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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

Rule 34(f)(1) of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure ("NRAP") provides that "[t]he court may order a case submitted for decision on the briefs, without oral argument." The Nevada rule does not prescribe any standards or criteria for consideration by this Court in making a determination to order an appeal submitted for decision without oral argument. However, its federal counterpart does. Thus, Rule 34(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP") provides as follows:

- "(2) Standards. Oral argument must be allowed in every case unless a panel of three judges who have examined the briefs and record unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary for any of the following reasons:
 - (A) the appeal is frivolous;
- **(B)** the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided; or
- (C) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument."

Although NRAP 34(f)(1) does not prescribe standardized criteria for the submission of an appeal for decision without oral argument, the jurisprudence of this Court does reflect consideration of factors similar to those set forth in the above-quoted federal rule. See *e.g.*, *In re Discipline of Winter*, 2012 WL 642837 (Nev. February 24, 2012) (ordering appeal submitted on the record without oral argument where parties did not submit briefs challenging findings and recommendation of state bar panel or inform the Court of intent to contest the same); *Simpson v. State*, No. 58435, 2011 WL 5827791 (Nev. Nov. 17, 2011) (ordering appeal submitted on the record without oral argument where "there were no non-frivolous issues . . . on appeal"); *Luckett v. Warden*, 91 Nev. 681, 541 P.2d 910 (1975) (denial of oral argument with respect to successive

¹ NRAP 34(f)(3) does provide that "[a]ppeals brought in proper person and appeals in post-conviction proceedings instituted under NRS 34.360 et seq. will be submitted for decision without oral argument, but the court may direct that a case be argued." Neither of these circumstances is present in the case at bar.

application for post-conviction relief absent explanation as to why issues were not previously raised).

Appellant Luis Hidalgo, Jr. respectfully submits that circumstances justifying the submission of an appeal for decision without oral argument do not obtain in the instant case, and that for the reasons hereinafter stated, the Court should therefore reconsider its order of March 9, 2012 submitting his appeal on the record and the briefs on file without oral argument – at least with respect to the three issues identified hereinafter.²

I.

THE INSTANT APPEAL PRESENTS IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF FIRST IMPRESSION IN THIS JURISDICTION; AND THEREFORE, THE COURT SHOULD NOT TAKE THIS APPEAL UNDER SUBMISSION WITHOUT PROVIDING THE APPELLANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ORAL ARGUMENT.

Appellant respectfully submits that his appeal in this case is hardly frivolous. Nor have the dispositive issues in question been authoritatively decided. Indeed, the instant appeal implicates important constitutional and legal issues of first impression in this jurisdiction. And therefore, it cannot be said that the decisional process of this Court would not be significantly aided by oral argument in this case.

Thus, appellant's challenge to jury instruction number 40, given by the court over his contemporaneous objection at trial, presents this Court with its first opportunity to construe the constitutional implications of NRS 47.060 (Preliminary questions of admissibility: Determination) and 47.070 (Preliminary questions of admissibility: Relevancy conditioned on fact) identified in the briefs with respect to the impermissible confusion inherent in a jury's consideration of the "slight evidence" standard applicable with respect to the admissibility of coconspirator statements in view of its ultimate and overriding simultaneous constitutional duty to apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in its determination of guilt or innocence under the substantive law of conspiracy. Appellant's Opening Brief pages 32-42; Appellant's Reply Brief pages 1-14. Indeed, as the state expressly concedes in its brief in this case: "In Nevada, it is

² Appellant's Opening Brief identifies a total of five issues on appeal. Pages ii, 1.

an unresolved issue of statutory interpretation whether a jury may be charged with also making an admissibility determination regarding co-conspirator statements." Respondent's Answering Brief Page 16, lines19-21. See also Respondent's Answering Brief Page 20, lines 4-6 ("it is unsettled law in Nevada whether a jury must be instructed to make an admissibility determination prior to considering the statements of a defendant's co-conspirators"); Respondent's Answering Brief Page 24, lines 25-28 ("the Court is free to now permit or prohibit Nevada's district courts from instructing their juries to make the admissibility determination regarding co-conspirator statements. The law would probably benefit from the Court's guidance and Mr. H's case does present the question"). A

Likewise, Appellant's challenge to the state's deliberate and purposeful decision in this case not to memorialize the evidentiary proffer of a cooperating alleged accomplice who testified against him at trial pursuant to an executory agreement with the state providing for substantial benefits and inducements in exchange for such testimony in order to frustrate meaningful cross-examination and confrontation of that witness implicates important state and federal constitutional questions of due process and confrontation that have never been authoritatively decided by this Court. However, this Court's decisions in *Sheriff v. Acuna*, 107 Nev. 664, 819 P.2d 197 (1991) and *Leslie v. State*, 114 Nev. 8, 952 P.2d 966 (1998) strongly suggest that such sharp practice is constitutionally repugnant and precludes the admissibility of the testimony of a putative accomplice. Appellant's Opening Brief pages 48-52; Appellant's Reply Brief pages 25-27.

In addition, this case involves critical and important issues involving the insufficiency of corroboration of the accomplice testimony which was absolutely essential to the state's case against this moving Appellant; corroboration of which by independent evidence was likewise

³ *I.e.*, after the trial court has already made a threshold determination to admit such a statement into evidence pursuant to NRS 47.070(1).

⁴ Furthermore, this issue is particularly – and uniquely – important in the case of this moving Appellant because – in contradistinction to the case of co-defendant and appellant Luis Hidalgo, III (as to whom this Court *has* granted oral argument), the co-conspirator statements in question are entirely *vicarious* with respect *only* to Appellant Luis Hidalgo, Jr. (Notice of Oral Argument Setting in the case of Luis Hidalgo, III appended hereto as Exhibit "B").

essential to support the Appellant's conviction. Appellant's Opening Brief pages 42-48; Appellant's Reply Brief pages 17-25.

The deliberate, calculated, and selective official decision not to memorialize the initial evidentiary proffer *only* of alleged accomplice Anabel Espindola and the lack of adequate independent corroboration of her testimony against this moving Appellant at trial are particularly troubling in this case. For her testimony was the *sine qua non* of any arguable hypothesis of culpability on the part of this moving Appellant and the testimony of other, highly-credible witnesses affirmatively undermined the credibility of her testimony.

Indeed, Espindola had been jailed for 32 months awaiting trial on a murder charge and facing the death penalty in this matter prior to making a deal with the state to testify against this moving Appellant – who, unlike herself, had not theretofore been charged in this case – in exchange for avoidance of the death penalty, probation-eligibility and release from confinement. The state has affirmatively acknowledged that without Espindola it did not have sufficient evidence to charge Appellant in this matter. 14 ROA 2724; 15 ROA 2837-2838; 16 ROA 3119; 17 ROA 3281, 3286. And prior to cutting her deal, Espindola knew that the state wanted her to tie this moving Appellant to the crimes with which she was charged. 17 ROA 3280.

The evidence showed that prior to making her deal with the state, Espindola had come to believe that Appellant – with whom she had been involved in a long-standing intimate relationship – had been unfaithful to her while she was locked up, and had told him that he had one week to procure her release on bail. 17 ROA 3291, 3299-3300.

Espindola was debriefed for hours in the presence of 2 deputy district attorneys, 2 detectives and her attorney without recordation. 17 ROA 3271-3271. She was the only state's cooperating witness in this case whose evidentiary proffer was not memorialized.

And Espindola had given a detailed account of the events in question -- completely inconsistent with her trial testimony and exculpatory as to this moving Appellant – in a face-to-face meeting attended by both Attorney Jerome De Palma and private investigator Don Dibble, a 24 year veteran of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and its predecessor Clark County Sheriff's Department, as both De Palma and Dibble testified at trial. 19 ROA 3702-3704,

3710-3721, 3723-3725, 3731-3732, 3736-3738. Mr. De Palma's notes of the meeting were produced to the district attorney in advance of his trial testimony, (19 ROA 3708), and were admitted in evidence as Exhibit 241. 19 ROA 3730.

Despite the detailed testimony of both De Palma and Dibble to the contrary, Espindola denied ever speaking with them about the events at issue in this case, (16 ROA 3058, 3065, 3069-3072,17 ROA 3290), and testified that if Attorney De Palma were to testify that she had done so (as he later did) he would be lying. 17 ROA 3239-3240, 3306-3309.

Appellant respectfully submits that, in view of the foregoing, the deliberate, selective decision of state officials not to memorialize Espindola's debriefing by them for the calculated purpose of thereby insulating her from meaningful cross-examination as required by *Sheriff v. Acuna*, 107 Nev. 664, 819 P.2d 197 (1991) and *Leslie v. State*, 114 Nev. 8, 952 P.2d 966 (1998) raises profound due process and confrontation issues sufficient to preclude the admissibility of her testimony against this moving Appellant at trial, and requires scrupulous insistence that her testimony against him have been corroborated by sufficient independent evidence. And Appellant further respectfully submits that the Court should entertain oral argument on all of the issues identified herein before taking the instant appeal under advisement.

II.

THE COURT HAS SET ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE COMPANION APPEAL OF APPELLANT'S CO-DEFENDANT, LUIS HIDALGO, III, WHICH RAISES SEVERAL APPELLATE ISSUES CO-EXTENSIVE WITH THOSE RAISED BY APPELLANT LUIS HIDALGO, JR., WITHOUT LIMITING THE SCOPE OF ORAL ARGUMENT TO APPELLATE ISSUES WHICH ARE UNIQUE TO CO-DEFENDANT LUIS HIDALGO III'S APPEAL; AND THEREFORE, THE COURT SHOULD PROVIDE APPELLANT LUIS HIDALGO, JR. AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ORAL ARGUMENT WITH RESPECT TO THOSE ISSUES WHICH ARE COMMON TO THE APPEALS OF BOTH CO-DEFENDANTS.

As pointed out *supra*, at footnote 4, this Court has granted oral argument in the appeal of this moving Appellant's co-defendant, Luis Hidalgo, III. See Exhibit "B." But in so doing, the Court has not limited the scope of oral argument in the latter's case to those issues raised in his briefs which are unique to his case on appeal. Rather, Appellant's co-defendant has been

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permitted oral argument with respect to all issues raised on appeal, including those which are coextensive with the issues raised in the briefs filed by this moving Appellant – including the three
issues identified in this Motion as particularly deserving of oral argument. And Appellant
respectfully submits that, in fairness, his counsel should likewise be permitted to present oral
argument to this Court with respect to these issues. This is particularly true in that, as pointed out
supra, at footnote 4, in contradistinction to the case of co-defendant Luis Hidalgo, III, the coconspirator statements implicated by the jury instruction issue are merely vicarious in the case of
this moving Appellant, Luis Hidalgo, Jr., and particularly in view of the fact that the testimony of
alleged accomplice Anabel Espindola was absolutely essential to any arguable hypothesis of
culpability in the case of this moving Appellant.

Respectfully submitted this 30th day of March, 2012.

GORDON SILVER

DOMINIC P. GENTILE, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 1923

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, an employee of Gordon Silver, hereby certifies that on the 30th day of March, 2012, she served a copy of the Motion to Reconsider Submission for Decision Without Oral Argument, by Electronic Service, in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

Nancy A. Becker Chief Deputy District Attorney Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89155

ADELE L. JOHANSEN an employee of GORDON SILVER

EXHIBIT "A"

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LUIS HIDALGO, JR. A/K/A LUIS A. HIDALGO, Appellant, vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 54209

MAR 0 9 2012

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT

ORDER SUBMITTING APPEAL FOR DECISION WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT

Oral argument will not be scheduled in this appeal, and it shall stand submitted on the record and the briefs filed herein, as of the date of this order. NRAP 34(f).

It is so ORDERED.

 $_{\mathrm{CJ}}$

cc: Gordon & Silver, Ltd.
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(O) 1947A

12-07799

EXHIBIT "B"

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT

201 SOUTH CARSON STREET CARSON CITY, NEVADA 89701-4702 (775) 684-1600

LUIS A. HIDALGO, III, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. Supreme Court No. 54272 District Court Case No. C212667

NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT SETTING

DATE: March 01, 2012

TO: Christopher W. Adams

Arrascada & Arrascada, Ltd./John L. Arrascada

Clark County District Attorney/Nancy A. Becker, Deputy District Attorney Attorney General/Carson City/Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General Clark County District Attorney/Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney

Pursuant to NRAP 34, the above-referenced matter is set for oral argument as follows:

Date:

April 11, 2012

Time:

10:00 AM

Length:

30 minutes

Location:

Regional Justice Center

200 Lewis Avenue Courtroom - 17th Floor

Las Vegas, NV 89101

BEFORE:

Southern Panel 12

Justices Douglas, Gibbons, Parraguirre

Notification List

Electronic

Arrascada & Arrascada, Ltd./John L. Arrascada
Attorney General/Carson City/Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General
Clark County District Attorney/Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney
Clark County District Attorney/Nancy A. Becker, Deputy District Attorney
Gordon & Silver, Ltd./Dominic P Gentile
Gordon & Silver, Ltd./Paola M. Armeni

Paper

Christopher W. Adams