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7	SUPREME	COURT	
8	STATE OF	NEVADA	
9	SHADOW WOOD HOMEOWNERS		
10	ASSOCIATION; and GOGO WAY TRUST,	No. 63180	
1112	Appellants,		
13	VS.		
14	NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANK,		
15	Respondent.		
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19			
20	APPELLANT GOGO WAY	TRUST'S RE	EPLY BRIEF
21	Michael F. Bohn, Esq. Law Office of		
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ARGUMENT

1. Gogo Way's claim to be a bona fide purchaser is not a new theory raised for the first time on appeal.

At pages 6 to 13 of its Opening Brief, Gogo Way Trust (hereinafter "Gogo Way") established that the record on appeal contains no evidence to support the district court's conclusion of law that "Defendant Gogo Way was not a bona fide purchaser at the March 1, 2012, HOA foreclosure sale." See page 9 of order, dated April 10, 2013. (APP. Pg. 925) In particular, Gogo Way purchased the property at a duly noticed foreclosure sale without notice of the <u>unrecorded</u> dispute between New York Community Bank (hereinafter "Respondent NYCB") and Alessi & Koenig regarding the cure payment tendered by Respondent NYCB and returned by Alessi & Koenig prior to the HOA sale.

At pages 14 to 21 of its Answering Brief, Respondent NYCB argues that NRS 645F.440 does not apply to an HOA foreclosure sale and that this statute was "repeatedly argued to the District Court as the sole basis of its [Gogo Way] bona fide purchaser defense." (Answering Brief, Pg. 19, Il. 17-18) Respondent NYCB then claims that the citations at pages 9 to 13 of Gogo Way's Opening Brief regarding Gogo Way's status as a bona fide purchaser raise "a new theory for the first time on appeal, which is inconsistent with or different from the one raised below." (Answering Brief, Pg. 19, Il. 22-23) Gogo Way disputes this characterization of the arguments that it made to the district court.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on February 7, 2013. (APP. Pgs. 196-257) At page 5 of this motion, defendants cited this court's decision in Long v. Towne, 98 Nev. 11, 639 P.2d 528 (1982), and argued "as the evidence shows, the Association issued all the foreclosure notices required by law and sold the Property to a bona fide purchaser, the Gogo Way Trust." (APP. Pg. 200). Defendants also stated in this motion that "[a] public auction was held where a bona fide purchaser, The Gogo

Trust, acquired the Property." (APP. Pg. 208) Gogo Way made no reference to NRS 645F.440 in this pleading.

On February 8, 2013, Respondent NYCB filed a motion for summary judgment. (APP. Pgs. 258-491). On March 1, 2013, defendants filed their opposition to plaintiff's motion summary judgment. (APP. Pgs. 668-727). Page 11 of this opposition cites NRS 645F.300 *et seq* and NRS 645F.440 in support of defendants' argument that plaintiff had "not provided any evidence whatsoever that the Gogo Way Trust, or any representative of the Gogo Way Trust, engaged in any fraud or deceit upon the homeowner." (APP. Pg. 678, 11. 25-27)

On March 7, 2013, Respondent NYCB filed a reply in support of its motion for summary judgment. (APP. Pgs. 731-795) At pages 17 and 18 of this reply, Respondent NYCB argued that NRS 645F.330, NRS 645F.350, NRS 645F.440, and NRS 645F.450 did not apply to the HOA sale in this case and then cited the case of <u>United States v. Countrywide Home Loans</u>, 408 F.App'x 3, 2010 WL 3938095 (9th Cir.), to argue that Gogo Way Trust could not be a bona fide purchaser because it had not paid "fair value" for the property at the HOA sale. (APP. Pgs. 747-748)

On March 12, 2013, defendants filed a reply to opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. (APP. Pgs. 908-915) At pages 4 and 5 of this reply, defendants quoted from NRS 645F.440, but they also cited this Court's decision in Long v. Towne, 98 Nev. 11, 639 P.2d 528 (1982) and NRS 116.31166 as support for their argument that the sale to Gogo Way should not be set aside by the court. (APP. Pgs. 911-912)

In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, filed on April 10, 2013 (APP. Pgs. 917-925), the court mentions NRS 645F.440 in Paragraph 11 of its findings of fact (APP. Pg. 924), but the court's conclusion of law that "Defendant Gogo Way was not a bona fide purchaser at the March 1, 2012, HOA foreclosure sale" includes no reference to NRS 645F.440. (APP. Pg. 925)

On September 20, 2013, Gogo Way filed its opposition to plaintiff's motion for attorneys fees, (APP. Pgs. 1145-1148) and Gogo Way cited three of the cases cited in its Opening Brief in support of its argument that it was a bona fide purchaser. (APP. Pgs. 1146-1147).

Consequently, NRS 645F.440 was not the **sole** basis for Gogo Way's claim to be a bona fide purchaser, and every single argument raised by Gogo Way below was not based upon statute as Respondent NYCB claims. (Answering Brief, Pg. 20, Il. 18-19) In addition, Respondent NYCB did not limit itself to discussing the provisions of NRS 645F.440 when it argued that Gogo Way was not a bona fide purchaser. Gogo Way is not seeking to introduce new arguments on appeal that are inconsistent with the arguments presented to the district court.

2. As the purchaser at a duly noticed HOA sale, Gogo Way obtained absolute title to the Property free of Respondent NYCB's claim to ownership.

At page 21 of its Answering Brief, Respondent NYCB claims that because Gogo Way purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, it cannot be a bona fide purchaser. However, none of the cases cited by Respondent NYCB state that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale cannot be a bona fide purchaser.

In the case of <u>Long v. Towne</u>, 98 Nev. 11, 639 P.2d 528, 530 (1982), this court upheld the sale of a mobile home lot by an HOA to the respondent for \$3,000.00 pursuant to the CC&Rs for Steamboat Mobile Homeowners Association. Rejecting the appellants' argument to set aside the foreclosure sale, this Court stated:

Here, the lien foreclosure sale was conducted under authority of the CC&Rs and in compliance with NRS 107.080. The Longs had actual notice of the sale and received the excess of the sale price over the amount of the Association's lien and costs. There simply was no forfeiture in this case. In fact, in Moore v. Prindle, supra, this court implied that a lien foreclosure sale conducted in accordance with NRS 107.080 is an equitable alternative to forfeiture. 80 Nev. at 377, 394 P.2d at 357.

NRS 116.31166(3) specifically provides that "[t]he sale of a unit pursuant to NRS 116.3112, 116.3116 and 116.31164 vests in the purchaser the title of the unit's owner

without equity or right of redemption." In the case of <u>7912 Limbwood Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank</u>, ____ F. Supp. 2d _____, 2013 WL 5780793 (D. Nev.), the court stated:

The purchaser at an HOA foreclosure sale obtains the unit owner's title without equity or right of redemption, and a deed which contains the proper recitals is "conclusive against the unit's former owner, his or her heirs and assigns, and all other persons." <u>Id.</u> § 116.31116(2). <u>Compare Nev. Rev. Stat.</u> § 107.080 (providing that a mortgage foreclosure sale "vests in the purchaser the title of the grantor and any successors in interst without equity or right of redemption"); <u>Bryant v. Carson River Lumbering Co.</u>, 3 Nev. 313, 317-18 (1867)(providing that such a sale vests absolute title in the purchaser).

This court has also recognized that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale terminates legal interests in property. <u>Charmicor, Inc. v. Bradshaw Finance Co.</u>, 92 Nev. 310, 550 P.2d 413, 415 (1976).

In this case, at the time of the HOA sale held on February 22, 2012, Respondent NYCB was the unit owner because it had already foreclosed its deed of trust at a public auction held on May 9, 2011. See trustee's deed upon sale at App. Pgs. 312-313.

The trustee's deed upon sale recorded on March 1, 2012 in favor of Gogo Way (APP. Pgs. 383-384) specifically states: "All requirements of law regarding the mailing of copies of notices and the posting and publication of the copies of the Notice of Sale have been complied with." (APP. Pg. 383) Pursuant to NRS 116.31166(1), these recitals are "conclusive proof" of the matters recited.

At page 22 of its Answering Brief, Respondent NYCB argues, however, that according to <u>Huntington v. Mila, Inc.</u>, 119 Nev. 355, 75 P.3d 354 (2003), "[a] subsequent purchaser with notice, actual or constructive, of **an interest in property superior** to that which he is purchasing is not a purchaser in good faith, and is not entitled to the protection of the recording act."

At page 23 of its Answering Brief, Respondent NYCB then claims that "[t]here is no genuine issue of fact that NYCB's ownership interest in the property had been

recorded before the interest that Gogo Way was purchasing. (APP000012)" At page 24 of its Answering Brief, Respondent NYCB also states that "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether Gogo Way was aware of a prior, superior interest in the property - not whether it was aware if the HOA or its trustee behaved improperly before and during the sale."

In making this argument, Respondent NYCB ignores the super priority lien rights held by the HOA pursuant to NRS 116.3116(2) that are **prior** to Respondent NYCB's earlier recorded deed of trust. The HOA's super priority lien survived the trustee's sale at which Respondent NYCB acquired its ownership of the Property, and Respondent NYCB held title "subject to" the HOA's super priority lien. By allowing the HOA to foreclose its super priority lien, Respondent NYCB's interest in the Property was extinguished.

This argument also ignores that although Respondent NYCB was at one time the assigned beneficiary of the deed of trust recorded on April 27, 2007, Respondent NYCB became the owner of the Property by entering a credit bid at the public auction held on May 9, 2011. See trustee's deed upon sale at APP. Pgs. 318-321. Respondent NYCB does not dispute that subsequent to acquiring its ownership of the Property, it failed to pay its HOA assessments. Pursuant to NRS 116.3116(1), the HOA had an additional lien on the Property from the time each assessment become due. Pursuant to NRS 116.31166(3), as the purchaser of the Property at an HOA sale, Gogo Way is vested with Respondent NYCB's title as the unit's owner.

Respondent NYCB's argument is therefore not based upon it having a prior lien on the date of the HOA sale – its argument is based on Respondent NYCB's claim that the HOA and its agent wrongfully demanded that Respondent NYCB tender a cure payment for an improper amount. Because this dispute over the cure payment took place entirely outside the public record and without any involvement by Gogo Way, it does not affect Gogo Way's status as a bona fide purchaser.

At page 24, lines 5-6, of its Answering Brief, Respondent NYCB argues (without

citing any authority) that "the price paid for the property is another point of consideration when determining whether to extend bona fide purchaser protections." The first element of being a bona fide purchaser "does not require that the buyer's consideration be the fair market value of the property (or anything approaching it)." Melendrez v. D&I Investment, Inc., 127 Cal. App. 4th 1238, 26 Cal. Rptr. 413, 424-425 (2005). The second element requires that the buyer "have no knowledge or notice of the asserted rights of another." Id.

The record on appeal contains no evidence that Gogo Way had "actual" knowledge **before** it purchased the Property at the sale held on February 22, 2012 that Respondent NYCB had any right to object to the HOA sale. The record on appeal likewise contains no evidence that Respondent NYCB provided any "constructive" notice of its objections to the HOA sale. In the case of <u>Adaven Management</u>, Inc. v. Mountain Falls Acquisition Corp., 124 Nev. 770, 191 P.3d 1189, 1195 (2008), this Court stated:

The county recorder maintains recorded deeds, including those transferring water rights. By statute, a county recorder is required to keep indices of all deeds arranged by the names of the grantors and grantees. A prospective purchaser of land may search those indices to ensure that the person attempting to sell the property has clear title to it. To search the indices, the prospective purchaser would first search the grantee index for the purported owner's name to ascertain when and from whom the purported owner received the property. Using that name the purchaser would check the grantee index for the names of each previous owner, thus establishing the "chain of title." The purchaser must then search the grantor index, starting with the first owner in the chain of title, to see whether he or she transferred or encumbered the property during the time between his or her acquisition of the property and its transfer to the next person in the chain of title. Whether or not a purchaser of real property performs this search, he or she is **charged with constructive notice of**, and takes ownership of the property subject to, **any interest such a title search would reveal.** (emphasis added)

Respondent NYCB did not file its complaint challenging the validity of the HOA sale until April 18, 2012. (APP. Pgs. 4-62) Respondent NYCB did not file its notice of lis pendens until April 20, 2012. (APP. Pgs. 63-64) As a result, a search of the county recorder's records on the sale date on February 22, 2012 would not have provided Gogo

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Way with "constructive notice" of any interest in the property claimed by Respondent NYCB other than the ownership interest that was extinguished by the HOA sale.

By allowing the HOA sale to Gogo Way to take place without objection, Respondent NYCB cannot now claim that it tendered sufficient funds to the HOA prior to the sale.

At page 25, 1 ines 4-6, of its Answering Brief, Respondent NYCB asserts that "by alleging that NYCB did not make a proper tender of the lien amount," Gogo Way has raised "a second new argument on appeal that was not made to the District Court below."

To the contrary, Respondent NYCB raised the tender issue by arguing in its motion for summary judgment (APP. Pgs. 258-491) that "the sale should not have gone forward in the first place" (APP. Pg. 270, 1. 23) because "Shadow Wood provided conflicting payment information" (APP. Pg. 270, 1. 13) and "Shadow Wood rejected NYCB's payment, claiming that NYCB now needed to pay Alessi & Koenig \$9,017.39 to avoid the HOA sale." (APP. Pg. 273, 11. 21-22).

Similarly, defendants raised this issue in their motion for summary judgment, filed on February 7, 2013 (APP. Pgs. 196-257) when they stated: "Furthermore, in response to a request from Plaintiff's representative, Alessi & Koenig, LLC emailed the payoff information directly to Plaintiff's representative on February 14, 2012, eight days prior to the sale. Plaintiff did not make payment or take any form of legal action to stop the (APP. Pgs. 208-209) These same statements are contained in defendants' opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, filed on March 1, 2013. (APP. Pg. 674)

Furthermore, defendants' opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment included the following argument at pages 9 and 10 (APP. Pgs. 676-677) regarding Respondent NYCB's failure to tender the cure amount demanded by the HOA:

Plaintiff claims that A&K's foreclosure documents contain "varying amounts," such that Plaintiff was justified in not sending payment prior to the foreclosure sale. First, if Plaintiff had a legitimate dispute regarding the amount owed, Plaintiff could have sought court intervention to enjoin the sale. Second, Plaintiff did not act in a reasonable manner with respect to the payoff because Plaintiff (1) waited to the last minute before sending in payment and (2) chose to pay the amount shown on the Association's history of the delinquent assessment balance rather than pay the amount shown on the breakdown, produced by A&K, showing the total amount currently owed. When A&K informed Plaintiff about the error, Plaintiff took no action and the foreclosure sale took place fourteen (14) days later. (emphasis added)

The cases cited at pages 13 to 15 of Gogo Way's Opening Brief relate to this issue that was raised and argued below. At page 25 of its Answering Brief, Respondent NYCB argues that the decisions in <u>Gaffney v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n</u>, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 246 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1988), and <u>Nguyen v. Calhoun</u>, 105 Cal. App. 4th 428, 129 Cal. Rptr. 436 (2003), can be distinguished from the present case because Respondent NYCB claims that in this case, the HOA demanded "a tender of an amount *greater* than the amount the creditor is owed" (Pg. 25, Il. 23-24) and that "Shadow Wood was owed far less that it claimed." (Pg. 25, I. 27)

This argument, however, does not rebut the statement by the court in <u>Moeller v.</u> <u>Lien</u>, 25 Cal. App. 4th 822, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777 (1994), that:

The conclusive presumption precludes an attack by the trustor on the trustee's sale to a bona fide purchaser even where the trustee wrongfully rejected a proper tender of reinstatement by the trustor. Where the trustor is precluded from suing to set aside the foreclosure sale, the trustor may recover damages from the trustee. (Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 11 [89 Cal. Rptr. 323]) (emphasis added)

As a result, even if the HOA rejected a proper tender by Respondent NYCB, the rights of Gogo Way are protected from a suit by Respondent NYCB to set aside the sale. In its Answering Brief, Respondent NYCB cites no authority that contradicts this principle recognized by the court in Moeller v. Lien. Respondent NYCB merely argues that "such a notion would be absurd and is ripe for abuse from creditors." (Answering Brief, Pg. 25, 1. 25) This argument fails to recognize that Gogo Way is not a "creditor." Gogo Way is a bona fide purchaser. As a matter of public policy, if the rights of bona

fide purchasers are not protected, then purchasers will be discouraged from appearing and bidding at public auctions.

Respondent NYCB has failed to identify a single case where a court set aside a foreclosure sale where the property owner allowed the foreclosure sale to a bona fide purchaser to proceed without objection after a trustee returned a properly tendered cure payment.

At pages 15 and 16 of its Opening Brief, Gogo Way identified the difference between NRS 107.080(5) (which provides for a 45 day period to challenge a foreclosure sale held pursuant to a deed of trust) and NRS 116.31166 (which does not provide any time period to challenge a foreclosure sale by an HOA). Respondent NYCB simply ignores this critical distinction. If the Nevada legislature wanted to provide unit owners with a judicial remedy to challenge an HOA foreclosure sale, NRS Chapter 116 would include a counterpart to NRS 107.080(5). In addition, even if NRS 107.080(5) had such a counterpart, Respondent NYCB waited longer than 45 days after the HOA sale to file its complaint.

At page 26 of its Answering Brief, Respondent NYCB argues that allowing Gogo Way to prevent the HOA sale from being set aside would serve "only to offer safe harbor for other unscrupulous collectors who use similar 'unreasonable and oppressive tactics." To the contrary, in the case of Munger v. Moore, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1, 89 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1970), the court recognized that a "trustee or mortgagee may be liable to the trustor or mortgagor for damages sustained where there has been an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property under a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust." 11 Cal. App. 3d at 7.

Respondent NYCB's remedy for its claim of wrongful foreclosure lies against the HOA and its agent, but not against the innocent purchaser, Gogo Way. The record on appeal contains no evidence that Gogo Way took any improper action relating to the HOA sale. Gogo Way is a bona fide purchaser that paid \$11,018.39 at a validly noticed

trustee's sale that extinguished Respondent NYCB's ownership interest in the Property. The district court acted improperly in setting aside the sale to Gogo Way and restoring title to the Property to Respondent NYCB. 4 **CONCLUSION** 5 The bona fide purchaser doctrine clearly applies to appellant Gogo Way Trust. This Court should enter an Order reversing the Order by the district court granting 7 Respondent NYCB's motion for summary judgment. 8 It is respectfully submitted that this Court remand this case to the district court with 9 directions to enter judgment in favor of Gogo Way on its counterclaim quieting title to 10 the real property in Gogo Way's name. 11 DATED this 13th day of February, 2014. 12 LAW OFFICES OF 13 MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD. 14 15 By: /s/Michael F. Bohn, Esq. / Michael F. Bohn, Esq. 376 East Warm Springs Road, Ste. 125 16 17 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Attorney for defendant/appellant 18 Gogo Way Trust 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

- 1. I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Word Perfect X6 14 point Times New Roman.
- 2. I further certify that this brief complies with the page or type-volume limitations of NRAP 37(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7) it is proportionately spaced and has a typeface of 14 points and contains 3,838 words.
- 3. I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found.

DATED this 13th day of February, 2014.

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1	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING		
2	I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of February 2014, I served a photocopy		
3	of the foregoing APPELLANT GOGO WAY TRUST'S REPLY BRIEF by placing the		
4	same in a sealed envelope with first-class postage fully prepaid thereon and deposited in		
5	the United States mails addressed as follows:		
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