IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI,	Electronically Filed Apr 26 2013 11:12 a.m. Tracie K. Lindeman
Petitioner,	Clerk of Supreme Court
	No. 63046
vs.)
) District Court No. 10C265107
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT	
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
COUNTY OF CLARK, DEPARTMENT 21)
)
Respondent.)
)
and)
)
THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
Real Party In Interest.)
)

PETITIONER'S REPLY TO STATE'S ANSWER

Pursuant to this Court's Order, dated April 22, 2013, Petitioner, DIPAK KANTILAL DESAI, by and through his attorney, Richard A. Wright and Margaret M. Stanish, WRIGHT STANISH & WINCKLER, replay to the State's Answer. The State concedes that the independent medical evaluator ("IME") confirmed that Petitioner suffered strokes in July 2008, which likely resulted in retrograde amnesia, and he suffered multiple focal strokes on February 24, 2013, resulting in aphasia.

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The State, however, incorrectly assumes that aphasia and memory problems do not raise a reasonable doubt as to competency under NRS 178.405. The State's answer misstates and distorts certain facts which merit correction herein.

DATED this 26th day of April 2013.

Respectfully Submitted,

WRIGHT STANISH & WINCKLER

BY

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1. Undisputed Facts on Petitioner's Present Neurologic Functioning

The State's Answer does not contest the fact that the IME confirmed that Petitioner suffered a stroke on February 24, 2013, resulting in receptive and expressive aphasia. Nor does the State contest the IME's finding that the 2008 acute stroke caused some degree of retrograde and anterograde amnesia, as well as aphasia. The State does not deny that the IME concluded that it will take up to nine months for Petitioner to regain close to his pre-morbid condition, with full recovery expected in up to 18 months. These uncontested facts raise substantial doubt as to Petitioner's present competency to assist in his defense, especially when coupled with counsel's bona fide expression of doubt and Dr. Thomas Bittker's recent finding of incompetency.

The February 2013 stroke was a serious medical episode that in and of itself raises doubt as to competency. Petitioner was hospitalized for six days, including four days in the intensive care unit. Exhibit 8 (134). In studying the MRI, the IME observed new lesions in the part of the brain involved in processing speech, which support the finding that he has expressive and receptive aphasia. Exhibit 3 (64-66) The IME report, standing alone, raises reasonable doubt as to Petitioner's ability to assist in his defense by virtue of the finding that the stroke caused Petitioner to suffer expressive and receptive aphasia.

Rather than address the above undisputed evidence of doubt as to competency, the bulk of the State's Answer primarily focuses on the findings of Petitioner's past condition, especially the Lake's Crossing findings that he exaggerated his symptoms when participating in formal testing.¹ State's Answer, pp. 4-6.

In reviewing the medical records prior to the February 24, 2013 stroke, the IME found that Petitioner previously embellished his symptoms, due in part to malingering and depression, when participating in past formal testing. Exhibit 3 (60-64, 66). His review of the 2009 UCLA records, however, established the Petitioner's "baseline deficits" stemming from the 2008 acute stroke, which included trouble in expressing himself, processing speech inputs, following complex commands, and problems forming new long-term memories (anterograde amnesia) and recalling events up to two years prior to the 2008 stroke (retrograde amnesia). Exhibit 3 (60-61).

¹ The State also argues that the IME's summary of a physical therapist's notes showed evidence of malingering because Petitioner performed basic motor tasks on his own volition (brush his teeth, remove his sunglasses, wipe his arm in the area where the IV was leaking) versus his inability to follow instructions to perform motor tasks (finger to nose, etc.). State's Answer, pp. 5-6. Although the IME noted these inconsistencies by the physical therapist, it did not dissuade him from finding that Petitioner suffered expressive and receptive aphasia that required up to nine months to regain close to his pre-morbid condition and up to 18 months for full recovery. Exhibit 3 (64 & 66).

The State cannot and does not dispute these findings. Instead, its argument is essentially, "once a malingerer, always a malingerer." These undisputed findings, however, merit the "broader inquiry" that this Court recognized would be necessary if sufficient evidence of doubt as to competency to stand trial was raised. Order in No. 60038, *2, n. 1, *citing*, State v. Fergusen, 124 Nev. 795, 805, 192 P.3d 712, 719 (2008), Morales v. State, 116 Nev. 19, 22, 922 P.2d 252, 254 (2000); NRS 178.405; NRS 178.415. Exhibit 2 (38).

2. Sufficient Doubt as to Competency – The Inability to Assist Counsel

Astonishingly, the State argues that retrograde amnesia covering the time relevant to the indictment is "not germane to the statutory competency standard;" and Petitioner's present, undisputed "[d]ifficulty speaking does not even approach the standard for incompetence." State's Answer, pp. 5, 8-9. An accused must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding ...and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." <u>Dusky v. United States</u>, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)(emphasis added); NRS 178.400.

The Sate treats Petitioner's current stroke-induced aphasic condition as if it were a mere speech impediment in which he just needs a bit more time to

pronounce words. This is incorrect. Aphasia distorts the ability to comprehend and process language and accurately express ones thoughts. For discussion of aphasia, see original petition, pp. 1, n. 1, 22-23. In other words, aphasia effects the ability to "consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Id.

The State's argument that Petitioner's undisputed memory problems caused by the 2008 acute stroke is irrelevant to competency is equally troublesome. This is not a case where A sold drugs to B and everything was tape-recorded. This case will involve at least six more weeks of testimony, scientific and medical testimony and voluminous records pertaining to historical events and conversations regarding numerous patients during the period from 2004 through early 2008, over five to nine years ago. It defies common sense to believe that doubt as to competency is not implicated when a brain-damaged defendant suffers from receptive and expressive aphasia and anterograde and retrograde amnesia.

Without the ability to process language and accurately express desired thoughts, Petitioner cannot effectively communicate with his counsel and rationally assist in his defense. Without such abilities, Petitioner cannot effectively exercise his right to testify or assist counsel in exercising the right of confrontation.

The IME report, Dr. Bittker's finding of incompetency, and counsel's firm conviction that Petitioner cannot rationally assist in his defense raise sufficient doubt as to Petitioner's ability to process and understand speech (receptive aphasia); accurately express his thoughts with the desired words (expressive aphasia); retain new information (anterograde amnesia); and retrieve information from the relevant 2007 time frame (retrograde amnesia).

As a point of emphasis, Petitioner is not arguing that the undisputed facts constitute a legal finding of present incompetency. Likewise, the State cannot argue that the findings of Petitioner's past embellishment of symptoms constitute a legal finding of present competency. Instead, Petitioner is arguing that the undisputed facts set forth in the IME report, counsel's bona fide doubts, and Dr. Bittker's findings raise sufficient doubt to merit an accurate evaluation of his present ability to stand trial based significant evidence of current stroke-induced neurological defecits. *See*, State v. Calvin, 122 Nev. 1178, 1183, 147 P.3d 1097, 1100 (2006)("An accurate competency evaluation is therefore critical to avoiding a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights").

In light of the undisputed evidence of doubt as to Petitioner's present competency, the district court abused its discretion when refusing to stay the trial and obtain a fair and accurate competency evaluation of Petitioner's present

ability, long after his release from Lake's Crossing in September 2011.

3. Misstatements in State's Answer

The State's Answer contains several mischaracterizations of facts that warrant correction. First, the State misstates the record when informing this Court that undersigned counsel represented to this Court in the instant Petition and to the district court on January 8, 2013, and April 16, 2013 that "Desai was completely unable to speak, comprehend, or otherwise assist in his defense." Answer, pp. 4, ln. 1-2; 6, ln. 7-9; and 9, ln. 12-13. This is untrue and offensive.

Counsel has consistently and accurately related to this Court and the district court that Petitioner cannot effectively communicate due to the effects of the strokes, which include expressive and receptive aphasia and memory loss.

Counsel accurately related that when he first visited Petitioner in the intensive care unit of Summerlin Hospital following the February 24, 2013 stroke, Petitioner could only make indiscernible sounds. Thereafter, his speech improved with therapy but nowhere near to the degree to permit him to effectively communicate in the defense of a complex criminal medical negligence and insurance fraud case.

See, Petition, pp. 17-18; Competency Motion, Exhibit 6 (80, 88-90); Hearing on Competency Motion, 1/13/13, Exhibit 7 (100 & 103); Calender Call, 4/16/13 (147-48, 157-58, 161, 170-71, 178, 182). In fact, counsel's accurate recitation of

Petitioner's post-stroke progress is corroborated by the IME's prognosis of Petitioner's expected recovery time from the February 2013 stroke.

Second, the State erroneously assumes that Dr. Bitter's finding of incompetency "entirely omits" the Lake's Crossing findings. Dr. Bittker discuss the findings of Lake's Crossing and noted that those findings were made 13 months before his evaluation. Exhibit 6 (87-88). Unlike the IME who provided a neurological review of the medical records, Dr. Bittker conducted a competency evaluation 13 months after Petitioner's return from Lake's Crossing. He was aware of the complex nature of the criminal medical neglect and fraud charges; he reviewed pertinent medical records, including the Lake's Crossing records; and personally examined Petitioner. Exhibit 6 (84-88).

Consistent with the IME's findings of aphasia and retrograde and anterograde amnesia resulting from the 2008 stroke, Dr. Bittker found that Petitioner had aphasia and memory impairments, including the ability to learn new information and retrieve past information. Given these deficits and the complexity of the instant case, Dr. Bittker concluded that Petitioner could not assist counsel within the meaning of <u>Dusky</u>. Exhibit 6 (88-89). Dr. Bittker's December 2012 conclusion of the Petitioner's inability to assist counsel would undoubtedly be bolstered by the medical records showing the impairment caused

by the new strokes suffered in February 2013.

Third, the State incorrectly claims that "in the two months since his stroke he it presenting as if he has worsened." State's Answer, p. 8, ln. 25-27. This is untrue. As stated above, counsel reported to both this Court and the district court that Petitioner has improved with therapy but doubt still remains as to his ability to assist counsel.

Fourth, the State erroneously describes the earlier petition for writ of mandamus in Case No. 60038. Petitioner did not seek extraordinary relief to challenge the competency court's written finding of competency. State's Answer, p. 3. That earlier petition was filed prior to the post-Lake's Crossing hearing and sought to competency court to permit Petitioner to introduce evidence of incompetency. Order Denying Petition, Case 60038, Exhibit 2 (37-38).

Fifth, the State goes outside of the record in an apparent attempt to leave this Court with the impression that the district court remedied Petitioner's "difficulty speaking" by permitting Petitioner and counsel confer for five minutes in the anteroom after a juror is passed for cause. State's Answer, p. 6, n. 3. Petitioner is compelled to also venture outside the record to disclose to the Court significant information omitted by the State.

On April 23, 2013, the undersigned counsel was permitted to make a record

of his interactions with Petitioner on the morning of that date. With respect to the voir dire of two jurors passed for cause on the morning of April 23, 2013, counsel related that Petitioner understood some of the information but was mistaken and confused about some of the information. Petitioner was mixing up facts, scrambling one juror's characteristics with another. Petitioner had difficulty communicating his thoughts and counsel opined that he was not obtaining accurate information from his client. When counsel attempted to ask Petitioner about the jurors that had been passed for cause on the previous day, Petitioner had no recollection of those jurors. In response to counsel's observations, the district court commented that everyone has trouble remembering jurors, or words to that effect.

While the undersigned counsel acknowledges that he is not a medical expert, Petitioner's difficulties in assisting counsel during the jury selection process appear to be confirmed by the IME's finding that Petitioner has expressive and receptive aphasia, as well "anterograde amnesia," i.e., the "[i]mpaired registration of new information." Exhibit 3 (60, 66). Based on counsel's experience as a long-time practitioner of criminal law, Petitioner's communications and memory problems exhibited during voir dire (one of the more simpler trial procedures) adds to the existing substantial doubt about Petitioner's

ability to assist counsel during a lengthy trial involving complex facts.

Based on the foregoing, the State's Answer fails to establish that the district court reasonably exercised its discretion when disregarding the substantial evidence of doubt as to Petitioner's <u>present</u> competency to assist in his defense.

Although Petitioner has been the subject of much public attention and disparagement, he cannot be fairly tried without an accurate competency evaluation of his current ability to assist counsel in light of the uncontradicted substantial doubt as to competency to assist in his defense.

DATED this 26d day of April 2013.

Respectfully Submitted,

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DECLARATION OF SERVICE

DEBRA K. CAROSELLI, an employee of Wright Stanish & Winckler, hereby declares that she is a citizen of the United States, over 21 years of age, and not a party to, nor interested in, the within action; that on the 26th day of April 2013, declarant caused PETITIONER'S REPLY TO STATE'S ANSWER to be delivered to the following via electronic court filing, email, or hand-delivery:

The Honorable Valerie Adair	
District Court, Department 21	
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

EXECUTED on the 26th day of April 2013.

DEBRA K. CAROSELLI