## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JEMAR MATTHEWS,

Appellant,

Respondent,

Supreme Court No. 62241 Electronically Filed

Aug 14 2013 01:52 p.m. Tracie K. Lindeman

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX of Supreme Court

**VOLUME VI** 

## APPELLANT'S INDEX VOLUME VI

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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on the 12th day of August, 2013, a true and copy of above and foregoing APPELANTS APPENDIX VOL. VI was served on all counsel via the Court's electronic filing system to all counsel of record listed below:

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/s/ William H. Gamage, Esq.

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1	
1	You may not form or express any opinion on
2	any subject connected with this case until it is finally
3	submitted to you.
4	We'll be in recess for ten minutes. Thank
5	you.
6	(Jury not present)
7	(Off-record colloquy)
8	THE COURT: Record should reflect we're
9	outside the presence of the jury. At this time this is
10	probably a good point.
11	There needs to be no outbursts, no emotion
12	in the audience during this testimony. It's important
13	that that be honored. Understood? Thank you.
14	We're in recess. Sorry.
15	(Court recessed at 11:55 a.m. until 12:07 p.m.)
16	(Jury not present)
17	THE COURT: And you want to do it now?
18	MR. BATEMAN: Please.
19	THE COURT: All right, let's go on the
20	MR. BATEMAN: But before that, Your Honor
21	THE COURT: Yes.
22	MR. BATEMAN: Are we on the record?
23	THE COURT: Yes.
24	MR. BATEMAN: We have one photo that was an
25	issue about whether

1	(Off-record colloquy)
2	THE COURT: We're on the record in
3	C228460
4	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Shhh.
5	THE COURT: State of Nevada, plaintiff,
	versus Pierre Joshlin and Jamar Matthews.
6	
7	Record should reflect we're outside the
8	presence of the jury, all counsel present with
9	Mr. Matthews and Mr. Joshlin.
10	Mr. Bateman.
11	MR. BATEMAN: It's my understanding there
12	was some after speaking with your clerk that there
13	was some issue about whether 156, our proposed exhibit
14	which is a photograph has been admitted. It's my belief
15	that it was admitted during Stephanie Smith's testimony.
16	It's a picture of the Colt .45 that's found in the
17	vehicle and that shows the jammed cartridges.
18	THE COURT: Any objection?
19	MR. BATEMAN: Does anybody have any
20	objection to just admitting this?
21	MR. FIGLER: No.
22	MR. BATEMAN: I mean, if it hadn't if for
23	some reason it hadn't been?
24	THE CLERK: Thank you. I'm sorry.
25	THE COURT: 156 is in then. All right.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 156 admitted) 1 THE COURT: Mr. Matthews, let's start with 2 Mr. Matthews, you have some important 3 constitutional rights that I must explain to you. 4 Under the right -- you have the right under 5 the Constitution of the United States and under the 6 Constitution of the State of Nevada not to be compelled 7 to testify in case. Do you understand that? 8 DEFENDANT MATTHEWS: Yes, sir. 9 THE COURT: You may if you wish give up that 10 right and take the witness stand and testify. If you 11 do, you'll be subject to cross-examination by the 12 13 District Attorney or anything -- and anything that you may say be it on direct or cross-examination will be the 14 15 subject of fair comment when the District Attorney speaks to the jury in its final argument. 16 17 understand that? DEFENDANT MATTHEWS: Yes, sir. 18 19 THE COURT: If you choose not to testify, the Court will not permit the District Attorney to make 20 21 any comments to the jury concerning that fact that you have not testified. Do you understand that? 22 DEFENDANT MATTHEWS: Yes, sir. 23 If you elect not to testify, the THE COURT: 24 25 Court will instruct the jury only if your attorney

specifically requests as follows: 1 The law does not compel a defendant in a 2 criminal case to take the stand and testify, and no 3 presumption may be raised and no inference of any kind 4 may be drawn from the failure of the defendant to 5 testify. Do you understand that? 6 DEFENDANT MATTHEWS: Yes, sir. 7 THE COURT: Do you have any questions that 8 you would like to ask me about your rights? 9 10 DEFENDANT MATTHEWS: No, sir. THE COURT: Have you conferred with your --11 both of your attorneys regarding your decisions and your 12 rights against self-incrimination? 13 DEFENDANT MATTHEWS: Yes, sir. 14 THE COURT: Has there been a decision on 15 whether he will testify or not to testify? 16 I will not testify. DEFENDANT MATTHEWS: 17 MR. FIGLER: That's correct, Your Honor. 18 MR. BUNIN: That's right. 19 THE COURT: Do you wish that instruction to 20 be given? 21 MR. FIGLER: Yes, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Further, under NRS 175.171 you 23 are requesting the instruction be given? Is that my 24 understanding? 25

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1
               MR. FIGLER: We are requesting the
   instruction --
2
               THE COURT: All right.
3
               MR. FIGLER: -- to be given.
4
               THE COURT: Has that been made a package of
5
   the proposed instructions --
6
7
               MR. FIGLER: Yes, it has.
               THE COURT: -- that have been prepared by
8
                     Again, any questions at all of me or
9
   you? All right.
   of your attorneys at this point regarding your rights?
10
               DEFENDANT MATTHEWS:
                                    No, sir.
11
               MR. FIGLER: Have a seat.
12
13
               THE COURT: All right. Mr. Joshlin, I'm
   going to have to do the same exact thing with you, sir.
14
               You have a right under the Constitution of
15
   the United States and under the Constitution of the
16
   State of Nevada not to be compelled to testify in this
17
          Do you understand that?
18
   case.
               DEFENDANT JOSHLIN: I understand that.
19
               THE COURT: You may if you wish give up that
20
   right and take the witness stand and testify. If you
21
   do, you'll be subject to cross-examination by the
22
   District Attorney, and anything that you say may on
23
   direct or cross-examination be subject of fair comment
24
25
   when the District Attorney speaks to the jury during
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1	final arguments. Do you understand that?
2	DEFENDANT JOSHLIN: (Indiscernible).
3	THE COURT: If you choose not to testify,
4	the Court will not permit the District Attorney to make
5	any comments to the jury concerning the fact that you
6	have not testified. Do you understand that?
7	DEFENDANT JOSHLIN: Yes, sir, I do.
8	THE COURT: If you elect not to testify, the
9	Court will instruct the jury only if your attorney
10	specifically requests as follows:
11	The law does not compel a defendant in a
12	criminal case to take the stand and testify, and no
13	presumption may be raised and no inference of any kind
14	may be drawn from the failure of the defendant to
15	testify. Do you understand that?
16	DEFENDANT JOSHLIN: Yes, I do, sir.
17	THE COURT: Do you have any questions of me
18	or of your attorney, Mr. Singer, regarding your rights?
19	DEFENDANT JOSHLIN: (Indiscernible).
20	THE COURT: Do you request Mr. Singer do
21	you gentlemen request that instruction be given as well
22	as part of the proposed package of instructions?
23	MR. SINGER: Yes, we do.
24	THE COURT: All right. Anything further
25	with regard to the rights, gentlemen?

1	DEFENDANT JOSHLIN: No, sir.
2	DEFENDANT MATTHEW: No, sir.
3	THE COURT: I want to make sure everything's
4	on the record.
5	MS. LEWIS: I'm sorry, Judge. I didn't get
6	that. Is Defendant Joshlin testifying or not?
7	THE COURT: He's
8	DEFENDANT JOSHLIN: No. I'm not, sir.
9	THE COURT: He's indicating that he
10	MS. LEWIS: Okay. And they want the
11	instruction as well? Okay.
12	THE COURT: Both want the instruction, both
13	have elected not to testify.
14	The record should reflect also a conference
15	at the bench regarding the question that was asked that
16	the question that that that final question that was
17	asked regarding the ten cartridges was agreed to in the
18	form I asked.
19	Is that correct, Mr. Singer? You just said
20	stay away from the crime scene.
21	MR. SINGER: Right. And that you told the
22	jury that you read, modified or asked it, and they
23	should listen to it in your form.
24	THE COURT: Right. Is that a correct
25	statement?

MR. SINGER: Right. 1 THE COURT: All right. And I've marked --2 for the record, I've had that marked as Court's Exhibit 3 No. 2. 4 MR. SINGER: And did you -- you just left it 5 as it was written? 6 THE COURT: I left the question -- it's not 7 8 going back to the jury. 9 MR. SINGER: Right. THE COURT: I've left the question as 10 written, but the record will reflect --11 That it was asked differently. MR. SINGER: 12 THE COURT: -- that it was asked differently 13 14 as you have requested. 15 MR. SINGER: Thank you. Is that acceptable? THE COURT: 16 MR. SINGER: Yes. 17 THE COURT: All right. I just want the 18 record to be clear. 19 20 MR. FIGLER: And just in case the record wasn't clear before, Judge, we had audience members 21 throughout the course of the proceeding here on both 22 sides, apparently there was something that happened 23 between them on day one, apparently that was satisfied. 24 I've been noting small sighs and cries, and 25

I think that's to be expected on some level. They've been growing in intensity. I didn't make note of it I believe yesterday, and I believe that somebody said something to someone.

Be that as it may, today it kind of came to a boil during the testimony of Mr. Krylo who in describing the bullet -- and that was the time of the record when I asked for a bench conference when he was describing the bullet that we all know to be retrieved from Ms. Williams' autopsy.

That there was an outburst from what appears to be the people who have been sitting on the prosecution side who, ostensibly, are relatives and family members and supporters of Ms. Williams. They were either asked to leave or left on their own accord.

And upon leaving the courtroom I heard,
Mr. Singer heard, Ms. Kilpatrick (phonetic) who is in
the audience heard words to the affect of they killed my
baby as she was leave being the courtroom, and we were
up -- headed up towards the bench. It's inappropriate.

I can't assign that to the State on any level. It was what happened at the prelim. It's what's happening here. I ask that they be admonished.

24 | Your Honor did admonish them.

If there is yet another outburst during this

witness' testimony, I think I have to renew an objection 1 2 for the record, and I'm not sure what the remedy would be at that point. 3 THE COURT: I understand. The record's 4 5 made. I, frankly, did not hear those words. MR. BATEMAN: Neither did the State. 6 THE COURT: I have instructed 7 Officer Reichert to be on guard. We have admonished --8 I know. 9 MR. FIGLER: THE COURT: -- the audience, and we're just 10 taking all precautions that we have -- that we can. 11 State, is there anything further? 12 I just want to have this MS. LEWIS: Yeah. 13 14 document marked as a Court exhibit. It's a two-page It's a DNA results in this particular case. 15 And only because we discussed DNA earlier, I 16 (indiscernible) have it marked as a Court exhibit so 17 that it's part of the record. 18 And I just ask the Court to note or I'll 19 just say for the record there's a signature on those 20 documents that belongs to a woman by the name of 21 22 Kelly Gatiae (phonetic) who I now know as the person who performed the DNA analysis in this case. 23 That's the same signature that exists on 24 some of the seals on some of the State's exhibits that 25

were referenced, specifically when Mr. Singer questioned 1 one of the witnesses about is this your seal, is this 2 your signature, and there was Stephanie Smith 3 specifically testified she didn't recognize the 4 That was the signature she was referencing. signature. 5 THE COURT: And we can have that marked as a 6 Court exhibit. We've litigated this. It's my 7 understanding that this information was not provided to the defense. 9 MR. FIGLER: Correct. I just have an 10 objection that even be made part of the record, but I'll 11 submit it, Your Honor. 12. THE COURT: All right. 13 MS. LEWIS: Well, Judge, it's not --14 MR. SINGER: I (indiscernible). 15 MS. LEWIS: -- that it wasn't provided to the 16 It was provided when it was available. 17 defense. Unfortunately, because of the continuances 18 requested by the defense, the State didn't get the 19 buccal swabs that were needed in order to perform the 20 testing in a timely fashion. We requested a continuance 21 on that basis and the Court denied that request. 22 THE COURT: Well, based upon the fact that 23 there was a 60-day rule invoked, the decision was made. 24 That's correct. 25 Yes.

MR. BATEMAN: And then just, also, I think 1 we ought to refrain -- and I don't see why we would ask 2 If defense counsel were to ask anything about we 3 don't know who the seal was and it could have been 4 tampered with, I mean, I would ask that, you know, that 5 can't be mentioned in closing argument because it's, you 6 know, it's already been ruled inadmissible, so --7 8 THE COURT: Is that anticipated? MR. SINGER: (Indiscernible). No, it's not. 9 10 It's not anticipated (indiscernible) ask it. THE COURT: All right. All right. 11 MR. SINGER: That's marked --12 THE COURT: Is there anything else? 13 MR. SINGER: So that's marked for 14 identification only. 15 Yes. It's not going back to the THE COURT: 16 17 jury. All right. Anything else to come before the Court? 18 MR. FIGLER: Oh, that was one other thing, 19 and I quess we could just make sure before. There was 20 one exhibit, the gun-residue sample kits, that were not 21 admitted should not go back to the jury either. I think 22 it was 163 or something like that. 23 THE COURT: If they're not admitted, they 24 don't go back to the jury. 25

1	MR. FIGLER: Okay. Just double-checking.
2	MS. LEWIS: And the record should reflect
3	there are numerous exhibits that were marked and not
4	admitted, so
5	MR. FIGLER: Okay. That's fine.
6	MS. LEWIS: those weren't the only ones.
7	MR. FIGLER: Right. Just want to make sure
8	164 doesn't go back. That's all.
9	THE COURT: Understood.
10	MR. FIGLER: Thank you, Judge.
11	THE CLERK: 164 is not admitted.
12	MR. FIGLER: Great.
13	THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else?
14	All right.
15	THE CLERK: I do have one thing, Your Honor.
16	Just on the record, I did get a list of the unadmitted
17	exhibits (indiscernible).
18	MS. LEWIS: That's right, Judge. We did
19	confer with the clerk, and we believe that all of our
20	exhibits have been admitted, that we want admitted have
21	been admitted.
22	THE COURT: Okay.
23	MS. LEWIS: Thank you.
24	(Off-record colloquy)
25	THE COURT: You promised me 1:00 o'clock,

- 1	
1	gentlemen, right?
2	MR. FIGLER: He's here at 1:00, our witness.
3	THE COURT: Okay. Any time before 1:00
4	because we
5	MR. FIGLER: I told him to get here as quick
6	as he could before 1:00 so that he would be here at 1:00
7	for sure, so he might show up a little early. If he
8	does, I'll alert the Court.
9	I believe this witness, her direct is
10	probably going to take about 20 minutes to go through.
11	There's going to be very limited cross if hardly any.
12	We already put her through it the first time, and we got
13	nowhere. She's solid.
14	(Off-record colloquy)
15	THE BAILIFF: Jury's present, please.
16	Your Honor, panel's present.
17	THE COURT: Thank you.
18	Record should reflect we're back on the
19	record on C228460, State of Nevada versus Pierre Joshlin
20	and Jamar Matthews.
21	Will counsel stipulate to the presence of
22	the jury?
23	MS. LEWIS: Yes, Judge.
24	MR. FIGLER: Yes, Your Honor.
25	MR. SINGER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You may continue with your 1 2 witness. Have we sworn? ALANE OLSON, PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS, SWORN 3 THE WITNESS: I do. 4 THE CLERK: You may be seated. Please state 5 your full name for the record, spelling your last name 6 for us. 7 8 THE WITNESS: My name is Alane Olson. Μv first name is spelled A-1-a-n-e. My last name is 9 spelled O-1-s-o-n. 10 THE CLERK: Thank you. 11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 12 BY MS. LEWIS: 13 How are you employed? 14 I'm employed as a medical examiner at the Clark 15 County Coroner's Office. 16 And how long have you been so employed? 17 I've worked in Las Vegas for just under two 18 19 years. 20 Okay. And prior to working for the Las Vegas Clark County Coroner's Office, did you work elsewhere as 21 a medical examiner? 2.2. Yes, I did. 23 Α. And how long have you been a medical examiner or 24 a doctor? 25

- I graduated from medical school in 1994, and I have worked as a medical examiner for just under seven years.
- Okay. And do you have special skills that allow 4 you to be a medical examiner? 5
  - I have special skills and training which Yes. enable me to carry out my job.
  - Okay. And what are some of the training that you've received that allows you to perform those duties?
  - I have an undergraduate degree from the
- University Idaho. I went to medical school at the University of Nevada School of Medicine. After that I 12
- moved to Portland, Oregon, and spent five years at 13
- Oregon Health and Sciences University in a pathology 14
- 15 residency program which included training in anatomic
- pathology as well as clinical pathology. 16
- Following that I moved to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 17
- and spent one year at the Milwaukee County Medical 18
- Examiner's Office in a forensic pathology fellowship 19
- program, and then I was able to go out and get a real 20
- 21 job.

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- All right. And since you've been working for the 22
- Clark County Coroner's Office, you have occasion to 23
- perform autopsies? 24
- Yes, I do. 25 Α.

- 1 Q. And how many autopsies have you performed total
  2 in your career?
  - A. It would be somewhere around 2,000.
- Q. When you perform an autopsy, do you also prepare a report in conjunction with the autopsy that you're performing at that time?
- 7 | A. Yes.

- Q. Okay. I want to direct your attention to an autopsy performed on the body of Mercy Alesa Williams (phonetic). Do you recall performing that autopsy?
- 11 A. Yes, I do.
- Q. And when you performed that autopsy, was the body of Mercy Alesa Williams identified to you by a Clark
- 14 | County Coroner number?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. And do you recall what that number was?
- 17 A. Yes. The number was 06 dash 07629.
- Q. Okay. And is that the same number that you also
- 19 would use in your report that you finally prepared?
- 20 A. Yes, it is.
- 21 Q. Okay. I want to show you --
- MS. LEWIS: May approach, Judge?
- 23 THE COURT: Yes.
- 24 BY MS. LEWIS:
- 25 Q. I've previously shown to defense counsel, showing

you what's been marked as State's Proposed Exhibits 98 1 2 and 102. Do you recognize those photographs? Yes, I do. 3 Α. 4 Q. And are those photographs that were taken in 5 conjunction with the autopsy that you performed? 6 Α. Yes. And do you recall the day that you 7 Okav. performed that specific autopsy? 8 It was October 1st of 2006. 9 10 0. And do those photographs fairly and accurately depict the autopsy as you viewed it at that time? 11 12 The portions depicted in these photographs are fair and accurate. 13 14 MS. LEWIS: Judge, I'd move for the admission of State's Proposed 98 and 102. 15 16 THE COURT: Any objection? MR. FIGLER: Submit it, Judge. 17 18 MR. SINGER: No, Judge. THE COURT: They're admitted. 19 (Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 98 and 102 admitted) 20 MS. LEWIS: Okay. Permission to publish? 21 THE COURT: 22 Yes. BY MS. LEWIS: 23 And when you perform an autopsy, what is it that 24 you are looking for? What do you do when you first are 25

viewing a body?

X

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A. An autopsy examination consists of two basic components. There's an external examination which consists of a general appraisal of the body, how tall is this person, how much do they weigh, what color is their hair, what color are their eyes, do they have any marks, scars and tattoos, have they had any resuscitation efforts from medical personnel, and also we look for evidence of injury and natural disease.

The second part of an autopsy consists of actually open up the -- opening up the body cavities, so an incision is made. It's a Y-shaped incision. It goes from the shoulders onto the central chest, and then continues down across the abdomen.

The body wall is pulled to the side. The rib cage is taken off in the front, and we have the opportunity to examine the organs as they sit in the body.

We then describe any changes that might be present in the organs and the body cavities, and we take the organs out one by one and examine them, again, looking for natural disease as well as injuries.

We also examine the contents of the head, and that's accomplished by performing an incision across the top of the head from ear to ear. The front portion of

this scalp is pulled forward over the face. The back portion is pulled backwards toward the neck.

The top portion of the skull is then removed and we can examine the brain. Again, we look as the brain is sitting inside the head to see if there's any evidence of natural disease or injury, and then the brain is taken out and further examined.

During the course of an autopsy we also collect specimens. This consists of toxicology specimens which is usually blood, urine, if it's available, and vitreous which is the fluid in the eye.

We make take additional specimens if there are questions about drug use. And if there are, for example, injuries consisting of bullet wounds and there are missiles still present within the body, then we recover those as well during the course of the autopsy.

- Q. So all of these things that you've just described that you look for and that you perform during the course of an autopsy, are you ultimately looking for a conclusion as to the cause and manner of death?
  - A. Yes.

- Q. And basically you do an external exam and then you do a more detailed internal examination, is that right?
  - A. Yes. That's correct.

During the external examination of the body of 1 Mercy Williams, what, if any, did you note of her body? 2 MR. FIGLER: I think it's a little vague 3 question, Judge. 4 MS. LEWIS: Oh, I'm sorry. Did I leave 5 something out? 6 BY MS. LEWIS: 7 During the external examination of 8 Mercy Williams' body what, if any, injuries did you note 10 on her body? Thank you. On her body surfaces I noted that 11 there was a gunshot entry wound. It was on the left 12 side of her forehead, above the left eye and about 13 midway between her eye brow and her hairline. 14 Okay. And that was readily apparent as you 15 performed the external examination? 16 Yes, it was. 17 Did you still go to the extent of removing the 18 outer skin layer as you described in performing an 19 internal examination as well on that area of the body? 20 I did, in fact, look at her brain directly. 21 Yes. And aside from that particular injury to 22 the head, did you note any other injuries to the body of 23 24 Mercy Williams?

A. No, I did not.

Q. And the exhibits that I've shown you, 98 and 102, can you tell us what they are? 98.

A. State's Exhibit 98 consists of a photograph which was taken. It depicts a label which is attached to a blue body bag. The label contains the Case No. 06-7629. It also contains a name.

When she arrived at the coroner's office, she still had not been definitively identified, so she is listed as Jane, open quotes, "Balzar, B-a-l-z-a-r", closed quotes, Doe. It also lists the date and the time when death was pronounced and certain other information is as in she's a black female and the name of the Clark County Coroner's Office investigator who was responsible for conducting the investigation.

- Q. And that's the tag that was on the bag that the body was contained in; is that right?
- A. Yes. And let me asked add because I forgot it, in that photograph there's also a blue plastic seal.

  The body bag was received in our office sealed, and the seal was broken prior to the commencement of the autopsy
- 21 to allow photography and processing.
- Q. Okay. And State's Exhibit 102, what is depicted in that photograph?
- A. State's Exhibit No. 102 is a photograph which was taken of Mercy's Williams' face, specifically

concentrating on the left forehead. There is a 1 triangular-shaped photo scale in this photograph, and 2 caught within the arms of that photo scale is the entry 3 gunshot wound. 4 MR. FIGLER: And, Your Honor, instead of 5 handing it to the jurors, if it would be possible to do 6 it like we used to do and just kind of walk it by the 7 jurors. I think that might be --8 THE COURT: She -- you have permission to 9 10 publish if you --MS. LEWIS: Thank you. 11 BY MS. LEWIS: 12 And when you performed the internal examination 13 of that area, did you note any specific injuries or any 14 specifics with regards to that specific gunshot injury 15 to the head? 16 17 Α. Yes, I did. And what were those findings that you made? 18 Q.

A. I found that the bullet passed through the skin of the forehead as well as the skull. It then went through the brain from left to right, and it ended up in the right back of the head above and behind the right ear. There was a fracture or the skull was broken in that area.

25

The bullet had not exited, but rather was found

just beneath those broken fragments of skull, and the primary observations had to do with the fact that the bullet actually went all the way through her brain.

- Q. Okay. And what if anything was done with that bullet fragment?
- A. I collected the bullet fragment and turned it over to a crime scene analyst from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department.
- Q. And can you tell -- could you tell at that time what path that bullet had entered and exited?
- A. I could tell the path. The bullet did not exit, in fact, but it passed from left to right, from front to back and slightly upward.
- Q. And what was the ultimate conclusion that you made with regards to the cause and manner of death?
- A. Her cause of death was listed as a gunshot wound to the head, and the manner of death was listed as homicide.
  - Q. Thank you.

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- MS. LEWIS: I'll pass the witness.
- 21 THE COURT: Cross.
- MR. FIGLER: Your Honor, we never disputed
- 23 | the cause of death here, so we don't have any questions
- 24 | for this witness.
- 25 THE COURT: Mr. Singer.

```
MR. SINGER:
                             No more questions for this
1
2
   witness, Judge. Thank you.
                THE COURT: May this witness step down?
3
                MS. LEWIS:
                            Yes, Judge.
4
                THE COURT:
                            All right.
                                        Thank you for your
5
   testimony, Doctor.
6
7
                              Thank you, Your Honor.
                THE WITNESS:
                THE COURT:
                            State, call your next witness.
8
                            Judge, the State has no
9
                MS. LEWIS:
   additional witnesses to call. At this time the State
10
   would rest.
11
                THE COURT: State now rests.
12
                Ladies and gentlemen, it is now time for
13
   defense case.
14
15
                Do you want to take a short recess --
                MR. FIGLER: Yeah. I'm kind of a little
16
   earlier than I thought it would be, so I guess there's
17
   some exhibits that I'm going to grab those back from the
18
19
   jurors.
                (Indiscernible) wanted to check and see if
20
   we have (indiscernible), Judge?
21
                THE COURT: Yes.
22
                MR. FIGLER:
                            Thanks.
23
                             Judge, prior to the defense's
                MR. SINGER:
24
   case, I want to just reserve the right to make motions
25
```

that are supposed to come directly after the State's 1 I know, procedurally, we're going to go directly 2 to the defense case. 3 THE COURT: Let's take a short break, then. 4 It's your duty not to converse among 5 yourselves or with anyone else on any subject connected 6 with this trial. 7 Further, you may not read, watch or listen 8 to any report of or commentary on this trial from any 9 medium of information including, without limitation, to 10 the newspaper, television or radio. 11 You may not form or express any opinion on 12 any subject connected with this case until it is finally 13 submitted to you. 14 We'll be in recess for approximately ten 15 minutes. 16 17 Record should reflect that Mr. Figler and Mr. Bunin have stepped out. 18 (Jury not present) 19 THE COURT: We're back on the record outside 20 the presence of the jury. I excused the jury based upon 21 the request of Mr. Singer. He has motions. 22 23 Mr. Singer. MR. FIGLER: And we got priority to have him 24 haul butt to get over here, Judge. 25

THE COURT: Okay. 1 Judge, I have a motion to MR. SINGER: 2 dismiss the specific counts that referred to Maurice 3 Hickman. No evidence whatsoever was produced 4 (indiscernible) as to Maurice Hickman. Obviously, 5 Maurice Hickman didn't testify today. 6 And the cumulative testimony of the other 7 two people at that scene which was Michel'le Tolefree 8 and Myniece Cook didn't provide anything whatsoever that 9 the jury could even speculate or maybe even cause them 10 to speculate, but not even that much. 11 All she -- all they said was that they drove 12 to his house. They called on the cell phone to have him 13 meet them outside. They never said that he did meet him 14 They never said anything about where 15 Maurice Hickman was, and we didn't have him here to 16 confirm anything. 17 He wasn't at the preliminary hearing either. 18 So he's an invisible man as far as this case as been, 19 and I don't think that the jury should be able to 20 consider attempted murder counts against Pierre Joshlin 21 on no evidence whatsoever. 22 MS. LEWIS: Well, Judge, I would disagree 23 with Mr. Figler's (sic) representation of what the --24 MR. SINGER: Singer. 25

1	MS. LEWIS: the evidence
2	THE COURT: Mr. Singer.
3	MR. SINGER: Figler's over there.
4	MS. LEWIS: I'm sorry. Mr. Singer's
5	THE COURT: And I think for the record,
6	we're referring to Count V?
7	MR. SINGER: Yes, Judge.
8	MS. LEWIS: I would
9	THE COURT: Yes.
10	MS. LEWIS: disagree with Mr. Singer's
11	recollection of the evidence. Both Myniece Cook and
12	Michel'le Tolefree specifically testified that Maurice
13	Hickman and them and Mercy Williams were all standing
14	outside in front of that house that evening.
15	As for as I know there's no law, case law,
16	statute or otherwise that says that a person has to be
17	here in court to testify in order to be labelled as a
18	victim, and so I don't see any reason why on those
19	reasons that count should be dismissed.
20	THE COURT: I believe
21	MS. LEWIS: I think there was evidence. It
22	should be up to the jury at this point.
23	THE COURT: I believe Myniece Cook and
24	.Michel'le Tolefree did testify that Maurice Hickman was
25	present with them in front of the house visiting I think

was the phrase before shots were fired. Based upon that 1 fact, I deny your motion to dismiss Count V. I think 2 3 there's sufficient evidence to support sending that count to the jury. 4 MR. FIGLER: For the record, Judge, we'll 5 join in in Mr. Singer's motion. 6 THE COURT: I understand. 7 Are there any other motions to come before 8 us at this time? Any other motions to come before the 9 10 Court at this time? Are we just waiting for your witness? 11 The only thing I would note, 12 MR. BATEMAN: they have I believe notices of one witness. I don't 13 14 know if that's the only --MR. FIGLER: That's the only one. 15 MR. BATEMAN: -- they intend on calling. 16 haven't received any witness notices from Mr. Singer. I 17 don't know if he's intending on calling anybody because 18 we are breaking at 2:00 today. 19 I don't see any reason why we can't be done 20 pretty early, and, obviously, we need to talk about jury 21 instructions, so I would just inquire as to whether 22 Mr. Singer intends to call anyone. 23 MR. SINGER: Not at this time, Judge. 24 THE COURT: All right. Let's do jury 25

```
instructions, then, gentlemen and --
1
               MR. FIGLER: That sounds great.
2
               THE COURT: -- lady.
3
                     (Off-record colloquy)
4
               THE COURT: You quys better have these
5
   worked out.
6
               MR. BUNIN: We're a lot closer than normal.
7
               THE COURT: Well, that's good.
8
               MR. BUNIN: It shouldn't be too bad.
9
               MR. BATEMAN: Judge, with your 20-plus years
10
   of experience and jury instructions --
11
               THE COURT: Give me a break, Bateman.
12
                      (Off-record colloquy)
13
               THE COURT: How many instructions,
14
15
   approximately, are we looking at?
                      (Off-record colloquy)
16
               MR. BATEMAN: Probably somewhere -- oh.
17
                     (Off-record colloquy)
18
               MR. FIGLER: Judge, we decided with your
19
20
   permission --
               THE COURT: Okay. We're still on the
21
   record.
22
               MR. FIGLER: -- is if we leave the amended
23
   information in the jury instructions because it usually
24
25
   is.
```

```
THE COURT: Record should reflect that
1
2
   Mr. Singer's not present.
               MR. BATEMAN: All right. We'll wait.
3
               MR. FIGLER: We'll wait. Just to save a
4
5
   little time.
                THE COURT: And I fully appreciate that.
6
                Oh, Danny, after we settle instructions, I
7
   want each member of the jury to have a copy of the
8
   instructions as well for tomorrow.
9
10
                     (Off-record colloquy)
        (Off the record at 12:40 p.m. until 1:10 p.m.)
11
                     (Off-record colloguy)
12
                THE COURT: We're back on the record in
13
   C228460, State of Nevada, plaintiff, versus
14
   Pierre Joshlin and Jamar Matthews.
15
                Record should reflect that we had some
16
   technical difficulties. We're now back on the record
17
   appropriately, all counsel present with clients outside
18
19
   the presence of the jury.
20
                State has requested a proffer of proof on
   the witness.
21
22
                Mr. Figler.
                MR. FIGLER:
                             Thank you, Your Honor.
23
   defense intends to call its one and only witness
24
   Richard Franky who was appointed a couple -- I guess
25
```

about a month ago in this particular case by the State to aid us in this investigation.

Mr. Franky was directed to find any public records that would support that Mr. Jamar Matthews, Jamar D. Matthews, would have had cause to be in that neighborhood, Jimmy, on the day in question, and how he would also have some concern if the police are there because he might have been in violation of the law being at that location at that time.

To that end, Mr. Franky, was able to procure four public record documents. Number one record document is a certificate of live birth. It references a child whose name is Jamar Demon Matthews, junior to a Ronanda Renee Jones (phonetic). That is of 2 -- I'm sorry, March 3rd, 2005, is when the child was born.

There is no father's name listed on there, but we indicate that Jamar Demon Matthews is the name of the defendant. To prove that Jamar Demon Matthews is the name of the defendant, we have procured his Nevada identification card. His Nevada identification card identifies him as Jamar Demon Matthews.

Finally, Judge, there was a restraining order against -- oh, and also, the live birth address, the address of the mother, is listed at 1301 Jimmy Street.

On the restraining order number one, there 1 is a restraining order against Mr. Matthews to stay away 2 from Ms. Jones and her son that was in effect. 3 address given was 1301 Jimmy Street. That was in effect 4 from 4/07/06 to 4/25/06. However, it was extended to 5 include 4/25/06 to 4/25/07 which encompasses the date of 6 the offense. 7 So the offer of proof and the relevance, 8 Your Honor, is that Mr. Matthews had a son living there. 9 10 He was ordered to stay away. He was in the vicinity when the police came. 11 He didn't want to be arrested for the misdemeanor 12 offense of domestic violence, so he ran and hid from the 13 police, and that would be the offer of proof. 14 THE COURT: State. 15 MR. BATEMAN: The only thing I would note, I 16 17 assume --MR. FIGLER: TPO violation. Not domestic 18 violence, I'm sorry. 19 MR. BATEMAN: I assume they're making a 20 motion under the public records exception --21 THE COURT: It's certified. 22 MR. BATEMAN: -- to the hearsay. 23 24 object necessarily to that. The problem I have with the TPO is generally 25

when we're prosecuting people for violation of TPO 1 orders, we're required to actually show that the 2 defendant or the person that's subject to the TPO got 3 notice. There's nothing in this particular document 4 that was ever served on the defendant, so I don't know 5 how the defendant would have any idea whether there was 6 a TPO against him. 7 DEFENDANT MATHEWS: Because I went to 8 9 court --10 MR. FIGLER: Hey, hey, hey, hey. MR. BUNIN: Don't say anything. 11 I also have certified records 12 MR. FIGLER: of his court appearance on the matter, Your Honor; 13 however, it does contain some hearsay information and 14 some excludable information under 48045. 15 I could offer that as an offer of proof to 16 the Court, but I don't think it would be proper for the 17 jury to see the allegations that were being made. 18 only real relevance is the fact that a restraining order 19 20 was against him. MR. BATEMAN: I don't know when that hearing 21 22 I don't have any idea about it. I have no proof that he --23 I'm making a proffer, Judge. 24 MR. FIGLER: I think the temporary order of THE COURT: 25

```
protection certified as admissible at this point.
1
   going to allow it in.
               MR. FIGLER: And if the State wants to
3
   question my investigator about the hearing, I do have
4
   that and I think it would be improper to imply that he
5
   wasn't noticed as a hearing. I'll show that information
6
   to the State.
               MR. BATEMAN: Well, that's exactly what I'm
8
   going to ask his investigator, is there --
9
               MR. FIGLER: Well, and --
10
               MR. BATEMAN:
                            -- notice on
11
   (indiscernible) --
12
               MR. FIGLER: -- my investigator can say that
13
   the certified record showed that he had a hearing and
14
   notice of it.
15
               MR. BATEMAN: Then we need those records.
16
               MR. FIGLER: I don't believe it should go to
17
              There's too much prejudicial stuff unless we
18
   the jury.
   were to redact it.
19
               THE COURT: About the fact that he had
20
   notice?
21
                                  The fact that he had sex
               MR. FIGLER:
                            No.
22
   with the woman and that she doesn't like him --
23
               THE COURT: You're concerned about the
24
   notice?
25
```

1	MR. FIGLER: because of gangs and drugs.
2	MR. BATEMAN: Well, how do I have any way of
3	proving one way or the other that this individual has
4	any idea that there's a TPO against him?
5	MR. FIGLER: Because I have the court
6	minutes where he was present.
7	MR. BUNIN: He appeared in court.
8	MR. FIGLER: Where he did appear, and that's
9	a certified copy. I just don't believe
10	THE COURT: Show it to counsel.
11	MR. BATEMAN: So I get to ask why he's in
12	there on a TPO? Do I get to ask the mom at this point
13	why she has a TPO against him?
14	MR. FIGLER: I don't think that's relevant,
15	only the fact that he would be reason to hide. If you
16	want to get into the fact that he because he was a
17	gang
18	MR. BATEMAN: (Indiscernible).
19	MR. FIGLER: in her opinion a gang banger
20	and that's excluded.
21	MR. BATEMAN: I think it's called rebuttal
22	big time.
23	THE COURT: You may be opening a door.
24	MR. FIGLER: I don't believe so, Judge. I
25	think that the prejudicial impact of that is highly

outweighs the probative value. What possible reason 1 would they need to know why as long as it's a legitimate 2 court order? Why would they need to know what the basis 3 of that was? 4 5 THE COURT: I agree. MR. BATEMAN: Other reasons he's in the 6 7 area. Judge, we're entitled to present 8 MS. LEWIS: in rebuttal other reasons to rebut why he might be in 9 10 the area if that's what they're proposing this information to come in for. 11 MR. FIGLER: And what would that be and how 12 would they tie that up? 13 MS. LEWIS: We might have --14 He's a gang member and the MR. BATEMAN: 15 whole motive behind the actual shooting itself we 16 17 believe was gang retaliation. I mean --THE COURT: How would you prove that if I 18 let you do it? How would you do that? 19 MS. LEWIS: Well, we have documents or other 20 information that suggests that he might have been in the 21 area for other reasons, aside from this TPO, and so we'd 22 be entitled to explore that and certainly one means of 23 24 exploring that is cross --THE COURT: Ms. Lewis, tell me how. 25

1	MR. BATEMAN: (Indiscernible).
2	MS. LEWIS: Do you want me to make you an
3	offer of proof?
4	THE COURT: Sure.
5	MS. LEWIS: We have several FI cards on this
6	individual showing not only that he resides in this
7	area, but that he's frequently in this area and stopped
8	in this area, and that when he's stopped, he says he's a
9	member of this gang or that gang. He gives monickers.
10	He says what he's doing. He says what activities he's
11	up to in that area.
12	MR. BATEMAN: (Indiscernible).
13	MS. LEWIS: And it also includes other
14	people that he's with when he's stopped in this area so
15	that
16	MR. BATEMAN: Including
17	MS. LEWIS: certainly would rebut other
18	reasons or would rebut their one and only reason for why
19	he might be in that area.
20	THE COURT: I'm going to let the TPO in.
21	THE CLERK: Okay. So we're talking about
22	E then, Your Honor?
23	THE COURT: Yes.
24	MR. BATEMAN: Again, well, then I need to
25	know what the parameters that we can cross-examine the

```
investigator.
1
               THE COURT: Well, you can cross-examine the
2
   investigator regarding the notice that he has of the
3
   TPO, but we're not going to get into gang member.
4
               THE CLERK: Is that admitted now,
5
   Your Honor?
6
               THE COURT: No, not yet. It hasn't been
7
             Let's get the -- are we ready? Are you ready?
8
   offered.
               MR. BUNIN: Yes.
9
               MR. FIGLER: One moment, Judge.
10
               MR. BUNIN: No, we're not.
11
                     (Off-record colloquy)
12
               MR. FIGLER: I mean, the first line of it is
13
   adverse party appeared in custody, sworn and testified.
14
   We're ready to go forward, Judge.
15
                THE COURT: All right. Bring the jury in.
16
                              I want a copy of it.
                MR. BATEMAN:
17
                THE COURT: Yeah. Show it to opposing
18
   counsel.
19
                MR. FIGLER: I'll make a copy. I showed it
20
   to him, but I don't have a copy for him.
21
                     (Off-record colloquy)
22.
                MR. BATEMAN: So how much of this do we get
23
24
   to get into?
                THE COURT:
                            Notice.
                                     The notice.
25
```

1	MR. FIGLER: That he was present and told
2	about the restraining order being extended.
3	THE BAILIFF: Jury's present, please.
4	Panel's present, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Thank you. Record should
6	reflect we're back on the record in C228460, State of
7	Nevada, plaintiff, versus Jamar Matthews and
8	Pierre Joshlin. Record should also reflect presence of
9	all counsel.
10	Do counsel stipulate does counsel
11	stipulate to the presence of the jury?
12	MR. FIGLER: Yes, Your Honor.
13	MS. LEWIS: Yes, Your Honor.
14	MR. SINGER: Yes, Judge.
15	THE COURT: Defense.
16	MR. FIGLER: Defense would call
17	Richard Franky to the stand.
18	THE CLERK: I'll swear you in, sir. Raise
19	your right hand.
20	RICHARD FRANKY, DEFENDANT'S WITNESS, SWORN
21	THE WITNESS: I do.
22	THE CLERK: Thank you. You may be seated.
23	Please state your full name for the record and spelling
24	both first and last name.
25	THE WITNESS: Richard Franky. Last name is

spelled F-r-a-n-k-y. 1 DIRECT EXAMINATION 2 3 BY MR. FIGLER: Mr. Franky, how are you employed? 4 Q. Thank you. I was employed by the law office of Bunin & 5 Bunin. 6 And in what capacity? 7 Ο. As a private investigator. 8 Sir, and as a private investigator do you 9 Okay. have any licensing in State of Nevada? 10 Yes, I do. I'm licensed to conduct business 11 under the DBA of RDF Investigative Agency, Nevada State 12 license No. 797 issued through the Private Investigators 13 Licensing Board, a subdivision of the Attorney General's 14 Office of the State of Nevada. 15 Thank you, Mr. Franky. And did Mr. Bunin and 16 myself engage your services to find some public records 17 relating to Mr. Jamar Matthews? 18 Yes, you did. 19 Α. Okay. And were you able to procure those 20 21 records? Yes, I was. 22. Α. And exactly what records were you 23 24 requested to find?

I was requested to go town to Vital Records

```
Marriage -- or not -- sorry, Vital Records Birth
1
   Certificates from the Clark County and extract or obtain
2
   a certified copy of the birth certificate of
3
   Mr. Matthews' son.
4
5
      Q.
          Okay.
               MR. FIGLER: And may I approach, Your Honor?
6
               THE COURT:
                           Yes.
7
   BY MR. FIGLER:
8
          And, Mr. Franky, I'm showing you what's been
9
   marked as Defense Proposed Exhibit B. Does that appear
10
   to be a true and accurate copy of the public record
11
   which you procured from that agency?
12
          Yes, it is.
13
      Α.
          And what is the name of the child on that birth
14
   certificate?
15
                MS. LEWIS: Judge, I'd object as to hearsay.
16
                THE COURT: It's a certified document.
17
   BY MR. FIGLER:
18
         Let me ask --
19
      Q.
                MS. LEWIS: I don't know that --
20
   BY MR. FIGLER:
21
                      Is that a certified copy of that
22.
            -- again.
   document sir?
23
          Yes. Yes, it is, Your Honor.
24
                MS. LEWIS: Judge, then I'd object to
25
```

```
foundation.
1
                THE COURT: Overruled.
2
                                          At that point,
                MR. FIGLER:
                             Thank you.
3
   Judge, I'd move for the admission of Defense Proposed
4
5
   Exhibit B.
                            Any other objection?
                THE COURT:
6
               MS. LEWIS:
                            No, Judge.
7
                THE COURT:
                           It's in
8
              (Defendant's Exhibit No. B admitted)
9
10
                MR. FIGLER: Thank you.
   BY MR. FIGLER:
11
          Mr. Franky, can you tell me who the child that
12
   belongs to this birth certificate is? What the name of
13
   that child is.
14
           It's Jamar Demon Matthews, Junior.
15
          Okay. And does it list the mother?
      Q.
16
          Yes, it does.
17
      Α.
          And her name?
18
      0.
          Ronanda Renee Jones.
19
      Α.
          And does it give her address?
20
          Yes, it does. 1301 Jimmy Street, Las Vegas,
21
22
   Nevada, 89106.
           Thank you. Now, having the name of the mother of
23
   the child, were you able to find any other public record
24
   documents that referenced Mr. Matthews?
25
```

```
Yes, I was.
                       I was able to locate a temporary
1
   protective order in basically Family Division District
2
   Court, Eighth Judicial District, and temporary
3
   protective.
4
      Q. Okay.
5
               MR. FIGLER: May I approach, Your Honor?
6
               THE COURT:
7
                            Yes.
8
               MR. FIGLER:
                             Thank you.
   BY MR. FIGLER:
9
      Q. Mr. Franky, I'm showing you what's marked as
10
   Exhibits -- Defense Proposed Exhibit D and E. Do you
11
   recognize these documents?
12
          Yes, I do.
      Α.
13
          Are these the documents that you procured from
14
   the Family Division of the District Court?
15
          Yes, I did.
      Α.
16
          And are they certified and accurate copies of the
17
   -- of those documents that you retrieved from the public
18
   record?
19
          Yes, sir.
20
      Α.
          Okay.
21
      Q.
               MR. FIGLER: At this time, Your Honor, I'd
22
   move for the admission of Defense Proposed Exhibits D
23
24
   and E.
               THE COURT:
                            State.
```

MS. LEWIS: Same objections as to foundation 1 and also as to relevance. 2 THE COURT: Overruled. They're in. 3 (Defendant's Exhibit Nos. D-E admitted) 4 MR. FIGLER: Thank you. 5 BY MR. FIGLER: 6 Mr. Franky, now with regard to that temporary 7 order for protection, what is the date on the first one? 8 The date that it was filed the first one was 9 filed on April the 11th of '06. 10 And can you tell me what dates that encompassed? 11 It says date issued 4/7/06 and date expires 12 4/25/06. 13 And within that document does it indicate O. Okav. 14 how far away from the complaining party -- and what was 15 the name of the complaining party in that? 16 Ronanda R. Jones --17 Okay. 18 Q. -- the mother of his son. 19 And does that indicate that someone needs 20 Q. to stay away from that person? 21 Yes, it does. 22 Α. And does it say what the consequence of not 23 staying at least 100 yards away from that place would 24 25 be?

- A. I believe it's punishable by a misdemeanor.
- Q. Thank you. Now, there's a second document that
- 3 | you have up there called an extended order for
- 4 protection; is that correct?
- 5 A. Correct.

- 6 Q. And can you tell me and that's off of Defense
- 7 | Exhibit E; is that correct?
- 8 A. Actually, it's D.
  - Q. That's -- I'm talking about the next one, E.
- 10 A. You just talked about E.
- 11 Q. Oh, I got them reversed. Okay. Oh, I see.
- 12 Okay. Now we're going to talk about D. That was E. I
- 13 | got them backwards. Let's go with E then.
- 14 A. Can you repeat the question?
- 15 Q. Or D, sorry. Yeah. You have one filed on July
- 16 -- I'm sorry, June 21st, '06?
- 17 A. Correct.
- 18 Q. Okay. And what's the name of the parties there?
- 19 A. Ronanda R. Jones, applicant, versus Jamar D.
- 20 | Matthews, adverse party.
- 21 Q. Okay. And that's also an extended order for
- 22 | protection?
- 23 A. Correct.
- Q. And can you tell me the date that was issued?
- 25 A. This was issued on 4/25 of the year 2006.

And when did that expire? 1 2 Α. 4/25 of the year 2007. So the date of September 30th, '06, would be 3 4 encompassed by this order; is that correct? 5 Α. Yes, sir. 6 And what would be the violation or the penalty 7 for violation of this order? 8 A misdemeanor, once again. Okay. Lastly, you were asked to procure the 9 10 identification card for Jamar Matthews; is that correct? That's correct. 11 Α. MR. FIGLER: May I approach, Your Honor? 12 THE COURT: Yes. 13 BY MR. FIGLER: 14 I'm showing what's been marked Proposed Exhibit 15 C. Does that appear to be the true Nevada 16 identification card based on your experience of 17 Jamar Matthews? 18 19 Α. Yes, sir. 20 0. Is that a state-issued document? 21 Α. Yes, sir. 22 0. Okay. (Off-record colloquy) 23 MR. BUNIN: I'm sorry. 24 MR. FIGLER: 25 Okay.

```
BY MR. FIGLER:
1
          And that is the identification of -- what's the
2
   name on that identification?
3
4
      Α.
          Jamar Demon Matthews.
5
      Q.
          Okay. And it gives other identifying
   information?
6
7
          Yes, it does.
      Α.
               MR. FIGLER: At this time, Your Honor, we
8
   move for the admission of the actual Nevada
9
10
   identification card of Jamar Matthews.
               MS. LEWIS:
                           No objection.
11
               THE COURT:
                            It's in.
12
              (Defendant's Exhibit No. C admitted)
13
14
               MR. FIGLER:
                             Thank you.
15
   BY MR. FIGLER:
          Now, Mr. Franky, I have a demonstrative exhibit.
16
               MR. FIGLER: It's just a blowup of it,
17
18
   Judge. The only thing is putting it up on the thing.
   It's identical. I'm going to show it to the witness
19
   first to make sure it is identical. I believe there's
20
   no objection to it being published to the jury.
21
22
               MS. LEWIS: No objection, Judge.
               THE COURT:
                           All right. It's in.
23
24
   BY MR. FIGLER:
          And so that's Jamar Demon Matthews; is that
25
```

1	correc	t?
2	Α.	That is correct.
3	Q.	Thank you. Now, Mr. Franky, you were also
4	inform	ed that Mr. Matthews was arrested in the present
5	matter	at a certain location; is that correct?
6	Α.	That's correct.
7	Q.	And do you know what that location is?
8	Α.	Yes. It's 1116 Jimmy Street or Jimmy Avenue.
9	Q.	Okay. And have you had occasion to go out to
10	that a	rea?
11	Α.	Yes, I did.
12	Q.	Okay. And at that area what is its proximity to
13	Ms. Jo	nes' address at 1301 Jimmy Street?
14	Α.	It is precisely five houses east from the address
15	of Ms.	Ronanda Jones.
16	Q.	And is it visually are you visually able to
17	see on	e home from the other?
18	Α.	Yes, you are.
19		MR. FIGLER: No further questions,
20	Your H	onor.
21		THE COURT: Cross.
22		CROSS-EXAMINATION
23	BY MS.	LEWIS:
24	Q.	So, Mr. Franky, did you actually go and meet with

25 Ms. Jones at her address?

- A. No. I never approached her.
- Q. You've never had any contact with Ms. Jones;
- 3 | isn't that true?

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- A. That's correct.
- Q. In fact, the only information or only contact you have that relates to Ms. Jones is going down to the family court and obtaining certified records.
  - A. Correct.
- 9 Q. So you don't actually know what relationship
  10 Ms. Jones has to Mr. Matthews as you sit here today, do
  11 you?
  - A. Well, through the documentation, the actual application that she filed.
  - Q. Right. And on here does it say what relationship she has to Mr. Matthews? It does not, does it? It just says that she filed for a temporary protective order; isn't that true?
- 18 A. Correct.
- Q. Okay. So you don't know what relationship if any she has with Mr. Matthews; isn't that correct?
- A. Based on the document you're showing me, that's correct.
- Q. Okay. Based on anything else, you don't know
  what relationship Ms. Matthews has -- Ms. Jones has with
  Mr. Matthews, do you?

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- A. There was an application that Ms. Ronanda Jones
  filed with District Court Family Division in which she
  stated that Mr. Jamar D. Matthews was his -- was her
  ex-boyfriend --
- 5 O. And which --
- 6 A. -- and the father of her son.
- 7 Q. -- application is that?
  - A. There was handwritten application that she filed.
  - Q. Is that one that you brought here to court that's
- 10 been certified?
- 11 A. No.

- Q. Okay. So let's not talk about that. Let's just
- 13 talk about the documents that you brought to court
- 14 | that's certified.
- 15 And back to my original question, despite what
- 16 you might have read in papers and documents, you've
- 17 | never spoken to Ms. Jones to find out from her what the
- 18 | state of her relationship is with Mr. Matthews; isn't
- 19 | that right?
- 20 A. That is correct.
- 21 Q. Okay. And you're familiar with the process of
- 22 | obtaining protective orders or not?
- 23 | A. Yes, I am.
- O. You are. And so you know that in order to
- 25 | actually generate these documents that you brought with

```
you to court today, these certified documents from
1
   family court, you have to go through a number of steps;
2
3
   isn't that right?
           The applicant?
4
      Α.
5
      0.
           Yes.
                 That is correct.
6
      Α.
           Yes.
          And the applicant, the person who's asking for
7
   these documents from the family court, has to jump
8
   through a number of hoops in order to get them in the
9
10
    first place, isn't that right?
           That is correct.
11
12
          And there has to be a reason that the family
   court judge would even grant these documents in the
13
14
    first place --
                MR. FIGLER:
                             And I'll --
15
16
   BY MS. LEWIS:
            -- or issue them; isn't that right?
17
                MR. FIGLER: And I'll object, Your Honor, as
18
19
   to --
                            What's the basis?
                THE COURT:
20
                MR. FIGLER: -- the foundation and I don't
21
22
    know if Mr. Rick Franky is an attorney and he knows what
    the standard of proof is in a family court proceeding.
23
                THE COURT: I'll allow her. I'll give her
24
   some latitude.
25
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MR. FIGLER: If he knows. 1 BY MS. LEWIS: 2 And I'm not asking you about, you know, what 3 might have happened in the courtroom because you weren't 4 there, right? 5 Α. Correct. 6 Okay. And so, I mean, everything that you're 7 telling us is just based on papers that you've read that 8 you obtained from the family court, right? 9 10 Correct. Okay. But as an investigator, you're familiar 11 with these types of documents and generally what is 12. required in obtaining them; isn't that right? 13 Yes, ma'am. 14 Α. So you know that in order to go down to 15 family court and even go before a judge, not even 16 talking about what happens in the courtroom, but before 17 you even get to that point, you have to jump through a 18 few hoops, right? 19 Yes, ma'am. 20 Α. Okay. And so then you go in front of a judge, 21 and you basically state your claim to the judge, and you 22 tell the judge reasons why you want these documents; 23

isn't that true?

Α.

Correct.

24

And sometimes the judge might say yes and 1 sometimes the judge says no; isn't that right? 2 3 That's correct. MR. FIGLER: I'll object, Your Honor, as far 4 as the relevance of the underlying basis. There was a 5 restraining order in place. He'd be arrested if he was 6 violating it. I don't understand why the process is 7 important. 8 MS. LEWIS: Judge, this is 9 This is his own witness. 10 cross-examination. THE COURT: Overruled. 11 BY MS. LEWIS: 12. And when you go down to family court and you ask 13 for these things to be granted, sometimes the judge will 14 grant them and sometimes the judge won't; isn't that 15 16 right? That is correct. 17 Α. Okay. And, generally speaking, a protective 18 order against domestic violence means that there's some 19 reason why the person is asking for it in the first 20 place; isn't that right? 21 MR. FIGLER: And I'll object, Your Honor. 22 believe that the State is trying to speculate as to 23 reasons when it's absolutely irrelevant. He's not being 24

charged with any other offense.

THE COURT: Well, they're your documents 1 2 so --3 MR. FIGLER: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: 4 -- overruled. 5 THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question, I'm sorry. 6 7 BY MR. FIGLER: Q. Yes, Mr. Franky. Generally speaking, a temporary 8 protective order against domestic violence, there has to 9 10 be some reason why a person would go and ask for that in the first place; isn't that right? 11 12 Α. That is correct. And these aren't -- these documents you brought, 13 14 these aren't just temporary protective orders. They're specifically related to protection 15 16 against domestic violence; isn't that right? That is correct. 17 18 Okay. And so by the very nature that they were 19 granted by a judge means that the judge had to make some sort of factual determination or some sort of finding in 20 21 a courtroom in order to grant that particular 22 application; isn't that right? MR. FIGLER: And I would object as to 23 24 foundation, how this witness would possibly know what happened in that courtroom. He already established that 25

he wasn't there. He has no personal knowledge. 1 I think she's referring to the THE COURT: 2 3 documents. MS. LEWIS: That's absolutely right, Judge. 4 Thank you. 5 BY MS. LEWIS: 6 Q. My question was in order for a judge to actually 7 grant the application -- and the application is the 8 person's asking for it, right? 9 Correct. 10 Α. Okay. So in for a judge to say yes, I'll give 11 you what you're asking for, that means the judge had to have had some sort of proceedings on a record and had to 13 have made some sort of factual findings, some sort of 14 basis for granting that request; isn't that right? 15 That is correct. 16 Okay. And that happened in this case, right? 17 Q. It appears that it did. 18 Α. And you know that because you've got the 19 documents that prove it, right? 20 Yes, ma'am. 21 Α. And you also have court minutes as well 22 Okay. that you brought with you that show who was there and 23

just a brief summary of what happened in the courtroom;

24

25

is that right?

- 1 A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. And you reviewed those court minutes?
- A. I did read them.
- 4 Q. And based on your review of those court minutes,
- 5 do you agree with the position that the judge actually
- 6 in this instance made specific factual findings that
- 7 allow the judge to say yes, I will grant that request;
- 8 | isn't that right?
- 9 A. Can I request to read those documents at that
- 10 | point?
- 11 Q. Sure. You --
- 12 A. At this point?
- 13 Q. The --
- 14 A. The minutes that you have in your hand. Thank
- 15 you.
- 16 Q. And you brought these to court with you today,
- 17 | right?
- 18 A. Correct. Actually, these were provided to
- 19 Attorney David Figler prior to today's hearing.
- 20 Q. Oh, when did you provide those to Mr. Figler?
- 21 A. I believe my office provided them this week or
- 22 | last week --
- 23 | Q. Okay.
- 24 A. -- because they're certified on April 24th.
- 25 | Q. Okay.

- I'm talking about the court minutes that you're referring to.
- And the actual protective order documents that you brought to court, were those also provided --
- Α. No.

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- -- at the same time? Ο.
- -- those were obtained this morning.
  - Ο. Okay. So those you just brought with you to court this morning?
- 10 Α. Correct.
- Okay. Go ahead, read through that. Q. 11
- Α. Thank you. Yes. 12
- So back to my original question. Okay. 13 Ο. 14 reviewing those records, then, you're aware that in this particular instance with relating to this particular 15 16 protective order against domestic violence, the judge who heard that request actually made specific factual 17

findings that supported that request for granting the

- protective order; isn't that right? 19 That would be correct. Α.
- And you said that you came about these 21 Okay. 22 records by doing this records search for the name
- Ronanda Jones, right? 23
- That is correct. 24 Α.
- And did you do any other records search or are 25

these the only records that you came up with? 1 2 These are the records that I came up with. Okay. So you didn't do any other further searchs 3 0. 4 after that? 5 A. No. 6 And you're familiar with the process of having a protective order against domestic violence dissolved, 7 8 are you not? Yes, I am. 9 Α. And so you're aware that in certain instances 10 even though these documents might be granted on one 11 date, parties can go back to court and ask the judge, 12 you know what, we've reconciled, we don't need this 13 anymore; isn't that right? 14 It does exist. That is correct. 15 And you don't know whether Ronanda Jones went 16 back to court and maybe made that request of a judge, do 17 you, because you didn't do any further checks after you 18 obtained these records, did you? 19 20 MR. FIGLER: Calls for speculation, Judge. THE WITNESS: Today --21 22 THE COURT: If he can answer. If he can answer. 23 MS. LEWIS: THE WITNESS: Can I answer? 24

Yes.

THE COURT:

THE WITNESS: Okay. Today I actually 1 requested to see the file. 2 BY MS. LEWIS: 3 0. Um-h'm. 4 5 And I went through the file page by page --Q. Um-h'm. 6 -- and the document that you're describing does 7 not exist in this file. 8 In that file. 9 Q. Correct. 10 Α. Okay. Did you check any other files or any other 11 records? 12 There is only one file pertaining to this TPO --13 Α. Q. Okay. 14 -- in family division. There's no two files. 15 There's one. 16 But did you check for any other files? 17 Q. Okay. They did run the name of Ronanda Jones and 18 Α. Matthews, and this is the only file that came --19 Oh, who's they? 20 Q. -- up. The county -- the clerk at the window at 21 22 family court. Oh, so you didn't actually go and do anything. 23

You just went and asked somebody else to do it.

That is the procedure with the county.

24

- Q. Okay. So you don't know if there are other files with the name of Ronanda Jones, then?
  - A. That is correct.
  - Q. You just know what was given to you.
- 5 A. That is correct.
- Q. And so the record search that you did only led you to this one file; is that right?
- 8 A. That is correct.
- 9 Q. Okay. And you said that you went out to this
- 10 address -- where is it -- 1301 Jimmy Street, right?
- 11 A. That is correct.
- 12 Q. And you believe that that's Ronanda Jones'
- 13 | address?

- 14 A. That is correct.
- Q. Did you go to the door to see if Ronanda Jones
- 16 | resided there?
- 17 A. No, because of the temporary protective order.
- 18 Q. When did you go out there?
- 19 A. I went out there about a week and a half ago.
- 20 Q. Okay. So because of the temporary protective
- 21 order you didn't go to the door?
- 22 A. Correct.
- 23 | Q. Well, do you have a temporary protective order
- 24 | against going over to Ronanda Jones' residence?
- 25 A. No. But I am working for his -- Mr. Matthews'

attorney, so, therefore, I did not want to cross that line.

- Q. Oh, I see. So you're trying to be safe.
- A. Yes, ma'am.

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- Q. All right. That's fair. But you don't know, then, who actually resides at that address today or when was it that you said you went there?
- 8 A. About a week and a half ago.
  - Q. So a week and a half ago you don't know who resided at that address, do you?
    - A. That would be accurate.
- 12 Q. And back on September 30th of 2006, you don't know whether she resided there at all, do you?
- 14 A. That would be correct.
- Q. You were out in that general vicinity or that neighborhood for some time a week and a half ago when you went out there?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. Okay. And, in fact, you said that the house,
- 20 | 1116 Jimmy, was five houses to the east, right?
  - A. Correct.
- 22 Q. You counted that yourself?
- 23 | A. Yes, I did.
- Q. Did you measure out in yards the distance between
- 25 | the two?

- A. No, I did not.
- Q. Are you familiar with the location of 1801 J Street?
  - A. I did not look at that address.
- Q. You didn't. Well, didn't you know that on the driver's license that you brought to court with you today? Doesn't it say 1801 J Street on there?
- 8 A. Yes, it does.
  - Q. Do you know where that is in relation to Ronanda Jones' house, for example?
- 11 A. No, I do not.
- Q. Would it surprise you to know that it's almost around the corner, practically? Would that surprise
- 14 | you?

2

3

4

9

- 15 A. Okay.
- 16 Q. Okay. The ID card that you brought with you,
- 17 | that's a Nevada ID card, right?
- 18 A. Yes, ma'am.
- 19 Q. You go down to DMV and you request that, correct?
- 20 A. How did I obtain this identification?
- 21 Q. No. I'm saying generally speaking, a Nevada ID
- 22 card, in order to get one, if I wanted to get one or
- 23 anybody wanted to get one you just go down to DMV, you
- 24 | request it, correct?
- 25 A. Yes, ma'am.

- And you have to fill out some paperwork to get 1 that, right?
  - Yes, ma'am. Α.

3

- 4 And on that paperwork you fill out your 5 information; your name, date of birth, that sort of stuff, correct? 6
- Yes, ma'am. 7 Α.
  - And, in fact, you also give them your address.
- 9 What else is on here? Your height, your weight, your
- 10 hair color, what else? Your eyes, that's all
- 11 information that you give DMV, correct?
- Yes, ma'am. Α. 12
- 13 And then when you give them that information,
- 14 they put it in the computer, they do whatever they do
- 15 with it, they take your picture, and then this handy
- 16 little ID card comes out that's marked Exhibit C, right?
- 17 Correct.
- 18 Okay. So nobody measures your height before they
- put that information on there, do they? 19
- Not that I know of. 20 Α.
- They don't put you on a scale and take your 21
- 22 weight before they put that information on there, do
- they? 23
- Not that I know of. 24 Α.
- And you haven't -- well, let me say it this way. 25

1	You're familiar with Mr. Matthews because you've been
2	working on this case, correct?
3	A. Yes, ma'am.
4	Q. And that's because you're employed by
5	Mr. Matthews' lawyers, correct?
6	A. Correct.
7	Q. So you're not a friend of his. You don't
8	socialize with Mr. Matthews, right?
9	A. No, I do not.
10	Q. Okay. So would you know or would you have reason
11	to know of other instances besides September 30th of
12	2006 because you said you're aware that he was
13	arrested on that date at 1116 Jimmy Street, correct?
14	A. Correct.
15	Q. So would you be aware of or would you have any
16	other instances
17	MR. FIGLER: And I'm going to object,
18	Your Honor. Beyond the scope of direct and beyond the
19	scope of the relevant inquiry.
20	THE COURT: It's cross.
21	MS. LEWIS: Judge
22	THE COURT: I'm not sure where she's going.
23	MS. LEWIS: Judge, there's no scope
24	MR. FIGLER: Well, maybe we should approach.
25	MS. LEWIS: to cross-examination.

THE COURT: Let's approach. 1 (Off-record bench conference) 2 3 BY MS. LEWIS: Q. Mr. Franky, are you aware of any other times when 4 Mr. Matthews was in the neighborhood of let's say for 5 argument sake Ronanda Jones' home because we're 6 presuming that that's her home there. Would you know of 7 any other times that Mr. Matthews might have been in 8 that area? 9 10 Α. No, I do not. So if he was in that area May 20th of 2005, you 11 wouldn't know about that, correct? 12 13 Α. No. 14 Or how about if he was in the area June in 2006, would you know about that? 15 I don't -- no, I would not. 16 Would you have done any other investigation or 17 records checks to find out if there were any other 18 instances when, perhaps, Mr. Matthews might have been in 19 20 that area or in the vicinity? No, ma'am. 21 Α. 22 So the only records checks you did were pertaining to these documents and this is what resulted, 23 the two documents, the protective orders against 24

domestic violence that you brought with you to court,

```
correct?
1
          That is accurate.
2
      Α.
          And there's two of them because one is the actual
3
   protective order and one is an extension, correct?
4
           That is accurate.
5
      Α.
          And that means that the judge extended it,
6
      Q.
   granted it for a longer period of time than just the
7
   initial 30 day period; is that right?
8
           That is accurate.
9
                MS. LEWIS: Thank you. I have no further
10
   questions.
11
                THE COURT: Mr. Singer.
12
                MR. SINGER: No, thank you, Judge.
13
                THE COURT:
                            Redirect.
14
                             Thank you.
                MR. FIGLER:
15
                      REDIRECT EXAMINATION
16
   BY MR. FIGLER:
17
           Mr. Franky, you were asked some questions on
18
                          If I went to the DMV and said I
   cross about the DMV.
19
   had a head of bushy brown hair and I was
20
   five-foot-eleven, do you think they'd issue that ID to
21
22
   me?
                             Objection.
                                         Leading.
                MS. LEWIS:
23
                THE COURT:
                             Sustained.
                                         Rephrase.
24
25
    //
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BY MR. FIGLER: 1 2 Do you believe, Mr. Franky, one way or another 3 that there are some limitations with regard to verification at the DMV? 4 I believe so. 5 Α. And if someone says something that's not 6 accurate, do you have a position as to whether or not 7 8 they would be issued an identification card? 9 Rephrase the question, please. With regard to giving false information to the 10 DMV, do you know one way or another if they issue people 11 identification cards with false information on it? 12. No, they would not. 13 14 Q. Thank you. THE COURT: 15 Recross. 16 MS. LEWIS: Nothing, Judge. THE COURT: Is this witness excused? 17 18 MR. FIGLER: Yes, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Thank you, sir, for your 20 testimony. 21 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 MR. FIGLER: If we could have this marked The bigger version of Defense B. 23 Defense next. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Defense, call your next 25 witness.

1	MR. FIGLER: The defense rests.
2	THE COURT: Mr. Figler rests.
3	Mr. Singer.
4	MR. SINGER: Mr. Joshlin rests.
5	THE COURT: Mr. Singer rests?
6	MR. SINGER: Yes, Judge.
7	THE COURT: Does that conclude State,
8	rebuttal?
9	MS. LEWIS: Yes, Judge. We'd reserve that
10	right for tomorrow because I understand we're recessing
11	today at 2:00 so
12	THE COURT: We are recessing today at 2:00.
13	MS. LEWIS: And we didn't know the length of
14	the defense case
15	THE COURT: I understand.
16	MS. LEWIS: so we didn't prepare any for
17	today.
18	THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we're
19	going to take our afternoon recess at this time. We
20	still have some additional items to take care, but it's
21	important that I admonish you on your evening
22	admonishments.
23	You're admonished not to converse among
24	yourselves or with anyone else on any subject connected
25	with this trial, read, watch or listen to any report of

or commentary on this trial or any person connected with 1 this case by any medium of information including, 2 without limitations, newspapers, television or Internet 3 or radio. You are further admonished not to form or 4 express any opinion on any subject connected with this 5 trial until the case is finally submitted to you. 6 We'll be in recess until tomorrow. I think 7 we'll start at 9:30 tomorrow morning, and we will work 8 the full day tomorrow. Thank you. We'll be in recess, 9 10 and Officer Reichert has stepped away. Officer Reichert, you're in charge. 11 (Off-record colloquy) 12 THE COURT: Record should reflect -- the 13 door's still open. Record should reflect we're outside 14 the presence of the jury. All parties present. 15 Where we going? 16 Do you want to continue with 17 MR. BATEMAN: -- I don't know if Mr. Figler wants to address just the 18 specific ones in our packet. I don't think we have that 19 many more. 20 It's up to you, Judge. MR. FIGLER: 21 ten minutes before your investiture. 22 THE COURT: I want to settle these 23 instructions. 24 MR. BATEMAN: Okay. 25

THE COURT: Assuming that it's not affected 1 by the rebuttal case --2 It shouldn't be. 3 MR. BATEMAN: -- that you're working on. THE COURT: 4 And we're able to print, 5 MS. LEWIS: No. right? 6 THE CLERK: Yes. 7 THE COURT: So where are we at? Are we on 8 D8? 9 MR. SINGER: Yes, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: All right. D8, you have 11 received no evidence that there's a proven relationship 12 between the witness' confidence and the accuracy of the 13 witness' testimony. Even if the witness is positive in 14 his identification, this does not relieve you of the 15 duty to carefully consider identification testimony, 16 especially if you find that only evidence or most 17 significant evidence that directly supports this claim 18 the defendant committed the offense charged. 19 You also know that some identifying 20 witnesses are of a different race than the defendant 21 than the witness who is a member of one race identifies 22 the defendant who is a member of another race 23 (indiscernible) that we said there was cross-racial 24 identification. 25

You may consider it if you think it 1 appropriate to do so whether cross-racial nature of the 2 identification is affected by the action of the witness 3 original perception or the accuracy of the subsequent 4 identification. 5 I see a New York citation from 1996, state 6 New York citation. 7 8 State. MR. BATEMAN: I think the -- I think it's 9 the first part is covered in the credibility of 10 witnesses part, Your Honor. I think the second 11 paragraph is not really a statement of law at all. 12 think that it may be borderline if there was an expert 13 on cross racial or ID that come in and testify, but I --14 THE COURT: I think it's covered by other 15 I'm not going to give it. All right. instructions. 16 Let's talk about conspiracy, D9, and, State, 17 you had a bunch of conspiracy instructions, too. 18 -- you take me where we need to go to clear this up. 19 The instructions I see from the State 20 involve four -- four different -- no. 21 instructions involving conspiracy; is that correct? 22 MS. LEWIS: Let me find them. 23 THE COURT: One says conspiracy's agreement 24 or mutual understanding, and I want conservative on 25

```
I want statutory language.
   this.
1
               I see the citation on the defense
2
   instruction is Bolden which is obviously good authority.
3
   Tell me where we differ, where we differ.
4
               MR. BATEMAN: Judge, I think these -- ours
5
   are basically standard from cases previous to Bolden.
6
   don't think Bolden changes them.
                                      I don't think Bolden
7
   is all inclusive of every conspiracy.
8
               THE COURT: Where in D9 is there a problem?
9
   Where is there a misstatement in law --
10
               MR. BATEMAN: I don't have a problem giving
11
12
   it --
               THE COURT:
                            Okay.
13
               MR. BATEMAN: -- as long as it's in addition
14
15
   to ours.
               THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's fine.
16
   Well, that's what we'll do.
17
               MR. FIGLER: I think -- Judge, I know that
18
   there's no problem with D9 --
19
                            I think some of it is redundant.
               MS. LEWIS:
20
               MR. FIGLER: -- because it is all exact
21
   identical language that comes out of Bolden.
22
               THE COURT: Perfect.
23
               MS. LEWIS: Post-Bolden, however, there's
24
   still language in there about the act of one is the act
25
```

of all and their conspiracy instructions. That's not 1 the law anymore. I think if we have one concise 2 statement of conspiracy law in the most recent case on 3 4 the subject matter, then we're covered. MR. BATEMAN: Judge, I'd be happy to give 5 you the Bolden case. I have it here. The instruction 6 that was at issue in Bolden included act of one and is 7 8 act of all. 9 THE COURT: Right. 10 MR. BATEMAN: If you'll remember --THE COURT: I remember Bolden. 11 MR. BATEMAN: Yeah. And it specifically 12 addressed the reasonable and foreseeable consequences 13 when the ultimate --14 THE COURT: One act as it relates to another 15 act as it relates to the parties involved. I know --16 MR. BATEMAN: And only specific crimes. 17 18 THE COURT: -- Bolden. Right. MR. BATEMAN: The instruction that it 19 20 addressed in Bolden specifically stated in that instruction -- it was the instruction that we always 21 give -- act of one is act of all, and nothing in Bolden 22 says that particular portion of the instruction is --23 THE COURT: Is bad. 24 MR. BATEMAN: -- inappropriate. 25

1	THE COURT: Right. I
2	MR. BATEMAN: And I've got the case law.
3	I'd be happy it give it to you.
4	MR. FIGLER: Right. And
5	THE COURT: No.
6	MR. FIGLER: And
7	THE COURT: I don't
8	MR. FIGLER: And
9	THE COURT: I don't need to read Bolden.
10	MR. FIGLER: there is not one Nevada
11	State law case. This has always been something put in
12	as dicta that says, quote/unquote, the act of one is the
13	act of all.
14	What my instruction does is encompass every
15	active of conspiracy that the State could possibly need.
16	Everything else in there is either duplicative or it
17	adds areas that are marginal admissibility after Bolden.
18	It doesn't include the mere presence aspect
19	of it. It doesn't include the mere approval of it, but
20	it does have everything else, including the language
21	reasonably foreseeable consequences of the object of the
22	conspiracy as opposed to the act of one is the act of
23	all. This sums it up.
24	This is the latest, greatest and absolutely
25	concise conspiracy instruction that one could glean from

```
the most recent case. There is no Nevada Supreme Court
1
   case that approves instructions against conspiracy, not
2
         I think Mr. -- Sam would agree with me.
3
               THE COURT: I'm inclined to give D9 in
4
   conjunction with the other three instructions.
                                                    Ι
5
   believe that's fair. It gives both parties the ability
6
   to answer. I don't believe the conspiracy instructions
   as contained here are inconsistent in the law.
8
               MR. FIGLER: And honestly, Judge, I don't
9
   think anything in theirs isn't contained in mine, so,
10
   apparently, on our side when it's duplicative it's out,
11
   but on theirs it comes in --
12
               THE COURT: Well, there's --
13
               MR. FIGLER: -- and that's fine.
14
               MS. LEWIS: Actually, that's not true,
15
16
   Judge.
               THE COURT: I don't --
17
                            There are things in our
               MS. LEWIS:
18
   instructions that are not contained in this one.
19
               MR. FIGLER: And that aren't supported --
20
               MS. LEWIS:
                            I can go through --
21
               MR. FIGLER: -- by the law including the act
22
                               That language --
   of one is the act of all.
23
               MS. LEWIS: I can go --
24
               MR. FIGLER: -- has never been approved by
25
```

```
Nevada Supreme Court as an instruction, never.
1
               MR. BATEMAN:
                             Been implicitly --
2
               MR. FIGLER: Never approved, Judge.
3
               MS. LEWIS: Can I finish what I was saying?
4
               MR. FIGLER: And post (indiscernible) it's
5
   marginal, questionable, if it is even alive anymore.
6
               MS. LEWIS: Can I finish what I was saying?
7
               MR. FIGLER: Of course.
8
               THE COURT: Yes.
9
               MS. LEWIS: Judge, I can point out specific
10
   examples of things that are in our three conspiracy
11
   instructions that are not contained in D9.
12
               UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
                                       Yes.
13
               MS. LEWIS: Just as an example, for example,
14
   conspiracy is an agreement our instruction says which
15
   they have. And then our instruction says the crime is
16
   the agreement to do something unlawful. It doesn't --
17
   does not matter whether it was successful or not. Their
18
   instruction doesn't address that.
19
               MR. FIGLER: And that's --
20
               MS. LEWIS:
                            That isn't --
21
               MR. FIGLER: -- extraneous.
22
               MS. LEWIS:
                            It's not.
23
               MR. FIGLER:
                             That's not the law of
24
                         That does not -- that's not what
   conspiracy, per se.
25
```

```
the definition of conspiracy is under Bolden.
1
   extra dicta language that they want to throw in every
2
   case, sure, but show me a case where it's supported as
3
                          Not. Bolden is the last word --
   being an instruction.
4
                           Were you finished?
               THE COURT:
5
               MR. FIGLER: -- on what is conspiracy.
6
               MS. LEWIS:
                            It's okay.
7
               MR. FIGLER:
                             I'm sorry.
8
                            It's okay. I'm done.
               MS. LEWIS:
9
                            It's just, you know, why they
10
               MR. FIGLER:
   get extra language and I don't get my eyewitness
11
   identification which I've offered in about ten other
12
   murder cases that always come in. It seems to me --
13
               THE COURT: Which one?
14
               MR. FIGLER: Which murder case has it come
15
16
   in?
               THE COURT: No, no, no. Which instruction.
17
               MR. FIGLER: The eyewitness identification.
18
   You said it was duplicative of the other one, the D1.
19
               MS. LEWIS:
                            Judge, I think we need to finish
20
   this issue of D9 before we move on to the next one.
21
                THE COURT: D9's coming in.
22
               MS. LEWIS: Okay. And the State's
23
    conspiracy instructions?
24
               THE COURT: Yes.
25
```

MS. LEWIS: I'll take it up right now. 1 THE COURT: All right. Now, let's not go 2 back to D1 yet, because I want to give Mr. Figler every 3 opportunity. 4 MR. FIGLER: I appreciate it, Judge. 5 THE COURT: Let's talk about malice. 6 have two malice instructions --7 MR. FIGLER: I just submit it, Judge. 8 that the malice instruction that the State has offered 9 includes extraneous language that the actual definition 10 of malice aforethought is presented in Guy v. State 11 which is a '92 decision. 12 And I'll leave it to the Court. This isn't 13 one that I need to fight about. It's just what I think 14 is appropriate. 15 MS. LEWIS: And, Judge, the record should 16 reflect we did meet last night. We had two different 17 malice instructions. We discussed this particular issue 18 19 at length. And based on that, we paired it down to one 20 malice instruction, and that's the one that we included 21 in our packet. It does have some extra language that 22 D10 does not have, so we would ask to give ours. 23 THE COURT: So the language contained in D10 24 is also contained in the State's instruction? 25

1	MS. LEWIS: Yes.
2	THE COURT: Okay. And is there additional
	language in the State's instruction on malice that,
3	
4	Mr. Figler, you find objectionable?
5	MR. FIGLER: I just think it's extraneous,
6	Judge, and superfluous, and that it's not supported by
7	any cases. There's one case where it's listed as dicta,
8	and that's the only time it ever appears in a Nevada
9	Supreme Court case, so I don't think it's necessary.
10	THE COURT: D10. I'm not giving D10. We'll
11	make a record.
12	Let's go back does that include all the
13	defense instructions?
14	MR. FIGLER: That would hit all of ours.
15	MS. LEWIS: Actually, that's all of Mr
16	THE COURT: All right. Now let's talk about
17	D1.
18	MS. LEWIS: That's all of Mr. Figler's.
19	MR. FIGLER: I don't know if Mr. Singer has
20	any.
21	THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Singer?
22	MR. SINGER: No. (Indiscernible).
23	THE COURT: All right.
24	MR. SINGER: Thank you, Judge.
25	THE COURT: You have heard the witness. You

heard the testimony of an eyewitness in deciding how much weight to give as testimony. You may take into account various factors mentioned in these instructions concerning credibility.

In addition to these factors in evaluating eyewitness identification, you may also take into account (indiscernible) an opportunity of the witness to observe the offender based upon the length of time and observation and conditions at time of observation, whether the identification was the product of the eyewitness' own recollection or was the result of subsequent influence or suggestiveness, any inconsistent identifications made by the eyewitness, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the witness. State.

MS. LEWIS: Judge, we have a credibility of witness instruction that essentially addresses most of these points, and it basically says credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his manner upon the stand, his relationship to the parties, his fears, motives, interests or feelings, his opportunity to have observed the matter to which he testified, the reasonableness of his statements and the strength or weakness of his recollections. It goes onto say more. As far as I know it's the standard -
THE COURT: I agree.

```
-- stock instruction.
                                                   I don't
               MS. LEWIS:
1
   have on objection.
2
               THE COURT: I think that language addresses
3
   all witnesses, not just eyewitnesss. It covers all the
4
   operative points in D1; therefore, I'm inclined to just
5
   not give D1.
6
                            So are you reconsidering the
               MR. FIGLER:
7
   conspiracy because that does the same thing or no?
8
                           I think the conspiracy language
               THE COURT:
9
   -- the three are not inconsistent in theory.
10
               MR. FIGLER: And neither are these two.
11
   This is --
12
               THE COURT: You know what, David? That's
13
   not a bad argument. Okay.
                                It's in.
14
               MR. FIGLER: Thank you, Judge.
15
               THE COURT: We'll put it right behind the
16
   credibility, believability instruction.
17
               MR. FIGLER: That's where it belongs.
18
   That's exactly where it belongs in the packet.
19
               THE COURT: So you have them matched up.
20
               MR. BATEMAN: Do you want to go through our
21
   packet real quick?
22
               Was there any others, David? We had just
23
   did the aiding and abetting and --
24
               MR. FIGLER: Right. There was a --
25
```

```
MR. BATEMAN: -- then there was one other --
1
               MR. FIGLER: -- secondary the act of one is
2
   the act of all, so it is duplicated in there in their
3
            The act of one is the act of all shows up
4
   twice.
5
               THE COURT: How are we going to do this
6
          Do we have a clean package?
7
   easv?
               MR. FIGLER: I believe we did.
8
               THE COURT: I want a clean package of the
9
   D1s that I -- or the D instructions that I want to mark
10
   as a Court's exhibit so you can have a record on appeal
11
   for them.
12
                      (Off-record colloquy)
13
               MR. BATEMAN: Do you have a -- you've only
14
   included the one, right?
15
               THE COURT: I'm including --
16
               MR. FIGLER: The one and the two.
17
               THE COURT: -- D1.
18
               MR. BATEMAN:
                              Two.
19
               THE COURT: There was two. D1 --
20
               MR. BATEMAN: Give me clean copies of D1 and
21
22
        I'll give them to the judge and we can
    (indiscernible).
23
               MR. FIGLER: Okay. D2 needs to have the
24
   amendment to it. I'll print these up in the right
25
```

```
I wanted to keep them in different format so we
1
   could distinguish them.
2
                                                   She's
               MS. LEWIS: I've already done it.
3
   already got one.
4
                                 They all have to be in the
               THE COURT: Yes.
5
   same format.
6
                           Judge, I --
               MS. LEWIS:
7
               THE COURT: How are we going to do this?
8
               MS. LEWIS: I've already done one of them I
9
   believe your clerk has already given you, and I'm typing
10
   the other one right now.
11
                           Which one was that? This one?
               THE COURT:
12
                            (Indiscernible).
               THE CLERK:
13
               MR. FIGLER: So what's coming? D1 and D2 or
14
   D1 and D9?
15
                            D1 and D9, I thought.
               MR. BUNIN:
16
                THE COURT: Whether two or more persons
17
   joined together by common design?
18
                              I think we're including the
               MR. BATEMAN:
19
   Bolden instruction and then that number one.
                                                  Is that
20
   the two you --
21
                THE COURT: Well, here's D1 we're including.
22
                             Right.
                MR. FIGLER:
23
                           D1 I'm typing right now.
                MS. LEWIS:
24
   me a couple more minutes.
25
```

```
(Off-record colloquy)
1
               MR. FIGLER: I've got all the ones that were
2
   offered but not admitted, clean copy of them. I'm going
3
   to give those to your clerk.
4
5
                THE COURT: Yes.
               MR. FIGLER: So that would be D2, D3, D4,
6
   D5, D6, D7, D8 and D10.
7
               THE COURT: Good.
                                   I have those too.
8
               MR. FIGLER: (Indiscernible) as Court
9
   exhibit next?
10
                THE COURT: Court exhibit next in order,
11
   that's fine.
12
                THE CLERK: Court exhibits
13
    (indiscernible) --
14
                            Staple them together and --
                THE COURT:
15
                THE CLERK:
                            No.
                                 Wait, Your Honor.
16
                THE COURT:
                            Oh.
17
                THE CLERK: These are the ones that are
18
   proposed but not used, right?
19
                THE COURT:
                           Correct.
20
                            Okay. They're filed in the
21
                THE CLERK:
   clerk's office as --
22
                MR. FIGLER:
                             Okay.
23
                THE COURT: -- proposed not used.
24
                MR. FIGLER:
                             Thank you.
25
```

```
THE COURT:
                           Okay.
1
               THE CLERK:
                           Defendant's.
2
               MR. BATEMAN: Before you insert those, do we
3
   want to go through ours, Judge, or how do you want to do
4
   it?
5
               THE COURT:
                          Well, right now as a consequence
6
   of this effort I've pulled apart the entire package.
7
               MR. BATEMAN:
                             Okay.
8
               THE COURT: But what I want is one clean
9
   copy, and I want multiple copies for --
10
               MR. FIGLER: And if we could just spin
11
   through the State's packet that they gave you, and I can
12
   just note my objections for the record --
13
               THE COURT:
                           Yes.
14
               MR. FIGLER: -- if that's okay.
15
               THE COURT: Yes.
16
               MS. LEWIS: Here. Do you want mine? Mine's
17
18
   clean.
               MR. BATEMAN:
                             Oh, yeah.
19
               MS. LEWIS: You can take mine.
20
               MR. BATEMAN: Let me give you -- Judge, if
21
   you pulled it apart already --
22
               MS. LEWIS: Here. Mine's clean.
                                                  Just trade
23
               The only thing is this is the one that --
   with mine.
24
   one of the Dls or I don't know which one that he wanted.
25
```

```
I've already typed it.
1
                              This's D9.
2
               MR. BATEMAN:
                           It needs to be included
               MS. LEWIS:
3
               You need to figure out where to put it in.
4
   somewhere.
               MR. FIGLER: D9 is the conspiracy.
                                                     D1 is
5
6
   the (indiscernible).
                            Why don't you guys decide right
               MS. LEWIS:
7
   now where to put it in there.
8
                             (Indiscernible) this one too.
9
                MR. BATEMAN:
               MR. FIGLER: No. He said that was covered
10
   by the other one.
11
                MR. BATEMAN:
                              Oh, okay.
12
                            No. That's the one that you
                MS. LEWIS:
13
   wanted --
14
                MR. FIGLER: Is that the one --
15
                            -- that he said he would give.
                MS. LEWIS:
16
                            Is that the ID one?
                THE COURT:
17
                                      There's a third one,
                MR. FIGLER: Oh, no.
18
            In this case, there are two defendants.
                                                      Some
   Judge.
19
   evidence may be applicable to one and only one.
                                                      That
20
   was a third one that was (indiscernible).
21
                             That's right. You did
                MR. BATEMAN:
22
23
    (indiscernible).
                            And you said you would give it.
                MS. LEWIS:
24
                             That is correct.
                MR. FIGLER:
25
```

1	
1	THE COURT: Well, it was covered by a
2	different instruction.
3	MS. LEWIS: But you said you would give it.
4	(Off-record colloquy)
5	THE COURT: I'm going to give it.
6	MS. LEWIS: Look, I wouldn't have typed it
7	if you didn't say you'd give it, so take it.
8	MR. FIGLER: That was D5. I'm pulling D5
9	out of the proposed.
10	MR. BATEMAN: Judge, I'm going to give you a
11	clean copy of ours, and you can insert what you just
12	received.
13	THE COURT: Hang on. All right.
14	MS. LEWIS: But you need to where's that
15	clean copy because that's that you took? That one in
16	your left hand?
17	MR. FIGLER: Yes.
18	MS. LEWIS: Yeah. Bring it back here. You
19	need to decide where in here to put it.
20	MR. FIGLER: Okay. We'll figure out as
21	we're going through it.
22	MS. LEWIS: We need to give it to the judge.
23	No, because he wants a clean copy of it.
24	THE COURT: Hold on to that clean copy.
25	MR. FIGLER: Hold on to clean copy. We're

```
going to go through and insert.
1
2
               THE COURT:
                          All right. Page 1 a problem?
               MR. FIGLER:
                            No.
3
               MR. BATEMAN: No.
4
               THE COURT: If it needs instructions a
5
6
   problem?
               MR. FIGLER: Are we going to mark these as
7
8
   numbers now? Why don't we do that. That will be
   instruction No. 2, correct?
9
                                1 is the first page.
10
               MS. LEWIS:
                          No.
                          Yeah. 1 is the first page.
               THE COURT:
11
               MR. FIGLER: Right. So that's No. 2.
12
                          2. Amended is 3.
               THE COURT:
13
                            And, Judge, the parties -- at
               MR. FIGLER:
14
   least myself and Mr. Bateman have decided that with
15
   regard to the amended information it should stay as
16
   instruction 3, but to save the Court time, Your Honor
17
   would only have to read the counts, not the
18
   (indiscernible) within.
19
               THE COURT: I appreciate that. Both parties
20
21
   agree?
               MR. SINGER: Yes.
22
               THE COURT: Mr. Singer?
23
               MR. BATEMAN: Right. There's an initial
24
   sentence, and then at the end of all of the -- and you
25
```

read the counts, and then at the end of all the counts 1 there's actually two more paragraphs that I believe the 2 Court would probably have to read --3 MR. FIGLER: That's correct. 4 MR. BATEMAN: -- because that's the standard 5 6 stuff. THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to read 7 lines one through 14, page 1 of that instruction --8 MR. FIGLER: And then skip. 9 THE COURT: -- and then line -- and then 10 skip to the back and read lines 6 through 11. 11 Save us some time. MR. FIGLER: 12 The only problem with that, MR. SINGER: 13 Judge, is that like in their opening, they put Counts X 14 and XI on both defendants which is not accurate. 15 MR. BATEMAN: Judge, I'm going to stand up 16 in summation and state specifically that I don't believe 17 that we charged Pierre with those charges, with those 18 assault with deadly --19 MR. SINGER: Right. But then when you read 20 this particular jury charge, you're just going to read 21 Count X, assault with a deadly weapon. 22 MS. LEWIS: No. He's going to -- no. 23 going to say defendant so and so is charged with A, B, 24 Defendant so and so is charged with A, B, C, D, 25

```
E, F.
1
               THE COURT: How am I going to do that,
2
           I can't do that.
3
   Linda?
               MR. FIGLER:
                            Yeah.
4
               THE COURT: I can read --
5
               UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
                                       Yeah.
6
               THE COURT: I can read lines 1 through 14 as
7
8
   outlined.
                UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Correct.
9
                THE COURT: And then I can read -- how do
10
   you want me to do it, Phil?
11
               MR. SINGER: I don't think there's any way
12
              I mean, unless you read the first nine counts
13
   just of line and (indiscernible) Count X, XI, the whole
14
15
   count.
                             Right. Read the whole thing.
                MR. BATEMAN:
16
                     (Off-record colloquy)
17
                MS. LEWIS: I think it would be easier if
18
   you just said defendant Pierre Joshlin is charged with
19
   and list the counts, name the counts he's charged with.
20
   Defendant Jamar Matthews is charged with and name the
21
   counts he's charged with, and you don't have to read all
22
   the things.
23
                MR. SINGER:
                             That's fine.
24
                THE COURT:
                            Okay.
25
```

MR. SINGER: So you don't have to read all 1 the to wits or all that other stuff. 2 MS. LEWIS: As long as you agree to separate 3 them that way, though. I mean, you'll have to make a 4 5 note to yourself. Well, it looks like -- yeah. THE COURT: 6 The only difference is the 7 MR. BATEMAN: possession of short-barrel rifle is charged I believe as 8 to Jamar Matthews, and then the two assaults are charged 9 as to Pierre Joshlin. 10 MR. SINGER: No. 11 THE DEFENDANT: No, no, no, no. 12 MR. BATEMAN: I'm sorry. Jamar Matthews. 13 It's backwards. MS. LEWIS: 14 MR. BATEMAN: So Pierre is not in Count 15 16 VI --MR. SINGER: Or X or XI. 17 MR. BATEMAN: -- X or XI. 18 You guys are killing me. THE COURT: 19 MR. SINGER: VI, X and XI. 20 All right. VI, X and XI as THE COURT: 21 22 to --MR. BATEMAN: Pierre Joshlin. He's not in 23 Those are only charged as to Jamar Matthews. 24 THE COURT: So I say you should note Counts 25

```
VI, X, XI are charged as to Jamar Matthews only?
1
               MR. BATEMAN: Correct.
2
               MR. FIGLER: Fine. However you want to do
3
   it to expedite time.
4
               THE COURT: Well, I'll think about that.
5
               MR. BATEMAN: However you want to do it,
6
7
   Judge.
                                      Four is in this case.
                           Exactly.
               THE COURT:
8
               MR. FIGLER: You know, we had decided if all
9
   parties were amenable to just get rid of all references
10
   to voluntary manslaughter, and Ms. Lewis can knock all
11
   those out and put a fresh set. It's up to Your Honor.
12
   We'll waive any --
13
               THE COURT: You guys tell me you have dinner
14
   and you settle instructions?
15
                                 We all agreed that --
               MR. FIGLER: No.
16
               THE COURT:
                            Okay.
17
               MR. FIGLER: -- if Your Honor was --
18
               THE COURT: So what are we doing?
19
               MR. FIGLER: If Your Honor's cool with
20
   getting rid of voluntary manslaughter --
21
                THE COURT: Why is voluntary manslaughter
22
    even mentioned here? This is --
23
                            Because open --
                MR. FIGLER:
24
                            -- ID defense.
                THE COURT:
25
```

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```
MR. FIGLER: -- murder necessarily
1
   includes --
2
               THE COURT:
                           Yeah.
3
               MR. FIGLER: -- ba, ba, ba, ba.
4
               THE COURT:
                           Yeah.
5
               MR. FIGLER: But involuntary is not listed
6
          I figured might as well get rid of voluntary.
7
   There's no factual basis for voluntary.
8
               MS. LEWIS: But Mr. Singer has to agree as
9
10
   well.
               MR. SINGER:
                             I agree.
11
                            So are we still on 4? It says
               THE COURT:
12
   in this case defendants are accused.
13
               MR. FIGLER: Right. So then it would just
14
15
   say --
                THE COURT: Do you want to strike voluntary
16
   manslaughter?
17
                MR. FIGLER: Yeah.
18
               MR. SINGER: That's fine, Judge.
19
                THE COURT: So, Linda, are you doing that
20
21
   one too?
                MS. LEWIS: I guess.
22
                MR. BATEMAN: We'll get you a clean copy by
23
   either this evening, Judge, and we'll E-mail it to your
24
   chambers.
25
```

```
THE COURT:
                            Yeah.
                                   Right.
1
               MR. BATEMAN: Or tomorrow morning.
2
                            I'll do it right now.
               MS. LEWIS:
3
                            That's exactly where I'll be.
               THE COURT:
4
                             That's 4. 5.
               MR. FIGLER:
5
                            5, murder is the unlawful.
               THE COURT:
6
               MR. FIGLER:
                             Correct.
7
                            (Indiscernible). 6, expressed
               THE COURT:
8
   malice.
9
               MR. FIGLER:
                            Correct.
10
               THE COURT: Murder in the first degree, 7.
11
               MR. FIGLER: Correct.
12
               THE COURT: Law does not undertake, 8.
13
               MR. FIGLER: Correct.
14
               THE COURT: It is -- if an illegal is 9.
15
                             Our objection, Your Honor, is
               MR. FIGLER:
16
   that 9 and 10 are both transferred-intent instructions.
17
   One's duplicative of the other. That the State would
18
   have to choose because it unnecessarily gives emphasis
19
   to the transferred intent there.
20
                THE COURT: Why do we need both, State?
21
               MR. BATEMAN: One talks about the definition
22
   of transferred intent and one is specific as to an
23
                        Transferred intent could be I have
   attack on a group.
24
   no idea somebody's behind the -- my intended target.
25
```

```
I also have a case, Your Honor. I'd be
1
   happy it hand it to you, Pal v. State, 113 Nevada 258,
2
   what would be instruction No. 10 is specifically
3
   referenced in this particular --
4
               MR. FIGLER: That's correct, Your Honor, but
5
   not with instruction 9 accompanying it. I'd say it's
6
   one or the other, and I don't care which one at this
7
   point because they're both good law. Just that they --
8
   they don't need to be emphasized.
9
               MR. BATEMAN: I don't think they're
10
   emphasized by having two instructions on it.
11
               MR. FIGLER: About transferred intent. I
12
   think it is.
13
               MR. BATEMAN: We can put one at the bottom
14
   of the first one.
15
               THE COURT: That's what I was thinking,
16
   moving -- move what you think to be 10 --
17
               MR. BATEMAN: Down into 9?
18
               THE COURT: -- down into 9.
19
               MR. BATEMAN:
                             Okay.
20
                MR. FIGLER: That solves 70 percent of the
21
   problem of my objection.
22
                                         I'll take 70 at
                            70 percent.
                THE COURT:
23
24
    this point.
                MR. FIGLER: All right. So that will be 9,
25
```

```
and we're going to strike that as 10.
1
                              I'll move it to 9.
               MR. BATEMAN:
2
               THE COURT: Move to 9.
3
               MR. BATEMAN: Okay.
4
                           All right. 10, the intention to
               THE COURT:
5
   kill.
6
               MR. FIGLER:
                            Correct.
7
               THE COURT:
                            11, all murder.
8
               MR. FIGLER: Correct.
9
10
               MR. BATEMAN:
                             Yep.
                            12, you are instructed.
               THE COURT:
11
               MR. FIGLER: Correct.
12
               THE COURT: Are we eliminating manslaughter?
13
               MR. BATEMAN: Yes.
14
               MR. FIGLER: Yes. And the next one.
15
               THE COURT: Heat of passion. If you find
16
   the State.
17
                MR. FIGLER: And the next one.
18
                            In arriving at your verdict.
                THE COURT:
19
                             That's correct.
                MR. FIGLER:
20
                              That's good.
                MR. BATEMAN:
21
                THE COURT: That will be 13.
                                               You are
22
   instructed.
23
                             There's voluntary in there.
                MR. SINGER:
24
                MR. BATEMAN:
                              I just need to take out --
25
```

```
we'll just strike the voluntary manslaughter. That's --
1
               THE COURT: 13. 14 is --
2
               MR. BATEMAN: It's actually -- I think that
3
4
   was 14, Judge.
                                           That was 14.
                            Nope. Yeah.
               MR. FIGLER:
5
               MR. BATEMAN: You are instructed that if you
6
   fine defendants guilty --
7
               THE COURT: You're right.
8
               MR. BATEMAN: -- that's 14.
9
               THE COURT: You're right. You're right, 14.
10
   15 is off cycle or off font there --
11
               MR. BATEMAN: We'll move it.
12
               THE COURT: -- or whatever you call it.
13
               MR. FIGLER: That's the new one, so we're
14
   going to object to that because that hasn't been
15
16
   approved yet.
               THE COURT: What do you mean?
17
               MR. FIGLER: I think that's a brand-new
18
   instruction.
19
               MS. LEWIS:
                           No.
20
               THE COURT: You are instructed that a
21
   firearm whether loaded or unloaded, operable or
22
   inoperable, is a deadly weapon?
23
               MR. FIGLER: I just haven't seen that
24
   before, so I'm just going to make my objection to it.
25
```

```
THE COURT:
                          Okay. Objection is -- what's
1
   the basis for the objection?
2
               MR. FIGLER:
                            That a firearm is -- oh.
3
   took out the deadly weapon one.
4
5
               MR. BATEMAN:
                             Yeah.
               MR. FIGLER:
                             That's fine.
                                           Okay.
                                                   There was
6
   two instructions that were in there. She took one out.
7
   She took the statutory instruction out and put this new
8
9
   one in, so I just don't know if it's been --
               MR. BATEMAN: Well, you're not suggesting
10
   the firearm isn't a deadly weapon, are you?
11
               MR. FIGLER: No, I'm not. So that's fine.
12
               THE COURT:
                            All right. That's 15.
13
               MR. BATEMAN:
                             Yep.
14
                           16, in order to use.
15
               THE COURT:
               MR. BATEMAN:
                              Yep.
16
                             That's fine.
               MR. FIGLER:
17
               THE COURT: 17, attempted murder.
18
               MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
19
               THE COURT:
                            18, malice aforethought.
20
               MR. FIGLER: With our noted objection.
21
                            With your noted objection.
                                                         19,
               THE COURT:
22
   it is not necessary.
23
                             I fundamentally oppose what the
               MR. FIGLER:
24
   State doesn't have to prove being in instructions.
25
```

```
think instructions should be what the State does have to
1
   prove, but on this particular one I don't take great
2
   offense.
3
               THE COURT: All right.
                                        20 --
4
                           Then why did you say it?
               MS. LEWIS:
5
               MR. FIGLER: Because I made my record.
6
                          -- robbery is the unlawful.
                                                          21,
               THE COURT:
7
8
   is to knowingly.
               MR. BATEMAN: That's short-barrel shotgun
9
10
   statute.
                             That's correct.
               MR. FIGLER:
11
               THE COURT: Okay.
12
               MR. BATEMAN: Or rifle (indiscernible).
13
                            22, assault with a -- an assault
                THE COURT:
14
   with a deadly weapon.
15
               MR. FIGLER: Again, the last line, Judge,
16
   doesn't need to be in place. It says what they don't
17
          I'd ask that it be stricken.
18
                MR. BATEMAN:
                              I'm sorry.
19
                THE COURT: Yeah. Let's see. The statute
20
   does read reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily
21
   harm by or through the use of a deadly weapon.
22
                MR. BATEMAN: Here's the problem.
                                                    If that's
23
   not in there and they get up and say no injury occurred,
24
   it can be an assault.
25
```

1	MR. FIGLER: That argument, and everyone's
2	entitled to argument.
3	MR. BATEMAN: Not if it's the law.
4	MR. FIGLER: But that's not the law.
5	MR. BATEMAN: If it is the law.
6	THE COURT: The law just requires the
7	creation of reasonable apprehension. It does not
8	require actual infliction. I can't remember the case
9	name off the top of my head.
10	MR. FIGLER: I know it's not an untrue
11	statement of law, but it's argument. I always object to
12	anything that would be argument when the statute states
13	it all. They're allowed to argue what they want.
14	THE COURT: All right. I'll strike it.
15	MR. FIGLER: Thank you.
16	THE COURT: 23, there are two or more
17	persons where there are two or more persons.
18	MR. BATEMAN: Wait, wait.
19	THE COURT: Where there are
20	MR. BATEMAN: This is where I had the
21	conspiracy are three. Did you
22	THE COURT: All right. Let's insert them.
23	MR. FIGLER: That's fine. D
24	MR. BATEMAN: So this would be 20
25	whatever you want to insert right here would be 20

```
THE COURT: All right.
1
               MR. FIGLER: This would be the D9?
2
               MR. BATEMAN: 23.
3
               THE COURT: You want D9 in front or you want
4
   D9 in the back of the conspiracy?
5
               MR. FIGLER: I think D9 in front because it
6
   tells --
7
               THE COURT:
                           All right.
8
               MR. FIGLER: -- what the conspiracy is.
9
                     (Off-record colloquy)
10
               THE COURT: So D9 in front becomes 23.
11
   we strike the citation?
12
               MR. FIGLER: Yeah. We will strike the
13
   citation, Judge, obviously.
14
                THE COURT: Conspiracy is agreement, 24.
15
               MR. FIGLER: And we object to the act of one
16
   is the act of all being in there.
17
               THE COURT: Noted for the record.
18
   haven't settled these up yet, anyway, but I guess we
19
   kind of are.
20
                             We're pretty close.
21
               MR. BATEMAN:
               MR. FIGLER: We're getting close.
22
                THE COURT: Each member of the criminal
23
24
   conspiracy, 25.
               MR. FIGLER: I've gotten out of order.
25
```

```
(Indiscernible) conspiracy
               MR. BATEMAN:
1
          I think you objected to it, anyway.
2
               MR. FIGLER:
                            I objected to it, anyway,
3
   Judge, so if I could just note my objection to that
4
5
   again.
                           Okay. Each member of conspiracy
               THE COURT:
6
   is liable for the act, each act, and bound by each
7
   declaration of every other member of the conspiracy.
8
   That one you object to?
9
               MR. FIGLER: Yeah. I don't believe that
10
   that is actually consistent with Bolden, so that was our
11
   objection.
12
               THE COURT: Okay. 26. It is not necessary
13
   in proving.
14
                              (Indiscernible) objection?
               MR. BATEMAN:
15
               MR. FIGLER:
                             Same thing, Judge.
16
               THE COURT: Okay. 27, where two or more
17
   persons joined together.
18
                             Is that my -- no.
               MR. FIGLER:
19
                             I think he missed something.
               MR. SINGER:
20
                             That's kind of the first part
               MR. BATEMAN:
21
   of the aiding.
                   That's the aiding and abetting one.
22
   It's kind of in between.
23
                MR. FIGLER: I got lost.
24
                THE COURT: Are you -- everybody up?
25
```

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
```
MR. FIGLER: Not yet, Judge.
1
                            So far we were doing okay.
               THE COURT:
2
               MR. FIGLER: We were good and I got lost.
3
   apologize, Your Honor.
4
               THE COURT:
                            It's okay.
5
                     (Off-record colloquy)
6
                             I'll tell you exactly where I
               MR. FIGLER:
7
   got lost was at 24. So if we could just tell me what 25
8
   is I'm going to --
9
                THE COURT:
                            Go back.
                                      Okay.
                                              25 is each
10
   member of a criminal conspiracy.
11
                             Is liable. Okay.
                MR. FIGLER:
                                                 And we
12
   objected.
13
                THE COURT:
                           And you object --
14
                MR. FIGLER:
                             -- to that one --
15
                THE COURT:
                            You --
16
                MR. FIGLER: -- and I got that.
17
                THE COURT:
                           And you object to 25.
18
                             That's 25.
                MR. FIGLER:
19
                THE COURT:
                           All right. 26, it is not
20
   necessary in proving a conspiracy.
21
                MR. FIGLER: Got that now.
                                             Thank you.
22
                THE COURT: Are you objecting 26?
23
                MR. FIGLER: Yes, we are, Your Honor.
24
                THE COURT: Okay. 27, where two or more
25
```

1	
1	persons joined together.
2	MR. FIGLER: And I'm just trying to locate
3	that one.
4	THE COURT: It's the aiding and abetting.
5	MR. FIGLER: Is that the general aiding and
6	abetting or is that the one that has
7	MR. BATEMAN: Yes. We have two aiding and
8	abettings.
9	MR. FIGLER: the act of one is act of
10	all.
11	THE COURT: It's the only one I have.
12	MR. SINGER: No. The one before that.
13	MR. BATEMAN: The next one after as well.
14	MR. FIGLER: Okay. I don't have that one.
15	THE COURT: Well, whatever. I
16	MR. FIGLER: I have no objection to that
17	first aiding and abetting which is No. 27.
18	THE COURT: It ends in contemplation of all
19	the acts of one or the acts of all.
20	MR. BATEMAN: This was before.
21	THE COURT: I
22	MR. BATEMAN: You have an objection to this
23	one, but not this one.
24	MR. FIGLER: Right.
25	MR. SINGER: There's one that says to aid

```
and abet means to actively know (indiscernible)
1
2
   purposely.
               MR. FIGLER: That one I have no objection
3
4
   to.
        That's the law.
               THE COURT: Say that again, Phil.
5
                            The one that's before that
6
               MR. SINGER:
   should say to aid and abet means to actively.
7
                           Okay. So that should be 27.
                                                           To
8
               THE COURT:
   aid or abet means to actively should be 27.
9
10
               MR. BATEMAN:
                              Fine.
               MR. SINGER: And then where two or more
11
12
   persons.
               THE COURT: Should be 28.
13
               MR. FIGLER: I'm sorry, Judge.
                                                28 I think
14
   is being pulled.
15
                            Okay. We don't need 28?
               THE COURT:
16
                              Wait. Which one was that?
17
               MR. BATEMAN:
               MS. LEWIS: Where two or more persons.
18
               THE COURT: Where two or more persons.
19
               MS. LEWIS: Is that it?
20
               MR. BATEMAN: Yeah.
21
                THE COURT: Because it's covered in 27.
22
                              Right. And, actually, in the
               MR. BATEMAN:
23
   conspiracy statute or the conspiracy --
24
               THE COURT: All right. So 28 is the -- now
25
```

1	I'm onto flight. Is everybody onto flight?
2	MR. FIGLER: Yep.
3	MR. SINGER: Yeah.
4	THE COURT: 28 of the flight of a person
5	immediately after.
6	MS. LEWIS: Um-h'm.
7	MR. FIGLER: And we object that that doesn't
8	have the necessary safeguards, and we offered two
9	alternatives, neither of with which was accepted by the
10	Court.
11	THE COURT: Correct. Those are marked as
12	defense exhibits.
13	MR. FIGLER: Thank you.
14	THE COURT: I feel that the flight
15	instruction is given is supported by current case
16	law.
17	Mr. Bateman, I want you to make your
18	statement on the record, too, regarding because I
19	can't recall what you had
20	MR. FIGLER: I wouldn't disagree that that
21	was an approved flight instruction by the State of
22	Nevada.
23	THE COURT: Yeah. It
24	MR. FIGLER: But I did note that in the case
25	law it says that it should be given cautiously and under

the proper safeguards, and that's why I offered my two 1 alternate versions. 2 THE COURT: Okay. Your record's made. 3 4 good. 29, to constitute the crime charged. 5 MR. FIGLER: Correct. Oh, we would object, 6 Your Honor, of what the State does -- just I'm objecting 7 8 for the record. We object to what they don't have to 9 prove. If motive is not an element, there shouldn't 10 be a commentary in the instruction about motive because 11 it unnecessarily emphasizes what the State does not have 12 to prove which is not the burden on the State. 13 THE COURT: Very good. You've made your 14 record on 29. 15 30, the defense -- the defendant is presumed 16 17 innocent --MR. FIGLER: Object. 18 I figured you might. That's 30. THE COURT: 19 MR. FIGLER: That's a reasonable doubt. 20 THE COURT: That's the reasonable doubt 21 instruction. It does appear to be the correct 22 reasonable doubt instruction. 23 MS. LEWIS: We'll take it. 24 MR. FIGLER: That's a little funny. 25



```
MR. FIGLER:
                             But ours just has that little
1
   extra in there that emphasizes the difference between
2
   the two defendants which I think is appropriate in a
3
   codefendant case.
4
                            Um-h'm.
5
               MS. LEWIS:
                            So you want it -- okay. Hang
6
               THE COURT:
7
   on, then.
                            32.
8
               MS. LEWIS:
                THE COURT:
                            So we've got 31. We're on to 32
9
   which is you are here to determine the guilt --
10
               MS. LEWIS:
                            Yes.
11
                           -- or innocence.
                THE COURT:
12
               MR. FIGLER: And our D5 which is the exact
13
   same language, but it does make that little extra about
14
   how there's two separate defendants in this case, and I
15
   think that's important.
16
                            All right. And you want that as
                THE COURT:
17
   33?
18
                            Instead of --
               MR. FIGLER:
19
               MS. LEWIS:
                            Can you tell me --
20
                            -- their 32, actually, to
               MR. FIGLER:
21
22
   replace their 32.
                            Can you tell me how does D5
                MS. LEWIS:
23
24
   begin?
                MR. FIGLER:
                             In this case --
25
```

```
THE COURT: In this case.
1
               MR. FIGLER: -- there are two defendants.
2
               MS. LEWIS: Okay. And we've got a clean
3
   copy of that one.
4
               MR. FIGLER: So if we could just sub that
5
6
   in.
                          Do you have any objection to
7
               THE COURT:
   substituting D5 for your 32? There's your 32. D5.
8
               MS. LEWIS: No, no, no. We need them both
9
   because they don't both say the same thing.
10
               MR. BATEMAN: Yeah, they do.
11
                            They do?
               MS. LEWIS:
12
               MR. BATEMAN: Yeah.
13
                          Oh, okay. Then that's fine.
               MS. LEWIS:
14
               MR. FIGLER: I think --
15
               THE COURT:
                           Then --
16
               MR. BATEMAN: There's no objection --
17
               THE COURT:
                            Then --
18
               MR. BATEMAN: -- making ours 32.
19
               THE COURT: Then we're going to make yours
20
21
   32.
               MR. FIGLER:
                            Thank you, Judge.
22
                      (Off-record colloguy)
23
                THE COURT: Now I have a clean copy of one
24
   we don't need. In this case there are two defendants.
25
```



```
Is that the one we do not need?
1
               MS. LEWIS:
                          No.
                                 That --
2
               MR. BATEMAN: Well, the only thing that this
3
   one says is that when you --
4
               MS. LEWIS: No. He's on a different
5
   instruction.
6
               MR. BATEMAN:
                              I know.
7
               MS. LEWIS: Say it again because that one's
8
   a different --
9
               THE COURT: Okay. Now I've got the one that
10
   was D5 --
11
               MR. BATEMAN: Right.
12
               THE COURT: -- now is 32.
13
               MS. LEWIS:
                            Yeah.
14
               MR. BATEMAN: Now he's on 33.
15
               THE COURT: I believe, Linda, you just
16
   approached me and you gave me one that says in this case
17
   there are two defendants.
18
               MS. LEWIS: Yeah.
19
               THE COURT: Isn't that the one --
20
               MS. LEWIS: That's a clean copy.
21
                MR. FIGLER: Yeah. That's fine.
22
                MR. BATEMAN: That's a clean copy of theirs
23
24
   that you're inserting.
               MS. LEWIS: I thought it was D5.
25
```

```
MR. FIGLER: And it does encompass the next
1
   one as well.
2
               THE COURT: Okay. So in this case you must
3
4
   decide separately.
               MR. FIGLER: Yeah. I think that goes out
5
6
   because that --
               MS. LEWIS:
                            Right.
7
               MR. FIGLER: -- is encompassed in our new
8
9
   32.
10
               THE COURT: Okay. 33, the evidence which
   you are to consider.
11
               MR. FIGLER: Correct.
12
                                   That's in. Well, I don't
               MR. BATEMAN: No.
13
   have a replacement yet, so as soon as I get a
14
   replacement --
15
               MS. LEWIS:
                            Oh.
16
               MR. FIGLER: That's 33.
17
               THE COURT: Credibility or believability.
18
                            That's 34.
               MR. FIGLER:
19
               THE COURT: That's 34.
20
               MR. FIGLER: And then our D1 would be 35.
21
22
                      (Off-record colloquy)
                            Do I have a clean copy of D1?
                THE COURT:
23
               MS. LEWIS:
                           Yes. She should be printing
24
   them or they should have printed.
25
```

```
Sharon, did you get those other E-mails to
1
2
   print?
               THE CLERK: (Indiscernible).
3
                           I'm sure my family's --
               THE COURT:
4
               MR. FIGLER: Freaking out? That's 35.
5
6
   We're almost done, Judge.
                          I know. Well, we're going to
               THE COURT:
7
   get a clean copy of 35.
8
               MR. FIGLER: Right.
9
               THE COURT: 36, a witness who has special
10
   knowledge.
11
               MR. BATEMAN:
                             Yep.
12
                             That's fine, Judge.
               MR. FIGLER:
13
               THE COURT: Although you are here to
14
   consider.
15
               MR. FIGLER: That's fine, Judge.
16
               THE COURT: 37. 38, if in your
17
   deliberation.
18
               MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
19
               THE COURT: 39 --
20
               MR. BATEMAN: When you retire.
21
               THE COURT: -- you're here to retire -- you
22
   are -- when you retire, 39. 40, you will now listen to
23
   arguments of counsel.
24
               MR. FIGLER:
                             Okay.
25
```

```
Now I'm sure you guys are going
               THE COURT:
1
2
   to fight about the verdict forms or --
               MR. FIGLER:
                             No.
                                  No objection to the
3
4
   verdict form, Judge.
                            Okay.
5
               THE COURT:
                                   Let's --
                            No. But we have to change them
               MS. LEWIS:
6
7
   to take --
                            Except they have to --
8
               MR. FIGLER:
                           -- out all the manslaughter.
               MS. LEWIS:
9
               MR. FIGLER: -- remove manslaughter.
10
               MS. LEWIS: Can you not interrupt me once,
11
   please.
12
               MR. FIGLER: Manslaughter.
13
                THE COURT:
                            All right.
14
                            Just once.
                MS. LEWIS:
15
                            So you're going to change the
                THE COURT:
16
   verdict forms to reflect manslaughter by tomorrow?
17
                MR. BATEMAN:
                              Sure.
18
                MS. LEWIS:
                            Yes.
19
                MR. FIGLER: I didn't interrupt you then.
20
                            All right. Can we settle these
                THE COURT:
21
   now?
22
                             The only thing that's left --
                MR. FIGLER:
23
                THE COURT: Let's settle them -- I want to
24
   settle them tomorrow.
25
```

```
MR. BATEMAN: Yeah. That's fine.
1
               MR. FIGLER: Fine, because, you know what,
2
   Mr. Bateman and I are going to work on the theory
3
   defense instruction and see if we can come up
4
   (indiscernible) we all agree on.
5
               THE COURT: I like that idea because I don't
6
   want to get any more on the record (indiscernible).
7
   Let's go off the record now. I think I'm good to go.
8
                     (Off-record colloquy)
9
               MR. FIGLER: Congratulations, Judge.
10
               THE COURT: Yeah.
11
               MS. LEWIS: Sorry if you don't see us there,
12
   but as you can tell, we have lots of work to do.
13
               THE COURT: I understand. I'm just going to
14
15
   go.
               THE BAILIFF: I'll see you over there, boss.
16
                THE COURT: Okay.
17
           (Court recessed at 2:21 p.m. until Friday,
18
                  May 11, 2007, 9:30 at a.m.)
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

		TAID	EΥ		
NAME	DI	IND RECT		REDIRECT	RECROSS
PLAINTIFF'S W	ITNESSES:				
JAMES KRYLO				67	
FRED BOYD			82,88	97	100
ALANE OLSON		117			
DEFENDANT'S W	ITNESSES:				
RICHARD FRANK	Y	143	151	169	
		EXHIB	ITS		
DESCRIPTION				I	ADMITTED
PLAINTIFF'S					
PLAINIIEE 2					
1A	9mm Car	rtridge	Cases		36
1 D	.45 Car	tri dae	Cagag		40
1B	.4J Cai	. crrage	. cases		10
1C	.45 Car	rtridge	: Cases		42
1D	.45 Car	rtridae	ı g		42
	.40 041	crrage			
2A	.22 Car	rtridge	: Cases		45
3A	.22 Car	rtridae	cases		47
		,			
3B	.45 Cai	ctridge	e Cases	i*	48
3C	Bullet	Fragme	ents		50
3D	Bullet	and Bu	ıllet f	ragments	52
6A	Ruger N	Magazir	ne		19
	-	_			0.1
6B	.22 Loi	ng Rifl	le Cart	ridge	21
I					

	EXHIBITS (Cont.)	
DESCRIPTION		ADMITTED
PLAINTIFF'S (Co	nt.)	
9B	Colt Magazine	28
9C	.45 Auto Cartridges	29
10A	Glock Model 21	30
11A	.45 Cartridge	32
11B	Glock Magazine	33
11C	.45 Cartridges	34
98 & 102	Photographs	120
156	Photograph	105
165	Evidence Bag	4
165A	Bullet	4
166	Photograph	53
DEFENDANT'S		
В	Birth Certificate	145
D	TPO	147
E	TPO	147
С	Identification Card	150
	PLAINTIFF'S (Co:  9B  9C  10A  11A  11B  11C  98 & 102  156  165  165A  166  DEFENDANT'S  B  D E	PLAINTIFF'S (Cont.)  9B

## CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

## **AFFIRMATION**

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
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## 







THE STATE OF NEVADA,

vs.

JEMAR D. MATTHEWS,

CASE NO. C-228460

Plaintiff

.

DEPT. NO. XVIII

PIERRE JOSHLIN

•

Transcript of Proceedings

Defendants

Delendants

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID BARKER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JURY TRIAL - DAY 5

FRIDAY, MAY 11, 2007

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

LINDA Y. LEWIS

SAMUEL G. BATEMAN

Deputy District Attorneys

FOR DEFENDANT JOSHLIN:

PHILLIP SINGER, ESQ.

FOR DEFENDANT MATTHEWS:

DANIEL M. BUNIN, ESQ. DAYVID J. FIGLER, ESQ.

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

RICHARD KANGAS District Court VERBATIM DIGITAL REPORTING, LLC

Littleton, CO 80120

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Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, FRIDAY, MAY 11, 2007, 9:36 A.M. 1 (Jury not present) 2 THE COURT: State of Nevada, plaintiff, 3 versus Jamar Matthews and Pierre Joshlin. Record should 4 reflect the presence of counsel for the State, counsel 5 for the defense, the defendants, outside the presence of 6 the jury. 7 We were in the process of settling jury 8 instructions yesterday afternoon. We had actually 9 tentatively numbered some instructions, but we now have 10 all -- should all have clean packages of instructions 11 that have been prepared, and we'll have to go through 12 and number. 13 Before we do that, there's two instructions 14 that we need to discuss further and insert or disregard. 15 First is an instruction that was submitted by the State. 16 States, "Your verdict must be unanimous to the charge. 17 You do not have to be unanimous on the principle of 18 criminal liability. It is sufficient that each of you 19 find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was 20 committed under any one of the principles of criminal 21 liability." 22 Is there any objection to that instruction? 23 MR. FIGLER: None from Mr. Matthews.

24

25

No, Judge.

MR. SINGER:

THE COURT: All right. We'll insert that in 1 2 right after where it was in the package, right after the aiding and abetting instruction. 3 4 MR. SINGER: That's fine. THE COURT: Now we also have what we're 5 going to mark as D next in order. I don't remember how 6 many we have. 7 This will be 11. 8 MR. FIGLER: 11 now. THE COURT: I'm not going to touch this yet, 9 but we'll refer to it as D11. It is a -- well, we can 10 call for the record the second theory of defense 11 instruction. 12 Yesterday we discussed D7, and I disallowed 13 D7 jury instruction based upon the proffered decision 14 and discussion with counsel. 15 We now have what Mr. Figler has prepared as 16 a second -- what we can refer to as theory of defense 17 instruction that reads while the State has allowed --18 Judge, can -- which one is MR. SINGER: 19 that? I'm sorry. 20 That's a new one. I don't have MR. FIGLER: 21 a copy for Mr. Singer. 22 Here, you want to read ours MR. BATEMAN: 23 while we're standing here. 24 MR. SINGER: Is it going in or it's being 25

argued?

theory of prosecution.

MR. FIGLER: We're going to argue it.

THE COURT: We're arguing it. "While the State has allowed to offer alternate theories of criminal liability, the State is disallowed from taking inconsistent positions with regard to material facts. A fact is material if it has significant bearing upon the

If the State takes the position that

Jamar Matthews was the driver of the vehicle as well as
the individual pursued on foot by Officer Walter, it
cannot suggest that the facts support a different
finding.

Therefore, you if you believe the State has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jamar Matthews was the driver of the vehicle as well as the individual pursued on foot by Officer Walter, then you must find that Jamar Matthews was not at the scenes where the other crimes took place and render a verdict of not guilty on all counts."

State's position.

MR. BATEMAN: Well, Your Honor, the first paragraph which is two sentences stating what the State is or is not allowed to do, I don't know why that has anything to do with theory of the defense. That's -- I

mean, I don't know any case law that says that, so I would just object to that.

I don't know -- I know Mr. Figler said he had some Ninth Circuit cases. I don't have any case law with regard to that one way or another. I've never seen it before, and I don't think it has anything to do with theory of defense.

The second portion I think is what they're claiming is their theory of the defense. Their theory of the defense is identity.

THE COURT: Exactly.

MR. BATEMAN: Right. It's not -- and the proffered case that I know Mr. Figler is referring to, the instruction that was proffered in Crawford by the defense and wasn't given by the district court in a murder case was referenced voluntary manslaughter.

And this is the instruction, and this is on the -- it's the State versus Crawford, 121 Nevada 744.

I'm looking for a pin. Let's go with the Pacific Reporter, 121 P (indiscernible) D582 at 586.

This is the instruction. "If after consideration of all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant acted in heat of passion, you must return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. This is because the State has the

burdening of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant did not act in the heat of passion."

That was the instruction that was at issue in Crawford, and what the district court said is all those other (indiscernible) instructions covered essentially what was being offered by the defendant.

It went up to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said no, you have the right to have what is called a significance instruction, the significance of your theory of the case, and they said that that was allowed in this particular case, and that was at issue.

And then it further even stated that the district court is not required to give the significance instruction when they're not accurate or -- I'll find the portion that it says that.

There's another portion in here that says that when they're not exactly accurate, but I don't see how this particular offering is in any way analogous — is in any way analogous to what we were talking about in Crawford. This is specific facts.

THE COURT: Fact specific as opposed to the analysis of the law.

MR. BATEMAN: Right. If you determine that this element is as such, this is the significance of making that determination. Being the driver in the

vehicle is not an element of any of the charges.

Their theory of defense is identity, and that's why I kind of threw out there yesterday, and I hadn't really thought about it, but, you know, they said if you find that he's merely present, that might be, you know, resulting in acquittal.

But this is too fact specific. It's not any way analogous to the instruction that was at issue in Crawford. I don't think it's appropriate.

THE COURT: Mr. Figler.

MR. FIGLER: Thank you, Judge. In every single theory of defense case with the exception of this one in Crawford -- and Crawford is not by any means heat of passion instruction specific. I don't think anyone's saying that.

What Crawford stands for is the general proposition that no matter how weak or incredible the evidence may be, the defense has an absolute right to have the jury instructed on its theory of the case.

THE COURT: And your theory of the case is ID.

MR. FIGLER: Okay. Now let's just presume for a moment that theory of the case is identification. We are, by the State's admission, allowed to show the

significance of that identity issue.

Now, in the theory of defense instruction, 1 there's nothing in there that the State can dispute. 2 The State is indicating that -- and the State will argue 3 based on the facts, and we have to take each case based 4 I mean, that's what's here. 5 on some facts. We have to. That's what we're doing, and that's what's being in 6 front of this jury. 7 So if we take each line -- let's bypass the 8 first two lines which is in our belief an accurate 9 statement of the law because I don't think that 10 Mr. Bateman's going to get up right now and tell 11 12 Your Honor that he's allowed to take inconsistent positions with regard to the facts. 13 I think that's a violation of due process 14 under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendment, let alone 15 16 Ninth Circuit case law. But be that as it may, if somehow the State is saying that they're allowed to take 17 inconsistent positions, I don't think that's an accurate 18 statement of the law. 19 I don't think that anyone thinks that the 20 State can -- they can argue alternate theories of 21 22 liability. He was either aiding or abetting here or conspirator, et cetera, but he can't say that he was 23 both there and not there. They can't take those --24 THE COURT: I agree --25

MR. FIGLER: -- positions.

THE COURT: -- with that.

MR. FIGLER: Okay. So starting from that original premise, the State is going to argue based on the facts, and I put in a qualifier here, if the State argues.

Now, he may argue something else. I don't know what he's going to argue. But if he argues and commits himself to the fact that Jamar Matthews was the driver, and we have every indication he's going to do that, and that Officer Walter in chasing him was able to identify him as Jamar Matthews, okay, so now that's an identity issue.

The State cannot disagree that if

Jamar Matthews is not that person, if they haven't

proved that he's that person, then how in the world did

he get there?

The only way he could have gotten there is through that high-speed chase and that foot chase to ultimately wind up on 1116 Jimmy Street. There's no other factual variant that the State can make at that time on his presence at the scene.

If he was at the scene, he's the guy who was driving the car. If he was the guy driving the car, he was the guy in the foot chase. Identity is the issue.

If he is not that guy, they have no factual basis to show that he was at the scene, aiding and abetting, conspiring, being the principal person responsible for it.

22.

If they can't change the fact which they're not allowed to do under the law, then the jury can't put Mr. Matthews at the original scene. If the jury can't put him at the original scene, all the alternate theories of liability don't count against Mr. Matthews. He has to be found not quilty over there.

However, if they have proven identity, then all bets off. This doesn't apply. And if they choose to do another theory of how Jamar Matthews winds up on 1116 Jimmy not being the driver and not being pursued by Officer Walter, that's still their option.

I'm not precluding them from choosing whatever theory of prosecution they want in front of that jury. But if that's what they want to do, if they decide to go that way, and if they haven't proven beyond a reasonable doubt this issue of identity, then we are absolutely entitled to a not guilty because he couldn't have been at the other scene.

THE COURT: If identity is an issue, identity is covered by the other instructions. You're able to argue identity based upon the law that I intend

to give.

MR. FIGLER: But that's the whole point. The heat of passion was covered in the other arguments as well, and this was a signifier. This is the one it emphasizes. That's what the whole idea of theory of defense is is to emphasize it, so we're emphasizing the identity issue here if that's what the State wants to boil it down to.

THE COURT: And I gave you an instruction that talks about eyewitness identification --

MR. FIGLER: Correct.

THE COURT: -- to support your ability to argue identification. I believe that's sufficient.

We're going to mark this as D next in order.

MR. FIGLER: Okay. And then, Judge, I would offer as a third one just the first two paragraphs, just the first two lines, nothing different, just the first two lines as an accurate statement of law not covered by any other instruction.

THE COURT: "The State is allowed to offer alternate theories of criminal liability. The State is disallowed from taking inconsistent positions with regard to material facts. A fact is material if it has significance -- has significant bearing on any theory of prosecution."

```
MR. BATEMAN:
                             I don't -- first of all, I
1
   don't know what that means, and I don't know what
2
   inconsistent --
3
                             What part of that doesn't --
               MR. FIGLER:
4
                             -- (indiscernible).
5
               MR. BATEMAN:
                             Well, exactly. And they can't
               MR. FIGLER:
6
7
   take an inconsistent position. So if they try to say
   ladies and gentlemen of the jury, Jamar Matthews was the
8
   driver of that vehicle. However, maybe some of you
9
   think that he wasn't the driver of the vehicle.
                                                     That he
10
   got there as the passenger of the vehicle or he was the
11
   person who ran off the other way and wound up there.
12
   That's fine too, as long as you think that he was
13
   involved, et cetera.
14
                That would be an inconsistent factual
15
   position based on their presentation.
                                           They can't do
16
   that. Not if they're going to be --
17
               THE COURT: State.
18
               MR. BATEMAN:
                             Aiding and abetting.
19
20
               THE COURT: Aiding and abetting.
               MR. FIGLER: But how is that aiding and
21
   abetting if --
22
                THE COURT:
                            They're working together in
23
   concert in the car.
24
               MR. FIGLER:
                             That's fine, if they're there.
25
```

```
THE COURT: It's a dynamic situation.
1
   They're moving --
2
                            If they're at the scene, but
               MR. FIGLER:
3
   there's no possible way that they can argue that he got
4
   to the Doolittle/Lexington address any other way than
5
   being the driver of the vehicle.
6
               MR. BATEMAN: (Indiscernible).
7
                            They can't say -- they're going
               MR. FIGLER:
8
   to say he was the passenger? Are you going to say that?
9
               MR. BATEMAN: (Indiscernible).
10
               MR. FIGLER: If you're going to take that
11
   inconsistent position, I will object because that's an
12
   inconsistent position, and that's precluded by law.
13
               THE COURT: I'm not going to give this
14
   instruction. Let's mark this next D in order.
15
               MR. FIGLER:
                            Thank you, Judge.
16
               THE COURT: All right. D -- what are they,
17
   D10?
18
               MR. FIGLER: That will be D11 and D12.
19
               THE COURT: All right. We're on D12.
20
               MR. FIGLER:
                           I believe.
21
               THE COURT: Well --
22
               MR. FIGLER: Is that correct, Madam Clerk?
23
               THE COURT: -- as long as they -- all right.
24
   Are there any other -- all right. Let's go through and
25
```

1	mark the final copies here.
2	MR. BATEMAN: (Indiscernible).
3	THE COURT: Yeah.
4	MR. BATEMAN: It was marked as a I don't
5	know if it was marked as (indiscernible).
6	(Off-record colloquy)
7	THE COURT: Again, I was reading yeah,
8	and I had reviewed the Crawford decision, understand the
9	right of the defense to have an instruction on the
10	theory of the case. The theory of the case is identity
11	based upon the instructions that would have been
12	previously agreed upon. I believe there's sufficient
13	grounds to argue identity and, therefore, that is my
14	ruling.
15	No. 2 is if in these instructions, correct?
16	MR. FIGLER: Correct.
17	THE COURT: An information is but a formal
18	method, 3. Now, how am I going to read this? Am I
19	reading the whole thing?
20	MR. SINGER: No.
21	THE COURT: Because in a previous package we
22	had agreed that I reference specific counts only.
23	MR. FIGLER: I guess you could just say 6,
24	10 and 11 only refer to Mr. Matthews.
25	MS. LEWIS: I think that the best way to do

```
it is to say in this case it is charged an information
1
   the defendants above-named having committed these crimes
   blah, blah, blah. Defendant Pierre Joshlin having
3
   committed the crimes of Count I, Count II, Count III,
4
   Count IV, go all the way up to Count IX, and then say
5
   defendant Jamar Matthews having committed the counts of
6
   Count I, Count II, all the way through Counts XI.
7
   would be -- and then you don't have to read all the
9
   language.
                THE COURT: So I to IX for Matthews.
10
                MR. FIGLER: Actually, I through XI for
11
12
   Matthews, Judge.
                MS. LEWIS:
                            I through IX for Pierre Joshlin.
13
                MR. SINGER:
                             No.
14
                MR. FIGLER:
15
                             No.
                MR. SINGER:
                             Not VI.
16
                             I through V for Jamar Matthews
                MR. FIGLER:
17
   and then VII through IX for Pierre Joshlin.
18
                THE COURT:
                            I through V --
19
                             (Indiscernible) VI.
20
                MR. BATEMAN:
                MR. FIGLER:
                             Right.
21
                MS. LEWIS:
                            Right.
22
                             Matthews is charged in all of
23
                MR. FIGLER:
24
   them.
                MS. LEWIS:
                            Right.
25
```

```
MR. FIGLER: So Matthews is I through XI.
1
   Pierre Joshlin is I through V and then again VII through
2
3
   IX.
               THE COURT: VII through IX Joshlin.
4
   Pierre Joshlin I through V and VII through IX.
5
   Mr. Matthews all counts --
6
               MR. FIGLER: Correct.
7
               THE COURT: -- I through XI.
8
                     (Off-record colloquy)
9
               THE COURT: All right. 4, in this case the
10
   defendants. 5, murder is the unlawful killing. 6,
11
   express malice. 7, murder in the first -- of the first
12
   degree. 8, the law does not undertake. 9, if an
13
   illegal yet unintended. 10, the intention to kill.
                                                         11,
14
   all murder which. 12, you are instructed. 13, in
15
   arriving at a verdict. 14, you are instructed that.
16
   15, you are instructed that a firearm. 16, in order to
17
   use. 17, attempted murder in the performance. 18,
18
   malice aforethought. 19, it is not necessary to prove.
19
   20, robbery is the unlawful taking. 21, it is unlawful
20
   to knowingly. 22, an assault with a deadly weapon.
                                                         23,
21
   a conspiracy means. 24, conspiracy's an agreement.
22
   each member of a conspiracy. 26, it is not necessary to
23
   prove. 27, to aid and abet. 28, your verdict must be
24
   unanimous. 29, the flight. 30, to constitute the
25
```

```
crimes charged. 31, the defendant is presumed innocent.
1
   32, it is a constitutional right. 33, in this case
2
   there are two defendants. 34, the evidence which you
3
   are to consider. 35, the credibility and believability.
4
   36, you have heard. 37, a witness who has special
5
   knowledge. 38, although you are to consider. 39, if in
6
   your deliberation. 40, when you retire. 41, now you
7
   will listen.
8
               Now we have verdict forms.
                                            We have a
9
   separate set of verdict forms for both Mr. Joshlin and
10
   Mr. Matthews; is that correct?
11
               MR. SINGER: Yes.
12
               THE COURT: All right. Is the State
13
14
   familiar with the Court's proposed jury instructions
   number 1 through 41?
15
               MR. BATEMAN:
                             Yes.
16
               THE COURT: Does the State object to the
17
   giving of any those instructions?
18
               MR. BATEMAN: No, Your Honor.
19
20
               THE COURT:
                           Does the State have any
   additional instructions to propose?
21
22
               MR. BATEMAN: No, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Is the defense for Mr. Matthews
23
   familiar with the Court's proposed jury instructions
24
   number 1 through 41?
25
```

1	MR. FIGLER: Yes, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Does the defense have any
3	objection to the giving of those instructions?
4	MR. FIGLER: Only as whatever was noted
5	previously and as a set we believe that they do violate
6	the due process of Fourteenth amendment to U.S.
7	Constitution and Fifth amendment rights of the
8	defendant, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: As previously outlined?
10	MR. FIGLER: That's correct, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Does counsel for Mr. Joshlin
12	have these instructions?
13	MR. SINGER: Yes, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: Do you object to the giving of
15	any of these instructions?
16	MR. SINGER: Judge, we join in the
17	co-counsel's objections.
18	THE COURT: Does the State or defense object
19	to the proposed verdict forms of the Court?
20	MR. BATEMAN: I think we might have an
21	error.
22	MS. LEWIS: There's an error in the verdict
23	form as to Pierre Joshlin is not charged in all the
24	counts. It says on the verdict forms as conspiracy
25	(indiscernible) Count VI in the information is

```
possession of short-barreled rifle, so that should
1
   actually read count VII. And then counts IX and X
2
   shouldn't be there, assault with a deadly weapon, so
3
   they need to be renumbered.
4
               MR. BATEMAN: Just as to Pierre Joshlin.
5
               MR. FIGLER: That's correct.
6
               THE COURT: How we going to make that happen
7
   gentlemen and lady?
8
                     (Off-record colloquy)
9
               MR. FIGLER: Are we going right into
10
   closings or is there rebuttal?
11
                THE COURT: Well, I was going to ask that as
12
   soon as we finish this up.
13
                     (Off-record colloquy)
14
                THE COURT: Danny, why don't you call Adam
15
16
   and have him run them.
                     (Off-record colloquy)
17
                MR. SINGER: Your Honor, can I use the
18
   restroom?
19
                THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Singer, any objection
20
   to the verdict forms as they're presently constituted
21
   for Mr. Joshlin? I understand that Mr. Joshlin should
22
   be referenced Counts I through V and Counts VII through
23
24
   IX only.
               MR. SINGER: That's correct, Judge.
25
```

```
you.
1
2
               MR. FIGLER:
                             Thanks. They got theirs.
               THE COURT: All right.
3
                     (Off-record colloquy)
4
5
               THE COURT: Do either counsel request the
   Court instruct the jury on the -- instruct the jury
6
   before closing arguments?
7
8
               MS. LEWIS: Huh?
                                  What?
9
               THE COURT: Just on the -- do you want me to
10
   read the instructions before closing arguments?
               MR. SINGER: What's the other choice?
11
               MR. BUNIN: Yes, please.
12
               THE COURT: Read the -- to do it after,
13
   believe or not.
                   Never been done in my time, but --
14
               MR. FIGLER: I've never heard of that.
15
               MR. BUNIN: Never heard of it.
16
               MR. FIGLER: I didn't know it was in the
17
18
   book.
               THE COURT: It's in the book.
19
               MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
20
                            That's why we were looking at
               MS. LEWIS:
21
22
   you like what else is there to do.
               THE COURT: I know, I know.
23
               MR. FIGLER:
                            (Indiscernible) the
24
   instructions and (indiscernible).
25
```

```
THE COURT: Okay. You know what, I'm going
1
2
   to strike that from the book because, you're right, it
   doesn't make sense.
3
4
                MR. FIGLER: I can't imagine anyone --
5
                THE COURT: Do parties agree to waive the
6
   reporting of the reading of the jury instructions to the
7
   jury?
8
               MR. FIGLER: Yes, Your Honor.
9
                THE COURT: All right.
                                        State?
10
               MS. LEWIS:
                            Yes, Judge.
                THE COURT: All right. It appears that
11
   we're prepared to settle instructions -- having settled
12
13
   the instructions, we're prepared to instruct the jury if
   the State has no rebuttal evidence. Does the State have
14
15
   any rebuttal evidence?
16
               MS. LEWIS:
                            Don't we have to do that in
17
   front of the jury?
18
               THE COURT: You have to tell us if you have
   a rebuttal case.
19
20
               MS. LEWIS:
                          Oh, no.
                                    We don't.
21
               THE COURT:
                            Well, I'm asking if you do.
22
   you do, then --
                                     I'm saying don't we
23
               MS. LEWIS:
                           Oh, no.
   have to do that in front of the jury, though or no?
24
               THE COURT:
25
                            Again?
```

1	MR. BATEMAN: I don't think we do.
2	MR. FIGLER: I don't think you need to.
3	MS. LEWIS: Okay.
4	MR. FIGLER: Both parties have rested.
5	MS. LEWIS: Okay. I didn't know.
6	MR. BATEMAN: We're good to go.
7	THE COURT: Now, we're waiting for the
8	copies of the jury instructions because I want each of
9	the jurors to have a copy of the instructions as we read
10	through them.
11	MS. LEWIS: They're coming.
12	MR. FIGLER: That's good for them.
13	MR. SINGER: Is that
14	MR. FIGLER: Based on the State's
15	representation, I'm going to release my anticipated
16	surrebuttal witnesses, if that's okay, Judge.
17	THE COURT: Yes. I guess since there's no
18	rebuttal, there's no need for a surrebuttal.
19	MR. FIGLER: Okay.
20	MR. BATEMAN: Surrebuttal.
21	MR. FIGLER: What? Have you never heard of
22	surrebuttal.
23	MR. SINGER: (Indiscernible) a copy of the
24	jury instructions that's allowable (indiscernible).
25	THE COURT: Yes.

1	MR. BATEMAN: Got to have the last word.
2	THE COURT: Yes.
3	(Off-record colloquy)
4	THE COURT: We're still on the record. I
5	think it helps them follow along. I mean, me reading
6	these instructions
7	MR. BATEMAN: Yeah.
8	MR. SINGER: Creates a certain yeah,
9	certain things need to be committed to their memory, but
10	I guess that's yeah. I just I would just wonder
11	why no other (indiscernible) do that.
12	THE COURT: They do it all the time.
13	MR. BATEMAN: Stu does it?
14	MR. SINGER: Stu Bell?
15	MR. BATEMAN: Yeah.
16	THE COURT: All the time.
17	MR. SINGER: Judge Bonaventure never did it.
18	Judge Mosley never did it. Judge Glass never did it.
19	MR. BATEMAN: Judge Barker's cutting edge.
20	MR. SINGER: Yes.
21	THE COURT: Yeah. Well
22	(Off-record colloquy)
23	THE COURT: All right. Let's bring them in.
24	(Jury present)
25	THE BAILIFF: Jury's present, please.

Panel's present. 1 THE COURT: Thank you. Back on the record, 2 C228460, State of Nevada, plaintiff, versus 3 Pierre Joshlin and Jamar Matthews. Record should 4 reflect presence of counsel and all members of the jury. 5 Do the counsel stipulate to the presence of 6 the jury? 7 Yes, Judge. MS. LEWIS: 8 Yes, Judge. MR. SINGER: 9 Ladies and gentlemen, you should 10 THE COURT: all have in your seats copies of proposed jury 11 instructions. I apologize for the delay, but we were 12 working. 13 Does everyone have a copy of the proposed 14 instructions? This morning we will be reading these 15 instructions to you in preparation for final summation. 16 (Thereupon, jury instructions were read, 17 but not transcribed.) 18 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, those are 19 the instructions as give. You will also be given forms 20 of verdict, one series of forms of verdict for 21 Pierre Joshlin and one series of form of verdict for 22. Jamar Matthews. You must consider these separately as 23 they relate to each defendant. 24 You will be permitted, again, to take these 25

instructions with you into deliberations so you can read 1 them, consider them further. 2 Are we prepared for argument? 3 MR. BATEMAN: Yes, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: State. 5 (Off-record colloquy) 6 May I proceed, Your Honor? MR. BATEMAN: 7 8 THE COURT: You may. Thank you. 9 MR. BATEMAN: 10 Ladies and gentlemen, generally in pretty much all the criminal cases that come in front of juries 11 12 they can be broken down into, essentially, two types of cases, cases where what happened is really at issue. 13 14 Take, for instance, a case where two individuals get in a fight, someone gets seriously 15 16 injured and one -- the person that does the injury's the one that is charged. 17 The question in a case like that is not who 18 was involved. It's what happened. What was the crime 19 committed? Was there a crime committed? Does this 20 individual have any defenses? 21 22. The other types of cases, ladies and gentlemen, are really not where the actual crimes that 23 are committed are in dispute. It's who did it. 24 committed those crimes? This case is one of the latter. 25

I doubt that the defense will claim or dispute that the charges that were included in the information that were read to you early on in this case, and they're included in your jury instruction form, are really in dispute.

The defendants are charged with murder,

The defendants are charged with murder, attempt murder, robbery. Mr. Matthews is charged with assault with a deadly and with possession of an illegal firearm.

This case, ultimately, really, is about murder, ladies and gentlemen, the murder of Mercy Williams on September 30th, 2006. That's why we're here. That's what needs to be brought to bear on the proceedings.

They'll not dispute that Mercy Williams was murdered in this case. There can be no dispute, so we'll cover the charges initially and talk about the evidence as it relates to these particular charges.

Murder, ladies and gentlemen, you'll have instructions in this case that you can choose between first-degree murder and second-degree murder.

The evidence in this case, ladies and gentlemen, is quite clear. First-degree murder was committed on September 30th, 2006. The elements of first-degree murder include premeditation, deliberation

and willful acts. Second-degree murder is, essentially, a murder without those three elements.

How do we determine whether first-degree murder was committed in this case? We look at the scene. The scene tells us all we need to know. The witnesses eventually will tell us all we need to know.

What you have in front of you is 1271 Balzar at 9:52 p.m. on the evening of September 30th, 2006. What you see there is a north view of Lexington and then to the right is Balzar. You see the residence on the corner of the street.

All those cones, ladies and gentlemen, signify, roughly, at least, 38 cartridge cases that were fired amongst the individuals that arrived from the south to the north on September 30th, stood on the corner of Balzar, and unloaded firearms as Mercy Williams, Myniece Cook, Michele'le Tolfree and Maurice Hickman ran for their lives. Roughly, 38 cartridge cases were collected and tied back to firearms, 38.

And one juror asked an interesting question. What's the difference between an automatic and a semiautomatic firearm? Ladies and gentlemen, the semiautomatic you have to pull every single time. Remember that .22 and how many times that .22's trigger

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had to be pulled by the individual shooting it. 1 You make a determination, ladies and 2 gentlemen, about murder in this case based upon the 3 evidence at the scene. The evidence at the scene is 4 that there were between three -- well, the witnesses say 5 between three and five individuals all shooting 6 firearms. Unfortunately, Myniece Cook, 8 Michele'le Tolfree couldn't tell you who those 9 individuals were. They can give you a description. 10 what's important -- and that will go to ID later. 11 But what's important in both the -- all 12 three of the attempt murder charges and the murder 13 charge is that the State proceeds on three potential 14 theories of liability because with three or four 15 individuals there it's not entirely within the State's 16 ability to tell you exactly who did what, who pulled 17 every trigger, who had exactly what gun at this 18 particular time as they were standing at 1271 Balzar. 19 20 Direct liability, of course, is someone -if one particular person shoots another person, they are 21 directly liable for that crime. 22 Conspiracy liability is if these individuals 23 came together at some point and made a decision to act 24 as coconspirators in committing a particular crime. 25

That's what we have here. These individuals came from 1 the south to the north, altogether, all had firearms and 2 all began shooting. 3 Aiding and abetting is also a theory of 4 liability where these individuals come together, 5 encourage each other to commit the crimes charged. 6 You do not have to be unanimous as to your 7. theory of liability. If six of you believe that the 8 defendants sitting before you here today conspired 9 together and six of you believe that they aided and 10 abetted one another, they are still guilty of 11 12 first-degree murder. Just briefly some instructions because this 13 is important law that the judge has provided you. 14 Conspiracy is an agreement or mutual understanding 15 between two or more persons that commit a crime and each 16 member of that conspiracy is liable for those acts. 17 In a sense, ladies and gentlemen, the act of 18 one as long as these individuals are conspireing 19 together is the act of all. 20 Ultimately, we know that Mercy Williams was 21 killed with a .22 bullet. The individual firing the .22 22 is directly liable for Mercy Williams' killing. 23 But that doesn't absolve the other 24 individuals that were there also shooting. As long as 25

you find that these individuals conspired to do what 1 2 they did on September 30th of 2006, then all are liable for Mercy Williams' killing and the attempted murders of 3 4 the other individuals at the scene. 5 MR. FIGLER: And, Your Honor, I just lodge a 6 technical objection. It's furtherance or foreseeable, rather, and that's in the instructions. 7 8 THE COURT: Noted. 9 MR. FIGLER: Thank you. 10 THE COURT: It's argument. It is not necessary in proving 11 MR. BATEMAN: a conspiracy to show a meeting of the alleged 12 conspirators or the making an expressed or formal 13 14 agreement. 15 It's not required that the State prove that these individuals sat down around a conference table, 16 17 mapped when they were going to meet, what car they were going to take to when they got there, who was going to 18 shoot first, who was going to shoot second. 19 20 The formation and existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from all the circumstances tending to 21 22 show the common intent. The fact that these individuals all arrived 23 together southbound, all shot together at these 24

individuals and all left together and then eventually

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stole -- robbed Geishe Orduno and Melvin Bolden of their car, fled from police, that is all evidence to show that these individuals were acting in concert throughout the course of this crime.

What is the likelihood that all three, four of these individuals show up with firearms at the exact same spot, fire all the firearms, just happen to leave altogether and hadn't made any plans whatsoever one way or the other to do what it is they did?

Aiding and abetting means to actively, knowingly or purposely facilitate or assist another individual in the commission or attempted commission of the crime.

Again, as long as these individuals take someone who is encouraging someone to commit a crime or helping them by providing them firearms or ammunition, knowing full well what the individual that they are helping and encouraging intends to do, that individual's also guilty of the exact same crime that the ultimate person who directly committed the crime is guilty of. That's what aiding and abetting means.

And importantly, those who aid and abet a crime and those who directly perpetrate the crime are principals and equally guilty of the commission of that crime, and, therefore, the finder of fact -- and that's

you ladies and gentlemen -- need not unanimously agree nor individually determine whether a defendant is an aider or abetter or direct perpetrator.

You don't have to determine what each one of these individual persons did so long as the entirety of the acts together form the commission of a crime.

There's also a doctrine called transferred intent, ladies and gentlemen. Basically, this is a situation where let's say an individual tries to punch another individual, and the other individual dodges the punch. And in the course of punching, the person who's doing the punching accidentally hits another person. It was an accident. They didn't mean to hit that individual.

The doctrine of transferred intent tells you that under the law the individual that threw that punch, even though they missed the person that they intended to hit, is still guilty of that crime.

It's ultimately for you to decide what took place and what the intentions were of the defendants as they arrived at 1271 Balzar on the evening in question.

Based upon their actions, it's quite clear that every individual that was there had the intent to commit murder based upon the sheer number of cartridges, cartridge cases that resulted on the ground, the fact

that they all came together, the fact that they were shooting at three or four -- actually, four individuals at a fairly close distance. It would suggest that they all individually had that intent.

If they went there initially and they intended only to shoot one particular person but continued to attack upon a group, you'll notice also in this instruction, during an attack upon a group a defendant's intent to kill need not be directed at any one individual. It is enough if the intent to kill is directed at that group.

Myniece, Michele'le, Mercy and Mr. Hickman were all together in a group sitting in front of 1271 Balzar when they were shot at by multiple individuals in close range.

Intent to kill. The intention to kill may be ascertained or deduced from the facts and circumstances of the killing such as -- and in this case it's particularly important -- such as the use of a weapon calculated to produce death and the manner of its use.

Ladies and gentlemen, we didn't go through the exercise with Jim Krylo for no reason. The fact of the matter is the guns that these individuals brought to the particular location on this day with the number of ammunition that they had is all the evidence you need of their intent to kill.

22.

The Glock, .45 caliber, was ultimately found underneath Mr. Joshlin in a dumpster some five minutes after the shooting. 15-round -- or, excuse me, 28-round capacity magazine, an extended magazine. This was brought to the crime scene, to the murder scene.

What is the intention of someone who brings a Glock with a 28-round capacity extended magazine and ultimately unloads ten cartridge cases that were tied back by Jim Krylo to this particular gun? Ten rounds.

And you saw all of those individual casings come up one by one by one. That's every time pulling that trigger, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten as he stood on the corner of 1271 Balzar shooting at three women and a man.

A Colt .45 found in the vehicle that the individual shooters robbed from Geishe and Melvin.

Again, an extended round, not quite the same as -- not quite as extensive or substantial as the Glock, but still an extended magazine, ten rounds.

One cartridge case was recovered at the scene with regard to this Colt .45. Why is that? Why wasn't it shot more? It jammed.

Is there any doubt that the individual that

was shooting this gun had every intention to unload those ten rounds and was unable to do it solely through the good fortune for the victims that that gun jammed? This gun, again, was found with the individuals that had dodged out of the Lincoln in the front passenger seat, another gun with an extended magazine.

Finally, the third gun, .22 caliber rifle that had been sawed off, was illegal. You heard Stephanie Smith describe that the length of the barrel was ten inches -- a little over ten inches, ten-and three-quarters I believe, and the total length of the gun was 20 inches.

And you'll see the instruction in there -and we'll get to it in a second -- as to why this
particular gun was illegal at the time, but was equipped
with a 30-round capacity magazine, magazine empty,
empty. Whoever sat and shot this gun emptied it. Is
that intent to kill?

25 cartridge cases recovered that were matched up to this particular weapon. That's 25 times. I'm not going to count it off. 25 times that that trigger was pulled standing on that corner.

One block south, with one block south,

Geishe Orduno and Melvin Bolden come back from eating

dinner at the Main Street Station Buffet, roll in about

9:52, unfortunately, and hear all of this firing, and 1 2 Geishe tells Melvin let's keep going. Melvin probably thinking, you know, I'm not going to stop or I'm not 3 4 going to go. We're going to stop and park the car. He's driving because the power steering doesn't work. 5 6 Immediately after hearing these shots, here Those individuals that had shot at Mercy and 7 they come. 8 Myniece and Michele'le and Mr. Hickman come running southbound, same direction that they came to get to --9 10 that they went to get to Balzar. Nobody else is out and around. They take 11 the car, all of them, all of them that made it 12 Again, this would be a robbery with use of southbound. 13 a deadly weapon, unlawful taking of the personal 14 property of another without their permission using force 15 or violence. 16 This isn't even really disputable either. 17 The individuals that forced Geishe and Melvin out of 18 their car took off with the car while they had weapons 19 in their hands, committed robbery with use of a deadly 20 weapon. 21 22 In this particular case, it's also charged as an aiding and abetting liability. The individual 23

How about the other two that got in the

that drove away you could say was directly responsible.

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vehicle and helped him through the use of their weapons? Should they not be responsible as well for the robbery with use? The law says they should.

Possession of short-barreled rifle. Again, we had Stephanie Smith tell you how long a rifle needs to be for it not to be illegal, a rifle having one or more barrels less than 16 inches in length. This one was ten-and-three-quarters. Must be at least 26 inches in total. This one was 20. Again, that particular charge, and I'll reiterate, only is charged against Mr. Matthews.

Finally, assault with a deadly weapon against Officers Cupp and Walter. Assault with a deadly weapon is an intentional placing of another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm through the use of a deadly weapon.

At least once, and there's testimony that twice, the driver of the stolen Lincoln looked out his driver's side door, brandished a weapon at Officers Cupp and Walter, and especially while they were on Lexington after this individual exited the Lincoln stood up with that weapon, and Officer Cupp felt the need to actually direct his car into this individual to avoid what he believed was potential bodily harm to himself and to his partner.

Ladies and gentlemen, that's an assault with a deadly weapon. I don't believe the defense will dispute that.

So with all of this evidence as to what was committed, the question ultimately for you, the trier of fact, is who are the identities of these shooters.

There's a combination of circumstantial and direct evidence, and you'll have an instruction about how you should view circumstantial and direct evidence. That they are equal in their relative importance. One is not better than the other.

Circumstantial is like poses of a puzzle. Direct evidence is, for instance, an eyewitness to a crime.

The identity of the shooters in this particular case can be gleaned from the time frame of the crimes, the evidence at the scene and the witnesses, ladies and gentlemen, and it's important in this case because you look at all the evidence. There's been a great deal of evidence that's been provided to you over the last four days.

Everyone in the room I would ask that when you go back and deliberate, you take a look at this evidence, think about it very -- deliberate over this evidence. You will come to the conclusion that the

defendants are at least two of the shooters in this particular case.

The evidence tells you exactly, actually, how many shooters were there. There was some talk about four or five I believe by the witnesses at Balzar. Mind you, it was happening very quickly.

How do we know there are four shooters? We talked about firearms that were found. The Glock, the Colt, the Ruger. What was the fourth gun? It was that 9mm that wasn't found. How do we know? Two shell casings -- excuse me -- cartridge cases are found in the street.

Where did that fourth shooter go? We know exactly where he went. When Maurice and Michele'le took off running for their lives, one shooter took off after them. Remember how Michele'le said that someone was following her and that her and Maurice had to hide. He was shooting as he was following them in the middle of that street, and he went northbound across Balzar.

So when the three individuals on the corner decided to take off out of there southbound and get the heck out after they just killed and murdered one of the individuals, maimed the other, they took off south, the three of them.

There wasn't time, obviously, for or perhaps

the fourth individual wasn't around to see them leave or to know where they went. Four shooters, that's what the scene tells you.

And again, one block. Is there any doubt that the individuals who shot at 1271 ended up one block south to do the carjacking? The time tell you that.

Melvin and Geishe tell you that when they hear shooting and immediately on top of them are three to four they say. We know it's three. Three come out of the car.

It's highly doubtful the defense will suggest that there are two different groups of males similar in description, one shooting at Balzar, one carjacking at Lawry. It makes virtually no sense.

Let's talk about just briefly the identity

-- the description of these individuals. The witnesses

that are these two particular scenes because all

(indiscernible) was insinuated that all of these

descriptions are so off and that they are, you know,

completely wrong, inconsistent.

Myniece Cook and Michele'le Tolfree tell you three to five young African-American males wearing dark clothes is headed southbound, and, specifically, Myniece says all dark clothes.

Michele'le initially said all dark clothes. She told the police officers at the time one of them

that she saw with the hands behind his back was wearing blue jeans or some sort of blue-jean shorts or pants.

Why did that individual have their -- why did these two ladies fail to see the red gloves? Could it be the individual with the blue jeans had his hands behind his back, as they testified, and there were the red gloves?

And when the gun came out, they didn't see the red gloves. They were running for their lives. All they saw was the or felt was the bullets whizzing past their heads.

Geishe Orduno and Melvin Bolden -- well, and let me back up. Myniece Cook and Michele'le say it's too dark. I didn't get a look at their face. She didn't say it wasn't these two. She said at the time and in here today it was too dark. I couldn't see their face. And is that really something we should hold against these individuals as they're running from 38, at least, shots?

Geishe Orduno and Melvin Bolden coming home late at night, again, ten to 10:00, describe three to four young African-American males, dark clothes. Geishe says one with a white shirt, at least one with red gloves. Melvin also talked about red gloves.

What this tells you is that people under

these types of circumstances, generally when it's very short periods of time and when guns are pointed at their face, get a little bit of the inconsistencies in their descriptions. Is that really to be unexpected under the circumstances? Especially when you have — if you think about it, Cupp and Walter pull up on this corner, and they still can't see what's going on.

It must be awfully dark in one, two, three, four, five, six witnesses are having a hard time seeing.

four, five, six witnesses are having a hard time seeing That doesn't mean they're wrong about what they see, necessarily. It makes it difficult to make an identification at this point, but they give you some very important information.

Young, they all said they were young. These guys are young. Said they're African-American males. That's important because they're African-American males, and it's important because at the scene down at Lexington or the people that Cupp and Walter see exiting the Lincoln or the individuals that are found on J Street or at Jimmy, they're not Hispanic, they're not white, they're not Asian.

If these young ladies had said it was four Hispanic males and these two individuals were found down the street, well, that's a pretty big material inconsistency that doesn't exist in this case.

Cupp and Walters follow -- and I go back to 1 There was some mention about height, ladies and 2 3 gentlemen, of the individual that came up with the rifle and the red gloves to Geishe's side of the door and 4 5 opened it up. She said they were pulled up to a curb. 6 7 Could she have made a mistake about saying they were my 8 height as she scrambled out of the car and dodged back 9 east to her hiding spot? Could it be that the individual that was 10 holding the gun and screaming at them to get out was 11 crouched down? 12 Could it be that the individual that was 13 14 holding that gun was standing on the asphalt, and when Geishe exited the vehicle, she stood up on the actual 15 sidewalk some inches above to make it look like they 16 were the same height? Is that so impossible or 17 improbable? Does that make any of the information she 18 19 gave less reliable? 1271 Balzar. You'll see that the route that 20 Cupp and Walter take as this vehicle speeds off from the 21 22. carjacking at 1284 westbound on Lawry out to Martin Luther King. 23 What's important here? The individuals in 24 the vehicle take off westbound out to Martin Luther King 25

Boulevard. Martin Luther King, as everyone in this community knows, is a fairly large road. It's fairly populated. It's out in the open where people can see things.

They cross Lake Mead Boulevard. Inevitably, these individuals are thinking to themselves how do we get away with a police officer behind us with these lights blaring? And they know what's going on.

They turn right on Martin Luther King.

They're getting out of the neighborhood going westbound.

They don't go east because they haven't decided yet what they're going to do. They continue to come down Lake

Mead -- excuse me, Martin Luther King.

There's no place to go right and run. It's all open field. What do they do? They turn back in on Jimmy back to the neighborhood because they think they can ditch the car at this point.

And remember its power steering's out, so they're having a tough time controlling this car most likely. It's a big boat.

They turn back into the neighborhood where they know that they -- they know the houses, they know the lay out, they think that their best bet for getting away from the officers with this is to get back into the neighborhood.

How do we know they know the neighborhood?

1801 J Street, No. 217. Mr. Matthews knows the neighborhood. They crash the vehicle, and they exit the vehicle at this point.

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Now, at least one of the officers had seen the door open or testified to seeing the door open on Jimmy and seeing the driver's general description and face.

They both, obviously, observe the driver get out of the vehicle where it crashes at the church down here on Lexington. This was after this individual who was driving opens the door while the car is moving at a slow pace, looks out, has the gun with them and brandishes it to the officers.

Yet, neither of them said they were particularly far away who saw this individual and, eventually, the car runs off into the road and onto the fire extinguisher or -- excuse me -- fire hydrant. This is obviously because of the power steering that he can't control the car.

And they find themselves against the fire hydrant next to the church. And important to note in a minute, this is the grassy area in front of the church and behind the Lincoln where Mr. Matthews runs.

But it's important to slow that down. As

1 this car makes a turn and it slows down and these officers at this point have just been chasing someone 2 who they basically observe what they thought was some 3 suspicious activity when the car was taken and it peels 4 5 out immediately after shots are fired, are they not looking? Are they paying attention to other stuff? 6 These are Las Vegas Metropolitan police 7 officers in what has been described as a high-crime area 8 9 should be concerned about what's going on. They do this every day for a living. Observing this car travel, 10 observing the individual as he's sticking his head the 11 driver's side door turning around looking at him. 12 When the car stops, the driver leaves, 13 actually, ends up outside the vehicle, stands up. 14 Officer Cupp feels the need to actually angle the car 15 into him, front right corner, to avoid being shot 16 potentially. He's now seen the gun brandished as the 17 door was open. 18 The driver gets out of the vehicle, tumbles 19 20 over the right side, and they both told you that the driver then heads back along the sidewalk this way 21 northbound on Lexington. 22. Walters gives chase at this point. 23 designated as the primary individual who's going to give 24 chase if that's what occurs. They both told you that 25

they thought this was coming the way of the slowing down, the way the individuals in the car were driving and acting. He takes off after this individual. He heads northbound and then, ultimately, towards Eleanor.

You'll note that Officer Cupp first sees one of the passengers get out on the passenger side and head directly west through the parking. He said he didn't see any guns at that time. That's because the gun was left in the front passenger seat, the Colt.

Why was it left in the front passenger seat?

Because he can't fire it. It was jammed. So that

individual takes off. This unknown individual takes off
westbound.

Cupp then sees the other individual get out and sees a Glock. What's ultimately found? A Glock. Remind you that he saw a Glock at the time. He must have got a pretty good look at that gun. He must have been paying attention to what was going on.

He sees him running with a Glock down

Doolittle where he ultimately sees this individual point
the gun over his shoulder at him. Officer Cupp stops,

fires three times.

That was determined by the CSA on the scene, by Krylo, the firearms examiner, testified exactly truthfully as to what happened. He fired three times,

missed the guy. That's exactly what was found at the scene.

The passenger then runs through a parking lot across J Street at the exact same time officers are bearing down on these individuals. It's been called over the dispatch what's going on from the north down.

Officers are bearing down forming a perimeter.

And Rios, Officer Rios, sees a young

African-American adult running across J Street and into

1701 J Street apartments, immediately pulls in behind

him as the gate opens up.

Well, and let me back up. Again, these were the shells that were found on Doolittle that Cupp fired.

Individual shoots through 1701 J Street through the gate where they said he could pry through. They have to actually wait for the gate to open. He's right in front of them as he's walking through or he's running through basically eastbound on the north side of 1701 J Street.

He hangs a right, right as Rios and his partner are coming through the gate, they pull in, form a perimeter, hear some movement in these dumpsters.

They pull this man that was identified in court,

Pierre Joshlin, out of that dumpster.

And what's he sitting on top of? Black

gloves that have been described before and that Glock, a 1 Glock that Cupp saw, the Glock that ultimately was tied 2 back to the homicide scene, the Glock with the extended 3 magazine. 4 And on those gloves is gunshot residue. 5 was both identified by individuals at the Balzar and 6 They all this gloves on. There's your shooter 7 8 or one of your shooters. 9:57, five minutes. Time. In the case of 9 Mr. Joshlin time got him. And look at his clothes. 10 Dark clothes, black shirt, jeans. 11 12 Back at the crash Walter had taken off after Mr. Matthews. His gun was actually dropped on the way 13 running north out onto the grass. This was the Ruger 14 that was ultimately found with the extended magazine 15 tied back to the shooting at Balzar. 16

Walters follows him northbound on Lexington and immediate right into Eleanor where he jumps a chain-link fence leaving behind the red glove, the red glove that Walter identified when he called out through dispatch or called to dispatch, someone else to dispatch out, red gloves, the red gloves that were identified by Geishe Orduno and a torn red glove.

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There's a little bit of information from the canine officer, Cord Overson, who said, yeah, he came up

1 when he located Matthews at 111 Jimmy, right around the corner, that he had some injury to his hand, and he said 2 that it was unusual for a dog to bite someone's hand. 3 He didn't see it actually happen. 4 5 MR. FIGLER: Misstates the evidence, I'm going to object that. He said that 6 Your Honor. when he hit him on the nose that the dog bit him. 7 THE COURT: This is argument. The jury's 8 impression and memories of the evidence will stand. 9 That torn glove right there on MR. BATEMAN: 10 the palm as he's going over the fence, there's your 11 12 injury. Importantly, again, at 11:59 the description 13 of -- I'm sorry, 9:59, the description of Jamar Matthews 14 is broadcast as wearing dark clothes, blue jeans, red 15 16 gloves. I show you these two pictures because, 17 obviously, ultimately, this is how Mr. Matthews was 18 located at the 111 Jimmy Street which is right very near 19 where Walters broke off his pursuit when he heard 20 Officer Cupp firing shots. 21 And remember, again, we've got a perimeter 22 There was testimony about the lights and sirens 23 apparently going off to let everybody know they were 24

They set up a perimeter on this area.

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nowhere for Mr. Matthews to go after he had hopped two fences and Walters had hopped two fences.

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Mr. Matthews inevitably saw Walters cut off his pursuit and decided at that point rather than running back out onto Jimmy which is the next road over, where police are descending, be out in the open, I'm going to hunker down. I'm going to hunker down into somebody's backyard, and I'm going to wait it out.

And the canine officers had some interesting testimony about the scent or the pheromones that are given off in someone who's in this kind of a position as Mr. Matthews and based upon what he had done. That's what the dog is designed to look for.

Just briefly, there was some information about a TPO. I'd ask you when you go back to deliberate to ask yourselves whether Mr. Matthews was really worried about that TPO or was he worried about being caught for the murder of another individual, for the attempt murder of other individuals, for the robbery with use of a deadly weapon or running from police officers.

I'd ask you to look at the documents very carefully. There's a reason why they presented you with the birth certificate with the address of the complaining witness from 2005. It's because that

address is not on any of the documents in the TPO. 1 There's no information to tell you where that 2 complaining individual was in September of 2003, where 3 she was living. In fact, those documents say that her 4 residence on them is marked confidential. 5 Ladies and gentlemen, there is no evidence 6 that has been presented regarding this TPO other than it 7 was in existence. No evidence. 8 This is a court of law. Evidence is what is 9 10 brought in before you. You make decisions in criminal trials based upon evidence. 11 12 For you to speculate as to where Mr. Matthews was or that he was actually not the 13 individual and he was just afraid that he was in 14 vicinity 100 yards of the residence that was on the 15 birth certificate some almost year and a half prior, 16 pure speculation. Instructions say you can't do it. 17 Importantly, in this case why did 18 Mr. Matthews drop that Ruger? This is not his pants 19 just falling down. These are long shorts. This is how 20 young kids wear their pants --21 MR. FIGLER: Objection, Your Honor. 22 Absolutely that's not in evidence whatsoever that 23 somehow the State is going to say they brought in an 24 expert to say how Mr. Matthews or any other black person 25

in that -- young person in that neighborhood wears their pants.

They obviously were pulled down by the officers for a number of different reasons including search which was brought into evidence, so this is outside the scope of what evidence is in the record.

THE COURT: And you can respond in argument.

MR. BATEMAN: I never said the term "black". I said young people across all ethnicities have begun wearing their pants, generally, shorts -- it started out when I was in college, a little bit short, so that you could see --

MR. FIGLER: And again, Your Honor, I would object to the prosecutor testifying as to his personal experiences with fashion.

THE COURT: Argue the facts.

MR. BATEMAN: I didn't wear (indiscernible) because I'm kind of a dork, but started out kind of high so you could see a little bit of boxers, and it slowly worked its way lower as time has gone on, slowly worked its way lower and the shirts gotten longer, longer, longer to cover those boxers.

Everybody knows that -- I'm not saying in particular any type of people are doing it other than young people. I don't generally see too many, you know,

60-year-old grandparents doing it.

This is how he looked on the day in question when he got out of that car. This is how he was running, and he couldn't run that way. You can't hop fences with your pants down around your thighs. He had to pull them up. He needed hands to pull them up. He had to drop that firearm because he's running down the street pulling his pants up so that he can jump over fences.

Identity. In opening statement the defense said that this really comes down to the identification of Cupp and Walters. I dispute that. It's certainly important.

Cupp and Walter are police officers, had been in that area, in the Bolden area command, for at least I believe both of them said two to three years, had been in that neighborhood talking to people, patrolling the neighborhood. They were familiar with the neighborhood.

They (indiscernible) tell you truthfully I can see who at 12 -- at Lawry who those individuals were. They could have said right then. They could have side right then, oh, we knew who they were. They didn't. They said I didn't know who they were. That's why we followed them.

At 11:54, after the individuals bailed, 1 2 after this chase, after seeing at least the driver poke his head out at least once, Cupp as he's following calls 3 out black male adult, black shirt headed southbound. 4 Objection. That's not what the 5 MR. SINGER: -- there's a document in evidence that refers to that, 6 and it's miswritten purposely by the prosecution on the 7 8 screen there in contrast to what the catalogue says. 9 THE COURT: The jury --10 MR. BATEMAN: I'm sorry. And that actually is a mistake. It's 9:54, not 11:54. 11 MR. SINGER: It says BMJ and not BMA, so are 12 we going to allow the prosecution to --13 MR. BATEMAN: I don't know what BMJ is. 14 MR. SINGER: -- write up -- well, that's 15 what he says in the evidence. 16 THE COURT: And he's accurately reflected 17 18 the evidence. MR. BATEMAN: The catalogue's not in 19 20 evidence, Judge. Yes, it is. 21 MR. SINGER: 22 MR. BATEMAN: 9:54 -- and I apologize for my typo -- calls out black male adult, black shirt, 23 southbound. Who's found? Who's found southbound on J 24 Street, black male adult, black shirt sitting on top of 25

the gun that was fired?

Walter tells you that he tells someone else to call out at 11:59 black male adult, black shirt, blue-jean shorts, red gloves. And again, that should be 9:59 as well.

Who's found at 11:10 wearing the black shirt, blue-jean shorts, a red glove closely nearby hiding in a backyard, hiding in a backyard?

Mr. Matthews.

Both Officers Cupp and Walter, Walter on the scene identifies Mr. Matthews. Officer Cupp identifies him in court as the driver.

Been much made about identification processes that were used. There's been no evidence before you, ladies and gentlemen, that the process that was used with regards to Walter's identification with Mr. Matthews was somehow inappropriate. In fact, he testified that it is done all the time pursuant to police procedures.

And think about it. Someone commits a crime. Someone steals someone's car. They're found a short period of time later. They're in this vehicle. Doesn't it make sense to bring the individual who got their vehicle stolen over and say, hey, I'm just going to have you look at somebody. Does this person look

familiar? 1 Is that so unreasonable to say is this 2 person? Do we not expect that much of our officers that 3 they're going to come in here and just say, you know, 4 looks like him. I'm going to say 100 percent positive. 5 I'm going to risk my career -- 100 percent positive --6 if it later turns out that it's not him. Joshlin is found on top of the qun that was 8 used, top of the gloves that he was wearing with gunshot 9 residue. Mr. Matthews was located in the same area that 10 Mr. -- or that Officer Walter broke off his chase and 11 was last seen near the red glove hiding. 12 Ladies and gentlemen, this is substantial 13 evidence, more than enough evidence to convict both of 14 these individuals of all the crimes charged. They match 15 the description. Two officers came in here and 16 identified these individuals. 17 The scene tells you that they were the 18 The time tells you that they were the 19 shooters. 20 shooters. There was a certain inevitability on 21 September 30th of 2006. These two individuals -- all of 22 the shooters weren't going to get away. 23 That car, that Lincoln Town Car, was there. 24

Perhaps if they hadn't taken it, they would have gotten

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away, but they decided to take it in front of two 1 2 officers, two officers that just happened to be nearby and saw this happen. 3 There's a certain inevitability when they 4 5 turned back into the neighborhood, cashed the car. 6 There's an inevitability when the police are coming from the north and south creating a complete 7 8 barricade in. 9 There's an inevitability when Mr. Matthews 10 finds himself in the backyard pinned down, nowhere to 11 go. There's an inevitability that as Mr. Joshlin 12 is running across J Street that Rios is driving right at 13 him, and he's got nowhere to go. 14 It was inevitable, unfortunately, that they 15 were going to commit the crimes they night they decided 16 17 to do it. It was inevitable, ladies and gentlemen, 18 that they were going to get caught that night. 19 The only question now is whether it's 20 inevitable that this jury is going to return the right 21 22 verdict. It is inevitable. I ask this jury to return verdicts of guilty as to all counts. 23 THE COURT: Defense. 24 (Proceedings from 11:35 p.m. until 1:07 p.m. 25

previously transcribed.)
providual, orangering,
(Jury present)
THE BAILIFF: The jury's present, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. May the record
reflect we're back on C228460, State of Nevada,
plaintiff, versus Pierre Joshlin and Jamar Matthews.
Counsel stipulate to the presence of the
jury?
MS. LEWIS: Yes, Judge.
MR. FIGLER: Yes, your Honor.
MR. SINGER: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you ready, Counsel?
MR. SINGER: I am. Thank you, Judge.
Let me tell you, that's a tough act to
follow (indiscernible) one of those meetings that going
to bomb after the headliner comes on.
But nevertheless, a certain thing I want to
tell you is I haven't heard from the prosecution and I
haven't heard from anybody a real sincere thank you to
all of you as jurors.
I was a prosecutor a long, long time ago and
our chiefs used to always tell us make sure you thank
those jurors because it's not a it's an unenviable
job. It's part of our legal system. It's part of our

justice system. It's part of why all of this works because of you. And on behalf of Pierre and myself, I just want to say thank you for paying attention.

You know, part of our job is to pay attention to you guys and make sure you guys are paying attention to the evidence, and I carefully watched all of you, maintained eye contact with most of you, and I see everybody taking notes. I really appreciate on behalf of Pierre that you did that, you know. Because of you our system's really working here.

I understand it's been a long couple days, and I understand that there's been a lot of people talking at you, more to come still, but if you could just pay a little -- hang in there a little bit longer and pay attention to some of the -- some of the points I'm going to bring up to you, because I'm going to try very hard not to duplicate the excellent summation that Mr. Bunin gave you.

I'm going to try to let you know that if there's a point that he made that could be applied to Pierre as well, please do that, because I'm not going to go over them in detail again to save time, keep you here any longer for that reason.

During my closing, I'm going to make some references to facts that occurred during the testimony

that came from the stand, both testimony and physical evidence. And if I misstate something, believe me it's not on purpose because everybody -- as you've seen from this trial, everybody from their own perspective sees things differently.

So if I saw something sitting over there or I heard something, maybe my ear was somewhere else or halfway or on three different things, but it's your memory that rules. It's your memory that is what governs the decision that you must make.

So it's not purposeful on my part, and I apologize in advance if I do that. So just use your recollection to tell what you heard from the stand.

What I'm going to try to do also is take you through the facts as you've heard them and the law as you've heard them because, really, what your verdict is is a marriage between the facts and the law.

You take the law that the judge told you about and you apply the facts that you believe, that you believe are credible, that you heard. You put those two together and you get the verdict. It's a simple equation.

Now, before I get to that, let me just remind you a little bit about your role as a juror, you know. When we were on voir dire it was a long voir

dire, and you made certain promises, and one you have to remember is you were told that Pierre was arrested and he was taken into custody. We saw that.

And at that first moment he was given an opportunity to enter a plea. And from the minute he was arrested until right now as he sits there, he's had the same plea of not guilty, never wavered, and that's why we have this trial.

But you also have to remember that he could have at any point in time from the first time he was taken into custody until right now, he could have said I'm guilty, but he never said that. He never changed his mind. He never wavered, always done what any of us would have done if wrongfully accused. He couldn't have done anything else. He put his faith in the system. That's all he could really do.

Now, one thing that I want you to pay some attention to is that when we talked to you on voir dire about some people have preconceived notions of defense attorneys or different attorneys have different styles and there were a lot of questions about that.

Well, in this case something that struck me last night is that you heard a law from the defense team for Mr. Matthews, and you heard less from the defense attorney for Mr. Joshlin, and that's not for any purpose

as in we don't take it as seriously because we do.

And don't speculate as to why, but one of the reasons why could be and was is that I don't want to repeat things. I didn't intend on repeating things. I all I wanted to address was specific facts, specific points that referred to Pierre Joshlin.

And by my very nature I like to cut to the chase. I see things in black and white. I want to get you to the point quickly. That's just me. For good, for better or for worse, that's just me.

But please, this case -- Pierre's life's on the line, and I know that. Nothing could be further from the truth that because I said I'm a man of fewer words that this case is not very, very important to me and Pierre.

And we also spent a lot of time on the right not to testify. Now you promised all of us, all of us, that you wouldn't hold that against Pierre, and he didn't testify.

And you have to stick to your promises because when you made them, I believed you. Pierre believed you. He and I conversated and we talked, and we agreed to believe you when you took your oath and you made those promises, so now I'm going to hold you to them.

The burden of proof as you heard from the judge is on the prosecution to prove that Pierre is guilty beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. And if there is a reasonable doubt, you promised the judge -- and it's your promise to the legal system-that you must find Pierre not guilty, and that's what your oath as jurors is all about.

We also talked about in voir dire the preponderance of the evidence and how that applies to a civil case where if somebody wants money and both sides kind of start out on an even level playing field. But in this case, we don't start out on a level playing field. The scales of justice is tipped like this in favor of Pierre.

So it's not when we mentioned a 51/49 preponderance. It's beyond a reasonable doubt, and there's no quantity -- numerical quantity to it, but the scale's definitely tipped to protect an innocent person.

Reasonable doubt is not some possible speculative, imaginary or doubt that you force into your mind. In other words, if you have to strain to find reasonable doubt, then it's not there. It's only present when there's a doubt as to the guilt of Pierre and there is a reason, an articulable reason, for that doubt. And it can be found from the evidence, conflicts

in the evidence or lack of evidence.

You have to ask yourself has the State, the prosecution, eliminated all reasonable doubt. And your verdict must be based on the evidence that's presented to you, and it can't be based on speculation or questions of why wasn't certain evidence presented to you because, you know what, if certain evidence wasn't presented to you, you can't put that burden -- you can never shift the burden to this table right here anywhere. You have to hold the burden to this table right here. That's why it's next to you.

And if you say to yourself, for example, how come I never heard from any homicide detectives in a homicide case, you can't say, well, the defense could have presented them, too. You can't do that. It violates your oath as a juror.

You have to say why didn't it come from the prosecution. And if it didn't come from the prosecution, why didn't it come from the prosecution?

And Mr. Bunin pointed out to you a couple example of those. I'm not going to go repeat them.

We have to come down to asking ourselves this question. What proof is there that Pierre killed Mercy Williams, attempted to kill Myniece Cook, Maurice Hickman, Michel'le Tolefree? And what proof is

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there that he robbed Melvin and Geishe of their vehicle? And from what I see, where I'm sitting, I didn't see concrete tangible proof of that fact, and they owe that to you.

Can we just say, well, Pierre was found in a dumpster in the neighborhood so he must be guilty and he's here? You can't do that. The prosecution wants you to do that. They want you to work backwards and say, well, we found him in the dumpster, he must have done something wrong. There has to be evidence to allow you to come to that conclusion.

Just because Pierre was found in the dumpster doesn't automatically place him at either crime scene, and I'm going to go over with you in detail why that's true. As if it's not obvious enough, I'm going to go over with you, write down for you all the reasons why it doesn't do anything. It doesn't implicate him in either scenario, either the Balzar scenario or the Lawry scenario.

Now, right before I start showing you what evidence that I'm going to ask you to pay attention to regarding Pierre, I'm going to ask you -- before you actually get to the evidence, you have to look -- in a way you have to look at each witness. You have to look at their demeanor. You have to look at their ability to

see the situation, their bias.

There's a lot that goes into evaluating the evidence prior to even hearing the person's words or actions. You have to -- are they giving you eye contact? Are they giving you up-front, forward answers? Are they hesitating? Are they looking down? Are they sweaty? There's a lot of things that go into it before you even get to the substance of someone's words.

You have to really say to yourself I can't leave my everyday life experiences and my experience outside the door. I have to bring them to me, and what do I know about people from my life.

No one's asking you to leave your common sense outside the courtroom. You know, if a person lies, they lie with a badge or without a badge, and that's common sense.

You know, for example -- and I'm going to give you a good example of what a person's demeanor can tell you. Look at Officer Rios, very minor player in this case.

But came up there and he really had a hard time or seemed it a little combative to me when we were talking about, well, he looked defeated. Do you remember that?

And he gave me this whole face, and that was

ridiculous, but it shows what an arrogant person he is. It tells you a lot about who he is. It tells you a lot about how he presents himself above and beyond what he says.

And, you know, it seems a little bit silly, irrelevant as an aside, not really important to the case, but I personally asked these policemen about their dress, and I think each and every one of you can tell with 100 percent certainty that those policemen don't go to work in their uniforms.

And then the whole garbage about I don't own a suit and have to come in a suit or a uniform. You know that's not true. 100 percent you know it's not true because we had an officer later, relevant or not, you know now before you even get to the substance of the testimony that they lied.

They wear the badge, they wear the gun belt because they think that they're going to sucker you into believing that the badge equals justice or badge equals truth, and it doesn't. And I'm going to show you as it relates to Pierre how that's -- how you can tell that there was lies 100 percent.

And according to the jury charge that you read about credibility, if you think that there's one piece of a person's testimony that's unbelievable, you

can throw out the whole substance of it. And, you know, that makes sense in everyday life experiences because let's say we all go to lunch and we eat something that's not so good.

22.

You're eating some chili or whatever and you eat a bite of it, and it's spoiled, rotten, doesn't taste good. Are you going to just put that piece aside and say, well, let me just finish the rest of it? No. It doesn't make any sense.

The rule of law is not based on some judge somewhere that's just making up stuff. It's based on common sense. If you eat something bad, you're going to throw the whole bowl out. You're going to return it. Same thing with testimony. It's just common sense.

And, also, before you get to the substance of the testimony, you know, questions aren't evidence. Questions plus answers are evidence. And you're going to have to say to yourself why, a lot of times in this particular case, did we have to wait until cross-examination to get to the actual point, to get to the actual meat of the situation?

Is it possible that the prosecution was taking a chance and hoping that the defense was not going to ask certain questions? They could kind of slip some stuff by you without us noticing? Maybe the

prosecution wanted you to look at Pierre's case with one eye closed just to see half of a story.

22.

But I had to ask you questions. I had to follow up so that you guys could get the entire picture. You can get the whole story. And you need the whole story because you're going to make a really important decision, a decision that's going to affect Pierre's life, an important decision to him and me. And when you make it, you need everything in front of you.

None of us are going to go out and buy a used car just on the representation of a used-car salesman. You know a smart purchaser, a smart consumer, is going to go test that for a road test, take it to a mechanic, check it out and make sure it runs well. And that's the purpose of cross-examination.

Your job is way more important than these examples I'm giving you. You have a huge question, and you need to use care and caution and deep concern in deciding this question as it relates to Pierre.

You have to really think about is all reasonable doubt eliminated from my mind, and I'm going to tell you right now why it can't be that.

Now, Mr. Bunin spent a lot of time and did an excellent job on identification, but in Pierre's case, as this case relates to Pierre, there was no

identification. None. There was none at Balzar. There was none at Lawry. The only -- and the police in this case, they worked backwards, you know. They found him at the dumpster, and then they figured out how to put him at the scene, but they didn't do a really good job about that because there's holes in every step of their case.

12.

22.

They never had one person, any of them, and there were so many witnesses, they never had one person, even Officer Cupp that said I saw his face. That's the guy or I saw that guy in the car or I saw that guy at Balzar, I saw that guy running, none, never. No facial identification. They gave a general description of him and even that was extremely variant between the people.

What are the chances that no one at Balzar IDs him by face or even resembling that? No one at Lawry IDs him.

And the police officers have no idea who this person is because his back is to them until he gets taken custody, and then they say, yeah, this is the guy. That's the guy that I saw from behind from 60 or 70 feet. One person said that.

You know, human nature -- we talked about that in the beginning -- wants you to place blame because the tragedy occurred. Someone died. No doubt.

We agree with that. You have to fight that urge. 1 you go back to deliberate, you have to fight the urge 2 that just because Pierre sits here you have to blame him 3 because, you know what, you can blame somebody else. 4 Blame the police for not doing their job. 5 Shame on them. Blame the police for not taking 6 fingerprints off this gun. 7 And, you know, Mr. Boyd could have told you 8 that this gun was really easy to take prints off of, but 9 10 he hedged. He said it has a little bit of rough surfaces. 11 But, you know, this gun was found in the 12 dumpster and all you had to do (indiscernible). All you 13 got to do is pick it up like this from the dumpster and 14 take prints off of it, really, just like that, you know. 15 Mr. Krylo said he got to his ballistics test 16 in the middle of October, and he did it from like 17 October 16th to the end of October. The crimes occurred 18 the end of September on the 30th, so that's two weeks 19 20 where these guns weren't being tested at all. You pick 21 it up. Well, we know from the scene of the Lincoln 22 that latent prints are readily available. They took 23 tons of prints that night off the Lincoln. 24

They had the gun in the dumpster. How easy

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was it? And if that's not enough, if that's not enough, we heard about the Super Glue technique, and they found a clip there also and -- excuse me -- and in the clip were bullets that were loaded by somebody, though, no prints off those either. Shame on the police for not doing that.

They found him in the dumpster, a young African-American person in a neighborhood populated by those exact type of people, those exact looking people, those exact dressing people. They found them, and that was enough. No need -- why do we need an investigation anymore?

Let's talk about the clothing. You know, something else that just offended me to no end. It amazes me, and I submit to you, you should throw this out with the chili. You know, Michel'le Tolefree gets up there, and she had the recorded statement before and she couldn't ID anybody, and she had the prior proceeding and she couldn't ID anybody, and on direct from the prosecution she couldn't ID, and on cross-examination from me she couldn't ID anybody, and then that's five times right there, but on the sixth time, you know what, on redirect, you know, it maybe it looks like, it could look like that guy right there. That's offensive. You know, but, you know, she's young

and her cousin died, and I understand that, and I do 1 understand that, and she wants, everybody, human nature, 2 wants to place blame. Who else to place blame on, but 3 that is not the way this criminal justice works and 4 shame on her for trying that. 5 You know, shame on her because someone did 6 die, and she's just willing to willy-nilly affect 7 8 someone's life, another person's life. But, you know --I mean, she left herself in such a situation, and you 9 know that couldn't have been Pierre because all black 10 with a black hoody on. 11 Now we know, we know that wasn't Pierre with 12 100 percent certainty because we know what Pierre was 13 wearing that night; black shorts, black hoody, and an 14 Afro. I mean, that's one of those issues of 15 cross-cultural identification. 16 Police officer said -- I mean, he did worse 17 than anybody. He said that doesn't look like an Afro to 18 19 him. But we know that it's not all black from 20 head to toe. We know it's not a black hoody, and we 21 know if it's an Afro, I mean, in my opinion, I would 22 submit it's probably more of a fade or a close-cropped 23 hair cut, but definitely not an Afro. 24

So she wanted to ID him but she really

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couldn't because other than her sixth try at doing it, maybe she has the -- we can't escape that she didn't see his clothes. She saw his clothes wrong. She picked the wrong guy in her effort to do what she thought was right.

Melvin Bolden said that the person came up to him, had black and red gloves on with short sleeves, all black. Nothing said that there was any black and red gloves ever found at all in this case, and we know it's not short sleeves.

Even Officer Cupp said that the person that was running away from him was wearing a sweat shirt because he tried to tuck -- well, as he was looking at him 70 foot away which is double the length of the courtroom he saw him tucking a gun into a sweat shirt. I don't think there's any way we're calling that a sweat shirt. You can see right through it. There's holes in it. It's a thin, long-sleeve T-shirt. More and more ways we know it's not Pierre.

Here's another one that you need to really keep in mind. He used that word really carefully and he used it over and over again thank goodness. Thank goodness. "Ejection." You know, when I think of an ejection, you think of like a pilot ejecting from a crashing airplane, a traumatic ejection of a car on a

rollover where the driver goes out of the front windshield or through the roof, sun roof that's open or unbelted passenger.

You know, the word "ejection" doesn't mean you open the car and step out. It doesn't mean the car opens and you roll out. Ejection. He used that and I held -- I forced him to marry it, you know. He couldn't around that word "ejection".

He said Pierre got ejected from the vehicle or the person, the suspect that was in the passenger side got ejected from the vehicle. Now, if you would get ejected from a vehicle, would you say -- let's say you were super enough or fit enough not to get any physical injuries, but you couldn't escape some ripped knees in your pants. How about maybe some grass stains?

What else would you associate with an ejection? Not nothing. His hands don't look like he was superman flying through the air getting ejected. You know, as you go forward your body goes forward when you're ejected. Nothing on his face was scraped. His chin probably, maybe nose.

I mean you can say he get ejected from the side. Nothing. So you know for sure he wasn't in the car because the two passengers got traumatically ejected.

Now while it's true you're going to get a 1 jury charge -- I'm going to move onto the next thing 2 While it's true you're going to get a jury charge 3 that the prosecution has no responsibility to prove 4 motive, they can get up here and say there's no -- but 5 it's something you can consider. And (indiscernible) 6 have nothing, nothing to show any connection 7 from Pierre to Myniece Cook to Michel'le Tolefree to 8 Maurice Hickman who we didn't hear from. We don't know 9 anything about him. To the crime scene at Balzar to the 10 crime scene at Lawry. 11 There's no motive. No jilted lovers. 12 retribution. No revenge. You didn't hear any of that, 13 so all you know is the prosecution's trying to say it 14 was just random senseless for no reason. 15 But that's not true because the people who 16 really did it probably did have a motive, but Pierre has 17 no motive. He has no connection to them at all. 18 MS. LEWIS: Judge, I'm going to object. 19 There's been no evidence of any way one way or the 20 other. 21 THE COURT: It's argument. 22 MR. SINGER: Right. You know, that's an 23 There's no evidence one way or the interesting point. 24

other, but you still -- if there's no evidence one way

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or the other, the law forbids you to shift the burden here.

You can never shift the burden here and say there's no evidence one way or another. I want to hear something from here if there's no evidence one way or the other. No, no, you cannot do that. I need to hear evidence from here if there's no evidence one way or the other. That's the responsibility of a prosecutor who alleges that Pierre did something wrong.

Here's another way you know it's not Pierre. When Officer Cupp was chasing him he said that he first was 60 to 70 feet away and then he gained on him a little bit. He became a little bit closer to him. I think he said 30 to 40 feet, maybe, and then he fired three shots.

From that close of a range -- and I'm not saying that you know this for sure, but I'm suggesting to you, I'm submitting to you, I'm asking you to use your common sense.

If an officer qualifies at a range to be an officer, and he's licensed to carry the gun and, he does the police training, at 30 to 40 feet one-on-one, not in a crowd, with no bad backdrop like said, nobody else around that he could have possibly hit, 30 to 40 feet, that's -- I think we agreed 30 to 40 feet was from here

to the door, maybe.

22.

It looks to me, I submit to you, like the distance on a police firing range or any firing range.

30 to 40 feet, three shots, none of them even grazed him.

But, you know what, it probably did. I bet that guy got shot and went to the hospital. It's not just the guy that's here. The guy got shot and went home and nursed his wounds. It's just not the guy that's here.

I mean, we can say the cops lie, but we -and that's not something you can prevent by going to the
police academy. But you sure can prevent him from being
a bad shot because they got to be trained. They're
trained police officers. Part of the training is the
use of a gun.

Even no ID with no Officer Rios, and he said that the guy was an African-American young adult with all black again. No gun mentioned. So we don't know if -- I mean, we know Pierre was in the dumpster, but we don't know if the person Officer Rios saw was Pierre. He didn't see his face, and he missed -- and he said the guy had dark pants on.

And another thing that's interesting in this case, you know, that you need to consider is Pierre was

never charged with possession of a gun. The prosecution tells you that that gun, in their opinion, is connected to the murder scene. That's a policeman's gun.

Remember that. That's a policeman's gun.

And you don't know if that policeman is from the same command as these policemen. You don't know anything about them because the prosecution left that out.

That's not my responsibility to tell you where that gun was stolen from, when it was stolen, how it was stolen, which policemen it was stolen from, none of that. But you need to remember that's a policemen's gun that was in the dumpster, and Pierre never got charged with it.

You heard the charges. He didn't get charged with possession of stolen property. He didn't charged with carrying a firearm without a permit. He didn't get charged with concealed weapons. He didn't get charged with anything to do with that gun, and that's a gun that they say is connected to a murder scene. He didn't get charged with anything, anything.

I mean, I can submit to you that there's tons of charges that they could have put on him for that gun. The clip was extra long. It was stolen. We know that. We don't know how that gun got into that

dumpster, but we do know it was a policeman's gun.

Another thing you need to recall and remember is that the prosecution showed no connection between the defendants, so then when they came up here and you have all these charges about conspiracy is that — is an agreement between two or more people with some overt acts in furtherance of the agreement.

Don't you think they might have to show that there was some connection between these two young people? They're sitting at the table because that's all they could do. They were accused of a crime. But nothing, no connection, no meeting of the minds, not even for one second.

I mean, conspiracy doesn't mean you sit around a board room and you have to discuss it, but it does mean that for some time you have to be associated in some way. And you can't speculate that, well, maybe they would be, maybe they're from the same neighborhood. You don't know any of that. It's quessing.

And another thing you need to know, there was also gloves found in the dumpster. The forensic analyst or the crime scene analyst uses scissors and all kinds of careful stuff. This is my client's life on the line, you know. I have no fear of touching this stuff. You know, if I contaminated, so be it.

what, these gloves are in evidence, and you need to see that there's somebody else's initials on those gloves. But you know what, I'll tell you one thing for sure. that said PJ on it, you know these would be in your face. They'd be passing them around. looking at the P and the J and saying that's pretty conclusive right there. PJ must -- it probably stands for Pierre Joshlin. But AG or whatever this is, definitely not a PJ, so they want to just brush that under the rug. You know, who knows. Guess whose they are. Guess where they came from. You're talking about a dumpster full of garbage in a high-crime neighborhood. We're not talking about a nice, clean, empty, sterile dumpster in

I have to show you these, because you know

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about a nice, clean, empty, sterile dumpster in

Summerlin or in Southern Highlands or wherever we're

talking about. We're talking about a dumpster on the

old west side that we all heard about over and over

again who frequents it and what happens down there.

Did the State prove to you beyond a

reasonable doubt that these gloves were ever on Pierre.

reasonable doubt that these gloves were ever on Pierre, with Pierre, being held by Pierre? No prints from the gloves, no prints from the gun.

Tons of prints from the Lincoln. I mean, you could almost say to yourself, gosh, they really wanted those prints in the Lincoln, and they tried everything to get prints from Pierre in that Lincoln and none, nothing, none, not so much as half of a maybe. No palm prints. They can do palm prints, too. Nothing.

So you can't tie him to the Lincoln. I mean, you can almost say for sure 100 percent he wasn't in there because you know there was other people. They took a lot of prints. Nothing.

But I guess I saved the best for last, you know, something that really offended me both as a former prosecutor, as a human being I guess you could really say. And, you know, I noticed some of you guys laughing at it, so I really appreciate that you're picking up on this stuff.

Officer Cupp, boy, he was in a box because he identified the guy as wearing dark pants, and he knows everybody else in the case was identified as everybody wearing dark pants and especially what they said the person that ran out of the car was wearing.

I mean, is there anybody that can stretch their imagination to such an extreme that the picture that you're looking at in evidence shows dark pants?

Does it even show medium dark pants? I mean, those are

faded blue jeans. Faded blue jeans with like almost white patches on them.

12.

I mean, if you look here in the folds, it's almost like I wouldn't say white pants because then I would be (indiscernible) Officer Cupp, but, certainly, light blue. Light blue, not medium blue, not brand-new blue.

There's no one that has any rationality, common sense or any life experience that's going to call those dark pants, and he did that. He insulted you. He told every one of you that those were dark in his opinion.

I mean, in my 15 years of practice I don't think I could ever get a cop on the stand to -- and get him in a situation where he -- you know 110 percent that he's lying.

And another way you know he was lying, too, is that he said 70 feet away he knew the gun was a Glock. Now come on. I mean, he didn't even need to embellish that fact. He could have just said it was a gun, but he needed to tie that to the dumpster.

If you look at this back in the jury room you can see that the word "Glock" is in black highlights on the side here and the same kind of logo on the chamber there. 70 feet away which is from here to the

door twice at night and he knew this was a Glock. I mean, that's just -- why? Why? Why does he have to do that? Why did he do that? There's in reason to. He had to tie that gun to the gun in the dumpster. I mean, it wasn't even a good lie. It wasn't even a lie that really like made any sense and helped his case.

You know, and I, too, am going to sit down because I know I only have a certain amount of time and your patience is running, and I understand that, and what I want you to do for me, though, is one thing.

When I sit down there, Pierre and I aren't going to get up again, and Mr. Bunin went over this, but, you know, in another way think about it this way.

Think about when the prosecution gets up and talks to you again how would Mr. Singer or how would any good, semi-good, average defense attorney answer that point, you know?

The prosecution's going to try to take the last bite. It's their burden. They're going to have the last word, you know, but there's going to be a rational explanation and rational -- a way to rationalize and a way to explain their argument. I'm counting on you to do that on behalf of Pierre and myself.

Now after today, soon, you're going to go

back to your lives and I realize, well, and we're not going to probably see each other ever again in life, so I'm going to take this opportunity again to thank you.

Pierre -- on behalf of Pierre and myself, thank you.

You did an excellent job. Paid great attention. Never caught anybody sleeping. Everybody was here on time. It was really excellent.

I mean, you wouldn't believe what we see as defense attorneys as far as people losing their way to courthouses, as far as people falling asleep, as far as people getting sick, as far as a million things happen. I just want to really say how much I appreciate your time and effort in this very important system that we have in the United States.

You know, I mean, I hope also the trial has been important to you. I think that you guys are going to remember this for the rest of your lives. I really do. I really think it's going to be a very meaningful experience to all of you.

And today when you retire to deliberate, you're going to have bestowed on you the greatest power that any group of people could ever have put on them. You have the power in your hand to decide the guilt or innocence of a human being, of a fellow citizen. The power to decide the fate of Pierre.

And I know, I know from talking to all of you as much as we got to, that you're going to exercise that power with wisdom and compassion. I've tried to the best of my ability to show you that there's only one verdict -- there's only one verdict consistent with what you now know as reasonable doubt.

But you know what, I can't give each and every one of you the courage to return that verdict.

That has to be within you, you know. You have to find the courage despite the fact that a tragedy occurred.

You have to have the courage to return the correct verdict. You have to find the courage in yourselves to say the State of Nevada does not deserve a conviction in this case based on the lack of proof.

You have to think of your verdict as a marriage, you know. Although, some, you know, unfortunately, marriages you can get divorced and verdicts you can't. There's no divorce court for verdicts.

Your verdict is with you for the rest of your lives. You're inseparable from it. And if you return the proper verdict, a verdict of not guilty, you can walk out of the courtroom with your held high and be very proud of your verdict for the rest of your life. Thank you.

1	(Proceedings from 1:49 p.m. until 2:25 p.m.
2	previously transcribed.)
3	THE COURT: Also, ladies and gentlemen,
4	pursuant to our procedures, two members of the jury of
5	this panel have been we have a question.
6	Counsel approach.
7	(Off-record colloquy)
8	(Off-record bench conference)
9	THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we've
10	reviewed the question. The evidence is concluded prior
11	to argument. We're unable to supplement that evidence
12	now. The information that you have as you understand it
13	must control, so we are unable to ask that question.
14	As I was saying, pursuant to Rule we have
15	selected two alternate jurors to sit in the if there
16	is a need. Those two jurors are jurors No. 13 and 14,
17	Mr. Tate and Mr. Randall. They were predetermined prior
18	to you even walking in the building.
19	We will now swear the officers to take
20	charge of the jury and the alternates.
21	(Officers sworn)
22	THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, you're
23	directed to follow the bailiff, Mr. Reichert. Okay.
24	(Jury deliberation)
25	THE COURT: May the record reflect we're

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outside the presence of the jury.
1
               Is there anything else to come before the
2
   Court before we recess and await the verdict?
3
               MR. FIGLER: Who do we give our cell phone
4
   numbers to, Judge?
5
               THE COURT: Yes. Phone numbers to --
6
               MR. SINGER: Can you advise us what time
7
   you're going to release them so that we can be off call?
8
               THE COURT: I'll call you.
9
               MR. SINGER: I just want to let you know at
10
   6:00 I'm going to be in Summerlin. I'll be here,
11
   downtown, until 6:00, but I can be here in 10, 15
12
   minutes, but --
13
14
               THE COURT: Okay.
               MR. SINGER: -- (indiscernible).
15
               MS. LEWIS: Do you know how late --
16
                             That's what I was asking, too.
               MR. SINGER:
17
               THE COURT: I'm hesitating because it's 2:30
18
   now, and I want to see where we go.
19
               MS. LEWIS:
20
                            Okay.
                      (Off-record colloquy)
21
          (Court recessed at 2:58 p.m. until 6:30 p.m.)
22.
                      (Off-record colloquy)
23
               MR. FIGLER: There wasn't one query from the
24
   jury, huh?
25
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THE COURT: No, not as far as I know.
1
                         (Jury present)
2
               THE BAILIFF: Jury's present, please.
                                                        All
3
   rise.
4
               THE COURT: We're back on the record in
5
   C228460, State of Nevada, plaintiff, versus
6
   Pierre Joshlin.
7
                     (Off-record colloquy)
8
               THE COURT: All right. Again, we're back on
9
10
   the record in C228460, state of Nevada, plaintiff,
   versus Pierre Joshlin and Jamar Matthews.
11
               May the record reflect the presence of the
12
   defendants, their attorneys, deputy district attorneys.
13
               Do parties stipulate to the presence of the
14
15
   jury?
                             There's 12 there, Judge.
               MR. FIGLER:
16
               MS. LEWIS: Yes, Judge.
17
                THE COURT: So parties stipulate to the
18
   presence of the jury?
19
               MR. FIGLER:
                             Yes.
20
               MS. LEWIS: Yes, Judge.
21
                THE COURT: All right. Has the jury elected
22
   a foreman?
23
                JURY NO. 8:
                             Yes.
24
                THE COURT: And based upon the blue sheets
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in your hand, I believe it's Mr. Ashley. 1 JUROR NO. 8: Yes, sir. 2 THE COURT: Mr. Ashley, has the jury reached 3 a verdict? 4 JUROR NO. 8: Yes, we have. 5 THE COURT: Could you hand those verdicts to 6 the bailiff, please, and I'll hand the verdicts to the 7 clerk and ask her to read the verdicts out loud. 8 THE CLERK: Okay. District Court Clark 9 County, Nevada. State of Nevada, plaintiff, versus 10 Jamar Matthews also known as Jamar Demon Matthews, 11 defendant. Case No. 228460 in Department 18. 12 Verdict. We the jury in the above-entitled 13 case find the defendant, Jamar Matthews, as follows: 14 Count I, conspiracy to commit murder. 15 Guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. 16 Count II, murder with use of a deadly 17 weapon. Guilty of first-degree murder with use of a 18 deadly weapon. 19 Count III, attempt murder with use of a 20 deadly weapon, Myniece Cook. Guilty of attempt murder 21 with use of a deadly weapon. 22 Count IV, attempt murder with use of a 23 deadly weapon, Michele'le Tolefree. Guilty of attempt 24 murder with use of a deadly weapon. 25

1	Count V, attempt murder with use of a
2	deadly
3	THE CORRECTIONS OFFICER: Face forward.
4	(Indiscernible).
5	THE DEFENDANT: No. Just take me out the
6	courtroom, please. I don't want to react in the
7	courtroom. Can you just take me out, please? Please,
8	I'm guilty of
9	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible).
10	THE DEFENDANT: Can I please just step out
11	the courtroom because I don't want to react in the
12	courtroom.
13	MR. FIGLER: That's fine, Judge.
14	THE DEFENDANT: Go ahead. I'll maintain,
15	Judge. I'm sorry about that.
16	MR. FIGLER: Thank you.
17	THE CLERK: Count V, attempt murder with use
18	of a deadly weapon, Maurice Hickman. Guilty of attempt
19	murder with use of a deadly weapon.
20	Count VI, possession of short-barreled
21	rifle. Guilty of possession of short-barreled rifle.
22	Counts VII, conspiracy to commit robbery.
23	Guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery.
24	Count VIII, robbery with use of a deadly,
25	Geishe Orduno. Guilty of robbery with use of a deadly

1	weapon.
2	Count IX, robbery with use of a deadly
3	weapon, Melvin Bolden. Guilty of robbery with use of a
4	deadly weapon.
5	Count X, assault with use of a deadly
6	weapon, Bradley Cupp. Guilty of assault with use of a
7	deadly weapon.
8	Count XI, assault with use of a deadly
9	weapon, Brian Walters. Guilty of assault with use of a
10	deadly weapon." Dated this 11th day of May, the year
11	2007 by the foreperson, Jeffery Ashley.
12	Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is that
13	your verdict as read, so say you one, so say you all?
14	THE JURY: Yes.
15	THE CLERK: Thank you.
16	In the matter of State of Nevada versus
17	Pierre Joshlin, defendant.
18	Verdict. Count I, conspiracy to commit
19	murder. Guilty of conspiracy to commit murder.
20	Count II, murder with use of a deadly
21	weapon. Guilty of first-degree murder with use of a
22	deadly weapon.
23	Count III, attempt murder with use of a
24	deadly weapon, Myniece Cook. Guilty of attempt murder
25	with use of a deadly weapon.

1	Count IV, attempt murder with use of a
2	deadly weapon, Michele'le Tolefree. Guilty of attempt
3	murder with use of a deadly weapon.
4	Count V, attempt murder with use of a
5	deadly weapon, Maurice Hickman. Guilty of attempt
6	murder with use of a deadly weapon.
7	Counts VII, conspiracy to commit robbery.
8	Guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery.
9	Count VIII, robbery with use of a deadly
10	weapon, Geishe M. Orduno. Guilty of robbery with use of
11	a deadly weapon.
12	Count IX, robbery with use of a deadly
13	weapon, Melvin Bolden. Guilty of robbery with use of a
14	deadly weapon." Dated this 11th day of May, the year
15	2007 by Jeffery Ashley.
16	Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is that
17	your verdicts read, so say you one, so say you all?
18	THE JURY: Yes.
19	THE CLERK: Thank you.
20	THE COURT: Do either of parties decide to
21	have the jury polled?
22	MR. FIGLER: Absolutely, Judge.
23	MR. BUNIN: Yes.
24	MR. SINGER: Yes, please.
25	THE COURT: Juror No. 1, is that your

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verdict as read?
1
                JUROR NO. 1: (Indiscernible).
2
                THE CLERK: No. 2, is that your verdict as
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4
   read?
                JUROR NO. 2: Yes.
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                THE CLERK: No. 3, is that your verdict as
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7
   read?
                JUROR NO. 3: Yes.
8
                THE CLERK: No. 4, is that your verdict as
9
10
   read?
                JUROR NO. 4: Yes.
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                THE CLERK: No. 5, is that your verdict as
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   read?
13
                JUROR NO. 5: Yes.
14
                THE CLERK: No. 6, is that your verdict as
15
   read?
16
                JUROR NO. 6: Yes.
17
                THE CLERK: No. 7, is that your verdict as
18
19
   read?
                JUROR NO. 7: Yes.
20
                THE CLERK: No. 8, is that your verdict as
21
22
   read?
                JUROR NO. 8: Yes.
23
                THE CLERK: No. 9, is that your verdict as
24
25
   read?
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1	JUROR NO. 9: Yes.
2	THE CLERK: No. 10, is that your verdict as
3	read?
4	JUROR NO. 10: Yes.
5	THE CLERK: No. 11, is that your verdict as
6	read?
7	JUROR NO. 11: Yes.
8	THE CLERK: And, No. 12, is that your
9	verdict as read?
10	JUROR NO. 12: Yes.
11	THE CLERK: Thank you.
12	THE COURT: The Court will now record the
13	verdict and the minutes of the Court.
14	Ladies and gentlemen, I want to thank you
15	for your time and attention in this matter. Without
16	your patience and your cooperation this type of trial
17	could not proceed.
18	Your role in this is fundamental to our
19	system of justice; and, therefore, on behalf of the
20	Eighth Judicial District Courts and the people of the
21	State of Nevada and the community, I thank you for your
22	efforts.
23	Also, on behalf of counsel I wish to thank
24	you for your careful deliberation in this matter. You
25	are now free from your admonishment.

I advise you that you may talk to anyone you 1 wish about this or not talk. Parties may be interested 2 in discussing this matter with you further. If you wish 3 to discuss this case with them, you may do so. If you 4 do not wish to discuss this matter with anybody, you 5 don't have to. 6 If someone should approach you and persist 7 in discussing or trying to discuss this case with you 8 and you do not wish to do so, please bring that fact to 9 10 my attention through the bailiff and appropriate action will be taken. 11 Again, the jury's excused with the thanks of 12 the Court and counsel. Please follow Officer Reichert. 13 14 (Jury excused) THE COURT: Record should reflect we're 15 outside the presence of the jury. The verdicts having 16 been recorded, we will set this matter for sentencing. 17 THE CLERK: And that will be June the 18th 18 at 8:30. 19 The Court: Are there any further motions to 20 come before the Court before we adjourn? 21 22 MS. LEWIS: Yes, Judge. The Court: State. 23 The State would ask that both MS. LEWIS: 24 defendants be remanded at this time without bail. 25

The Court: It will be a no-bail hold at 1 this time. 2 Defense, any motions? 3 MR. FIGLER: No, Judge. Just one thing, 4 We intend to file a motion for new trial. 5 I was a little curious, and I didn't want to 6 make a big deal of it during the time, but there was a 7 number of objections during the prosecutorial rebuttal 8 and Your Honor simply ruled noted, and there was no ruling on it, so I'm not exactly sure how I'm supposed 10 to proceed on that. 11 The Court: Well, it's my understanding that 12 I note -- I note the -- your objection for the record. 13 In terms of prosecutorial misconduct, that's an issue 14 that you take up on appeal. That was my understanding 15 16 of the process. MR. FIGLER: Okay. Well, that's fine. 17 I have then is that they were denied? Our objections 18 were not sustained? They were overruled? 19 They were overruled. The Court: 20 MR. FIGLER: Okay. 21 The Court: As argument. 22 MR. FIGLER: And then as a course what I'll 23 do is I'll make a motion for mistrial based on 24 cumulative prosecutorial misconduct at this time, and 25

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    then if I need to -- if depending on how Your Honor
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    rules on that, then I'll file my motion for mistrial --
 3
    or for a new trial, rather.
                The Court: At this point I'll deny that
 4
 5
    motion.
 6
                MR. FIGLER:
                             Okay.
 7
                The Court: Is there anything further to
 8
    come before the Court?
 9
                MR. FIGLER:
                              No.
                MR. SINGER:
10
                              No.
11
                             We are in adjournment.
                The Court:
12
                  (Court concluded at 6:41 p.m.)
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#### CERTIFICATION


I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

#### **AFFIRMATION**


I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

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Michele Phelps	7-3-08
MICHELE PHELPS, TRANSCRIBER	DATE



1	6.	Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction other than the convictio attack in this motion? Yes No _X	n under		
2		If "yes," list crime, case number and sentence being served at this time: N/A			
3	7.	Nature of offense involved in conviction being challenged: Conspiracy to commit murder; murder with use of a deadly weapon; attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon; possession of a short barreled riffle; conspiracy to commit robbery; robbery with use of a deadly weapon; assault with a deadly weapon.			
5	8.	What was your plea? (check one)			
6		(a) Not guilty X			
7		(b) Guilty			
8		(c) Nolo contendere			
9	9.	If you entered a plea of guilty to one count of an indictment or information, as	nd a plea of		
10		not guilty to another count of an indictment or information, or if a plea of guil negotiated, give details: N/A	lty was		
11	10.	If you were found guilty after a plea of not guilty, was the finding made by: (c	check one)		
12		(a) Jury X	ŕ		
13		(b) Judge without a jury			
14		(c) Not Applicable			
15	11.	Did you testify at the trial? No			
16	12.	Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction? Yes X No			
17	13.	If you did appeal, answer the following:			
18		(a) Name of court: The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada			
19		(b) Case number or citation: 50052			
20		(c) Result: Decision of the Eighth Judicial District of Nevada Affirmed			
21	•	(d) Date of result: June 30, 2009			
22	14.	If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you did not: N/A			
23	15.	Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you previously filed any petitions, applications or motions with respect to this judgment in any court, state or federal? Yes No _X			
24	16.	If your answer to No. 15 was "yes," give the following information:			
25		(a) (1) Name of court: N/A			



1	Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.): Trial-Level and Appeal Counsel did not adequately represent Petitioner because he failed to file a Motion to Sever. This ineffective assistance prejudiced Petitioner at the trial-level.		
2	(b) Ground two: N/A		
3	Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.): N/A		
4	(c) Ground three: N/A		
5	Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.): N/A		
6	(d) Ground four: N/A		
7	Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law.): N/A		
8	WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the court grant petitioner relief to which he may be		
9	entitled in this proceeding.		
10	, n		
11	EXECUTED at Las Vegas, Nevada on the 12 <sup>40</sup> day of December, 2010.		
12	G. LUKE CICILIANO, ESQ.		
13	Nevada Bar No. 9530 CICILIANO & ASSOCIATES, LLC		
14	621 S. 10 <sup>th</sup> Street,		
15	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 382-2209		
16	Attorney for Petitioner		
17			
18	DOINTS AND AUTHODITIES		
19	POINTS AND AUTHORITIES		
20	I.		
21	INTRODUCTION		
22	On October 17, 2006 Jemar Matthews (hereinafter "Matthews") was charged with:		
23	conspiracy to commit to murder (NRS 799.480; NRS 200.010; NRS 200.030); murder with the		
24			
25	use of a deadly weapon (NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165); attempted murder with the use of a		
43	deadly weapon (NRS 200.010, 200.030.193.300, 193.165); discharging a firearm at or into a		

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structure (NRS 202.285); possession of a short-barreled rifle (NRS 202.215); conspiracy to commit robbery (NRS 199.480, 200.380); robbery with the use of a deadly weapon (NRS 200.380; 193.165); and assault with a deadly weapon (NRS 200.471). Matthews was charged with co-defendant Pierre Joshlin (hereinafter "Joshlin").

Matthews was initially arraigned on December 11, 2006, before the Honorable Kevin

Williams, arraignment court judge for the Eighth Judicial District Court at which time Matthews
plead not guilty and invoked his right to a trial within sixty days. A trial date was set for
February 12, 2007 in front of the Honorable Judge Elizabeth Halverson, and was later reset to
May 7, 2007. The case was switched over to the Honorable Judge David Baker. A trial by jury
commenced on May 7, 2007 and concluded May 11, 2007. The jury returned a verdict of guilty
on all counts. Premised on alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments,
Matthews filed a timely Motion for New Trial on or about May 21, 2007. The Court heard the
matter on July 9, 2007 whereupon the Motion was denied. Matthews was sentenced the same
day to life with the possibility of parole on the murder charge with an equal and consecutive
sentence for the weapon enhancement. With regard to the remaining charges, Matthews was
sentenced to concurrent time with the exception of mandatory enhancements which ran
consecutive within the counts but not concurrent to the life sentence on the murder count.

Matthews now brings this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Court because his trial level Counsel inadequately represented him. Matthews's trial level Counsel inadequately represented him because he failed to file a Motion to Sever, and his failure to do so highly prejudiced Matthews during trial. Accordingly, Matthews Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted.

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## **DISCUSSION**

Matthews should be granted a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Defendant is entitled to effective representation during appeals and post-conviction proceedings. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 121 Nev. 225 (2005). "To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish two elements: (1) that counsel provided deficient performance, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Lara v. State, 120 Nev. 177, 179-180, 87 P.3d 528, 530 (2004) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984)). Deficient performance occurs where counsel fails to "exercise the skill, judgment, or diligence of a reasonably competent attorney." United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). "The factual allegations supporting an ineffective-assistance claim must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.' State v. Powell, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 65, 138 P.3d 453, 458 (2006).

Matthews prior Counsel provided deficient performance by failing to file a Motion to Sever. As explained below, prior counsel's failure to file a Motion to Sever highly prejudiced Matthews. N.R.S. §174.165(1) states that:

If it appears that a defendant or the State of Nevada is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information, or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.

Here, Matthews was prejudiced when he was tried together in this action with Joshlin because there is high likelihood that each group of crimes tainted the jury's determination of guilt regarding each individual sets of crime. By moving forward with the Joinder of the parties and stacking of all the unrelated evidence into one case the jury was lead to believe that Matthews was more likely to have committed each of the offenses.



Deficient performance occurs where counsel fails to "exercise the skill, judgment, or diligence of a reasonably competent attorney." United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Here, prior Counsel failed to exercise the judgment of a reasonably competent attorney.

Matthews was tried jointly with his co-defendant Joshlin. Prior Counsel should have known that such joinder would be unfairly prejudicial to Matthews. There was a significant amount of evidence presented against Joshlin, aiding in his conviction, which was not presented against Matthews. Prior Counsel knew of such risks because he referenced the possibility of a Motion to Sever in the bench brief filed May 8, 2007. A reasonable competent attorney would have recognized that the evidence presented which was attributable only to Joshlin was highly prejudicial to Matthews and would have not only recognized the possibility of a Motion to Sever, which is what Prior Counsel did here, but would have taken it seriously and filed a Motion to Severe to adequately represent his client.

Accordingly, Matthews' Prior counsel provided deficient performance when he failed to file a Motion to Severe.

# B. PRIOR COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION TO SEVER PREJUDICED MATTHEWS.

Joinder creates undue prejudice when evidence establishing acts will lead a jury to convict someone not charged with those particular acts. *Tabish*, 119 Nev at 304-05. The *Tabish* court held that joinder was prejudicial due to the "graphic" nature of the allegations that were charged against one defendant but not another. *Id.* Accordingly, Matthews' Counsel should have files a Motion to Sever, and his case should have been tried separately.

There were numerous testimonies throughout the trial which references the Las Vegas 1 Metropolitan Police Department officers chasing Joshlin. Officers eventually made contact with 2 him in a nearby dumpster. Officers also recovered a gun and gloves in that same dumpster. This 3 evidence is highly prejudicial against Johslin, but should have no impact on Matthews. 4 5 However, when Matthews is sitting at the same table at trial with Joshlin there is a high 6 likelihood that each group of crimes will be tainted the jury's determination of guilt regarding 7 each individual's charges. 8 By moving forward with the Joinder of the parties and stacking of all the unrelated 9 evidence into one case the jury was lead to believe that Matthews was more likely to have 10 committed each of the offenses. Accordingly, because Matthews' Prior counsel provided 11 deficient performance when he failed to file a Motion to Severe, and because failure to file a 12 Motion to Sever prejudiced Matthews, his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted. 13 14 III. 15 **CONCLUSION** 16 For the reasons stated above, Petitioner Jemar Matthews respectfully requests that the 17 Court grant his habeas corpus relief and vacate his conviction so that he may proceed at trial. 18 19 Dated this 44<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2010. 20 G. LUKE CICILIANO. ESO 21 Nevada Bar No. 9530 CICILIANO & ASSOCIATES, LLC 22 621 S. 10<sup>th</sup> Street, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 23 (702) 382-2209 Attorney for Petitioner 24 25

## **VERIFICATION**

I, G. Luke Ciciliano, Esq. verify that I was appointed to represent Petitioner for the purpose of filing this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. I have read this document and know the contents thereof; the pleading is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and as to such matters I believe them to be true.

G. Luke Ciciliano, Esq.

-10-



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 1 2 I, G. Luke Ciciliano, hereby certify pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), that on this 14<sup>th</sup>day of 3 December, 2010, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF 4 HABEAS CORPUS addressed to: 5 Warden 6 Nevada State Prison 7 PO Box 607 3301 East 5th Street 8 Carson City, Nevada 89702 9 Attorney General Heroes' Memorial Building 10 Capitol Complex Carson City, Nevada 89710 11 Clark County District Attorney's Office 12 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 13 14 15 EMPLOYEE OF CICILIANO & ASSOCIATES 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

MASTER CALENDAR 11

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**OSH** 

G. LUKE CICILIANO, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9530 CICILIANO & ASSOCIATES, LLC 621 S. 10<sup>th</sup> Street, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 382-2209

FILED

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# **DISTRICT COURT** CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Attorney for Petitioner

Plaintiff,

VS.

JEMAR MATTHEWS,

Defendant

Case No.: C228460

Dept.:

06C228460 - 2 Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpu

## ORDER FOR PETITION OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction Relief) on December 14, 2010. The Court has reviewed the petition and has determined that a response would assist the Court in determining whether Petitioner is illegally imprisoned and restrained of his liberty, and good cause appearing therefore:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent shall, within 45 days of the date of this Order, answer or otherwise respond to the petition and file a return in accordance with the provisions of NRS 34.360 to 34.830, inclusive;

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DEC 16 2010

CLERK OF THE COURT

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1	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter shall be placed on the Court's calendar on
2	the 14 day of February, 200, at the hour of 8:15 A.m. for
3	further proceedings.
4	DATED this day of, 2010.
5	
6	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
7	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
8	
9	DATED this 14th day of December, 2010.
10	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED by:
11	
12	C. LIVE CICH LAND FOR LUKE
13	G. LUKE CICILIANO, ESQ.  Nevada Bar No. 9530  CICILIANO & ASSOCIATES. LLC
14	CICILIANO & ASSOCIATES, LLC 621 S. 10 <sup>th</sup> Street, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
15	(702) 382-2209 Attorney for Petitioner
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	2 of 2

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CLERK OF THE COURT

SUPP
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629 South Sixth Street
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(702) 384-1274 Telephone
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E-Mail: cjc@lvcoxmail.com
Attorney for Petitioner

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JEMAR MATTHEWS,

CASE NO. C228460 DEPT NO. XVIII

Petitioner,

vs.

RENEE BAKER, WARDEN, ELY STATE PRISON,

Respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)

Petitioner, JEMAR MATTHEWS (hereinafter Matthews), hereby files these supplemental points and authorities in support of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). Petitioner requests that these be considered in addition to the original points and authorities filed with the original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction).

I.

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

An Amended Criminal Complaint was filed in open court on October 17, 2006, charging petitioner, Matthews, along with co-defendant Pierre Joshlin, with Conspiracy to Commit Murder (NRS 199.480, NRS 200.010, NRS 200.030); Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (NRS 200.010, NRS 200.030, NRS 193.165); Two counts of Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (NRS 100.010, 200.030, 193.300, 193.165); Discharging a Firearm at or into a Structure (NRS 202.285); Possession of a Short Barreled Rifle (NRS 202.275); Conspiracy to Commit Robbery

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Possession of a Short Barreled Rifle (NRS 202.275); Conspiracy to Commit Robbery (NRS 199.480, 200.380); two counts of Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon (NRS

200.380, NRS 193.165) and two counts of Assault with a Deadly Weapon (NRS 200.471).

On November 30, 2006, a preliminary hearing was held. At the end of the hearing, the State moved to amend the Amended Criminal Complaint to reflect one additional count of Attempt Murder (Maurice Hickman) and drop the Discharge of a Firearm charge. Following the preliminary hearing, Matthews was held to answer of all counts in the Amended Criminal Complaint.

On or about December 7, 2006, an Information was electronically filed in Department XVIII of the Eighth Judicial District Court with the same charges bound over in the Justice Court.<sup>1</sup> Matthews was then arraigned on December 11, 2006, before the Arraignment Court Judge at which time Matthews pled "not guilty," and invoked his right to trial within 60 days. The trial date was set for February 12, 2007, in front of Judge Elizabeth Halverson.

A calendar call was held on February 7, 2007, and during that proceeding, the trial date was reset to May 7, 2007. In the interim, the State filed a Motion for Buccal Swabs which was heard and granted on April 20, 2007. A trial by jury commenced on May 7, 2007, and concluded on May 11, 2007. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts on May 11, 2007.

Matthews filed a timely Motion to New Trial on or about May 21, 2007, which was mostly premised on alleged prosecutorial misconduct which occurred during closing arguments. The Court heard that matter on July 9, 2007. That motion was denied. Matthews was then sentenced to life with the possibility of parole on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See court minutes attached hereto as Exhibit 1 for the chronology of the district court proceedings.

murder charge with an equal and consecutive sentence for the weapon enhancement. With regard to the other charges, Matthews was essentially sentenced to concurrent time with the exception of mandatory enhancements which ran consecutive within the counts but concurrent to the life sentence on the murder count.<sup>2</sup>

The Judgment of Conviction was filed on July 17, 2007. The Order denying the Motion for a New Trial was filed on September 17, 2007. A Notice of Appeal was filed on August 17, 2007. Petitioner's conviction on all counts was affirmed. The Order of Affirmance was filed on June 30, 2009.<sup>3</sup>

II.

#### FACTS OF THE CASE

Mercy Williams (hereinafter "Mercy") was killed by a single .22 caliber bullet in the evening hours of September 30, 2006, while standing with others in front of a friend's house on Balzar Street in North Las Vegas (Trial Transcript, hereinafter referred to as TT 5/8/07, p. 9; TT, 5/10/07, p. 126). Two Las Vegas police officers, Cupp and Walter, assigned to the "Problem Solving Unit" were in the vicinity and proceeded to the location where they believed the gunshots had come from (TT, 5/8/07, pp. 226-231).

A short time after the shooting, a car theft took place approximately one block away. The victims, Geishe Orduno was the passenger and her friend, Melvin Bolden was the driver (TT, 5/8/07, pp. 178-182). Officers Cupp and Walter located and pursued the stolen vehicle which was a silver, Lincoln Towncar with tinted windows. The victims related that this vehicle had been taken by three or more young African-American men (TT, 5/8/07, pp. 237-242).

Officers Cupp and Walters engaged in a short car chase that proceeded down

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See Judgment of Conviction attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>The issues considered on appeal are set forth in Section III herein. The Order of Affirmance is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.

Martin Luther King Boulevard to Jimmy Street and concluded very suddenly on Lexington. The officers testified that just prior to the stolen vehicle crashing into a fire hydrant, the driver of the vehicle very briefly leaned out of the door of the car while holding a rifle or shotgun. The police saw the driver exit the stolen vehicle and they directed their car towards the driver, striking him and causing him to fall to the ground. He then got up quickly and ran away. Two other individuals also exited the stolen vehicle and fled on foot. A chase of the fleeing individuals ensued (TT, 5/8/07, pp. 239-245, TT 5/9/07, pp. 33-35). It was late at night and very dark where this car crash had occurred.

During the incident, Officer Cupp fired shots at one of the fleeing suspects. Not long after that, Pierre Joshlin was found in a nearby dumpster and within that same dumpster were black gloves and a .45 caliber handgun (TT, 5/9/07, pp. 39-41). Officer Walter responded to the sound of Office Cupp's gunshots and abandoned his pursuit of the alleged driver consequently losing sight of that person (TT, 5/8/07, p. 251).

Approximately an hour later, Jamar Matthews, petitioner herein, was located by a K-9 dog in some bushes in a backyard on Jimmy Street (TT, 5/8/07, pp. 330-353). Matthews had been bitten on the shoulder and the hand by the police dog (TT, 5/8/07, p. 352). A single red glove was recovered from Eleanor Street (TT, 5/9/07, p. 236). A rifle was located near the original location of the stolen vehicle's crash into the fire hydrant (TT, 5/9/07, p. 247).

During the trial, the State did not produce any lay witnesses from either the shooting, or the car robbery, and who were able to identify Matthews as being present at or involved in either crime. However, the identification and other evidence presented against the co-defendant, Pierre Joshlin, was much stronger (TT, 5/8/07, P. 172).

Officers Walter and Cupp both admitted to only catching a "fleeting glimpse" of the fleeing driver from the stolen vehicle (TT, 5/8/07, p. 259, TT 5/9/07, p. 85).

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the fleeing driver from the stolen vehicle (TT, 5/8/07, p. 259, TT 5/9/07, p. 85). Cupp only identified Matthews at in-court proceedings (TT, 5/9/07, p. 56). Officer Walter identified Matthews as the fleeing driver after a one-on-one line-up while Matthews was in custody (TT, 5/8/07, p. 290-295). Officer Walter was allowed over objection to testify during the trial that he was "100 per cent" certain of his identification and that they had "the right guy" (TT, 5/8/07, p. 324). Officer Walters didn't dispute, however, that Matthews is 5'11" (TT, 5/8/07, p. 296) which conflicted with the testimony of the car theft victims who felt the driver was substantially shorter. Additionally, during the trial, the State elicited that Officer Cupp had identified Matthews in a prior proceeding. An objection was made, and it was sustained (TT, 5/9/07, pp. 56-57). Nevertheless, the State brought it up again in its closing argument (TT, 5/11/07, p. 80).

There wasn't any physical evidence admitted at trial that linked Matthews to any of the weapons that were retrieved. There wasn't any evidence produced by the State that linked Matthews to co-defendant, Pierre Joshlin. Indeed, Joshlin was found at a different location from Matthews an hour or more earlier that evening. The State did not offer any evidence of motive or any connection between the defendants and the allegedly "intended" victims of the shooting.

Also, both Officers Walter and Cupp agreed that Matthews was hit in the legs by the police vehicle which was traveling approximately 10-15 miles an hour, Yet there weren't any injuries to Matthews' legs or body, except for the dog bites, when he was taken into custody (TT, 5/8/07, pp. 273, 374); TT 5/9/07, p. 84). A number of inconsistent descriptions were given regarding the shooter as well as the ultimate driver of the stolen vehicle, all of which had that person at 5'7" or shorter and in long pants (TT, 5/8/07, pp. 130-219). During the trial, Matthews was identified from his Nevada ID as being 5'11" tall (TT, 5/10/07, p. 150). Matthews was wearing jean shorts at the time of his arrest (TT, 5/8/07, pp. 340-341). Joslin was wearing dark pants at the time of his apprehension (TT, 5/7/07, p. 307).

establish that the reason that Matthews was hiding in the bushes when he was apprehended, was because he saw the police and didn't want to be arrested for violating an active restraining order which was in effect during this time period. The restraining order required him to stay out of that area or face arrest. Evidence of that restraining order was presented to the jury (TT, 5/10/07, pp. 142-170).

III.

#### **ISSUES RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL**

Matthews previously appealed his conviction to the Nevada Supreme Court.

The Case Appeal Statement was filed on August 17, 2007. The following issues were raised and decided on appeal.

- 1. Whether there sufficient evidence to convict the defendant on any of the offenses?
- 2. Whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by holding up and referring to the defendant's criminal "SCOPE" history and suggesting to the jury that he doesn't look like an innocent person, that he doesn't dress nice, etc?
- 3. Whether it was error to allow the so-called "expert" in gun residue to testify regarding a glove unconnected to any crime?
- 4. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the key witness for the State (Officer Cupp) to offer his opinion that they "had the right guy?"
- 5. Whether the court erred by claiming it had no discretion to order additional peremptory challenges?

IV.

# **ARGUMENT**

The evidence of guilt against Mr. Matthews in this case was not overwhelming. His conviction was based upon the weak, unreliable identifications of two police officers who responded to a dark, night shooting in the neighborhood that they were patrolling and Mr. Matthew's mere presence in the vicinity of said shooting. "Mere presence" at a crime scene is not enough to sustain a conviction. <u>Brooks v. State</u>,

 103 Nev. 611, 747 P.2d 893 (1987).

The State's case rested upon the testimony of Officers Walter and Cupp. Both officers only got a "fleeting glimpse" of the driver of the stolen vehicle who they identified as Matthews. Walter never saw the driver's face after this mere "glimpse."

It is important to note also that there was a collision between the police car driven by Officer Crupp and the driver of the stolen vehicle which resulted in the driver being forcefully knocked down by the police car. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Matthews did not have any injuries consistent with being hit by a car. His only injuries worth noting were from the police dog bites.

Further, the police officers could not testify that the driver of the stolen vehicle was involved in the earlier shooting and resulting homicide since they did not witness the shooting and the stolen car was not the car driven by the shooters. Nor was there any corroborating forensic evidence linking the bullet that caused Mercy Williams' death with the rifle found by the police in the grass near the suspect vehicle. It was merely the same caliber.

Aside from the "fleeting glimpse" of Officer Walter, there wasn't any evidence to ever put the rifle recovered near the stolen vehicle in Matthew's possession. Quite the contrary. There was evidence introduced during the trial which tended to place this rifle in the possession of a passenger in the backseat of the suspect vehicle. The police testified that based upon their fleeting glimpses that Matthews was the driver of the stolen car. There was never any testimony that Matthews was a passenger in that car.

# <u>INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL</u>

Petitioner has raised, in his original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), the issue of whether he was denied his right to due process of law and his Sixth Amendment Constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel which would have triggered his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial as guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of

the United States. Petitioner has asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective in violation of his Sixth Amendment right because his trial counsel failed to attempt to sever his trial from that of Joshlin at any time prior to or during his trial.

Petitioner has asserted that being forced to go to trial with this co-defendant denied him a fair trial and due process. Petitioner's attorney did not even request to sever the trials, despite the fact that he acknowledged that the need might arise and if so that he would file for it.<sup>4</sup>

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are properly raised for the first time in a timely first post-conviction petition. This petition has been timely filed. The standard for review has been set forth in <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). That case states the two-prong test that must be satisfied before a court can rule that counsel has been constitutionally ineffective.

In <u>State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993), the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the standard announced in <u>Strickland</u>. Under this test, in order to successfully prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show first that, his counsel's representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. See <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687-688 and 684, 104 S.Ct. At 2065 and 2068. See also <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 103 P.3d 25 (2004)

In considering whether trial counsel was effective, the court must determine whether counsel made "sufficient inquiry into the information which is pertinent to his client's case." <u>Doleman v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 843, 846, 921 P.2d 278, 280 (1996) citing <u>Strickland</u>. The court will then make an inquiry into whether counsel made a reasonable strategy decision on how to proceed. See <u>Doleman</u> at 846. The judge considering a petitioner's claim must ". . . judge the reasonableness of counsel's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>See Bench Brief filed on May 8, 2007, attached hereto as Exhibit 4.