EX #2

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JOCP STEWART L. BELL DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #000477 200 S. Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 435-4711 Attorney for Plaintiff

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff,

GARY PICKETT, aka Cary Jerard Pickett, #0725059

Defendant.

Case No. C143146
Dept. No. XI
Docket S

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (PLEA)

WHEREAS, on the 28th day of August, 1997, the Defendant GARY PICKETT, aka Cary Jerard Pickett, appeared before the Court herein with his counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime(s) of GRAND LARCENY (CATEGORY B FELONY), committed on or about the 3rd day of May, 1997, in violation of NRS 205.220 and

WHEREAS, thereafter on the 25th day of September, 1997, the Defendant, In Propria Persona, being present in court with his counsel JORDAN SAVAGE, ESQ., as Stand By Counsel, and ARTHUR G. NOXON, Deputy District Attorney, also being present; the above entitled Court did adjudge the Defendant guilty thereof by reason of his plea of guilty and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, sentenced Defendant to a minimum of thirty-six (36) months and a maximum of one-hundred twenty (120) months in the Nevada Department of Prisons, suspended; placed on probation for an indeterminate period not to exceed five (5) years. Conditions: 1. Search Clause for controlled substances and weapons.

2. Complete Drug Court Program, noting weapons were not involved. 3. Complete long-term

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counseling, vocational and educational programs as deemed necessary by the Division of Parole and Probation. 4. Complete eight (8) hours community service per month within the first three (3) years of probation. 5. Pulsuant to NRS 176.185, Defendant to be supervised in the Nevada Division of Parole and Probation's House Arrest Program for the first four (4) months of probation. Defendant to receive eighty-nine (89) days credit for time served. Court referred matter to Drug Court, and Ordered, set for further proceedings on October 6, 1997 at 9:00 o'clock a.m. in Department X. THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above entitled Court is hereby directed to enter this Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above entitled matter. DATED this 16th day of October, 1997, in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada.

DA#97-143146X/pm LVMPD EV#9705030904 G/L-F (TK1)

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JOCP STEWART L. BELL DISTRICT ATTORNEY 2 Nevada Bar #000477 200 S. Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 435-4711 Attorney for Plaintiff 5 6 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA 8 9 Plaintiff. 10 -vs-CARY JERARD PICKETT, aka 11 Gary Picken, #0725059 12 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 17 18

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Docket

Case No.

Dept. No.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (PLEA)

WHEREAS, on the 18th day of September, 1997, the Defendant CARY JERARD PICKETT, aka Gary Pickett, appeared before the Court herein with his counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime(s) of BURGLARY (CATEGORY B FELONY), committed on or about the 7th day of August, 1997, in violation of NRS 205.060 and

20 WHEREAS, thereafter on the 25th day of September, 1997, the Defendant, In Propria Persona, being present in court with his counsel JORDAN, SAVAGE, ESQ., as Stand By 21 Counsel, and ARTHUR G. NOXON, Deputy District Attorney, also being present; the above entitled Court did adjudge the Defendant guilty thereof by reason of his plea of guilty and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, sentenced Defendant to a minimum of thirty-six (36) months and a maximum of one-hundred twenty (120) months in the Nevada Department of Prisons, to be served consecutive to sentence imposed in Case No. C143146, suspended; placed on probation for an indeterminate period not to exceed five (5) years. Conditions: 1. Search Clause for controlled substances and stolen property. 2. Complete Drug

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Court Program, noting there was no use of weapons in this incident. 3. Complete long-term counseling, vocational and educational programs as deemed necessary. 4. Defendant to be supervised in the Nevada Division of Parole and Probation's House Arrest Program for the first four (4) months of probation. Defendant to receive thirty-five (35) days credit for time served. Court referred matter to Drug Court, and Ordered, set for further proceedings on October 6, 1997 at 9:00 o'clock a.m. in Department X. THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above entitled Court is hereby directed to enter this Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above entitled matter. DATED this ______ day of October, 1997, in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada. DA#97-145127X/pm LVMPD EV#9708071616 (TK1)

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REX BELL DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #001799 200 S. Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4711 Attorney for Plaintiff THE STATE OF NEVADA

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ALC:D

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. 10 C109725 Plaintiff, DEPT. NO. 11 -Vg-DOCKET NO. GARY PICKETT, 12 Н aka Cary Jerard Pickett 13 **₽**0725059 14 Defendant. 15

AMENDED

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (PLEA)

18 WHEREAS, on the 15th day of December, 1992, the defendant GARY 19 PICKETT aka Cary Jerard Pickett, appeared before the Court herein with his counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime of 20 21 ATTEMPT GRAND LARCENY (Felony) committed on the 11th day of 22 November, 1992, in violation of NRS 205.220, 193.330; and

WHEREAS, thereafter on the 21st day of January, 1993, the 24 defendant being present in Court with his counsel MARK CICHOSKI, DEC 0 7 199525 Deputy Public Defender, and JAY L. SIEGEL, Deputy District 26 Attorney, also being present; the above entitled Court did adjudge 27 the defendant guilty thereof by reason of his plea of guilty and sentenced defendant to THREE (3) years in the Nevada State Prison

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to run concurrent with C107733. Credit for time served 14 days. \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee. WHEREAS, on the 18th day of November, 1993, Defendant's Motion for Amended Judgment of Conviction to Include Jail Time Credits is granted and Defendant given an additional 30 days credit for time served. THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above entitled Court is hereby directed to enter this Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above entitled matter. DATED this _____ day or November, 10 1993, in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada. 11 12 13 C DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 92-109725X/kjh 27 LVMPD DR#9211111354 ATT G/L - F 28 TK4

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REX BELL DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #001799 200 S. Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4711 Attorney for Plaintiff THE STATE OF NEVADA

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. C109725

GARY PICKETT, aka Cary Jerard Pickett ID#0725059) Defendant.

DEPT. NO. DOCKET NO. H

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JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (PLEA)

WHEREAS, on the 15th day of December, 1992, the Defendant GARY 18 PICKETT, aka Cary Jerard Pickett, appeared before the Court herein with his counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime of ATTEMPT GRAND LARCENY (Felony), committed on the 11th day of 21 November, 1992, in violation of NRS 205.220, 193.330; and

WHEREAS, thereafter on the 21st day of January, 1993, the 23 Defendant being present in Court with his counsel MARK D. CICHOSKI, 24 Deputy Public Defender, and JAY L. SIEGEL, Deputy District 25 Attorney, also being present; the above entitled Court did adjudge the Defendant guilty thereof by reason of his plea of guilty and, in addition to a \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, sentenced 28 Defendant to three (3) years in the Nevada Department of Prisons

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concurrent with C107733. Defendant granted fourteen (14) days credit for time served. THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above entitled Court is hereby directed to enter this Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above entitled matter. day of February, 1993, in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada. DISTRICT DA#92-109725X/da LVMPD DR#92-11111354 ATT GL - F

REX BELL DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #001799 200 S. Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4711 Attorney for Plaintiff THE STATE OF NEVADA

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

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CARY JERARD PICKETT aka Cary Jerroid Pickett **#**0725059

CASE NO. C107733X

DEPT. NO. III

DOCKET NO. E

Defendant.

<u>Amended</u> JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (PLEA)

WHEREAS, on the 27th day of August, 1992, the Defendant, CARY 15 16 JERARD PICKETT aka Cary Jerroid Pickett, appeared before the Court 17 herein with his counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime 18 of COUNT I - BURGLARY (FELONY), committed on the 9th day of June, 19 1992, in violation of NRS 205.060; and

WHEREAS, thereafter, on the 10th day of December, 1992, the 20 21 Defendant being present in Court with his counsel DEBORAH OWEN, and 22 KAREN L. VAN DE POL, Chief Deputy District Attorney, also being present; the above entitled Court did adjudge Defendant guilty 23 24 thereof by reason of his plea of guilty and sentenced Defendant, in addition to a \$25 Administrative Assessment Fee, to: years in the Nevada State Prison with whatever credit for time served defendant is entitled to. Count II dismissed.


WHEREAS, on the 2nd day of March, 1993, Defendant not being

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1 present, represented by DEBORAH OWENS and STEVEN S. OWENS, Deputy District Attorney, also being present the Court amended Judgment of Conviction to reflect Defendant given ten (10) days credit for time served. THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above entitled Court is hereby directed to enter this Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above entitled matter. DATED this _ day of March, 1993/An the city 9 County of Clark, State of Nevada 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 92-107733X/1ib LVMPD DR#9206090810 27 Burg - P TK 3

FRANKIE SUE DEL PAPA Attorney General FILED By: WILLIAM P. HENRY 2 Senior Deputy Attorney General Nevada Bar No. 101 3 401 South Third Street, #500 Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 486-3420 Attorneys for Plaintiff 5 6 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 . STATE OF NEVADA, 11 12 Plaintiff, 13 VS. CASE NO. C119000 DEPT. NO. VIII CARY PICKETT a/k/a .14 DOCKET "M" GARY PICKETT, 15 Defendant. 16 17 JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 18 Date of Hearing: 7/08/94 Time of Hearing: 9 a.m. 19 On the 13th day of April, 1994, defendant CARY PICKETT a/k/a 20 GARY PICKETT pled guilty to the crime of Count I - Escape, a 21 felony, in violation of NRS 212.090. 22 On the 8th day of July, 1994, defendant CARY PICKETT a/k/a 23 GARY PICKETT, being present with his counsel Douglas P. DeJulio, 24 Deputy Public Defender, and William P. Henry, Senior Deputy 25 Attorney General, also being present, the above-entitled court, 26 in addition to requiring payment of a Twenty-five Dollar (\$25) JUL 28 1974 administrative assessment, adjudged the defendant guilty of CE-01 AUG 0 1 1994

Count I - Escape, a felony, and imposed a sentence of two and onehalf (2-1/2) years in the Nevada Department of Prisons to run consecutively with the sentence imposed in Case No. C109725. Pursuant to plea negotiation between counsel, Count II was dismissed. THEREFORE, the clerk of the above-entitled court is directed to enter this Judgment of Conviction as part of the record of the above-entitled matter. DATED this 26 day of July, 1994. 9 10 11 12 SUBMITTED BY: 13 FRANKIE SUE DEL PAPA 14 Attorney General 15 By: 16 William P. Henry Senior Deputy Attorney 17 Nevada Bar No. 101 401 South Third Street, #500 18 Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -2-



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Cary Pickett, NDOC# 57591 P40. Box 650 Indian springs, NV 89070

Cary Pickett, Petitioner

D.C. Case No. 10C262523-2

vs.

State of Nevada Et. Al Warden Scillia HDSP

State of Nevada

County of Clark

100262523-2 MEMO

Memorandum 1360847

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MEMORANDUM/AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL FROM EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

To: The Honorable Supreme Court Justices State of Nevada

SS.

Cary Pickett, Petitioner in pro-per, under penalty of perjury being duly sworn, deposes and says that:

- 1. That the Eighth Judicial District court denied my petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus citing Petitioner as failing to provide proof to support his four (4) grounds for relief at his April 6, 2001 hearing.
- 2. That the assertions raised in two (2) of the grounds raised in my petition are true and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims that warranted the Eighth Judicial District Council

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JALIST OF THE COURT

to conduct an evidenciary hearing in order to provide the proof required by the Court as proof.

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- 3. That the allegation of counsel's ineffectiveness related directly to his failure to investigate or ask any questions to 5 assertion petitioner's prior felonies for constitutionally validity prior to advising Petitioner to stipulate/plead guilty to habitual criminal status and that two (2) of his prior convictions were in fact invalid.
 - 4. That being Petitioner was sentenced by the District Court and two (2) invalid J.O.C.'s were used to adjudicate Petitioner should cause concern to this Court as to how all three (3) entities in the advocacy process could have missed (A) Defense Counsel (B) the Prosecution and (C) the Court.
 - 5. That the petition also asserted improperly adjudicated as a habitual offender as the Court made its decision to adjudicate Petitioner using two (2) prior convictions (#143146 and 145127) that according to Nevada law were invalid for purposes of enhancement under N.R.S. 207.010 being that Petitioner was not represented by counsel and the State failed to acknowledge or disclosed to the Court the truth of those convictions (J.O.C.'s) and further did not provide any proof of valid waiver of counsel, however the Court although Petitioner also submitted copies of those J.O.C.'s as proof the Eighth Judicial District Court ignored them as proof according to its ruling.
 - 6. That based on Nevada Law, the adjudication process is the responsibility of the State and the Cort to insure that only valid prior convictions be used to support an enhanced sentence before a defendant is adjudicated a habitual offender and not as claimed

used how many valid ones remain would allow a sentence to stand; clearly the Court and the State got the standard wrong.

7. That this Court based on a review of the allegation and ruling of th Eighth Judicial District Court should vacate his sentence under N.R.S. 207.010 or in the alternative remand his case back for an evidenciary hearing.

DATED: this 12th day of April, 2011.

Cary Pickett, 57591

P.O. Bbx 650

Indian Springs, NV 89070

UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY STATEMENT

I declare (or certified, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true and correct in accordance with N.R.S. 208.165 and USCA, Section 1746. Executed on April 12, 2011.

Cary Rickett-57591

7.0. Box 650 Cary Pickett 57591 Indianisprings NV 89070 文学,在Mindeldengago,文学和人文学和Hilliam Haminal Haminal Had Halliam Hamila Clark of the Court 200 S Lewis Ave Lasyeges NV 89155

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1	Cary Rickett 57591 FILE
2	Cary Rickett 57591 Defendant In Proper Person P.O. Box 650 H.D.S.P. Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 APR 18 2011
3	Indian Springs, Nevada 89018
4	CLERK OF COURSE
5	DISTRICT COURT
6	CLARK COUNTY NEVADA NOASC Notice of Appeal (criminal)
7	Warden Scilla
8	State of Nevada ETAL.
9	RESPONDENT, Case No. 10CZ62523-2
10	_v_ Dept.No. XVIII
11	Cary Pickett
12	Petitioner.
13	
14	NOTICE OF APPEAL
15	Notice is hereby given that the PETITIONES, Cary J.
16	Pickett , by and through himself in proper person, does now appeal
17	to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the decision of the District
18	court DENIGL of his Writ of HADEOS Corpus Hearing date April
19	6 2011, date of Written order unknown
20	
21	Dated this date, April 12, 2011
22	
23	Respectfully Submitted,
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26	RECEIVED In Proper Person
27	ADR 1 8 2011
28	CLERK OF THE COURT

CERTFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING

2	I, CARY Rickett , hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on this 12.
3	day of April 2011, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing. " Notice
4	of Appeal
5	by depositing it in the High Desert State Prison, Legal Library, First-Class Postage, fully prepaid,
. 6	addressed as follows:
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8	District Attorney office
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10	Lus (rda) NV. MISS
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12	Warden Scillia H.O.S.P P.O. Box 650
13	INDIAN Spring NV. 89070
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19	DATED: this 12 day of April , 2011.
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22	/In Propria Persona
23	Post Office box 650 [HDSP] Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 IN FORMA PAUPERIS:
24	<u>IN FORMA PAUPERIS</u> :
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AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The unders gned does hereby affirm that the preceding
Motice of Appeal (Title of Document)
filed in District Court Case number10 c. 26 252 3-2
Does not contain the social security number of any person.
-OR-
☐ Contains the social security number of a person as required by:
A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:
(State specific law)
-or-
B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant. 4-(2-) Signature Date
CARY PICKETT 57591 Print Name Petitioner 14 pro-per Title
Title

ã **FILED** APR 2 0 2011 1 **ASTA** 2 3 4 **DISTRICT COURT** 5 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 6 7 STATE OF NEVADA, Case No: 10C262523-2 8 Plaintiff(s), Dept No: XVIII 9 vs. √10C262523 – 2 10 CARY PICKETT, ASTA Case Appeal Statement 1384373 11 Defendant(s), 12 13 **CASE APPEAL STATEMENT** 14 15 1. Appellant(s): Cary Pickett 16 2. Judge: David Barker 17 3. Appellant(s): Cary Pickett 18 Counsel: 19 Cary Pickett #57591 P.O. Box 650 20 Indian Springs, NV 89070 21 4. Respondent: THE STATE OF NEVADA 22 Counsel: 23 David Roger, District Attorney 200 Lewis Ave. 24 Las Vegas, NV 89101 25 (702) 671-2700 26 5. Respondent's Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes 27 6. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: No 28

ORIGINAL

ORDR 1 DAVID ROGER 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 3 ROY L. NELSON, III. Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #007842 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 10C262523-2 Attorney for Plaintiff Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and C DISTRICT COURT 7 1422159 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA. Plaintiff, 9 CASE NO: 10C262523-2 10 -vs-DEPT NO: XVIII 11 CARY J. PICKETT, #0725059 12 Defendant. 13 14 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 15 16 DATE OF HEARING: April 6, 2011 TIME OF HEARING: 8:15 A.M. 17 18 THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable David Barker, 19

District Judge, on the 6th day of April, 2011, the Petitioner not being present, Proceeding In Forma Pauperis, the Respondent being represented by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, by and through Stephanie Graham, Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, no arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On February 3, 2010, Cary J. Pickett, hereinafter "Defendant," was charged by way of Criminal Complaint with five (5) counts of Burglary While in Possession of a Firearm seven (7) counts of Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, five (5) counts of

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Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, and six (6) counts of Possession of a Firearm by an Ex-Felon.

- 2. On March 10, 2010, pursuant to negotiations, Defendant was charged by way of Information with one count each of Burglary While in Possession of a Firearm, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Possession of a Firearm by an Ex-Felon. On March 11, 2010, pursuant to a written Guilty Plea Agreement, Defendant pled guilty to the same charges.
- 3. On May 10, 2010, Defendant was adjudged a Habitual Criminal and sentenced as follows: as to Count 1 Burglary While in Possession of a Firearm, to a MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS; as to Count 2 Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, to MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS; as to Count 3 Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon, to a MAXIMUM of TWENTY-FIVE (25) YEARS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TEN (10) YEARS, Count 3 to run CONSECUTIVE to Count 1; as to Count 4 Possession of a Firearm by an Ex-Felon, to a MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS, Count 4 to run CONCURRENT with Count 2, with EIGHTY-EIGHT (88) DAYS credit for time served.
 - 4. A Judgment of Conviction was filed on May 19, 2010.¹
 - 5. Defendant did not file a Direct Appeal.
 - 6. Defendant filed the instant petition on January 27, 2011.
 - 7. Defendant's counsel rendered effective assistance.
- 8. Defendant stipulated to habitual criminal treatment as part of his plea agreement.
- 9. Defendant has failed to provide any evidence supporting his claim that two out of seven of his previous felony convictions which were the basis for his treatment as a

¹ Due to clerical errors, an Amended Judgment of Conviction was filed on September 24, 2010.

habitual criminal were constitutionally infirm.

- 10. Even if counsel had successfully challenged two of Defendant's previous convictions as constitutionally infirm, five would have remained for the court to consider. Defendant therefore cannot demonstrate prejudice.
- 11. Since Defendant stipulated to treatment as a habitual criminal, any arguments by counsel against such treatment at sentencing would have been futile. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make futile arguments.
- 12. Defendant's bare allegation that his counsel failed to make mitigation arguments at sentencing is insufficient for relief.
- 13. The totality of the circumstances, including the relevant portions of Defendant's GPA, the plea canvass, and taking into account the presence of counsel, demonstrates Defendant's guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.
- 14. Defendant's claim that he was improperly sentenced as a habitual criminal is not cognizable in a petition for post-conviction relief since Defendant's conviction was based upon a plea of guilty.
- 15. Defendant has failed to provide evidence for consideration which supports the grounds alleged.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. In order to assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must prove that he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-64 (1984). See also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under this test, the Defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting Strickland two-part test in Nevada).

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- 2. The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether or not the petitioner has proved disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004).
- 3. Judicial review of a lawyer's representation is highly deferential, and a defendant must overcome the presumption that a challenged action might be considered sound strategy. State v. LaPena, 114 Nev. 1159, 1166, 968 P.2d 750, 754 (1998) (quoting from Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct at 2052 (1984)). Strategy or decisions regarding the conduct of defendant's case are "virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances." Doleman v. State, 112 Nev. 843, 848, 921 P.2d 278, 280 (1996) (quoting Howard v. State, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800P.2d 175, 180 (1990)).
- 4. Pursuant to NRS 176.165, after sentencing, a defendant's guilty plea can only be withdrawn to correct "manifest injustice." See also Baal v. State, 106 Nev. 69, 72, 787 P.2d 391, 394 (1990). The law in Nevada clearly establishes that a plea of guilty is presumptively valid and the burden is on a defendant to show that the plea was not voluntarily entered. Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986) (citing Wingfield v. State, 91 Nev. 336, 337, 535 P.2d 1295, 1295 (1975)). Manifest injustice does not exist if defendant entered his plea voluntarily. Baal, 106 Nev. at 72, 787 P.2d at 394. To determine whether a guilty plea was voluntarily entered the Court will review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's plea. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367.
 - 5. NRS 34.810(1)(a) states in relevant part:
 - 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
 - (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.

1	<u>ORDER</u>
2	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas
3	Corpus (Post-Conviction) shall be, and it is, hereby denied.
4	DATED this MAY 1 9 2011 of May, 2011.
5	
6	DISTRICT JUDGE 1/8
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8	DAVID ROGER
9	DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781
10	
11	BY POYL AND SON III
12	ROY L. NELSON, III. Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #007842
13	11Cyaua Dai #007642
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MAY 3 1 2011 1 NOED 2 **DISTRICT COURT** 3 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 10C262523 - 2 4 NOED Notice of Entry of Decision and Order 5 CARY PICKETT, 6 Petitioner, Case No: 10C262523-2 7 VS. Dept No: XVIII 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 9 Respondent, **DECISION AND ORDER** 10 11 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 19, 2011, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a 12 true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice. 13 You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you 14 must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is 15 mailed to you. This notice was mailed on May 31, 2011. 16 STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT 17 Heather Ungermann, Deputy/Clerk 18 19 **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING** 20 I hereby certify that on this 31 day of May 2011, I placed a copy of this Notice of Entry of Decision and 21 Order in: 22 The bin(s) located in the Office of the District Court Clerk of: Clark County District Attorney's Office 23 Attorney General's Office - Appellate Division 24 ☑ The United States mail addressed as follows: Cary Pickett # 57591 25 P.O. Box 650 Indian Springs, NV 89070 26 27 Heather Ungermann, Deputy (Serk

ORIGINAL



1 2 3 4 5	ORDR DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 ROY L. NELSON, III. Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #007842 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney Atto
7	DISTRICT COURT Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and (1422159
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA THE STATE OF NEVADA,
9	Plaintiff,
10	CASE NO: 10C262523-2
11	CARY J. PICKETT,
12	#0725059 }
13	Defendant.
14	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
15	LAW AND ORDER
16	DATE OF HEARING: April 6, 2011
17	TIME OF HEARING: 8:15 A.M.
18	THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable David Barker,
19	District Judge, on the 6th day of April, 2011, the Petitioner not being present, Proceeding In
20	Forma Pauperis, the Respondent being represented by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney,
21	by and through Stephanie Graham, Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having
22	considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, no arguments of counsel, and documents
23	on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions
24	of law:
25	<u>FINDINGS OF FACT</u>
26	1. On February 3, 2010, Cary J. Pickett, hereinafter "Defendant," was charged by
27	way of Criminal Complaint with five (5) counts of Burglary While in Possession of a
28	Firearm seven (7) counts of Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, five (5) counts of
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	CLERK OF THE COURT

- 2. On March 10, 2010, pursuant to negotiations, Defendant was charged by way of Information with one count each of Burglary While in Possession of a Firearm, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Possession of a Firearm by an Ex-Felon. On March 11, 2010, pursuant to a written Guilty Plea Agreement, Defendant pled guilty to the same charges.
- 3. On May 10, 2010, Defendant was adjudged a Habitual Criminal and sentenced as follows: as to Count 1 Burglary While in Possession of a Firearm, to a MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS; as to Count 2 Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, to MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS; as to Count 3 Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon, to a MAXIMUM of TWENTY-FIVE (25) YEARS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TEN (10) YEARS, Count 3 to run CONSECUTIVE to Count 1; as to Count 4 Possession of a Firearm by an Ex-Felon, to a MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS, Count 4 to run CONCURRENT with Count 2, with EIGHTY-EIGHT (88) DAYS credit for time served.
 - A Judgment of Conviction was filed on May 19, 2010.¹
 - 5. Defendant did not file a Direct Appeal.
 - 6. Defendant filed the instant petition on January 27, 2011.
 - 7. Defendant's counsel rendered effective assistance.
- 8. Defendant stipulated to habitual criminal treatment as part of his plea agreement.
- 9. Defendant has failed to provide any evidence supporting his claim that two out of seven of his previous felony convictions which were the basis for his treatment as a

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Felon.

¹ Due to clerical errors, an Amended Judgment of Conviction was filed on September 24, 2010.

habitual criminal were constitutionally infirm.

- 10. Even if counsel had successfully challenged two of Defendant's previous convictions as constitutionally infirm, five would have remained for the court to consider. Defendant therefore cannot demonstrate prejudice.
- 11. Since Defendant stipulated to treatment as a habitual criminal, any arguments by counsel against such treatment at sentencing would have been futile. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make futile arguments.
- 12. Defendant's bare allegation that his counsel failed to make mitigation arguments at sentencing is insufficient for relief.
- 13. The totality of the circumstances, including the relevant portions of Defendant's GPA, the plea canvass, and taking into account the presence of counsel, demonstrates Defendant's guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.
- 14. Defendant's claim that he was improperly sentenced as a habitual criminal is not cognizable in a petition for post-conviction relief since Defendant's conviction was based upon a plea of guilty.
- 15. Defendant has failed to provide evidence for consideration which supports the grounds alleged.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. In order to assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must prove that he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-64 (1984). See also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under this test, the Defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting Strickland two-part test in Nevada).

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2. The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether or not the petitioner has proved disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004).

- 3. Judicial review of a lawyer's representation is highly deferential, and a defendant must overcome the presumption that a challenged action might be considered sound strategy. State v. LaPena, 114 Nev. 1159, 1166, 968 P.2d 750, 754 (1998) (quoting from Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct at 2052 (1984)). Strategy or decisions regarding the conduct of defendant's case are "virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances." Doleman v. State, 112 Nev. 843, 848, 921 P.2d 278, 280 (1996) (quoting Howard v. State, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800P.2d 175, 180 (1990)).
- 4. Pursuant to NRS 176.165, after sentencing, a defendant's guilty plea can only be withdrawn to correct "manifest injustice." See also Baal v. State, 106 Nev. 69, 72, 787 P.2d 391, 394 (1990). The law in Nevada clearly establishes that a plea of guilty is presumptively valid and the burden is on a defendant to show that the plea was not voluntarily entered. Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986) (citing Wingfield v. State, 91 Nev. 336, 337, 535 P.2d 1295, 1295 (1975)). Manifest injustice does not exist if defendant entered his plea voluntarily. Baal, 106 Nev. at 72, 787 P.2d at 394. To determine whether a guilty plca was voluntarily entered the Court will review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's plea. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367.
 - 5. NRS 34.810(1)(a) states in relevant part:
 - 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
 - (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.

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ORDER THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) shall be, and it is, hereby denied. DATED this MAY 1 9 2011 of May, 2011. DISTRICT JUDGE P8 **DAVID ROGER** DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781 BYROY L. NELSON, III. Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #007842 10F02742B/GCU: ts/RN/ckb P:\WPDOCS\FOF\002\00274201.doc

GMEM DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781 3 ROY L. NELSON III Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #007842 4 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff 6 7 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 11 12 -VS-CARY PICKETT, aka, 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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ILEU IN OPEN COURT M#R 1 1 2010

STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Plaintiff,

CASE NO:

C262523

DEPT NO:

XVIII

Cary Jerard Pickett, #0725059

Defendant.

GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT

I hereby agree to plead guilty to: COUNT 1 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (Felony - NRS 205.060 / Category B); COUNT 2 -CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Felony - NRS 199.480, 200.380 / Category B); COUNT 3 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165 / Category B) and COUNT 4 - POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON (Felony - NRS 202.360 / Category B), as more fully alleged in the charging document attached hereto as Exhibit "1".

My decision to plead guilty is based upon the plea agreement in this case which is as follows:

The State has agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. Defendant stipulates to large habitual treatment under NRS 207.010. Parties stipulate to a 2-5 year sentence on Count 1. Defendant treated as habitual under Count 2 and receive 10-25 year sentence, consecutive to

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Count 1, for a total of 12-30 years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. All other counts to run concurrent.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA

I understand that by pleading guilty I admit the facts which support all the elements of the offense(s) to which I now plead as set forth in Exhibit "1".

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty as to Count 1, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than two (2) years and a maximum term of not more than fifteen (15) years. The minimum term of imprisonment may not exceed forty percent (40%) of the maximum term of imprisonment. I understand that I may also be fined up to \$10,000.00.

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty as to Count 2, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than one (1) year and a maximum term of not more than six (6) years. The minimum term of imprisonment may not exceed forty percent (40%) of the maximum term of imprisonment. I understand that I may also be fined up to \$5,000.00.

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty as to Count 3, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than two (2) years and a maximum term of not more than fifteen (15) years, plus a consecutive minimum term of not less than one (1) year and a maximum term of not more than fifteen (15) years for the use of a deadly weapon enhancement. The minimum term of imprisonment may not exceed forty percent (40%) of the maximum term of imprisonment.

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty as to Count 4, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than one (1) year and a maximum term of not more than six (6) years. The minimum term of imprisonment may not exceed forty percent (40%) of the maximum term of imprisonment. I understand that I may also be fined up to \$5,000.00.

I understand that the law requires me to pay an Administrative Assessment Fee.

Further, I understand that if I am sentenced under the under the "small" habitual criminal enhancement, the Court must sentence me to a term not less than FIVE (5) years and a maximum of TWENTY (20) years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. I understand that if I am sentenced under the "large" habitual criminal enhancement the Court must sentence me to LIFE without the possibility of parole; life with the possibility of parole, parole eligibility begins after a minimum term of TEN (10) years has been served; OR a definite term of TWENTY FIVE (25) years, parole eligibility begins after a minimum of TEN (10) years has been served.

I understand that, if appropriate, I will be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty and to the victim of any related offense which is being dismissed or not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement. I will also be ordered to reimburse the State of Nevada for any expenses related to my extradition, if any.

I understand that I am eligible for probation for the offense to which I am pleading guilty to in Count 1, 2, and 4. I understand that, except as otherwise provided by statute, the question of whether I receive probation is in the discretion of the sentencing judge.

I understand that I am not eligible for probation for the offense to which I am pleading guilty to in Count 3.

I also understand that I must submit to blood and/or saliva tests under the Direction of the Division of Parole and Probation to determine genetic markers and/or secretor status.

I understand that if more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed and I am eligible to serve the sentences concurrently, the sentencing judge has the discretion to order the sentences served concurrently or consecutively.

I also understand that information regarding charges not filed, dismissed charges, or charges to be dismissed pursuant to this agreement may be considered by the judge at sentencing.

I have not been promised or guaranteed any particular sentence by anyone. I know that my sentence is to be determined by the Court within the limits prescribed by statute.

I understand that if my attorney or the State of Nevada or both recommend any specific punishment to the Court, the Court is not obligated to accept the recommendation.

I understand that if the State of Nevada has agreed to recommend or stipulate a particular sentence or has agreed not to present argument regarding the sentence, or agreed not to oppose a particular sentence, or has agreed to disposition as a gross misdemeanor when the offense could have been treated as a felony, such agreement is contingent upon my appearance in court on the initial sentencing date (and any subsequent dates if the sentencing is continued). I understand that if I fail to appear for the scheduled sentencing date or I commit a new criminal offense prior to sentencing the State of Nevada would regain the full right to argue for any lawful sentence.

I understand if the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty to was committed while I was incarcerated on another charge or while I was on probation or parole that I am not eligible for credit for time served toward the instant offense(s).

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty, if I am not a citizen of the United States, I may, in addition to other consequences provided for by federal law, be removed, deported, excluded from entry into the United States or denied naturalization.

I understand that the Division of Parole and Probation will prepare a report for the sentencing judge prior to sentencing. This report will include matters relevant to the issue of sentencing, including my criminal history. This report may contain hearsay information regarding my background and criminal history. My attorney and I will each have the opportunity to comment on the information contained in the report at the time of sentencing. Unless the District Attorney has specifically agreed otherwise, then the District Attorney may also comment on this report.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

By entering my plea of guilty, I understand that I am waiving and forever giving up the following rights and privileges:

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- 1. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, including the right to refuse to testify at trial, in which event the prosecution would not be allowed to comment to the jury about my refusal to testify.
- 2. The constitutional right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, free of excessive pretrial publicity prejudicial to the defense, at which trial I would be entitled to the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained. At trial the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense charged.
- 3. The constitutional right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who would testify against me.
 - 4. The constitutional right to subpoena witnesses to testify on my behalf.
 - 5. The constitutional right to testify in my own defense.
- 6. The right to appeal the conviction, with the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained, unless the appeal is based upon reasonable constitutional jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings and except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of NRS 174.035.

VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

I have discussed the elements of all of the original charge(s) against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the charge(s) against me.

I understand that the State would have to prove each element of the charge(s) against me at trial.

I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest.

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I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency, except for those set forth in this agreement.

I am not now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this agreement or the proceedings surrounding my entry of this plea.

My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

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DATED this \ \ \ day of March, 2010.

CARY PICKETT, aka, Cary Jerard Pickett Defendant

AGREED TO BY:

ROY P. NEILSON III

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #007842

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL: I, the undersigned, as the attorney for the Defendant named herein and as an officer of the court hereby certify that: 1. I have fully explained to the Defendant the allegations contained in the charge(s) to which guilty pleas are being entered. 4 2. I have advised the Defendant of the penalties for each charge and the restitution 5 that the Defendant may be ordered to pay. 6 3. All pleas of guilty offered by the Defendant pursuant to this agreement are consistent with the facts known to me and are made with my advice to the Defendant. 7 4. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Defendant: 8 a. Is competent and understands the charges and the consequences of pleading 9 guilty as provided in this agreement. 10 b. Executed this agreement and will enter all guilty pleas pursuant hereto voluntarily. 11 c. Was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug at the time I consulted with the defendant as certified in paragraphs 12 1 and 2 above. 13 Dated: This \\\ day of March, 2010. 14 15 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 10F02742B/GCU:abf 28

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ļ INFO DAVID ROGER **CLERK OF THE COURT** Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 3 ROY L. NELSON III Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #007842 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 5 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 I.A. 3/11/10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10:30 A.M. 8 ALMASE 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 C262523 Case No: Plaintiff, Dept No: **IIIVX** 11 -VS-12 CARY PICKETT, aka, Cary Jerard Pickett, #0725059 INFORMATION 13 Defendant. 14 15 STATE OF NEVADA SS. COUNTY OF CLARK 16 DAVID ROGER, District Attorney within and for the County of Clark, State of 17 Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs the Court: 18 That CARY PICKETT, aka, Cary Jerard Pickett, the Defendant(s) above named, 19 having committed the crimes of BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM 20 (Felony - NRS 205.060); CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Felony - NRS 21 199.480, 200.380); ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony - NRS 22 200.380, 193.165) and POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON (Felony - NRS 23 202.360), on or between October 11, 2009 and November 14, 2009, within the County of 24 Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made 25 and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, 26

EXHIBIT "1"

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COUNT 1 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM

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did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter, while in possession of a firearm, with intent to commit robbery, that certain building occupied by BEANO'S BAR, located at 7200 West Lake Mead, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada and/or ROADRUNNER SALOON, located at 5990 Centennial Center, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada and/or TRIPLE BAR, located at 4420 North Decatur Boulevard, North Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada and/or RAE'S BAR, located at 2531 Wigwam Parkway, Henderson, Clark County, Nevada and/or TIMBERS BAR, located at 7240 West Azure, Suite No. 170, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada and/or TENAYA LODGE, located at 5717 Sky Pointe Drive, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada.

COUNT 2 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY

did, together with co-defendant ALAN DANIELS, aka, Alan Demetrius Daniels, then and there meet with each other and between themselves, and each of them with the other, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire and agree to commit a crime, to-wit: robbery, and in furtherance of said conspiracy, Defendant did commit the acts as set forth in Count 3, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.

COUNT 3 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to-wit: lawful money of the United States and a cellular telephone, from the person of JUSTIN SANCHEZ and/or GEORGE MATTIE and/or DELTON LEMA and/or AARON PARDUHM and/or JOSHUA KIEHL, or in their presence, by means of force or violence or fear of injury to, and without the consent and against the will of the said JUSTIN SANCHEZ and/or GEORGE MATTIE and/or DELTON LEMA and/or AARON PARDUHM and/or JOSHUA KIEHL, said Defendant using a deadly weapon, to-wit: a handgun, during the commission of said crime, the Defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly committing this crime and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by providing counsel and/or encouragement and by entering into a course of

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conduct whereby the Defendants pointed handguns at the said victims and took said items (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

COUNT 4 - POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON

did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously own or have in his possession, or under his control, a weapon, to-wit: a handgun, the said Defendant being an ex-felon, having in 2006, in Case No. C226282 been convicted of Transport of a Controlled Substance and/or having in 1997, in Case No. C145127 been convicted of Burglary and/or having in 1997, in Case No. C143146 been convicted of Grand Larceny and/or having in 1993, in Case No. C109725 been convicted of Attempt Grand Larceny, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, felonies under the laws of the State of Nevada.

DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781

BY /s/ROY L. NELSON III

ROY L. NELSON III

Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #007842

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THE LANGUAGE CONTAINED HEREINAFTER TO BE READ TO A JURY HEARING THE PRIMARY OFFENSE FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT IS PRESENTLY CHARGED.

Defendant CARY PICKETT, aka, Cary Jerard Pickett, hereinbefore named, is placed on notice that, in accordance with the authorization of NRS 207.010, punishment imposed pursuant to the above-stated habitual criminal statute will be urged upon the Court if said Defendant is found guilty on the primary offenses of BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (Felony - NRS 205.060); CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Felony - NRS 199.480, 200.380); ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165) and POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EXFELON (Felony - NRS 202.360), for which the Defendant is presently charged.

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This page concerning the prior convictions hereinbelow set forth is to be considered by the Court in its discretion ONLY after the finding of guilty of Defendant on the primary 2 charge herein. 3 That said Defendant CARY PICKETT, aka, Cary Jerard Pickett, has been seven (7) 4 times convicted of crimes, which, under the laws of the situs of the crime and/or the State of 5 Nevada, amount to felonies, to-wit: 6 1. That in 2006, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada, for the crime 7 of Transporting a Controlled Substance, in Case No. C226282. 8 2. That in 1997, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada, for the crime 9 of Burglary, in Case No. C145127. 10 3. That in 1997, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada for the crime 11 of Grand Larceny, in Case No. C143146. 12 4. That in 1994, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada for the crime 13 of Escape, in Case No. C119000. 14 5. That in 1993, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada for the crime 15 of Attempt Grand Larceny, in Case No. C109725. 16 6. That in 1993, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada for the crime 17 of Burglary, in Case No. C107733. 18 7. That in 1991, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada for the crime 19 of Attempt Grand Larceny, in Case No. C99915. 20 DAVID ROGER 21 Nevada Bar #002781 22 23 BY /s/ROY L. NELSON III 24 Chief Deputy District Attorney 25 Nevada Bar #007842 DO NOT READ TO THE JURY 26 DA#10F02742BGCU:abf

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EXHIBIT 2

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	INFO DAVID ROGER Cl. 1. C. atta District Attorney	CLERK OF THE COURT
	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781	
3	ROY L. NELSON III Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #007842	
4 ∥	200 Lewis Avenue	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500	
6	Attorney for Plaintiff	COLUT
7	I.A. 3/11/10 DISTRICT 10:30 A.M. CLARK COUNT	TY, NEVADA
8	ALMASE	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
0	Plaintiff,	Case No: C262523 Dent No: XVIII
1	-vs-	Dept No: XVIII
2	CARY PICKETT, aka,	}
3	Cary Jerard Pickett, #0725059) INFORMATION
4	Defendant.)
15	STATE OF NEVADA) ss.	
16	COUNTY OF CLARK)	
17		within and for the County of Clark, State of
18	Nevada, in the name and by the authority of	
19		Jerard Pickett, the Defendant(s) above named,
20	II	RY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM
21	`	Y TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Felony - NRS
22		SE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony - NRS
23		F FIREARM BY EX-FELON (Felony - NRS
24	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	and November 14, 2009, within the County of
25	1	n, force and effect of statutes in such cases made
26	and provided, and against the peace and dig	mity of the State of Nevada,
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did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter, while in possession of a firearm, with intent to commit robbery, that certain building occupied by BEANO'S BAR, located at 7200 West Lake Mead, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada and/or ROADRUNNER SALOON, located at 5990 Centennial Center, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada and/or TRIPLE BAR, located at 4420 North Decatur Boulevard, North Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada and/or RAE'S BAR, located at 2531 Wigwam Parkway, Henderson, Clark County, Nevada and/or TIMBERS BAR, located at 7240 West Azure, Suite No. 170, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada and/or TENAYA LODGE, located at 5717 Sky Pointe Drive, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada.

COUNT 2 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY

did, together with co-defendant ALAN DANIELS, aka, Alan Demetrius Daniels, then and there meet with each other and between themselves, and each of them with the other, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire and agree to commit a crime, to-wit: robbery, and in furtherance of said conspiracy, Defendant did commit the acts as set forth in Count 3, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.

COUNT 3 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to-wit: lawful money of the United States and a cellular telephone, from the person of JUSTIN SANCHEZ and/or GEORGE MATTIE and/or DELTON LEMA and/or AARON PARDUHM and/or JOSHUA KIEHL, or in their presence, by means of force or violence or fear of injury to, and without the consent and against the will of the said JUSTIN SANCHEZ and/or GEORGE MATTIE and/or DELTON LEMA and/or AARON PARDUHM and/or JOSHUA KIEHL, said Defendant using a deadly weapon, to-wit: a handgun, during the commission of said crime, the Defendants being criminally liable under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly committing this crime and/or (2) by aiding or abetting in the commission of this crime, with the intent that this crime be committed, by providing counsel and/or encouragement and by entering into a course of

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conduct whereby the Defendants pointed handguns at the said victims and took said items (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

COUNT 4 - POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON

did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously own or have in his possession, or under his control, a weapon, to-wit: a handgun, the said Defendant being an ex-felon, having in 2006, in Case No. C226282 been convicted of Transport of a Controlled Substance and/or having in 1997, in Case No. C145127 been convicted of Burglary and/or having in 1997, in Case No. C143146 been convicted of Grand Larceny and/or having in 1993, in Case No. C109725 been convicted of Attempt Grand Larceny, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, felonies under the laws of the State of Nevada.

DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781

BY /s/ROY L. NELSON III

ROY L. NELSON III

Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #007842

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THE LANGUAGE CONTAINED HEREINAFTER TO BE READ TO A JURY HEARING THE PRIMARY OFFENSE FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT IS PRESENTLY CHARGED.

Defendant CARY PICKETT, aka, Cary Jerard Pickett, hereinbefore named, is placed on notice that, in accordance with the authorization of NRS 207.010, punishment imposed pursuant to the above-stated habitual criminal statute will be urged upon the Court if said Defendant is found guilty on the primary offenses of BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (Felony - NRS 205.060); CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Felony - NRS 199.480, 200.380); ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165) and POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EXFELON (Felony - NRS 202.360), for which the Defendant is presently charged.

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This page concerning the prior convictions hereinbelow set forth is to be considered by the Court in its discretion ONLY after the finding of guilty of Defendant on the primary charge herein.

That said Defendant CARY PICKETT, aka, Cary Jerard Pickett, has been seven (7) times convicted of crimes, which, under the laws of the situs of the crime and/or the State of Nevada, amount to felonies, to-wit:

- 1. That in 2006, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada, for the crime of Transporting a Controlled Substance, in Case No. C226282.
- 2. That in 1997, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada, for the crime of Burglary, in Case No. C145127.
- 3. That in 1997, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada for the crime of Grand Larceny, in Case No. C143146.
- 4. That in 1994, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada for the crime of Escape, in Case No. C119000.
- 5. That in 1993, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada for the crime of Attempt Grand Larceny, in Case No. C109725.
- 6. That in 1993, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada for the crime of Burglary, in Case No. C107733.
- 7. That in 1991, the Defendant was convicted in Clark County, Nevada for the crime of Attempt Grand Larceny, in Case No. C99915.

DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781

BY /s/ROY L. NELSON III

ROY L. NELSON III

Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #007842

DO NOT READ TO THE JURY

DA#10F02742BGCU:abf LVMPD; NLVPD; HPD EV#0910230605; 0911130506; 0911140728; 0908310560; 0907040926; 0910110978; 0926503; 0923087 BURG WFA; CONSP ROBB; RWDW; EX FEL POSS FA - F(TK10)

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EXHIBIT 3

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5	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
6	CLARK COOK 1, NEV 101
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, Vs. CARY PICKETT, aka, Cary Jerard Pickett, Defendant. Defendant. BEFORE THE HONORABLE KEVIN V. WILLIAMS, HEARING MASTER THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE:
17	ARRAIGNMENT
18 19 20	APPEARANCES: For the State: ROY NELSON, ESQ., Chief Deputy District Attorney
21 22	For the Defendant: CAESAR V. ALMASE, ESQ., Attorney at Law
23 24	
25	RECORDED BY: KIARA SCHMIDT, COURT RECORDER

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Cary Pickett. Yes, Mr. Almase?

MR. ALMASE: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, sir.

MR. ALMASE: Mr. Pickett is present in custody. You want me to do it?

MR. NELSON: Either way. Whatever you want.

THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and let Mr. Nelson put it on there. Go ahead, Mr. Nelson.

MR. NELSON: Judge, it's my understanding this morning he's going to plead guilty to one count of burglary while in possession of a firearm, count two, conspiracy to commit robbery, count three, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, and count four, possession of a firearm by ex-felon. There's a signed guilty plea agreement dated March 11th, today, Judge.

The State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. The Defendant stipulates to the large habitual criminal treatment under NRS 207.010. The parties stipulate to a two- to five-year sentence with regard to count one. The Defendant will agree that he'll be treated as a large habitual under count two and receive a sentence of ten to twenty-five years. That will run consecutive to count one for a total of twelve to thirty years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. All the other counts will run concurrent, Judge.

THE COURT: Now did you hear that -- those negotiations put on the record by the State, sir?

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1
1	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.	
2	THE COURT: What is your true name, Mr. Pickett?	
3	THE DEFENDANT: Cary Jerard Pickett.	
4	THE COURT: How old are you?	
5	THE DEFENDANT: Forty-four.	
6	THE COURT: How far did you go in school?	
7	THE DEFENDANT: Thirteen years.	
8	THE COURT: Read, write, and understand the English language?	
9	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.	
10	THE COURT: Okay, move just a little closer to the microphone if you would	
11	there, Mr. Pickett.	
12	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.	
13	THE COURT: Understand what you're charged with?	
14	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.	
15	THE COURT: What is your plea?	
16	THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.	
17	THE COURT: Before I can accept your guilty plea, I must be assured it's	
18	freely and voluntarily given. Has anyone threatened you to get you to plead guilty?	
19	THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.	
20	THE COURT: Has anyone threatened anyone closely associated with you in	1
21	order to get you to plead guilty?	
22		
23	THE COURT: You understand the penalty range for count one is two to	
24	fifteen years, Nevada Department of Prisons?	
25	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.	

THE COURT: Do you understand the penalty range for count two is one to six years, Nevada Department of Prisons, up to a \$5,000 fine?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand the penalty range for count three which you're pleading guilty to, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, is one to fifteen years -- two to fifteen years for the robbery; do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And do you understand there's an additional one- to fifteen-year penalty for use of a deadly weapon; you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand the penalty range for count four is one to six years, Nevada Department of Prisons, up to a \$5,000 fine?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And do you understand that sentencing is strictly up to the Court and no one can promise you probation, leniency, or any special treatment? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you further understand, sir, that you stipulated to the use of the large habitual criminal which carries the following penalty ranges: Life without the possibility of parole, life with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning after ten years, or a definite term of twenty-five years in the Nevada Department of Prisons with parole eligibility beginning after ten years; you

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

understand that?

THE COURT: And do you understand that you have stipulated to the last type of sentencing which is ten to twenty-five years; you understand that?

did. Count one, burglary while in possession of a firearm, it says that you did

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willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter, while in possession of a firearm, with the intent to commit robbery, that certain building occupied by Beano's Bar, located on West Lake Mead, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, the Roadrunner Saloon, located on Centennial Center, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, the Triple Bar, located on North Decatur Boulevard, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, Rae's Bar, located on Wigwam Parkway, Clark County, Nevada, Timbers Bar, located on West Azure, Suite 170, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, and/or the Tenaya Lodge, located on Sky Pointe Drive, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And it says here in regards to count two that you did meet with Alan Daniels and between yourselves you willfully, unlawfully conspired and agreed to commit the crime of robbery, and in furtherance of that conspiracy you did the act set forth in count three?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And in regards to count three, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, it says you did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, lawful money of the United States, and cellular phone from the person of Justin Sanchez, and/or George Mattie, and/or Delton Lema, Aaron Parduhm, Jushua Kiehl, in their presence by means of force, fear, or violence of injury thereto, without the consent and against the will of those individuals; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And during the commission of the crime either you or your co-defendant used a handgun; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay, in regards to count four, possession of a firearm by an

ex-felon, it says you did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously own or have in your possession or under your control a weapon, and that was a handgun, and that at that time you were an ex-felon, 'cause in 2006 you had been convicted in Case Number C226282 of transport of controlled substance, a felony under the laws of the State of Nevada, and also in 1997 you had previously been convicted of a -- in Case Number 145127 of burglary; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And in Case C21 - 143 [sic] and you had been convicted of grand larceny; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And in -- that was in 1993 -- excuse me. And then for a final case you had was C109725 in 1993 where you'd been convicted of attempt grand larceny; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: So you had possession of a firearm after being convicted of felonies; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else there, Mr. Nelson?

MR. NELSON: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay, Court accepts the Defendant's guilty plea as being freely and voluntarily given. Listen closely now, sir. We're going to set your sentencing date on --

THE CLERK: May 10th, 8:15, Department 18.

MR. NELSON: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. Have a good day there, Mr. Nelson.

MR. ALMASE: Thank you, Judge. (Whereupon, the proceedings concluded) ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. Kiara Schmidt, Court Recorder/Transcriber

EXHIBIT 4

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

May 10, 2010

10C262523-2

The State of Nevada vs Cary J Pickett

May 10, 2010

8:15 AM

Sentencing

SENTENCING DEFT PICKETT

HEARD BY:

Barker, David

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Sharon Chun

RECORDER:

Richard Kangas

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Almase, Caesar V.

Attorney for Deft

Nelson III, Roy L.

Attorney for State

Pickett, Cary J

Defendant

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- The State lodged seven (7) certified copies of Deft Pickett's prior Judgments of Convictions in support of their request for Habitual Criminal enhancement. Exhibits were marked as State's Exhibits and admitted. COURT FOUND documents to be accurate and sufficient to support and FOUND DEFT PICKETT AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL pursuant to NRS 207.010.

DEFT. PICKETT ADJUDGED GUILTY of COUNT 1 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (F); COUNT 2 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (F); COUNT 3 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F); AND COUNT 4 - POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON (F).

In addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment fee, COURT ORDERED, Deft Pickett to PAY RESTITUTION in the AMOUNT of \$11,948.60 JOINTLY and SEVERALLY with co-deft, an INDIVIDUAL RESTITUTION of \$1,550.00, and SENTENCED, as follows:

COUNT 1 - A MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC);

COUNT 2 - A MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC);

COUNT 3 - Habitual Criminal Enhancement with a MAXIMUM term of TWENTY-FIVE (25) YEARS and a MINIMUM of TEN (10) YEARS in the NV Dept of Corrections, SENTENCE CONSECUTIVE TO COUNT 1;

PRINT DATE:

09/27/2010

Page 1 of 2

Minutes Date:

May 10, 2010

10C262523-2

COUNT 4 - A MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), CONCURRENT TO COUNT 2.

COURT REITERATED that COUNTS 1 AND 3 ARE CONSECUTIVE and COUNTS 2 and 4 ARE CONCURRENT, with 88 DAYS CREDIT for time served.

COURT FURTHER ORDERED, DNA fee and testing WAIVED, having been previously submitted.

If bond, exonerated.

9/27/10-MINUTES CORRECTED TO REFLECT CORRECT DEFT'S NAME, AND THE SENTENCING MINUTE ORDER OF DEFT PICKETT HAS NOW BEEN SEPARATED FROM THE SENTENCING MINUTE ORDER OF DEFT DANIELS. /SSC

PRINT DATE: 09/27/2010

Page 2 of 2

Minutes Date:

May 10, 2010

	Page	1333675
	, ·	/ 10C262523 – 2 RPLY Reply
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APR (27)	Court.	
26	Exidentary hearing, if deemed nece	ssary by this Huwarable
25	in support hereof, and oral argumen	t at time of hearing or
24	Fradings on file herein, the attached	Points and authorities
23	This Reply 13 made and based up	on all the papers and
22		
21	RESPONSE to PETITIONERS PETITION P	or writ of Habeas
20	the attached points and authorities	23 to Reply to States
19	Come Now, DETITIONER IN PRO-SE	, and hereby submits
18	-	
17	Time of Hearing: 8:15	5 AM
16	DATE OF HEARING: April	6,2011
15	Corpus (Post-conuc	tron)
14	PETITIONER'S CEPTY to States CESPON	use to writ of HADECS
13		
12	Petitioner,	NEQUESTE O
11	CARY PICKETT	Evidentary Hearing Requested
10	Vs. DEP	+ No: XVII
9	RESPONDENT, CASE	No: 101.262523-2
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Page 362

1	ARGUMENTS
2	
3	I. Contrary to the state's arguement, DEFENSE COU-
1	MSEIS failure to conduct Any investigation into his
5	client's prior convictions or mitigating Evidence
6	prior to advising his client to stipulate to the
7	Habitual criminal statute is INEFFECTIVENESS.
8	
9	The state argues that the petitioner fails to
10	satisfy the two prong test of "reasonably effective
[1	assistance of Counsel as set forth in Strickland
12	v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688-87 104 S. Ct 2052,
13	2063-64. The right to be represented by counsel
	is a right to be effectively represented at all
I	critical stages of the criminal process. The Constit-
16	ution gaurantees an accused "adequate legal assistance
17	Cuyler v Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335.
18	An Attorney must make a reasonable investr -
	gation in preparation for trial or a reasonable de-
	CISION NOT to INVESTIGATE. Strategic choices made
22	after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable profession-
23	al judgements support the limitations on investi-
	gation. Kirksey v. State of NEVADA 923 P2d 1102
1	IN the case at bar defense counsel conducted
	NO IMVESTIGATION NOT made any inquiry into the
	prior Felony convictions to assertian validity
28	prior to advising his dient to stipulate /Pleas

NRS 34.810 (1) (a) provides that a court shall dis- miss a post-conviction habers petition - challenging a conviction based on a guilty plea unless the petition alleges "that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel" a petitioner is entitled to assistance of counsel" a petitioner is entitled to unth specific factual allegations that if true would entitle him to relief" The fact that counsel did not know at entry of plea war at sentencing they two of his client prior T.O.C. he was inithout counsel" in pro-per" and that the state did not as legally required produce valid waiver of rights of counsel for those two conviction "se 143144 and 114 127 demonstrates counsel failure to 143144 and 115 127 demonstrates counsel failure to 143144 and 116 145 127 demonstrates counsel failure to 143144 and 117 and howhers does the record alemanstrate this fail 118 ure to investigate was some strategic mode. 119 120 120 T. Petitioner negues that plea of guilty (slightlating to the habitual criminal statute was not knowingly or 121 122 123 124 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125	1	quilty to the habitual criminal statute.
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26 the "Bait and Switch" pulled off in the course of this		
		the "Bait and Switch" pulled off in the course of this
LI PROJECTION IN TEXT OF THE TANKETS BITCH IN THE POST	27	prosecution in (Ex-1 of petitioners brief in support
28 of his petition for writ of habeas coapus pg 2) the	28	

1 State clarifies for both the court and the defen-2 dant "with regards to robbery with the use of a 3 deadly weapon, that will be the charge that he will plead to the large habitual on." Taylor v. worden 609 P2d 587, the court must "consider as a whole, the process by which the plea was obtinued was Fundamentally fair". The petitioner had a reasonable Expectation based upon the aforemention clarification 9 | " plead to the large habitual" his plea agreement would 10 | DE Specific in waver of right or acknowledgement IN REFERENCE to the habitual offender adjudication process itself, not a simple "treated as or Treatment under NRS. 207.010 . Those terms are ambiguous and any ambiguities in a plea agree ment must be levied against the State U.S. V. 16 ANDERSON, 970 F 20 602. IN Parkerson V. State of NEVADA 678 P2.d 1155 18 IN regards to stipulating to habitual as part of a guilty plea two thing should be demonstrated the "record must show, that the defendant understands that an habitual criminal determination "and" an ENsurvey life sentence may be a consequence of his or her plea" IN this case 10-25 yr's Nowhere IN the plea convious does the defendant acknow-25 | ledge that he understand that a later termination will have to be made all language 27 Indicates an automatic result "treated as a hab-28 Itual" and SENTENCEd to "10-25yrs"

1	
1	III. Contrary to the State's arguement that the petitioners
2	Improper Adjudication and SENTENCE is NOT COGNIZABLE, due-process At SENTENCING was violated.
3	due-process at sentencing was violated.
4	
5	AT SENTENCING, the district Attorney ROY NELSON
6	Submitted to the court what was proported to be
7	(7) certified ropies of petitioner's prior judgement of
8	conviction in support of his being adjudicated as a
	habitual offender, upon review of those same J.O.C's
	provided to the defense only (1) = c226282 EX-1
	(Attached) bear's a certification seal "Certified copy
12	document Attached is a true and correct copy of the original
13	on file" and Dated all other J.O.C'S Ex 2-7 have NO such
14	CERTIFICATION SECT! UNDER NEVADA LOW. admission into EVIDENCE
15	of exemplified copy of Felony conviction is a prima facio
16	EVIDENCE of COMVICTION OF Prior FELONY" Williams Y. Wolff
17	
18	1
19	IF the state produces record of Judgement of
.20	conviction from proceeding in which defendant was not
21	represented by counsel, as it did in the case at bar in
22	PEtitioners (cc + 143146 and 145127 Ex-2 and 3), state has
23	the burden to produce evidence to demonstrate the defen-
24	dant validly warved right to counsel Davenport v. State
25	915 P 2.d 878, here the state did not produce any valid
26	waver of counsel as require when Jio. C's clearly on their
27	
28	PERSONA" (Without counsel), INSTEAD THE State argues

1	that EVEN "If" clearly invalid convictions were successfully
2	challenged there would be (5) remaining to be considered.
3	demonstrating his deliberate indifference to prome
	PETHONER'S right to due-process. The standard is set
	IN Mc Nulty V. State of NEVADA 826 P 2d 567 "IN order
	to use prior convictions for enhancement purposes, it is
	ESSENTIAL that those convictions be constitutionally valid
8	SEE Baldasar V. IIIINUIS 466 U.S. 222.
9	The court went on to rely on the District Attorneys
10	preparation and instead of factually determinion attat
11	Each submitted prior conviction were in fact constitu-
12	tionally valid. "The constitutional validity of prior convict-
13	ions is a legal status to which a defendant may not stip-
14	ulate. No matter what the plea bargain, the district court
15	must make it's own determination as to the constitutional
16	validaty of prior convictions the "question of the validity
17	
	court as a matter of law" Staley v. State 787 P2d 396.
19	where records of the defendants prior convictions are devoid
20	of an affirmature showing that the defendant had been repre-
21	sented by coursel in any of those proceedings or had
22	Validly unived his right to counsel, the defendant could
23	Not be sentenced as a habitual criminal Hamlet i State
24	455 P 2d 915.
25	
26	, and the second
27	
28	

GROUND ____ CONTINUED

1	CONCLUSION
2	
3	For the foregoing reasons, petitioner request
4	that his sentence under MRS. 207,010 be vacated
5	or for the court conduct an Evidentariary hearing
6	into allegations asserted in his petition. Petitioner
7	also request the opportunity for oral argument
8	
9	Respectfully Submitted
10	
11	
12	Cary Pickett 57591
13	
14	Dated this 30th day of March 2011
15	
16	
17 18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
I	Page

GROUND CONTINUED

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Mailing
2	
3	I Cary Pickett hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5 (b),
4	that on this 30th day of March I mailed a true and
5	
6	response to writ of hobeas Corpus (Post-consiction)
7	by depositing it in the High Dessert State Prison, Legal
8	First- Class Postage, Fully pre-paid address Ed as follows
9	
0	District Attorney
1	David Rodgers
2	200 LEWIS STREET
3	Las Vegas NV 89101
4	
5	Warden H.D.S.P
6	7.0. Box 650
7	
8	Indian Springs NV 89070
	Dated this 30th day of MARCH 2011
	THE THE PARTY AND THE PARTY AN
,	CARy Pickett # 57591
	PETITIONER IN PROPER-DELSON PO BOX 1050 H.D.S.P
,	Judian Springs NV 89070
ı	
	Page

The Defendant previously appeared before the Court with counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime(s) of TRANSPORT OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (Category B, Felony), in violation of NRS 453.321; thereafter, on the 14th day of February, 2007, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with his counsel, JAMES L. BUCHANAN II, ESQ., and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offense(s) and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, \$60.00 Drug Analysis fee and \$150.00 DNA Analysis fee are IMPOSED, the Defendant is sentenced as follows: to a MINIMUM of TWELVE (12) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of THIRTY (30) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), SUSPENDED; placed on PROBATION for FIVE (5) YEARS.

CONDITIONS:

1. Enter and complete Drug Court.

P:\WPDOCS\UDG\613\61359101.doc

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CLERK OF THE COURT **ALCOENER**

2. Search Clause for illegal substances. 3. Maintain full-time employment. DATED this _____ day of February, 2007. DISTRICT JUDGE CERTIFIED COPY DOCUMENT ATTACHED IS A TRUE AND CONRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE CLERK OF THE COURT cl ren , 4 2010 P;\WPDOCS\UUDG\613\61359101.doc 1. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, including the right to refuse to testify at trial, in which event the prosecution would not be allowed to comment to the jury about my refusal to testify.

- 2. The constitutional right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, free of excessive pretrial publicity prejudicial to the defense, at which trial I would be entitled to the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained. At trial the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense charged.
- 3. The constitutional right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who would testify against me.
 - 4. The constitutional right to subpoena witnesses to testify on my behalf.
 - 5. The constitutional right to testify in my own defense.
- 6. The right to appeal the conviction, with the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained, unless the appeal is based upon reasonable constitutional jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings and except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of NRS 174.035.

VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

I have discussed the elements of all of the original charge(s) against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the charge(s) against me.

I understand that the State would have to prove each element of the charge(s) against me at trial.

I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest.

///

] ///

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency, except for those set forth in this agreement. I am not now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this agreement or the proceedings surrounding my entry of this plea. My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney. DATED this day of March, 2010. CARY PICKETT, aka, Cary Jerard Pickett Defendant AGREED TO BY: elsot ief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #007842

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL: I, the undersigned, as the attorney for the Defendant named herein and as an officer of the court hereby certify that: 1. I have fully explained to the Defendant the allegations contained in the charge(s) to which guilty pleas are being entered. 2. I have advised the Defendant of the penalties for each charge and the restitution that the Defendant may be ordered to pay. 3. All pleas of guilty offered by the Defendant pursuant to this agreement are consistent with the facts known to me and are made with my advice to the Defendant. 4. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Defendant: a. Is competent and understands the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty as provided in this agreement. b. Executed this agreement and will enter all guilty pleas pursuant hereto voluntarily. c. Was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug at the time I consulted with the defendant as certified in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. Dated: This day of March, 2010. ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 10F02742B/GCU:abf

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor		COURT MINUTES	July 14, 1997
97C143146	The State	of Nevada vs Gary Pic	kett
July 14, 1997	9:00 AM	Request	DEFT'S PRO PER REQUEST TO RECEIVE FERETTA CANVASS Court Clerk: SUSAN BURDETTE/sb Reporter/Recorder: CATHY NELSON Heard By: Douglas, Michael L
HEARD BY:			COURTROOM:
COURT CLER	K:		
RECORDER:			
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESENT:	Bloxham, Rona Justice, Patricia Pickett, Gary Public Defende	R. Attorney Defendant	

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Upon Court's inquiry, Deft. stated he wishes to represent himself as he and Ms. Justice have a conflict of interest; she does not believe he can win this case; she has insulted him and requested a psychological evaluation; he requested a substitution of counsel and she suggested that he represent himself. Court stated the penalty and admonished Deft. that if he represents himself at trial, the Court will not make any exceptions for him. Ms. Justice stated the defenses Deft. wants her to take at trial would be obvious ineffective assistance of counsel and it would be unethical to go forward. Following further statements by Deft., COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED; Ms. Justice to contact and discuss with Deft. Court stated he will have his office contact Mr. Savage for possible

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appointment -- not as counsel of record but as stand-by counsel if Deft. wishes to go forward and represent himself. Deft. requested a copy of the discovery. COURT ORDERED, DENIED. Ms. Justice requested this matter be recalled at 2:00 p.m., and COURT SO ORDERED.

At 2:00 P.M., matter recalled with all parties present. COURT ORDERED, State excused. Court noted the Calendar Call and Jury Trial, noted that Deft. wishes to go forward and represent himself, and noted Ms. Justice's request to make certain representations on the record this date. Ms. Justice concurred and make in-camera representations as to this case. Statements by Deft. as to his defense. Court found that Deft. has a right a trial that is based on physical identification of physical evidence available.

CUSTODY

07-17-97 9:00 AM DEFT'S REQUEST: PRO PER MOTION TO RECEIVE FERETA CANVASS CANVASS ... CALENDAR CALL ... POSSIBLE CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL (J. (SAVAGE) 07-21-97 10:00 AM JURY TRIAL

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DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor		COURT MINUTES	August 14, 1997	
97C143146	The State	of Nevada vs Gary Pickett		
August 14, 1997 9:00 AM		All Pending Motions	ALL PENDING MOTIONS (08-14-97) Court Clerk: SUSAN BURDETTE/sb Reporter/Recorder: JANICE LISTON Heard By: Michael Douglas	
HEARD BY:	HEARD BY: COURTROOM:			
COURT CLERK:				
RECORDER:				
REPORTER:				
PARTIES PRESENT:	Noxon, Arthur Pickett, Gary Savage, Jordan	Defendant		

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- STATUS CHECK: TRIAL STATUS ... STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND INFORMATION As to STATUS CHECK: TRIAL STATUS: Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Noxon noted the State is ready for trial. Deft. requested discovery as to the photos. Mr. Noxon lodged the photos and copies of Deft's four (4) prior convictions with Mr. Savage. Mr. Noxon requested that Deft. advise the State, so they can respond, if he challenges any of those convictions.

As to STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND INFORMATION: Mr. Noxon noted the State wishes to seek Habitual Criminal treatment. Deft. objected to the State filing Habitual Criminal treatment at this late date. Response by Mr. Noxon that per Statute, any time up to 15 days prior to sentencing, the State may file Habitual Criminal charges and will obtain the Statute and respond if the Court so wishes, noting the State is within the limit. He further stated that if Deft. wishes to discuss negotiations, he will do so. Court cited NRS 207.010, and ORDERED, State's Motion to Amend Information

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GRANTED, noting it is the State's prerogative to go forward with it, if appropriate. ORDER TO AMEND INFORMATION signed and FILED IN OPEN COURT. AMENDED INFORMATION FILED IN OPEN COURT. COURT ORDERED, Calendar Call and Jury Trial dates STAND. Mr. Noxon stated he will contact Mr. Savage as to negotiating this matter. CUSTODY

08-28-97 9:00 AM CALENDAR CALL 09-02-97 10:00 AM JURY TRIAL

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DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Felony/Gross N	Aisdemeanor	COURT MINUTES	April 14, 1999
97C143146	The Stat	e of Nevada vs Gary Pi	ekett
April 14, 1999	9:00 AM	I All Pending N	ALL PENDING MOTIONS (04-14-99) Court Clerk: JOYCE BROWN Reporter/Recorder: CATHY NELSON Heard By: Michael Douglas
HEARD BY:			COURTROOM:
COURT CLER	K:		
RECORDER:			
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESENT:	Weckerly, Par	nela C. Attorney	

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFT'S PRO PER MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME, MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, MOTION FOR PRE-SENTENCING REPORT, SENTENCING TRANSCRIPT, GUILTY PLEA MEMORANDUM, PRE-TRIAL AND ALL POST-TRIAL HEARING TRANSCRIPTS AND AMENDED INFORMATION TO RESPOND TO STATE'S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS...DEFT'S PRO PER PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)...DEFT'S PRO PER MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AS TO THE FIRST MOTION LISTED, COURT ORDERED motion DENIED. Court advised it would be appropriate to have the file sent to the Defendant by the previous Counsel, Mr. Savage, if he still had it.

AS TO DEFT'S PRO PER MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, COURT ORDERED motion GRANTED.

AS TO THE DEFT'S PRO PER PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-

CONVICTION), Court advised it was untimely; good cause had not been shown in this matter; and

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97C143146

ORDERED, pursuant to NRS 34.726 the Petition was DENIED. Additionally, Court noted for the record, against the Court's advice, Mr. Pickett represented himself. Court further advised the petition was without merit; the Defendant had signed off on the negotiations; and he was canvassed thoroughly; as to Counsel, it was by his own design; and Court had ordered stand-by Counsel for him. State to prepare the order.

NDP

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EXMORT#2

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JOCP STEWART L. BELL DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #000477 200 S. Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 EITED

1911 GCT 17 A 8:51

4 (702) 435-4711 Attorney for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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THE STATE OF NEVADA,

9

10 -vs-

11 GARY PICKETT, aka Cary Jerard Pickett, #0725059

Defendant.

Plaintiff.

Case No. Cl Dept. No. XI Docket S

C143146 XI

1-:-

Defen

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JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (PLEA)

WHEREAS, on the 28th day of August, 1997, the Defendant GARY PICKETT, aka Cary Jerard Pickett, appeared before the Court herein with his counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime(s) of GRAND LARCENY (CATEGORY B FELONY), committed on or about the 3rd day of May, 1997, in violation of NRS 205.220 and

WHEREAS, thereafter on the 25th day of September, 1997, the Defendant, In Propria Persona, being present in court with his counsel JORDAN SAVAGE, ESQ., as Stand By Counsel, and ARTHUR G. NOXON, Deputy District Attorney, also being present; the above entitled Court did adjudge the Defendant guilty thereof by reason of his plea of guilty and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, sentenced Defendant to a minimum of thirty-six (36) months and a maximum of one-hundred twenty (120) months in the Nevada Department of Prisons, suspended; placed on probation for an indeterminate period not to exceed five (5) years. Conditions: 1. Search Clause for controlled substances and weapons.

2. Complete Drug Court Program, noting weapons were not involved. 3. Complete long-term

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CT 20 1997

counseling, vocational and educational programs as deemed necessary by the Division of Parole and Probation. 4. Complete eight (8) hours community service per month within the first three (3) years of probation. 5. Pursuant to NRS 176.185, Defendant to be supervised in the Nevada Division of Parole and Probation's House Arrest Program for the first four (4) months of probation. Defendant to receive eighty-nine (89) days credit for time served. Court referred matter to Drug Court, and Ordered, set for further proceedings on October 6, 1997 at 9:00 o'clock a.m. in Department X. THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above entitled Court is hereby directed to enter this Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above entitled matter. DATED this 16th day of October, 1997, in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada. DA#97-143146X/pm LVMPD EV#9705030904 (TKI)

-2-

P:\WPDOC\$\JUDG\706\706#0301.WPD

INDIVIDUAL RESTITUTION of \$3,034.50, and SENTENCED, as follows: COUNT 1 - A MAXIMUM of ONE-HUNDRED-EIGHTY (180) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); COUNT 2 - A MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); COUNT 3 - A MAXIMUM term of LIFE in the NV Dept of Corrections, with the possibility of Parole when a MINIMUM of TEN (10) YEARS has been served, CONSECUTIVE TO COUNT 1; COUNT 4 - A MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), CONCURRENT TO COUNT 2. COURT REITERATED that COUNTS 1 AND 3 ARE CONSECUTIVE and COUNTS 2 AND 4 ARE CONCURRENT. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, SENTENCING IN THIS CASE IS TO BE SERVED CONSECUTIVE TO THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IN CASE NO. C156246, with ZERO (0) DAYS CREDIT for time served. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, DNA fee and testing WAIVED, having been previously submitted.

If bond, exonerated.

AS TO DEFT PICKETT: The State lodged seven (7) certified copies of Deft Pickett's prior Judgments of Convictions in support of their request for Habitual Criminal enhancement. Exhibits were marked as State's Exhibits and admitted. COURT FOUND documents to be accurate and sufficient to support and FOUND DEFT DANIELS AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL pursuant to NRS 207.010. DEFT. PICKETT ADJUDGED GUILTY of COUNT 1 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (F); COUNT 2 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (F); COUNT 3 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F); AND COUNT 4 - POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON (F). In addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment fee, COURT ORDERED, Deft Pickett to PAY RESTITUTION in the AMOUNT of \$11,948.60 JOINTLY and SEVERALLY with co-deft, an INDIVIDUAL RESTITUTION of \$1,550.00, and SENTENCED, as follows: COUNT 1 - A MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); COUNT 2 - A MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); COUNT 3 - Habitual Criminal Enhancement with a MAXIMUM term of TWENTY-FIVE (25) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TEN (10) MONTHS in the NV Dept of Corrections, SENTENCE CONSECUTIVE TO COUNT 1; COUNT 4 - A MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), CONCURRENT TO COUNT 2.

COURT REITERATED that COUNTS 1 AND 3 ARE CONSECUTIVE and COUNTS 2 and 4 ARE CONCURRENT, with 88 DAYS CREDIT for time served.

COURT FURTHER ORDERED, DNA fee and testing WAIVED, having been previously submitted.

If bond, exonerated.

CLERK'S NOTE 7/27/10 - AS TO DEFT PICKETT. COUNT 3 HAS BEEN CORRECTED PER ABOVE MINUTE. (S.CHUN)

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March 11, 2010

INDIVIDUAL RESTITUTION of \$3,034.50, and SENTENCED, as follows: COUNT 1 - A MAXIMUM of ONE-HUNDRED-EIGHTY (180) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); COUNT 2 - A MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); COUNT 3 - A MAXIMUM term of LIFE in the NV Dept of Corrections, with the possibility of Parole when a MINIMUM of TEN (10) YEARS has been served, CONSECUTIVE TO COUNT 1; COUNT 4 - A MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), CONCURRENT TO COUNT 2.

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COURT REITERATED that COUNTS 1 AND 3 ARE CONSECUTIVE and COUNTS 2 and 4 ARE CONCURRENT, with 88 DAYS CREDIT for time served.

COURT FURTHER ORDERED, DNA fee and testing WAIVED, having been previously submitted.

If bond, exonerated.

CLERK'S NOTE 7/27/10 - AS TO DEFT PICKETT. COUNT 3 HAS BEEN CORRECTED PER ABOVE MINUTE. (S.CHUN)

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LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NV, THURS., FEB. 25, 2010

10:25 A.M.

-000-

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: With respect to Mr. Pickett.

MR. NELSON: Judge, it's my understanding this morning, he will unconditionally waive his preliminary hearing. In district court he will plead guilty to one count of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon naming all victims, one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, one count of burglary while in possession of a firearm naming all bars, one count of felon possession of a firearm.

He will stipulate to the large habitual under NRS 207.010. Both of the parties stipulate to a term of years of 12 years to a maximum term of 30 years in the Nevada Department of Corrections.

With regard to robbery with use of a deadly weapon, that will be the charge that he will plead to the large habitual on. The conspiracy to commit robbery will be a two-to-five-year sentence to run consecutive to his 10-to-25-year sentence.

MR. ALMASE: And obviously the remaining counts will run concurrent.

MR. NELSON: That's correct.

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1
                THE COURT: Mr. Picket, did you understand
 2
    the terms of the negotiations?
 3
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
                THE COURT: Do you understand also that
 5
    one of the things you are being asked to do this
    morning is to unconditionally waive your right to a
    preliminary hearing which means that if you get to
 7
    district court and you change your mind about the
 9
    negotiations you won't be able to come back to this
10
    court to have a preliminary hearing as to these
11
    charges?
12
               Do you understand that?
13
               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
14
               THE COURT: And understanding that, is it
    still your intention to unconditionally waive your
15
16
    right to a preliminary hearing?
17
               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
18
               THE COURT: Then it appearing to this
    Court from the amended criminal complaint on file
19
20
    herein that the crimes of conspiracy to commit
    robbery, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, allege
21
22
    burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon have
23
    been committed and the Defendant, Cary Pickett,
    having unconditionally waived his right to a
24
25
   preliminary hearing on said charges shall be held to
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answer said charges in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Department --THE CLERK: 18, March 11th at 10:30, lower level basement, Courtroom 1A. -000-ATTEST: FULL, TRUE, ACCURATE AND CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS. CCR No.

1	CASE NO. C262523			
2	IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF LAS VEGAS TOWNSHIP			
3	COUNTY OF CLARK, STATE OF NEVADA			
4	-000-			
5				
6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)			
7	Plaintiff,			
8	vs.) CASE NO. 10F02742B			
9	CARY PICKETT,			
10	Defendant.			
11				
12	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF			
13	UNCONDITIONAL WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY HEARING			
14				
15	BEFORE THE HON. KAREN BENNETT-HARON			
16	JUSTICE OF THE PEACE			
17	Thursday, February 25, 2010			
18	10:25 A.M.			
19				
20	APPEARANCES:			
21	For the State: ROY NELSON, ESQ.			
22	Deputy District Attorney For the Defendant: CAESAR ALMASE, ESQ.			
23	TOT THE DETENDANCE. CAESAR ALMASE, ESQ.			
24				
25	Reported by: SHAWN E. OTT, CCR NO. 577			

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STEWART L. BELL DISTRICT ATTORNEY 2 Nevada Bar #000477 200 S. Third Street 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 435-4711 4 Attorney for Plaintiff 5 6 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA. Plaintiff, 9 10 -VS-GARY PICKETT, aka 11 Cary Jerard Pickett, #0725059 12 Defendant. 13 14 15 16 17 18

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Case No. Dept. No.

C143146

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Dept. No. Docket XI S

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (PLEA)

WHEREAS, on the 28th day of August, 1997, the Defendant GARY PICKETT, aka Cary Jerard Pickett, appeared before the Court herein with his counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime(s) of GRAND LARCENY (CATEGORY B FELONY), committed on or about the 3rd day of May, 1997, in violation of NRS 205.220 and

WHEREAS, thereafter on the 25th day of September, 1997, the Defendant, In Propria Persona, being present in court with his counsel JORDAN SAVAGE, ESQ., as Stand By Counsel, and ARTHUR G. NOXON, Deputy District Attorney, also being present; the above entitled Court did adjudge the Defendant guilty thereof by reason of his plea of guilty and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, sentenced Defendant to a minimum of thirty-six (36) months and a maximum of one-hundred twenty (120) months in the Nevada Department of Prisons, suspended; placed on probation for an indeterminate period not to exceed five (5) years. Conditions: 1. Search Clause for controlled substances and weapons.

2. Complete Drug Court Program, noting weapons were not involved. 3. Complete long-term

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counseling, vocational and educational programs as deemed necessary by the Division of Parole and Probation. 4. Complete eight (8) hours community service per month within the first three 2 (3) years of probation. 5. Pursuant to NRS 176.185, Defendant to be supervised in the Nevada Division of Parole and Probation's House Arrest Program for the first four (4) months of probation. Defendant to receive eighty-nine (89) days credit for time served. Court referred 5 matter to Drug Court, and Ordered, set for further proceedings on October 6, 1997 at 9:00 6 o'clock a.m. in Department X. THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above entitled Court is hereby directed to enter this 8 Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above entitled matter. DATED this 16th day of October, 1997, in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, 10 State of Nevada. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

DA#97-143146X/pm LVMPD EV#9705030904 G/L-F (TK1)

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JOCP STEWART L. BELL DISTRICT ATTORNEY 2 EllED Nevada Bar #000477 200 S. Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4711 131 col : 7 A D: 53 Attorney for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 8 9 Plaintiff, 10 CARY JERARD PICKETT, aka 11 Case No. C145127 Gary Pickett, #0725059 Dept. No. 12 Docket 13 Defendant. 14 15 JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (PLEA) WHEREAS, on the 18th day of September, 1997, the Defendant CARY JERARD 16 PICKETT, aka Gary Pickett, appeared before the Court herein with his counsel and entered a 17 plea of guilty to the crime(s) of BURGLARY (CATEGORY B FELONY), committed on or 18 about the 7th day of August, 1997, in violation of NRS 205.060 and 19 WHEREAS, thereafter on the 25th day of September, 1997, the Defendant, In Propria 20 Persona, being present in court with his counsel JORDAN, SAVAGE, ESQ., as Stand By 21 Counsel, and ARTHUR G. NOXON, Deputy District Attorney, also being present; the above 22 entitled Court did adjudge the Defendant guilty thereof by reason of his plea of guilty and, in 23 addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, sentenced Defendant to a minimum of 24 thirty-six (36) months and a maximum of one-hundred twenty (120) months in the Nevada 25 Department of Prisons, to be served consecutive to sentence imposed in Case No. C143146, 26 suspended; placed on probation for an indeterminate period not to exceed five (5) years, 27 Conditions: 1. Search Clause for controlled substances and stolen property. 2. Complete Drug 28 l **CE-05**

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Court Program, noting there was no use of weapons in this incident. 3. Complete long-term counseling, vocational and educational programs as deemed necessary. 4. Defendant to be supervised in the Nevada Division of Parole and Probation's House Arrest Program for the first four (4) months of probation. Defendant to receive thirty-five (35) days credit for time served. Court referred matter to Drug Court, and Ordered, set for further proceedings on October 6, 1997 at 9:00 o'clock a.m. in Department X.

THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above entitled Court is hereby directed to enter this Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above entitled matter.

DATED this day of October, 1997, in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada

DISTRICT JUDGE

DA#97-145127X/pm LVMPD EV#9708071616 BURG-F (TK1)

1 LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NV, THURS., FEB. 25, 2010 2 10:25 A.M. -000-PROCEEDINGS 5 THE COURT: With respect to Mr. Pickett. Judge, it's my understanding MR. NELSON: 7 this morning, he will unconditionally waive his preliminary hearing. In district court he will plead guilty to one count of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon naming all victims, one count of 10 11 conspiracy to commit robbery, one count of burglary while in possession of a firearm naming all bars, one 12 13 count of felon possession of a firearm. 14 He will stipulate to the large habitual under NRS 207.010. Both of the parties stipulate to 15 a term of years of 12 years to a maximum term of 30 16 17 years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. 18 With regard to robbery with use of a deadly weapon, that will be the charge that he will 19 plead to the large habitual on. The conspiracy to 20 21 commit robbery will be a two-to-five-year sentence to 22 run consecutive to his 10-to-25-year sentence. 23 MR. ALMASE: And obviously the remaining counts will run concurrent. 24 25 MR. NELSON: That's correct.

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1
                            Mr. Picket, did you understand
                THE COURT:
 2
    the terms of the negotiations?
 3
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
                THE COURT: Do you understand also that
    one of the things you are being asked to do this
 5
    morning is to unconditionally waive your right to a
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 7
    preliminary hearing which means that if you get to
    district court and you change your mind about the
    negotiations you won't be able to come back to this
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    court to have a preliminary hearing as to these
11
    charges?
12
               Do you understand that?
13
               THE DEFENDANT:
                               Yes, ma'am.
14
               THE COURT: And understanding that, is it
    still your intention to unconditionally waive your
15
16
    right to a preliminary hearing?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
18
               THE COURT: Then it appearing to this
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    Court from the amended criminal complaint on file
    herein that the crimes of conspiracy to commit
20
21
    robbery, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, allege
22
    burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon have
    been committed and the Defendant, Cary Pickett,
23
24
    having unconditionally waived his right to a
25
    preliminary hearing on said charges shall be held to
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answer said charges in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Department --THE CLERK: 18, March 11th at 10:30, lower level basement, Courtroom 1A. -000-ATTEST: FULL, TRUE, ACCURATE AND CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS. CCR No.

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CLERK OF THE COURT

FEB 1 1 2011

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CARY PICKETT,

Petitioner,

VS.

WARDEN SCILLIA AT HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON, Respondent,

 $\mathsf{Casc}\;\mathsf{N}_{\underline{o}}\!\colon\thinspace C262523$ Dept No: 18

ORDER FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (Post-Conviction Relief) on

January 27, 2011. The Court has reviewed the petition and has determined that a response would assist the Court in determining whether Petitioner is illegally imprisoned and restrained of his/her liberty, and good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent shall, within 45 days after the date of this Order, answer or otherwise respond to the petition and file a return in accordance with the provisions of NRS 34.360 to 34.830, inclusive.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that this matter shall be placed on this Court's

Calendar on the day of April

o'clock for further proceedings.

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10C262523-2 Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpu



District Court Judge

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THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010

* * * * *

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Cary Pickett. Yes, Mr. Almase?

MR. ALMASE: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, sir.

MR. ALMASE: Mr. Pickett is present in custody. You want me to do it?

MR. NELSON: Either way. Whatever you want.

THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and let Mr. Nelson put it on there. Go ahead, Mr. Nelson.

MR. NELSON: Judge, it's my understanding this morning he's going to plead guilty to one count of burglary while in possession of a firearm, count two, conspiracy to commit robbery, count three, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, and count four, possession of a firearm by ex-felon. There's a signed guilty plea agreement dated March 11th, today, Judge.

The State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. The Defendant stipulates to the large habitual criminal treatment under NRS 207.010. The parties stipulate to a two- to five-year sentence with regard to count one. The Defendant will agree that he'll be treated as a large habitual under count two and receive a sentence of ten to twenty-five years. That will run consecutive to count one for a total of twelve to thirty years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. All the other counts will run concurrent, Judge.

THE COURT: Now did you hear that -- those negotiations put on the record by the State, sir?

1	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
2	THE COURT: What is your true name, Mr. Pickett?
3	THE DEFENDANT: Cary Jerard Pickett.
4	THE COURT: How old are you?
5	THE DEFENDANT: Forty-four.
6	THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
7	THE DEFENDANT: Thirteen years.
8	THE COURT: Read, write, and understand the English language?
9	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
10	THE COURT: Okay, move just a little closer to the microphone if you would
11	there, Mr. Pickett.
12	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
13	THE COURT: Understand what you're charged with?
14	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
15	THE COURT: What is your plea?
16	THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
17	THE COURT: Before I can accept your guilty plea, I must be assured it's
18	freely and voluntarily given. Has anyone threatened you to get you to plead guilty?
19	THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
20	THE COURT: Has anyone threatened anyone closely associated with you in
21	order to get you to plead guilty?
22	THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
23	THE COURT: You understand the penalty range for count one is two to
24	fifteen years, Nevada Department of Prisons?
25	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand the penalty range for count two is one to six years, Nevada Department of Prisons, up to a \$5,000 fine?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand the penalty range for count three which you're pleading guilty to, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, is one to fifteen years -- two to fifteen years for the robbery; do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And do you understand there's an additional one- to fifteen-year penalty for use of a deadly weapon; you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand the penalty range for count four is one to six years, Nevada Department of Prisons, up to a \$5,000 fine?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And do you understand that sentencing is strictly up to the Court and no one can promise you probation, leniency, or any special treatment?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you further understand, sir, that you stipulated to the use of the large habitual criminal which carries the following penalty ranges: Life without the possibility of parole, life with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning after ten years, or a definite term of twenty-five years in the Nevada Department of Prisons with parole eligibility beginning after ten years; you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And do you understand that you have stipulated to the last type of sentencing which is ten to twenty-five years; you understand that?

1	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
2	THE COURT: Do you understand it's consecutive to count one?
3	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
4	THE COURT: And is one of the reasons you're pleading guilty here today is
5	because in truth and fact you are guilty?
6	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
7	THE COURT: I have a copy of your guilty plea agreement in my hand. Did
8	you read it?
9	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
10	THE COURT: Understand it?
11	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
12	THE COURT: Understand by pleading guilty you're giving up the several
13	valuable Constitutional rights listed in the guilty plea agreement?
14	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
15	THE COURT: Discuss those rights with your attorney?
16	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
17	THE COURT: Have any questions about those rights?
18	THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
19	THE COURT: Have any questions regarding negotiations?
20	THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
21	THE COURT: Did you sign this guilty plea agreement freely and voluntarily
22	on page six, sir?
23	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
24	THE COURT: Okay, listen closely, Mr. Pickett. This is what they said you
25	did. Count one, burglary while in possession of a firearm, it says that you did

willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter, while in possession of a firearm, with the intent to commit robbery, that certain building occupied by Beano's Bar, located on West Lake Mead, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, the Roadrunner Saloon, located on Centennial Center, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, the Triple Bar, located on North Decatur Boulevard, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, Rae's Bar, located on Wigwam Parkway, Clark County, Nevada, Timbers Bar, located on West Azure, Suite 170, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, and/or the Tenaya Lodge, located on Sky Pointe Drive, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And it says here in regards to count two that you did meet with Alan Daniels and between yourselves you willfully, unlawfully conspired and agreed to commit the crime of robbery, and in furtherance of that conspiracy you did the act set forth in count three?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And in regards to count three, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, it says you did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, lawful money of the United States, and cellular phone from the person of Justin Sanchez, and/or George Mattie, and/or Delton Lema, Aaron Parduhm, Jushua Kiehl, in their presence by means of force, fear, or violence of injury thereto, without the consent and against the will of those individuals; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And during the commission of the crime either you or your co-defendant used a handgun; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay, in regards to count four, possession of a firearm by an

ex-felon, it says you did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously own or have in your possession or under your control a weapon, and that was a handgun, and that at that time you were an ex-felon, 'cause in 2006 you had been convicted in Case Number C226282 of transport of controlled substance, a felony under the laws of the State of Nevada, and also in 1997 you had previously been convicted of a -- in Case Number 145127 of burglary; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And in Case C21 -- 143 [sic] and you had been convicted of grand larceny; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And in -- that was in 1993 -- excuse me. And then for a final case you had was C109725 in 1993 where you'd been convicted of attempt grand larceny; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: So you had possession of a firearm after being convicted of felonies; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else there, Mr. Nelson?

MR. NELSON: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay, Court accepts the Defendant's guilty plea as being freely and voluntarily given. Listen closely now, sir. We're going to set your sentencing date on --

THE CLERK: May 10th, 8:15, Department 18.

MR. NELSON: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. Have a good day there, Mr. Nelson.

MR. ALMASE: Thank you, Judge.

(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded)

* * * * *

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

Kiara Schmidt, Court Recorder/Transcriber

Electronically Filed 03/22/2011 01:35:15 PM

1	RSPN		Alun D. Column		
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney		CLERK OF THE COURT		
3	Nevada Bar #002781 H. LEON SIMON				
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #000411				
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500				
6	Attorney for Plaintiff				
7	DICTRIC	TT COLIDT			
8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	NII, NEVADA			
10	Plaintiff,) CASE NO:	10C262523-2		
11	-VS-	DEPT NO:			
12	CARY J. PICKETT,)			
13	#0725059				
14	Defendant.				
15	STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDAN	IT'S PETITION FOR	R WRIT OF HABEAS		
16	CORPUS (POS'	T-CONVICTION)			
17		ING: April 6, 2011 RING: 8:15 AM			
18		ikino. 6.13 Aw			
19	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, b	by DAVID ROGER,	, District Attorney, through		
20	H. LEON SIMON, Chief Deputy District At	torney, and hereby s	submits the attached Points		
21	and Authorities in Response to Defendant'	s Petition for Writ	of Habeas Corpus (Post-		
22	Conviction).				
23	This response is made and based upon	all the papers and p	oleadings on file herein, the		
24	attached points and authorities in support here	eof, and oral argume	ent at the time of hearing, if		
25	deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.				
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 3, 2010, Cary J. Pickett, hereinafter "Defendant," was charged by way of Criminal Complaint with five (5) counts of Burglary While in Possession of a Firearm, seven (7) counts of Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, five (5) counts of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, and six (6) counts of Possession of a Firearm by an Ex-Felon. On March 10, 2010, pursuant to negotiations, Defendant was charged by way of Information with one count each of Burglary While in Possession of a Firearm, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Possession of a Firearm by an Ex-Felon. On March 11, 2010, pursuant to a written Guilty Plea Agreement, Defendant pled guilty to the same charges.

On May 10, 2010, Defendant was adjudged a Habitual Criminal and sentenced as follows: as to Count 1 - Burglary While in Possession of a Firearm, to a MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS; as to Count 2 – Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, to MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS; as to Count 3 - Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon, to a MAXIMUM of TWENTY-FIVE (25) YEARS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TEN (10) YEARS, Count 3 to run CONSECUTIVE to Count 1; as to Count 4 – Possession of a Firearm by an Ex-Felon, to a MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS, Count 4 to run CONCURRENT with Count 2, with EIGHTY-EIGHT (88) DAYS credit for time served. A Judgment of Conviction was filed on May 19, 2010. Defendant did not file a Direct Appeal. Defendant filed the instant petition on January 27, 2011. The State's response is as follows.

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¹ Due to clerical errors, an Amended Judgment of Conviction was filed on September 24, 2010.

ARGUMENT

I

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE WITH REGARDS TO DEFENDANT'S HABITUAL CRIMINAL TREATMENT (GROUNDS 1 AND 4)

In order to assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must prove that he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-64 (1984). See also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under this test, the Defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting Strickland two-part test in Nevada). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975), quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 (1970).

In considering whether trial counsel has met this standard, the court should first determine whether counsel made a "sufficient inquiry into the information that is pertinent to his client's case." <u>Doleman v State</u>, 112 Nev. 843, 846, 921 P.2d 278, 280 (1996); *citing* <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Once such a reasonable inquiry has been made by counsel, the court should consider whether counsel made "a reasonable strategy decision on how to proceed with his client's case." <u>Doleman</u>, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280, *citing* <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Finally, counsel's strategy decision is a "tactical" decision and will be "virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances." <u>Doleman</u>, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280; <u>Howard v. State</u>, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175, 180 (1990); <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.

Based on the above law, the court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether or not the petitioner has proved disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). The role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978), citing Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977).

This analysis does not mean that the court "should second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Donovan</u>, 94 Nev. at 675, 584 P.2d at 711. In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989).

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999), *citing* Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Id.</u>, *citing* Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694.

First, Defendant claims his counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge two of the prior convictions used as the basis to have him adjudicated a habitual criminal as unconstitutional. Defendant also argues that had counsel informed him that he could challenge the prior convictions he would not have stipulated to be adjudicated a habitual criminal. However, this argument is wholly without merit. The State specified a total of seven (7) prior felonies in the Information to be considered by the court when sentencing. Ex. 2. Moreover, the State lodged seven (7) certified copies of the Judgments of Convictions in support of its request for habitual criminal treatment. Ex. 4. As such, even if Defendant could have successfully challenged the constitutionality of two (2) of those convictions there would be five (5) remaining to be considered.

Second, Defendant claims his counsel should have argued against habitual criminal treatment at sentencing. However, Defendant effectively stipulated to such treatment when the State specified the previous felonies in the Information (Ex. 2), the GPA contained the stipulation (Ex. 1 p. 1), and the court reminded him of the penalty ranges he would be facing under the large habitual criminal statute (Ex. 3 p. 4). *See* Hodges v. State, 119 Nev. 479, 78 P.3d 67 (2003). Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make futile arguments. *See* Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Furthermore, it should also be noted that Defendant's attorney effectively negotiated with the State to substantially reduce the amount of prison time Defendant was facing if convicted. The State provided notice that it intended to seek habitual criminal treatment. Had Defendant been convicted of all sixteen (16) charges he would have been facing a possible sixteen (16) life sentences.

Defendant has also failed to explain how or why two of his previous convictions are allegedly infirm. Moreover, Defendant has also failed to specify what "mitigation" arguments his counsel could have made on his behalf that would have had a reasonable probability of success in avoiding being treated as a habitual criminal. Claims asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and

repelled by the record. <u>Id</u>. It should also be noted that Defendant was facing twenty-three (23) felony counts. It is highly unlikely he would have insisted on going to trial. As such, he has failed to demonstrate prejudice.

H

DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS ENTERED KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY (GROUND 2)

Pursuant to NRS 176.165, after sentencing, a defendant's guilty plea can only be withdrawn to correct "manifest injustice." *See also* <u>Baal v. State</u>, 106 Nev. 69, 72, 787 P.2d 391, 394 (1990). The law in Nevada clearly establishes that a plea of guilty is presumptively valid and the burden is on a defendant to show that the plea was not voluntarily entered. <u>Bryant v. State</u>, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986) (*citing* <u>Wingfield v. State</u>, 91 Nev. 336, 337, 535 P.2d 1295, 1295 (1975)). Manifest injustice does not exist if defendant entered his plea voluntarily. <u>Baal</u>, 106 Nev. at 72, 787 P.2d at 394.

To determine whether a guilty plea was voluntarily entered the Court will review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's plea. <u>Bryant</u>, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A proper plea canvass should reflect that:

"(1) the defendant knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers; (2) the plea was voluntary, was not coerced, and was not the result of a promise of leniency; (3) the defendant understood the consequences of his plea and the range of punishments; and (4) the defendant understood the nature of the charge, i.e., the elements of the crime." Wilson v. State, 99 Nev. at 367, 664 P.2d at 331 (citing Higby v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 774, 476 P.2d 950 (1970)).

The Nevada Supreme Court suggests in <u>Patton v. Warden</u> that the presence and advice of counsel is a significant factor in determining the voluntariness of a plea of guilty. 91 Nev. 1, 2, 530 P.2d 107, 107 (1975).

This standard requires the court to personally address the defendant at the time he enters his plea in order to determine whether he understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A court may not rely simply on a written plea agreement without some verbal interaction with a defendant. Id. Thus, a

"colloquy" is constitutionally mandated, and a "colloquy" is but a conversation in a formal setting, such as that occurring between an official sitting in judgment of an accused at plea. *See Id.* However, the court also need not conduct a ritualistic oral canvass. <u>State v. Freese</u>, 116 Nev. 1097, 13 P.3d 442 (2000). The guidelines for voluntariness of pleas of guilty "do not require the articulation of talismanic phrases. It required only 'that the record affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily." <u>Heffley v. Warden</u>, 89 Nev. 573, 575, 516 P.2d 1403, 1404 (1973); <u>Brady v. United States</u>, 397 U.S. 742, 747-748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970).

In the instant case, Defendant's plea was clearly entered knowingly and voluntarily. First, Defendant was represented by counsel. <u>Patton</u>, *supra*. Second, Defendant signed a guilty plea agreement which was filed on March 11, 2010. The relevant portions of said agreement are as follows:

My decision to plead guilty is based upon the plea agreement in this case which is as follows:

The State has agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. Defendant stipulates to large habitual treatment under NRS 207.010. The parties stipulate to a 2-5 year sentence on Count 1. Defendant treated as habitual under Count 2 and receive 10-25 year sentence, consecutive to Count 1, for a total of 12-30 years...all other counts to run concurrent.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA

"I understand that by pleading guilty I admit the facts which support all the elements of the offense(s) to which I now plead as set forth in Exhibit '1.'

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty of Count 1, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than two (2) years and maximum term of not more than fifteen (15) years...

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty of Count 2, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than one (1) year and maximum term of not more than six (6) years...

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty of Count 3, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections

for a minimum term of not less than two (2) years and maximum term of not more than fifteen (15) years, plus a consecutive minimum term of not less than one (1) year and a maximum term of not more than fifteen (15) years for the use of a deadly weapon enhancement...

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty of Count 4, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than one (1) year and maximum term of not more than six (6) years...

. . .

... Further, I understand that if I am sentenced under the "large" habitual criminal enhancement the Court must sentence me to LIFE without the possibility of parole; life with the possibility of parole, parole eligibility begins after a minimum term of TEN (10) years has been served; OR a definite term of TWENTY-FIVE (25) years, parole eligibility begins after a minimum of TEN (10) years has been served.

I have not been promised or guaranteed any particular sentence by anyone. I know that my sentence is to be determined by the Court within the limits prescribed by statute.

I understand that if my attorney or the State of Nevada or both recommend any specific punishment to the Court, the Court is not obligated to accept the recommendation.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

By entering my plea of guilty, I understand that I am waiving and forever giving up the following rights and privileges:

- 1. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, including the right to refuse to testify at trial, in which event the prosecution would not be allowed to comment to the jury about my refusal to testify.
- 2. The constitutional right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, free of excessive pretrial publicity prejudicial to the defense, at which trial I would be entitled to the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained. At trial the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense charged.
- 3. The constitutional right to confront and cross-examine any witness who would testify against me.
- 4. The constitutional right to subpoena witnesses to testify on my behalf.
 - 5. The constitutional right to testify in my own defense.
 - 6. The right to appeal the conviction, with the assistance of an attorney,

either appointed or retained, unless the appeal is based upon reasonable constitutional jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings and except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of NRS 174.035.

VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

I have discussed the elements of all of the original charge(s) against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the charge(s) against me...

I understand that the State would have to prove each element of the charge(s) against me at trial.

I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies, and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest.

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney....

I am not now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug....

My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

Ex. 1 p. 1-6.

The relevant portion of Defendant's plea canvass is as follows:

THE STATE:

Judge, it's my understanding this morning he's going to plead guilty to one count of burglary while in possession of a firearm, count two, conspiracy to commit robbery, count three, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, and count 4, possession of a firearm by ex-felon. There's a signed guilty plea agreement dated March 11th, today, Judge.

The State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. The Defendant stipulates to the large habitual criminal treatment under NRS 207.010. The parties stipulate to a two-to-five-year sentence with regard to count one. The Defendant will agree that he'll be treated as a large habitual under count two and receive a sentence of ten to twenty-five years. That will run consecutive to count one for a total of twelve to thirty years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. All other counts will run concurrent, Judge.

THE COURT: Now did you hear that - - those negotiations put on the record by

1		the State, sir?
2	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
3	THE COURT:	Understand what you're charged with?
4	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
5		
6 7	THE COURT:	Before I can accept your guilty plea, I must be assured it's freely and voluntarily given. Has anyone threatened you to get you to plead guilty?
8	DEFENDANT:	No, sir.
9 10	THE COURT:	Has anyone threatened anyone closely associated with you in order to get you to plead guilty?
11	DEFENDANT:	No, sir.
12	THE COURT:	You understand the penalty range for count two [one] is two to fifteen years, Nevada Department of Prisons?
13	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
14	THE COURT:	You understand the penalty range for count two is one to six years, Nevada Department of Prisons
15	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
16 17	THE COURT:	Do you understand the penalty range for count three which you're pleading guilty to, robbery with use of a deadly weapon,
18		is one to fifteen years two to fifteen years for the robbery; do you understand that?
19	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
20 21	THE COURT:	And do you understand there's an additional one-to-fifteen-year penalty for use of a deadly weapon, you understand that?
	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
2223	THE COURT:	Do you understand the penalty range for count four is one to six years, Nevada Department of Prisons?
24	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
2526	THE COURT:	And do you understand that sentencing is strictly up to the Court and no one can promise you probation, leniency, or any special
27	DEFENDANT:	treatment? Yes, sir.
	DEFENDANT.	1 05, 511.
28		

1	THE COURT:	And you further understand, sir, that you stipulated to the use of the large habitual criminal which carries the following penalty
2		ranges: Life without the possibility of parole, life with the possibility of parole with parole eligibility beginning after ten
3		years, or a definite term of twenty-five years in the Nevada
4		Department of Prisons with parole eligibility beginning after ten years; you understand that?
5	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
6	THE COURT:	And do you understand that you have stipulated to the last type
7		of sentencing which is ten to twenty-five years; you understand that?
8	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
9	THE COURT:	Do you understand it's consecutive to count one?
10	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
11 12	THE COURT:	And is one of the reasons you're pleading guilty here today is because in truth and fact you are guilty?
13	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
14	THE COURT:	I have a copy of your guilty plea agreement in my hand. Did you read it?
15		V
16	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
17	THE COURT:	Understand it?
18	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir. Understand that by pleading quilty you're giving up the gaveral
19	THE COURT:	Understand that by pleading guilty you're giving up the several valuable Constitutional rights listed in the guilty plea agreement?
20	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
21	THE COURT:	Discuss those rights with your attorney?
22	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
23	THE COURT:	Have any questions about those rights?
	DEFENDANT:	No, sir.
2425	THE COURT:	Did you sign this guilty plea agreement freely and voluntarily on page six, sir?
26	DEFENDANT:	Yes, sir.
27	THE COURT:	in 2006 you had been convicted in Case Number C226282 of
28		transport of a controlled substance, a felony under the law of the State of Nevada, and also in 1997 you had previously been
	1	

25

26

27

28

convicted of a - - in Case Number 145127 of burglary; is that

correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: and in Case C21—143(sic) you had been convicted of grand

larceny, is that correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And in - - that was in 1993 - - excuse me. And then for a final

case you had was C109725 in 1993 where you'd been convicted

of attempt grand larceny; is that correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

Ex. 3 p. 3-7.

After reviewing both the relevant portions of Defendant's GPA, the plea canvass, and taking into account the presence of counsel, it is clear Defendant entered his plea freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. As such, there is no manifest injustice and Defendant's petition should be denied.

Ш

DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS IMPROPERLY SENTENCED AS A HABITUAL CRIMINAL IS NOT COGNIZABLE (GROUND 3)

Defendant also argues that he was improperly sentenced under the habitual criminal statute. NRS 34.810(1)(a) states in relevant part:

- 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.

As such, this claim is not cognizable since Defendant's conviction was upon a plea of guilty. Furthermore, since this claim could have been raised on direct appeal but was not, it has been waived per NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2).

1	
2	CONCLUSION
3	Based on the foregoing arguments, Defendant's petition should be denied.
4	DATED this 22 ND day of March, 2011.
5	Respectfully submitted,
6	DAVID ROGER
7	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781
8	
9	
10	BY /s/ H. Leon Simon
11	H. LEON SIMON Chief Deputy District Attorney
12	Nevada Bar #000411
13	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
14	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this $22^{ m ND}$ day of
15	March, 2011, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
16	
17	CARY PICKETT, BAC #57591
18	HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON
19	PO BOX 650
20	INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89018
21	
22	
23	BY: /s/ D. Jason
24	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
25	
26	
27	
28	TS/HLS/djj
	C:\Program Files\Neevia.Com\Document Converter\temp\1627795-1903157.DOC

EXHIBIT 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CARY PICKETT.

Appellant(s),

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent(s), Case No: 10C262523-2 SC No: 58191 Electronically Filed Jun 15 2011 09:03 a.m. Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

RECORD ON APPEAL VOLUME

2

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT CARY PICKETT # 57591 PROPER PERSON P.O. BOX 650 INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT DAVID ROGER, ESQ. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 200 LEWIS AVE. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101

10C262523-2

STATE OF NEVADA VS. CARY PICKETT

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27

28

Caesar Almase, Esq. Nevada Bar #7974 Almase Law Group 520 South Ninth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 474-0404 Attorney For Defendant



EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA,)		
	į	Case No.:	C262523
Plaintiff,)	Dept. No.:	XVIII
v.	{	DATE:	January <u>19</u> , 2011
CARY PICKETT, #0725059	}	TIME:	2:00-AM 8:15
Defendant.	{		

MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD

COMES NOW Caesar Almase of the Almase Law Group, attorney of record for the abovenamed Defendant, Cary Pickett, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to withdraw as attorney in the instant matter.

This Motion is based upon Declaration of Counsel, and argument of Counsel at the time set for hearing of this motion.

DATED this <u>S</u> of January, 2011.

By:

Caesar Almase #7974 520 S. 9th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 474-0404 Attorney For Defendant

10C262523 - 2 MWCN Motion to Withdraw As Counsel 1140084 l

CAESAR ALMASE makes the following declaration:

- I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada; that I am the appointed attorney of record for the Defendant in the instant matter, and that I am familiar with the facts and circumstances of this case.
- 2. Your declarant received a letter from Mr. Pickett in which it was requested that your declarant file a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record, in order that Mr. Pickett may file proper person pleadings.
- Your declarant has mailed a copy of this foregoing motion to Mr. Pickett at PO Box 650, Indian Springs, NV 89070, along with a copy of his entire file, including all discovery.

000MACINTOSH HD:USERS:CAESARALMASE:DOCUMENTS:TRACK CASES:VARIOUS

PLEADINGS:MOT. WITHDRAW AS ATTY IN DC.DDC

1	NOTICE OF MOTION
2	TO: CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Attorney for Plaintiff:
3	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Caesar Almase has set the foregoing motion for hearing on
4	the day of January, 2011, at \$200 am in District Court Department XVIII.
5	DATED this <u></u> day of January 2011.
6	By
7	Caesar Almase #7974
	520 S. 9 th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101
8	(702) 474-0404
9	Attorney For Defendant
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	RECEIPT OF COPY
18	
19	RECEIPT OF COPY of the above and foregoing is hereby acknowledged this
20	day of January 2011.
21	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
22	
23	Ву
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	3 000MACINTOSH HD:USERS:CAESARALMASE:DOCUMENTS:TRACK CASES:VARIOUS
	PLEADINGS:MOT. WITHDRAW AS ATTY IN DC.DOC

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the day of January 2011, I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing:
Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record and a copy of the entire file for C262523, postage
prepaid, by regular mail addressed to:
Cary Pickett, Inmate ID #57591 PO Box 650 Indian Springs, NV 89070
MARIA LEIVA, LEGAL OFFICE ASSISTANT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I herehy certify that on the ______ day of January 2011, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing:

Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record and a copy of the entire file for C262523, postage prepaid, by regular mail addressed to:

Cary Pickett, Inmate ID #57591
PO Box 650
Indian Springs, NV 89070

MARÍA LEIVA, LEGAL OFFICE ASSISTANT

H	
1	PIFP Cary Pickett 57591 (your name) Cary Pickett 57591
2	Cary Pickett 57591
3	P.O. Box LSO
4	(your street address)
5	Indian Springs NV 89070
6	(your city, state & zip code) (your city, state & zip code) PIFP Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
7	(your telephone number)
8	IN PROPER PERSON
9	DISTRICT COURT
10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
11	
12	CARY PICKETT)
13	Plaintiff(s),
14) CASE NO.: <u>C2te2523</u>
15	Worden Scilla H.D.S.P) DEPT. NO.:
16	Defendant(s).
17	
18	APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
19	(Filing Fees/Service Only)
20	
21	Pursuant to NRS 12.015, and based on the following Affidavit, I request permission
22	from this Court to proceed without paying court costs or other costs and fees as provided in NRS
23	12.015 because I lack sufficient financial ability.
24	12.013 0000.00
25	
26	
27	RECEIVED
28	JAN 2 7 2011
20	CLERK OF THE COURT

<u>AFFIDAVIT</u>

2	STATE OF NEVADA)			
3	COUNTY OF CLARK) ss:			
4	I, Cary Pickett, a	fter being duly sworn, de	pose and state as	follows:
5	(your name) I wish to file with this Court the co	ncurrently submitted plea	ding. I cannot pa	y the costs of
6	filing because I lack sufficient income, asse	ets or other resources. In	cluding myself, t	here are
7	adults and children in my household	. Their age(s) is/are	,,	,
8	and			
9	My total monthly income before taxes is:			
10	From all sources including employment,			
11	social security, child support, etc:		\$	
12	Any other household income from another member of the household:		\$	Ø
13	List where you work and	***************************************		
14	your job title:		\$	<u>Ø</u>
15	The following represents a list of my assets	and their value	I.	oan
16	Automobile	<u>Value</u>		lance
17	(year and type of car)	\$	<u>Ø</u> s	<u></u>
18	Mobile Home, House or Other Real Estate			ź
19	(size, type and/or year of account)	\$	<u>Ø</u> s_	9
20	Bank Accounts		\sim	
21	(name of bank and type of account)	\$	<u>Ø</u>	<u> 8</u>
22	Other		~ /	~
23		\$	<u> </u>	<u>Ø</u>
24		\$	<u> </u>	<u>Ø</u>
25	<i>///</i>			
26	///			
27	///			
28		2		
İ				

_ } }	My total monthly expenses are.
2	Rent or Mortgage\$
3	Phone, Gas, Electricity, and Other Utilities\$
4	Food
5	Child Care\$
6	Insurance
7	Medical \$
8	Transportation\$
9	Other
10	<u> </u>
11	(List other expenses)
12	TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES
13	
14	I request the Court hold a hearing on this Application if the Court is inclined to deny same, so
15	that I may testify as to my indigent status.
16	
17	Affiant (your signature)
18	•
19	SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me
20	this 19th day of January, 2011.
21	
22	Notary Public
23	/// c certify uscity or state) under pender q
24	III) what the toregoing is true and correct in accordance
25	
26	/// 2011
27	
28	3

$\overline{}$	CATE
1	CASE NO. 26 2523
2	CASE NO. 26 2523 DEPT. NO IAN 2 7 2011 ROLL IMBANK'18DED S
3	2011 ROUD IMBANK*18DEC S
4	OF COURT
5	
6 7	
8	IN THE MATTER OF)
9	Cary Pickett 57591 FINANCIAL CERTIFICATE
10	Name (ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED) IN FORMA PAUPERIS)
11	IN FURMA PAUFERIS
12	200 00)
13	I, hereby certify that the Petitioner named herein above has the sum of \$ on account
14	to his credit at the facility where he is confined. I further certify that the Petitioner likewise has the
15	following securities to his credit according to the records of said facility:
16	\$ 200.00 m savings.
17	
18	
19	DATED: this The day of December 20 10
20	RECEIVED JAN 2 7 2011 CLERK CIF THE COUTT
21	NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
22	CLERK CIF 1HE OF INMATE SERVICES ACCOUNTANT OR AUTHORIZED OFFICER IF FACILITY
23	111
24	111
25	
26	111
27	111
28	111

	<u> </u>	^
- r ,		
	CARY RICKETT 51591	10C262523 - 2 PWHC Polition for Many
1	Petitioner/In Propria Persona	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 1188690
2	Post Office Box 650 [HDSP] Indian Springs, Nevada 89018	
3		
4	i	rict Court Newsday 27 2011
5	Dis	rict Court 27 2011
6	Clar	K County. Nevada
7	Can Pakarr	· VĀĪ
8	CARY PICKETT	}
9	Petitioner,	Case No. C262523
10 11	vs.	Dept. No.
12	worden thinh DESSERT	Docket
13	Respondent(s).	Evidentiary HEARING REQUESTED
14	Teapoinson(b).	ENIGENTIARY TEMENTAL
15	PETITION FOR WRIT OF	HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)
16	INSTRUCTIONS:	
17	(1) This petition must be legibly handy	ritten or typewritten signed by the petitioner and verified.
18	(2) Additional pages are not permitted	except where noted or with respect to the facts which you
19	arguments are submitted, they should be a	of. No citation of authorities need be furnished. If briefs or ubmitted in the form of a separate memorandum.
20	(3) If you want an attorney appointed,	you must complete the Affidavit in Support of Request to we an authorized officer at the prison complete the
21	certificate as to the amount of money and institution.	securities on deposit to your credit in any account in the
22	institution.	
23	(4) You must name as respondent the	erson by whom you are confined or restrained. If you are of corrections, name the warden or head of the institution. It
24	you are not in a specific institution of the department of corrections.	lepartment within its custody, name the director of the
. 25	copardists of confections.	·
26	(5) You must include all grounds or cla conviction and sentence.	ims for relief which you may have regarding your
rece n i		
JAN 2 3 8	011	1
CLERK OF THE	COURT	•

i	Failure to raise all grounds I this petition may preclude you from filing future petitions challenging your conviction and sentence.	
2		
3	(6) You must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition you file seeking relief fany conviction or sentence. Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause	
4	petition to be dismissed. If your petition contains a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, claim will operate to waive the attorney-client privilege for the proceeding in which you claim	
5	counsel was ineffective.	
6	6 (7) If your petition challenges the validity of your conviction or sentence, the original and one copy must be filed with the clerk of the district court for the county in which the conviction occur	
7	Petitions raising any other claim must be filed with the clerk of the district court for the county in which you are incarcerated. One copy must be mailed to the respondent, one copy to the attorney	
8	I general's office, and one come to the district attorney of the county in which you were convicted of U	
9	the original prosecutor if you are challenging your original conviction or sentence. Copies must conform in all particulars to the original submitted for filing.	
10	<u>PETITION</u>	
11	1. Name of institution and county in which you are presently imprisoned or where and who you	
12	are presently restrained of your liberty: High Dassert State Prison, Clark County.	
13	2. Name the location of court which entered the judgment of conviction under attack:	
14	Judicial District Court	
15	3. Date of judgment of conviction: Amended J.O.C Oct. 2010	
16	4. Case number: <u>C 26 2523</u>	
17	5. (a) Length of sentence: 10 - 25 Years	
18	(b) If sentence is death, state any date upon which execution is scheduled:	
19	6. Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction other than the conviction under attack in	
20	this motion.	
21	Yes No X If "Yes", list crime, case number and sentence being served at this time:	
22		
23	7. Nature of offense involved in conviction being challenged: Habitual offender Entran-	
24	cineut 1 Robbery with use of weapon, Burglary while in poss.	
25	Ession of a firearm, conspirary to commit robbery, possession of	
26	FIREARM by EX-FEWN	
27		

	8. What was your plea? (Check one)
,	2 (a) Not guilty
;	3 (b) Guilty <u>×</u>
4	(c) Nolo contendere
	9. If you entered a guilty plea to one count of an indictment or information, and a not guilty plea
(to another count of an indictment or information, or if a guilty plea was negotiated, give details:
	Died quilty to 4 felony counts and stipulated to treatment as a
9	10. If you were found guilty after a plea of not guilty, was the finding made by: (check one)
10	
11	(b) Judge without a jury
12	11. Did you testify at trial? Yes No
13	12. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?
14	Yes No <u> </u>
15	13. If you did appeal, answer the following:
16	(a) Name of court:
17	(b) Case number or citation:
18	(c) Result:
19	(d) Date of appeal:
20	(Attach copy of order or decision, if available).
21	14.) If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you did not: was Not aware of the
22	Constitutional violations related to stipulating to treatment as
23	habitual offender until recently
24	15. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you previously
25	filed any petitions, applications or motions with respect to this judgment in any court, state or
26	federal? Yes No <u>X</u> _
27	
28	3
1	

16. If your answer to No 15 was "Yes", give the following information:
(a) (1) Name of court:
(2) Nature of proceedings:
(3) Grounds raised :
(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion?
Yes No
(5) Result:
(6) Date of result:
(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or date of orders entered pursuant to each
result:
(b) As to any second petition, application or motion, give the same information:
(1) Name of Court:
(2) Nature of proceeding:
(3) Grounds raised:
(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion?
Yes No
(5) Result:
(6) Date of result:
(7) If known, citations or any written opinion or date of orders entered pursuant to each
result:
(c) As to any third or subsequent additional application or motions, give the same information
as above, list them on a separate sheet and attach.
4

1	(d) Did you appeal to the highest state or federal court having jurisdiction, the result or action
2	taken on any petition, application or motion?
3	(1) First petition, application or motion?
4	Yes No
5	Citation or date of decision:
6	(2) Second petition, application or motion?
7	Yas No
8	Citation or date of decision:
9	(e) If you did not appeal from the adverse action on any petition, application or motion, explain
10	briefly why you did not. (You may relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response
11	may be included on paper which is \$ 1/2 x 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not
12	exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length).
13	
14	17. Has any ground being raised in this petition been previously presented to this or any other
15	court by way of petition for habeas corpus, motion or application or any other post-conviction
16	proceeding? If so, identify:
17	(a) Which of the grounds is the same:
18	
19	(b) The proceedings in which these grounds were raised:
20	
21	(c) Briefly explain why you are again raising these grounds. (You must relate specific facts in
22	response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x 11 inches attached
23	to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length).
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	5

1	18. If any of the grounds listed in Nos. 23(a), (b), (c), and (d), or listed on any additional pages
2	you have attached, were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, list briefly what
3	grounds were not so presented, and give your reasons for not presenting them. (You must relate
4	specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 ½ x
5	11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or typewritten
6	pages in length).
7	
8	19. Are you filing this petition more than one (1) year following the filing of the judgment of
9	conviction or the filing of a decision on direct appeal? If so, state briefly the reasons for the delay.
10	(You must relate specific facts in response to this question. Your response may be included on paper
11	which is 8 1/2 x 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or
12	typewritten pages in length).
13	
14	
15	20. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal, as to the
16	judgment under attack?
17	Yes No <u> </u>
18	If "Yes", state what court and the case number:
19	
20	21. Give the name of each attorney who represented you in the proceeding resulting in your
21	conviction and on direct appeal: CAE sar Almase
22	
23	
24	22. Do you have any future sentences to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the
25	judgment under attack?
26	Yes No _X _ If "Yes", specify where and when it is to be served, if you know:
27	
28	6

GROUND I CONTINUED

mitigating evidence To Provide the court with factors against adjudicating defendant to status of a habitual offender, Defense coursel, the prosecutor not the court advised the defendant that those right existed, the pettitioner believed that he could actually plead quilty to a charge of habitual criminality, then busically agree to the state's recomendation for the midrange sentence of 10-25 yrs, rather than being sentenced to life sentences futher counsel never inquired of his client as to the validity of his prior convictions, had rounsel asked he would have learned that his client was without coun-SET IN (2) of his prior convictions com 143146 + 145127 and all prior convictions wire non-violent and about the (2) aforementioned constitutionally invalid convictions are remote and may not be construed by the court as fitting the intent of Law to be Adjudicated a habitual offender, coursel also did not inquire as to mitigating factors and Evidence existing that could be presented to the court to support a case against being adjudicated a habitual offender when in fact documented mitigating factor's and Evidence does exist Coursels Error's prejudiced the petitioner because coursels error's lead to a reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings would have been different had the ERROR'S Not occured. Itad the petitioner understood or had DEEN advised the he could challenge prior convictions that

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are unconstitutional as (2) of his are, that he could not

GROUND | CONTINUED

or was not in actuality pleading guilty to a charge of habitual criminality or that his stipulation to "treatment ment as a habitual offender" did not mean a automatic finding or adjudication to the status of a babitual offender upon the finding of 3 prior Felony consistions this petitioner would not have stipulated to "treatment as a habitual offender" as part of his quilty plea and counsel would have had the needed information to act as an advocate for his client instead of merely a messenger for the prosecutor. 10 This petitioner understands that his guilty plea and subse-11 quent convictions and sentences on his underlying charges are valid, knowing and intelligently made and has not asked the court to disturb those, however the stoulation and sentencing as a habitial offender upon course I advise must determine what counsel advised, The defendant be reviewed to about the rights or process for him to be adjudicated and does the record demonstrate that the DETITIONER was advised by counsel who also sign signed the plea agreement that he the petitioner understood that adjudication as a habitual offender would be a pricess or that he would be waiving any rights associated with that process is challenging constitutionally invalid convictions or convictions born of the same information and to present factors in mitigtion against the habitual off-ENDER Status in fact this petitioner believes that requirdless defense counsel would be obligated to insure the court had all the correct information to properly rule.

GROUND 2 CONTINUED

	n
1	Constructed that by stipulation the defendant is waring coetian rights
2	or functions associated with the adjudication process, the issue
,3	with "stipulate to treatment as a habitual offender" is that wiether
4	the defendant or the court is ever actually informed of what is fact-
5	vally agreed upon, warred or mutually acknowledged between parties
6	therefore for all intent and purpose there is no stipulation, because
7	due process demands that a defendant pleading guilty who waives any
8	rights be specifically made aware, be informed and advised of those
9	rights both in his written plea agreement as well as canvassed so that
10	the record will demonstrate that at the time of his plea the defen-
11	don't knows and understands the rights he is giving up.
12	
13	The plea agreement that the defendant recipied 10 minutes or so before
14	he was to enter his plea differed from the agreement stated at the
15	waiver of preliminary hearing on the defendant will plead guilty to
16	the large habitual "to" "treatment as a habitual affender" consing
17	the plea memo to become unclear and ambiguous. The state is the
18	party who proposed the negotiated plea and authored the plea memorandum
- 1	but the state mether verbally for the record or in the written plea
20	memo does the state EVER make KNOWN to the defendant or the
21	court what rights are being waived or terms are being agreed
22	upon either by acknowledgement or omission as relating to the
23	habitual offender adjudication process that would define use of
24 25	the term "treated as a habitual or treatment as a habitual offen- der"
26	
27	For Example: By Entering my plea to the large habitual
28	I understand that I am waiving and forever giving up the
-0	following rights and previledges: 1. To challenge the validity

GROUND 2 CONTINUED

of prior convictions used to adjudicate me by the court 2. Present EVIDENTE or Statements in mitigation against the hobitual criminal 3. Oppose being sentenced to 10-25 prior to the courts finding or at the very minimum (Example) Both parties. Shouldte that: 1. Only prior convictions that the defendant was represented by coursel will be submitted by the state to the court to support adjudication of the defendant as a habitual offender pursuant to his guilty plea 2. Not appose sentence of 10-25 yes 3, and only present evidence in mitagation so that the court will have the appropriate required factor's against adjudication, however defendant will stand silent and not argue the charge of habitual criminality be dismissed.

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12.

This petitioner asserts that this court must determine that the defendant believed that he was pleading guilty to the habitual criminal and that he did so believeng that upon having 3 or more prior felony convictions automatically made him a habitual offender, what the court is being ask to also determine is what need be afforded to the defendant when the habitual offender becomes his "direct consequences" pursuant to guilty plea that incorporates the habitual offender statute, because there can not be any reasoning that the requirement pursuant to a guilty plea convass based on primary offenses can be said to qualify as informing a defendant who has plead guilty to the habitual criminal of the round tations and consequence as they relate to or apply toward the habitual criminal adjudication process.

GROUND 2 CONTINUED

1 The court has to ultimately determine I what the defendant himself under stood 2. was the process as a whole fundamentally fair under which he tendered his plea. This petitioner was assested on FED 11, 2010 the inless than two weeks during a hearing to consulidate his case with his now co-defendant on or about Feb 23, 2010 he was presented with the states offer to plead guilty to four felony charges and the habitual criminal and given two dais to make his décision. The 23rd of Feb 2010 was also the very 1st time petitioner met his court appointed Lawyer and that Evening defense course! come to the jail gave the defendant a copy of discovery that was in excess of 300 pages briefly reviewed with defendant various pal-ICE reports from the incidents, courset did not discuss with the defendant any aspects of the habitual criminal adjudication process This prior convictions or factors in mitigation against the habitual criminal in hindsight the meeting could indicate that defense counsel 16 himself may not have had any prior experiences with the habitual criminal adjudication process, however he still within hours of actreally receiving this case and simulaniously meeting his client did advise differentiant to plead guilty to the large babilial criminal. Two days later the perthoner did waive his preliminary hearing so that as stated by the state he would "plead to the large habitual" and his other four felony charges and was set to enter his formal Plea a few weeks later on march 11, 2010 between FEB 25 and Mar 11, 2010 there was no other meeting with defense counsel and defendant on Mar 11, 2010 approximately 10 mins before defendant was called to enter his plea counsel gave defendant for the first time a copy of the plea mema the defendant after a basic scan of the agreement did ask counsel to seek a two week conti-

GROUND 2 CONTINUED

mance, coursel offered to go into a side room and discuss any ques tions the defendant might have and the defendant told munsel that that was not snough time for him to get to thoroughly review the agreement and again request counsel to request a two WEEK OF EVEN ONE WEEK CONTINUANCE. THE defendant row defense coursel go over to the state then return in second saying that the state refused to agree to a continuance the defendant sent comment back a second time and upon counsels return was informed by defense counsel that the state according to commet would NOT agree to an extention because he thinks your trying to bet INTO your girlfriends head" referring to another co-defendant (Female) and that "he made a deal with her and don't want to put off her release or something to that effect, of that point the defendant asked counsel what would the judge soy if we ask for a continuance and was told he would give a continuouse, counsel for a third time went back to the state and upon his return stated that the state would only parce to a Four day continuance the defendant wanted to continue his plea hearing and believed that his co-defendant Daniels was also seeking a continuance however just as the state and the defense came to an understanding the co-defendent plead guilty to his charges one of which was a conspirary charge naming the patitioner as part of the plea fearing a worse situation given the states refusal to consent to a continuous the petitioner entered his plea also. This petitioner necessary request an Fuidentiary hearing in this matter as he believes that his plea memo and canvass was not sufficient to support a voluntary, intelligent and Knowing plea of guilty as it applies to the habitual criminal adjudicetion process waiver of rights and functions associated with that **DUICESS**

21

suctions invalid, but were not properly submitted by the state or admitted into the popoceeding by the court, even if the state would argue that absent the use of thoses convictions the petitioner would have had a least three (3) other valid conviction making that error harmless would be wrong as the finding of (3) prior conviction do not make the habitual status automatic, futher the court never asked the defense if any of the prior judgements could be challenged using constitutionally invalid prior convictions as well as convictions counted as separate that were part of a single industrient or information.

The court also inadvertantly denied or at the very least discouraged the petitioner from providing the court with mitigating evidense or a statement in mitigation, so that the rount would factor's "against" the habitual criminal. The court asked the defendant if he would like to make a statement in mitigation, however before the defendant could respond the court state that "I am inclined to go with the plea recommendation or something to that effect, whatever the exact language the statement itself indicated to the defendant that I. The court was predisposed to it's decision without factors against the habitual criminal 2.) that his belief that the habitual criminal was automatic upon (3) or more prior Felony convictions. The petthouse asserts that he was improperly adjudicated a habitual criminal without being allowed to challenge his prior convictions, without any factors against the Enhancement, without a determination Hat IN was just and proper based on middle prior convictions and an ambiguous unel far plea memo.

Page 9a

1	23. (d) GROUND FOUR: Ineffective assistance of course at soutencing
2	counsels representation at sentencing fell below an objective level of reasonable-
3	ness at sentencing prejudicing defendant creating a probability results would
4	
5	have been different unlating U.S. cont 5"6"+14" NEV Const Article I SEC 3, 6, and 8 and Article 4 station 21 23. (d) SUPPORTING FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law):
6	1
7	
8	did not provide to the court any information, arguement or
9	Evidence in mitigation against imposition of the habitual
10	criminal offender status, due to consel Failure to inquire
11	of his client as to what information in mitigation existed.
12	This petitioner has never participated in a habitual offender
13	adjudication and had no knowledge of the courts need
14	3 ,)
15	al conviction, therefore it was of counsel own making
16	,
17	
18	though many documentable factors in mitigation did exist.
19	
20	The defendant in this case stipulated to "treatment as a habit-
21	val offender", what is unclear is exactly what the defendant
22	stipulated to do is unclear, however there is nothing in the
23	terms of the plea agreement prevents counsel from advocating
24	and or participating in the adjudication bearing process by
25	challenging prior unconstitutional convictions and providing
26	the ourt with mitrocting exidence and factors, but due
27	to counsels ownFailure to inquire he was un prepared to
28	10

GROUND 4 CONTINUED

	1 Challenge prior unconstitutional conviction and was unable
:	2 to present arguments and Evidence in mitigation. Por the
:	court to be fully in suformed prior to adjudicating
4	his client as a habitual offender
:	5
(I was prejudiced by comusels ineffective representation at
7	SENTENCING , DECAUSE had connect investigated my case
8	
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(a)	Ground Pive:
Supporting I	VACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.):
	Ground Six:
	FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.):
	Ground Seven:
	ACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.):
(d)	Ground Eight:
Supporting F	ACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.):

(a) Ground Nine:	
Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.):	
	<u> </u>
(b) Ground Ten:	·
Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.):	
(c) Ground Eleven:	
	
Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.):	
(d) Ground Twelve:	
\-\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	
Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.):	
	<u> </u>

1	WHEREFORE, PEHHONET prays that the court grant habeas
2	relief ti which he may be entitled in this proceeding.
3	EXECUTED # High dessert state prison
4	on the 10th day of January, 2010.
5	
6	Contract of the contract of th
7	Signature of Petitioner
8	YERIFICATION
9	Under penalty of perjury, pursuant to N.R.S. 208.165 et seq., the undersigned declares that he is
10	the Petitioner named in the foregoing petition and knows the contents thereof, that the pleading is
11	true and correct of his own personal knowledge, except as to those matters based on information and
12	belief, and to those matters, he believes them to be true.
13	
14	Signature of Petitioner
15	
16	
17 18	Atttorney for Petitioner
19	
20	·*,
21	
22	
23	
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8.	
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1]	LOCATION DE LA COMPANIA DE LA COMPAN
2	I, Cary Pickett hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on this 11th
3	day of January 20 11 I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing.
4	,
5	by depositing it in the High Desert State Prison, Legal Library, First-Class Postage, fully prepaid,
6	addressed as follows:
7	
8	District Attorney
9	David Rodaers 200 Lewis street
10	Las VEgas NV 89101
11	
12	MARGEN H.D.S.P
13	P.O. Box 650
14	Indian spring NV 89070
15	
16	
17	CC:FILE
18	
19	DATED: this 19 day of January, 20 11.
20	- 126-
21	Cary Pictory 5757
22	Post Office box 650 [HDSP]
23	Post Office fox 650 [HDSP] Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 IN FORMA PAUPERIS:
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	_34
	-14-

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding
·	Writ of Habens Corpus (Title of Document)
filed i	in District Court Case number
	Does not contain the social security number of any person.
	-OR-
	Contains the social security number of a person as required by:
	A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:
	(State specific law)
	-or-
	B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant. Jau 19, 2011 Signature Date
	CARY PICKETT Print Name
	Petition Writ habeas Corpus Title

1/2KeTT 57591 Indan Springs NU

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Cary Pickett, #57591 High Desert State Prison 22010 Cold Creek Road P.O. Box 650 Indian Springs, Nevada

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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

Warden Scillia, H.D.S.P. Respondent, vs.

Petitioner,

Cary Pickett.

Case No. C262523 Dept. No.

10C262523 - 2 BREF Brief 118B724

100/24

PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST CONVICTION)

COMES NOW, Petitioner, Cary Pickett, in Proper Person, and respectfully submits his brief in support of his Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction).

This brief is submitted and made, and based, pursuant to NRS 34.720, the supporting Points and Authorities attached herein, as well as all papers, pleadings, and documents on file herein. Also pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which guarantees Equal Protection and Due Process of Law to all citizens of this Great Nation.

JAN 2 7 2011

CLERK OF THE COURT

Points and Authorities

|

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Counsel for petitioner, Casear Amase, did not render to the defendant "reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances" a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to criminal defendants. According to the plea negotiations offered by the state defense counsel was called to actually advise his client on two separate crucial matters, his plea of guilty on his primary amended charges and also the large habitual criminal; in the case at bar, this defendant alleges that on the latter prior to advising or agreeing with his client in regards to the large habitual, defense counsel was ineffective.

When deciding to enter into a plea agreement with the state, a criminal defendant has a right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel more so when that plea agreement, as in this case, involves both the intricacies of law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor after the plea, which is the habitual offender adjudication process, therefore a criminal defense attorney who does not provide his client with the guiding hand that the constitution guarantees has to be deemed as ineffective. The proper standard to determine if counsel performance was deficient is the two prong test as setforth in Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 supra.

The court must look to the harsh and penal nature of the habitual offender statute and the proported errors counsel is to have made prior to advising the defendant to plead guilty/stip-ulate to a charge of habitual criminality as part of his guilty plea to determine as a whole affirms misrepresentation of counsel.

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The errors that counsel made are: not requesting a continuance to consult with his client and the laws that apply to plead-2 ing guilty or stipulating to the habitual criminal, on February 23 counsel met with his client for the first time during a motion to consolidate his case with the other charged suspect at that time counsel was approached by the state and presented an offer to relay to the defendant and told that the state would only afford the defense (2) days to give a decision, being that the plea offer included pleading to the large habitual combined with the new appointment and discovery that exceeded 350 pages, counsel should have requested a continuance for his own needs as well as 11 his client's. Counsel also after only 30 minutes of consultation with his client at the jail also on the same day he first met his client with only the understanding that his client believed that 14 15 based on having (3) prior convictions he was a habitual criminal advised his client that it was best or O.K. to plead guilty to the 16 17 large habitual, even though the Nevada Supreme Court in Staley v. State 787 P.2d 396 ruled that a defendant pleading guilty can not 18 19 stipulate to status as a habitual offender or further in Walker v. 20 Deeds 50 F.3d 670 the habitual criminal "is not automatic on the finding of comission of (3) felonies," therefore his advise to 21 plead guilty/stipulate to the large habitual was error, even if a determination could be made that a criminal defendant could in fact stipulate/plead to the habitual criminal before counsel could 24 advise his client to do so he would need to make sure that his 25 client's substantial rights are not prejudiced in that counsel 26 27 would have to have inquired if any of his prior convictions were 28 obtained when he did not have legal counsel, determine if prior

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convictions were old and remote and if any mitigating evidence 1 2 existed that would or could convince the court to dismiss a charge of habitual criminality, to advise the defendant to plead/stipulate to the habitual criminal and not to inform his client that he will be waving certain substantive rights because at the time of advise on February 23, 2010 the day he first met his client and received the offer from the state he had no idea what rights his client would be waiving with the adjudication process nor where those rights outline in his plea memo prior to counsel signing the memorandum. Defense counsel has a duty to assist his client by bringing 11 his expertise at law not only if the defendant goes to trial but 12 also when deciding to accept a negotiated plea, in this case coun-13 sel did not, and committed the following errors prior to advising 14 his client to accept a plea: 1. Did not request a continuance to determine if it was lawful for a defendant pleading guilty to plead 16 or stipulate to the habitual criminal before advising the defendant 17 on the matter. 2. Failed to inform the defendant that adjudication 18 is a process and not automatic upon the finding of (3) prior felony 19 convictions. 3. Failed to inform his client of substantive rights 20 associated with the habitual adjudication process that he would be 21 waving by stipulation. 4. Failed to inquire of the state exactly 22 what rights his defendant stipulates to waive. The aforementioned errors committed by counsel prejudiced the defendant because his 23 decision to plead/stipulate to the large habitual was uninformed 24 not based on the connotations and consequences, but a misguided 25 perception that (3) prior felony convictions automatically made 26 him a habitual offender.

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Petitioner fully incorporates the supporting facts setforth

herein as fully setforth in ground four ineffective assistance of counsel a sentencing where counsel's errors were 1. Counsel failed to challenge prior Judgment of Conviction that was constitutionally invalid. 2. Counsel failed to present evidence and factors in mitigation against the habitual offender.

II. Stipulating to Treatment as Habitual
Offender Not Knowing and Intelligent Plea

Although the Nevada Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant pleading guilty can not stipulate to status as habitual offender "questions of validity of prior convictions must be determined by District Court as a matter of law, with punishment dependant upon Courts excercise of its discretion"

Staley v. State, 787 P.2d 396, 106 Nev. 75 (1990); the State nontheless did solicit Pickett, in this case to "stipulate" to treatment as a habitual offender as part of his guilty plea.

In reviewing an attack on a guilty plea a court must consider whether the plea was voluntarily entered as well as whether, "consider: as a whole, the process by which the plea was obtained was fundamentally fair, Taylor v. Warden, Nevada State Prison (1980), 609 P.2d 587, 96 Nev. 272. This defendant asserts that even the term as written in his guilty plea memorandum "Defendant stipulate to large habitual treatment under N.R.S. 207.010" is ambiguous to be reviewed by the district court, U.S. v. Anderson, 970 F2d 602, and "Defendant treated as habitual under count 2 and receive 10-25 years sentence" is fundamentally unfair as it implies that there is no process and adjudication is automatic Taylor v. Warden, see: Exhibit A (Guilty Plea

- 1. Not oppose notice of charge of habitual criminality?
- 2. Three or more prior felony convictions?
- 3. Not to challenge constitutional validity of prior convictions?
- **4.** Or not to oppose sentence recommendation if adjudicated a habitual offender?

NRS.174.035 (1) demands either a showing that the defendant himself (not just his attorney) understood the elements of the offense to which the plea was entered, or a showing that the defendant himself has made a factual statement to the court which constitute an admission to the offense plead to, NRS 207.010, Nevada Law requires a criminal information to "charge" a separate offense of being a habitual criminal. Hardison v. State, 437 P.2d 868 (1968), 84 Nev.125 and "Before a defendant may be sentenced as a habitual criminal, the state must duly file an allegation of habitual criminality" Grey v State", 178 P.3d 154(2008).

Under Nevada Law, decision to adjudicate a person as a "habitual criminal" is not automatic on findings of commission of (3) felonies, see: Walker v. Deeds, 50 F.3d 670 (1995), therefore a plea memorandum that charges habitual criminality has to insure that the defendant understands the "direct consequences" of his guilty plea, thus must inform the defendant himself of the adjudication process and the rights that attach, N.R.P.C. 3.8 (D) the prosecutor has a duty to "Make a timely discloser to the defense... in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged

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mitigating information known to the prosecutor..." The adjudication process for NRS 207.010, has to be construed as part of the nature of the charge i.e., element of the offense to the defendant pleading guilty, therefore the details of the process must be expressly outlined in his plea agreement or the court can not determine that a particular defendant actually understood the "Direct consequences" of his guilty plea, NRS 207.010, has a "immediate impact on sentencing", therefore has to be thoroughly canvassed at plea entry and outlined in the plea agreement to be knowing and intelligent.

When a defendant, as in this case does not know when he decides to enter his plea to a criminal information that does charge habitual criminality that his convictions #5 ccf143146 and #6 ccf145127, obtained without his right to counsel can not be used because the record will prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

- 1. Self representation was not a voluntary election as he did state to the court "I did not ask to represent myself, I asked for alternate counsel and she suggested that I represent myself" contrary to Faretta v. California, Supra 95 S.Ct.2525, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 U.S.Cal.1975, see: exhibit (B).
- 2. Later after the defendant was compelled to represent himself, and after his canvass the state did file notice of intent to seek habitual treatment the court failed to inquire as to if the defendant still would represent himself see: exhibit(C), because of greater penalty possibility see Scott v. State, 877

P.2d 503 110 Nev.622(1994. Those convictions are constitutionally invalid. Then that defendant has not been properly informed enough to be said to Have made a knowing or intelligent Plea, Waiver or stipulation, no matter how it may be phrased.

The State with full knowledge that defendant was not represented by counsel in case #143146/#145127, bearing, "the burden of proving the convictions where constitutionally valid" Burns v. State, 495 P2d, 88 Nev.215 (1972), further the aforementioned were "part of a single information" Rezin v. State, could only be counted as (1) conviction had they been able to be used for purpose of the habitual enhancement, did present to the Court all prior convictions as separate and valid. See Exhibit E

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The critical factor being that "In proving prior convictions for purposes of defendant to be habitual criminal, burden is on the state to show that either attorney was present or validly waived at time of prior prosecutions <u>Hamlet v. State</u>, 455 P.2d 915, 85 Nev.385 (1969).

With regards to incorrect or insufficient information as to sentencing the proper test to be applied is whether defendant would have plead differently "stipulated in this case to treatment as a habitual offender" had he been correctly informed, upon which issue the state must bear the burden of proof. "Misinformation as to sentencing renders the plea involuntarily made and it must be vacated" <u>Paige v. United</u> <u>States</u>, 443 F.2d 781.

III. Due Process at Sentencing

Defendant asserts that the trial court was obstructed from affording him due process at his sentencing, based upon insufficient or misinformation as to sentencing. When the state did solicit the defendant to stipulate to "treatment as a habitual offender" and neither the State, Defense Counsel nor the Hearing Master who excepted his guilty plea, advised or informed defendant that adjudication as a habitual offender is a procedural process "not an automatic one; person alleged to be habitual offender is subject to broadest kind of judicial discretion" Clark v. State, 851 P.2d 426, 109 Nev. 426 (1993).

The State deprived the Trial Court of it's ability to make "an actual judgment" on the question that it is "Just and Proper" to punish and segregate the defendant as a habitual criminal by not informing the defendant of the rights he had associated with the adjudication process insuring the Court only had factors "for" (Defendants prior convictions) see: exhibit (E) and none "against" in which to weigh it's decision. The Nevada Supreme Court nor the United States District Court (Nevada) did not reach to the merits of Pickett's, post-conviction writ due to a procedural time bar he has always maintained that his waiver of counsel and convictions in collaboration and convictions in collaboration with the collaboration conviction and convictions in collaboration collaboration collaboration collaboration collaboration collaboration.

This Defendant standing silent during his adjudication, is a direct indication of his knowledge of the Habitual Adjudication process "None", surely had he known, convictions 5 and 6, would have been challenged and eliminated from the process. All of the defendant's prior convictions are for non-

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violent offenses, mostly property crimes relating to his long drug addiction, but without convictions 5 and 6, The Court would have to weigh nonviolent and remote convictions 16 to 19 years prior and give consideration to <u>Tillema v. State</u>, (1996) 914 P.2d 605, 112 Nev.9, the court found only that the copies of defendant's prior convictions sufficient to adjudicate him as a habitual criminal, but did not make an "Actual Judgment" on the question of whether it is "just and proper" for the defendant to be punished as a habitual offender <u>Walker v. Deeds</u>, 50 F.3d 670, but as previously mentioned not all of those convictions were valid and the state was aware of this.

"The District Court has inherent authority to correct a judgment or sentence found on mistakes is in accord with the constitutional considerations underlying the sentencing process. The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that where a defendant is sentenced on the basis of materially untrue assumptions concerning his criminal record "results whether caused by carelessness or design is inconsistent with due process of law" Townsend v. Burke, 736,741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 1255, 92 L Ed. 1690 (1948). Further, the cases clearly established that constitutionally violate "materially untrue assumptions" concerning a criminal record may either arise as a result of sentencing Judges correct perception of misapprehension. (Emphasis in original) Id. 677 P.2d at 1048 n3."

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Defendant would ask that this Court not perceive this request to be pointing the finger at the Court and saying "you were wrong" as that is not the case. Defendant is merely requesting that the Court reconsider the sentence that was pronounced based upon mistakes of facts in the States allegation of habitual criminality and the defendant "stipulating to treatment as a habitual offender" as a part of his guilty plea.

Statement of the Facts

Defendant was arrested February 11, 2010, (1) of (2) suspects in **Bar Robberies**; he was charge formally on or about February 15th 2010, on or about February 16th 2010, during a states motion to consolidate his case with the other suspects Daniels Defendant met his Court Appointed Attorney Ceasar Almase, and advised the State had extend an offer to both defendant and we had (2) days to render our decision, (terms of plea agreement) see: plea memo, but basically plead guilty to (4) felonies stipulate to 10 years to 25 years as a habitual criminal to run consecutive to 2 years to 5 years ex-felon in possession of a firearm for a total of 12 years to 30 years.

Counsel for defendant visited him at C.C.D.C, provided a copy of discovery and discuses the plea offer in general however did not discuss anything that dealt with the adjudication hearing process or his prior convictions, on or about the 23rdof February 2010, Defendant again appeared in Court his codefendant agreed to plead guilty and therefore did Defendant also did agree. Defendant 14, days or so later appeared for entry of plea before the Courts Hearing Master, prior to entry of plea Defendant was provided with a written plea agreement that he did read and signed. The agreement only stated defendant stipulates to treatment as a habitual offender and 10 to 25 year sentence the agreement did not advise of the process of adjudication as a habitual offender.

The Defendant believing that (3) prior convictions could result in Multiple life sentences did plead to the terms of the plea agreement as he understood them and neither the plea

 agreement, the District Attorney, Defense Counsel or the Hearing Master advised or informed the defendant that:

- 1. Adjudicating a criminal Defendant is procedural
- Discretionary dependant upon many factors and the Court discretion, but not automatic solely due to (3) prior convivtions
- 3. And that the allegation/charge could actually be dismissed
- 4. The legislative Intent may not be applicable based on the nature of his prior convictions and Drug Addiction which the Court will view as a whole
- 5. Prior conviction constitutionally infirm could not be used for the process.

Without any knowledge of the aforementioned; procedures, the defendants guilty plea was accepted, discussing with the defendant only the elements, waiver of rights and nature of charges for the underlying offenses and not the Habitual Criminal charge itself does not insure an understanding of the charge stipulated to that has the greater impact.

May 10, 2010, the defendant was sentence in accordance with the written plea agreement. The State did present certified copies of all of his prior conviction (2) of which the State knew or should have known should not have been submitted, the defendant stood silent as he believed he was required to do, further demonstrating how misinformed or rather uninformed he really was. The decision to adjudicate Defendant was based on only the information the State wanted the Court to weigh, the

defendants prior convictions. This motion follows as it is at this time the defendant did become aware of his rights and the relevant case Authorities, therefore request relief from the Court.

CONCLUSION

Thereby, pursuant to the Facts and Laws stated herein, being that the State failed to property inform Defendant of valuable rights associated with the adjudication process of NRS.207.010, a duty the State was required to perform, as the aforementioned statute had an immediate impact on sentencing, further the submission of invalid prior conviction to the Court depriving the Court by misinformation of its ability to make an actual Judgment as to NRS.207.010.

The Defendant has been deprived of Due Process of Law at sentencing and request that his sentence be modified/corrected as follows: his sentence pursuant to NRS.207.010, be vacated, the charge of habitual criminality be dismiss

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Dated: this if _, day of Jinnay , 20 fl.

Respectfully Submitted,

Cary Pickett, #57591

H.D.S.P

P.O.Box 650

Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 In Proper Person

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Court Program, noting there was no use of weapons in this incident. 3. Complete long-term counseling, vocational and educational programs as deemed necessary. 4. Defendant to be supervised in the Nevada Division of Parole and Probation's House Arrest Program for the first four (4) months of probation. Defendant to receive thirty-five (35) days credit for time served. Court referred matter to Drug Court, and Ordered, set for further proceedings on October 6, 1997 at 9:00 o'clock a.m. in Department X.

THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above entitled Court is hereby directed to enter this Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above entitled matter.

DATED this day of October, 1997, in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada.

DISTRICT JUDGE

DA#97-145127X/pm LVMPD EV#9708071616 BURG-F (TK1) GMEM
DAVID ROGER
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Nevada Bar #002781
ROY L. NELSON III
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #007842
200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212
(702) 671-2500
Attorney for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-vs
CARY PICKETT, aka,
Cary Jerard Pickett, #0725059

Defendant.

GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT

I hereby agree to plead guilty to: COUNT 1 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (Felony - NRS 205.060 / Category B); COUNT 2 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Felony - NRS 199.480, 200.380 / Category B); COUNT 3 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165 / Category B) and COUNT 4 - POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EXFELON (Felony - NRS 202.360 / Category B), as more fully alleged in the charging document attached hereto as Exhibit "1".

My decision to plead guilty is based upon the plea agreement in this case which is as follows:

The State has agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. Defendant stipulates to large habitual treatment under NRS 207.010. Parties stipulate to a 2-5 year sentence on Count 1. Defendant treated as habitual under Count 2 and receive 10-25 year sentence, consecutive to

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Count 1, for a total of 12-30 years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. All other counts to run concurrent.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA

I understand that by pleading guilty I admit the facts which support all the elements of the offense(s) to which I now plead as set forth in Exhibit "1".

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty as to Count 1, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than two (2) years and a maximum term of not more than fifteen (15) years. The minimum term of imprisonment may not exceed forty percent (40%) of the maximum term of imprisonment. I understand that I may also be fined up to \$10,000.00.

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty as to Count 2, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than one (1) year and a maximum term of not more than six (6) years. The minimum term of imprisonment may not exceed forty percent (40%) of the maximum term of imprisonment. I understand that I may also be fined up to \$5,000.00.

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty as to Count 3, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than two (2) years and a maximum term of not more than fifteen (15) years, plus a consecutive minimum term of not less than one (1) year and a maximum term of not more than fifteen (15) years for the use of a deadly weapon enhancement. The minimum term of imprisonment may not exceed forty percent (40%) of the maximum term of imprisonment.

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty as to Count 4, the Court must sentence me to imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than one (1) year and a maximum term of not more than six (6) years. The minimum term of imprisonment may not exceed forty percent (40%) of the maximum term of imprisonment. I understand that I may also be fined up to \$5,000.00.

I understand that the law requires me to pay an Administrative Assessment Fee.

Further, I understand that if I am sentenced under the under the "small" habitual criminal enhancement, the Court must sentence me to a term not less than FIVE (5) years and a maximum of TWENTY (20) years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. I understand that if I am sentenced under the "large" habitual criminal enhancement the Court must sentence me to LIFE without the possibility of parole; life with the possibility of parole, parole eligibility begins after a minimum term of TEN (10) years has been served; OR a definite term of TWENTY FIVE (25) years, parole eligibility begins after a minimum of TEN (10) years has been served.

I understand that, if appropriate, I will be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty and to the victim of any related offense which is being dismissed or not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement. I will also be ordered to reimburse the State of Nevada for any expenses related to my extradition, if any.

I understand that I am eligible for probation for the offense to which I am pleading guilty to in Count 1, 2, and 4. I understand that, except as otherwise provided by statute, the question of whether I receive probation is in the discretion of the sentencing judge.

I understand that I am not eligible for probation for the offense to which I am pleading guilty to in Count 3.

I also understand that I must submit to blood and/or saliva tests under the Direction of the Division of Parole and Probation to determine genetic markers and/or secretor status.

I understand that if more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed and I am eligible to serve the sentences concurrently, the sentencing judge has the discretion to order the sentences served concurrently or consecutively.

I also understand that information regarding charges not filed, dismissed charges, or charges to be dismissed pursuant to this agreement may be considered by the judge at sentencing.

I have not been promised or guaranteed any particular sentence by anyone. I know that my sentence is to be determined by the Court within the limits prescribed by statute.

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I understand that if my attorney or the State of Nevada or both recommend any specific punishment to the Court, the Court is not obligated to accept the recommendation.

I understand that if the State of Nevada has agreed to recommend or stipulate a particular sentence or has agreed not to present argument regarding the sentence, or agreed not to oppose a particular sentence, or has agreed to disposition as a gross misdemeanor when the offense could have been treated as a felony, such agreement is contingent upon my appearance in court on the initial sentencing date (and any subsequent dates if the sentencing is continued). I understand that if I fail to appear for the scheduled sentencing date or I commit a new criminal offense prior to sentencing the State of Nevada would regain the full right to argue for any lawful sentence.

I understand if the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty to was committed while I was incarcerated on another charge or while I was on probation or parole that I am not eligible for credit for time served toward the instant offense(s).

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty, if I am not a citizen of the United States, I may, in addition to other consequences provided for by federal law, be removed, deported, excluded from entry into the United States or denied naturalization.

I understand that the Division of Parole and Probation will prepare a report for the sentencing judge prior to sentencing. This report will include matters relevant to the issue of sentencing, including my criminal history. This report may contain hearsay information regarding my background and criminal history. My attorney and I will each have the opportunity to comment on the information contained in the report at the time of sentencing. Unless the District Attorney has specifically agreed otherwise, then the District Attorney may also comment on this report.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

By entering my plea of guilty, I understand that I am waiving and forever giving up the following rights and privileges: