the person who, from the zoomed out picture at the shoe store video, looking from the back, has a hat on, a -- a baseball hat turned backwards, has a jersey on that's number 6, appears to be male, appears to be black skinned, and has similar if not identical shape and size as the person who's dressed the same way as the Tropicana video.

He says he can -- he's seen the two videos and they appear to be the same person. Now, he wasn't there when Mr. Ross was in the shoe store on the 17th. He came a couple of days later and watched the videotape with the -- with Kevin, the manager. Kevin, on the other hand, says when he watched the videotape he recognized on the videotape seeing a guy that he had been acquainted with, Phillie. And how does he know Phillie? Because Phillie -- he saw it was Phillie's hair. Well, that suggests that when he saw a videotape of Mr. Ross, Mr. Ross wasn't wearing a hat. You don't see someone's hair in the picture that we saw because he's got a baseball cap on.

Kevin, who watched the videotape, says he sees Mr.

Ross come up to the counter. Now, how does he know for sure that's the -- the credit card transaction in question? He says well, he can look at the monitor and he can see what's being rung up. Well, the detective who was watching the same videotape at the same time said no, the screen was -- the

image is from the opposite side. It's -- you can see the back of the customer and the front of the -- of the cashier, and you can't see the screen. And you couldn't see what was being rung up, nor could you see what was being handed over. All he could see was a timestamp on the video.

Then you have Deja who indicates when he is talked to maybe an hour after he does a transaction with a credit card, a credit card that turns out to be stolen, he remembers back and he says yeah, I saw Mr. Ross come in -- he didn't call him Mr. Ross; he called him Phillie, which, according to Kevin, he'd never heard the word Phillie before or he hadn't told -- Kevin hadn't told him who Phillie was -- but the indication is that Deja knows Kevin separately (indiscernible) he says he comes in with a girl.

Well, the detective sees the person at 13:55, which is when the card is being used in the system, the person who he saw come in the front door and shop and approach the cashier and pay with a stolen credit card, that has the hat and the jersey and the pants that match up with the Tropicana, came in with a man. We're talking about two separate people. We're talking about two separate groups of people.

What we know is that someone used Georg -- somebody took Georgia's card, probably from the Tropicana. Whether that person went to the Tropicana intending to do that I don't know and I'm not sure how anybody could know; that the person

who is in the videotape talking with Georgia appears to be dressed exactly the same as the person who was later on in the shoe store is what the detective says, and I don't see any reason to doubt that, but is that Mr. Ross?

Deja indicates in a -- in a real sense no because Deja says that Mr. Ross came in but he came in with a girl. And he was telling that to Georgia an hour after it had actually happened.

What Kevin is telling us is what he saw on a videotape two or three days later, and he personally witnessed none of it because he was on break.

What the detective is telling us is simply what he saw in the videotape because he wasn't at the shoe store until two or three days later himself because this happened on a Saturday and, as you remember, the detective doesn't work on Saturdays or Sundays.

So Mr. Ross comes into the shoe store anywhere from a half a dozen to eight times during March. He makes friends with Kevin to the point where he tells Kevin that he's from Philadelphia. He probably makes friends with Deja because Deja knows his nickname to be Phillie, and he knows that independently of Kevin because Kevin said he never told him about his nickname being Phillie until after this investigation started.

And you remember that Deja is telling Georgia an

hour after it happened, prior to him talking with his supervisor, that Phillie had come in -- a guy named Phillie had come in and used the card.

Now, think of what Deja's facing. He's working five days a week or whatever. The shoe store's been open a year -- a month or two. He's an employee. Someone comes up and uses a credit card with a wemen -- woman's name on it, and he lets that credit card go through. Look -- think about it. He clearly must not have asked whatever person had that -- who offered that credit did not ask for an ID because if --had he asked for the ID it would have been quickly obvious that whoever was holding that card was not Georgia Stathopoulos.

Independent of the fact that whoever signed this card signed it misspelling the last name, whoever was standing there, unless they had gone to the trouble in this 45 minutes (indiscernible) obtaining a false ID with the name Georgia Stathopoulos on there, who -- whenever at 12:53 or no, at -- yeah, I'm sorry, at 1:53, whenever he -- he -- he processed that card -- and we know that Deja processed the card because he's the person who is the -- he is the guy listed as being the -- the clerk who processed this receipt -- he did not -- he didn't ask for ID, which is, as I asked him at the preliminary hearing, are you supposed to ask for ID and he said yes, in fact, I got in trouble for not asking for ID.

So an hour after during a Saturday day, busy or not

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I I'm not sure, he gets a call from a lady in a panic saying I lost my credit card an hour ago, the credit card company says it was -- it was used an hour ago in your store, my name is Georgia whatever, and she might have said it was for card amount so-and-so and gave him a credit card number. He then went and -- went to the system and saw, number one, that it was him that accepted it, and he's trying to think back to an hour ago as to who was it who -- who prob -- who is it that did that transaction.

Does he know for sure that it was Mr. Ross? as sure as that he's -- that Mr. Ross was the person who used the card as the fact that Mr. Ross came in with a girl. But that doesn't match the person on the video. That Mr. Ross was in that day sounds like that's uncontested. Whether or not Mr. Ross is the one -- that actually is the one who tendered the card, that's what you have to decide.

But Deja, you can imagine, is in a position of realizing that \$500 worth of credit card things went through on his watch, and he didn't do it properly, and so now he's trying to come up (indiscernible) answer. He remembers Mr. Ross coming in.

Now, I'll tell you what the one thing that if we had would end up resolving the case one way or the other, and that is if we would have got, if the -- if the detective would have asked, some kind of handwriting analysis to take this

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Well, the detective didn't do that. And I imagine the detective didn't do that because he saw the Tropicana video and he says oh, that's Mr. Ross in there. He sees the shoe store video, and he says you can't tell by the face who that person is but it's wearing the same clothes. And so he doesn't decide he needs to go to the trouble of getting in a handwriting analysis to see whether or not if this signature is, in fact, Mr. Ross's signature. So you don't have that when you go back into the jury room.

What we do know is whoever signed this was wearing a red hat, had a jersey on with a number 6 on it, and entered the store with a man. And that's not Mr. Ross. Mr. Ross wasn't wearing a hat, as Kevin told us, and he came in with a woman, as Deja told us who, if I remember right, is a man even though he has a name that sounds like a woman. Deja is a man if I'm -- if my memory of the preliminary hearing is correct.

The question ultimately, and in conclusion, the question ultimately is not whether or not there was a -- a -- a larceny from the person, from Georgia, whether there was a misuse of a credit card and obtaining shoes under false pretenses at the shoe store. The question is who did it.

And I would suggest as you go back into the jury

room and look at the videotape, look at the -- the paperwork, that you will decide that you're not nearly as positive as the detective is that the person in that streaked, noisy videotape that (indiscernible) the Tropicana if -- if you can tell anything other than it appears to be a 20-something black guy and that he's got a red -- that he's got a cap on and a long jersey, looks like a basketball jersey, with a number 6 on it. That you can tell.

Can you tell that's Mr. Ross? Can you go back into the jury room and watch that videotape as many times as you want and come and say to yourself I got an abiding conviction that's Mr. Ross? Well, if you do then you'll believe that's the same person that was in the shoe store because the detective says they were dressed the same. Can't tell from the face if it was the same but they're dressed the same.

What I would suggest is you go back in there and take your obligation to study this case seriously. And realize that not the detective and not anybody else, you are the guys who decide what happened that day or you decide if you're satisfied that you have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt; that you'll decide there is -- that -- that the person who's in that Tropicana videotape is not Mr. Ross or that you can't tell who it is; and that Mr. Ross, when he came into the store -- the shoe store later on that day, came in with a woman and wasn't wearing a hat and is not the person

in the videotape. And while we don't know who committed this crime it wasn't Mr. Ross. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Jorgenson.

Ms. Walsh?

MS. WALSH: Thanks, Judge. Thank you, Judge.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Mr. Jorgenson said it doesn't make a difference what the detective says, it's all up to you, you're the ones who decide. And that's true; you're the finders of the fact, you're the jury, you decide this case. But how do you decide?

You decide by listening to the evid -- to the testimony in this case, by listening to the evidence. And what is the evidence in this case? The evidence is the detective's testimony. The evidence is Georgia's testimony. The evidence is Deja's testimony. And it's your job to judge their testimony and see if what they're saying does make sense to you. And what you should know by now that it does. It makes a lot of sense. It is the Defendant that committed these crimes, and we know that for a number of ways.

How do we know that it's the Defendant? We have the identification, identification in court by Georgia, Luis, Kevin, Deja, the detective. All those people came in here, got on this witness stand, and said that's the guy. The photo lineups by Luis Valadez, Kevin Hancock, and Deja Jarmin all separately independently of each other identify the Defendant

through the photo lineup.

And you heard the testimony of those witnesses. They didn't talk about it amongst each other. You heard the testimony from Detective Rader; he didn't do the photo lineup where they're all together or they all know who each other one picked. They all pick the Defendant, Ronald Ross, as the guy who they saw in the store that day.

And you heard testimony from Luis, Kevin, and Deja that the Defendant is a regular customer. They're not just relying on their memory of this guy who came in who was just one of random thousands of customers that they've probably seen and were able to pick out this guy. They remember him because they know him.

Is that all just the biggest coincidence ever that all these people are able to identify the Defendant? Or is it proof beyond a reasonable doubt that it's the Defendant (indiscernible) talking about? Is it just a coincidence that all of them -- Georgia, who has nothing to do with the people at the shoe store, is able to identify the same guy who used her credit card 40 minutes later? They all point to the same guy. And not just to any guy; to the Defendant.

Now, Mr. Jorgenson also said it's up to you to see if the detective's testimony about it being Mr. Ross on the video, does it make sense. And we have a lot of testimony about the video. You have the video from the Tropicana;

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you've seen it. You know what the Defendant is wearing that's (indiscernible). We have the testimony from Luis, Kevin, and Deja and the detective about the video.

And there was some question is the video that

Detective Flenner is talking about, how do we know that's the

video that corresponds with this transaction. Well, first of

all, Deja said an hour after I got the information that a

fraudulent credit card was used we immediately went, we pulled

the video, my assistant manager, my regional manager, and we

showed that video to the detective. And he was asked is the

video that you show the detective a fair and accurate

description of what happened for that transaction. He said

yes, the transaction that I watched on the video that I showed

the detective is the same transaction.

And then Kevin Hancock later on watched a video, and he said the angle that he watched -- because remember they said they have a couple of different angles at the store which common sense we know stores have more than one surveillance -- (indiscernible) he could see -- he was able to see the cash register, he was able to see the transaction was \$490. He had the receipt that the Defendant signed for what merchandise he bought. The merchandise on a counter matched the receipt, and the information that was coming up on the computer matched.

So we do know that the testimony from Kevin and the testimony from Detective Flenner are coming from the

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transaction that was signed for by the Defendant for the credit card that you have in evidence.

And what did the detective say? The Defendant enters the shoe store with same second suspect. And Mr.

Jorgenson talked a lot about testimony from Deja that he came in with a woman. That wasn't the testimony of Deja -- and you should be able to remember this. He was asked I want to turn your attention again to that early afternoon of March 17th, 2007. Could you tell us your observations of the Defendant on that day when he entered your store. The answer was I recall that he had on -- I believe it was a T-shirt and a jersey when he walked in with his friend. So he walked in with his friend. And then he was asked to describe the friend. He said no, he was a black -- a black guy. No mention in Deja's testimony of a girl. Came in with a guy.

Where does this girl come from? This girl comes from Georgia, this woman who, over two years ago, had her credit card stolen who's now trying to remember the details of what someone told to her two years ago about what he came in — who he came in with, did he come in with a man, did he come in with a woman. Credibility of the witnesses. Which are you going to believe? The clerk who actually waited on them or our victim who's trying to recall minor details two years later? That's up to you to decide.

So he enters this store with the same second

suspect, he's wearing the same clothing. It's clear that we're talking about a guy wearing a jersey, number 6 on it, has a jacket, has a hat. Kevin said he probably couldn't remember what type of hair the Defendant had. Maybe that's because he had the hat on.

Kevin Hancock is able to identify the Defendant off the video immediately. He knows the Defendant. In fact, the Defendant asked for Kevin when he initially came into the store, but Kevin was on break, so that's why Luis waits on him. But as soon as he goes back a few days later and watches the same transaction he says I know that guy, that's Phillie, and he picks him out of a photo lineup identifying the Defendant, Ronald Ross.

And the Detective Flenner is able to identify the Defendant off both the videos. He's able to identify the Defendant off the Tropicana video saying yes, I know Ronald Ross and this is Ronald Ross, and he's wearing the exact same clothing 40 minutes later, using the credit card of a woman that he just stole it from at the Tropicana. That's how we know it's the Defendant on both videos.

And you also have the timing. The wallet's stolen around 1:00, the transaction's completed around 2:00, the store is about 15 minutes away from the Tropicana, he's in the store for 20 to 30 minutes, and Georgia's credit card was used.

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We talked about reasonable doubt, and for doubt to be reasonable it has to be actual, not mere possibility or speculation. And is that just a mere possibility, a huge speculation, that all of that could have occurred in that short 20 minutes, 20, 25 minutes that we went from the time of the card being taken to the time we get to the shoe store?

And then the Defendant introduces himself as Phillie, the person that Kevin ID's off the video is Phillie, and the Defendant is from Philadelphia. You heard that from Detective Flenner, born and from Philadelphia. How we know it's the Defendant.

So, ladies and gentlemen, ask you to really think about and listen to what you remember about Deja's testimony because Deja was the one who actually waited on the Defendant, he's the one who remembered who bought these items, he's the one who pulled the video and said yes, this is the transaction. He says he comes in with a guy, wearing a jersey, buys \$490 worth of merchandise -- you have the receipt and you have the carbon copy -- he uses a credit card. He

didn't check the ID -- he got in trouble for it -- because he was a known customer. He had seen Phillie in the store before -- or, excuse me, he had seen this person in the store before that he later -- Kevin identified as Phillie, he had previously used a credit card, everything was fine there. He didn't check it, got in trouble for it. The Defendant is the one who signed the receipt, that blue ink that we have in evidence.

And then one hour later he's called and informed that it was a fraudulent transaction, and that's when he watches the video. It's not like we're talking about three weeks later where he's now waited on multiple customers between the time that the Defendant came in. We're only talking about a short hour.

Now, Mr. Jorgenson would have you believe — and he only talked about the crimes of burglary and larceny from the person because this case really isn't about what crime was committed; it's more about how we know it's the Defendant and how we know it is the Defendant. He said we don't know when the wallet was taken from Ms. Stathopoulos at the Tropicana. We don't know. It could have fell on the floor or somebody could have picked it out of her pocket. But we do know because we have the video in evidence.

If we could play the video?

We have Detective Flenner's testimony about the

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distract thefts and how individuals operate when they're conducting a distract theft; that it's common to pick out an elderly victim who's not really surrounded by a lot of people. He walks by. You see her, look at her, notice her, prepares the coat, and comes back. What else are we doing with our coat if we're not preparing to pick the pocket -- to pick the wallet out of a purse that's open? If we're not going to stick around to play the machine, what are we doing asking a woman how you play it, how does it work, explain it to me? What else are you doing if you're not distracting her and getting her attention away from the wallet? What are you doing with this other person who's acting as a blocker? What are you doing having this other person stand this close to the victim if not to make sure passer-bys don't see what you're about to do with your coat and your hand that's hidden by your coat?

And we talked about larceny from the person, and you can see in the video she does have a black strap right there on her shoulder. She testified she couldn't remember if the strap was on her shoulder or if it wasn't -- if it was off.

And if we can pause it right there, please.

What else was that that we just saw if not a handoff of a wallet? Who gives a coat to somebody like that? I have my coat draped around my arm and I'm going to give it to someone, I'm going to pick it up and I'm going to say here you

go, here's my coat. You don't put it over to the side and say okay, here's my coat. The person who's taking it doesn't grab it like this and then walk away. If the wallet wasn't taken right there then what was that, what was going on there? The only possible explanation is you just saw the handoff between two people operating as a distract theft team, one person lifted, now he's still acting as distracting her from noticing that the second person is now walking away with a coat that has the wallet inside. We know when the wallet was taken. It was right there.

And we know what the intent of the Defendant was because you saw what he did. You saw him looking for the right victim. You saw him lift the wallet. We know he leaves because the timing says he has to have left almost immediately after taking the wallet. And we know these guys are working together because they're seen together at the shoe store. Detective Flenner said that's something that commonly happens in these types of thefts, because Georgia only paid attention to the Defendant, who's the one that was standing right next to her and talking to her. So if she would have immediately noticed that her wallet was missing, security would have been looking for Mr. Ross. And Mr. Ross wouldn't have been found with the property, and he could have said oh, not me, I don't have it, where's my stuff. It's because the guy I'm working with just walked off with it and we're going to meet up later,

and they did.

And that's what happened that day, ladies and gentlemen. You know it. You know it's the Defendant for all of those reasons we just talked about. It's the Defendant on this tape, it's the Defendant at Sheikh Shoes, same clothing, a mere 30 minutes at the most after he appears on this videotape. And for all that we ask that you return a verdict of guilty.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Walsh.

The clerk will now swear in the marshal to take charge of the jury.

THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that you will keep this jury together in some private and convenient place; that you will not permit any person to speak with them, nor speak to them yourself unless it be by order of the Court, except to ask them whether they have agreed upon a verdict; and that you will return them into court when they have so agreed, so help you God?

THE BAILIFF: (Indiscernible)

(Jury retires to deliberate)

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, a quick question?

THE COURT: Why don't you talk to your attorney

23 first, sir.

We are out -- for the record, we're outside the presence of the jury. I'd appreciate it if everyone can stay

C236169 STATE OF NEVADA V. ROSS 11/13/2008 TRANSCRIPT

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within 15 minutes of the courtroom, and we'll call you as soon 1 2 as a verdict's reached. 3 (Off record) THE COURT: This is Case Number C236169, State of 4 Nevada versus Ronald Ross. Mr. Ross is present with counsel, 5 6 Mr. Jorgenson. Representatives of the State for the -- from the District Attorney's Office, Ms. Walsh and Ms. Rinetti. 7 8 I've been advised that we do have a verdict. And 9 who is our foreperson? 10 (No audible response.) 11 THE COURT: Sir, can you please hand the verdict 12 form to the marshal. The clerk will now read the verdict. THE CLERK: District Court, Clark County, Nevada. 13 State of Nevada, Plaintiff, versus Ronald Ross, Defendant, 15 Case Number C236169, Department XVII. Verdict: 16 We, the jury, in the above-entitled case find the 17 Defendant, Ronald Ross, as follows. Count I, burglary: guilty of burglary; 18 19 We, the jury, in the above-entitled case find the Defendant, Ronald Ross, as follows. Count II, larceny from 20 the person: guilty of larceny from the person; 21 22 Count III, burglary: guilty of burglary; 23 Count IV, possession of credit or debit card without cardholder's consent: guilty of possession of credit or debit 24 25 card without cardholder's consent;

1 Count V, fraudulent use of credit or debit card: 2 quilty of fraudulent use of credit or debit card; 3 VI, theft -- or Count VI, theft: guilty of theft; 4 Count VII, conspiracy to commit larceny: quilty of 5 conspiracy to commit larceny. 6 Dated this 13th day of November, 2008, signed by the 7 foreperson, juror number 1, Robbie Davies. 8 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is this your 9 verdict as read, so say you one so say you all? 10 THE JURY: Yes. 11 THE COURT: Do either party wish to have the jury 12 polled? 13 MR. JORGENSON: No, Judge. 14 MS. WALSH: No, Judge. 15 THE COURT: All right. The clerk will now record the verdict in the official minutes. And the Defendant is 16 remanded to custody. We're going to set this matter for 17 18 sentencing, refer it to the Department of Parole and Probation 19 for preparation of presentence investigation report, and 20 imposition of sentence on the following day. 21 THE CLERK: That will be December 23rd at 8:00 a.m. 2.2. THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to thank 23 you for your service performing your -- your civic duty. know it's late in the afternoon here, and even though it was a 24 short trial I -- I often watch the jury and I could see that 25

everyone was very attentive and -- and watched this -- and watched the witnesses testify and listen to the evidence very carefully.

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At -- at each break I read you an admonishment that ordered you not to discuss the case with anyone else regarding -- discuss the case with anyone. You are now released from that admonishment, so you can talk with your friends, neighbors, coworkers about the case. Also, you can talk to any of the attorneys if you would like to do that. Oftentimes after a trial some of the jurors may have some questions of the attorneys -- why did you do something a certain way -- or if you just have any questions about the case or anything about the criminal procedure -- be more than happy to ask them those questions or -- as well as you can ask me any questions. If the attorneys have any questions for you you're not obligated to answer any questions. You're not obligated to ask them any questions also. But is a good -- it is a good learning tool for them. Sometimes you might just have a comment, what you thought was good with their presentation or what have you.

What I'd like to do is just meet you in your -- in the deliberation room and personally thank you for your service, and at that time the attorneys may, if they would like to, come back. And if you don't want to talk to them that's fine; if you do then that -- you're free to do that as

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well. I know it's late in the afternoon or early evening here, and we want to get you on your way. And so I'd like to again thank you for your service on behalf of the Eighth Judicial District Court. I appreciate you performing your civic duty and, in particular, in my department. And I thank you for your service. And so we are adjourned. (The proceedings ended at 5:52:05 p.m.) ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. Sean Rowley, Transcriptionist

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4	2009 JUN 26 P 1: 44
5	DISTRICT COURT
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA BULL OF THE COURT
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8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
9	Plaintiff, CASE NO. C236169
10 11	vs. \ DEPT. XVII
12	RONALD ROSS,
13	Defendant.
14	}
15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL P. VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
16	THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, 2009
17	RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE:
18	SENTENCING
19	APPEARANCES:
20	For the State: DENA I. RINETTI, ESQ.,
21	Deputy District Attorney
22	For the Defendant: CRAIG F. JORGENSON, ESQ.,
23	Deputy Public Defender
24	RECORDED BY: MICHELLE L. RAMSEY, COURT RECORDER
25	The state of the s
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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA; THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, 2009

[Proceeding commenced at 8:22 a.m.]

THE COURT: C236169, State of Nevada versus Ronald Ross. Mr. Ross is present in custody with Mr. Jorgenson, Mr. Nelson for the State. Time set -- set for sentencing. On November 13, 2008 --

MR. NELSON: Judge, I apologize to interrupt you, but this is Ms. Dena Rinetti's case, so she should be on her way to handle it.

THE COURT: All right.

[Matter trailed]

[Matter recalled at 8:51 a.m.]

THE COURT: All right. C236169, State of Nevada versus Ronald Ross. Mr. Ross is present in custody and Ms. Rinetti for the -- Mr. Jorgenson, Ms. Rinetti for the State. Counsel, approach please?

[Bench Conference]

THE COURT: All right, sir, it's my understanding that you're disputing some of the felony convictions that have been presented by the State; is that correct, sir? You're saying these are not you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: No. is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't want to give you the label of habitual felon if, in fact, they are not you. And so we're going to continue this for sixty days for both attorneys to -- Mr. Jorgenson to provide documentation to establish they're not you. The State to -- to provide documentation that they are you. She'll get booking

photos and fingerprint reports; and so we'll continue this for sixty days.

MS. RINETTI: Your Honor, if I could just put something on the record --

THE COURT: All right.

MS. RINETTI: — for the State? Just for the record, I wanted to — just for the record just to note that Defendant had previously contested the previous felony convictions both in New Jersey as well as Philadelphia were not him; that was back in 2007 in case C219404. Ultimately the case was passed about five or six different times for the defense to get some kind of proof that the Defendant wasn't in New Jersey or Philadelphia during those times. The defense was unable to do so.

We filed a notice of habitual in this case in November 2008. We filed a sentencing memorandum listing all of the name, convictions as well as copies of the certified judgments of convictions on January 5th of 2009. Defense has had ample opportunity to bring this to the State's attention yet again that now again the Defendant is contesting the fact that the -- his previous eighteen felony convictions are not him.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what information was provided in the other case. If there was proof provided in those then I want to make your job easier if you can pull the records of his other case, but if they're disputing them and they are under a -- under a -- some A.K.A's and different names, so that's my concern and I don't know what they did in the previous case if they just went ahead without double checking. I don't want this to come back 'cause we didn't double check.

And so that's what we're going to do, sir. I hope you're not playing games with this Court --

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: -- 'cause that could have an adverse impact on your sentence

TRAN 1 FILED 2 COPY JUN 26 2009 3 4 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CRIMINAL DIVISION 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 STATE OF NEVADA, 9 Plaintiff, 10 VS. CASE NO. C236169 11 RONALD ROSS, DEPT. XVII 12 Defendant. 13 14 15 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL P. VILLANI, 16 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 17 TRANSCRIPT RE: SENTENCING 18 19 TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 2009 20 APPEARANCES: 21 22 For the Plaintiff: DENA RINETTI, ESQ. 23 For the Defendant: CRAIG JORGENSON, ESQ. 24 25 C236169 STATE OF NEVADA v. ROSS 4/7/2009 TRANSCRIPT VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 2009

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PROCEEDINGS

(The proceedings began at 8:26:14 a.m.)

THE COURT: C236169, State of Nevada versus Ronald

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, this is Mr. Jorgenson's case of our office.

THE COURT: This is the time set for sentencing. Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Jorgenson?

MR. JORGENSON: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on Counts I through VII; based upon that he is hereby adjudged guilty of those counts. Any argument by the State?

MS. RINETTI: Yes, Your Honor. As you may remember we were here about a month ago. The -- the State's seeking habitual treatment in this case, and the Defendant had contested the 18 prior felony convictions. And this Court had asked us to get some booking photos or fingerprint cards in order to establish identity, because the Defendant has used about 21 different aliases both here as well as New Jersey as well as Pennsylvania. And we were able to, in about a month, find five different booking photos representing five different felony convictions.

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The first one would be -- first of all, he's not contesting his identity in Case C219404, in which he was adjudicated guilty on May 22nd, 2007, by Judge Bixler and was given a 19- to 48-month sentence on an attempt larceny from the person.

The next case that the State was going to submit as part of our package for seeking habitual treatment is Case 92061676. It -- the certified judgment of conviction is Exhibit S in our sentencing memorandum. If I could approach, on -- on Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 we have various booking photos that go along with that case, as well as Exhibit 4, which is his presentence report investigation from that case, which not only lists that -- that instant case but also the -- the other 14 prior felony convictions that were not contested at the sentencing hearing in that case.

The next case would be Case 94071697. The certified judgment of conviction is Exhibit O in our sentencing memorandum that was previously filed in January. In that case the Defendant was adjudicated guilty of one count of theft. If -- Your Honor, if I could back to the first case I had mentioned in New Jersey, 92061676, which is the Exhibit S which I had provided also Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 to Your Honor with the booking photos, the Defendant was adjudicated guilty on July 21st, 1994, of two counts of theft, both felony convictions. In case 94071697, which is Exhibit O in our

sentencing memorandum of the certified judgment of conviction, the Defendant was adjudicated guilty on July 21st, 1994, for one count of felony theft by unlawful taking.

Your Honor, if you look at Exhibit number 5 as well there's a booking photo as well as inmate information that not only lists the charge, the date of the booking, the commitment number identified to this Defendant, as well as the indictment number 94071697, which charges theft by unlawful taking.

The next felony conviction is 010601123. The certified judgment of conviction is Exhibit N in our sentencing memorandum. On August 23rd, 2002, the Defendant was adjudicated guilty of one count of felony bail jumping. And if you also look at Exhibit 3 that I handed you this morning there's a booking photo that represents him being booked into that case, 010601123. It also lists the indictment number, the charge, and the sentencing date in that case as well.

So based upon our limited resources, in the last month we were able to come up five different felony convictions that have booking photos. We do have other information if the Court is not inclined just to go based upon those five felony convictions. I was able to get fingerprint cards, original fingerprint cards, for four different cases, two coming out of New Jersey and two coming out of Pennsylvania. If this Court's inclined I can always submit

those for a forensic request, but I didn't get those fingerprint cards until yesterday, and it would take some time in order to do a comparison with this Defendant.

But based upon what information we have right now the State's going to ask you to adjudicate the Defendant guilty under the large habitual statute under those five felony convictions: the one case in Nevada and the three cases in New Jersey. I think based upon that we have five felony convictions, and the Defendant is -- is eligible for a large habitual.

As far as my sent -- as far as my argument for sentencing I'm going to ask that you adjudicate him guilty to 10 to life in this case. If you look at his presentence report investigation in this case his adult record started in 1988 and has not stopped until the present time. He has 18 prior felony convictions. Granted we've only given you five prel -- felony convictions that have booking photos, but there's numerous other ones included in that presentence report investigation from the case back in 1994.

Your Honor, he -- he -- his entire -- if you look it up, all -- all of his charges that he's been adjudicated guilty of, they're all very common in the fact that he goes to casinos and robs elderly or disabled individuals. And if you look back on the New Jersey case from 1994 in which he was adjudicated guilty of two counts of theft, in one instance he

took the victim's money from a -- the Steamboat Casino in Atlantic City, the victim was disabled and 52 years old; the other victim in that case was 58 years old, and his wallet was taken from the Sands Casino in Atlantic City. Then in 1994 he also committed a larceny from the person, adjudicated guilty of a theft at a Bally's where he stole a victim's wallet who was 64 years old. Then in 2001 he was adjudicated guilty of bail jumping for not making his sentencing dates in those two cases.

Your Honor, what I'd like to highlight is the last couple of years of the Defendant's life. In August 15th, 2005, he was charged with theft related to a -- a theft at a casino; also on August 24th, 2005; as well as September 2nd, 2005. All of these cases are open cases in New Jersey. And I'll approach with Exhibit number 6 that I've marked -- includes a booking photo as well as all the inmate information from those three active cases. According to the District Attorney's Office in New Jersey he has already entered a plea of guilt and was waiting sentencing. He was -- according to the District Attorney's Office the Defendant at -- entered a plea of guilty to three -- on all three different cases, and the plea agreement contemplated the Defendant spending four years concurrent to each count.

He was out on bail as part of the negotiations in New Jersey. Once released, he came here and committed Case

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C220915, which is presently scheduled for sent -- for trial. In that case the Defendant stole a wallet from a victim over 65 years of age at the New York, New York on January 6th -- 9th, 2006.

And he's also alleged to have committed, on January 10th, 2006, a larceny from the person at the Fremont Hotel, the victim being 78 years old.

Then he committed -- then while he was out on bond on the case that he was adjudicated guilty in Case C219404 he picked up two new cases. Case C220916, which went to trial in front of Judge Herndon, and the Defendant was found guilty. In that case the Defendant was found guilty of committing a larceny from the person and burglary on January 11th, 2006, wherein he stole a victim's wallet at JCPenney's, the victim being 74 years old. He was also found guilty of a crime of burglary and larceny from a person from a crime arising out of January 16th, 2006, where he stole a victim's wallet at the Golden Nugget, the victim being 84 years old.

Then, Your Honor, while out on bail on all those cases he picks ups this instant case where, on March 17th, 2007, he stole a victim's wallet at the Tropicana casino, the victim being 57 years old.

Your Honor, it's just a pattern of behavior. This

Defendant -- preys on older individuals, some of them

disabled. He's [sic] goes in and out of these casinos. He's

been given at least four or five different grants of 1 2 probation, has never learned his lesson. I think under the 3 habitual statute this Defendant fits into the preview of why 4 we have the habitual statute. The Defendant has never learned 5 since 1988 to the present. The -- any chance of probation, 6 his periods of incarceration have never deterred his criminal behavior. And so I'm going to ask that you adjudicate him 7 guilty of the large habitual senten -- as a large habitual, 8 9 and sentence him to 10 to life. 10 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Actually, 11 Counsel, just so I'm clear, the Counts I and II in this 12 particular case dealt with the casino; is that correct? And 13 then the III through VII were -- was the shoe store? 14 MS. RINETTI: That's correct, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 16 Mr. Ross, do you have anything to say before I 17 impose your sentence? 18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Thank you for allowing me to 19 I had sent a letter to the courts in October -- I 20 think you were out on jury duty, and Judge (indiscernible) 21 received it, and he said it would be made a part of the record. And I didn't know did -- did you have it? 22 23 THE COURT: I don't have it with me. We'll check 24 our file. It doesn't appear to be in the file. 25 THE DEFENDANT: He said that he -- he received it,

he read it; he said he would make it a part of the record. 1 should be in the transcripts. The date was October 30th that 2 3 we had --4 THE COURT: Do you have an --5 THE DEFENDANT: -- the hearing. 6 THE COURT: -- extra copy of that, sir, or does your 7 attorney? 8 THE DEFENDANT: (Indiscernible) no. I sent it 9 straight to you in --THE COURT: Do you have that, Mr. Jorgenson, a copy 10 11 of --12 MR. JORGENSON: I don't --13 THE COURT: -- that letter? 14 MR. JORGENSON: -- Judge. 15 THE COURT: Why don't you tell me what was in it, 16 sir? 17 THE DEFENDANT: There were some issues that I had 18 about pretrial leading up to the contesting of my case and just some things I wanted to put on the record about my speedy 19 trial issues that I wanted -- several things that I wanted 20 done in my case that I don't think that was properly done --21 and I wanted to make the Court aware of it. And he acknowledged it; he said that he -- he would make the Court 23 24 aware of it. 25 THE COURT: Well, sir, it sounds like those items C236169 STATE OF NEVADA v. ROSS 4/7/2009 TRANSCRIPT

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1 may relate to any appeal issues or post-conviction relief. 2 today we're here for sentencing. Do you --3 THE DEFENDANT: All right. THE COURT: -- have anything to say in mitigation --4 5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: -- of your sentence? 6 7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. The PSI report that was taken, 8 there was a lot of mistakes in there, and I wanted to know (indiscernible) the Court correct it before sentencing, after 9 10 sentencing. There were some things in there that wasn't 11 correct. And --12 THE COURT: Did you discuss those with your attorney 13 so he can highlight those for me, or do you --14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 15 THE COURT: -- wish to do that? 16 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Can I do (indiscernible) 17 THE COURT: Sure. 18 THE DEFENDANT: All right. Lastly, them cases that she -- all the -- the cases that she uses -- ask for habitual 19 20 criminal, I'm not trying to mitigate them but they non-violent cases; most of them are remote. And she asking for 10 to life 21 for -- a lot of stuff she's saying just not -- it's just not 22 true. It's not -- it's -- it's just simply not true. And I 23 don't think she got the -- she's saying it but she's probably 24 25 misled. It's just not true. It -- just you don't have the

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evidence to support a lot of stuff that she's saying. And I'm 2 contesting a lot of the stuff that she's saying. That's about 3 it, so --THE COURT: Well, sir, aren't these you in these 4 5 pictures here? 6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I'm not -- yeah, that's --7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 THE DEFENDANT: -- me. I believe --9 THE COURT: All right. Thank --10 THE DEFENDANT: -- so. 11 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 12 THE DEFENDANT: I see it from here. 13 THE COURT: Mr. -- Mr. Jorgenson --14 THE DEFENDANT: But she was saying 18 felonies from 15 1988 and conviction in New Jersey at the Showboat casi -- I never pleaded guilty to not -- no case in New Jersey 16 17 (indiscernible) was facing four years. There's no such thing 18 as a Steamboat casino in New Jersey. She's -- it's -- it's 19 just a lot of stuff that she's saying that it's not true. 20 Even in my PSI they -- they still -- it was two cases; on the 21 morning of trial she came in and dismissed a whole case, said 22 I finally looked at the video, and it's just not you, Mr. 23 Ross, so I'm going to dismiss this -- this -- this case. PSI, not only do they (indiscernible) any recommendation but 24 25 they also use that as for the -- for the -- restitution.

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1 So it's -- the case never happened. She looked at the video 19 months into the case and realized it wasn't me, so she dismissed it. But the P & P's still referring to it; 3 they said it was in the original information, so they put it 4 down. But that weighed heavy into they recommendation, and if 5 I'm ever to seek parole, if it's in my PSI report, I'm going 6 7 to be sanctioned again for something that never happened. 8 THE COURT: Well, at this point, sir, I'm just considering the five felonies that were mentioned, not -- I'm9 10 not considering the 18. 11 THE DEFENDANT: And --12 THE COURT: So you --13 THE DEFENDANT: -- all the --14 THE COURT: -- dispute those, I --15 THE DEFENDANT: All the --16 THE COURT: -- understand? 17 THE DEFENDANT: -- five felonies are non-violent. Your Honor, I can remember one time where you was representing 18 a guy, he was alleged to have broken into a federal judge's 19 house, and you was his attorney at the time. And you was 20 arguing against a large habitual because you said they were 21 22 non-violent cases. And the guy was so messed up he kicked the 23 door in, and the door was open; he didn't even have to kick 24 the door. But you said when -- in one of your arguments and 25 you cited some cases -- Walker versus Dees (phonetic) -- you

cited several cases that was against large habitual for a non-violent offender. Even though there's reprehensible his record it still didn't warrant a large habitual.

And after -- after the argument was over with, as you was leaving, I said that was a heartfelt argument that you gave. And you said something to me, but you had left after that. But I don't know how that guy [sic] case turned out in the long run, but I can remember in this court building not long ago where you, yourself, argued against a judge giving somebody a large habitual for non-violent offenses.

And I'm just asking you now that you are on the other side, I'm in the guy position, and you are on the side as the judge, to -- maybe you remember the case or maybe you don't; it happened a while ago. But I can -- I remember it like it was yesterday, and I remember the words that you were saying versus this guy receiving a life sentence for a non-violent offense. I don't know what's your position on that, but I just hope you can remember it, and maybe it'll weigh in on my sentence.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Jorgenson?

MR. JORGENSON: Judge, we're here to accomplish -- or the State's asking you in addition to finding him guilty, which is based on the jury's verdict, to make a factual finding of habituality and then proceed under the statute that

C236169 STATE OF NEVADA v. ROSS 4/7/2009 TRANSCRIPT VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC

allows you to give him a different sentence if you have been convinced that he fits the factual settings in two or more or three or more prior convictions.

The -- our position last time we were here for sentencing was that just as each and every element of the crime charged has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt by the State to sustain a conviction in front of the finder of facts, each and every element of the factual allegation of habitual criminality has to be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt to the finder of fact. The difference here is you're the finder of fact, not the jury.

And so my client's advice, he disp -- simply did not -- he disputes all of his prior convictions or takes the position that under the US and Nevada constitution he has a right to not incriminate himself and to remain silent; he -- it's not his job to answer the question from either the State or the bench saying Mr. Ross, aren't these really your convictions anymore than in the middle of a trial can a jury stand up and say Mr. Ross, didn't you really do this crime.

So we're here now, and the State has gone quite a bit further than where we were in the past in terms of showing proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There's two parts to deciding whether or not there has been convictions for NRS 207, habitual criminal. One is does there exist out there a felony conviction? In other words, is there a court case in a

county or a city or a state in which that it details a conviction?

Short of bringing the files from that county, if it's out of state, we get -- or the procedure is to have someone who works for that county, who is authorized to handle those records, to copy the pertinent parts of a conviction, usually the judgment of conviction, and then certifies it saying I've looked at this copy that I'm sending you, and I've looked at the copy that it's in -- I -- the original in the file, they match up one to one, it's the same thing, and then they emboss it or however their state provides for that, saying it's a certified judgment of conviction. That makes that document then competent.

It does not address the question is it relevant. That next question is addressed by deciding if the person who is mentioned in that certified judgment of conviction actually happens to be the same person who is the Defendant at the sentencing. And when we here originally we had convictions with people with different names, different birth dates, different states, and our objection was that there's simply no link at all between these documents that come from different courts talking about felony convictions and Mr. Ross.

So the State, in an -- in an effort to link these two up to make them relevant, has brought photographs. Now, I would suggest that ultimately to be able to establish whether

or not, for instance, this person who is in Exhibit O -- this 2 person who was arrested in New Jersey in 1994, booked in, 3 charged, and then convicted as outlined in Exhibit 0 -- if 4 that person is my client, the way it -- a way, not the only 5 way, but a certain way to resolve the issue would be to obtain 6 the prints of the person who was booked in, in July of 1994, 7 or whatever month that was, along with the booking photo because -- but the photo is not usually left alone because 8 9 we're not, as humans, that good at matching up photographs. 10 We -- a photograph is great but it's not completely 11 dispositive. We have the unique identifiers of a set of 12 fingerprints, and then we compare that with the guy who is in 13 front of you. Now, the State says they do have some prints, but I gather that it's not prints from these; it's from --14 15 prints from a different state. 16 So the question is, to the trier of fact, as to the 17 existence of these prior convictions -- and that is this Court -- does Exhibits S, N, O, and T, which is the ones we're 18 referring to, rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable 19 20 doubt? Now, in S --21 Which is the -- the local one? 22 MS. RINETTI: No. That's --23 MR. JORGENSON: T?24 MS. RINETTI: T is the local one.

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In Exhibit T we have what is the

MR. JORGENSON:

25

normal circumstance. And in the 20 years I've been doing this and -- and fighting people -- fighting -- representing people charged with habitual criminality, I would say 95 out of 100 prior convictions come out of Clark County. That -- out of state convictions are really not that usual in determining prior convictions.

If you include in-state convictions, convictions from Reno or -- or Tonopah, you'd probably get 98 percent of convictions. We just don't see very many out of state convictions for habitual criminality, and I guess that's due to the way a person who commits a crime normally doesn't move around that much. It -- that's just -- factually, that's just what happens.

Now, what happens if a person gets arrested and brought down to the detention center tomorrow, they pull his prints, they send them up to Carson City. Carson City runs him through their analyzer and immediately sees if it matches up with somebody already in the system, and, if he does, he'll already have a state ID number; that's in -- in the scope. And he'll also have a -- a Clark County number. And they will then just know that's him because they have -- they'll -- the process does that match, the match that I'm talking about.

So as to Exhibit T, Exhibit T, I would suggest, appears to be competent, it appears to be relevant. But with the other exhibits I think they're competent in the sense that

they're certified judgments. I think we're safe in saying there is files somewhere in New Jersey that have these convictions, and these are accurate copies of that. The question is are they relevant to Mr. Ross? Are -- is the person that got arrested in 1994, 2002, 2005, if -- or -- or what -- if I got the dates wrong. The point is in those three different years in New -- New Jersey, are they Mr. Ross or not?

I would suggest that absent a match-up of the fingerprints of the person who was booked in, in New -- in the New Jersey jail in Newark or wherever it was, in Atlantic City, if that matches up with my client. And absent that, I don't think the Court can decide beyond a reasonable doubt that these are relevant.

So I would ask the Court to rely on Exhibit T, not accept Exhibits O, N, and S as being relevant in our case because they're not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

And I -- and I think that that really ultimately does not hurt the state or hurt our community. My client has a one to 10 felony on Count I, a one to four felony on Count II, another one to four in Count III, another one to four in Count V, a one to five in Count VI, and a gross misdemeanor. By using the sentencing ranges in those sentences and running them consecutive, running them concurrent, I think you can keep our community safe without having to resort to the

Does that deserve -- does -- does the community need to pay for a person's life in prison to make sure that they're safe? I would suggest no. I think that you have plenty of leeway in a one to 10 and a one to four and a one to five running concurrent or running consecutive to walk away from the bench this morning knowing that you have made Nevada safe from people who commit property crimes.

So I'd ask the Court to not rely on Exhibits O, N, and S as your role of -- as a fact finder, due to the fact that they've not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and sentence him under the normal guidelines. And I apologize; I haven't done the calculation of his current credit for time served.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything else, Mr. Jorgenson?

MR. JORGENSON: No, Judge. Oh, one other thing. In the restitution amount, my client was pointing out that Parole and Probation was asking for restitution in that Santa Fe case, and when we all looked at the -- the surveillance video it was clear that that was a different person, and the State

dismissed those prior to the case -- the trial, so we didn't 2 use them at trial. 3 Parole and Probation, understandably, because they 4 -- they deal with, you know, dismissed counts, I don't fault 5 them from looking at it and treating it as if it's part of the case because they wouldn't have known it was the unusual 7 circumstance of the State simply saying Counts XII to XV, or 8 whatever the Santa Fe counts were, that they simply don't 9 apply to us. But I would ask the Court when you're deciding 10 restitution to simply leave that Santa Fe portion out because 11 that really was nothing to do with this case. 12 THE COURT: Let me hear from the State on the Santa 13 Fe issue. 14 MS. RINETTI: Your Honor, that's fine. Before trial 15 the -- the State had voluntary -- voluntarily dismissed those 16 counts for the Santa Fe, so the State's not opposed to not 17 having any restitution regarding the Santa Fe case and 18 actually striking the language in the off -- of the offense 19 synopsis regarding the Santa Fe because, indeed, the vol -the State voluntarily dismissed those counts. 20 21 THE COURT: So the restitution remaining will be \$270; is --22 23 MS. RINETTI: That's --24 THE COURT: -- that correct? 25 MS. RINETTI: -- correct, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Jorgenson or State?

MS. RINETTI: Your Honor, the only thing I would -I would add, just for the record, the booking photos that were
given to -- to Your Honor as Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 -specifically 3 and 5 -- with the booking photos, attached to
those booking photos are inmate printouts from New Jersey that
detail not only the inmate number, which is on the bottom of
the booking number, but also the date of the booking number.
And those inmate numbers correspond to the input -- the inmate
information printout that's behind the booking photo that
lists the charges that the Defendant was adjudicated guilty
of, and all those numbers are the same.

THE COURT: All right. The Court's going to receive as exhibits State's proposed 3 through 6.

MS. RINETTI: Your Honor, and I also did 1 and 2. Exhibit number 1 is just the cert -- the affidavit saying that they were (indiscernible) that everything that was presented to Your Honor was a certified copy, the booking photos as well as the in -- inmate information. And in -- then Exhibit number 2 is just another photograph of the Defendant -- and I would ask that the State take judicial notice of that -- with a different num -- name. I believe the name on Exhibit number 2 is Kevin Johnson. But the New Jersey inmate number is 46457B, which is the same inmate number in all the other ju --

ju -- judgments of conviction out of New Jersey. THE COURT: All right. In reviewing the photographs 2 it's clear to this Court that the person depicted in the photographs are, in fact, the Defendant in -- in court today. In accordance with the law of the state of Nevada 5 this Court does now sentence you, sir, on Count I to life in 6 prison with the possibility of parole after 10 years; Count II, life in prison with the possibility of 8 parole after -- after 10 years, Count II to run concurrent to Count I; 10 On Count III through VII, life in prison, 11 possibility of parole after 10 years, and that would -- III 12 through VII inclusive. Counts III through VII to run 13 consecutive to Counts I and II. 14 This is under the large habitual statute. And does 15 someone have -- and also restitution in the amount of \$270. 16 Does someone have a correct credit for time served? 17 **i**l MS. RINETTI: I have that according to the PSI most 18 of his credit for time served was given to Judge Bixler's 19 case. I have a credit for time served of 145 days. 20 THE COURT: Mr. Jorgenson? 21 MR. JORGENSON: I don't think Judge Bixler has 22 23 sentenced him yet. THE COURT: Actually, he didn't. That sentencing is 24 25 set for --

MS. RINETTI: Judge Bixler, in 404, has already --1 he already sentenced him back on May 22nd of 2007. 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. MR. JORGENSON: Well, he -- and --4 5 THE DEFENDANT: (Indiscernible) I got 200 days 6 credit --7 MR. JORGENSON: And he --THE DEFENDANT: -- as far as that --8 9 MR. JORGENSON: -- cleaned that up --10 THE DEFENDANT: -- sentence in September. 11 MR. JORGENSON: September when? 12 THE DEFENDANT: September 15th. 13 MR. JORGENSON: Yeah. I think he gets credit from 14 September 15th as which -- when that Bixler case flattened out and he's been held only on our cases. So how many days did 15 16 you have from Sep --THE DEFENDANT: Two hundred. 17 MR. JORGENSON: Two hundred even? 18 19 THE DEFENDANT: (No audible response.) 20 MR. JORGENSON: I think that's what it is, Judge. 21 THE COURT: All right. I'll give him 200 days 22 credit for time served. Also, he's ordered to pay a \$25 administrative assessment fee, a \$150 DNA fee, and submit to 23 24 [DNA testing. 25 (The proceedings ended at 8:58:32 a.m.) C236169 STATE OF NEVADA v. ROSS 4/7/2009 TRANSCRIPT

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SCREEN CAPTURE: Santa Fe Station Casino Security Video, Time Index: 9 minutes, 24 seconds

"immediately apparent it [was] not Mr. Ross" on the video. AA 439 (emphasis added). months. On the first day of trial, Deputy District Attorney Walsh dismissed all the Santa Fe Station Casino charges, because it was number "6" on it). The testimony resulted in Ross being bound up to District Court and held in custody, without trial, for over 18 identified this man as Ronald Ross. See AA 19, 24. (Note: the suspect in this screen capture is wearing a basketball jersey with the Picture of a burglary suspect in the Santa Fe Station Casino. State witnesses, including Metro Tourist Safety Detective Julie Holl,



<u>Appendix Page 789 – Santa Fe Video</u>

<u>Appendix Page 790 – Tropicana Video</u>

(Sent via United States Mail)

1	IN THE SUPREME CO	OURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
2		
3	RONALD ROSS,) No. 52921
4	Appellant,)
5	V.))
6	THE STATE OF NEWADA))
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,))
8	Respondent.)
9	APPELLANT'S APPEND	DIX – VOLUME IV – PAGES 705-790
10	PHILIP J. KOHN	DAVID ROGER
11	Clark County Public Defender 309 South Third Street	Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3 rd Floor
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12	Attorney for Appellant	CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO Attorney General
13 14		100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (702) 687-3538
15		Counsel for Respondent
16	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
17	I hereby certify that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada	
18	Supreme Court on the 19th day of April, 2010. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall	
19	be made in accordance with the Master Ser	ervice List as follows:
20	CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO STEVEN S. OWENS	P. DAVID WESTBROOK HOWARD S. BROOKS
21	I further certify that I served	ed a copy of this document by mailing a true and correct
22	copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to	
23		
24	RONALD ROSS NDOC No. 1003485	
25	c/o High Desert State Prison P.O. Box 650	on C
26	Indian Springs, NV 89018	(100.0)
27	ВУ	sutul
28		Employee, Clark County Public