See, Banegas 117 Nev. at 228, 19 P.3d at 249 ("no part of a statute should be rendered nugatory, nor any language turned to mere surplusage, if such consequences can properly be avoided." Citing, Paramount Ins. v. Rayson & Smitley, 86 Nev. 644, 649, 472 P.2d 530, 533 (1970)). The State Engineer urges the Court to reject these calls to add complexity and cost to the administration of water rights in Nevada.

Rulings by the State Engineer, including Ruling 6127, are a quasi-judicial function assigned to the State Engineer by the legislature. NRS 533.370(8). Rulings apply only to the application before the State Engineer and do not set rules for future applications. The Nevada Supreme Court has consistently refused to assign controlling authority to prior administrative decisions.

Moreover, "even if the [agency] has failed to follow some of its prior decisions, the [agency] has not thereby abused its discretion. In Nevada, administrative agencies are not bound by *stare decisis*." *Motor Cargo v. Public Service Comm'n*, 108 Nev. 335, 337, 830 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1992). Thus, no binding effect is given to prior administrative determinations.

Desert Irr., Ltd. v. State Engineer, 113 Nev. 1049, 1058, 944 P.2d 835, 841 (1997). A ruling that cannot even be used to invoke the doctrine of *stare decisis* can hardly be viewed as a rule of general applicability. Approval of the 3M Plan is not rulemaking and is merely a tool the State Engineer uses to avoid conflicts with existing water rights.

D. The 3M Plan is not Vague and is in Compliance with Ruling 6127.

The Monitoring, Management and Mitigation plan is based on the idea that monitoring must come first. Etcheverry argues that it is merely a plan to make a plan. This is incorrect. This is a plan to implement specific monitoring measures to detect and predict the effects of pumping. SEROA at 5. The plan allows for local affected parties to have input into management and mitigation options should pumping effects threaten to conflict with existing rights. SEROA at 5-6.

Etcheverry seems to be arguing that the plan is inadequate because it allows affected parties, including Etcheverry who is a participant in the 3M Plan, the ability to make recommendations to the State Engineer as to management and mitigation options.

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Protection of existing rights is required by statute, and the State Engineer must comply with state law. The NRS does not dictate how existing rights are to be protected, and seeking input from the affected parties as to how they feel senior rights might best be protected, or if necessary mitigated, is simply good management practice.

The 3M Plan is specific as to what data is to be collected and reported to the State Engineer. SEROA 17-29. The plan was developed over time and the State Engineer had representatives present at meetings between Eureka County and KVR during the development of the plan. As is evident in the record, the State Engineer reviewed several drafts of the plan and required changes before he approved the final plan. ROA at 1, SE Supp ROA at 27.

The intent of the plan is clearly to avoid conflicts if possible. The specific monitoring will provide the data needed to manage pumping within the KVR well field to avoid conflicts. Thus, the management of the well field will change from time to time as KVR gains both data and experience as to the reaction of the aquifer to the pumping stress. It is clear from a practical standpoint that management based on predictions is no substitute for management based on actual observations and experience. Thus, the management portion must allow the flexibility to provide the best management possible. SE Supp ROA at 27.

Mitigation measures will be even more tentative at this time. As pumping begins and the stress to the aquifer is known more precisely, the measures needed to mitigate any impacts to existing rights will become more clearly understood. The plan allows the parties to work together to determine mitigation measures that will be suitable to those concerned. If they fail to reach agreement, any party can petition the State Engineer to order specific measures.

Thus, the 3M Plan is in substantial compliance with State Engineer Ruling 6127 and this Court's decision to affirm that Ruling at this point to accomplish the purpose assigned to it. The plan will accumulate data on the water resources, manage pumping to avoid impacts if possible, and to mitigate impacts if they do occur. The plan is well within the State 111

Engineer's discretion to approve and this Court should not require the 3M Plan to be more specific than is warranted at this time.

It is also the policy of Nevada's water law in general that the waters of the State should be put to beneficial use and to the extent possible not left idle. *Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State Engineer*, 113 Nev. 1049, 1059, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (1997)("The concept of beneficial use is singularly the most important public policy underlying the water laws of Nevada and many of the western states."). The State Engineer's interpretation of the water code balances the need to protect existing rights and the long-term sustainability of the resources while allowing for the maximum use of the resource for the benefit of the State and its people. *See, Bacher v. State Engineer*, 122 Nev. 1110, 1116, 146 P.3d 793, 797 (2006)("state regulation like that in NRS Chapters 533 and 534 is necessary to strike a sensible balance between the current and future needs of Nevada citizens and the stability of Nevada's environment.") The phased nature of the plan complies with the requirement of Ruling 6127.

E. This Court Should Affirm the State Engineer's Definition of Conflict and Mitigation.

With the understanding that the Motion for Leave to File Amicus has not been granted, the State Engineer makes the following arguments for the Court to consider if the motion is granted. Amicus Eureka argues that "there is little or no guidance in Nevada law regarding the definition, purpose or scope of mitigation. . . ." EAB at 9. The State Engineer has consistently interpreted a conflict with existing rights under NRS 533.370(2) to occur when a senior water right holder's beneficial use cannot be satisfied due to the junior water right holder's use. In addition, mitigation has consistently meant actions that ensure the senior water right can be satisfied.

The State Engineer disagrees with the arguments raised by Eureka that the two small springs must be mitigated with water allocated to the mine. The specific measures will be determined when impacts manifest, however as an example, the mine could install a shallow well and pumping system for Etcheverry to bring water to the surface from the same aquifer source that the springs normally come from.

Nevada Office of the Attorney General 100 North Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4717 Pumping in Diamond Valley affected both Shipley and Thompson springs and the owners of those springs have applied for groundwater rights to mitigate the effects of pumping in Diamond Valley. If Eureka's argument that there can be no effect whatsoever on spring flow is successful, all pumping in Diamond Valley should cease immediately and until the springs begin to flow again. Thus, in Diamond Valley the 30,000 acre-foot annual perennial yield would remain idle to allow these few users to hopefully have their spring waters begin to flow again. There are many areas of the state that could be faced with the same issue.

The definitions are important to this case and the water law in general. As stated earlier, "[a]n agency charged with the duty of administering an act is impliedly clothed with power to construe it as a necessary precedent to administrative action." *Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Washoe County*, 112 Nev. at 747, 918 P.2d at 700 (1996), *citing State v. State Engineer*, 104 Nev. at 713, 766 P.2d at 266 (1988). The State Engineer and this Court must balance the need to make water available to the public for appropriation while protecting existing rights; however, the Court should defer to the experience and expertise of the State Engineer and not graft on the artificial constraints advocated by Eureka County.

III. CONCLUSION

The State Engineer approved the 3M Plan as a specific measure to deal with potential impacts on existing rights. It is specific as to the data that needs to be collected once pumping starts. The plan has adequate provisions to guide the management of pumping to avoid impacts and is subject to modification as conditions warrant for mitigation measures to be taken to ensure that existing rights are satisfied. The State Engineer retains all his authority to order any water user to curtail or cease pumping water at any time that pumping interferes with existing rights that cannot be mitigated. This Court should defer to the expertise of the State Engineer on issues surrounding the administration of water rights.

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DATED this 20th day of December, 2012.

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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2 3

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I, Sandra Geyer certify that I am an employee of the Office of the Attorney General,

State of Nevada, and that on this 20th day of December 2012, I sent a copy of the NEVADA

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STATE ENGINEERS ANSWERING BRIEF via electronic mail and U.S. Mail to the

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10	number of any person.	
11	IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC	COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
12	IN AND FOR THE CO	DUNTY OF EUREKA
13		
14	MICHEL AND MARGARET ANN ETCHEVERRY FAMILY, LP, a Nevada	
15	Registered Foreign Limited Partnership, DIAMOND CATTLE COMPANY, LLC, a	PETITIONERS MICHEL AND MARGARET ANN ETCHEVERRY
16	Nevada Limited Liability Company, and KENNETH F. BENSON, an individual,	FAMILY, LP, DIAMOND CATTLE COMPANY, LLC, AND KENNETH F.
17	Petitioners,	BENSON'S REPLY BRIEF
18	v,	
19	STATE ENGINEER, OF NEVADA, OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER,	
20 21	DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION	
22	AND NATURAL RESOURCES	
23	Respondents,	
24	KOBEH VALLEY RANCH, LLC, a Nevada limited liability corporation,	
25	Intervenor-Respondents.	
26		

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1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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9	NRS § 533.335
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1	REPLY BRIEF
2	Petitioners MICHEL AND MARGARET ANN ETCHEVERRY FAMILY, LP,
3	DIAMOND CATTLE COMPANY, LLC, and KENNETH F. BENSON (collectively referred to
4	herein as "Petitioners"), by and through their attorneys of record, Schroeder Law Offices, P.C.,
5	file this Reply Brief in support of their Petition for Judicial Review, filed in Case No. CV1207-
6	178 on July 5, 2012, and in response to Respondent State Engineer's and Intervenor-Respondent
7	Kobeh Valley Ranch, LLC's ("KVR's") Answering Briefs, separately filed in this matter on
8	December 20, 2012.
9	I.
10	INTRODUCTION
11	Petitioners submitted their Opening Brief in this matter on November 5, 2012.
12	Respondents filed their separate Answering Briefs on December 20, 2012. Respondents'
13	arguments in response are unpersuasive, and highlight the reasons proffered by Petitioners why
14	the Monitoring, Management and Mitigation Plan ("3M Plan") is defective and contrary to law.
15	This Court should grant Petitioners' Petition for Judicial Review, and should vacate the State
16	Engineer's approval of the 3M Plan.
17	II.
18	ARGUMENT
19	Petitioners reply to Respondents' Answering Briefs as follows:
20	A. 3M Plan does not cure conflicts with existing water use rights and is contrary to

Nevada Revised Statute § 533.370(2) provides: "[W]here its proposed use or change conflicts with existing rights...the State Engineer shall reject the application and refuse to issue the requested permit." Ruling 6127 requires any 3M Plan to "ensure that any existing water rights are satisfied to the extent of the water right permit." See Petitioner's Supplemental Record ///

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Ruling 6127 and NRS § 533.370(2).

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on Appeal ("PSROA") at 27. Therefore, NRS § 533.370(2) and Ruling 6127 mandate that no conflicts occur and that existing water use rights are capable of satisfaction to their full extent.

The State Engineer defines a "conflict" as "a situation wherein the senior user is not able to use his entire water right." SE Ans. Br. 6 (Dec. 20, 2012). A water right is a property right with several elements, including among other things: 1) source of water, 2) point of diversion, 3) place of use, 4) purpose, or manner of use, and 5) quantity of water. NRS § 533.335. To change any of these elements, a water user must submit a change application to the State Engineer. NRS § 533.345. Not every element of a water use right can be changed; the only elements that may be changed are place of diversion, place of use, or manner of use. *Id.* Thus, according to the State Engineer's definition of "conflict," a conflict occurs when a water user is not able to use any single element of his water use right.

In Ruling 6127 and subsequent briefing on review, the State Engineer admitted that KVR's Applications would conflict with existing water use rights, but determined that such conflicts could be mitigated by implementation of a 3M Plan. PSROA 22, 27, 38-39, 898, 910. The State Engineer opines: "Whether the senior user gets his water through his current diversion works or from works constructed as mitigation by a junior user, his water right is whole and the junior user is not in conflict with the senior right." SE Ans. Br. at 6. This determination overlooks several critical issues, assuming that mitigation can be appropriate at all in cases of conflict: 1) timing of mitigation, and 2) method of mitigation.

First, the timing of mitigation is a critical issue under Nevada water law. The doctrine of prior appropriation, adopted by the Nevada State Legislature, provides that "priority of appropriation gives the superior right." *Ophir Silver Min. Co. v. Carpenter*, 4 Nev. 534, 2, 1868 WL 2014 (1869). The State Engineer and KVR hypothesize that the 3M Plan will be sufficient to mitigate any conflicts with existing water uses because KVR will monitor water resources for existing and potential conflicts. SE Ans. Br. at 6; KVR Ans. Br. at 12-15 (Dec. 20, 2012). However, both the State Engineer and KVR recognize that KVR's proposed water use may

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create conflicts that must be mitigated after-the-fact. *Id.* Such after-the-fact mitigation is in direct conflict with NRS § 533.370(2) and the prior appropriation doctrine. Nevada Revised Statute § 533.370(2) does <u>not</u> provide that conflicts may occur, so long as the junior appropriator "makes it up" to the senior water user at some time in the future. The statute provides that the application must be denied. Unless the State Engineer can impose mitigation measures that "ensure that any existing water rights are satisfied to the extent of the water right permit" (Ruling 6127, PSROA at 27) and that no conflicts will occur, the Applications must be denied.

Second, the method of mitigation is also critical under Nevada water law. The State Engineer has defined "mitigation" to mean "[a]ctions that ensure the senior water right can be satisfied." SE Ans. Br. at 11. As shown above, this means that all elements of the water use right must be satisfied. The State Engineer also opines: "Whether the senior users gets his water through his current diversion works or from works constructed as mitigation by a junior user, his water right is whole and the junior user is not in conflict with the senior right." *Id.* at 6. However, the 3M Plan expressly permits mitigation methods such as financial compensation or property exchange. *See* State Engineer's Record on Appeal ("SEROA") at 16. Respondents have also suggested trucking in water as a viable mitigation measure. *See* oral argument by Francis M. Wikstrom, attorney for KVR, PSROA at 145. The State Engineer has even suggested drilling a water user a new well in a different location. SE Ans. Br. at 7. None of these methods constitute mitigation of a water right under Nevada law and Ruling 6127 to "ensure that any existing water rights are satisfied to the extent of the water right permit." PSROA at 27.

These proposed mitigation methods do not allow continued use of senior water use rights. Instead, these methods propose substitutes to fulfillment of water use rights at some time after the conflict has damaged the senior user. If the Court takes Respondents' arguments to their logical conclusion, Respondents would have affected water right users using water from a different source and different point of diversion, but under the water user's original water use

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right. The State Engineer does not have the authority to allow different water to be substituted for the water permitted under the existing right.¹

KVR's Applications conflict with existing water use rights. The 3M Plan does not mitigate or cure the conflicts because the timing and methods proposed for mitigation are contrary to Nevada water law. This Court must vacate the State Engineer's approval of the 3M Plan for error of law.

B. The 3M Plan conflicts with NRS § 534.110(4) and (5).

Nevada water law provides that groundwater appropriations are subject to "a reasonable lowering of the static water level at the appropriator's point of diversion." NRS § 534.110(4).² The State Engineer must make a determination about what is "reasonable." *Id.* Consistent with that statute, Nevada law also provides that later-in-time appropriations that would cause the ground water level to be lowered at the appropriator's point of diversion may only be permitted "so long as any protectable interests in existing domestic wells...and the rights of holders of existing appropriations can be satisfied under such express conditions." NRS § 534.110(5).³

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¹ Since an existing water user's right will not allow water use from a different point of diversion without prior approval via a change application, and because no change is allowed for the source of water, KVR must presumably provide the substituted water as part of mitigation. However, KVR does not hold any water use rights for irrigation or stock watering. KVR's Applications are limited to mining, milling and dewatering for mining purposes.

An issue also arises from an existing water user's continued use of substitute water provided by KVR. If a water user fails to use water under the conditions of their water use right, their right could be deemed forfeited or abandoned for nonuse. See NRS § 534.090 relating to forfeiture and abandonment of groundwater uses.

² It is a condition of each appropriation of groundwater acquired under NRS chapter 534 that the right of the appropriator relates to a specific quantity of water and that the right must allow for a reasonable lowering of the static water level at the appropriator's point of diversion. In determining a reasonable lowering of the static water level in a particular area, the State Engineer shall consider the economics of pumping water for the general type of crops growing and may also consider the effect of using water on the economy of the area in general. NRS § 534.110(4).

This section does not prevent the granting of permits to applicants later in time on the ground that the diversions under the proposed later appropriations may cause the water level to be lowered at the point of diversion of a prior appropriator, so long as any protectable interests in existing domestic wells as set forth in NRS § 533.024 and the rights of holders of existing

appropriations can be satisfied under such express conditions. NRS § 534.110(5).

On April 3, 2012, oral argument was held before this court on the Petitions for Judicial Review challenging Ruling 6127 (Case Nos. CV-1108-155, CV-1108-156, CV-1108-157, CV-1112-164, CV-1112-165 and CV-1202-170). At oral argument, the State Engineer conceded that if effects to existing water use rights are known, then NRS § 534.110(5) requires the State Engineer to put express terms in the water use permits to avoid those effects. PSROA at 98-104 ("So all these effects that you know about, based on geology, that statute [NRS § 534.110(5)] applies to and you can put in the permit terms." PSROA at 102-103. "So if we knew what they were going to be, I would agree the statute [NRS § 534.110(5)] would apply and require specific terms." PSROA at 103).

The State Engineer specifically found that KVR's Applications will conflict with existing, known rights on the floor of Kobeh Valley. PSROA at 22, 27, 38-39, 898, 910. Thus, under the State Engineer's own reasoning, express conditions to avoid effects/conflicts must be put in the permit terms before issuance. The State Engineer continues to argue that "until the actual effects of pumping are known, the State Engineer cannot determine what to order." SE Ans. Br. at 7. However, the State Engineer's argument is contrary to its own findings in Ruling 6127. The truth is that certain effects are known. By the State Engineer's own admission, he was required to put express conditions in the permits to ensure existing rights will be satisfied.

KVR argues that this Court affirmed the State Engineer's decision to merely condition the permits on submission and approval of a 3M Plan. KVR Ans. Br. at 15. However, this Court based its decision on the assumption that it would take time for Respondents to collect additional data to 1) "identify impacts and the extent of those impacts," and 2) "develop and implement mitigation efforts to ensure impacted existing rights are made whole." PSROA at 194. The District Court assumed that Respondents would conduct such necessary work prior to submitting and approving the 3M Plan in order to ensure express conditions were imposed on KVR's water use.

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The District Court's assumption did not come to fruition. The State Engineer approved the 3M Plan after the hearing, and seven days <u>before</u> issuance of the Court's Order. No additional data collection or analysis was performed to identify impacts and develop and implement mitigation efforts.

The 3M Plan fails to identify any specific impacts (even known impacts), and the mitigation methods permitted by the 3M Plan do not ensure existing rights will be satisfied. Nevada law requires express conditions be placed in the permits when issued. This Court apparently considered it appropriate in this particular case to allow the State Engineer to put the express conditions in the 3M Plan due to the complexity of identifying impacts and developing appropriate mitigation. However, the 3M Plan was approved by the State Engineer without any additional study, analysis or development, and contains no express conditions. The 3M Plan is merely a plan to create a plan. *See* KVR Ans. Br. at 17 noting, "These thresholds *will be set* at appropriate levels..." (emphasis added). This circular process cannot be allowed to be continued to the detriment of senior water users. This Court must vacate the State Engineer's approval of the 3M Plan for error of law.

C. Impermissible delegation of authority.

The State Engineer is charged with the obligation and duty to administer water appropriations. This entails reviewing water change applications and denying applications where the proposed "use or change conflicts with existing rights or with protectable interests in existing domestic wells as set forth in NRS 533.024, or threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest." NRS § 533.370(2). With respect to ground water appropriations, NRS § 534.110(5) further provides:

[t]his section does not prevent the granting of permits to applicants later in time on the ground that the diversions under the proposed later appropriations may cause the water level to be lowered at the point of diversion of a prior appropriator, so long as any protectable interests in existing domestic wells as set forth in NRS 533.024 and the rights of holders of existing appropriations can be satisfied under such express conditions.

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As reasoned by this Court previously, the import of NRS § 534.110(5) is that new ground water appropriations are permissible so long as express conditions are imposed to protect the rights of prior appropriators. *See* PSROA at 12-13.

Within their Answering Briefs, Respondents State Engineer and KVR both stress that the 3M Plan simply establishes "Advisory Committees" to assist the State Engineer. SE Ans. Br. at 5; KVR Ans. Br. at 19. This, however, is not the case. The State Engineer specifically found that KVR's Applications will conflict with existing, known rights on the floor of Kobeh Valley. PSROA at 22, 27, 38-39, 898, 910. Therefore, "[t]he 3M is designed to include or develop, as needed or appropriate, *express conditions* that will protect the rights of domestic well owners, if any, and existing appropriations." SEROA at 5 (3M Plan, Section 2.A)(emphasis added). As a result, the Technical Advisory Committee ("TAC") and Water Advisory Committee ("WAC") established by the 3M Plan are more than advisory in nature. Instead, they are specifically charged with the task of establishing the "express conditions" that serve to protect prior appropriators. The 3M Plan, together with the protocol that arises therefrom, collectively constitute the "express conditions" upon which the State Engineer's approval of KVR's water rights is predicated under NRS § 534.110(5).

A monitoring, management and mitigation plan containing express and particularized plans would not be objectionable if every other aspect of the permit issuance complied with the applicable statutory requirements. In this case, however, the 3M Plan approved by the State Engineer fails to specifically articulate actions that will be undertaken to guard the interests of prior appropriators in the future. It is a plan to plan. Rather than fulfill his statutory obligations *prior* to approving the change permits, the State Engineer has approved a 3M Plan that in turn establishes committees seated by third parties – one of which is the applicant.

The plain language of the 3M Plan counsels against finding that the TAC and WAC are simply advisory committees. To develop the express conditions upon which KVR's Applications must be predicated, the committees are authorized with discretion as follows:

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- "The Water Advisory Committee (WAC) is to establish and carry out policy under this 3M." SEROA at 6.
- "After the full WAC has been convened, the WAC will establish policy and define
 additional roles and responsibilities of the WAC and TAC, such as scheduling of
 meetings, agenda setting, publication of minutes, receiving input from the public and
 any other necessary components." SEROA at 7.
- Among other things, purposes and functions of the WAC will be to:
 - "Make modifications to the Monitoring component of this 3M, including, but not limited to additional data collection and scientific investigations, based on recommendations from the TAC." SEROA at 7.
 - "Establish values for monitored variables (water levels, springs discharges, vegetation responses, etc.) known as 'action criteria' which, if exceeded, may be of concern to the Parties and could require mitigation or management actions." SEROA at 7-8.
 - "Determine what constitutes an adverse impact on a case-by-case basis."
 SEROA at 8.
 - "Form and ensure implementation of groundwater management or mitigation measures approved by the WAC based on recommendations of the TAC."
 SEROA at 8.

As KVR asserts, "[d]elegation is defined as '[t]he act of entrusting another with authority or empowering another to act as an agent or representative." KVR Ans. Br. at 19, *citing*, Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999). In approving the 3M Plan, the State Engineer has voluntarily displaced his obligation under NRS § 534.110(5) to require express conditions to protect prior appropriators.

While the 3M Plan professes to retain the State Engineer's final decision-making authority, this should not be viewed as a talismanic proclamation that preserves the integrity of

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the 3M Plan. The tasks imposed upon the WAC and TAC exceed being ministerial in nature. The Committees are vested with discretion to develop and establish policies to implement the express conditions of KVR's permit. Finally, the risk of impartiality is elevated given KVR's inclusion within the advisory committees.

The very need for "advisory committees" confirms that the State Engineer has not yet developed or imposed the requisite conditions necessary under NRS § 534.110(5) to approve the KVR permits. The 3M Plan should be overturned as an improper delegation of the State Engineer's authority and obligation under NRS § 534.110(5).

D. The State Engineer's approval of the 3M Plan constitutes ad hoc rulemaking contrary to law.

The State Engineer has the power: "[to] make such reasonable rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper and orderly execution of the powers conferred by law." NRS § 532.120. A regulation is defined by statute as: "An agency rule, standard, directive or statement of general applicability which effectuates or interprets law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure or practice requirements of any agency." NRS § 233B.038(1)(a).

The State Engineer and KVR argue the following: 1) the 3M Plan does not constitute a rule, 2) the State Engineer is not required to follow APA rulemaking procedures, and 3) the 3M Plan is not contrary to the State Engineer's statutory duties. SE Ans. Br. at 7-11; KVR Ans. Br. at 24-26.

First, the 3M Plan is a plan of general applicability that will <u>affect all water users</u> in the Kobeh and Diamond Valleys that may be impacted by KVR's proposed water use. The stated purpose of the plan is to create a process for avoiding "adverse impacts" caused by KVR's proposed water use, and imposing "express conditions" on KVR's water use. SEROA at 5.

Nevada water law mandates avoidance of conflicts with existing rights and the imposition of

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{P0238770; 1165,02 SRL }

⁴ Although the stated purpose in the 3M Plan is to impose express conditions, no express conditions required by law are provided in the 3M Plan. See argument *supra*.

express conditions if junior appropriators will lower the ground water level. NRS §§ 533.370(2), 534.110(5). Thus, the 3M Plan promulgates the procedure and policy the State Engineer will follow when regulating KVR's water use for conflicts with <u>all other water uses</u> in Kobeh and Diamond Valleys. The 3M Plan determines the process by which the State Engineer will determine conflicts and what express conditions are required. By approving the 3M Plan, the State Engineer, in substance, adopted a new rule for water regulation in Kobeh and Diamond Valleys.

Second, the State Engineer relies heavily on the fact that the State Engineer is exempt from NRS Chapter 233B as to rulemaking (other than for procedure in contested cases). The State Engineer fails to recognize that Petitioners have not relied on Chapter 233B in their Opening Brief. Instead, Petitioners' arguments focus on the statutory duties of the State Engineer, and how the State Engineer violated his duties by adopting the 3M Plan as a new rule.

Third, the State Engineer violated his duties by adopting the 3M Plan as a policy/rule because the 3M Plan is contrary to Nevada law. The State Engineer does not have authority to promulgate rules or regulations that are contrary to Nevada law. NRS § 532.120. As explained above, the 3M Plan violates Nevada law by allowing conflicts with existing water use rights and failing to impose express conditions that ensure satisfaction of existing water use rights. Further, the 3M Plan creates an entirely new process for regulation of KVR's water use when conflicts occur in Kobeh and Diamond Valleys. As fully explained in Petitioners' Opening Brief and *supra*, the new process created by the 3M Plan departs from current State Engineer enforcement (under, in part, NRS § 534.110) because it delegates enforcement decisions to an outside body, creating a lengthy, nebulous process preceding actual enforcement.

The State Engineer and KVR argue that the 3M Plan does not limit the State Engineer's ability to act independently from the 3M Plan process when regulating KVR's water use in the face of conflicts with other water uses. KVR states that other water rights holders "may avail themselves of the processes created by the 3M Plan, but they are not required to do so." KVR

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Ans. Br. at 24. KVR also states: "Nowhere, however, does the 3M Plan state that the State Engineer will or must wait for the WAC and TAC to review a potential impact before taking action." KVR Ans. Br. at 25. This position is disingenuous because, logically, what is the point of adopting the 3M Plan if no one needs to follow the 3M Plan? How can Respondents argue that the 3M Plan imposes mandatory express conditions on KVR, while at the same time arguing that neither the State Engineer nor water users need to follow the procedure imposed by the 3M Plan?

The State Engineer adopted the 3M Plan as a rule of policy/procedure for addressing conflicts between KVR's water use and other water uses. The policies and procedure in the 3M Plan are fatally flawed and contrary to law. This Court should vacate the State Engineer's approval of the 3M Plan because it constitutes ad hoc rulemaking contrary to Nevada law.

E. The 3M Plan is vague and deficient, and the State Engineer's approval of the 3M Plan was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.

KVR incorrectly informs this Court that Petitioners merely reargue in this section items already discussed above. KVR Ans. Br. at 26. Contrary to KVR's misreading of Petitioners' Opening Brief, the sections above relate to <u>legal errors</u> committed by the State Engineer that are reviewed by this Court *de novo* and without deference to the State Engineer's decision below. The current section highlights the deficiencies in the 3M Plan itself that are so pervasive that the State Engineer's approval of the 3M Plan was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion (necessitating a different standard of review).

Upon previous Petitions for Judicial Review, this Court affirmed the State Engineer's decision to condition the permits on submission and approval of a 3M Plan. This Court's decision was based on the following analysis:

The key to protecting existing rights will be the 3M Plan which will first serve to identify impacts and the extent of those impacts, and second, to develop and implement mitigation efforts to ensure impacted existing rights are made whole. As inferred from the record, test pumping and analysis of pumping data, as it relates to impacts to existing rights, obviously takes time to complete. That data will form the basis of a 3M Plan ultimately submitted to the

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State Engineer for approval. The specifics of a 3M Plan not known at the time of the hearings will be made known after the data is collected and analyzed with input from Eureka County.

(PSROA 194).

However, no additional tests or analysis were completed prior to submission of the 3M Plan. The 3M Plan does not identify impacts or implement mitigation efforts. The 3M Plan merely creates a plan to create a plan based on future monitoring activities. The 3M Plan does not meet this Court's expectations for content or sufficiency, and thus the State Engineer abused his discretion when approving the 3M Plan.

The 3M Plan creates a plan for monitoring water resources as well as for management and mitigation of conflicts with existing water uses. However, the State Engineer and KVR now contend, upon judicial review, that the management and mitigation portions of the 3M Plan are not binding. Respondents argue that the State Engineer has the authority to conduct enforcement however he sees fit, and that water users do not need to go through the process outlined in the 3M Plan. If that is true, then how does the 3M Plan impose express conditions on KVR's water use, and how can the 3M Plan fulfill its stated purpose of avoiding adverse impacts?

Finally, the 3M Plan is clearly deficient on its face. As explained *supra*, the 3M Plan is contrary to Nevada law. The 3M Plan does not cure known conflicts with existing water use rights to ensure existing rights will continue to be satisfied. No express conditions are imposed due to the known lowering of the water level at appropriators' points of diversion. The State Engineer has impermissibly delegated authority to an outside body, and the 3M Plan is in substance a rule that conflicts with Nevada law. Further, the 3M Plan's circular process is not designed for addressing conflicts that require immediate action. This Court should vacate the State Engineer's approval of the 3M Plan.

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1	III.
2	CONCLUSION
3	Approval of the 3M Plan constitutes error by the State Engineer. In the absence of
4	particularized conditions of monitoring, management and mitigation, the 3M Plan fails to include
5	the express conditions necessary to approve the KVR transfers. Instead the 3M Plan is permeated
6	with non-committal and aspirational provisions that accomplish little else other than to kick the
7	can down the road. Given its general applicability to nearly all water rights of use existing
8	within the basin, the 3M Plan constitutes ad hoc rulemaking. This Court should vacate the State
9	Engineer's approval of the 3M Plan.
10	
11	DATED this 1 st day of February, 2013.
12	SCHROEDER LAW OFFICES, P.C.
13	1.
14	Jum /ho
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20	
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23	
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25	
26	

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1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>
2	I hereby certify that on the 1st day of February, 2013, I caused a copy of the foregoing
3	Petitioners Michel and Margaret Ann Etcheverry Family, LP, Diamond Cattle Company,
4	LLC, and Kenneth F. Benson's Reply Brief to be deposited for mailing, postage prepaid, with a
5	copy by electronic mail to the following:
6	Ross E. de Lipkau, Esq. Bryan L. Stockton, Esq. Nevada Attorney General's Office
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8	Reno, NV 89501 Carson City, NV 89701 rdelipkau@parsonsbehle.com bstockton@ag.nv.gov
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10	
11	Further, I hereby certify that on the 1st day of February, 2013, I caused a courtesy copy
12	of the above-named document to be sent by electronic and US mail to the following interested
13	parties:
14	Karen A. Peterson Theodore Beutel, Esq. Allision, Mackenzie, Pavlakis, Wright & Eureka County District Attorney
15	Fagan Ltd. 701 South Main Street
16	P.O. Box 646 P.O. Box 190 Carson City, NV 89701 Eureka, NV 89316
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18	Dated this 1st day of February, 2013.
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24	Benson
25	

Page 1 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE



ORIGINAL

Case No. CV1207-178

Department No. II

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF EUREKA

THE HONORABLE J. CHARLES THOMPSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MICHEL AND MARGARET ANN ETCHEVERRY FAMILY, LP, a Nevada Registered Foreign Limited Partnership, DIAMOND CATTLE COMPANY, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company, and KENNETH F. BENSON, an individual,

Petitioners,

-vs-

STATE ENGINEER OF NEVADA, OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER, DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES,

Respondents.

KOBEH VALLEY RANCH, LLC, a Nevada limited liability corporation,

Intervenor-Respondents.

ORAL ARGUMENTS
Monday, April 15th, 2013
Eureka, Nevada

Transcribed by:

KATE MURRAY, CCR #599



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EUREKA, NEVADA; MONDAY, APRIL 15TH, 2013; 1:30 P.M. 1 2 ---000---3 4 THE COURT: On the record. Counsel, for 5 6 the record. 7 MS. SCHROEDER: Laura Schroeder for 8 Matthew Etcheverry is in the gallery petitioners. 9 here, and also Ken Benson. My co-counsel is Therese 10 Ure. 11 THE COURT: Good morning or afternoon. 12 MR. STOCKTON: Good morning, Your Honor. 13 Bryan Stockton from the Office of the Attorney 14 General representing the state engineer (inaudible). 15 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon, 16 gentlemen. 17 Ms. Schroeder, this is your petition. 18 MS. SCHROEDER: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 As to surface water, the Nevada State adopted the 20 prior appropriation system early in the 1900s, and 21 it adopted this, a more comprehensive system 22 (inaudible), but like other western states, it 23 didn't adopt a ground water protocol until the mid 24 1900s, and naturally, given the experience of the 25 surface water code, it adopted a prior appropriation

system of some sort.

However, I would suggest to Your Honor that the prior appropriation system for ground water never quite fit the easy model that regulating by priority did with the surface water code because of its hydrology.

Because surface water has -- the natural system has the ability to gauge water volumes by looking at the water stream visually, you can look at diversions visually and observe the effects concurrently with the effect of that diversion on the stream.

Recharge can also be gauged by the snow, the rain and the runoff, but none of these measurements are needed or were available for the easy regulation of ground water.

We cannot see the aquifer nor the effects of diversion on the aquifer, and there are some scientists that tell us that withdrawals below the aquifer, the alluvium aquifer can be minor and never actually replenish.

In any case, a massive timing of recharge to the ground water aquifers is largely unknown, and their effect long-term spanning years and decades, not just a season or a year.

This is the background we're running against here, Your Honor.

Against this hydrological background, the state engineer is charged with regulating ground water and the legislature with perhaps the state engineer's assistance has adopted certain regulatory provisions in the ground water code that are different from the surface water code, and these ground water provisions are important in this particular case.

Specifically, there are three provisions in this case that I, in my briefing, have gone over in great detail that I want to highlight now. NRS 533.370(2), I will paraphrase that to say where the proposed use or change conflicts with existing rights, the state engineer shall reject the application and refuse to issue the requested permit.

But this is modified, Your Honor, by two separate provisions in NRS 534. The first one, 110(4), ground water appropriation must allow for a reasonable lowering of the static water level of the appropriator's point of diversion, which reasonable lowering shall be determined by the state engineer.

The second one, (5), junior ground water

permits can be issued that cause the water level to be lowered, so long as any protectable interest in existing domestic wells and in rights of holders of existing appropriations can be satisfied under such express conditions.

This latter part is where my clients fall.

The state's engineer's counsel represented to this Court in April of 2012 that if the state engineer knew the effects of ground water pumping, that NRS 534.110(5) would apply and requires specific terms in the permit, and this is at our supplementary record, page 103.

Pursuant to that representation, this

Court made an order and determined what would be

necessary in a 3M plan, and I would ask the Court to

turn to the supplementary record at page 194.

In its June 13, 2012 order, this Court approved the -- put out and determined some ideas and process by which a 3M plan should be determined. Nevertheless, the state engineer approved the 3M plan seven days before the Court's order in the previous case.

Even though it didn't wait for this Court to make its decision or later consider this Court's

conclusion, the Court's conclusion is important.

This Court said, The key to protecting existing rights will be the 3M plan, which will, number one, serve to identify impacts and the extent of those impacts, and second, to develop and implement mitigation efforts to ensure impacted existing rights are made whole.

Then the Court went on to say, this Court went on to say, Test pumping and analysis of pumping data as it relates to impact in existing rights takes time to complete, that this data will form the basis of the 3M plan, not known at the time of the hearings will be known, be made known after the data is collected and analyzed.

This Court's order came out seven days after the 3M plan was approved, but the state engineer did not pull it back and reconsider it or look at what this Court had said. Instead, they are here today.

Let's circle back to those critical statutes that this Court recognized involved the principle that regulating ground water requires consideration of existing ground water rights at the approval stage in ground water permitting and regulation because the prior appropriation doctrine

regulation doesn't quite work as well for the ground water hydrology.

The Court recognized this fact when it issued its June 13th, 2012 order, and it said that testing will form the basis of the 3M plan, a plan that the Court expected would identify impacts and the extent of those impacts, and number two, develop and implement mitigation to ensure impacted rights are made whole.

Instead, the state engineer approved the 3M plan and that was not based on testing and did not identify impacts, the extent of those impacts nor develop or implement mitigation to ensure impacted existing rights were made whole.

What we do know is that even though the state engineer and KVR have told us that there are going to be significant impacts to water rights in Kobeh and Diamond Valleys, the state engineer approved a 3M plan that neither follows the Nevada law providing express conditions to satisfy existing rights nor follows this Court's direction and process.

What the state engineer and KVR might have done instead is, number one, adopt express conditions such as when the drawdown of existing

ground water exceeds five feet, KVR will limit its rate of withdrawal, or should the drawdown exceed 15 feet, KVR would cease pumping altogether.

These are very common permit conditions we see in ground water permits throughout the west. Should KVR be faced with regulation because an existing water right holder experienced such drawdowns in their well, KVR could protest the state engineer's regulation.

The existing water right holder is not faced with the burden of satisfying its existing rights through litigation or by petitioning for regulation as the 3M plan lays out at present.

The 3M plan lays out a plan for a plan that requires the petitioner who has existing rights to go the court and to assume the burden of proof and defend his property interests earlier established by Nevada law.

In this respect, Your Honor, the 3M plan as its exists turns the table on Nevada statute and expected rules of the state engineer in the permitting phase because the state engineer is charged with satisfying with express conditions the existing rights. The 3M plan, as it exists, doesn't do that.

Certainly once this Court issued its decision, the state engineer should have withdrawn its approval of the 3M plan for consideration and forced KVR to comply with this Court's order.

 $\label{eq:continuous} \textbf{Instead}, \ \ \textbf{the state engineer and KVR are}$ here before you.

Under the circumstances, this Court will not be surprised that my clients are not fully convinced that KVR and its multiple associated companies are to be, quote, good neighbors, or leave their water rights and livelihoods unharmed in the wake of their development path.

Legally, for all the reasons outlined in our briefing, the 3M plan fails. Number one, it does not provide express conditions except for one, and it provides an express condition for wildlife surface water supply.

Secondly, the 3M plan establishes an advisory, if not regulatory, commission which is outside of the Nevada Constitution, outside of the legislative power given to the state engineer, outside of the state engineer's authority, which only has a power to create commissions by specific legislative dictate and/or its rule making.

Thirdly, it establishes legal terms that

interpret statute or rule or makes its own terms.

It determines regulation as action criteria, adverse impact, and apparently attempts to redefine the statute for express conditions or reasonable lowering or conflict.

It also is attempting to establish what mitigation is, even suggesting that private condemnation in the 3M plan would be a kind of appropriate mitigation.

Standards to establish these terms of regulation by unknown processes in the 3M plan without any opportunity for the public to be involved are also included in the 3M plan.

Fourth, it lawfully empowers an organization called a WAC to make decisions about injury, injury to existing water rights, and mitigation without any review process because this WAC is not an administrative agency of the state and is not required to follow the public processes of public meeting law, public records law that are required to make government transparent and open for criticism.

Number five, it lawfully gives rule making authority -- unlawfully gives rule making authority to the WAC and also its Technical Advisory

Committee to affect water management and regulation in the whole of Kobeh and Diamond Valley, not just the Mount Hope Project, and allows for substitution rather than the required satisfaction -- statutorily required satisfaction of existing rights.

Sixth, it is vague and deficient. Both the state engineer and KVR argue in their briefing that the 3M plan is not binding. Then let's go back in the circle. Earlier in their argument they said it was an express condition.

THE COURT: It isn't binding, though, is it?

MS. SCHROEDER: It is. If it's an order, Your Honor, I would assume it's binding, but they say that because it can be changed, it's not binding.

THE COURT: Doesn't the state engineer have ultimate authority over that?

MS. SCHROEDER: The state engineer should have ultimate authority over it, and in the 3M plan it says it does, but there is a whole process before the state engineer is involved. The state engineer is the last resort --

THE COURT: And he is supposed to be, isn't he? Doesn't he serve on the WAC?

1 MS. SCHROEDER: Yes, he does, but there 2 is nothing --3 THE COURT: And if the decision of the WAC is not unanimous, then he makes the final 4 5 decision, right? 6 MS. SCHROEDER: That's right. There is a 7 long involved process that is not statutory. 8 is no authority under the statute to establish a WAC. 9 10 The state engineer's authority is limited 11 to defining what a reasonable lowering of the 12 aguifer is and also to establish express conditions. 13 It isn't given the authority to form this WAC or 14 this TAC. 15 THE COURT: I got the impression the TAC 16 and WAC were advisory committees. The TAC is really 17 advisory to the WAC, and the WAC is advisory to the 18 state engineer; isn't that right? MS. SCHROEDER: Yes, Your Honor. 19 20 THE COURT: Well, there is nothing wrong 21 with receiving advice, is there? 22 MS. SCHROEDER: Well, the legislature 23 establishes by statute advisory committees to the 24 state engineer, and this isn't one of them.

The legislature, in our briefing, I

25

outlined for you several statutes where advisory committees are established by the legislature to the state engineer. This is not one of them.

THE COURT: They work statewide as opposed to a particular area; do they not?

MS. SCHROEDER: Well, they're supposed to be setting policy, but if you read the 3M plan, it is setting policy for this whole valley, two valleys.

THE COURT: It's just one valley as opposed to the statewide advisory committees.

MS. SCHROEDER: I think that's a difference.

THE COURT: I don't know. There may be a distinction there.

MS. SCHROEDER: Yeah. Well, there is that distinction, a regional versus statewide, but I would argue that that doesn't give the state engineer the power to legislate itself advisory commissions.

The state engineer and KVR's circular argument coupled with the "just trust me" statements that we will be express as soon as possible that have been typical here are wearing thin.

This Court already gave the state

engineer and KVR the leeway in its order of June 2012 to do testing first with the development of conditions expressly addressing the results of that testing in the later issued 3M plan, and instead of withdrawing its order, the state engineer approved the 3M plan and continues to do so to this day without consideration of this Court's order requiring testing and conditions that relate to those testings.

We simply need to go back to the beginning and require the state engineer to comply with the conditions that says, We need express conditions when there is interference, not a plan that turns the constitution, the division of the powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial on its head, that puts in its own administrative law, statutes and ground water regulation, and at the very minimum, we believe that this Court should enforce its April order by remanding the state engineer's approval of the 3M plan and directing it to follow the requirements this Court has already established that are necessary to meet the express conditions established by statute.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Schroeder. 1 2 Mr. Stockton? 3 MR. STOCKTON: Yes, Your Honor. 4 your indulgence, I'd like to use a little PowerPoint 5 presentation. 6 THE COURT: Certainly. 7 MR. STOCKTON: I would like to start out, 8 Your Honor -- by the way, for the record, Bryan 9 Stockton. May it please the Court, I'm representing 10 the Senior Deputy Attorney General representing the 11 Nevada State Engineer. 12 The state engineer --13 THE COURT: I have a tough time seeing 14 They have got this other stuff here in its 15 way. 16 Oh, it's movable, okay. Don't hurt 17 yourselves. All right. That's fine. That's much 18 better. 19 MR. STOCKTON: The state engineer regulates ground water and surface water in the 20 21 entire state of Nevada, and I'd like to address 22 Ms. Schroeder's analogy, if I could, at the start. 23 She talks about the fact that you can see 24 the surface water that is coming down. You can 25 measure the snow pack. You can measure the

rainfall. You know basically how much water is going to come down into the river.

It is somewhat similar with ground water. You know the amount of precipitation that falls. You know the amount that is going to be recharged to the aquifer, and generally the rule of thumb in the United States is about -- not in the United States, in Nevada is about three percent of that precipitation makes it to the aquifer, and so the state engineer knows all that information, and he takes that into account when he does all these things.

The other thing he knows is that if you look at the state engineer's website, they have a series of what are called reconnaissance reports, and these are reports when in the 60s, the United States Geological Survey went out and surveyed all these valleys in Nevada.

In that report by Rush and Everett, which is number 30 for Kobeh Valley, they estimate there is 2.7 million acre feet of water in the top 100 feet of that aquifer in Kobeh Valley, so that's another way that ground water is different.

You have all this water in what the state engineer calls transitional storage that helps with

the amelioration of effects year to year, whereas surface water, once it runs off, it's gone.

Ground water is there and is replenished every year, and the state engineer found that the perennial yield was 15,000 acre feet in Kobeh Valley, and so that 15,000 acre feet is recharged every year.

But we are the driest state in the nation and that's in case law. I didn't bring the cite for that, but generally, what you have --

THE COURT: There is no question about that. I'm from southern Nevada where I hear a lot about water and how dry we are.

MR. STOCKTON: Thank you, Your Honor.

What this case represents is the same thing we face in most water law cases in Nevada, and that's the tension between two goals that are set by the legislature and by the case law in Nevada.

The first goal is protecting existing rights, and we understand the concerns of the Etcheverrys, and the state engineer is dedicated to protecting existing rights. It's his job to protect existing rights and he does not shirk that responsibility.

THE COURT: As I understand it, he

1 determined while there was adequate water for this 2 mining project, he determined in advance that there 3 were two wells that the Etcheverrys have, both of 4 which are likely to be impacted by this pumping. 5 MR. STOCKTON: Two springs, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Excuse me. Two water 7 sources. MR. STOCKTON: 8 Correct. One spring and 9 one mountain spring. 10 THE COURT: And mitigation could replace 11 those; is that right? 12 MR. STOCKTON: That is correct, Your 13 Honor, and the mitigation will have to take place 14 before the mine starts pumping, so when the 15 Etcheverrys talk about known impacts, I'm not sure 16 where they come from because the mine hasn't started 17 pumping yet, so we know that they're going to have 18 to probably --19 THE COURT: They're going to have to do 20 this before they start pumping, right? 21 MR. STOCKTON: Right, and my 22 understanding is they have offered twice to go ahead 23 and drill those wells and put in solar pumps. 24 THE COURT: There is no expense to the 25 Etcheverrys to do this?

MR. STOCKTON: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STOCKTON: Correct. The mine has offered to drill the well, to install a solar pump and maintain the solar pump so there is no expense to the Etcheverrys, and the water will be available at the same location that it's currently available.

The reason the state engineer doesn't just order that yet is because the mine hasn't pumped anything yet, so it's a little difficult to order somebody to do something before they have actually gone and had an impact.

What I would like to talk about today is back to these two goals of the Nevada water law, and in fact, the Etcheverrys have been talking about existing rights, which is absolutely one of the goals of Nevada water law, but you have also got the goal to make maximum beneficial use of these limited water supplies that we have.

I was going to talk about it later, but I'm going to talk about it upfront and I may talk about it later, but Ms. Schroeder talked about the testing that was supposedly envisioned in the order.

THE COURT: In Judge Papez's order.

MR. STOCKTON: In Judge Papez's order.

The problem with that analysis is beneficial use.

You can't pump 11,000 acre feet just to test and run
it out on the ground. That much water has to be put
to beneficial use.

They really can't get out there and run test wells and pump 11,300 acre feet until they're able to put that water to beneficial use, so the monitoring and mitigation -- I'm going to make sure I don't get past myself here. I'm sorry. Let me back up here a little bit.

Again, in Nevada water law, your water right is a usufructuary right. You don't own specific water. You own the right to make beneficial use of water.

Under the mitigation plan, they're going to be able to do that.

If I could change the slide here, I would like to use this as an example. It's from another valley. It's not what happened in this case. It's just an illustration to show how the mitigation will have to work as we go along.

This is the Lone Tree mine. It's in Pumpernickel Valley, and this black line in the upper right-hand corner is Highway 80. The mine is on a ridge right here, and this is -- (inaudible).

When they were dewatering that, they had a similar situation in which you have here. They knew the springs along this boundary ridge that were going to dry up, so as they dewatered, they pumped water into these four black boxes you can see kind of in the middle of the screen, and they also pumped water over to Fruit spring, and that was the mitigation that they had to do upfront.

That's the mitigation that the mines have to do, mitigate the Mud, Lone Springs and Lone Mountain Spring before they start pumping, and until they start pumping them -- this is Sulfur Spring over here, and what happened is this is 7.7 miles from the mine pit. That spring went dry as well.

They didn't -- it wasn't expected to go dry because it's on the other side of the playa, so it wasn't expected that the water would be connected. It did go dry and the state engineer found out about it. They ordered the mine to mitigate those rights.

The way they mitigated that right was the farmer and the mine got together and talked and figured out how much it would cost to install a well, and the farmer elected to accept a check from the mine and put in the well and solar pump on his

own. So that's an option.

So in that way, the 3M plan is a way to avoid conflict. Let me talk a little bit about conflict, and conflict -- impacts are different than conflict.

Impacts are unavoidable. Any time any of us are using water, we're having an impact on somebody else's water rights because any time you pull water out of the aquifer, it's going to have an impact.

THE COURT: Not if the person whose water right is still available.

MR. STOCKTON: That's the difference between an impact and a conflict.

THE COURT: I always assumed it was the same. Tell me what the difference is.

MR. STOCKTON: Okay. So my client may hit me for this, but let's say, if you have a 100-foot deep well and your pump is set at 90 feet and your static water level is at 50 feet, and I use water so your static water level in your well comes down to 60 feet, well, you have still got 30 feet ahead above.

I have had an impact, but I haven't conflicted with your water right. See, so that's

the difference between an impact -- there is always going to be impacts any time you take water out of an aquifer.

THE COURT: Well, I was using "impact" as having an impact on your water right. It doesn't have an impact on your water right if, in fact, you're able to obtain the number of acre feet of water that you have been allocated.

MR. STOCKTON: And the terminology is a little different, so in order to be precise, an impact is an effect and that's not impermissible. A conflict, which is what is the statutory term --

THE COURT: Conflict is impermissible. I understand.

MR. STOCKTON: Correct. So you can have impacts as long as you don't conflict because, again, you don't own the water. You own the right to use water, so as long as you get the full beneficial use of your water, you may be impacted but not conflicted.

I mean, to go back to their example or your example, if the mine started pumping without putting in these mitigation measures on the Lone Mountain and Mud Springs, there would be a conflict, but if the mitigation measures are there before the

springs go dry, then there is no conflict, and therefore the requirements of 533.370(2) are satisfied, okay?

So that's what this is talking about here. If the senior right has its full beneficial use of water, there is no conflict, and therefore, the use of water is appropriate.

Now, as far as NRS 533 -- so this is 534.110. This is sub five, and what we talk about here are express conditions and that's in red there on the slide.

The state engineer has to make those express conditions before he grants a permit. It's our position that those express conditions are the monitoring, the management and the mitigation.

Those are the express conditions.

What our position is, is what Etcheverrys are asking for, are express measures, and that's the difference. Express measures are, okay, you put this well in this location, this deep at this time.

The monitoring plan is necessary to detect those impacts. I mean, the impacts of the two springs is pretty clear.

THE COURT: You probably don't know what the express measures are until you start pumping, do

you?

MR. STOCKTON: Correct, correct, other than the two springs because --

THE COURT: Other than those.

MR. STOCKTON: Exactly, and that's our point. That's what the 3M plan calls for. The 3M plan is to -- I like the term 3M plan used in their -- I was reading it again last night.

They call them sentinel wells, so the mine will have a production well in one location, and then there will be a water source in another location, and there will be this monitoring well in the middle standing guard, so that as that production well starts pumping, they'll see what is happening at the monitoring well and they can interpolate what is going to happen at the water source.

So in Judge Papez's ruling, he talks about the data that is going to be gathered as they get down to this mitigation, to cure the shortages, and so he talked about the data that is going to be gathered.

Well, that is what the monitoring plan is all about. That monitoring plan -- and there is nothing to monitor until they start pumping, so that

is where the monitoring plan is very specific in the 3M plan.

The monitoring portion is very specific.

They're going to have monitoring wells in certain locations, production wells in other locations.

They're going to have monitoring on the creeks that are out there.

All those things are going to keep track of what is going on with the water resources in that area to make sure that those senior rights are protected.

THE COURT: It's the TAC's job to analyze that and supply that information to the WAC; is that right?

MR. STOCKTON: As I understand it, the WAC is -- our position is and this goes to the delegation of authority argument -- they're an advisory committee and they're a forum where everybody can work out their differences.

The WAC would get all the data in and they'll look at it, and then my understanding is if it's not clear, then they send it to the Technical Advisory Committee, which is these hydrologists and other experts who look at the data and say, We think it means that this impact is going to propagate to

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this location.
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2
               THE COURT: I misunderstood then.
3
    thought the TAC was going to look at the data,
4
    analyze it, and explain what it meant to the WAC.
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               MR. STOCKTON:
                               If there is a question.
6
               THE COURT: If there is a question?
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           I thought they were going to do it anyway.
8
    Maybe I'm wrong.
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               MR. STOCKTON: That's my understanding,
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    but I hate to --
               THE COURT: Well, maybe -- no, that's
11
    fine.
12
           I misunderstood.
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               MR. STOCKTON:
                               (Inaudible).
14
               THE COURT: You're correct then.
                                                  Ιf
    there's a problem, they're going to use the TAC to
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16
    figure it out.
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               MR. STOCKTON: Right, because the WAC is
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    the water rights specialists.
               THE COURT: Right.
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               MR. STOCKTON:
                              The state engineer's
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    hydrologist sits on the WAC, but he is also on the
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          So the hydrologist and the water managers will
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    look at it, and if they can figure out what to do
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    among themselves, they'll go ahead and implement
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    that, but if there is a question of what the data
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means, that's when they refer it to the TAC, and those are those technical people who are going to plug all the data into the model and see if they can figure out what is going on with it.

So we have got the monitoring in place and that's where the data that Judge Papez is looking for is going to come from.

Without the 3M plan, you know, we would have to do it in three stages. To satisfy the arguments of the Etcheverrys, you would have to do the monitoring plan first and then you would have to get the data from that to do the management plan, but the state engineer has the expertise in-house and with the resources supplied by the mine basically to be able to do that, to do that all at once, and that's what is in this monitoring, management and mitigation plan.

Until you find out where those shortages are going to be, you don't know what measures are going to be taken, so there's the difference between conditions, which is monitoring, management, mitigation, and measures which are those actual measures that are going to be taken to mitigate any water rights that might be impacted.

So again, to go back -- okay. The WAC

and the TAC don't have authority to tell anyone to do anything. That is their -- they're like a forum for people to work out their differences.

If everybody agrees, then they can go -then they can implement whatever they agree on, and
I think probably from your experience on the bench,
you'll know it's usually better for people to work
out their differences than to have to come into
court and fight over every little thing.

THE COURT: The one thing that concerns me about that is if the WAC unanimously agrees upon a decision, whatever that might be, who -- can that be appealed because -- here is my question.

If the state water engineer makes a decision that adversely impacts somebody, anybody has a right -- any person that is adversely impacted has a right to appeal that to the court, right?

MR. STOCKTON: Correct.

THE COURT: But if the WAC makes a decision, it isn't the state engineer's decision, it's the WAC's decision.

MR. STOCKTON: Correct.

THE COURT: Can anybody appeal that?

MR. STOCKTON: It wouldn't really be an

appeal because the state engineer has de novo

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authority there, so they would actually file, in
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    essence, a complaint, to use the standard
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    terminology.
               They would say, Look, state engineer,
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    their decision does not protect my rights, and the
6
    state engineer would look at that de novo.
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               He would go out there, find out what's
8
    going on in the ground and he would make an
9
    independent decision --
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               THE COURT: But somebody adversely
11
    impacted could not file a petition for judicial
    review of a WAC decision, could they?
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               MR. STOCKTON:
                              I wouldn't think so.
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               THE COURT: And that would a decision of
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    the WAC unless somebody on the WAC opposed it.
               MR. STOCKTON: Right, but under NRS
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    533.450(1) it has to be a decision or order of the
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    state engineer to be appealable to the District
    Court.
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               THE COURT:
                           I understand that, but you
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    could have significant decisions made by the WAC
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    that are not appealable.
23
               MR. STOCKTON: Well, they're significant
24
    agreements.
               THE COURT: I understand.
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                                           It may be
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somebody that -- maybe everybody on the WAC agrees to it, but some third person is adversely affected. They can't appeal it. That concerns me.

MR. STOCKTON: They can't appeal it directly, but they come to the state engineer and say, My water rights are being impacted.

The state engineer will look at those and say, Yes, your water rights are being impacted, or if he says, No, your water rights are not being impacted, then that is directly appealable to the District Court.

The state engineer still does that de novo review to satisfy his statutory duty, and if someone is being impacted, they don't have to wait for the WAC to finish.

The only party that has to comply with this process is the mine. The mine has to comply with this because this is an express condition on their permit. It's not a condition on anyone else's permit.

THE COURT: I just want to make sure that if this is implemented, there is no way that somebody who is adversely impacted is going to be unable to file an appeal which they would be able to file if the state engineer had just made a decision.

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    That's my concern.
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               MR. STOCKTON: Well, and so your concern
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    is that if they --
               THE COURT: Well, the WAC apparently can
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    act -- if they act with unanimity, then there is no
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    state engineer's decision.
                                It's a WAC decision.
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               MR. STOCKTON:
                              Correct.
               THE COURT: Okay. A WAC decision isn't
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9
    appealable, right?
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               MR. STOCKTON: Well, so your concern is
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    it's not directly appealable to the District Court?
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               THE COURT: Right.
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               MR. STOCKTON:
                              The difference is if your
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    water rights --
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               THE COURT: Do you see what I mean?
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               MR. STOCKTON:
                              I do, I do, but I'm trying
17
    to make it clear what is happening here, because you
18
    have got all this monitoring going on and --
               THE COURT:
19
                           Uh-huh.
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               MR. STOCKTON: -- the whole goal of the
21
    monitoring is to find out those impacts are coming
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    before they happen.
               So the WAC comes to its decision before
23
24
    they're being impacted, so if Mr. Etcheverry has a
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water right or Mr. Benson does out there somewhere,

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it's being impacted, he doesn't have to go to the WAC. He comes straight to the state engineer. The state engineer makes a decision and that comes straight to District Court.

If he chooses to come to the WAC, then they can make their decision. They can come to their unanimous agreement, and he can either abide that, or he can come to the state engineer and say, I don't like it and I want you to change it.

So he doesn't have -- they don't have to go through that procedure. If they're being impacted --

THE COURT: I understand that. I understand that they don't have to go to the state engineer or the WAC.

I'm just concerned that if the WAC makes a decision, that decision is not appealable.

Normally, decisions that are made are made by the state engineer and they're all appealable.

MR. STOCKTON: And finally, those decisions are always appealable.

THE COURT: Right, but the WAC is -- he has -- by adopting this program, he's created an entity whose decisions are not appealable.

MR. STOCKTON: They are appealable.

1 THE COURT: And they're making decisions 2 as though they were him, right? 3 MR. STOCKTON: In other words, you can 4 appeal it to the state engineer, but you get de novo 5 review on the appeal to the state engineer. 6 I mean, if you're aggrieved by that and 7 the state engineer does nothing, you can obviously come to District Court. 8 9 THE COURT: Right, that's true. I just want to make sure we haven't left somebody out. 10 11 MR. STOCKTON: The reasoning is exactly 12 Ms. Schroeder's argument, the WAC and TAC are not 13 agencies of the state. 14 THE COURT: I understand they're advisory 15 and I approve of getting advice. That's fine. 16 MR. STOCKTON: But if somebody doesn't 17 like it, they come to the state engineer and say, I 18 don't like it. The state engineer takes a fresh 19 look at the facts, makes a decision. If they don't 20 like that, it comes to District Court. If they 21 don't like that, it goes to the Supreme Court. 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 MR. STOCKTON: But they can short-circuit 24 Tell the state engineer they're adversely

impacted. If they don't like the state engineer's

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decision, without going through all that -- so it is reviewable. It's just there's an extra step in there where they get another de novo review from the state engineer, so.

Ms. Schroeder talked about express conditions in the permit that five feet of lowering would result in certain consequences and 15 feet of lowering of the static water level would result in consequences.

I have never -- I have been doing this for five years. I have never seen those conditions on any permit in this state. It has always been done on a fact by fact -- case by case basis -- a factual specific case by case basis, so like I said in my 100-foot well example, if you pump at 90 feet, you have 40 feet ahead above that, are you really impacted if you only have 20 feet ahead above that?

That's a factual question the state engineer needs to make to determine the mitigation that needs to be done on each particular water right.

All right, so just real quickly, I have most of my points. As far as the rule making issues, the only party that is really bound by this is the mine because this is in their permit terms.

This is not a rule of general applicability. It's not going to apply to any water right holder.

Each one is fact specific and have to be based on the facts of the hydrology in the area and the other water rights in the area, and each one has to be fact specific, so it's our position that this is not a rule making. It's not a rule of general applicability, and therefore, it was appropriate for the state engineer.

Finally, so this is from the (inaudible) and what the Court there said is it goes back to that tension between beneficial use and protecting existing rights, and basically, the state engineer's interpretation of the water code attempts to balance the need to protect existing rights, but also to allow for the sustainability of the resource and to allow the water to be used for the benefit of the people of Nevada, so that is what this 3M plan does.

It initiates specific monitoring to determine where impacts are going to occur. It requires the mine to manage their pumping because sometimes they can pump from different wells. If they see there's going to be an impact here, they can pump less on this well and more on that well, and finally, if the impacts can't be avoided, then

they can mitigate those impacts to where the senior water right is fully satisfied.

We know there is water in Kobeh Valley.

Let me get my number right. There is 1,100 acre

feet of existing rights in Kobeh Valley, so those

are the rights that are potentially impacted by the

mine's pumping.

That's the total amount that is not owned by the mine in the entire valley, the entire hydrographic basin, so there is 1,100 acre feet.

There is 15,000 acre feet of perennial yield in that valley, and the mine has proposed to put 11,300 of that 15 to beneficial use, and so it's our position that in order to satisfy the Nevada goal of getting the maximum beneficial use out of the water, the state engineer's determination that this 3M plan adequately protected existing rights is a factual finding, which as a finding of fact is entitled to deference from the Court, and he found that this will adequately protect those 1,100 acre feet of water rights.

Let me just check my notes one quick second. I think I covered everything, but -- thank you, Your Honor. Any questions?

THE COURT: No. Mr. Wikstrom?

MR. WIKSTROM: Thank you Your Honor. May it please the Court and counsel, the petitioners, the Etcheverry group and Mr. Benson, have a right to get their water.

What they don't have a right to do is to tell the state engineer how to do his job. Kobeh Valley Ranch has always conceded that priority rights such as the rights of Mr. Benson and the Etcheverry group take priority over our ability to pump and that those rights have to be protected.

Mr. Benson, I should note, Your Honor, his rights are in Diamond Valley and it's not even clear -- there is no evidence suggesting that they're even going to be affected, but he still has a right to his water.

Before -- if we pump, we have to make sure that their rights, there is no conflict. They have to get the amount of water that they're entitled to under their prior existing rights.

The state engineer, of course, has recognized that as well, and the ruling and the permits that issued expressly provide that they are issued subject to existing rights.

We would submit, Your Honor, that is an express condition. That means they have to get

their water before we can get our water.

Not only did the state engineer put that express condition in the permits and in the ruling, he also provided for this -- he conditioned it upon the 3M plan to protect those rights.

The 3M plan was not hastily prepared as petitioners would suggest to Your Honor. It was a process that was more than a year long. It just happened to be it was submitted to the state engineer while Judge Papez was considering his ruling.

The county had input into the plan, and appellants were fully aware of the process when the 3M plan was being developed, and they could have had as much input as they wanted. They chose not to, and now they want to challenge the plan, which really is a tool for the assistant state engineer to do his job.

So when they say trust us, we're not asking them to trust us, Kobeh Valley Ranch, but by the same taken, what they're really saying to Your Honor is, and to this Court, is don't trust the state engineer to do his job, which is to administer the water of the state of Nevada and to protect those who have prior existing rights.

We would submit, Your Honor, that the appellants here have read the 3M plan in a very contorted way by taking bits and pieces out of context, and it's really inconsistent. Their reading is inconsistent with the plain meaning and the intent of the plan.

They want to ignore the fact that the state engineer is -- retains complete control at all times, and his job is to protect existing rights. The 3M plan is a tool. It's not the only tool he has, but it's an important tool for him to do his job.

It's not a delegation of his authority and it doesn't replace the state engineer as they suggest in their briefing. It merely assists him.

They fault the plan because they say it's not specific enough as to what would be done in the future to protect their rights. Well, Your Honor, as Yogi Berra says, Predictions are very difficult, especially about the future.

The problem we have here is this is a mine that is going to go on for 44 years. Under the model that now exists, Mr. Etcheverry's water probably wouldn't be impacted for about nine years, and so all of this is because as you start

pumping --

MR. WIKSTROM: As you start pumping, you create a cone of depression from the wells and it spreads out and gets larger and larger, so the prediction is about nine years, but it could be sooner, and that's why the state engineer has insisted on this plan that has very specific monitoring requirements.

I didn't know that, but.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

MR. WIKSTROM: And to increase the predictive power. What the plan really is is just an early warning system.

THE COURT: Well, they're right, it's a plan to make a plan, but the plan that bases his decision is how to mitigate, right?

MR. WIKSTROM: That's right, and who to mitigate because even though appellants say in their brief that the state engineer concluded that those springs would be impacted, well, that is not what it says. As Your Honor noted, it says they're likely to be impacted. We deal with probabilities and likelihood. Could be wrong. Could be right.

There are other springs that the state engineer found in his rulings are not likely to be

impacted, but they could be too, so what he has done is he has required us to monitor the whole area, so that he can see -- what you see as you start to pump and you start to stress the aquifer, you start to see which way the cone of depression is going, and before it gets to the Etcheverrys, before it gets to the Bensons, before it gets to anybody else, the state engineer can say, You have got to start mitigating this well so that they're not impacted because if they are, I'm going to shut you down. He told us that. He has that power. He can shut us down at any time if we impact somebody else.

So that's why if you look at the 3M plan it's very specific about the monitoring, and then as you get to the mitigation, it says what the mitigation devices are.

These are all well known mitigation devices, and as Mr. Stockton indicated, my client is perfectly willing to go out to the Etcheverrys tomorrow and improve their wells if they would allow us. We have made that offer before and we will tender that offer today, but we will have in place improvements on their wells whether it's solar-powered pumps or deepening their wells or whatever it is so that they get their water because

we have acknowledged and we have always acknowledged that they are entitled to their water right and we can't impact that.

What they're basically saying again, as I mentioned, is don't trust the state engineer to do his job right. He's the one, he's the specialist in the state of Nevada for making sure that our water resources are used wisely, beneficially to the best extent possible, and yet, as the law requires, protecting anybody who has prior rights from junior or new appropriators, and it is all under his control.

Under the standard of review by which this Court must review the state engineer's decisions, this is an area that is "procurely" within the expertise of the state engineer. How to interpret the statute, how to understand the ground water system, how to protect people that he is charged by law to protect.

What appellants have tried to do is suggest that these are really questions of law, but I would submit, Your Honor, to the extent that there is any legal interpretation at all, it is the state engineer's interpretation of his own enabling statute which is entitled or should be entitled to

deference by the courts.

So as I mentioned, Your Honor, the problem is that appellants want to characterize the plan and the ruling in a way that best fits their argument, but we're talking about the future. We're talking about 44 years in the future. None of us know, as we sit here today, what exactly is going to happen, and so what the state engineer has done is he has incorporated these express conditions in his approval so that he can -- his crystal ball will be better because he'll be continually improving the database, the knowledge base. He can see what is going to happen. He can protect people who are entitled to be protected.

A lot of their arguments are just rehashing some of the things that they argued before Judge Papez when we were here a year ago, but as he ruled, this is an area that is uniquely within the state engineer's expertise, particularly when we're dealing with something -- with an area of uncertainty when we don't know in the future.

None of us can sit down today and write a 3M plan that would absolutely definitively describe what we're going to do for every spring, every water source in this area for 44 years because none of us

know what is going to happen, so the legislature has entrusted the state engineer to do his job, and these advisory committees, as their name suggests, are just advisory to him.

As I mentioned, they create this early warning system of potential conflicts so that they can be dealt with before they happen and to protect people, and if they don't, the state engineer always has the nuclear sanction.

He can come to us at any time and say,

Stop, you can't pump another gallon because you're

impacting somebody that has prior rights.

Whether we improve Mr. Etcheverry's wells, whether we pipe water to him from one of our wells, whether we build him stock tanks and haul in water, he is absolutely entitled to his water, and it's our job to make sure that he gets it, it gets to him, and it's the state engineer's job to make sure that we do that.

Kobeh Valley Ranch is the only party that is, quote, bound by the 3M plan. Nobody else is.

Mr. Etcheverry is a member, but he's not bound by it. He can appeal and go around the WAC. He can come straight to the state engineer, and if he doesn't like the decision, he can come to this

court.

Now, Your Honor raised an important issue, and that is, Well, is a WAC decision appealable? As Mr. Stockton said, if the WAC -- they don't really make a determination. What they do is reach an agreement. The state engineer has to agree.

Mr. Etcheverry sits on the WAC, so if he and the rest of the WAC agree to, let's say, a mitigation measure for one of his springs or for his domestic well, arguably no one is -- no one else in the world is impacted by that decision and so there would be no reason to appeal because it's an agreement.

On the other hand, if Mr. Etcheverry says, No, wait a second, I'm not satisfied with what you're proposing to take care of my water rights, then first of all, we don't have an agreement by the WAC and it has to go to the state engineer for --

THE COURT: That I understand.

MR. WIKSTROM: So what about Mr. Benson? He is not a member of the WAC, and let's use him as a representative of other third parties out there who could conceivably be impacted by something that is done.

They're not on the WAC. They don't participate in the decision or the agreement or whatever comes out of the WAC.

THE COURT: The WAC's decisions are really unanimous agreements; are they not?

MR. WIKSTROM: They're agreements and --

THE COURT: They have to be unanimous in order to be effective?

MR. WIKSTROM: That's right. So the WAC agrees to do something, and Mr. Benson or somebody else out there says, Wait a second, I'm being impacted by Kobeh Valley Ranch's pumping --

THE COURT: That was my concern. What happens then?

MR. WIKSTROM: They don't go to the WAC because they have no standing before the WAC.

They're not members of the WAC.

They do what any other citizen of the state of Nevada does if he or she feels like he's being impacted by a junior's pumping. You go straight to the state engineer and you say, Kobeh Valley Ranch is pumping and my well is going dry.

Then it's the state engineer's duty to investigate that. It's the state engineer's duty to make a decision, and then that third party has

statutory rights to appeal, so that's how I see it, Your Honor.

It doesn't really set up such that -since the WAC is not an adjudicatory body and
doesn't make decisions, then the question of appeal
really doesn't fit in that context.

Appellants argue that it's really kind of a wait and see approach. It's a plan to make a plan. To a certain degree, they're right because --

THE COURT: Well, it is a plan to make a plan. It's a plan to find out what the facts are, and then you would advise the WAC and/or the state engineer and then a decision is made and then that's the plan.

MR. WIKSTROM: That's the plan.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't have a problem with that. That's not the issue.

MR. WIKSTROM: There is some suggestion in one of the briefs or in their brief that the state engineer cannot allow the substitution of, quote, different water.

Well, under the laws of Nevada, nobody has the right to any particular molecules of water. What your right is you get a certain number of gallons per minute or acre feet or whatever it is,

but whether that comes by way of a pipe from Kobeh Valley Ranch's well, whether it comes from deeper in the same aquifer because we put in a pump, all they're entitled to is the use of water and not any particular water.

They have offered you no reasons whatsoever why, if we supply water, for example, to Mud Spring from our well or truck it in daily or whatever it does to get them their water, that that doesn't satisfy their existing rights.

They raise the spectre, Well, Kobeh
Valley, you don't have the water rights to do that.
Well, we do. We have 11,000 acre feet of water
rights, and if we have to divert some of ours to
satisfying them, that is certainly something that we
can do.

The express conditions argument, Your Honor, is -- the statutory language is kind of interesting. The appellants want to read that statute as if the word "such" doesn't exist because it says, Under such express conditions.

They want to read it as if it says, Under express conditions, but "such" as a rule of English grammar requires an antecedent. It has to refer back to something and I have read that statute so

many times that I get cross-eyed, Your Honor, and I'm hard pressed to say what it refers back to other than just the basic fact that prior users have the right to get their water, and I think that is why the state engineer puts in, Subject to existing uses.

Here, the state engineer went further with the 3M plan and required even further express conditions. It's not something that the state engineer does frequently, as I understand it.

As I understand it, this is one of the most comprehensive 3M plans that the state engineer has ever promulgated and required.

It's clearly something that is within the state engineer's expertise, and under Nevada law, we should be giving him deference.

This whole argument about whether test pumping had to occur before, and that language came out of Judge Papez's decision.

First of all, Your Honor, that wasn't raised in appellant's opening brief, and by law, that argument should be waived.

They raised it for the first time in their reply and they did it because they saw it in the Eureka County proposed amicus brief, and that's

when they brought it in.

Even if Your Honor wants to consider that argument on the merits, again, thinking about it, as Mr. Stockton says, you can't test the aquifer, you can't test the system until you start pumping, so it becomes we can't put the cart before the horse. We have to start pumping. To start pumping, we need a permit.

The permit is subject to these express conditions, and once we start stressing that aquifer and seeing what happens, then the express measures, the express mitigation measures will be brought to play.

Right now, in the year since the 3M has been approved, what we have been doing is collecting data. No pumping has taken place. So all that data is establishing the baseline conditions, so that once we start pumping, they can compare it and see how it changes and be in a position to allow the state engineer to do his job.

THE COURT: Have these monitoring wells been drilled?

MR. WIKSTROM: A lot of them have, yes, and we're collecting data on them right now, and we're also collecting data on the streams, the

stream flow, and the streams in the Roberts 1 2 mountains that surround this area, and I believe we 3 have made our first report last month. THE COURT: Is there a time table for 4 5 mining and pumping? 6 MR. WIKSTROM: There is a time table. We need the water to process, but all we have started 7 8 to do out on the site is stripping. They have 9 started to do some construction. They have welded 10 about half, I believe, of the pipe that would carry the water from the wells. 11 12 I think they have -- but we're still a 13 ways off before pumping even starts. 14 THE COURT: A ways off is months, years? 15 I'm just curious. It has nothing to do with this 16 decision. 17 MR. WIKSTROM: They need water to do some 18 construction and that's going to come as soon as the 19 -- if I can inquire of my client. 20 THE COURT: That would be nominal, I would assume. 21 22 (Inaudible statement). 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. STOCKTON: But the big demand for

water will be processing in about two years from

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now, so it's down the road quite a bit.

In the meantime, we'll just continue to collect this data.

We take serious issue, Your Honor, with this delegation of authority. The WAC does not have any authority. It's merely an advisory board as the name suggests.

The 3M plan says specifically it's there to assist the state engineer. It reserves to the state engineer his final authority. It.

Is clearly only advisory. It is not a delegation. He has not delegated one iota of his authority.

There is no authority to adjudicate disputes. If there is a dispute, nobody has to take that dispute to the WAC. If Mr. Etcheverry wants to, he can, but he is not required to.

Again, Kobeh Valley Ranch is the only party that is bound.

If anybody, Mr. Etcheverry or anybody doesn't like it, they come to the state engineer, and if they don't like his decision, then they come to this Court.

The other thing is -- that I should point out is the state engineer is not even hamstrung or

shackled by this 3M. He can, on his own motion, at any time, do whatever he is entitled to do under the law. He doesn't have to wait for a recommendation from the WAC or the TAC.

After Your Honor asked the question about who makes recommendations to whom, I was looking at this, and it's clear. I think your understanding is correct too, that the Technical Advisory Committee also would evaluate the monitoring data, reports, analyses -- I'm quoting from the 3M plan -- to determine whether data gaps exist and make appropriate recommendations, and they also will develop and recommend action criteria to the WAC for management or mitigation measures based on available data.

THE COURT: I think that's what I read and I got the impression that they were out there looking at this data. Don't they meet quarterly?

MR. WIKSTROM: They meet, I think, at least once a year and more often as required, but these are the technical experts that --

THE COURT: These are the technical people, and I thought they were going to do the analysis and then they would make -- evaluate that analysis and then submit that, the evaluation to the

WAC.

MR. WIKSTROM: But there is also a large amount of --

THE COURT: Apparently, if the WAC has a question, they give it to the TAC and they go figure it out.

MR. WIKSTROM: Right, and there's a lot of expertise on the WAC too because of who is on it, so I think there's going to be a little bit of overlap of duties there and responsibilities.

It's not a rule making -- this 3M plan is not a rule making. It doesn't establish a rule of general applicability. It applies only to KVR and its use of water. Other water users are not bound, so it does not fit within the rubric of a rule making.

If we don't -- if we, KVR, don't comply with the 3M, then we're in violation of that, in violation of our permit terms, and all of those ramifications will come home to roost, but again, it only applies to Kobeh Valley Ranch. It doesn't apply to Mr. Etcheverry, Mr. Benson, or anyone else out there.

Certainly, they'll argue that it's vague and deficient. I think we have made our point clear

there, Your Honor, that this plan is a very robust 1 2 plan to develop information so that the state 3 engineer can do his job and do it well, Kobeh Valley 4 Ranch and Eureka Moly can run their mine, and bottom 5 line, Bensons and Etcheverrys get the water they're 6 entitled to. 7 For that reason, Your Honor, we ask you to dismiss this appeal and affirm the decision of 8 9 the state engineer. 10 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 11 MR. WIKSTROM: Thank you. 12 THE COURT: Do you need a break? 13 MR. STOCKTON: Yes, we do. 14 THE COURT: You want a break? 15 MS. SCHROEDER: All right. Thank you. 16 THE COURT: That's what I thought. 17 (Break taken) 18 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Schroeder? 19 MS. SCHROEDER: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 We're here because the state engineer 21 issued a ruling to protect existing rights and 22 further issued an order saying that this 3M plan 23 would protect those existing rights. 24 We're here because they did that pursuant

to a statute, and everyone wants to define the

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statute today, and ultimately, Your Honor, it's up to you, but NRS 534.1105 is what we're looking at.

It doesn't say that we issue a permit and then we take care of the existing appropriations. It says that junior ground water permits can be issued -- can -- not after the fact, but they are not to be issued unless express conditions can protect them, Your Honor, and what are these permits that we're talking about?

Those permits for existing rights are not a right to a molecule of water. I would agree with counsel that water law isn't about molecules of water, and that's exactly the point. The molecule of water that comes from the mine over to my client to replace his spring is not his right. That is not his property right.

The property right he has is to the spring, to that source of water. He is not entitled to the molecule.

The statute, if you look at it, requires the protection of the existing rights to that source of water, not a molecule from the mine --

THE COURT: I didn't understand that he was entitled to water from the exact same source.

MS. SCHROEDER: He is entitled to the

water from that source. His water right states the source on the water right.

THE COURT: I understand that, but if that can be mitigated by getting him water from some other source, doesn't that suffice under the statute?

MS. SCHROEDER: That mitigation, under the statute as the state engineer's brief points out, is not defined, and when you are replacing a property interest, Your Honor, I would suggest to you that if you're taking an acre of land and replacing it with another acre of land, you simply don't do that by mitigation.

THE COURT: Land is different than water. Water is water. It doesn't make any difference where it comes from so long as you get --

MS. SCHROEDER: It's not about water.
We're talking about a water right, which is
different from that molecule of water as counsel
points out.

The statutes in Nevada and the case law in Nevada talk about water rights, not about the molecule. We're not talking about molecules of water --

THE COURT: You're saying that the water

that he has has to come from that source? 1 2 MS. SCHROEDER: It has to come from that 3 source, and it can be mitigated, but those 4 mitigation problems have to be solved with his 5 agreement, or the state engineer has to order it in 6 some way. 7 THE COURT: I never understood that the 8 water right is from -- is necessarily from the same 9 source. It can be -- I'm going to have the state 10 engineer respond to this because I'm not sure that 11 is accurate. 12 MS. SCHROEDER: The water right has the 13 source on it. It says, You are --14 THE COURT: No. I understand that the 15 water right is from the source, but can it not be 16 mitigated from other sources? 17 MS. SCHROEDER: That's a question you can 18 ask the state engineer, but I'm --19 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to ask him 20 that. 21 MS. SCHROEDER: The mitigation, certainly 22 it can be, but legally, does the statute say it? 23 No, the state engineer's brief says, Mitigation is 24 not defined, so what I would say to Your Honor is

that mitigation isn't going to be slapped on my

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client by a pipeline. He is going to have to agree to that.

THE COURT: So what you're saying is they have to maintain the spring -- apparently, one of your sources comes from a spring; is that right?

MS. SCHROEDER: Yes. Thank you, Your

THE COURT: I knew there were sources. I didn't know whether they were springs or wells, but

10 apparently, one of them is a spring.

Honor.

What you're saying is they have to maintain the water as a spring rather than pumping it from a different aquifer or something?

MS. SCHROEDER: That's right, and of course, there is the option for mitigation, but what I'm saying is that the state engineer doesn't have authority to slap on any kind of mitigation on my client because, as KVR pointed out in its argument, this plan is only about them. It's not about me or my clients, Mr. Benson or Mr. Etcheverry.

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't bind them. It only binds the mine.

MS. SCHROEDER: That's right, and so they cannot bind Mr. Etcheverry or Mr. Benson to accept mitigation unless they agree. This statute says

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they can't -- the state engineer has no authority to
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    issue --
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               THE COURT:
                           No.
                                 Judge Papez's order
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    makes it clear that the 3M plan can bind your client
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    to accept mitigation.
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               MS. SCHROEDER: I don't think so, Your
            What it says was -- Mr. Papez, Judge Papez
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    said that the 3M plan should go through testing and
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    then based upon that testing establish appropriate
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    mitigation, but it doesn't say anything about what
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    that mitigation might be.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Stockton makes the
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    argument that you can't test until you pump.
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               MS. SCHROEDER:
                                Mr. --
               THE COURT:
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                           Is that true?
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               MS. SCHROEDER: That's probably true.
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    What I'm suggesting --
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               THE COURT: You can't pump until you get
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    a permit.
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               MS. SCHROEDER:
                                I'm suggesting -- you can
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    get a permit to pump and do testing.
                                           They're
22
    capable of getting a temporary permit or another
23
    permit just to do testing. That's a possibility.
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               That hasn't been happening, but what I
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    was suggesting is that instead of involving all of
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us in this plan to make a plan with no orders that can be appealed, that we need to have a drawdown condition. That's an easy condition.

Counsel for the state engineer,
Mr. Stockton suggests, Oh, he has never seen it. I
have been practicing 25 years. I have seen it.
Maybe not in Nevada, but it happens in all the
western states. It's an easy condition to put in.

Has KVR suggested they would accept that?

They said, Oh, no, we'll put in a new well for you.

We don't want a drawdown express condition, but

we'll put in a new well for you.

That isn't the mitigation that is required. I'd like to talk about my clients too.

KVR suggests that my client is sitting on their WAC. My client has been invited to sit on their WAC. Mr. Benson has not been invited to sit on their WAC. In fact, he attended a meeting and was kicked out of the meeting because it's not a public meeting and he was not allowed to speak.

Also, we talked about whether their orders are appealable, but their orders aren't even published. How is anyone to know what is happening? No one is to know because it's all private.

Just like Mr. Benson being kicked out of

the meeting, they get to choose who sits there.

They get to choose who is going to be unanimous.

They get to choose who is going to hear about their decision until someone is injured, and that's the hugest problem with this case. There is no public process, as the Court noted.

Also, the state engineer makes the argument through Mr. Stockton that we know that two of the springs of Mr. Etcheverry are going to be impacted, and the 3M plan addresses that. It doesn't address it. I went through it again. As I was sitting there, I went through all 15 pages of it. There is nothing in there about those springs being mitigated, nothing about them being injured or impacted, or that there being a conflict with them.

I would suggest to you this idea of impact and conflict, the word "impact" is not defined by statute. I don't have a problem with the way the state engineer defined it, but it's not in the statute. Conflict is, and we do have a conflict as the state engineer suggested with my two clients and --

THE COURT: Well, he made that finding.

MS. SCHROEDER: Yes, he did, in his
ruling, but there is nothing in the 3M plan to

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address that problem, not specifically, maybe some
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    generality that I don't understand.
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               Obviously, as KVR pointed out, I don't
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    know how to read their mitigation plan, and if I, as
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    a water lawyer practicing 25 years, don't understand
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    it, I would suspect that most people don't.
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               We talked about the source of your right,
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    and then I would like to point out one last thing.
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               I'm reading from page 14 of the
    decision-making process, parens 28, section B.
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11
               THE COURT: Page 14?
12
               MS. SCHROEDER:
                                Uh-huh, of the 3M plan.
13
               THE COURT:
                           Of the 3M plan?
14
                                This is section 28.
               MS. SCHROEDER:
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    There's 19 pages in this 3M plan and --
16
               THE COURT:
                            I have got 27.
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               MS. SCHROEDER:
                                Well, you have the -- I'm
18
    not talking about anything beyond the monitoring.
19
    I'm not talking about the monitoring.
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               THE COURT:
                           Oh, okay.
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               MS. SCHROEDER: I'm just talking about
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    the written part.
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               In section 28, the decision-making
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    process, which Your Honor has been interested in,
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    which of course is very interesting to me.
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In section B, it says, In the event that any of the parties disagree as to whether the proponent's proposed or ongoing ground water extraction are resulting or will result in unreasonable adverse impacts, any party may petition the Nevada State Engineer to request the Nevada State Engineer to determine whether there is or is not the adverse impact that requires implementation of management or mitigation measures, so they write statute here.

They provide that the parties in this little group, if they don't like something or they disagree with something can go ahead and take it to the state engineer.

What I'm going to suggest to you is the state engineer does not make advisory opinions. He is required by statute to act on enforcing water law, and this is suggesting that he is going to be on an ongoing basis on-call to KVR and its WAC to mitigate or decide things on a day-by-day basis.

In actuality, the state engineer is only going to receive the monitoring reports according to its ruling, to its letter approving this, once a year. Once a year, it's going to receive the monitoring information.

By then, my clients' springs are dry. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to ask

Mr. Stockton just to address this one issue that she
raised that she said -- and I did not understand
this to be the law, that the permit holder, to a
certain amount of water from a particular source,

must confine that right to that source.

MR. STOCKTON: Correct, and she is correct in that regard. The example I used with the Sulfur Spring with the map I showed you --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STOCKTON: -- what happened was the mine paid for and filed an application, a change application on behalf of the owner of the spring, which is what KVR will have to do here.

What the state engineer did there and we'll do here is issue what is called a supplemental water right, so in the normal case where a supplemental right is used, if you have -- let's say I have a right to the Carson River and I need four acre feet a year to make my crop of alfalfa, and this particular year I only get 2.5 feet of surface water.

I can apply for a supplemental ground

water right where I use my surface water right and then whatever the surface water doesn't supply, I can make up from ground water, so that is what this would be.

This would be a supplemental right that is issued to use ground water to make up for the lack of --

THE COURT: This has happened before?
This isn't the first time?

MR. STOCKTON: Exactly the same thing happened on the Sulfur Spring.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STOCKTON: But she is correct, there does have to be an application. The state engineer does issue a permit for that ground water right as supplemental to the surface water right, so when the mine gets done mining their stuff, the spring starts flowing again, the Etcheverrys will have the choice -- well, no, they'll have to use the surface water first if the spring starts flowing again, but then they can make up any difference from the ground water supplemental right.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Stockton. Anything further from KVR?

MR. WIKSTROM: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further? 2 MS. SCHROEDER: No, Your Honor. Thank 3 you.

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THE COURT: All right. Well, let me tell you how I feel about this. First of all, I spent a great deal of time reading Judge Papez's order, which authorized the 3M plan.

I must tell you, I have never seen more a thorough analysis of a petition for judicial review than was given by Judge Papez in that, I think, 53-page decision.

He must have spent an awful lot of time writing that decision, and doing, I think, a very good analysis.

While I know that you would like me to change his decision and reverse it, I'm not about to do that because he really did a good decision.

Number two, on your delegation of authority argument, in my mind, as I look at these two committees, both the TAC and the WAC are really advisory committees.

Now, there is nothing wrong with the state engineer receiving advice, and if it be by a committee, so better the advice, and if it be by a technical committee, even better. The state

engineer still has the final authority.

If somebody on the WAC doesn't agree with the decision, the state engineer has to make that decision, and even if everybody on the WAC makes a decision and there's a complaint by a third person, the state engineer makes the final decision, so he has not delegated any of his authority. He still has it all.

On your express condition argument, the 3M plan does have standards, standards for conflicts.

Now, a senior water right permit defines what that right is. Any time a senior user is not able to use his or her water, there is a conflict.

The 3M plan is designed as proactive, not reactive. It's proactive in the sense that it is going to monitor the water, and in advance of a conflict, advise the state engineer through the WAC that there is a problem or a potential problem and deal with that problem.

Now, I think that's good. That's better than waiting to see, waiting to have a conflict and then having to deal with it, so I think that the standard -- the express condition argument is without merit.

You're right, it is a plan to create a plan. It is the TAC and the WAC's analysis. That's the plan to submit to the state engineer sufficient facts so that they can develop an appropriate decision to avoid a conflict. That's the plan, and I don't have a problem with that.

The last analysis, I think substantial evidence supports the decision of the state engineer, so if that is the case, I'm required to deny the petition for judicial review.

I'm going to ask the state engineer to prepare appropriate findings, and if you want to submit them to KVR for their input, that's fine, but if you would submit those to me.

MR. STOCKTON: Your Honor, I would be glad to do that. I'd like to ask for a little time, though. I have to be at the Ninth Circuit on Thursday and --

THE COURT: Time is not particularly of the essence. I have plenty of time. If you don't have my -- I'd like them in MS Word form so that I can work on them myself and I can give you an e-mail address if you would like that.

MR. STOCKTON: That's would be perfect, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. We'll be in
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    recess and I'll have the clerk give you my business
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    card.
               (Proceedings concluded at 3:03 p.m.)
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1	STATE OF NEVADA)
2	COUNTY OF WASHOE)
3	
4	I, KATE MURRAY, Certified Court Reporter
5	of the Second Judicial District Court, in and for
6	the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, do hereby
7	certify:
8	That I transcribed the recording of the
9	above-entitled hearing held on Monday, April 15th,
10	2013, as herein appears;
11	That the foregoing transcript is a full,
12	true and correct transcription of my stenotype notes
13	of the recording of said hearing.
14	
15	DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 6th day of
16	May, 2013.
17	May, 2013.
18	KATE MURRAY, CCR #599
19	·
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
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PROOF OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRAP 25(d), I hereby certify that on the 26th day of July, 2013, I caused a copy of the foregoing *JOINT APPENDIX VOLUMES 1 THROUGH 8* to be served on the following parties as outlined below:

VIA COURT'S EFLEX ELECTRONIC FILING SYSTEM:

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///

VIA US MAIL, POSTAGE PRE-PAID ADDRESSED AS FOLLOWS:

William E. Nork, Settlement Judge 825 W. 12th Street Reno, NV 89503

Dated this 26th day of July, 2013.

/s/ Therese A. Ure

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counsel@water-law.com Attorneys for Appellants Electronically Filed Jul 29 2013 09:54 a.m. Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EUREKA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Nevada; KENNETH F. BENSON, individually; DIAMOND CATTLE COMPANY, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; and, MICHEL AND MARGARET ANN ETCHEVERRY FAMILY, LP, a Nevada registered foreign limited partnership, Appellants,

Case No. 61324

THE STATE OF NEVADA STATE ENGINEER; THE STATE OF NEVADA DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES; and

KOBEH VALLEY RANCH, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,

Respondents.

MICHEL AND MARGARET ANN
ETCHEVERRY FAMILY, LP, a Nevada
registered foreign limited partnership;
DIAMOND CATTLE COMPANY, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company; and,
KENNETH F. BENSON, individually,

Appellants,

STATE ENGINEER, OF NEVADA, OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER, DPEARTMENT OF CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE; and KOBEH VALLEY RANCH, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,

Respondents.

Case No. 63258 (Consolidated with Case No. 61324)

JOINT APPENDIX VOLUME 7

APPENDIX SUMMARY

Chronological Order by Filing Date

Document	Filing Date	Vol.	3MJA Page Nos.
Letter from State Engineer Approving 3M Plan	June 6, 2012	I	1
Petition for Judicial Review	July 5, 2012	I	2-35
Lisa Morlan's Affidavit of Service of Notice of Petition for Judicial Review and Petition for Judicial Review	July 18, 2012	I	36-38
State Engineer's Record on Appeal Vol. 1		I	39
Vol. 1 - SE ROA Summary SE ROA 39-42	August 3, 2012	I	39-42
Vol. 1 – SE ROA Conti. SE ROA 43-52		I	42-95
Vol. 1 – SE ROA Conti. SE ROA 53-132		II	96-175
Vol. 1 – SE ROA Conti. SE ROA 133-218			176-261
Vol. 1 – SE ROA Conti. SE ROA 219-249		IV	262-292
Vol. 1 – SE ROA Conti. SE ROA 250-251		V	293-294
State Engineer's Record on Appeal Vol. 2	A	V	295
Vol. 2 – SE ROA Summary SE ROA 295	August 3, 2012	V	295

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Document	Filing Date	Vol.	3MJA Page Nos.
Vol. 2 – SE ROA Conti. SE ROA 252-376	August 3, 2012	V	296-420
Vol. 2 – SE ROA Conti. SE ROA 377-448			421-492
State Engineer's Supplemental Record on Appeal		VI	493
Supplemental Record Summary SUP SE ROA	August 15, 2012	VI	493-495
Supplemental Record SUP SE ROA 1-29		VI	495-525
Kobeh Valley Ranch, LLC's Answer to Petition for Judicial Review	August 17, 2012	VI	526-531
Petitioners' Opening Brief	November 5, 2012	VI	532-576
Kobeh Valley Ranch's Answering Brief	Dec. 20, 2012	VI	577-610
State Engineer's Answering Brief	Dec. 20, 2012	VII	611-629
Petitioner's Reply Brief	February 1, 2013	VII	630-646
Transcript of Oral Argument	April 15, 2013	VII	647-719
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Note: 4057 Markea 12/21/2012

CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO Attorney General BRYAN L. STOCKTON 2 Nevada State Bar # 4764 3 Senior Deputy Attorney General 100 N. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701 (775) 684-1228 4 Attomeys for Respondents 5 IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 6 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF EUREKA 7 8 MICHEL AND MARGARET ANN ETCHEVERRY FAMIL, LP, a Nevada Registered Foreign Limited Partnership, DIAMOND CATTLE COMPANY, LLC, 9 a Nevada Limited Liability Company, 10 and KENNETH F. BENSON, an Nevada Office of the Attorney General 11 individual. Petitioners, Carson City, NV 89701-4717 100 North Carson Street CV 1207-178 12 Case No.: VS. 13 Dept. No.: Ш STATE ENINGEER OF NEVADA OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER, DIVISION OF WATER RESOUCES, 15 DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES. 16 Respondents. 17 **NEVADA STATE ENGINEER'S ANSWERING BRIEF** 18 Respondent, Jason King, P.E., Nevada State Engineer ("State Engineer"), by and 19 through his legal counsel, Attorney General CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, and Senior 20 Deputy Attorney General BRYAN L. STOCKTON, hereby files his Answering Brief. 21 22 Submitted this 20th day of December, 2012. 23 CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO Attorney General 24 25 By: BRYAN L. STOCKTON Serior Deputy Attorney General Nevada Bar No. 4764 26 27 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701 Tele: (775) 684-1228 28 Attornèys for Respondent

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. ISSUES ON APPEAL

- Did the State Engineer Delegate his Statutory Authority to Administer Water
 Rights in the State of Nevada?
- 2. Was the State Engineer's Decision to Approve the Monitoring, Management and Mitigation (3M) plan developed by Kobeh Valley Ranch, LLC and Eureka County Supported by Substantial Evidence?
 - 3. Is Requiring a 3M Plan Rulemaking?
 - 4. Is the 3M Plan too Vague or Inadequate to Satisfy Ruling 6127?
 - 5. Should the Court Redefine the terms "Conflict" and "Mitigation"?

II. FACTS

The State Engineer issued State Engineer's Ruling No. 6127, which approved applications for the use of groundwater in Kobeh Valley and also approved changes to existing water rights in Diamond Valley. In that ruling, the State Engineer found that "Because the groundwater flow model is only an approximation of a complex and partially understood flow system, the estimates of interbasin flow and drawdown cannot be considered absolute values." Ruling 6127 at 19. Recognizing that there cannot be absolute certainty in predicting potential impacts from the pumping of groundwater by the Mount Hope Mine project, the State Engineer required Kobeh Valley Ranch (KVR) to develop a Monitoring, Management and Mitigation plan (3M Plan) for the mine. The impacts from pumping by the mine are predicted to manifest over a period of years. It is expected that the monitoring element of the Plan will provide indicators of where impacts will appear before the impact actually occurs and allow time to implement specific and effective mitigation measures.

The purpose of the 3M Plan is to prevent conflicts with existing water rights as required by NRS 533.370(2). A conflict occurs when a senior water right cannot be used in full because of use by a junior appropriator. In the case that the junior uses by the mine do threaten to conflict with a senior water right holder, the 3M Plan requires the mine to mitigate

the affect by ensuring that the senior user has all water to which the senior user is entitled. This must be done at the sole expense of the mine as the junior user. The State Engineer does not specify how mitigation will occur, but gives the junior user the choice to stop pumping, find a way to provide water to the senior user, or reach some other settlement to the satisfaction of the senior user and the State Engineer.

The process to develop an acceptable 3M Plan took well over a year to complete and included significant input from Eureka County. The record contains at least three draft versions that were reviewed by various parties and the State Engineer prior to the final submittal. SEROA at 57, 75, and 108.

KVR submitted the final version of the plans, tables and maps on May 30, 2012. SEROA 5-30. The State Engineer approved the plan on June 6, 2012. Supp ROA 27. The 3M Plan allows the parties to monitor water resources in the area of the Mount Hope Mine and to manage the usage to avoid impacts to existing water rights. SEROA 12-14. If monitoring indicates that senior water rights will be impacted, the 3M Plan allows the parties to work within a framework to provide water to the senior right holder. SEROA 14-16.

The State Engineer did not rule that KVR could use its water rights in ways that conflict with those of senior users as suggested by Etcheverry. A conflict will exist if the senior user is not able to use its entire water right as a result of the junior user's pumping. In order to protect any senior water right holder, the State Engineer ruled that through monitoring, impacts can be detected before they happen and mitigation measures can be accomplished either through the 3M Plan or through an order of the State Engineer to ensure that the senior water rights are satisfied. If the senior rights are not satisfied, the State Engineer retains the authority to order pumping to cease. NRS 534.110 (6).

Noticeably absent from the plan is any indication that the State Engineer has relinquished any authority over the management of water rights in either Kobeh or Diamond Valley Hydrographic Basins. *See* generally, Ruling 6127.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The State Engineer is appointed by and is responsible to the Director of the Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and performs duties prescribed by law and by the Director of the Department. NRS 532.020, 532.110. His duties include administering the appropriation and management of Nevada's public water, both surface and ground water, under NRS Chapters 533 and 534.

Pursuant to NRS 533.450(9), "[t]he decision of the State Engineer shall be prima facie correct, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same." On appeal, the function of this Court is to review the evidence on which the State Engineer based his decision to ascertain whether the evidence supports the decision, and if so, the Court is bound to sustain the State Engineer's decision. *State Engineer v. Curtis Park*, 101 Nev. 30, 32, 692 P.2d 495, 497 (1985).

Review of a decision of the State Engineer is in the nature of an appeal and is, consequently, limited in nature. NRS 533.450(1) states in pertinent part:

Any person feeling himself aggrieved by any order or decision of the State Engineer, acting in person or through his assistants or the water commissioner, affecting his interests, when such order or decision relates to the administration of determined rights or is made pursuant to NRS 533.270 to 533.445, inclusive, may have the same reviewed by a proceeding for that purpose, insofar as may be in the nature of an appeal

The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions to mean that a petitioner does not have a right to de novo review or to offer additional evidence at the district court. *Revert v. Ray*, 95 Nev. 782, 786, 603 P.2d 262, 264 (1979). *See also Kent v. Smith*, 62 Nev. 30, 32, 140 P.2d 357, 358 (1943) (a court may construe a prior judgment, but cannot properly consider extrinsic evidence); *State Engineer v. Curtis Park*, 101 Nev. at 32, 692 P.2d at 497 (function of court is to review evidence relied upon and ascertain whether evidence supports order); *State Engineer v. Morris*, 107 Nev. 699, 701, 819 P.2d 203, 205 (1991) (court should not substitute its judgment for that of the State Engineer).

Purely legal issues or questions may be reviewed without deference to an agency determination. However, the agency's conclusions of law that are closely related to its view

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of the facts are entitled to deference and will not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Town of Eureka v. State Engineer, 108 Nev. 163, 826 P.2d 948 (1992). Likewise, an agency's view or interpretation of its statutory authority is persuasive, even if not controlling. State Engineer v. Morris. 107 Nev. at 701, 819 P.2d at 205 (quoting State v. State Engineer, 104 Nev. 709, 713, 766 P.2d 263, 266 (1988)). Any review of the State Engineer's interpretation of his legal authority must be made with the thought that "[a]n agency charged with the duty of administering an act is impliedly clothed with power to construe it as a necessary precedent to administrative action." Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Washoe County, 112 Nev. 743, 747, 918 P.2d 697, 700 (1996), citing State v. State Engineer, 104 Nev. at 713, 766 P.2d at 266 (1988).

IV. **ARGUMENT**

A. The State Engineer Did Not Delegate his Statutory Authority.

Etcheverry asserts repeatedly that the State Engineer delegated his authority to administer water to the "Water Advisory Committee" and "Technical Advisory Committee." EOB at 13-18. These arguments are made with no citations to the record and should be disregarded as unsupported. State Indus. Ins. System v. Buckley, 100 Nev. 376, 382, 682 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1984) ("[T]his Court has been supplied with two pages of conclusory arguments, lacking substantive citation to relevant authority, and failing to address the pivotal issues in the case. Under these circumstances, we decline to consider its assignments of error."). The arguments ignore the plain language of the 3M Plan:

- "The purpose of this 3M is to assist the NSE [Nevada State Engineer] in managing development of groundwater resources . . . to avoid adverse impacts to existing rights." SEROA 5.
- "The State Engineer has final authority over the 3M " SEROA 5.
- "Nothing herein limits or changes the NSE authority, and any Party can petition the NSE to consider any issue." SEROA 11.
- "Nothing herein seeks to limit, alter, modify or change the exclusive authority of the NSE to approve or modify the 3M." SEROA 11.

- "Additional measures will be implemented if a previous mitigation measure does not meet its intended purpose(s)." SEROA at 15.
- The 3M Plan sets aside \$250,000 initially and an additional \$750,000 early in the life of the mine for mitigation purposes and gives the State Engineer the authority to release these funds only upon a finding that "there is no longer a reasonable potential for future impacts" SEROA at 15.
- "Other measures as agreed to by the Parties and/or required by the NSE."
 SEROA at 16.

The names of the committees that are set up also show that they are not authoritative bodies. Both bodies are "Advisory Committees" to assist the State Engineer. The State Engineer has reserved all of his authority to manage all the waters in both Kobeh and Diamond Valleys. These arguments are frivolous on their face and should cause grave concern to the Court.

B. The Decision to approve the Monitoring, Management and Mitigation (3M) Plan was Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. *United Exposition Service Co. v. State Indus. Ins. System*, 109 Nev. 421, 424, 851 P.2d 423, 424 - 425 (1993) *State, Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels*, 102 Nev. 606, 608, 729 P.2d 497, 498 (1986).

The day to day management of water resources in Nevada is the responsibility of the State Engineer. NRS 532.110. The State Engineer employs engineers, water resource specialists, attorneys and hydrologists to assist him in these duties. NRS 532.090; 532.160. When the State Engineer determines the best method to execute his duties, deference from the Court should be at its highest. Where a power is conferred by statute, everything necessary to carry out that power and make it effectual and complete will be implied. *Checker, Inc v. Public Service Commission*, 84 Nev. 623, 630 (1968). In this case, Etcheverry provides only speculation that the plan will not work.

When the State Engineer determines that a specific, large-scale water use has the potential to need more intensive monitoring and management to avoid conflicting with

existing rights, he may require a 3M Plan, and KVR is not unique in this regard. In this case, the purpose of the committees established by the 3M Plan is to allow KVR, Eureka County, and the other parties to work through issues before they become a problem that requires action by the State Engineer. However, it is clear in the 3M Plan and as demonstrated above, the State Engineer retains his authority to administer these water rights in accordance with statutory constraints and his inherent authority.

Etcheverry argues that the 3M Plan is in error and does not rely on "legislative mandates" to determine whether there is a conflict or not. However, the State Engineer has consistently defined conflicts to be a situation wherein the senior user is not able to use his entire water right. There is no reason to deviate from this standard. The prior appropriation doctrine provides that one does not own the water itself, but rather one holds a usufructuary right to use water. *Desert Irr., Ltd. v. State*, 113 Nev. 1049, 1059, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (1997)("Indeed, even those holding certificated, vested, or perfected water rights do not own or acquire title to water. They merely enjoy the right to beneficial use."). Whether the senior user gets his water through his current diversion works or from works constructed as mitigation by a junior user, his water right is whole and the junior user is not in conflict with the senior right.

Etcheverry argues that the process will cause long delays if senior right holders must wait for committee action. The statement misstates the purpose of the Committees. They have been created to anticipate and deal with potential conflicts to avoid actual conflicts with water rights. SEROA at 7-9. If they fail in that mission, water right holders may petition the State Engineer to order compliance by the junior water right holder.

Etcheverry asks this Court to require the State Engineer to adopt specific mitigation measures before the nature and extent of any conflicts are even known. However, the goal of the 3M Plan is to monitor the response of surface and groundwater to pumping by the mine and manage pumping within the well field to avoid conflicts. If the effects of pumping cannot be managed to avoid conflicts, specific mitigation measures be developed by the committees or ordered by the State Engineer. General mitigation measures designated now

will not have the advantage of the data that will be gathered and provided regarding actual use in the future.

The issue of future impacts to the domestic well has been used by Etcheverry to demand specific mitigation measures. However, until the actual effects of pumping are known, the State Engineer cannot determine what to order. The well may need to be deepened and a new pump installed. Perhaps the mitigation measure would need to be a new well in a different location. For the Court to require the State Engineer to provide specific measures at this point would be to require the State Engineer to guess what the impacts will be. The guess would be based on the best currently available scientific information, however hydrology studies events that often occur far under the earth and the mitigation measures will be more effective if they are based on actual data gathered as the aquifer begins to be stressed by pumping.

C. The 3M Plan Applies to Only One Situation and Is Not Rulemaking.

The State Engineer is specifically exempted from the requirements of NRS 233B in the discharge of his duties. NRS 233B.039(1)(j) ("The following agencies are entirely exempted from the requirements of this chapter: . . . Except as otherwise provided in NRS 533.365, the Office of the State Engineer."). As the State Engineer is specifically exempted from the mandates of the Nevada Administrative Procedures, Petitioners must provide a reference to a specific law that would require the State Engineer to adopt the 3M Plan through rulemaking. However, they have only provided vague and conclusory statements to support their arguments, and have violated their duty of candor to this Court by failing to even acknowledge this mandatory authority which is contrary to their position.

The 3M Plan is designed to assist the State Engineer in the collection of data concerning the effects of water use by Kobeh Valley Ranch in the operation of the Mount Hope Mine. As such, it is not of general applicability, but applies only to the Mount Hope Mine project. "'Regulation' means: An agency rule, standard, directive or statement of general applicability which effectuates or interprets law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure or practice requirements of any agency." NRS 233B.038(1)(a). As

the 3M Plan applies only to the monitoring and management of water use in Kobeh and Diamond Valley Hydrographic Basins by one water user, no stretch of imagination, other than that possessed by the Petitioners, could view the 3M Plan as a rule of general applicability.

Etcheverry *cites Banegas v. State Indus. Ins. System*, 117 Nev. 222, 19 P.3d 245 (2001) for the proposition that the 3M Plan was "an impermissible delegation of authority." *Banegas* was an unmarried cohabitant who relied on the decedent for financial support until his work-related death. She applied for death benefits as a dependent. *Id.* at 223, 19 P.3d at 246. In *Banegas*, the court noted that:

One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to any other body or authority. See Nev. Const. Art. 3, § 1. However, the Legislature may authorize administrative agencies to make rules and regulations supplementing legislation if the power given is prescribed in terms sufficiently definite to serve as a guide in exercising that power. See Sheriff v. Luqman, 101 Nev. 149, 153-54, 697 P.2d 107, 110-11 (1985).

Id. at 227, 19 P.3d at 248. The court held that in that case, Banegas' interpretation of the statute would lead to an "invalid delegation of legislative power . . . would compromise the constitutionality of the statute. Id. (Citations omitted). The first weakness of this argument as applied to this case is that the administration of water rights in the State of Nevada is an executive function and not a legislative function.

The second and most important distinction lies in the contradictory arguments made by Etcheverry. In Section VI.A., they argue that the "3m Plan sets forth an arduous, lengthy, and circular process . . ." for mitigating impacts on water rights. EOB at 10. In Section VI.D., they argue that the 3M Plan must be established through the much more arduous and slow process of rulemaking. See, NRS 233B.0395 – NRS 233B.105. The management of individual water rights through the rulemaking process is in direct opposition to the legislative direction that gives the State Engineer the authority to carry out these executive functions. NRS 532.110. If individual water rights had to be managed through the rulemaking process, the process would render nearly all of NRS 533 and 534 completely irrelevant.