IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 1 2 BENNETT GRIMES, No. 62835 3 **Electronically Filed** 4 Appellant, Aug 19 2013 12:33 p.m. Tracie K. Lindeman 5 Clerk of Supreme Court ٧. 6 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 7 Respondent. 8 9 APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME V PAGES 930-108 10 11 STEVE WOLFSON PHILIP J. KOHN Clark County Public Defender 309 South Third Street Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 12 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2610 13 CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO Attorney for Appellant 14 Attorney General 100 North Carson Street 15 Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (702) 687-3538 16 Counsel for Respondent 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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MR. HILLMAN: Mr. Grimes and I have talked about 1 2 that. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Grimes, just based on my 3 cursory review. I mean, the State obviously has to -- I'm 4 assuming you have certified judgments of conviction? 5 MS. BOTELHO: We do, Your Honor, for both. 6 THE COURT: Okay. And I would look at them, but 7 based upon their proffer thus far, it looks like -- and 8 they're battery domestic violence felonies, correct? Is that 9 correct? Mr. Burns, are they battery DV felonies? 10 MS. BOTELHO: Yes, Your Honor, abuse or injury on a 11 1.2 corporal spouse. THE COURT: Oh, that's right. California says it a 13 little bit differently. Okay. So if you took the stand and 14 testified, whoever cross-examines you will be able to ask you 15 about those prior felonies because they're within the ten 16 years. Do you understand that? 17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 18 THE COURT: Okay. Have you had an opportunity to 19 discuss whether you should testify or exercise your right to 20 remain silent with your attorneys? 21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Have they answered all your questions? 23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 24 THE COURT: Do you have any questions of me? 25

have any questions, feel free to ask. Go ahead, just say 1 whatever it is. I'll figure it out. 2 THE DEFENDANT: I'm just -- I know there's a window 3 where I could give an answer --4 THE COURT: It's now. 5 THE DEFENDANT: - 24 hours. 6 THE COURT: No, you cannot. It's now. 7 THE DEFENDANT: That's what I mean. So I'm just 8 trying to give it a quick thought. 9 THE COURT: And I don't require you to tell me. 10 Remember yesterday when I said you're entitled to see and hear 11 all of the evidence against you before I ask you. That's why 12 I didn't ask you yesterday. So I got a jury out there 13 14 waiting. THE DEFENDANT: No questions. 15 THE COURT: All right. Have you decided whether 1.6 you're going to testify or not? 17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 18 THE COURT: What are you going to do? 19 THE DEFENDANT: I'm not going to testify. 20 THE COURT: You're not going to testify? 21 THE DEFENDANT: No. 22 THE COURT: Okay. And your attorney has told you how 23 that could change the case and how I will instruct the jury, 24 25 correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes

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MR. HILLMAN: And we'd like to make a record on that if we could briefly when you're done.

THE COURT: I'm done. If he doesn't want to testify.

MR. HILLMAN: Right. And I talked to Mr. Grimes for
a few minutes. He indicated he wanted to testify. We talked
about rebuttal evidence. He decided that, and I don't know
what he based his decision on, he decided that he — it would
be more harm than good for him to testify at this point in
time. Is that correct, Bennett?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

MR. HILLMAN: Okay. And what the basis of our conversation was is that while reviewing jury instructions we came to the self-defense instructions and Your Honor indicated that she felt that the state of the evidence was not such that we are entitled to argue for self-defense. We respectfully disagree with Your Honor on that and feel that we've met a scintilla of evidence.

THE COURT: And go ahead and tell me what you think the evidence is and how you would argue self-defense. Because I'm not suggesting that there's evidence that you could argue certain aspects, it was what I was told would be argued. And so, that's not on the record, so why don't you go ahead and tell me what your theory is about how Ms. Grimes obtained all of those wounds and I'll let you make your record.

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MR. HILLMAN: Beginning with the positioning of the parties as indicated on our diagrams, as well as in the photographs shown by the State that Mr. Grimes entered the apartment, spent most of his time near the door. There may have been some testimony that he approached Aneka. Aneka did say that he approached her. Grabbed the knife and pulled her to the door and then began stabbing her.

Our argument would be that it was just as reasonable that — that's kind of an unreasonable scenario, that actually Bennett was standing by the door. She said that she wanted to get him out of her life forever and that she grabbed a knife and approached Bennett.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HILLMAN: All of the bloodstains --

THE COURT: Right up to he's standing by the door.

It's right up to there I'm okay. It's when you cross over to Ms. Grimes grabbed that knife in the kitchen, went out of the kitchen and went after him. That's the part that I don't believe there is any evidence whatsoever, not even a reasonable inference.

MR. HILLMAN: And we're not saying if she went in the kitchen, grabbed a knife. She was standing at the counter next to the knife rack and had a direct shot at him five to seven feet away, as she said. She could not remember how he grabbed her, how he pulled her over to the door. And if

someone's going to stab someone, why in the world would they pull them five to seven feet next to the door and then start stabbing them —

THE COURT: Block the front door so the mom can't get out.

MR. HILLMAN: — instead of grabbing the knife from the dish rack and starting the attack right there? That's the basis of our self-defense.

THE COURT: I think that's fine. I think you can argue that what she says doesn't make sense.

MR. HILLMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: That's perfectly permissible. Where I have the problem is when you want to stand in front of the jury and say that Ms. Grimes — I think there's even a reasonable inference that she was closest to the knife. Okay. But it's after that when you say that he's by the front door, she's five to seven feet away and that she was the original aggressor and that she began stabbing him. And that in order to save his own life — well, I guess you didn't even tell — it wasn't even really that. There was a struggle that ensued and in that struggle she ended up with 21 stab wounds and that that was self-defense.

MR. HILLMAN: Also, in addition, the DNA on the knife, the fact that her DNA was on the knife, Mr. Grimes was not.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm okay with all that. It's the in between. I mean, I'll just tell you straight out. Mr. Grimes, there's absolutely no evidence, none, that she grabbed that knife, went after you, attempted to stab you and that somehow you acted in self-defense and she received 21 stab wounds in self-defense. Okay? Everything else you've said, I agree you can argue all that. I'm not going to — your attorneys can only argue the evidence and reasonable inferences of the evidence. They cannot make up a story. Well, they can defend you to the extent that the evidence allows them to defend you. Okay?

There is — we had Ms. Grimes here and everybody had an opportunity to clearly ask her whether she went after him with the knife and whether this was a struggle. There's — your attorneys can argue everything except — I mean, they can even argue she had her hand on that knife because the evidence would support that argument, that she had her hand on that knife. There's just no evidence to support her being the original aggressor and that there was some kind of — I don't even know. I don't want to put words in your mouth. So how did she get those stab wounds? What would you argue to the jury? I'm not telling — Mr. Grimes doesn't have to answer that.

MR. HILLMAN: She approached him with the knife, there was an altercation over the knife and she got those stab

wounds because he's stronger and bigger than she is and they were fighting over the knife.

THE COURT: And you know what? There's no evidence of how strong he is. There's no evidence of how tall he is. There's no evidence about how much he weighs. Nor is there any evidence about Aneka Grimes. None of that was elicited.

MR. HILLMAN: Other than the visual that the jurors have of both parties.

THE COURT: I'm not going to let the jury speculate as to how big the parties are.

MR. HILLMAN: They have seen him standing here when he's -- when they've walked in and walked out.

THE COURT: Okay. So? State it one more time for me. Just state it one more time.

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, at this point this is our theory of the case. Our theory of the case basically is that we have met the scintilla of evidence standard that we need in order to get a self-defense instruction. We are not required to get it even to probable cause, just a scintilla of evidence.

THE COURT: I completely agree with you.

MS. HOJJAT: We think we've met the scintilla of evidence due to the fact that all of the testimony places Mr. Grimes five to seven feet away from the knife. All of the testimony places Ms. Grimes, the victim, Mrs. Grimes directly

next to the knife. Due to the fact that the testimony as to
the forensic analysis of the knife shows that at least what
could be found by the State, there was no touch DNA of Mr.
Grimes on that knife handle. There was another individual's
touch DNA on that knife handle. There was Ms. Grimes' DNA on

THE COURT: We don't need to speculate because she told us it was blood.

that knife handle. We can speculate as to whether it was a

combination of touch DNA and fluids, but the point is --

MS. HOJJAT: She said it could have been a combination of both, Your Honor. She said it wasn't just blood, it could be touch DNA and blood. And the point is, Your Honor, that because another male's touch DNA was found on that knife, the blood had not overwhelmed all of the touch DNA on this knife. But Mr. Grimes' touch DNA was not found on this knife.

So given the facts and circumstances that he's five to seven feet away, she's standing right next to the knife, none of his touch DNA is found on the knife, and we would argue to the jury how reasonable does it sound that you'd drag somebody five to seven feet before you stab them. Now, whether there's a response to that or not, it is an argument that we can make to the jury. We do believe that those things together do rise to the level of a scintilla of evidence that he's not the first person who touched that knife that day,

he's not the person who picked up the knife and began the aggression that day.

THE COURT: If that's all you say. I mean, if you say as little as you say right now, I don't know what that gets you. I'm not sure that gets you to self-defense. You still have a person who has 21 stab wounds and another person with none. With that, with a cut on their right index finger.

MS. HOJJAT: And, Judge, clearly, Your Honor doesn't feel that this rises to the level of more likely than not --

THE COURT: It doesn't matter what I think.

MS. HOJJAT: -- or beyond a reasonable doubt.

evidence. I can't even find a scintilla of evidence to — everything you said, you can argue his DNA wasn't on there. You can argue his touch DNA, all that you can argue. And you can argue in her home, her DNA was on her knife. That's all fine. That doesn't bother me. It's when you then take the leap and say she took that hand in her knife — I'm sorry, that knife in her hand and that she went after your client in an effort to stab him. And then he had to stab her 21 times to thwart the attack on himself? Because it would be — that would be deadly force. That would be deadly force. He'd have the right to use deadly force against her if that happened. But there's got to be something that gets you to your ability to use deadly force to get you there.

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, we do think the fact that she was the one positioned closer to the knife. She was the only person in that apartment who actually knew that knife was there because the testimony was the knife was on a drying rack, it wasn't in the proper place that a knife is going to be. She was frankly the only person in the apartment who actually knew that knife was on that drying rack because it was on the other side of the counter. She's the person standing next to it.

THE COURT: You're getting caught up on where that knife is. I'd say I agree 100 percent. She's the only person on the planet that knew where that knife was.

MS. HOJJAT: Then we do think we've risen to the level of the scintilla of evidence of self-defense if she's the person who grabbed the knife.

THE COURT: Who grabbed the knife and then --

MS. HOJJAT: Moved towards him, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You don't get to — you don't get to use deadly force against someone unless deadly force is being used against you. So you have to tell me there is a scintilla of evidence that deadly force was used against your client.

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, the positioning also, we do believe there's a scintilla of evidence that she moved towards the entryway, because again, he's in the entryway the whole time. She's the one at the counter, she's moving towards the

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entryway. We believe there is enough for a scintilla of evidence that she grabbed the knife, she moved towards the entryway. We do think that's enough for a scintilla of evidence that this was self-defense. Now certainly --

THE COURT: She grabbed the knife. What evidence is there that she moved towards the entryway in an effort to use that knife on your client?

MS. HOJJAT: Again, every single person has placed Mr. Grimes' positioning at the entryway.

THE COURT: I got that. Tell me what evidence there is that she -- there's evidence you can argue she put that knife in her hand. Got it. What evidence is there that once she put that knife in her hand she became an aggressor and used deadly force against your client? That's what I want to hear. Not that everybody says where everybody is. Okay? Because either way, somebody has to come towards somebody in order for there to be deadly force. Because if you're seven feet away with a steak knife, no reasonable person is going to say that's deadly force.

MS. HOJJAT: Precisely, Your Honor, but I think there is a reasonable inference. Your Honor said somebody has to move towards somebody for there to be deadly force. We think there's a reasonable inference that she moved towards him. think it's enough for a scintilla, that she moved towards him.

THE COURT: Tell me what evidence you have that you

can argue, what inference, what evidence is there that the jury can infer she moved towards him with a knife in her hand and it was exercising deadly force against your client?

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, she's at the counter and then she's in the entryway. He's always in the entryway. I mean, there's —

THE COURT: Who testified that she's in the entryway besides her and her mother and they both said he dragged her there. So, who other than her and her mother — every single person that's gotten up here, Hoffman, the detective today, mother, Aneka, all of them said he took her there. Every single person said he took her there.

MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, those are responses to our argument, absolutely. And we're not saying they're invalid responses to argument. But our point is that we have an argument, Your Honor. We have, based on the evidence, the way that it is, it wouldn't be completely outside the realm—it's not unreasonable, it's not completely unreasonable for a juror to think maybe she walked towards him. And that's a scintilla, Your Honor. If a juror could say you know what, looking at that positioning, I think she walked towards him. Then we've met our burden of scintilla.

THE COURT: She has to walk towards him with a knife in her hand and she has to be using deadly force against him.

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, she has to be using deadly

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force against him for us to prevail in our self-defense argument, but not for us to reach a scintilla of self-defense in a self-defense argument. For us to prevail, absolutely.

There has to be --

THE COURT: For you to even argue, you have to —
there has to be some evidence that she had the knife in her
hand and that she moved towards your client in an effort to, I
don't know, guess stab him with it or do something with it.

MS. HOJJAT: It's our position that we have met that burden. We have met the burden of scintilla based on the forensic evidence that was testified to, based on the positioning that was testified to, based on where the blood spatter is in this case, it's our position we've met the burden of scintilla. This is our theory of the case and we do think it's fundamentally unfair and in violation of Mr. Grimes' due process rights under the 14th Amendment if we're not allowed to present our theory of the case.

THE COURT: If you're not allowed to make up something that isn't supported by the evidence?

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, we will be drawing inferences based on the evidence that was presented and we will be careful not to go outside of drawing inferences based on the evidence that was presented.

THE COURT: And I appreciate because you've been answering all my questions, you've been doing a really good

job, so I don't want you to think I'm — because you're doing very, very good. But I think if you rewind the tape and listen to yourself, you said, at one point you said it's not unreasonable for the jury to think that maybe she was the one that grabbed the knife and went towards him. That's a problem I'm having. I think I've asked like ten times and I keep getting the same response.

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The problem is, the state of the record is the state of the record. There has to be some evidence. There's no evidence from anybody that's testified that she went towards him in a manner — I mean, there has to be some evidence. Somebody has to testify that she was the initial aggressor and everything that makes up that. You can't say his DNA wasn't on the knife so she must have picked it up, went after him and tried to stab him. That's ridiculous.

MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, I guess that's the part we're disagreeing with. We don't think there has to be some testimony. We don't think somebody has to get up there and say she walked towards him for us to be able to make that inference to the jury. That would be like if there was a gun and it had been fired and only one person's fingerprints were on it. Nobody needs to get up there and say I saw him fire the gun in order for the inference to be drawn that this is the person who fired the gun. We think that sometimes — we think that in this case particularly when the burden is solely

a scintilla of evidence, we think positioning, we think forensics is enough to get us over the burden of scintilla. We don't think there has to be a person who gets up there and testifies for us to make that burden.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I've asked like ten times and I haven't gotten anything, so I don't think they have anything. I've sat here and I know what the state of the record is. I mean, I'm okay with everything up to her putting that knife in her hand, but it's the taking the logical leap that there's some evidence that supports. There's none. That would be absolutely just making up a story. It's not even in good — well, I'm not even quite sure you can tell me that's in good faith.

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, we do believe that's what happened, that she got the knife and — from the positioning, from — it's just not logical, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That she grabbed the knife --

MS. HOJJAT: For him to have walked five to seven feet. Grabbed a knife that he didn't know was there. Grabbed her, dragged her five to seven feet back in the space of — what the testimony makes it sounds like is 15 to 20 seconds.

MS. BOTELHO: But what they believe doesn't necessarily equal --

MS. HOJJAT: To drag another human being that far in 15 to 30 seconds.

THE COURT: Yeah, you can't just ignore the evidence.

MS. BOTELHO: I mean, what they believe --

happened are not evidence and that's a problem. Because every proffer that you've made is you believe that it's reasonable or maybe this can happen. Problem is is there has to be some evidence. I have literally strained myself over the last couple of days because I knew you were going to bring up a self-defense argument. I'm trying to articulate how you would do it and I always got stuck at that point.

MS. BOTELHO: And the problem is, Your Honor, we went over some of the self-defense instructions and they say things like if a person attempts to kill another in self-defense, it must appear that the danger was so urgent and pressing — we don't have —

THE COURT: There's none.

MS. BOTELHO: — anyone saying that there was a danger, that was urgent, that was pressing, that it was needed to save somebody's life or to prevent them from receiving great bodily harm, that the non-assailant did it in good faith, that the defendant, you know, attacked the initial aggressor, Aneka, allegedly in good faith. We don't have — when a person without voluntarily seeking, provoking, inviting or willingly engaging in a difficulty of his [indiscernible] is attacked by an assailant.

First of all, we have no evidence that she's an assailant. We have no evidence that he was just standing there, charming as can be, not voluntarily seeking or provoking some kind of difficulty. He has the right to stand his ground. We have no evidence of that. The use of a deadly weapon is justifiable when it's a lawful defense of the person and he believes he is in danger of death or great bodily injury and there is imminent danger. There's no testimony of that.

The right to self-defense exists only as long as the real or apparent threat and danger continues to exist. We have no evidence of any danger, whether or not it continued, whether or not it existed. The use of force against a person is justified. Again, when there is imminent danger necessary under the circumstances. What circumstances? We don't have circumstances.

The problem with this particular case is it's fundamentally unfair to the State. Basically, it's allowing the defense to put forth a story that's not based on evidence or fact and that allows the defendant to circumvent having to take the stand to put forth his defense without cross—examination. And the problem with this is, if they're allowed to give this story—

THE COURT: Basically allows them to basically tell the jury what the defendant would have said had he taken the

stand.

MS. BOTELHO: Exactly. And then, if they were to argue this particular story in closing, we would be objecting that it's not supported by facts and evidence and they should not be allowed to argue it. You take that away, they can't argue — I mean, a scintilla or whatever piece of evidence that they need to establish self-defense cannot be based on inference built upon inference upon inference that then makes a story.

THE COURT: I don't think, in all fairness, I don't think you have an inference. Once you place her with the knife, there is not even an inference. I cannot think of any logical inference that gets her going after him with the knife in a deadly manner and him having no choice but to do whatever it is he did. We don't know what that is, we just know she ended up with 21 stab wounds.

So you cannot get up and argue to the jury what he may have said had he taken the stand. And in all fairness, it is extraordinarily difficult to assert a self-defense theory if there isn't something from your client, either a statement made to the police. I mean, I've had cases where statements made to the police, but then — well, that's a whole other story about how that gets in or doesn't get in. Or the defendant has to take the stand.

I don't know how in the world you get those jury

UNCERTIFIED ROUGH DRAFT

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THE COURT: About what? About whether you want to testify or not? You get to, you can --

THE DEFENDANT: Things that occurred and things that are being said.

THE COURT: What happened that day? Take the stand, take the oath --

THE DEFENDANT: I was asking about here, right now, as I'm standing here.

THE COURT: To tell me? I'm not the trier of fact.

THE DEFENDANT: I mean, as we were all speaking. I was just saying am I allowed to speak --

THE COURT: No, that's why you have lawyers. only thing -- I'll tell you, I think you pretty much realize I'm not going to give any self-defense instructions. thought it was only fair to tell your lawyers back in chambers that they would be -

MR. HILLMAN: We appreciate that.

THE COURT: I think it's only fair. I knew your attorneys wanted to raise a self-defense theory. I've been following the case intently, taking notepads of notes towards a self-defense theory. I don't always know that up front, but towards a self-defense theory. It's not there. I told them in all fairness it wasn't there. I told them that I thought maybe you would testify in order to put it there. I did not know you had the priors. Sometimes you have to weigh all that

out. I did not know about your priors before then. So there's no evidence, so I can tell you there's no evidence, I'm not going to instruct the jury on self-defense. It will go to the jury on what there is.

It doesn't mean the State doesn't have to prove their case and the jury doesn't have to hold them to each and every element as alleged in the charging document. That's still a fact. I'm just not going to let the attorneys basically make up a story. And if it's the truth, I'm not going to let them tell it because it wasn't testified to up there. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: I do.

THE COURT: Okay. And I think that's probably why your attorney came out here to discuss with you whether you were going to testify or not. Okay? So it's up to you because it's your life. And again, I want to make sure you understand this and I usually tell this to everybody no matter what kind of case it is. This is your right and your right alone. Regardless of what anybody in this room tells you to do, it is your decision whether to testify. You can — I mean, your attorneys can tell you don't testify, don't testify, or the opposite, testify, testify. It is still your decision what to do.

Now, the decision should be made after consulting with your attorneys. That's my opinion. However, you can disagree with everything they say or agree with everything they say. At the end of the day, it is your right and your right alone. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: So you have to search your soul and determine whether you're going to testify or not. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. After hearing everything I said, do you want to have more time to talk to your lawyers? I'll make everyone leave the courtroom and you can talk to your lawyers privately. Do you want more time?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Okay. What are you going to do?

THE DEFENDANT: I won't take the stand.

THE COURT: All right. And you understand I'm not going to instruct the jury on self-defense?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you want the Carter instruction?

MR. HILLMAN: No.

THE COURT: Okay. Then let's go back and finalize the instructions.

MR. BURNS: Just one quick thing, Your Honor, I want to put on the record. Ms. Botelho has argued it. Just the fact that if the defense is to proceed on this non-existent showing of this affirmative defense, the Nevada Supreme Court's been very clear that it's the State's burden to disprove self-defense. And it effectively puts us in a catch-22 position where we have really nothing to argue about because there is no evidence. And if we're commenting on the complete absence of evidence to the jury, then obviously, we're going to draw a burden shifting objection from the defense.

Also, if this kind of showing is sufficient for self-defense in the future, then any case where there's victim defendant proximity, where there's victim DNA on the weapon, which will be the case in every knife-type case, then there would be this kind of — be automatically entitled to argue self-defense. We just add those things to the record.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor has clearly already made your ruling, so I would just respond to that and say that it's a very different situation when the alleged perpetrator's DNA is found nowhere on the weapon and that's what we think distinguishes this case and that's why we think we have met the burden of scintilla.

THE COURT: All right. Do you want to come back and

record on.

THE COURT: Okay. One of them is the reasonable doubt instruction, I know that. Instruction Number 5? Do you want to start making a record on — it's the reasonable doubt instruction. Go ahead.

MR. HILLMAN: Go ahead.

MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, on the reasonable doubt instruction, Instruction Number 5, what we had asked or was on line two to read, the defendant is presumed innocent. A period after innocent and striking the language until the contrary is proved. We believe the fact that it's saying until the contrary is proved implies to the jury that it's an inevitable conclusion that the contrary will be proved. We believe that the rest of the instruction does thoroughly inform the jury that they — if the State meets its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did commit the crimes, then they are to find him guilty. But we believe that the until the contrary is proved language is unduly suggestive to the jury.

THE COURT: The objection's noted and I indicated I was going to give the instruction as stated in number 5 based upon the Nevada Supreme Court's prior precedent and [indiscernible] give this instruction exactly as stated. Any other objections?

MR. HILLMAN: We have two more and I'm looking for

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those instructions, Judge. One of them has to do with burglary.

THE COURT: Oh, I know, the burglary in possession.

MR. HILLMAN: Every person who commits --

THE COURT: Obtaining possession afterwards.

MR. HILLMAN: Yes.

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THE COURT: I'll help you.

MR. HILLMAN: Twenty-four. Our objection to number 24 is that the crime of burglary is either committed or completed upon entry and the weapon in possession can occur after entry. It seems to be logically at opposite ends of the intent of the statute. And that's our objection to number 24.

MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, coupled with the objection in number 24, we did propose a defense instruction, proposed defense instruction number nine, which was if you find that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bennett Grimes entered the apartment with a weapon, you must find him not guilty of burglary with a deadly weapon in violation of a temporary protective order.

THE COURT: You can approach and that will be marked as Court's Exhibit Number 6, Court's Exhibit Number 6. And this was the instruction that was proffered by the defense in place of Number 24 that was rejected by the Court, but I will make it part of the record. Does the State want to say anything?

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MR. BURNS: Briefly, Your Honor. As to Number, Instruction Number 24, it's the State's view that the statute intends essentially a separate offense that when there is a firearm and it's brought into possession, it's a separate element added to a burglary that there's not the -- the burglary still has to have the entry intent contemporaneous, but not necessarily the firearm. It does constitute a separate offense.

As to the defense's proffered instruction number nine, it's --

They wanted me to take out -- I mean, I THE COURT: believe the statute says --

MR. BURNS: -- an incorrect statement.

THE COURT: - regardless of how logical it is, the statute indicates he can be charged with burglary and possession of firearm -- I'm sorry, with a deadly weapon, if he obtains the possession of the deadly weapon after he's inside the place, whatever structure he enters.

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor, and I guess we would be asking Your Honor to find that statute unconstitutional as it's written because the offense of burglary is completed upon entering a dwelling. Indeed, if he had entered the dwelling with an intent to commit a crime and then committed no crime within it, he would still be guilty of the burglary. However, it seems the crime can be extended for the purposes of

THE COURT: If you want, do you want to just staple them all together? Are those --

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. These are them.

THE COURT: Do you mind if we just mark them as one and they'll will be Court's Exhibit Number 7?

MS. HOJJAT: Not at all. We can certainly mark them as one exhibit. If we could just make a very quick record on them.

THE COURT: Absolutely. Go ahead.

MS. HOJJAT: If I may approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. HOJJAT: Thank you. So we're having marked as Court's Exhibit 7, I believe. Your Honor, as previously stated on the record, it was the defense's intention in this case to argue self-defense. We already had a hearing on whether the defense had met the scintilla of evidence that was necessary in order to obtain that affirmative defense. Your Honor ruled that it was — we had not met the scintilla of evidence. Obviously, we argued that we had met it.

What's been entered as Court's Exhibit 7 is the jury instructions that had been agreed upon by the State, the defense and the Court as the jury instructions that would have been read to the jury had the defense been allowed to argue self-defense, had the affirmative defense of self-defense been allowed for the defense. And so it's our position that those

jury instructions should be presented to the jury and read to the jury and we should be allowed to argue self-defense in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. And I think everyone agrees that if I did instruct the jury on self-defense, they would be the instructions from the Runyon case. And we actually worked on them, but they would be — if I did believe self-defense was appropriate to instruct the jury on, these instructions would have been given.

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: So they'll be marked Court's Exhibit

Number 7. Any other instructions the defense would like to

propose?

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor, there are a couple.

I'm going to go backwards a little bit here. Proposed defense instruction number 12 is our Daniels instruction. We did previously have —

THE COURT: Your what?

MS. HOJJAT: The Daniels instruction. The instruction pursuant to State v. Daniels. We previously filed a motion for failure to collect and preserve the fingerprints. Your Honor heard the motion and denied it. However, we are also — our first remedy that we requested was a dismissal. Our second one was a jury instruction. We are now submitting a jury instruction to the Court that we are requesting

1 pursuant to that motion.

THE COURT: Okay. That will be marked as Court's Exhibit next in line, 8.

MS. HOJJAT: May I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes. Does the State wish to say anything?

MS. BOTELHO: Yes, Your Honor. You had previously addressed this particular issue and my understanding of Daniels is that they're entitled to some kind of jury instruction if there was bad faith or even gross negligence. However, this particular case there was no failure to gather and certainly, the evidence has been available to the defense to test as previous records have already indicated.

THE COURT: Okay. So that would be — the Court is not giving this instruction, but it will be made part of the record. Any other instructions that you would like to propose?

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. There were a couple more. Proposed defense instruction one was simply a presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt instruction pursuant to Bleek v. State. If I may approach?

THE COURT: That will be marked as Court's Exhibit Number 9. Says every person charged with a commission of a crime shall be presumed innocent. This was apparently a different — well, why did you want me to give this?

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, we just — that's the presumption of innocence instruction that we are requesting the Court to give. We think that the other instruction kind of buries the presumption of innocence and doesn't make it clear. It's a very long instruction. By the time you get to the end of it, you kind of forget that there's a presumption of innocence. So we wanted a short statement of that. We were asking for that to be given.

THE COURT: Okay. Does the State wish to respond?

MS. BOTELHO: Yes, Your Honor. The State's position
is that this particular instruction is already covered by the
reasonable doubt instruction, which, according to the Nevada
Supreme Court is all that is allowed to be given as far as the
issue of reasonable doubt.

THE COURT: Okay. This instruction will be rejected and will be marked as Court's Exhibit Number 9. Any other ones?

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. Proposed defense instruction number five, which was basically that to support a conviction for attempt murder with a deadly weapon, the — and I put the District Attorney, but I guess I'll amend that to say the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Grimes had the specific intent to kill Aneka Grimes and that he used a deadly weapon.

THE COURT: Does the State wish to respond?

MS. BOTELHO: Your Honor, we indicated that we believe this to be an incomplete instruction and also repetitive, as it is already covered by other instructions. There are lots of instructions right now regarding the attempt murder charge and also specifically dealing with the elements of specific intent and also the deadly weapon. And they were also given their Crawford instruction, the reverse or the negatively worded version.

THE COURT: All right. And I made a determination that the jury had been accurately instructed on the attempt murder. This will be the Court's Exhibit next in line, Number 10. Any other instructions the defense would like to proposed?

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. Proposed defense instruction number six was — it's language that we've taken from Holmes v. State where the Nevada Supreme Court is citing Randolph v. State, another Nevada Supreme Court case. In those cases, the Nevada Supreme Court discusses the fact that the reasonable doubt standard requires the jury to reach a subjective state of near certitude on the facts in issue. We were asking for an instruction so saying to the jury.

THE COURT: Randolph, the same case that they sanctioned the District Attorneys off for quantifying — the District Attorney's Office for trying to quantify — here it is. It's the same case. The DA in that case was sanctioned

without even a hearing because he attempted to quantify the reasonable standard. That case?

MS. HOJJAT: In that case, Your Honor, the Nevada Supreme Court did hold that reasonable — to reach — place a reasonable doubt the jury required — the jury must reach a subjective state of near certitude, which is why we're recording the language directly out of that case, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I just think it's interesting it came from that case. Isn't that the case, the Randolph case? I don't want to say the D.A.'s name because he gets mad when people bring it up.

MR. BURNS: I don't know.

THE COURT: I rejected this instruction for reasons stated previously, that the reasonable doubt standard has been given in the format that the Supreme Court has indicated we're supposed to give it. Therefore, this one was rejected for that reason. It will be marked as Court's Exhibit Number 11. Any other instructions?

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor, we do have one final instruction, which was proposed defense instruction number seven, that if their evidence allows two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to innocence, the other points to guilt, the jury must adopt the interpretation that — must adopt the interpretation that points to his innocence and reject the interpretation that points to guilt. That is

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from Crane versus State, which is a Nevada Supreme Court case.

THE COURT: Any response?

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, the Nevada Supreme Court's been very clear that no kind of variation or other [indiscernible] can be put on the reasonable doubt instruction. I think this is pretty clearly a thinly veiled attempt to recast part of the reasonable doubt instruction. So in that case really not permitted.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MS}}$. HOJJAT: Your Honor, if I can just respond to that.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. HOJJAT: We think this instruction goes to the presumption of innocence. The point is if there's two perfectly reasonable interpretations of the evidence, the presumption of innocence requires the jury to presume the defendant is innocent. So this is not an attempt to describe or quantify reasonable doubt. Instead, it is going to the presumption of innocence.

THE COURT: Okay. And this instruction will be rejected and will be marked Court's Exhibit next in line, Number 12. Any other instructions that the defense would like to propose?

MS. HOJJAT: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Is the State familiar with the verdict

form?

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my notes? These were yours. I'm just going to do it. MS. HOJJAT: Sorry, I got confused. I thought those were the exhibits. THE COURT: No, I get nervous to throw away my notes. I want to make sure we're done. Monday morning, 10:30. (Court recessed for the evening at 4:47 p.m.)

ACKNOWLEDGMENT:

Pursuant to Rule 3C(d) of Nevada Rules of Appellate

Procedure, this is a rough draft transcript expeditiously prepared,

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TRAN

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. C276163-1

DEPT NO. XII

vs.

BENNETT GRIMES,

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JURY TRIAL - DAY 4

MONDAY, OCTOBER 15, 2012

APPEARANCES:

For the State:

AGNES M. BOTELHO, ESQ.

Deputy District Attorney PATRICK J. BURNS, ESQ.

Deputy District Attorney

For the Defendant:

RALPH HILLMAN, ESQ.

Deputy Public Defender

NADIA HOJJAT, Esq.

Deputy Public Defender

RECORDED BY KERRY ESPARZA, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: KARR Reporting, Inc.

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, OCTOBER 15, 2012, 10:41 A.M. * * * * *

(In the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: Do the parties stipulate to the presence of the jury panel?

MS. BOTELHO: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. HILLMAN: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Does the State have any additional witnesses that they intend to call at this time?

MS. BOTELHO: No, Your Honor. At this point the State rests.

THE COURT: Okay. The State rests. The defense?

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, the defense rests.

gentlemen, you have heard all of the evidence that will be introduced at the time of the trial in this matter. You have been provided with the written jury instructions when you came in. Each of you has a copy. You'll be permitted to take those with you when you go back to deliberate upon your verdict. Before the attorneys do address you in their closing argument, I'm required by law to read the instructions to you.

(Jury instructions read - not transcribed)

THE COURT: The State of Nevada may open and close the arguments.

MR. BURNS: Thank you, Your Honor.

CLOSING ARGUMENT

MR. BURNS: The evidence has shown that on July 22nd, 2011 the defendant, Bennett Grimes, was experiencing two different emotions. The first is the emotion of desperation, that he was completely desperate, at a total sense of loss. The other is that he had a sense of entitlement, that he deserved something, that he owed something.

Now, the sense of desperation he had was because the woman he had been with for ten years, to whom he had been married for seven years, had ended their relationship permanently and forever. You heard Aneka Newman get up there and testify that she wanted "him out of my life forever." She wanted him gone, she wanted him out of her life forever. Aneka was — had her family, she had her job, her apartment. She had just bought a new car. She was turning her gaze towards a new future and in that new future there was no place for that man, the defendant, Bennett Grimes.

He knew that also. He clearly knew that and he knew she didn't even want him around her. He was not to be around her. So finding that out filled him with a sense of total desperation. You've heard Stephanie's 9-1-1 call, you've heard Aneka's 9-1-1 call and you can hear the defendant's voice. It's a sense of total loss, total desperation, total anxiety.

But that's not the only emotion he was feeling on

July 22nd, 2011. He was also feeling like he was entitled to something, like he was owed something by Aneka. He was owed that she — he deserved to be taken back by her. He had gone out, he had gotten this job. He deserved something from her. He also thought that he deserved to lurk around and hide in the shadows outside her apartment on that evening, waiting for Stephanie and Aneka to come home. He felt like he deserved when they actually got home to burst his way into that house, to batter his way through the door against the combined resistance of Aneka and Stephanie.

Once inside the house, he felt like he deserved to block the door, to stand there and make sure that no one left until he got what he wanted. He also felt like once — after they had told him ten plus times that he had to leave, after you heard Stephanie telling him go outside, Bennett, he felt like he deserved to stay there. Not only that, he felt like he deserved to not have the police called. And when he found out that the police were called, what was the testimony you heard from Stephanie. He told Stephanie and Aneka that they were scandalous. They were scandalous for calling 9-1-1 and trying to have him removed from the house.

He also felt — once it became clear that the police were going to come and remove him from the house, that he was probably going to go to jail that night, he felt like — the sense of desperation was enhanced and he felt like he deserved

something else. He felt like he deserved to ruin things for Aneka, to pick up a knife and to try and murder her. And that's exactly what he did. But for the heroics of Officer Bobby Hoffman, that's exactly what he would have done. It's what he felt entitled to do because she wouldn't take him back. And that's the state of the evidence. Don't make any mistake that Aneka is the one who he almost murdered and is the victim in this case.

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Now, the point of this first closing argument is to talk about the elements of the offenses. You have Count One, attempt murder; Count Two, the burglary, and then Count Three, the battery offense. I'm going to go through those offenses, talk about their specific legal elements and talk about the evidence you've heard over the last three days last week. And we'll talk about how those facts fit into the elements and how they demonstrate by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that that man attempted to murder Aneka Newman with a deadly weapon, that he committed the battery offense alleged in Count Three and that he also committed a burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon.

Now, in every criminal case the State has two larger, general burdens. The first is to show that a crime was committed. The second is to show that the defendant committed the crime. Now, the second element in this case, it's not difficult. It's a question of — that's the element we

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usually refer to as identify. There's no question who was the person stabbing Aneka 21 times. There's no alternate suspect or any kind of theory like that. It's the defendant, Bennett Grimes. Just a question of running the facts through the legal elements of the crimes the State of Nevada has charged and coming to the conclusion that that evidence has shown that he committed those crimes by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Let's talk first about Count One, attempted murder with a deadly weapon in violation of a temporary protective order. And you've heard some, throughout the trial, about TPO and you'll hear about it. It's in all the offenses, but we're not going to talk about it much because it's stipulated between the parties there was a valid temporary protective order in place and it was violated.

Attempted murder, there are two essential elements, performance of acts that tend, but fail to kill a human being. And in this case, stabbing someone 21 times, that's conduct that tends to kill someone, but it failed in this case because the defendant's effort to kill Aneka was interrupted by Officer Hoffman.

Second aspect is the mental state element. You have to find by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill Aneka when he was stabbing her 21 times. And we'll talk about how you prove that, how you determine that from the evidence and then we'll talk about the specific

evidence. But you have to prove both of those elements that the defendant had the specific intent to murder Aneka.

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Intention to kill. You have an instruction on this, I believe it's Instruction 14. It may be ascertained or deduced from all the facts and circumstances. We don't need some mind reader to go into Bennett Grimes' mind and tell us what he was thinking at the time he stabbed Aneka 21 times. You look at the facts, you look at the circumstances, you look at the testimony and you infer from that what his intention was.

You can also infer that intention of the use of a weapon calculated to produce death and the manner of the weapon's use. So the fact that a deadly weapon — and I'll talk more about the definition of a deadly weapon — was used in this case. And the manner, and we'll talk about the manner that was used.

The most important fact is that the defendant in ascertaining his intent, he stabbed Aneka 21 times. You've seen that evidence. Stabs her all over her body. She's literally riddled in stab wounds. In all, 21 stab wounds all over her body. And the State of Nevada submits to you that you don't stab your wife in the face, you don't stab her in the neck, you don't stab her in the head three times and you don't stab her in the back unless you intend to kill her. And that evidence is the only evidence you even need in this case

to convict him of attempted murder.

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You can also look at the weapon and the use of the weapon. It's a common steak knife. Probably all have one like this in your home. Under the circumstances that it was used, you can infer that his choice of this weapon and the way that he used it, that he had the specific intent to kill Aneka. You look at the weapon, the manner of its use is another factor you can look at. You look at that blade and that blade is warped from being plunged into Aneka repeatedly. That shows his intention, it shows the amount of force he was putting into those stab wounds and it shows exactly what he wanted to do to Aneka.

Also, you look at the defendant's hand. Now, you can look at that cut and you can see that by repeatedly stabbing her one, two, three, four, five — 21 times, that his hand slipped. That just shows you the amount of force he was putting into it, the amount of strength he was using.

Bobby Hoffman testified about how the defendant was holding that knife and he used this plastic picnic knife to show you that he was holding it like this. That lines up exactly with the defendant's index finger and that cut. You don't need an expert witness, you don't need a lawyer to tell you that what the defendant did was while he was stabbing her 21 times so vigorously, so angrily, that his hand slipped and he cut his finger. That's other evidence you can show, the

fact that he would cut himself while stabbing her 21 times and keep trying to stab her is evidence that he intended to kill her. And the only thing that stopped him was Officer Hoffman. So the manner of the weapon's use is a critical factor showing his intent to murder Aneka.

Also, you can look at the types of wounds that the defendant did inflict and you can infer his intent from that. You had Dr. Kuhls come in here and testify. She was the doctor who treated him — I'm sorry, treated Aneka. And she testified that a particular stab wound in the neck area, that it came very close and nicked a blood vessel branch of the subclavian artery. That injury was bleeding actively. And that kind of injury, she said, "Brings a risk of bleeding to death and large internal hematoma."

So, based on that type of injury — and you remember, she testified that doing a surgery to close that — fortunately, the active bleeding stopped, but doing the type of surgery to repair that would have to be very deep, you'd have to go under all this muscle and that's why they would prefer to o the radiography type of treatment. That just shows you that the defendant was stabbing her as hard as he could and he was stabbing — getting that knife as deep as he could into her.

Also, the chest wounds. Dr. Kuhls testified about the chest wounds, the stab that the defendant inflicted on

Aneka's chest, that it was of the breastbone, it was near the heart and the blood vessels that are underneath the breastbone. And she testified that that injury is "potentially very lethal injuries," those stab wounds to the So that's more evidence of his intent, that he's stabbing her all over her body, but he's stabbing her in potentially vital, critical areas.

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Now, one element that you have in al of the offenses is -- in all the Counts is deadly weapon. And the law defines deadly weapon in one or two ways. And you have a jury instruction on this. Any instrument which, if used in the ordinary manner contemplated by its design and construction, will or is likely to cause substantial bodily harm or death. And any weapon, device used under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used is readily capable of causing substantial bodily harm or death. Although it's just a mundane, everyday steak knife, that is a deadly weapon the way he was using it, the injuries he was inflicting on her and the way he was stabbing her.

There's no question it's a deadly weapon under the circumstances he used it. That's an element you need to find, but it's an easy element to find based on the way he used the knife and the all the testimony you've heard from the witnesses. And you can see further, you know it's a deadly weapon because it was able to do this.

Now, temporary protective order, talked about this very briefly. It's stipulated between the parties. It's not something that you need to spend a lot of time on. The defendant should not have been near Aneka.

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Count Three is a very long, has a very long title, but it's actually more simple than it looks. It's battery with the use of a deadly weapon constituting domestic violence resulting in substantial bodily harm in violation of temporary protective order. Now, we'll just break it down element by element. It's actually pretty simple when you break it down. It's just a mouthful.

Those are two elements that you have to find in order to convict the defendant of Count Three. First is battery. Any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. There's no question, stabbing someone 21 times constitutes a battery. Domestic violence, it's defined when an act is committed upon a person — the battery is committed upon a person, former spouse, or any other person to whom he is related by blood or marriage. You heard Aneka testify that she was married to the defendant, that she finally divorced him April of this year. So there was this spousal relationship that makes the battery inflicted on her domestic violence. Battery, domestic violence, very easy for you to find based on the evidence.

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Substantial bodily harm. Now, this is another element you have to find. And there are four different ways you can find this. State submits that each way that you could find it has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence. Look at the first. Creates a substantial risk of death, that the injury had to have created a substantial risk of death. I just refer you again to Dr. Kuhls' testimony that these injuries were potentially very lethal and that they could have caused Aneka to die. He stabs her in the neck, he stabs her in the face, he stabs her in the head, he stabs her in the chest and the back. Now clearly, that created a substantial risk of death.

Next, serious or permanent disfigurement. You saw
Aneka get off the witness stand. She came up to you and she
showed you her scars. You know, she's obviously a very lovely
person. She's not someone you'd describe as disfigured. But
in this case, it meets the elements because you've seen the
disfigurement on her arms, particularly what appear to be
these defensive wounds from being stabbed repeatedly by the
defendant on her arm. You've seen the scars on her neck and
on her chest. She's covered in scars and those will always be
with her. So that second element shows substantial bodily
harm.

The third is protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. This is pretty simple

also because you'll remember, Aneka telling you about her ordeal after she was stabbed. She said that she couldn't use her left arm. She had to rehabilitate it. In the aftermath of the stabbing, she could not use it. She could not move it. She was eventually able to regain movement. On top of that, she told you that she couldn't — after the stabbing she couldn't use her thumb, that she actually had to go and undergo a surgery that repaired and gave her back the use of her thumb. That's protracted loss of a bodily member. So that's substantial bodily harm. That's proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

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And finally, prolonged physical pain. Lasted longer than the pain immediately resulting from the wrongful act. You'll remember that Aneka testified how much pain she was in. Also, Dr. Kuhls testified to her complaining about the pain from the stab wounds. Aneka testified that she was on pain killers for some amount of time, some months after this incident. Clearly, there's protracted physical pain based on what the defendant did to Aneka.

So the substantial bodily harm element has been proved in so many ways. It's been proved by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. You've heard the doctor's testimony, you've heard Aneka's testimony and you've also heard Stephanie provide some testimony about it.

Now, let's go to Count Two, it's burglary. There are

three elements to burglary. First is that there's a house or structure; second is that the defendant enters it; third is that the defendant has the intent to commit an assault, battery or a felony when he enters the house or structure. He has to have that intent at the time he enters.

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There's the structure. It's the apartment 173, West Desert Inn Road. You heard lots of testimony that the defendant entered it, that he was hiding out there, that he battered his way into the house and forced his way in. Once he was in there, he stabbed Aneka. Both Stephanie and Aneka testified that he busted his way in there.

Now, the specific intent element of burglary is like the specific intent element of attempted murder. It can be inferred from the circumstances. And you look at all the different circumstances showing what the defendant intended to do. First, that he's lurking outside. He's ready. He essentially lays in wait and then ambushes them and forces his way into the house. That's one circumstance you can look at.

He pushes his way in, he batters his way into the house against their will. Stephanie testified that she was pushed back by the amount of force he applied to get into the house. Also, once he's in there, he doesn't let anybody leave. So you know what his intent is. You can infer from the evidence that he's not leaving until he gets what he wants. And if he doesn't get what he wants, he's going to

perpetrate some violence against someone, specifically Aneka.

And that's exactly what he did. Now, that he might have the hope that she takes him back or something like that doesn't mean he didn't commit a burglary because he had the intent to commit violence. He didn't get what he wanted when he went in there.

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Finally, you can infer from the fact that he stabs

Aneka 21 times that he went in there with that intent, to do

something physical to commit violence against Aneka or anybody
else.

Now, there's a fourth element to burglary in this case, it's that the defendant came into possession of a deadly weapon while he was — while the burglary was going on. Now, all you need to find — you don't need to find that he had the weapon at the time he entered, right at the time he entered. It's sufficient, if he commits a burglary and sometime thereafter he comes into possession of the deadly weapon. So he gains possession of any firearm or deadly weapon at any time during the commission of the crime, at any time before leaving the structure or upon leaving the structure. You know, he grabbed that knife in the middle of everything and long before — you know, he only left the structure after the police took him. So he came into possession of that deadly weapon, that steak knife which we've talked about is a deadly weapon, during the commission of a burglary. The proof is

overwhelming of that.

Now, I want to talk a little bit about your verdict form, what it's going to look like and what the State submits you should be — how you should fill it out. There's page one of the verdict form. Let's look at Count One, attempt murder with use of a deadly weapon. You have three choices. The evidence in this case is overwhelming, so I'll just submit that you're not even going to consider a not guilty verdict. And then you have two options. The difference between those two options is one of them has a deadly weapon, one does not. Now, the evidence is very clear that the defendant used a deadly weapon, that steak knife, the way he used it. You find it's a deadly weapon, so at that point really the only verdict based on the evidence, only reasonable verdict would be guilty of attempt murder with the use of a deadly weapon in violation of a temporary protective order.

Count Two is the burglary count. Pretty similar here. You've got two options. Obviously, it's the State's view you're not going to take — you're not going to choose not guilty. You have one option with a deadly weapon and one option without. Clearly, he came into possession of a deadly weapon. He picked it up, he stabbed Aneka 21 times, Aneka testified to it. Officer Hoffman testified to it. Stephanie testified to it. The evidence is overwhelming.

Let's look at the second page of your verdict form,

Count Three. This one looks a little crazy. You've got a bunch of options here and we'll talk about it. It's more simple than it looks, but we'll just talk more specifically about it. There are a number of elements. There's battery, domestic violence, deadly weapon, substantial bodily harm and TPO. Don't worry about TPO. All your options except for a not guilty verdict are going to have a TPO.

Now, the first option has all of those. It has the battery, domestic violence, substantial bodily harm, deadly weapon. Second option drops out the deadly weapon, but keeps the substantial bodily harm. Third option does the opposite, drops substantial bodily harm, keeps in deadly weapon. Fourth option drops substantial bodily harm and drops deadly weapon.

Now, based on the evidence, the only reasonable verdict is going to be the number one option, that there was a battery, that they were married, it constituted domestic violence, that the knife was used so there was a deadly weapon and that all of this — all of these substantial bodily harm was inflicted on Aneka. So really, although you have a lot of options, State submits that you're going to pick the first option because it has all of those elements. Evidence of each element is overwhelming.

The defendant's not the victim in this case. He's guilty of Counts One through Three. I ask you to find him as such. Thank you.

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THE COURT: Thank you. The defense may address the jury in their closing argument.

MR. HILLMAN: Judge, do you mind if I grab the podium?

THE COURT: Not at all.

MR. HILLMAN: And may I turn off the monitor for this portion?

THE COURT: Sure.

DEFENSE CLOSING ARGUMENT

MR. HILLMAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. In this particular hearing, you folks are the people who are going to decide the facts in this case. You'll decide what happened on that day. You'll decide if the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crimes that have been alleged against Bennett Grimes.

Mr. Burns stood up and told you that Bennett Grimes was desperate when he went there on July 22nd. I don't know if that's exactly what it sounded like. It may sound like that. But his family was breaking up, he was concerned. And you can hear that on the 9-1-1 call. You can hear that in the testimony that was given by Aneka Grimes, Aneka Newman and Stephanie Newman as well.

Let's talk for a few minutes and I'm not going to put up any pictures of any jury instructions and read them to you. You have the jury instructions. You'll be able to read them

yourselves. Let's talk a little bit about the burglary.

Burglary means entry into the structure with the intent to commit one of those acts as described in the jury instruction. What evidence do we have of that intent? You can hear Bennett in the 9-1-1 tape. You can hear what he had to say. He was upset. He was sad. He was not happy with the way things were. You heard what Aneka said. Aneka said that Bennett told her that he loved her, that he wanted her back. Stephanie said the same thing. He entered that apartment with no knife, with no gun, with no weapon, with no intent to do anything other than to try and get Aneka back. He had obtained a new job and he hoped that would smooth over the problems that they had and this could be over with.

He was in there quite a while. You can hear it in the 9-1-1 call. Aneka walked over, opened up the sliding glass door. Stephanie went out while all this was going on and talked to the police officers. There was no indication that anything was going to bad at that point in time. He did not enter that apartment with the intent to do anything other than to try and get Aneka back.

Now, let's go on to the attempt murder. The State talked an awful lot about the 21 stab wounds. And there's no doubt that there were 21 stab wounds. But if he intended to kill her and stabbed her 21 times, how did that not happen? How did she not die? You see what he looks like. He's a fit

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Hoffman burst in, tackled him off of her, took the knife away. That's what Officer Hoffman said. Officer Tavarez says that when she went in Officer Hoffman was saying where's the knife, where's the knife. He didn't know where the knife was. Stephanie Newman said that Officer Hoffman didn't tackle anybody, that he used his weapon and intimidation to stop whatever was going on on the floor by the entryway to that apartment.

So we've got several different facts. We've got several different stories about what was going on in there. Is that unusual? Probably not. When emotions get high, when the adrenaline starts to go, everybody sees things a little bit different. If you watch football, if you watch baseball, if you watch basketball, they have slow motion replays to show what the referees didn't see, what everybody else thinks they saw and people argue about it and argue about it.

Officer Hoffman, in his domestic violence report, indicated that Bennett Grimes was cut on his left hand, even though it was his right. The AMR, the medic Robison, said that it was his right ring finger. She said that she filled this out just a few minutes after it happened. But perceptions can vary, things can be different.

Excuse me for a minute. I wonder if I could have — approach and get those.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HILLMAN: Thank you very much. One thing that's pretty consistent, though, is that Bennett Grimes spent a lot of time by the entry, that Aneka spent a lot of time by the kitchen counter, minutes, several minutes that you can hear on the 9-1-1 call, that you can hear from the testimony of Stephanie Newman and Aneka Newman. You can hear the conversation going on in the background in the 9-1-1 call. Bennett's over here, Aneka is over here in front of the counter.

Aneka says that Bennett left the entry in five to seven feet, grabbed her, took her back five to seven feet and then commenced to stab her. Aneka did not say she was fighting back. Aneka said she was trying to get away, which makes sense. Stephanie said she went over and tried to pull Aneka off of Bennett, away from Bennett. Anybody who's seen a fight, anybody who's been in a fight knows that if you pull one combatant off the other, the person who's getting pulled away is pretty much helpless to the other combatant. If two guys are fighting and someone grabs one of the guys and pulls him off, that guy's going to get punched. The guy that's pulled off is going to get punched.

Officer Hoffman said that when he entered Aneka was standing here, Stephanie was standing directly behind her and Bennett was standing —

(Cell phone interruption)

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MR. HILLMAN: You won't get in as much trouble for that as I would. And Bennett was standing here. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Hoffman testified that Bennett had Aneka in a headlock and was punching her in the head. At trial, Officer Hoffman said Bennett had Aneka in a headlock and was stabbing her in what appeared to be the upper left chest. While these wounds may be consistent with what the State has alleged, they may just as well be consistent with two people struggling over a weapon.

We talk about 21 stab wounds. There is no medical evidence to indicate that that knife was ever plunged completely into her body. None of the stab wounds are that If you look at the pictures, they look like scrapes and cuts and pokes that are also consistent with two people struggling over the weapon. And Aneka said she did struggle over that weapon. She said she was trying to get away.

And the State talks about defensive wounds. Anybody remember when their brother was going to hit them with a wiffle ball bat? How did you block it? Did you block it like this, Bruce Lee style? Or do you put your hands up, cover your face like this? What's the natural reaction? And yet, if you look at the pictures, there are no wounds on the hands. There are no wounds on the fingers. There's no wounds to her thumb.

The State needs to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bennett Grimes entered the building with the intent to do something. There was no intent. They need to prove that he intended to kill Aneka. There's no intent to kill Aneka here. And there's some other questions that still remain.

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There's the DNA evidence. There's DNA on that knife. The DNA belongs to Aneka and an unknown male. What kind of a palette do we have for that knife? What kind of a palette, as if we're painting a picture, do we have for the DNA to stick there? We have a freshly washed knife in the dish drainer around the corner from where Bennett was standing. Julie Marschner said well, this knife isn't rough enough to hold any DNA and yet, it had Aneka's, which may have come from the I think that's what the testimony was. And another male that is not Bennett Grimes. It's not rough enough to hold Bennett Grimes' DNA and yet, the Government says Bennett Grimes held that knife long enough and hard enough to stab Aneka 21 times. If you're going to leave DNA, you're going to leave DNA then. And then there's the matter of fingerprints on the knife. We don't know who they belong to. We don't know who they belong to.

Ladies and gentlemen, State has not met their burden in this case. Bennett Grimes did not enter that apartment with any intent other than to try and talk his wife into letting him come back. He shouldn't have been there. He

shouldn't have gone back. But he didn't have any intent. Since he had no intent when he entered the apartment, doesn't matter if he picked up the knife later on because there's no burglary. He did not attempt to kill Aneka Grimes. He did not have the specific intent to kill anybody here. No DNA from Bennett Grimes on the knife, fingerprints that belonged to who knows. Who knows? Find Bennett Grimes not guilty is what we're asking. Thank you.

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THE COURT: The State can address the jury in their rebuttal.

STATE'S REBUTTAL CLOSING ARGUMENT

MS. BOTELHO: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, Mr. Hillman's right. The State does have the burden of proving to each of you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed each and every element of each of the charges that we have brought against him. But I'll tell you right now that it is a burden that the State, Mr. Burns and myself, it's a burden that we welcome. And I remind you that it is a burden that is met in courtrooms across America every single day.

You heard a lot about this reasonable doubt. State has to prove this, that, this, that beyond a reasonable doubt. What is that? I'd like you to turn to jury instruction number five because this tells you exactly what it is. "A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt, but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the

more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, you, after the comparison and consideration of all the evidence are in such a condition that you feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt." There is not. If after looking at the exhibits, if after hearing all the testimony you have an abiding conviction of the charges we have brought forth, there is not a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt must be actual. It is not a possibility or speculation.

Now, you're charged with this very, very hard task. Look at all of the evidence, decide this case. What tools do you have to make this decision? I'd like you to turn to juror instruction number 31, towards the back. Instruction number 31 says, "Although you are to consider only the evidence in this case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. You're not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of common experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess."

You heard a lot of eyewitness testimony in this particular case. What instruction do you have to guide you in evaluating that testimony? I ask you to turn your attention

to jury instruction number eight. "The credibility of believability of a witness should be determined by his or her manner upon the stand, her relationship to the parties, fears, motives, interests or feelings, opportunity to have observed the matter to which she or he is testifying, the reasonableness of the statements and the strengths or weaknesses of his recollections."

Newman all testified for you as eyewitnesses. Yes, some of their descriptions of what happened kind of varied. But as Mr. Hillman stated, adrenaline was high. Think about what Aneka was going through. What were her fears and motivations? What was it that Aneka, as she was being stabbed 21 times by her husband, what was she thinking about? Defending herself, getting out of there. What was her mother thinking about? Helping her daughter, stopping her daughter from being killed. What was Officer Hoffman thinking about at that exact moment? Did he have much time to react, to sit there and take a snapshot of what exactly he saw? No.

Officer Hoffman had just jumped over a balcony, walked into an apartment, saw the defendant appeared to be punching his wife. But he wasn't punching her. Officer Newman sat on the witness stand and told you he had little to no time to react. What did he do? He tackled the defendant, shoved the knife away or at least got it out of his hand, and

brought the defendant outside. Yes, he drew his weapon. He absolutely did. He told that the defendant, the defendant, drop your knife or I'm going to fucking shoot you. That's exactly what he said. That was his reaction. What was Officer Hoffman thinking at that time? Was he thinking oh, I need to remember whether or not the victim was laying down or standing up? I need to remember their exact positioning. I need to know exactly what was going on. No. What was he seeing? Danger, fear, get to it. Stop it. Save her life. You're going to expect variations in testimony.

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Using your common sense, I ask you, you expect DNA or at least Aneka's DNA to be everywhere. She was stabbed 21 times. You saw the bloody pictures. You expect her blood to be everywhere. Julie Marschner, the DNA analyst, told you blood DNA can consume touch DNA. What's the big deal about this anyway? DNA is not going to tell you the obvious. You cannot test for the obvious. It's called common sense. The defendant is holding the knife, stabbing her 21 times. Yes, touch DNA may be there. Well, what is going to consume that? Aneka's blood. The pictures that you saw her being treated at the hospital was after the blood or the bleeding had been stopped. You can believe that she was bleeding all over the place as her mother held her against her chest trying to stop those wounds. It wasn't that clean, clean wounds that you saw.

There was testimony or at least an assertion that there was another person's DNA on it. So what? So what? What's the claim? Officer Hoffman stabbed her? Some other person did it? No, that is not it. You have three eyewitness testimonies that the defendant held that knife and stabbed her. You cannot test the obvious. The DNA can't tell you anymore than what you already know.

Burglary. Mr. Hillman talked about this. What was his intent, what was the defendant's intent when he busted his way through the apartment door? I submit to you, we don't have the capability of having a recording of what exactly the defendant was thinking before, during and after this incident. No, we don't have the ability to then download his thoughts and then play it for you. That is why you have to use your common sense. You have to use your experience. You have to use the facts and circumstances of this case to decide what did he mean. That's the one thing you're not going to have direct evidence of. What did he mean?

There's a valid protection order in place. He's lurking around. He busted his way against the wishes of Mrs. Newman and Aneka. Burglary is with the intent to commit assault, battery or felony. You could find that maybe when he walked in he didn't have the intent to try to kill her. But if he so much had the intent to scare her or her mother, which is what assault is, or to batter, use unlawful force against

4 intent to commit assault, battery or a felony, such as

attempted murder.

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If you find that he violated that TPO, that he busted through that door to scare Aneka into taking him back or to scare them into allowing him in or to batter them by shoving the door open, he's guilty of burglary.

Where was the defendant once he entered the residence? Where? What kind of movements did he make? Well, there's a big deal made about how he stood in front of the door most of the time. That could be true. But the evidence has shown and the evidence is that at some point the defendant walked over to that bar area, grabbed a knife, grabbed Aneka and dragged her back. How do we know that? Again, we don't have a videotape of this. We can't just press play and say here, jurors, this is what happened. Look with your own eyes. What do we have?

Remember that blue bag, the blue bag with the defendant's work schedule? The blue bag that he brought with him that day. That blue bag was found near the counter. That blue bag didn't have blood on it. Why is that important? Well, because all of the stabbing and the bloody mess happened near the entrance. That blue bag, we submit to you, the

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defendant dropped during his struggle with Aneka and in his attempt to grab a knife and Aneka and drag her towards the front where he could stab her. That's why there's no blood.

Now, could it have been kicked? Yes. But the fact that there's no blood shows that it was kicked from the bar area towards the front door, if anything. If anything. It's not the other way around where you have a clean blue bag with no blood being kicked to the bar area from the front area where there's blood everywhere. Use your common sense when you're looking at the evidence. Yes, he stood there. He stood near the front door blocking their entrance or exits. But he moved from there.

There's an instruction and I'm not going to read it to you again that makes a difference between motive and an attempt to kill. Motive is what causes someone to act a certain way. The State doesn't have to prove motive in this case. But I submit to you that we've proven it. As Mr. Burns told you in closing argument, he wasn't getting what he wanted. He wanted Aneka back; she wanted nothing to do with him. So he responded in anger. And he stabbed her, he attacked her. What motivation does Aneka have to engage in a struggle with the defendant? Aneka got a temporary restraining order against domestic violence.

When the defendant walked in against her will and against her mother's will, what did Aneka do? She called

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about the attempt murder with a deadly weapon. There are three different charges. Attempt murder with a deadly weapon, burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon and also the battery charge, which has all the different other elements. The battery, you don't have to have a specific intent to do anything. It's just you used forced against someone, you used a deadly weapon, it caused substantial bodily harm. And you saw the substantial bodily harm. Aneka stood in front of you, took off her cardigan and showed you the scars. The scars from the cuts, scrapes and pokes, as the defense would call it. She stood right here, right in front of you and showed it to you.

You decide whether those were just cuts, scrapes and pokes. What did the defendant intend to do when he picked up that steak knife and thrust it into her body 21 times? We may be losing the effect of this 21 times. You've heard it so many times, you saw the pokes, you saw the reenactments, but use your common sense. Each time the defendant grabbed that knife, thrust it into her body, took it out, thrust it, took it out, thrust it, took it out, thrust it, took it out, what did he mean? What did he

mean? What did he mean to do to Aneka?

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Use your common sense to fill in the blanks. If
Officer Hoffman had not arrived to stop the defendant, if
Officer Hoffman had not walked in at that exact moment in
time, what would have happened to Aneka? I submit to you that
if Officer Hoffman had not walked in at that exact moment in
time, you would be deliberating a murder case. You would have
heard not from a trauma surgeon, but from a coroner. More
than 21 cuts, scrapes and pokes.

I told you in opening statement at the very beginning of this case the fact that Aneka Newman was alive on July 22nd, 2011 at 7:04 p.m. is nothing short of a miracle. The defendant tried to kill her. He stabbed her 21 times. It caused her substantial bodily harm and he went into that apartment with the intent to do something bad to her. Find him guilty of all the charges.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. At this time, the clerk's going to swear the officers of the Court who will take charge of the jury panel.

Okay. The clerk will now swear the officers of the Court who will take charge of the jury panel.

(Oath to officers given)

THE COURT: At this time, ladies and gentlemen, you are going to be excused to deliberate upon your verdict. When

you go back to deliberate upon your verdict you can take your notes as well as the jury instructions.

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Mr. Richard Evans, you've been selected to be our alternate juror, so I'm not going to — I'm going to let you go for now. I'm not going to discharge you, but I'm not going to require you to stay at the courthouse while the jury deliberates. You haven't been discharged because if for any reason we need you to come back to help with the jury deliberations, we need you to be able to come back. So you're still under the same admonition not to discuss the case with anyone. Before you go, I'm going to ask that you see the clerk, Susan, here. She's going to take charge of all of your notes and your jury instructions. She's also going to get your phone number so in case we have to call you back. And I'd just ask that you don't leave the jurisdiction until we have discharged you. Okay?

Thank you very much and the jury is now discharged to deliberate upon their verdict. Ladies and gentlemen, the officer is going to take you to deliberate in the back. And as soon as you get back there we're going to bring lunch back.

(Jury recessed at 11:49 a.m.)

MR. HILLMAN: One last thing.

THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead, Mr. Hillman.

MR. HILLMAN: Ms. Hojjat and I were on our way over here. We got on the elevator downstairs, went down to a lower

1	level, came back up, picked up juror number 11 and rode up in
2	the elevator with him, but nothing was said.
3	THE COURT: Okay. So it sounds like everyone
4	complied with the admonition.
5	MR. HILLMAN: Yes, we did.
6	THE COURT: Number 11 didn't even try to talk to you?
7	MR. HILLMAN: No. He just looked at us and we looked
8	down.
9	THE COURT: Very, very good. Thank you very much for
10	letting me know. Thank you.
11	(Court recessed at 11:50 a.m. until 2:50 p.m.)
12	(In the presence of the jury.)
13	THE COURT: Do the parties stipulate to the presence
14	of the jury panel?
15	MS. BOTELHO: Yes, we do, Your Honor.
16	MR. HILLMAN: Yes, Judge.
17	THE COURT: Okay. Has the jury selected a
18	foreperson?
19	JUROR NO. 12: Yes, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Mr. Sanford, have you selected to be the
21	foreperson?
22	JUROR NO. 12: Yes, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: Has the jury reached a verdict?
24	JUROR NO. 12: Yes, we have, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Okay. Did the Court Marshal bring you in
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here?

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JUROR NO. 12: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Sorry, because he has to get the verdict form for me.

THE MARSHAL: Sorry, Judge.

THE COURT: That's okay. Can you just get the verdict form from Mr. Sanford? The Marshal's going to come get it. If you'll just present the verdict form to the Court Marshal, Mr. Sanford. Thank you. Okay.

At this time, if the defendant and his attorneys will please stand and the clerk will read the verdict form out loud.

THE CLERK: District Court, Clark County, Nevada.

The State of Nevada, plaintiff, versus Bennett Grimes,

defendant, Case Number C-11-276163-1, Department 12.

Verdict. We the jury in the above entitled case find the defendant Bennett Grimes as follows:

Count One, attempt murder with use of a deadly weapon in violation of a temporary protective order. Guilty of attempt murder with use of a deadly weapon in violation of a temporary protective order.

Count Two, burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon in violation of a temporary protective order. Guilty of burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon in violation of a temporary protective order.

1	Count Three, battery with use of a deadly weapon
2	constituting domestic violence resulting in substantial bodily
3	harm in violation of a temporary protective order. Guilty of
4	battery with use of a deadly weapon constituting domestic
5	violence resulting in substantial bodily harm in violation of
6	a temporary protective order.
7	Dated this 15th day of October, 2012. Signed by
8	juror number 12, foreperson.
9	Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, are those your
10	verdicts as read, so say you one, so say you all?
11	JURORS: Yes.
12	THE COURT: Does either side wish to have the jury
13	panel polled?
14	MS. BOTELHO: The State does not, Your Honor.
15	MR. HILLMAN: Defense does.
16	THE COURT: Okay. At this time the clerk will poll
17	the ladies and gentlemen of the jury.
18	THE CLERK: Juror Number 1, are those your verdicts
19	as read?
20	JUROR NUMBER 1: Yes.
21	THE CLERK: Juror Number 2, are those your verdicts
22	as read?
23	JUROR NUMBER 2: Yes.
24	THE CLERK: Juror Number 3, are those your verdicts
25	as read?

1	JUROR NUMBER 3: Yes.
2	THE CLERK: Juror Number 4, are those your verdicts
3	as read?
4	JUROR NUMBER 4: Yes.
5	THE CLERK: Juror Number 5, are those your verdicts
6	as read?
7	JUROR NUMBER 5: Yes.
8	THE CLERK: Juror Number 6, are those your verdicts
9	as read?
10	JUROR NUMBER 6: Yes.
11	THE CLERK: Juror Number 7, are those your verdicts
12	as read?
13.	JUROR NUMBER 7: Yes.
14	THE CLERK: Juror Number 8, are those your verdicts
15	as read?
16	JUROR NUMBER 8: Yes.
17	THE CLERK: Juror Number 9, are those your verdicts
18	as read?
19	JUROR NUMBER 9: Yes.
20	THE CLERK: Juror Number 10, are those your verdicts
21	as read?
22	JUROR NUMBER 10: Yes.
23	THE CLERK: Juror Number 11, are those your verdicts
24	as read?
25	JUROR NUMBER 11: Yes.
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THE CLERK: Juror Number 12, are those your verdicts as read?

JUROR NUMBER 12: Yes.

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THE COURT: At this time, the Clerk will record the verdict in the official record of the Court. And at this time — you can have a seat, thank you. At this time, ladies and gentlemen, I am going to discharge you from your duty. You are no longer under the admonition not to discuss this case with anyone. You're free to discuss this case, your deliberation and everything that went on in here with anyone, but you're under no obligation to discuss this case. I do give the attorneys the opportunity to speak to the jury panel, but only if that's what you want to do. So when you do get discharged, you're going to go back to the jury deliberation room with the Court Marshal, at which time I will give the attorneys the opportunity to speak to you. But again, you're under no obligation to speak to any of us.

Before I do excuse you, I do want to extend my gratitude and thanks to you for your willingness to be here, especially your willingness to come back this week. I know I speak on behalf of all of us, the attorneys and the Eighth Judicial Court in thanking you for your willingness to be here. At this time you are discharged as jurors. Thank you very much. You're excused.

(Jury exits courtroom at 2:56 p.m.)

THE COURT: The record will reflect this hearing is 1 taking place outside the presence of the jury panel. At this 2 time the defendant's bail will be revoked. He'll be remanded 3 pending sentencing. The matter will be referred to parole and 4 probation and it will be set for sentencing. 5 THE CLERK: Sentencing date, December 18th at 8:30. 6 THE COURT: The Court did receive a note from the 7 jury panel. I did not respond to the note because my only 8 response would have been read the jury instructions. But it 9 will be marked as Court's Exhibit next in line. The note, the 10 content of it was communicated to myself, but I did not 1.1 respond to it. And the note was: Does criminal intent have 12 to be established before entering a structure or can intent 13 change during the chain of events for the charge of burglary? 14 I didn't respond to it because my only response would have 15 been continue to deliberate and look at the instructions. 16 MR. HILLMAN: I think that would have been a correct 17 18 response. THE COURT: It will be Court's Exhibit Number 13. 19 there anything else? 20 MS. BOTELHO: No, Your Honor. 21. No, Judge. MR. HILLMAN: 22 THE COURT: Do you want to talk to the jury? 23 MS. BOTELHO: Yes, Your Honor.

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor.

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	THE COURT: Okay. We'll let you go and you can go	
1	back and chat with the jury.	
2	(Court adjourned at 2:58 p.m.)	
3	(Come adjourned de 2100 prom)	
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT:

Pursuant to Rule 3C(d) of Nevada Rules of Appellate

Procedure, this is a rough draft transcript expeditiously prepared,

not proofread, corrected or certified to be an accurate transcript.

KIMBERLY LAWSON TRANSCRIBER

RTRAN CLERK OF THE COURT 2 3 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 5 6 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 7 CASE #: C276163-1 Plaintiff, 8 DEPT. XII 9 VS. 10 BENNETT GRIMES, 11 Defendant. 12 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2012 15 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 16 17 18 APPEARANCES: 19 JONATHAN COOPER, ESQ. For the State: 20 **Deputy District Attorney** 21 R. ROGER HILLMAN, ESQ. For the Defendant: Deputy Public Defender 22 23 RECORDED BY: KERRY ESPARZA, COURT RECORDER 24 25

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2012 AT 10:18 A.M.

THE COURT: State of Nevada versus Bennett Grimes, C276163. He's present. He's in custody. The motion is on. I've had a chance to read it. Anybody want to say anything beyond that?

MR. HILLMAN: We'll just submit it upon the pleadings, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COOPER: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: At this time, the Court's going to deny the motion and the State can prepare the order.

MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor.

[Proceedings concluded at 10:19 a.m.]

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings with the sound recording in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

THÉRESA SANCHEZ

Court Recorder/Transcriber

Electronically Filed 04/26/2013 04:05:22 PM

RTRAN 1 CLERK OF THE COURT 2 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 4 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 5 CASE NO. C276163 6 Plaintiff, DEPT. NO. XII VS. 7 BENNETT GRIMES, 8 Defendant. 9 10 BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID BARKER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 11 12 TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2012 13 ROUGH DRAFT RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING 14 15 16 17 18 19 APPEARANCES: AGNES M. BOTELHO For the State: 20 HAGAR TRIPPIEDI Deputies District Attorney 21 22 LAUREN R. DIEFENBACH For the Defendant: Deputies Public Defender 23 24 RECORDED BY: KERRY ESPARZA, COURT RECORDER 25 Rough Draft - Page 1 001013

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2012, 8:48 A.M.

THE COURT: This is C276163, State of Nevada versus Bennett Grimes. Record should reflect the presence of Mr. Grimes in custody with counsel, representative of the State. This is time set sentencing. My notes reflect this is sentencing as a consequence of the jury verdict from October 15, 2012, notes of the court staff reflects that defense was going to be requesting a continuance until 12-20, based upon the nature of the allegation, the fact that Judge Leavitt heard this trial, frankly, my inclination would be to pass it to a time when she can address the sentencing components here because she knows the case and she has a unique insight in that effort.

MS. DIEFENBACH: We would agree, Your Honor. We did not -- we were not aware that Judge Leavitt was not going to be here on Thursday the 20th. That's why we were going to ask for that date. But whatever date that she's here, we may need to check -- this is Mr. Hillman's case, he's on a different team. He does the outers now.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. DIEFENBACH: And so, and it was not my case. Also Ms. Hojjat did it with him. So, we can set it for a date in early January and hope if there's a problem we would put it back on.

THE COURT: I think in talking with the JEA for the Judge, that she may, we're going to head towards the first week of February, frankly.

MS. DIEFENBACH: Oh, really? All right. So it will be the first week of February.

THE COURT: Now, I note also, State has filed a witness notification of oral statement; is that witness present?

MS. TRIPPIEDI: Your Honor, this is actually Agnes Botelho was going to be here to argue this case because she's the one that did the trial.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TRIPPIEDI: I can definitely get that February date for her, but if you don't mind just trailing it 'til the end and then we can just make sure that the date that you give is --

THE COURT: That's fine, we'll --

MS. TRIPPIEDI: -- a date that is fine for her.

THE COURT: -- find a date that works for all parties.

Mr. Grimes, you understand what's happening today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Very good, we'll trail, we can get everybody in the room that we need.

MS. DIEFENBACH: Very good, thank you, Your Honor.

[Proceeding trailed until 10:08 a.m.]

THE COURT: All right. This is C276163, State of Nevada versus

Bennett Grimes. The record should reflect the presence of Mr. Grimes in custody; representative of the State, Botelho, Ms. Botelho; Ms. Diefenbach on behalf of Mr. Hillman. This is the time set for sentencing. Minutes should reflect parties, sidebar have indicated that the -- now Ms. Botelho's in the room, she's indicating that there are victim impact statements that the State wishes to present.

MS. BOTELHO: Yes.

THE COURT: Although we weren't really clear on that before, that because this is a jury trial and Judge Leavitt has heard the trial and the allegations are serious -- of a serious nature and the victim impact has flown in to participate, that

THE COURT: So Mr. Newman is going to give that impact.

Officer, I'm going to need -- because I want to do a capture off the witness stand. So we'll present that information and then set a date in early February to move forward for the totality of the sentence hearing; fair enough?

MS. BOTELHO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Diefenbach?

MS. DIEFENBACH: Yes, that is -- that is my understanding as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

THE DEFENDANT: What's the reason for a victim impact?

THE COURT: Under Nevada law, a victim or a family member as identified is permitted to address the Court and to offer what's called classic victim impact, how the offense has impacted the family and they, under law they get to go last. Okay. You'll get an opportunity, Mr. Grimes, to address the Court too, and offer information in mitigation of sentence before the judge reviews this information. I'm sure she'll follow the rules or whoever the sentencing judge is. I would hope it would be Judge Leavitt because she heard the trial. I don't know the case. I hear lots of trials. And there's a lot of insight that a judge draws as a function of listening to witnesses testify. You understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Let's put the witness under oath, please.

EARL LAWRENCE NEWMAN,

[having been called as a victim witness and first duly sworn, testified as follows:]

THE CLERK: Thank you, please be seated. And could you please state your full name spelling your first and last name for the record?

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THE WITNESS: Okay. My name is Earl Lawrence Newman, first name spelled Earl, E-A-R-L, last name Newman, N-E-W-M-A-N.

THE COURT: Mr. Newman, what would you like Judge Leavitt to understand?

THE WITNESS: Well, I just have a impact statement that I'd like to read.

THE COURT: How ever you wish proceed, yes.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor.

I speak today on behalf of my daughter, Anika, and my entire family and would like to thank you for giving us this opportunity to share the emotional impact that this horrific act of selfishness has had on all of us, in particular the emotional stress and anxiety that Bennett Grimes placed on my daughter, Anika.

I myself, up until this incident, have never been a victim of violent crime, and I can only hope that my family or anyone else in this courtroom will never have to experience this sort of pain in their life either. Acts such as this make us all victims either directly or indirectly. My daughter, Anika, will always have the unfortunate scars and memory of this violent act etched in her mind forever. Going forward, her life will change and she will, without a doubt, move on to better things. But the marks on her skin will never diminish and will always be a constant reminder how close she came to having her life ended. Bennett, on the other hand, only ended up with a small cut on his hand. It just does not seem fair.

The vicious and potentially deadly attack on Anika at the hands of Bennett Grimes did not have to happen. He could have been a true man and recognized that his relationship with Anika was over. He could have moved on, changed his life and found someone else. He knew he was not supposed to be at that apartment. He knew he was not supposed to have any contact with my

daughter, Anika. He knew that she had a restraining order against him, but instead he chose to ignore all of that and lurk in the shadows waiting for his chance to do harm. It is truly sad to see such irresponsible, angry, and aggressive behavior by someone who claims to be an adult.

Sadly, Your Honor, there is one other victim to this tragedy, and that's my wife, Stephanie. To have to witness her own flesh and blood attacked in such a horrible fashion is more than any mother should have to see or endure. And then in the moments immediately after her attack to see your daughter bleeding profusely from so many places, not knowing if any of her over 20 stabs wounds would be fatal, to have your clothing soaked with your child's blood, to be inches away from potentially being stabbed yourself is more than any mother should have to comprehend. This too did not have to happen if Bennett had been a real man, a stand-up man, a man of honor and adhere to the guidelines of the restraining order. He chose not to be any of these things and so today here we are.

The anguish and worry that we had to endure in the days, weeks, and months following the attack were unbearable. We wondered if Anika would regain the use of her hand and her arm. More importantly, we wondered how she would ever recover mentally. There were many days of tears, depression, followed by fear, anger, and resentment.

In the days and weeks leading up to these proceedings, my daughter was so fearful that Bennett would some how get out of custody and come back to harm her. She stressed about what would be the outcome of the court trial, we all did. Would he figure out a way to beat the charges against him and be found not guilty was almost as bad as the attack itself. If myself have one regret is that I did not do more to warn and protect my daughter from the unstable behavior of Bennett

III

PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 10:15 A.M.

ATTEST: Pursuant to Rule 3C(9) of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, I acknowledge that this is a rough draft transcript, expeditiously prepared, not proofread, corrected, or certified to be an accurate transcript.

SARA RICHARDSON

Court Recorder/Transcriber

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1	RTRAN	Ston S. Column
2		CLERK OF THE COURT
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5	DISTRICT	COURT
6	CLARK COUN	ITY, NEVÁDA
7	,	
8	STATE OF NEVADA,	CASE NO. C276163
9	Plaintiff,	DEPT. XII
10	vs.	
11	}	
12	BENNETT GRIMES,	·
13	Defendant.	
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELL	
15	THURSDAY, FEI	3RUARY 7, 2013
16		PROCEEDINGS ENCING
17		
18	APPEARANCES:	
19 .	For the State:	AGNES M. BOTELHO, ESQ.
20		J. PATRICK BURNS, ESQ. Deputy District Attorneys
21	For the Defendant:	NADIA HOJJAT, ESQ.
22	1 of the Dolondart.	Deputy Public Defender
23		
24		
25	RECORDED BY: KERRY ESPARZA, CO	OURT RECORDER
		·

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2013 AT 9:33 A.M.

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THE COURT: State of Nevada v Bennett Grimes, C276163. He's present, he's in custody. This is the date and time set for entry of judgment, imposition of sentencing.

Mr. Grimes, any legal cause or reason why judgment should not be pronounced against you at this time?

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, very briefly, we're not asking for a continuance, but I did just want to note for the record that the PSI at one point is recommending large habitual treatment and Mr. Grimes is not eligible for large habitual treatment.

THE COURT: Is the State seeking --

MS. BOTELHO: No, we're not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You're not seeking to habitualize him at all?

MS. BOTELHO: We are seeking for a habitual sentence, but under the small

THE COURT: Under the small. Okay.

MS. HOJJAT: And so we just wanted to note for the record that the PSI was incorrect in suggesting large habitual, he's not eligible for large habitual treatment. It was my understanding the State is not seeking large habitual.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.

MS. BOTELHO: That's true.

MS. HOJJAT: And then other than that, I just wanted to inquire whether the Court had received the letters. I believe Mr. Hillman was going to send to the Court the support letters.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. HOJJAT: In that case, no legal cause or reason.

anything even remotely close.

MS. BOTELHO: I don't either.

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1	THE COURT: That being mentioned.
2	THE DEFENDANT: He had mentioned Prop 36 was in effect in the state,
3	that's what he had mentioned. So.
4	THE COURT: Prop 36.
5	THE DEFENDANT: That's what he had mentioned.
6	THE COURT: Well, in Nevada we don't call it your I mean, in California,
7	they call it propositions, in Nevada we don't refer to
8	THE DEFENDANT: That's that's what he stated as, what his word, it was
9	proposition.
10	THE COURT: I reviewed the sentencing and I don't recall anything even
11	remotely close to that.
12	THE DEFENDANT: He didn't saying during my standing, he said it during
13	someone else's standing that he had mentioned that it was in effect.
14	[Colloquy between the Court and the Court Clerk]
14 15	[Colloquy between the Court and the Court Clerk] THE COURT: Okay.
15	THE COURT: Okay.
15 16	THE COURT: Okay. THE DEFENDANT: By the way, I was just seeking if that was possible.
15 16 17	THE COURT: Okay. THE DEFENDANT: By the way, I was just seeking if that was possible. THE COURT: He said it during another case, had nothing to do with you.
15 16 17 18	THE COURT: Okay. THE DEFENDANT: By the way, I was just seeking if that was possible. THE COURT: He said it during another case, had nothing to do with you. THE DEFENDANT: I know. I was he said that it was in effect so I was
15 16 17 18	THE COURT: Okay. THE DEFENDANT: By the way, I was just seeking if that was possible. THE COURT: He said it during another case, had nothing to do with you. THE DEFENDANT: I know. I was he said that it was in effect so I was just THE COURT: Any reason THE DEFENDANT: mentioning if it was available to me as well.
15 16 17 18 19 20	THE COURT: Okay. THE DEFENDANT: By the way, I was just seeking if that was possible. THE COURT: He said it during another case, had nothing to do with you. THE DEFENDANT: I know. I was he said that it was in effect so I was just THE COURT: Any reason
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	THE COURT: Okay. THE DEFENDANT: By the way, I was just seeking if that was possible. THE COURT: He said it during another case, had nothing to do with you. THE DEFENDANT: I know. I was he said that it was in effect so I was just THE COURT: Any reason THE DEFENDANT: mentioning if it was available to me as well.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	THE COURT: Okay. THE DEFENDANT: By the way, I was just seeking if that was possible. THE COURT: He said it during another case, had nothing to do with you. THE DEFENDANT: I know. I was he said that it was in effect so I was just THE COURT: Any reason THE DEFENDANT: mentioning if it was available to me as well. THE COURT: Any reason why we shouldn't proceed with your sentencing

.

Does the State wish -- by virtue of the jury verdict return in this matter, I hereby adjudicate you guilty of Count 1, attempt murder with use of a deadly weapon in violation of temporary protective order.

Count 2, burglary while in possession of a firearm in violation of temporary protective order.

Count 3, battery with use of a deadly weapon constituting in domestic violence resulting in substantial bodily harm in violation of a temporary protective order.

Does the State wish to address the Court?

MS. BOTELHO: Yes, Your Honor. The State's not going to rehash the facts and circumstances of this particular case, you presided over the trial and so very confident in your recollection of what occurred and what the testimony and evidence showed to be.

I will say this, though, that the Defendant's conduct constituted a vicious heinous attack against Anika in front of her mother. Anika is present here today with her family. And I can also tell the Court this, that Anika would be dead had it not been for the heroic actions of police officers who saved her life that day who responded and had to pretty much tackle this knife out of the Defendant's hand as he was going for his 22nd stab.

The Defendant has two prior DV convictions from California, Your Honor, from 2000 and also 2004. I will approach in just a minute and present the Court with the certified judgments of conviction. I will note there's a Post-it on the 2000 conviction paperwork. I have that noted because the Defendant used a knife in that particular case. So he has this propensity for not only using violence, but also using deadly weapons.

He's 33 years old and in the 33 years that he has been around, he's already left two victims -- actually, three victims and just a trail of violence that's never -- that can never be undone. I read his Presentence Investigation interview and what really struck me was that given the severity of this particular crime, he minimized the severity of his offense. In fact, I'll quote him on page 7, he says: I think people are taking this case more serious than it was.

And despite being convicted by a jury and the state of the evidence, what's missing from this PSI is: And I'm sorry, I shouldn't have done it, I will never do it again. None of that is here. In fact, he fails to acknowledge any kind of responsibility for his conduct. And that just shows to us, Your Honor, that he constitutes an ongoing threat to women, particularly Anika. He hasn't shown any signs of change. Conviction from 2000, 2004, and now from 2012. He is going to keep victimizing women. And the next victim, if he's released, he has this opportunity, may not be as lucky as Anika was.

For these reasons, Your Honor, the State is recommending the following sentence: As to Count 1, the attempt murder, the State is recommending a sentence of 8 to 20 years. We would ask that for the deadly weapon enhancement, that he be sentenced to 8 to 20 years consecutive.

THE COURT: I think you can only choose one enhancement. I think if you're asking for the small habitual -- I mean --

MS. BOTELHO: We're not asking for habitual on this particular charge --

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MS. BOTELHO: -- or on this particular count.

THE COURT: I'm sorry.

MS. BOTELHO: Yes.

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THE COURT: So on this particular count, you're not asking him to be habitualized?

MS. BOTELHO: No, Your Honor. We're asking for an 8 to 20 on the attempt murder, plus a consecutive 8 to 20 on the deadly weapon enhancement. And the reason for the 8 to 20 being justified in the enhancement is that you heard the testimony, he stabbed her 21 times barely missing, you know, arteries that really could have killed her.

As to Count 2, we are asking for small habitual treatment. We would ask for a sentence of 8 to 20 years consecutive to the attempt murder with a deadly weapon.

As to Count 3, we're asking for the battery with a deadly weapon resulting in substantial domestic violence in violation of a TPO, we ask that small habitual treatment also be imposed and that an 8- to 20-year term be imposed consecutive to Counts 1 and 2.

THE COURT: Okay. So you're asking for habitual on Count 2 and 3 --

MS. BOTELHO: That's correct.

THE COURT: -- but not Count 1.

MS. BOTELHO: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BOTELHO: Your Honor, we believe the Defendant should be in prison for as long as the scars and these memories live in Anika. So we feel that this is an appropriate sentence.

May I approach with the certified judgments of conviction?

THE COURT: Sure. Has the defense seen them?

MS. BOTELHO: They have, it was given to them prior to trial.

THE DEFENDANT: I said I heard that -- they were told me -- they told me it wasn't available, but that was my asking in the letter, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, to start off, I didn't want to interrupt anybody but we are actually objecting to adjudication of Count 3 in this case, the battery with use of a deadly weapon constituting domestic violence resulting in substantial bodily harm in violation of a temporary protective order. There was some talk of this during the trial, I'm not sure if the Court --

THE COURT: You're right. I mean, does the State have any objection to it being dismissed?

MS. BOTELHO: We actually do, Your Honor. I have copy of case law, Adrian Jackson versus the State of Nevada, it's an advisory opinion but basically it deals with the issue of redundancy and also whether or not a Defendant can be adjudicated guilty of both the Counts 1 -- Count 1, attempt murder with use, and also Count 3, battery with a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. It is directly on point. It essentially says yes, you can adjudicate him guilty as to both.

THE COURT: What's an advisory opinion? Because the Nevada Supreme Court --

MS. BOTELHO: It's going to be published and -- it just came out, Your Honor. May I approach?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, if I may --

THE COURT: Why do you -- why don't we -- you be able to talk all you want, but this is a long case and so why don't we trail it? I mean, this is 14 pages. I want an opportunity to read it.

like 14, 15 pages long. And I don't want to make a decision on the fly. So can we

1	THE COURT: Okay. Tuesday.
2	THE CLERK: February 12 th at 8:30.
3	THE COURT: Thank you.
4	[Proceeding concluded at 9:50 a.m.]
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21	ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/visual recording in the above-entitled case.
22	recording in the above-entitled case. Jil Jacoby Jil Jacoby
23	Jil Jacoby Court Recorder
24	Sour Resoluci
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	II

Electronically Filed 05/07/2013 11:30:42 AM

1	RTRAN	Alun b. Comm
2		CLERK OF THE COURT
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5	DISTRICT	COURT
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_	CLANIC GOON	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
8	STATE OF NEVADA,	CASE NO. C276163
9	Plaintiff,	DEPT. XII
10	lvs.	
11	}	
12	BENNETT GRIMES,	
13	Defendant.	
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLI	LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
15	TUESDAY, FEBF	RUARY 12, 2013
16	TRANSCRIPT OF SENTE	
17	·	*
18	APPEARANCES:	
19	For the State:	AGNES M. BOTELHO, ESQ.
20		J. PATRICK BURNS, ESQ. Deputy District Attorneys
21	For the Defendant:	R. ROGER HILLMAN, ESQ.
22	For the Deterioant.	Deputy Public Defender
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25	RECORDED BY: KERRY ESPARZA, CC	OURT RECORDER
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2013 AT 10:00 A.M.

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THE COURT: State of Nevada versus Bennett Grimes. He's present, he is in custody. This is on for sentencing.

And Mr. Hillman, were you made aware of what the issue was last

MR. HILLMAN: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. And you've read the Jackson case?

MR. HILLMAN: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. What's your -- are you in agreement?

MR. HILLMAN: Well, the Supreme Court's said what they've said on this.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HILLMAN: However, my understanding is that the case wasn't published until after this case was over with. And I think that that changes things and the fact that it seems to be ex post facto to me.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. HILLMAN: If not practically --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HILLMAN: - I mean, if not legally, at least practically. Because Mr. Grimes and I have talked about this very issue very first time we talked about the elements of the case, potential punishment. It affected the way we prepared for this case, it affected the way we presented this case. And if I remember correctly when we were settling jury instructions in chambers, we talked specifically about --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. HILLMAN: -- Count 3 merging.

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THE COURT: Okay. I'm not quite sure this is a new rule, it's not a new rule. I mean, the Supreme Court basically just analyzed it under Blockburger. So it wouldn't be a retroactive, it means we were doing things wrong before. Right? That's all it means to me is that we were just doing it wrong.

MR. HILLMAN: Yeah. And in effect --

THE COURT: And the Supreme Court says don't do it wrong anymore.

MR. HILLMAN: And in effect what that does, that makes us ineffective in our representations of the truth for Mr. Grimes.

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, if I could respond to that. I'll respond to the ex post facto issue. The law interpreting Strickland is abundantly clear that counsel is not ineffective for failing to anticipate changes in the law. And I think that's exactly what Mr. Hillman and Ms. Hojjat were doing. They were clearly not in facto to this case.

As to whether or not this would constitute an ex post facto law, you -- it doesn't fit into any of Calder versus Bull's four categories.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. BURNS: It's not a law as that term of art would be construed for an ex post facto analysis. The law is very clear from the U.S. Supreme Court California Department of Corrections versus Morales that just because a Defendant ends up being exposed to a worse situation, that these procedural changes are bad for him doesn't mean it's an ex post facto violation.

And just as juris prudential clarification, it's certainly not a type of -- it's not a change in a new law, and more importantly the quantum of punishment attached to his conduct has not changed. So it doesn't meet any of Calder versus Bull's four categories which the U.S. Supreme Court has admonished ex post facto

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analysis should not go beyond.

THE COURT: Okay. And everyone agrees -- I know last time there was some concern, you only get one enhancement.

MS. BOTELHO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So how does the State want to proceed?

I mean, I can't rule on any issue about being ineffective --

MR. HILLMAN: Right. Not at this point in time.

THE COURT: -- you agree, right?

MR. HILLMAN: Sure.

THE COURT: I mean, you agree that I have to sentence him first?

MR. HILLMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

So Mr. Grimes, you understand today's the date and time set for entry of judgment, imposition of sentencing.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Any legal cause or reason why judgment should not be pronounced against you at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: By virtue of the verdict returned by the jury in this matter, I hereby adjudicate you guilty of Count 1, attempt murder with use of a deadly weapon in violation of a temporary protective order.

Count 2, burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon in violation of a temporary protective order.

Count 3, battery with use of a deadly weapon, constituting domestic violence resulting in substantial bodily harm in violation of a temporary protective

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With regard to any enhancement, we ask for the deadly weapon enhancement, we ask for a consecutive 20 -- 8 to 20 years as to that charge.

MS. BOTELHO: Your Honor, as in the previous date, we asked as to the

attempt murder, we asked for 8 to 20 years just for the attempt murder as to that.

So how is the State going to proceed?

As to Count 2, battery -- or excuse me, burglary with a deadly weapon with a temporary protective -- violation of temporary protective order, we asked for treatment under small habitual which is an 8 to 20, consecutive to Count 1.

With Count 3, we asked also for small habitual treatment, 8 to 20 years consecutive to Counts 1 and 2. With us asking for the small habitual treatment kind of doesn't necessitate the deadly weapon violation of TPO finding or any enhancement.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have your priors to prove up?

MS. BOTELHO: We gave that to the Court at the last hearing --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BOTELHO: -- Your Honor. They've been marked as exhibits. There were no objections [indiscernible].

THE COURT: That's right. There -- Mr. Hillman, there's no objection to the priors?

MR. HILLMAN: I assume Ms. Hojjat looked over them and talked about it. So.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you want, I'll get them for you. I just want to make sure there's no objection.

MR. HILLMAN: If they've been marked and admitted, I'm sure that they were

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reviewed --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HILLMAN: -- and any record needed to be made was made at that time.

THE COURT: Okay. So basically the State's asking for the small habitual as to all three counts?

MS. BOTELHO: As to Counts 2 and 3, Your Honor. We're asking for -- not habitual treatment on Count 1 which is the attempt murder with use. We're asking for 8 to 20 on the attempt murder and a consecutive 8 to 20 on the deadly weapon.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right. It's basically kind of the same thing, though. All right.

MS. BOTELHO: Yes.

THE COURT: That you're asking me to utilize the deadly weapon enhancement.

MS BOTELHO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Got it.

Mr. Grimes, do you want to say anything? I have to tell you, I'm a little disappointed in your statement when you said that we're all making just too big of a deal about this.

THE DEFENDANT: I don't remember saying that.

THE COURT: Do you want me to read it to you?

THE DEFENDANT: She -- I didn't state that for word for word for her.

THE COURT: You think we're making too big of a deal of this and you deserve probation.

THE DEFENDANT: I never told her that it wasn't a serious crime or anything, I said that --

THE COURT: I didn't say that.

THE DEFENDANT: No, she said that -- that I -- [indiscernible].

THE COURT: I think and it's a quote -- let me just read it to you. It's page 7, quote: I think people are taking this case more serious than it was.

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I think the charges filed were excessive.

THE COURT: You've got to be kidding me. How -- you stabbed that woman numerous times.

MR. HILLMAN: Mr. Grimes and I have talked about this exact point. And I think what happened is there was a bit of miscommunication in that Mr. Grimes when he went over to Anika's house didn't expect the things to turn out like they did and that's how --

THE COURT: I believe that would probably be true, but it did. Okay. I believe maybe that's true that you went over there but you didn't expect things to turn out the way they did, but they did.

I sat up here and watched that woman testify and looked over at her and saw that -- just looking at her, not even trying, and I saw the horrible horrendous scars left on her, like, area that you can see just in normal clothing. Horrific scars that she has to live with the rest of her life. I think the girl's lucky that she's alive, if you want my opinion. How many times was she stabbed? It was --

MS. BOTELHO: 21.

THE COURT: Pardon?

MS. BOTELHO: 21.

THE COURT: I mean, 21 times. 21 times. I mean, at some point a voice of reason has an opportunity to take over and say, ooh, you know, she's going to die. In front of her mother. Her mother couldn't even protect her from you while her

father sat on the phone and listened to the horror that was transpiring.

And you have no hope with that girl, you understand that, right? She's divorcing you, if she hasn't divorced you already.

THE DEFENDANT: I heard it was final. So.

THE COURT: Pardon?

THE DEFENDANT: Our papers are already final.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So you get -- you've got to move on. Okay. Do you want to say anything prior to sentencing? Because I'm telling you, I don't think anybody is making this a bigger deal. I think that what happened that day, I think that girl, I think it's a miracle that she's alive. And I think that police officer, I think he saved her life because I don't think you were going to stop.

THE DEFENDANT: Um.

THE COURT: If you're not going to stop with someone's mother there. You know. It took someone with a gun pointing --

THE DEFENDANT: I apologize to the situation that took place --

THE COURT: -- it to your head --

THE DEFENDANT: -- Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- and threaten to kill you.

THE DEFENDANT: I take responsibility for what happened there that day, but all the details don't add up correctly. Like police officers doing this or that or what happened --

THE COURT: Okay. 21 stab wounds don't lie. The doctor, she doesn't have a dog in this fight. She just happens to be the doctor on duty that the trauma patient gets brought into. And she talked -- do you remember her testimony?

THE DEFENDANT: I never physically had possession of that knife in the first

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THE COURT: Oh, for the love of all that's good in this world. So she stabbed herself 21 times.

THE DEFENDANT: No, we were tussling over the knife.

THE COURT: No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. You can't tussle over a knife and get 21 stab wounds and you get a scratch on your finger. That's what you got.

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, well, she initiated --

THE COURT: You did not get a stab wound, you got a scratch.

THE DEFENDANT: But initiated the fight is her first swinging the knife at me.

THE COURT: So she was swinging the knife at you?

THE DEFENDANT: She swung it at me which initiated a struggle and then wrestling to get the knife loose

THE COURT: Okay. And everybody's a liar, everybody that saw you stabbing her.

THE DEFENDANT: No one saw -- no one saw anything. No testimony --

THE COURT: Her mother did.

THE DEFENDANT: She didn't see anything. Neither did the cops.

THE COURT: Her mother was there the whole time.

Okay. Do you understand that 21 stab wounds is 21 stab wounds?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand.

THE COURT: That you just sound stupid today by saying that you tussled with a knife and you came out with an itty bitty scratch? An itty bitty scratch. I'll get the picture out. Because you came out with an itty bitty scratch and she came out with 21 stab wounds and horrific scars that I saw with her sitting there with normal clothes on. Horrific scars.

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Any wit -- I mean, you stab someone in the chest, they die -- they can die. It's a miracle that woman didn't die, 21 stab wounds. It is a miracle she didn't die. You don't get 21 stabs from tussling. So. I mean, I thought after the trial and you'd heard all the evidence that you would, you know, give up the tussling with the knife story.

THE DEFENDANT: Waver from what actually happened.

THE COURT: Okay. Even though it's impossible.

THE DEFENDANT: That's an opinion --

THE COURT: Unless she stabbed herself.

THE DEFENDANT: No. That's an opinion based on someone --

THE COURT: It's impossible based upon the facts.

THE DEFENDANT: -- looking from the outside in.

THE COURT: Okay. I sat here and listened to it every day. It's impossible based on the facts. Absolutely impossible. But.

Mr. Hillman.

MR. HILLMAN: Judge, that's been Mr. Grimes' position from when we first talked about it was that she came at him with a knife. And as I argued to the jury, they were the result of two people fighting with a knife.

THE COURT: And maybe she did. But 21 stab wounds isn't --

MR. HILLMAN: And I wasn't there. I mean, that was -- that's always been a problem, it's always been a problem with this case and --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. HILLMAN: -- Bennett and I talked about that as well.

The State is in fact asking for 40 to 100 years on this particular case. If Anika Grimes had died as a result of her wounds, that's pretty much the sentence

he would get for first-degree murder with use would be 40 years to life. That's not what happened here.

THE COURT: Problem is, this guy has a history of beating up on women.

MR. HILLMAN: She has -- she was stabbed 21 times, she went to the hospital, she had some sutures, she left the next day. And I admit, it could have been much worse than it was.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HILLMAN: But I'm thinking that the top end of the sentencing scheme should be saved for those who are the worst of the worst. Bennett Grimes should not have gone over to that apartment, we've talked about it. He had a temporary restraining order. But they had this before where they were on the outs, he'd gone back, they worked things out.

He had gotten a new job, he took the proof that he had a new job to kind of smooth the domestic relationship out, he wanted to talk to her about that. He didn't hide in the bushes and wait for them. He didn't break down the door. He pushed his way in or they gave up talking to him and stepped away and he stepped in. He didn't bring a weapon --

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. HILLMAN: -- to this. The weapon was in the apartment. And there's some dispute in Bennett's mind about how the whole thing started. Bennett Grimes -- and there was a problem with the burglary as well in that I think that that burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon confused the jury to a great extent. Hojjat spoke with the jurors afterwards and several of them said we didn't think that he went there with the intent to do anything but he got the knife after so he committed burglary with intent.

And I didn't cover that very well in my closing argument because I still think that the evidence shows that Bennett went over there not with the intent to commit any particular crime. And that's a real problem in this case.

We sent letters to Your Honor from his family, from his friends. I've spoken a lot with his family, he's got a loving family. He's a young man, he's only 34 years of age. He's got two children.

THE COURT: Well, and I can't figure out because your wife is a lovely -- your ex-wife is a lovely woman.

MR. HILLMAN: The children are --

THE COURT: I couldn't figure it out.

MR. HILLMAN: -- are currently living with Bennett's parents.

THE COURT: But they're not -- they're another wife's children.

MR. HILLMAN: They're Anika's children, no.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HILLMAN: Bennett understands that there's nothing between him and Anika anymore. We talked about that several months ago, so that's completely over with. But these children are going to grow up without seeing Bennett as well. And that's due in large part to Bennett's own activities and his own actions and he understands that as well.

But what I'm going to ask you to do is to just -- if we're talking 8 to 20s, let's run them concurrent. That will put him eligible for parole at the age of 42. It will give the Department of Parole and Probation a lot of time to keep him on parole if they deem him worthy of parole. And that would be my request.

THE COURT: Okay. In accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada, this Court does now sentence you as follows, in addition to a \$25 administrative

assessment, \$150 DNA fee, order that you submit to genetic marker testing.

As to Count 1, the attempt murder charge, the Court is going to sentence you to a term of 8 to 20 years in the Nevada Department of Corrections, plus a consecutive term of 5 to 15 years in the Nevada Department of Corrections, based upon the factors enumerated in NRS 193.165, subsection 1.

As to Count 2, Count 3, the Court is going to make a determination that is just and appropriate to treat you as a habitual criminal and sentence you under the habitual criminal statute, the small habitual.

As to Count 2, sentence you to 8 to 20 years in the Nevada Department of Corrections to run concurrent to Count 1.

Count 3, 8 to 20 years in the Nevada Department of Corrections to run consecutive to Count 1 and 2.

How much credit does he have?

MR. HILLMAN: Sorry, I didn't figure that out before. Looks like he has 581.

THE COURT: 581 days credit for time served.

I'm sorry, did anybody have victim statements? I apologize.

MR. HILLMAN: That was done before.

THE COURT: Okay. I know it was done before and I know it was done in front of Judge Barker and it was preserved, but I would absolutely allow the victims to speak today.

MR. BURNS: Thank you, Your Honor. But I believe only Earl, the father, was going to speak.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BURNS: So Anika did not plan to speak so I think everything's included in the record.

1	THE COURT: Okay. I didn't see Anika here.	
2	Are you Anika's father?	
3	THE DEFENDANT'S FATHER: I'm his father.	
4	THE COURT: I'm sorry?	
ľ	THE COOKT: Thr sorry: THE DEFENDANT'S FATHER: I'm Bennett Grimes' father.	
5		
6	THE COURT: Okay. I apologize. Okay. Thank you, sir.	
7	THE DEFENDANT'S FATHER: No, that's okay, Judge.	
8	THE COURT: Thank you.	
9	[Proceeding concluded at 10:20 a.m.]	
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21	ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/visual recording in the above-entitled case.	
22	recording in the above-entitled case.	
23	Jill Jacoby	
24	Court Recorder	
25		

Notice

\boxtimes	EXHIBIT(S): TR	IAL BY JURY - 10/10/1 (Hearing/Trial Start Date)	12 THROUGH 10/
	DEPOSITION(S)	(Date Filed or Published)	- Addition
	TRANSCRIPT(S)	8 11	
	ADMINITET DATIVE	(Actual Hearing Date(s) of	
<u> </u>		on Appeal)	(Date Filed)
	(Other- ie: Medical Rec	ords, Exhibits to Motion, etc.)	(Date Filed)
Received			10/16/12
	Susan Jov	anovich, Deputy	Date
Released		eputy	/ <i>\delta/17/12</i> Date
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CASE NO. <u>C276163</u>

	Date Offered	Objection	Date Admitted
1. Voir Dire Jury List	10-10-12	no	10-10-12
2. Note from Turor	10-11-12	No	10-11-12
3. Note from Juror	10-11-12	no	10-11-12
4. Note from Juror	10-11-12	No	10-11-12
5. Note from suror	10/12/12	,1	10/12/12
6. Instruction offered by Defense & Rejected		H	10/12/12
7. Instructions offered by Defense & Rejected	10/12/12	н	10/12/12
8. Instruction offered by Defense & Rejected	10/12/12	/r	10/12/12
9. Instruction offered by Defense & Rejected	10/12/12	P	10/12/12
10. Instruction offered by Defense & Rejected	10/12/12	"	10/12/12
11. Instruction offered by Defense & Rejected	10/12/12	11	10/12/12
12. Instruction offered by Defense & Rejected	10/12/12	"	10/12/12
13. Note from Jury foreperson	10/15/12	No	10/15/12
13. Note from Jury foreperson	10/15/12	no	10/15/12
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JURY LIST

CASE NO CAHOLOB	TRIAL DATE October 10,2012
DEPT. NOX11	JUDGE <u>Michelle Leavitt</u> CLERK <u>Susan</u> Jovan Ovich
State of Nevada	RECORDER KERRY ESPARZA RECORDER
PLAINTIFF	JURY FFES
Romett Grimes	Agnes Botelho Patrick Burns COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
Bennon en anos	
DEFENDANT	Roger Hillman / Nadia Hojjat
Carely (625)	COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

			EXCUSED	
Badge No.	Name of Jurors	Plaintiff	Defendant	Court
0001	1. mark whelchel ()			
0005	2. Nick Schetting (2)			
0000	3. Phillip Allen Jennings			
0007	4. USa Pod (3)		_	
0009	5. Brandon Cruz (4)			
0011	6 Gordon Brooke			
0016	7. Janice David (5)			
0017	8. Ruben Placido (6)			
0018	9 Michala Reinholtz (3)		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<u> </u>
00,20	10. Anthony martino (8)			
0021	11. Karen Augspurger	3		
<u> </u>	12. Jason morgan (9)			<u> </u>
0023	13. Robert Conley (10)			
2 45	14 Michael Andrews		3	
0025	15 Brandbn Keenum (W)			
0026	16 Kirk Sanford (12)			
0027	17 Karen Florence Hopkins	<u> </u>		
0043	18 Daniel Davenport	2		
0034	19 Elizabeth Denny		5	
0036	20 Vicky woodside		Н	
0037	21 Peter Pryor		2	
0038	22 Richard William Evans (13)			
0041	23 Brian Kuntz	5		
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ANTHONY MARTINO
JUROR #8



PROPOSED DEFENSE INSTRUCTION NO. ___9____

If you find that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bennett Grimes entered the apartment with a weapon, you must find him not guilty of Burglary with a Deadly Weapon in Violation of a Temporary Protective Order.

Crawford v. State, 121 P3d 582, 586

Rejected Jewind -Brichall Jewind -Dylahu 12, 2012.

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If evidence of self-defense is present, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. If you find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense, you must find the defendant not guilty.

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1	INSTRUCTION NO
2	The right of self-defense is not available to an original aggressor.
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1	INSTRUCTION NO
2	If a person attempts to kill another in self-defense, it must appear that:
3	1. The danger was so urgent and pressing that, in order to save the person's own life, or
4	to prevent the person from receiving great bodily harm, the attempt killing of the other was
5	absolutely necessary; and
6	2. The person attempted to be killed was the assailant, or that the non-assailant had
7	really, and in good faith, endeavored to decline any further struggle before the mortal blow
8	was given.
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INISTR	UCTION NO.	
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Where a person without voluntarily seeking, provoking, inviting, or willingly engaging in a difficulty of his own free will, is attacked by an assailant, he has the right to stand his ground and need not retreat when faced with the threat of deadly force.

The use of a deadly weapon against another is justifiable and not unlawful when committed by a person in the lawful defense of himself, when he has reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger of death or great bodily injury and that there is imminent danger of such a design being accomplished

In order to justify the use of a deadly weapon in self-defense the person using the weapon, as a reasonable man, must have reason to believe and must believe that he is in imminent danger of death or of great bodily injury; and, further, the circumstances must be such that an ordinarily reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would believe that it was necessary for him to use, in his defense and to avoid imminent death or great bodily injury to himself, such force or means as might cause the death of his adversary.

A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is not sufficient to justify the use of a deadly weapon against another. To justify such use, the circumstances must be such as to excite the fears of a reasonable man placed in a similar position, and the party using the weapon must act under the influence of such fears alone and not in a spirit of revenge.

Words of abuse, insult or reproach addressed to a person, without any threat of injury or attempt to inflict injury, will not justify a battery with the use of a deadly weapon.

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1 2	The minute of	INSTRUCTION NO
	11	self-defense exists only as long as the real or apparent threatened danger
3		When such danger ceases to appear to exist, the right to use force in self-
4	defense ends.	
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INSTRUCTION NO.

PROPOSED DEFENSE INSTRUCTION NO. ___12____

Due to the fact that the police elected not to collect the fingerprints on the knife, you are to presume the fingerprint evidence would have shown that Bennett Grimes' fingerprints were not on the knife and that Aneka Grimes' fingerprints were on the knife.

State v. Daniels, 114 Nev. 261 (1998)

Rejected Squared Dulielle Land 12, 2012.



	PROPOSED DEFENSE INSTRUCTION NO1_
1	
2	Every person charged with the commission of a crime shall be presumed innocent.
3	This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every
4	material element of each of the crimes charged.
5	N.R.S. §175.191
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8	Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779 (2005)
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PROPOSED DEFENSE INSTRUCTION NO. ____

State

To support a conviction for attempt murder with use of a deadly weapon, the District

Attorney must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

(1) Mr. Grimes had the specific intent to kill Aneka Grimes and

(2) that Mr. Grimes used a deadly weapon

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1	PROPOSED DEFENSE INSTRUCTION NO6
2	The reasonable doubt standard requires the jury to reach a subjective state of near certitude
3	The reasonable doubt standard requires the jury to reach a subjective state of the standard requires the jury to reach a subjective state of the standard requires the jury to reach a subjective state of the standard requires the jury to reach a subjective state of the standard requires the jury to reach a subjective state of the standard requires the jury to reach a subjective state of the standard requires the jury to reach a subjective standard requires the subjective standard requires the jury to reach a subjective sta
4	on the facts in issue.
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9	Holmes v. State, 114 Nev. 1357, 972 P.2d 337 (1998); Randolph v. State 117 Nev. 970 (2001.)
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defendant's guilt and the other to his innocence, you must adopt the interpretation that points to the defendant's innocence, and reject that interpretation that points to his guilt.

If the evidence permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the


Crane v. State, 88 Nev. 684 (1972).

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Special Security
Ocholus 12, 2012.



Does criminal intent have to be established betwee Entering the structure, or can intent change during the chain of events &	








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


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
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[Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department]

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
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DEFT'S EXHIBITS


CASE NO. <u>C276/63-1</u>

	Date Offered	Objection	Date Admitted
A. Diagram of Apartment	10-11-12	no	10-11-12
B. Diagram of Apartment	16-11-12	no	10-11-12
C. Diagram of Apartment	10-11-12	No	10-11-12
D. Diagram of Apartment	10/12/12		10/12/12
D. Diagram of Apartment E. Diagram of Apartment		<i> </i>	
E. Diagram, or Apartment		<u></u>	
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DEF EX A




DEF EX B




DEF EX C

DEF EX D



PROPOSED DEF EXE

Pg# 1087



1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA					
2	DED DEFECT CODE AT C	NI. (2025				
3	BENNETT GRIMES,)	No. 62835				
4	Appellant,					
5	vi.					
6)					
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)					
8	Respondent.)					
9	APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME V PAGES 930-108					
10						
11	PHILIP J. KOHN Clark County Public Defender	STEVE WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney				
12	309 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2610	Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3 rd Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89155				
13	Attorney for Appellant	CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO				
14		Attorney General 100 North Carson Street				
15		Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (702) 687-3538				
16		Counsel for Respondent				
17		E OF SERVICE				
18	I hereby certify that this docum	nent was filed electronically with the Nevada				
19	Supreme Court on the 1-11 day of					
20	foregoing document shall be made in accorda	hee with the Master Service List as follows:				
21	CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO	HOWARD S. BROOKS DEBORAH L WESTBROOK				
22	STEVEN S. OWENS I further certify that I served a c	opy of this document by mailing a true and				
23	correct copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to:					
24	ll .					
25	NDOC # 1098810 c/o HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON					
26	P.O. Box 650					
27	Indian Springs, NV 89070	241(0)				
28	BY					
	Employees	Clark County Public Defender's Office				