## Exhibit 10

Transcript of Calendar Call, 4/16/13 (#142-182)

TRAN

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA \* \* \* \* \*

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff ·

CASE NO. C265107-1,2 CASE NO. C283381-1,2

vs.

DEPT. NO. XXI

DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI, RONALD ERNEST LAKEMAN,

Defendants

Transcript of Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

## CALENDAR CALL (ALL) STATE'S MOTION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES

TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE STATE:

MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, ESQ.

PAMELA WECKERLY, ESQ.

Chief Deputy District Attorneys

FOR DEFENDANT DESAI:

RICHARD A. WRIGHT, ESQ. MARGARET M. STANISH, ESQ.

FOR DEFENDANT LAKEMAN:

FREDERICK A. SANTACROCE, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: JANIE OLSEN, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: JULIE POTTER, TRANSCRIBER

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013, 9:51 A.M. (Court was called to order)

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THE COURT: Desai. All right. This is the time for State versus Dipak Desai and Ronald Lakeman. The record should reflect the presence of Dipak Desai along with his attorneys, Mr. Wright and Ms. Stanish, the presence of Mr. Lakeman along with Mr. Santacroce, and we have Ms. Weckerly and Mr. Staudaher for the State.

As you all know, the report from the expert was 10 received by the Court late yesterday afternoon. 11 believe 28 pages. We did -- I had my JEA disseminate that 12 immediately to the attorneys and then to call and confirm that 13 you all received the report from the expert.

I, of course, read the report from the expert, and 15 while the expert does confirm that in February of 2013 Dr. Desai 16 did suffer a minor stroke, I find nothing in this report to 17 suggest that a further competency evaluation is warranted at 18 this time. I would note that the evaluator indicates that there 19 may be some difficulties with speech as a result of the new 20 stroke. Certainly this Court will make whatever reasonable 21 accommodations are necessary in view of this disability.

Additionally, the Court would just note that there are 23 other ways of communicating besides the spoken word. 24 obviously handwriting. There's obviously texting and, you know, 25 typing on a laptop or something like that, and technology being

1 what it is, those items certainly can be present in the 2 courtroom to assist Dr. Desai.

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Again, we'll make whatever reasonable accommodations are necessary. If we need to take breaks throughout the 5 proceedings, certainly, you know, Mr. Wright and Ms. Stanish whenever they need a break to confer privately with your client just make the Court aware of that, and we will, you know, take whatever breaks are necessary.

The only other thing I just -- I think the report 10 speaks for itself. I don't need to summarize it or parse it out 11 in any way. It's going to be, obviously, an exhibit with the 12 court, and it stands alone. I would just note that noted in the 13 report was the fact that his ability to read and write had 14 previously been intact prior to the 2013 stroke following the 15 2008 stroke, which according to the evaluator was the most 16 severe of the several strokes that Dr. Desai has suffered.

So I think in view of that, I don't see any reason to 18 delay the trial. I don't see any reason for any further 19 evaluation or to send this to competency court.

As you know, we moved the calendar call from Thursday 21 to today, so today is the time for calendar call. And in view 22 of the fact that we did get the report ahead of time, I've 23 reviewed it. Those are, you know, that's what I think the 24 report says. That's what I think it means, and so I see no 25 reason not to go forward with the trial which is set for this

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1 Monday.
 2
             And I believe, Ms. Stanish, you had indicated at a
 3 meeting in chambers you had a federal appearance in the morning
   on Monday; is that correct?
 4
 5
             MS. STANISH: I think the schedule you gave us will
   permit us --
 6
 7
             THE COURT:
                        Okay.
             MS. STANISH: -- to do our --
 8
 9
             THE COURT: So if we start at 9:30 with jury
10 selection, would that be sufficient?
11
             Okay. And basically as we discussed, the way we're
12 going to do this is we're not going to have hundreds of people
13 show up on the first day. We'll limit the first day's number of
14 jurors to 30 or 35 to inconvenience people who have been
15 summoned as perspective jurors as little as possible.
16 Hopefully, so that people won't have to wait around needlessly
17 while questioning the jurors. And I think we discussed the
18 particulars of selection in chambers, and so if anyone has any
19 additional questions we can deal with that Monday morning with
20 how we're going to do jury selection.
21
             So that's the calendar call. Does anyone have
22 anything that they'd like to say just relating to that issue?
             State, are you ready to go? You've got everybody --
23
24
             MR. STAUDAHER:
                             Yes.
25
            MS. WECKERLY: We're ready.
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             THE COURT: -- geared up? All right.
 2
             Mr. Santacroce?
 3
                             Mr. Lakeman is ready to proceed, Your
             MR. SANTACROCE:
 4
   Honor.
 5
             THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wright?
 6
             MR. WRIGHT: I -- I am not ready to proceed discussing
 7
   the competency.
 8
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
 9
                          The -- I would request a hearing and the
             MR. WRIGHT:
10 testimony from Dr. Palestrant. Obviously, I read the report
11 different than the Court reads the report. As I read the report
12 he concludes that on February 24th it looks like a shower of
13 small embolic strokes in the left middle cerebral artery
14 distribution. The biggest of these strokes involving the left
15 parietal area.
             The anticipated damage from these involves problems
16
17 with comprehension, both expressive aphasia and receptive
18 aphasia. The doctor's expectation is that the symptoms will
19 improve over time. Whether he will get back to his real
20 non-embellished premorbid functional status is unclear at this
21 point, but I do expect him to make significant gains.
22 recovery from stroke occurs in the first three to nine months,
23 but can take up to 18 months out.
24
             The -- his -- I'm reading. His new strokes in
25 February 2013 involve the speech cortex with a resultant
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1 expressive and receptive aphasia. Again, questions of some 2 degree of embellishment of the systems -- symptoms have been Memory should not be further compromised by the new stroke. However, these strokes are small. It is my expectation he will make significant gains and return close to his level of function prior to February 2013. Most of his gains in 7 neurologic function will be seen in the first nine months, but still recovery can take up to 18 months. My reading of the report is that this raises an issue 10 as to his competence presently to proceed with the trial. 11 THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. --12 MR. WRIGHT: He --13 THE COURT: I'm sorry. 14 MR. WRIGHT: He cannot communicate with me. 15 30 minutes with him this morning communicating about the month 16 distinguishing between endoscopy and anesthesia and trying to 17 get what month it was, what day it is, and trying to get him, 18 other than checking yes or no on papers, to communicate with me. 19 He has not been able to communicate with me now for 50 days 20 since his discharge from the hospital. 21 I have a presently not competent, within that meaning 22 of Drusky, client. He is not able to communicate with me both 23 expressively, and he's not able to comprehend what I am talking 24 about. I spoke with him about the motion on calendar this 25 morning and former patients. He had no recognition cognizance

JRP TRANSCRIPTION

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1 of what I was even talking about. He's not competent presently 2 in my judgment, and as I read the report of the doctor, in his judament.

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I read it completely differently, and at THE COURT: the end of the day it's how this Court reads it. As I said, the report, you know, for whatever reviewing court may look at this, the report stands on its own. But he, you know, acknowledges the strokes. He says that they're small strokes.

The report is replete with references to higher executive function, which is manifested by the fact that he's able -- Dr. Desai is able to feign and exaggerate symptoms for 12 the purposes of secondary gain, which, according to Dr. Pemsurit (phonetic), indicates high executive function. You know, if you 14 read the whole thing it says he's had some difficulty with 15 speech. As I said, we can make reasonable accommodations to 16 deal with that.

And let me just put this out there, Mr. Wright. You 18 know, you have to report the situation as you perceive it. 19 Desai is in full and complete control if he -- if he has the 20 ability to communicate as to how he chooses to communicate. 21 so the fact that he doesn't communicate with you, you know, 22 doesn't understand the difference between endoscopy or 23 gastroenterology and anesthesia, that's within his control.

And, you know, if you read the rest of the paragraph 25 that you started, Dr. Desai presented on February 23rd, once

1 again -- and this is referring to the professionals at Summerlin 2 Hospital. Once again, members of his treatment team have 3 notices inconsistencies between his observed functional ability and his performance during formal examination. This was 5 apparent from the exams performed by the physical therapist. 6 And, you know, he talks again about, you know, 7 malingering, and the fact that the symptoms reported are not consistent with what would be caused from strokes of this type. So that's how I'm reading the report. Again, you know, I'm happy to entertain argument, but the report was prepared to --11 to, you know, educate the Court and to provide this Court to 12 determine whether or not a competency exam was -- was -- was 13 needed, and whether there was really anything new here affecting 14 Dr. Desai's competency. 15 And I would just note, I mean, you know, if you go 16 back to your first appearances in here after this case was 17 transferred from Judge Mosley's department because of his, you 18 know, impending retirement, you know, you were saying, you know, 19 he's cognitively impaired and has difficulty. So, I mean, 20 again, the issue is, you know, he's been thoroughly evaluated. 21 And the issue is what's new here that requires a delay of this 22 trial. 23 And does the State wish to respond? Or, Mr. Wright, complete your --24 25 MR. WRIGHT: I wasn't finished yet.

JRP TRANSCRIPTION

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1	THE COURT: I'm sorry. Go ahead.
2	MR. WRIGHT: What's new here is he has had a fifth
3	stroke in the left portion of the brain. That's the finding in
4	there. I want a hearing. I don't want to debate your reading
5	of sentences to my reading of sentences. I want to ask Dr.
6	Palestrant if he thinks for the last 50 days and presently he
7	has expressive aphasia or doesn't, and is he going to improve?
8	Which, the way I read it, the answer is yes. And is he
9	presently able? That's that's what I want to know. And the
10	issue is is there even a question about that. Has a question
11	arisen as to his abilities? And a debilitating small shower of
12	strokes raises no question?
13	THE COURT: Well, debilitating
14	MR. WRIGHT: I want
15	THE COURT: Mr. Wright
16	MR. WRIGHT: I want a hearing
17	THE COURT: is your word.
18	MR. WRIGHT: not I would like a hearing.
19	THE COURT: Well, Mr. Wright
20	MR. WRIGHT: And I'd like to be sworn in.
21	THE COURT: First of all
22	MR. WRIGHT: I would like to be sworn in.
23	THE COURT: Okay. Well, debilitating
24	MR. WRIGHT: And give testimony.
25	THE MARSHAL: Mr. Wright, when the Judge starts

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1 talking, you stop.
             THE COURT: Okay. Debilitating is your word. I
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  didn't see that. It said a series of small embolic strokes.
   And I understand. I would just note that there -- you know,
  there hasn't been any affidavits. I understand there's a
   situation with Ms. Stanish, but we never had actually a formal
 7 filing in this case seeking a transfer to competency court.
             MR. WRIGHT: I filed a motion in December.
 8
   the motion.
                         Right.
10
             THE COURT:
             MR. WRIGHT: Okay.
                                 I renewed a motion.
11
             THE COURT: Well, there was the letter. There was the
12
13 letter, and based on the close proximity to the trial date, the
   action was taken that was taken.
             State, do you wish --
15
16
             I'm sorry. Have you completed?
17
             MR. WRIGHT: No:
18
             THE COURT: All right.
             MR. WRIGHT: I renew the motion right now for -- I --
19
20 a question has arisen as to his competency and I renew the
21 motion for a competency evaluation. I asked for a hearing, a
22 hearing on the motion, a hearing in which we can ask Dr.
23 Palestrant these questions. I'll -- I'd like to be sworn in.
24
             THE COURT: At this time?
            MR. WRIGHT: Yes.
25
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The clerk will swear him -- well, let's 1 THE COURT: hear argument first --2 3 MR. WRIGHT: Okay. -- and then --4 THE COURT: 5 MR. WRIGHT: Okay. Well --THE COURT: -- we'll determine how --6 7 MR. WRIGHT: -- I'll make representations --8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. WRIGHT: -- if the Court -- I mean --10 THE COURT: And, again, Mr. Wright, I'm not 11 distrusting you. But, again, you are reporting your 12 perceptions. 13 MR. WRIGHT: I understand that, and I want to explain And I -- I have been dealing with clients for 40 years, 15 longer than you've practiced. And I -- I understand and have 16 dealt with stroke patients. 17 My partner has had a stroke and I know expressive 18 aphasia and receptive aphasia and I know when I am talking with 19 a man for 30 minutes and he is agonizing and struggling, I can 20 tell, whether the Court likes it or not, I can tell fakers from 21 not fakers. I can tell someone that's impaired at the present 22 time and isn't. 23 And I am telling the Court, he is pathetically not 24 competent at the present time and cannot assist me. 25 stroke and this report supports that. And that's my reading.

1 You read it differently. That's why in courts we have 2 evidentiary hearings and that's what I'm asking for. State, would you like to respond? 3 THE COURT: MR. STAUDAHER: Yes, Your Honor, a couple things. 4 5 First of all, I read this report fairly carefully yesterday, as 6 I'm sure the Court did as well. I did not see a single reference to there being called into question any issue regarding his competency. And I talk -- I'm referring to Dr. Desai. Specifically, I believe, on the -- in the second 10 11 paragraph under the neurologic symptoms section after the 12 February 2013 stroke -- or 2013 stroke, it specifically says in 13 the middle of that paragraph memory and executive function should not be affected by these new strokes. 15 Now, that's the kind of issue that they're concerned 16 about, whether or not he knows who the players are and he can 17 assist and do so. If he needs a reasonable accommodation, as 18 the Court said, it would be granted because there is some 19 additional effect based on the fact that he may have more 20 difficulty communicating verbally with Mr. Wright. Certainly the Court is willing to give him that, and I think that's 21 22 completely appropriate. There is no indication, or no question, rather, that, 23

JRP TRANSCRIPTION

24 as the Court has pointed out, that he isn't driving the bus on

25 whether or not his symptoms, whatever they truly are, how they

1 manifest from an observed position by the Court or by anybody What he exhibits to Mr. Wright, what he exhibits to other 2 lelse. people may vary depending on his -- his particular situation, as even was evidence by the caregivers at Sunrise -- or Mountain View Hospital -- or, excuse me, Summerlin Hospital when he was 5 there most recently.

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I went back and looked at the speech pathology notes and the physical therapy notes and so forth, and that's what Dr. Palestrant picked up on. He read those. He saw that when they go into do an examination that they're confused by this because 11 the level of impairment that he's exhibiting to them when he's 12 doing things that aren't directly interacting with them, they see him do things that show that he has understanding.

Mr. Wright came into court and said that he goes to 15 see Dr. Desai, and when he appears to him his arms are outstretched and he's just moaning, has no ability to speak There is a -- there is a passage under one of the whatsoever. speech pathology notes where there's actually, albeit very short 19 words given back and forth between the therapist and Dr. Desai, 20 he clearly is acknowledging that he understands the question and 21 he responds appropriately to the question with words.

Those kinds of inconsistencies, the fact that he 23 supposedly doesn't have motor control in certain areas, but all 24 of the results of his tests show that he has no impairment of 25 motor function on either side of his body, upper or lower

1 extremities, yet he rolls into this court immediately after the 2 stroke, a few days later after he's been discharged, in a wheelchair with his arm gnarled up complaining of left-sided symptoms, when, in fact, his stroke is supposedly on the left side.

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There's nothing new on his right side. And if there was any motor impairment from this stroke, it would be on the opposite side of his body. So it's not even the same thing. The issue with Dr. Desai as from the outset, he has embellished his symptoms, he has malingered, this has been picked up by 11 professionals in his regular care situations, as well as Lakes 12 Crossing and before this Court. Even Your Honor has observed 13 some of these inconsistencies.

Now, one of the main questions here is after we had 15 Dr. Desai come in, the State asked the Court to essentially 16 order that if there was any further follow up treatment that 17 needed to be done, any further therapy that needed to be done, 18 that because he's out of custody, that he actually afford 19 himself those opportunities and get it done.

I've not heard that he's been out there undergoing 21 speech pathology or speech -- speech therapy or occupational 22 therapy or physical therapy or anything and that there has been 23 some sort of finding or lack of improvement or anything like 24 that. I'd like to know what he's done in the last 50 days to 25 try to improve himself.

1 Dr. Palestrant, in his -- in his report says that the most improvement that would take place, the most marked improvement would occur within the first three to nine months, 3 that all stroke victims show some improvement, although that 5 clearly varies, depending on the type of stroke, the location of the stroke, the severity of the stroke, and its proximity to actually when this event is that he's having to perform in.

We do know that the most severe stroke that Dr. Palestrant refers to, Dr. Desai was going to take himself out of 10 his practice for six months. When he came back and found out 11 that, gosh, they were dropping the numbers at the clinic, he was 12 back within a couple of weeks starting to do things. And he was 13 back in when it was suiting him to be back in, even when he had 14 the most severe observable, demonstrable impairment to his 15 brain.

Clearly he's had strokes. Clearly he has medical 17 conditions. But we have many people come before the courts that 18 have committed crimes, and that does not absolve them from their 19 crimes or being held accountable for those. So from the State's 20 perspective, we think the Court has read it completely right, 21 that there is nothing in this report that calls into question 22 anything to do with his competency.

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In fact, the areas that the strokes took place 24 supposedly have no effect on the memory or executive function 25 which is what would be really concerning to the Court, I would

1 think, at this point was if he had a stroke that did, in fact, 2 impair his ability to think or function appropriately, whether 3 or not he can get out words. If he needs to use an iPad, a typewriter, whatever, he can do that. The Court will give the We think the Court has gotten right, and we accommodation. 6 would submit.

Anything the State wants to be heard -- or THE COURT: add on the issue of an evidentiary hearing.

We think that that's not necessary MR. STAUDAHER: 10 based on this report and the Court's findings at this point. 11 There's nothing new. And we still don't know if anything has 12 happened to try and better his situation since the time he actually had this stroke in the first place.

THE COURT: Mr. Wright?

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MR. WRIGHT: Yes. The having -- number one, what 16 treatment is he presently having? He's having physical therapy 17 treatments and speech therapy treatments. He has since the 18 stroke up to and including this week and going forward. 19 there been improvement in his abilities with me? The answer is, 20 yes, he is improving.

The fact that he has motor skills or executive skills 22 has nothing to do with the stroke in his speech vortex or 23 wherever. It affects his comprehension and his speech 24 abilities. And -- and when you have expressive aphasia and 25 receptive aphasia, it isn't simply the words don't come out.

1 It's the brain part that puts them together and gets it out of 2 your trapped brain what you want to say or put out. And whether 3 you have an iPad or a computer or can write makes no difference 4 in drawing it out. 5 Ten years after my partner's stroke he still cannot 6 speak, not can he write it, nor can he email it. And that's 7 what we're talking about, aphasia. That is exactly the area he 8 had the stroke. That is what the doctor says the manifestations 9 would be for a genuine stroke, which he said is that area, and 10 he needs time to heal. And hopefully he will heal to his 11 premorbid state prior to the stroke in 2013. But I want a 12 hearing to ask Dr. Palestrant these questions that we're talking about. He didn't give a competency evaluation. 14 THE COURT: Right, because the --MR. WRIGHT: That wasn't what he was asked to do. 16 THE COURT: Correct. That was --17 MR. WRIGHT: So he didn't discuss Drusky. He didn't 18 discuss the Wilson factors on a complex case. 19 THE COURT: Mr. Staudaher? 20 MR. STAUDAHER: I think we'll submit it, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Well, first of all, he was not 21 22 asked to specifically discuss competency. However, he was asked 23 to evaluate the extent of the stroke, whether there had been a 24 stroke, the area of the brain that had been impacted by the 25 stroke, the difference in the impact from or the exacerbation or

1 the manifestation of new symptoms that could be observed from either the records or the radiological images and other things from the 2013 stroke comparing that to the earlier strokes.

Part of that, I think, necessarily entails evaluating areas such as cognition, memory, executive function, and things that are directly related to competency. So while the request was certainly not for a competency evaluation, per se, the information and what we were looking for, I think, speaks to that. And, again, speaks to the need as to whether or not to delay this.

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Because I think what's been established, not from what 12 I have observed or what the Courts have observed or the judges 13 thing, but what's actually out there in the medical records, 14 what the professional clinicians are writing about and observing 15 and, you know, physicians, therapists, other people, is that 16 there's an exaggeration of symptoms here. And I think thats 17 there is only one conclusion, and that is Dr. Desai has the goal 18 of postponing this trial as long as possible.

And even in this report, again, you know, it says Dr. 20 Desai's claimed degree of neurologic dysfunction or 21 neuropsychiatric testing performances between 2009 to 2013 are 22 | far worse than would be expected and not corroborated by the 23 extent and anatomic distributions of his strokes. In my opinion 24 there has been a significant amount of embellishment of his 25 symptoms and incomplete efforts on neuropsychiatric testing.

So, you know, the inquiry was to see whether or not 1 2 there was a need to refer this for additional testing and evaluation beyond what has been done already. I do not believe that based on this extensive report and what is here. there is no dispute that there have been additional strokes. But I don't think that there is further question of -- of his competency to stand trial. This -- you know, the 2013 stroke cannot be looked at in a vacuum. It has to be looked at, you know, in the totality of everything that's gone before, and the 10 history of Dr. Desai and the history of, you know, his 11 performance with other medical evaluators.

And so, again, I think the report speaks for itself. 13 You know, both sides can parse out what they think is more 14 favorable to their position, but I think the report has to be 15 looked at in its totality. I, you know, thoroughly read this 16 when it came in yesterday. And after reading it I concluded 17 that there was no need for need for any further inquiry on that 18 point.

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I think that includes the need for an evidentiary I think the report is pretty clear. Again, this was 20 hearing. 21 ordered -- well, I don't need to state. We all know why. 22 don't see a need for any further proceedings on this in this 23 court. And so the trial date stands and we'll begin with jury 24 selection.

And as I said, Mr. Wright, you know, there is

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1 reference here that he has other motor -- you know, he has motor
 2 functioning, he has the ability to think, and while he may have
 3 difficulty forming words, he may have difficulty recalling
 4 words, certainly accommodations can be made so that you're given
 5 ample time and he can sort through that.
             Now, I understand that you're saying, you know, he's
 6
 7 not speaking at all. He's just making sounds and noises.
 8
   that's --
 9
             MR. WRIGHT: No, I did not say that.
             THE COURT: Okay. That was said at one time.
                                                             And
10
11 | that's --
                          That was said at the time I came in 50
12
             MR. WRIGHT:
13 days ago.
             THE COURT:
                         All right.
14
15
             MR. WRIGHT: And I told you he's improving.
16
             THE COURT:
                         All right. Well --
17
             MR. WRIGHT: And I didn't say he isn't presently
18 speaking and is just making noises.
19
             THE COURT: All right. Well, --
             MR. WRIGHT:
                          Is my --
20
             THE COURT: -- I misspoke. All right.
                                                     And I'm sorry.
21
22 But as I said, you know, if it takes him a long time to come up
23 with the words or to form words, you know, technology, of
24 course, can address the issue of forming words and speech itself
25 through, you know, using a computer and whatnot.
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JRP TRANSCRIPTION

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If the issue goes to actually recalling certain words
 1
 2 and things like that, you know, again, we can make
 3 accommodations with breaks and other things to allow you time to
  confer with your client, recognizing that it may take him a
   little bit longer to communicate --
             MR. WRIGHT: Of course --
 6
             THE COURT: -- communicate --
 7
             MR. WRIGHT: -- the accommodation I'd like is that
 8
  |computer that will make him speak and communicate with me.
  like that as soon as possible for my office and for here in the
11
   courtroom.
12
             THE COURT:
                         All right.
13
             MR. WRIGHT: So is my motion --
                         Your motion? Well, there was no formal -
14
             THE COURT:
15 I guess your oral --
                          No, I am formally renewing --
16
             MR. WRIGHT:
1.7
             THE COURT:
                         Your making an oral motion.
18
                                I am renewing my previously filed
             MR. WRIGHT:
                          Okay.
19 motion.
20
             THE COURT:
                         All right.
21
             MR. WRIGHT: And filing a motion because I believe a
22 question has been raised to his present competency.
23 what I am requesting is an evidentiary hearing so that we can
24 actually hear witnesses. I disagree with the assertions that
25 caregivers, plural, at Summerlin said they saw and believed he
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1 was embellishing. I disagree with that. I want an evidentiary 2 hearing on that. I want an evidentiary hearing. testimony of this doctor. I don't understand our aversion to having a hearing. I -- I like something where we argue about it, we take evidence on it, and then the Court decides it, as opposed to we walk in and I've read it and here's what I've decided. So I -- is my request to put on evidence for an evidentiary hearing denied? 8 I mean, Mr. Wright, I'm relying on what's THE COURT: 10 in the report and you want the opportunity to cross-examination 11 the expert on what's --12 MR. WRIGHT: Correct. THE COURT: -- in the report. And the point of 13 14 retaining this expert was to say we want someone independent who 15 has not been retained by either side to, you know, look at 16 these, someone that's very well respected in the field, as this 17 person appears to have been. You know, you -- both sides agreed on this person. 18 19 And I just don't see a reason for further inquiry. And I don't 20 believe anyone said that, you know, the physical therapist or 21 anyone else at Summerlin Hospital actually said he was 22 embellishing. I think what was stated in the report was that it 23 was inconsistent or they observed inconsistencies. 24 So I don't think any of them formed the conclusion 25 that, oh, he's embellishing. I think that that's the -- then,

1 you know, that's what he, the reviewer can conclude. But they 2 found inconsistencies, and that was noted in their reports, as it should have been noted in their reports.

State, Mr. Staudaher, on the issue of hearing additional evidence and calling witnesses on the Summerlin Hospital records as Mr. Wright seems to be requesting.

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MR. STAUDAHER: Clearly, the reviewer in California, Dr. Palestrant, reviewed the medical record which contains the exact reports and the inconsistent kinds of things that those individuals at Summerlin Hospital saw when they went in to treat 11 and deal with Dr. Desai.

We think based on the fact that they -- that it's part 13 of the record, part of the medical record, that thing that he 14 relied on, and they do not come back and say that he was 15 malingering, faking, lying, doing whatever. They're just saying, you know, as the Court pointed out, that their 17 evaluation of him in inconsistent and difficult because of those 18 inconsistencies.

When, you know, he supposedly is impaired, but then --20 and not able to do something that they ask him to do, but they 21 turn around and watch him do something else which requires the 22 same type of motor skills and cognitive ability. 23 inconsistencies. You can take those for what they mean.

The actual person who watched those and documented 25 them is not the one who evaluates their significance.

1 Palestrant was the one who did that. He looked at that 2 information in conjunction with the actual physical films 3 themselves of the damage and the areas that the damage took place, the prior results of studies and testing that took place. 5 And I think that the passage that Your Honor pointed 6 out was one of the more pointed ones in that his bottom line assessment was that the areas, even though he acknowledges that there's injury from prior strokes, the sort of symptoms that are displayed by Dr. Desai he believes far and exceed what would be expected. And that's the person that we went to, a stroke 11 specialist, a person who deals with these kinds of things who 12 knows what the significance of a particular finding, a test 13 result, an MRI, and how to expect to have that manifested from somebody who might have those kinds of injuries. 15 That's not what he found. There's no reason to have an evidentiary hearing to have him come in to be cross-examined 17 on those portions. He gave an independent review of this 18 medical record. We think that that's sufficient. 19 MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor? 20 THE COURT: Yes. 21 MR. WRIGHT: Your all's ability to speculate and 22 extrapolate without hearing witnesses just astonishes me. 23 | I don't understand why we do not ask Dr. Palestrant what are the 24 accommodations that we can do for someone who's had a stroke 25 like this, instead of just, well, there's computers or there's

1 machines and things. We need a hearing on it. We need I need to know what it is. And Dr. Palestrant can 2 testimonv. 3 say, yes, here's what can be done. And I can say, well, is he 4 | presently, as we speak, competent right now to assist and go forward with a trial. THE COURT: I --6 And what accommodations can be made, if 7 MR. WRIGHT: 8 any. THE COURT: Mr. Wright, Dr. Desai is currently under 9 10 the care of a neurologist of in this community. He's seen other 11 professionals for therapy and other things. I don't understand, 12 you know, why you or Dr. Desai's family can't make those 13 inquiries of those professionals. 14 MR. WRIGHT: We have. 15 THE COURT: We are going to trial and, you know, the 16 judge has refused to continue this and so how can we assist Dr. 17 Desai in communicating? You know, I don't know that we need to 18 have an evidentiary hearing to ask those questions. And I would 19 just note, you know, as Mr. Staudaher pointed out, Dr. 20 Palestrant is an expert in stroke. He was the director of the 21 stroke and neurocritical care program at Cedars-Sinai. 22 board certified neurologist, vascular neurologist. I don't know that there's any -- you know, again, he 23 24 was retained and asked to do this for a specific purpose, to 25 have someone look at the, you know, records, the images, and

1 say, you know, is there something new here, is there something 2 new here justifying new inquiry into the area of competency.

And I -- and I just don't see it.

3

21

And so, you know, again, the report speaks for itself. We can all pull out sentences and this and that, but, you know, you have to look at the totality of the report which, you know, you disagree with me. I read this as carefully as I could, you I had no idea what it was going to 8 know, with an open mind. say, obviously. I never communicated with him, I didn't choose 10 him, I didn't know anything about him beforehand.

And when I read the conclusion, you know, to me, 11 12 looking at the conclusion, looking at the totality of the 13 report, it seemed quite clear to me that there was no issue 14 here, nothing new justifying a reexamination of Dr. Desai's 15 competency. And so, you know, I would agree with you on one You know, you summarizing and taking out of the report 17 and Mr. Staudaher doing that and me doing that, you know, the 18 report is what it is, and I think at the end of the day we have 19 to look at, you know, the medical professionals and what they're saying. And so -- and I'm sorry I cut you off.

MR. WRIGHT: As for what we -- what we have been doing 22 and his professionals, they tell me he needs to continue with 23 his motor therapy and his speech therapy and he may then regain 24 in -- in months, months, just the same recommendation as the 25 doctor, as Dr. Palestrant, in 9 to 18 months he will regain

JRP TRANSCRIPTION

....

those abilities. We are doing all of that. No one has told me about this magic computer that I can utilize --2 3 THE COURT: Well, Mr. ---- with him. 4 MR. WRIGHT: 5 THE COURT: You know --And he is --MR. WRIGHT: 6 -- I'm going to ignore your facetiousness. THE COURT: 8 But you and I both know that he can sit there with a laptop and use one finger and his motor skills are not impaired, 10 notwithstanding the fact -- you know, with his finger he can 11 still, you know, type out messages right there at counsel table 12 to you during the course of the trial. So that's all I was 13 saying. You know, if he has difficulty making words, forming |words, and he's difficult to understand, that's all I was 15 saying. So, you know, your facetiousness really is not called 16 17 for here. Because, you know, they're directly talking about 18 speech, and I understand speech encompasses not just the spoken 19 word, but the ability to recall language and form sentences and 20 other things. If you read this in its totality, however, Dr. 21 Palestrant speaks to some of that. And that's why I said, you 22 know, the report has to -- you know, it has to stand on its own. Well --23 MR. WRIGHT: 24 THE COURT: Again, I don't see the reason here for any 25 additional inquiry -- you know, inquiry on this.

1 MR. WRIGHT: I just wanted to hear from the |well-credentialed doctor and examine him. I don't think the report speaks for itself. It spoke to you differently than it 3 spoke to me. And when you and I say you and I both know he could sit there and peck out words on the typewriter, I -- I don't know that and I disagree with you on that and that directly effects his ability. The problem is what wants to come out can't come out of the head because of the receptive and expressive aphasia. 10 And that's what I believe Dr. Palestrant would testify to. 11 Would the Court entertain a stay so I can -- while I seek 12 appellate relief? 13 That request is denied. I can't find it THE COURT: 14 in the report, but, you know, now apparently Dr. Desai has been 15 seeking therapy, but I think there was a reference, and I can't 16 find it, somewhere here in the report that he didn't follow 17 through with his recommended care earlier. And I was looking 18 for exactly where it is. I just recall that. I can't find it 19 at this point in the report. 20 But I remember reading that there was some reference 21 to that that -- that there wasn't a follow through and there was 22 also reference to the fact that maybe some of these reported 23 symptoms weren't event related to his previous strokes, now 24 we're going back, but were, in fact, related to his depression.

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And may I just editorialize here, but I think

1 depression is a perfectly natural reaction to the fact that, you 2 know, what's occurred with respect to the endoscopy clinic and 3 publicity and the charges against Dr. Desai. I think depression 4 would be just an absolutely normal reaction to all of that. 5 can find it in the report again. It's 28 pages. 6 recall, I don't know if anyone else recalls seeing that, but I do believe I saw that in report as well. 8 State, anything else on the request for an evidentiary 9 hearing the need to call Dr. Palestrant and possibly --10 MR. STAUDAHER: No, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: -- other witnesses? 12 MR. STAUDAHER: No, Your Honor. 13 MR. WRIGHT: Can I mark the exhibit? And I'll explain 14 what it is. It's part of my -- part of my proffer to the Court. THE COURT: We'll mark this Defense A. 15 16 MR. WRIGHT: Yes, I'd like to have marked the work 17 product of Dr. Desai of the -- even though it was like a half 18 hour, it was actually like a 20-minute session with Dr. Desai 19 and myself and me telling him to answer various questions and the questions that comport with that. 21 And it took 20 minutes to get the answers. Day of the 22 week, Monday. Page, 60. Month, February or March. This is all 23 his own handwriting as he would sit there and do this. 24 speech therapist, man. What is her name, lady, L-A-D-Y. 25 me the names of the doctors you worked with. Ultimately I got

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1 Sharma and temple. And my best understanding is that it's Dr.
 2 Sharma who attends the same temple. And I can't remember what
   T-H-A-R-G or E was an answer to. Thank you.
 3
 4
             THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Wright?
 5
             MR. WRIGHT: No.
                               I will offer myself for
   cross-examination if there is any question about my
 6
 7
   representation.
 8
             THE COURT: State, anything else --
 9
             MR. STAUDAHER: No, Your Honor.
10
             THE COURT: -- on the need to swear Mr. Wright in
11 land --
12
             MR. STAUDAHER:
                             No.
             THE COURT: -- make a statement before the Court under
13
14 oath?
15
             MR. STAUDAHER:
                             I don't think that's necessary.
16
             THE COURT: All right. Therefore, again, your renewed
17 oral request to open the issue of competency and refer Dr. Desai
18 to competency court is denied. Your request for a stay is
19 denied. The trial date stands at Monday -- as Monday, April
20 22nd at 9:30 to begin jury selection.
             And we also have pending today, or what was calendared
22 for today, the State's motion to admit evidence of other crimes.
23 We did not receive a written opposition to that.
24
             MR. SANTACROCE: Yes, there was one filed by you.
25
             MS. STANISH: Oh. Yes, Your Honor. We filed it on
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JRP TRANSCRIPTION

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1 | Monday. THE COURT: Oh. Okay. I'm sorry. I didn't get that. 2 I'll look at that and --MR. SANTACROCE: And for the record, I filed a joinder yesterday. As I advised the Court on Friday I had not received the motion. THE COURT: All right. MR. SANTACROCE: I did receive it Friday afternoon and 8 filed a joinder yesterday so I want the record clear that Mr. 10 Lakeman is in opposition to the State's motion. THE COURT: Okay. I had read the State's motion not 11 12 knowing there was an opposition. I had some concerns not even 13 reading an opposition. I'm sure some of those were addressed, 14 but, you know, I'll just take it under advisement, read 15 everything, and then issue a decision from chambers. But what 16 was not -- what was not clear from the State's motion, to me 17 anyway, was the complaints filed about Dr. Desai with the Nevada 18 State Board of Health Examiners. Did you just want to introduce 19 the complaints, or were you going to call the complaining 20 witnesses, or what was your plan on that? MS. WECKERLY: The complaining witnesses --21 22 THE COURT: Okay. MS. WECKERLY: -- in the instances that --23 24 THE COURT: Okay. MS. WECKERLY: -- that are factual. There's 37, but 25

```
1 there's only three that are factually discussed.
 2
             THE COURT: Right. The three that you mentioned.
 3
  Okay. And then on the Rexford lawsuit, how are you planning on
   presenting that?
 5
             MS. WECKERLY: From reading Ms. Stanish's opposition,
  I don't think there's an opposition to that coming into
  levidence.
             THE COURT:
                         Okav.
 9
             MS. WECKERLY: So I think that would just be through
10 testimony of the -- of the percipient witnesses, you know, why
11 they were looking at certain documents and what they noticed at
12 the time.
             THE COURT: Okay. So there is no objection.
13
             And is that also true for Mr. Lakeman --
14
15
             MR. SANTACROCE: No, Your Honor.
16
             THE COURT: -- Mr. Santacroce, on the -- on the
17 Rexford lawsuit?
                                    I have a problem with -- well,
18
             MR. SANTACROCE: Yes.
19 first of all, the Court needs to be cognizant of the fact that
20 there are two men on trial here.
21
             THE COURT: Right.
22
             MR. SANTACROCE: And Mr. Lakeman is constitutionally
23 entitled to a fair and impartial trial. Now, whatever the Court
24 rules as it relates to Mr. Desai is going to be prejudicial to
25 Mr. Lakeman.
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For example, the State cites some 37 complaints. 1 2 of those occurred by Lisa Phelps in July of 2000. Mr. Lakeman 3 was not even employed until 2005, and there's some highly 4 inflammatory language that the State uses. I don't know if they 5 intend to try to admit that, whereas there's allegations that Desai instructed his staff to hold her arms down while the procedure was going on. The Court needs to differentiate here and we need some

protection if the Court does allow these bad acts to come in 10 because most of them, if not all of them, do not apply to Mr. 11 Lakeman. So I don't know how the Court is going to reason that 12 out, but at the very least, the Court should issue a cautionary 13 instruction to the jury that it should not hold these bad acts 14 against Mr. Lakeman, unless we have a Petrocelli hearing where they can show that Mr. Lakeman was directly involved, and I think that we need to have that hearing.

THE COURT: All right. And just on the -- well, as I 18 said, the issue of the complaints, I had some concerns even 19 without looking at an opposition just from my reading. 20 going to read the opposition, consider it, and issue a decision 21 from chambers.

On the Rexford lawsuit, Ms. Stanish, you're not 23 opposed to that?

17

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24 MS. STANISH: Your Honor, I of course base that on the 25 representation that it was going to be offered for the, what I

1 understood to be, just the limited purpose of showing that there was a litigation. You know, to the extent that the State is going to go beyond that and we have to like relitigate this 3 issue --5 THE COURT: Right. We --6 MS. STANISH: -- it was very limited was -- my 7 opposition was quite limited based on what was stated. 8 Okay. Well, I don't know, then, if we THE COURT: would need to have a hearing, like a Petrocelli type hearing to see what the scope would be. 11 Or maybe for purposes of at least today, Ms. Weckerly, 12 you can tell us what you intend to do with respect to the 13 Rexford lawsuit and then we can hear whether or not Ms. Stanish 14 and Mr. Santacroce have any objections if you proceed that way. 15 MS. WECKERLY: What -- what we were seeking to 16 introduce is the existence of the lawsuit, not whether -- not 17 its legitimacy or not, which caused a witness to review certain 18 records and what came to that witness's attention as a result of 19 preparing for the lawsuit. And then -- I mean, I don't think 20 that we need to get into the details of the lawsuit, but more 21 that it was in existence and that caused this witness to --22 THE COURT: Right. There was this lawsuit, so I had 23 to do a records review. And then once I began the records 24 review, I noticed --25 MS. WECKERLY: This is what I noticed.

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THE COURT: -- A, B, and C. I don't see --1 2 Ms. Stanish, you're fine with that? MS. STANISH: That's correct. 3 4 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. --5 MR. SANTACROCE: I object to that as far as Mr. 6 Lakeman is concerned. Mr. Lakeman wasn't even a party to that 7 lawsuit. And, again, it's going to be more prejudicial than probative as it relates to Mr. Lakeman. 9 THE COURT: Well, I think what we can do is in the questioning it can be made clear that Mr. Lakeman wasn't a 11 party, he wasn't involved in that lawsuit. 12 MS. WECKERLY: He was --13 MR. STAUDAHER: He was involved --14 MS. WECKERLY: -- deposed in it. 15 MR. STAUDAHER: -- in that lawsuit. 16 THE COURT: You know, that he wasn't a party, that he 17 was never sued in connection with that matter, or something like 18 that, and maybe clean it up --19 MR. STAUDAHER: That's fine. 20 THE COURT: -- that way. And then so that -- that's 21 the only remaining issue, then, is the complaints. 22 And, again, the purpose for which the State seeks to 23 introduce those, as I understand them, Ms. Weckerly, is to show 24 that there is a financial motive here with the insurance fraud? 25 Which I think --

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MS. WECKERLY:
                            That's -- well --
 1
             MR. STAUDAHER: Well --
 2
                         I think there's always a financial motive.
 3
             THE COURT:
             MS. WECKERLY: Not just the insurance fraud, but the
 4
   whole -- the reason why --
 5
             THE COURT: The way they're running --
 6
 7
             MS. WECKERLY:
                            -- the treatment --
                        -- the clinic and that --
 8
             THE COURT:
 9
                            -- was the way it was.
             MS. WECKERLY:
             THE COURT: -- they're doing these really quickly --
10
11
             MS. WECKERLY:
                            Right.
             THE COURT: -- is because there was a profit motive
12
13 above all else.
                    That's your point. And the way you intend to
14 do this would be to call the actually complaining witnesses and
15 they would testify this happened to me and I filed a
16
  complaint --
             MS. WECKERLY:
                            Yes.
17
18
             THE COURT:
                        -- or the doctor would say I filed a
19 complaint.
20
             MS. WECKERLY: That's correct. And we don't dispute
21 that if the Court gives us a preliminary admissibility ruling
22 that we would have to have a Petrocelli hearing.
23
                         Right. Exactly. Basically all I'm going
             THE COURT:
24 to be looking at the motion and the opposition, at this point,
25 is to say whether or not if proven by clear and convincing
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1 evidence I even think it's relevant and it's more probative than 2 prejudicial on these questions, if I don't even answer yes to 3 that, then obviously there's no need for a Petrocelli hearing. Okay? And, you know, jury selection is going to take some 5 time, so we can just schedule that hearing sometime some morning 7 or something like that. We don't need to, obviously, delay jury selection in any way to do that. So I think that that covers everything that was pending for this morning. Again, we'll see you all here, assuming we don't get something from the Supreme 11 Court. Yes? 12 MR. WRIGHT: Will the Court please indulge me. 13 14 not rearguing it. Just two points. The three witnesses we are 15 talking about are the witnesses I tried to discuss with Dr. 16 Desai this morning on this motion we just addressed. 17 Technically I just want to articulate that my request for a 18 hearing and my motion is to have evidence presented on whether I don't 19 there is a doubt that has arisen as to his countenance. 20 care if that is transferred to competency court or it's this 21 court --22 THE COURT: Right. I understand. 23 MR. WRIGHT: -- or wherever. All I'm saying is I -- I 24 -- as the record stands, I have never had a hearing on where 25 I've been allowed to call witnesses. As the Court will recall,

1 I was denied the hearing by Judge Delaney, and I took it up on writ to the Supreme Court.

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And then the Supreme Court said in a footnote that if any motion is made challenging his competency to stand trial presently based upon interactions and evaluations since his return from Lakes Crossing, then a broader inquiry would be required. And so I am still waiting for a chance to examine and put on evidence. It is that I am asking the hearing on, not a competency hearing.

THE COURT: Well, I understand. I mean, thank you for 11 correcting the record, and then I would just note that the first 12 motion that was a formal motion filed, the Court denied that 13 based on the fact that there is nothing new medically, no new 14 strokes, no heart attacks, nothing like that that was new 15 medically to say that there was a change in Dr. Desai's circumstances from the time he was evaluated and found to be competent until the time that that motion was filed. 18 don't recall the exact date.

And then there was the new neurological event in 20 February 2013, which the State and Court was alerted to by way 21 of letter from Mr. Wright and the request that there be a 22 competency evaluation. And basically the Court said, look, 23 there may have been strokes, but that doesn't necessarily mean 24 that there has been a change in cognitive function to the extent 25 that we have to reopen the competency issue.

1 And so that was the point of having an independent 2 medical review by a neutral expert agreed to by both sides, and 3 that was Dr. Palestrant. And so that is the state of where --4 of where we are. 5 State, anything else you need to add? 6 MR. STAUDAHER: No, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 I think you summarized it. MR. STAUDAHER: 9 THE COURT: All right. Okay. Well, thank you all and |we'll -- assuming we don't hear anything otherwise, we'll be 11 prepared to begin Monday at 9:30. MR. STAUDAHER: 12 Thank you, Your Honor. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

JULIE POTTER TRANSCRIBER

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# Exhibit 9

Order Appointing IME, 3/13/13 (#138-141)

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**ORDR** 

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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DEPARTMENT XX

DISTRICT JUDGE VALERIE ADAIR

THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff,

-VS-

DIPAK KANTILAL DESAL #1240942, RONALD ERNEST LAKEMAN, #2753504,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: 10C265107-1

DEPT. XXI

#### ORDER

Upon the request of the parties in the above entitled action:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Christina Green make the necessary arrangements with DAVID PALESTRANT, MD, of the Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in California to perform an independent medical evaluation of DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI, the scope of which is detailed as follows:

The primary objective of the independent medical evaluation is to determine the nature and extent of any changes to Desai's brain from the date of his release from Lake's Crossing on or about October 7, 2011, to the date upon which he was released from Summerlin Hospital on March 1, 2013. Dr. Palestrant should review all radiological studies pertaining to DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI, either independently or in collaboration with a neuroradiologist or other similar expert of his choosing, to determine the objective findings, if any, of any neurological injury sustained by

DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI over time, whether or not said injuries are chronic or acute in nature, as well as the stability of any injury patterns observed.

In addition, Dr. Palestrant should, to the extent possible, review said radiological studies specifically to determine the nature and extent of any new radiological findings, and/or the evolution of any pre-existing findings following DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI's return to Las Vegas, Nevada, on October 7, 2011, after his discharge from Lake's Crossing Center.

- 2. Dr. Palestrant should review the medical records of DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI as necessary, including those from the University of California, Los Angeles in July of 2008, in reference to his previously documented strokes. Dr. Palestrant should, in addition to reviewing said records, specifically review the observations and testing results documented by personnel at the Lake's Crossing Center of DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI. Dr. Palestrant should, to the extent possible, determine the legitimate physical and psychological manifestations of said strokes to DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI.
- 3. Dr. Palestrant should also review the medical records of DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI to the extent necessary to determine the outcome of any post-stroke recommended treatment or therapy. In addition, Dr. Palestrant should, to the extent possible, determine whether or not DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI appropriately adhered to any said treatment regime and whether or not DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI's efforts, or lack thereof, have had any impact on his current level of alleged impairment.
- 4. Dr. Palestrant should also specifically review the two neuroradiological studies performed on DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI between the time of his return from the Lake's Crossing Center on October 7, 2011, and his February 24, 2013 hospitalization.
- 5. Finally, Dr. Palestrant should specifically review the medical records of DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI from his most recent hospitalization on February 24, 2013, to determine the extent of any neurological injury and the correlation, if any,

VALERIE ADAIR DISTRICT JUDGE DEPARTMENT XXI

with DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI's currently reported physical and psychological impairment. In addition, Dr. Palestrant should, to the extent possible, opine as to the reasonably expected physical and psychological manifestations of an individual with a similar injury pattern.

DATED this 13th day of March, 2013.

DISTRICT JUDGE

VALERIE ADAIR DISTRICT JUDGE DEPARTMENT XXI

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on the date filed, I placed a copy of this Order in the attorney's folder in the Clerk's Office, mailed or faxed a copy to:

Michael V. Staudaher Chief Deputy District Attorney

Richard A. Wright WinghteStanish & Winckler 4

Frederick A. Santacroce Santacroce, Ltd.

Christina Green

ary Mascarell

Sharry Frascarelli

Judicial Executive Assistant

## Exhibit 8

Transcript of Status Hearing on IME, 3/7/13 (#112-137)

Electronically Filed 04/19/2013 03:39:32 PM

1 TRAN CLERK OF THE COURT 2 3 DISTRICT COURT 4 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 5 6 STATE OF NEVADA, 7 CASE NO. C265107-1,2 CASE NO. C283381-1,2 DEPT. XXI Plaintiff, 8 VS. 9 DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI, RONALD E. LAKEMAN, 10 Defendants. 11 12 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2013 15 TRANSCRIPT RE: STATUS CHECK: EXPERTS (ALL) 16 APPEARANCES: 17 FOR THE STATE: MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, ESQ. 18 PAMELA WECKERLY, ESQ. Chief Deputy District Attorneys 19 20 FOR DEFENDANT DESAL: RICHARD A. WRIGHT, ESQ. MARGARET M. STANISH, ESQ. 21 FOR DEFENDANT LAKEMAN: FREDERICK A. SANTACROCE, ESQ. 22

RECORDED BY: JANIE L. OLSEN, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: KARR Reporting, Inc.

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KARR REPORTING

THE COURT: All right. This is the time for State versus Dipak Desai and Ronald Lakeman. The record should reflect the presence of Defendant Desai along with his counsel, Ms. Stanish and Mr. Wright, and we have Mr. Santacroce whose client's appearance for today for the status check will be waived.

I'd like the record to note that we did previously have a status check set for today on the matter of trial readiness; however, on Friday, the Court along with Mr. Staudaher received a letter from Mr. Wright informing the Court that the defendant had been transported by ambulance to the Summerlin Hospital where he was in the intensive care unit for some days, and I believe he was released Friday; is that correct?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. According to the letter this recent stroke had caused Dr. Desai to suffer additional cognitive impairment. Mr. Wright requested that based on the recent stroke the Court stay this matter, which as we know is set for trial on April 22<sup>nd</sup>, and refer Dr. Desai either to competency court or for a competency evaluation.

While I would normally take such a letter at face value, in this particular case given its history, given the fact that Dr. Desai has already been found to be a malingerer and an exaggerator, I must look at this recent request with suspicion. Therefore, while I will accept that Dr. Desai was transported by ambulance and that Dr. Desai received care at the Summerlin Hospital, I am unwilling to accept at face value that Dr. Desai has suffered a stroke resulting in significant additional cognitive impairment such as to change his condition requiring an additional competency

evaluation.

I am unwilling at this point to consider sending it for a competency evaluation unless there is an independent medical evaluation and independent evidence establishing that there has been a stroke and that there is new and additional brain impairment which would affect Dr. Desai's ability to be competent and to stand trial in this matter. Then and only then with such additional information will this Court even consider sending Dr. Desai for competency evaluation and delaying the trial and issuing the requested stay.

So based on the information we have before us right now, again, I'm considering the history of the case and findings that have been made, requests that have been made and denied in the past, I'm unwilling to issue the stay. I'm not moving the trial date from April 22<sup>nd</sup>, and I expect counsel to prepare with their experts, their witnesses, the jury questionnaire and what have you.

Now, an independent medical evaluation may be in order, and I understand that the State would be -- is in agreement with that.

Mr. Staudaher?

MR. STAUDAHER: Yes.

THE COURT: And then, Mr. Wright, obviously you and Ms. Stanish will be heard as well.

MR. STAUDAHER: The State concurs with all the things that Your Honor has just said.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wright, anything that you would like to add to this part of the record?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes. I did provide the Court -- I did write the letter that the Court indicates, and I did --

-3-KARR REPORTING

THE COURT: And this will be, you know, made a court's exhibit. Obviously, his condition has to be reviewed publicly because it's -- it's been made as an issue. So your letter of March 1<sup>st</sup> will become a court's exhibit.

Additionally, the letter we received yesterday would also become a court's exhibit, and that related to the fact that -- from his neurologist that his recent stroke, his recent ischemic stroke has caused him to be confused, disoriented, and he has expressive language problems as well as weakness on, I believe, the left side.

Did you receive that letter?

MR. STAUDAHER: I did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry, Mr. Wright, please continue.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes. The purpose of that letter was to waive his presence here today because Dr. Veerappan stated that this was detrimental and could cause him further cerebral damage to even appear here. So the letter wasn't to state his medical condition, it was to ask to waive his appearance to be here today.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. WRIGHT: And that request was denied by the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. And again, you know, I saw nothing in the letter indicating that having to appear in court would cause some sort of a condition, additional harm. I mean, frankly, Dr. Desai is under Indictment for murder and being a murder defendant simply put is probably not good for one's health, but I did not see anything in this letter that suggested that he should be treated in such a way that any other defendant under indictment, such as this defendant, would be treated.

You know, frankly, you know, weakness and language problems and confusion to me does not suggest that someone cannot be brought into court. And

frankly, Mr. Wright, you know, we can look at this two ways. If Dr. Desai is unaware of the proceedings as you have been repeatedly suggesting so that he doesn't really comprehend and understand what's going on, then this would not be stressful in my view for Dr. Desai.

Conversely, if he is aware and he does understand and his symptoms are being exaggerated, then it would be stressful for him. And so, you know, you kind of can't have it both ways. I would just say that it was never articulated to the Court's satisfaction as to how coming to court could be detrimental, and so for that reason his appearance was not waived, you know, today.

I would just note, you know, he was released in under a week and was not released to a sub-acute facility, wasn't released to a rehabilitation hospital.

Now, I'm no expert. I'm no physician, obviously, but, you know, that's something I think in just common, general understanding people might anticipate. Again, I say that clearly as a layperson. I don't pretend to have any expert knowledge one way or the other, but he is not in a facility at this point in time like many people who do suffer massive brain injuries whether it be by stroke or some kind of traumatic injury of another sort are sent. So I would just note that in an effort, Mr. Wright, to explain the Court's reasoning in this matter.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Your Honor.

I'm a layperson also, and that's why I submitted the letter of Dr.

Veerappan dated March 6<sup>th</sup>, which states, In my professional opinion I believe that

Dr. Desai is not in a position both physically and mentally to make a court

appearance so soon after his stroke as this would be -- as this would place

excessive strain on his recovery and may lead to reoccurrence of another cerebral

vascular event. That wasn't my opinion. I'm a layperson also so I rely on the

treating physicians and neurologist to report to the Court his condition.

Additionally, on --

THE COURT: And I was looking at the part of the letter that said, Dr. Desai suffered a multifocal ischemic stroke within the left cerebral hemisphere. This has caused him to be confused, disoriented and has expressive language problems with left arm and leg weakness. He needs to have therapy for language, physical and occupational therapy. In my professional opinion I believe that Dr. Desai is not in a position both physically and mentally to make a court appearance so soon after his stroke.

And again, you know, these are the types of letters we get all the time in a typical case, of course, but the Court is not looking at this event in a vacuum. The Court is looking at the long-standing history of this case where Dr. Desai has been found to be an exaggerator and a malingerer and to have feigned, essentially feigned symptoms. And so, you know, this may be a case of the boy who cried wolf, but unfortunately, you know, the defense is stuck with the record that has already been made in this case, which are those things.

Now, I don't know what happened. Like I said, all I know is he was transported by ambulance, and he was treated. The rest we need to have explained to us by an independent medical evaluation by a physician who is completely neutral and whose opinion I think the Court can rely upon.

So that's all I'm saying, and, you know, again, it's the history of the case, what has transpired previously that, you know, I have to consider as well.

MR. WRIGHT: What has transpired previously was never any suggestion that the strokes were feigned, fabricated, malingered. Even --

THE COURT: That is correct. He had --

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MR. WRIGHT: -- even doctor --

THE COURT: -- he had two strokes. I'm talking about the symptoms, and if I didn't say the word symptoms, I apologize. I meant to say the symptoms, not the strokes themselves. Those have been verified. The State agrees they've been verified. There was never a dispute, and if I in any suggested that I didn't believe that, then I apologize. But I thought I said symptoms, not the fact of strokes themselves. So I just want to make that clear in any event, Mr. Wright.

MR. WRIGHT: Okay. Additionally, what was submitted to the Court, so you weren't just taking my letter and my layperson's opinion that he had a stroke, I submitted to the Court the MRI results of February 24, Sunday, read by -- or performed by Dr. Diane Mazu (phonetic) at Summerlin Hospital, verified by Dr. Mazu. The MRI report showing the stroke also submitted to the court the MRI head without contrast report of February 25 on Monday performed by Dr. Raznish Agrawal, A-g-r-a-w-a-l, additionally, U.S. carotid duplex bilateral report of February 25 by Dr. Robert Polander (phonetic). So it was not simply me sending some letter saying I think he had a stroke and went by hospital -- to the hospital, and I told you I went and visited him three times in the hospital, and he was unable to communicate with me or say an intelligible word.

And so that is what I brought to the Court, just to make the record more complete, and I have no disagreement with an independent medical evaluation.

THE COURT: And the issue, Mr. Wright, if I didn't make that already clear, you know, again, we all agree he's had strokes in the past, and there was some cognitive deficit. The issue is whether or not that affects his competency to stand trial, and the important issue for the Court is, has this new neurological event, this new stroke, what kind of damage has that caused, and has that caused a change in

essentially Dr. Desai's brain that creates a different situation than what has already existed in the past and what was thoroughly evaluated because the defense has been maintaining that Dr. Desai is incompetent and that he's had difficulty, I guess, communicating with you and recalling events and other things.

So the issue again is, you know, okay, there was a neurological event. What's the outcome? What's different here? Because, you know, he's already been evaluated and in a sense has been given a roadmap based on the last competency hearing and what occurred in front of Judge Delaney. And so, you know, that's what the Court's interest is to see, well, all right, there's been an event. What does that mean according to the medical experts? What's changed here? What can we ascertain through objective findings based not just on the recent MRIs but a comparison of any recent MRIs to past MRIs?

Because of course, you know, the MRI showed something in the past, and not being a medical expert I can't evaluate Dr. Mazu's report. I don't know that it even indicates a comparison to what has happened in the past, and to me, that's the critical inquiry. What were his brain injuries before that were found to not have created such a cognitive deficit that he couldn't stand trial, and what are his brain injuries now? To me, that's really the inquiry here not whether there was an event, not whether he was hospitalized, but what if anything was the impact of that event? And I certainly don't, while we go into this inquiry, I certainly don't want to delay this trial any further.

Now, obviously, if it is a situation where it does get sent to competency court, then that's how it is, but in the meantime, I'm not willing to grant a stay and tell the lawyers to stop working and that we're not going to trial.

State, do you have anything that you'd like to place on the record, Mr.

MR. STAUDAHER: A couple of things. First of all, there was no comparison of prior studies according to at least the reports that we did receive, and we just have those reports of the acute event, at least the radiologic studies that were done at the time he was hospitalized in Summerlin.

That being said, we agree with the Court that there should be an independent medical evaluation done of him to see what, if any, impact his most recent event has on his status. I mean, it's been clearly the defense's position that regardless of what the evaluators have said at Lakes, regardless of what anybody has said with regard to his testing in the past that he's not competent. He can't communicate.

As the Court's aware, there's a — there's a significant subjective component to that, meaning that the testing and everything else that had been done in the past is entirely reliant on his efforts as — in his good-faith efforts in evaluation. I would note that even after the second stroke, the one that is postdating the events in this particular case, not the most recent event, that the recommendation was for him to undergo the same kinds of recommendations that he has currently from Dr. Veerappan based on that letter, that he undergo speech pathology, or speech therapy, cognitive therapy, that he has occupational therapy.

All these things were recommended at that time, and to my knowledge we don't have any reports or records that indicate that he's ever attempted to avail himself of those things, and he's been out of custody. It's not like he's sitting in Clark County Detention Center and he somehow does not have the access to those types of treatments and help.

The records we show just the opposite, that he has not tried to help

himself or make himself better. In fact, it's the State's position -- one of the reasons why we concur with the independent medical evaluation ordered by the Court -- that sounds like it's going to be ordered by the Court -- is that it is in his best interest to not have someone look at him on a regular basis, in his best interest to not try and get better, if in fact there is a legitimate impairment based on his objective findings on the ct scans and the MRIs and the like.

So because of that, we feel that his past record over literally years has not shown him to be actively trying to get himself over the hump, so to speak, and to help his attorney or attorneys in this particular case, and because of that the Court feels that if he is ordered to do the medical evaluation that the Court is anticipating here that he also be ordered to undergo the therapies that are recommended so that he can overcome whatever legitimate impairment that he does have.

With that regard, we do know that there was a most recent MRI study. I think the last time we were in court on this particular issue, it's indicated that that was done in October. There was not indication there was any marked change from the previous studies before that. Clearly all of these studies would be necessary to have someone critically evaluate whether or not we're looking at old damage, new damage, the extent of the new damage, if there's evolution of existing problems that were there or whether or not these are really anything that's significant and if they manifest in the manner that Dr. Desai is showing today.

Now, I know that this is the first time that he has appeared in court in a wheelchair. I would note that he's not on oxygen, and he's not on -- there's no caregivers next to him hoping that he's going to be able to make it through this particular hearing. So I think the Court was actually accurate in saying based on the reports that the Court has that this isn't as stressful an event as it might well have

been indicated in the medical letter that was sent by Dr. Veerappan.

However, with this one issue out there with regard to the evaluation, the Court has indicated that this needs to be a completely independent evaluation. The State would concur with that completely. To that end, I think we need to address at least at some point how the Court wishes to order that evaluation to be done and who is to be the person or persons that would do the evaluation and what role, if any, I mean, I obviously would believe that the Court would be the one who would receive the records, would kind of direct where this needs to be so that it doesn't look like the State used its experts or the defense used their experts to make the evaluation.

I don't know if that needs to be at another time, but it's certainly something that needs to be addressed in a relatively short order. I know that Mr. Wright has indicated that he is in the process of obtaining the medical records, the films and so forth from this most recent hospitalization. We would certainly like to see those, and he's indicated that he can forward them to us as well when he receives them.

If it is necessary, the State would ask the Court to issue an order for the release of those records to facilitate them if in fact there's any delay for any reason. I don't see that a relatively short six-day hospital stay that they should have voluminous records that would be difficult obtain in a relatively short order. And so we would expect those to be with or at least accessible to us in the very near future.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Wright, you have no problem doing whatever you need to do to expedite that, correct?

MR. WRIGHT: Whatever orders you all want to issue. I'm not sure we need another doctor. Listening to the State, it sounds like he has it all solved. I'm a

layperson. I represent a client with diminished capacity. The decisions being made are mine, not his. Ethically, I'm required to do this --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WRIGHT: -- you can cast aspersions on him all you want; the decisions are mine, and I will keep making them. He is not capable right now. Get whatever orders --

THE COURT: Well, has he --

MR. WRIGHT: -- you want. I'm happy to --

THE COURT: Has a guardian been --

MR. WRIGHT: -- have them.

THE COURT: Has a guardian been appointed then if he --

MR. WRIGHT: Yes. Mrs. Desai's a guardian. Under the ethics, I have a client with diminished capacity. I'm not saying incompetence. I'm saying I have to make the decisions. You say continue to prepare for trial. I can't even speak to my client, but I will continue to prepare for trial without a client who can communicate with me. And I welcome any court orders to expedite all the medical records plus.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Wright, with all due respect, this is what we've been hearing. The previous judge, Judge Mosley sent him -- I believe it was Judge Mosley -- sent him for a competency evaluation. As we know, he went to Lakes Crossing. He was evaluated. There was a hearing in front of Judge Delaney. The scope of the hearing was upheld, and he was found to be competent.

So a lot of the claims are the same claims that have been made in the past and have been rejected. Now, I understand, just to reiterate, and I think Mr. Staudaher put it better, that, you know, the issue is, was there a stroke? What was the damage that can be viewed, and how significant is that? To me, before we even

get to the competency evaluation, that is the issue, and, you know, to the extent -- and again, I understand you have to rely on what your client is manifest -- your client and your client's wife are telling you, in the case of the wife, and manifesting to you in the case of your client.

MR. WRIGHT: And his doctors that I met with.

THE COURT: And I understand that. While I have what I have, you know, whatever other communication you have, I don't know. I'm not privy to that. I understand that you're doing ethically what you are bound to do, and I'm in no way intending to disparage you or the work that you and Ms. Stanish are doing on this case. But again, your information, a lot of it, is based on what you're able to observe Dr. Desai demonstrating and doing.

And I would note for the record that Judge Mosley made an order, specifically made the order that Dr. Desai have to appear at all of the hearings because he wanted to be able to observe him in the courtroom setting, and, yes, he is in a wheelchair today, and this is the first time that he has come to court in a wheelchair. However, you know, I'm looking at him, his appearance otherwise, I mean, he's a little, actually, his color isn't, I guess, as good, I would say, but in terms of being downcast and not looking around the courtroom and other things, his demeanor is largely the same as what we have seen throughout the hearings, and I'll just kind of note that, and the only reason he's even here again is because of Judge Mosley's ongoing order, that Judge Mosley had ordered that he wanted him here for that very purpose to observe him.

So I think that we do need to appoint someone who is independent.

Any conflicts can be vetted by the State to make sure, you know, it's not someone who's in the --- had been in the country club with Dr. Desai or some other

connection. My understanding is that a neuroradiologist would be the appropriate person to look at this and possibly a neurologist.

MR. STAUDAHER: I believe it may be a neurologist certainly, possibly a neuropsychiatrist or neuropsychologist, and I assume that they would also require a, at least a neuro-radiologic evaluation, films and --

THE COURT: Yeah. The neuropsychologist might be more relevant if we go to a competency determination as opposed to the preliminary determination what changes, if any, are evident through objective testing.

MR. STAUDAHER: The State did, after our hearing in court, Your Honor, no, excuse me, in chambers --

THE COURT: -- meeting after the letter with everyone.

MR. STAUDAHER: -- last week. The State did start to make inquiries around not necessarily locally because it's hard for us to determine what connections, if any, people may have or what influences there may be. So inquiries were made up north. Inquiries were made in California as well for individuals who might be able to evaluate and do an independent evaluation.

Again. It's not -- the purpose of us doing that was not to try and find a person that was aligned with the State just to come up with names. I don't know if the Court has anybody in mind in particular or evaluators, but we would certainly pass those along to the Court if the Court -- I assume the Court is going to make the determination.

THE COURT: Right, and I'd rather do this sooner rather than later because, again, you know, it's the Court's desire to go forward with this case. It was the Court's desire to go forward last time with the case. Had we done that, maybe we wouldn't be in this position. We can all, you know, quibble about that.

What I would suggest and what I would ask is for the State and the defense, Mr. Wright and Ms. Stanish to get together and see if you can agree on a name. I would ask that if it's a person who has testified as an expert witness in the past that it obviously not be for either side and that if you -- if they do do much expert testimony, it not be somebody who strongly favors one side or the other, at least in the criminal arena. You know, if it's in the civil arena I don't really think that's as relevant.

If you can't agree, then just submit names and the Court will make a determination of who to select. Can both sides agree to do that?

MR. STAUDAHER: Yes, and the State has somebody in mind and we'll submit those to both counsel, and I think it would be appropriate to just go ahead at the same time and submit them to the Court so the Court's aware of independent inquiries. I've never worked with any of these individuals before, and we're certainly still in the process of trying to garner some names of individuals who may be, one, available to do that kind of work. And so we'll certainly submit that to counsel and the Court. That's what the State will do. I'll be able to have that by the end of the day.

THE COURT: Okay. And then I don't know that we have to formally have another hearing to make the appointment. Perhaps since time is of -- I want to move this along. Perhaps we can just agree to have a meeting in chambers or a conference call, anything that's, you know, if it seems like it's -- any issues that need to be made part of the record, then, of course, we'll just put it on calendar as soon as possible and have it public. But if we can all agree, I think we can maybe do that informally by way of a conference call or something like that.

And, Ms. Stanish, you're nodding.

Mr. Wright, would that be agreeable with the defense to move this along?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that agreeable with the State?

MR. STAUDAHER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't want to say let's wait till Tuesday because if we can do it Friday or Monday, let's by all means get that done.

All right. Anything else we need to discuss on the issue of the recent medical events concerning Dr. Desai and how we're going to go forward at this point?

MR. STAUDAHER: Not from the State, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Again, I think I've made it pretty clear that at this point in time anyway, the trial date will stand. Is there anything -- it was on for status check, anyway today, is there anything -- we have a pending motion in limine from the State set for March 12<sup>th</sup>. Is there anything else that we need to discuss regarding --

Anything from you, Mr. Santacroce?

Is everyone moving forward?

Last time, Ms. Stanish, you'd indicated you had three medical experts on retainer. Have you been moving forward? I mean, this is only the last week that this medical event has occurred. Have you been moving forward getting those experts ready and making sure they're going to be available whichever ones that you're going to use?

MS. STANISH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The jury questionnaire, where are we on the jury

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questionnaire?

MS. WECKERLY: Your Honor, I sent two versions of the questionnaire to counsel. I think they just want to review it. I think we still are pretty good on time on the questionnaire. I'm just waiting for -- they can email me their input, and then I'll finalize it.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Stanish, have you -- are you the one that, I'm assuming, that --

MS. STANISH: Well, we both have already reviewed it, and there's just a few minor things that we can discuss after with the State.

THE COURT: Okay. And then, Mr. Santacroce, have you received that and reviewed the questionnaire as well?

MR. SANTACROCE: I have, and I've expressed the last time we were here my concern about the time on the questionnaire as to how long the trial would be.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SANTACROCE: And I don't know if that's been rectified or not.

MS. WECKERLY: I can, I mean, the time is the easiest thing to change. If Ms. Stanish has substantive changes I'm sure she can get those to me, and we'll work that out.

THE COURT: Right. On the time, I mean, you said a month. One thing, you know, a lot of times when we say it's going to take this long we include jury selection in that. Because of the way the number of questionnaires we're going to have, the way we're going to be having, you know, we're not going to have 500 people show up on the same day.

MS. WECKERLY: Right.

THE COURT: The way we're going to be doing jury selection is a little bit

different than what we'd do in most cases. And so for that reason, let's say, somebody, you know, the first 20 who come on the first Monday, if one of those people is chosen, they may not have to come back for two weeks until we get the jury. So for that reason, you know, if we just focus on the actual trial time excluding the time for jury selection, because as I said, people won't have to come back each and every day until we qualify enough so that we can have, you know, our 12 jurors, 4 or 5 alternates, and, you know, enough people for all of the peremptory challenges, you know, it's not as much time as what, you know, you would ordinarily consider.

So if we exclude, say, five days or seven days or whatever for jury selection, then we might be closer to five weeks or four weeks. We can always put down six weeks out of an abundance of caution as well, and if people indicate that's a conflict, we can vet that out through the selection process.

Yes?

MR. WRIGHT: I think it will be longer. The -- as doctor -- assuming we go forward and his condition remains as it is, I mean Dr. Desai, and assuming he's in the same condition as he was when he was evaluated at Lakes Crossing, I think it was Dr. Zurkowski (phonetic) who stated that additional time would be necessary for communication with the client because I'm not able to communicate with him, but in between witnesses, I am looking at -- the Court will obviously rule as it sees, but I will be looking at taking recesses in efforts to communicate. If his condition is the same way it was, Dr. Zurkowski said that's what we'll have to do. So I'm just advising the Court of that because I could see it going longer.

THE COURT: Okay. The other thing, you know, to address is Mr. Staudaher pointed out, you know, Dr. Desai was advised to do this therapy and other things

that apparently he hasn't been doing. We discussed this at the last --

MR. WRIGHT: That's not true.

THE COURT: Okay. We discussed it at the last hearing, and I think it was mentioned, well, you know, there is therapy, and I said, Well, he's out of custody, you know, why hasn't he done it. So to the extent that there is therapy out there than can benefit him, I think he ought to be doing it. You know, not rely on the fact that he's not improving and then say, well, I'm not improving, but I didn't go to therapy. I didn't do what was recommended to me by my physician.

And so, you know, to the extent that things as indicated by the letter have been recommended, I think Dr. Desai ought to do it because I'm not going to, you know, again say, Well, he's incompetent or he can't communicate or he has difficulty communicating, but we won't know. Could he have improved had he done the recommended therapy and training and other things that are indicated in the letter? So I would just add that.

Anything else from the defense?

MR. WRIGHT: Yeah, I disagree with the State's representations. As the Court knows from having read Dr. Bitker's finding that he's presently incompetent before the most recent stroke, he had been down to UCLA again to see about any rehabilitative efforts, and those were unsuccessful. So it is not that he has done nothing despite the State's representations to the contrary.

THE COURT: Mr. Staudaher.

MR. STAUDAHER: Well, I would just point out that's one example. When he came back after UCLA there was the recommendation that he undergo -- one of the biggest problems he has is the speech issue, his ability to come up with the names of objects that are -- that he knows, for example, a pen, coming up with the name

pen. That was one of the main issues supposedly from that.

One of the things that was recommended was that he undergo speech therapy. He did go and have the evaluation at a local speech therapy provider. I actually myself went and looked at the records of that provider. He came for the original evaluation. There was a recommendation that he undergo weeks of therapy afterward. He did not avail himself of that. In fact, there were indications in that record that that organization had called him, had tried to communicate with him not once, not twice, but multiple times trying to set up times for him to start his therapy. The last entry in the record in that regard was that he informed them or through — somebody informed them for him that he would not be treating with them. So that is what I'm — that's in part the kind of thing that I'm basing what I said on.

Secondly, I don't have any record that he, aside from his maybe to travel down to UCLA for a single or two separate evaluations there that he's attempted to undergo any evaluations locally or treatment locally or gone anywhere else. I know he is restricted based on the fact that he is a criminal defendant in a case, that he can't just go free will outside the state borders, but that doesn't mean that he's not at least able to go locally to find people to help him and to do that. To my knowledge and at least the records that I have do not indicate that he's done any of that.

MR. WRIGHT: That's not --

MR. STAUDAHER: So there's no basis --

MR. WRIGHT: -- records report --

THE MARSHAL: One at a time.

THE COURT: All right. Well, what he's done in the past is the past. I would just note according to the letter from Dr. Veerappan dated March 6<sup>th</sup>, it says, He

needs to have therapy for language, physical and occupational therapy. That's, you know, March 6<sup>th</sup>. That was the situation by his long-time neurologist. I'm sorry, according to his long-time neurologist, that's what his long-time neurologist recommends as of yesterday.

And so to me if that's what's been recommended, all I'm saying is, you know, if there are improvements that can be made, the fact that improvements aren't made if as a result of his failure to avail himself of available therapy, will certainly be taken into account by the Court. That's all I'm suggesting. And again, you know, long-time neurologist, at least five years, says, He needs to have this therapy. So I don't know, it seems to indicate he needs to have the -- some therapy or may benefit from therapy or at least could potentially benefit from therapy.

Yes, Mr. Wright.

MR. WRIGHT: We told you all of that in the meeting in chambers, but everything that's in that letter was told to you on Monday or Tuesday and Mr. Staudaher and that it was being scheduled, all of the things recommended, that he was seeing the speech therapist, the occupational therapist, everything requested.

So it's not like these things just came up and we're doing nothing. All of this has been made through disclosure. I'm sitting here thinking, Were you in the meeting in chambers? I --

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Wright, you know --

MR. WRIGHT: I object to characterizing --

THE COURT: -- perhaps the Court and Mr. Staudaher don't have the perfect recall that you may have because we discussed a lot of things, and now that you say it, yes, I recollect that that was discussed.

MR. STAUDAHER: Your Honor, it's not that I don't believe that Mr. Wright

would, you know, actively not make efforts on the part of -- on behalf of his client to have him undergo therapy, but based on the track record, there's a recommendation; he's looking into it. We just want to make sure there's follow through. That's all.

I'm not saying that he -- that no efforts are being made initially to schedule things, but he's been out of the hospital. It seems like he can get scheduled for treatment. If it's important to him, he needs to get it done. We're just asking that the Court monitor whether or not that follow up was ever done. We don't want to be in a situation, you know, down the road a month, two months, or whatever it is from this point forward where again he just didn't get it done. And that's where we're at.

THE COURT: All right. Going forward. Basically, what I'd like the State today, early tomorrow and Mr. Wright and Ms. Stanish to do is to get together with those names, see if you can reach an agreement and then perhaps we can have some kind of a conference call or something like that tomorrow afternoon to see where we are.

Thank you.

MR. STAUDAHER: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Proceedings adjourned 10:39 a.m.)

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#### CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

## **AFFIRMATION**

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

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March 1, 2013

The Honorable Valerie Adair District Court Judge, Department 21 Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89101

**Hand-Delivered** 

Michael V. Staudaher Chief Deputy District Attorney Major Violators Unit 301 East Clark Place 10th Floor Las Vegas, NV 89155

RE: Client's Present Incapacity
State v. Dipak Desai, Consolidated Case Nos. C -12-283381 and C265107

Dear Judge Adair and Mr. Staudaher:

I am writing to inform you that Dr. Desai suffered another stroke which has further aggravated his inability to assist in his defense.

Early in the morning of Sunday, February 24, 2013, Dr. Desai suffered a stroke and was transported by ambulance to Summerlin Hospital. He was placed in the Intensive Care Unit from Sunday to Wednesday. On Wednesday, he was transferred to the Intermediate Care Unit. He was discharged earlier this afternoon and returned home where he will receive constant monitoring and care by family members.

Neurological imaging and testing confirmed that Dr. Desai suffered acute multifocal infarction, which affected multiple areas of his brain. He has been administered various medications and therapists have been evaluating and treating him. He will require substantial outpatient treatment and follow-up as recommended by his neurologist and other providers.

I visited with my client on three occasions this week. Based on my observations, his speech has been severely affected, as he was unable to converse or speak recognizable words during my visits. As an officer of the court, I can tell you that Dr. Desai does not have the present ability to assist in his defense. This stroke has further exacerbated his inability to assist in his defense. My understanding is that there is additional and severe damage to the areas of the brain controlling executive functions, including speech, memory, and cognition. I understand that this new stroke is a symptom of a progressive and deadly condition from which he is unlikely to recover.

I believe that it will be necessary to stay the proceedings and appoint competency evaluators pursuant to NRS 178.405 and 178.415. Out of concern for my client's health and respect for his family, I request that his health care information remain confidential for the time being to afford him time to recuperate. We are awaiting receipt of his hospital records, which we will promptly provide to both the Court and Mr. Staudaher. Upon receipt of the records, the

The Honorable Valerie Adair Michael V. Staudaher March 1, 2013 Page 2

competency issue can be more fully addressed. In the meantime, I am glad to meet and confer with you to discuss procedural issues.

Respectfully,

Richard A. Wright

### WRIGHT STANISH & WINCKLER

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March 6, 2013

The Honorable Valerie Adair
District Court Judge, Department 21
Regional Justice Center
200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, NV 89010

Hand-Delivered

RE:

Request to Waive Client's Presence

State v. Dipak Desai, Consolidated Case Nos. C -12-283381 and C265107

Dear Judge Adair:

I request that you waive Dr. Desai's presence at tomorrow's status check hearing based on the attached letter of his treating neurologist, Venkat Veerappan, M.D. Due to the multifocal stroke suffered last week, Dr. Desai is weak and vulnerable to reoccurrence of another cerebral vascular episode.

Respectfully,

Richard A. Wright

Attach. Veerappan Letter, 5/6/13

cc: Michael Stauderhar (w/ attch) Chief Deputy District Attorney



enkat Veerappan, M.D. M.R.C.P. inical Associate Professor, Touro University surology Residency Program Director roke Director, Valley Hospital

jeurology Residents

ahareh Bonyadi D.O.

aura Marcu Buck D.O.

obert Balsiger D.O.

ay Mahajan D.O.

Inthony DiCamillo D.O.

Cyndi Tran D.O.

### Diagnostic Testing

Cognitive Testing

**DBS** Interogation

EEG - Ambulatory

EEG - Routine

**Evoked Potentials** 

Nerve Conduction Studies/EMG

Sleep Studies

VNS Interogation

Office Location

Goldring Medical Plaza 2020 Goldring Avenue, Suite 202 Las Vegas, NV 89106

Phone: (702) 732-2600 Fax: (702) 732-2622

Email: desertneurology@yahoo.com

March 6, 2013

To whom it may concern:

I am Dr. Desai's neurologist and have been since 2007, and was his treating physician during his recent hospital stay at Summerlin Hospital Medical Center. Dr. Desai suffered a multifocal ischemic stroke within the left cerebral hemisphere. This had caused him to be confused, disoriented, and has expressive language problems, with left arm and leg weakness. He needs to have therapy for language, physical, and occupational therapy. In my professional opinion, I believe that Dr. Desai is not in a position, both physically and mentally, to make a court appearance so soon after his stroke; as this would place excessive strain on his recovery and may lead to recurrence of another cerebral vascular event.

Thank you,

Venkat Veerappan, M.D.M.R.C.P.

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# Exhibit 7

Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Competency Evaluation, 1/11/13 (#93-111)

Electronically Filed 01/11/2013 11:15:32 AM

1 **RTRAN** CLERK OF THE COURT 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 STATE OF NEVADA. 6 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C265107-1 CASE NO. C265107-2 7 VS. CASE NO. C283381-1 CASE NO. C283381-2 8 DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI, RONALD E DEPT. XXI LAKEMAN, 9 Defendants. 10 11 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 13 TUESDAY, JANUARY 8, 2013 14 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE: DEFENDANT DESAI'S MOTION FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION 15 STATUS CHECK: EXPERTS/TRIAL READINESS (ALL) 16 17 APPEARANCES: 18 FOR THE STATE: MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, ESQ. 19 Chief Deputy District Attorney PAM WECKERLY, ESQ. 20 Chief Deputy District Attorney 21 FOR DEFENDANT DESAI: RICHARD A. WRIGHT, ESQ. 22 MARGARET STANISH, ESQ. FOR DEFENDANT LAKEMAN: FREDERICK A. SANTACROCE, ESQ. 23 24 25 RECORDED BY: JANIE L. OLSEN, COURT RECORDER/TRANSCRIBER

## LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NV., TUES., JAN. 8, 2013

 THE COURT: This is the time set for Defendant Desai's motion and notice of motion for competency evaluation. Dr. Desai is present in custody -- I'm sorry, out of custody with Mr. Wright and Ms. Stanish, and we have Mr. Santacroce here although the motion pertains to Dr. Desai.

I have reviewed everything, Mr. Wright. I've reviewed the affidavit. I went back and I reviewed the record from Lake's Crossing, the findings made by Judge Delaney, everything that had been before the competency court, and as I read NRS 178.405, If doubt arises as to the competence of the defendant, it is doubt with the Court. Doubt is created with the Court, not with Dr. Desai, not with you because you've essentially been maintaining that your client is not competent, and, you know, if we go back over the various hearings, I think you've alluded to that several times.

I would just note for the record we did not receive an opposition or any response from the State in writing. So I'm assuming at this point the State is not taking a position on this matter.

MR. STAUDAHER: That is correct, Your Honor. The -- and I don't know -- the interpretation, I think, certainly could be argued one way or the other, but I think from our perspective that we cannot thwart any efforts on the part of the defense to, at least at this stage, to at least raise the issue, and whether the Court makes an evaluation of that I think is up to the Court. So that is why we did not respond.

THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Wright, the Court's point is this, that you have to establish doubt to the Court for me to either do the competency evaluation here or send it to competency court, which I checked with the Chief Judge I'm not required

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to do. That, as you know, is a relatively new creation.

So as I said, as I prefaced all of this, I reviewed everything, and frankly don't see anything new here. I don't see anything that wasn't raised before, really, before he went to Lake's Crossing. And so, you know, what's new, what's different here that hasn't been thoroughly addressed and wasn't litigated before Judge Delaney? I know the defense disagrees with the way that hearing was conducted, but, of course, as we all know, the parameters of that hearing were upheld by the Nevada Supreme Court. So they were satisfied with the way Judge Delaney maintained that hearing.

And so my question to you after reviewing everything is what's new? What's different because I frankly don't see that anything's different, anything's changed from what was presented before, and you're free to address that.

MR. WRIGHT: Okay. Dr. Bittker examined -- I've attached his report.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WRIGHT: Dr. Bittker had never seen Dr. Desai ever until, let's see, the report is December 1<sup>st</sup>, two months ago.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WRIGHT: And he personally evaluated, tested Dr. Desai in Reno, had additional tests done by Dr. Wu that he -- is referenced in there that he relied upon, and Dr. Bittker made the determination that Dr. Desai is presently not competent under the standards of Dusky based upon his evaluation and testing post Lake's Crossing. None of that was at the last hearing.

THE COURT: Here's the thing, Mr. Wright. I mean, I see Dr. Bittker is out of Reno, but let's face it, you know, you could get numerous physicians to evaluate Dr. Desai and to come in with a finding and an opinion and a report that he's not

competent at the present time. And so the concern -- I mean, we could just keep going ad infinitum with different experts who would opine that, and that would not be surprising to the Court, and I'm not, you know, critical of Dr. Bittker. I'm sure he did this in good faith to the best of his ability.

But my question is -- and I think we all recognize that we could go on forever with new reports and findings -- what is different? Why do we need to go back and do the same thing that has already been done and, you know, assess him again. Because as I read this, I don't see what's different. I don't see really anything -- new diagnostic testing. I don't see any evidence of change.

I would just point out, of course, the Court recognizes that with age Dr. Desai's cognitive abilities may deteriorate just like all of our cognitive abilities may deteriorate, and Dr. Desai, you know, he does have damage to his brain. He had strokes; that's not disputed. And so maybe that would exacerbate some kind of cognitive decline. But other than just what's going to happen with the progression of time, we can all argue over why that's occurred in this case and whatnot. I just don't see that there's anything new or different here that wasn't considered before -- I mean, I understand this report wasn't considered before, but that there's been a change, that there's anything to create doubt with this Court that there's really something different and that we need to go --

MR. WRIGHT: The question --

THE COURT: -- through the process again because that's how I read the statute. Again, it's not your doubt. It's not Dr. Desai's doubt. It's doubt, and who's to find the doubt? It's me to find the doubt, and that's where I am, and I'm just being very candid with you, Mr. Wright. That's where I am. I just don't see what's different here to cause us to go back where we've already been.

MR. WRIGHT: The question isn't is something different. The question is, is there a doubt as to his competence. You have a report from a psychiatrist who evaluated him, had him tested, gave him tests, sent him to Dr. Wu for imaging, and that doctor certifies to a medical degree of certainty that the man is not competent. If that doesn't raise a doubt as to present competence, I don't know what does.

Mr. -- Dr. Desai thinks he's still in front of a nice judge, man, that keeps us from arguing who is Judge Mosley.

THE COURT: Mr. Wright, I would just point out --

MR. WRIGHT: He also thinks that --

THE COURT: -- that Dr. Desai can answer those questions however he chooses to answer those questions, and if you go back and read the evaluation from Lake's Crossing as I did, you know, there's a belief that he's not trying to answer the questions to the best of his ability. There's a finding that, yes, he does have impairment with the ability to come up with words and things like that, but he controls the answers to those questions.

So if he wants to appear incompetent, he certainly can say, oh, yeah, a jury is just a group of people and the prosecutor is that guy that fights with Mr. Wright, and, you know, the Judge is a nice guy that keeps quiet in the courtroom or something to that effect that he said. That doesn't mean that he's incompetent.

What I'm saying is, you know, we could keep going over the same terrain over and over again with another report, another doctor, another assessment that he's incompetent at the present time. And so why go through the process again and send him back and do everything that has been fully litigated.

You know, Judge Delaney had a day-long hearing, and, again, I understand you disagree with the parameters of that hearing, but the Nevada

Supreme Court upheld those parameters. So why go back over the same ground. You know, the way I read it is I don't know that we have to say, oh, well, any time there's a report that's essentially what we've seen already that we have to say now there's new doubt.

My feeling is that this issue has been thoroughly litigated on Dr. Desai's competency. He spent a significant period of time at Lake's Crossing. He was found to -- while he -- you know, no one disputes he suffered two strokes, one of which, at least, he again continues working, but no one's disputing the strokes. The consistent opinion is that there are deficits with respect to language and his ability to think of words and whatnot that, you know, many of us suffer from from time to time.

You know, he was evaluated and found to be, you know, malingering and not trying hard to answer some of these questions, and I think that maybe manifested with response to some of the questions about, you know, what's the Judge do and what's the jury do and whatnot.

And so, frankly, the way I read this, Mr. Wright, just because you come to the Court again with a new affidavit from a different doctor, essentially the same kinds of things that we've already heard about, I don't know that that creates new doubt and necessitates us going back to square one. That's my concern.

MR. WRIGHT: Okay. It's not a new affidavit from a new doctor. It is a current evaluation as to his mental competency, and this is a request under 405, and as the Supreme Court noticed, the prior hearing before Judge Delaney was under 460, and I had no right to present the evidence of Dr. Bittker at the hearing because it was under 460. And the Supreme Court said that any motion challenging petitioner's present competency, not past, based upon interactions and evaluation since his return from Lake's Crossing would require a broader inquiry should the

motion create sufficient doubt as to petitioner's competency to stand trial.

So you're saying the motion does not create sufficient doubt because Dr. Bittker may be a liar?

THE COURT: No, I --

MR. WRIGHT: May be on the take?

THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Wright. I never said that. In fact, in explicitly said I had no reason not to believe that Dr. Bittker evaluated Dr. Desai, and he's somewhat dependent on how Dr. Desai responds to these questions. Dr. Desai is largely controlling a lot of the testing, which has been recognized, that Dr. Desai is attempting — not by me, not recognized by me, recognized by doctors, recognized by experts that he's largely controlling this, and I believe, you know, looking over this, there was even reference to the fact that people normally with cognitive impairments don't answer the questions this way, and in fact, they try harder.

A lot of times it's difficult, and we can all think of past cases, to discern when someone is cognitively impaired because they try so hard to hide it. That's not what Dr. Desai is doing in this case. That's not me opining. That's the experts opining, Mr. Wright.

So what I am saying is after reviewing everything I don't see that -someone said he was incompetent before. What is different? That is, you know,
and you don't agree with that or whatever, and I just want to correct the record. I
explicitly say I have no reason at this point in time to think that Dr. Bittker is a liar, to
think that Dr. Bittker is unethical, and I never suggested that.

So I'm accepting the affidavit of Dr. Bittker as made in good faith to the best of his ability, but reading that and comparing it with the previous affidavits and what has already been said, why -- I mean, to me we're back to square one. We're

back with the same opinions that led to him being -- and I think rightfully so -- sent to Lake's Crossing. I think that the Judge in that case did the appropriate thing, and he was evaluated there. And so we've litigated this.

So now you have another doctor saying he's presently not competent. He's been, Mr. Wright, he's been found competent. You don't agree with that. You have never agreed with that. You've maintained his incompetence at numerous hearings in front of me, and so I just don't know why we need to go back to square one and litigate what's already been litigated because I don't see that there's any change here, that there's anything new, that there's new diagnostics. There's no evidence of any change, and so that's my position.

And I'm asking you, well, what other than Dr. Bittker saying he's presently not competent, what's different other than the normal progression of time and aging, which we can expect to see? And so --

MR. WRIGHT: The deterioration from a stroke, that's what Dr. Bittker said. He didn't say it was normal aging. He said looking at the report of Dr. Wu, which was another MRI, that the deterioration from the stroke has resulted in his inability to assist counsel, and what he has additionally you can swear me in or take my representations.

THE COURT: Mr. Wright, I'm accepting your representations --

MR. WRIGHT: I'm going to give you additionally. You asked for what's additional. What's additional is the Supreme Court has said, Look at his counsel and the counsel's ability to interact with the client, and I am telling you he doesn't understand the difference between the Federal charges and the State charges. He thinks the Federal Judge in this case is Sandy Bustos who is his pretrial services officer, okay. Maybe he's lying about that to me, right?

THE COURT: Maybe.

MR. WRIGHT: Why not have a hearing and find out instead of making all these pronouncements simply by reading things. That's what due process is for, to hear the evidence, hear the --

THE COURT: Mr. Wright, aren't we also supposed to rely on the written material that's been submitted to the Court, which I have done? And so --

MR. WRIGHT: Did you read Dr. Kinsora's report?

THE COURT: I've read everything that was submitted to me and everything --I reviewed everything from the record that was before Judge Delaney.

MR. WRIGHT: She wouldn't allow us to use Dr. Krelstein's report or Dr. Kinsora's report.

THE COURT: And what I'm saying is that, the parameters were upheld by the Supreme Court. So we're not going to, you know, address right, wrong, what Judge Delaney did. She set the parameters, and that was upheld.

So what are you asking for at this time? You know, you want to go to competency court and have two new physicians appointed and start that all over, or are you asking for an evidentiary hearing with Dr. Bittker?

MR. WRIGHT: I am asking --

THE COURT: I know your motion asked to be sent to competency court.

MR. WRIGHT: I am asking what Section 405 requires. I believe the evidence, and you accept Dr. Bittker's report as in good faith and accept his findings so we have --

THE COURT: Well, I say I have no reason at this point in time to have a quarrel with Dr. Bittker.

MR. WRIGHT: So you accept that this doctor, licensed, says he is not

competent. So I simply looked at 405, If a doubt arises as to competency suspend the proceeding. Then what? We go to 415. The Court shall appoint two psychiatrists, two psychologists or one psychiatrist and one psychologist to examine the defendant.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WRIGHT: And the way I read the procedures and what the Supreme Court was talking about between 405 and 415 and 460 was that this is where we were previously. We had Kinsora and Krelstein -- pardon me, Dr. Shera Bradley and Dr. Krelstein were appointed by Judge Glass to evaluate, and they both came back and determined he was not competent. At that point there would be a 405 hearing once the appointed two doctors make a determination if either party wants a hearing. Judge Glass didn't want a hearing.

THE COURT: He went to Lake's Crossing for thorough evaluation --

MR. WRIGHT: Correct. So I am asking --

THE COURT: -- and observation in a manner where there was day-to-day observation and it wasn't just -- well, it wasn't just dependent on, you know, a series of testing or whatnot.

MR. WRIGHT: They warehoused him and didn't do the tests that were recommended by Dr. Krelstein and Dr. Shera Bradley.

THE COURT: Here's what I'm hearing, Mr. Wright, and what concerns this Court. What I'm hearing is, you know, you disagree with the parameters of the hearing before Judge Delaney, and it sounds to me like really what you're seeking is another bite at that apple, another chance to have the hearing that you didn't get to have in front of Judge Delaney. That is my concern, that that's really, as I hear you speaking and what you're complaining about, that that's really what you want here.

You want what you were not given in the competency court. You want a chance to revisit all of this in a manner that you were denied previously. That's what I'm hearing, and --

MR. WRIGHT: Well, I'm not articulating myself well.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. WRIGHT: I'm not articulating myself well then because what I really want is my client to be examined, evaluated and treated because there is a doubt as to his competency. He does not remember the events. He can't communicate or assist with me, and what -- I don't want another hearing so I can have a hearing. I want him evaluated and treated, and there's a doubt as to his competency and that -- competency isn't something where we just find it once and then --

THE COURT: No, I understand there's an ongoing thing, and that's why we get back to the same thing. What is different? What is different today than in the past? If there were something different today, and I understand you're saying well, there's been progressive decline and whatnot, but to me, the doubt isn't your doubt. It's not Dr. Desai's doubt.

The Court has to say based on everything I think there's a doubt, and we need to proceed further. That's how I read NRS 178.405. Whose doubt is it? It's ultimately the Court has to say there's enough here to create a doubt, and we need to proceed further.

And let me just say this: There's no prohibition -- you know, Dr. Desai is out of custody -- if he wanted to see a physician and get treatment, he certainly could do that. There's no court order in place saying, oh, Dr. Desai, you can't get treatment. You can't help yourself. And so you keep saying, Well, he wants to be treated. Well, you know, he's out of custody. He's not like these other people who

are sitting in custody dependent on what services the jail gives him. If there were some treatment out there that you keep alluding to, then let him go get it.

MR. WRIGHT: He has. He has.

THE COURT: No one's preventing him.

MR. STAUDAHER: Your Honor, may ! --

MR. WRIGHT: He has and it has been ineffective, and it's in Dr. Bittker's supplemental December report.

THE COURT: The reason I say that is because you keep saying he wants to be treated. I'm not saying there's effective treatment or ineffective treatment. All I'm saying is, you know, if that's the case, let him be treated. Let him be treated. I mean, I just think it's either another bite at the apple, more continuances, more delays in this matter.

Mr. Staudaher.

MR. STAUDAHER: A couple of things. First of all, some of the items that counsel has referred to, the -- apparently the study of Dr. Wu, the letter from Dr. Wu, the telephone conversation with Dr. Wu, the interview with Kusum Desai that he was relying on in part, he had a -- as far as I can tell from this report, a single or at least a very limited interaction with Dr. Desai. The Lake's Crossing thing was six months long, and they watched him when he wasn't in front of people --

THE COURT: That was the point.

MR. STAUDAHER: -- that was the reason why -- one of the reasons that they believed he was malingering.

As far as the treatment issue is concerned, when he came back from -- and I'm talking about pre Lake's Crossing and after UCLA he comes back one of the things that they wanted him to do was to follow up with a speech pathologist. So he

goes to a speech pathologist here, and he gets evaluated, and they recommend a course of treatment. Dr. Desai never engaged in that. He never went back. They telephoned him; he just didn't respond.

The whole attitude of this man from the get go has been don't get anybody -- don't get in front of anybody that's going to recommend treatment, and if they do, I'm either not going to pursue it or I'm going to pursue it in a halfway manner, and then if they order a drug for me, I'm going to have serious side effects with the drug so I can't take it so I cannot be treated.

He has made no significant efforts at all in any report I have ever seen that indicate that he has sought out or wanted treatment for any supposed deficit that he may have. This whole evaluation by Dr. Wu, there's nothing in here that says that there has been evidence of an additional stroke or deterioration further from an objective review of the MRI data before that individual that he had deteriorated from one study to the next, and therefore, there is a reason for him to essentially have a problem.

Everybody is relying, everybody is relying on that man's words and his actions before the evaluators, which are completely crafted, as the Court's pointed out, to get what he wants. He is crazy like a fox. He's a competent as you and I are. He knows exactly what's going on, and he's using the system, and he's using it through his attorneys -- I'm not necessarily saying anything about Mr. Wright or Ms. Stanish in this case -- but he knows exactly what he's doing, and as long as he acts like a babbling idiot he's going to get what he wants. That's what he thinks.

One of the reasons why the Court -- or the State has asked this Court and the Court agreed to have Dr. Desai come in for every single hearing was so that the Court could observe and evaluate him. And I will point out one point.

One time back a number of hearings ago when there were a lot of individuals in this courtroom. We were all at the table, all the defense attorneys were there, all the defendants including -- excuse me, I think it was Nurse Mathahs as well as Mr. Cristalli, and I don't know if Eunice Morgan was here, but there was a crowd of people here. Dr. Desai was sitting in the back of the courtroom. Dr. Desai was sitting in the back of the courtroom with his wife. Your Honor asked Mr. Wright this question, directed at Mr. Wright, not directed at Dr. Desai but directed at Mr. Wright.

You said, shouldn't your client be sitting with you. That's all you said. I don't know if the Court remembers this or not or observed this, but what happened immediately following that question, Mr. Wright didn't turn around and ask his client to come up. Ms. Stanish didn't do that. His wife didn't say anything to him. He immediately got up himself from the back of the courtroom, walked out, walked around, stood right next to his client (sic). He completely understood the words being said by the Court, that what the Court was saying related to him, and that's an example and one of the reasons why we wanted him here on every event.

I think that the Court is right in the sense that the Court makes the evaluation, and again, I have not heard or seen anything based on what counsel has argued that shows that he is any different from an objective, physiologic perspective other than one individual who saw this person on a limited basis, and it's completely susceptible and dependent on the responses by Dr. Desai.

There's not also any indication whatsoever that there was any malingering testing done by this individual or anybody else, and that was paramount even in the pre Lake's Crossing evaluations where they said they didn't know because they did some of that testing. Lake's did.

I think at this point the Court is able to make the determination with the information that's presented, and I would submit that as far as what I've heard today that they have not met their burden.

THE COURT: All right. Here's the thing. The way I read NRS 178.40, if doubt arises, that means there has to be at least some threshold finding that there is doubt, and who has to find the doubt? The doubt isn't controlled by the defendant. The doubt isn't controlled by the defense team, and I don't need to go over the history of this case or possible motivations, but for obvious reasons that's not controlled by them. There has to be a finding, and I find that there is no evidence that anything has changed. There's no new, you know, objective diagnostics as Mr. Staudaher has pointed out.

You know, if there had been a new stroke, if there had even been a major medical event, open-heart surgery or something like that where you could say, well, maybe that's something that could have, you know, a diabetic emergency where we had something linking some kind of, you know, extreme medical event to cognitive decline, I would say, well, okay, we need to visit this. We need to evaluate this. There's something here. But there's no evidence of that. There's no evidence of any change. There's no evidence that there's anything different than what led Dr. Desai to be in front of Judge Glass, however long ago that was, and then to be sent to Lake's Crossing.

And when I prepared everything and reviewed everything I thought, well, do we need to have some kind of testimony from Dr. Bittker, and that's why for purposes of today I think accepting that he's an ethical man, he's obviously, you know, a medical doctor in good standing in this state, everything like that, you know, I can accept the evaluation.

But as we've all pointed -- or the Court has pointed out, a lot of the responses are completely controlled by Dr. Desai. And, you know, Judge Mosley, I believe, is the one who ordered that Dr. Desai come to court, and he does have reactions to what I say, you know, and so that tells me that he is listening, and he tries to look down or he does look down, you know, whether he's trying or not trying, you know, there's reaction going on. And I think it was a very -- I guess the State had requested it, but I think Judge Mosley's order that Dr. Desai appear was very well founded for that reason.

And so the motion to refer this matter to competency court is denied for the reasons that I have stated. I don't find anything here that justifies at this point in time additional inquiry, additional evaluation by professionals, or as I said, additional inquiry by this Court at this time. And so for that reason the matter is denied.

Now --

MR. WRIGHT: Just for clarification, I didn't care whether it went to competency court or this court --

THE COURT: No, it doesn't go to competency court, and I'm not required to send it --

MR. WRIGHT: Right.

THE COURT: -- and your request to send it to competency court is denied.

MR. WRIGHT: Right, and also my request to -- for appointment -- I mean, whether you do it or competency court --

THE COURT: Right. You're asking --

MR. WRIGHT: -- I mean, I didn't care, but does the Court do it --

THE COURT: -- that he have other experts appointed --

MR. WRIGHT: Right.

THE COURT: -- that then to go through the evaluation process and to have another hearing whether I do it or whether the competency court does it I think is largely immaterial, but I'm denying that request.

I don't see a reason. I don't find that the doubt is here based on my review of everything, the history of the case, the six months at Lake's Crossing, the fact that there's really nothing different in his change and looking, studying the affidavits that have been prepared in the past. And so for all of those reasons, I hope I have articulated this to — so that all of you can understand the rationale for my ruling, if you take it up on a writ, hopefully the Nevada Supreme Court whether they agree or disagree will understand the basis for my ruling. I'm not saying never in the future if there is, you know, a change, a stroke, a major medical event, something else, obviously you can revisit this.

At this point in time, I don't find -- I don't find the doubt that would justify this, and I don't -- again, there's no change here as I evaluate this, and I don't see the need for further inquiry at this point in time. Again, I'm not saying you -- of course there's an ongoing obligation as the defense attorney, and there can be ongoing review. But at this point I just don't see that there's anything different.

So I hope I've explained myself well enough regardless of whether people agree or disagree, but that's my finding at this point in time.

State would prepare the order on that, and if you need a transcript to reflect my findings you can get that.

MR. STAUDAHER: I think I will ask for it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Moving on. We also had a status check for today regarding the experts and trial readiness, and Mr. Cristalli is not here.

MR. STAUDAHER: Mr. Cristalli, Your Honor?

MS. MORGAN: I'm actually here on something else. THE COURT: Well, it was for the status check as to everybody. MR. STAUDAHER: He's no longer in the case. THE COURT: Oh, that's right. I'm sorry. Where are we on the experts because this was an issue last time before the trial date? MS. STANISH: Correct, and since our previous status check, I think I reported that we had three experts retained. Now we have four experts on retainer, Your Honor, who are still, you know, reviewing materials. THE COURT: Okay. How many additional experts do you anticipate that you're going to need in order to be ready for trial? MS. STANISH: I'm not sure until these four experts conclude their review. THE COURT: Okay. So in other words that may be sufficient, or you may need additional experts --MS. STANISH: Correct. THE COURT: -- and these experts may direct you, I guess, to other experts? MS. STANISH: That's correct. THE COURT: Okay, 'cause you would rely on, like, them as to who's good in the field and that sort of thing?

MS. STANISH: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Let's set another status check for six weeks.

And, Mr. Santacroce, where are you with respect to experts? Are you going to be using the same experts or --

MR. SANTACROCE: Yes, we're working on a joint defense regarding the experts.

1	THE COURT: All right. So you won't have any additional experts then, is that	t
2	correct?	ļ
3	MR. SANTACROCE: I might have. I'm waiting on the review of these	
4	experts.	
5	THE COURT: All right. We'll set a status check for six weeks.	
6	THE CLERK: March 7 <sup>th</sup> at 9:30.	
7	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.	
8	MR. STAUDAHER: Thank you, Your Honor.	
9	-oOo-	
10	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case.	
11	proceedings in the above-entitled case.	
12	Jani Illan	
13	JANIE L. OLSEN  Recorder/Transcriber	
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# Exhibit 6

Desai's Motion for Competency Evaluation, 12/21/12 (#76-92)

/ Electronically Filed 12/21/2012 04:12:46 PM

MOTN 1 RICHARD A. WRIGHT, ESQUIRE 2 Nevada Bar No. 886 CLERK OF THE COURT MARGARET M. STANISH 3 Nevada Bar No. 4056 WRIGHT STANISH & WINCKLER 4 300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 701 Las Vegas, NV 89101 5 (702) 382-4004 Attorneys for Dipak Desai 6 7 8 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 12 C-12-283381-1 THE STATE OF NEVADA 13 CASE NO. G265107 DEPT. NO. XXI 14 Plaintiff, DATE OF HEARING: //8//3 15 TIME OF HEARING: 9:30 qm 16 DEFENDANT DESAI'S MOTION DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI, #1240942, AND NOTICE OF MOTION 17 FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION Defendant. 18 DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI, by and through his attorney, Richard A. Wright, WRIGHT 19 STANISH & WINCKLER, moves for a competency evaluation. Based on counsel's 20 interactions with Desai and the attached psychiatric evaluation, a bona fide doubt exists as to 21 22 Desai's present ability to assist counsel at trial. 23 This motion is based upon the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Right to Counsel clause in the Sixth Amendment to the United States 24 Constitution and the corresponding clauses in Article I, Section 8, of the Nevada Constitution; **25** NRS 178.415; Order in Desai v. Eighth Jud. Distr Crt., No. 60038 (Nev. Sup. Ct., Jan. 24, 26 27

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3	2012); and the following Points and Authorities.
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5	DATED this 21, day of December 2012.
6	
7	Respectfully Submitted,
8	WRIGHT STANISH & WINCKLER
9	BY Parkt
10	RICHARD A. WRIGHT Counsel for DESAI
11	Counsel for Dissal
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NOTICE OF MOTION PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above Motion will be brought on for hearing in District Court, Department 21, on the \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_JANUARY\_,\_\_\_, at the hour of 9:30 A, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. Dated this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_

### POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

### A. Procedural Facts

On or about June 16, 2010, the State filed an unopposed motion to transfer this matter to Competency Court. On February 8, 2011, the Competency Court ruled that Desai was deemed incompetent by the two court-appointed evaluators, Michael S. Krelstein, M.D., and Shera D. Bradley, Ph.D. He was sent to Lake's Crossing for a period of approximately six months. On or about September 20, 2011, Lake's Crossing issued a competency report concluding that Desai was competent.

Desai requested a competency hearing to afford the defense a full opportunity to examine and challenge the conclusions of the Lake's Crossing evaluators pursuant to NRS 178.460(1). Competency Court set a competency hearing but limited Desai to cross-examining the Lake's Crossing doctors and presenting only one expert whose testimony would be restricted to evaluations, if any, occurring after his return from Lake's Crossing.

Desai immediately sought extraordinary relief from the Nevada Supreme Court from the restricted scope of the Section 178.460 competency hearing. By order dated January 24, 2012, the Nevada Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of a hearing regarding the conclusions of the Lake Crossing evaluators pursuant to NRS 178.460. It noted, however, that Desai would be afforded a broader inquiry into his competency pursuant to a new motion questioning his present competency under NRS 178.405 and 178.415. The Court stated:

We note that any motion challenging petitioner's present competency (based on interactions and evaluations since his return from lake's Crossing) would require a broader inquiry should the motion create sufficient doubt as to petitioner's competency to stand trial to warrant such an inquiry. See [State v. Fergusen, 124 Nev. 795, 805, 192 P.3d 712, 719 (2008)], Morales v. State, 116 Nev. 19, 22, 922 P.2d 252, 254 (2000); NRS 178.405; NRS 178.415. But that inquiry is not part of the proceedings under NRS 178.460.

Order in Desai, No. 60038, \*2, n. 1.

Following a hearing, Department 25 determined that Desai was competent to stand trial

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by order dated February 2, 2012.

#### В. Request for Competency Evaluation

Under NRS 178.405, "if doubt arises as to the competence of the defendant, the court shall suspend the proceedings . . . until the question of competence is determined." Based on this section and the above-cited authority, Desai requests a suspension of all proceedings pending a competency determination.1 Sufficient doubt exists as to Desai's present competency by virtue of the attached independent neuropsychiatric evaluations of Thomas E. Bittker, M.D., dated November 1, 2012 and December 5, 2012. Upon review of medical records and a recent neuropsyhiatric examination, Dr. Bittker concludes that Desai is incompetent under the Dusky standard.

Additionally, undersigned counsel continues to express a bona fide doubt as to his client's competency. See, Nevada v. Calvin, 122 Nev. 1178, 1184, 147 P.3d 1097, 1100 (2006), citing, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177 n. 13 (1975)(counsel's doubts as to client's competency are especially relevant given close contact).

Accordingly, Desai moves for a suspension of all proceedings and transference of the competency issue to Competency Court for further competency proceedings.

DATED this 21st day of December 20122.

Respectfully Submitted,

WRIGHT STANISH & WINCKLER

Counsel for Desai

<sup>1</sup> Desai reserves the right to seek (1) reconsideration of the Nevada Supreme Court's Order Granting Petition in Part in Desai v. Eight Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 61230 (Nev. Dec. 21, 2012); and (2) seek relief from this Court's denial of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Alternative Motion to Dismiss the Murder Indictment.

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION AND NOTICE OF MOTION FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2/4 day od December, 2012, I caused a copy of the foregoing Defendant's Motion and Notice of Motion for Competency Evaluation to be e-filed, fax or hand-delivered to:

Michael V. Staudaher Chief Deputy District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue Third Floor Las Vegas, NV 89101 702-477-2994

Alley Crosell

An Employee of Wright Stanish & Winckley

# Thomas E. Bittker, M.D., Ltd.

Diplomate, American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology Distinguished Life Fellow, American Psychiatric Association Diplomate in Forensic Psychiatry, American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology

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Phone:

(702) 382-4004

Fax:

(702) 382-4800

INDEPENDENT NEUROPSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

RE: DESAI, DIPAK Date: 11/01/2012

REASON FOR ASSESSMENT: Richard Wright, attorney for defendant Dipak Desai has requested that I perform an Independent Neuropsychiatric Assessment on Dr. Desai with particular attention to his competence to stand trial.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Dr. Desai is being charged with several felonies including racketeering, performance of acts in reckless disregard of persons or property, criminal negligence of patients, insurance fraud, and obtaining money under false pretences.

Dr. Desai is a gastroenterologist who is currently disabled coincident to at least two strokes, one which occurred on September 27, 2007 and the second which occurred in July 13, 2008. The strokes have left him with profound deficits in memory, speech, and executive functioning.

## SOURCES OF INFORMATION:

- 1. Post-competency hearing argument filed by attorney Richard Wright on January 31, 2012.
- 2. Assessment of neurocognitive processing performed by Thomas F. Kinsora, Ph.D. in 2009.

Page 1 of 9

RE: DESAI, DIPAK Date: 11/01/2012

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- 3. Staged complaint against defendant filed in June 2010.
- 4. Competency evaluation performed by Michael S. Krelstein, M.D. on a report filed on February 6, 2011.
- 5. Competency evaluation by Shera D. Bradley, Ph.D. filed in a report of February 7, 2011.
- 6. Evaluation of competency performed by Sally Farmer, Ph.D. at Lake's Crossing Center on 09/01/11.
- 7. Psychiatric evaluation at Lake's Crossing Center performed by Linda Bradley, M.D. on 09/02/11.
- 8. Social history of Tom Durante, LCSW on 05/09/11.
- 9. Psychiatric evaluation by Steven J. Zuchowski on 09/06/11.
- 10. Order Denying Petition by Justice Douglas.
- 11. Finding of Competency of January 27, 2012 by Judge Kathleen E. Delaney.
- 12. Discharge summary from Chinese Hospital September 29, 2007.
- 13. Neurological consultations by V. Veraptan, MD.
- 14. Neuroimaging studies by V. Veraptan, MD.
- 15. Outpatient speech pathology assessment by Michelle Gannan of 4/22/2009.
- 16. Psychological report of Thomas Kinsora of 3/12/09: Assessment of neurocognitive processing.
- 17. Neurological consultation by David Liebeskind of UCLA.
- 18. Summerlin Hospital neurological consultations by Dr. Veraptan 6/1/2009.
- 19. Neurological consultation by William Torch, MD on 9/28/11.
- 20. Nevada Imaging Center studies including MRI of the brain with and without contrast dated 10/05/2007, 11/02/2007, 02/05/2008, 02/25/2009, 07/02/2010.
- 21. Neuroimaging studies from UCLA extending from 07/03/2008 to 07/14/2008.
- 22. Neuroimaging studies and Doppler studies from Summerlin Hospital dated 7/28/1998, and 06/01/2009.
- 23. MRI study of brain by Anthony Bruno, MD on 6/13/2011.
- 24. Positron emission tomography study of 11/21/2007.
- 25. Interview with Dr. Kusum Desai, the wife of Dipak Desai.
- 26. Psychiatric examination of the defendant by Thomas E. Bittker, MD on 10/01/12.
- 27. Telephone consultation with Dr. Joseph Wu 10/24/12.
- 28. Letter from Dr. Joseph C. Wu on 10/24/12.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Dipak Desai is a 62-year-old married former gastroenterologist who is currently disabled coincident to two strokes, one suffered on September 27, 2007 and the other suffered on July 13, 2008. Dr. Desai is the father of three daughters, ages 26 through 31. He is married to Kusum Desai, a

RE: DESAI, DIPAK Date: 11/01/2012

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pulmonologist who practices in Las Vegas. Dr. Desai has been formally disabled since the second stroke, which occurred in July of 2008.

He is confronting multiple criminal charges as outlined above.

Dr. Desai grew up in India and attended medical school in India, completed his residency in New York City, and moved to Las Vegas in 1980 where he established his gastroenterology practice.

From 1993 to 2001 he served on the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners and had been at the time of his 2008 stroke, the Medical Director of the Department of Gastroenterology at the University Medical Center.

Dr. Desai and his wife state that his primary life stressors have occurred coincident to his medical challenges following the stroke as well as the challenges of his criminal cases. Although numerous observers have commented about Dr. Desai's presumed post-stroke depression, Dr. Desai denies subjective sense of this depression.

FAMILY HISTORY: Dr. Desai is the youngest in a sibship of four children. Two of his older sisters immigrated to the United States and one remains in India. His father is deceased coincident to a myocardial infarction, which occurred when his father was 55 years old and when Dr. Desai was in his 30's. His mother is 85 years old, alive, and recently served as Dr. Desai's caretaker.

Dr. Desai and his wife deny any family history of depression, anxiety, or substance abuse problems.

MEDICAL HISTORY: Dr. Desai suffered a myocardial infarction at age 37 and underwent coronary artery bypass surgery coincident to that infarction. He suffered his initial venous stroke on September 27, 2007

The second stroke, a massive lacunar stroke, occurred on July 13, 2008. According to Dr. Kusum Desai (Dr. Desai's wife), Dr. Desai demonstrated significant improvement in functioning when he was treated at the UCLA Post-Stroke Intervention Unit for approximately twelve weeks after his July 2008 episode. Over the past year, however, she has noted progressive deterioration in Dr. Desai's memory, evidenced by his inability to recall events of the previous day, as well as increasing confusion. She denies any history of incontinence or seizure.

## INDEPENDENT NEU SYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

RE: DESAI, DIPAK Date: 11/01/2012

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MEDICATION ALLERGIES: Dr. Desai has had a negative response to Coreg, which yielded lightheadedness.

CURRENT MEDICATIONS: Include aspirin at 50 mg a day, Persantine 75 mg b.i.d., Ramipril 2.5 mg per day, and Lipitor 20 mg per day. Dr. Desai takes no psychotropic medications.

PSYCHIATRIC REVIEW OF SYSTEMS: Dr. Desai denies suicidal ideation. He reports low energy, poor concentration, significant difficulty with memory, and is saddened by the impact that his illness has had on his wife.

MENTAL STATUS EXAM: The patient arrived on time for his appointment in the company of his wife. He walked slowly to the interview room. His speech was slow. He had difficulty expressing himself and finding words. He relied on his wife heavily to relate his history.

His affect was blunted. His speech pace was slow with increased speech latency and speech lag. Performance on the mini mental status exam indicated significant deficits consistent with a vascular dementia. Dr. Desai was disoriented to year (2011), season (winter), and date, but he did know the day.

He was aware that he was in Nevada and in Reno and knew that he was in a doctor's office. He could register two words out of three, but could only recall one of three words three minutes after registration. He could not perform serial subtraction successfully and when asked to spell "world" backwards, spelled it as "dlow".

He could name a pencil and a watch. He could repeat "no ifs, ands, or buts" and he could follow a three-stage command. He read and obeyed the command "close your eyes". He could write a sentence spontaneously. When asked to copy two intersecting trapezoids he copied them, but did not intersect the two figures. Total score was 16 out of 30.

COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT: Dr. Desai offered only a superficial recognition of the role that various court principals play in the trial process. He did not understand the charges he was confronting. He referred to the judge as "a good guy who keeps everybody quiet". He could not recall the function of a jury, other than "lots of people sit there". He referred to the prosecuting attorney's role as "fighting with Richard", and he referred to Mr. Wright's role as "a good guy who holds my

## INDEPENDENT NEW SYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

RE: DESAI, DIPAK Date: 11/01/2012

Page - 5 -

hand". He was unable to appraise the available defenses. He did understand that if convicted he would not be able to see his wife or children and that he would be kept locked up.

Regarding specific procedural competencies necessary to be considered competent, Dr. Desai failed in a number of areas. Specifically, he was unable to appraise legal defenses available. He was unable to plan a legal strategy. His ability to appraise the roles of various participants in the courtroom proceedings was marginal. His understanding of court procedures was marginal. His appreciation of the charges was inadequate. His appreciation of the range of possible penalties was inadequate. His ability to appraise a likely outcome was marginal. His capacity to disclose to the attorney available pertinent facts surrounding his offense was inadequate and likely to be permanently compromised coincident to his memory deficits. His capacity to challenge prosecution witnesses realistically was inadequate. His capacity to testify relevantly was inadequate.

Employing the Dusky criteria, the defendant demonstrated an incapacity to fully understand the nature of the criminal charges with which he is confronted, moderate impairment in his ability to understand the nature and purposes of court proceeds, and severely impaired in his ability to aid and assist counsel.

REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING: Dr. Kinsora's testing concludes "Findings in a nutshell - performance on the tests were of indeterminate validity since some of the performance was so poor. This examiner needs to determine if the severity of damage to medial temporal, hippocampal, and anterior occipital regions are such that his performance is plausible. Thus, additional information is needed by this examiner. Severe depression is present that is confounding the clinical picture. He would have difficulty assisting counsel currently just based on his depression, if genuine treatment is recommended".

Subsequent testing concludes "Performance is likely valid and consistent with degree and location of brain damage. Deficits are widespread, but most pronounced in the areas of word finding, memory, and executive control. Depression continues to be significant, but is becoming manageable. He is likely competent based on NRS criteria 178.400, but in the borderline range with regard to assisting counsel he can be considered impaired in his ability to assist counsel, but is not clearly unable to assist counsel".

# Independent neu psychiatric assessment

RE: DESAI, DIPAK Date: 11/01/2012

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Dr. Krelstein concludes "Prima Facie, Dr. Desai presents as a demented and procedurally incompetent man with objective neurological findings in support of his cognitive deterioration. At the same time, Dr. Desai has apparently not received aggressive neurocognitive rehabilitation, neurocognitive enhancers, and/or treatment for a secondary poststroke depression. There remains an element of dissimulation and/or purposeful symptom embellishment that such does not account for the bulk of his impairment in my opinion. these findings, Dr. Desai should be strongly considered for admission into Lake's Crossing for aggressive treatment and more comprehensive neurocognitive testing. Given Dr. Desai's previous high level of function and his superior intellect (which theoretically mitigates the cognitive effects of stroke), anticipated response to aggressive treatment and subtracting the suspected elements of symptom embellishment, there is at least a reasonable chance that competency could be restored. would not be expectedly obtained in an outpatient setting".

According to Dr. Sally Farmer of the Lake's Crossing Center, "It is this evaluator's professional opinion that Dr. Dipak Kantilal Desai possesses the ability to understand the nature of the criminal charges against him, to understand the nature and purpose of the court proceedings, and to aid and assist his counsel in his defense at any time during the proceedings with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. He has been able to do so under less formal settings (such as during legal process classes). Although his strokes have diminished his cognitive abilities to some extent, in this writer's opinion they are sufficiently intact for him to proceed to adjudication ... It is this evaluator's professional opinion that Dr. Dipak Kantilal Desai has demonstrated the ability to understand the nature of the criminal charges against him, to understand the nature and purpose of the court proceedings, and to aid and assist his counsel in his defense at any time during the proceedings with a reasonable degree of rational understanding". Note that this assessment was completed on 09/01/11, approximately 13 months prior to my assessment.

According to Dr. Zuchowski, "Given Dr. Desai's alleged embellishment and failure to cooperate fully with psychological testing, it is impossible to determine the precise extent of his current cognitive deficits, if any. His word-finding difficulty has been consistent from examiner to examiner and over time, this is likely authentic; however this does not have a significant impact on his competency to stand trial status. His alleged deficits and working memory appear heavily embellished,

RE: DESAI, DIPAK Date: 11/01/2012

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given his relatively preserved functioning in the hospital milieu. Individuals with as severe deficits as Dr. Desai claims are not able to function well, even in the structured setting in a hospital ward. They would likely appear befuddled, needing considerable guidance from staff surrounding their activities of daily living including personal hygiene, meals, and navigating to and from living areas. . Although some authentic level of cognitive deficit cannot be ruled out, it is my opinion that his current level of functioning reflects an individual who meets competency to stand trial criteria". Similar to Dr. Farmer's assessment, Dr. Zuchowski's assessment was performed approximately 13 months prior to my assessment of Dr. Desai.

Brain imaging studies confirm the presence of an area of old infarction in the left posterior inferior temporal lobes, bilateral medial occipital lobes, right lateral occipital lobe, left thalamus and left hemicerebellum.

FORMULATION: Dr. Desai presents with a history of two cerebrovascular accidents that have left him with significant deficits in intellectual performance, ability to retain and recall information, thought organization, and adaptive capacities. He is currently reliant on his wife for much of his executive functioning.

He scores poorly on one of the most critical elements in competency, and that is ability to aid and assist counsel, largely coincident to his memory deficits and his inability to integrate new information.

There is a sharp divide between the impressions of the professionals at the Lake's Crossing Center when compared with Dr. Kinsora, Dr. Krelstein & Dr. Shera Bradley. Dr. Desai's performance on the mini mental status exam, in brief, confirms the findings of significant deficits as related in Dr. Kinsora's, and Dr. Krelstein's reports.

He had achieved modest stabilization coincident to the aggressive interventions at the UCLA Stroke Center; however, in recent months, according to his wife, there has been progressive deterioration in his functioning.

#### DIAGNOSES:

AXIS I: Vascular Dementia with Depressed Mood by History. (290.43) The dementia is characterized by memory

RE: DESAI, DIPAK Date: 11/01/2012

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impairment (impaired ability to learn new information or to recall previously learned information), and aphasia, apraxia, and disturbances in executive functioning.

Depression Secondary to Medical Condition (293.70)

AXIS II:

Language Deficit Secondary to Cerebral Vascular Accident.

AXIS III:

Status Post Venous and Arterial Strokes.

Hypertension. Hyperlipidemia.

AXIS IV:

Stressors - Confronting Felony Charges, Loss of Vocation, Profound Medical Problems.

AXIS V:

40/40.

OPINION REGARDING COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: Dr. Desai unfortunately falls short of a number of key abilities necessary to be competent to stand trial. Specifically, he has only the most superficial awareness of the players in the courtroom process, he cannot recall events sufficient to aid in his defense, he lacks sufficient cognitive flexibility to fully integrate the trial proceedings, and his speech impairments are sufficient to cause him great challenge in expressing his thoughts to his attorney. All of these deficits conspire to undermine his ability to aid and assist counsel sufficiently to allow him to participate effectively in his own defense.

There are a number of complex charges arrayed against Dr. Desai. Because of the complexity of the charges, even with the provision of his historical information by other sources, his ability to appreciate his reasoning at the time of the alleged offenses and to attempt to justify his behaviors have been profoundly impaired by his strokes.

In addition to the above, Dr. Desai is suffering from a significant depression, which is impacting his ability to initiate actions, his attention and concentration, and his motivation. Although previously a trial of antidepressants was initiated, that trial terminated coincident to complications with his various vascular medications. A further trial would be warranted predicated on mutual endorsement of both his treating psychiatrists and his cardiologist.

### -INDEPENDENT NEW SYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

RE: DESAI, DIPAK Date: 11/01/2012

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Finally, according to the history I reviewed, I see no evidence of any aggressive efforts to rehabilitate Dr. Desai following his strokes, save for the initial interventions at UCLA. Intensive neurocognitive treatment and speech therapy would be warranted as part of an integrative comprehensive stroke rehabilitation effort to determine if the deficits presented to me at the time of my examination are reversible and if Dr. Desai's capacities can be restored sufficient to consider him competent to stand trial.

I would welcome reevaluating Dr. Desai following such interventions.

Sincerely,

Thomas E. Bittker, M.D.

TEB/vs/jld

### Thomas E. Bittker, M.D., Ltd.

Diplomate, American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology Distinguished Life Fellow, American Psychiatric Association Diplomate in Forensic Psychiatry, American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology

> 80 Continental Drive, Suite 200 Reno, NV 89509 (775) 329-4284

December 05, 2012

Margaret Stanish c/o Wright Stanish & Winckler 300 South 4<sup>th</sup> Street, Suite 701 Las Vegas, NV 89101

Phone:

(702) 382-4004

Fax:

(702) 382-4800

RE: DESAI, DIPAK

Dear Ms. Stanish:

Pursuant to your request, I have reviewed the aphasia evaluation performed by the UCLA Outpatient Speech Pathology Department authored by Jennifer H. Bullaro, SLP on November 20, 2012.

According to Ms. Bullaro, "Language, auditory comprehension, biographical yes/no questions, 8/8 correct. The patient hesitated before answering these questions. Simple yes/no questions, 4/8 correct. The patient hesitated before answering; he answered "I don't know" for two questions. Complex yes/no questions, 2/6 correct. The patient asked for repetition of most questions; the patient did not provide yes/no answers; answers were tangential. Commands: The patient followed up with two-step command accurately. He demonstrated a recency effect with three-step commands. Short Story Comprehension: Conversation: The patient did not attempt to participate in conversation. He repeatedly stated "I can't understand what you're saying". Written Comprehension, WAB written commands: The patient followed 2/3 written one-step commands. sentence and paragraph completion: The patient was unable to complete simple sentence completion accurately. Spoken Expression Confrontation Naming: The patient accurately named 2/15 pictures. . . Conversation: The patient required clinician encouragement to attempt conversation. He repeatedly stated "I'm sorry". Additionally, he stated "I feel very sad that I cannot come up with the word for people who want to know things". Dr. Desai demonstrates signs and symptoms consistent

RE: DESAI, DII
Date: 12/05/2012

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with a diagnosis of aphasia. He is able to understand some questions with reasonable accuracy. His auditory comprehension deteriorates with increased complexity. Spoken expression is halting and filled with paraphasias and circumlocutions. patient requires encouragement to attempt communication. . . Spoken Language Comprehension: Level II - With consistent maximal cues the individual was able to follow simple directions, respond to simple yes/no questions in context, and respond to simple words or phrases related to personal needs. Spoken Language Expression: Level IV - Individual successfully able to initiate communication using spoken language in simple structured conversations and routine daily activities with familiar communication partners. . . PROGNOSIS FOR IMPROVED LANGUAGE FUNCTION: Prognosis for improved language function through therapy is poor given the amount of time since the patient's neurological insult and his progress to date.

SUMMARY IMPRESSIONS: The finding of the Speech Pathology Center is consistent with the psychological testing of Dr. Thomas Kinsora, is consistent with the competency evaluation of Michael S. Krelstein in his report filed February 6, 2011, the MRI study of the brain by Anthony Bruno, M.D. of 06/13/11, the positronemission tomography study of 11/21/07, and the reports of Dr. Joseph Wu of 10/24/12. In addition, they confirm the findings in my own neuropsychiatric examination. On the basis of all of the above, I can state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Dr. Desai's potential to recapture sufficient cognitive functioning to permit him to be competent to stand trial is remote. In addition, the UCLA study of November 20, 2012 indicates no improvement in Dr. Desai from their assessment at the time of his initial evaluations at UCLA. Consequently, it is unlikely that further rehabilitative interventions will show significant promise in restoring Dr. Desai's mental capacity sufficiently to permit him to stand trial.

Sincerely,

Thomas E. Bittker, M.D. TEB/vs/jld

### Exhibit 5

Finding of Competency, 2/2/12 (#72-75)

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**FFCL** 

DISTRICT COURT

Hun & Linum.

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

A Leganories of the

Plaintiff,

Case No.: 10C265107-1

Dept. No.: XXV

nough after to said

DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI, #1240942

**阿拉克斯斯斯斯 (阿斯斯斯) 医学术氏疗的** 

Defendant

Date of Hearing: January 27, 2012 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.

FINDING OF COMPETENCY

IT APPEARING TO THE COURT that, on or about March 24, 2011, the Sheriff conveyed Defendant, Dipak Kantilal Desai ("Defendant"), into the custody of a designee of the Administrator of the Division of Mental Health and Developmental Services of the Department of Health and Human Services for detention and treatment at Lake's Crossing Center, the Division's secured facility, pursuant to NRS 178, 425(1);

IT FURTHER APPEARING that, upon Defendant's admission to Lake's Crossing Center, the Administrator's designee appointed a licensed psychiatrist. Dr. Steven Zuchowski, and a licensed psychologist, Dr. Sally Farmer, from the treatment team, as well as a licensed psychiatrist, Dr. Lindell Bradley, who was not a member of the treatment team, all three of whom were certified pursuant to NRS 178.417, to evaluate the current competency of Defendant, pursuant to NRS 178.455(1);

IT FURTHER APPEARING that, in a letter dated September 20, 2011, the Administrator's designee reported in writing to the Court that Defendant is of sufficient mentality to be able to understand the nature of the criminal charge against him and, by

KATHLEEN E. DELANEY

DEPARTMENT TWENTY FIVE LAS VEGAS NV 89155

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 $y \mapsto (\mathbb{R}_+^{\mathrm{TY}},$ 

KATHLEEN E. DELANEY DISTRICT JUDGE

DEPARTMENT TWENTY FIVE LAS VEGAS NV 89155 reason thereof, is able to assist his counsel in the defense interposed upon the trial or against the pronouncement of the judgment thereafter, pursuant to NRS 178.450(2);

IT FURTHER APPEARING that Defendant requested, and the Court did, in fact, hold a hearing on January 27, 2012, at which the District Attorney and Defendant's counselwere given the opportunity to examine the Lake's Crossing Center evaluators on their respective reports, pursuant to NRS 178:460(1), and

IT FURTHER APPEARING that the Court gave Defendant the opportunity at the time of the January 27, 2012 hearing to present testimony of any psychologist or psychiatrist who may have examined Defendant subsequent to his return from Lake's Crossing Center and who would opine that Defendant was not able to understand the charges against him or assist counsel in his defense despite his treatment at Lake's Crossing Center, but Defendant neither identified nor called an additional witness; now, therefore:

THE COURT FINDS, pursuant to NRS 178.460(3), that Defendant is competent to stand trial in the above-entitled matter. The testimony provided by the Lake's Crossing Center evaluators at the January 27, 2012 hearing consistently and overwhelmingly established Defendant's sufficient present ability to understand the charges against him and to assist counsel in his defense, and Defendant provided no credible evidence to the contrary. None of the evaluators dispute the existence of cognitive deficits secondary to two strokes suffered by the Defendant in September, 2007 and July, 2008, respectively. Following approximately six months of observation of the Defendant between March and September, 2011, however, all three evaluators independently stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Defendant is competent and obviously exaggerating his symptoms.

During Defendant's extended stay at Lake's Crossing Center, the evaluators regularly observed Defendant's behavior and functional abilities both directly and

KATHLEEN E. DELANEY DISTRICT JUDGE

DEPARTMENT TWENTY FIVE LAS VEGAS NV 89155 indirectly, subjected the Defendant to multiple independent psychological tests, and thoroughly reviewed all of Defendant's medical and legal records. At no time, other than when directly questioned by his evaluators, did Defendant actually exhibit any cognitive deficits. As stated on page 5 of Dr. Farmer's report, "[Defendant] easily learned the rules, restrictions, and schedule in place in the milieu. He has been responsive to staff direction and cooperative with all procedures. Unlike Lake's Crossing Center clients with serious memory problems, he has always found his room and various facilities (including the kitchen, laundry, canteen, barber shop and classrooms) without difficulty." Dr. Farmer adds later on the same page, "[Defendant] has been compliant with his medication regimen, and has been able to solve problems (such as receiving food that is not on his vegetarian diet) that have, arisen in his daily life." Similar observations of Defendant's unimpaired memory function and problem solving abilities were reported by Drs. Zuchowski and Bradley.

The only impediment to competency asserted by the Defendant is self-reported memory loss, secondary to two strokes, regarding facts relevant to his criminal charges. Memory loss itself, even if true, is not a bar to prosecution of an otherwise competent Defendant. Further, there is no indication in the present record that Defendant and his counsel would be unable to reconstruct the events of the alleged crimes for which he is accused or to raise any possible defenses to the evidence against him. Finally, Defendant's performance on at least one independent psychological test administered to him during his tenure at Lake's Crossing Center, the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM), which is used to distinguish between the truly memory impaired and malingerers, suggested Defendant was feigning his memory deficits to greater degree than would be expected from the neurological damage caused by his stokes.

1. 182

For all of the reasons stated herein, and based on the arguments of counsel and the record before the Court.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant, Dipak Kantilal Desai, return to Department XIV of the Eighth Judicial District Court to proceed with adjudication of the instant criminal case in the normal course;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court's Order to Release and Readmit to Bail filed on September 29, 2011, shall remain in effect until further notice by the Court; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Exhibits admitted into evidence at the time of the January 27, 2012 hearing shall be entered into the official record of the proceedings. The Court can find no applicable statutory or regulatory requirement, or otherwise compelling privacy or safety interest, that outweighs the public interest in access to the Courtiecord and a second of a second of the second of the second vision of

Dated this 2 day of February, 2012.

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District Court Judge

I hereby certify that on the date filed, this FINDING OF COMPETENCY was E-Served, mailed, or a copy placed in the attorney folders in the Clerk's Office to:

Michael Staudaher, Esq., Chief Deputy District Attorney - District Attorney's Office Richard A. Wright, Esq. - Wright Stanish & Winckler

Cindy Springberg

Judicial Executive Assistant

KATHLEEN E. DELANEY DISTRICT JUDGE

DEPARTMENT TWENTY FIVE LAS VEGAS NV 89155

### Exhibit 4

Excerpts of Minutes 7/21/10 and 2/8/11 (#68-71)

10.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
11.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
11.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
12.PERFORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM	202.595.2	Felony	01/01/1900
13. CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENT RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM	200.495.2b	Felony	01/01/1900
13.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
14.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
14.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
15.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
16.PERMORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM	202.595.2	Felony	01/01/1900
17. SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
17.CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIEN RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM 18.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	200.495.2b	Felony	01/01/1900
	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
18.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
19. PERMORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLSESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM	202.595.2	Felony	01/01/1900
20. SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
20.CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENT RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM	200.495.2b	Felony	01/01/1900
21.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
21.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
22.PERFORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PERPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM	202.595.2	Felony	01/01/1900
23. SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
23.CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENTS, RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM 24.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	200.495.2b	Felony	01/01/1900
	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
24.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
25.THEFT	205.0835.3	Felony	01/01/1900
26.THEFT-PENALTIES	205.0835	Felony	01/01/1900
26.OBTAIN MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSEES	205.380.1a	Felony	01/01/1900
27. OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES.	205.380	Felony	01/01/1900
27.IT SHALL BE NO DEFENSE TO A PROSECUTION FOR LARCENY THAT THE ACCUSED WAS 28.OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES	205.265	Felony	01/01/1900
	205.380	Felony	01/01/1900
28.IT SHALL BE NO DEFENSE TO A PROSECUTION FOR LARCENY THAT THE ACCUSED WAS 29.MURDER, SECOND DEGREE	205.265	Felony	01/01/1900
	200.030.2	Felony	09/21/2007

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

07/21/2010 All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) ()
ALL PENDING MOTIONS 7/21/10

07/21/2010 9:00 AM

(1) STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL PROVIDERS, FOR TRANSFER TO DEPARTMENT FIVE FOR A COMPETENCY EVALUATION AND FOR AN ORDER FOR THE RELEASE OF MEDICAL RECORDS AND ORDER FOR AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EVALUATION...(2) DEFT'S MOTION TO QUASH GRAND JURY SUBPONEA AND TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF ANY OTHER ABUSE OF GRAND JURY PROCESS...(3) NEVADA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPONEA AS TO #3: Mr. Bailus appeared on behalf of Nevada Mutual Insurance, advised he has spoken with Mr. Staudaher and requested this be taken OFF CALENDAR, COURT SO ORDERED, AS TO #2: Mr. Wright advised this has already been removed and requested it be taken OFF CALENDAR. COURT SO ORDERED. AS TO #1: Mr. Wright advised there is an issue of Dr. Desai's competency and stated he does not oppose giving the medical records to the Dept. 5 team for their evaluation, however, he does object to giving them to the State as some medical information was "leaked" to the press. Arguments by Mr. Staudaher including that there have been several hearings set for Dr. Desai to testify, however, due to his mental/physical condition, he has been unable to do so. Mr. Staudaher stated he would like to find out if Dr. Desai is malingering and would like to see the records of his condition. Colloquy as to independent physical examination. Mr. Wright had no objection. COURT ORDERED, matter REFERRED to Dept. 5 next week. Mr. Staudaher stated he would like a doctor to verify Dr. Desai's condition and would like some input as to what doctor is selected. Mr. Wright advised he had no objection as long as it was controlled by the Court. Court requested Judge Glass coordinate both physical and mental examinations. COURT ORDERED, Motion held in ABEYANCE until there has been a decision from Dept. 5. Mr. Staudaher requested that Dr. Desai be present for all hearings to show his stature to the Court. Mr. Wright advised he usually does not have Defendants come to Court for motions. FURTHER, any outstanding bench warrant is QUASHED. H.A. 7/29/10 9:30 AM STATUS CHECK: COORDINATE COMPETENCY EXAM

Parties Present Return to Register of Actions

10.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
11.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
11.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
12.PERFORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM	202.595.2	Felony	01/01/1900
13.CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENT RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM 13.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	200.495.2b	Felony	01/01/1900
	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
14.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
14.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
15.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
16.PERMORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM	202.595.2	Felony	01/01/1900
17.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
17.CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIEN RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM 18.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	200.495.2b	Felony	01/01/1900
	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
18.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
19. PERMORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLSESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM	202.595.2	Felony	01/01/1900
20.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
20.CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENT RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM 21.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	200.495.2b	Felony	01/01/1900
	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
21.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
22.PERFORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PERPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM 23.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	202.595.2	Felony	01/01/1900
	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
23.CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENTS, RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM 24.SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM.	200.495.2b	Felony	01/01/1900
	0.060	Felony	01/01/1900
24.INSURANCE FRAUD	686A.291	Felony	01/01/1900
25. THEFT	205.0835.3	Felony	01/01/1900
26. THEFT-PENALTIES	205.0835	Felony	01/01/1900
26.OBTAIN MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSEES	205.380.1a	Felony	01/01/1900
27.OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES.	205.380	Felony	01/01/1900
27.IT SHALL BE NO DEFENSE TO A PROSECUTION FOR LARCENY THAT THE ACCUSED WAS 28.OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES	205.265	Felony	01/01/1900
	205.380	Felony	01/01/1900
28.IT SHALL BE NO DEFENSE TO A PROSECUTION FOR LARCENY THAT THE ACCUSED WAS 29.MURDER, SECOND DEGREE	205.265	Felony	01/01/1900
	200.030.2	Felony	09/21/2007

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

02/08/2011 Further Proceedings: Competency (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Glass, Jackie)

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: COMPETENCY//STATUS CHECK: RECEIPT OF THE EVALUATIONS

Minutes 02/08/2011 9:30 AM APPEARANCES CONTINUED: Christina Greene of the Specialty Courts present. Conference at the Bench. Court stated it had a discussion with counsel regarding procedural matters; the reports came back finding the deft. not competent and in cases where the deft. is found not competent, the deft's are sent to Lakes Crossing in Reno, NV for restoration under NRS 178.425, therefore, the deft. has to be remanded as that is the only way for the deft. to be admitted to Lakes Crossing since there is no mental facility in Clark County. Court further stated that there are people who are severely mentally ill that are on the waiting list and the deft. will be sent to Lakes Crossing in the order the deft. is placed in as this Court will not bump anyone out of order. Court has checked with the jail and the next available transport date is in March, 2011, therefore, the deft. will have to surrender to the Court to be remanded, to have medical testing and a clearance done prior to admission. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED for the deft. to surrender himself; FURTHER ORDERED, deft. is not to travel outside of Clark County. Court stated it will send all documentation that has been gathered and will have it transmitted to Lakes Crossing; deft. will remain in Lakes Crossing until a determination is made that either the deft. is competent and returned or not competent without probability and at that time parties will receive notice and either side can challenge the findings, depending on the findings. Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Wright stated that he believes the deft's passport has been surrendered. Court Clerk advised the Court that the passport has been surrendered and is being held in the Vault. BAIL (H.A.) 3/17/11 9:30 AM FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: COMPETENCY/SURRENDER

Parties Present
Return to Register of Actions

### Exhibit 3

Independent Medical Evaluation, 4/14/13 [Filed under seal] (#40-67)

### Exhibit 2

Supreme Court Order Case No. 60038, 1/24/12 (#37-39)

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI, M.D.,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
KATHLEEN E. DELANEY, DISTRICT
JUDGE,
Respondents,
and
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Real Party in Interest.

No. 60038

FILED

JAN 2 4 2012

CLERIN ON SUPPREME COUNTY
BY DEPUTY CLERK

### ORDER DENYING PETITION

This original petition for a writ of mandamus challenges a district court's evidentiary decision related to a competency hearing under NRS 178.460. Having considered the petition and the State's answer on behalf of respondents, we conclude that our intervention is not warranted.

As a general rule, we will not exercise our discretion to consider a petition for a writ of mandamus when the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law such as an appeal. NRS 34.170. Despite that general reluctance, we have considered some issues related to competency hearings where an "important legal issue needs clarification." Sims v. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. 126, 129, 206 P.3d 980, 982 (2009). We are not convinced that this case presents such an issue.

Nor are we convinced that the district court manifestly abused its discretion or exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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37 12-02607 manner. See id. The documents submitted to this court indicate that the upcoming hearing is to examine the members of the Lake's Crossing treatment team on their report pursuant to NRS 178.460(1). The district court's evidentiary decision is consistent with NRS 178.460, which does not include the expansive language that appears in NRS 178.415, and is within the bounds of the law as set forth in our prior decision in Fergusen v. State, 124 Nev. 795, 192 P.3d 712 (2008), which addressed both an untimely motion for a hearing under NRS 178.460 and a subsequent, separate request for a new competency evaluation. See State v. Dist. Ct. (Armstrong), 127 Nev. \_\_\_, \_\_\_, \_\_\_, P.3d \_\_\_\_, \_\_\_ (Adv. Op. No. 84 at 5, December 29, 2011) (defining manifest abuse of discretion and arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion). Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.2

Douglas J

Gibbons

Parraguirre , J.

<sup>1</sup>We note that any motion challenging petitioner's present competency (based on interactions and evaluations since his return from Lake's Crossing) would require a broader inquiry should the motion create sufficient doubt as to petitioner's competency to stand trial to warrant such an inquiry. See Fergusen, 124 Nev. at 805, 192 P.3d at 719; Calvin v. State, 122 Nev. 1178, 147 P.3d 1097 (2006); Morales v. State, 116 Nev. 19, 22, 922 P.2d 252, 254 (2000); NRS 178.405; NRS 178.415. But that inquiry is not part of the proceedings under NRS 178.460.

<sup>2</sup>We deny the motion for a stay as moot.

cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge Wright Stanish & Winckler Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

### Exhibit 1

Fourth Amended Indictment 2/20/13 (#1-36)

Electronically Filed 02/20/2013 10:34:07 AM

1 AIND STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney CLERK OF THE COURT Nevada Bar #001565 3 MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #008273 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 11 Plaintiff. CASE NO: 10C265107-1 12 -VS-DEPT NO: XXI 13 DIPAK KANTILAL DESAL #1240942 14 RONALD ERNEST LAKEMAN. FOURTH AMENDED #2753504 15 INDICTMENT Defendant(s). 16 17 STATE OF NEVADA SS. 18 COUNTY OF CLARK 19 The Defendant(s) above named, DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI and RONALD ERNEST LAKEMAN accused by the Clark County Grand Jury of the crime(s) of 20 INSURANCE FRAUD (Category D Felony - NRS 686A.2815); PERFORMANCE OF 21 ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN 22 23 SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Category C Felony - NRS 0.060, 202,595); CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENTS RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY 24 HARM (Category B Felony - NRS 0.060, 200.495); THEFT (Category B Felony - NRS 25 205.0832, 205.0835); OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES (Category

B Felony - NRS 205.265, 205.380) and MURDER (SECOND DEGREE) (Category A

Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.020, 200.030, 200.070, 202.595, 200.495), committed at and

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within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, on or between June 3, 2005, and April 27, 2012, as follows:

#### **COUNT 1 - INSURANCE FRAUD**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about July 25, 2007, knowingly and willfully present, or cause to be presented a statement as a part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefits under a policy of insurance issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, knowing that the statement concealed or omitted facts, or contained false or misleading information concerning a fact material to said claim; and/or did assist, abet, solicit or conspire to present or cause to be presented a statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a broker or any agent thereof, knowing that said statement concealed or omitted facts, or did contain false or misleading information concerning a fact material to a claim for payment or other benefits under such policy issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, by falsely representing to ANTHEM BLUE CROSS – BLUE SHIELD that the billed anesthesia time and/or charges for the endoscopic procedure performed on SHARRIEFF ZIYAD were more than the actual anesthetic time and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to the Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or their medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedure; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

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## COUNT 2 - PERFORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about July 25, 2007, then and there willfully and unlawfully perform acts in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property resulting in substantial bodily harm to MICHAEL WASHINGTON, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to MICHAEL WASHINGTON, in the following manner, to wit: by directly or indirectly using and/or introducing contaminated medical instruments, supplies, and/or drugs upon or into the body of MICHAEL WASHINGTON which were contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said MICHAEL WASHINGTON; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he limited the use of medical supplies, and/or drugs and rushed patients, and/or patient procedures which in turn allowed DEFENDANT DESAI to directly or indirectly treat and/or perform an unreasonable number of patient procedures in a single day all at the expense of patient safety and well being, and which resulted in substandard care and jeopardized the safety of MICHAEL WASHINGTON and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this

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27 28 crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

## COUNT 3 - CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENTS RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS on or about July 25, 2007, being professional caretakers of MICHAEL WASHINGTON, did act or omit to act in an aggravated, reckless or gross manner, failing to provide such service, care or supervision as is reasonable and necessary to maintain the health or safety of said MICHAEL WASHINGTON, resulting in substantial bodily harm to MICHAEL WASHINGTON, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to MICHAEL WASHINGTON, said acts or omissions being such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent, careful person under the same circumstances that it is contrary to a proper regard for danger to human life or constitutes indifference to the resulting consequences, said consequences of the negligent act or omission being reasonably foreseeable; said danger to human life not being the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure, but the natural and probable result of said aggravated reckless or grossly negligent act or omission, to wit: by directly or indirectly using and/or introducing contaminated medical instruments, supplies, and/or drugs upon or into the body of MICHAEL WASHINGTON which were contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said MICHAEL WASHINGTON; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and

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KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he limited the use of medical supplies, and/or drugs and rushed patients, and/or patient procedures which in turn allowed DEFENDANT DESAI to directly or indirectly treat and/or perform an unreasonable number of patient procedures in a single day all at the expense of patient safety and well being, and which resulted in substandard care and jeopardized the safety of MICHAEL WASHINGTON and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

#### **COUNT 4 - INSURANCE FRAUD**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about July 25, 2007, knowingly and willfully present, or cause to be presented a statement as a part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefits under a policy of insurance issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, knowing that the statement concealed or omitted facts, or contained false or misleading information concerning a fact material to said claim; and/or did assist, abet, solicit or conspire to present or cause to be presented a statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a broker or any agent thereof, knowing that said statement concealed or omitted facts, or did contain false or misleading information concerning a fact material to a claim for payment or other benefits under such policy issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, by falsely representing to VETERANS ADMINISTRATION that the billed anesthesia time and/or charges for the endoscopic procedure performed on MICHAEL WASHINGTON were more than the actual anesthetic time and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or their medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedure; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding

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or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

#### **COUNT 5 - INSURANCE FRAUD**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, knowingly and willfully present, or cause to be presented a statement as a part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefits under a policy of insurance issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, knowing that the statement concealed or omitted facts, or contained false or misleading information concerning a fact material to said claim; and/or did assist, abet, solicit or conspire to present or cause to be presented a statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a broker or any agent thereof, knowing that said statement concealed or omitted facts, or did contain false or misleading information concerning a fact material to a claim for payment or other benefits under such policy issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, by falsely representing to ANTHEM BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD that the billed anesthesia time and/or charges for the endoscopic procedure performed on KENNETH RUBINO were more than the actual anesthetic time and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or their medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedure; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime. ///

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# <u>COUNT 6</u> - PERFORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, then and there willfully and unlawfully perform acts in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property resulting in substantial bodily harm to STACY HUTCHINSON, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to STACY HUTCHINSON, in the following manner, to wit: by directly or indirectly using and/or introducing contaminated medical instruments, supplies, and/or drugs upon or into the body of STACY HUTCHINSON which were contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said STACY HUTCHINSON; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he limited the use of medical supplies, and/or drugs and rushed patients, and/or patient procedures which in turn allowed DEFENDANT DESAI to directly or indirectly treat and/or perform an unreasonable number of patient procedures in a single day all at the expense of patient safety and well being, and which resulted in substandard care and jeopardized the safety of STACY HUTCHINSON and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime,

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Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

## <u>COUNT 7</u> - CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENTS RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS on or about September 21, 2007, being professional caretakers of STACY HUTCHINSON, did act or omit to act in an aggravated, reckless or gross manner, failing to provide such service, care or supervision as is reasonable and necessary to maintain the health or safety of said STACY HUTCHINSON, resulting in substantial bodily harm to STACY HUTCHINSON, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to STACY HUTCHINSON, said acts or omissions being such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent, careful person under the same circumstances that it is contrary to a proper regard for danger to human life or constitutes indifference to the resulting consequences, said consequences of the negligent act or omission being reasonably foreseeable; said danger to human life not being the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure, but the natural and probable result of said aggravated reckless or grossly negligent act or omission, to wit: by directly or indirectly using and/or introducing contaminated medical instruments, supplies, and/or drugs upon or into the body of STACY HUTCHINSON which were contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said STACY HUTCHINSON; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform

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said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he limited the use of medical supplies, and/or drugs and rushed patients, and/or patient procedures which in turn allowed DEFENDANT DESAI to directly or indirectly treat and/or perform an unreasonable number of patient procedures in a single day all at the expense of patient safety and well being, and which resulted in substandard care and jeopardized the safety of STACY HUTCHINSON and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

#### **COUNT 8 - INSURANCE FRAUD**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, knowingly and willfully present, or cause to be presented a statement as a part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefits under a policy of insurance issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, knowing that the statement concealed or omitted facts, or contained false or misleading information concerning a fact material to said claim; and/or did assist, abet, solicit or conspire to present or cause to be presented a statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a broker or any agent thereof, knowing that said statement concealed or omitted facts, or did contain false or misleading information concerning a fact material to a claim for payment or other benefits under such policy issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, by falsely representing to HEALTH PLAN OF NEVADA that the billed anesthesia time and/or charges for the endoscopic procedure performed on STACY HUTCHINSON were more than the actual anesthetic time and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or their medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedure; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting

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each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

## <u>COUNT 9</u> - PERFORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, then and there willfully and unlawfully perform acts in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property resulting in substantial bodily harm to RUDOLFO MEANA, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to RUDOLFO MEANA, in the following manner, to wit: by directly or indirectly using and/or introducing contaminated medical instruments, supplies, and/or drugs upon or into the body of RUDOLFO MEANA which were contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said RUDOLFO MEANA; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he obtained the medical supplies, and/or drugs utilized in the treatment of KENNETH

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RUBINO and RODOLFO MEANA which were subsequently contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus and thereafter directly or indirectly shared, exchanged or transferred said contaminated medical supplies, and/or drugs between himself and KEITH MATHAHS and/or between treatment rooms before, during or after the endoscopic procedure performed on KENNETH RUBINO which resulted in the transmission of the Hepatitis C virus into the body of RODOLFO MEANA and others and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

## COUNT 10 - CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENTS RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS on or about September 21, 2007, being professional caretakers of RUDOLFO MEANA, did act or omit to act in an aggravated, reckless or gross manner, failing to provide such service, care or supervision as is reasonable and necessary to maintain the health or safety of said RUDOLFO MEANA, resulting in substantial bodily harm to RUDOLFO MEANA, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to RUDOLFO MEANA, said acts or omissions being such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent, careful person under the same circumstances that it is contrary to a proper regard for danger to human life or constitutes indifference to the resulting consequences, said consequences of the negligent act or omission being reasonably foreseeable; said danger to human life not being the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure, but the natural and probable result of said aggravated reckless or grossly negligent act or omission, to wit: by directly or indirectly using and/or introducing contaminated medical instruments, supplies, and/or drugs upon or into the body of RUDOLFO MEANA which were contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or

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supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day. and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said RUDOLFO MEANA; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he obtained the medical supplies, and/or drugs utilized in the treatment of KENNETH RUBINO and RODOLFO MEANA which were subsequently contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus and thereafter directly or indirectly shared, exchanged or transferred said contaminated medical supplies, and/or drugs between himself and KEITH MATHAHS and/or between treatment rooms before, during or after the endoscopic procedure performed on KENNETH RUBINO which resulted in the transmission of the Hepatitis C virus into the body of RODOLFO MEANA and others and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

### **COUNT\_11 - INSURANCE FRAUD**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, knowingly and willfully present, or cause to be presented a statement as a part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefits under a policy of insurance issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, knowing that the statement concealed or omitted facts, or contained false or misleading information concerning a fact material to said claim; and/or did assist, abet, solicit or conspire to present or cause to be presented a statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a broker or any agent thereof, knowing that said statement concealed or omitted facts, or did contain false or misleading information concerning a fact material to a claim for payment or other benefits under such policy issued pursuant to Title

57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, by falsely representing to SECURE HORIZONS and/or PACIFICARE that the billed anesthesia time and/or charges for the endoscopic procedure performed on RUDOLFO MEANA were more than the actual anesthetic time and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or their medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedure; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

## COUNT 12 - PERFORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, then and there willfully and unlawfully perform acts in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property resulting in substantial bodily harm to PATTY ASPINWALL, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to PATTY ASPINWALL, in the following manner, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said PATTY ASPINWALL; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform

said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he limited the use of medical supplies, and/or drugs and rushed patients, and/or patient procedures which in turn allowed DEFENDANT DESAI to directly or indirectly treat and/or perform an unreasonable number of patient procedures in a single day all at the expense of patient safety and well being, and which resulted in substandard care and jeopardized the safety of PATTY ASPINWALL and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

## COUNT 13 - CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENTS RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS on or about September 21, 2007, being professional caretakers of PATTY ASPINWALL, did act or omit to act in an aggravated, reckless or gross manner, failing to provide such service, care or supervision as is reasonable and necessary to maintain the health or safety of said PATTY ASPINWALL, resulting in substantial bodily harm to PATTY ASPINWALL, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to PATTY ASPINWALL, said acts or omissions being such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent, careful person under the same circumstances that it is contrary to a proper regard for danger to human life or constitutes indifference to the resulting consequences, said consequences of the negligent act or omission being reasonably foreseeable; said danger to human life not being the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure, but the natural and probable result of said aggravated reckless or grossly negligent act or omission, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number

of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said PATTY ASPINWALL; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he limited the use of medical supplies, and/or drugs and rushed patients, and/or patient procedures which in turn allowed DEFENDANT DESAI to directly or indirectly treat and/or perform an unreasonable number of patient procedures in a single day all at the expense of patient safety and well being, and which resulted in substandard care and jeopardized the safety of PATTY ASPINWALL and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

#### **COUNT 14 - INSURANCE FRAUD**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, knowingly and willfully present, or cause to be presented a statement as a part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefits under a policy of insurance issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, knowing that the statement concealed or omitted facts, or contained false or misleading information concerning a fact material to said claim; and/or did assist, abet, solicit or conspire to present or cause to be presented a statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a broker or any agent thereof, knowing that said statement concealed or omitted facts, or did contain false or misleading information concerning a fact material to a claim for payment or other benefits under such policy issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, by falsely representing to ANTHEM BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD that the billed anesthesia time and/or charges for the endoscopic procedure performed on PATTY ASPINWALL were more than the actual anesthetic time

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and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or their medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedure; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

### **COUNT 15 - INSURANCE FRAUD**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, knowingly and willfully present, or cause to be presented a statement as a part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefits under a policy of insurance issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, knowing that the statement concealed or omitted facts, or contained false or misleading information concerning a fact material to said claim; and/or did assist, abet, solicit or conspire to present or cause to be presented a statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a broker or any agent thereof, knowing that said statement concealed or omitted facts, or did contain false or misleading information concerning a fact material to a claim for payment or other benefits under such policy issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, by falsely representing to UNITED HEALTH SERVICES that the billed anesthesia time and/or charges for the endoscopic procedure performed on PATTY ASPINWALL were more than the actual anesthetic time and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or their medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedure; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging,

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hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

# COUNT 16 - PERFORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, then and there willfully and unlawfully perform acts in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property resulting in substantial bodily harm to SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA, in the following manner, to wit: by directly or indirectly using and/or introducing contaminated medical instruments, supplies, and/or drugs upon or into the body of SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA which were contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he obtained the medical supplies, and/or drugs utilized in the treatment of KENNETH RUBINO and SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA

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which were subsequently contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus and thereafter directly or indirectly shared, exchanged or transferred said contaminated medical supplies, and/or drugs between himself and KEITH MATHAHS and/or between treatment rooms before, during or after the endoscopic procedure performed on KENNETH RUBINO which resulted in the transmission of the Hepatitis C virus into the body of SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA and others and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

## COUNT 17 - CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENTS RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS on or about September 21, 2007, being professional caretakers of SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA, did act or omit to act in an aggravated, reckless or gross manner, failing to provide such service, care or supervision as is reasonable and necessary to maintain the health or safety of said SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA, resulting in substantial bodily harm to SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA, said acts or omissions being such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent, careful person under the same circumstances that it is contrary to a proper regard for danger to human life or constitutes indifference to the resulting consequences, said consequences of the negligent act or omission being reasonably foreseeable; said danger to human life not being the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure, but the natural and probable result of said aggravated reckless or grossly negligent act or omission, to wit: by directly or indirectly using and/or introducing contaminated medical instruments, supplies, and/or drugs upon or into the body of SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA which were contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly

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or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he obtained the medical supplies, and/or drugs utilized in the treatment of KENNETH RUBINO AND SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA which were subsequently contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus and thereafter directly or indirectly shared, exchanged or transferred said contaminated medical supplies, and/or drugs between himself and KEITH MATHAHS and/or between treatment rooms before, during or after the endoscopic procedure performed on KENNETH RUBINO which resulted in the transmission of the Hepatitis C virus into the body of SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA and others and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

#### **COUNT 18 - INSURANCE FRAUD**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, knowingly and willfully present, or cause to be presented a statement as a part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefits under a policy of insurance issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, knowing that the statement concealed or omitted facts, or contained false or misleading information concerning a fact material to said claim; and/or did assist, abet, solicit or conspire to present or cause to be presented a statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a broker or any agent thereof, knowing that said statement concealed or omitted facts, or did contain false or misleading information concerning a fact material to a claim for payment or other benefits under such policy issued pursuant to Title

57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, by falsely representing to CULINARY WORKERS HEALTH FUND that the billed anesthesia time and/or charges for the endoscopic procedure performed on SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA were more than the actual anesthetic time and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or their medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedure; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

# $\frac{\text{COUNT 19}}{\text{OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM}} - \frac{\text{PERFORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS}}{\text{OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM}}$

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, then and there willfully and unlawfully perform acts in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property resulting in substantial bodily harm to CAROLE GRUESKIN, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to CAROLE GRUESKIN, in the following manner, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said CAROLE GRUESKIN; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform

said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he limited the use of medical supplies, and/or drugs and rushed patients, and/or patient procedures which in turn allowed DEFENDANT DESAI to directly or indirectly treat and/or perform an unreasonable number of patient procedures in a single day all at the expense of patient safety and well being, and which resulted in substandard care and jeopardized the safety of CAROLE GRUESKIN and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

### COUNT 20- CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENTS RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS on or about September 21, 2007, being professional caretakers of CAROLE GRUESKIN, did act or omit to act in an aggravated, reckless or gross manner, failing to provide such service, care or supervision as is reasonable and necessary to maintain the health or safety of said CAROLE GRUESKIN, resulting in substantial bodily harm to CAROLE GRUESKIN, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to CAROLE GRUESKIN, said acts or omissions being such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent, careful person under the same circumstances that it is contrary to a proper regard for danger to human life or constitutes indifference to the resulting consequences, said consequences of the negligent act or omission being reasonably foreseeable; said danger to human life not being the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure, but the natural and probable result of said aggravated reckless or grossly negligent act or omission, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number

of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said CAROLE GRUESKIN; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he limited the use of medical supplies, and/or drugs and rushed patients, and/or patient procedures which in turn allowed DEFENDANT DESAI to directly or indirectly treat and/or perform an unreasonable number of patient procedures in a single day all at the expense of patient safety and well being, and which resulted in substandard care and jeopardized the safety of CAROLE GRUESKIN and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

#### **COUNT 21 - INSURANCE FRAUD**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, knowingly and willfully present, or cause to be presented a statement as a part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefits under a policy of insurance issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, knowing that the statement concealed or omitted facts, or contained false or misleading information concerning a fact material to said claim; and/or did assist, abet, solicit or conspire to present or cause to be presented a statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a broker or any agent thereof, knowing that said statement concealed or omitted facts, or did contain false or misleading information concerning a fact material to a claim for payment or other benefits under such policy issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, by falsely representing to HEALTH PLAN OF NEVADA that the billed anesthesia time and/or charges for the endoscopic procedure performed on CAROLE GRUESKIN were more than the actual anesthetic time and/or

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charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or their medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedure; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

## COUNT 22 - PERFORMANCE OF ACT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or about September 21, 2007, then and there willfully and unlawfully perform acts in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property resulting in substantial bodily harm to GWENDOLYN MARTIN, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to GWENDOLYN MARTIN, in the following manner, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said GWENDOLYN MARTIN; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against

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universally accepted standards of medical care, that he obtained the medical supplies, and/or drugs utilized in the treatment of KENNETH RUBINO and GWENDOLYN MARTIN which were subsequently contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus and thereafter directly or indirectly shared, exchanged or transferred said contaminated medical supplies, and/or drugs between himself and KEITH MATHAHS and/or between treatment rooms before, during or after the endoscopic procedure performed on KENNETH RUBINO which resulted in the transmission of the Hepatitis C virus into the body of GWENDOLYN MARTIN and others and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

## COUNT 23 - CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF PATIENTS RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS on or about September 21, 2007, being professional caretakers of GWENDOLYN MARTIN, did act or omit to act in an aggravated, reckless or gross manner, failing to provide such service, care or supervision as is reasonable and necessary to maintain the health or safety of said GWENDOLYN MARTIN, resulting in substantial bodily harm to GWENDOLYN MARTIN, to wit: transmitting the Hepatitis C virus to GWENDOLYN MARTIN, said acts or omissions being such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent, careful person under the same circumstances that it is contrary to a proper regard for danger to human life or constitutes indifference to the resulting consequences, said consequences of the negligent act or omission being reasonably foreseeable; said danger to human life not being the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure, but the natural and probable result of said aggravated reckless or grossly negligent act or omission, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures,

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime in order to fraudulently increase the insurance billing and/or money reimbursement for the medical procedure performed on the said GWENDOLYN MARTIN; specifically, as to DEFENDANT DESAI, that he directly or indirectly both instructed DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and said others to perform said acts and created a work environment where DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, and KEITH MATHAHS and others were pressured to commit the said acts described above; specifically, as to DEFENDANT LAKEMAN, engaging in conduct against universally accepted standards of medical care, that he obtained the medical supplies, and/or drugs utilized in the treatment of KENNETH RUBINO and GWENDOLYN MARTIN which were subsequently contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus and thereafter directly or indirectly shared, exchanged or transferred said contaminated medical supplies, and/or drugs between himself and KEITH MATHAHS and/or between treatment rooms before, during or after the endoscopic procedure performed on KENNETH RUBINO which resulted in the transmission of the Hepatitis C virus into the body of GWENDOLYN MARTIN and others and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

#### **COUNT 24 - INSURANCE FRAUD**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or between September 20, 2007 and September 21, 2007, knowingly and willfully present, or cause to be presented a statement as a part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefits under a policy of insurance issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, knowing that the statement concealed or omitted facts, or contained false or misleading information concerning a fact material to said claim; and/or did assist, abet, solicit or conspire to present or cause to be presented a statement to an insurer, a reinsurer, a producer, a broker or any agent thereof, knowing that said statement concealed or omitted facts, or did contain false or misleading information concerning a fact material to a claim for payment or other benefits under such policy issued pursuant to Title 57 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, by falsely representing to PACIFIC CARE that the billed anesthesia time and/or charges for the

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endoscopic procedure performed on GWENDOLYN MARTIN were more than the actual anesthetic time and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or their medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedure; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

### **COUNT 25 - THEFT**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did between July 25, 2007 and December 31, 2007, then and there knowingly, feloniously, and without lawful authority, commit theft by obtaining personal property in the amount of \$250.00, or more, lawful money of the United States, from STACY HUTCHINSON, KENNETH RUBINO, PATTY ASPINWALL, SHARRIEFF ZIYAD, MICHAEL WASHINGTON, CAROLE GRUESKIN and RODOLFO MEANA, and/or ANTHEM BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD, HEALTHCARE **PARTNERS** OF NEVADA. UNITED HEALTH SERVICES, VETERANS ADMINISTRATION and SECURED HORIZONS, by a material misrepresentation with intent to deprive those persons of the property, in the following manner, to-wit: by falsely representing that the billed anesthesia time and/or charges for the endoscopic procedure performed on STACY HUTCHINSON, KENNETH RUBINO, PATTY ASPINWALL, SHARRIEFF ZIYAD, MICHAEL WASHINGTON, CAROLE GRUESKIN and RODOLFO MEANA, were more than the actual anesthetic time and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or their medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise, which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedure, thereby obtaining said personal property by a material misrepresentation with intent to deprive them of the property, Defendants and

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KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

### **COUNT 26 - OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or between September 20, 2007, and December 31, 2007, with intent to cheat and defraud, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, knowingly, designedly, and by use of false pretenses, obtain \$250.00, or more, lawful money of the United States from GWENDOLYN MARTIN and/or PACIFICARE, within Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, in the following manner, to-wit: by falsely representing that the billed anesthesia times and/or charges for the endoscopic procedures performed on GWENDOLYN MARTIN were more than the actual anesthetic times and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or the medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise, which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedures Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

### **COUNT 27 - OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES**

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or between September 21, 2007, and December 31, 2007, with intent to cheat and defraud, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, knowingly, designedly, and by use of false pretenses, obtain \$250.00, or more, lawful money of the United States from SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA and/or CULINARY WORKERS

HEALTH FUND, within Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, in the following manner, to-wit: by falsely representing that the billed anesthesia times and/or charges for the endoscopic procedures performed on SONIA ORELLANA-RIVERA were more than the actual anesthetic times and/or charges, said false representation resulting in the payment of money to Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS and/or the medical practice and/or the racketeering enterprise, which exceeded that which would have normally been allowed for said procedures Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said acts; and/or (2) aiding or abetting each other in the commission of the crime by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to commit said acts, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit said crime, and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit this crime.

### <u>COUNT 28</u> – MURDER (SECOND DEGREE)

Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS did on or between September 21, 2007 and April 27, 2012, then and there willfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with malice aforethought, kill RODOLFO MEANA, a human being, by introducing Hepatitis C virus into the body of RODOLFO MEANA, based upon the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by the killing occurring under circumstances showing an abandoned and malignant heart; and/or (2) during the commission of an unlawful act, to-wit: criminal neglect of patients, and/or performance of an unlawful act in reckless disregard of persons or property, which in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being; and/or (3) the killing being committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent, to-wit: criminal neglect of patients, and/or performance of an act in reckless disregard of persons or property, which in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, by directly or indirectly using and/or introducing contaminated medical instruments, supplies, and/or drugs upon or into the body of RODOLFO MEANA which were contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus; Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to wit: (1) by directly committing said

acts; and/or (2) by aiding or abetting each other and/or others including uncharged confederates in the commission of the crime(s) of criminal neglect of patients, and/or performance of an act in reckless disregard of persons or property by directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing, or procuring each other, and/or others to utilize a patient care delivery system which directly or indirectly limited the use of medical instruments, and/or supplies, and/or drugs; scheduled and/or treated an unreasonable number of patients per day, and/or rushed patients or patient procedures all at the expense of patient safety and/or well being, and which resulted in substandard care and/or jeopardized the safety of RODOLFO MEANA, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting with the intent to commit the crime(s) of criminal neglect of patients, and/or performance of an act in reckless disregard of persons or property; and/or (3) pursuant to a conspiracy to commit the crime(s) of criminal neglect of patients, and/or performance of an act in reckless disregard of persons or property, Defendants and KEITH MATHAHS acting in concert throughout.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of February, 2013.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #001565

BY

MICHAEL V.STAUDAHER Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #008273

- Names of witnesses testifying before the Grand Jury:
- 2 ARMOUR, PATRICIA, NV. HEALTH DISTRICT
- 3 | ASPINWALL, PATTY
- 4 ∥ BAGANG, MAYNARD, LVMPD
- 5 CAMPBELL, LYNETTE, RN
- 6 CAROL, CLIFFORD
- 7 CARRERA, HILARIO
- 8 CERDA, RYAN, HEALTH CARE BUSINESS SOLUTIONS
- 9 DESAI, SAEHAL
- 10 DROBENINE, JAN, CDC LAB SUPERVISOR
- 11 | DUENAS, YERENY, INSURANCE CLAIMS
- 12 GONZALES, PATRICIA, BLUE CROSS DIRECTOR DEPT.
- 13 | GRUESKIN, CAROLE
- 14 | HAWKINS, MELVIN
- 15 HUTCHINSON, STACY
- 16 KALKA, KATIE, UNITED HEALTH GROUP INV.
- 17 KHUDYAKOV, YURY, CDC
- 18 KRUEGER, JEFFREY ALEN, RN
- 19 LABUS, BRIAN, NV HEALTH DISTRICT
- 20 | LANGLEY, GAYLE, CDC PHYSICIAN
- 21 LOBIANBO, ANNAMARIE, CRNA
- 22 | MARTIN, GWENDOLYN
- 23 MEANA, RODOLFO
- 24 MYERS, ELAINE, CLAIMS DIRECTOR
- 25 NEMEC, FRANK, GASTROENTEROLOGIST
- 26 OLSON, ALANE, MEDICAL EXAMINER
- 27 | RIVERA, SONIA ORELLONO
- 28 | RUBINO, KENNETH

1 RUSHING, TONYA, OFFICE MGR. 2 SAGENDORF, VINCENT, CRNA 3 SAMPSON, NANCY, LVMPD SAMS, JOANNE, VET ADMIN. CODER 4 5 SCHAEFER, MELISSA, CDC PHYSICIAN 6 SHARMA, SATISH, ANESTHESIOLOGIST 7 SIMS, DOROTHY, BUREAU OF LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION 8 SPAETH, CORRINE, CLAIMS DIRECTOR 9 VANDRUFF, MARION, MEDICAL ASSISTANT 10 WASHINGTON, MICHAEL 11 YEE, THOMAS, ANESTHESIOLOGIST 12 YOST, ANNE, NURSE 13 ZIYAD, SHARRIEFF 14 15 Additional witnesses known to the District Attorney at time of filing the Indictment: 16 ALFARO-MARTINEZ, SAMUEL 17 ANWAR, JAVAID, 3006 MARYLAND PKWY #400, LVN 89109 18 ARBOREEN, DAVE, LVMPD 19 ARMENI, PAOLA 20 ARNONE, ANTHONY, LVMPD 21 ASHANTE, DR. 22 BAILEY, PAULINE, 3416 MONTE CARLO DR., LVN 89121 23 BARCLAY, DR. ROBERT 24 BIEN, KATHY, 3800 DALECREST DR. #1117, LVN 89129 25 BLEMINGS, RENATE, 2100 PLAIN ST., PAHRUMP, NV 89060

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BROWN, DAVID

BUNIN, DANIEL

BUI, DR.

- 1 | BURKIN, JERALD, FBI SA
- 2 | CALVALHO, DANIEL CARRERA
- 3 CARAWAY, ANTOINETTE, 1407 BAREBACK CT., HNV 89014
- 4 CARRERA, ELADIO, 612 CANYON GREENS DR., LVN 89144
- 5 CARROLL, CLIFFORD, 10313 ORKINEY DR., LVN 89144
- 6 CASTLEMAN, DR. STEPHANIE
- 7 CAVETT, JOSHUA, 7829 TATTERSALL FLAG ST., LVN 89139
- 8 CHAFFEE, ROD, 9303 GILCREASE #1080, LVN 89149
- 9 CLEMMER, DANA MARIE, 4913 FERRELL ST., NLVN 89034
- 10 COE, DANIEL, LVMPD
- 11 COHAN, DR. CHARLES, POB 4144, SAYLORSBURG, PA
- 12 COOK, KATIE, FBI S/A
- 13 COOPER, DOUG, CHIEF INV., NV. ST. BOARD OF ME
- 14 CRANE, AUSA
- 15 | CREMEN, FRANK
- 16 DESAI, DIPAK, 3093 RED ARROW, LVN 89135
- 17 DESAI, KUSAM, MD
- 18 DIAZ, ALLEN, LVMPD INTERPRETER
- 19 DIBUDUO, CHARLES
- 20 DORAME, JOHN
- 21 DRURY, JANINE
- 22 | ECKERT, PHYSICIAN ASST.
- 23 | ELLEN, DIANE
- 24 FALZONE, LISA, 8024 PEACEFUL WOODS STREET, LVN 89143
- 25 FARIS, FRANK
- 26 FIGLER, DAYVID
- 27 | FISHCHER, GAYLE, 1600 CLIFTON MAIL STOP #G37, ATLANTA, GA. 30333
- 28 | FORD, MIKE, LVMPD

- 1 FRANKS, LISA, PHYSICIAN ASST.
- 2 | GASKILL, SARA
- 3 | GENTILE, DOMINIC
- 4 | GLASS-SERAN, BARBARA, CRNA
- 5 GRAY, WARREN, LVMPD
- 6 GREER, MARY, 3462 SHAMROCK AVE., LVN 89120
- 7 GREGORY, MARTHA
- 8 ∥ HAHN, JASON, LVMPD
- 9 | HANCOCK, L., LVMPD #7083
- 10 | HANSEN, IDA
- 11 HARPER, TIFFANY
- 12 | HARRIS, ORELENA (HOLLEMAN), 2816 DESERT SONG, LVN 89106
- 13 | HERRERO, CARMELO, 1864 WOODHAVEN DR., HNV 89074
- 14 | HIGGINS, HEATHER, INV. NV. ST. BOARD OF ME
- 15 HIGUERA, LILIA, 3504 FLOWER, NLVN 89030
- 16 | HITTI, DR. MIRANDA
- 17 HOWARD, NADINE, HEALTH FACILITIES SURVEYOR
- 18 | HUBBARD, LINDA, 515 PARK ROYAL DR., NLVN 89031
- 19 | HUGHES, LAURA, AG INV.
- 20 HUYNH, NGUYEN, 3004 HAZY MEADOW LN., LVN 89108
- 21 | IRVIN, JOHNNA
- 22 JOHNSON, SHONNA S., 22 VIA DE LUCCIA, HNV 89074
- 23 JONES, LISA, CHIEF NSB OF LICENSURE AND CERTIFICATION (BLC)
- 24 JURANI, DR.
- 25 KIRCH, MARLENE
- 26 KAUL, DR.
- 27 KAUSHAL, DR. DHAN
- 28 | KELLEY, J., LVMPD #3716

- 1 KHAN, IKRAM, 3006 S. MARYLAND PKWY, #465 LVN 89109
- 2 KNOWLES, DR.
- 3 KOSLOY, LESLEE, RN, HEALTH FACILITIES SURVEYOR
- 4 | LAKEMAN, RONALD, 700 SHADOW LN #165B, LVN 89106
- 5 LATHROP, CAROL, 1741 AUGUSTA ST., PAHRUMP, NV 89048
- 6 | LATHROP, WILLIAM
- 7 | LEWIS, DR. DANIEL
- 8 | LOBIONDA, CRNA
- 9 LOPEZ, J. JULIAN, 7106 SMOKE RANCH RD. #120 LVN 89128
- 10 | LUKENS, JOHN
- 11 MAANOA, PETER, RN
- 12 | MALEY, KATIE, 4275 BURNHAM #101, LVN
- 13 MALMBERG, GEORGE
- 14 MANTHEI, PETER, 7066 AZURE BEACH AZURE ST., LVN 89148
- 15 MANUEL, DR. DAVID
- 16 MARTIN, LOVEY
- 17 MASON, ALBERT
- 18 MATHAHS, KEITH, 10220 BUTTON WILLOW DR., LVN 89134
- 19 MCDOWELL, RALPH, 388 SANTA CANDIDA ST., LVN 89138
- 20 MCGOWAN, SHANNON, 5420 CARNATION MEADOW ST., LVN 89130
- 21 MCILROY, ROBIN, FBI
- 22 MILLER, JAMES
- 23 MIONE, VINCENT, 2408 W. EL CAMPO GRANDE AVE., NLVN 89031
- 24 MOORE, DAVID
- 25 MUKHERJEE, RANADER, MD
- 26 MURPHY, MAGGIE, 10175 W. SPRING MTN RD. #2012 LVN 89117
- 27 NAYYAR, SANJAY, MD
- 28 NAZAR, WILLIAM

- 1 NAZARIO, DR. BRUNILDA
- 2 | OM, HARI, LLC MGR
- 3 O'REILLY, JOHN
- 4 O'REILLY, TIM
- 5 PAGE-TAYLOR, LESLIE, CDC
- 6 PATEL, DR.
- 7 PENSAKOVIC, JOAN
- 8 PETERSON, KAREN, 2138 FT. SANDERS ST., HNV
- 9 | PHELPS, LISA, 784 MORMON PEAK ST., OVERTON, NV 89040
- 10 POMERANZ, AUSA
- 11 | PRESTON, LAWRENCE, 801 S. RANCHO DR., STE C-1, LVN
- 12 | QUANNAH, LAKOTA
- 13 | REXFORD, KEVIN
- 14 | RICHVALSKY, KAREN, 3325 NIGUL WAY, LVN 89117
- 15 ROSEL, LINDA, FBI SA
- 16 RUSSOM, RUTA, 4854 MONTERREY AVE., LVN 89121
- 17 | SAGENDORF, VINCENT
- 18 SAMEER, DR. SHEIKH
- 19 SAPP, BETSY, PHLEBOTOMIST
- 20 SCAMBIO, JEAN, 2920 YUKON FLATS CT., NLVN 89031
- 21 SCHULL, JERRY, 5413 SWEET SHADE ST., LVN
- 22 SENI, DR.
- 23 SHARMA, DR. SATISH
- 24 | SHARMA, VISHVINDER, DR. 3212 CEDARDALE PL., LVN 89134
- 25 SHEFNOFF, NEIL, 755 E. MCDOWELL RD., PHOENIX, AZ 85006
- 26 SMITH, CHARNESSA
- 27 SOOD, RAJAT
- 28 STURMAN, GLORIA

1	SUKHDEO, DANIEL, 3925 LEGEND HILLS ST. #203, LVN 89129
2	TAGLE, PEGGY, RN
3	TERRY, JENNIFER, LVMPD INTERPRETER
4	TONY, DR.
5	VAZIRI, DR.
6	WAHID, SHAHID, MD
7	WEBB, KAREN, 1459 S. 14TH ST., OMAHA, NE
8	WHITAKER, GERALDINE, 701 CARPICE DR. #17B, BOULDER CITY, NV 89005
9	WHITELY, R. LVMPD
10	WILLIAMS, SKLAR, RESIDENT AGENT, 8363 W. SUNSET RD. #300, LVN 89113
11	WISE, PATTY
12	YAMPOLSKY, MACE
13	ZIMMERMAN, MARILYN, 550 SEASONS PKWY, BELVIDERE, IL 89040
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28	LVMPD EV #0802292576 (TK11)
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### 1 **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING** 2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of April, 2013, I caused a copy of 3 the foregoing Petitioner's Appendix to be placed in the United States mail, postage 4 5 prepaid, hand delivered or e-filed to the following persons at their last known address 6 as listed below: 7 8 The Honorable Valerie Adair District Court, Department 21 9 200 Lewis Avenue 10 Las Vegas, NV 89101 11 Michael V. Staudaher 12 Clark County District Attorney's Office 200 Lewis Avenue 13 Third Floor 14 Las Vegas, NV 89155 15 Frederick A. Santacroce 16 5440 W. Sahara Avenue 17 Third Floor Las Vegas, NV 89146 18 19 Catherine Cortez Masto 20 Attorney General State of Nevada, Criminal Justice Division 21 100 North Carson Street 22 Carson City, NV 89701-4717 23 24 BY Well K. Caro 25 An employee of Wright Stanish & Winckler 26

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