Republican central committee consists of hundreds of people. They also mention that, according to the state law, it could be as few as a handful of 17 or so. That's up to the party to decide. Obviously, the State -- the State doesn't have a role in that decision. So it's quite possible that in some cases, the party's leadership could be very, very small.

But in any event, opening that up to all of the members of the party, and not just the party leadership, we think fuels -- furthers the public policy and furthers the right to vote by allowing those voters a chance to vote for the candidate that they support, rather than to give all that power to just the party leadership.

Finally, I just wanted to point out, as well, that the parties' argument that the right to vote will not be effectively used, that's demonstrated just not to be the case. Both California and Hawaii have recently held special elections. California, for example, was the special election to replace the governor after the recall of Gray Davis in 2003, where anybody could run if they submitted a petition and 65 signatures.

There were 135 people on the ballot.

THE COURT: And Arnold Schwarzenegger won. I don't even think you want to go there.

MR. BENSON: Given the timing of recent events, maybe we should go to Hawaii, instead.

But in either event, both candidates won by substantial plurality in those cases. And so the experience of other states demonstrates that these elections can be held with a large slate of candidates. And the voters know who these candidates are. They know who they want to vote for. They're not intimidated by a large slate of candidates, and they can view the votes effectively.

So, I don't believe that the experience of other states, or the case law, for that matter, bears out any argument from the plaintiffs that this is going to be a severe burden on their associational rights, or any burden, for that matter.

So, for those reasons, Your Honor, we ask that you deny their complaint for injunctive relief and uphold the Secretary's interpretation.

THE COURT: One last question for you.

MR. BENSON: Certainly.

THE COURT: Am I required, under NRS 293.247, sub (4), to give deference to the Secretary of State, if I believe they're wrongly interpreting the statute?

MR. BENSON: As you know, Your Honor, agencies are entitled to deference. They are not entitled to deference where the agency's interpretation clearly conflicts with the statute. We don't believe that's the case here. We think that, if anything, the statute compels our interpretation,

because our interpretation essentially mirrors the plain 1 language of the statute itself, which is that a major party 2 is nominated by filing their declaration of candidacy. 3 So, in this case, whatever ambiguity there may be 4 as to the procedures for that, I think it's appropriate to 5 give deference to the Secretary of State, with his expertise 6 7 in administering the official elections. Is it also fair to state that your 8 THE COURT: entire argument is predicated upon NRS 304.240, in the one 9 10 sentence: "A candidate of a major political party is 11 nominated by filing a declaration or acceptance of 12 13 candidacy within the period of time prescribed by the Secretary of State pursuant to 14 15 NRS 293.204"? 16 MR. BENSON: That's certainly a large part of it, 17 1.8 Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Thank you. Court's going to be in recess for about ten 20 21 minutes. Thank you. Thank you. 22 MR. BENSON: 23 (Recess taken.) 24 THE COURT: Please be seated. We're back on the record in respect to 25

Case No. 11 OC 00147, the Nevada Republican Party, David Buell, versus State of Nevada, Secretary of State Ross Miller, and the Intervenor, the State of Nevada Democratic Party.

Mr. Elias, are you ready?

MR. ELIAS: I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And in -- I've listened to the arguments in regards to both parties, so, in respect to that, there's no need to reargue a lot of the issues by the Secretary of State, unless you really want to; but that's fine, it's your time.

MR. ELIAS: Your Honor, let me start by thanking the Court for allowing me to appear today pro hac vice, and I promise I will not overstay my welcome. I will be -- I will be, hopefully, brief, and hit only a handful of points that I think have come up in the -- in the back-and-forth, where I think I could add -- add, if not value, at least a perspective on behalf of the Nevada Democratic Party.

Let me start with what I think is one of the things that I hear in the questioning from the Court, which is this question of whether or not this statute is plain. If you read plaintiffs' briefs initiating this matter, they took the position that the statute actually was clear; that the plain -- that the statute was plain in its text. And, of course, if it is, then the Court need to look no further to

traditions, or -- or anything else, but rather it's bound by the plain text.

I think there is a distinction to ask -- to answer the question that you asked the Secretary of State's Office about whether the Legislature could have done a better job. I'm not in a position, as a -- as only a visitor, of criticizing the Legislature, but I do want to say that the Nevada statute is not unlike most election administration statutes in this country. They get passed. There is little attention paid to them. They're usually passed, either in this instance, in the wake of September 11, there's a feel there's the need to do something to deal with what happens if there are vacancies, either by catastrophe, or through resignation, or otherwise, and then little happens with them; they sit on the shelves.

The fact that these statutes are not always well explained, and the fact that they're not always comprehensive doesn't mean, however, that individual provisions within them are not clear and are not plain.

And, Your Honor, the provision that is centrally at issue, quote, "A candidate of a major political party is nominated by filing a declaration or acceptance of candidacy within the time prescribed by the Secretary of State pursuant to NRS 293.204" is plain, and it is clear. That doesn't mean that there aren't other interstices and gaps

and questions that have to be worked out, but that's why a state has a chief election official.

The elections work in Nevada, they work throughout the country, by having certain principles which are plain and which are clear, and then allowing county -- county election officials, state election officials, the Secretary of State, the opportunity to fill in those gaps.

I noticed, I listened with great care to counsel for the plaintiff, who himself acknowledged and admitted — it seems not in contention that the Secretary of State is entitled to deference. I believe the term that plaintiffs' counsel used was as long as the interpretation was, quote, "reasonable."

So, the question is, in light of the plain text of that provision, is the way in which the gaps and the interstices have been filled out by the Secretary of State reasonable? If it is, then this Court need look no further, because it is elementary, under principles of agency law, that the Secretary of State is entitled to deference. And that, again, seems not to be a contested issue in this case.

The second point I wanted to make is in respect to minor parties. I am here on behalf of a major party. Also in the courtroom is counsel for a major party. Frankly, I am somewhat perplexed why we are debating the rights or the non-rights of non-major parties. If there are minor parties

in the state of Nevada who feel that this process is unfair to them, it strikes me, with all due respect, it is not the place of the Republican Party to assert those rights. They have no standing to assert the rights of a minor party, they have no genuine interests in the plight of the minor parties. They're -- they are a major party, and it seems to me that, that is what this case is ultimately about.

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That said, it is the rule, not the exception, not just in Nevada, but everywhere -- not just in election administration law, but in all kinds of law, that -- that major parties and minor parties are treated differently, and candidates between them are treated differently.

There's a lot of case law water under this bridge, whether it is in the campaign finance arena, the federal public funding statutes that provide greater access, or easier access to greater funding for presidential campaigns for major party candidates and minor party candidates, whether it is in the ballot access arena, whether it is in the presidential or congressional or senatorial or other federal debate arena, where debate commissions set up debates where they invite major party candidates, under more permissive rules, and minor party candidates; whether it is in the campaign finance arena, where major parties are oftentimes given extraordinary rights. By "extraordinary," I mean rights that are not ordinarily provided to other

organizations, including minor parties.

The fact that we have a system that treats major parties one way and candidates seeking to run as major party candidates one way, and minor party or unaffiliated candidates another, is both unexceptional, and, frankly, I don't believe is properly before this Court, given the record that is here.

The third point I wanted to make relates to something that I -- I listened to with great interest, which is the suggestion that this is an as-applied challenge.

This is, with all due respect, an odd as-applied challenge.

In fact, we have no facts before the Court, other than now a DVD. We don't have candidates. We don't know whether there are going to be three candidates, two candidates, a hundred fifty-some-odd candidates, as was the case in California.

So, we don't actually know what the -- whether there's going to be voter confusion or not. We don't actually have a ballot. We don't -- we don't know whether the ballot is going to seem very clear or very confusing.

We don't have any evidence or any testimony in the record regarding what injury the parties will suffer. We have assertion by counsel, we have argument by counsel, but there actually isn't anything concretely put before this Court, that I could find, that lays forth the kind of record that a court would make an as-applied constitutional ruling

to this.

This is, quite simply, an as-applied challenge to this statute, and what the plaintiffs are asking for is no less sweeping and dramatic to simply declare, or at least part of their argument is to simply sweep this statute out as unconstitutional and replace it and start from -- start from scratch.

This is not an as-applied challenge. An as-applied challenge to apply to the facts of this election, with respect to the candidates actually on this ballot, with respect to how this ballot will present what the specimen will look like, and whether or not there is injury in that context.

And, indeed, that is, if you look at the -- if you look at the *Grange* case, that was, indeed, the criticism that the Supreme Court offered the plaintiffs in *Grange*, who stood in almost the identical shoes of the kinds of complaints that -- that were being made -- that are being made today were made there.

So, it doesn't surprise me that counsel begins by, by -- with a -- with a, with the making the sweeping statement this is an as-applied challenge, because, of course, if Your Honor reads *Grange* carefully, as I know the Court has, you see the court is quite -- is quite influenced by the fact that there were no actual facts before it about

how, in this actual election, the actual ballot would look, would actually be presented, and there was no evidence of whether real voters would really be confused, and whether the parties would genuinely be injured. None of that is present in this case.

mentioned by the Secretary of State, the state of Hawaii and the state of California, and Louisiana, which has had an interesting history -- Louisiana had what they -- had a system which allowed all candidates to run on a single ballot, regardless of party. If any candidate got over 50 percent, then there would be no subsequent election, for a variety of reasons, including the constitutional challenge that's unrelated to the issues at hand here. Louisiana moved away from it. Louisiana has now moved back to that system, and I note in moving back to it, though, obviously, not a court decision, I think it is worthwhile this Court being cognizant of the fact that the Department of Justice did preclear that change under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

So, where does this leave us? It leaves us with the question of whether or not Jones or Grange compel this Court to throw out the state statute, and I think, quite clearly, they don't.

The court in Jones, when you read the opinion,

Justice Scalia and the majority were quite -- were quite concerned that what seemed to be going on was an effort by the state of California to essentially engineer better -- better candidates, and, therefore, better policy, through changing the process by which primary elections were held.

1.7

And what Jones, what the court said in Jones is that parties have a associational right not to have what -- what several courts have referred to as undesired voters. You're not to have voters that are not of their party choose their standard there.

Jones didn't stand for the proposition -- and, in fact, in Grange, the court makes clear, and subsequently, the Ninth Circuit, in Alaskan Independence Party, makes clear that Jones doesn't stand for the proposition that parties have a right not to be -- not to associate with candidates they don't like. It's an undesired voter case; it's not an undesired candidate case.

And, of course, in this, in this instance, there's no issue as to whether or not who -- the Republican Party is not challenging who gets to vote in this election; their sole concern is who gets to run in this election, and who gets to run with what label next to their name.

And though I think counsel ably took *Grange* and did the best he could with it, the fact is, *Grange* stands quite squarely for the proposition that, that in that case, the

state of Washington could, in fact, have candidates with party labels next to their names, and that absent some better factual record, which subsequently, as the Secretary of State's Office pointed out, on remand, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful on a true as-applied challenge, as well. But there is -- but the *Grange* court clearly held that there is no -- there is no right of a party to -- to not have multiple candidates with the same party label next to their name.

I might add, if this Court feels compelled -- which I don't believe is necessary -- but if this Court feels compelled to engage in some measure of judicial surgery, something short of, of -- of tearing -- of open-heart surgery, which is being proposed on the other side, could be done consistent with what the Secretary of State mentioned, and which we mentioned in footnote 7 of our brief, which is a simple disclaimer on the bottom of the box, on the bottom of the ballot, that is straight out of Grange. Straight out of the Supreme Court decision in Grange, straight out of the remand decision in Grange. And if -- if the -- if, ultimately, the Court believes that this hinges on this question of nominee, which I don't believe it does -- and I think a fair reading of Grange, I think, doesn't lead you to that conclusion -- but if the Court believes that that's a concern, then affixing that disclaimer is a much more

modest, judicially modest, and a way for this Court to proceed than to simply decree that the -- the legislatively enacted statute has to -- has to be replaced as unconstitutional.

THE COURT: Well, one argument you make is nothing precludes either of the parties, major political parties, from going out and having their convention anyway, and going ahead and nominating a candidate, and going forth and say this is -- "this is the candidate we're supporting, and we encourage everybody in the Republican Party, or the Democratic party, to go ahead and vote for this candidate."

MR. ELIAS: That's exactly right, Your Honor, and that was actually my next point, so I'm glad you mentioned it.

There is, of course, no -- there is, of course, no burden on the associational rights of the Republican Party, because, again, this is not an undesired voter case. It's not a case where the concern is that you're going to have voters, who are not truly of your party, selecting the single standard barer of your party.

The Republican Party can say, you know -- "You know who our candidate is?" There are a hundred and -- I forget what the number was -- 154? 125?

FROM THE AUDIENCE: Thirty-five.

MR. ELIAS: A hundred thirty-five people on this

ballot. Were there three? Were there five? Who knows what it will be. "But you know what? This is the person who is our candidate. We'll -- we're going -- we're to knock on doors, and we're going -- we're going to call our members, and we're going to take out advertising, and we're going to publicize that endorsement that this is the true

Republican-endorsed candidate." And that is a relatively easy thing for the party to do, and I think an easy solution to the associational rights burden that they -- that they posit.

Two final points, and then I -- I promise I'll be done. The first -- the first is that the question came up: What is the compelling state interest? And, again, I think it's -- it's very instructive. It's very interesting reading Grange and Jones next -- next to each other, because of course, you have Justice Scalia, who, in Jones, writes a very, very strong opinion, gets a majority, and then I think quite to your surprise, when you read his dissent, that much of that majority winds up flipping the other way in Grange.

But what's really interesting about the majority opinion in -- in -- in Jones, is that if you look at what it is the State posited as the harm that they were trying to -- to solve, and what their interest is -- was, I think it clearly influenced the court that there just wasn't much there.

This is not the State of Nevada trying to pass a statute governing every election they hold, or even every congressional election they hold. This is the State of Nevada passing a statute to deal with the rare -- and we know historically it has been quite rare -- and unusual -- we know, historically, that it's been a very unusual circumstance -- of where there is a vacancy. And the vacancy might be caused by death, the vacancy might be caused by resignation, the vacancy might be caused by natural disaster, by a man-made disaster; but this is the State of Nevada dealing with not the usual, but, rather, dealing with the unusual.

And I would suggest that the State of Nevada has a much higher, or a much greater compelling interest in making sure that in the unusual case, where it doesn't have two years to prepare for the next election, where it doesn't have schools that know that two -- you know, next November, we're going to be coming to your gymnasium again to put voting machines in; and registrars, you know, don't worry, next November, we're going to be coming back, and you're going to have to print ballots, and you're going to have UOCAVA ballots and MOVE Act requirements, where you have the unusual, the out-of-the-ordinary election.

I think the State of Nevada deserves -THE COURT: Does somebody have a cell phone on?

We have a sign up that you're not supposed -- you're supposed to turn them off. So please turn any cell phones off. The Court would appreciate it. It's very disrupting to his argument.

So, go ahead.

MR. ELIAS: Thank you, Your Honor.

The State of Nevada has a greater interest, and deserves, candidly, more deference at the legislative level, under constitutional analysis, and with the Secretary of State, under administrative law analysis, deserves more slack to make this system run in the case of the unusual.

The Secretary of State has to deal with a lot of different contingencies in every election. Every election, there's some set of issues: voting machines break, or there's not enough voting machines here, or there are observers that are disruptive, and the Secretary of State's Office has to be permitted, along with the counties, has to be permitted enough play in the joints to make the system work; otherwise, it freezes up, and the system breaks. That's particularly true in the case of special elections. These are not regularly scheduled.

They -- all of the problems you read about in the newspaper, or, no doubt, hear in this courtroom about getting enough volunteers and getting funding and getting space, all of those things are only greater exacerbated in

the case of special elections, and I think that that -- that rises to a different level of -- of interest that the State has in short-cutting some of the other processes that might be in place every two years.

The last point I was going to make relates to Brown, and I will then promise, I will -- I will end.

It is certainly the case that a vacancy in office can create a vacancy nomination. It is not necessarily the true intent. Certainly, in the case of the federal action in Brown, they did. But the Legislature actually fixed that through, and I quote, "A candidate of a major political party is nominated by filing the declaration or acceptance of candidacy when the time prescribed -- within the time prescribed by the Secretary of State pursuant to," and there's, then, the citation.

The Legislature filled in the gap that was in place, and that's -- in that election, there wasn't any mechanism to deal with the -- the one vacancy, so it caused the other.

In this case, the Legislature took its best shot -not a perfect shot -- but candidly, compared to the rest of
the states in the country, not that bad a shot at getting
this right, and I don't believe that there's anything about
it that is unconstitutional, and I believe that the
Secretary of State's interpretation is reasonable, which is

the standard set forth by plaintiff in his argument, and, therefore, I believe it should be upheld.

Unless Your Honor has any questions, I will -
THE COURT: No, I'm fine. Thank you very much for
your argument.

MR. ELIAS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. O'Mara or Mr. --

MR. O'MARA: Yes, Your Honor. I'm just going to be very brief, and then I'll let Mr. Goodenow come up and talk about some -- the constitutional issues on rebuttal.

You heard the State talk about their argument, and its argument is basically, the majority of it, is one sentence, and then they picked and choosed [sic] statutes to fill in gaps. And guess what they picked and choosed? Statutes that are specifically exempt under other legislative statutory provisions. 293.175 excludes many of those provisions that they are now saying fill in the gaps.

But what they don't do in filling in the gaps, they don't even look at the statutes that are not exempt, like 293.165, which allows for the nomination in a vacancy.

What also do they not do in regards to a general election? They don't look at how those individuals are put on the general election ballot, 293.260, which, again, is a -- used in most all circumstances -- it means one candidate from the major party per office. Yes, if no one

else runs, that may be two candidates from one major party.

Second, the State wants to argue that you should use the specific statute over all the general statutes, but that's only if there's a conflict. And there's no conflict, if you read the statutes of 304.240. It says they were supposed to nominate pursuant to 293. So, we have to read Chapter 293 in conjunction with NRS 304.240. And if you read NRS Chapter 293 in conjunction with 304.240, you're going to come to the result that central committees that nominate major parties, executive committees nominate minor parties, and those go on for that.

But what is interesting is, you talk about the difference between major parties and minor parties, and the State says the reason why they have the provision in -- in there that says "and must file a declaration or acceptance of candidacy within the time prescribed by the Secretary of State" -- and he said everybody has to do that -- but that's not the case, because minor parties don't have to declare or file acceptance of candidacy under the interpretation, and neither do independents. They have to file a petition, or a list of candidates.

And if you look at that, and you look at the breakdown, Your Honor, it says "must file a declaration of acceptance of candidacy." So, how is a -- how is a major party, an acceptance of candidate, that's line 3. How is --

except for, that would take it out of the situation that minor parties don't have to file, except as a candidate, they file a list. So, it's clear, we can read it, and we can come to a constitutionally well-reasoned interpretation that is not what happened with the Secretary of State.

Also, if you look at it, you're looking at a nomination and then a placement on the ballot. If we read line, sentence four and sentence five, it doesn't talk about a nominee of a minor political party is placed on -- it is nominated, it only talks about that they are placed --

"A minor political party that wishes to place its candidates -- candidates on the ballot, must file a list of candidates with the Secretary of State not more than 46 days before the special election and not less than 32 days before the special election."

So, where -- how do they nominate them? So, that's another problem that we have.

The recall election analysis, Your Honor, is just not something that we need to look at. It's just not the same. It's clearly not the same here in Nevada. The declarations and the nomination forms that are filed have nothing to do with the party. And guess what? There's no vacancy, so we're not looking at a vacancy position.

But the -- the statute does provide that if there

is a resignation in a recall, then we do have a vacancy; and under that vacancy, we then go to -- to the law of how we fill vacancies.

And finally, Your Honor, the deadlines. You heard the State say July 8th. I think that would be sufficient time for all the parties to get their nominations in. If that's what the Secretary -- if that's what the -- if that's what the registrars are telling us.

But what we need to look at is when they're picking and choosing, and they're saying that they need all this additional time, they -- they picked the statute, like NRS 293.200, that requires a hundred signatures, it's specifically exempt. They're placing an extra burden on those individuals.

And what is -- why we think that the -- also, in regards to the mail-out ballots, we think that the Secretary of State did the right thing in regards to finding that the 46 days' provision is not applicable. In fact, we think that it may not even be the federal presumption, or preemption that allows them to do that, because if you look at the statute, it says that he has to provide -- prescribe the time with enough -- sufficient amount of time to mail those ballots. And I think that when we look at this, and we look at how this, the Legislature did this, I mean, they knew that we were going to have problems with 45 days, that

the ballots had to be out in 45 days, yet they still put these time frames in here on the minor parties.

So, I'm not trying to be political here. I'm trying to look at the law. But doesn't that seem a little fishy, the minor parties now have a time period of 46 to 32 days, and we knew? If you look at the Clerk, Alan Glover's statement, and he says, "We have to get these out within 45 days," but they set it at 46 days.

So, we think that the statute is clear. If you read it in conjunction with NRS 293, Chapter 293, we believe that our interpretation is exactly what the interpretation should have been by the Secretary of State, and we believe that his interpretation is unreasonable, and we ask that you give us declaratory and injunctive relief.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Goodenow, just a few minor comments. Don't go into any lengthy argument. But go ahead, if you want. I will allow you.

I've given both parties about the same amount of time. I've tried to be equal.

MR. GOODENOW: I think I have three points.

THE COURT: Three points?

MR. GOODENOW: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to hold you to that.

MR. GOODENOW: Okay.

First of all, I didn't hear any mention, in either one of the arguments given by the defendants, of a state interest, of a compelling state interest. The only possible point that I heard was in Mr. Elias' argument that, look, we -- the Secretary of State has to be given some latitude to make this sit -- make this system work. That's it.

And so I think, really, what that gets back to,

Your Honor, is my point that the only possible state

interest here was in timing, which is what we said was the

foundational reason for the -- the statute to begin with.

It's not a compelling state interest. There are less

restrictive ways to accomplish that timing, certainly within

the time frames given by state and federal law. That's

first.

Second, there is no foundation given here for the conclusion that the Legislature intended a new system of election for the state of Nevada. There -- if we look at the Alaskan Independence Party case, 545 F.3d, 1173, that was cited by Mr. Benson, it -- it really is based upon a -- an act that was found by the citizens of Alaska to address perceived problems in the party process.

That's -- there is nothing in the legislative history, in this instance, to suggest, let alone establish, that the citizens of Nevada took any action whatsoever,

through their legislature, or through an initiative process, as was the case in the *Grange* case, to change the election process.

Finally, Your Honor, the Nevada -- excuse me -- the U.S. Supreme Court has been clear in *Jones, Tashjian*, in *Eu*, and others, that all struck down attempts to interfere with the parties' nomination process. At least there, there were voters involved.

Here, it's not the case that we have a general and no nominations. The statute itself, and the Secretary, Secretary of State's interpretation, which is in evidence, state that there will be self-nomination, and that's all we need to do to establish the factual predicate for our case under the First Amendment.

Your Honor, thank you. That's all I have.
THE COURT: Thank you.

Well, obviously, and what I'm going to do in this particular case -- and, first of all, I'd like to thank the attorneys for their excellent briefs in this case. You know, sometimes I don't get excellent briefs; but I got great briefs in this particular case, and the arguments were great. I -- you know, and I appreciate them very much, by everybody.

This case, as I kind of indicated, is obviously headed to the Nevada Supreme Court, and time is of the

essence. Therefore, it is going to be my intent to rule from the bench to expedite this matter, due to the timetables involved. And so that's the Court's intent in this particular case.

The parties also have agreed this matter can be construed on its merits, pursuant to NRS -- excuse me -- pursuant to Rule 65(2) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure.

And I'd ask the parties, is that correct?

MR. GOODENOW: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Benson --

MR. ELIAS: Yes.

THE COURT: -- is that correct?

MR. BENSON: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I just want that, put that on the record because it was in the briefs, and I wanted to make sure everybody understood that.

The Nevada statute in issue, NRS 304.240, is extremely confusing, in the Court's view, and the Nevada Legislature certainly should have been more precise in the language adopted thereby, considering the importance of this issue, and it should be clarified; the Court believes it should be clarified.

Mr. Elias says they did a pretty good job. Well,

I'm not sure they did a pretty good job. I think it's kind

of confusing.

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Additionally, there is no legislative history that really helps the Court in this particular matter. I've reviewed that legislative history, and it really doesn't help.

This Court, additionally, believes, and I presume the Nevada Supreme Court is being asked, then, to make sense out of a very confusing language.

And, finally, NRS 304.250 provides that:

"The Secretary of State shall adopt such regulations that are necessary for conducting elections pursuant to the provisions of NRS 304.250."

And, basically, in that provision from NRS -- excuse me -- 304.200 to NRS 304.250, inclusively.

And the Court notes there's been more than one secretary of state since the adoption of this statute in 2003, so I'm not being disparaging to any secretary of state in regards to that. It's obviously an issue that nobody looked and felt was important at the time, and, obviously, it has become very important at this time in respect to that matter. So, again, the Court notes that in respect to this matter.

As to the merits of this case -- and this is going to take a little bit of time, but I'm going to go through it

as best I can.

First of all, NRS 304.230 clearly provides that we are concerned here with a special election. However, NRS 304.240(2) provides that, (a), the election is conducted pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 293 of NRS; and, the general election laws of the state of Nevada apply to the election.

This is, again, an example of kind of the confusion back and forth in regards to the statute.

NRS 293.175, sub (5), provides that:

"The provisions of NRS 293.175 to NRS 293.203, inclusive, do not apply to: Special elections to fill vacancies."

Another example, kind of, of the confusion that we find in regards to these statutes.

NRS 304.240 provides, in part, that, (a), no primary election will be held.

Also, "Except as otherwise provided in sub," in that subsection, "a candidate must be nominated in the manner provided in chapter 293 of NRS and must file a declaration or acceptance of candidacy within the time prescribed by the Secretary of State pursuant to NRS 293.204, which must be established..." to establish a sufficient time for the -- for the election ballots, for handling the

election ballots.

Also, "A candidate of a major political party is nominated by filing a declaration or acceptance of candidacy within the time prescribed by the Secretary of State pursuant to NRS 293.204.

A minority political party that wishes to place its candidates -- " and, again, it uses the word "candidates," not "candidate" -- "candidates on

"candidates," not "candidate" -- "candidates on the ballot must file a list of its candidates with the Secretary of State not more than 46 days before the special election and not less than 32 days before the special election."

Again, this is kind of an indication of confusion. It uses the word "candidates," not "candidate."

But it's also noted that NRS 293.1715(4) provides that only the name of one candidate of each minority political party for each partisan office may appear on the ballot. Again, another example of confusion in respect to this entire matter.

NRS 304.240 further provides that "an independent candidate must file a petition of candidacy within the appropriate -- with the appropriate filing officer," but NRS 293.175, sub (4), provides for nominating independent candidates, pursuant to NRS 293.200, requiring a petition of

candidacy signed by 100 registered voters.

Given these statutes, the issue before this Court is whether or not the nomination of a major political party candidate or minor political party candidate is governed by either NRS 304.240 or NRS 293.165.

As stated, NRS 304.240 provides that NRS 293 applies, except as otherwise provided in, in that subsection (1) of that particular statute.

The issue then becomes: What does this language mean? What does the following language mean?

"A candidate of a major political party is nominated by filing a declaration or acceptance of candidacy."

What's that mean? Again, Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, defines the word "nominate" to mean:

"One, to propose a person for election or appointment; or, two, to name or designate a person for a position."

NRS 293.165 provides as follows:

"A vacancy occurring in a major or minor political party nomination for a partisan office may be filled by a candidate designated by the party central committee of the state of the major political party or

executive committee of the minor political party."

This, again, is another kind of example of the confusion that we were going through.

Here, the important words, though, in this particular statute, NRS 293.165, is that "a candidate designated by." NRS 304.240, and important words, again, are "a candidate of a major political party."

Isn't it the intent of the laws to be read together and given meaning to each of them, that a major political party is the one that should put forth its candidates? When possible, the interpretation of a statute must be harmonized with other statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd results. That's the Nevada Power Company vs. Haggerty case, 115 Nev. 353, at 364.

Additionally, all statutes are to be read *in pari* materia; that's, basically, give an equal effect to all the statutes.

The interpretation adopted by the Secretary of
State would eliminate the involvement of the major political
party in the nomination process. The wording of
NRS 304.420 -- 240, excuse me -- does not state "a member of
a major political party," but again, "a candidate of a major
political party." This language implies that action must be

taken for a designation or a nomination of a candidate.

Even though the Secretary of State's interpretation is entitled to deference, pursuant to NRS 293.247, sub (4), that interpretation cannot go beyond the plain meaning of the statutes in consideration.

Further, the following -- following the arguments by the Secretary of State would allow -- if you follow the arguments of the Secretary of State, you would allow any member of a major political party to file, yet limit the members of a minority party to a list provided by the minority party, disallowing members, all members of a minority party from filing if not on that list. Also, you would limit independent candidates, unless they have filed a petition of candidacy supported by 100 registered voters.

Additionally, why are these people being treated differently in respect to what -- is that really fair? And I know the general election laws apply, but we've heard the argument that that's applied in every case. Well, we're not applying it in every case, and this is a special election, and we're going to turn around and allow any member of a majority party to go file, but we're going to limit anybody, any independent filing based upon the requirement that they've got to go retain all these signatures? Or we're going to limit a minority party being on a list? That doesn't make sense to the Court.

sets forth how the candidates get on the ballot after being nominated. If you look at the provision in the -- in respect to minority party candidates, it indicates placement on the ballot. If you look at the indication in regards to the independent, again, it talks about appearance on the ballot. So, we're not giving effect to the sentence right before that, which we should give effect to, and it's how a majority party candidate is then placed on the ballot.

There are two steps, the Court believes, in regards to the process set forth in the statutes, how candidates are nominated and put forth by the parties as, again, a candidate, under NRS 293. And the second issue is how those candidates, then, are placed on the ballot. Again, the Court believes NRS 304.240, that section kind of indicates that.

And, again, the Court's troubled by the fact that the Secretary of State is picking and choosing from different portions of the statute that they appear to want to apply.

As to the argument that NRS 293.165 only applies if there is a, quote, "vacancy in the nomination process," it is clear that under the -- under similar situation or similar legislation, the Nevada Supreme Court, in *Brown vs.*Georgetta, 70 Nev. 500, 509, held that a vacancy can exist

where there has been no primary, as in this case.

NRS 293.165 can be read that there is a vacancy in this particular matter, where no nomination was made in respect to a primary not being -- there not being any primary.

Therefore, reviewing this matter -- the Court, additionally, is not going to go into the constitutional issue. If I had to, however, I, again, I think that we are creating a different standard in respect to the different parties, which troubles me greatly. We are also denying the major political parties from, basically, from -- denying them any access or being involved in the process of, basically, just designating their candidates, which I don't think is totally correct. And statutes must be interpreted to be constitutional.

Therefore, it is hereby ordered by this Court that:

One, it grants a permanent injunction to the plaintiffs and enjoins the Secretary of State from placing the names of members of a majority political party or a minority political party on the ballot until the candidate is determined pursuant to NRS 293.165.

Second, that the time frame established by the Secretary of State shall be extended until NRS 293.165 can be complied with, so that a majority political party and a minority political party can nominate their candidates, as

indicated in that statute. Thereby, I extend the Secretary of State's deadline until June 30th, 2011. Mr. O'Mara and Mr. Goodenow, you will prepare the order for the Court, and provide it to me no later than May 23rd, 2011, by e-mail, so that I can review it and make any comments, if I want. Additionally, provide it to the other parties, as well. Each party are to bear their own attorney's fees and costs in respect to this matter. Again, thank you very much for -- for your arguments and that. The Court appreciates it very much. Thank you. (Proceedings concluded.) 

STATE OF NEVADA ss. WASHOE COUNTY I, JULIETTA FORBES, Certified Court Reporter, do hereby certify: That I was present in court and took stenotype notes of the proceedings had in the matter entitled herein, and that I thereafter reduced the same into typewriting through the use of computer-aided transcription; That the foregoing transcript, consisting of pages 1 through 97, is a full, true and accurate transcription of said proceedings had. Dated this 20th day of May, 2011. JULIETTA FORBES, CCR #105 NV REPORTING, LLC 455 W. PECKHAM LANE, STE. A RENO, NV 

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Case No. 11 OC 00147 1B

Dept. No. I

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ALAN GLOVER

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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

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NEVADA REPUBLICAN PARTY, and DAVID BUELL, an INDIVIDUAL,

Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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vs. 12

> STATE OF NEVADA, SECRETARY OF STATE ROSS MILLER

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Defendants.

On Thursday, May 5, 2011, Plaintiffs, the Nevada Republican Party ("NRP") and Mr. David Buell ("Mr. Buell") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed a Verified Complaint and Application for a Preliminary and Permanent Injunction. Additionally, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for an order shortening time to respond to Plaintiffs' application. This Court granted Plaintiffs ex parte motion and heard the matter in an expedited manner.

On May 12, 2011, Defendant, Ross Miller, Secretary of State ("State/Defendant") filed an opposition to Plaintiffs' application. Additionally, on the same day, the Nevada State Democratic Party ("NSDP/Intervenor") filed a motion to intervene, and Answer, and an opposition to Plaintiffs' application. Plaintiffs' acknowledged that they do not object to NSDP's motion to intervene and thus, this Court granted such request, on Tuesday, May 17, 2011.

On Monday, May 16, 2011, Plaintiffs' filed a reply in support of their application for preliminary and permanent injunction. Before the hearing, the parties met and set the date of Thursday, May 19, 2011, for this Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The parties both consented to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits. See NRCP 65(a)(2).

On May 19, 2011, the matter of Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary and permanent injunction came on for hearing. Plaintiffs appeared by and through their respective counsel, David O'Mara, Esq, of The O'Mara Law Firm, P.C. and Rew R. Goodenow, Esq., of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Defendant Secretary of State Miller appeared by and through his counsel Kevin Benson, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, and Scott F. Gilles, Deputy Secretary of the Elections for the State of Nevada. Defendant Nevada State Democratic Party appeared by and through its counsel Marc E. Elias, Esq., Matthew M. Griffin, Esq., and Bradley Scott Schrager, Esq.

#### ISSUE

Plaintiffs have filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in order to require the Secretary of State to construe NRS 304.240(1) in a manner that provides for full compliance with NRS Chapter 293 and to prevent the Secretary of State from placing on the special election ballot the names of individuals that have not been designated by their respective major

22 II

Attached to the respective parties' briefs were various exhibits. There were no objections by any of the three parties to the filing of these exhibits or the evidence introduced at the hearing. As such, the Court has reviewed and considered such exhibits in its findings.

or minor political party as the specific party's candidate for the special election.2

As such, the issue before this Court is whether or not the nomination of a major political party candidate or minor political party candidate is governed by the Secretary's interpretation of one sentence contained in NRS 304.240, or if a correct reading of the statutory language in Chapter 304, incorporating by reference the election laws contained in Chapter 293, including NRS 293.165, provides that each major or minor political party is entitled to designate its respective candidate that is placed on the special election ballot.

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<sup>26</sup> Even though the general election laws of this State apply to a special election, the term "general election" is used to describe the normal election process, while the term "special election" is used to describe the pending election process, unless otherwise stated.

## FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW3

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After reviewing the respective parties' briefs, the relevant statutes governing elections, reviewing case law, and having heard extensive oral argument, and good cause appearing, this Court finds as follows:

This Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief. See Kress v. Corey, 65 Nev. 1, 26, 189 P.2d 352, 264 (1948). First, a justiciable controversy, that is, a controversy in which a right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. In this case, Plaintiffs' interest are adverse to the Secretary of State and Intervenor NSDP regarding the procedure for the designation and nomination of major/minor party candidates for the pending special election. Second, the parties are adverse and the controversy is ripe for judicial determination because all parties have an interest in the manner in which the Secretary of

controversy must be ripe for judicial determination."

In light of the Court's decision today, it is unnecessary for the Court to address the constitutional issues raised by Plaintiffs in this case. Indeed, under the Court's decision today, NRS 304.240 can be interpreted in a way that is constitutional. However, if the Court were to reach the constitutional issues, then the Secretary's interpretation would

present challenges. For example, the Court is troubled by the Secretary of State's interpretation that provides for different

treatment by the Secretary that allows the minor political parties and independents to designate their respective

candidates, while denying the major political parties any access or involvement in the process of designating their candidates.

In the case of Kress v. Corey, supra, the requirements for declaratory relief were summarized as follows: "(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relieve must have a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally protectable interest; and (4) the issue involved in the

1 State conducts the special election under Nevada law and the issue is ripe for review because the election process has already begun.

Additionally, injunctive relief is appropriate in this case in See Nevada Management aid of the declaratory judgment sought. Company v. Jack, 75 Nev. 232, 236, 338 P.2d 71 (1959) citing, Kress v. Corey, 65 Nev. 1, 189 P.2d 352, 364 (1948); see also, Woods v. Bromley, 69 Nev. 96, 241 P.2d 1103 (1952).

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The evidence presented in this case leads this Court to 9 conclude that Plaintiffs have met their burden and are entitled to permanent injunctive relief because they have shown that they are not only successful on the merits, but would suffer irreparable harm if the conduct was allowed to continue. See University and Community College Systems of Nevada v. Nevadans for Sound Gov't., 120 Nev. 712, 721, 100 P.3d 179, 187 (2004); Dangberg Holdings v. Douglas County, 115 Nev. 129, 142, 978 P.2d 311, 319 (1999).

The Secretary of State and NSDP assert that the Secretary of State's interpretation deserves deference while Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary of State erred because he went beyond the plain This Court meaning of the statute in construing the statute. agrees with Plaintiffs.

Additionally, in this case, resolution of the issue rests solely on statutory construction principles, a question of law, and deference to the Secretary of State's interpretation is not See State v. State Farm, 116 Nev. 290, 293, 995 P.2d 482 absolute. (2000) ("[A] court will not hesitate to declare a regulation invalid when the regulation violates the constitution, conflicts with existing statutory provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency or is otherwise arbitrary and capricious.") Even

1 reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute may be 2 stricken by a court when a court determines that the agency 3  $\parallel$  interpretation conflicts with legislative intent. <u>Id.</u>

While this Court has considered the Secretary of State's 5 | interpretation for its persuasive value, this Court does not find the Secretary of State's interpretation to be controlling, and thus because the matter is purely a legal question, will not give deference to the Secretary of State's interpretation, and has undertaken an independent review of the construction of Nevada's 10 election statutes. See Bacher v. State Engineer, 122 Nev. 1110, 11 | 1117, 146 P.3d 793 (2006).

The Nevada laws that are at issue in the case are Chapter 304 and Chapter 293 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. Unfortunately, the cross-referencing of these two chapters has resulted in some 15 | confusion.

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In discerning the meaning of the statutory provisions regarding the special election for Nevada's Representative to the United States House of Representatives, the Court has relied on "Unless well-established precepts of statutory construction. 20 | ambiguous, a statute's language is applied in accordance with its 21 | plain meaning." See, e.g. We the People Nevada v. Miller, 124 Nev. 874, 881, 192 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2008). However, if the statute "is 23 | ambiguous, the plain meaning rule of statutory construction" is inapplicable and the drafter's intent "becomes the controlling factor in statutory construction." See Harvey v. District. Ct. 117 26 Nev. 754, 770, 32 P.3d 1263, 1274 (2001). An ambiguous statutory 27 | provision should also be interpreted in accordance "with what 28 reason and public policy would indicate the legislature intended."

1 See McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 649, 730 P.2d 438 2 | (1986). Additionally, the Court construes statutes to give meaning 3 to all of their parts and language and has read each sentence, phrase, and word to render it meaningful within the context of the purpose of the legislation. See Coast Hotels v. State, Labor Comm'n, 117 Nev. 835, 841, 34 P.3d 546 (2001). Further, no part of 7 | the statute should be rendered meaningless and its language "should not be read to produce absurd and unreasonable results." See Banegas v. SIIS, 117 Nev. 222, 228, 19 P.3d 245 (2001).

NRS 304.240 is ambiguous. The Court has reviewed the scant legislative history and finds that it does not assist the Court in 12 | resolving the particular matter. NRS 304.230 clearly states that the Nevada Legislature was concerned with a special election, yet, it is clear that the Nevada Legislature intended for the election to be conducted pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 293 of NRS. See NRS 304.240.

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Thus, the Nevada Legislature's intentions and the reasons and public policy indicate that the general election laws of the State of Nevada, Chapter 293 of NRS, apply to this election.

interpretation statute possible, of а the constitutional provision will be harmonized with other statutory or provisions to avoid unreasonable or absurd results. Power Co. v. Haggerty, 115 Nev. 353, 364, 989 P.2d 870 (1999). Additionally, all statutes are to be read in pari materia. See Farm Mut. v. Comm'r of Ins., 114 Nev. 535, 541, 958 P.2d 733, 737 (1998). When this is done, in this instance, the result is that a major or minor political party designates its candidate to be placed on the special elections ballot.

The Secretary of State's reliance on a single sentence within NRS 304.240 without considering other statutes within Chapter 293 3 | produces an unreasonable and absurd result. Indeed, the Secretary 4 | of State has provided argument that the general election laws apply in every case, yet it is clear that the Secretary of State is picking and choosing from different portions of the general election statutes to support its interpretation. The Court is Indeed, even under the Secretary of troubled by this method. 9 | State's own Interpretation, he has chosen not to apply the general 10 election laws such as NRS 293.165 and NRS 293.260, yet the 11 Interpretation makes reference to NRS 293.1715(2) in paragraphs 3 12 and 4; NRS 293.1276 through NRS 293.1279 in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5; and incorrectly makes reference to NRS 193.200, which should be NRS 14 293.200. Each of these statutes referenced in his Interpretation 15 is specifically excluded under the provisions of NRS 293.175 in 16 special elections.

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If the Court were to follow the Secretary of State's arguments, it would allow any individual to file under a major political party, yet limit the same individual from filing as a minor party candidate or an independent candidate because that individual would either have to be placed on the minor party's list or file a petition of candidacy supported by 100 registered voters. This is an unreasonable and absurd result; and results in unfair treatment.

Further, the State's argument that NRS 304.240 supercedes the provisions of Chapter 293 of NRS because NRS 304.240 is a specific statute while NRS 293.165 is a general statute is incorrect. Indeed, "when statutes are potentially conflicting, [the Court]

will attempt to construe both statutes in a manner to avoid conflict and promote harmony." See Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist., 120 Nev. 575, 587, 97 P.3d 1132 (2004).

The Nevada Legislature adopted the statutory provision at issue in this case during the 2003 legislative session. See AB 344 (Statutes of Nevada 2003). The legislative history cited by Plaintiffs evidences an intent to adjust the election timeframes required by NRS Chapter 293, not to adopt a new election process. There are two steps in regards to the process for an individual to be nominated and then placed on the ballot as a candidate for the position. First, under NRS 304.240, the language sets forth that:

[e]xcept as otherwise provide in this subsection, a candidate must be nominated in the manner provided in Chapter 293 of NRS and must file a declaration or acceptance of candidacy within the time prescribed by the Secretary of State pursuant to NRS 293.204, which must be established to allow a sufficient amount of time for the mailing of election ballots."

See NRS 304.240(1)(emphasis added).

NRS 293.165 provides,

[e]xcept as otherwise provided in NRS 293.166, a vacancy occurring in a major or minor political party nomination for a partisan office may be filled by a candidate designated by the party central committee of the county or State, as the case may be, of the major political party or by the executive committee of the minor political party...

See NRS 293.165(1) (emphasis added). Here, in reading the two statutes in harmony with each other, the important words in each particular statute are, NRS 304.240, "a candidate of a major political party" and NRS 293.165, "a candidate designated by." Further, there is no language in NRS 304.240 that conflicts with the right of a major political party to designate its candidate. Thus, NRS 293.165 is applicable.

Under the Secretary of State's Interpretation, he would eliminate any involvement of the major political parties in the nomination process, while allowing the minor political party to preclude an individual from nominating themselves for this office, which is unreasonable. The language of NRS 304.240 does not state, "a member of a major political party." The language specifically states, "a candidate of a major political party." Additionally, Seventh Edition, defines the word, Black's Law Dictionary, "nominate" to mean, "1. [t]o propose (a person) for election or appointment"; or, "2. [t]o name or designate (a person) for a position." This language sets forth that an action must be taken for a designation or nomination of a candidate, which in this case, is pursuant to NRS 293.165 for major and minor party candidates. Every member of a major party is certainly not a candidate of that There must be a process to designate a candidate, namely party. NRS 293.165.

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Second, in reading the statutory laws in harmony, it is clear that the language in the third, fourth and fifth sentences of NRS 304.240 sets forth the process of how the major/minor party candidate is placed on the ballot after being designated. Indeed, the provisions in respect to the minor party candidate indicates placement on the ballot. The language in regards to independent candidates indicates an appearance on the ballot. In order to give effect to the third sentence regarding major party candidates, the language provides the method for placing a major party candidate on the ballot.

This process conforms with the general election statutes regarding placement of candidates on the ballot and that in most

1 cases, only one candidate per major or minor party is placed on the ballot for each position. See NRS 293.260; see also, State ex rel. NRS 86 P.2d 32 (1939);Nev. 127, Cline v. Payne, 59 293.1714(4) ("The name of only one candidate of each minor political party for each partisan office may appear on the ballot for a general election.")

Finally, the resignation of former Congressman Dean Heller Indeed, like Nevada's created a vacancy in the nomination. election in 1954, which did not allow for a primary, a vacancy was created. At the time, a similar Nevada law provided,

The provisions of § 25 of the primary election law, as amended 1947 p. 478, § 2429 N.C.L. 1943-1949 Supp., relate to the filling of a vacancy where a person nominated at the preceding primary election has died, resigned or for some other reason ceased to be a candidate.

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See Brown v. Georgetta, 70 Nev. 500, 507, 275 P.2d 376, 380 (1954). 16 In citing State ex inf. Barrett ex rel. Shumard v. McClure, 299 Mo. 17 688, 253 S.W. 743, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected the contention that the death of Senator McCarran created only a vacancy in the 19 office and not a vacancy in the nomination. Like Brown, NRS 293.165 is broad enough to permit the designation and nomination of 21  $\parallel$ a candidate in this situation, and thus, there is a vacancy in the 22 | nomination.

As such, had this Court allowed the Secretary of State's Interpretation to stand, Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm. Indeed, under the Secretary's Interpretation, the major parties would be specifically excluded from any involvement in the designation and nomination process, for which compensatory relief 28 is inadequate.

- This Court finds in favor of Plaintiffs' and against Defendant and Intervenor.
- Plaintiffs' claim for a permanent injunction is granted 2. and the Secretary of State is enjoined from placing the names of 7 members of a majority political party or a minority political party on the ballot until the candidates are designated by their respective major or minor political party pursuant to NRS 293.165.
- The time frames established by the Secretary of State regarding the designation of a party's candidate and the filing of 12 | the declaration or acceptance of candidacy shall be extended up to, 13 and including, June 30, 2011, so as to allow the respective political parties an opportunity to comply with NRS 293.165.
  - This Order is nunc pro tunc to the date the Court issued its Order from the bench on May 19, 2011.
  - Each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and costs in respect to this matter.

DATED: May 23, 2011

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The Secretary of State acknowledged that the Registrar of Voters would need to submit the ballot to the printers by July 8, 2011 which is after the June 30, 2011, date requested by Plaintiffs.

# CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| •  | •   |   |  |
|--|---|---|--|
| 2  | 2 I hereby certify under penaltie               | es of perjury that on this                          |  |
| 3  | date I served a true and correct cor            | by of the foregoing document                        |  |
| 4  | by:   |   |  |
| 5  | Depositing for mailing, in a sealed             |   |  |
| 6  | envelope, U.S. Postage prepaid, at Reno, Nevada |   |  |
| 7  | Personal delivery                               |   |  |
| 8  | X Facsimile                                     |   |  |
| 9  | Messenger Service                               |   |  |
| 10   | Federal Express or other overnight              |   |  |
| 11   | delivery  | 0,01,114,11   |  |
| 12   | Email   |   |  |
| 13<br>14   | addressed as follows:                           |   |  |
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| 23   |   | West Liberty Street<br>no, NV 89501                 |  |
| 24   | 4   |   |  |
| 25   | DATED: May 23, 2011.                            | merun   |  |
| 26   | 5   | ryerun  |  |
| 27   | 7   |   |  |
| 28   | s   |   |  |

| 1           | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA  |  |
|-------------|--|--|
| 2           |  |  |
| 3<br>4<br>- | NEVADA STATE DEMOCRATIC PARTY; ) AND ROSS MILLER, IN HIS CAPACITY AS) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE STATE) OF NEVADA, | Electronically Filed<br>May 31 2011 04:05 p.m.<br>Tracie K. Lindeman               |
| 5           | Appellants.  | Supreme Court No. 58404  |
| 6           | vs.  | District Court No. 11 OC 00147 1B  |
| 7<br>8      | NEVADA REPUBLICAN PARTY, and DAVID BUELL, an individual,   |  |
| 9           | Respondents,   |  |
| 10          | <u>JOINT</u>   | APPENDIX   |
| 11          | VOI  | LUME 3   |
| 12          | CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO Attorney General  | WILLIAM M. O'MARA, ESQ.<br>DAVID C. O'MARA, ESQ.                                   |
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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I declare that I am an employee of the State of Nevada and on this 31st day of May, 2011, I served a copy of the foregoing Joint Appendix Volume 3, by Nevada Supreme Court CM/ECF Electronic filing to:

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REC'D & FILED CASE NO. 11 OC 00147 1B 2011 MAY 25 AM 11: 09 DEPT. NO. 1 ALAN GLOVER 3 4 5 IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 6 7 IN AND FOR CARSON CITY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS NEVADA REPUBLICAN PARTY, 8 and DAVID BUELL, an Hearing 9 individual, Plaintiffs, May 19, 2011 10 11 vs. 12 STATE OF NEVADA, SECRETARY OF STATE ROSS MILLER, Defendants. 13 14 15 THE HONORABLE JAMES T. RUSSELL, DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING 16 -000-1.7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 REPORTED BY: Julietta Forbes, CCR #105, NV Reporting, LLC 25

| 1        | APPEARANCES  |   |
|----------|--|---|
| 2        | ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS:                             | REW R. GOODENOW<br>Attorney at Law                      |
| 3<br>4   |  | DAVID O'MARA<br>Attorney at Law                         |
| 5        | ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT<br>SECRETARY OF STATE MILLER: |   |
| 6<br>7   |  | SCOTT F. GILLES, ESQ.<br>Deputy Secretary for Elections |
| 8        | ON BEHALF OF NEVADA STATE DEMOCRATIC PARTY:          | MARC E. ELIAS<br>Attorney at Law                        |
| 9        |  | MATTHEW M. GRIFFIN<br>Attorney at Law                   |
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       CARSON CITY, NEVADA, THURSDAY, MAY 19, 2011, 1:25 P.M.
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 4
             THE COURT: Please be seated.
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             For the record, this is Case No. 11 OC 00147 1B,
 6
    Nevada Republican Party and David Buell, plaintiffs, versus
    the State of Nevada, Secretary of State Ross Miller, the
 8
    defendant, and the Nevada State Democratic Party,
    Intervenors.
10
             Pursuant to an order issued by this Court on
11
    May 17th, 2011, the Court allowed the Nevada State
12
    Democratic Party to intervene.
13
             The Nevada Republican Party is being represented by
14
   Rew -- Mr. Goodenow.
15
             MR. GOODENOW: Yes, Your Honor.
16
             THE COURT: And Mr. O'Mara.
             MR. O'MARA: Yes. Good afternoon, Your Honor.
17
18
             THE COURT: And who else is with you at the table?
19
            MR. O'MARA: This is Mr. Buell.
20
             THE COURT:
                         Okay, thank you.
21
            MR. BUELL:
                        Good afternoon, Your Honor.
22
             THE COURT:
                         And the Secretary of State's being
23
   represented by Kevin Bacon.
24
            MR. BENSON: Benson, Your Honor.
25
             THE COURT: Benson. Excuse me. Kevin Benson.
```

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             MR. BENSON:
                          Yes.
 2
                         Is anybody here with you, Mr. Benson?
             THE COURT:
 3
             MR. BENSON:
                          My client, Scott Gilles.
 4
             MR. GILLES:
                          Yes, Your Honor, Scott Gilles on
 5
    behalf of the Secretary of State.
 6
             THE COURT: Nice to see you.
 7
             The Nevada State Democratic Party being represented
 8
   by Matt Griffin, Bradley Schrager --
 9
             MR. SCHRAGER: Schrager, Your Honor.
10
             THE COURT:
                         Schrager. Excuse me. Schrager.
                                                            And
   Marc Elias?
11
12
             MR. ELIAS:
                        Yes, Your Honor.
                                           Thank you.
13
             THE COURT:
                         And who is going to make the argument
    on your behalf?
14
15
                                  I will, Your Honor.
            MR. ELIAS:
                        I will.
16
             THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
17
             Just for the record, we're here today for a hearing
18
    on the verified complaint filed by the Nevada Republican
19
    Party and David Buell, seeking injunctive relief to prevent
20
    the Secretary of State of Nevada from placing names of
21
   candidates on the ballot for the September 13th, 2011,
22
   special election for the 2nd Congressional District, who are
23
   not nominated pursuant to NRS 293.
24
            Counsel, are you ready to proceed?
25
            MR. GOODENOW: Yes, Your Honor.
```

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. GOODENOW: Rew Goodenow, appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Your Honor, I wanted to cover how we would present the argument. Due to the time, shortness of time and the issues being somewhat complex, we've decided to divide up the issues.

We have two independent bases for relief, one of them being the statutory interpretation basis. Mr. O'Mara has agreed to argue that basis, and then I would address the constitutional issues.

And so what we propose to Your Honor, subject to your better direction, is that Mr. O'Mara would go first, and then I would proceed after him.

THE COURT: I have no objection to that, in respect to that, so you can go ahead and make your argument.

We'll allow equal time to both sides, and then we'll come back and maybe allow you one final comment, being the plaintiffs in this particular action.

So, with that, Mr. O'Mara, go ahead.

MR. O'MARA: Great. Thank you very much, Your Honor.

Thank you for hearing this matter on such an expedited basis.

The Nevada Republican Party and Mr. Buell are here

today seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the Secretary of State's interpretation and rewriting the Nevada election laws.

In order to fully understand the Secretary of State's promulgation of new laws under his claimed interpretation rights, we must look at the history of the special election statute, as well as Nevada's election history.

Now, if the statute had been interpreted clearly, or interpreted properly, then the language would be clear; but because it wasn't interpretated [sic] in the proper method, we're going to go and skip through and just give you a little bit of analysis in regards to the interpretation, or the legislative history that's happening in regards to the -- the statutory framework.

THE COURT: Well, the Court reviewed the legislative history. There isn't any legislative history in respect to the Legislature, from the standpoint of when they adopted NRS 304.240. I went through and tried to find the legislative history; it didn't help at all. There wasn't much at all. There was one short meaning, and down the road we were, so...

MR. O'MARA: Well, I think if we go back into the first committee hearing, you'll find that there is some distinct discussions in regards to how the Legislature was

thinking about going about in the nomination process, and how everything was going to happen. Because if you look at the -- Alan Glover, the Carson City Clerk-Recorder, and you look at his statement, he specifically brings up the issue of whether or not major or minor parties have the ability to -- to, or the authority for their executive committee, or another committee of that, to pick their candidates. And what he specifically said was, "I don't know how that affects the minor political parties, whether they have the authority for their executive committee, or one," meaning their executive committee, "of those to pick their candidates." So, he did what -- he was not really under the impression of what the law really was.

I mean, obviously, the law was specifically there in NRS 293.165, that when there is a vacancy, that that is the proper method in regards to filling a position in -- in the congressional district.

And, also, in response, you'll see the legislative history goes on, and they start talking about another issue. But Ms. Hansen then comes on and says, in regards to the minor parties, she states, "The minor party -- the minor parties don't have a primary, they have a convention, where they select their candidates. What we did last time, I think, will work. The state convention, which is the highest authority of the party, authorized the state's

executive committee to add any people to the list that we had to file with the Secretary of State. We could -- we could do that again."

Obviously, they can do that, because NRS 293.165 specifically allows, if there is a vacancy in an election, that that is the proper method of going about putting someone on the ballot.

THE COURT: But isn't there an argument in that case, from the standpoint that if you look at that particular statute, NRS 293.165, that it only applies where there is a, quote, "a vacancy occurring in a non -- in a major or a minor political party's nomination"? Is that limited just to a nomination situation?

MR. O'MARA: But there isn't -- there is an actual vacancy in the nomination, and the vacancy occurs because our statutes specifically apply for a primary. It's almost the exact same scenario that we had in regards to the election of 1954, where there was no primary, so there was no nominees in that, in that case either, and that, therefore, we had to nominate through the State Central Committee, which happened in that case, where --

THE COURT: The Brown vs. Georgetta case.

MR. O'MARA: That's correct, Your Honor. And that case really expands upon what -- what we're looking at. And if you look at the *Brown vs. Georgetta* case, the statute for

vacancies actually said primaries, but that's been taken out of the statutory language, because in that case, the Supreme Court actually said our statute is broad enough to include other areas where there is an actual vacancy, and so they were -- allowed that to happen in that regard.

And the 1954 case is -- is similar in the fact that, you know, Senator McCarran died. He wasn't even up for election, so there was no pending election, in that case, that happened. So, what they had to do was, they had to nominate through the State Central Committee and then have a special election.

Now, I know that the defendants want to say that that wasn't a special election because it was held on the same day as another general election, but it was a special election. It wasn't supposed to be held that day, it was supposed to be held in 1956, but because of his death, that we now needed to have a special election.

And if you look at the -- you look at the history of what's happened, the -- in other elections, the election did occur, and you look back in 19 -- during a period of time during the 1940s and 1950s, we lost a lot of senators; I think we lost three. And in those cases, when it got to a point where there was a primary, those -- those individuals were appointed, and then there was a primary. Because there was no statute like 293.175 that says in special elections

there is a primary. There is no primary.

So, the -- the analysis in regards to there is a -that 304.240 says there is no primary is really irrelevant,
because NRS 293.175 also makes the primary nonexistent in
any special election. It also not only does that, but it
takes away the ability of a minor party to do their normal
nomination process. And, therefore, you look at when they
are going to have to nominate, and you look at where you
look -- you look at NRS 293.165 because there is a
nomination vacancy, and, therefore, the only way of them to
get a nomination is through that statute.

And we -- and we brought that up in our reply brief, Your Honor, is that this interpretation of the Secretary of State's, in regards to minor party candidates just have to submit lists, well, how does the minor party get their nominees? There's no regulation of that.

Well, they get their nominee by going forward and looking at 293.165. They -- they have the right, unlike the major parties, where they do their executive -- their central committee, the minor parties have an executive committee, which clearly shows Ms. Hansen's correct in regards to that's the proper method in regards to filling a vacancy through the legislative history.

So, Brown vs. Georgetta is -- is a good case to look at, it's a good tradition of Nevada. We -- we follow

that tradition, and that's -- that's really one of the things that we have to look at, because when you analyze the defendants' arguments, they've used *Grange*, *Washington vs*. *Grange*; they use the *American Liberties vs*. *Alaska*, and they use all of these cases that are all not partisan primaries.

They're all either a blanket open primary, or they're a partial open primary, which is not the standard that Nevada has come to enjoy, and that's the standard that we put.

We have a tradition in Nevada to make sure that our nominees in the -- in an office are nominated through the party system. And that will also be an argument with Mr. Goodenow in regards to the constitutional issue of why that is true.

So, when -- when we allow this to happen, we have to go and look at the statute and look at how to construct it and how to make sure that we don't nullify any provisions in that regard, and that -- and that's pretty -- excuse me, Your Honor. If I can get a glass of water.

So, if we look at the history of how we nominate, we have an acceptance of candidacy form, and those people file their acceptance of candidacy forms when -- prior to the primary.

Now, it's interesting to note in that, in that document, because if you read it, you'll find that Nevada, clearly, is looking forward towards a nomination by the

party, because it says, farther down, it says:

"That if nominated as a candidate of the blank party at the ensuing election, I will accept the nomination and not withdraw."

And so we're looking at this candidacy form that says that they are going to accept a nomination.

Now, if we allow the Secretary of State's interpretation to go forward, it means that an individual person, without -- maybe without any connection to any political party whatsoever, is able to nominate themselves and assert themselves in an election as the Republican Party or the Democratic Party, or any minor party's candidate, and I think that is outside of what our Nevada tradition is, where we have a closed primary.

THE COURT: What about NRS 304.240, which clearly indicates "a candidate of a major political party is nominated"? That language clearly kind of contemplates some kind of nomination going on.

MR. O'MARA: And that's true, but in order to get to that sentence, you have to construct the statute to not nullify another sentence in the statute. And so you look at the first statute, and the first statute clearly says that the nomination must be conducted pursuant to NRS 290 -- Chapter 293, and they must file a declaration. So there's

two things in regards to, to what happens.

Now, the argument is, is that it says that except for, and so that next sentence, take out all of that sentence, because it -- it means the nomination is done by that. But that -- that would create an absurd result, because it would make that statute completely nullified.

But if you look at it, and you look at, and you actually look at Chapter 293.165, which is the nomination method in regards to a vacancy, you will see that it is -- it is necessary for that third sentence in that -- in that, in NRS 304.240, for that to be in there, because we need to have different time frames.

Now, if you look at the statute, the 304, you'll see that there's two different mechanisms of how -- how we go about nominating vacancies. And the first one is for -- excuse me. The first one is for major political parties in a nomination for a partisan office, and that's 293.165(1).

But if you look at number (2), they talk about a vacancy occurring in a nonpartisan nomination after the close of filing for a nonpartisan. And what -- what is the next provision? The next provision, under (a), is that they must file a declaration of candidacy or acceptance of candidacy. So, what this statute of 304.240 is doing is it's filling in the blanks of what needs to happen once the nomination from the party occurs.

So, because what we have in 20 -- in 293(1) is that a vacancy occurred, but then they want you to follow these times. Well, that, that statute of 304.240, takes those time frames out of 293.165, because it would be impossible in any election from now on, any special election, for us to use this, this provision, because under the analysis of the defendants, they want to say that these, these time frames are absolute, and that doesn't -- that really doesn't make any sense that a vacancy can occur at any time, and, therefore, a nomination can occur at any time. And we need to have the ability of the Legislature -- or the Secretary of State to promulgate those rules in regards to when things need to be filed.

For example, Your Honor, this -- this case is -- is set for September 13th. The Secretary of State was given this date by the governor. Now, the statute requires that he has to do it within 180 days, so those rules that need to be promulgated are going to be different when, if, God forbid, a catastrophe happens, because the rules for a 180-day election could be different than a 90-day election, because we have certain provisions that we need to figure out.

Now, what would happen if the governor said a hundred days on the next special election? Well, the rules are going to have to change there. And that's what the

statute gives the Secretary of State the authority to do, is to look at these time frames, to -- to look at what goes on in this state, to go to the bylaws of the major parties and see how it -- they need to nominate their parties, to set deadlines so that everybody has the opportunity to properly vet their candidates, to properly nominate their candidates, and get their candidates on the general ballot for the special election. And that just didn't occur in this case, because what happens is, is you had arbitrary dates being put in place, and the dates that did not mean anything in that regard.

And what happens is, is that you -- in furtherance of that, when you look at how other candidates are put on there, you see that the Secretary of State has picked and choosed [sic] different statutes that he wants to apply.

Now, for example, an independent is now required to get a hundred signatures. Where is the requirement for a hundred signatures? Well, it's under 290 -- it's under NRS 293.200. But under NRS 293.175(5), the provisions set forth in NRS 293.175 are not applicable for special elections; so, therefore, independents are not required to find these 100 candidates -- or these hundred individuals to sign their form. All they need to do is file their forms with the Secretary of State. They're an independent party. They're an independent candidate.

THE COURT: But isn't that required, because the section set forth in NRS 304.240 clearly indicates that the -- excuse me -- that the independent party candidate must, basically, file the application? Petition for candidacy? Excuse me.

MR. O'MARA: That's correct, they -- they have to just file the petition of candidacy. But the requirement in regards to a petition -- the -- of a hundred -- there's no requirement in this for a petition of candidacy with 100 names.

THE COURT: Well, how do you differentiate, then, between an independent -- this is a question I have for that side -- you have an independent candidate, and you basically have a minority party candidate, and then you have a major political party candidate, and they have all three different requirements for each one of them.

You have, basically, the majority party candidate -- anybody can go file. Any member, filed member of that party can go down and file; yet, if you're a minority party candidate, you have to go through, basically, the process indicated, being on a list. Or, if you're an independent party candidate, you have to, basically, go out and get a hundred signatures.

MR. O'MARA: And I think that that's -- that's an analysis that I think is the crux of their argument, that

you can't do that in regard -- and if you -- if you read that in there, it's a result, it's really a result-based argument for them to say "we want everybody to be on this ballot, but we're going to set all these different provisions for -- for different people," whereas the statutes are there already to say that these are nominees, which will be put forth by Mr. Goodenow on the constitutional issue.

But that's why -- that's why NRS 293.175 has been put into place, Your Honor; it takes away all of those provisions. It takes away -- the minority parties do not have to get signatures; they just have to go to their executive committee and get a nominee.

Now, what they -- when you look at the -- let's just stay on the minority party. When you look at the statute, people think lists of candidates, and they're trying to say, oh, "lists of candidates" is plural, and, therefore, they get to nominate as many people as they want. But that's just not true, because you've got to look back into how they nominate in the first place, and you look at their nomination statute, and it specifically says that minority parties submit their lists of candidates. But then if you look at subsection (5) of that same statute, it says that only one candidate may be placed on the ballot.

So, it specifically, the "lists of candidate" means

that major parties can provide, you know, minor parties, plural, can provide a -- lists of their candidates. It's a plural of both, of all of it. So I don't think that that should be the analysis in regard, it should still be one candidate per minor party.

THE COURT: What about NRS 304.240, sub (2), which clearly indicates, "Except as otherwise provided in NRS 304.200 to NRS 304.250," that "the general election laws of this State apply to the election"?

MR. O'MARA: That's exactly -- exactly right, so the general election laws apply to this, this statute. They don't -- there's nothing specifically in here that says that NRS 293.165 is excluded. It says "except as otherwise provided."

So, if it's not provided in this section, then NRS 293.165 is applicable, because if that would be the case, why didn't the Legislature, when it promulgated 293.175, say "none of these statutes apply to special elections"? They didn't do that. They only put NRS 293.175 says that statutes from 293.175 to 293.203, 2-0-3, are not applicable. And those are statutes like the filing fees, or 100 -- 100 signatures in regards to the independent candidate.

Or, under -- or if you look at subsection (2) of that, it sets forth what the minority parties do. But since

293.175 is not applicable, neither is the nominating process of all three sections. The primary process is not applicable, the minority process is not applicable, and the independent process is not applicable, and, therefore, you have to look at another statute, which is 293.165, that allows for a vacancy in the nomination.

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So, we look at that, and that's -- that brings us to the next question. If you go look at 293.260, which is the method in which the general election is conducted, that statute is also not excluded. But we have to follow it. And that's a statute that allows for one major party candidate to be put on the ballot if another major party candidate is put on the ballot; or, one major party is put on the ballot, and a minor party is put on the ballot; or, the third issue is when there is a major party and an independent is put on the ballot. Therefore, there would be two people.

And that's because, if you look at the case law, it talks about that the legislative intent wanted, in the general election, wanted to have at least an election, because if you -- if you notice there, if one person is in the primary, say -- say the Republicans have a primary for the U.S. Congress and only one of them is the nominee, and there's no other people running, well, the Nevada Legislature wants to have two people in the general

election, and so that next person gets to be the next votegetter in regards to the major party.

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So, the statutes have been clear. In fact, this the Nevada Supreme Court has looked at that and said that you're only entitled to one candidate per position. regards to a case down in Las Vegas where the Democratic Party wanted to put in seven of their candidates for the one Republican, because there were four open seats, and, therefore, they believed that there should be eight candidates, the Supreme Court said, "No. Your major political party gets one candidate per opening." And that's -- that's the whole system of our -- of our election statutes is one candidate per party, unless there is some -by some special circumstances, that no independent candidate, no Democrat, and no minor party is going to run in this special election, and we know that that's not going to happen.

THE COURT: Say I accept your argument. Then, essentially, what has to happen in regards to going back in regards to the process that's going forward for the September 13th, 2011 election?

MR. O'MARA: Well, I think it's pretty easy to accomplish for the Secretary of State. In fact, it's a lot easier than what they've been trying to do.

It's clear, the nomination process has to be

conducted by the major parties. We have already put that motion into place. We've asked for 45 days, which is, under our bylaws, the proper notice that we need to give to our central committee.

Now, our central committee is made up of hundreds of individuals, and as the Court would -- would know, in the statute, that -- that amount of people could be every single Republican in the state, or it could be the 17 delegates from -- one from each county, so that the Legislature has given us that permission to do it that way.

So, the notion that it's just going to be this smoke-filled room of party elite is not correct, and it's really disingenuous to say that, because these people are hard-working people that are working really hard for their association.

But we go into that issue, and they -- they will nominate their candidate, and that candidate will be able to go and file an application -- a declaration or an acceptance of candidacy with the Secretary of State.

Now, the minor parties, they would go and they would have their executive committee meet, and they would get their list of candidates, which is one person on their list, and they would file that with the Secretary of State.

And then, there would be --

THE COURT: What about the independent?

MR. O'MARA: The independents. The independents would need to file a declaration -- a petition of candidacy with the Secretary of State.

Now, it makes sense, too, if you look at No. 8 of the interpretation, because in No. 8, the Secretary of State says that they're not going -- they're not going to receive any challenges.

I'm pretty sure that that was attached as Exhibit 1 to our preliminary hearing injunction, or preliminary injunction hearing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But under the law, there's a -- you know, the case law clearly indicates that, essentially, I'm to give deference to the interpretation by the Secretary of State. Isn't that correct?

MR. O'MARA: Well, I think that we have two issues here, Your Honor. And I think that we -- there is a deference in regards to the interpretation. But this is not really an interpretation, if you look at what the Secretary of State has done, because he's actually created law. It's not an actual interpretation where he's looked at the statute and said "this statute applies this way." He's actually created law and said that "these statutes that are not applicable also are applicable," and so the deference should not be given to him. But that's only in regards to the statutory -- statutory construction issue in regards to

that, and it has to be reasonable.

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Now, we've already shown that there are so many different scenarios that the Secretary of State has provided are things that could happen in this case, in regards to one party gets to nominate freely -- actually, no -- the majority party doesn't get to nominate at all; they just allow their -- any member, or anybody that wants to be a Republican or a Democrat to nominate themselves, and minor parties have to nominate a candidate, and the independents have to actually go out and get votes. And so you see that there's some serious concerns with that style.

So, when -- if we go back to my analysis in regards to what would happen, after these, these documents are filed with the Secretary of State, they're -- they're in place. You have the major party candidates running, you have the minor party candidates on the list, and you have the independents. And that should be open until 32 days before the election, by statute. The statute allows for independents, and the statute allows for -- allows for minor parties to put their names and their candidates on the ballots until the 32nd day before the election, and that's what the Legislature wanted.

And so we go forward with that, and that, there's sufficient time to do that. We have -- electronic voting machines now, these days, will allow anybody to -- to place

that on the ballot a lot quicker, and so we move forward.

So, Your Honor, let me just -- if you have any other questions in regards to the statutory...

Oh, let me just -- and I know Mr. Goodenow will address this -- but in regards to the constitutional issue, we don't believe that the Secretary of State gets deference in regards to whether or not a statute is constitutional, and I think Mr. Goodenow will address that a little bit for you.

In closing, Your Honor, the Secretary of State is supposed to promulgate rules so that the ballots can be sent out properly, and things of that nature. And he set a May 23rd to 25th deadline in which all of those nominees must be filed within, and we think that that's an abuse of discretion. It's arbitrary and capricious, and it really shows the lack of understanding of what the committees, the central committees are all about, by not providing, under our bylaws -- the bylaws are on the Secretary of State's website; they're 45 days.

Their argument against that is that there would be no challenges, or we wouldn't -- we would need sufficient time for the challenges. Well, there are no challenges, so that's a dead issue. The 45 days should be included.

What I would like to do, Your Honor, is I have the Secretary of State Special Election Press Conference on CD.

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I'd like to admit this into evidence.
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             THE COURT: That's fine. Any objection?
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             I don't know what it says or contains, but it --
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             MR. BENSON: No objection, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Mr. Benson? Thank you.
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             We'll mark it as Exhibit 1 for purposes of this
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   hearing, in respect to this matter.
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             (Exhibit 1 marked and admitted.)
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             THE COURT: I did have one other question.
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             Are you aware whether or not the Secretary of State
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    adopted any regulations, as required pursuant to NRS
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    304.250, which indicates:
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             "The Secretary of State shall adopt such
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             regulations as are necessary for conducting
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             elections pursuant to the provisions of
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             NRS 304.200 to NRS 304.250, inclusive"?
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            MR. O'MARA: We are unaware of any regulations,
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   Your Honor.
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             THE COURT:
                         Yeah.
                                Nobody provided any, so I didn't
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   know if -- whether or not they ever adopted any, in
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   respect -- and, again, this law goes back to 2003, so it's
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   not intended to be disparaging to any secretary of state.
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            MR. O'MARA:
                          Right.
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            THE COURT: I think there's been a couple since
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then, in respect to that, so it's not my intent to do that.

But I --

MR. O'MARA: What -- the reason why we've presented the Court with and asked for the admittance of the press -- with no objection -- the press conference, during this, during this press conference, the Secretary of State was giving information about deadlines. And the one deadline that is apparent in this case is that he said that July 15th is the date that he would need to have everything in regards -- so that the clerks would be able to print the ballots and mail the ballots.

There are no challenges, so it's a simple filing. So, we've asked for -- we've asked for June 30th, Your Honor, in our briefing, to be extended, so that all parties, minor parties, major parties -- obviously, because of the -- maybe some parties have relied upon the improper interpretation of the Secretary of State, they have not -- they have not moved forward with their processes, so they need that additional time to -- to fully vet their candidates.

And so we ask that, at the very minimum, July -- or June 30th be the date in which the parties get to nominate their -- their specific candidate, and that candidate can file -- can file with the Secretary of State that they are the nominee of the specific party.

It goes to say, Your Honor, that under the statute, it doesn't mean that people are going to be precluded from running in this election, because the statute says that you can change your party affiliation. It's not -- it's not applicable in this state, in this special election, so if someone does want to run, and they're not -- they're not nominated through the party process, then they can become an independent and run during that process. And so there's no -- there's no prejudice to any of those individuals, and that's something that we need to look at.

So we ask that the Court provide declaratory relief, injunctive relief in regards to the improper interpretation. We ask for the Court to rule that party nominees should be done pursuant to 293.165.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. O'Mara.

Mr. Goodenow?

MR. GOODENOW: Thank you, Your Honor.

I'm going to work methodically through the Supreme Court constitutional precedent, and I've prepared a binder with a couple of the pertinent cases in it. And I do have it for the Court's ease in being able to follow along with my argument.

I wanted to show it to opposing counsel before I bring it forward.

1 THE COURT: That's fine. 2 MR. GOODENOW: Thank you. 3 (Discussion held between counsel.) MR. GOODENOW: May I approach, Your Honor? 4 5 THE COURT: You may. 6 MR. GOODENOW: Thank you. 7 (Counsel approached the bench.) 8 THE COURT: Thank you. 9 MR. GOODENOW: You're welcome. 10 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Goodenow. 11 MR. GOODENOW: We think the statute can be 12 interpreted consistently with the United States 13 Constitution. That was the whole point of Mr. O'Mara's 14 argument. 15 For the purposes of my argument, Your Honor, I'm 16 going to give the Secretary of State deference and assume 17 that the Secretary of State's interpretation is that interpretation with which we're working. 18 19 There is a right of association under the United 20 States Constitution, the First Amendment to the 21 Constitution, incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, under the case of Gitlow vs. New York, in 1925. 22 23 The present case before the Court today squarely 24 presents the issue whether the state may take from the major 25 political parties the right to determine who their nominees

will be in a special election, and whether the state action violates the party's right of association.

This is an applied challenge. The Nevada Secretary of State issued Interpretation 112801, dated May 2nd, 2011.

Oddly enough, that was before Secretary -- House of Representative's member Heller resigned on May 9th, 2011. I assume they were preparing for this day.

In paragraph 2 of the interpretation, the Secretary determined that -- and I'm going to quote here from it, because the language of the Secretary of State's interpretation is important and determinative of the resolution of this case. I quote:

"Major political party candidates are nominated and will appear on a special election ballot by filing a declaration of candidacy or acceptance of candidacy within the time, and on the form prescribed by the Secretary of State," end quote.

That interpretation is attached to our moving papers, and I believe it's already in the court's record.

So, the Secretary says, "Persons who self-nominate will be the party's nominees." There is no primary. In the form they sign, that's provided by statute, that's NRS 293.177, the nominees agree to accept the party's nomination.

Now, I don't know whether the Secretary of State will or will not change that form, but that's the form that's statutorily provided.

And I -- I took note of Your Honor's question for Mr. O'Mara, and that was: Doesn't the sentence that we're talking about in 304.240 seem to presuppose some sort of nomination? And I think that's right. If you believe that the Secretary's interpretation is correct -- and, again, I'm assuming -- I'm giving deference, and for the purposes of my constitutional argument, to the Secretary's interpretation -- that's the nomination process, that's what the interpretation, Secretary's interpretation says. Those persons who file their form, under the statute, with the Secretary of State, are the party's nominees. That's the language that it uses. That is the language that the statute, 240, uses. And if we turn to 240, which we can do, we'll find that.

That sentence that Your Honor referred to reads:

"A candidate of a major political party is

nominated by filing a declaration or acceptance of

candidacy within the time prescribed by the

Secretary of State pursuant to NRS 293.204."

And that's critical for the constitutional analysis that I'm going to walk through in a moment.

The Secretary of State and the Nevada Democratic

Party argue that open-access special election does not

violate the freedom of association. That's their argument.

They rely solely on the cases that discuss the effect of

state restrictions on the selection of nominees through the

primary system.

Again, Nevada's party nominees for the general election are selected through a closed primary. That is our tradition. That is Nevada's election law.

Here, we are dealing with a special election. The the Secretary of State's interpretation removes the major political parties from any role in nominating their candidates in this special election scheduled for September 13th.

The United States Supreme Court disapproved of such restrictions in *California Democratic Party vs. Jones*, 530 U.S. 567, a 2000 case, about three years before NRS 304.240 was adopted. In striking down California's blanket primary system, the Court stated that, and I'm quoting here from the Court's decision:

"In no area is the political association's right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its nominee."

That's page 575 of the Supreme Court's decision, or

page 8 of 24 in the bench copy that I provided.

In reaching this result, the Court observed that, and I'm quoting here from the decision:

"A corollary of the right to associate is the right not to associate. Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if associations could not limit control over their decisions to those who share the interest and persuasions that underlie the association's being," end quote.

That's found on page 574 of the Court's decision. That's just up above the quote that I read a moment ago.

In our case here at bar today, this is not merely speculation, but fact. The fact is that we will have candidates that are not the party's choice voted into office as the party's nominees by voters who are not party members.

This Court should apply strict scrutiny. In

Timmons vs. Twin Cities New Area -- Area New Party,

520 U.S. 351, a 1997 Supreme Court case, the Supreme Court
was upholding Minnesota's anti-fusion laws. It said that:

"When deciding whether a state election law violates First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights," it "must weigh the character and magnitude of the burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests

the State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary."

That's page 358 of the Court's opinion.

Then it goes on to say: "Regulations imposing severe burdens" on plaintiffs' rights "must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest," as I've mentioned in our briefing.

And in that case, Timmons, the Court contrasted the statute in Timmons, which prohibited candidates from appearing on the ballot as a candidate for more than one political party, and did not involve control of a party's nominating mechanisms with the following cases: Eu, the former Secretary of State of California, vs. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, and Tashjian vs.

Republican Party of Connecticut, both of which struck down statutes interfering with a party's rights to select or nominate its candidates. And that can be found at pages 359 through 360 of the Timmons decision.

This Court should ask the Secretary of State, in this case of a resignation from office -- because that's what we're considering here is a replacement after resignation -- what is the compelling state interest that

justifies depriving the major political parties of their right to nominate candidates?

Neither the legislative history of NRS 304.240, as Your Honor and Mr. O'Mara just observed, nor the briefs, suggest anything other than time constraints.

A couple of statutory comparisons are very helpful when analyzing this problem, Your Honor. First, it is helpful to review what the United States Congress did to address the same issues addressed in NRS 304.240, the statute that we've been concerned with this afternoon.

In 2005, two years after Nevada adopted our statute, Congress enacted amendments to 2 U.S.C. § 8.

2 U.S.C. § 8. These provisions provide a method to replace U.S. senators and congressmen in extraordinary circumstances. That's a defined term for the purposes of this statute.

Congress was very careful to draft this statute in a way that does not infringe the party's rights of association, by providing, first, for nominations by parties. Specifically, Your Honor, if you -- I'll refer the Court to section (b)(3) of 2 U.S.C. § 8, that lists nominations by parties as the first method. It also provides the option for states to enact their own legislation.

Congress also anticipated the UOCAVA problems, the

overseas ballot problems, by suggesting the states consider electronic means to solve those problems, and that's in section (b)(5) in the statute. Thus, the Congress recognized the importance of permitting the parties to exercise their right to nominate.

Next, section 8 only applies in extraordinary circumstances. Such circumstances are defined by the statute as where there are a hundred vacancies in the House. And that's subsection (b)(4) of 2 U.S.C. § 8. Thus, Congress recognized, the United States Congress recognized that this statute that changes the election process needed a compelling state interest to justify it and placed that interest within the text of the statute.

Unfortunately, NRS 304.240 is overinclusive in this respect, since it addresses not only catastrophe, an extraordinary circumstance, but also, resignations.

Next, Your Honor, a second very helpful comparison is the Washington state statute that was at issue in Washington State Grange. I've given you a copy in the bench binder of that case.

The Supreme Court considered, in Washington State Grange vs. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, a 2008 case, a facial challenge to the people's choice initiative of 2004. It was described and referred to throughout the case as "I-872." It stands for

Initiative 872. That provides that candidates for office shall be identified on the ballot by their self-designated party preference -- party preference; that voters may vote for any candidate, and the top two votegetters for each office, regardless of party preference, advance to the general election.

Going to, moving to page 458 to 459 of the decision, Your Honor, this is a critical portion of the court's decision. Its concluding paragraph of the majority decision says, and I quote:

"Because I-872 does not, on its face, provide for the nomination of candidates, it does not, on its face, severely burden Respondent's associational rights."

Our case, today, involves the statute interpreted by the Secretary of State to provide that the persons who file nomination forms are the party's nominees. That is the end of the hunt. Nevada statute NRS 304.240, as interpreted by the Secretary of State, is facially unconstitutional. It says, according to the Secretary of State, that the parties have no role in nominating the candidates. They are nominated by filing their declaration.

It is important to thoroughly read Washington State

Grange in order to understand fully that the Secretary of

1 State's interpretation results in Nevada's statute being so 2 clearly unconstitutional. In that case, the Supreme Court 3 reversed the Ninth Circuit, which had enjoined enforcement 4 of the initiative. The respondent, who opposed the initiative, argued that I-872 suffered from the same 5 constitutional infirmity that doomed California's blanket 7 primary that we talked about a little while ago. It allowed primary voters, who are unaffiliated -- unaffiliated with a 9 party, to choose the party's nominee. You will find this at the decision at page 452, 10 page 11 of 21 of your bench copy. 11 12 Justice Thomas wrote for the Court. Writing for 13 the majority, Justice Thomas wrote that the, and I quote: 14 "The flaw in this argument is that, unlike the 15 California primary, the I-872 primary does not, by 16 its terms, choose parties' nominees," end quote. 17 18 That's at, found at page 453, or at page 11 of 21 19 of your bench copy. 20 He says: 21 "The flaw in this argument is that, unlike the 22 California primary, the I-872 primary does not, by 23 its terms, choose parties' nominees." 24 25 In the opinion, the Court takes great pains to note

this repeatedly, saying again later, and I quote:

"The law never refers to the candidates as nominees of any party, nor does it treat them as such," end quote.

That quote can be found on the same page, page 453 of the Court's opinion, page 11 of 21 of your bench copy.

Here, we have an actual election, and the State had the opportunity to implement 204 -- excuse me -- 304.240, and it has done so in a way that violates the First Amendment. Therefore, this Court's evaluation of the statute does not involve an evaluation, as the defendants suggest, of whether it has some hypothetically plain, legitimate sweep; it doesn't, as Washington State Grange points out.

As Your Honor is no doubt aware, and it's really beyond contradiction, statutes must be construed to be constitutional, and that citation for, authority for that proposition is *Citizens First for Honest Government*, 116 Nev. 939, pinpoint cite is 946, a 2000 case from our Supreme Court.

Your Honor, we urge that the Court find that NRS 304.240 can be interpreted constitutionally. If it is not and it is interpretated [sic] in -- excuse me -- interpreted as the Secretary of State suggests, then it is

1 unconstitutional in its application and facially 2 unconstitutional should the Secretary of State's 3 interpretation be found to be correct. Your Honor, I'm happy to answer any questions that 5 you may have. 6 THE COURT: That's fine. Thank you. 7 Mr. Benson, are you ready to proceed? 8 MR. BENSON: Yes, I am, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you, does anybody have -- first of all, does anybody have any objection to the 10 11 documents being provided being admitted into evidence? 12 just, primarily, cases that the Court looked at, and some 13 statutes in respect to that. So, I'm not sure we even need 14 to admit it, so I'm not going to admit it; there's no need 1.5 to, so -- after I looked at it again, don't think there's 16 any basis for that. 17 So, Mr. Benson, why don't you go ahead. 18 MR. BENSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 We've seen you a lot lately, Mr. Benson. 20 MR. BENSON: Yes, Your Honor. I've made it quite a habit to be here. 21 22 Going back to the beginning with the statutory

provides, which is that a major party candidate is nominated

interpretation, the Secretary's interpretation is directly

in line with what the plain language of the statute

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by filing the declaration of candidacy.

The Secretary's interpretation is perfectly consistent with this statute, if not compelled by this statute. And, as you're well aware, the language of a statute, where it's plain and unambiguous and clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and the Court should give effect to the plain language of the statute.

The Secretary's not writing new laws here or inventing anything out of thin air. All the Secretary is doing is giving an effect to what is already stated in the law.

The plaintiffs argue that 304.240, the section, the third sentence that says that major party candidates are nominated by filing the declaration of candidacy within the time period as prescribed by the Secretary of State, they argue that that's merely a timing issue. But the second sentence of that same statute provides that all candidates have to file the declaration of candidacy within the time prescribed by the Secretary, Secretary of State. So, the third sentence would be completely redundant and meaningless, if that's all it was intended to do. Instead, I think that it was intended to do what it says, which is provide that a major party candidate is nominated by filing the declaration of candidacy.

The remainder of the statute goes on to describe how the remaining types of parties are nominated.

THE COURT: Isn't there a distinction being made -my point, and I made it to them as well -- that somehow we
allow every single member of a major party to go ahead and
go down and file and become a candidate, where we limit the
minority party candidates in respect to coming down and
filing. Then we put another onus on those independent
people that are coming down to file, by requiring them to go
get -- go get a hundred signatures? Doesn't that create a
different standard under that interpretation?

MR. BENSON: Your Honor, that's the standard that's laid out in the statute. And also, I'd point out that that's basically business as usual in any election.

In any given election, anybody can file to run in the primary for either of the major parties, and the parties can't prevent them from doing so. And that person might even win, because it's the voters of the party that choose the nominee, not the leadership of the party.

In a regular election, the minor parties file a list, and so, too, do the independent candidates file a petition for candidacy. So, we're really treating them as much to the same way as we can, as we do in a regular election.

Again, on the statutory construction argument, the

plaintiffs' construction of the statute would have the Court completely ignore that third sentence in the statute, of 304.240, and it would have no meaning whatsoever. The Secretary --

THE COURT: Well, doesn't your argument, then, ignore the language that said -- says, primarily, that "a candidate must be nominated in the manner provided in Chapter 293," I know, and this provides "except as otherwise provided" in this. But I just have to ignore NRS 293 totally, then?

MR. BENSON: No. And the Secretary's interpretation takes account of those sections of 293 where -- where they are necessary.

For example, we talked about the independent candidates already. 20 -- 304.240 says that they have to "file a petition of candidacy with the appropriate filing officer." Well, what does that mean? 304 says nothing about what a petition of candidacy is or who the appropriate filing officer is. For those provisions, you have to go look at section -- at Chapter 239 -- or, excuse me -- 293. That provides what a petition of candidacy is, what its form is; as you're familiar with, with how it has to have the signatures on it; that it has to have the name of the county.

The appropriate filing officer is not the Secretary

of State. The appropriate filing officer is the county clerk, or the voter registrar in whatever county you gather those signatures in, because that's who has to verify those signatures.

So, in that respect, the Secretary's interpretation gives effect to all parts of 304.240, because in that sense, the candidates are nominated in the manner provided in 203 -- or, excuse me -- 293, because you have to look at those to receive guidance on how you fill out these petitions of candidacy, what the forms required, who you turn it into, all of those things that are not directly addressed in 304.

THE COURT: What about the specific wording -- and, again, I'm narrowing in very specifically in regards to the following words "a candidate of a major political party."

It doesn't say "a member of a major political party," it says "a candidate of a major political party."

To me, that -- that -- and, again, I haven't made any -- don't taking anything by my questions. I ask lots of questions of both sides, just to try to make sure we have an appropriate record for the Supreme Court, because I'm sure that's where we're going. So, I try to -- I try to make sure we get as much information as we can in respect to these matters.

So -- so, basically, my question is, you know,

where is -- wouldn't it have said "a member of a major political party is nominated," rather than "a candidate," which implies that this is their candidate picked by the major political party? I mean, what about that argument?

MR. BENSON: Well, I would direct you, also, to the regular primary section. It's the same in that sense, it's you're a candidate for the nomination. So, to be called a candidate doesn't imply that you've been nominated or selected by anybody else.

THE COURT: But what about NRS 293.165, which clearly indicates, in that section, it says, under the first section, it indicates:

"Except as otherwise provided in NRS 293.166, a vacancy occurring in a major or minor political party nomination for a partisan office may be filled by a candidate designated by the party."

And, again, I -- I'm just trying to understand the statute, Mr. Benson. I, if I go back and forth between them, how do I give credence to that?

You're saying that doesn't apply, and I understand that, and I just have to look at 304.240. Is that correct?

MR. BENSON: That's correct. And I don't think

that the use of the term "candidate," as it's used in both of those cases, it could, essentially, mean a member,

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   because in either case, you haven't been nominated by
   anybody in particular until you receive either the
   endorsement of the central committee, in the case of
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   293.165, or you file your declaration of candidacy in the
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   case of 304.240.
                         What does the word "nominate" mean?
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             THE COURT:
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                          It's an excellent question, Your
             MR. BENSON:
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   Honor.
             THE COURT: Well, I looked in Black's Law
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   Dictionary, and let me tell you what it means, specifically,
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    in regards to this matter. It kind of indicates that it
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   means to, essentially:
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             "To propose a person for election or appointment;
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             or, two, to name or designate a person for a
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             position."
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             And so "nominate" has to be given some -- some
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    interpretation.
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             And, again, don't take anything by my questions,
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   because I just want to beat up on you a little bit anyway,
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    in respect to this matter, so ...
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             MR. BENSON:
                          I appreciate that, Your Honor.
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             And under 304.240, it says a person is nominated.
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    So, that's a good question: What does it mean to be
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    nominated? If we give it the ordinary sense of the word,
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then you are nominated just by filing your declaration of candidacy, in which case 293.165, by its own terms, does not apply, because it only applies when there is a vacancy in the nomination.

Under --

THE COURT: But wasn't that taken care of in regards to that matter in the Brown vs. Georgetta case, in respect to the matter where it's almost an identical issue, when you go read it, because in that particular case, we had a U.S. Senator that died, and there wasn't any primary in that particular case, and yet the Supreme Court said, basically, "We're going to go ahead and look at that particular statute, and we're going to treat that as being a vacancy"? Isn't that what that case says?

MR. BENSON: In that case, the Court did hold that the vacancy in the office also created a vacancy in the nomination, under the particular circumstances of that case.

That case is distinguishable for several different reasons. One, in the case of a U.S. Senator, there is a provision where a temporary appointment can be made. There is no such availability for a representative in Congress, which is the whole reason why we have to have a special election in the first place; because otherwise, you can't make an appointment, and people just go without any representation.

Also, in the *Georgetta* case, again, it involved the situation where it was after the primary, it was shortly before the general election, and ordinarily, because you would have an appointment to fill the vacancy, you would have a party nominate their candidates through the ordinary primary process, but that wasn't possible in that sense.

That case was decided about 50 years before 304.240 was enacted. And 304.240, as you know from reading the legislative history, was put in place to deal with the very specific situation that we have here today, which is a vacancy in only a representative in Congress position. And that statute, being the more specific statute, controls in this case.

There's no other situations that I've -- or any other case law or authority that I've been able to find, nor that the plaintiffs have cited, that have applied the reasoning of Brown vs. Georgetta to a special election, where there is no primary permitted, and where -- and where there is a specific statute on point that is apparently designed exactly to prevent vacancies in nomination from happening. That is the situation we have here.

So, I think in that case, that Brown vs. Georgetta does not apply in this case, and that 304.240, itself, takes care of the vacancy and the nomination by providing simply that you are nominated by filing your declaration of

candidacy.

THE COURT: Do you think the Secretary -- I -- not the Secretary of State -- do you think the Legislature should have done a better job in drafting NRS 304.240?

FROM THE AUDIENCE: Yeah.

MR. BENSON: May I decline to comment on that, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Well --

MR. BENSON: It's --

THE COURT: Isn't it confusing? I mean, I'm

just -- candidly, if you read that statute, and you read it

in respect to that, they certainly could have done a better

job in regards to bringing us here today on such an

important issue. Think how important this issue is in

regards to coming forth with somebody to take the place in

regards to the United States Congress, in respect to that,

and looking at the legislative history. And I know there's

a couple of minor comments on the history in respect to

that. But don't you think the Legislature should have done

a much better job, and maybe somebody over there ought to

take a look at this today, and maybe fix it between now and

then?

MR. BENSON: I think there are certain things that could be cleared up, but I think they did do a good job in the sense that, like I said, the third sentence of 204 -- or

304.240 is very clear, and it does say that you are nominated simply by filing your declaration of candidacy. It doesn't really get much clearer than that.

As you know from reading the legislative history, the whole point of putting this in place was so that we could get these vacancies filled as quickly as possible. The 180 days, that's the end time. It's also clear in the statute that if possible, if practicable, we should have the election before that. And in this case, the governor, in fact, did set the date for less than 180 days.

So, I think that they did address this as clearly as they could have. There might have been -- there's a little bit of confusion, of course, involved because of, as the plaintiffs have mentioned, there's certain statutes that don't apply in special elections per 293, but the Secretary of State's interpretation uses those statutes for guidance.

THE COURT: What about Mr. O'Mara's argument the Secretary of State is picking and choosing those provisions they want to apply and not applying other provisions?

I mean, this is his argument, so I'm just --

MR. BENSON: Sure. And we're not just picking and choosing statutes that we think ought to apply or ought not to. We are drawing on guidance from those statutes, because otherwise, it's very unclear, and people would be without any guidance whatsoever what to do, as I mentioned, in

304.240.

So, you are an independent candidate, and you look at that and it says "a petition of candidacy with the appropriate filing officer." How are you supposed to know what that means? It's true that 293.200, which is the statute that governs independent candidate petitions for candidacy, does not apply in special elections to fill vacancies.

Under the Secretary's interpretation, using that as guidance, what the interpretation does is it puts in, it fills in those gaps by using what is usually the standard rules in an ordinary election for independent candidates. So it provides everybody with some guidance and with some consistency on what they need to do in this election.

With regard to the plaintiffs' argument that there's a tradition in Nevada of having only one candidate on the ballot for any -- for each of the parties, first of all, even assuming that there is any such tradition, the Legislature is free to change that any time. The states have broad authority to manage and administer elections, and that's what the Legislature did in this case.

Again, by enacting 304.240 to deal with these kind of vacancies, they were free to change that tradition, assuming that that even exists, and that's just what they did here.

And, on the other hand, there is really no such tradition, there's no such fundamental principle. Under 293.260, that provides for two candidates of the same party to appear on the ballot in certain cases. And, also, in recall elections, you can have anybody who qualifies appear on the ballot, regardless of their party denomination.

They argue that recall elections are always nonpartisan. That's not really the case. It all depends on whether the office is partisan or not.

Frequent -- frequently, recalls happen in local offices that happen to be nonpartisan, in which case they are correct, there is no party designation in a nonpartisan election.

So, this notion that there's some kind of in vital tradition in Nevada law that you can only have one person on the ballot, one, it just isn't so; and, two, the Legislature's free to change that at any time, which I believe they've done in this case.

THE COURT: Are you arguing the constitutional issues, or is somebody else going to argue those?

MR. BENSON: I will argue the constitutional issues, also. I just want to get by -- through one more statutory thing before I move on to that. And I will try to -- to be as brief as I can. That regards these deadlines and extending the deadlines.

The plaintiffs argue that the minor and independent candidates have until 32 days before the election. Under the Secretary's interpretation, we believe that that provision is preempted by federal law; and, therefore, all candidates have the same deadline to file their declarations of candidacy, or the petitions, as the case may be.

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THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Is Mr. O'Mara correct in regards to Exhibit 1 that was provided, in regards to the date, as long as there's some resolution before the first -- end of June, I guess -- or July 15th, I guess is what he indicated that the -- there wouldn't be any impact on the ballot issues?

MR. BENSON: As it happens, we have consulted with the county clerks very recently, and Washoe County, of course, being the one that's the most impacted by the -- that -- this, and I believe that their estimation is that they would need three weeks from the UOCAVA deadline to prepare the ballots, which I believe puts us at July 8th, rather than July 15th.

THE COURT: You know, and before you leave this issue, and without getting you in trouble with your boss, doesn't NRS 304.250 indicate:

"The Secretary of State shall adopt such regulations as are necessary for conducting elections pursuant to the provisions of

NRS 304.200 to 304.500"?

Were any regulations ever adopted?

MR. BENSON: To my knowledge, no regulations were adopted. And, again, of course --

THE COURT: Is it one of those statutes that was just kind of "well, we'll never need it, so we aren't going to adopt any," or what happened?

MR. BENSON: I -- from our view, we looked at the statute, and it seemed quite clear to us that you are nominated by filing your declaration of candidacy; that seemed clear. Until we end up in the situation we are here today, I don't think anybody anticipated that that would be a problem, and, therefore, that the regulations were not -- not necessary.

But as regards to the UOCAVA and the MOVE Act, the MOVE Act requires that our military and overseas voters receive their -- are sent their ballots 45 days before a special election in federal office. That's not optional. They cite the *Brown vs. Georgetta* case, also for the proposition that voting by absentee ballot is -- is a privilege and not a right.

Now, that might have been the case 50 years ago, but Congress, by enacting UOCAVA and the MOVE Act, has essentially conferred an obligation upon the states to make sure that, you know, our service members and their spouses

and their dependents who are overseas have a reasonable chance to vote by getting those ballots out to them in time. And what they get is a regular ballot. It's not a write-in ballot, it's not a ballot that doesn't include all the candidates' names; it's a regular ballot, so we have to have those ballots prepared well in advance, so that we can met that deadline.

The U.S. Department of Justice has been fairly aggressive in enforcing this, this law. And just last election, the last general election, they sued several states: Wisconsin, Guam, New York, New Mexico, and Illinois, to enforce the -- that statute.

So, that, those deadlines are preempted by federal law, and we cannot extend the deadline to have those ballots and still meet that, that deadline.

So, unless Your Honor has any further questions on the statutory construction argument, I will move on to the constitutional issues, then.

Oh, one other mention. The plaintiffs note that our interpretation states that there will be no challenges entertained. The -- and that we also say in our brief that we need some time to resolve challenges. We're talking about two different types of challenges there. The challenges that will not be entertained, according to our interpretation, are challenges to the qualifications of a

candidate under 293.182, which are typically brought in state -- for state positions, things like challenges to your residency, whether you live in your district or not, things of that nature. Those are not going to be entertained, because, as you know, Congress determines qualification of its own members. Those are the kinds of challenges that we're not going to entertain.

In our brief, of course, the challenges that we were alluding to, the legal challenges are this one we're here on today, and any appeal that might result from that.

THE COURT: You made one comment I want to go back to. The comment you made, essentially, the differentiation between the minority party and the independent party, in respect to those matters, it's like "business as usual," just like any other election in respect to that. But in any other election, we don't allow every member of a political, major political party to go down and file, do we?

MR. BENSON: Yes, we do. We allow any member of --

THE COURT: In the primary.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}\xspace$  . BENSON: In the primary.

THE COURT: But not in the general.

MR. BENSON: But not in the general. And in this case, we do not have a primary election, of course. And when we get to the constitutional issues, I'll address that a little bit further, as well.

I'm sorry. I have one other note to myself on -on the ballot issues, is they mention that now we have
voting machines, and that they're faster, and that it's not
such a big deal to change the ballot, and all of that. And
I would disagree with that. They're not necessarily faster.
They have to be programmed. The ballot has to be designed,
and the machines have to be tested for accuracy and logic
testing. That's a significant process that has to be done.
It's not necessarily any faster to do it with voting
machines.

Now, I will shift gears to the constitutional arguments. And the key difference in this case is your -- I think your question was alluding to, is that the purpose of this special election is not to select the nominees of the party. The purpose of this special election is for the voters of Congressional District 2 to choose somebody to represent them in Congress.

So, what we're doing here does not implicate the associational rights of the parties to pick a standard there, to pick a nominee. This is just like the *Grange* case, in that sense, which is the top two primary, where the purpose of the primary was not to pick party nominees, it was to winnow the field down to a handful of candidates to go on, onto the general election ballot.

So, in that case, this is just like the Grange

case. It's not like the case in Jones, where in Jones, it was a traditional primary, in the sense that its purpose was to pick a party's nominee. The problem in Jones is that anybody could vote for the party's nominee, including nonmembers, including members who were registered of a different opposing political party. That was the problem in Jones. We don't have that problem here, because we're not selecting a nominee for this special election, so the fact that multiple Republicans and multiple Democrats appear on the ballot doesn't implicate the associational rights of the party.

Additionally, the plaintiffs don't make this argument explicitly, but the challenge that was brought in *Grange* was that because voters normally think of a primary as choosing the party's nominee, that those people who got to the general election, that the voters would necessarily assume that they were the party's nominee. In this case, we don't have that risk, one, because we don't have a primary.

And the court also found that any kind of confusion that might be created could be addressed by having some sort of disclaimer, so to speak, on the ballot itself, some information advising the voters that the party affiliation was the candidate's choice of party, and that it did not imply any endorsement by the party.

And I don't think it's necessary in this case, but

if the Court believes it's necessary, or helpful, I'm sure that we could work with the county clerks to arrange something of that nature, as well.

They also mention that *Grange* was a facial challenge. When it came to the U.S. Supreme Court, that's true, it came on a facial challenge, and part of the reason that they upheld it was because there was no evidence at the time that voters actually would be confused by this, and —but when it went down on remand, it was subsequently upheld on an as-applied challenge, and one of the things that they did was provide that sort of disclaimer, as well. And so it's passed muster, both as an applied and as a facial challenge.

In this case, the plaintiffs state that they're making an as-applied challenge to the Secretary's interpretation. The Secretary's interpretation essentially mirrors the language of the statute itself.

Contrary to what they've represented, the Secretary's interpretation says major party -- major political party candidates are nominated and will appear on the special election ballot by filing a declaration of candidacy or an acceptance of candidacy. That's almost verbatim from the statute itself.

The Secretary's interpretation does not say that those people become the party's nominee. There's no such

implication in our interpretation. Essentially, they're
challenged for --

THE COURT: What about the language in NRS 304.240, in the caption? And we don't look at captions. But if you go through the caption, it goes through -- it's kind of an outline of what, basically, is contained in NRS 304.240.

It indicates:

"Issuance by governor of election proclamation precludes holding a primary election; nomination of candidates; placement of names of candidates on the ballot," in respect to that.

So, isn't that -- and I'm going back to the statutory interpretation, to some extent. And I know you're on the constitutional law area, but doesn't that mean that part of that section and that particular statute is really there for placing names on the ballot, because there's nothing, no other provision in 293 or anything else, if we accept 293, to do that?

MR. BENSON: Well, with regard to that, I think what it, that's intended to do is just to cover, briefly outline everything that the statute does. And nothing in that implies that 293.165 is implicated, because the -- as I discussed in my brief, for example, independent candidates. According to 293.200, their names are placed on the ballot.

Minor party candidates, you know, file a list. In this case, it states clearly that major party candidates are nominated by filing declaration of candidacy.

And, again, this is the reviser's, kind of outline of what goes into the statute, and it's not binding on what the legislative intent is. The title of the act can be used for legislative intent, and the title of this act is "AN ACT relating to elections; providing for a special election to fill a vacancy in the office of Representative in Congress," requiring the election be held sooner "in event of certain catastrophes; and providing other matters properly related thereto."

It has nothing -- it makes no distinction between nominations or placing on the ballot, or any other provisions of that nature.

THE COURT: Do you have a great -- a lot more argument on the constitutional issue? And the reason is, I'm looking at the court reporter, and we tend to give them a break after about an hour and 15 minutes or so. So, if you have, you know, a lot; otherwise, we'll finish up with your argument, and then we'll go on to the other argument. So...

MR. BENSON: I will try to conclude it very briefly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BENSON: My point that I was getting at is, the plaintiffs' challenge in this case is, essentially, a challenge to the statute itself, because the Secretary's interpretation mirrors the statute.

As you know, statutes are presumed constitutional, and that the burden is upon them to show that it clearly is not constitutional.

And, additionally, the associational rights, the Supreme Court has recognized that the rights of candidates to be placed on the ballots and the rights of the voters to vote for those candidates are intertwined, and that when candidates are unnecessarily excluded from the ballot, that that necessarily impinges upon -- puts a burden on the right to vote, as well.

The plaintiffs argue that the right to vote is being burdened in this case. If anything, it appears to us that it's being enhanced by allowing the voters an additional choice of who to vote for in this election. And that is, by the way, the *Lubin vs. Panish* case, 415 U.S. 709, at 716.

And with regard to the state interest on the party's associational rights, the *Lightfoot* case and the *Alaskan Independent Party* case, those were cases that involved direct primaries, which is what we have in Nevada, basically, where the parties challenge the State's authority

to require a primary election, rather than letting the party membership designate who the nominees are; in other words, shifting the power to choose the nominee to the voters, to the members of the party, rather than from the party leadership.

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And in those cases, the state interest was to remove the influence of special interests, to remove the power of just the party leadership, and to shift that to the more disinterested members themselves to make that decision.

And in those cases, the Ninth Circuit upheld those as compelling state interests, and, therefore, it was not necessary to even reach whether or not it severely burdened the associational rights.

The Court seemed to entertain doubts about whether it severely burdened the rights or not, but in any event, upheld it, because it found those to be compelling interests.

In this case, I think the interest is even more compelling, because, again, we're not choosing a nominee of the party; we're choosing a representative, and, therefore, the associational rights, if they're burdened at all, the burden is very, very slight. And allowing the voters themselves to make those decisions furthers those same interests that were identified in those cases.

The plaintiffs mentioned that in their case, the