

CLARK COUNTY COURTS EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLERK OF THE COURT



REGIONAL JUSTICE CENTER 200 LEWIS AVENUE, 3RD FLOOR LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89155-1160 (702) 671-4554 Electronically Filed May 12 2011 01:40 p.m. Tracie K. Lindeman

Steven D. Grierson Clerk of the Court

May 12, 2011

Tracie Lindeman Clerk of the Supreme Court 201 South Carson Street, Suite 201 Carson City, Nevada 89701-4702

RE: STATE OF NEVADA vs, ANDRE DUPREE BOSTON S.C. CASE: 58216

D.C. CASE: C084650

Dear Ms. Lindeman:

Pursuant to your Notice to Transmit Required Document, dated May 5, 2011, enclosed is a certified copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed April 22, 2011 in the above referenced case. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me at (702) 671-0512.

Sincerely,

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

Heather Lofquist, Denuty Clerk

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7.1	ORDR		
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781	FILED	
3	ROBERT STEPHENS	Apr 22 3 54 PM 11	
4	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #011286 200 Lewis Avenue	APR CC 3 STIFE II	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500	Atun A. Chum	
6	Attorney for Plaintiff	CLERK OF THE COURT	
7	DISTRICT COURT		
8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
9	Plaintiff,)	
10	-vs-	CASE NO: C084650	
11	ANDRE D. BOSTON, #0920638	DEPT NO; VI	
12	•	Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1371313	
13	Defendant.		
14	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER DATE OF HEARING: 03/23/2011 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M.		
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18	THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable ELISSA F.		
19	CADISH, District Judge, on the 23rd day of March, 2011, the Petitioner not being present,		
20	proceeding in forma pauperis, the Respondent being represented by DAVID ROGER,		
21	District Attorney, by and through ROBERT STEPHENS, Deputy District Attorney, and the		
41	Tobulet Auditicy, by and unough Robert 3 fel fleres, Deputy District Audiney, and the		

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and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, no arguments of counsel,

and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact

On July 7, 1988, the State of Nevada (hereinafter "State") filed a Criminal 1. Complaint charging Andre Boston (hereinafter "Defendant") with the following: Burglary (Felony - NRS 205.060); Lewdness with a Minor with use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony -

NRS 201.230); Assault with a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.471); Battery with Intent to Commit a Crime with use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.400, 193.165); First Degree Kidnapping with use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165); 6 Counts - Sexual Assault with use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 200.364, 200.366, 193.165); Robbery with use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165); and Attempt to Dissuade Victim or Witness from Reporting a Crime with use of a Deadly Weapon (Felony – NRS 199.305, 193.330, 193.165).

- 2. On July 7, 1988, the Juvenile Division of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada certified Defendant to be tried as an adult. In doing so, the juvenile division of the district court noted the nature and seriousness of offenses charged against Defendant and the persistency and seriousness of Defendant's past adjudications or admitted criminal offenses.
- 3. On August 2, 1988, the State filed an Information charging Defendant with the following: Count 1 Burglary; Count 2 Lewdness with a Minor with use of a Deadly Weapon; Count 3 Assault with a Deadly Weapon; Count 4 Battery with Intent to Commit a Crime with use of a Deadly Weapon; Count 5 First Degree Kidnapping with use of a Deadly Weapon; Count 6 through 12 Sexual Assault with use of a Deadly Weapon; Count 13 Robbery with use of a Deadly Weapon; Count 14 Attempt Dissuade Victim or Witness from Reporting a Crime with use of a Deadly Weapon.
- 4. On September 12, 1988, Defendant's jury trial commenced. On September 15, 1988, Defendant's jury returned finding him guilty of Counts 1 8 and Counts 10-14.
- 5. On October 20, 1988, Defendant appeared for sentencing. The court sentenced Defendant to the Nevada State Prison ("NSP") as follows: Count 1 TEN (10) years; Counts 2 and 4 TEN (10) years plus a consecutive TEN (10) years for the use of a deadly weapon; Count 3 SIX (6) years; Counts 5-8 and 10-12 LIFE with the possibility of parole plus a consecutive term of LIFE with the possibility of parole for the use of a deadly weapon; Count 13 FIFTEEN (15) years plus a consecutive term of FIFTEEN (15) years for the use of a deadly weapon; and Count 14 THREE (3) years plus a consecutive term of

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THREE (3) years for the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant's sentences between the counts were to all run consecutively. In addition, the court ruled that Defendant's sentences in the instant case would all run consecutively to the sentence imposed in his California case. The court granted Defendant zero (0) days credit for time served. Defendant's Judgment of Conviction was filed on November 7, 1988. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on November 1, 1988, alleging only insufficient evidence for his convictions. (Boston v. State, SC Docket No 19607.) The Nevada Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal on the merits and Remittitur issued on November 14, 1989.

- On December 21, 1988, Defendant filed a Pro Per Petition for Writ of Habeas 6. Corpus with the Nevada Supreme Court. On December 27, 1988, the Nevada Supreme Court issued its Order denying Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus due to lack of jurisdiction.² (SC Docket No 19625). Remittitur issued on January 15, 1989.
- On October 22, 1990, Defendant filed a Pro Per Petition for Post Conviction Relief Pursuant to NRS 177.315 in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The State filed its Response to Defendant's Petition On November 28, 1990. On December 18, 1990, the district court issued its Order denying Defendant's Petition on the merits. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on January 11, 1991. On September 30, 1991, the Nevada Supreme Court remanded to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing as to trial counsel's decision not to pursue an insanity defense and whether or not that constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (Boston v. State, SC Docket No 21871). Remittitur issued on October 22, 1991.
- The district court held the evidentiary hearing ordered by the Nevada Supreme 8. Court on September 4, 1992. During the evidentiary hearing, Defendant's trial counsel testified that in preparing for trial, he considered an insanity defense; however, given Defendant's insistence that he was not guilty and not the perpetrator of the crime, and

²⁷ Defendant was serving a sentence in the California State Prison for kidnapping, sexual assault and assault in Case No. A-565679.

As Defendant was in the custody of the California State Prison, the Nevada Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ in his case.

Defendant's wish to proceed with a defense of innocence, that he decided against the insanity defense. Reporter's Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, P. 12-13, Sept. 4, 1992. However, the district court noted that this would not have been a valid defense as there was no indication from the evidence that Defendant did not know the difference between right and wrong. Id. at 31.

- 9. On June 8, 1993, the Court noted that Defendant would not be able to come to Nevada to participate in an evidentiary hearing until he was released from his incarceration in California as every mechanism the State had attempted to compel Defendant's attendance was unsuccessful. There is no indication in the record that Defendant was told that he could not file for habeas relief since he was incarcerated in California. Rather, since there was no mechanism by which the State could compel Defendant's presence at his evidentiary hearing, the district court videotaped the hearing, allowed Defendant to view the videotape, allowed Defendant to prepare an affidavit regarding the issues he wanted to present to the Court, and then took the testimony, affidavits, and arguments of counsel under advisement.
- 10. On October 14, 1993, the court denied Defendant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief on the merits. The Order denying Defendant's petition on the merits was filed on March 18, 1994. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on July 25, 1994. (Boston v. State, SC Docket No 26034). On October 7, 1994, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's Petition on the merits. Remittitur issued on October 26, 1994.
- 11. On January 5, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion for Permission to Extend the Page Limit for a Separate Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State filed its Opposition on January 14, 2011. The district court denied Defendant motion on January 19, 2011, as moot.
- 12. Defendant filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 5,2011. The State filed its response and motion to dismiss on March 4, 2011.
- 13. This Court held a hearing on Defendant's petition on March 23, 2011. Defendant was not present and the Court entertained no argument from the State.

- 14. Since Remittitur issued from the denial of Defendant's appeal on November 14, 1989, Defendant had until Wednesday, November 14, 1990, to file his post-conviction habeas petition. After a prolonged evidentiary hearing, Defendant's first petition was ultimately denied on October 14, 1993. The Nevada Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's petition and Remittitur issued on October 26, 1994.
- 15. Defendant filed the instant petition on January 5, 2011, more than twenty (20) years after the one-year time limitation had passed.
 - 16. Defendant's petition is successive and time-barred.
- 17. A petition subject to procedural bars may be considered on its merits if good cause is shown.
- 18. Defendant fails to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that good cause for delay exists sufficient to overcome the successive petition and one-year time bars.
- 19. Furthermore, the State specifically pled laches in its response and motion to dismiss Defendant's petition.
- 20. Defendant failed to overcome the presumption that his delay of over twenty (20) years in filing the instant petition has prejudiced the State.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. The mandatory provisions of NRS 34.726 read:
 - 1. Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within I year after entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within I year after the supreme court issues its remittitur. For the purposes of this subsection, good cause for delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court:
 - (a) That the delay is not the fault of the petitioner; and
 - (b) That dismissal of the petition as untimely will unduly prejudice the petitioner.

(Emphasis added).

2. In Gonzales v. State, 118 Nev. 590, 593, 590 P.3d 901, 902 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court rejected a habeas petition that was filed two days late, pursuant to the "clear and unambiguous" mandatory provisions of NRS 34.726(1). Gonzales reiterated the importance of filing the petition with the district court within the one year mandate, absent a

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showing of "good cause" for the delay in filing. Id, at 593, 590 P.3d at 902. The one-year time bar is therefore strictly construed.

NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2) reads in pertinent part: 3.

The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:

- (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been: . .
- (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus or post conviction relief. . . .
- The Court further noted in Evans v. State, "A court must dismiss a habeas 4. petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." 117 Nev. 609, 646-47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001).
- The Nevada Supreme Court has found that "application of the statutory 5. procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory." State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005) (citing State v. Haberstroh, 119 Nev. 173, 180, 69 P.3d 676, 681 (2003)). "Habeas corpus petitions that are filed many years after conviction are an unreasonable burden on the criminal justice system. The necessity for a workable system dictates that there must exist a time when a criminal conviction is final." Riker, 121 Nev. at 231, 112 P.3d at 1074 (quoting Groesbeck v. Warden, 100 Nev. 259, 261, 679 P.2d 1268, 1269 (1984).
- "In order to demonstrate good cause, a petitioner must show that an 6. impediment external to the defense prevented him or her from complying with the state procedural default rules." Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 30, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003); citing Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 886-87, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001); Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 353, 871 P.2d 944, 946 (1994); Passanisi v. Director, 105 Nev. 63, 769 P.2d 72 (1989); see also Crump v. Warden. 113 Nev. 293, 295, 934 P.2d 247, 252 (1997); Phelps v. Director, 104 Nev. 656, 764 P.2d 1303 (1988).
- Such an external impediment could be "that the factual or legal basis for a 7. claim was not reasonably available to counsel, or that 'some interference by officials' made

compliance impracticable." Hathaway, 71 P.3d at 506; quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986); see also Gonzales, 118 Nev. at 595, 53 P.3d at 904; citing Harris v. Warden, 114 Nev. 956, 959-60 n. 4, 964 P.2d 785 n. 4 (1998). Clearly, any delay in filing of the petition must not be the fault of the petitioner. NRS 34.726(1)(a).

- 8. In addition, to find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." Hathaway, 71 P.3d at 506; quoting Colley v. State, 105 Nev. 235, 236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230 (1989), quoting State v. Estencion, 625 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Haw. 1981). The lack of the assistance of counsel when preparing a petition, and even the failure of trial counsel to forward a copy of the file to a petitioner, have been found to be non-substantial, not constituting good cause. See Phelps v. Director Nevada Department of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660, 764 P.2d 1303 (1988); Hood v. State, 111 Nev. 335, 890 P.2d 797 (1995).
- 9. NRS 34.800 creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the State if "[a] period exceeding five years between the filing of a judgment of conviction, an order imposing a sentence of imprisonment or a decision on direct appeal of a judgment of conviction and the filing of a petition challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction..." The statute also requires that the State plead laches in its motion to dismiss the petition. NRS 34.800.

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ORDER .1 THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief shall be, and it is, hereby denied. _day of March, 2011. **DAVID ROGER** DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781 BY Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #011286 4. 0

CERTIFIED COPY
DOCUMENT ATTACHED IS A
TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE

CLERK OF THE COURT

MAY 1 2 2011