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2	PAT LUNDVALL (NSBN 3761) CARLA HIGGINBOTHAM (NSBN 8495)	•
	McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP	2898 NOV 21 P 2:26
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4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Telephone No. (702) 873-4100	C & Think
. 5	Attorneys for Defendant Franchise Tax Board	CLERN OF THE COURT
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7		CT COURT
0	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA
8	*	***
9	CITE DEPOS D. LTILLA COM	la 37 4 000000
10	GILBERT P. HYATT,	Case No. : A 382999 Dept. No. : X
	Plaintiff,	Docket No. : R
11		
12	vs.	STIPULATION AND ORDER RE:
13	FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF THE	(1) HEARING DATE FOR (a) FTB'S
14	STATE OF CALIFORNIA,	MOTION TO RETAX COSTS, (b) FTB'S PROVISIONAL MOTION FOR STAY
	Defendant.	PENDING APPEAL WITHOUT BOND,
15	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	and (c) FTB'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
16		OR ALTERNATIVELY, AND
107		CONDITIONALLY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO NRCP 50 AND
17		ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR NEW
18		TRIAL AND OTHER RELIEF
19		PURSUANT TO NRCP 59; and
		(2) EXTENSION, IF NECESSARY, OF
20		PRESENT STAY OF EXECUTION/ENFORCEMENT OF
21		JUDGMENT WITHOUT BOND
		PENDING POSSIBLE REVIEW BY
22		NEVADA SUPREME COURT
23		Hearing Date: n/a
24		Hearing Time: n/a
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H	Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt ("Hyatt") and	defendant Franchise Tax Board of the State of
27	California ("FTB"), stipulate and agree as follow	ws:
. II	Commission (1 22.), bull and ania agree as toller	

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- (1) At the Court's request, the November 19, 2008 hearings on FTB's (a) Motion to Retax Costs, (b) Provisional Motion for Stay Pending Appeal Without Bond, and (c) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or Alternatively and Conditionally Motion for New Trial Pursuant to NRCP 50, and Alternative Motion for New Trial and Other Relief Pursuant to NRCP 59 ("Post-Trial Motion"), may be scheduled for Wednesday; December 17, 2008 at 9:00 am
- (2) If the Court denies FTB's Post-Trial Motion, either in whole or in part, and FTB's Provisional Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal Without Bond, either in whole or in part, then FTB may file its writ and/or motion with the Nevada Supreme Court seeking a stay of execution/enforcement pending appeal without bond within 15 days after service of written notice of entry of the district court's order denying FTB's Provisional Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal Without Bond. Hyatt shall timely file an opposition, if any, and FTB may file a reply brief, if allowed. If FTB files its writ and/or motion with the Nevada Supreme Court within such time, the present stay of execution/enforcement of judgment without bond dated September 16, 2008 shall remain in place until 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the Nevada Supreme Court order(s) disposing of FTB's request for a stay pending appeal without bond, or until further order of either the Nevada Supreme Court or the district court. If FTB does not file its writ and/or motion with the Nevada Supreme Court within such time, then

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the present stay, if not yet expired, will continue in accord with the Court's September 16, 2008 Order. This stipulation is not intended to modify the September 16, 2008 Order; the sole purpose of paragraph 2 of this stipulation concerns the timeframe after expiration of the stay presently in force. Dated: November 20, 2008 Dated: November McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP PETER C. BERNHARD (NSBN 734) ARLA HIGGINBÖTHAM (NSBN 8495) 3883 H. Hughes Parkway, No. 550 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Las Vegas, NV 89102 Telephone No. (702) 669-3600 Telephone No. (702) 873-4100 Attorneys for Defendant Attorney for Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt Franchise Tax Board of the State of California ORDER IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 11-21-08 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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Defendant.

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Attorneys for Defendant Franchise Tax Board of the State of California

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Case No. Dept. No.

Docket No.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Hearing Date: N/A Hearing Time: N/A

Notice is hereby given that Defendant Franchise Tax Board of the State of California ("FTB") hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the following judgment and orders:

1. Judgment entered upon jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt entered on September 8, 2008 (Exhibit 1);

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2.	Order denying FTB's Motion For Judgment as a Matter of Law or Alternatively And
	Conditionally Motion for New Trial Pursuant to NRCP 50; and FTB's Alternative
	Motion for New Trial and Other Relief Pursuant to NRCP 59 entered on February 5,
	2009 (Exhibit 2); and

3. All other judgments and orders made final and appealable by the foregoing.

Dated this _____ day of February, 2009.

McDONALD LANANO WILSON LLP

By:

IAMES W/BRADSHAW (NSBN 1638) PAT LUNDVALL (NSBN 3761) CARLA HIGGINBOTHAM (NSBN 8495) 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, NV 89102 Telephone No. (702) 873-4100

ROBERT L. EISENBERG (NSBN 0950) LEMONS, GRUNDY, & EISENBERG 6005 Plumas Street, Suite 300 Reno, Nevada 89519 Telephone No.: (775) 786-6868 Facsimile No. (702) 873-9966

Attorneys for Defendant Franchise Tax Board of the State of California

MCDONALD-CARANO-WILSONS 2300 WEST SAHARA APENIE - SUTE 1000 - LAS VEGAS, NEWDA 89102-4334 PHONE (702) 873-4100 - (702) 873-5966

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP, and that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL on this day of February, 2009 by hand delivery upon the following:

Peter C. Bernhard, Esq. Bullivant Houser Bailey PC 3883 H. Hughes Parkway, No. 550 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169

I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP, and that I served true and correct copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL on this day of February, 2009 by depositing said copies in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, upon the following:

Mark A. Hutchison, Esq. Hutchison & Steffen Peccole Professional Park 10080 West Alta Drive, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89145

Donald Kula, Esq. Perkins Coie 1620 - 26th Street Sixth Floor, South Tower Santa Monica, CA 90404-4013

Robert L. Eisenberg Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg 6005 Plumb Street, Suite 300 Reno, NV 89519

An Employee of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP

EXHIBIT "1"

EXHIBIT "1"

NEOJ 1 Mark A. Hutchison (4639) 2 Hutchison & Steffen 10080 Alta Drive Suite 200 3 Las Vegas, NV 89145 (702) 385-2500 Peter C. Bernhard (734) Bullivant Houser Bailey PC 3883 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Ste. 550 Lan Vegas, NV 89169 CLERK OF THE COUFIT Telephone: (702) 669-3600 7 8 Attorneys for Plaintiff Gilbert P. I lyatt 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 3883 Howard Hughes Pkww., Stc. 550 Law Vegas, NV 89169 Tetephoat (702) 669-3600 Facalmile (702) 650-2995 BullivantiHouseriBailey PC 12 GILBERT P. HYATT, Case No.: A382999 Plaintiffs. Dept. No.: X NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Date of Hearing: N/A Time of Hearing: N/A 16 Defendants. (filed under seal by order of the Discovery 17 Commissioner dated February 22, 1999) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Judgment was entered in the above-entitled matter, on the 8th day of September, 2008, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". DATED this day of September, 2008.

> HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, LTD. Mark A. Hutchison, Esq. (4639) 10080 Alta Drive Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145

BUILDY ANT HOUSER BAILBY PC

Peter C. Bernhard, Esq. (734) 3883 Howard Hughes Pkwy. Suite 550 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 669-3600

Attorneys for Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyat:

-2-

RECEIPT OF COPY

RECEIPT OF COPY of NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT is hereby

acknowledged this _____ of September, 2008.

McDonald Carano Wilson LLP

By: Num L. Mas In No. 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

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JGJV Mark A. Hutchison (4639) Hutchison & Steffen 10080 Alta Drive Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89145 (702) 385-2500

Peter C. Bernhard (734)
Bullivant Houser Bailey PC
3883 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Stc. 550
Las Vegas, NV 89169
Telephone: (702) 669-3600
Attorneys for Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt

FILED

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

GILBERT P. HYATI,

Plaintiff,

FRANCITISE TAX BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

Defendant.

Case No.: A382999

Dept. No.: X

JUDGMOENT

Date of Hearing: N/A Time of Hearing: N/A

(filed under scal by order of the Discovery Commissioner dated February 22, 1999)

This matter came on for trial before the Court and a jury, beginning on April 14, 2008, and concluding with the verdicts of the jury on August 6, 2008 (liability for and amount of compensatory damages), on August 12, 2008 (liability for punitive damages), and on August 14, 2003 (amount of punitive damages), the Honorable Jessie Walsh, District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt appeared with his counsel Mark A. Hutchison, Esq. of Hutchison & Stoffen, LJ.C, Peter C. Bernhard, Esq. of Bullivant Houser Bailey, PC, and Donald J. Kula Esq. of Perkins Coic. Defendant Franchise Tax Board of the State of California appeared with its

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representative and its counsel, Pat Lundvall Esq., and James Bradshaw Esq., of McDonald Carano Wilson, LLP.

Testimony was taken under oath, and evidence was offered, introduced and admitted. Counsel argued the merits of their clients' cases, the issues have been duly tried, and the jury duly rendered its verdict. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff Gilbert P Hyatt and against Franchise Tax Board on all causes of action presented to the jury, including Plaintiff's second cause of action for invasion of privacy intrusion upon seclusion, third cause of action for invasion of privacy publicity of private facts, fourth cause of action for invasion of privacy false light, fifth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, sixth cause of action for abuse of process, seventh cause of action for fraud and eighth cause of action for breach of confidential relationship. This Court previously dismissed Plaintiff's first cause of action for declaratory relief, and that cause of action was not presented to the jury.

The jury returned its verdict awarding Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt compensatory damages of EIGHTY-FIVE MILLION DOLLARS AND NO CENTS (\$85,000,000.00) for emotional distress; compensatory damages of FIRTY-TWO MILLION DOLLARS AND NO CENTS (\$52,000,000.00) for invasion of privacy; attorneys' fees as special damages of ONE MILLION, EIGHTY-FIVE THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-ONE DOLLARS AND 56 CENTS (\$1,085,281.56); and punitive damages of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION DOLLARS AND NO CENTS (\$250,000,000,00).

At the conclusion of the verdict reached on August 6, 2008, the jury was poiled, and each juror responded that the verdict as read by the Clerk of the Court was the verdict of that juror, resulting in a verdict of eight (8) in favor and zero (0) opposed, as to liability and the amount of compensatory damages awarded on each of Plaintiff's seven claims. At the conclusion of the verdict on punitive damages on August 12, 2008, the jury was polled, and

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 cach juror responded that the verdict as read by the Clerk of the Court was the verdict of that juror, resulting in a verdict of eight (8) in favor and zero (0) opposed, as to whether the conduct of the Defendant warranted punitive damages. At the conclusion of the verdict on punitive damages on August 14, 2008, the jury was polled, and seven jurors responded that the verdict as read by the Clerk of the Court was the verdict of that juror, with one juror responding in the negative, resulting in a verdict of seven (7) in favor and one (1) opposed, as to the amount of punitive damages awarded against Defendant.

NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, judgment upon the jury verd ets is entered in favor of Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt and against Defendant Franchise Tax Board, as follows:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt is awarded compensatory damages in the amount of EIGHTY-FIVE MILLION DOLLARS AND NO CENTS (\$85,000,000.00) for emotional distress, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of seven percent per annum (7%) (the applicable prejudgment statutory rate) in the amount of \$63,184,110.12 from the date the Complaint was served (calculated through August 27, 2008, and accruing from August 27,2008 at the rate of \$16,301.37 per day until the date of this Judgment), with interest continuing to accrue at the applicable postjudgment statutory rate from the date of this Judgment until satisfied in full;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff Gilbert P.

Hyatt is awarded compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY-TWO MILLION DOLI ARS

AND NO CENTS (\$52,000,000.00) for invasion of privacy, plus prejudgment interest at the rate
of seven percent per annum (7%) (the applicable prejudgment statutory rate) in the amount of
\$38,653,797.60 from the date the Complaint was served (calculated through August 27, 2008,
and accruing from August 27, 2008 at the rate of \$9,972.60 per day until the date of this

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Judgment), with interest continuing to accrue at the applicable postjudgment statutory rate from the date of this Judgment until satisfied in full;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt is awarded attorneys' fees as special damages in the amount of ONE MILLION, EIGITY-FIVE THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED EIGITY-ONE DOLLARS AND 56 CENTS (\$1,085,281.56), plus prejudgment interest at the rate of seven percent per amount (7%) (the applicable prejudgment statutory rate) in the amount of \$497,824.53 from the dates the special damages were incurred (calculated through August 27, 2008, and accruing from August 27, 2008 at the rate of \$ 208.14 per day until the date of this Judgment), with interest continuing to accrue at the applicable postjudgment statutory rate from the date of this Judgment Intil satisfied in full; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff Gilbert P.

Hyatt is awarded punitive damages in the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION

DOLLARS AND NO/100 CENTS (\$250,000,000.00), with interest to accrue at the applicable postjudgment statutory rate from the date of this Judgment until satisfied in full.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff Gilbort P. 1 Hyatt is awarded costs in the amount of to be described with interest to accruc at 2 the applicable postjudgment statutory rate from the date of this Judgment until satisfied in full. 3 DATED this ___ day of August, 2008. 4 5 **JESSIE WALAH** 6 DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 Prepared and submitted by: Prepared and appmitted by: 9 10 11 10080 Alia Diive Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Peter C. Bernhard, Esq. (734) 3883 Howard Hughes Pkwy. 16 Suite 550 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 669-3600 17 18 Attorneys for Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyart 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

EXHIBIT "2"

EXHIBIT "2"

FILED NEOJ Mark A. Hutchison (4639) Hutchison & Steffen 2 10080 Alta Drive Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89145 (702) 385-2500 Peter C. Bernhard (734) Bullivant Houser Bailey PC 3883 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Ste. 550 Las Vegas, NV 89169 (702) 669-3600 Telephone: Attorneys for Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 GILBERT P. HYATT, Case No.: A382999 12 Dept. No.: X 13 Plaintiffs, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 14 FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF THE STATE 15 Date of Hearing: N/A OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Time of Hearing: N/A 16 Defendants. (filed under seal by order of the Discovery Commissioner dated February 22, 1999) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order was entered in the above-entitled matter, on the 3rd day of February, 2009, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

DATED this 5 day of February, 2009.

HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, LTD. Mark A. Hutchison, Esq. (4639) 10080 Alta Drive Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145

BULLIYANT HOUSER BAILEY PO

Peter C. Bernhard, Esq. (734) 3883 Howard Hughes Pkwy.

Suite 550

Las Vegas, Nevada 89169

(702) 669-3600

Attorneys for Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, and that on the

day of February, 2009, I caused to be deposited, postage fully prepaid, at Las Vegas,

Nevada, a true copy if the foregoing, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER to all parties below.

James A. Bradshaw, Esq. Pat Lundvall, Esq. McDonald Carano Wilson LLP 100 West Liberty Street 10th Floor

Reno NV 89501

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Jeffrey Silvestri, Esq. McDonald Carano Wilson LLP 2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

Robert L. Eisenberg Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg 6005 Plumas Street, Suite 300 Reno, NV 89509

An Employee of
Bullivant Houser Bailey PC

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ORDR
Mark A. Hutchison (4639)
Hutchison & Steffen
10080 Alta Drive, Suite 200
Las Vegas, NV 89145
(702) 385-2500

Peter C. Bernhard (734)
Bullivant Houser Bailey PC
3883 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Ste. 550
Las Vegas, NV 89169
Telephone: (702) 669-3600

Attorneys for Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt

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CHISTON THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

GILBERT P. HYATT,

Plaintiffs,

FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1-100 inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: A382999

Dept. No.: X

ORDER DENYING:

(1) FTB'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ALTERNATIVELY, AND CONDITIONALLY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO NRCP 50;

(2) FTB'S ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND OTHER RELIEF PURSUANT TO NRCP 59

DATE: January 29, 2009

TIME: 9:00 a.m.

(filed under seal by order of the Discovery Commissioner dated February 22, 1999)

This matter having come before the Court on January 29, 2009, for hearing the

Defendant California Franchise Tax Board's ("FTB") Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

or Alternatively, and Conditionally Motion for New Trial Pursuant to NRCP 50 and FTB's

Alternative Motion for New Trial and Other Relief Pursuant to NRCP 59, Plaintiff having been

represented by Mark A. Hutchison, Peter C. Bernhard, Donald J. Kula, and Michael K. Wall and the Franchise Tax Board having been represented by Pat Lundvall, Carla Higginbotham, and Robert L. Eisenberg; the Court having considered the papers submitted by counsel as well as oral arguments at the hearing; and GOOD CAUSE APPEARING;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the FTB's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of
Law or Alternatively, and Conditionally Motion for New Trial Pursuant to NRCP 50 and FTB's
Alternative Motion for New Trial and Other Relief Pursuant to NRCP 59 be and the same
hereby are denied.

DATED this day of leb, 200

JESSIE WALSH

DISTRICT JUDGE

SUBMITTED BY:

BOLLIVANT HOUSER BAILEY PC

Peter C. Bernhard, Esq. (734) 3883 Howard Hughes Pkwy.

Suite 550

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89109

19 (702) 669-3600

Attorneys for Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt

APPROVED AS TO FORM BY:

McDONALD CARANO WILSON

Pattandolal 1-30-09

24 | Pat Lundvall (3761)

100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor

25 | Reno, NV 89505-2670

Attorneys for Defendant Franchise Tax Board of the State of California

1	ROC					
2	JAMES W. BRADSHAW (NSBN 1638) PAT LUNDVALL (NSBN 3761)					
3	CARLA HIGGINBÒTHAM (NŚBN 8495) McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP					
4	2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102					
5	Telephone No. (702) 873-4100					
6	ROBERT L. EISENBERG (NSBN 0950) LEMONS, GRUNDY, & EISENBERG					
7	6005 Plumas Street, Suite 300 Reno, Nevada 89519					
8	Telephone No.: (775) 786-6868					
9	Attorneys for Defendant Franchise Tax Board	of the State of California				
10	DISTRIC	CT COURT				
11	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA					
12	GILBERT P. HYATT,	* * *				
	GILBERT F. HTATT,	Case No. : A 382999 Dept. No. : X				
13	Plaintiff,	Docket No. : R				
14	vs.	RECEIPT OF COPY				
		TREARIET OF LOPY				
15						
15 16	FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1-					
	FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1-100, inclusive,					
16	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1-					
16 17	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1-100, inclusive,					
16 17 18	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1- 100, inclusive, Defendants.					
16 17 18 19	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1- 100, inclusive, Defendants. A receipt of copy of the NOTICE OF	APPEAL AND CASE APPEAL				
16 17 18 19 20 21	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1- 100, inclusive, Defendants.	APPEAL AND CASE APPEAL				
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1- 100, inclusive, Defendants. A receipt of copy of the NOTICE OF STATEMENT is hereby acknowledged this	APPEAL AND CASE APPEAL				
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1- 100, inclusive, Defendants. A receipt of copy of the NOTICE OF STATEMENT is hereby acknowledged this	APPEAL AND CASE APPEAL day of February, 2009.				
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1- 100, inclusive, Defendants. A receipt of copy of the NOTICE OF STATEMENT is hereby acknowledged this	APPEAL AND CASE APPEAL O day of February, 2009. JLLIVANT HOUSER BAILEY PC Let C. Bernhard, Esq.				
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1- 100, inclusive, Defendants. A receipt of copy of the NOTICE OF STATEMENT is hereby acknowledged this BU Pe 38	APPEAL AND CASE APPEAL Of day of February, 2009. JLLIVANT HOUSER BAILEY PC				
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1- 100, inclusive, Defendants. A receipt of copy of the NOTICE OF STATEMENT is hereby acknowledged this BU Pe 38	APPEAL AND CASE APPEAL O day of February, 2009. JLLIVANT HOUSER BAILEY PC Ler C. Bernhard, Esq. 83 H. Hughes Parkway, No. 550				

Exhibit 1

Question 9: Issues on Appeal

The following is a list of issues that may be raised in this appeal. Although this list is lengthy the potential appellate issues that may be raised in this matter is not limited to only the issues listed below. Therefore, FTB reserves the right to raise additional issues in its appellate brief which are not listed herein.

- 1. Did the district court err by permitting the Nevada jury to sit as a court of appeal over the administrative investigation and conduct of the FTB, an out-of-state governmental agency?
- 2. Did the district court err in the manner in which it permitted Hyatt to present his case to the jury, thereby violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution?
- 3. Did the district court err by failing to apply the "law of the case doctrine" to this Court's previous rulings in this case?
- 4. Should the Nevada Supreme Court case of Falline v. GNLV Corp., 107 Nev. 1004, 823 P.2d 888 (1991) be overruled?
- 5. Did the district court err when it allowed Hyatt to pursue claims based upon the invasion of his informational privacy?
- 6. Did the district court err when it took judicial notice of the California and federal laws and permitted Hyatt to use these laws as evidence to establish the essential elements of his Nevada common law torts?
- 7. Did the district court err when it failed to apply various privilege defenses to Hyatt's invasion of privacy claims?
- 8. Did district court err when it failed to apply the "republication defense" contained in Montesano v. Donrey Media Group, 99 Nev. 644, 668, P.2d 1081 (1983) to Hyatt's invasion of privacy claims?
- 9. Did the district court err in admitting into evidence the "Litigation Roster," which was a list containing a summary of this litigation and other cases involving FTB and was published pursuant to a public records act request?
- 10. Did the district court err when it permitted Hyatt's abuse of process claim to be submitted to the jury when it was undisputed that FTB had not used of any "legal process" for an ulterior purpose in this case?

- 11. Did the district court err in permitting the jury to consider Hyatt's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where there was no objective evidence that Hyatt suffered "severe" emotional distress?
- 12. Did the district court err by refusing to permit FTB to present any evidence of any alternative theory of causation for Hyatt's emotional distress?
- 13. Did district court err when it failed to dismiss Hyatt's intentional infliction of emotional distress because the governmental conduct complained of in this case had social value?
- 14. Did the district court err when it failed to dismiss Hyatt's fraud claim that was predicated upon FTB's alleged unenforceable promise to act "fairly and impartially" during the audit?
- 15. Did the district court err when it permitted Hyatt's claim for breach of confidential relationship claim to be submitted to the jury when the essential elements of this claim could not be satisfied in this case as a matter of law?
- 16. Did the district court err when it permitted Hyatt's claim for attorneys fees as special damages to be submitted to the jury when these damages were not recoverable as a matter of law?
- 17. Did the district court err when it permitted the jury to award punitive damages against FTB, a state governmental agency, when these damages were not recoverable as a matter of law?
- 18. Did district court err when it permitted the trial to proceed to a punitive damage phase of trial?
- 19. Did district court err when it permitted evidence of California's "net worth" as opposed to FTB's net worth to be presented to the jury in the punitive damage phase of trial?
- 20. Did the district court err when it failed to properly reduce the grossly excessive punitive damage awards in violation of FTB's right to due process of law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution?
- 21. Did the district court err when it failed to reduce the \$138 million compensatory damage award which clearly "shocks the conscious"?
- 22. Did the district court err when it awarded Hyatt pre-judgment interest?
- 23. Did the district court err when it struck Jury Instruction 24, replaced it with a new instruction, and provided a curative instruction which invited jury nullification?

- 24. Did the district court err when it inconsistently applied its own pretrial orders and rulings during the trial?
- 25. Did the district court err when it allowed various expert witnesses to usurp the Court's and the jury's roles by opining as to the law that applied to this case and how that law applied to the facts as determined by those experts?
- 26. Did the district court err in permitting the jury to consider evidence of California's Tax Amnesty program, which was a program created by the California Legislature that provided all California taxpayers that owed taxes to the State of California the opportunity to come forward and pay their delinquent taxes in return for a waiver of interest and penalties?
- 27. Did the district court err when it refused to permit FTB to present any evidence in defense of Hyatt's claim that FTB improperly delayed the California Administrative Protest Proceedings in this case in bad faith?
- 28. Did the district court err when it adopted the Nevada Protective Order in this litigation?
- 29. Did the district court err when it granted Hyatt's Motion to Strike the Complaint based on his allegations that FTB spoliated evidence?
- 30. Did the district court err when it adopted a legally and factually inaccurate jury instruction related to FTB's alleged spoliation?
- Did the district court err by prohibiting FTB from presenting any evidence to the jury rebutting the inference that the alleged spoliated evidence was harmful to FTB?
- 32. Did the district court err when it failed to grant FTB's pre-trial dispositive motions?
- 33. Did the district court err when it granted Hyatt's pre-trial motions in limine?
- 34. Did the district court err when it denied FTB's pre-trial motions in limine?
- 35. Did the district court err in its evidentiary rulings at trial?
- 36. Did the district court err in adopting various jury instructions which misstated Nevada law?
- 37. Did the district court err when it refused to adopt various jury instructions that correctly stated Nevada law?

- 38. Did the district court err when it failed to grant FTB's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of law at the conclusion of Plaintiff's case-in-chief?
- 39. Did the district court err by granting Hyatt's Motion for Judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of FTB's case-in-chief?
- 40. Did the district court err by denying FTB's post-trial motions?
- 41. Did the district court err by denying FTB's motion to re-tax Hyatt's memorandum of costs?

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

* * * *

FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Appellant,

v.

CASE NO: 53264

GILBERT P. HYATT,

FILED

Respondent

FEB 18 2009

TRACIEK, LINDEMAN
CLERK OF SUPPLEME COURT
BY
DEPUTY CLERK

APPENDIX TO

MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL WITHOUT BOND

VOLUME 3

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

	Appellant,	
v.		CASE NO:
GILBERT P. HYATT,		
	Respondent	

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
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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

GILBERT HYATT,) 10. 1
Plaintiff,))
vs.))) Case No.
THE FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)) A382999
Defendant.) Dept. X

HEARING ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS LAS VEGAS, NEVADA JANUARY 29, 2009

REPORTED BY: KIMBERLY A. FARKAS, RPR, CRR, CCR 741 LS&T JOB NO. 1-102554

Page 2

PROCEEDINGS held at 200 Lewis Avenue, Courtroom 1 14B, Las Vegas, Nevada, on Thursday, January 29, 2009, 2 3 at 9:06 a.m., before Kimberly A. Farkas, Certified 4 Court Reporter, in and for the State of Nevada. 5 6 APPEARANCES: 7 8 For the Plaintiff: 9 MARK A. HUTCHISON, ESQ. PETER C. BERNHARD, ESQ. 10 DONALD KULA, ESQ. MICHAEL WALL, ESQ. 11 12 For the Defendant: 13 PATRICIA LUNDVALL, ESQ. 14 CARLA HIGGINBOTHAM, ESQ. ROBERT L. EISENBERG, ESQ. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, 2009; 9:06 A.M.

-000-

THE COURT: We have a court reporter in the courtroom. We should probably make a record of that.

Can we ask your name, please.

THE REPORTER: Kim Farkas.

THE CLERK: Case Number A382999, Gilbert Hyatt versus California State Franchise Tax Board.

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, Pat Lundvall with McDonald, Carano, Wilson. With me here today is Carla Higginbotham. Also Bob Eisenberg from the firm of Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg. Karen Sorwerck, our paralegal, who is going to help me from a technical standpoint. Have a client representative here with me today, Scott DePeel from the FTB.

MR. HUTCHISON: Good morning, Your Honor.

Mark Hutchison on behalf of Mr. Hyatt. I think you know everyone from our side. Mr. Kula is with us, along with my client, Mr. Hyatt, is here at counsel table. Pete Bernhard and Mike Wall also representing Mr. Hyatt.

THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. All right. There were several motions on calendar this

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morning. Ms. Lundvall.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor. There are three motions on calendar this morning. from the perspective of the FTB, what we approximated is that the Court should hear the motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative for new trial, basically the post-trial motion first, because that will be -- the Court's resolution of that motion will be dependent upon what happens to the motion for retax costs and then whether or not we need to request a stay pending appeal. And those are the three motions before the Court. And I'm prepared to begin then with our post-trial motion.

MR. HUTCHISON: Your Honor, my understanding from our discussion with staff is that we're limited to an hour and that's how we've arranged our arguments is in anticipation of an hour a piece. Is that correct?

> THE COURT: Yes.

MS. LUNDVALL: I note that the Court has large stacks, and I'm assuming that those are ours. They look very familiar. And these motions are very extensive.

I belong to a legal reporting service. It's called Lawyers USA. And they're a fairly decent

legal reporting service. One of the things they do on an annual basis is they report on jury verdicts and they create a top 10 across the nation. So it's not particular here to the State of Nevada, but it looks across the nation. And when I got my January 14th report and I looked, they have top legal news and it's titled Top 10 Jury Verdicts of 2008, and the first one that I looked there's like, wow, those numbers look familiar.

When I clicked on the story that reported then on the top, number 1 ,jury verdict across the nation, this case is it. So then I got to thinking, well, there's nine others that fall in the top 10, and last year there was a report that reported as far as on what the top 10 jury verdicts were.

So I got to digging around trying to figure out a little bit across these last couple years what happened to these 20 cases to try to figure out then whether or not there's any rhyme or reason or any type of a rhythm as to what happened with these top jury verdicts.

One of the things that I learned is that many of them have settled. Some of them are up on appeal at this point in time. And some of them have been remitted. In other words, through post-trial

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motions very similar to what is in front of the Court today, a Court has looked at the case and has said that the jury verdict was too high and has granted remittitur as well as other relief similar to what we are asking for then pursuant to our motions.

In fact, there's even a couple decisions then from the State of Nevada that have been subject to remittitur. There was a decision in front of Judge Mahan that was an insurance bad faith case, and Judge Mahan granted remittitur. Also Judge Perry with the Wyeth breast implant cases, he too granted remittitur after taking a look at the jury verdict and said it was too high.

None of these cases that I can discern have gone all the way through the appeal process, and, therefore, I can't report on what the appellate courts have done with these after the post-trial phase. sure that we will look at it.

I bring this to the Court's attention for this reason. Is that we sought remittitur from this Court as well as various other forms of post-trial relief then in our post-trial motion. Remittitur in particular is a concept, it's a legal principle, that obligates the Court to review the jury's verdict for excessiveness. When I took a look at the cases that

are analyzing excessiveness, basically what this Court is obligated to do is to look to determine whether or not the jury treated the defendant fairly and impartially. That's what the basic components are. That's what the basic analysis is underlying the excessiveness prong that the Court is obligated to look at.

As part of our presentation to the Court, we demonstrated that, in fact, the scarcity of evidence presented by Mr. Hyatt at the time of trial for which to provide a foundation for an \$85 million emotional distress jury verdict. We also pointed out the scarcity of the evidence in the record to support a \$52 million invasion of privacy award.

And we compared it to other cases that have been reported in this jurisdiction particularly. And the comparison is done within the case law so the Court can get some guidance. There are some guidelines to try to determine whether or not the jury's verdict has been a product of unfairness or that there has been partiality that has been afforded to one party versus another through the jury's verdict.

Also, I'm an avid reader of the newspaper.

I couldn't help but from a recent comparison

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1 standpoint I noticed the article that was in 2 yesterday's Review Journal about the jury verdict that 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

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came down in the medical malpractice case where a woman who was failed to be diagnosed with colon cancer, had a 97 percent chance of survival had she been properly diagnosed, but, in fact, she wasn't and she died. And before she died she was subjected to many, many types of surgeries for which there was an emotional distress component associated with that as well as the wrongful death analysis that is afforded to her child as well as to her husband. And the jury then awarded \$2.5 million in that particular circumstance.

I also noted in Wednesday's New York Times. The New York Times reported on the situation involving the veterans who, in fact, had lost or there had been a failure by the Veterans Administration to properly maintain security over veterans' private information that had been vested with the Veterans Affairs. other words, there were 26.5 million veterans who had given their information to Veterans Affairs, everything from names and addresses, Social Security numbers and pay grades and things of that nature. Well, the New York Times yesterday reported upon a resolution of five class actions that had been brought against the veterans associations in that particular matter.

And what they reported on was this: That, in fact, that the revolution of that case allows a veteran to come before a special panel and to demonstrate actual harm in the form of emotional distress or costs associated with trying to monitor or protect their privacy because of the disclosure that was made by the Veterans Administration. In other words, there was an invasion of privacy claim, and, therefore, they could come forward, but their monetary damages were capped at \$1,500. And that stands in stark contrast to the \$52 million that was afforded to Mr. Hyatt.

We challenged Mr. Hyatt in our brief to come forward and to explain how the evidence supported damages in the magnitude that the jury awarded. And he was silent in response.

We laid out all of our reasons that underlie our requests then for all of the post-trial relief. We filed our motion then on September 22nd. As the Court well knows, we were originally scheduled to be before you in November and then in December and then for various reasons then we got bumped from the calendar and now we're here, and as I understand it,

the Court has limited us to a one hour period of time then for purposes of all three of these motions.

Candidly, we object to that. And we think that the information that is found within all of the briefs is important information to be analyzed and it cannot be done within an hour period of time. And, therefore, unless the Court is willing to grant us additional time for which to present the balance of all of the reasons underlying our request for post-trial relief, we will submit then the motions on the briefs that have been filed before the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. HUTCHISON: Good morning, Your Honor.

Your Honor, if I may just take counsel's last point first. I can't remember what the last count was. I think there were like 70 motions filed pretrial. I think that the Court took extraordinary measures to allow counsel every possible argument that we wanted to make during the course of the 17 weeks in trial. For counsel to somehow suggest that in the briefing that you've received there are -- there's this information that has not been seen before, there may be a couple of arguments here and there. There may be a couple of issues here and there that was not presented in pretrial briefing ad nauseam, and that

was not presented over and over again at trial is simply mischaracterization of the record. And any Court that looked at the record would readily see that.

Most of what we've seen in the post-trial briefs are regurgitations and repeats of arguments that have been presented over and over and over again and rejected over and over and over again. So what I'd like to do, Your Honor, is I don't want to take any more time than the Court needs. There were a few points that I wanted to make, but I would like to direct my attention to any arguments and we'd like to have our team direct our attention to any arguments that you think would be helpful for you beyond what we've already argued, beyond what we've already briefed ad nauseam, and I'd like to direct my attention there.

So I'll ask the Court, are there any arguments that are presented in the briefs or that counsel presented today that you would like to hear from us?

THE COURT: Give me a moment to review my notes, if you would, Mr. Hutchison. I don't think I have any particular questions.

I think it's important to note for the

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record that I think probably every single person in this room knows, having briefed and argued these multiple pretrial motions and having tried this very lengthy trial, I think everybody in this room knows that I prepare thoroughly, that I read everything, that I consider carefully. So I think it's important that I say that on the record.

MR. HUTCHISON: Thank you, Your Honor. There were a couple points that I would like to just make in response to the briefing. I think that the characterization -- there have been two serious mischaracterizations of legal doctrines. One is the law of the case. That misapprehension of a legal principle permeates the briefing by the Franchise Tax There is no law of the case that says that Board. Nevada must treat California the same as it treats Nevada agencies or Nevada officials. That's just absolutely untrue.

That was never said. It was never ruled upon by the Nevada Supreme Court or by the U.S. Supreme Court. The law of the case is a ruling in the case. The relevant ruling in the case is that there would be immunity granted to the State of California for purposes of negligent actions. would not be immunity granted for purposes of

intentional torts. That's the ruling of the case. That's the law of the case. There was no ruling or law of the case where either Nevada Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court said, Nevada must treat California agencies the same as it treats its own agencies. On the contrary.

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The concept of comity, which is the other point that the FTB continually misrepresents, the point of comity is in every exercise of comity a Court takes on a case by case basis. It is a voluntary discretionary act. There is no constitutional mandate. There is no federal mandate that Nevada do anything under comity. And the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that and continues to recognize that over and over again. Are there factors that are to be considered? Of course. Are there starting points to be used? Yes. But ultimately the Nevada system and the Nevada judicial system here must decide what interest the Nevada courts and the Nevada state government has in protecting its citizens and in upholding its own policies and whether or not the exercise of comity would be consistent with those.

And to suggest otherwise is simply a mischaracterization of that doctrine. I think that the FTB has done that repeatedly in briefing, and I

would, for the record, like to correct what I think is a serious, I'll say, misapprehension of that doctrine.

Your Honor, I want to repeat our Rule 50 motion. I stood up here for, I think an hour, hour and a half, during trial at the close of our case and defended the Rule 50 motion. For counsel to say that there is a scarcity -- I can't remember exactly what she said -- there's a scarcity of evidence to support the verdict, I think is just ludicrous given this record.

We've laid it out specifically in opposition to the Rule 50 motion. There was lots of evidence that came in after that as well. The jury considered it. There were many egregious and offensive actions taken by the Franchise Tax Board that were brought before the jury. And to suggest the jury came up with some verdict without looking at the evidence I think is just a disservice and a dishonor to what this jury did for 17 weeks.

I think we all looked at that jury and knew what kind of a jury they were. This was not a jury running around with passion and prejudice and some crazy notion in their mind. They looked at the evidence. They saw a huge volume of evidence that supported each of the claims and supported the damage

assessments that they made at every level.

There are even -- just one point that I might bring up. There have been exhibits attached to the motions and arguments about the tax amnesty program. There were issues related to that tax amnesty program that were particularly egregious that could alone support many of the findings by the jury, and the jury had many, many more besides just that tax amnesty program.

That tax amnesty program was only applicable to due and payable tax assessments. Mr. Hyatt's taxes were not due and payable at the time. Yet, it was still applied to Mr. Hyatt. And the 50 percent interest penalty was applied to him. That required him to drop the Nevada tort case and litigation against the State of California, that was never part of the bill by the legislature. The FTB wanted to circumvent the Nevada judicial process by using that program alone. That's just an example of one of the many, many elements that the jury considered.

We heard Candace Les' testimony. We heard Sheila Cox on the stand for I don't know how many days. Mr. Hyatt was on the stand for nine days. There was just a lot of evidence that supported all of

the determinations by the jury.

The bottom line is the jury found that this government agency was guilty of oppression, fraud and/or malice, and the evidence supports that. And the jury then carefully considered what it thought was appropriate compensation to Mr. Hyatt, awarded that. What it thought was appropriate punitive damages, awarded that. It wasn't even a 2-to-1 ratio. Nevada allows a 3-to-1 ratio.

Your Honor, those were just a couple of comments that I wanted to put on the record. With that, unless the Court has any questions or unless I need to respond to what counsel will say in any follow-up, we'll submit on the briefs. Thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Lundvall.

MS. LUNDVALL: Very briefly, Your Honor. We too would make the same inquiry of the Court whether or not the Court has any questions of us that you wish to address.

I disagree with the statements that

Mr. Hutchison made, but I don't think, with one
exception, that I need to make any response to that.

The one exception concerns this: The comment and the
argument that we made in our brief for which I
highlighted the scarcity of the evidence concerned the

amount of damages that were awarded to Mr. Hyatt.

And let me back up just a very brief bit for something that's very elemental. There is evidence that regards one's liability and then there is evidence for the amount of one's damages. What we've demonstrated in our post-trial brief is that there is little to no evidence in the record by which to support an \$85 million jury verdict for emotional distress damages. There is no evidence to support an invasion of privacy damage verdict to the tune of \$52 million.

And the point that we make is that we challenged Mr. Hyatt to come forward and to say, show us the evidence by which that supported the jury's determination that that was the amount of your damages. And he was silent in the face of that. And, once again, he has been silent in the face of that. And that is the point that underlies the remittitur argument and the excessiveness argument that we presented to the Court.

Now, that is just one component then of our post-trial request for relief, and there are many other requests that underlie our post-trial motion, but that's the point that I wanted to highlight to the Court.

THE COURT: I guess the only question, Ms.

Lundvall, that I would have for you is this: These matters have been thoroughly briefed by both sides.

The Court has reviewed everything. So is there anything that you want to say that's not contained in the brief that the Court ought to hear at this time?

MS. LUNDVALL: No. We submitted to the Court, if the Court will recall, as far as the supplemental authorities. There were three Nevada Supreme Court decisions that we believe weigh very heavily and have an impact upon this case. And we submitted those, so I'm assuming that the Court would include that within the scope of the materials that the Court has reviewed then in preparing or being prepared then to issue its decision.

THE COURT: I suspect Mr. Hutchison may want to be heard on this matter if I recall his position with respect to the supplemental items.

MS. LUNDVALL: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. HUTCHISON: Your Honor, may I just stay here?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HUTCHISON: I just want to point out, I can't allowed the representation and, of course, the

record is going to speak for itself, but there is a lot of evidence that supports the jury's verdict on emotional distress as well as invasion of privacy.

Our system of government and the justice system in this country allows jurors to make decisions about damages. In an emotional distress case the more egregious the conduct, the more serious the emotional distress. There's a direct relationship between the huge volume of evidence in terms of the egregiousness of the conduct, who was directing their efforts against whom in this case, the level of resources that the government had.

This is a case that is different than many others, no question about it. But as far as the egregious nature of the conduct, the evidence is clear there was a load of evidence; I'm not going to repeat it here.

As far as the value in privacy interests, that's what jurors do. They value privacy interests, particularly a man like Mr. Hyatt. And all the evidence they heard about it and why privacy is important to him, and the promises that the FTB had made regarding that, we spent so much time on that and there was lots of evidence on that as well, Your Honor. So I just didn't want to leave that unanswered

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from counsel.

Now, there was one other matter that you thought I would want to be heard on, Your Honor.

THE COURT: There were some supplemental -there was a supplemental notice. I'm not quite sure
how Ms. Lundvall titled it.

MR. HUTCHISON: It was a 162-page document that they said was notice of some analysis, I think, of the cases.

MS. LUNDVALL: No. There were three decisions that came down from the Nevada Supreme Court, and we did a notice of supplemental authority. That notice of supplemental authority was presented then to the Court in support then of our post-trial motion.

MR. HUTCHISON: Mr. Kula is going to handle that one.

MR. KULA: I know the Ramsdell (phonetic) case I think is what counsel is referring to is the supplemental authority that the FTB submitted. The basic issue in that case the Court was deciding is this an administerial act or a discretionary act. They're using tests to come up with that. That's not the issue in our case.

Our case the Nevada Supreme Court said

discretionary acts taken in bad faith are not immune. So the issue in our case was the FTB conducting its investigation, was it acting in bad faith. It's not a debate on whether we were acting in an administerial fashion or a discretionary fashion. So that case does not have application to this case. Doesn't change, doesn't affect, the amnesty ruling in this case. So I don't think that case has application, Your Honor.

MR. BERNHARD: Let me just add, all three of the cases involved allegations of conduct that was within the scope of employment but not intentional misconduct of the individuals. In fact, in the third case, the Boulder City case, the Nevada Supreme Court made it very clear although there was an allegation of an intentional interference with contract there was no entitlement to a contract and there was no evidence that the employee acted with any kind of bias or prejudice directed at the victim. In this case, of course, there was a lot of evidence of that that the jury could rely on in making its findings. These cases simply aren't applicable.

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, we simply disagree as far as the characterization. Our submission then was found in our notice of supplemental authority.

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Anything else? THE COURT:

MS. LUNDVALL: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to step down for

about five minutes and then I'll give you my ruling.

MR. HUTCHISON: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Short recess)

THE COURT: Thank you for indulging me. I appreciate it.

With respect to FTB's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, FTB essentially relies on previously unsuccessful arguments. So for all the reasons that the Court considered previously and cited, this motion is denied.

With respect to FTB's motion to alter or amend judgment, first, the statutory damages cap. comparison here is immunity, not the monetary limit. In California FTB would have complete sovereign immunity as it argues in its reply. In Nevada a state agency has no immunity for intentional torts. Therefore, applying California code would contravene Nevada's public policy that state agencies are answerable in Court for their intentional torts.

FTB stretches the law of the case by arguing it has already been determined that FTB should be granted comity on all issues. If that were true,

the Nevada Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court would have dismissed all of Hyatt's claims. The decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court and the Supreme Court reject FTB's assertion for sovereign immunity against intentional torts.

Further, Nevada Supreme Court and the Supreme Court holdings only briefly touched on the issue of comity as it pertained to FTB's request for immunity. Comity was not argued as justification for the application of NRS 41.035, so it was improper for FTB to argue that as the law of the case.

With respect to future damages, Mr. Hyatt didn't request future damages. In fact, what I recall is that Mr. Hyatt's counsel provided a detailed analysis regarding the amount of the assessments, particularly how much after FTB assessed fraud penalties. Hyatt never tried to quantify damages such as people thinking he's a fraud. FTB fails to provide this Court with a better blueprint for identifying the plaintiff's request for future damages.

This case is sufficiently distinguished from Las Vegas-Tonopah. The damages in that case may better be described as recurring while the damages in this case would best be described as accruing. The FTB never argued that Hyatt didn't suffer emotional

distress or invasion of privacy until after the date of service. Hyatt already incurred damages from FTB's conduct before the date of service, but FTB's continued post-complaint tortious acts caused those damages to continue.

On the other hand, the Nevada Supreme

Court's request for monthly invoices to prove

additional post-complaint damages in Las Vegas-Tonopah

shows that those damages were recurring and separable.

It would be impossible to quantify Hyatt's damages

between pre and post-complaint conduct. And FTB does

not sufficiently demonstrate that the jury must have

included future damages in its award.

With respect to the issue of remittitur and new trial. Under the Countrywide case damages awarded by the jury will not be upset so long as there's sufficient evidentiary support for them. FTB spends too much time comparing this judgment with previous judgments instead of arguing that Hyatt's evidence was insufficient. On the other hand, Hyatt leads this Court through a great deal of evidence that he presented and the jury relied upon. The lone fact that the dollar amount is larger than other cases may be a factor, but is not determinative without more proof that the jury was influenced by passion or

prejudice.

Specifically, FTB's arguments for remittitur and new trial for both categories of Hyatt's compensatory damages, emotional distress, and invasion of privacy are exclusively devoted to comparing the size of this judgment to other Nevada cases. FTB's only arguments regarding Hyatt's evidence deal with garden variety emotional distress.

FTB discusses the discovery commissioner's report that precluded Hyatt from presenting medical records as evidence of his emotional distress damages, but his only an analysis was that Hyatt's recovery was somehow limited by the discovery commissioner's recommendation to the Court.

With respect to punitive damages. FTB does not demonstrate that the jury's verdict warrants remittitur or new trial. As Hyatt effectively argued previously, Nevada has a strong public policy in protecting its citizens from the intentional torts of out-of-state agencies. This public policy supports denying California comity because the state's interests are not in line. Neither the Nevada Supreme Court nor the Supreme Court ever ruled that FTB is to be granted comity or treated like a Nevada state agency in all respects.

Hyatt was allowed to bring his intentional tort claims in Nevada State Court so FTB's arguments for sovereign immunity fail.

With respect to the bifurcation order.

Mr. Hyatt did not waive his punitive damages claim.

If punitive damages were required to be omitted in the first phase of the trial, how could the jury be instructed on them. The purpose of the bifurcation order was to prevent the jury from being improperly prejudiced by arguments regarding punitive damages before ever deciding if FTB was liable. This Court separated liability from punitive damages and there is no showing that the jury was prejudiced.

The jury carefully considered the evidence and FTB cannot demonstrate the excessiveness of the verdict beyond the assertion that it is larger than previous verdicts. This is insufficient to overturn a jury's verdict. And FTB cites no case law that supports overturning a verdict on the sole basis that it is larger than previous verdicts. The Court is inclined to deny FTB's alternative request for new trial.

With respect to Instruction Number 24, this Court meticulously and painstakingly held several days of hearings before concluding which instructions to

give the jury. Hyatt effectively argued that FTB's proposed instruction was improper and this Court chose not to adopt it. Whether FTB accidentally or purposely included it in the final instructions and closing arguments is unknown.

This Court ruled that Malcolm Jumelet's testimony was admissible, and FTB argued to the jury that it was not. The curative instruction was necessary to prevent prejudice to Hyatt through FTB's wrongdoing. If FTB was charged with preparing final instructions, it bears the responsibility of errors in those instructions. It cannot claim that Hyatt waived his objection when FTB affirmatively represented that Instruction 24 was the same as the preliminary statement.

throughout this case, and it did not have immunity for them. If FTB's discretionary authority was dismissed along with Hyatt's negligence and declaratory relief causes of action, what was Hyatt permitted to argue to the jury constituted an intentional tort. Hyatt was permitted to argue that FTB's discretionary analysis was biased and predetermined to assess as many taxes as possible. It was a difficult line to tow. Hyatt did not argue that FTB's decision was wrong and it did

not argue the issue of residency.

With respect to Instruction Number 58.

This Court already determined twice that FTB improperly failed to preserve evidence. FTB is wrong that Hyatt didn't request the EMC tapes before they were destroyed. Well before the tapes were destroyed Hyatt requested emails and/or electronic data. Hyatt had a right to inspect those tapes, and FTB prevented that by its own affirmative acts. The determination that FTB spoliated the evidence was proper and so was Instruction Number 58.

Hyatt's counsel did mention Instruction 58 during closing arguments, but it was as a lead-in to statements regarding the witnesses' testimony about destruction of evidence. Hyatt never argued that Instruction 58 warranted the implication that FTB destroyed evidence other than the EMC backup tapes. Each argument regarding evidence other than the EMC tapes has been supported by witness testimony, not Instruction 58.

After giving this issue a great deal of thought, I'm not certain how FTB could have argued the evidence on the EMC tapes wasn't adverse. But what I do know is that what FTB sought to do focused on the issue of whether or not it spoliated the evidence.

With respect to publicity of private facts versus false light. The demand letters and litigation roster contained both private facts and inaccurate information. The jury considered these causes of action and appreciated that they did not conflict. The verdict should not be disturbed.

With respect to the issue of judicial notice. FTB never explains how taking judicial notice in this particular matter warrants a new trial. FTB's manuals reference the California Information Practices Act. That was the Court's understanding why Hyatt argued FTB was required to comply with those laws. It's not so much that FTB violated the law, but it violated its own policies and procedures.

With respect to demands to furnish information. FTB misstates Judge Seda's ruling which was limited to the issue of Hyatt's residency. FTB does not demonstrate that this issue was improperly ruled upon or warrants a new trial.

With respect to the protective order. It's apparent that FTB believes very strongly in its position that the protective order was improper. That is the law of the case, however. Hyatt exercised its rights under the protective order by refusing to provide evidence. FTB cites no improper action by

Hyatt in that refusal, and that refusal alone is insufficient basis that Hyatt refused protective order and caused FTB to delay the protests. Hyatt presented substantial evidence that FTB consciously and purposely delayed the protests, nothing to do with the protective order.

With respect to tax amnesty legislation.

FTB does not really elucidate any basis for new trial on these grounds.

With respect to luminous other evidentiary arguments, it appears to the Court that FTB essentially attempts to argue every evidentiary ruling made throughout this litigation, and FTB is not persuasive in any particular of these issues and there are too many and too numerous for the Court to go through on a case-by-case basis.

All right. I think we can move on to the other two items that remain.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm going to move on to FTB's motion to retax costs. And I'm going continue to be sensitive to the time limitations that we have.

One thing that I would observe up front is that there is no limitation on what out-of-pocket costs that an attorney can incur in trying to put

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their case together for trial. Whatever outside vendors you go to, whatever out-of-pocket costs that you incur, whatever activities that you involve yourself in, that's only limited by a trial attorney's imagination. But what is not limited by one's imagination is the amount of recoverable costs that has been permitted both by our Nevada legislature in adopting our costs statute as well as our judiciary in determining interpreting that cost statute. And our judiciary interpreting from our Nevada Supreme Court interpreting that cost statute has instructed the district courts then to interpret the cost statute narrowly. Why? Because it's an exception to the American rule, and it also requires meticulousness by the trial court to ensure that each and every cost that the trial court may award as part of a post-judgment award of costs then has been properly supported.

Our Nevada Supreme Court and our legislature in conjunction then have created not only a procedure by which counsel are supposed to bring their requests for cost award to the Court's attention, but also they have created the substantive law by which they've identified what is recoverable.

I'm going to begin by noting that Mr. Hyatt

filed his memorandum of costs. And in that memorandum of costs he originally sought \$2,597,830.20. That is what was found in his original memorandum of costs. And what he did do is he gave an itemization, an attorney's itemization, of those costs. That attorney's itemization though, our Nevada Supreme Court has said, wrong, that's not what you give. That is insufficient. That is not the process.

What you're supposed to do is you're supposed to bring to the Court's attention the underlying documentation, the bill, the receipt, whatever as far as documentation that there exists underlying that particular cost, and that is what is supposed to be appended then to your memo of costs.

We pointed that out in our motion to retax. And Mr. Hyatt then in response to that said, well, wait a minute. Here's some invoices and here's some receipts. What he failed to do is to present a receipt for each and every one of the costs. And what he also failed to do was to provide an explanation for many of those costs.

Also what he did is he took his \$2.5 million cost award and he jacked it up to \$3,092,736.90 and then he jacked it up a second time to \$3,226,270.78, \$3.2 million. In my opinion, that's

a lot of money.

And in the estimate as far as of the Nevada Supreme Court, counsel is supposed to come forward with an explanation of what each one of those was for, as well as documentation of each one of those costs. Our basic position in this motion to retax is because Mr. Hyatt's memo of costs, the very first document that started this procedural process, contained an itemization only and that is insufficient then under the U.S. Labs case, that Mr. Hyatt is entitled to zero.

If, in fact, the Court is inclined to say, well, I'll look at the receipts, the invoices that he gave in opposition to our motion to retax even though they are untimely, then our position is that Mr. Hyatt at best, at the very best, has given an explanation for recoverable costs in the amount of \$53,563.80.

We gave a chart to the Court and put it in a graph. And we spent a great deal of time trying to make your job and probably Lucas' job a little bit easier. What we tried to do is to put into that chart where the analysis was and what Mr. Hyatt then had to demonstrate so as to claim entitlement to an award of costs.

The only opposition that we got back from

Mr. Hyatt to that is that he claimed one of our line items was actually his Lexis bill. And he put that before the Court and he said, well, this is my Lexis bill so of course I should be able to keep recovery of this because computerized research is recoverable as far as an amendment to our costs statute. That came as a result of a Nevada Supreme Court decision.

Well, he says that this is his Lexis bill. However, this is my firm's Lexis bill for the same period of time. And I don't understand why it is that Lexis would be sending different bills to

Mr. Hutchison's law firm versus to my law firm. So to the extent that we go back and we compare this, this doesn't look anything like what Lexis was sending to us and gave an itemization then. And this is what my law firm then would have used to pay an invoice from Lexis by which to substantiate then out-of-pocket costs for computerized research.

So what I'm going to do is I'm going to go through, because I can't highlight in the timeframe that we have everything as far as for which we contend, but I do want to bring to the Court's attention a few of the things that Mr. Hyatt seeks recovery upon. And it's our basic position that these items illustrate that, in fact, Mr. Hyatt's gone too

far. And they invite -- Mr. Hyatt invites this Court to abuse its discretion by awarding him everything that he has asked for.

As an example, like I said, these are the billings that my firm gets for Lexis, and this is the exact same timeframe that Mr. Hutchison was contending that that other single sheet was his Lexis bill.

All right, now, this one. I'm hoping that the Court can see this. All of us as trial counsel got fairly spoiled with the audiotron and being able to blow things up. We don't have that ability by which to do so anymore, but what I'm going to try to do is to highlight on the Court's screen a couple of the additional issues.

This is an order for photocopies. It's not even in this case. It's a case that Mr. Hutchison's firm was handling involving the Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency and a gentleman by the name of Paul Malden (phonetic). So they're asking for photocopies in a case that has nothing to do with this one.

And you go through these, and you end up as far as within a receipt then from the County Clerk, but this receipt from the County Clerk makes it clear that it's for the Las Vegas downtown case. There's

another example that we bring to the attention of the Court.

The costs statute permits recovery when, in fact, you may have to travel and take depositions, but these have to be reasonable and necessary. I looked at a \$25 tip on a \$45 meal and there's no explanation by Mr. Hyatt that that was somehow reasonable and necessary.

There are many, many requests for reimbursement of fees that are found in this format, check request. These happen to be check requests, if I can pick up from the initials, that this is an internal check request by Mr. Ganley to the Hutchison Steffen law firm. The one thing I kind of scratch my head for as I looked at it and it's for August 28th of '08. That's after trial had completed in this particular case. And he identifies that he's seeking a recovery for rental car, tolls and gas.

And there's many, many, many of these check requests found within their invoices that they submitted in their opposition, not in their original bill of costs, but in their opposition and contending that somehow these should be sufficient.

Well, the point I wanted to bring to the Court's attention is from the Village Builders versus

U.S. Labs case. The counsel who lost in that particular case argued those who are moving for costs should not be required to provide justifying documentation for each copy made or each call placed or each invoice requested. That's what the argument was that was made to the Nevada Supreme Court. But the Nevada Supreme Court rejected that argument. And I quote from that decision. This argument is unpersuasive because such documentation is precisely what is required under Nevada law to ensure that the costs awarded are only those that are actually incurred.

So when we look at all of these check requests, you can see it was for airfare, cars, tolls, food. That's what the notation is out there. We all know from our common experience that, in fact, we get bills for those. There's an invoice. There's a check request. There's a credit card statement. There's something by which then that will evidence, in fact, if these were incurred and for what they were incurred and the proper time frames.

I'll move forward a little bit with some of these. One I found to be kind of interesting. Buried in their request for transcript costs is an invoice from a woman by the name of Donna Davidson. She did a

transcript in a case called Sierra Gateway Ventures
vs. Landmark Homes & Development. That case is
familiar to me. I represented Landmark Homes &
Development in that case. It was the last case that I
tried before I tried this one.

Mr. Hutchison ordered the transcripts of my opening statement and my closing argument in that case. And I think that's a great idea, but I looked through the costs statute and I looked as far as through the Nevada Supreme Court case, and I can't find anything that says he's entitled to recover on those.

What they did do is they buried this in their transcripts request suggesting that it was a transcript that came from this Court rather than from some other case. And as I indicated, our Nevada Supreme Court doesn't care what costs that an attorney may incur, but they do care what costs may be recoverable, and this isn't the type of cost that's recoverable.

I'm going to go forward a little bit relatively quickly. What the Court will also see is you've got a whole bunch of invoices from a firm called Kohler, Smoller & Freed (phonetic). They're a law firm. There are legal charges associated with

this. If the Court will recall, Dr. Thompson who took the witness stand. When Dr. Thompson's deposition was being taken, Mr. Hyatt hired him an attorney. They're saying we should be entitled to reimbursement of those legal fees.

Same thing, he had a friend by of name of Sid Kerns that was back East, and his deposition was being taken. Mr. Hyatt hired him an attorney, and those legal fees then are found within their bill of costs as well. If you take a look at these all from the Kohler firm, that's what this is as well.

This one, this is a \$20 charge, but this is to me illustrative of the overreaching that is being done in this bill of costs. You know what this is for? Parking ticket. Somebody delivered lunch and they got a parking ticket. They paid 20 bucks for the parking ticket and they want us to pay for it.

With all due respect, I looked through the bill of costs statute and also looked through the Nevada Supreme Court decisions, and can't find that that's recoverable. If they try to dump it into the catchall phrase as to reasonable and necessary, they provided no explanation as to why this parking ticket was reasonable and necessary and why we should pick up the tab.

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In addition, moving forward, they bought a bunch of books so as to be able to present their case. A bunch of Nevada Revised Statutes, some evidentiary books, and they want us to pay for those books now.

They had a bunch of private investigators with no explanation whatsoever as to what these private investigators were or what they were doing and they want us to pay for these private investigators.

I'm going to try to get to the one -- this is the one, too, that I find a little bit interesting. Mr. Hyatt took a writ of your decision on the economic The Nevada Supreme Court awarded us costs associated with that writ to the amount of \$250, but now he wants us to pay that \$250.

Let me get to my favorite one in the interest of time. These -- all of these invoices that I've got highlighted up here, the bill of costs statute says that you get one copy of a transcript. In other words, if you go to a deposition and you ask for a request for a transcript, you get one copy. that may be recoverable. What you see here is invoice upon invoice upon invoice where Mr. Hutchison's firm asked for a copy, Mr. Bernhard's firm asked for a copy, and then even later on they asked for a copy then for Mr. Kern so there are three separate.

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They're not only duplicate billings but they're triplicate billings as to what is recoverable.

And there are many, many, many of these. Ι probably should have taken them out of this presentation once it got shortened up. Let me get to the one that I find interesting.

Remember Paul Sherbish (phonetic)? Sherbish was the expert witness that Mr. Hyatt presented on wealth holders. His basic testimony was that we didn't properly analyze the evidence concerning wealth holders and how they live. Well, Mr. Sherbish lived in Boston. He flew first class here to Nevada. And his first class ticket then is what they want us to pay without any explanation as to why first class versus coach.

When Mr. Sherbish testified, he stayed at the JW Marriott. And after he testified that day he went and had a meal. And then about 9:45 he went down and bought himself a cigar, paid \$14.01 for the cigar and gave a tip to the amount of \$2, and presumably smoked the cigar. And they want us to pay for that. I don't think that that is a recoverable cost.

In sum, what we did is we tried to make the Court's job as easy as possible. We gave you a chart as to each and every cost that has been requested by

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Mr. Hyatt. As I said before, we believe that he has failed to adhere to the proper procedure, and, therefore, should not be allowed any costs. But if the Court is going to permit him to have the late disclosure of these invoices, an analysis has to be made of those invoices. We did that analysis on his invoices and that recovery then is \$53,563.80. And we believe that that is the maximum then that Mr. Hyatt should be entitled to as recovery of costs based upon what he has presented to this Court. Thank you.

> THE COURT: Thank you.

Your Honor, let me start MR. HUTCHISON: with counsel's suggestion that they provided a helpful document or make the Court's job easier with this I think it was a 165-page document which they called a notice of analysis and summary of costs. Well, I'm like counsel. I like to take a look at the rules and see what they say. There's nothing under the local rules that allows for this filing. a motion in opposition and reply. So we filed a motion to strike.

It is not only a rogue document. It is not only absolutely untimely. It's also completely inaccurate and false. Counsel wanted to pick up a little bit on that point, but she didn't go quite far

enough.

For example, the very first entry of that so-called analysis and summary of costs states that, Hyatt provided no invoice for the Lexis Westlaw charges. It didn't say, we were unhappy with the form. It says, provided no invoice for the Lexis Westlaw charges incurred on July 31st, 1997. It also states on that chart the charge is not specifically recoverable under NRS 18.005. And it states that Hyatt provided no explanation for the charge.

Well, contrary to the FTB assertions an invoice for this charge was provided, Bates number HS00386. The charges for computerized services for legal research are expressly allowed under NRS 18.0017, subsection 17. And Hyatt did provide an explanation for why the charge was reasonable and necessary and it's on his opposition paper at page 10 lines 14 through 21. So that's an example.

And we have asked that the Court strike the document. It's completely inaccurate, it's completely rogue, and it's untimely.

I assume that counsel gave us her best shot. Had a long time to go through and pick out any little receipt that wasn't appropriate or something that she thought, well, let's see if we can find a tip

that's excessive or a cigar that somebody smoked and now we're paying for it. I suppose that she gave us her best shot. And we have a total amount claimed of a little over \$3.2 million. If you add up the receipts that she gave you as her best shot example of, I don't know, call it a thousand dollar, ten thousand dollars, a hundred thousand dollars, it's nowhere close to \$3.2 million.

Here's the point. You've got broad discretion here. Everybody knows that. That's what the case law is. You've got broad discretion to look at and fashion an equitable relief and recovery here. You can take a look at the documents we submitted. You can take a look at the explanations that we provided in the papers that we submitted to the Court. We provided an itemization, no question about that.

The FTB then came back in their opposition and said, oh, no, itemization isn't enough. You've got to provide receipts and documentation. Matter of fact, I think what they said on that point was, let me just quote it for you, they said, You have to provide invoices, statements, receipts, checks, et cetera to support the costs.

So then we did that in our opposition, which now we've been criticized for doing. Then the

reply we hear, no, you can't just attach the statements and the receipts and invoices. What you have to do is you have to have verifying receipts. You have to do is have verifying receipts so that we can verify that every charge was an actual charge.

But there's no case law that requires that, Your Honor. This is a broad, discretionary act by the Court in evaluating this case, evaluating how long it's been going on, evaluating the massive amount of documents, the massive number of depositions. I think we took 100 depositions. We've taken -- we've produced hundreds of thousands of pages of documents. It's been going on for 10 years.

Counsel cites receipts, I think, those check receipts in terms of what the dates were on that. It was after the litigation. That was when people began to compile their costs, and if there were costs that were incurred for interviewing witnesses or for taking depositions or for traveling out of state that hadn't been submitted previously, then they were submitted at that time. It wasn't the date that those activities actually occurred, Your Honor.

So the bottom line is we could spend seriously the next week going through this, or you can decide in broad terms and under your broad discretion

how to fashion a remedy and how to provide a fair and equitable reimbursement of costs, which Mr. Hyatt is certainly entitled to.

We've provided every document that we've got. I guarantee you if the roles were reversed, the FTB doesn't have every single document they're asking us for either. No law firm does. You always get down to these kind of crazy arguments back and forth among counsel depending on which show is on whose foot.

And the document we provided you is the best we could do. It's everything that we've got over a 10-year period of time to justify the charges. You know this was a gigantic case. You know this was a hard fought case. You know that we flew all over the country. We took hundreds of depositions. Some of those depositions lasted seven, eight, nine days.

And this was not a small, little case. I agree with counsel that \$3.2 million is a lot of money. It's also a lot of justified money for a case of this size and of this nature.

So, Your Honor, unless there are specific questions you have again, I just get back to can I be helpful in any way with questions. If you have specific questions for us, we'll certainly be happy to do that. But to suggest that there is this fair chart

that you ought to look at is just not true and it's not accurate.

Counsel keeps saying that there's no case law, there's no statutory provision for allowing many of these charges and many of these costs. Again, within your broad discretion you can certainly award any other reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the action and then include any reasonableness expenses for computerized legal research. That's under Section 17 of NRS 18.005.

There are all kinds of examples that I can go through as well, Your Honor. But, again, unless the Court has specific questions, I think we'll submit on the papers and the volumes of documents that we've already provided to the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Lundvall.

MS. LUNDVALL: Very briefly, Your Honor.

Just two points I want to make to comments that

Mr. Hutchison made. First I want to address his very
last comment, and that is concerning the reasonable

and the necessary component. There is a catchall

phrase within the costs statute. But what that means
though or what the Nevada Supreme Court has said is
that counsel who is seeking recovery has to come
forward and to explain what is reasonable and

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necessary. So, in fact, with many of the costs that they put under this catchall phrase you've got to come forward with your explanation.

What we did is very painstakingly went through as far as their opposition papers to determine whether or not there was some type of an explanation when they put a cost category within that catchall phrase. If there wasn't an explanation, then guess what, they failed in their burden of proof.

This is a burden of proof issue. So from the perspective of for them trying to say, well, anything is reasonable and necessary, but they don't have to explain how or why. Like they don't have to justify or explain why it is that they spent almost a million dollars on one expert witness, and when you look at that close to a million dollars on one expert witness what you see is almost \$200,000 of it is in legal fees. They offered no explanation for that. And for them to try to somehow jump outside then the statute that only permits \$1,500 for an expert when there's been no explanation for it, I believe that that would be an abuse of this Court's discretion.

But the second and more important point that I want to make is when you listen to Mr. Hutchison, basically what he said is, jeez, it's , 1

unreasonable for any law firm to keep all of these little scraps of papers and all of these invoices, especially across a case that's been going on for this length of time. But you were here, you know what happened, so just go ahead and give it to us. That's what his argument is.

Well, on a recoverable cost award it doesn't work that way. It's a burden of proof that falls upon the party that is seeking recovery of those costs. It was their burden of proof to bring that evidence to the Court's attention. And they can't say, well, we can't do this. Our Nevada Supreme Court has expressly held that is an unpersuasive argument and that it is not permitted by which to provide a substitute then for proof of a recoverable cost.

Therefore, we stand by the chart that we gave to the Court as to what is and has been demonstrated by them and where they have possibly met their burden of proof.

We also stand by our basic point and that is this. I find their argument interesting on my chart in this respect on one last point. They say, well, it's late. She can't give it to you. It's too late. Well, guess what, their opposition that included all the invoices under the procedure that's

been established under the statute and under the Nevada Supreme Court cases, that was late too. And, therefore, we would submit.

THE COURT: I think both sides make very good and valid arguments. This is a very important issue to determine these actual costs, exactly what is what and to determine further whether these costs were reasonable and necessary. It's the Court's intention to appoint a special master to assist it in being able to sift through all this data. And with that in mind, I'd asked Mr. Hall to be present this morning.

Mr. Hall, will you come forward for a moment, please.

MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I've asked you to be present for purposes of perhaps accepting an appointment as a special master to assist the Court in combing through all this data and trying to determine what's what and what are reasonable and necessary costs.

MR. HALL: May I approach you so I could hear?

THE COURT: Would counsel approach, please.
Mr. Hall has a hearing issue. It's my intent to seek
some assistance by way of a special master. What are
your thoughts?

in any way we can.

MS. LUNDVALL: We think it's a great idea.

MR. HUTCHISON: I think it's a great idea.

We have absolutely no objections to Mr. Hall serving as a special master. It's going to take some time to go through the documentation. We're happy to assist

MS. LUNDVALL: One comment that we would make is we don't think there should be any supplement. In other words, if, in fact, it's a review that should be based upon the record that is presently in front of the Court.

MR. HUTCHISON: Your Honor, I think we can rely on Mr. Hall for that. If Mr. Hall feels there's a need for additional information, let's get this right.

THE COURT: I don't want to tie his hands. I don't want to give him a job and then tie his hands and not allow him to do whatever he's got to do. Certainly there's already been provided vast amount of invoices and data and documents. That's one reason why the Court needs some assistance frankly. But I think he's going to have to sit down with both sides. And I'm going to allow you -- if you're all amenable to Mr. Hall serving in this capacity.

MS. LUNDVALL: We are very amenable, but I

want to continue as far as on this particular point. I am not amenable as far as to permitting

Mr. Hutchison or any of his representatives by which to submit additional materials. For instance, their opportunity and their time for submitting their invoices and any argument as to what was reasonable and what was necessary has come and gone. And, therefore, what we would do is we would object, for instance, if there's a line item that is found for which there is no invoice, if Mr. Hall contacts

Mr. Hutchison and says, where is your invoice and he now produces it, but has not produced it before, we think the time if frame for doing that has expired.

MR. HUTCHISON: Judge, this is a broad discretionary call by Your Honor. You have broad discretion. That's what the statutes say. That's what the case law allows. You've appointed a special master to reach the right result or at least come as close as you can to reach the right result. And we think we've provided everything that we've got. But if Mr. Hall finds something that particularly needs more detail and he wants to see some documents, why can't that happen? Why would that be an abuse of your discretion for that to happen?

Counsel has already said they've already

done the analysis. I'm sure they're going to use their little chart analysis with Mr. Hall. untimely. We've ask that that be stricken. they're going to use that, if they're going to be able to put in their analysis that was late under the briefing, it seems like it's got to go both ways, one way or the other. But it seems to me within the discretion of the Court we ought to get to the right result as best we can. That seems to be the best way to get there.

If there needs to be some additional information to Mr. Hall, so be it. If there doesn't, then he'll let you know. But he's an arm of the Court. He's a special master.

MS. LUNDVALL: May I have one last comment? I don't deny that the Court has broad discretion by which to determine which are recoverable costs. But the Court does not have broad discretion to alter the procedure whereby parties are supposed to bring their proof to you concerning what is recoverable or not. That procedure is set out by statute by our Nevada legislature. That procedure has been interpreted then by our Nevada Supreme Court, and that procedure then allows the Court the discretion once the procedure is adhered to make your decisions, but it doesn't allow

you to say I'm going to put the time frames and the procedure that was established just put it in the trash can and come up with a new procedure.

THE COURT: Let me -- I thought you were finished.

MS. LUNDVALL: I am. Thank you.

THE COURT: I think Ms. Lundvall's points are well taken. I think Mr. Hutchison's points are also well taken. I can't anticipate whatever it is you may be thinking about in the back of your mind. I don't know what may or may not transpire. I'm not inclined to limit -- I'm not inclined to limit Mr. Hall's ability in any way to ferret out whatever information he's got to ferret out to get to the bottom of the matter in as expeditious fashion as possible.

I would think you would reserve your right to object to any items that might suddenly appear that haven't already been produced. I think you would retain that right. On the other hand, I don't know what we could be thinking of. It would seem to me that whatever items plaintiff's counsel could get their hands on were probably already produced. So with that said, with respect to plaintiff's motion to strike the chart, I'm not inclined to strike this

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              I don't think this Court needs to look at
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      every single item. That's one of the reasons I'm
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      asking Mr. Hall to serve in this capacity. He can
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      sort through that information if it's helpful to him.
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      He can have some questions for both sides, I would
      think.
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                 MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 MR. HUTCHISON:
                                 Your Honor, as far as the
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      costs, I assume that will be split between the
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      parties?
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                 THE COURT:
                             I should think so.
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                 MS. LUNDVALL: I assume that's not going to
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      end up being a recoverable cost such that I end up
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      picking up a hundred percent of the tab?
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                 MR. HUTCHISON: I think Mr. Hall's fees are
      reasonable and necessary.
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                 THE COURT: I think we'll address that at a
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      later period of time.
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                 MR. HALL: One comment that I want everyone
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                Twenty something years ago I married this
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      attorney and her husband. I was a military chaplain.
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      I married them. I've known them for many years.
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      have had no business dealings with them or with any of
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      you.
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                 THE COURT: Any objection?
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MR. HUTCHISON: No. I stand by my commitment to Mr. Hall. I think he'll do a fine job.

THE COURT: I'm certain he will. I thank

you for willing.

MR. EISENBERG: Your Honor, do we understand that he would submit a report to you and then you would have a chance to review it and then you would make your own independent determination?

THE COURT: Yes. Exactly. Counsel will be provided a copy as well as the Court. He's served in similar capacities in other courts. Counsel is probably aware of that. Mr. Adams.

MR. ADAMS: I'll take care of that, Your Honor and I would be.

MS. LUNDVALL: I would imagine that the order would be Rule 53, concerning special masters, and it would be in accord then with Rule 53?

MR. ADAMS: Yes.

MR. HUTCHISON: Your Honor, will there be a discussion for time frames of reports and that kind of thing or do you want to defer that for a later time?

THE COURT: I'm going to ask Mr. Hall what he has in mind.

MR. HALL: I've done over 50 of these receivership special masters for various courts, very

complex cases to less complex. Generally what I do is take a good look initially at the case. Then I come back to the Judge with an opinion, with a professional opinion. As to the length based on the scope of the work in terms of what we do and how we do it. I would say this. That my fee is \$200 an hour. Mr. Adams, my attorney, is \$200 an hour. He works as needed. I have a forensic analysis who works with me at \$75 an hour. He does most of the work.

I review the work. I scope the work with him, if I need to do. I do that basically to cut costs.

MR. HUTCHISON: Sounds fine.

THE COURT: I'm going to let you work out the details then on when you will all get together and also you will get back to me, I suppose, and let me know what you need. The motion for retax, we'll continue it until we have further information.

MR. HALL: If I might have an opportunity to meet with either both parties at the same time or the parties separately to see what information is available that we might begin getting. It's a sealed case. We have no information on the case.

MR. HUTCHISON: We'll get you that.

THE COURT: Why don't you take an

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opportunity to do that. We can't go forward on the remaining motion until we have information with respect to this one.

MS. LUNDVALL: I believe that we can. And the reason I say that, in fact, I think we have to for purposes of I'm now flying by the seat of my pants. I do not believe that a cost award or an attorney fee award delays the entry of final judgment that starts the timeframe then for filing a notice of appeal. So to the extent then that we must go forward then with the motion for stay so as to cover the time frames that are going to be at issue pending the -- until the timeframe then for the Nevada Supreme Court then ultimately to rule on this, assuming that either side does not like what the District Court does based upon whatever the stipulation is.

I guess what I'm getting into is this. Is that I do not believe that the cost award will push off the argument for purposes of the stay motion that we still have on calendar.

MR. EISENBERG: Your Honor, that's true assuming that you intend to issue your order on the post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law right away. That would trigger the time for the appeal even if the costs order is not entered until

later. If you planned to delay the first order until the costs order is also issued, then we wouldn't be appealing for that. But we're not requesting you to delay that. The interest obviously is a lot in this case.

MR. WALL: Of course, the rule requires that entry of judgment not be delayed for any taxing of costs. So it would be appropriate for the Court to go forward with the order denying the motion. At that point the time limits will begin to run for the appeal.

MR. EISENBERG: In that case we do need a decision on the motion for a stay.

THE COURT: Then let me step down and give you a chance to speak to Mr. Hall and Mr. Adams so we don't delay them further. Then I'll come back with you.

(Short recess)

THE COURT: Last but not least, Ms.

Lundvall.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor. We originally captioned this motion a provisional motion for stay because the timing of it was that it was going to be heard and decided before the Court had decided the post-trial motions. It's no longer

provisional. It's now as far as in place so to speak. There is a stipulation between the parties concerning this and there has been no discussion as to modifying any of the stipulation than already exists as it talks about review by either side by the Nevada Supreme Court and how long the existing stay then will continue in place.

This argument that we are presenting today on this motion for the stay pending appeal deals with the timeframe once the notice of appeal is filed and the case then is -- the District Court is divested of jurisdiction and the case goes to Nevada Supreme Court. This argument is not intended to alter or amend any of the parties' stipulation in any respect.

The Court will be asked as part of this motion essentially to make two determinations. first determination is whether or not FTB is entitled to a stay in the first place. And the second determination we're asking the Court to make then is whether or not that stay will be without bond. And as to the second question, I think it's important to kind of keep in mind, or at least the thing that I've kept in mind, is that what we're talking about from a cost standpoint.

Given the magnitude of the jury's verdict

and the judgment then that has been imposed against the FTB, we're looking at an annual bond premium of somewhere between 22 and 37 million dollars. That's just the premium. That's just for one year. We don't get that back if successful at the end. And if you even assume that, I think best case scenario, that this case is resolved within a two-year period of time by our Nevada Supreme Court, you're looking at about somewhere between 50 and 74 million dollars of costs that may not be recoverable.

At the same time, the FTB then would have to post a bond not only -- not a bond, but we would have to post assets or a letter of credit for the full amount then that a bonding company is going to be asked to secure. In other words, we've got to take assets aside, put them aside. And the amount then that assets would have to be put aside or some type of letter of credit would have to be created with the bonding company to the tune of about \$790 million.

The way I look at that is there's an awful lot of services to the State of California and to the people that make up the State of California that they will be deprived across the period of time that this case is on appeal. Therefore, I'm going to begin my argument then demonstrating why the FTB is entitled

first to a stay. There's no -- there is contest, but it doesn't appear that there's any real contest. But in the abundance of caution I'm going to very briefly address the four factors associated with whether or not the FTB is entitled to a stay pending appeal.

Interestingly, the case law that examines whether or not a party is entitled to a stay pending appeal is factored upon appellate factors found in Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 8. And the four factors basically deal with whether or not the object of the appeal will be defeated if a stay is denied, if we will suffer irreparable harm, whether or not Mr. Hyatt will suffer irreparable harm, and the prevailing of the merits component.

Let me very briefly run through these issues. Without -- as to the first one, without a stay, Mr. Hyatt can begin executing upon his judgment, and he can begin going and trying to capture assets or bank accounts or whatever other methods that he would seek for recovery and to be able to secure those monies. And he would then be able to have the enjoyment of those monies across the period of time that the appeal is pending. And that it is possible then that if, in fact, the Nevada Supreme Court looks

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at this case differently than the District Court and what the jury has done, we may not be able to recover that. So that is one of the factors and I think it is a factor then that merits the FTB being entitled to a stay.

We also look at whether or not we will suffer irreparable harm. As I indicated, Mr. Hyatt would be entitled to go out and execute unless there is a stay. This is monies that we've got to keep in mind that we're talking about the FTB. And what Mr. Hyatt's position is is that he can execute against assets that belong to the State of California generally. So, therefore, these are monies that would be -- would be taken away from individuals who reside in the State of California for which would be receiving California services. So to the extent that there is a irreparable harm in the form that these individuals then would be denied services, everything from schools to health care to public safety, those types of issues for possibly no recovery of being able to get those back. I think that that is an issue that merits, warrants a stay being afforded to the FTB.

The third factor then is whether or not Mr. Hyatt will suffer irreparable harm from a stay. His own evidence that he presented at the time of

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trial in support of his request for punitive damages established that he is secure in being able to ultimately execute upon a judgment if that judgment is upheld, and that there is no issue then concerning him being able to find that the FTB through the State of California then is quote/unquote good for it.

The one comment that I would make is that this case is significantly different than cases in which maybe somebody has experienced some type of physical harm and that they're needing medical attention and they're looking to a judgment then to provide them the money so that they can pay for that medical attention. We're not looking at that type of a case here at all. It was very affirmatively established during the course of the trial that Mr. Hyatt is very affluent, very wealthy man, and, therefore, this is a factor we think, too, warrants a stay then in favor of the FTB.

The last factor is then whether or not there's a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.

It's a very high, high standard that the Nevada

Supreme Court under its case law has looked at. And basically it would have to be demonstrated that somehow an appeal would be frivolous or fruitless and entirely futile. So to the extent that we submit that

that showing has not been made by Mr. Hyatt, and, therefore, the FTB should be entitled to a stay.

The real -- the meaty question and the real question for the Court's determination is whether or not we have to post a bond by which to secure that stay. And there are two different reasons why, in fact, the FTB is entitled to a stay without bond. I'm going to walk through the comity analysis, and I'm going to keep my comments in mind based on the Court's previous ruling on our post-trial motion. But also, the Nelson vs. Heer factors.

I guess what I'm trying to impress upon the Court is there's two different grounds for our request to you to not permit Mr. Hyatt to request a bond from us, in other words, for us not to be required to post a bond. One of the grounds is a comity grounds and the second ground is Nelson vs. Heer grounds. They're not dependent upon each other. It's an either/or analysis. If I lose on one, I can still win on the other and still be able to demonstrate that the FTB should not be required to post a bond.

I'm going to start with the comity analysis. And the comity analysis, maybe in my simple as far as way of trying to look at things, I look at the comity analysis as a golden rule analysis. In

other words, you're going to do unto somebody else the same that you either want or what is being done unto you. That's a circumstance that you end up when a request for comity is being made.

We are asking this Court to apply the public policy of the State of California. And I'm going to walk through both Nevada's public policy as well as California's public policy and ask this Court then to apply comity. Why? Because the public policy on the issue of whether or not a government agency needs to post a bond to secure a stay pending appeal is identical. They match up perfectly.

You have to look at in your basic determination is that when a party asks for comity to be applied, is whether or not the law that they're asking to be applied somehow offends the public policy of the host jurisdiction or, in other words, of this state. Does somehow that the law that I'm asking you to apply to decide whether or not FTB must post a bond, it's your analysis to determine what is the public policy of the State of Nevada, and, therefore, does this somehow offend that public policy of the State of Nevada.

The analysis begins with taking a look at what our own public policy is. Our public policy on

this particular point is found then in Rule 62(e). Rule 62(e) very simply says, if you're a government agency and you have a judgment that's imposed against you and you're going to seek an appeal and you want a stay, you do not have to post a bond.

That's the public policy of the State of Nevada. That public policy is identical to the public policy in the State of California. This is California's civil code of procedure and it also then sets forth the public policy of the State of California. And the public policy in the State of California is identical to Nevada's. If you are a government agency and you have a judgment that's been imposed against you and you intend to seek an appeal of that judgment and you're asking for a stay, you do not have to post a bond.

So what you end up with then is that the public policy both in the State of Nevada as well as in the State of California is identical. And what we're asking the Court to do then is to apply the public policy that is found in the California statute. Why? Because it does not offend the public policy of the State of Nevada.

The public policy -- we brought to the Court's attention the case law then that speaks to

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kind of why states do have these public policies. And it talks about how one of the things that's acknowledged is that the public entity is going to have the ability ultimately to pay the judgment if it is upheld. And that's, once again, back to the evidence that we looked to and cited to that Mr. Hyatt had cited in support then of his request for punitive damages.

Additionally, a government agency is not like a private party, whereby, its activities are conducted in private. In fact, governments and their agencies conduct their activities in the public. it's not as if we can hide something. It's not as if we can sell the Golden Gate Bridge or one of the state parks and try to hide that from Mr. Hyatt. It's not as if we can take bank accounts and deplete those bank accounts and hide that money somewhere in offshore accounts in some fashion or another.

Government cannot engage in the type of shenanigans that the fear is that private parties might do if they end up with a judgment against them. Why? Because a private party in large part conducts its business in private.

In addition, the public policy both in the State of Nevada as well as in the State of California

identifies then that the government and its taxpayers and its people should not be saddled with unnecessary expenses. That's why I pointed out up front what type of costs we're talking about when it comes to posting this bond.

I don't know if this is going to come up or not, but this is, once again, back to my simple way of trying to understand this. This photograph, if I were on vacation now, this is what I would have seen two days ago in southeast Asia. It was a lunar eclipse. And what this lunar eclipse was is the moon literally passing in front of the sun and blocking out the sun.

In our case we have a history, in fact, of both the Nevada Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court finding that there was a partial eclipse of the sun in California through the negligence cause of action, but not a complete. And that's why this case was permitted to go forward.

But when I match up in this motion that we have in front of you the public policy of the State of California and the public policy of the State of Nevada, they are the same size. They are completely -- they match up. So, therefore, that's why we believe that the comity analysis is applicable here and why the Court then may rely upon comity by which

to permit the State of California's law to be applied and, therefore, for no bond to be required.

The four bases that we believe that the comity is required. I heard the Court's analysis on the law of the case and I'm not going to try to quarrel with that. I'm not going to try to change your mind. But the point I will try to make though is this. Is that each time that the Court is given the opportunity or a request is made for comity to be applied to you, that our Nevada Supreme Court as well as the U.S. Supreme Court has said that comity is a doctrine by which creates harmonious relationships between neighboring states. And it is an analysis and a doctrine that has been applied previously in this case.

Now, we believe that it constitutes law of the case. The Court does not. But from this standpoint at the very minimum the Court has acknowledged that, in fact, the comity was applied. There was a writ of mandamus that was issued to then District Judge Seda telling her to dismiss the negligence action. Why? On comity analysis. Why? Because at that point in time the immunity that was afforded to California was bigger than the immunity that was afforded to the State of Nevada.

In other words, we had a partial eclipse. And what was left as far as of the immunity that was afforded in California, Nevada was not required then to apply that here in this case. When I go back though to the request that we're asking for in this particular motion, they match up identically.

The other component that we believe that also applies here is judicial estoppel. Mr. Hyatt in his written briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court as well as in his oral argument to the U.S. Supreme Court said that comity should apply. And he described the comity that should apply as affording the FTB the same treatment that would be afforded to a Nevada agency. That's how he described it. He did that both in his written papers as well as in his oral presentation then to the U.S. Supreme Court.

An he was successful on that argument. In fact, he used language in his papers that talked about how the benchmark that was applied by the Nevada Supreme Court was how it treated its own state agencies. And that very language that he had used in his brief was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court when they talked about how that the State of Nevada had sensitively applied the comity analysis using its own treatment of its own state agencies as the benchmark

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for the treatment that would be afforded to the FTB.

So in this particular factual circumstance, we believe that that benchmark is found both as far as within our state rule as well as in California's rule, which are identical. And that Mr. Hyatt then is judicially estopped to try to suggest otherwise.

In addition, we brought to the Court's attention then -- the interesting thing about having a case in front of the U.S. Supreme Court is it gets published. People cite to it. And you can look to see how other courts have interpreted that very decision. And we brought to the Court's attention the Sam vs. Sam case which was the New Mexico decision that applied this comity analysis exactly like we had described it to you. So, therefore, it's not as if you have to write on a fresh slate when it comes to how other courts have interpreted what happened in this case. You have the New Mexico Supreme Court then applying that same analysis. And that analysis was to a statute of limitations issue. It's a very similar procedural type of an issue as what we're talking about then as to whether or not the FTB needs to post a bond.

And the last is that Mr. Hyatt's argument somehow -- I have a hard time articulating this

argument because it makes no sense to me. Mr. Hyatt in response to our comity analysis in his papers has said, well, Nevada will never apply comity. Why? Because California didn't do so in the Nevada vs. Hall case, a decision that happened over 30 years ago. Well, that makes no sense. Comity was applied in this case, in this case. So if there was going to be any opportunity for some kind of retaliation against the State of California, that argument has to be thrown by the wayside. Why? Because in this very case comity was applied. Why? So as to dismiss then the negligence claim.

Bottom line, Your Honor, as far as on our comity analysis, we say this: California statute and Nevada's rule set forth what each state's public policy is. And because those match up identically, we would ask the Court then to apply and to not require the FTB to post a bond to secure its stay pending appeal.

The last analysis then is the Nelson vs. Heer factors. Nelson vs. Heer is a decision that talked a little bit about the purpose of the bond. And they talk about the fact that, in fact, the purpose of a bond is to try to afford a party some security. That they know at the end of the day that

there may be funds that may be out there available so that the judgment ultimately could be paid.

Mr. Hyatt's own evidence that he presented at the time of trial demonstrates that security. His expert in the form of Mr. Sjoberg then established -- went through as far as the analysis about how the State of California was the eighth largest economic entity as far as in the world. He went through as far as the multi billions that it had in claimed net worth. He went through multi billions that were claimed in assets available for which to pay judgments. He went through the multi millions, in fact, that were secured by the FTB in tax revenue on a daily basis. He has demonstrated then as far as that very security and, therefore, does not need additional security in the form of a bond.

The five factors that were supplied then by the Nelson vs. Heer, and I'm going to go through those quickly because of the interest of time. We brought to the Court's attention then the affidavits then that identified that the collection process in the state against the FTB in the State of California is not unusually complex. We explained that the FTB has the funds. We explained if that fund is not sufficient how appropriations are made. All of those were fully

explained and it does not demonstrate then that there is some type of a complex collection process that Mr. Hyatt must go through.

Also, one of the things that I took a look at is when you look at the time required to obtain the judgment after affirmance. That really is tied into the first factor in how complex it is and whether or not it's going to take a long time for a party. So the same evidence that we presented concerning that collection process would apply here.

The third factor is in the confidence in the ability to pay the judgment. I cite back then to Mr. Hyatt's own evidence that he presented in this trial and that concerned then the testimony coming from Mr. Sjoberg on California and its net worth and its net assets and what income tax revenue was being generated on a daily basis.

The fourth is whether or not it is a waste of money on the cost of a bond because the judgment debtor's ability to pay is plain.

I go back to as far as what I started on this analysis to begin with. We're looking at somewhere between 50 and 74 million dollars at minimum that it's going to cost us just simply to secure the bond in annual bond premiums. That's a lot of money.

And in addition, what we'll have to do is to post assets then up to 100 percent. And that amount that the affidavit that we provided then from the woman with the bonding company then was probably about \$790 million.

So that is assets. That is money that the State of California, its taxpayers, its citizens, those that use public services in the State of California will be deprived of during the pendency of this appeal. Why? Mr. Hyatt's already secure. He already has presented his own evidence then that the FTB through the State of California has the ability to pay.

And the last factor is the defendant's lack of a precarious financial condition. And that factor I look at is somewhat of a repeat then of what has already been -- I've already mentioned as far as the rest of the factors.

Bottom line is, Your Honor, I believe that the FTB is entitled to a stay, pending appeal. And in addition, we would ask the Court then to either apply comity or to find under the Nelson vs. Heer factors that we do not need to post a bond pending that appeal. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Lundvall.

MR. WALL: Good morning, Your Honor.

Michael Wall on behalf of Mr. Hyatt. Your Honor, we didn't hear anything here that wasn't in the papers and that hasn't been addressed. There are some things that hadn't been directly addressed that I would like to address that were particularly in the reply that we didn't have an opportunity to go through. But I do need to go through quickly each of these things and I'll try to be brief.

First, whether or not they're entitled to a stay. The standard is set as to whether or not she should get a stay, and there are the four factors that they have to meet. The only thing I heard on whether or not the object of the appeal will be defeated is this will cost money because he'll start executing. Generally, the fact that a party may begin executing and that money may trade hands is not sufficient to show that the object of the appeal will be defeated. I've seen hundreds of orders from the Nevada Supreme Court that say money is fungible and that doesn't supply that basis.

Second, it's a weighing of the prejudice to the parties. We didn't hear any prejudice specifically to the FTB or even to California. But more we talked about this, well, it's going to tie up

some of their funds. And I would suggest that that's not irreparable prejudice to the FTB or the State of California or to the citizens of California that is required when you're talking about a weighing factor of whether or not there should be a stay.

Then we heard, because the next part of that is to weigh the prejudice to Mr. Hyatt. Well, Mr. Hyatt's a wealthy man. If he doesn't collect his money now or for however long it takes for all of the processes to go through. It has taken 10 years to get to trial. It's going to take years to get through the rest of the process. There will be significant prejudice to Mr. Hyatt. He's an individual. As opposed to the prejudice to the State of California, which was general. The prejudice to Mr. Hyatt is direct.

And then the issue of whether they have to

-- they will or will not prevail on the merits.

They've try tried to shift the burden of proof there.

And they've taken some language from a couple of cases where it said, well, we didn't think this case, that the issue was frivolous and under the circumstances we thought that a stay would be appropriate.

Of course, a stay is always within the discretion of the Court. But the burden of proof is

upon the FTB to show that they are likely to prevail on the merits, not to show that their appeal is not frivolous or that it will necessarily be fruitless. We don't have that burden. They have that burden and they haven't even attempted to demonstrate to this Court that they have a likelihood of a success on the merits. And there's a good reason for that. Most of the time the issue of whether or not a stay should be granted turns on that issue alone because there's no point in a stay if they haven't raised an issue on which they're likely to prevail.

I'll move on to the issue of the bond. Speaking of the issue of the bond, there's a number of arguments. The first argument, it's going to cost them some money to put up a bond. And the reason it's going to cost them some money is because of the size of the verdict. It costs every plaintiff, every appellant, who puts up a bond money to put up that bond. The fact that it's going to cost them some money and it's going to tie up some money and they could use that money to pay off some of those IOUs that they're sending to their taxpayers in California right now is not a basis for saying they shouldn't have to post a bond. It simply doesn't address that issue at all.

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They say in order to get the bond they have to post assets. Everybody has to post assets in order to get a bond. There are other ways to secure a judgment. They can explore what all of their options are. But the State of California is in a position to put up a bond. And the alleged cost of putting up that bond and how that's going to hurt the taxpayers in California is not a basis to ignore the purpose of the rule that they have to put up a bond. And that purpose is to protect Mr. Hyatt when it comes time to collect.

Going first to the Nelson vs. Heer factors, each of those things, the complexity of the process in collecting, it's not complex to collect in California. All you have to do is go there. The FTB says they've got some money. I don't know how we're going to attach that. Then we can get some money from the legislature. That's exactly the process that we should not have to rely upon, the process of going through legislative sessions and legislative assessments.

They cited a couple of cases where states did not require other states to post bonds. And in each of those cases there was a ready fund without legislation being required from which the judgment

could be satisfied. Here there's no such thing.

We've talked about going out and executing on assets in California. But that's not exactly how it would happen and we all know that. The process is complex. And our assurety of being paid and how quickly we can be paid and how quickly Mr. Hyatt will be compensated after the process of an appeal and whatever else follows that is not, under those standards, going to give Mr. Hyatt any peace of mind at all that he's some day going to be able to collect this judgment from the State of California.

So you weigh those factors. If it weren't the State of California, if it were just somebody else out there, those factors would never weigh in favor of not requiring a bond. And the rulings of the Court are that bonds should be required in almost every case.

So the only issue that really addresses -that we really need to address today as to whether or
not the State of California should not be required to
post a bond is comity. Because if they were a private
individual, they would be required to post a bond.

So we talk about comity. And I'm not going to go through their complete lack of understanding of the doctrine of comity in this case. Your Honor has

already ruled on that and ruled against them on that.

But I want to address this is what's wrong with their entire argument. It's the first line, the very first sentence of their reply to our opposition in this motion. And that sentence is, Hyatt's opposition encourages this Court to become hostile toward a state agency of California by requesting that this Court treat the FTB worse than it would treat a similarly situated Nevada state agency.

That is wrong on so many levels it's almost impossible to address, but I want to address a couple of levels that it's wrong on. Hyatt has never asked this Court to be hostile to the State of California. Determining what the policy of this state is and how that applies to protect a citizen of this state is not hostility toward the State of California.

We have never argued that the FTB should be treated worse than a Nevada agency. It's not a question of better or worse. It's a question of the same or different from. And it should be different from.

The FTB is not similarly situated as a Nevada agency for one, simple reason. It's in California. It's not here. It's not located in Nevada. It's not subject to Nevada law. It's not

subject to the Nevada legislature. It's not subject to the Nevada police authority, and it's not subject to the Nevada administrative control. That's why the laws are so clear on this subject.

A Nevada resident is not in the same position to collect against a foreign agency as that Nevada resident is to collect against a Nevada agency. It's simply a different situation.

Mr. Hyatt is asking this Court to protect his rights and interests, to protect the rights and interests of a Nevada citizen, and that's him.

Comity is a non-issue in this case. Comity is a applied in every case where a foreign law exists. Comity is either applied by applying that foreign law or determining that you won't apply that foreign law. Comity is just a doctrine of the law.

The problem with the FTB's arguments on comity is that they set up a false set of policies. They state falsely that the policy of Nevada is that government agencies generally should not have to post bonds, and that that's the same policy they have in California. So since we have the same policy, apply that policy.

That's not the policy of Nevada and it's not the policy of California. Incidentally,

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California and Nevada have the same policy. It's very clear. NRCP 62(e) says that a Nevada agency does not have to post a bond. California law 995.220 says very clearly, the State of California does not have to post a bond.

There's a reason for those laws and we've cited the case law. The federal courts have been Their rule is the same. If you get a judgment in federal Court, you don't have to post a bond if you're the federal government. But if you're the County of Clark in Nevada, you do have to post a bond. And we cited that authority. The policy of the State of Nevada is that domestic agencies do not have to post bonds. The policy of the State of California is that domestic agencies do not have to post bonds. There is no policy in California or in Nevada that foreign agencies should not have to post a bond, and there are very good reasons for them not having to post a bond, for not requiring a bond from your own agency but requiring a bond from somewhere else and I've gone through those.

We can't protect our citizens against the vagaries of the law of a foreign jurisdiction as we can here. And when the rules were adopted and the laws were adopted, they were to protect government

agencies and the fiscal interests of the state in which they were adopted. Just as the federal one is so clear, the federal rule, the counterpart of the Nevada rule, absolutely clearly says federal government doesn't have to post a bond, but everybody else has to post a bond.

So the comity issue is a non-issue. If we're going to apply comity, doesn't matter which law we apply, California or ours, we reach the same result. They are a foreign agency. They should be required to post a bond so that we are secure.

Finally, the judicial estoppel argument is absolutely absurd in my view, Your Honor. Mr. Farr on behalf of Mr. Hyatt at the United States Supreme Court never, ever made the argument that a California agency has to be treated for all purposes the same as a Nevada agency. The opinions have never been cited for that proposition. The issue there was immunity, which is not an issue that we have here. And what Mr. Farr said was, remember, the United States Supreme Court was reviewing to see whether or not the State of Nevada in its exercise of comity violated some federal law, the Constitution.

And they said that they hadn't done so.

That's all they decided. Mr. Farr simply said -- his

comments were in the context of that the Nevada
Supreme Court in that instance with respect to those
issues had sensitively applied comity because it had
treated under those circumstances a California agency
the same way it would have treated a Nevada agency.
No suggestion was made there or at any other time that
in every circumstance, no matter what the law is, a
Nevada agency and a California agency are the same
thing and should be treated the same.

Today we're looking at a situation where if we don't have some kind of protections, then we are looking at more years of litigation with no real guarantee that at the end we will be able to collect that judgment.

A bond is required from everybody who appeals. An appeal is not a constitutional right. It's a statutory right. And a party who accepts or takes advantage of that statutory right has to secure the other party.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wall. Ms Lundvall.

MS. LUNDVALL: Very briefly, Your Honor.

Mr. Wall in opposition to our comity argument says you
do not have to apply Nevada's rule of procedure
because it is special to Nevada agencies. In other

words, he says this. When you look at this rule of procedure, it only applies to Nevada agencies. And that's why you can't apply comity.

Well, if I had NRS 41.032 up here that talks about whether or not Nevada agencies are immune even from a case being filed against them, what the Court would see is that that statute only talks about Nevada agencies. Doesn't talk about foreign agencies. Doesn't talk about out-of-state agencies.

Why am I bringing up this point? That statute, the immunity that was found in that statute was said to apply to us by the Nevada Supreme Court and by the U.S. Supreme Court. And it makes no mention whatsoever of a foreign agency. And so Mr. Wall's argument on comity makes no sense whatsoever, especially when you look at the most concrete analysis that is in front of you.

What the comity analysis is is we're asking you to apply the public policy that is found in the statute of the State of California in this circumstance that says a state agency, California, doesn't have to post a bond. Why? Because it's identical to our policy regarding government agencies here in Nevada. It's the exact same analysis that was applied for purposes of a negligence claim. It's the

exact same analysis that the New Mexico Supreme Court did in the Sam vs. Sam case, and it applied a two-year statute of limitations from Arizona in a New Mexico case. And, therefore, I disagree with his argument.

Second thing is that he closed his remarks by saying everybody who takes an appeal must post a bond. Not so. It's a permissive language that is found within the bond requirement. Moreover, if it's not permissive, then why are we looking at the Nelson vs. Heer factors? The Nelson vs. Heer case particularly said that a bond is not required in every circumstance.

And the last point I'm going to make is this. He said, I don't think they've shown any irreparable harm to FTB or the State of California so as to be entitled to a stay in the first place. Well, the irreparable harm that we identified to the Court was this: Is that if we have to post a bond, we talked about the costs and how much in assets we have to segregate even put up some type of a letter of credit. That's in excess, it's right at almost a billion dollars. Public services that could be afforded to the citizens of California while this case is pending that appeal. And the testimony in this trial was that ultimately the taxpayers of the State

of California are going to be paying for this judgment if it is upheld.

So what you're talking about is the deprivation of state services to the taxpayers of the State of California that provides the irreparable harm. If, in fact, a school district is not able to fully afford some of the special programs, the child who doesn't get the benefit of that program, that's irreparable harm. They have to cut back on those services and somebody experiences harm because of that. That's irreparable harm. We have demonstrated that to the Court.

And we would ask the Court then not only to grant us a stay pending the appeal, but also to grant us a stay without a bond. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. WALL: Just one very quick point, if I may. Ms. Lundvall argued out of both sides of her mouth when she talks about her analogy she made to NRS Chapter 41 and the application of that statute to the FTB even though it doesn't say Nevada. I would remind her that we didn't apply Nevada immunity to California. We've applied to California California immunity under the California statute to the extent it was not inconsistent with Nevada law. That's exactly

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what the comity argument is all about.

The statute, it's right there, within the state. Their statute says the same thing, the State of California. The policies are the same. Domestic corporations are treated differently from foreign agencies.

THE COURT: Any response?

MS. LUNDVALL: The response that I go back as far as to our overall analysis, Your Honor. I'm trying as hard as I can to be as respectful. This is the statute that we're asking you to apply. This is the California statute. Why? Because the public policy reflected in that statute is identical to Nevada's. And that's what the comity analysis is. Is do unto others as you're going to do unto yourself.

So what is this Court going to do unto California and the FTB is the same thing that we would do unto ourselves. What would we do unto ourselves? We wouldn't require a government agency to post a bond. And that is identical then to what the State of California applies as its public policy. That's what we're asking this Court to apply under the comity analysis. And as I go back before, because I don't want anyone to think that we're hanging our hat on one analysis versus another.

THE COURT: Thank you. I understand the arguments and the parties' respective positions. The Court is inclined to partially grant this motion. The motion for stay ought to be granted. It is the Court's opinion that FTB be required to post a superceding bond.

It's interesting to me to note that FTB's positions seem to be striking in their contradictory nature. FTB now submits to this Court it has plenty of money and that the judgment is a drop in the bucket. Then it has plenty of money -- then FTB argues that it would be irreparably harmed by a bond because of the tremendous burdens it would suffer by dealing with a bonding agent. Court notes FTB is not required to appeal.

Mr. Hyatt has been fighting the FTB for about 16 years. FTB's conduct throughout the audit process and this 10-year litigation does not give this Court any reason to believe that payment to Mr. Hyatt will be swift if and when FTB loses this appeal. Even as FTB attempts to reassure this Court of that fact, it raises doubts. There is very clearly a politicized process that must take place before this judgment is paid. It's the Court's ruling.

MR. WALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

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(Hearing adjourned at 11:54 a.m.)
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1 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 2 STATE OF NEVADA SS: 3 COUNTY OF CLARK 4 I, Kimberly A. Farkas, a duly commissioned Notary 5 Public, Clark County, State of Nevada, do hereby 6 certify: That I reported the taking of the 7 proceedings commencing on Thursday, January 29, 2009 8 at 9:06 a.m. 9 That I thereafter transcribed my said shorthand 10 notes into typewriting, and that the typewritten 11 transcript of said proceedings is a complete, true and 12 accurate transcription of said shorthand notes. 13 I further certify that I am not a relative or 14 employee of an attorney or counsel of any of the 15 parties, nor a relative or employee of an attorney or counsel involved in said action, nor a person 16 17 financially interested in the action. 18 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand in 19 my office in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, 20 this 30th day of January, 2009. 21 22 Kimberly A. Farkas, CCR 741 23 24 25

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CLERGION THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

GILBERT P. HYATT,

Plaintiffs,

V.

FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1-100 inclusive.

Defendants.

Case No.: A382999

Dept. No.: X

ORDER DENYING:

- (1) FTB'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW OR ALTERNATIVELY, AND CONDITIONALLY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO NRCP 50; AND
- (2) FTB'S ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND OTHER RELIEF PURSUANT TO NRCP 59

DATE: January 29, 2009

TIME: 9:00 a.m.

(filed under seal by order of the Discovery Commissioner dated February 22, 1999)

This matter having come before the Court on January 29, 2009, for hearing the

Defendant California Franchise Tax Board's ("FTB") Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

or Alternatively, and Conditionally Motion for New Trial Pursuant to NRCP 50 and FTB's

Alternative Motion for New Trial and Other Relief Pursuant to NRCP 59, Plaintiff having been

1	represented by Mark A. Hutchison, Peter C. Bernhard, Donald J. Kula, and Michael K. Wall and
2	the Franchise Tax Board having been represented by Pat Lundvall, Carla Higginbotham, and
3	Robert L. Eisenberg; the Court having considered the papers submitted by counsel as well as
4	oral arguments at the hearing; and GOOD CAUSE APPEARING;
5	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the FTB's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of
6	
7	Law or Alternatively, and Conditionally Motion for New Trial Pursuant to NRCP 50 and FTB's
8	Alternative Motion for New Trial and Other Relief Pursuant to NRCP 59 be and the same
9	hereby are denied.
10	DATED this day of ob, 2009
11	
12	JESSIE WALSH
13	DISTRICT JUDGE
14	SUBMITTED BY:
15	BULLIVANT HOUSER BAILEY PC
16	Peter C. Bernhard, Esq. (734)
17	3883 Howard Hughes Pkwy.
18	Suite 550 Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
19	(702) 669-3600 Attorneys for Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt
20	Thorneys for I turney Guocht I. Hyun
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26	Attorneys for Defendant Franchise Tax Board of the State of California
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CLEHX OF THE COURT

Attorneys for Defendant Franchise Tax Board of the State of California

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

GILBERT P. HYATT,

Plaintiff,

VS.

FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

A 382999 Case No. Dept. No.

Docket No.

ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, FTB'S PROVISIONAL MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL WITHOUT BOND

Hearing Date: January 29, 2009

Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

This matter came before the Court on January 29, 2009, for hearing on the Defendant Franchise Tax Board of the State of California's ("FTB") Provisional Motion for Stay Pending Appeal Without Bond. At this hearing, Plaintiff Gilbert P. Hyatt was represented by Mark Hutchison, Peter C. Bernhard, Donald J. Kula, and Michael Wall. FTB was represented by Pat Lundvall, Carla Higginbotham, and Robert L. Eisenberg. The Court having considered the

1	papers submitted by counsel as well as oral arguments at the hearing; and GOOD CAUSE
2	APPEARING;
3	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that FTB's Provisional Motion for Stay Pending Appeal
4	Without Bond is granted, in part. Upon the expiration of the current stay entered in this case
5	pursuant to express terms of the Stipulation and Order signed and entered on November 21,
6	2008, all proceedings to enforce the Judgment in this case shall be stayed pending FTB's appeal
7	of the Judgment upon FTB's posting of a supersedeas bond.
8	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order does not amend or modify the Stipulation
9	and Order signed and entered on November 21, 2008, a copy of which is attached hereto.
10	Dated this 8th day of Fen , 2009.
11	
12	100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13	By:
14	DISTRICT JUDGE
15	
16	SUBMITTED BY:
17	D. V. W. M. AND. V. S. C. W.
18	Pat Lundvall (NSBN 3761) Carla Higginbotham (NSBN 8495)
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