IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 1 2 3 Supreme CoElectronically Filed Apr 08 2011 09:08 a.m. BRIAN KERRY O'KEEFE, 4 District Court Case No. (25063) 5 Petitioner, 6 7 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT: THE HONORABLE MICHAEL P. VILLANI, 9 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE, 10 Respondents, 11 And 12 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 13 Real Party in Interest. 14 APPENDIX 15 TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, A WRIT OF PROHIBITION 16 AND REQUEST FOR STAY OF TRIAL 17 18 VOLUME 7 19 PATRICIA A. PALM DAVID ROGER 20 BAR NO. 6009 BAR NO. 0477 1212 S. CASINO CENTER BLVD. CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 21 LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 DISTRICT ATTORNEY 22 200 LEWIS AVE., 3RD FLOOR (702) 386-9113 LAS VEGAS, NV 89155 23 (702) 671-2500 24 CATHERINE CORTEZ-MASTO 25 ATTORNEY GENERAL 26 100 N. CARSON STREET 27 CARSON CITY, NV 89701-4717 (702) 486-3420 28 Counsel for Real Party in Interest Attorney for Petitioner 1

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA * * * * *

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

CASE NO. C-250630

Plaintiff,

vs.

DEPT. NO. 17

BRIAN KERRY O'KEEFE,

Transcript of

Defendant.

Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS HEARING

THURSDAY, AUGUST 19, 2010

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

CHRISTOPHER LALLI, ESQ.

Assistant District Attorney

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

PATRICIA PALM, ESQ.

Special Deputy Public Defender

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, AUGUST 19, 2010, 8:50 A.M.

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THE COURT: Can we take care of O'Keefe? Page 11.

Can I have counsel approach, please.

(Off-record bench conference).

THE COURT: The first motion we're going to handle this morning, the defendant's motion to preclude the state from introducing at trial other act or character evidence and other evidence which is unfairly prejudicial or would violate his constitutional rights.

Specifically, in item one, Ms. Palm, is a statement he made to one of the witnesses stating, sort of paraphrasing, that he could kill anyone with a knife. Anything additional to add to your motion?

MS. PALM: No, your Honor. I think I'll just submit on my argument there.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Lalli, anything to add?

MR. LALLI: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I think I had previously ruled that that was admissible, and I still believe it is relevant in this particular case. We have a situation of someone either by accident or in self-defense being stabbed, and so I'm going to deny the motion to that extent.

The second part is redaction from the JOC regarding concurrent sentencing. The think the State agrees with your motion, so it's granted in that respect. Ms. Palm, I'm going

to ask you to prepare the order on this motion here. 2 The item three is the evidence, was it sexual 3 assault; is that what it was? 4 MR. LALLI: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: I'm trying to read my own sloppy writing. 5 6 MS. PALM: A prior case allegation. 7 MR. LALLI: Right. We don't intend to admit that unless when the defendant's testifying, if he chooses to testify again, if he somehow opens the door to that or if in 9 10 the defense case or through cross-examination they open the 11 door to it. Barring that, we don't intend to elicit that in 12 our case in chief. 13 THE COURT: So I'm going to grant the defendant's motion with the understanding that if somehow the defense side 14 15 opens the door that that could become relevant, then we'll deal with it on a case-by-case basis. 17 MS. PALM: And your Honor, he was acquitted of that, 18 just so the record's clear. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Like I said, it's granted, but I 20 don't know how -- how else it could come up. But if somehow it 21 comes up and becomes relevant, then we'll deal with it at that 22 time. But right now you're motion is granted in --23 MR. LALLI: Thank you. 24 THE COURT: -- that respect. The second item is a 25 sexual assault kit. Mr. Lalli, I have a -- my understanding is

that they did a sexual assault kit on the victim here and it came up negative; is that correct? There's no findings consistent with the sexual -- actually zero findings; is that correct?

MR. LALLI: Well, not -- not -- and I -- I wish I had all those notes with me. There's a lot of information that is received in the sexual assault kit. For example, the -- the DNA standards for our descendant came from the sexual assault kit. Her fingernails, fingernail clippings, things of that nature, they're all collected in the sexual assault kit.

The problem is sexual assault kit is a term of art.

On the impound sheet, if memory serves, it's listed as sexual assault kit. The -- the DNA experts, when they examine them, they say yes, I went into the sexual assault kit.

It will be perfectly clear that the defendant has never -- is not being charged with sexual assault. Certainly, something aberrant occurred here because our descendant's found completely naked from the waist down.

But barring introducing and -- and that being kind of res gestae evidence, I mean, we don't intend to suggest there was a sexual assault here. But to -- to somehow say that wow, a jury's going to convict him because there's a little evidence collection kit that everybody calls a sexual assault kit is kind of silly.

More importantly, you're setting the State up for

failure, because it's parlance. It's how we refer to that item. So to tell a crime scene analyst who for 20 years has referred to that as a sexual assault kit that hey, for the purposes of your trial don't call it that, and if there's a slip, now we have all of a sudden mistrial motions and things of that nature. I just don't think it's necessary.

THE COURT: Ms. Palm.

MS. PALM: And your Honor, last time it was absolutely no problem. I think we agreed to call it a DNA collection kit. Nobody had a problem with that. No mistakes were made because the term sexual assault is negative and prejudicial, and there's no reason to call it a sexual assault kit if we don't have to.

It just wasn't a problem last time. And with respect to his certainly something aberrant occurred here, that's just not the case. Mr. O'Keefe explained he was looking for a knife wound. So that's the reason the pants were off. So there's no certainty about it.

THE COURT: So are you saying -- I don't recall -- I mean, I recall the case. I don't recall obviously all the rulings. Are you saying in the previous case the State referred to it as the DNA kit or --

MS. PALM: Yes, and we stipulated to it. And they agreed to that it was overly prejudicial and will stipulate to call it a DNA collection kit.

THE COURT: All right, I -- Mr. Lalli, I'm going to grant the motion to the extent that the State's witness is going to call it a DNA collection kit. If there is a slip, I don't know if it necessarily is going to be a motion -- you know, a mistrial will be granted. I'm going to give the defense some leeway, so it's absolutely crystal clear to the jury that he was never charged with a sexual assault. There's no allegation of sexual assault, and it's just another name for the kit, but if it comes out.

MR. LALLI: Very good. Well, I'll admonish our witnesses. I'll do my best to keep them so that they abide by the Court's ruling.

THE COURT: Okay. Next item is photos of the bruising. Ms. Palm, I'm going to deny that motion. The doctor had testified that there was some blunt force trauma and it's consistent with either a self-defense or an attack by your client.

The racial slurs is irrelevant. So I'm granting your motion in that regard. The next item is Mr. Toliver, who is the downstairs neighbor. If I recall, he went upstairs, I don't know if he actually looked into the room. The defendant may have made some comment to him, and Mr. Toliver went downstairs and told his wife, apparently he done killed that girl or something along those lines.

Mr. Lalli, how -- why is that coming in or why should

that come in?

MR. LALLI: Well, it's an ex sited utterance. It is certainly a statement of (indiscernible), and it's based upon things that the defendant said to him. Based upon what the defendant said to him and based upon what he saw.

It's certainly, probative. I mean, it's certainly relevant of identity, especially when now there seems to be some claim that maybe this woman stabbed herself or fell down on the knife or something ludicrous like that. In light of that sort of a defense being injected in the case, it's certainly highly probative and relevant.

THE COURT: Well, it's not something that Mr. Toliver actually saw. It wasn't -- that's his interpretation that --

MR. LALLI: Well, it's based upon what he saw and it's based upon things that the defendant said to him.

THE COURT: What specifically did he -- I mean, refresh my memory. What specifically did the defendant say to him which would justify that statement?

MR. LALLI: I'm paraphrasing, but as -- as Mr.

Toliver -- he actually walks into the apartment and he's -- the defendant is engaging him in conversation, words to the effect of, you need to help me out, or you need to help me, or you need to see this or you need to -- things of that nature. And he goes in and he sees the descendant laying there on the ground and the defendant in close proximity to her, and he runs

out and -- and says these things. 2 THE COURT: I think this relates to speculation on his part and so I'm going to grant the motion that -- that 3 statement -- I think it was, baby, he done killed that girl, should be excluded. And Mr. Lalli if you would advise your 5 6 witness, both -- both the Tolivers not to --7 MR. LALLI: Very well. 8 THE COURT: -- make that statement. The next motion 9 is on Detective Wildemann testifying, giving as defense states, 10 an expert opinion regarding the cuts on his own hand. MR. LALLI: Your Honor, in a related motion to this, 11 12 it's the defense motion to strike the notice of expert 13 (indiscernible) with regard to Detective Wildemann. 14 THE COURT: Yes. MR. LALLI: I don't know if the Court has had the 15 16 opportunity to review that, but I -- I -- if not, I'll argue 17 some of the law that's contained in it. But I wanted to 18 incorporate some of -- particularly a case that I cited in 19 that --20 THE COURT: And you're referring to --21 MR. LALLI: -- opposition. 22 THE COURT: -- the --23 It's the Meadow (phonetic) versus Civil MR. LALLI: 24 Service Board (phonetic) case. It's on Page 3 of that motion. 25 THE COURT: And that's where the officer testified

that it sounded like someone was getting their butt whipped?

MR. LALLI: Right.

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THE COURT: Well, in that case, I mean, isn't -- to me it seems like it's consistent with anyone. Any lay person can say, look, sounds like someone's getting beat up versus -- I mean, that's just what I would say almost a common observational lay observation. But the concern I have is that a lay observation, that if you are the attacker in a knife situation, that it's not uncommon to see receive knife wounds to our own hand.

MR. LALLI: What's different about that case, your Honor, is specifically the facts that the Supreme Court relied on. And they paid particular attention to the level of experience that this police officer had. In that case they noted that Officer Burney (phonetic) at the time had over 14 years of experience.

And in rendering their opinion, their -- their holding in the case, and I put it in quotes, it's quote, "Given Officer Burney's experience, his testimony was rationally based upon his perception at the time."

So it -- it is -- it is specifically the situation that we have with Detective Wildemann. This is not -- this is not just some person off the street coming in. It's as though the -- the Supreme Court looks at the statute as there some fluidity to it in terms of the lay witness opinion

of the police officer versus the lay witness of Joe off the street.

And I think it's quite telling that take the time in this opinion, which is certainly still good law today, to note Officer Burney's 14 years of experience and given this experience, he can testify that what he heard was consistent with a beating.

So I would respectfully suggest to the Court they are very concerned and very interested in the level of experience of police -- this is classically the situation. The other thing that's quite telling here is this is not Detective Wildemann coming up with an opinion based upon books these read or studies that he's read. He's actually seen these things.

And the statute is specific to that. The statute says rationally based upon the perception of the witness, the perception. I read that to mean I saw it, I heard it, I felt it, whatever it is. I -- I experienced it in a sensory manner.

And in -- in this case when you have a homicide detective who's investigated stabbing cases, he has a wealth of experience. He has seen those. He's investigated those. This is the essence of being rationally based upon his perception, and he can, based upon that, give an opinion as a lay witness.

So I think that he certainly is able to do that.

Moreover, the Court allowed that. The Court's already passed upon this issue and allow it had in a previous trial. And it

was absolutely the correct ruling. So I'd ask the Court not to change courses on that.

MS. PALM: May I respond?

THE COURT: Ms. Palm.

MS. PALM: It did happen in the last case the detective testified that it has frequently been his experience that stabbing a suspect has cuts on the fingers in the same area that O'Keefe did. We objected to that and we raised that as an issue on appeal. The Court on appeal did not deal with the issue because they remanded on another issue.

So there's been no ruling that that's the correct ruling. As well as the case cited in my motion to preclude him from testifying, Lord versus State (phonetic), the Supreme Court dealt with the issue and ruled that a detective's opinion, based on his experience as to the significance and cause of injuries on the defendant was improper. He was not qualified to give an expert opinion and a lay person is not the appropriate -- a lay person opinion is not the appropriate vehicle for this. That's Lord versus State.

So they've addressed it. That's the law. A detective -- a detective's opinion is not proper whether it's lay or expert.

THE COURT: Mr. Lalli, have you reviewed Lord v.

24 | State?

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MR. LALLI: I have, your Honor, and I -- and I think

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it's a different situation. I think that the -- the -- not the
     Mitchell (phonetic) case, the -- the Meadow case is -- is the
     -- is the controlling one.
  3
               THE COURT: What I'm going to do is I'll continue
  4
     this -- I want to review Lord v. State and Meadows (phonetic)
  5
     again. And I'll continue this until tomorrow. Did we decide
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     on 9:30 or 8:15 on this?
               MR. LALLI: Whatever the Court's pleasure. My -- I
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    would -- I would -- probably 9:15 would probably be better for
    me. But I'll certainly -- I think that was what the Court
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    originally recommended, but I'll certainly be here when the
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    Court tells me to.
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               THE COURT: Like I said, the problem is I'm doing
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    another calendar and --
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              MS. PALM:
                          (Indiscernible).
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              THE COURT: Yeah, let's -- you know what, Mr. Lalli,
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    if you can make it 8:15, I -- I'm doing 20 things tomorrow
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    morning and --
              MR. LALLI: Very good. We'll be here at 8:15.
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              THE COURT: And the rest of the motions will be heard
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    tomorrow.
              MR. LALLI: The other motions?
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              THE COURT:
                         Right.
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              MR. LALLI:
                         Okay. Your Honor --
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              THE COURT: Now, were you able to get the -- the --
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2 doctor --MR. LALLI: Right. 3 4 THE COURT: Was it Dr. Benjamin? MR. LALLI: Unfortunately, no. And I -- I wanted to 5 6 address this now because obviously it -- it has a great impact 7 on -- on our ability to proceed next week. Before I forget, I did want to request leave of Court. I filed this morning a 8 Second Amended Information. It charges murder of the second 9 degree with use of a deadly weapon. There's no additional 10 theories or no changes of theories. 11 12 As the Court knows, the prior verdict was one of second degree murder. So we are prohibited from proceeding on 13 an open murder theory in this case. So just to -- to make that 14

the doctor? Wasn't there a question that whether or not the

THE COURT: You don't have any objection to that, do you, Ms. Palm?

part of this case right, an amended charging document needed to

MS. PALM: No.

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be filed.

THE COURT: All right. So that will be filed in Court.

MS. PALM: And your Honor, I filed in Court this morning a motion to preclude their new expert from testifying because we just got the notice after calendar call of the Dr. Dutra (phonetic) expert. So I don't know if the Court's going

to deal with this morning or --

THE COURT: I didn't get an opposition to that one.

MR. LALLI: Well, your Honor, the -- the opposition essentially the -- the Mitchell case that we cited in the motion that the -- the Court had just heard argument on. It -- it is a late notice.

And the question is, the Court has discretion -- the Mitchel case so holds that the Court has discretion to allow the witness to be called if there's been no bad faith shown on the part of the -- of the state and the defendant's substantive rights are not prejudiced.

So I -- I -- I first wanted to kind of bring the Court up to speed on our efforts to procure the attendance of Dr. Benjamin. Dr. Benjamin, she is a forensic pathologist, a doctor, a professional. When we were preparing our subpoenas and getting ready for -- for trial, we decided that we wanted to use her again.

And, in fact, I believe it was early last week Ms.

Palm came to my office and reviewed my file, and we had some discussions about our inability or our concerns with regard to a forensic pathologist, whether we would be using Dr. Benjamin or whether we would be using somebody assigned to us by the Coroner's Office because I'm not sure that we told we were having difficulty in finding the witness at that point. But we certainly told her there was -- mentioned to her that there was

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some issue of this.

And if memory serves, and I could be wrong, but I thought our supplemental notice with respect to Dr. Dutra was filed on Friday. But I -- but I could be wrong.

MS. PALM: It was actually filed on the 16th and I was served with it yesterday.

MR. LALLI: Okay, so it was filed on the 16th.

MS. PALM: (Indiscernible).

MR. LALLI: Okay. So just to kind of bring the -the Court up to speed on our efforts to get Dr. Benjamin here.
A subpoena was issued by deputy district attorney Stephanie
Graham for Dr. Felicia Benjamin. The last known address that
we had for her was the Coroner's Office here in -- in Clark
County.

Dr. Benjamin was -- is no longer with that office.

On Monday, August 9th, district attorney investigator Don

Barlow (phonetic) began to search electronic databases in on

effort to locate her, including the CLEAR, C-L-E-A-R, and JL

Client, J -- initial J, initial L Client database.

Investigator Barlow was able to identify three potential phone numbers for Dr. Benjamin. When called two of the numbers were out of service. The third and the -- the -- the third number was called, messages were left and never -- we never received any return phone calls.

Through use of those same databases, investigator

Barlow was able to identify two potential addresses for Dr. Benjamin, one of which was 168 North Wilson Avenue, Apartment No. 304 in Pasadena, California. Investigator Barlow drafted letters for both of those addresses that she was able to identify introducing herself and explaining to Dr. Benjamin that she was needed to testify in this case and providing e-mail addresses, phone numbers, things of that nature and these letters still to this date have gone unanswered.

In addition to Investigator Barlow, another investigator in our office, Ed Dougherty, D-o-u-g-h-e-r-t-y, my investigator -- so we've had two investigators working on this -- contacted the Office of the Clark County Coroner Medical Examiner to get any sort of contact information we could on Dr. Benjamin.

And we were provided with the same North Wilson

Avenue address that Investigator Barlow had discovered.

Investigator Dougherty was also given an e-mail address. And
on that same day, the same day he received the e-mail address,
he shot an e-mail to Dr. Benjamin and introduced himself,
explained why she was needed, means of contacting our office,
things of that nature. That went unanswered.

Having received no response, Investigator Dougherty contacted the Medical Examiner's Offices in Orange County, California, Los Angeles County, California, Ventura County, California in an effort to locate a place of employment for Dr.

Benjamin all with negative results.

Investigator Dougherty inquired with the National Association of Medical Examiners, negative results. He conducted a search but the California Physicians and Surgeons database, and was able to obtain another address for Dr. Benjamin, which ultimately proved not to be helpful.

Through the use of electronic databases, Investigator

Dougherty was able to identify neighbors, who lived in the

North Wilson Avenue apartment complex in hopes that he could

contact a neighbor who might be able to reach out to Dr.

Benjamin. That was unsuccessful. He actually contacted -
tried to find a manager for the unit to see if a manager could

reach out and contact Dr. Benjamin. What was fruitless.

Eventually he called the Pasadena Police Department because this is in the City of Pasadena and requested that a member of law enforcement respond to the North Wilson Avenue address in an effort to personally contact her Dr. Benjamin. On August 17th, a police officer by the last name of Harris, H-a-r-ri-s, with the Pasadena Police Department responded to 168 North Wilson Avenue, Apartment No. 304 in Pasadena.

Officer Harris contacted my investigator, Mr.

Dougherty, when he arrived there at the residence. No one answered the door. Officer Harris left his card with a message that if Dr. Benjamin received the card, she needs to immediately contact our office. The very next day, which was

yesterday, Investigator Dougherty received a response to his e-mail from Dr. Benjamin.

Obviously, she had seen the card left by the police department there. And the e-mail message, which I have, and I can certainly provide it to the Court, but the e-mail message stated, quote, Mr. Dougherty, apparently you did not receive my prior e-mail. Please feel free to contact the Clark County Coroner's Office and they will provide you with an available medical examiner to testify. Obviously that individual will need a transcript of my previous trial testimony. Regards, Dr. Benjamin.

So there was never a phone call, never if you need to reach me, never anything. She's obviously stonewalling us.

Investigator Dougherty immediately responded to that. I've never received any other e-mails from you. He again reiterated that she should contact me if she intended not to come so that I could take it up to the Court.

Also, upon being informed that she had responded to an e-mail, taking that same e-mail address, I drafted her an e-mail and I explained to her that she was absolutely required to be here, that we would accommodate her schedule in any way we could, she could pick the day that she wanted to testify, we'd bring her in in an afternoon. Still to this day I have not had a response to that e-mail.

In addition, yesterday I -- I contacted and had a

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conversation with the coroner himself, Michael Murphy. I asked Mr. Murphy if he would be willing to reach out to Dr. Benjamin to attempt to persuade her to at least be somewhat cooperative in our efforts to get her out here. He attempted to do that. The contact information he had didn't work.

So this morning what I have is a -- a certificate for attendance of out-of-state witness. And what I'd like to do is just approach and have the Court sign this. This essentially a compelling order which will allow us to try to compel her through the -- the superior Court of Los Angeles County to come here.

The problem that I see is there are other people who can testify to this. And a superior Court judge could recognize that and could certainly say well, I'm not going to honor your request because you just have another expert look at it. That's done in this jurisdiction as it is, I'm sure, in California.

So I'm not sure at this point because I have no jurisdiction over her. She's not here in Nevada. I'm not sure that the passage of time is going to change this. I'm not sure that if the Court were to sign the documents that I have, that that is going to change it.

So when you put all that together, I -- I certainly think that under the Mitchel case we have not acted in bad faith. I mean, we have used extreme diligence in attempting to

procure her attendance here.

The other issue that Mitchel talks about is whether the defense is going to be prejudiced in any way. And I would submit to the Court that they're not, and for a number of reasons. One, this is -- the information that is new pathologist would testify to is nothing new to them. I mean, they've had testimony, opinions from -- from doctors. I mean, this issue has been fully litigated. They've cross-examined on the issue. So it's not as though they're going to be surprised by the testimony.

Now, I understand that a different forensic pathologist is involved, different credentials. In fact, the pathologist that we were assigned has never qualified as an expert in the courts of our state. He is from another jurisdiction. And so they may very well want to prepare for that. But under the circumstances, what I would ask the Court to do is to consider starting the trial on Wednesday. Give Ms. Palm two full days that she would otherwise have planned on being in Court here to prepare for that witness.

I will make that witness available to her so that she can ask all the questions she needs to you of the witness. But under the circumstances to -- to prevent us from calling the medical examiner because the one that we intended to call is out of the jurisdiction and -- and not willing to play ball, I think is -- would be an extreme hardship. The Mitchel case

says that the Court has -- it is within your jurisdiction, it is not an abuse of your discretion, to allow us to call an expert under the circumstances.

So -- and -- and if the Court allows us to do that, we will certainly continue our efforts to procure the attendance of Dr. Benjamin, but it's just not looking promising at this point.

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Palm. Thank you, Mr. Lalli.

MS. PALM: Your Honor, with that very long explanation about their diligence (indiscernible) was that they didn't even subpoena Dr. Benjamin until the 9th, which is 14 days from trial, which is already into the period. And the Hernandez (phonetic) case, which I cited in my motion to preclude her testimony or preclude Dr. Dutra's testimony, that case says that they have to use diligence before the period expires, which they are supposed to give notice.

They didn't do anything here until they'd already blown the expert notice period. And that expert notice period is important because it's already processed right. It's our right to have a timely notice and not have to do everything at the last minute like we've had to do everything else in this case, and you know, we get all these late notices and argument set after calendar call for everything.

It -- he did tell me last week that they were having

trouble finding Dr. Benjamin. And I did tell him I'm going to have to object to any experts you'd want to put up because you're outside your notice period. And still we didn't get notice until just after calendar call. We have a due process right no notice, and I don't think that the Court should give them a break when they didn't exercise diligence before they were supposed to give that notice.

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Aside from that, there are problems. He told me that Dr. Dutra was going to rely on what Dr. Benjamin did and not do his own review. Is that still the case? I don't know.

MR. LALLI: Well, two things. There's obviously the new case out from the Supreme Court that a -- a -- an expert cannot reiterate another expert's opinion. Cannot reiterate hearsay evidence. And what we have here is a doctor who would be basing his opinions upon photographs, which can be independently admitted into evidence, and upon an autopsy report, which is a record of regularly recorded activity, which can be admitted into evidence.

So he would be basing an opinion upon those things. So the -- the case that Counsel's referring to is really not going to come into play here.

MS. PALM: The case that he's referring to now is Pulp versus State (phonetic). And what it says is that the expert cannot rely on hearsay that wasn't subjected to cross-examination. So, I mean, I know Dr. Benjamin, some

things were subjected to cross-examination, but I don't know if this guy's going to come up with something that he apparently learned from her that we never knew about before. That would be a huge problem in this case.

And with the late notice, it's a little late to go figure it out. Also, if they wanted to use Dr. Benjamin, what she did, they should have noticed that they wanted to use her trial testimony outside of trial testimony period. They can't even do that now because they're so close to trial. They couldn't do that time because they didn't show diligence in the time period.

run out of all that and throw somebody new at us at the last minute. If we have to pick between the Hobson's (phonetic) choice of a late notice expert that we don't even know and I don't have time to go investigate his background, and two days is not going to be time in this case. And besides that, Mr. O'Keefe wants his trial. His family's going to be here. We have a lot of witnesses lined up. It would cause us a lot of prejudice to have to go redo all of that.

So if we have to choose between the new expert, who is just now being noticed that we don't know anything about and Dr. Benjamin, I would rather have him just admit her trial testimony. That would be less prejudice to us.

THE COURT: Mr. Lalli, on the issue of just admitting

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prior trial testimony of Dr. Benjamin.

MR. LALLI: Well, it's -- it's insufficient. I mean, the -- the -- the -- the case is -- is so important -- it is so important that a jury understands the injuries that this woman receives. The manner in which he she was beaten. And I suppose the other remedy, if -- if -- if it's that huge of a deal is to -- is to kick the case out three weeks. It would be a minimal intrusion upon the defendant's speedy trial right.

And then, I guess, we, in spite of having two full days, I can't imagine that every minute of everyday for the next 21 days Ms. Palm would be investigating a reading of a 13 page CD and investigating it. I can't imagine she would be doing that. And that's really a good faith argument that's being presented to the Court.

But if -- if -- if that is the option here, well, then -- then I'd ask the Court alternatively to -- to -- to kick the case for three weeks and -- and -- and do it then. But, you know, I've been doing this for a long time, and I've never had an -- a professional expert witness, especially a medical doctor stonewall me or our office in the manner in which we're being stonewalled.

It's never -- it's never been an issue. Forensic scientists come and forensic scientists go. And they always come back to testify in cases. So to somehow suggest that we should have known this is -- is really -- is really not a

fair criticism of -- of what happened. And incidentally subpoenas were not issued two weeks. They were issued approximately 30 days ago.

We don't have the ability to issue subpoenas out any further than that because of our staffing needs. The requests will just sit there. We don't -- we don't have the manpower to process those things any sooner, so --

THE COURT: Initially on did you -- did you state you thought Dr. Benjamin was still here in town?

MR. LALLI: No, I didn't believe she was still here in town.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LALLI: What I would ask the Court to do is to -to allow us to call Dr. Dutra. I will -- I will make him
available to the defense for interview, and I would ask the
Court to start the trial an Wednesday to give Ms. Palm to days
to do whatever she needs to do to prepare. And if she feels
that she is not prepared, she can certainly tell us, and -- and
-- and -- and we can decide where to go from there.

If the Court does that, if the Court fashions that sort of a remedy, certainly it is protecting the defendant's rights. The defendant would not be prejudiced under those circumstances. For if there was prejudice, it would be so miniscule that he would be entitled to no relief in the Supreme Court.

And the Court is still -- would still be fair to the State in giving us the opportunity to present our case.

THE COURT: Ms. Palm, I do find due diligence. The issue of this case is, reading the motions, is self-defense, and it's of paramount importance as to the injuries, the -- the analysis of those injuries as far as self-inflict because there's some argument that perhaps she may have fell -- you know, fell on the knife herself. Self-defense or committed by your client.

So, I mean, this is -- that's the crux of the entire case is that -- or it's part of the -- is the injuries and how they were sustained. And so I think our two alternatives are that we can start on Wednesday of next week to give you ample opportunity with the directive to the State that they will make this person available at your convenience to -- to meet with them.

If you don't feel that's sufficient time to do a thorough investigation of their background and also to meet with them because of other scheduling issues, we can continue the trial. But we can do it on a very short basis.

THE CLERK: (Indiscernible).

MS. PALM: And your Honor, we have our experts lined up. We have our witnesses lined up. His parents are elderly. It's a big deal for them to travel. You know, we don't want to change the trial date at all. So I guess, we'll just have to

make do and hopefully they'll give me access to their expert at 1 2 a time that works with me. 3 MR. LALLI: We will. THE COURT: Okay, so that would be -- so we'll start 4 Wednesday --5 6 MS. PALM: No. 7 THE COURT: Oh, you'll start --8 MS. PALM: He wants to start Monday. That's when his 9 parents are going to be here, and it would be very difficult 10 for them to make other arrangements. It's been difficult to 11 get these arrangements. 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 MS. PALM: I mean, if -- if I have to fit it in, I'll 14 have to fit it in, but I'm saying we want to keep our trial 15 date. THE COURT: Okay. 16 17 MR. LALLI: Your Honor, may I approach with the certificate and the -- I think there's an order for payment of 18 19 witness fees. We're still going to pursue diligence to get Dr. 20 Benjamin here. 21 THE COURT: All right. 22 MR. LALLI: Thank you. 23 MS. PALM: And your -- and your Honor, there was one 24 other motion on today. I didn't know if you were continuing 25 that or not.

THE COURT: Which one's that?

MS. PALM: That is the motion on the victim's mental health history. And one of the reasons I wanted to deal with that is because I need to work that out with my experts still. And we've continued it three times already. I know you said we were going to continue the motion to suppress.

THE COURT: We can go forward on that one. It's just the other ones. Go ahead, Ms. Palm.

MS. PALM: Well, your Honor, for all the reasons stated in our -- our motion, we want to be able to present records from Ms. -- Ms. Whitmarsh's mental health history showing that she had anger issues, that she was on anger management, that she had numerous prior suicide attempts with a -- a cut or a self-mutilator, that she used knives and cutting instruments for that.

The Court's aware, it's all the evidence that we submitted as our Proposed Exhibit B during the last trial. But she has this very long history dating back to the 1980s of doing this. My client was aware of all of it. She has self-reported going -- you know, being angry, screaming and going berserk after arguments with her husband.

I think all of that is relevant to the many issues in this case being, you know, did -- who brought the knife into the bedroom is a huge issue in this case because if there's no -- if there's nothing that we can show the jury why she might

have brought the knife into the bedroom, then they're going to assume my client did it.

And I think it's very likely that she brought the knife into the bedroom. I this I it also explains all the pounding noises the neighbors heard if she was having an anger fit and slamming drawers and things in the bedroom, which was over the Toliver's. And they reported hearing that noise like no screaming going along with it.

It all makes sense when you know about her history, so I think it's very relevant. I think all the cases that we cited talking about, you know, this isn't necessarily the victim's character for aggression, it's more of a mental health illness and the effects of having that illness.

So other courts admit that kind of evidence because it is so important to the defendant's defense to be able to show what happened and what's the cause of death, what were the circumstances. So, you know, I think that it -- the closest we have to that in Nevada is the petty line of cases talking about a self-defense straight up case, which this is not.

You know, Mr. O'Keefe is saying he defended himself, but that there was an accident that caused the injury. But even in those cases when a defendant knows about his -- the victim's history and here Mr. O'Keefe did, he knew about all of her history. He can talk about it, and then he can corroborate it with independent evidence. Because if he can't do that,

then it's just his self-serving testimony for the jury to consider and they're less likely to believe it.

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Here I think it's just so probative on so many issues and it's not really character evidence. It's evidence of a mental illness in a specific manifestations. So if you do it under that test or under the petty test, I think either way it should come in.

Ms. Whitmarsh had anger problems and she had problems that caused her to go get a knife when she was upset. That's our defense in this case. So if Mr. O'Keefe cannot corroborate that by expert testimony or by showing her medical records, which corroborate that back to the 1980s, then I think he's denied his right to present a defense.

THE COURT: Mr. Lalli.

MR. LALLI: Your Honor, at the previous trial the Court excluded all of this evidence. Something that's -- that's -- that's a wonderful guide into how all this evidence comes in is the Daniel (phonetic) case, which is cited at 119 Nevada 498. And it talks about how character of a victim is utilized.

And it -- it cites NRS 480451. It sets forth the rule that character evidence is normally not -- is normally not admissible to show that a person acted in conformity therewith. But there are exceptions.

The evidence of the character or trait of character

of the victim of a crime offered by an accused is admissible.

How do you admit that? Well, you admit it under the statute
the normal way by defendant's presenting evidence of the
victim's character by testimony as to reputation or in the form
of an opinion. That's how character evidence is normally
admitted.

So they're certainly, under Daniel in the statute, they're certainly allowed to do that. Daniels also discusses the petty case and the petty scenario as to when evidence of the victim's character comes in. And what it specific talks about are cases of self-defense. And what they say in Daniel is, quote, however this Court has held that evidence of specific acts showing that the victim was a violent person is admissible if the defendant seeks to establish self-defense and was aware of those acts.

So just general character evidence in the form of an opinion or -- or reputation, they can offer that irrespective of -- of whether the defendant says that he knew about things. They have that right.

With respect to petty, there is a predicate to the admissibility of that evidence. And that is he has to say that he into you about it or through some manner of admissible evidence, they have to establish in the presence of the jury that the defendant knew about these acts, these specific acts.

And if he does -- and again, we're talking about acts

of violence against others, which would make his reasonable belief of his right of self-defense more likely. If he says that he knew about acts of violence toward others, then Ms. Palm is absolutely correct under petty and under Daniel, they can prove that up extrinsically, and I would certainly presume one of the ways you can prove that up extrinsically is through medical records.

So as a general proposition, I -- I don't totally disagree with her analysis, except in two major points. One, in all of the incidents we have here, we don't have a -- a victim who is taking a knife and acting in in an aggressive manner towards others. All of her aggressive actions are inward. They are against herself.

Is it relevant that she tried to overdose on pills a time or two? Certainly not. Not under any analysis is that information relevant. Is it relevant that she might have cut herself as people who suffer from depression do? I don't think it is, but out of an abundance of caution I would ask the Court to fashion some sort of remedy here where some of this evidence can come in.

However, I was handed this morning medical records, which apparently are lodged with the Court as a Court's exhibit in the prior trial. And for the record, they're probably two to three inches thick. And there's all kinds of information in here that is not relevant under any scenario.

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And to just say well, yeah, send that whole packet of information to the jury, that's just character assassination of the victim, which certainly our Supreme Court does not intend by all of this.

But my position, your Honor is this, based upon the Daniel position -- case. In the defendant testifies and lays the predicate, lays the foundation that he was aware of the very specific acts, I am not opposed to the following evidence coming in, but it's gotta be distilled from all of the other mental health information that's in our victim's medical records.

So one, that in October of 2001, after she cut both wrists with a knife, she was reported to have her fourth suicide attempt. So using a knife on herself on October 31st, 2001, I'm not opposed to that information coming in. And for the record, that -- that fact is listed in the defendant's motion at Page 9 on lines 21 and 22. That very specific fact I'm not opposed to. On Page 10, roughly lines 19 and 20 there, that she became angry, screaming, went berserk after an argument with her husband and overdosed on pills. As long as he is lay the predicate that he knew that, I'm not opposed to that coming in.

And then finally, that on August 22nd, and this information is provided in the defendant's motion on Page 11, it's line -- roughly line two or three, that she stabbed her --

herself on her hands. She's -- she's a mutilator. She's a self-mutilator, but that she did this on August 22nd, 2006.

I'm not opposed to those things coming in. There is no case that says they do, but I think our Supreme Court, I would not put it past them to expand Daniels to something like that. But certainly, to have all of these medical records come in and all of this information come in is overly prejudicial. It's subject to unfair prejudice. It would confuse the jury, and it's certainly not relevant.

THE COURT: Ms. Palm, what other records do you want to come in?

MS. PALM: And your Honor, I gave him all the records because he said that Phil Smith had not given him what he had. And as the Court well knows, we had a joint order last time we got the records, we gave them all to Phil Smith. So they have those records, even though Mr. Lalli said he needed them again. I did recopy the entire thing.

But what we wanted was what was referenced in that exhibit, just every reference to her being -- having anger control problems, going berserk, the references he talked about and cutting herself. Those are the references we wanted. The cuts with knives and scissors. I think overdosing is relevant because we have evidence in this case that she had -- she was on a large amount of pills that night also.

So any of the suicide cutting references and any of

the anger control problems --

THE COURT: Are those records bate stamped?

MS. PALM: No, they are not. And -- and -- and it's the -- the stack we have is much smaller. I actually have a very -- this is what we had last time that we were talking about. It's very small, and that's in the Court's Exhibit B from the last time. We can go through it and see what we can agree on. But if -- if we're agreeable, you know, and I -- and --

THE COURT: Well, why don't we do -- why don't you meet or discuss those records that you have in your hand, which appear to only be about 20 pages or 25 pages, see if agree on some of those. And we'll deal with the others probably when we take a break -- our various breaks during the trial.

MS. PALM: And the other issue that I had was, you know, I wanted her various diagnoses in. Specifically, that she was bipolar and that she had the anger control problems because then I can have an expert talk about who those diagnoses mean. Court.

MR. LALLI: I mean, now what we're going to do is we're going to have a -- a shrink come in, I guess, and analyze someone who's dead after the fact.

THE COURT: Well, we're not having it at this point. So I want counsel to meet with one another and perhaps we can resolve some of those issues during our breaks on Monday.

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MR. LALLI: I'm certainly happy to do that, your
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    Honor.
               THE COURT: But if you can get the -- the records to
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    me as soon as the ones you agree upon, the ones you disagree,
    okay. And the other motions we'll hear tomorrow.
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              MS. PALM: Thank you, your Honor.
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              MR. LALLI: And that's at 8:15?
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              THE COURT: Yes.
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                      (Court recessed at 9:42 a.m.)
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

ATTEST: Pursuant to Rule 3C(d) of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, I acknowledge that this is a rough draft transcript, expeditiously prepared, not proofread, corrected, or certified to be an accurate transcript.

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JULIE LORD, TRANSCRIBER

11-15-10

DATE

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7 8	DISTRICT COURT		
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
11	Plaintiff,		
12) Case No. C250630 -vs-) Dept No. XVII		
13	BRIAN KERRY O'KEEFE, SECOND AMENDED		
14	#1447732) SECOND AMENDED Defendant. INFORMATION		
15			
16	STATE OF NEVADA) ss:		
17	COUNTY OF CLARK		
18	DAVID ROGER, District Attorney within and for the County of Clark, State of		
19	Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs the Court:		
20	That BRIAN KERRY O'KEFFE, the Defendant above named, having committed the		
21	crime of MURDER OF THE SECOND DEGREE WITH USE OF A DEADLY		
22	WEAPON (Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165), on or about the 5th day of		
23	November, 2008, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force		
24	and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of		
25	the State of Nevada, did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and		
26	with malice aforethought, kill VICTORIA WHITMARSH, a human being, by stabbing at		
27	///		
28	///		

1	and into the body of the said VICTORIA WHITMARSH, with a de-	adly weapon, to-wit: a		
2	2 knife.			
3				
4		EY		
5	Nevada Bar #002781			
6		\$ ·		
7	CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005398			
8	8 Nevada Bar #005398	,		
9	9 La addition to the Nation of Without and W			
10	In addition to any other Notice of Witnesses, names of witnesses known to the			
11				
12	12 NAME ADDRESS ARMBRUSTER, TODD 5001 OBANNON DR	#2.4 I V/NIV/		
13		. #34 L v IN v		
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5	MURPHY, KATE	LVMPD #9756
6	NEWBERRY, DANIEL	LVMPD #4956
7	PAZOS, EDUARDO	LVMPD #6817
8	RAETZ, DEAN	LVMPD #4234
9	SANTAROSSA, BRIAN	LVMPD #6930
10	SHOEMAKER, RUSSELL	LVMPD #2096
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12	TINIO, NORMA	2992 ORCHARD MESA HENDERSONNV
13	TOLIVER, CHARLES	1013 N. JONES #101 LVNV
14	TOLIVER, JOYCE	1013 N. JONES #101 LVNV
15	WHITMARSH, ALEXANDRA	7648 CELESTIAL GLOW LVNV
16	WHITMARSH, DAVID	7648 CELESTIAL GLOW LVNV
17	WILDEMANN, MARTIN	LVMPD #3516
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28	(TK9)	



Nov 23 10 2 AN '10

CLEAR OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BRIAN KERRY O'KEEFE,

Defendant.

CASE NO. C-250630

DEPT. NO. 17

Transcript of

Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS HEARING

FRIDAY, AUGUST 20, 2010

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

CHRISTOPHER LALLI, ESQ.

Assistant District Attorney

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

PATRICIA PALM, ESQ.

Special Deputy Public Defender

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

MICHELLE RAMSEY District Court

VERBATIM DIGITAL REPORTING, LLC

Littleton, CO 80120

(303) 798-0890

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, FRIDAY, AUGUST 20, 2010, 8:38 A.M.

THE COURT: I appreciate everyone's patience. I had to do Judge Barker's 8:00 o'clock calendar and his 9:00 o'clock calendar and this morning. All right, we had a couple issues to resolve.

The first item is the statement that the defendant made to Officer, is it Ballejos. Am I pronouncing that correctly?

MR. LALLI: Yes.

THE COURT: And at least according to the briefs, the defendant was -- was in custody, had not been Mirandized and the officer asked him his name and also he asked the name of the female, what's your date of birth, blood type and perhaps even social security number.

And in response to that the defendant said something along the lines as, I didn't do this, man. She tried to stab me. Is that the bottom line of that aspect of the motion, Ms. Palm?

MR. LALLI: Yes.

MS. PALM: Well, and -- and also the, yeah, the whole name issue where Ballejos is testifying he gave the false names, which was downstairs. And he said it took him 30 minutes to get to that point. So that whole issue because they made a big deal out of it in the last trial that he wasn't forthcoming with Victoria's name.

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Okay. But it's based upon --
  1
                          That he was in custody and not Mirandized.
               MS. PALM:
  2
               THE COURT: Right, Miranda violation or --
 3
 4
               MS. PALM:
                          Yes.
 5
              THE COURT:
                           Okay.
 6
              MR. LALLI:
                          Yeah, it's based upon those -- the same
 7
    -- the same circumstances.
              THE COURT: And I think the State's response was that
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 9
    it was actually decided that this Arizona case we were talking
    about the public safety exceptions; is that correct?
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11
              MR. LALLI: Yes, which stems from New York versus
    Quarrels (phonetic), the United States Supreme Court case.
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13
              THE COURT: Wasn't at the time the inquiry was made
14
    they already had been inside the apartment, they were aware
15
    that there was one person in there and there wasn't any issue
    of other individuals, other people needing assistance?
16
17
              MR. LALLI: Well --
                         That is correct, and they knew she was
18
              MS. PALM:
19
    dead --
              MR. LALLI: Well --
20
              MS. PALM: -- because she was declared dead two
21
    minutes into it and -- and Newberry (phonetic) says that
22
    actually in his statement also, by the time that O'Keefe was
23
    taken downstairs they knew she was dead.
24
25
              MR. LALLI: Well, your Honor, when you look at
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Officer Conn's statement, for example, the defendant at one point, as officers are poised to enter the room, Conn will testify that they don't know the condition of this woman. And it's a very dynamic scene at that point.

Я

They're there, they're trying to persuade the defendant to come out. And the defendant is telling the officers she's dead, then he's saying no, she's alive, she's dead, no, she's alive, get in here, get in here, she's alive. And they very quickly rush in. I think as Ms. Palm made the point during cross-examination in the trial, it was very quick, and they pulled him out and get him onto the floor and then take him out on the banister.

And it is in that period of time that the officer is saying, you know, what's your name, who's that person inside.

And the defendant, like he does most times, doesn't even respond to those questions.

So, I mean, one argument here is that these are almost spontaneous statements that he's making, which are not the product of interrogation. But he's just -- just starts saying things like, I know you're mad at me. Well, they -- they never said anything to elicit that response.

They're asking her name so that paramedics can render aid. They attempted to ascertain her status and things of that nature. So I think when you look at Quarrels and you look at the Arizona case that we cited, certainly there is no violation

here under the circumstances. 2 THE COURT: All right. Under the nature of these statements and what the police officers knew at the time, I 3 don't believe this falls within the public safety exception. 5 So the statements the defendant made to Officer Ballejos 6 about --7 MS. PALM: Thank you, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: -- I didn't do this, you tried to stab 9 me, et cetera is -- is excluded or suppressed. 10 MR. LALLI: Your Honor, what if -- I mean, an 11 alternative argument here is that they're spontaneous 12 statements. They're not -- the statements weren't -- I mean, 13 the -- he just starts saying things to them, I know you're mad 14 at me. Well, they weren't -- they didn't -- that's a 15 spontaneous statement. I mean, would the Court --16 THE COURT: Well, my ruling was on a statement that 17 was on (indiscernible) page -- the statement that I had here 18 was when they asked who is she, date of birth, blood type, et cetera, when he said I didn't do this, man, she tried to stab 19 20 me. 21 MR. LALLI: Okay, so --22 THE COURT: And that's what I'm dealing with. 23 MR. LALLI: Okay. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. LALLI: The other statement where he says, "I

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know you're mad at me," I presume we're still allowed to elicit
  l
  2
     that?
               THE COURT:
  3
                          Yes.
               MR. LALLI: Okay, thank you.
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  5
               MS. PALM: And none of the name stuff?
  6
               THE COURT: Right. Now, I went through each of the
 7
     specific portions of the statement that Ms. Palm is seeking to
 8
    have excluded page by page and line by line. And does everyone
    have the voluntary statement in front of them?
10
              MR. LALLI: I didn't actually bring the statement
    itself, your Honor.
11
              THE COURT: Do you have yours, Ms. Palm?
12
13
              MS. PALM: Yeah, I know I provided a copy of the full
14
    statement to the Court, but what I have is just the issues that
    I was -- I have my -- my motion here today. I don't have his
15
    full statement.
16
17
              THE COURT: Do you have that handy, Mr. Lalli, so you
18
    can --
19
              MR. LALLI: I don't, unfortunately.
              MS. PALM: And -- and before we get to the specific
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21
    portions, I just want to make sure the Court understands, I was
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    moving to suppress the entire thing.
              THE COURT: I understand.
23
24
             MS. PALM: And -- and sorry, I take it --
             THE COURT: I -- I -- I read through this entire
25
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matter, and the Court finds that even though there was intoxication on behalf of the defendant that the Court finds that under the totality of circumstances, his statement was freely and voluntarily given. Have you found that Mr. Lalli?

MR. LALLI: I don't have it, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have the motion where at least the identification of the specific statements --

MR. LALLI: I do have that.

THE COURT: Okay. Page 2 of the defendant's statement, and this is on Page 17 of Ms. Palm's motion. She's objecting to the statement of you've before in the system before, right? You've talked to police officers? Specifically, Mr. Lalli, why should that come in?

MR. LALLI: Well, your Honor, the Court in prior rulings has admitted the defendant's prior conviction. So there's certainly no harm in allowing that statement.

THE COURT: Ms. Palm.

MS. PALM: Well, I just think it, you know, I don't know the -- the jurors are going to know about that prior conviction, but I think that this is kind of makes it sound like he's really familiar with the system versus one prior conviction.

THE COURT: Can -- and counsel bear with me here.

You know, this trial was -- I don't even remember when this

trial -- I mean, I remember the trial. I don't remember

exactly when it was. Specifically why were we allowing in his prior conviction, the domestic violence. I'm just refreshing my memory.

MR. LALLI: Your Honor, there are a number of cases that talk about domestic violence homicides and how juries have the right to know the circumstances in which the relationship occurred and fostered and created motive for the murder.

There are a long line of cases. But that was litigated the last time and the ruling was that that information was admissible. And even to the extent of allowing a judgment of conviction.

MS. PALM: And your Honor, the ruling was limited, just, you know, so the Court doesn't recall exactly. But it was limited that the Court ruled that it would be admissible to show motive and intent, and it was just going to be the judgment of conviction, not underlying facts or anything. Just the fact that he had been convicted and the name of the conviction, the date of the conviction. And --

MR. LALLI: No --

MS. PALM: -- you know, I mean, we -- we did object to it then. We still object to it now. I understand the Court's ruling. This is a second degree case. I don't know how much that would change it for the Court. But that's what the ruling was before, that it was for motive and intent.

And then the Court had limited it to no other issue

with domestic violence was going to come in unless we open the door. And the only way we could open the door was by talking about their relationship prior to the time he went to prison. So that's -- that's where things stood.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LALLI: Your Honor, what -- what -- what the Court actually allowed in evidence is the Judgment of Conviction, which is a domestic violence third offense. So in, I think in crafting your ruling in that, the jury was apprized of the fact that there was some ongoing domestic violence there.

Certainly, that would imply multiple contacts with law enforcement.

MS. PALM: Actually, no, it just says felony domestic violence.

THE COURT: Well, on this particular section I'm going to allow that statement to come in.

The next one is on Page 3, but apparently -- I'm quoting the language. But apparently when the officers came in, a struggle ensued. We're going to have those officers testify that when they try to get him out of his bedroom, so that -- I'm going to allow that statement in.

On Page 4, it -- it begins on the top of the page with the answer and it goes down halfway to the bottom. I'm just saying this, Mr. Lalli, since you don't have it in front

of you. You do have the -- I'm sorry, you do have the 1 statement that you're reading, correct? 2 MR. LALLI: No, unfortunately, I don't, and it's hard 3 for me, and I apologize, your Honor. It's hard for me to 4 understand the context of this. I've looked at -- I've read 5 the statement, obviously, I've watched the video. 6 THE COURT: Ms. Palm, do you have any objection to 7 Mr. Lalli looking over your shoulder so we can follow along on 8 9 the statement? MS. PALM: Well, he -- he does have my motion. 10 MR. LALLI: Right. 11 THE COURT: Right, but it just has little snippets, 12 and I it's important that we have --13 MS. PALM: No, I don't have the full --14 THE COURT: -- it in context. 15 MS. PALM: -- thing. That's what I said. I don't 16 have his entire statement. 17 I can go make a copy. THE CLERK: 18 I thought I had a -- I think it will go THE COURT: 19 quicker if we can just run a quick copy so everyone --20 MR. LALLI: Thank you. 21 THE COURT: So two copies. All right, I can tell you 22 right now the very last item is on Page 34 where Detective 23 Wildemann says, "You might want to open the door" -- I'm assuming he's referring to the other officer there -- "because 25

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he's a fucking nut." And what's the relevance of that, Mr.
  2
     Lalli?
               MR. LALLI: Oh, I -- I don't have any objection to
  3
  4
     taking that out.
  5
               THE COURT: Okay. All right. All right, that's out.
    Ms. Palm, the statement of the defendant you provided to me,
 6
 7
    I'm looking at my notes here, was missing Page 15.
              MS. PALM:
                         Oh, okay.
 8
 9
               THE COURT: So I don't know exactly what the context
    it is and --
10
              MS. PALM: Is there anything in here that's cited on
11
    Page 15?
12
              THE COURT: Yes, it's on --
13
14
              MS. PALM:
                         Okay.
              THE COURT: -- Page 18 of your motion.
15
                         Okay. I'm sorry.
16
              MS. PALM:
17
              THE COURT: Ms. Palm, while we're waiting for the
    statement to be copied, it seems that there's a couple items
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19
    here that could be interpreted as the police officer during
    interviewing just sort of telling the defendant some things to
20
    try to elicit information. You had objected to some as
21
    hearsay. At one point the detective says, "No -- no neighbor
22
    tells us that you were screaming for somebody to call the
23
24
   police." And you object to that as hearsay.
              And I don't recall the specific testimony in that
25
```

regard, but during an interview, I mean, oftentimes we have police officers sort of telling a story to get someone to fess 2 up a little bit or to give more information. Well, we'll 3 address that in just a second here because I just wanted you to know that it's a concern of the Court that they often say that, 5 they often make something up and obviously you're free to 7 cross-examine on that. Okay, I think we're at Page 4. You can see I have 8 9 brackets --MS. PALM: Um-h'm. 10 THE COURT: -- in there. That's the quoted language. 11 State, your response? 12 MS. PALM: And my concern here, Judge, is that it's 13 -- it refers to multiple domestic violences and the Court's 14 only let them know the one felony conviction. And it does not 15 say third offense. It just says felony conviction. 16 MR. LALLI: Well, I --17 THE COURT: Where does it say multiple? 18 MR. LALLI: Yeah, I don't see that either. 19 MS. PALM: Domestic violences. It's multiple. 20 MR. LALLI: Your Honor, I don't think that warrants 21 I just don't -- and this is conversation that's 22 suppression.

being directed by the defendant. I mean, he's the one who's

once again, not really responding to questions. Domestic --

he's the one who says domestic violences. What he -- and then

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24

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he says, I just want to put that question on the table -- on 1 the tape. 2 So he is going out of his way -- he wants to -- he 3 wants certain things put on -- on -- on the recording, on the 4 interview. So certainly there's no basis to suppress that. 5 MS. PALM: Your Honor, the basis is that it's more 6 prejudicial than probative, which is an everyday evidentiary 7 basis to suppress things. 8 THE COURT: I'm going to exclude the portion in the 9 brackets. 10 Thank you. MS. PALM: 11 THE COURT: The next item's on Page 6. I got out of 12 prison, she called me, I did all my probation thing. Top of 13 Page 6. 14 MR. LALLI: Your Honor, that's the prior. 15 talking about his prior, and he's talking about how she put him 16 in -- in prison. 17 THE COURT: Ms. Palm. 18 Your Honor, please, looking at that again, MS. PALM: 19 I'm not so concerned about that one. I'll withdraw. 20 THE COURT: So that's going to be allowed in -- to 21 remain in. Next one is Page 10, middle of the page. Ms. Palm, 22 your position? 23 MS. PALM: My position is it's more prejudicial than 24 probative. It's, you know, slurring the cops and I don't think

25

that it puts Mr. O'Keefe in a good light.

THE COURT: I had a note there, as you can see, I wasn't quite clear of the context he was -- they're talking about putting money in account to checking phone numbers, cell phones. Mr. Lalli?

MR. LALLI: Your Honor, what he's doing is he's -he's telling the police officers that he wants them to look at
certain things. And he's talking about how in his prior case
they didn't, and so he is voicing his displeasure with -- with
-- with the investigation basically.

And again, this is not -- these are spontaneous statements that he -- that he makes. They're -- they're certainly relevant to his state of mind, his anger, his frustration that day. Anger, ill will, all those things are certainly the -- the -- the touch tone -- or the touch tail indicators of malice. He had just killed this woman.

And certainly his state of mind, how he's thinking, how he's feeling at the time are certainly relevant.

THE COURT: Ms. Palm.

MS. PALM: Malice toward police officers in a prior case for not collecting evidence that he had asked them to, is not relevant to malice to killing a person in this case. I'm concerned about just the language. I think it's prejudicial for the jury to hear him saying "f'ing cops."

THE COURT: All right, I'll exclude the "f'ing cops"

portion.

MS. PALM: Thank you.

THE COURT: Page 12. I think here he's just saying I already went through this. He's talking about his -- well, actually I'm not sure what he's talking about. That's why I had the word context there.

MR. LALLI: He's talking about his prior.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Palm?

MS. PALM: And you know, I -- I guess I'm not so concerned about this. It's obvious he wasn't happy with his prior. I -- I just -- you know, I guess I'm -- what we had talked about before is we're not opening the door by anything because it -- we weren't allowed to challenge this prior because it is a conviction.

So, you know, if the State's not concerned about that coming in, I guess, I'm not.

THE COURT: Okay, so that will remain in. Page 13.

The leads up questions or they're asking where was the car parked. That's from Page 12. What color. And he says it's in a particular spot. And he's talking about when he went to jail, went to prison, I fought my cases. He's talking about how he was compliant with the Court orders.

MS. PALM: And my concern with this, your Honor, is, "We had a lot of shit happen, and I went to jail and I went to prison, I fought my cases," because it refers to multiple

cases. Our ruling here was just the one felony conviction and that there wasn't going to be any reference anything else unless we opened the door, and that's what I'm concerned about. 4 THE COURT: From Mr. Lalli, anything to add? MR. LALLI: Your Honor, again, I -- I think the Court 5 is allowing history of domestic violence. You know, that -that's the real motive here. You'll recall Court is allowing 8 the testimony of Cheryl Morris who talks about the defendant saying, "Yeah, she put me in prison for three years, I want to 9 10 kill her, " or words to that effect. This is entirely consistent with that. It's entirely 11 12 consistent with his frustration, his anger. This is why this murder happened. And it's incredibly relevant as to his 13 intent. And I think if you --14 THE COURT: Yeah, I'll going to --15 MR. LALLI: -- exclude it, you're --16 THE COURT: I'm going to allow it in. 17 18 MR. LALLI: -- you're hampering our case. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Page 14, top page, it says, "I 19 20 went to prison, I lost everything, so when I got out of prison, I did the right thing." Ms. Palm? 21 22 MS. PALM: I'm sorry, where -- where are we? THE COURT: Page 14, top of 14. 23 My concern about that is that he's talking MS. PALM: 24 about that he litigates everything, and some people have a bias 25

against people who are litigious and who basically don't take 1 responsibility, they think they should. And so that's my 2 concern about that is it's referring that, you know, he's 3 always fighting everything --4 MR. LALLI: Well --5 MS. PALM: -- legally. I mean, it's a kind of a 6 comment on his -- his -- invoking his right to a trial or to --7 to due process and it's kind of a comment on that and it's 8 prejudicial. MR. LALLI: Well, I -- I thought, your Honor, we were 10 arguing on Page 14, "I went to prison, I lost everything." 11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MS. PALM: I'm --13 THE COURT: That's the first section that you 14 identified. It's on Page 18 of your motion. 15 MS. PALM: And that's -- I -- I just have the I went 16 to prison, that was what I was concerned about. 17 MR. LALLI: A Judgment of Conviction tells the jury 18 that he went to prison. 19 MS. PALM: After a year and the Court order was --20 okay. The main concern with that, your Honor, is if you look 21 in my closet, you'd be surprised about the reports I filed 22 about everything. That's what I'm really concerned about. 23 THE COURT: That's at the bottom of the page? Oh, 24 also bottom of that section. If you look in my closet --25

MR. LALLI: Right. 1 2 -- you'd be surprised reports. THE COURT: 3 MS. PALM: Yes. THE COURT: The first portion, I went to prison, I 4 5 lost everything, is going to come in. Bottom of that paragraph, if you look in my closet -- if you look in my closet 6 all the way to the last time she accused me -- I wonder if that 7 goes to possibly motive, the last time she accused me --8 MR. LALLI: It does. 9 THE COURT: -- Ms. Palm. 10 It does. He's obsessed with this. MR. LALLI: 11 THE COURT: Okay, I'm going to allow that statement. 12 The last time she accused me? 13 MS. PALM: THE COURT: I'm sorry? 14 15 MS. PALM: Are you cutting off, always the Supreme Court, up to that? Because again, it's his exercising his 16 constitutional rights to appeal to the Supreme Court, and that 17 is sounding like multiple cases, which is not the Court's 18 19 ruling in this case. They get one Judgment of Conviction. 20 So if you want to -- is the Court saying the last time she accused me? I understand that, but up to the Supreme 21 22 Court is what I'm asking for. THE COURT: If -- the section i,s, "If you look in my 23 closet, Detective, you'd be surprised the reports, everything I 24 25 filed, I fought the -- fought the always Supreme Court."

going to exclude that. "The last time she accused me of being" is in.

MS. PALM: Thank you.

THE COURT: At the very bottom of the page you identified was, "I was -- I was out, if you go into the shit, my closet, spare bedroom, you'll find all these documents."

Mr. Lalli, why is that relevant?

MR. LALLI: Well, because it shows his obsession with -- this is all about Victoria. This is all about her and fighting her. It's totally consistent with his intent as indicated to Cheryl Morris. It's relevant to whether this was a malicious killing. It's relevant to the -- to his state of mind.

MS. PALM: And your Honor, that is not the case he went to prison for. The DNA case, he was actually acquitted of the sexual assault. So it's kind of rambling here, but it's not part of the Court's order of what's going to be admissible in this case, what the Court said is the one prior felony domestic violence.

THE COURT: I'm going to exclude that section where in the bracket I was out to the word -- to the last portion, did all the, and then you can finish his sentence. Well, actually, it goes to Page 15, which I don't have, Ms. Palm. So I can't --

ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT

MS. PALM: Okay.

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1
               THE COURT: If you can get that to me today, because
     then I'll -- we'll just do a minute order or a memo to both of
  2
     your offices so you'll know this afternoon --
  3
  4
               MS. PALM:
                          Okay.
                          -- on Page 15. So let's go to Page 16.
  5
               THE COURT:
               MR. LALLI: Well, your Honor, just -- I'm --
  6
  7
               THE COURT:
                           Sure.
 8
               MR. LALLI:
                          So you're saying that on Page 14, the
    bottom of the first full paragraph there, the portion that the
 9
    Court has bracketed, "If you look at my closet, Detective,
10
11
    you'd be surprised the reports, everything I filed, I fought
    the Supreme Court," that's out?
12
                          Yes, and the last time she --
13
               THE COURT:
              MR. LALLI: And then "The last time she accused me of
14
15
    being" --
16
              THE COURT:
                          Yes, that's in.
              MR. LALLI:
                          -- that's in?
17
18
              THE COURT:
                          Right.
                          And then just going down, "accused me of
19
              MR. LALLI:
    being jealous." And then where it says, "I was out, if you go
20
21
    into, oh, shit my closet, " and then all the way down to where
    your bracket ends?
22
23
              THE COURT:
                          Yes.
                          "Did all the" -- and then yeah, we're
24
              MR. LALLI:
25
    going to take a break.
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THE COURT: Right, and I don't know what Page 15 --1 Oh, okay. MR. LALLI: 2 -- says. And then Page 16, "The judge THE COURT: 3 and everybody told me to be careful of the woman." Mr. Lalli, 4 5 on that one? MR. LALLI: It's relevant to -- to intent and motive. 6 Well, (indiscernible) "The judge, told me THE COURT: 7 to be careful of the woman." 8 MR. LALLI: Well, he's -- he's got a prior. He's got 9 a prior, so his -- I mean, normally or many times we have 10 defendants whose criminal records don't come before a jury. 11 That's not the case here. So a lot of the things that we're 12 normally concerned with just aren't applicable. And I'm not 13 sure that any judge told him, quote, "Be careful of the woman 14 you're fucking." I would be -- you know, certainly not in open 15 Court. I can envision some judges saying that outside of 16 Court, but certainly in Court. 17 So, I mean, it's also consistent with just the 18 nonsense that he's pushing in this interview. It's totally 19 consistent with that. 20 THE COURT: All right, Ms. --21 MR. LALLI: It's relevant to his credibility. 22 Ms. Palm. THE COURT: 23 MS. PALM: Again, your Honor, I believe this is the 24 case that he was acquitted on the sexual assault. 25

Court has ruled they're -- you know, to keep this fair that's what's coming in is the one prior felony (indiscernible) of conviction. So I think it's just -- you know, it's just exacerbating the prejudice that attaches to that when here we have a second degree murder, so the weighing is a little bit different.

THE COURT: I'm going to exclude that portion. Page 17. He was talking about his last attorney, Bucky Buchanan (phonetic).

MS. PALM: And again, that -- when you're saying last attorney, it sounds like there's multiple times he's had attorneys and the jury here is only going to know about one.

THE COURT: Mr. Lalli?

MR. LALLI: Well, I mean, I'm not sure that it's terribly probative one way or the other. And just as a practical matter, it's -- it's quite difficult to -- to edit these sorts of statements.

But certainly the portion at the beginning of the brackets there, "But let's don't forget some factors that might come up," I don't think there's any reason to eliminate that sentence when he's talking, for instance, "My last attorney was Bucky Buchanan, the one that wanted to bring records out, mental ward, crazy."

Again, the jury is informed of a prior that he's had. So I don't see any prejudice in -- in leaving that in. "Talk

to her husband that, I don't even know why you're not writing this down." And that also is extremely important, "I don't know why you're writing this down, " around how he treats the female detective during the course of the interview. extremely relevant. So I just don't find any need at all to exclude it. THE COURT: I'm going to exclude the section from "For instance" to the end of the paragraph. MR. LALLI: Well, will the Court leave in, "I don't even know why you're not writing this down, " because he's challenging the detective at that point? It's very clear he's treating her differently than he's treating Detective Wildemann, which is certainly relevant to his -- how he feels about women. It's -- he's -- he's just killed a woman. his ability to dominate women. That's what this case is about. MS. PALM: You know what, your Honor, on second look at that paragraph, I will withdraw my request to exclude that answer. THE COURT: All right, so it's in. The entire section? MR. LALLI: That -- from -- from, "Let's stick to the MS. PALM: truth." to "all talking," that -- that answer, I'm fine with that. THE COURT: All right, Page 18. And that's where it says, "Don't order her around."

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MS. PALM: And you know, I think that this is an improper opinion on the detective on what he's doing, and it -- it kind of invades the province of the jury. They can decide for themselves if that's ordering her around. And I think it's improper bad act. They're trying to make it sound like he's doing something wrong, and he's just saying, "Check my phone."

I think that, you know, it's the detective opinion on what he's doing and it's irrelevant and prejudicial.

MR. LALLI: I don't know how "Don't order her around" could be construed as an opinion. He's directing him, "Don't do something in the context of this interview." I mean, what's the basis for excluding it? It's a statement -- it's -- it's -- it's -- it's -- it's certainly not an opinion that's being offered by the detective. It's the detective's attempt to control this man who's acting like an absolute imbecile during the course of -- of an interview.

THE COURT: I'm going to allow that statement in. At the bottom, he made statements to her that she stabbed her then you made different statements, and objection was hearsay, but he made those statements to other officers; is that correct, Mr. Lalli?

MR. LALLI: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm going to allow that statement in.

Next page, we can go to Page 24 where it says, the officer

says, "Stop acting ridiculous," and it says unintelligible as

far as the response. 1 Same response as the previous section, 2 MR. LALLI: 3 your Honor. 4 MS. PALM: And -- and I have the same comment. 5 Again, these officers are trying to put their spin on, you know, how they interpret his behavior. I think the jury can 7 interpret it for themselves. If they said, you know, "Stop 8 being such a frickin moron killer," would that be allowed in? I mean, it's their opinion on what he's doing. The jury can decide for themselves. 10 THE COURT: I'm going to allow that statement in. 11 12 Page 25, it says, "You're being utterly ridiculous." 13 MS. PALM: Same objection. 14 MR. LALLI: Same response. 15 THE COURT: I think it's just part of, you know, the officer's investigative techniques, and Ms. Palm, you're free 16 to, you know, cross-examine him on that, so I'm going to allow 17 18 that in on Page 25. We jump to Page 27, and it says did time of 22 months 19 20 in CCDC because the Judgment of Conviction is on the felony, not on the gross misdemeanor. 21 22 I don't know if he's talking about just jail time 23 pending trial. MR. LALLI: It -- you know, it's hard to tell, your 24 Honor, and -- and oftentimes folks who are in the criminal 25

justice system are -- you know, they -- they don't see the 1 significance in words like CCDC versus the prison. They don't 2 3 -- they don't -- we as lawyers, I mean, we obviously understand those, while those are two huge things, and I just don't think 4 that there's really any prejudice in leaving in there. 5 We're not going to argue that based upon that he has 6 -- you know, he'd done time this CCDC in addition to -- to the 7 prior. I just don't think it's worth what is going to already 8 take a lot of time of now editing the statement. I -- I just 9 don't think there's sufficient prejudice in that. I think it's 10 11 also lost upon jurors. MS. PALM: And I -- I --12 THE COURT: Well, just in case some of them might 1.3 know, I'm going to exclude that --14 MS. PALM: Thank you. 15 THE COURT: -- section. 16 MR. LALLI: Well, would the Court then consider just 17 allowing the CCDC? "So I did time, 22 months," and leave in 18 the CCDC? 1.9 THE COURT: Well, we don't know if he's referring to 20 the prison or to his jail time. No, I'm going to exclude that 21 -- that sentence --22 23 MR. LALLI: Okay. -- fragment. Go to Page 29. THE COURT: 24 being ridiculous, " I'm going to allow that in. (Indiscernible) 25

Page 29. And then we go to Page 31. I'm going to allow that in. 32, I had some questions. Both counsel read that, get up to speed on that one.

MS. PALM: Again, my -- my objections on this is, you know, they're putting their spin on it. They're saying what a normal rational person does and what he didn't to, and the jury's going to hear from the officers what he did and he didn't do and whether he was combative or not.

And then they had -- the whole normal person wants that person helped. Well, that's for the jury to determine what -- what his intentions were, and I think when the officers are saying how they interpret that evidence, it's improper opinion and vouching for the State's case. And then they talk about having the standoff in the apartment for 15 minutes. It was actually 13 minutes from the time of the call until he was in custody. So it doesn't even state the facts right.

But I -- I just think when they're saying their comment on -- on how that's all to be interpreted, it invades the providence of the jury. It's inappropriate vouching. It's inappropriate opinion and prejudicial. So I don't know why that needs to come in when they're going to hear from the officers anyway.

MR. LALLI: Your Honor, this is great interrogation on behalf of the police officer. He's actually -- he's telling this defendant, he is challenging the manner in which he

responded to law enforcement being there. If this was really somebody that he loved, somebody that he cared about, wouldn't he have invited these police officers in, hey come on in here and help her?

And -- and his answer is so incredibly telling. He doesn't say, well, yeah, maybe that would have made a difference. He changes the whole subject. He -- he makes it about him as opposed to the victim. Standoff, that's what you're being told? I mean, that is incredibly telling of his consciousness of guilt and -- and how he responded to police officers when they arrived there.

THE COURT: I'm going to allow that in. It's somewhat consistent with sexual assault cases where a detective oftentimes will say, you know, like man up. It's not a comment saying you're not being a man. It's just a technique and again, Ms. Palm can clarify that on cross-examination. Page 34.

MS. PALM: 33 you mean?

THE COURT: Did I miss 33? I did. All right. All right, Ms. Palm.

MS. PALM: "You do know, you do know it's time to accept responsibility for what happened in there, okay."

Again, it's improper opinion, comment, they're telling him he will has to accept responsibility. If he did something, maybe, but that's for the jury to determine. If she did something to

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herself or it's an accident, I mean, that's just -- that's
 1
    improper opinion and vouching for State's case.
 2
                         Mr. Lalli.
              THE COURT:
 3
              MR. LALLI: Again, I don't see how "It's time for you
 4
    to accept responsibility," is opinion. It -- I'm not sure that
 5
    I haven't seen this in -- in almost every police interview that
    I've read. Hey, you need to accept responsibility for what
 7
    happened here. It's absolutely proper.
 8
              THE COURT: I'm going to allow that in. Okay, we'll
 9
    go to Page 34. I'm going to allow those two sections in.
10
    There's one at the bottom. I'm going to -- as I had mentioned
11
    I'm already -- I'm excluding the question that says, "You might
12
    want to open the door, actually he might be a fucking nut."
13
    That's excluded.
14
              MR. LALLI: Understood.
                                       Your --
15
              MS. PALM: And I will send over the Page --
16
              THE COURT: Page 15.
17
                         -- 15 today (indiscernible).
18
              MS. PALM:
              THE COURT: If you can do it sooner than later
19
20
    because --
              MS. PALM: I'll do it as soon as I get back --
21
              THE COURT: -- I have a all day evidentiary --
22
                         -- to my office.
              MS. PALM:
23
              THE COURT: -- hearing starting at 11:00.
24
              MR. LALLI: Your Honor, because I want to start
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working on these editions, or the removals of this information,
 1
    can I just quickly make sure that I have -- have it all?
 2
    think the first thing that the Court excluded is on Page 4
 3
    where it -- it -- it says could -- right at the very top where
 4
    it says, "both talking, could it be because they run my prior
 5
    record with me and sigh so-called fiance," and then all the way
 6
    down to where he says, "could that be possible," all that's
 7
    out?
 8
              THE COURT:
                           Yes.
 9
10
              MR. LALLI:
                          Okay.
              THE COURT: I was hoping all of you were -- were
11
    taking notes.
12
                         Well, no, I did, but --
              MR. LALLI:
13
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
14
                          -- I'm -- I'm going to make these edits
              MR. LALLI:
15
    and I just want to make sure that -- that I -- that I didn't
    miss anything.
17
              THE COURT: I have some notes as well, but perhaps
18
    not as detailed as yours.
19
              MR. LALLI: On the next thing that I have is on Page
20
    10, "fucking cops."
21
              THE COURT:
                          Correct.
22
              MR. LALLI: And I don't -- I don't have anything in
23
   between, but just "fucking cops."
24
              THE COURT: Right, that's out.
25
```

MR. LALLI: And then the next thing that I have out 1 is on Page 14, bottom of the first paragraph, "if you look in 2 my closet, Detective, you'll be surprised the reports, 3 everything I filed, fought the always the Supreme Court," that's out? 5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 And then when we go down to the last 7 MR. LALLI: paragraph, "I was out, if you go into oh, shit my closet," all 8 the way down to, "did all the" on the very end of the page is out. 10 THE COURT: Well, let's hold off on that because it 11 appears his sentence is finishing up on Page 15, which I don't 12 So I just want to --13 have. 14 MR. LALLI: Okay. THE COURT: So the sooner I can get that, the sooner 15 I can contact both your offices. 16 MR. LALLI: Okay. And then -- but certainly 17 everything I've read there is out? 18 19 THE COURT: Yes. MR. LALLI: On the next page, Page 16, "The judge and 20 everybody told me to be careful of the woman you're f'ing 21 looking for, " that's out? 22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 "The woman you want to be with," that MR. LALLI: 24 whole sentence is out. And then on Page 17, all that's in. 25

let's see here, the -- the next thing that I have is Page 27, 1 "Did time, 22 months in CCDC," that's out? 2 THE COURT: Correct. 3 MR. LALLI: And then the only other thing that I have 4 is the comment by Detective Wildemann, "You might want -- want 5 to open the door, actually might be an f'ing nut." 6 7 THE COURT: Right. MR. LALLI: One other issue with respect to the 8 statement, there is approximately an hour, the officers start the statement, they talk to him, he's not really being 10 cooperative, they stop, they leave for about an hour, and they 11 come back and they resume the interview. I don't know what Ms. 12 Palm's thought is on that hour in the middle there. 13 I mean, we can certainly leave it in or we can have 14 kind of two statements on one DVD that we admit into evidence. I'm not sure. 16 MS. PALM: You know, can I confer with my client for 17 a minute. 18 THE COURT: All right. We're almost done. 19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have a prelim at 11:00 with 20 a four-year-old, Judge. I moved it back to 11:00. 21 THE COURT: Oh, no, we'll be --22 Okay. We're -- we're fine with taking MS. PALM: 23 that break out so long as it shows that they're breaking. 24 MR. LALLI: 25 It does.

MS. PALM: And then, I -- you know, there's stuff 1 before the transcript that I would like in when -- you know, 2 from the time they start filming until the end of the whole DNA 3 4 collection stuff. I don't want just the interview in. you're going to show the custody, then --5 MR. LALLI: Okay, I'll -- I mean, I'll -- I mean sure 6 7 we can --8 THE COURT: You can meet with her on that. -- agree on something. But I was just MR. LALLI: 9 concerned about the middle section. 10 11 THE COURT: Anything else? 12 MS. PALM: We have lots of other stuff still. Remember, we have the expert issue? Are you talking about 13 anything else on the statement? 14 THE COURT: On the statement. 15 16 MS. PALM: Oh, no, I have nothing else on the statement. 17 18 MR. LALLI: No. We have the issue with respect to Detective Wildemann. And, your Honor, I -- I went back and I 19 20 looked at the trial transcript, and what Detective Wildemann say, he actually -- I don't think he ever even offered a lay 21 witness or an expert opinion in the case. 22 What he said is that, words to the effect of in -- in 23 homicide cases that I have investigated, it's not uncommon for 24 a stabber to cut himself. He doesn't look at the wound. 25

doesn't say anything about it. He just -- he just makes that statement. And the context of it was actually as a result of some cross-examination.

MS. PALM: And that's not -- I don't remember it that way. The transcript says, in his experience suspects in stabbings tend to have wounds where Mr. O'Keefe's wounds were. That's how I remember it. But regardless, they want to have him testify to the wounds in this case. That's how they noticed him and that's the opinion they want from him, and it's not appropriate either lay or expert opinion from a detective.

MR. LALLI: Well, at this point, your Honor, we're withdrawing the -- the notice of expert with respect to Detective Wildemann. We still don't have a CV to --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LALLI: -- to present, and I just don't think it's fair to -- to pursue that route. But I think certainly as a detective, I mean, it's not even an opinion so much. It's just a matter of him saying yeah, in stabbing cases that I've worked on, it's not uncommon for the stabber to have injuries on his hands.

THE COURT: In that regard, Ms. Palm.

MS. PALM: And in that regard, it's inappropriate lay opinion and it's irrelevant what happens in other cases. You know, this is something that a detective is not just qualified to speak on. What they're trying to do is -- is say that these

are, you know, no defensive wounds, and it's inappropriate. 1 And the Lorer (phonetic) case says that. A 2 detective's opinion on the cause or nature of a defendant's 3 injuries is not appropriate lay or expert opinion or expert testimony. 5 MR. LALLI: Well --6 MS. PALM: So I don't know how they think they can 7 address it through Detective Wildemann. 8 MR. LALLI: What --9 THE COURT: Well, you're not going to say it's 10 defense -- defensive in this case? 11 I'm sorry? MR. LALLI: 12 He's not saying -- making a statement THE COURT: 13 specifically to this case that --14 MR. LALLI: No, he's not. 15 MS. PALM: Well, and -- but it -- what's the 16 relevance of other cases then? Why even bring it up? 17 no relevance to it. 18 MR. LALLI: There is relevance to it. 19 MS. PALM: Because he wants to say what happens --20 THE COURT: One at a time. One at a time. 21 MR. LALLI: The relevance of it is is just that. 22 Oftentimes in stabbing cases you're going to have an individual 23 who cuts himself. And to say that Detective Wildemann as a 24 police officer can't testify to that, he's been a police

officer for over 22 years, homicide detective for almost 9 years, worked on over 200 homicide investigations.

THE COURT: How is this different, Ms. Palm, from a homicide detective saying that someone gets shot and behind them's a wall and it's not uncommon most find blood spatter on the walls? Is that an expert opinion or is that opinion based upon his -- his observations, his training and experience?

MS. PALM: Well, wounds are a different thing, and that's what the Lorer case said. Wounds are a specific medical issue that requires some kind of forensic background. And I think it is different because they're trying to implication that he should be a suspect because he has these wounds on his hand.

I think it's -- you know, the jury can think about that themselves. They can look at the wounds and think about that. But he is not the person to, you know, talk about what is common in cases because the implication is that he's part of the commonality that he should be the suspect because of the wounds on his hands.

MR. LALLI: Well --

THE COURT: No, I'm going to allow the testimony, but he's not going to say "and that's what happened here."

MR. LALLI: Great, thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PALM: We also had in -- because they withdrew

the expert notice, we're back on the other act motion. there was one other item in the other act motion which was 2 references to prior trial because the Court had asked me to do 3 the order on it. And so I need to, you know, have -- have the 4 rest of them addressed. 5 We had objected to any reference to the prior trial. 6 The State had said that they agreed, they'll just say prior 7 testimony. 8 MR. LALLI: Prior testimony --9 THE COURT: Prior hearing. 10 -- prior proceeding, things of that nay. MR. LALLI: 11 THE COURT: Yeah. 12 So that will be the order? MS. PALM: 13 THE COURT: Yes. 14 MR. LALLI: We won't tell the jury that he's been 15 convicted one time for this. 16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MS. PALM: And then the Court had said that they were 18 going to look at my discovery, proposed discovery order and 19 20 make any changes. THE COURT: I believe either changes have been made 21 and signed or it's been signed. 22 MS. PALM: Okay. 23 THE COURT: So check with my law clerk. 24 25 MS. PALM: Okay.

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THE COURT: I know I've signed it.
 1
              MS. PALM: And then --
 2
              THE COURT: Remember the scanning process is not one
 3
    day, two days or three days --
 4
              MS. PALM:
                         Right.
 5
              THE COURT:
                         -- we've been told.
                                               It's ten days.
 6
              MS. PALM: And then I still am waiting to meet with
 7
    their expert. I haven't been able to do that yet.
 8
    don't know.
 9
              MR. LALLI: This -- this afternoon is free.
10
              MS. PALM: You have set it up? Okay.
11
              THE COURT: All right, and on any, what I call
12
    special jury instructions, if I could have those the first day
13
    of trial if you have time. If not, the second day with cites
14
    and without cites.
15
              MS. PALM:
                         Okay.
16
              MR. LALLI: Oh, you want them with cites? Okay, very
17
    good.
18
              MS. PALM: And then I need to be able to tell my
19
    experts what we're working with. I had given Mr. Lalli as well
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    as the Court's clerk a copy of the excerpts from the medical
21
   records that we want to admit. And I need to work that out as
22
   soon as possible because I have to let my experts know what
23
   we're doing.
24
             MR. LALLI: Well, I -- I received it yesterday late
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afternoon, and I was at an event all last night, so I haven't
 1
    had a chance to really go through that stuff. But I --
 2
    obviously, it's I think a priority for both of us. We want to
 3
    know the status of that evidence --
 4
              THE COURT: All right.
 5
              MR. LALLI:
                           -- so --
 6
                          If you can -- if you know before 5:00
              THE COURT:
 7
    today, if you can fax it over.
 8
              MR. LALLI:
                          The both of us --
 9
                          No, because --
              THE COURT:
10
                          -- if we have an agreement?
              MR. LALLI:
11
                         -- I -- there was -- there was -- we had
              THE COURT:
12
    a smaller stack of records and I think Ms. Palm was going to --
13
    the two of you were going to meet to see which you don't object
14
    to and perhaps there's a couple pages you do object to. And I
15
    thought I was going to decide on Monday.
16
              MS. PALM: Okay.
17
                          That was my understanding.
              MR. LALLI:
18
              MS. PALM: All right.
19
              MR. LALLI: But I think what we, Ms. Palm and I, had
20
    actually discussed was a written stipulation because it is --
21
    it is going to be extremely difficult to redact the medical
22
    records. But we, I think, would have something
23
24
    (indiscernible).
              MS. PALM: Either way I could redact them or not, but
25
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I gave him what I wanted and I copied the Court with it, so --
 1
              THE COURT: Okay.
 2
              MS. PALM: -- hopefully Monday we'll have a
 3
    resolution.
 4
              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
 5
                          Thank you.
              MR. LALLI:
 6
              MS. PALM:
                         Thank you.
 7
              THE COURT: All right.
 8
              THE CLERK: Are you going to use all the old
 9
    exhibits?
10
              MR. LALLI: The physical evidence, yes.
                                                        The
11
    photographs, no.
12
              THE CLERK: You're going to bring me new exhibits,
13
    then?
14
              MR. LALLI: New photographs.
15
              THE CLERK: Okay.
16
                         I would like to use the --
              MS. PALM:
17
                         (Indiscernible).
              THE CLERK:
18
              MS. PALM: -- other photographs. That's how I
19
    prepared.
20
              THE CLERK: (Indiscernible) exhibits (indiscernible).
21
                         Thank you.
              MS. PALM:
22
              MR. LALLI: Are they -- I'd like to go to the vault
23
   and look at the exhibits. Is -- is there a time that those
24
   will be called up and I'll go before then?
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THE CLERK: I can send an e-mail to Ann right now and
 1
    -- and go to the third floor records on the -- of this
 2
    building --
 3
              MR. LALLI: Yes.
 4
                          -- and ask (indiscernible) -- you know,
              THE CLERK:
 5
    say that you want to look at the stuff in the vault and they'll
 6
    call Ann (indiscernible).
 7
              MS. PALM: Your Honor, what time are we convening
 8
    Monday?
 9
              THE COURT: 10:00.
10
                         10:00? Thank you.
              MS. PALM:
11
              MR. LALLI:
                         Thank you.
12
              THE COURT: All right, thank you. Actually, if
13
    counsel could be here 15 minutes early so we can go over any
14
             Be here at 9:45. The jury will be --
15
    issues.
              MR. LALLI: May I approach (indiscernible).
16
                          Yes. And --
              THE COURT:
17
                         (Indiscernible).
              MR. LALLI:
18
              THE COURT: Yeah. And I've got to do overflow.
19
                    (Off-record bench conference).
20
                    (Court recessed at 9:33 a.m.).
21
22
23
24
25
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

ATTEST: Pursuant to Rule 3C(d) of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, I acknowledge that this is a rough draft transcript, expeditiously prepared, not proofread, corrected, or certified to be an accurate transcript.

Verbatim Digital Reporting, LLC Littleton, CO 80120 303-798-0890

JULIE LORD, TRANSCRIBER

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CAROL DONAHOO, DEPUTY

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff.

VS.

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BRIAN K. O'KEEFE,

Defendant.

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVII

DATE:

TIME:

080250630

Jury Instructions

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

COMES NOW Defendant, Brian K. O'Keefe, by and through his attorney, Patricial Palm of Palm Law Firm, Ltd., and hereby submits to this Honorable Court his attached proposed and requested jury instructions.

Dated this 21st day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

Pátricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd.

Las Vegas, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113

Fax: (702) 386-9114

Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

INSTRUCTION NO. ___

If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis therein is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance to their relative importance.

Yamaha Motor Co. v. Arnoult, 114 Nev. 233, 955 P.2d 661 (1998).

INSTRUCTION NO. _

If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis therein is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance to their relative importance.

В

INSTRUCTION NO. _

An Information is a formal method of accusing a person of a crima but is not evidence of his guilt.

In this case, Brian O'Keefe is charged by Second Amended Information with Second Degree Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon. This charge encompasses the lesser charge of Involuntary Manslaughter.

The jury must decide if the State has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian O'Keefe is guilty of any offense, and if so, which offense.

 Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 745, 751, 121 P.3d 582, 586 (2005).

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The jury must decide if the State has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian O'Keefe is guilty of any offense, and if so, which offense.

INSTRUCTION NO.

The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by the witness's manner on the stand, his or her relationship to the parties, fears, motives, interests or feelings, and opportunity to have observed the matter to which the witness testified; the reasonableness of the witness's statements and the strength or weaknesses of his or her recollections.

If you believe a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of the witness's testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

The weight of the evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of witnesses testifying. You should consider all the facts and circumstances in evidence.

Quillen v. State, 112 Nev. 1369, 1381, 929 P.2d 893, 901 (1997).

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The weight of the evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of witnesses testifying. You should consider all the facts and circumstances in evidence.

 Evidence that Brian O'Keefe committed the felony offense of domestic battery, or is alleged to have made statements indicating an intent to harm Victoria Whitmarsh, and evidence that he is alleged to have indicated an ability to kill with a knife by cutting a person in the sternum area was not received and may not be considered by you to prove that he is a person of bad character or to prove that he has a propensity to commit any crime. Such evidence was received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining the issue of whether or not Brian O'Keefe had a motive or intent to commit the crime charged.

Neither the felony conviction, nor the other acts, if believed, necessarily establish proof of motive or intent to commit the crime charged. You must weigh this evidence in the same manner as you do all other evidence.

<u>Fields v. State</u>, 125 Nev. ____, 220 P.3d 724, 729 (2009) (trial court, absent waiver from defendant, must give a limiting instruction explaining the purpose for which bad act evidence is being admitted immediately prior to its admission and an instruction at the end of the case reminding jurors of the limited use of the evidence).

Harris v. State, 106 Nev. 667, 799 P.2d 1104 (1990) (addressing the use of felony convictions).

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The fact a person has been convicted of a felony, may only be considered by you

for the purpose of determining the credibility of that person. The fact of such conviction

does not necessarily destroy or impair a person's credibility. It is one of the

circumstances that you may take into consideration in weighing the testimony of such

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INSTRUCTION NO.

The elements of second degree murder are: (1) an unlawful killing of a human being, and (2) with malice aforethought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be effected by various means.

NRS 200.010

INSTRUCTION NO.___

б

The elements of second degree murder are: (1) an unlawful killing of a human being, and (2) with malice aforethought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be effected by various means.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Malice aforethought means the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal cause or excuse. The State has the burden of proving the intent to do a wrongful act beyond a reasonable doubt.

This requires that the State also disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was legally excused or justified by accident or self-defense.

If the State fails either to prove malice aforethought or to disprove accident and self-defense, it is your duty to return a verdict of Not Guilty of second degree murder.

NRS 200.010; <u>Ybarra v. Wolff</u>, 662 F. Supp. 44 (D. Nev. 1987) (government's burden); Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687, 715, 7 P.3d 426, 444 (2000) (State's burden on malice); <u>Crawford v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 746, 751, 752-53, 121 P.3d 582 (2005) (state's burden, definition of malice aforethought, and defendant's entitlement to significance of his theory instruction); <u>Brooks v. State</u>, 124 Nev. ____,180 P.3d 657, 662 (2008) (defendant's entitled to significance instructions and instructions that are specifically tailored to the facts of the case).

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If the State fails either to prove malice aforethought or to disprove accident and self-defense, it is your duty to return a verdict of Not Guilty of second degree murder.

INSTRUCTION NO. ___

Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of another, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.

Malice may be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

NRS 200.020; <u>Cordova v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 664, 6 P.3d 481 (2000) (malice may be implied is the preferred instruction).

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 Malice may be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

INSTRUCTION NO. __

The abandoned and malignant heart implied malice requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian O'Keefe acted with an extreme recklessness regarding homicidal risk. That is, he must have intended to commit acts which caused the death of Victoria Whitmarsh, he must have known that his acts were likely to cause her death, and he must have consciously disregarded the risk to her life.

Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687, 712-13, 716, 7 P.3d 426, 442, 444 (2000).

INSTRUCTION NO. _

The abandoned and malignant heart implied malice requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian O'Keefe acted with an extreme recklessness regarding homicidal risk. That is, he must have intended to commit acts which caused the death of Victoria Whitmarsh, he must have known that his acts were likely to cause her death, and he must have consciously disregarded the risk to her life.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being without malice aforethought, but in the commission of a lawful act which might probably produce such a consequence in an unlawful manner.

If Brian O'Keefe unintentionally or accidentally killed Victoria Whitmarsh during a lawful act, but in doing so acted with a wanton or reckless disregard for human life that is not of the extreme nature that will support a finding of implied malice, then the crime is involuntary manslaughter and not second-degree murder.

 NRS 200.070; <u>United States of America v. Crowe</u>, 563 F. 3d 969, _____(9th Cir. 2009): <u>Crawford v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 746, 751, 752-53, 121 P.3d 582 (2005) (state's burden, definition of malice aforethought, and defendant's entitlement to significance of his theory instruction); <u>Brooks v. State</u>, 124 Nev. ____,180 P.3d 657, 662 (2008) (defendant's entitlement to significance instructions and instructions that are specifically tailored to the facts of the case).

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Β

INSTRUCTION NO.

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was unlawful, but you have a reasonable doubt whether the crime is second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter, you must give the benefit of the doubt to the defendant and find it to be involuntary manslaughter rather than second degree murder.

<u>Crawford v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 746, 751, 752-53, 121 P.3d 582 (2005) (state's burden, benefit of the doubt instruction, and defendant's entitlement to significance of his theory instruction); <u>Brooks v. State</u>, 124 Nev. ____, 180 P.3d 657, 662 (2008) (defendant's entitlement to significance instructions and instructions that are specifically tailored to the facts of the case).

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An lawful act done without any intention of killing which unfortunately kills another, and which is not done with such extreme or wanton and reckless disregard for human life as would constitute malice aforethought or involuntary manslaughter is not unlawful and does not constitute second degree murder or manslaughter. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the death of Victoria Whitmarsh was caused by such a lawful act, you must give the benefit of the doubt to Brian O'Keefe and return a verdict of Not Guilty.

NRS 200.180; <u>United States of America v. Crowe</u>, 563 F. 3d 969, (9th Cir. 2009) (definition of involuntary manslaughter recklessness): <u>Ybarra v. Wolff</u>, 662 F. Supp. 44 (D. Nev. 1987) (government's burden); <u>Collman v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 687, 715, 7 P.3d 426, 444 (2000) (State's burden on malice, definition of abandoned and malignant heart malice); <u>Crawford v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 746, 751, 752-53, 121 P.3d 582 (2005) (state's burden, definition of malice aforethought, and defendant's entitlement to significance of his theory instruction); Brooks v. State, 124 Nev. ____,180 P.3d 657, 662 (2008) (defendant's entitled to significance instructions and instructions that are specifically tailored to the facts of the case).

 An lawful act done without any intention of killing which unfortunately kills another, and which is not done with such extreme or wanton and reckless disregard for human life as would constitute malice aforethought or involuntary manslaughter is not unlawful and does not constitute second degree murder or manslaughter. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the death of Victoria Whitmarsh was caused by such a lawful act, you must give the benefit of the doubt to Brian O'Keefe and return a verdict of Not Guilty.

To constitute the crime charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an

act forbidden by law and certain mental state in the mind of the actor. Unless the

mental state is proved, the crime to which it relates is not committed.

CALJIC 3.31.5; NRS 193.190.

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INSTRUCTION NO. ___

The intent with which an act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Θ

Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done.

Motive is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to prove motive on the part of a defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case.

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В

Brian O'Keefe is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places on the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged and that Brian O'Keefe committed the offense.

A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Brian O'Keefe, he is entitled to a verdict of Not Guilty.

NRS 175.211; <u>Brooks v. State</u>, 124 Nev. ___,180 P.3d 657, 662 (2008) (defendant's entitled to significance instructions and instructions that are specifically tailored to the facts of the case).

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If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Brian O'Keefe, he is entitled to a verdict of Not Guilty.

 The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

There are two types of evidence; direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime charged, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a chain of facts and circumstances which tend to show whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.

Statements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case. However, if the attorneys stipulate to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

You must not speculate to be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the court and any evidence ordered stricken by the court.

Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

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A witness who has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in a particular science, profession or occupation is an expert witness. An expert witness may give his opinion as to any matter in which he is skilled.

You should consider such expert opinion and weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if, in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound.

Prabhu v. Levine, 112 Nev. 1538, 930 P.2d 103 (1996).

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 Although you are to consider only the evidence in eh case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in light of common experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess. A verdict should never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

Howard v. State, 102 Nev. 572, 729 P.2d 1341 (1987).

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В

The right of self-defense is not available to an original aggressor, that is a person who has sought a quarrel with the design to force a deadly issue and thus through his fraud, contrivance or fault, to create a real or apparent necessity for making a felonious assault.

However, where a person without voluntarily seeking, provoking, inviting, or willfully engaging in a difficulty of his own free will, is attacked by an assailant, he has the right to stand his ground and need not retreat when faced with the threat of deadly force.

Culverson v. State, 106 Nev. 484, 797 P.2d 238 (1990).

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However, where a person without voluntarily seeking, provoking, inviting, or willfully engaging in a difficulty of his own free will, is attacked by an assailant, he has the right to stand his ground and need not retreat when faced with the threat of deadly force.

 Actual danger is not necessary to justify force used in self-defense. A person has a right to defend from apparent danger to the same extent as he would from actual danger. A person using even deadly force is justified if:

- he is confronted by the appearance of imminent danger which arouses in his mind an honest belief and fear that he is about to be killed or suffer great bodily injury; and
- 2) He acts solely upon these appearances and his fear and actual beliefs; and
- A reasonable person in a similar situation would believe himself to be in like danger.

Such force is justified even if it develops afterward that the person using it was mistaken about the extent of the danger.

Runion v. State, 116 Nev. 1041, 13 P.3d 52, 59 (2000).

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Such force is justified even if it develops afterward that the person using it was mistaken about the extent of the danger.

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B

Brian O'Keefe is entitled to use even deadly force in self-defense even though the danger to life or personal security may not have been real, if a person in the circumstances and from the viewpoint of Brian O'Keefe would reasonably have believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.

Pineda v. State, 120 Nev. 204, 88 P.3d 827 (2004).

INSTRUCTION NO. _

Brian O'Keefe is entitled to use even deadly force in self-defense even though the danger to life or personal security may not have been real, if a person in the circumstances and from the viewpoint of Brian O'Keefe would reasonably have believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.

If evidence of self-defense is present, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. If you find the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian O'Keefe did not act in self-defense, you must find him Not Guilty.

Runion v. State, 116 Nev. 1041, 13 P.3d 52 (2000).

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 Before you may consider evidence of the Statements of Brian O'Keefe made during his interrogation by Homicide Detectives, you must find that the State has established by a preponderance of the evidence that he made those statements voluntarily. Voluntariness under the law requires that the act be a product of rational intellect and free will. In determining voluntariness, you must consider the totality of circumstances present during the interrogation, including, Brian O'Keefe's physical condition, including intoxication, experience with the criminal justice system, age, education, the length of the detention, repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, and use of physical punishment such as deprivation of food or sleep.

A defendant's intoxication will make a statement inadmissible only if the accused is intoxicated to the extent of being incapable of understanding the meaning of his comments. If you determination that Brian O'Keefe was so incapable, then you may not consider his interview with homicide detectives in your assessment of the evidence in this case.

Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 111 P.3d 690 (2005); <u>Laursen v. State</u>, 97 Nev. 568, 634 P.2d 1230 (1981).

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A defendant's intoxication will make a statement inadmissible only if the accused is intoxicated to the extent of being incapable of understanding the meaning of his comments. If you determination that Brian O'Keefe was so incapable, then you may not consider his interview with homicide detectives in your assessment of the evidence in this case.

B

When you retire to consider your verdict, you must select one of you to act as foreperson who will preside over your deliberation and will be your spokesperson here in court.

During your deliberation, you will have all the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions and forms of verdict which have been prepared for your convenience.

Your verdict must be unanimous. As soon as you have agreed upon a verdict, have it signed and dated by your foreperson and then return with it to this room.

The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict must be unanimous.

It is your duty, as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors.

In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because it is the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.

You are the judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in this case.

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In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because it is the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.

You are the judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO. __

The non-flight of a person from the location immediately after the act occurred which resulted in a criminal charge is not sufficient in itself to establish innocence, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proved facts in deciding whether the State has met its burden of proof to establish the elements of the offense charged.

CALJIC NO. 2.52

INSTRUCTION NO. _

The non-flight of a person from the location immediately after the act occurred which resulted in a criminal charge is not sufficient in itself to establish innocence, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proved facts in deciding whether the State has met its burden of proof to establish the elements of the offense charged.

NRS 193.220

No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be

deemed less criminal by reason of his condition, but whenever the actual existence of

any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular

species or degree of crime, evidence of intoxication may be taken into consideration in

determining such purpose, motive or intent.

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No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, evidence of intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such purpose, motive or intent.

INSTRUCTION NO.

If the evidence in this case is subject to two constructions of interpretations, each of which appears to you to be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of the defendant, and the other to the innocence, it is your duty to adopt the interpretation which will admit of the defendant's innocence, and reject that which points to guilt.

В

You will notice the rule applies only when both of the two possible opposing conclusions appear to you to be reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the possible conclusions should appear to you to be reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere to the reasonable deduction and to reject the unreasonable, bearing in mind, however, even if the reasonable deduction points to defendant's guilt, the entire proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt to support a verdict of guilty.

<u>Crane v. State</u>, 88 Nev. 684, 687, 504 P.2d 12 (1972); <u>Bails v. State</u>, 92 Nev. 95, 97, 545 P.2d 1155 (1976).

INSTRUCTION NO. _

If the evidence in this case is subject to two constructions of interpretations, each of which appears to you to be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of the defendant, and the other to the innocence, it is your duty to adopt the interpretation which will admit of the defendant's innocence, and reject that which points to guilt.

You will notice the rule applies only when both of the two possible opposing conclusions appear to you to be reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the possible conclusions should appear to you to be reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere to the reasonable deduction and to reject the unreasonable, bearing in mind, however, even if the reasonable deduction points to defendant's guilt, the entire proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt to support a verdict of guilty.

7 3								
1	VER							
2								
3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA							
4 5	STATE OF NEVADA,)	CASE NO: C250630						
6	Plaintiff,	DEPT NO. XVII						
7	vs.	DATE:						
8	BRIAN K. O'KEEFE,	TIME:						
9	Defendant.							
10)							
11								
12	v	ERDICT						
13	We, the jury in the above entit	ed case, find the Defendant BRIAN KERRY						
14	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant BRIAN KERRY O'KEEFE, as follows:							
15								
16 17	COUNT 1 — SECOND DEGREE MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON: Guilty of Second Degree Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon							
18								
20	Guilty of Second Degree	e Murder						
21	Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter Not Guilty							
22								
23	THOC COMEY	;						
24								
25	Dated this day of	_, 2010.						
26								
27	Foreperson							
28								
	30							

1	ORDR PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.	FILED IN OPEN COURT AUG 2 3 2010 20						
3	PATRICIA PALM, ESQ. NEVADA BAR NO. 6009	CHARLES J. SHORT CLERK OF THE COURT						
4	1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD. LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113	BY CAROL DONAHOO						
5	Fax: (702) 386-9114 Email: Patricia.palmlaw@gmail.com	DEFUTY						
6	Attorney for Brian O'Keefe	OT COURT						
7	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA							
В	STATE OF NEVADA,) CASE NO: C250630						
9	Plaintiff,) DEPT. NO: XVII						
10	vs.) DATE:						
12	BRIAN K. O'KEEFE,	TIME:						
13	Defendant.)						
14		,						
15 16	ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND DENYING, IN PART, MOTION BY DEFENDANT							
17	This matter having come before the	e Court on August 12, 2010, on a Notice o						
18	Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe	for Discovery, to which an Opposition was						
19 20	filed by the State, and the Court having heard argument and been fully advised in the							
21	premises, and good cause appearing therefore;							
22		Motion is GRANTED, in part, except as to the						
23		c), pursuant to this Court's Order, the State						
24	·	cient to identify any felony convictions of the						
25								
26								
27								
28								

lay witnesses within the past ten (10) years and the last known addresses for the lay witnesses, as to any additional information sought under paragraph 8(a)-(c), the Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 2 day of August, 2010.

Respe	ctfully submitted by:	
PALM	LAW FIRM, LTD.	

District Tudge

PATRICIA A. PALM

1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104

(702) 386-9113

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Nov 23 10 21 AM '10

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

CASE NO. C-250630

Plaintiff,

vs.

DEPT. NO. 17

BRIAN KERRY O'KEEFE,

Defendant.

Transcript of Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL - DAY 1

> PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT (EXCLUDES VOIR DIRE)

MONDAY, AUGUST 23, 2010

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

CHRISTOPHER LALLI, ESQ.

Assistant District Attorney

STEPHANIE GRAHAM, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

PATRICIA PALM, ESQ.

Special Deputy Public Defender

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

MICHELLE RAMSEY District Court

VERBATIM DIGITAL REPORTING, LLC

Littleton, CO 80120

(303) 798-0890

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, AUGUST 23, 2010, 10:21 A.M. (Outside the presence of the prospective jury panel).

THE COURT: On the record outside. We are outside the presence of the jury panel. Just so I'm clear, Ms. Palm, the -- you have some items from the psyche reports or hospitalization of the victim in this matter. And you've typed some areas that you would like to get into or to have your expert review and opine his view on these issues; is that correct?

MS. PALM: Well, here's what it is, your Honor, we started with about three inches of medical records from numerous hospital admissions and then the court had asked us well, can we agree to something.

This is what I reduced it down to, which is substantially reduced. And I want actually the records in themselves or if we can agree to a stipulation that has this language that these things show in her medical records, because otherwise, Mr. Lalli and I were talking, the records would probably have to be heavily redacted.

But yes, these are the things that I want in whether or not an expert testifies. And then I would like an expert to be able to explain bipolar disorder, what that means and agoraphobia, what that means and anxiety attacks, what that means. Those things that are in this.

THE COURT: And there's -- there's items in here

ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT

about her trying to kill herself, cutting her -- cutting herself.

MS. PALM: That's correct. And -- and then what Mr. Lalli did was he highlighted the portions that he was agreeable to. My problem is it takes out references to the numerous suicide attempts, which I think are relevant. By the time of the 2007 one, it was her seventh documented suicide attempts. And if you look at what he's just got in here, it looks like she's only had two. I think that's a big difference to five years apart versus seven.

So that's one of my concerns. The other concern is he's taken out the diagnoses of borderline personal traits, depression, bipolar disorder. He has also taken out the substantial mood swings, mood periods, high moods at problems of anger and then again the diagnoses with that. And the final suicide attempt from 2007 he doesn't even want mentioned.

So, I mean, what I felt like that I had reduced a lot of records from many years to a very few records. But I think that the suicide attempts are important. And I didn't even include the 2002 hospitalization, in which she had -- the records show that it was a overdose or she was in for drug dependency.

But -- but my client actually took her to the hospital for that. She had overdosed. So he knows about that one. Also, I didn't even include that because it wasn't listed

in the records as an overdose. It was just a drug treatment, 1 and you know, being fair and trying to limit it to what's 2 really relevant in this case, the numerous suicide attempts and 3 the various diagnoses she's had, I didn't include the drugs 4 because I didn't think that the court would think that the 5 drugs just being a drug addict by itself is -- is necessarily 6 all that relevant to all the issues in the case. 7 So that's why I made this -- you know, this reduced list that I made, and -- and that's where my position is. 9 THE COURT: Just so I'm clear, is there a specific --10 I mean, I read through -- is there a -- did I miss this, is 11 there a specific entry that says seven suicide attempts or is 12 that just that you added them up throughout the records? 13 MS. PALM: If you add them up --14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 -- based on the references in here, yes, MS. PALM: 16 there are seven documented. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 There's eight that he knows about. MS. PALM: 19 THE COURT: Okay. All right, thank you. Mr. Lalli, 20 let's address first if we are allowing certain entries, whether 21 by stipulation or records. And those are the ones you've 22 identified and highlighted with yellow that you have no 23 objection to. How are -- I mean, is there an agreement as to 24 how we're going to admit that into evidence? 25

MR. LALLI: Well, what I had proposed to Ms. Palm is that it be in the form of a stipulation. A written stipulation that can be read to the jury is -- is how my experience of how stipulations are done with respect to specific fact.

If I could just hit rewind a little bit. Generally, character evidence is not admissible to show that a person acted in conformity therewith and -- number one. Number two, it has never been the law in this state or the law in any state that a victim can or should be subjected to complete in total character assassination. It's -- it's simply not fair to the victim. It's prejudicial in that it confuses the -- the facts in controversy to the jury. And that's -- that's what's going on here.

Suicide attempts don't equate to a danger or specific acts of danger to somebody else, especially when the aggression is inward. Depression and mood swings doesn't mean that this person poses a physical risk or threat to someone else.

There's -- I'm sure there's probably 30 people with bipolar disorder that are -- are walking around this courtroom right now or court house -- court house right now.

So, I mean, that in conjunction with the concept or the idea that medical records, particularly psychiatric records, are very personal, very discrete, very private. And it -- it's just a courtroom is not the proper place to just air this woman's laundry. What -- what -- what the law says, what

Daniels and Petty (phonetic) say is that generally evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, opinion or reputation are admissible to show that it the victim was a violent person which in other words would make it more likely that the victim was the initial aggressor in a self-defense case.

This really is not even a self-defense case because the defendant has never said that he killed this woman out of fear that she would kill him first or hurt him first. He never even said that. So we're not even arguably in a very technical sense in a self-defense case. I'm not even sure they're entitled to self-defense instructions.

Now let's -- let's move into the specific incidence situation. That's when -- when -- when does this sort of information specific incidence come before a jury? Well, as -- even as a predicate to that, he's -- he's gotta testify and he's gotta -- to indicate that he knew it. But under the facts of the case, your Honor has to use your discretion to determine is this truly relevant to an issue of self-defense? The reasonableness of his fears.

It's in the admissible as Ms. Palm suggests in her argument to show that the victim acted in conformity therewith. She's a suicidal person, therefore she tried to commit suicide on this day. It's not relevant for that. The law is very specific. In fact, there is no Nevada case that says inward acts of aggression. Attempted suicides are relevant in

self-defense cases when it's the victim who's doing it.

So I -- and I would also note that the court reviewed this issue at the prior trial and made a determination that none of it was admissible. However, out an abundance of caution, out of appearing before the supreme court and -- and going there, there are some things that are would not be surprised if they were to extend our doctrines in this state.

And certainly, mere depression, bipolar disorder, mood swings, suicide attempts in and of themselves would not be included in that. There's no articulable legal standard that would allow those items to come before a jury in this case.

Now, if you're talking about in this case attempts where she's using implements to cut herself and it's the defense -- it's the defendant's position that she introduced the knife to controversy, I mean, I can -- I can understand how perhaps our supreme court would extend current doctrines to allow that in.

So I have highlighted the areas that I think best suit that in spite of the fact that there's no case law to support it and the court's already ruled that it was inadmissible in the last trial. But the court is correct, the information that I have highlighted is information that I am willing to agree would be admissible.

THE COURT: All right. Excuse me. All right, thank you, Mr. Lalli and Ms. Palm. I've reviewed the, I guess I'll

call it a summary. And what we'll do, Ms. Palm, we'll have had admitted as a court's exhibit, the sheet here, okay, for any appellate purposes.

And so does everyone have their copy in front of them.

MS. GRAHAM: Yes.

MS. PALM: Yes, Judge.

MR. LALLI: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. On paragraph one, Mr. Lalli, the first two lines are just setting forth that it -- that this entry came from Monte Vista Hospital. Do you have any objection to that information being admitted through a stipulation?

MR. LALLI: No.

THE COURT: Okay. So from the word records to the word herself, the court is going to allow. This is paragraph one. From the word she to agoraphobia and -- and discharge summary, the court is going to not allow that information. The second paragraph it says when Victoria Whitmarsh was brought to Sunrise Hospital, that -- that section will be admitted.

On the next paragraph down, it starts with she was diagnosed, the court's going to allow that she had laceration on both wrists. So the remaining portion would be disallowed and again, hopefully the parties will work together and get a stipulation with these items. The next paragraph --

MR. LALLI: I'm sorry, so the -- the -- the 1 2 paragraph --Where it says she was diagnosed by Edwin 3 THE COURT: Decay (phonetic), MD. 4 Yes, that paragraph is out? 5 MR. LALLI: Right. However, the -- and we'll have to THE COURT: 6 work on the stipulation here where there's an entry that says 7 laceration --8 9 MR. LALLI: I see. -- on both wrists, that will be allowed 10 to come -- to come in. 11 MR. LALLI: Okay. 12 I'll sorry, so it would be she was 13 MS. PALM: diagnosed with laceration on both wrists, maybe? 14 THE COURT: Right. And then we'll come down to the 15 next paragraph where it says psychiatric eval by Dr. Decay 16 shows, that paragraph, okay. 17 MS. PALM: Um-h'm. 18 THE COURT: I'm going to allow that paragraph up 19 until the last phrase, she reported anxiety attacks. She 20 reported anxiety attacks is out, okay. The last paragraph on 21 Page 1 will not be admitted in. On Page 2, first paragraph 22 will come in. MS. PALM: And your Honor, could we have the heading 24 that says the September 2006 Monte Vista from the first 25

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1
    paragraph --
              THE COURT:
                          Yes.
 2
                          -- because otherwise it doesn't --
 3
              THE COURT: Yes.
 4
                         -- really make sense.
              MS. PALM:
 5
 6
              THE COURT: Yes.
 7
              MS. PALM:
                         Okay.
                          So then we're on paragraph one of Page 2,
              THE COURT:
 8
    that comes in. Paragraph two an Page 2 comes in. Paragraph
 9
    three is out. Paragraph four is in, excluding the last
10
    sentence that says she's also had one other psychiatric
11
    admission, that's out. The next paragraph is in. The final
12
    paragraph on Page 2 is out.
13
              First two paragraphs of Page 3 are out.
14
    three is in. And the last paragraph on Page 3 is out. And so
15
    if parties can work together and prepare some type of
16
    stipulation for that information. All right, and do the
17
    parties have any proposed jury instructions for me to start
18
    looking at?
19
                         I filed mine this morning, your Honor.
20
              MS. PALM:
21
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
              MR. LALLI: Your Honor, I -- I will have mine for the
22
    court tomorrow morning.
23
              THE COURT: All right.
24
             MR. LALLI: And my -- my question is, I know the
25
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court wanted cites. Does the court want cites on the --
  1
               THE COURT: Not on the what we call --
  2
                          -- the murder instruction, for instance?
  3
               MR. LALLI:
               THE COURT:
                           We're not supposed to call them stock, I
  4
    guess, but any what we'll call special instructions that you --
 5
    that you believe there will be some objections to.
 6
               MR. LALLI:
                          Does --
 7
               THE COURT: If you can give us the cites on that.
 8
    don't need the one for beyond a reasonable doubt.
 9
              MS. PALM: Oh, see, I try to look all that stuff up.
10
              THE COURT: Okay.
11
                          I thought you wanted cites on --
12
              MS. PALM:
13
              MR. LALLI:
                          Would the court --
                           If you have them, great. I'm saying
14
              THE COURT:
    you'll have them for next time, Ms. Palm, okay.
15
              MR. LALLI: Well, I have a voluntary intoxication
16
    instruction, for example.
17
              THE COURT: All right.
18
              MR. LALLI: I will attach cites to it.
19
20
    Runion (phonetic) self-defense instructions, I --
              THE COURT: Are you -- well --
21
                          (Indiscernible) a couple (indiscernible)
22
              MS. PALM:
23
    instructions?
24
              MR. LALLI:
                          No.
                          If you'd just -- just cite Runion on
              THE COURT:
25
```

I also need instruction in the event the defendant takes 1 -- instruction on voluntariness of confession. 2 3 MR. LALLI: Right. THE COURT: I need that instruction. Instruction if 4 the defendant takes the stand. I'm assuming, Ms. Palm, you ma 5 I have that in your packet. 6 MR. LALLI: Okay. 7 All right. 8 THE COURT: MS. PALM: And -- and I do have another issue with 9 instructions, your Honor. And that is that before Cheryl 10 Morris takes the stand or before they get evidence of the prior 11 felony conviction, the court is supposed to instruct them on 12 the limited use of that evidence. I do have an instruction in 13 my packet which talks about it. I don't know if the court 14 wants to use that. 15 I've given them a copy of it. But they are --16 THE COURT: All right. 17 18 MS. PALM: -- supposed to be instructed before it 19 comes in. 20 THE COURT: Yes. All right. I would agree just (indiscernible) 4805 21 MR. LALLI: instruction. 22 Right. If you have one, State's 23 THE COURT: 24 different than Ms. Palm's, or if you agree on hers, then that's 25 fine.

MS. PALM: And -- and I have to make an -- or a record of my objections --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PALM: -- during the jury voir dire.

THE COURT: Please do so.

MS. PALM: During the jury voir dire there was reference to battered women's syndrome. I objected to that on the basis that it's touching on the facts of the case. We don't have any evidence of battered -- and also we don't have any evidence of battered women's syndrome and we're not planning to introduce such evidence, so I thought it was improper.

And the second objection I made was improper currying favor with the juror when Ms. Graham was talking about (indiscernible) to I understand about following your kids around. The third objection was to touching on the facts of the case by talking about whether a neighbor should be getting involved in a domestic violence dispute or not.

THE COURT: Who's going to handle that for the State?

MR. LALLI: Well, with respect to domestic violence,
asking jurors what they believe battered women's syndrome is,
battered women's syndrome, as I understand it, is the syndrome
by which women or certainly men find themselves in an
inescapable relationship. And they either keep returning to it
or they come back. And it is an acknowledged psychiatric

condition.

In this case we have a situation where a woman, in spite of being battered to the point of having a defendant suffer a felony conviction and go to prison for three years, she went back to him. And the questions are designed to discern whether jurors have a preconceived idea of whether that exists, that such a syndrome exists, whether there are situations where that happens or whether, you know, they have the opinion that if -- if she went back, then she deserved to be murdered.

And I think without asking to prejudge the evidence, those are real issues, and I think it is fair for us to discern where these jurors are coming from as they enter the -- this case. I mean, ask them any specific questions that related to the evidence in any way other than in a very generic way discussing domestic violence.

And it -- my assessment is it's absolutely proper.

We did not elicit specific facts. We did not ask them how they would prejudge evidence. We just asked them their feelings about things.

THE COURT: At the time there was an objection by Ms. Palm the attorneys approached the bench. And I think the main objection was that -- at least what I interpreted was the question was what's your understanding of battered wife syndrome. There was an objection at that point. We had a

conference at the bench. And I believe the State had agreed to move on and not ask any further jurors or that juror in 2 particular what their understanding of that it term meant. 3 MR. LALLI: That's correct. 4 THE COURT: Okay. And so I'm going to allow the 5 State to talk about the general issues of domestic violence 6 because that is relevant to the situation. However, the State 7 has agreed, I think --8 MR. LALLI: We have. 9 THE COURT: -- not to ask anyone about what's their 10 understanding or for the State to try to define that term to 11 the jury. On the issue of Ms. Graham as a grandmother, that 12 surprised Ms. Graham, but -- okay. 13 MS. GRAHAM: Judge, you've known that. 14 MS. PALM: She's trying to curry favor over the 15 16 court, too. THE COURT: Actually, Ms. Palm told me she was a 17 grandmother a couple years ago --18 MS. GRAHAM: I know that. 19 THE COURT: -- if I recall. 20 MS. GRAHAM: I had the --21 THE COURT: I'm not --22 MS. GRAHAM: I had my second one during this trial 23 last year or 2008. 24 MR. LALLI: Well, I'm not a grandparent. 25

THE COURT: Okay. I am, by the way, as well. And so 1 Ms. Palm moved -- I mean, excuse me, Ms. Graham moved on, and 2 so I'm not -- I don't know if you're making a motion for 3 mistrial because of those issues. 4 MS. PALM: No, I'm not. I'm making a record of my 5 6 objection --7 THE COURT: Okay. MS. PALM: -- and --8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MS. PALM: -- you know, if it becomes cumulative 10 11 error --THE COURT: Right. 12 -- then I might. MS. PALM: 13 THE COURT: And I think the one comment about 14 grandmother happened once and apparently it's only going to 15 happen -- that -- that's the extent of it. Domestic violence, 16 I'm going to allow those questioning. We're not going to talk 17 about any syndromes or anyone defining that, either party --18 any of the attorneys are not going to define that term and 19 we're not going to ask any of the jurors to give us their 20 understanding of that term, okay. Anything else? MS. PALM: And then, your Honor, with respect to 22 should neighbors get involved in domestic violence cases, that 23 kind of thing. I think that that's touching too much on the 24 facts of this case because they have neighbors getting involve 25

in the case. And I don't think that's appropriate questioning since, you know, well, one it's improper to touch on the facts of the case.

And two, you know, I -- I am limited on I can't ask about bipolar disorder and other facts of the case. I mean, we're not supposed to go there, so I -- I think that they should be held that standard.

MR. LALLI: Well, some people have pre-conceived notions that -- and there's studies on this. This isn't stuff that I'm just making up. They've got pre-conceived notions that domestic violence is not a community issue. That the courts and law enforcement have absolutely no business sticking their nose into what happens behind closed doors.

And we absolutely have the right to inquire of these jurors to determine whether they're going to have some nullification issue with sitting in judgment of the defendant because, you know, this happened between him and his old lady. And some people are the mind set that we all have no business inquiring into that sort of thing. So it's absolutely relevant to assess that bias in the jurors.

THE COURT: Well, I think and also you had followed up with some questions as far as if something was going on, I think you were asking if they would be the type of person who would call the police. That's two different questions. One, is it is a community issue. And the second one, would you as a

-- I mean, you as an individual, as a neighbor, would you call the police department on this situation?

MR. LALLI: They both really address the same issue, your Honor.

MS. PALM: And my point would be, I think that they could address the same issue by saying do you think domestic violence ought to be a crime without saying should neighbors call the police, should neighbors get involved. It's almost vouching for the witnesses in this case by, you know, talking about how they did the right thing.

THE COURT: So you would not object to them asking whether or not domestic violence should be a crime?

MS. PALM: No, I think that's an appropriate question.

THE COURT: You know, I -- in abundance of caution, you know, obviously the State can ask that question if they so choose. I am concerned about the question of would you call if you saw domestic violence because that's exactly what we have here with the individuals downstairs in the apartment complex.

MR. LALLI: Well, if -- if I may, your Honor, nobody heard noise -- that scenario didn't happen here. We don't have a situation where somebody heard something and they called the police because of it. There are people who heard a disturbance upstairs, they went up there perhaps out of a sense of civic duty. More probably out of a sense of, at least initially,

they were being bothered and they didn't like it. They didn't like the disturbance. But it was such that they went up there. Not intending to call the police, but to tell the defendant to be quiet.

And not until they went in there and saw that there was a woman half dead that they -- or dead, certainly blood all over the police that they called the police. So it is a different -- it's not that situation. It's not that situation at all.

THE COURT: Okay, I don't recall the specifics, so I'm sure both --

MR. LALLI: I can represent as an officer of the court that's my belief of what the evidence --

THE COURT: So it wasn't --

MR. LALLI: -- is going to be.

THE COURT: -- they heard someone's being thrown against the wall or screaming out? It was like just loud screaming and yelling and music or -- I -- I just don't recall.

MR. LALLI: It was -- it was banging upstairs that went on over the course of about an hour. And when it reached a crescendo, a downstairs neighbor went up -- upstairs quite angry at first to tell this gentleman, the defendant, to knock it off because he was trying to sleep. And the defendant invites him in the room and -- and says go get her, referring to our victim.

He walks into the bedroom with the defendant and sees her victim on the ground. That's my belief of what the evidence is going to be after talking to him. So it's quite a different scenario than if you heard something, if -- you know, if you believe something was going on, are you going to call the police. That question is designed to elicit the level of responsibility that these jurors have to their community. And it's not prejudging the evidence.

MS. PALM: And -- and Judge, the -- the evidence was that Charles Toliver's wife or Charles Toliver told his wife, I don't remember which told the other, but I think he's beating that girl up there before he goes upstairs. He was upset about the noise, but that comment was made. And the way that the State has -- has put the case together, I mean, at least last time it was, you know, that they're concerned for this girl up there because they hear this noise going on.

They're trying to make it sound like that the -that's what the concern was, at least that's what they did
before. So -- and that was the evidence in the case. And I
think that they were not asking did you call the police. They
were asking would you get involved, either call the police or
get involved. So it's not just that they're asking about
calling the police and this case didn't involve anybody calling
the police. They're asking did -- would you get involved.

THE COURT: Is there a previous -- the Toliver's

previous testimony was that they thought the girl was getting beat?

MS. PALM: That one of them made the comment to the other one, I think he's beating her up there.

MS. GRAHAM: Judge, Mr. Lalli's correct in the fact that Cooky Toliver (phonetic) went upstairs because he was pissed because his first episode -- first he tried to get them to be quiet by banging a broom on the ceiling. He was woken up out of a deep sleep and he was mad, and he went up there to confront the defendant.

He wasn't -- although Ms. Toliver said to him, this has been going on for a minute, I think he's hurting that little girl up there, Charles Toliver went up there with the specific reason to -- the specific intent to tell defendant to stop doing who he was doing. He didn't even call 911. The Toliver's didn't even call 911. Mr. Toliver came out and yelled to other neighbors to call 911 because they was so surprised at what he saw when he walked up there and saw the door wide open.

He had no idea that the defendant had just stabbed and killed Victoria.

THE COURT: I don't think the -- the question to the prospective as far as are you the type of person who call is -- is placing them in the position of the Tolivers or in this particular case or personalizing so much for them, so I'm going

```
to allow that type of questioning.
 1
              MR. LALLI:
                         Thank you.
 2
              MS. GRAHAM: Thank you, your Honor.
 3
              THE COURT: And we're going to have the other jury.
 4
    They'll be in here at 10:00 o'clock. They'll be on my left
 5
   side so they can start hearing the questions. We'll probably
 6
   just put them under oath before the other jury comes in and
 7
    explain to them why they're here. And then just continue on.
    Hopefully we can get a jury picked tomorrow.
             MS. PALM: So --
10
             MR. LALLI: Well, we'll have to do -- I'm sorry.
11
             MS. PALM: Is the court going to do your general
12
   questions, then, first or are we going to start --
13
             THE COURT: No, we're going to --
14
             MS. PALM: -- and finish?
15
             THE COURT: -- finish up here.
16
             MS. PALM:
                        Okay.
17
             THE COURT: But I'll explain to them where we're at,
18
   what we've done so far. And then we'll just move on.
19
             MS. PALM: Okay. And then -- then finish that --
20
             MR. LALLI: We'll need to --
21
             MS. PALM: -- the -- the people who are sitting in
22
   this area and then I'll take over.
23
             THE COURT: Right. Once the State finishes, we have
24
   two or three more in the front row --
25
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ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT

MR. LALLI: Yes. 1 THE COURT: -- and then you'll take over here. All 2 right, any other questions? 3 MR. LALLI: No, other than just the observation that 4 we'll have to reindicate to the new group that comes in who are 5 6 the witnesses are so that they have some knowledge of that. 7 THE COURT: Right. MR. LALLI: That -- the introduction that's normally 8 9 done will have to be made to them. MS. PALM: Thank you. 10 11 THE COURT: Yes. MR. LALLI: Thank you, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 13 MS. GRAHAM: And 9:45 Judge? 14 THE COURT: 9:45 for the attorneys, yes. 15 MS. GRAHAM: Thank you. 16 (Court recessed at 5:32 p.m., until Tuesday, 17 August 24, 2010). 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

ATTEST: Pursuant to Rule 3C(d) of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, I acknowledge that this is a rough draft transcript, expeditiously prepared, not proofread, corrected, or certified to be an accurate transcript.

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JULIE BORD, TRANSCRIBER

11-15-10

DATE



DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Nov 23 18 21 AM 10

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

LERK OF THE COURT CASE NO. C-250630

Plaintiff,

vs.

DEPT. NO. 17

BRIAN KERRY O'KEEFE,

Transcript of

Defendant.

Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL - DAY 2

> PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT (EXCLUDES VOIR DIRE)

TUESDAY, AUGUST 24, 2010

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

CHRISTOPHER LALLI, ESQ.

Assistant District Attorney

STEPHANIE GRAHAM, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

PATRICIA PALM, ESQ.

Special Deputy Public Defender

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

MICHELLE RAMSEY District Court

VERBATIM DIGITAL REPORTING, LLC

Littleton, CO 80120

(303) 798-0890

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, AUGUST 24, 2010, AT 10:04 A.M.

(Outside the presence of the jury).

THE COURT: We're outside the presence of the jury.

Ms. Palm, you wanted to put some items on the record.

MS. PALM: Yeah -- yes, thank you, your Honor. I was a little bit -- I just need to make sure that I've got a clear ruling on yesterday from the victim's mental health history. I know what the court had said of the statement that we could use. But subject to that ruling then, the implication is that I also can't all experts to talk about Victoria Whitmarsh's diagnoses and treatment, what those diagnoses mean and what the manifestations of having those diagnoses could be.

And I just want to make sure that that's object the record that subject to the court's ruling, excluding all those other things out of what we wanted to admit, that I would then be limited with my experts also.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going over my list here. Some of those items, for example, on Page 1, paragraph two, it talks about that she was depressed, she cut her wrists, there's attempt suicide issues, she's tried to kill herself numerous times. So they're free to address any of the items that I'm allowing in as far as the records are concerned. So if that's part of their opinion, they're free to voice that opinion. Their opinion's based upon that information.

MS. PALM: Well, their opinion would be the

ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT

1 diagnoses, which you're not allowing in. So that's why it's a 2 little confusing to me. I'm not sure what they would say other 3 than yes, this is in other record, and I really couldn't say --I mean, I -- I'm understanding I'm not allowed to say and you 5 -- and she's been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, what is 6 bipolar disorder? What are the manifestations of bipolar disorder? 7 8 THE COURT: Right, that --9 MS. PALM: You know, I just need to clarify what the 10 court's ruling is because I have experts that I need to talk to 11 and I need to know, you know, if I can address that with my 12 client's testimony or any other witness. 13 THE COURT: Well, anything that I said is coming --14 is allowed in, they can address those items. 15 MS. PALM: So they can say that she cut herself, 16 according to the records? 17 THE COURT: And -- and you'll see on paragraph two of Page 2, they talk about mood swings, they talk about poor 19 appetite, anxiety, and there's some other issues that you may 20 be of interest to you. I have no idea, but they can address any of those items that the court's allowing in. 21 22 So there are some, you know, psychological issues, 23 mood swings, irritability. 24 MS. PALM: Okay, but --25 THE COURT: It says poor anger management.

also in there.

MS. PALM: Right. I'm just not sure how they would -- what are you saying, that they can say yes, that she had those things but they could not say what diagnosis was attached to those things?

THE COURT: Well, for -- I'm not really sure what you're saying because for example, it says here that she has anxiety, low energy, that she has poor anger management skills, impulsive behavior. So they can address those issues in there.

MS. PALM: Okay. I still -- I don't know what -- you know, what they would -- would they not then be able to add anything that's not in the portions that the court has said are coming in? If they could just say that yes, these things are in her record, then there's no point to call an expert because they couldn't, you know, elaborate on it from --

THE COURT: Well, they --

MS. PALM: -- as (indiscernible) understand the court's ruling.

MR. LALLI: Your Honor, are -- I -- as I interpret the court's ruling, experts can talk about that evidence which you are admitting and nothing more. So the court has excluded, for instance, bipolar disorder, and I believe correctly. It would certainly circumvent the court's ruling if an expert is then allowed to come in and say well, she suffered from bipolar disorder. That's just circumventing the order.

So I think Ms. Palm's interpretation of the order is the correct one, an expert can only discuss those things that will be contained in our stipulation and nothing more.

THE COURT: That's correct. Now, if they can form some opinion, a proper opinion, Ms. Palm, then they're free to address any of those issues.

MS. PALM: Thank you.

THE COURT: And there's --

MS. PALM: So --

THE COURT: -- numerous -- numerous identification in here of suicide or cutting herself. You know, I'm not going to tell you how they can couch their opinion, but, you know, if they can draw some opinion from these items that are -- that are allowed in, they're free to testify.

MS. PALM: Okay, so they -- they could opine to a diagnosis bases on these items?

MR. LALLI: Well, I don't think there's sufficient information on those two sheets of paper or three sheets to reach an opinion. So I would certainly interpose objections on speculation, things of that nature. I'm not sure -- and I'm certainly not telling Ms. Palm how to do her case. I'm not sure that an expert -- well, an expert could just, I mean, testify as to what depression is or to what anxiety is or maybe why people cut themselves.

THE COURT: There's things in here of anger outburst,

Ms. Palm. I'm not trying to highlight for -- things for you, 1 2 but --MS. PALM: No, I understand that they can say she had 3 4 those things, but they can't put them in the context of a mental health disorder. And -- and for the record, I'm not 5 sure if the court intend to do this or not, but with the 2006 6 7 admission, she also had a self-inflicted wrist laceration and 8 that's part of what the court took out. And I thought the 9 court was allowing us to have the lacerations. 10 THE COURT: And where was that? Which page and which 11 paragraph? MS. PALM: The bottom of Page 1 where we took out the 12 entire paragraph. That's the only mention of her wrist 13 14 laceration with that admission. 15 THE COURT: I'm sorry, which paragraph? 16 MS. PALM: The bottom paragraph, records 2006 17 admission to Monte Vista, also has self-inflicted wrist laceration, about the third line down. That is the only 18 reference to that laceration. 19 20 THE COURT: That --21 Your Honor, I didn't --MR. LALLI: 22 THE COURT: If I excluded that, because that does deal with the wrist lacerations, that that would be allowed in. 24 MS. PALM: Okay, thank you. 25 MR. LALLI: Your Honor, I didn't realize we were

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going to revisit this issue, and I don't have my --
  2
               THE COURT: Well -- well --
  3
               MR. LALLI: -- don't have my materials for it.
  4
               THE COURT: -- actually, it was -- I think it's an
  5
     error of the court. I missed that identification, wrist
     laceration.
 7
               MS. PALM:
                          Thank you.
 8
              THE COURT: We're not going to argue on any other
 9
    issues.
              MS. PALM: Okay, thank you.
10
              THE COURT: All right.
11
12
              MS. PALM: And then, you know, just so I'm clear, no
    other evidence either aside from experts. Brian couldn't get
13
14
    up and talk about the other suicide attempts he's aware or
15
    anything, that he should keep his -- I just don't want to
16
    violate the court's order. He should keep his testimony
17
    limited to what's in the -- this document?
                                                It --
18
              THE COURT: Well, we're -- because I thought these
19
    documents here related to your experts testifying.
20
              MS. PALM: No, my motion was to admit the evidence,
21
    the evidence of her mental health history --
22
              MR. LALLI: Your Honor --
23
              MS. PALM: -- and --
              MR. LALLI: Oh, I'm sorry.
24
                         -- I wanted to admit her records, I wanted
25
              MS. PALM:
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to admit experts to testify about her diagnoses and what that meant and I wanted to be able to talk about that evidence, Brian could testify to what he knows. That was the motion. The ruling as to this, I understand the court's ruling, and I'm not -- I'm not telling you I'm not accepting it. I just am trying to understand what the limitations would be on the other evidence I introduced.

Я

Now, I understand the experts, but I'm talking about Brian's testimony, Mr. O'Keefe's testimony, how that should be limited. Should it be limited to conform with what's admissible in this -- in this excerpt order?

MR. LALLI: Well, your Honor, it's -- it's -- certainly the -- the defendant's testified before, and I -- I mean, he didn't mention -- my recollection of reviewing his testimony, and I've done that quite thoroughly, I don't recall him testifying in a specific way to anything more than what is contained in -- in our stipulation so --

MS. PALM: We had an order last time it wasn't admitted (indiscernible).

MR. LALLI: Well, he still made references to the victim being in mental health counseling and attempted suicide. So maybe he violated your order the last time, I don't know. But it is in his testimony. The -- it would be my position, your Honor, that the defendant cannot testify that the victim suffered from bipolar disorder. That would be again,

irrelevant under Daniel and under Petty and under our character statutes.

1.6

Certainly, he could testify about any other specific incidents of cutting, self-inflicted cutting that the victim did or if he wants -- if they want to make an offer of proof as to what else is out there, and I think certainly that would be appropriate, but if they want to make an offer of proof as to what is out there that he may testify to, then we can litigate it just like we've litigated up to this point.

MS. PALM: Well, I mean, my offer of proof was in my motion, which I filed back on July 21st. And it's incredible to me that Mr. Lalli is talking about this at this point I need to make an offer of proof. Mr. O'Keefe knows everything that Ms. Whitmarsh went through, including all of her suicide attempts.

He wasn't testifying to that last time. I think he did make one slip when he did, but he was limited on testifying to everything that he knew. So he's never been given that opportunity. But we did litigate this last time. He does know about all of it. I understand that if the court is saying you cannot talk about the diagnoses because you're not a doctor and I've limited you on diagnoses, but can he talk about all her saw side attempts because it's in his mind when the stuff!s going on in the bedroom what she might be doing.

THE COURT: I think anything contained in the reports

1 that's coming in, he can testify about if he has that 2 knowledge, that foundation. 3 MS. PALM: Okay, so the two suicide attempts he can 4 say, you know, I know -- I know she's a cutter --5 THE COURT: If she --6 MS. PALM: -- and I know, you know, she's made these 7 two previous attempts and not talk about the other ones? 8 THE COURT: Whatever's contained in these reports --9 MS. PALM: Okay. 10 THE COURT: -- he can -- if he knows about them. 11 MS. PALM: He was there. 12 THE COURT: Okay, well --13 MS. PALM: He does know about them. 14 THE COURT: Then he can testify to those items. 15 MS. PALM: Okay. Thank you. 16 MR. LALLI: And just -- the -- the stipulation that 17 we received or the outline that I received is more inclusive than the information contained in the motion that Ms. Palm is 18 19 referring to. So to suggest that we are presented with a 20 plethora of information a month and a half ago and -- and --21 and somehow spaced it, I mean, that's just not what happened. 22 We received the -- the outline from Ms. Palm, I believe last week at which it contained more information than 23 24 -- than was in the motion so --25 THE COURT: I'm not faulting either side.

1 MR. LALLI: Thank you. 2 MS. PALM: Well, and -- and that's simply not true. My motion had all the exhibits attached to it, referred to the 3 Exhibit B that we filed last time that had all her medical 4 records, so that's --5 6 THE COURT: And I'm not going to be --7 MS. PALM: -- simply not true. THE COURT: I'm not faulting either side. And if 8 it's motions have been filed and opposition filed, they are 9 10 part of the record. MS. PALM: Thank you, your Honor. 11 MR. LALLI: Thank you. 12 13 THE COURT: Okay. MS. PALM: We -- we have just one scheduling thing. 14 15 I do have Dr. Grey flying in from Utah and Dr. -- or George Schiro flying from Louisiana on Thursday because I thought we'd 16 be further along like we were last time. And then I also have 17 18 Lou DeSalvio who's about a ten minute witness that has to 19 testify on Thursday because he has a cancer in the family that 20 he's gotta leave for. 21 So, I mean, hopefully we can accommodate that with our scheduling. But I -- I can't change doctors' flights at 22 this late hour. 23 THE COURT: I don't see why we couldn't do that. 24 25 you, Mr. Lalli?

1 I -- I don't other than I also have 2 witness limitations as well. 3 THE COURT: The court's inclined to work with everyone's schedule and do what we can. And hopefully -- and 4 5 some of these days the jurors can stay later than 5:00. Although, we're supposed to keep down our overtime. But 7 because of the nature of the case and that we are behind, I 8 mean, no fault of anybody, but you have to be thorough on 9 picking your jury. 10 If the jurors can stay until 5:30 or 6:00 we'll tell 11 you every single day, and then we'll give you as much advance 12 notice as possible so you can get more witnesses lined up --13 MR. LALLI: Okay. THE COURT: -- so we can get back on track. 14 15 MR. LALLI: Thank you, your Honor. 16 MS. PALM: Thank you. 17 THE COURT: All right, thank you. (Court recessed at 5:09 p.m., until Wednesday, 18 19 August 25, 2010). 20 21 22 23 24 25

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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