IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI,

Petitioner,

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, COUNTY OF CLARK, DEPARTMENT 21,

Respondent,

and THE STATE OF NEVADA, Real Party In Interest.

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No. 61230 Clerk of Supreme Court
(District Court No. C265107)

PETITION FOR REHEARING OF ORDER GRANTING HABEAS CORPUS PETITION IN PART

DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI, by and through his attorneys, Richard A. Wright, and Margaret M. Stanish, WRIGHT STANISH & WINCKLER, petitions this Honorable Supreme Court to reconsider its Order Granting Petition in Part, dated December 21, 2012, pursuant to NRAP 40.

After ruling that the criminal neglect of patients counts (Counts 4, 8, 11, 14, 18, 21, and 24) and reckless endangerment counts (Counts 3, 7, 10, 13, 17, 20, and 23) were insufficiently precise and ambiguous, the Court overlooked the constitutional grand jury right to indictment by the concurrence of 12 or more jurors and directed that the State amend these counts to cure the facial defects.

Given the ambiguity and imprecision of the alternatively pled negligent acts

and theories of criminal liability, the State cannot amend the indictment without second guessing the grand jury and infringing upon the due process right to a grand jury determination by a concurrence of 12 or more jurors. Petitioner, therefore, urges the Court for rehearing on the remedy of dismissal of the facially defective neglect counts.

This petition is timely filed within 18 days of the date of the Order.

Petitioner has satisfied the certification of compliance with formatting requirements and proof of service. See Attachments A and B. Trial in this matter is set for April 22, 2013.

This petition is based upon the Due Process clauses of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the similar clauses in Article 1, Section 8, of the Nevada Constitution, NRS 173.075, and 172.255, and the following Points and Authorities.

DATED this 26th day of December 2012.

Respectfully Submitted,

WRIGHT STANISH & WINCKLER

Richard A. Wright

Margaret M. Stanish

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. ISSUES PRESENTED

Is dismissal of the facially defective criminal neglect counts the appropriate remedy when the charging document is an indictment and the ambiguity and imprecision of the charging language cannot be amended without substantially impairing the Petitioner's constitutional right to an indictment found upon the concurrence of 12 or more grand jurors?

II. ARGUMENT

A. Rehearing is Appropriate

This Petition for Rehearing is properly before the Court pursuant to NRAP 40(c). The Court's order to amend the criminal neglect charges overlooks or misapprehends the constitutional protection of the grand jury right which is implicated and prejudiced by the State amending the charges. Moreover, the State's alternative argument in support of amendment, contains inapposite authority which may have led the Court to misapprehend material issues of constitutional law.

In his original petition for habeas relief, Petitioner argued that the criminal neglect counts should be dismissed because the imprecise and vague charging of multiple defendants based on alternatively pled negligent acts, including "by methods unknown," and multiple and conclusory theories of criminal liability violated not only due process notice requirements, but also violated Petitioner's

due process right to an indictment returned upon the concurrence of 12 or more grand jurors pursuant to the Article I, Section 8 of the Nevada Constitution and NRS 177.255. Original Petition, pp. 2-3, 14-15, 18, 24-25. In its Answer to Petition, the State raised, as an alternative argument, that the Court should permit the State to amend the indictment and strike the offending language. The State concluded that Petitioner could not possibly suffer any possible prejudice should the Court permit it to amend the indictment. Answer to Petition, pp. 19.

Petitioner seeks rehearing to bring to the Court's attention the prejudice that he will indeed suffer if the State is permitted to rewrite the criminal neglect charges in contravention of his due process right to grand jury process. Further, Petitioner seeks to inform the Court of the flaws in the State's argument made in support of amending the indictment.

B. Amending the Indictment Prejudices Petitioner's Grand Jury Right

Article 1, Section 8, of the Nevada Constitution establishes the right to grand jury. The due process procedures governing the grand jury are set forth in Chapter 172 of the NRS. Of particular relevance is the due process right to an indictment found "only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors." NRS 172.255(1); see, State v. Hancock, 114 Nev. 161, 167-68, 955 P.2d 183, 187 (1998) (denying State's request to amend imprecise indictment based on right to

indictment upon on concurrence of 12 or more jurors).

The State elected to present the instant case to the grand jury rather than proceed before a judge in a preliminary hearing. The State must, therefore, adhere to the due process requirement pertaining to the grand jury process. Like all defendants charged through the grand jury process, Petitioner is entitled to an indictment that clearly and concisely states the elements of the offense and means by which he allegedly committed the offenses as determined by a concurrence of 12 or more jurors – not the State's best guess as to what was on the jurors' minds when they returned the indictment. See, Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962); Simpson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 88 Nev. 654, 660, 503 P.2d 1225, 1229 (1972); Hancock, 114 Nev. at 167-68, 955 P.2d at 187.

In <u>Hancock</u>, the State sought leave to amend the indictment by placing into separate counts offenses that were originally charged in the alternative within a single count. In support of its motion for leave to amend, the State relied on <u>Jenkins v. District Court</u>, 109 Nev. 337, 339-40, 849 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1993), which permitted amendment of a criminal information to separate alternatively pleaded offenses in separate counts. <u>Hancock</u>, 114 Nev. at 167, 955 P.2d at 187. It also relied upon NRS 173.075, which reads in pertinent part: "The court may permit an indictment . . . to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if no

additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." <u>Id.</u>

Significantly, the <u>Hancock</u> court found that <u>Jenkins</u> was inapplicable because it involved the amendment of a criminal information rather than indictment by grand jury. Id. at 168, 955 P.2d at 187. In so doing, the Hancock court emphasized that "an indictment may be found only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors," pursuant to NRS 172.255(1). See, Id. [emphasis in original]. The crux of the Hancock ruling was that the proposed amendment materially altered the indictment because it infringed upon the due process right set forth in NRS 172.255(1). See, Id. The Court held, "We conclude that were the State to be granted leave to amend the indictment so as to add previously alternately pleaded offenses as separate counts, the respondents would be denied due process because it cannot be said that the grand jury found probable cause on each and every amended count." Id. [Emphasis added.]; see also, Russell, 369 U.S. at 770 (indefinite indictments impinge on due process right of grand jury determination of facts); Simpson, 88 Nev. at 660, 503 P.2d at 1229.

In the instant petition, the Court directs the State to amend the facially defective criminal neglect counts "to reduce the number of theories of liability alleged and resolve ambiguity regarding how Desai engaged in the remaining

theories. . . . The district court should permit the State to amend [these] counts to narrow the breadth of those charges and provide more detail as to how Desai engaged in the remaining theories." Order, pp. 1 & 5.

The State's use of the "and/or" pleading device when listing both the negligent acts (i.e., the *actus reas*) and theories of criminal liability render the indictment irreparable through amendment. As this Court has previously observed, State's use of "and/or" to connect the numerous allegations undercuts rather than bolsters due process notice requirements. <u>Hildalgo v. Eighth Jud.</u>

<u>Dist. Ct.</u>, 124 Nev. 330, 338, 184 P.3. 369, 375 (2008); <u>Sheriff v. Morris</u>, 99

Nev. 109, 118, 659 P.2d 852, 859 (1983).

To accomplish the task of amending the indictment to a point where it is clear and concise, the State would need to second guess what was on the minds of the grand jurors when they returned the facially defective indictment. The State would need to speculate upon which of the alternatively alleged acts of negligence (including "by methods unknown") the grand jury based its probable cause finding when it returned the indictment. It would also require the State to speculate as to what facts, if any, the grand jurors found as to which defendant and whether said facts were established by direct commission, aiding and abetting, or by participation in a conspiracy.

Amendments to the indefinite criminal negligence counts would be especially prejudicial because the specific negligent acts or omissions define the essential *actus rea* elements in NRS 202.595 and 200.495. These statutes generally prohibit criminal negligence resulting in substantial bodily harm. Since the statutes themselves do not define the specific facts that constitute the offense, due process requires the indictment to allege facts that particularize the criminal act. *See*, Sheriff v. Standal, 95 Nev. 914, 916 & n.1, 604 P.2d 111, 112 & n.1 (1979), *citing*, People v. Donacy, 586 P.2d 14, 16 (Col. 1978)("(I)f the statute does not sufficiently set out the facts which constitute the offense, so that the defendant may have notice with what he is charged, then a more particular statement of facts is necessary.").

To amend these counts, the State would need to pick and choose what alternatively pleaded allegations necessarily form the essential elements of the criminal negligence and, thereby decide how to charge each of the defendants.

Permitting the State to amend in such a manner usurps the independent role of the grand jury and Petitioner's constitutional right to an indictment based upon a concurrence of 12 or more jurors. Dismissal of the facially defective counts is the only appropriate remedy to protect this valuable constitutional right.

C. The State's Reliance on Inapposite Case Law

In its Answer, the State relied upon four cases to support its alternative argument for amendment. State's Answer, p. 19. These cases are inapposite to the procedural posture of the instant case.

Three of the four cases do not implicate the due process right to grand jury because they involved amendments to criminal informations or notice of death penalty: State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. (Taylor), 116 Nev. 374, 997 P.2d 126 (2000)(amending information before trial); Grant v. State, 117 Nev. 427, 24 P.3d 761 (2001)(same); and Hidalgo v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 330, 184 P.3d 369 (2008)(amending notice of death penalty). None of these cases addressed the grand jury rights implicated in the instant case.

The fourth case upon which the State relies is <u>Benitez v. State</u>, 111 Nev. 1363, 904 P.2d 1036 (1995). In <u>Benitez</u>, the defendant was originally charged with attempted murder but pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of battery with use of a deadly weapon. The indictment was amended in open court to accommodate the plea. 111 Nev. 1364, 904 P.2d at 1363. In a post-conviction petition, the defendant in <u>Benitez</u> claimed that his counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him that the statute of limitations had run on the lesser-included offense. <u>Id.</u> The <u>Benitez</u> court denied the petition on the grounds that the

amendment involved a lesser-included offense of the pending attempted murder charge and, therefore, the statute of limitations did not bar the battery count. <u>Id.</u> at 1365, 904 P.2d at 1038. Thus, <u>Benitez</u> did not involve a pretrial amendment requiring the district court to speculate on the probable cause finding of the grand jury.

None of the case authority cited by the State supports the pretrial amendment of a grand jury indictment to bring clarity to an otherwise indefinite indictment. The only viable remedy to cure the due process violations is to dismiss the facially defective counts.

DATED this 26th day of December 2012.

Respectfully Submitted,

WRIGHT STANISH & WINCKLER

By:

RICHARD A WRIGHT Nevada Bar No. 886

MARGARET M. STANISH

Nevada Bar No. 4057

Certification of Compliance

- 1. I hereby certify that this Petition for Rehearing complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5), and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6). It has been prepared in a proportionally and doubled-spaced typeface using Wordperfect X3, in 14-point, Time New Roman font.
- 2. I further certify that this Petition complies with the page limitations of NRAP 40 because it does not exceed 10 pages, excluding this Certificate and the Declaration of Service, and it contains less than 4,667 words.

DATED this 26th day of December 2012.

Margaret M. Stanish Nevada Bar No. 4057

WRIGHT STANISH & WINCKLER

300 S. Fourth St., Ste. 701

Las Vegas, NV 89101

(702)382-4004

Attachment A

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DECLARATION OF MAILING

I, Margaret M. Stanish, Wright Stanish & Winckler, hereby declares that she is, and was when the herein described mailing took place, a citizen of the United States, over 21 years of age, and not a party to the within action; that on the 26th day of December 2012, declarant deposited in the United States mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, a copy of Dipak Desai's **PETITION FOR REHEARING** enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid, hand delivered or e-filed addressed to:

The Honorable Valerie Adair District Court, Department 21 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89101 Catherine Cortez Masto Attorney General State of Nevada, Criminal Division 100 North Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4717

Michael V. Staudaher Clark County District Attorney's Office 200 Lewis Avenue Third Floor Las Vegas, NV 89155

That there is a regular communication by mail between the place of mailing and the place so addressed.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

EXECUTED on the 26th day of December 2012.

Margaret M. Stanish

Attachment B