

1                   **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA**

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4           CISILIE A. PORSBOLL, f/k/a  
5           CISILIE ANNE VAILE,

6                               Appellant,

7                       vs.

8           ROBERT SCOTLUND VAILE,

9                               Respondent.

S.C. NO.     53798  
D.C. NO:    98-D-230385-D

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15                                   **APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF**

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....	iv
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .....	vi
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .....	vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....	1
STATEMENT OF FACTS .....	1
ARGUMENT .....	3
I.    THE STANDARD OF REVIEW .....	3
II.   SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....	3
III.  HOW CHILD SUPPORT PENALTIES ARE CALCULATED .....	4
A.   History .....	4
1.    Background and Cast of Characters .....	4
2.    Interest Law .....	6
3.    Interest Calculations by the Private Bar and State .....	7
B.   Calculating Penalties .....	8
C.   Welfare's Calculation Process .....	11
D.   Welfare's Critical Error .....	13
E.   Welfare's Flawed Analogy .....	14
F.   Welfare's Attempt to Conform the Law to Error .....	16
IV.  WELFARE'S APPEARANCE IN THE <i>VAILLE</i> MATTER .....	17
A.   Background .....	17
B.   Welfare's "Friend of the Court" Brief .....	17
C.   Actual Calculation Differences – the Irony of Arguments Made in Ignorance .....	19
D.   The Perversion of Bureaucratic Priorities .....	21

1	V.	POLICY-BASED COMPARISON OF CALCULATIONS .....	23
2	A.	Interest Calculations .....	23
3	B.	Penalty Calculations .....	23
4	1.	The Question of Whether the Statute is Ambiguous .....	23
5	2.	Welfare’s Approach is Constitutionally Impermissible .....	25
6	VI.	THE DISTRICT COURT’S ERRORS .....	26
7	A.	Factual Errors .....	27
8	B.	Legal Errors .....	28
9	C.	Combined Legal/Factual Errors .....	28
10	VII.	CONCLUSION .....	29
11		CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE .....	31

12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

### FEDERAL CASES

<i>Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.</i> , 473 U.S. 432, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) .....	25
<i>Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.</i> , 496 U.S. 633 (1990) .....	9
<i>United States v. Novak</i> , 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) .....	9
<i>United States v. Price</i> , 361 U.S. 304 (1960) .....	9
<i>United States v. Wise</i> , 370 U.S. 405 (1962) .....	9

### STATE CASES

<i>Allen v. State, Pub. Emp. Ret. Bd.</i> , 100 Nev. 130, 676 P.2d 792 (1984) .....	25
<i>Carson City District Attorney v. Ryder</i> , 116 Nev. 502, 998 P.2d 1186 (2000) .....	3
<i>DeRosa v. Dist. Ct.</i> , 115 Nev. 225, 985 P.2d 157 (1999) .....	25
<i>Edgington v. Edgington</i> , 119 Nev. 577, 80 P.3d 1282 (2003) .....	22
<i>Foster v. Marshman</i> , 96 Nev. 475, 611 P.2d 197 (1980) .....	7
<i>Hughes Properties v. State of Nevada</i> , 100 Nev. 295, 680 P.2d 970 (1984) .....	15
<i>Irving v. Irving</i> , 122 Nev. 494, 134 P.3d 718 (2006) .....	3
<i>Jones v. Jones</i> , 86 Nev. 879, 478 P.2d 148 (1970) .....	7, 20
<i>LTR Stage Lines v. Gray Line Tours</i> , 106 Nev. 283, 792 P.2d 386 (1990) .....	7, 20
<i>Petition of Phillip A.C.</i> , 122 Nev.1284, 149 P.3d 51 (2006) .....	23
<i>Ramada Inns v. Sharp</i> , 101 Nev. 824, 711 P.2d 1 (1985) .....	8
<i>Rodgers v. Rodgers</i> , 110 Nev. 1370, 887 P.2d 269 (1994) .....	14, 23
<i>Sheriff v. Smith</i> , 91 Nev. 729, 542 P.2d 440 (1975) .....	15
<i>State, Dep't Taxation v. McKesson Corp.</i> , 111 Nev. 810, 896 P.2d 1145 (1995) .....	3
<i>Tighe v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't</i> , 110 Nev. 632, 877 P.2d 1032 (1994) .....	3
<i>Vaile v. District Court</i> , 118 Nev. 262, 44 P.3d 506 (2002) .....	iv, 4, 21
<i>Willerton v. Bassham</i> , 111 Nev. 10, 889 P.2d 823 (1995) .....	25

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**STATE STATUTES AND RULES**

EDCR 7.26(a) ..... 31

NRAP 3A(b)(1) ..... iii

NRAP 4(a)(1) ..... iv

NRAP 28(e) ..... 30

NRS 3.223 ..... iii

NRS 17.130(2) ..... 6, 8

NRS 99.040 ..... 6, 8

NRS 125B.095(2) ..... 9

NRS 125B.140(2)(c) ..... 6

NRS 130.201(2) ..... iii

NRS 201.020 ..... 21

NRS ch. 130 ..... iii

NRS 130.201 ..... iii

## JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT<sup>1</sup>

Pursuant to NRS 3.223, the family court in Clark County has original, exclusive jurisdiction in any proceeding brought pursuant various statutory chapters, including NRS ch. 130. Jurisdictionally, this dispute came before a Nevada District Court because Scot chose Nevada in which to file papers calling for the payment of child support.<sup>2</sup>

Pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(1), appeals may be taken from the final order in a proceeding commenced in District Court. This Court is the sole appellate court for the district courts, and has subject matter jurisdiction to review the final decisions of those courts, including the *Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final Decision and Order Re: Child Support Penalties NRS 125B.095*, filed April 17, 2009.<sup>3</sup>

Scot filed his *Complaint for Divorce* on August 7, 1998.<sup>4</sup> Summary disposition was granted August 10, 1998, by Judge Steel; the *Decree of Divorce* was filed on August 21, 1998,<sup>5</sup> and *Notice of Entry of Order* was filed and served by mail on August 26, 1998.<sup>6</sup> These parties have been in essentially continuous litigation since the children were recovered in 2002; however, most of the tortuous history after this Court's *Opinion* ordering return of the abducted children is irrelevant here.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Although the *Notice of Appeal* in this action was filed prior to July 1, 2009, the headings, style, etc. of the brief have been conformed to the new rules.

<sup>2</sup> Under NRS 130.201, there are independent and alternative bases for exercising child support jurisdiction over an obligor, including, per NRS 130.201(2), "Submission by the obligor to the jurisdiction of this State by consent, by entering a general appearance or filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction."

<sup>3</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00376-CAV00399.

<sup>4</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00001-CAV00027.

<sup>5</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00031-CAV00060.

<sup>6</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00061-CAV00089.

<sup>7</sup> See *Vaile v. District Court*, 118 Nev. 262, 44 P.3d 506 (2002).

1 The *Order* appealed from, containing a *Notice of Entry*, was filed April 17, 2009. The  
2 *Notice of Appeal* was filed May 6, 2009, pursuant to NRAP 4(a)(1).

3 On November 14, 2007, Cisilie filed her *Motion to Reduce Arrears in Child Support to*  
4 *Judgment [etc.]*<sup>8</sup> The first partial *Order* on Cisilie's *Motion* was issued January 15, 2008.<sup>9</sup> After  
5 a number of hearings, purported appeals,<sup>10</sup> and various motions, the district court rendered its  
6 *Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final Decision and Order*, addressing most issues on  
7 October 9, 2008, but reserving a ruling on the issue of penalties.<sup>11</sup>

8 On April 17, 2009, the court issued its *Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final*  
9 *Decision and Order Re: Child Support Penalties NRS 125B.095*.<sup>12</sup> This was the last order, and  
10 disposed of the final matters pending from the time of Cisilie's original motion filing.

## 11 12 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

- 13 1. Whether the lower court erred in finding NRS 125B.095 to be ambiguous.
- 14 2. Whether the lower court erred in finding it more appropriate to use the  
15 methodology used by the State Welfare Department, rather than the methodology employed by  
16 the private Bar, for calculating penalties on arrears of child support.

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<sup>8</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00090-CAV00122.

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24<sup>9</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00134-CAV00124.

25<sup>10</sup> This Court has already dismissed virtually all of the spurious "appeals" and writ  
26 petitions Scot filed from the district court's various interlocutory orders; the last of those filings  
are now being considered by this Court for dismissal.

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28<sup>11</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00344-CAV00372.

<sup>12</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00376-CAV00399.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appeal from *Final Decision and Order Re: Child Support Penalties NRS 125B.095*, by the Hon. Cheryl B. Moss filed April 17, 2009, making a determination that NRS 125B.095 is ambiguous and subject to different interpretations, and that penalties on child support arrears should be calculated under the methodology used by the State Welfare system since 2005, rather than that used by the private Bar for the past fifteen years.

This appeal followed.

## STATEMENT OF FACTS

A complete recitation of the lengthy procedural history of this case is set out in the district court's orders, *Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final Decision and Order* filed October 9, 2008,<sup>13</sup> and *Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final Decision and Order Re: Child Support Penalties NRS 125B.095* filed April 17, 2009.<sup>14</sup> That history is largely irrelevant to the issue of statutory interpretation presented by this appeal.

In the interest of judicial economy, this Statement of Facts will be confined to events commencing with the initial *Motion to Reduce Arrears In Child Support to Judgment* filed November 14, 2007, and the resulting hearings of June 11 and July 11, 2008, which are relevant to the issues before the Court. The additional spurious filings in this case by Scot are the subjects of Supreme Court Case Nos. 51981, 52457, 52244, 52593, and 53687, and are not relevant to this appeal.

On November 14, 2007, Cisilie filed her *Motion to Reduce Arrears In Child Support to Judgment [etc.]*, in an attempt to force collection of long past due child support payments.<sup>15</sup>

On June 11, 2008, a hearing was held on Scotlund's *Motion For Reconsideration and To Amend Order [etc.]*, along with various other of his motions and Cisilie's *Oppositions*. There, for the first time, issues were raised by Scot as to the correct methodology of calculating interest

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<sup>13</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00345-CAV00348.

<sup>14</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00378-CAV00381.

<sup>15</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00090-CAV00122.



1 and penalties.<sup>16</sup> The court directed the parties to file supplemental points and authorities on the  
2 issue of child support penalties.

3 On July 9, 2008, the Attorney General for the State of Nevada submitted to the court a  
4 *Friend of the Court Brief*.<sup>17</sup>

5 On August 1, 2008, Scotlund filed his *Supplemental Brief Re: Child Support Principal,*  
6 *Penalties, and Attorney Fees*.<sup>18</sup>

7 On August 14, 2008, Cisilie filed her *Supplemental Brief on Child Support Principal,*  
8 *Penalties, and Attorney's Fees*.<sup>19</sup>

9 On September 5, 2008, the Attorney General for the State of Nevada filed a *Supplemental*  
10 *Friend of the Court Brief*.<sup>20</sup>

11 On October 9, 2008, the district court issued its *Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact,*  
12 *Conclusions of Law, Final Decision and Order*.<sup>21</sup>

13 On April 17, 2009, the district court issued its *Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact,*  
14 *Conclusions of Law, Final Decision and Order Re: Child Support Penalties NRS 125B.095*.<sup>22</sup>

15 This appeal followed.  
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21 <sup>16</sup> AAP Vol 2, Excerpts of Transcript, pgs CAV00468-CAV00472.

22 <sup>17</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00154-CAV00170.

23 <sup>18</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00196-CAV00234.

24 <sup>19</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00238-CAV00283.

25 <sup>20</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00284-CAV00338.

26 <sup>21</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00344-CAV00372.

27 <sup>22</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00376-CAV00399.  
28

## ARGUMENT

### I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal purely concerns a question of statutory construction. This Court need not defer to the trial court's reading of the statute, but instead considers the question *de novo*.<sup>23</sup>

### II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

To encourage child support obligors to actually pay child support, the Nevada Legislature has long imposed statutory interest on child support arrears due but unpaid. In 1993, the Legislature added a "penalties" provision, effective as of 1995, under which an obligor who did not pay child support when due would also owe a penalty of "10 percent per annum, or portion thereof, that the installment remains unpaid."

The private Bar began calculating and the family court has been imposing penalties since 1995. If a penalty is owed for less than a year, only a fraction of the annual penalty was assessed; if outstanding for multiple years, multiple annual penalties were applied for as long as installments remained unpaid.

The district attorneys' offices were divided. The Washoe County D.A. calculated interest the same way the private Bar did, but did not calculate penalties. The Clark County D.A. did not calculate or impose interest *or* penalties, despite the statutory mandates to do both. Nevada Welfare consolidated the various D.A. Offices under its effective control.

In 2003, the Nevada Legislature demanded that Welfare begin calculating and collecting interest and penalties per law. 18 years after they were supposed to be collecting interest, and 10 years after they were supposed to be collecting penalties, Welfare got its outdated NOMADS computer system to roughly calculate interest (using months instead of days), and to calculate a non-recurring "penalty" of 10% of an unpaid installment of support in a single lump sum.

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<sup>23</sup> See *Irving v. Irving*, 122 Nev. 494, 134 P.3d 718 (2006); *Carson City District Attorney v. Ryder*, 116 Nev. 502, 998 P.2d 1186 (2000); *State, Dep't Taxation v. McKesson Corp.*, 111 Nev. 810, 896 P.2d 1145 (1995); *Tighe v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't*, 110 Nev. 632, 877 P.2d 1032 (1994).

1 In 2005, Welfare asked the Legislature to amend the law to allow it to impose the full  
2 annual penalty in a single lump sum the first month support was overdue, as that is what  
3 NOMADS could calculate; the Legislature refused. Welfare implemented its calculation  
4 methodology anyway, and began collecting penalties, obtaining a letter from a deputy Attorney  
5 General that such was permitted under the “ambiguous” penalties statute.

6 That same deputy chose to interpose himself in this case, upon request by Scot, writing  
7 a “Friend of the Court” brief on Scot’s behalf. Based on misinformation supplied by Welfare,  
8 and a number of factual and legal errors, the family court ruled that the Welfare method of  
9 calculating child support penalties should be used in family court.

### 10 11 **III. HOW CHILD SUPPORT PENALTIES ARE CALCULATED**

#### 12 **A. History**

##### 13 **1. Background and Cast of Characters**

14 Multiple persons, agencies, and entities appear in the record, and in the discussion below.  
15 This section is intended to allow the Court to follow more easily who did what, and why.

16 This Court’s 2002 decision in *Vaile*<sup>24</sup> provided for the recovery of two children who had  
17 been spirited out of Norway by Scot to the United States. Scot stopped paying child support  
18 when he kidnaped the children in 2000, and never started paying again, even after they were  
19 recovered, despite his continued receipt (except for a three-year period when he elected to attend  
20 law school in Virginia) of a six-figure income and lavish lifestyle.<sup>25</sup>

21 Greta Muirhead, Esq., is Scot’s on-again, off-again attorney, who appeared intermittently  
22 at some but not all of the family court hearings, claiming each time to be in an “unbundled”  
23 capacity, and so appears at some places in the transcripts and this brief.

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24 <sup>24</sup> *Vaile v. District Court*, 118 Nev. 262, 44 P.3d 506 (2002).

25 <sup>25</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00351, CAV00356.

1 Cisilie is the mother of the two kidnaped children, who received no child support from  
2 April, 2000, until the District Attorney finally began collecting some money from Scot by wage  
3 garnishment in July, 2006.<sup>26</sup>

4 After enormously protracted proceedings, counsel for Scot finally conceded the principal  
5 sum of child support arrearages (\$118,369.96),<sup>27</sup> and the interest on that principal (\$45,089.27),<sup>28</sup>  
6 but the amount of the child support penalty remained in dispute.<sup>29</sup>

7 Until about ten years ago, the various County District Attorney Offices operated  
8 independently, until political consolidation within the Nevada Welfare bureaucracy brought the  
9 District Attorneys of the various counties under the effective control of the Welfare Division.  
10 Thereafter, the State of Nevada, Division of Welfare and Supportive Services, Child Support  
11 Enforcement Program ("CSEP") has contracted with various District Attorneys' Offices to  
12 provide child support services as required under Title IV-D.

13 Ed Ewert, Esq., and Robert Teuton, Esq. (now the Hon. Judge Teuton) were supervisory  
14 attorneys in the Clark County District Attorney's Office, invited by Judge Moss to attend a  
15 hearing and explain how the D.A. actually calculates child support arrearages.

16 The original Pro Bono Project was an independent organization of attorneys dedicated  
17 to securing legal representation for the poor. In 2000, it was merged into Clark County Legal  
18 Services ("CCLS").<sup>30</sup>

19 The history of how the private Bar and state agencies approached child support arrears,  
20 interest, and penalties, is intertwined. Accordingly, while this appeal is solely concerned with  
21 penalty calculations, enough of that history to show what happened and why is set out below.  
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24 <sup>26</sup> AAP Vol 2, pg CAV00362.

25 <sup>27</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00364, CAV00467.

26 <sup>28</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00364, CAV00467.

27 <sup>29</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00380-CAV00381.

28 <sup>30</sup> Now called the Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada.

## 2. Interest Law

Unpaid installments in child support or spousal support become judgments as a matter of law as of the date they come due and remain unpaid.<sup>31</sup>

The Nevada Legislature amended the legal rate of judgment interest statutes – NRS 17.130(2) and NRS 99.040 – repeatedly in the 1970s and 1980s in reaction to changing inflation. In 1987, the Legislature decided to have the legal interest rate “float,” self-adjusting every six months to the prime rate at the largest bank in Nevada, plus 2%. The legislation itself was devoid of details as to precisely how such calculations were to be done, but some instructions were supplied by this Court’s decisions before and after the statutory change.<sup>32</sup>

Few family law attorneys calculated interest, and those who did either developed spreadsheets, or hired accountants to do the calculations for them. Most of those accountants, however, applied “generally accepted accounting principles” when they were hired to do such calculations – even when such principles directly conflicted with the controlling case law.

This led to significant variability in whether, how, and how much interest was applied to judgments in Nevada family law cases. The multiple changes to applicable interest rates also made the calculations technically difficult. Since installments of pre-July, 1987, arrears had a “fixed” interest rate, while post-July, 1987, arrears “floated,” the number of changes in every calculation increased every six months.

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<sup>31</sup> NRS 125B.140(2)(c) (court orders for child support arrears shall include “interest upon the arrearages at a rate established pursuant to NRS 99.040, from the time each amount became due . . . interest continues to accrue on the amount ordered until it is paid.”)

<sup>32</sup> The cases are collected and analyzed in Marshal Willick, *A Matter of Interest: Collection of Full Arrearages on Nevada Judgments*, first published in the September, 1990, issue of the NTLA *Advocate*, and revised several times since then, most recently as CLE materials at the Twelfth Annual Family Law Showcase (Tonopah, Nevada, 2001); posted at [http://www.willicklawgroup.com/published\\_works](http://www.willicklawgroup.com/published_works).

1           Spreadsheets required separate columns tabulating interest for each “class” of arrearage,  
2           to determine when each individual dollar of arrears was paid. They grew increasingly complex  
3           and difficult to follow after the 1987 amendments.<sup>33</sup>

### 4 5                           **3.       Interest Calculations by the Private Bar and State**

6           Following this Court’s directions to calculate interest from and to specific dates,<sup>34</sup> the  
7           private Bar has always calculated interest on a daily basis. The Clark County District Attorney’s  
8           legacy mainframe computer system – NOMADS<sup>35</sup> – was set up originally many years ago to  
9           operate and report on a monthly batch cycle, and had *no* provision to calculate or track interest.<sup>36</sup>

10          There were some variations between what public agencies and private attorneys did that  
11          could create differences when interest was being calculated. The IV-D program rules required  
12          application of payments to present support first, but Nevada case law required application of  
13          payments to the oldest arrearage first.<sup>37</sup>

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16                           <sup>33</sup> In 1989, it was obvious that an automated solution was necessary, and I began work  
17                           on what ultimately became the Marshal Law (“MLAW”) program.

18                           <sup>34</sup> *See, e.g., LTR Stage Lines v. Gray Line Tours*, 106 Nev. 283, 792 P.2d 386 (1990)  
19                           (damages prior to the filing of a complaint accrued interest from the date the complaint is filed);  
20                           *Jones v. Jones*, 86 Nev. 879, 478 P.2d 148 (1970) (when a family law judgment requires  
21                           payments on a series of future dates, any missed payment immediately “draws interest [from that  
22                           date]. . . until satisfied”).

23                           <sup>35</sup> For Nevada Online Multi-Automated Data Systems. NOMADS was set up many years  
24                           ago in an archaic programming language apparently not currently in use anywhere. There is  
25                           apparently no adequate documentation of the previous programming work, making any change  
26                           of any kind in the input, workings, or output of the existing patch-work require lengthy efforts  
27                           by large numbers of people.

28                           <sup>36</sup> *See* AAP Vol 2, pge CAV00308, at which, in 2003, Assemblywoman Buckley demands  
that Welfare create an incentive to actually pay child support by calculating and collecting  
penalties and interest, and Deputy District Attorney Hatch responds that NOMADS just could  
not do so.

<sup>37</sup> *See Foster v. Marshman*, 96 Nev. 475, 611 P.2d 197 (1980).

1 This difference in first application made a difference to the totals reached, at least when  
2 arrears were due from before July, 1987. Rates before that date were fixed, so changing the  
3 arrearage to which a payment applied altered the total owed.

4 So even on identical facts, different arrearages would be calculated by the D.A.s than by  
5 the private Bar and family courts. It still was no problem, really, since the uniform policy of the  
6 District Attorney's offices throughout Nevada was to conform to any total judgment as found  
7 by a district court.

8 As detailed in various of this Court's opinions, the purpose and function of statutory  
9 interest is to compensate the claimant for the use of money from the time the cause of action  
10 accrues until the time of payment.<sup>38</sup> In other words, even when interest is actually calculated on  
11 behalf of an obligee, and the sum is actually collected from an obligor, the person owed the  
12 money pretty much only breaks even on the original sum owed.

#### 13 14 **B. Calculating Penalties**

15 In 1993, the Nevada Legislature tried to come up with some *additional* way of  
16 encouraging delinquent child support obligors to pay their back child support sooner rather than  
17 later. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee on AB 604, then-Attorney General  
18 Frankie Sue Del Papa summarized the thinking on this proposal:<sup>39</sup>

19 The imposition of a 10% penalty for delinquent payments will give teeth to  
20 enforcement provisions already in place and will serve as an incentive for parents  
21 to remain current on monthly support obligations. It is a disappointing reflection  
22 of our society's priorities that other debt obligations – from delinquent power bills  
23 to late credit card payments – are assessed late fees and penalties, yet missed child  
24 support payments are not, reducing such payments to less of an obligation than  
25 paying off a credit card.

26 The legislation ultimately became the "penalties provision," NRS 125B.095:

27 The amount of the penalty is 10 percent per annum, or portion thereof, that the  
28 installment remains unpaid. Each district attorney or other public agency in this

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29 <sup>38</sup> See *Ramada Inns v. Sharp*, 101 Nev. 824, 711 P.2d 1 (1985) (speaking of NRS  
30 17.130(2)).

31 <sup>39</sup> AAP Vol 1, page CAV00213.

1 State undertaking to enforce an obligation to pay support for a child shall enforce  
2 the provisions of this section.<sup>40</sup>

3 The scant legislative history of the provision was examined in the hearings below, but it  
4 is silent as the precise mechanics of how the penalty calculation should be done, and so that  
5 history is not discussed much in this brief.

6 More problematic below was the persistent quotation of various representatives of the  
7 Welfare system from hearings in *later* years when they sought to amend the statute to comply  
8 with their methodology, and the Legislature refused to do so. First, as the United States Supreme  
9 Court has cautioned, “subsequent legislative history is a ‘hazardous basis for inferring the intent  
10 of an earlier’ Congress.”<sup>41</sup> Second, legislative “inaction lacks ‘persuasive significance’ because  
11 ‘several equally tenable inferences’ may be drawn from such inaction . . . .”<sup>42</sup>

12 That is why the A.G.’s 2005 use of the term “one-time penalty” is irrelevant to the  
13 meaning of a statute written in 1993; that term does not exist in the legislative history of the  
14 actual statute, but was made up later by Welfare as a rationalization. Unfortunately, the court  
15 below did not pick up on that fact, which was part of the lower court’s confusion leading to  
16 error.<sup>43</sup>

17 The private Bar began applying the penalty in 1995, when it became effective, and the  
18 family courts uniformly included a penalty assessment per the statute whenever counsel  
19 requested (and calculated) it.

20 The calculation was not particularly difficult. The statutory language on its face required  
21 calculation of an *annual* penalty, calculated by focusing on each “installment” to see if it had  
22 yet been paid and, if not, calculating a penalty at a 10% annual rate from the time that the sum

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23 <sup>40</sup> NRS 125B.095(2).

24 <sup>41</sup> *Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.*, 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (quoting *United*  
25 *States v. Price*, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).

26 <sup>42</sup> *United States v. Novak*, 476 F.3d 1041 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007) at 1987, quoting *Pension Benefit*  
27 *Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.*, 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (quoting *United States v. Wise*, 370 U.S.  
28 405, 411 (1962)).

<sup>43</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00382 & CAV00391-CAV00392.



1 went unpaid until the court heard the case. The only information needed was whether a  
2 particular “installment” of child support “remains unpaid” (i.e., was in arrears), then multiplying  
3 the sum by 10% and then by the number of years “or portion thereof” the installment had  
4 remained unpaid.

5 So if a \$500 installment of child support remained totally unpaid for a month, a penalty  
6 of \$4.17 ( $\$500 \times 10\% \div 12$ ) accrued. If it still remained unpaid the next month, another such  
7 penalty accrued, and so forth. After a year, the penalty assessed would be \$50. Throughout the  
8 1990s, such penalty calculations were done by spreadsheet and submitted as exhibits to child  
9 support arrears motions.<sup>44</sup> Apparently, every judge in Nevada who ever heard a child support  
10 motion where a penalty was so calculated approved the reasoning, methodology, and totals, over  
11 all objections that were made.

12 In the public sector, however, 1995 came and went without the mandatory calculation of  
13 penalties – *or* the long-awaited calculation and collection of interest – being performed by the  
14 Clark County D.A., despite repeated urging year after year by the original Pro Bono Project, and  
15 then CCLS, on behalf of the mostly poor people dependent on the D.A. for collection of child  
16 support.<sup>45</sup> Despite the statutory mandate to compute and collect penalties and interest, the D.A.’s  
17 Office repeatedly stated that it would not do so because NOMADS was incapable of performing  
18 the calculation.

19 Meanwhile, the Attorney General’s Office, in conjunction with the Welfare Division,  
20 began a process of unifying procedures relating to support collection (and other things) in the  
21 1990s. Reportedly, millions of dollars were expended in efforts to get the outdated NOMADS  
22 system to correctly perform interest and penalty calculations, without any visible result from  
23 1993 to 2003.

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24  
25 <sup>44</sup> Separate and apart from *interest* calculations, which were done by hand, by CPA, or  
26 by computer program.

27 <sup>45</sup> As to interest, the Washoe County D.A. had adopted version 2 of the MLAW  
28 calculator, and had been collecting interest the same way the private Bar had been doing it for  
at least several years, starting about 1991.

1           **C.       Welfare’s Calculation Process**

2           The 2003 Legislature “advised” CSEP to implement penalties as part of the collection of  
3 child support.<sup>46</sup> CSEP indicated that it found NRS 125B.095 to be ambiguous, and requested  
4 a legal opinion on the interpretation from the Attorney General’s Office.<sup>47</sup>

5           What Welfare proposed in 2004 was to assess a single lump-sum 10% penalty on the last  
6 day of the first month that a child support payment was due and unpaid, because NOMADS was  
7 capable of performing and tracking such a one-time, month-end calculation.

8           Welfare’s proposed policy Manual contained several mathematical, factual, logical, and  
9 other errors.<sup>48</sup> It became clear that Welfare would do only what NOMADS was capable of  
10 doing, irrespective of logic or consequences. As explained by Deputy District Attorney Ed  
11 Ewert in his revision and expansion of the Child Support section of the Nevada Family Law  
12 Practice Manual:<sup>49</sup>

13           **NOMADS**, like other computers, has its limitations. . . . in the mass production,  
14 conveyer-belt case processing world of Nevada’s child support enforcement  
15 program, the tail wags the dog. To make computerization work for child support  
enforcement in Nevada, the law and the courts, and most of all, our orders, have  
to conform to the computer’s needs.

16           Still, the assorted glaring deficiencies of the Welfare methodology could not simply be  
17 ignored. So, in 2004 a request was made by Administrator Nancy Ford of the Welfare Division  
18 to the Attorney General’s Office, asking “Does the Welfare Division, Child Support Enforcement  
19 Program, have authority under NRS 125B.095 to calculate the child support delinquent penalty  
20 on a monthly basis as a one-time late fee penalty?”

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21  
22           <sup>46</sup> AAP Vol 1, pg CAV00155 (recounted history by the Attorney General’s Office).

23           <sup>47</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00163-CAV00168.

24           <sup>48</sup> The Manual as it existed in 2006 was circulated – the mathematical errors in the  
25 guidance chart that had been identified in 2004 were not corrected, at least as of that time; even  
26 the principal sums outstanding were not correctly tabulated (the \$1,200 listed for May, 2004,  
27 should be \$1,100). AAP Vol 2, pg. 267 (Exhibit 1 of Defendant’s Supplemental Brief on Child  
Support Aug. 14, 2008).

28           <sup>49</sup> 2008 edition, at § 1.165.

1           Essentially, Welfare asked the Deputy A.G. for legal cover to interpret the statute to  
2 permit calculations in a manner that *just happened* to be what the archaic NOMADS computer  
3 system was capable of providing. The Welfare methodology had nothing to do with the  
4 legislative direction ten years earlier to actually calculate the penalty.

5           On October 22, 2004, the Welfare Division obtained a letter<sup>50</sup> from Deputy Attorney  
6 General Donald W. Winne reaching the conclusion that the statute was sufficiently ambiguous  
7 to allow Welfare to interpret it to permit doing the calculations the way that their computer  
8 system was capable of calculating.

9           The opinion letter had several errors in its own right – such as the conclusion, in the  
10 introductory “Background” section, that to follow the “public input” (i.e., the CCLS critique of  
11 the Welfare proposal at the 2004 “workshop”) would “result in significant increases in the  
12 amount of child support judgments that obligors would be required to pay.” That is just not so  
13 – at least in the first couple of years an arrearage accrues.

14           The Welfare method of calculation assesses an entire *year’s* penalty on the first day of  
15 the first month that a support is overdue. Welfare then ignores the penalty forever, failing to  
16 calculate *any* penalty for the second (or any later) year a sum remains outstanding.

17           The private Bar, by contrast, has always calculated the penalty in accordance with how  
18 much time has passed, so that the penalty imposed on an obligation due in January is less in  
19 February than it is in March, and continues to be assessed for however many years an installment  
20 remains outstanding, giving meaning to the statutory phrases “per annum” and “remains unpaid.”

21           We replicated the table of hypothetical sums due and sums paid that are set out in the  
22 Welfare Division’s Manual.<sup>51</sup> Over the same one-year time period as the sample in the Manual,  
23  
24

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25           <sup>50</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00163-CAV00168. At least one lawyer has incorrectly  
26 referenced Mr. Winne’s 2004 opinion letter as a formal Attorney General’s Opinion on the  
27 subject. There was and is no such published authority.

28           <sup>51</sup> AAP Vol 2, pg. 267 (Section 619-620 of the Division of Welfare and Supportive  
Services Support Enforcement Manual (MTL 1/06, 1 Jan 06)).

1 the private Bar calculates a total penalty (as of 12/31/04) of \$85.90.<sup>52</sup> The Welfare calculation  
2 shows \$230, grossly *overstating* the penalties actually owed, in the short term, by immediately  
3 assessing *in toto* a penalty that is supposed to be applied “per annum.”

4 The Welfare penalty is three times *greater* than the private Bar would calculate as due  
5 – at least on the one-year hypothetical facts in the Welfare table. Therefore, The A.G.’s  
6 statement that the private Bar’s methodology would “significantly increase” the sum owed is just  
7 incorrect as a matter of math.

#### 8 9 **D. Welfare’s Critical Error**

10 The Attorney General’s “Friend of the Court” brief<sup>53</sup> is an exercise in sophistry.<sup>54</sup> It starts  
11 with accepted rules of statutory construction, such as that all the words of a statute must be given  
12 effect if possible, and then cherry-picks from the legislative history to find a way to disregard  
13 nearly all of the actual words in the statute.

14 Specifically, the brief took the simple phrase “10 percent per annum, or portion thereof,  
15 that the installment remains unpaid,” and sought to give effect to the modifier “or portion  
16 thereof” by reading the words “per annum” *and* “that the installment remains unpaid” completely  
17 out of the statute. By linguistic backsprings, the brief and 2004 opinion letter it incorporates  
18 concludes that since the precise phrasing of NRS 125B.095 appears nowhere else in the NRS,

19  
20 <sup>52</sup> AAP Vol. 2, pgs CAV00238-CAV00283. See page CAV00269, copy of the calculation  
21 using the data of page CAV00267. The Arrears Balance Total on the Division of Welfare’s table  
22 is incorrect and should have been \$500, by simple addition. Welfare’s “Interest Accrued” is  
23 \$117.00 – in reality, it is \$56.63. The Total due under the Welfare methodology is \$947 as  
24 opposed to the \$642.53 that is *actually* due if the basic math is done correctly. The Welfare error  
25 in interest is attributing an interest rate of 10 & 12% when, in actuality, the interest rate was  
26 actually 6% from July, 2003, to June, 2004, and 6.25% from July 2004 to December 2004.  
27 There is no “arguing” on this point – the Welfare example in their manual is just wrong –  
28 mathematically and factually. It literally “does not add up.” Ironically, this has the effect of  
disguising their logic errors under their math errors.

<sup>53</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00154-CAV00170.

<sup>54</sup> “n. A subtle, tricky, superficially plausible, but generally fallacious method of reasoning.” Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (1989) at 1358.

1 the intent of the drafters must have been to perform a one-time-only penalty assessment, which  
2 by miraculous coincidence is the only thing NOMADS is capable of doing.

3 In actuality, and as the lower court found,<sup>55</sup> the legislative intention was stated with  
4 overwhelming clarity: to provide an incentive for child support obligors to pay support sooner,  
5 rather than later – a purpose that would be entirely frustrated by a calculation that did not get any  
6 worse no matter *how* much time elapsed from the due date.

7 And there is no known rule of statutory construction that permits three-quarters of the  
8 actual words of a statute to be rendered a nullity in order to give effect to a three-word incidental  
9 modifier. Rather, this Court has repeatedly held that “no part of a statute should be rendered  
10 nugatory, nor any language turned to mere surplusage, if such consequences can properly be  
11 avoided.”<sup>56</sup>

12 An entire calculation methodology based on the phrase “or portion thereof” eviscerates  
13 the obvious and plain meaning of the statute. “Per annum” *means* “per annum” – the penalty  
14 is to be applied at the rate of 10% *per year*.<sup>57</sup> And “remains unpaid” also means what it says –  
15 the penalty is to be based on child support arrears that remains outstanding, for the length of time  
16 that it *remains* outstanding.

### 17 18 **E. Welfare’s Flawed Analogy**

19 At several points, the 2004 opinion letter, as well as the “Friend of the Court” brief, cited  
20 to the legislative intent to analogize the statutory penalty to “a [commercial] late payment fee as  
21 a motivator for other bills.”<sup>58</sup> That analogy does not support a one-time-only penalty assessment.

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24 <sup>55</sup> AAP Vol. 2, pgs CAV00389-CAV00390.

25 <sup>56</sup> *See, e.g., Rodgers v. Rodgers*, 110 Nev. 1370, 887 P.2d 269 (1994).

26  
27 <sup>57</sup> This point is *so* obvious that even Ms. Muirhead was obliged to concede the point that  
a penalty must be applied annually. AAP Vol. 2, pg CAV00447-CAV00449.

28 <sup>58</sup> AAP Vol 1, page CAV00167.

1           *Every* known explanation of late fees notes that they get worse the longer they are late,  
2 as in this example for how credit card late fees work:

3           Late Fee

4           What is it: a charge for making less than the minimum payment or after the  
5           payment due date or both

6           Which cards have it: all cards

7           How much: \$15 - \$39 each billing cycle you miss a payment or pay less than the  
8           minimum

9           How often is it charged: *once each billing cycle you are late*

10          How to avoid it: pay your bills on time or call your creditor ahead of time to make  
11          payment arrangements.<sup>59</sup>

12          In other words, if you owe money to Best Buy, and don't pay on time, they hit you up  
13          with a late payment fee. And if you don't pay the bill by the *next* month, they charge you again  
14          – every time a billing cycle passes without you making the payment you owed originally.

15          Creating such a continuing incentive for obligors to make payments sooner, rather than  
16          later, was just what the Legislature said it was trying to do in 1993 – a purpose that would be  
17          frustrated by any policy that did not provide a *continuing* incentive to actually make up arrears  
18          each passing day.<sup>60</sup> The assertion in the 2004 opinion letter that making late fees continue to  
19          accrue over time would result in “double interest on total arrearages owed by an obligor” is just  
20          wrong as a matter of fact, and ignores the differences between interest and penalties.

21          This Court should find that the statute should be interpreted to provide the incentive it  
22          was intended to provide:

23               A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the unreasonableness of the  
24               result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is  
25               reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another that would produce a  
26               reasonable result.<sup>61</sup>

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27               <sup>59</sup> <http://credit.about.com/od/creditcardbasics/tp/credit-card-fees.htm> (emphasis added).

28               <sup>60</sup> AAP Vol 1, pg CAV00167. It is a bit ironic, but the opinion letter notes (at 5) that  
29               statutes must be construed “with a view to promoting, rather than defeating, [the] legislative  
30               policy behind them.” The citation is correct, but the Welfare methodology is counterproductive,  
31               and thus fatally flawed.

32               <sup>61</sup> *Hughes Properties v. State of Nevada*, 100 Nev. 295, 298, 680 P.2d 970, 971 (1984),  
33               quoting from *Sheriff v. Smith*, 91 Nev. 729, 733, 542 P.2d 440, 443 (1975).

1           No creditor would say “You owe this specific sum in January. If you don’t pay, you get  
2 assessed a late payment penalty in February. And then you’re off the hook – no further late fees  
3 in March, April, May, June, July – just pay when you can.” But that is what Welfare wants to  
4 do with child support. Such an unreasonable interpretation of a statute – one that does not  
5 actually accomplish the stated legislative goal – should be rejected out of hand.

6  
7           **F.       Welfare’s Attempt to Conform the Law to Error**

8           Having been informed during the 2004 “public workshop” that the proposed Welfare  
9 calculation methodology was counterproductive and not in keeping with the obvious legislative  
10 intent of the statute, Welfare did what a bureaucracy does in such circumstances – tried to get  
11 the law changed to support what it wanted to do. Specifically, in 2005, Welfare cooked up AB  
12 473, which would have altered the statutory penalty as follows:

13           ~~[The amount of the penalty is]~~ *If imposed, a 10 percent [per annum, or portion*  
14 ~~thereof, that the]~~ *penalty must be applied at the end of each calendar month*  
*against the amount of an installment or portion of an installment that remains*  
15 *unpaid [.] in the month in which it was due.*

16           All aspects of the calculation of interest and penalties were discussed at length in the  
17 resulting hearing held before the Assembly Judiciary Committee. After hearing and reading  
18 everything about why the law was the way it was, why the Welfare Division was trying to  
19 change the law to conform to their outdated computer capabilities, and why it would be a really  
20 terrible idea to do so, the Legislature left the “how-to-compute-penalties” portion of the statute  
21 exactly as it was, knowing how the private Bar had been doing the calculations for the prior 17  
22 years (as to interest) and 10 years (as to penalties).

23           The same Deputy A.G. who wrote the misguided 2004 opinion letter testified and claimed  
24 that the law should be amended to conform to Welfare’s view of the legislative history and  
25 intent. I testified immediately after, in part as follows:

26           Finally, the problem here, with due respect to the district attorneys and the  
27 Attorney General’s Office, is one of the tail wagging the dog. They are  
28 attempting to solve a calculation methodology problem left over from legacy  
hardware and software . . . NOMADS, that they are trying make do a job that it  
is not suited to do. They are attempting to conform the law to how their computer  
works. I would suggest that this is a bad basis for altering public policy and

1 altering statutes. I suggest it may be time that they just face up to the fact that  
2 they have wasted a huge amount of money on trying to fix something which may  
3 or may not ever be fixable. But certainly they should not start amending the law  
4 to conform to the problems that we know are built into that hardware system.<sup>62</sup>

5 Immediately after that session, the Assembly Judiciary Committee deleted from the bill  
6 draft any mention of amending the how-to-calculate-the-penalty provision, rejecting the Welfare  
7 provision entirely.<sup>63</sup>

#### 8 **IV. WELFARE'S APPEARANCE IN THE VAILE MATTER**

##### 9 **A. Background**

10 Well over \$100,000 of principal arrearages in child support accrued from 2000 to 2008,  
11 and Cisilie sought to reduce to judgment the principal, interest, and penalties accrued during that  
12 time. Ms. Muirhead contacted the Attorney General's office and solicited a "Friend of the  
13 Court" brief to buttress Scot's contesting of the massive arrears accrued during that time. For  
14 reasons commented upon below, the Attorney General's Office agreed.

15 Also, representative of the Clark County District Attorney's Office appeared in court to  
16 explain the methodology of the how the D.A. computes penalties.<sup>64</sup>

##### 17 **B. Welfare's "Friend of the Court" Brief**

18 The brief, dated July 9, 2008,<sup>65</sup> repeated most of the errors and mis-statements discussed  
19 above, and made several new errors. It recast the 2004 request for legal cover as "a legal opinion  
20 on the interpretation of NRS 125B.095."<sup>66</sup> It similarly recast the 2005 effort to gut the penalties  
21

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23 <sup>62</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00324-CAV00325.

24 <sup>63</sup> As detailed below, the bureaucratic response to this rejection was to declare victory and  
25 assert that it really constituted an endorsement of the rejected Welfare provision.

26 <sup>64</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00405-CAV00414.

27 <sup>65</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00154-CAV00170.

28 <sup>66</sup> AAP Vol 1, pg CAV00155.



1 statute as a proposal to insert “clarifying language,” and labeled the rejection of that effort as the  
2 Legislature “taking no action.”<sup>67</sup>

3 With logic only a bureaucrat could conceive, the brief opined that because the legislature  
4 “allow[ed] CSEP to continue with its regulation and policies” since 2005, the Legislature must  
5 have *really* meant to endorse the defective Welfare proposal while rejecting it.<sup>68</sup> The fact that  
6 Welfare had never actually assessed or collected a penalty as of 2005, and that the question of  
7 approving or criticizing Welfare’s methodology was not before the Legislature in 2005, or at any  
8 time since, was not mentioned.

9 Hypocritically, the A.G.’s brief *simultaneously* asserted that Legislative inaction to  
10 change the statute, having been informed of how the Bench and Bar had been doing interest and  
11 penalty calculations for decades, was meaningless.<sup>69</sup>

12 After repeating the inaccurate analogy to late fees charged by businesses discussed above,  
13 the brief tried to set out comparative calculations, asserting as a matter of fact that the private  
14 Bar’s calculation of penalties for one year of missed \$100 per month child support would be  
15 \$120.<sup>70</sup> In fact, the number is \$66.62. Welfare would have blindly assessed annual penalties on  
16 the same arrearage of \$120 over 12 months.<sup>71</sup>

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19 <sup>67</sup> AAP Vol 1, pg CAV00156.

20 <sup>68</sup> AAP Vol 1, pg CAV00156.

21 <sup>69</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00157-CAV00158.

22 <sup>70</sup> AAP Vol 1, pg CAV00158.

23 <sup>71</sup> AAP Vol 1, pgs CAV00163-CAV00168. The brief also falsely asserted what the effect  
24 of a second year of payments due but unpaid would be, incorrectly claiming that the family court  
25 would charge \$360 to Welfare’s \$240. This is again false; 10% per year on each missed  
26 installment for the amount of time it remained outstanding and unpaid results in a total penalty  
27 at the end of two years of \$213.56. There was no reason for Welfare to make the false assertions  
28 of fact – the calculation is easy to do, and the MLAW program was provided to them for free  
when it was issued, can be run on any PC, and they could have easily run the calculation before  
misrepresenting what its output would be.

1 The A.G.'s brief never even attempted to compare any calculations of the interest and  
2 penalties that would actually accrue in the *Vaile* case. It did, however, note that Welfare was not  
3 a party to the case, and that the outcome of the case would not affect it in any way, and so  
4 warned the Court that "the Court has no ability to set aside CSEP's regulation."<sup>72</sup>

5 Why Welfare would bother to take a stand in a case that did not affect it in any way is  
6 discussed below. But even a casual reading of the brief reveals that it is not much more than a  
7 personal attack on undersigned counsel, for having dared to identify publicly the deficiencies of  
8 the Welfare NOMADS calculation methodology.

9  
10 **C. Actual Calculation Differences – the Irony of Arguments Made in Ignorance**

11 The facts of the Vaile case involved large sums of arrears outstanding and unpaid for a  
12 long period of time, with very minimal payments – the District Attorney only managed to start  
13 a partial garnishment of support in 2006. So all sides agreed that the principal sum of  
14 outstanding child support arrears was in excess of \$100,000.

15 Remarkably, the difference in *interest* calculations over the eight-year time period,  
16 between NOMADS and a standard MLAW calculation, was only some \$52.46. The difference  
17 is apparently due to only two factors. First, as to the method of rounding – NOMADS rounds  
18 each month's interest to the nearest penny, with everything over 0.005 up to the next whole cent,  
19 and everything under 0.005 down. The private Bar – like banks and credit card companies –  
20 carries fractional cents forward in a "bit bucket" to eight places after the decimal point.

21 The second, and much larger, difference is that NOMADS is only *able* to do an end-of-  
22 the-month batch calculation, making the actual date of any payment invisible and irrelevant if  
23 received anywhere within a month. The private Bar – like every other organization doing  
24 financial calculations – has always calculated all arrearages on a *daily* basis, so earlier-received

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27  
28  

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<sup>72</sup> AAP Vol 1, pg CAV00159.

1 payments are credited earlier and the arrears accrue less interest, while later-received payments  
2 are credited later and accrue more interest, as this Court has stated should be done.<sup>73</sup>

3 In other words, according to this Court's prior holdings, Welfare's method of calculation  
4 is simply wrong. This was pointed out below, but was entirely ignored by Scot, the Attorney  
5 General's briefs, and by the district court in its decision. We submit that wrong is wrong, and  
6 the fact that Welfare's calculations "are just a little wrong" is not a defense of them.

7 As everyone involved below agreed, the big difference was in the penalties. Since  
8 nothing at all was collected from Scot between 2000 and 2006, the Welfare methodology would  
9 assess a 10% penalty when each payment initially went unpaid, and then ignore those  
10 installments for all the remaining years that they *remained* unpaid. The private Bar  
11 methodology, by contrast, continued to accrue penalties, following the statutory mandate, at the  
12 rate of 10% *per annum* for each year that each installment "remained unpaid." The result is that  
13 the sum of penalties assessed was really about \$50,000, while Welfare's penalty calculation  
14 would yield some \$12,000 – exactly 10% of sums not paid.<sup>74</sup>

15 Scot's counsel below conceded that penalties stated as accruing "per annum" must  
16 actually be applied annually.<sup>75</sup> We provided a Calculation Summary showing the actual sum of  
17 accrued interest and penalties, the way the private Bar has always done the calculations.<sup>76</sup>

18 We *also* provided a three-way Comparison Table, showing what the D.A. *actually*  
19 computes, what the private Bar computes, and what the total would be if Ms. Muirhead's in-  
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21  
22 <sup>73</sup> See, e.g., *LTR Stage Lines v. Gray Line Tours*, 106 Nev. 283, 792 P.2d 386 (1990);  
23 *Jones v. Jones*, 86 Nev. 879, 478 P.2d 148 (1970). Obviously, whether these differences would  
24 work for or against any particular party in any particular case depends on the dates of the actual  
25 payments. More accurate calculations could provide a larger, or smaller, interest calculation than  
26 a less accurate calculation if the facts were changed.

27 <sup>74</sup> This number, 10% of the principal not paid, would remain unchanged under the  
28 Welfare methodology no matter *how* long the installments remain unpaid.

<sup>75</sup> AAP Vol. 2, pg CAV00447-CAV00449.

<sup>76</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00273-CAV00278.

1 court-admission-method (one-time penalties, annually re-applied) was actually calculated.<sup>77</sup> It  
2 shows that if the D.A. actually *did* the calculations the way she indicated should be done, the  
3 total amount of penalty owed by Scot would have been \$14,207 higher than that calculated by  
4 the private Bar.

5 The logic is pretty simple. Front-loading the annual penalty to the first day of the first  
6 month that it is unpaid *necessarily* increases the sum owed over time, if any payments at all are  
7 ever made, because those payments then have no impact on the amount of penalty assessed.

8 Ms. Muirhead's suggested methodology would impose a full annual penalty the moment  
9 an installment goes unpaid, and then charge it again the next year if it is still unpaid. That should  
10 not be done, for the same reason that Welfare's defective "assess once and forget it"  
11 methodology is nonsense – both ignore the actual words of the statute, which require that the  
12 penalty be assessed at the rate of 10% per year on all installments remaining unpaid.

#### 13 14 **D. The Perversion of Bureaucratic Priorities**

15 On information and belief,<sup>78</sup> the funding received by the Welfare Division under the  
16 federal IV-D program is linked to the ratio they show of any collection to any overdue support  
17 – if they collect *any* money in a case – no matter how much is due – their statistics look better  
18 and they get more federal funding. It does not matter if the obligor owes \$100,000 or \$100: if  
19 they collect a single dollar, the statistics will be treated the same. Thus, Welfare has a perverse  
20 incentive to collect *something* in child support arrears in every case, but no further incentive to  
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24 <sup>77</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00280-CAV00283. Notably, no one, in any case known, has ever  
25 calculated penalties in the manner suggested by Scot's counsel. Ms. Muirhead's dumping of  
26 massive amounts of paper in court without any prior notice, and her assorted arguments with no  
basis in fact or law, served mainly to confuse the trial court, as discussed below.

27 <sup>78</sup> This information was provided to prospective Child Support Hearing Masters by the  
28 Clark County District Attorney's Office at a training session sponsored by the Eighth Judicial  
District Court.

1 actually pursue full collection of the actual sums owed. This puts the interests of the  
2 bureaucracy, and the poor persons it claims to serve, at odds.<sup>79</sup>

3 But why on earth would an agency charged with collection of child support – while  
4 stating that its resources are overtaxed and it has no legitimate interest in any possible outcome  
5 of a particular family court case – expend the resources to inject two District Attorneys and a  
6 Deputy Attorney General into that case anyway? And why on the side of the obligor who owed  
7 over \$100,000 in child support?<sup>80</sup>

8 Because any bureaucracy's first instinct is toward self-perpetuation and growth, and those  
9 interests are seen as imperiled if anyone has the temerity to say that "The emperor has no  
10 clothes" when the bureaucracy tries to get the law to match the counterproductive results that  
11 NOMADS is able to produce. Welfare sees it as *much* more important to push its position on  
12 how to (mis-)calculate penalties than to actually assist in collecting from a deadbeat who owes  
13 huge arrears of back child support.<sup>81</sup>

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19 <sup>79</sup> Mr. Ewert admitted as much in open court below in this case. AAP Vol 2, pgs  
20 CAV00412. The bureaucratic euphemism for minimizing the amount of outstanding child  
21 support arrears is "setting out 'realistic' arrearage sums to encourage compliance."

22 <sup>80</sup> In fairness, there is a distinction between why the D.A.s were present, and why the  
23 Attorney General's Office filed a brief. The D.A.s were there at the invitation of the Court,  
24 having been asked to explain what procedures their office actually followed, and why. The  
25 officious intermeddling of the Attorney General's office in this family court child support  
26 arrearage case was entirely voluntary and without legitimate purpose.

27 <sup>81</sup> Despite the fact that under *any* calculation methodology Scot is in violation of  
28 Nevada's criminal non-support statute (NRS 201.020), and been expressly so found to be in  
violation (AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00357-CAV00365), the prosecutorial offices of Nevada have  
refused to prosecute for non-support, just as they did nothing after Justice Young's 2002 request  
to prosecute Scot for his fraud on the divorce court. See *Vaile v. District Court*, 118 Nev. 262,  
44 P.3d 506 (2002) (Young, J., dissenting, at n.20).

## V. POLICY-BASED COMPARISON OF CALCULATIONS

### A. Interest Calculations

No one could legitimately dispute that the holdings of this Court have discussed precise dates as the start and end points for interest, so interest should be calculated on the precise number of days that an arrearage remains unpaid.

Welfare, however, uses “months,” disregarding the days within a month that an arrearage remains due, and thus treats an arrearage due, or paid, on the first of the month, and on the 30<sup>th</sup>, exactly the same. That’s not how banks calculate interest. It’s not how corporations do it. It’s not how the private Bar does it. But it is the only way that NOMADS can do it.

Although the total differential in the majority of cases is likely to be pretty small, that error is being made every day in every case that Welfare processes. And Welfare apparently will never do anything about *any* of the interest it should have collected since 1987, but failed to even start to compute until 2005. Those obligees who relied on Welfare to collect what was due under law are just out of luck, and if those who were short-changed by Welfare’s non-collection become public charges at taxpayer expense, the public is just out of luck as well.

### B. Penalty Calculations

#### 1. The Question of Whether the Statute is Ambiguous

In my opinion the statute is not ambiguous. “10 percent per annum, or portion thereof, that the installment remains unpaid” does not truly seem susceptible to alternative good faith interpretations. Still, Welfare has come up with a different – although illogical – interpretation of the words used. And if a statute is ambiguous, a number of rules of statutory construction come into play.

Statutory interpretation should avoid meaningless or unreasonable results.<sup>82</sup> When construing a specific portion of a statute, the statute should be read as a whole, and, where possible, the statute should be read to give meaning to all of its parts, with no words rendered

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<sup>82</sup> *Edgington v. Edgington*, 119 Nev. 577, 80 P.3d 1282 (2003).

1     nugatory or made surplusage.<sup>83</sup> Statutes with a protective purpose should be liberally construed  
2     in order to effectuate the intended benefits.<sup>84</sup>

3             In short, statutes are to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the intent of the  
4     Legislature. Since the Welfare methodology provides no continuing incentive for deadbeats to  
5     actually pay child support sooner rather than later, it fails at the first instance. The way the  
6     private Bar and family courts have been calculating and applying interest (since 1987) and  
7     penalties (since 1995) *does* provide a continuing incentive for payment sooner rather than later,  
8     and therefore is the more reasonable construction.

9             The assertion of ambiguity of the penalties statute in the A.G.'s 2004 opinion letter gave  
10    the Welfare Division legal "wiggle room" to do the calculations in the manner that their outdated  
11    computer system can perform, but it certainly did not, and does not, mean that their approach is  
12    legally or logically "correct."<sup>85</sup>

13            For the various reasons set out at the "public workshop" in 2004, and here, the opposite  
14    is true. The Welfare approach is inaccurate, sloppy, counterproductive, and *not* what was  
15    intended when the provision was drafted in 1993. Whether or not Welfare is ever held  
16    accountable for its bungling of the issue, it is unconscionable for them to try to get the family  
17    courts to follow suit.

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22           <sup>83</sup> See, e.g., *Rodgers v. Rodgers*, 110 Nev. 1370, 887 P.2d 269 (1994).

23           <sup>84</sup> *Petition of Phillip A.C.*, 122 Nev.1284, 149 P.3d 51 (2006).

24           <sup>85</sup> Scot, and the Deputy A.G., insinuated below that my motivations might be suspect; I  
25    have no personal dog in the fight as to how the math *should* be done, beyond my personal  
26    knowledge of what was intended, and my familiarity with the logic and law involved. It would  
27    be a simple matter to reprogram MLAW to perform the calculations like Welfare does them –  
28    if there was any legitimate reason to do so. In the unlikely event that this Court, or the  
   Legislature, deems it proper to perform either interest or penalty calculations in the less accurate  
   and counterproductive way advocated by Welfare, we will alter MLAW to produce those  
   calculations.

## 2. Welfare's Approach is Constitutionally Impermissible

One final difference of perspective merits explicit mention. The A.G.'s "Friend of the Court" brief raised the question of an "equal protection" issue, since long-period deadbeats like Scot would have a lower penalty assessed against them by Welfare than the private Bar tabulates. On that basis, Welfare asserted that the family law Bench and Bar should adopt the NOMADS methodology so that the low income persons typically involved in Welfare cases are not treated any differently than they would be in family court.

This tail-wags-the-dog argument is both wrong and backward. It is *wrong* because the clumsy and counterproductive front-loading of penalty calculations by NOMADS actually makes the penalties it applies much *higher* than they should be – at least for the first two years that arrearages accrue. So Welfare is grossly overcharging the large number of child support obligors in its system who are behind but trying, and making late payments, because when those payments are received, the penalty has already been assessed, and the obligors' efforts to make some payment have no impact on Welfare's totals.

Welfare's position is *backward* because the "impose-and-forget-about-it" approach to penalties built into NOMADS provides no continuing incentive to actually pay overdue support, and thus is contrary to the legislative intent of the statute. Once they impose a penalty, it can never get any worse no matter how much time passes – exactly the dis-incentive to actually make payments that Attorney General Frankie Sue Del Papa decried in 1993. There is no legitimate basis for the Bench and Bar to adopt Welfare's error.

There are at least two *actual* "equal protection" problems, but they were not addressed anywhere in Scot's or Welfare's submissions to the trial court. Properly construing the phrase "per annum, or portion thereof" requires assessing the penalty *every year*, and taking into account that a arrearage might only be owed for a *portion* of a year.

The way Welfare does it, if an obligor misses a payment, and pays it a month later, he pays exactly the same penalty as an obligor who misses a payment and is not held to account for years. As a basic matter of equal protection, any law that would treat identically being late for a month, and being late for a year – or 10 years – or 100 years – is highly suspect and probably



1 constitutionally infirm. People situated differently have a right to have the law treat them  
2 differently, just as those similarly situated have a right to have the law apply to them equally.<sup>86</sup>

3 On the larger scale is Welfare's complete failure to comply *at all* with the mandatory  
4 Nevada statutes requiring district attorneys to collect interest (since 1987) and penalties (since  
5 1995) through 2005. It is hard to conceive of a larger equal protection problem than the fact that  
6 poor people relying on the State instead of private counsel to collect child support arrears for  
7 about 20 years simply did not get what the law required them to get.<sup>87</sup> But that failure on  
8 Welfare's part is outside the scope of this case.

## 9 10 **VI. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRORS**

11 The district court did understand the gist of the dispute – whether the expressions “per  
12 annum” and “remains unpaid” should be given effect in interpreting the statute, or whether the  
13 statute should be read to ignore those words and permit assessing a one-time penalty and never  
14 considering it again.<sup>88</sup> Unfortunately, the district court apparently became confused by the sheer  
15 volume of material, and made a handful of errors of both fact and law by which it reached an  
16 incorrect conclusion.

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21 <sup>86</sup> Equal protection requires that “no class of persons shall be denied the same protection  
22 of the law which is enjoyed by other classes in like circumstances.” *Allen v. State, Pub. Emp.*  
23 *Ret. Bd.*, 100 Nev. 130, 135, 676 P.2d 792, 795 (1984). While a supportable classification  
24 between individuals is not unconstitutional, in the field of State action it is necessary that “all  
25 persons similarly situated [are] treated alike.” *DeRosa v. Dist. Ct.*, 115 Nev. 225, 235, 985 P.2d  
26 157, 164 (1999) (quoting *Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 87 L. Ed.  
27 2d 313, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985)); *see generally Willerton v. Bassham*, 111 Nev. 10, 19, 889 P.2d  
28 823, 829 (1995) (illegitimate children have a right to mandated equal legal treatment under the  
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution).

<sup>87</sup> *Allen v. State, Pub. Emp. Ret. Bd.*, *supra*, 100 Nev. 130, 135, 676 P.2d 792, 795 (1984);  
*DeRosa v. Dist. Ct.*, *supra*, 115 Nev. 225, 235, 985 P.2d 157, 164 (1999).

<sup>88</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00385-CAV00386.

1           **A.      Factual Errors**

2           The district court recited that it found A.G.’s treatment of the term “per annum” a  
3           “balanced interpretation” because it divides the year into 12 months, and assesses 1/12 of the  
4           annual penalty each month.<sup>89</sup> But that is not what Welfare *does*. As Mr. Ewert explained, the  
5           A.G.’s brief is inaccurate – NOMADS assesses 100% of the annual penalty on the first day of  
6           the first month an arrearage exists.<sup>90</sup>

7           Only the private Bar assesses 1/12 of the annual penalty each month. The court explicitly  
8           based its decision on the finding that breaking the penalty calculation into 12 monthly portions  
9           would properly give “equal weight and consideration” to the statutory terms<sup>91</sup> – but got wrong  
10          which calculation actually does that.

11          Next, the court below appears to have erroneously believed that the private Bar would  
12          assess a penalty on an installment that was paid.<sup>92</sup> In actuality, as detailed above, a penalty is  
13          assessed by the private Bar methodology during the same *month* that a full payment might be  
14          made, but the penalty is being assessed on *installments* that were previously unpaid and  
15          “remained outstanding.” So the lower court’s finding that assessment of a penalty during such  
16          a month is “less reasonable and less logical” seems to be just confusion on the court’s part.

17          The court seemed to be under the impression that NOMADS has calculated interest and  
18          penalties “since 1995.”<sup>93</sup> As detailed above, the capacity to do the crude calculation that  
19          NOMADS is now capable of was not engrafted onto the legacy system until 2005.

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24          <sup>89</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00385 & CAV00390.

25          <sup>90</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00410-CAV00412.

26          <sup>91</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00390-CAV00391.

27          <sup>92</sup> AAP Vol 2, pg CAV00391.

28          <sup>93</sup> AAP Vol 2, pg CAV00393.

1           **B.       Legal Errors**

2           The lower court found that there was agreement that the statute was ambiguous.<sup>94</sup> As  
3 detailed above, that was not and is not our position.

4           As noted above, the court confused a deputy A.G.'s comments at a committee hearing a  
5 decade after the statute was enacted with "legislative history" somehow having an effect on how  
6 the statute should be interpreted.<sup>95</sup>

7           The lower court seemed to think that Welfare's typical bi-weekly wage withholding had  
8 something to do with "federal regulation," to which deference had to be given.<sup>96</sup> There is no  
9 such regulation; Welfare intercepts paychecks every two weeks because most people are paid  
10 every two weeks, and no federal law has any impact on the due date for support set by State  
11 courts. In any event, only the private Bar's calculation takes into account the actual due date for  
12 support set by courts when calculating interest and penalties.

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14           **C.       Combined Legal/Factual Errors**

15           The lower court opined that "the technical implementation of assessing the 10% penalty  
16 MUST comport with the Federal Child Support Enforcement Program."<sup>97</sup> This single sentence  
17 contains *both* an error of fact, and an error of law.

18           The factual error was in apparently believing that there is any federal regulation on the  
19 point at all. There isn't. And even if there *was* some federal regulation requiring Welfare to do  
20 something in particular, it would have no effect on how the Nevada statute is applied in Nevada  
21 family court in non-Welfare cases.

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25           <sup>94</sup> AAP Vol 2, pg CAV00389.

26           <sup>95</sup> AAP Vol 2, pg CAV00392.

27           <sup>96</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00393-CAV00394.

28           <sup>97</sup> AAP Vol 2, pg CAV00390.

1 The legal error was confusion of the meaning of the federal law discussed in the quotation  
2 in the court’s decision.<sup>98</sup> As detailed above, the IV-D regulations speak only of applying support  
3 paid first to a current month’s support obligation in Welfare cases (directly contrary to this  
4 Court’s direction to apply all payments to the oldest arrearage first, in all other cases) – it has  
5 nothing whatsoever to do with the penalty calculations.

6 So the lower court’s reference to “federal preemption and deference” are just meaningless  
7 in the context of this case, and the lower court’s basing its decision on that “important public  
8 policy concern” was wholly misplaced.

9 Next, the court below seemed to think there was legal significance in the 2005  
10 Legislature’s failure to “take any action to change the status quo of how CSEP assesses the 10%  
11 penalty.”<sup>99</sup>

12 The error of fact was that, as of that time, Welfare had never collected any penalty; they  
13 started doing so just that year. There were two legal errors. First, what was before the  
14 Legislature in 2005 was Welfare’s request to *change* the statute to allow them to calculate  
15 penalties the way they wanted to, and the Legislature rejected the proposed amendment to the  
16 penalties statute. Second, there was no “twelve-year status quo” of Welfare’s calculation of  
17 interest and penalties for the Legislature to consider – Welfare had *never* done either.

18 So the lower court’s reliance on the 2005 Legislative history as supporting the Welfare  
19 calculation methodology was entirely misplaced.

## 20 21 **VII. CONCLUSION**

22 If this Court rules that the penalty statute is sufficiently ambiguous to permit more than  
23 one reasonable construction, then reasonable minds (if fully informed) could differ on what that  
24 construction should be. But the Welfare view of how the statute should be construed has already  
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27 <sup>98</sup> AAP Vol 2, pg CAV00393.

28 <sup>99</sup> AAP Vol 2, pgs CAV00392, CAV00394, CAV00395.

1 been rejected by the Nevada Legislature, would be counterproductive and illogical if applied,  
2 and would be poor public policy if implemented.

3 It simply makes no sense to read the words “per annum” and “remains unpaid” out of a  
4 statute intended to assess penalties at 10% per annum on the sum of arrears that remains  
5 outstanding. Calculation of both interest and penalties in accordance with the length of time  
6 installments of support remain outstanding is logically and legally correct, and serves the  
7 purpose for which the statutory provisions were implemented.

8 And it is doublespeak for Welfare to claim that going to the Legislature, asking to amend  
9 a statute to match how Welfare’s computer is able to do calculations, and having that amendment  
10 *rejected*, somehow constitutes an endorsement just because the Legislature did not also publicly  
11 chastise the Welfare Division for making the attempt.

12 The court below made a number of factual and legal errors, on the basis of which it  
13 mandated use of calculations that should not be used by anyone anywhere, but certainly should  
14 not be used in private family court cases.

15 The order requiring use of the defective Welfare methodology for calculating penalties  
16 on child support arrearages should be reversed, and the case remanded with directions to  
17 calculate penalties in accordance with the private Bar’s methodology of assessing those penalties  
18 per the amount of time arrearages have remained outstanding.

19 Respectfully submitted,

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## CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e) which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by appropriate references to the record on appeal. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Dated this 15<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2009.




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## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that service of the foregoing was made on the 2<sup>nd</sup> day of September, 2009, pursuant to EDCR 7.26(a), by U.S. Mail addressed as follows:

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That there is regular communication between the place of mailing and the place so addressed.

  
An Employee of the WILLICK LAW GROUP

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