### THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

2 KIRSTIN BLAISE LOBATO,

CASE NO.: 58913

Electronically Filed Feb 21 2014 11:19 a.m. Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

v.

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THE STATE OF NEVADA.

Respondent.

Appellant,

# APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES

COMES NOW, J. BEDIAKU AFOH-MANIN, pro bono counsel for the Appellant, Kirstin Blaise Lobato, and respectively submits the APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES. This Notice is made pursuant to and based upon all pleadings and papers on file herein, NRAP 31(e), the interests of justice, and the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Dated this 20<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2014.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ J. Bediaku Afoh-Manin
J. BEDIAKU AFOH-MANIN
Pro bono attorney for Appellant
Associate Counsel per NSC Order

By: /s/ Phung H. Jefferson
PHUNG H. JEFFERSON
Pro bono attorney for Appellant
Nevada Bar Number 7761

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#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The Appellant, Kirstin Blaise Lobato, respectively submits the APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES for this Court's consideration based on the following:

### I. NRAP 31(e) states in pertinent part:

"When pertinent and significant authorities come to a party's attention after the party's brief has been filed, but before a decision, a party may promptly advise the Supreme Court by filing and serving a notice of supplemental authorities, setting forth the citations. The notice shall provide references to the page(s) of the brief that is being supplemented. The notice shall further state concisely and without argument the legal proposition for which each supplemental authority is cited. The notice may not raise any new points or issues. ..."

II. <u>McQuiggin v. Perkins</u>, 569 US \_\_\_\_\_, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) provides pertinent and significant new authority that Ms. Lobato's new evidence claims supporting her actual innocence can rely on affidavits.

A. After briefing was concluded in this case the United States Supreme Court issued its ruling on May 28, 2013 in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 US \_\_\_\_, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) (Available at, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-126\_lkgn.pdf). In McQuiggin a habcas petitioner relied on three affidavits with what he asserted was new evidence showing his actual innocence for purposes of satisfying 28 United States Code § 2244(d)(1)(D). McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1929-30. The Supreme Court recited material aspects of the petitioner's three affidavits, and ruled the petitioner's actual innocence under the statute was to be appraised based on the "credibility of evidence proffered to show actual innocence." [Id., 1929-30, quote at 1936]

<u>McOuiggin</u> supplements Ms. Lobato's Opening Bricf (AOB) on the following pages related to her new evidence in the form of affidavits:

1. "Ms. Lobato's Petition includes more than 20 grounds based on new evidence not presented at trial of her actual innocence by (i) twelve experts (eleven working *pro bono* on her case), (ii) thirteen alibi witnesses, (iii) three alternate suspect witnesses and (iv) seven fact witnesses, which are detailed in more than 40 professional reports, affidavits, statements, and documents incorporated in her Petition as exhibits." [AOB 35] (Underlining added to original.)

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- 2. "The District Court prejudicially misapplied *Herrera* because the majority ruled a habeas petitioner's <u>affidavits</u> are "testimony," *Id.* at 418, and "Had this sort of testimony been offered at trial, it could have been weighed by the jury, along with the evidence offered by the State and petitioner, in deliberating upon its verdict. Since the statements in the <u>affidavits</u> contradict the evidence received at trial, the jury would have had to decide important issues of credibility." ... the emphasis on 'actual innocence' allows the reviewing tribunal also to consider the probative force of relevant evidence." [AOB 49-50] (Underlining added to original.)
- 3. "The District Court prejudicially misapplied *Herrera* for two reasons: First, the Supreme Court ruled in *Herrera* that a habeas petitioner's <u>affidavits</u> are "testimony," *Id.* at 418, and neither the District Court nor the State raise a specific objection that her <u>affiants</u> are not reliable, trustworthy, or credible witnesses." [AOB 84] (Underlining added to original.)
- **4.** "The State's argument misapplies *Herrera* because the majority ruled a habeas petitioner's <u>affidavits</u> are "testimony," *Id.* at 418, and "Had this sort of testimony been offered at trial, it could have been weighed by the jury, along with the evidence offered by the State and petitioner, in deliberating upon its verdict. Since the statements in the <u>affidavits</u> contradict the evidence received at trial, the jury would have had to decide important issues of credibility." *Id.*" [AOB 92] (Underlining added to original.)
- 5. "The District Court prejudicially misapplied *Herrera* because the majority ruled a habeas petitioner's <u>affidavits</u> are "testimony," *Id.* at 418, and "Had this sort of testimony been offered at trial, it could have been weighed by the jury, along with the evidence offered by the State and petitioner, in deliberating upon its verdict. Since the statements in the <u>affidavits</u> contradict the evidence received at trial, the jury would have had to decide important issues of credibility." *Id.* [AOB 99-100] (Underlining added to original.)

<u>McQuiggin</u> supplements Ms. Lobato's Reply Brief (ARB) on the following pages related to her new evidence in the form of affidavits:

- 1. "The State doesn't address the U. S. Supreme Court bases its habeas rulings on witness evidence in the form of <u>Affidavits</u>, statements, expert reports, etc., as does this Court." [ARB 11] (Underlining added to original.)
- 2. "The State misapplies *Herrera* in newly asserting the District Court's <u>blanket</u> rejection of Lobato's new witness evidence in Grounds 37-48, 50, 53, 62, 63, 71, 73 and 77 was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision Herrera's affidavits weren't sufficient to prove his actual innocence." [ARB 34] (Underlining in original.)
- III. <u>People v Hamilton</u>, (2014 NY Slip Op 00238) (1-15-14) provides pertinent and significant new authority supporting Ms. Lobato's actual innocence habeas claims.
  - A. After briefing was concluded in this case the Supreme Court Of The State Of New

York, Appellate Division: Second Judicial Department issued its ruling on January 15, 2014 in People v Hamilton, (2014 NY Slip Op 00238) (1-15-14) (Available at, http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014\_00238.htm). In *Hamilton* a habeas petitioner asserted his new alibi witness evidence proved his actual innocence, and the Court established the precedent: "If the defendant establishes his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, the indictment should be [\*8]dismissed pursuant to CPL 440.10(4), which authorizes that disposition where appropriate." *Hamilton*, 2014 NY Slip Op 238, at 7-8.

Hamilton supplements Ms. Lobato's Reply Brief on the following pages:

- 1. "As set forth above the State materially misstates *Herrera* in stating it established an "unquestionably" innocent standard of proof for Ground 23, when a consensus of State courts is the "clear and convincing" standard applies while Illinois applies the preponderance standard." [ARB 22]
- **2.** "The State fails to address that if Ground 23 is granted Lobato's charges should be dismissed." [ARB 22]
- **B.** The Court in *Hamilton* further ruled a petitioner's actual innocence claim should be evaluated based on "all reliable evidence." *Hamilton*, 2014 NY Slip Op 238, at 7, ¶5.

Hamilton supplements Ms. Lobato's Opening Brief on the following pages:

- 1. "Ms. Lobato argues the correct evidence standard to evaluate her grounds based on new evidence of her actual innocence is that it is "new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial." [AOB 38]
- **2.** "Consistent with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, many state courts have adopted a new evidence standard for actual innocence habeas claims consistent with the *Schlup* standard:" [AOB 39]

Hamilton supplements Ms. Lobato's Reply Brief on the following pages:

- 1. "The State doesn't address the significant issue new evidence in Lobato's Petition is evidence not presented at trial and it is irrelevant when that evidence became known to her." [ARB 6]
- C. The Court in Hamilton explained the restrictive new evidence standard applying to a

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motion for a new trial, was distinctly different from the expansive new evidence habeas standard "where the defendant asserts a claim of actual innocence." *Hamilton*, 2014 NY Slip Op 238, at 6. ¶4.

Hamilton supplements Ms. Lobato's Opening Brief on the following pages:

- 1. "Likewise, in Snow and D'Agostino, this Court specifically ruled the Appellants could pursue collateral review of their new evidence claims in an original habeas petition regardless of restrictions imposed on direct review of "new evidence" by NRS 176.515. Snow, 105 Nev. at 523; D'Agostino, 112 Nev. at 421." [AOB 40]
- 2. "By way of its Response to Ms. Lobato's grounds based on new evidence, the State makes the errant argument that the law applicable to direct review of a motion for a new trial under NRS 176.515 applies to collateral review of her new evidence claims in her original and timely habeas corpus petition, which argument is directly contrary to this Court's precedents in Orsborn, 82 Nev. at 301; Snow, 105 Nev. at 523; and, D'Agostino, 112 Nev. at 421." [AOB 40-41]

Hamilton supplements Ms. Lobato's Reply Brief on the following pages:

- 1. "The State doesn't address only collateral review applies to Lobato's Petition's new evidence grounds under NRS 34.360, while spending five pages irrelevantly discussing direct review of a new trial motion under NRS 176.515(3)." [ARB 6]
- 2. "Lobato filed a timely Petition under NRS 34.360, yet the State falsely asserts: "Appellant must still meet the criteria for an untimely motion for new trial pursuant to NRS 176.515(3) and Hennie v. State, 114 Nev. 1285, 1290, 968 P.2d 761 (1998)." [RAB-10] The State only cites cases involving an NRS 176.515 motion which includes Hennie, and disregards NRS 176.515(3) doesn't apply to an untimely motion or habeas petition." [ARB 8]

### IV. Conclusion.

As set-forth herein McQuiggin and Hamilton provide pertinent and significant new authority supplementing Ms. Lobato's briefs as required by NRAP 31(e).

Dated this 20<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2014.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ J. Bediaku Afoh-Manin J. Bediaku Afoh-Manin 953 Park Place #1R Brooklyn, NY 11213 917-270-6321 Pro bono attorney for Appellant Associate Counsel per NSC Order

By: <u>/s/ Phung H. Jefferson</u> PHUNG H. JEFFERSON 1448 E. Charleston Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104 702-382-4061 Pro bono attorney for Appellant

Nevada Bar Number 7761

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify and affirm that the APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on 20<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2014. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with

Steven B. Wolfson Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212

the Master Service List as follows:

Catherine Cortez Masto Attorney General 555 E. Washington Avenue, Suite 3900 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

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An Employee of Phung Jefferson