EXHIBIT B

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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

FAMILY DIVISION

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ERIC L. NELSON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. D-09-411537-D

vs.) DEPT. O

LYNITA NELSON, (SEALED)

Defendant.)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE FRANK P. SULLIVAN DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

TRANSCRIPT RE: MOTION

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2013

D-09-411537-D NELSON 06/19/2013 TRANSCRIPT (SEALED) VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

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PROCEEDINGS

(THE PROCEEDINGS BEGAN AT 14:37:51)

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THE COURT: This is the time set in the matter of Eric Nelson and Lynita Nelson, case number D-411537. Can we have everybody's appearance for the record? We'll start with our Trust.

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MR. LUSZECK: Jeff Luszeck, counsel for distribution Trustee of the ELN Trust.

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THE COURT: Thank you.

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MS. FORSERG: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Rhonda Forsberg, 9557 on behalf of Eric Nelson.

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MR. DICKERSON: Your Honor, Bob Dickerson, bar number 945 and Katherine Provost, bar number 8414 on behalf of Lynita Nelson who is present.

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THE COURT: It's good to see you again, Ms. Lynita.

I'm sorry Mr. Eric's not here. It's always a pleasure to see both of the parties. Everybody can sit down and get comfortable. This is on Mr. Dickerson's motion on behalf of Ms. Nelson for motion for payment of funds pursuant to this Court's divorce and decree that was entered by this Court and

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requested immediate payment.

The Court had ordered payment within 30 days of the

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-- to review that.

THE COURT:

THE COURT: Have it?

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MS. FORSERG: Yeah.

THE COURT: Counsel, do you have a position on that as your -- in this one and not --

MR. LUSZECK: Well, it doesn't involve --

THE COURT: Okav.

MS. FORSERG: Yeah.

MR. LUSZECK: -- the Trust, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I want to make sure everybody is comfortable on that and we'll try to see if we can get everything resolved today. Mr. Dickerson.

MR. DICKERSON: Yes, Judge. And -- and I don't know if you want to take time to review that first, but dealing with our motion --

> THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DICKERSON: -- our motion is rather simple. It's set out to specifically in the motion what our request is and the reasons for it. I believe in light of your specific findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the -the likelihood that Eric Nelson will not honor any of these Court's orders that -- that it's imperative and -- and I -it's very imperative. I -- I was kind of surprised to see that the -- that the injunction was -- was dissolved immediately at that point in time.

I don't know where the funds are. I don't know.

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I've been attempting to get a hold of Dave Stephens (ph). has not returned my calls. I don't know if the trust has taken the entire 1.8 million plus all the interest that has been accrued on that over the last year, year and a half that it's -- it's been there.

THE COURT: My intent was when I said dissolve it was to order immediate distribution within the 30 days I think -- at least maybe it wasn't as clear as I thought. And I said we'll distribute A, B, C, D, E and then the remaining 500,000 to Mr. Nelson. That was my intent.

> MR. DICKERSON: Well --

THE COURT: Not -- that's --

MR. DICKERSON: -- my -- my hope was is that that was the intent --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. DICKERSON: -- and my hope was that it would remain with -- with Mr. Stephens and that Mr. Stephens would cut the checks that Your Honor had ordered. I don't know why it -- it would have necessitated a -- a 30 day period. And we're asking that Your Honor order that those monies be released today. Ms. Nelson has no monies available to her. As you see, we've set it -- I believe she has about 19,000.

> THE COURT: 19,000 in --

MR. DICKERSON: She has significant debt.

THE COURT: -- credit card bills --

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MR. DICKERSON: I think it's also --

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THE COURT: -- about 53,000.

Nelson has received about \$30,000 from Eric Nelson.

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MR. DICKERSON: -- ironic and it -- it goes to tell you what we've been dealing with in this case. You know that this -- the case was filed in January of 2009. The parties have been going through divorce problems for years prior to that. They separated in June of 2008. And I think the -- the record reflects that approximately since 2008 at most Lynita

He left her this account roughly \$2,000,000 that she was strictly had to rely upon that. Receives no income from any other source, had to rely on those monies and that money is down to 19,000 which they -- they throw a line in their opposition pointing out that she's gone through the \$2,000,000. That \$2,000,000 was what she used for the purposes of her living expenses which Your Honor has already It's at least \$240,000 a year and she use those determined. money for the purposes of -- of her litigation expenses.

And I think it's ironic seeing that, Your Honor she is here and she's not -- she doesn't have the money available for her to go on vacation. And while Eric Nelson is not here, because he's spending two and a half weeks in Thailand with at least three of his children.

So in fairness, I mean, something needs to be done to get money to this woman. She's waited a -- a considerable amount of time. And I will simply ask that you enter the order that we've requested. I -- I prepared a proposed order for your consideration for that purpose and it's simply directing it at David -- Dave Stephens still retains those monies, that he is to release \$1,032,742 to Lynita and \$35,258 to Larry Bertsch and the -- the balance he can release to Eric Nelson pursuant to -- pursuant to your decree of divorce. And as I mentioned, I do have a proposed order if Your Honor's inclined to sign it.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel?

MR. LUSZECK: Your Honor, I don't have much to add other than what's in our opposition in -- in countermotion.

THE COURT: You're concerned if I gave the money and paid it and then he was successful on getting me --

MR. LUSZECK: Correct.

THE COURT: -- overruled that the money would be gone, they wouldn't get it. Is that kind of --

MR. LUSZECK: Yeah, I mean we're --

THE COURT: -- a little bit --

MR. LUSZECK: -- we're essentially concerned that the ELN Trust is going to suffer irreferable harm if the payment has to be made and the property is transferred over

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from the ELN Trust to the LSN Trust. We are going to file an appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court. We would ask that any type of transfer or payments be stay pending our appeal.

I think -- the argument that's been made essentially it's akin to a motion for reconsideration. The allegations that we've heard today and that are in the motion for payment are the same arguments that we've heard before in a trial. There's no new evidence, no new facts, no new law. the 30 days is appropriate to give us the -- the Trust ample time to -- to appeal the decision which it's going to do.

MR. DICKERSON: Well -- well, there are new facts. There's the facts that you found and you found that she is entitled to that money and it's time that she be paid that money and it's time that she be able to enjoy life like Eric Nelson has been doing since they separated in June of 2008. It's -- it's the only fair way to do it. They -- they ask for a -- Your Honor to issue -- to stay the proceedings. Essentially, they're asking her -- you to allow this woman to be out on the street and not have any money available to her while they decide to pursue the appeal.

I'll bring to their attention right now. I mean, if they do file a notice of appeal, they obviously need to file their motion for stay and they're going to have to post a supersedeas bond for the amount of the judgment that you have

found in her favor which is well in excess I believe of six, \$7,000,000 that they would have to do.

And our intent at that point in time Judge is we will be filing a Honeycutt motion seeking to have you pursue that finding that you made that you find that the trusts are invalid and that they -- and that the trusts are not effective. And -- and that would be our intent as we file in a Honeycutt motion so the supreme court can consider that issue also.

THE COURT: And I did look into on anticipation the supersedeas bond that the judgment and the Court would add interest on that, I believe five and a quarter percent interest, I think. Plus I would add two years interest on that, because the supreme court takes a couple years. Plus costs I think could be added. They can be anywhere from 50 to a hundred thousand. So I did look at some of those things that that bond could be kind of costly, but I do respect your right for the Trust to do as they deem appropriate.

My issue is do you know if that money's been -- have you -- would your client -- do you know if that money's been distributed? Because my intent was for Mr. Stephens to give that out to her and to give back the trust, but I could have been clearer when I looked at it. I thought it was -- when you're writing anything, it's not clearer than when you look

at it. When I looked at -- so I probably should have been very specific, but that's why I try to say this money, this money and then the remaining to Mr. Nelson, because I figured they may have some concerns that the money could dissipate.

MR. LUSZECK: Yes. It's my understanding the money has been transferred from the trust account to the ELN Trust.

MR. DICKERSON: So they have already --

MR. LUSZECK: Do you know if Mr. Nelson -- do you know if Mr. Nelson's got his 500 grand? Do you know if they distributed it and just transferred to the trust?

MR. LUSZECK: That I don't know, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DICKERSON: So what they've already done is they have already taken benefits of your judgment and now they're telling after we take the benefits of our judgment we're going to file an appeal. And they can't do that. And they — they very well have waived their rights to appeal.

MR. LUSZECK: I -- I don't think that's true, Your Honor. I believe the order -- the divorce decree has been complied with and I don't think we've waived any rights to appeal.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. We'll deal with that when it comes. My concern on this case is I thought that there could be possible appeals on that. I felt that -- give people

some time. I did feel that I would try to keep the trust in place in order to provide the protection from creditors, so I didn't want them to lose the intent as I found the intent of their trust which was to protect from creditors on both sides. They didn't want to open up Ms. Lynita either to any attacks by creditors as to her thing through Eric or otherwise. So I did feel on that.

I'll deal with those issues about setting aside appropriately with Honeycutt or whatever comes down on that, but I'm very -- the reason I asked you if those monies have been transferred, because if they left the money with Mr. Stephens I wouldn't been as concerned saying they left it there, fine, they're doing it on the up and up. They had concerns on that and they just want to protect that.

But I'll be honest with you. My findings on that and your client's got a lot of issues from this Court felt on credibility. I'm not the only judge that founds those issues. Issues about dissipating estates and the bankruptcy estate that I was concerned that this stuff could disappear. So that was my intent.

If that money is stayed with Mr. Stephens in his trust, then I'd have been more comfortable saying hey, the money ain't going anywhere. Mr. Stephens -- Attorney Stephens has it. He's an honorable. Money being transferred to Nelson

Trust — to his trust, I'm worried about that, because I think they could get distributions on that. Other ways to get that money out, transfer it to family members as he done to the other property on that. As I made my findings, getting out and had the estate thrown. So I'm troubled by that and the fact that they transferred to the trust. I'm very concerned now.

As far as that going, I'm inclined to grant their motion and make that money payable within 24 hours. And as far as that, I'm also would consider if you -- as far as if you want me to -- my concern is for -- for the trust for their appeal purposes, their concern that wait a minute, that money is gone. We give it to Ms. Nelson now. Now you kind of screwed us all because we can't get it back. But the issue is other property. They have two. There's other ways we can do and ought to make -- there's some collateral there if it disappeared over the next two years.

But I think -- there's other ways I could protect that if it's appropriate, because there is sizable real estate that could be pledged as collateral if necessary. So I think that there is a remedy. I don't think she's going to go and get rid of all the property in her trust during the pending of the appeal on that, so I'm not so sure that you couldn't get that money back.

But --

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THE COURT:

MR. LUSZECK: But --

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THE COURT: -- let me give you a chance.

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MR. LUSZECK: -- before we go on -- well --

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THE COURT: Yeah.

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MR. LUSZECK: -- I don't know that we technically can file an appeal right now, because you filed NRCP 55 -- 59

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motion which may preclude us from doing that. So we're going

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to have to seek a writ.

before we file a writ.

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. LUSZECK: And first up, before we can seek a

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writ is seeking a stay from this Court. So procedurally, we

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had no other choice but to seek this relief from this Court

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. DICKERSON: You have to file a writ and a writ

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would be an improper method when you have a final judgment.

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There -- there is a relief by an appeal. And as Your Honor

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pointed out, there is sufficient security with respect to the

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other property. It's not -- they -- they have -- they've got

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to transfer that property. That our next motion that comes.

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They're going to refuse to do that.

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MR. LUSZECK: Well --

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MR. DICKERSON: So I would ask that Your Honor enter

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the order today that we filed an order in open court that the

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MR. LUSZECK: Okay.

I'm going to do. I'll give you chance on that. I'm going to

grant the motion for the immediate release of the funds.

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going to give you up to the release by Friday, 5:00 o'clock.

That gives you two days. That way you can try to get

extraordinary relief if necessary. 24 hours is kind of tough,

gives you a chance a talk. I -- I believe Thailand has

telephones and emails in Thailand I believe they have, so I

imagine that it -- Mr. Nelson can be contacted.

I have serious concerns with that money being transferred into the trust that that money would dissipate.

And that's my concerns on that. If it's still with Mr.

Stephens' account, I would have frozen that account, you know, if I needed to on that, but I'm concerned on that.

So I am going to grant the motion. I'm denying the motion for stay. I'll give you a chance to -- now you can pursue your extraordinary relief if the supreme court has deemed appropriate. And I will address any issues at that time at the supersedeas bonds or otherwise, whatever needs to be done.

This case has been going on for a long time. I respect both parties. I am seriously concerned. Mr. Nelson has been controlling the estate essentially since day one.

Now he's losing control of the estate. And no disrespect to him. I expect a lot of problems trying to get payment.

That's why I did lump sums with my findings, because I can see this going on til the world ended to be honest. And I do

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I am going to grant the motion. It's hereby ordered that as follows. Good cause being shown. Well, I guess Mr. Stephens got to change there where it says ordered Dave Stephens to immediately upon present pay Lynita or attorneys. That's -- I think we have to modify that order to simply put it --

MR. DICKERSON: But the next -- but the next order covers that --

THE COURT: The next covers it, does it?

MR. DICKERSON: -- that it's already distributed.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll get it going. It's further ordered that if said 1.568 million or any portions thereof has already been transferred to Mr. Nelson to the trust. The ELN Trust is to pay Ms. Nelson the order of this Court. I haven't added up those numbers, but I think that includes the lump sum spousal and the child support. I'll add, again, add it up. I haven't added it up, but I'll go by counsel's --

MR. DICKERSON: It said out of the motion, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Of the \$1,032,742 and shall Mr.

Bertsch who has been waiting a long time for his fees. 35,280

will be that within 48 hours. So let's delineate that within

48 hours. The presentation of this order. I'm going to sign it today and get it dated. What's the date today?

THE CLERK: The 19th.

THE COURT: The 19th. I will initial. Let's get these filed and get them served, get taken care of now. That would give them two business days to get it done. I'm denying the motion for stay as I think this case — let the supreme court intervene and do what they need to do as they deem appropriate. This case has been ongoing since 2009 January. We've had numerous, numerous motions, numerous, numerous hearings. And I respect the party's right to litigate, but I think it's time that it needs to be resolved and it needs to be off of my desk up to the supreme court and let them handle it as they deem appropriate.

I do not believe that the release of those funds put you at any risk from the trust, because I do believe that Ms. Nelson has significant resources that will -- could be able to be collateral if -- if you need that. And so I don't think I've identified any wrongdoing on Ms. Nelson that she would try to get rid of funds and not pay any funds if the supreme court was indeed overturned it and said she was not entitled to said funds. And therefore, that's the basis for the order of this Court. And then we have another -- did you want to deal with this motion we have pending as to --

we can for the record to reflect that he has been served with the -- with the order?

THE COURT: Okay. She has to -- you got to file it first.

MR. DICKERSON: And then was Your Honor inclined to set this matter for a brief hearing in -- on Monday?

THE COURT: Absolutely. If they want to get there so we get it resolved, because -- and if it's not distributed, we can have the Nola Harbor or whoever needs to be here for the trust, because Mr. Nelson will still be out do you know if he's --

MS. FORSERG: He will be.

MR. LUSZECK: I believe so.

THE COURT: So when we put on a status check because the payment of the order, that way we'll see if there's anything pending on that just to try to get it resolved for you guys. We'll put on the status check as the Monday afternoon as to payment under the order and that will give you time on that while we're looking at that and I'll go in the back and read these two and come back in —

MS. FORSERG: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- about 10 minutes.

MR. DICKERSON: So your order --

THE COURT: Whatever time works --

THE COURT: -- 10:00 or 12:00. We'll work something

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MR. DICKERSON: And just one other comment and again, it's -- it's -- well -- because I don't know if Jeff is going to leave.

MS. FORSERG: He's not. He's waiting for the order.

THE COURT: We'll have him hang around until he gets the order, so we --

MR. DICKERSON: But -- but just one other comment for the record is --

THE COURT: Let's keep it on the record while we got just so we --

> This --MR. DICKERSON:

THE COURT: -- make sure there's --

MR. DICKERSON: This matter is here today based upon the fact that we filed a motion for ex parte relief on the day that Your Honor's findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce were entered. That day we filed an ex parte and unfortunately it was denied. We anticipated this would happen. And I -- I just respectfully suggest that in the future when you're dealing with an individual such as Eric Nelson, you have to know --

MS. FORSERG: Your Honor --

MR. DICKERSON: -- that this is going to happen.

MS. FORSERG: -- we have to object to this.

1	MR. DICKERSON: This is absolutely going to happen
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3	MS. FORSERG: We object to his statement.
4	MR. DICKERSON: and the likelihood we will get
5	these monies by Friday, I I it it will be a surprise.
6	THE COURT: Yeah, well, I did consider when I got
7	the ex parte, I don't do anything ex parte, because it gives
8	the appearance that it's being done. I did have concerns, but
9	I felt that Mr the funds were in the trust fund with the
10	attorney, so I wasn't too worried. Should and I maybe
11	should have clarified my order better, so that one's on me.
12	But we'll we'll get that money
13	MR. DICKERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: unless the supreme court says
15	otherwise. Thanks, everybody.
16	MR. DICKERSON: And Your Honor, and for the record
17	reflect that I'm providing your I'll have your
18	MR. LUSZECK: Thank you.
19	MR. DICKERSON: I'll have your marshal provide a
20	copy to both
21	THE COURT: The record reflect that the order's been
22	signed by the Court today approving the motion for the
23	immediate disposal dispersal to Ms. Nelson within 48 hours.

THE COURT: -- non-attorney, a non-attorney from the case on it. I have read that and I did read the points and authorities and the countermotion. I also read the affidavit submitted by Jeanette Lacker (ph). Ms. Forsberg, is there anything you want to add in to the argument or anything?

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MS. FORSERG: Your Honor, only one. They're both not huge law firms. Jimmerson's wasn't huge, so she had to be involved in things. And Dickerson's isn't huge, because of course most family firms are not. His is -- not everyone's, but that's the only thing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Dickerson, anything else?

MR. DICKERSON: Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: This Court has reviewed that. I did read the affidavit submitted by Jeanette Lacker. She indicated that she had been employed for the Jimmerson Law Firm from I think September 2008 through 2012 was when this case would have been involved. I think the case officially was filed with 2009 if I remember. I don't remember how long Mr. Jimmerson was involved in the case to be honest and when he got out. I'm not sure when he got out of the case.

Indicated our main concerned was did she acquire confidential information. That was my concern in this case. I do note that both firms are relatively small firms.

According to the affidavit, she indicated that during the employment she's been employed since April 1st, 2013, went to Dickerson Law Firm. She did disclose that she had been working for Jimmerson prior. She had another involvement with Michelle Roberts after she left Jimmerson in February 2012 through April 2013 and came to work for the Dickerson Law Firm

on April 1st.

So he said that prior to receiving an offer of employment with -- with Attorney Dickerson's firm she did disclose -- list any cases that she -- if that remained in controversy between the Dickerson Firm and any of her former employers including the Jimmerson Firm. She said she was -- she's not aware of when Jimmerson first got retained to the action.

In the matter she said during her employment with the Jimmerson Firm she performed very limited work. She did basically her -- she would review files. Her reviewed the files, indicated that the paralegal assigned was Shahana Polselli and not her. And the legal -- legal assistant assigned to the Nelson case was Jessica Dennis (ph).

As she indicated, she did not attend any confidential meetings with Eric Nelson and Mr. Jimmerson when Mr. Jimmerson represented Eric. She also indicated she did quote, I did not participate in any meeting with Mr. Jimmerson or Mr. Nelson or any client for that matter, that such meetings were attended to by the paralegal assigned to that case and not the legal assistance. And the -- and the paralegal in that case had been Shahana Polselli.

She indicated that the only document she worked on was a Plaintiff's first supplemental, NRCP 16.1 disclosure of

documents, witnesses and documents. She indicated that would have been initially prepared by Shahana Polselli and annotated by Mr. Jimmerson. And that would have been delivered to her to insert annotations so that she can have it then signed finally by Mr. Jimmerson and then complete their certificate of service and mailing process.

She said if there's any other documents that she would have worked on would have been certificates of service prepared by other parties. She indicated that quote, I obtained no confidential information by Mr. Nelson or this matter due to my empl -- my employer as one of Mr. Jimmerson's legal assistants. She said her interactions consisted at the office of saying hello, goodbye if she saw Mr. Nelson come into the office or answer the telephone. She said she quote, never had any telephonic conference or conversation with Mr. Nelson or any associate with Mr. Nelson.

Do you feel, counsel, that the -- her putting annotations in to the 16.1 disclosure witnesses and documents would give her access to any confidential information? I'm not sure what that would have been entailed to be honest, but

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MS. FORSERG: We would think that -- that it would, Your Honor, but we are not sure that's our concern is, because you're going through all of it. You're interacting with all

of this stuff when you're putting together documents for a witness list and everything like that. So that's where -- where her -- his concern is.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, based on the -- the affidavit and the issue I -- this Court -- based on the information provided at this time, it does -- did not say that she acquired any confidential information about the former client. If you got some more information specific, I'll be glad to look at it. I'm not sure if this citing this 16.1, dis -- disclosure of witnesses and documents means that she reviewed all the documents or have seen those documents. So I do not feel at this time that she -- the non-lawyer employees acquired any confidential information as to Mr. Nelson.

I -- I also notice that they did have some screening procedures in place according to the affidavit, that during her employment with Mr. Dickerson she was advised of course she cannot work in any capacity on the Nelson case. And the long, she also informed that she would be screened from any access to any of the work product existing in that Nelson case and was provided with a copy of the Leibowitz (ph) determination ascertained about the screening of non-lawyers or she would risk termination and that she has fully complied with those requirements.

I do know that these are both small -- really small

law firms. The issue is number one, I do not see any evidence that she did acquire any confidential about a former client and that number two, it looks like they had a screening process that would screen her from access to this case to provide any information on this case in order to screen her from any contact regarding this case or any input to make sure that there was not any unfairness to Mr. Nelson to using the information acquired.

And for all those reasons, I am denying the motion at this time. And again, if you have more specifics, I'd be glad to look at it after something more specific. But based on the information provided and the affidavit and opposition too, I do not believe there's any evidence that she acquired any confidential information and furthermore that Mr.

Dickerson had a sufficient screening in there to safeguard any -- Mr. Nelson from any disclosure. Do you want to prepare the

MR. DICKERSON: I --

order on that, Mr. Dickerson? Or do you want --

THE COURT: Do you want an order on that or -
MR. DICKERSON: Can we certify the minutes as the

Court's order.

THE COURT: Okay with that or do you want to -
MS. FORSERG: Well, as long as the minutes say that

we can look at more specifics. That's the only -- my only

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the digital proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

/s/ Adrian N. Medrano
Adrian N. Medrano

EXHIBIT A

Electronically Filed 06/03/2013 02:37:08 PM

1 CLERK OF THE COURT 2 3 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 ERIC L. NELSON. 9 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, CASE NO.: D-09-411537-D 10 DEPT. NO.: O 11 vs. 12 LYNITA SUE NELSON, LANA MARTIN, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON 13 NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001, 14 Defendant/Counterclaimants. 15 16 LANA MARTIN, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated 17 May 30, 2001, 18 Crossclaimant, 19 VS. 20 LYNITA SUE NELSON, 21 Crossdefendant. 22 23 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 24 25 Non-Trial Dispositions:
Settled/Withdrawn:
Settled/Without Judicial Conf/Hig
With Judicial Conf/Hig
With Judicial Conf/Hig
It
By ADR 26 27 Trial Dispositions: 28 Judgment Reached by Trial Disposed After Trial Start FRANK R SULLIVAN 1 DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101

1	TO:
2	· .
3	Rhonda Forsberg, Esq. Robert Dickerson, Esq.
4	Mark Solomon, Esq. Jeffrey Luszeck, Esq.
5	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that DECREE OF DIVORCE was duly entered in the above-
6	referenced case on the 3rd day of June, 2013.
7	DATED this 3 day of June, 2013.
8	DATED tins day of tune, 2013.
9	Lan Par
10	Lori Parr Judicial Executive Assistant
11	Dept. O
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DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O	2
LAS VEGAS NV 89101	

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2	DISTRICT COURT	
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
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5	ERIC L. NELSON,) CASE NO.: D-09-411537-D	
6) DEPT. NO.: O Electronically Filed Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,) 06/03/2013 01:35:50 PM	
7)	
8	VS. Storm to Character to Storm to Character	
9	Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON) CLERK OF THE COURT	
10	NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,)	
11 12	Defendant/Counterclaimants.)	
13	LANA MARTIN, Distribution Trustee of the)	
14	ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated) May 30, 2001,)	
15	Crossclaimant,	
16)	
17	ys.)	
18	LYNITA SUE NELSON,)	
19	Crossdefendant.)	
20	DECREE OF DIVORCE	
21	This matter having come before this Honorable Court for a Non-Jury Trial in October	
22		
23	2010, November 2010, July 2012 and August 2012, with Plaintiff, Eric Nelson, appearing and	
24	being represented by Rhonda Forsberg, Esq., Defendant, Lynita Nelson, appearing and being	
25	represented by Robert Dickerson, Esq., Katherine Provost, Esq., and Josef Karacsonyi, Esq.,	
26	and Counter-defendant, Cross-defendant, Third Party Defendant Lana Martin, Distribution	
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Trustee of the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust, being represented by Mark Solomon, Esq., and Jeffrey Luszeck, Esq., good cause being shown:

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that it has jurisdiction in the premises, both as to the subject matter thereof and as the parties thereto, pursuant to NRS 125.010 et seq.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS the Eric Nelson, Plaintiff, has been, and is now, an actual and bona fide resident of the County of Clark, State of Nevada, and has been actually domiciled therein for more than six (6) weeks immediately preceding to the commencement of this action.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the parties were married September 17, 1983.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that 5 children were born the issue of this marriage; two of which are minors, namely, Garrett Nelson born on September 13, 1994, and Carli Nelson born on October 17, 1997; and to the best of her knowledge, Lynita Nelson, is not now pregnant.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Plaintiff filed for divorce on May 6, 2009.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the parties entered into a Stipulated Parenting

Agreement as to the care and custody of said minor children on October 15, 2008, which was affirmed, ratified and made an Order of this Court on February 8, 2010.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that on August 9, 2011, both parties stipulated and agreed that the Eric L. Nelson Nevada (ELN) Trust should be joined as a necessary party to this matter.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Eric Nelson is entitled to an absolute Decree of Divorce on the grounds of incompatibility.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that during the couple's nearly thirty (30) years of marriage, the parties have amassed a substantial amount of wealth.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the parties entered into a Separate Property

Agreement on July 13, 1993, with Mr. Nelson being advised and counseled with respect to the legal effects of the Agreement by attorney Jeffrey L. Burr and Mrs. Nelson being advised and counseled as its legal effects by attorney Richard Koch.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, pursuant to NRS 123.080 and NRS 123.220(1), the Separate Property Agreement entered into by the parties on July 13, 1993, was a valid Agreement.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Schedule A of the Separate Property Agreement contemporaneously established the Eric L. Nelson Separate Property Trust and named Mr. Nelson as trustor. The trust included interest in:

A First Interstate Bank account; A Bank of America account: 4021 Eat Portland Street, Phoenix, Arizona; 304 Ramsey Street, Las Vegas, Nevada; Twelve (12) acres located on Cheyenne Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada; Ten (10) acres located on Cheyenne Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada; 1098 Evergreen Street, Phoenix, Arizona; Forty nine (49) lots, notes and vacant land in Queens Creek, Arizona; Forty one (41) lots, notes and vacant land in Sunland Park, New Mexico; Sport of Kings located at 365 Convention Center Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada; A 1988 Mercedes; Forty percent (40%) interest in Eric Nelson Auctioneering, 4285 South Polaris Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada: One hundred percent (100%) interest in Casino Gaming International, LTD., 4285 South Polaris Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada; and Twenty five percent (25%) interest in Polk Landing.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Schedule B of the Separate Property Agreement contemporaneously established the Lynita S. Nelson Separate Property Trust and named Mrs. Nelson as trustor. The trust included interest in:

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A Continental National Bank account;

Six (6) Silver State Schools Federal Credit Union accounts;

An American Bank of Commerce account:

7065 Palmyra Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada;

8558 East Indian School Road, Number J, Scottsdale, Arizona;

Ten (10) acres on West Flamingo Road, Las Vegas, Nevada;

1167 Pine Ridge Drive, Panguitch, Utah;

749 West Main Street, Mesa, Arizona;

1618 East Bell Road, Phoenix, Arizona;

727 Hartford Avenue, Number 178, Phoenix, Arizona;

4285 Polaris Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada:

Metropolitan Mortgage & Security Co., Inc., West 929 Sprague Avenue Spokane,

Washington:

Apirade Bumpus, 5215 South 39th Street, Phoenix, Arizona;

Pool Hall Sycamore, 749 West Main Street, Mesa, Arizona;

A Beneficial Life Insurance policy; and

A 1992 van

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that on May 30, 2001, the Eric L. Nelson Nevada

Trust (hereinafter "ELN Trust") was created under the advice and counsel of Jeffrey L. Burr,

Esq., who prepared the trust documents.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the ELN Trust was established as a self-settled spendthrift trust in accordance with NRS 166.020. ¹

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that all of the assets and interest held by the Eric L.

Nelson Separate Property Trust were transferred or assigned to the ELN Trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that on May 30, 2001, the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada

Trust (hereinafter "LSN Trust") was created under the advice and counsel of Jeffrey L. Burr,

Esq., who prepared the trust documents.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the LSN Trust was established as a self-settled

spendthrift trust in accordance with NRS 166.020.

NRS 166.020 defines a spendthrift trust as "at trust in which by the terms thereof a valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the interest of the beneficiary is imposed. See, NRS 166.020.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that all of the assets and interest held by the Lynita S.

Nelson Separate Property Trust were transferred or assigned to the LSN Trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while the parties may differ as to the reason why the trusts were created, the effect of a spendthrift trust is to prevent creditors from reaching the principle or corpus of the trust unless said creditor is known at the time in which an asset is transferred to the trust and the creditor brings an action no more than two years after the transfer occurs or no more than 6 months after the creditor discovers or reasonably should have discovered the transfer, whichever occurs latest.²

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while spendthrift trusts have been utilized for decades; Nevada is one of the few states that recognize self-settled spendthrift trusts. The legislature approved the creation of spendthrift trusts in 1999 and it is certainly not the purpose of this Court to challenge the merits of spendthrift trusts.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the testimony of the parties clearly established that the intent of creating the spendthrift trusts was to provide maximum protection from creditors and was not intended to be a property settlement in the event that the parties divorced.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that throughout the history of the Trusts, there were significant transfers of property and loans primarily from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust. Such evidence corroborates Mrs. Nelson's testimony that the purpose of the two Trusts was to allow for the ELN Trust to invest in gaming and other risky ventures, while the LSN Trust would maintain the unencumbered assets free and clear from the reach of creditors in order to provide the family with stable and reliable support should the risky ventures fail.

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² NRS 166.170(1)

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THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, due to Mrs. Nelson's complete faith in and total support of her husband, Mr. Nelson had unfettered access to the LSN Trust to regularly transfer assets from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust to infuse cash and other assets to fund its gaming and other risky investment ventures.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that on numerous occasions during these proceedings,

Mr. Nelson indicated that the ELN Trust and LSN Trust both held assets that were indeed

considered by the parties to be community property.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that during the first phase of trial held in August 2010, Mr. Nelson was questioned ad nauseam by both his former attorney, Mr. James Jimmerson, and by Mrs. Nelson's attorney, Mr. Dickerson, about his role as the primary wage earner for the family.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that on direct examination, when asked what he had done to earn a living following obtaining his real estate license in 1990, Mr. Nelson's lengthy response included:

"So that's my primary focus is managing all my assets and Lynita's assets so we manage our *community assets*, and that's where our primary revenue is driven (emphasis added)."

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that upon further direct examination, when asked why the ELN and LSN Trusts were created, Mr. Nelson responded:

"In the event that something happened to me, I didn't have to carry life insurance. I would put safe assets into her property in her assets for her and the kids. My assets were much more volatile, much more — I would say daring; casino properties, zoning properties, partners properties, so we maintained this and these —— all these trusts were designed and set up by Jeff Burr. Jeff Burr is an excellent attorney and so I felt comfortable. This protected Lynita and her children and it gave me the flexibility because I do a lot of tax scenarios, to protect her and the kids and me and we could level off yearly by putting assets in her trust or my trust depending on the transaction and protect — the basic bottom line is to protect her (emphasis added)."

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that upon further examination by Attorney Jimmerson inquiring about the status of a rental property located on Lindell Road, Mr. Nelson's response was:

"Well, we don't pay rent because we're managing all the assets, so I don't pay myself to pay Lynita because we — it's all *community* (emphasis added)."

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that during cross-examination on October 19, 2010, Mr. Nelson was questioned as to why he closed his auctioning company and his response was:

"I was under water these businesses. And for business purposes and to -- to set -- to save as much in our *community* estate, I was forced to lay people off, generate cash flow so Lynita would have the cash flow from these properties in the future (emphasis added)."

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that throughout Mr. Nelson's aforementioned testimony, he either expressly stated that his actions were intended to benefit his and Mrs. Nelson's community estate or made reference to the community.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that it heard testimony from Mr. Nelson over several days during the months of August 2010, September 2010 and October 2010, in which Mr. Nelson's testimony clearly categorized the ELN Trust and LSN Trust's property as community property.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson's sworn testimony corroborates Mrs. Nelson's claim that Mr. Nelson informed her throughout the marriage that the assets accumulated in both the ELN Trust and LSN Trust were for the betterment of their family unit, and, thus, the community.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS Attorney Burr's testimony corroborated the fact that the purpose of creating the spendthrift trusts was to "supercharge" the protection afforded against creditors and was not intended to be a property settlement.

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THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Attorney Burr testified that he discussed and suggested that the Nelsons periodically transfer properties between the two trusts to ensure that their respective values remained equal.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Attorney Burr further testified that the values of the respective trust could be equalized through gifting and even created a gifting form for the parties to use to make gifts between the trusts.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Minutes from a Trust Meeting, dated November 20, 2004, reflected that all Mississippi property and Las Vegas property owned by the ELN Trust was transferred to the LSN trust as final payment on the 2002 loans from the LSN to the ELN Trust and to "level off the trusts" (emphasis added).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the evidence adduced at trial clearly established the parties intended to maintain an equitable allocation of the assets between the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust.

Fiduciary Duty

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Nevada Supreme Court has articulated that a fiduciary relationship exists between husbands and wives, and that includes a duty to "disclose pertinent assets and factors relating to those assets." Williams v. Waldman, 108 Nev. 466, 472 (1992).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson owed a duty to his spouse, Mrs.

Nelson, to disclose all pertinent factors relating to the numerous transfers of the assets from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust.

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DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. Q LAS VEGAS NV 89101 THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mrs. Nelson credibly testified that on numerous occasions, Mr. Nelson requested that she sign documentation relating to the transfer of LSN Trust assets to the ELN Trust. Mrs. Nelson further stated that she rarely questioned Mr. Nelson regarding these matters for two reasons: (1) Mr. Nelson would become upset if she asked questions due to his controlling nature concerning business and property transactions; and (2) she trusted him as her husband and adviser.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson's behavior during the course of these extended proceedings, as discussed in detail hereinafter, corroborates Mrs. Nelson's assertions that Mr. Nelson exercises unquestioned authority over property and other business ventures and loses control of his emotions when someone questions his authority.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the evidence clearly established that Mr. Nelson did not regularly discuss the factors relating to the numerous transfers of the assets from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust with Mrs. Nelson, and, therefore, violated his fiduciary duty to his spouse.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that NRS 163.554 defines a fiduciary as a trustee...or any other person, including an investment trust adviser, which is acting in a *fiduciary capacity* for any person, trust or estate. <u>See</u>, NRS 163.554 (emphasis added).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that NRS 163.5557 defines an investment trust adviser as a person, appointed by an instrument, to act in regard to investment decisions. NRS 163.5557 further states:

2. An investment trust adviser may exercise the powers provided to the investment trust adviser in the instrument in the best interests of the trust. The powers exercised by an investment trust adviser are at the sole discretion of the investment trust adviser and are binding on all other persons. The powers granted to an investment trust adviser may include, without limitation, the power to:

(a) Direct the trustee with respect to the retention, purchase, sale or encumbrance of trust property and the investment and reinvestment of principal and income of the trust.

(b) Vote proxies for securities held in trust.

(c) Select one or more investment advisers, managers or counselors, including the trustee, and delegate to such persons any of the powers of the investment trust adviser.

See, NRS 163.5557 (emphasis added).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson continuously testified as to his role as the investment trustee for both trusts, specifically testifying during cross examination on September 1, 2010, as follows:

Q. Now you're the one that put title to those parcels that we've talked about in the name of Dynasty, Bal Harbor, Emerald Bay, Bay Harbor Beach Resorts and (indiscernible) Financial Partnerships. Is that correct?

A. I believe so, yes.

Q. And you're the one that also put title in the name of -- all the remaining lots in the name of LSN Nevada Trust. Is that true?

A. Yes, sir.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that during his September 1st cross-examination, Mr.

Nelson also testified as to the assets located in Mississippi as follows:

Q. The height of the market was 18 months ago according to your testimony?

A. No, no. But I'm just saying we could have -- the this lawsuit's been pending for a while, sir. We did these deeds mistake -- if you can -- if you reference back to it, it shows -- shows Dynas -- it's my --

Q. Exhibit -- the Exhibit for the --

A. -- company. It shows Eric Nelson. That's my company. We put them into Lynita's for community protection, and she would not cooperate.

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FRANK R SULLIVAN
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FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 Q. You put them --

A. Yes, sir.

Q. -- into Lynita's?

A. Yes, sir --

Q. All right. Sir --

A. -- for co -- unity wealth (emphasis added).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while the LSN Trust documents expressly named Mrs. Nelson as investment trust adviser, the evidence clearly established that Mr. Nelson exercised a pattern of continuous, unchallenged investment and property-transfer decisions for both the ELN and the LSN Trusts, thereby illustrating that Mr. Nelson acted as the investment trust adviser of the LSN Trust from its inception.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the testimony of both parties clearly shows that, pursuant to NRS 163.5557(2)(c), Mrs. Nelson delegated the duties of investment trustee to her husband, Mr. Nelson.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that as the delegated investment trustee for the LSN Trust, Mr. Nelson acted in a fiduciary capacity for Mrs. Nelson.³ Therefore, Mr. Nelson had a duty to "disclose pertinent assets and factors relating to those assets".⁴

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, despite serving as the delegated investment trustee for the LSN Trust, Mr. Nelson did not regularly discuss the pertinent factors relating to the transfer of the assets from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust, and, as such, violated the fiduciary duty he owed to Mrs. Nelson and to the LSN Trust as the delegated investment trustee to the LSN Trust.

³ NRS 163.554.

⁴ Williams v. Waldman, 108 Nev. 466, 472 (1992).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson, in his dual role as a spouse and as the delegated investment trustee for the LSN Trust, violated the fiduciary duties owed to Mrs. Nelson and the LSN Trust.

Constructive Trust

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson's activities as the delegated investment trustee for the LSN Trust in which he transferred numerous properties and assets from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust, unjustly resulted in the ELN Trust obtaining title to certain properties that the LSN Trust formerly held.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that a legal remedy available to rectify this unjust result is the Court's imposition of a constructive trust. The basic objective of a constructive trust is to recognize and protect an innocent party's property rights. Constructive trusts are grounded in the concept of equity. *Cummings v. Tinkle*, 91 Nev. 548, 550 (1975).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Nevada Supreme Court has held that a constructive trust is proper when "(1) a confidential relationship exists between the parties; (2) retention of legal title by the holder thereof against another would be inequitable; and (3) the existence of such a trust is essential to the effectuation of justice." *Locken v. Locken*, 98 Nev. 369, 372 (1982).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that in *Locken*, the Nevada Supreme Court found that an oral agreement bound a son to convey land to his father, as the father was to make certain improvements to the land. The Court found that even though the father completed an affidavit claiming no interest in the land, this act did not preclude him from enforcing the oral agreement. *Id.*, at 373.

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THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Locken court found that the imposition of a constructive trust does not violate the statute of frauds as NRS 111.025 states:

- 1. No estate or interest in lands...nor any trust or power over or concerning lands, or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared after December 2, 1861, unless by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance, in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by the party's lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
- 2. Subsection 1 shall not be construed to affect in any manner the power of a testator in the disposition of the testator's real property by a last will and testament, nor to prevent any trust from arising or being extinguished by implication or operation of law.

See, NRS 111.025 (Emphasis added).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that NRS 111.025(2) creates an exception to the statute of frauds that allows for the creation of a constructive trust to remedy or prevent the type of injustice that the statute seeks to prevent.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that in this case, we clearly have a confidential relationship as the two parties were married at the time of the transfers. In addition, Mr. Nelson acted as the investment trustee for the LSN Trust, which effectively created another confidential relationship between him and Mrs. Nelson as she is the beneficiary of the LSN Trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while Mr. Nelson argues that no confidential relationship existed between Mrs. Nelson and the ELN Trust, a confidential relationship clearly existed between Mrs. Nelson and Mr. Nelson, who, as the beneficiary of the ELN Trust, benefits greatly from the ELN Trust's acquisition and accumulation of properties.

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THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the ELN Trust's retention of title to properties that the LSN Trust previously held would be inequitable and would result in an unjust enrichment of the ELN Trust to the financial benefit of Mr. Nelson and to the financial detriment of the LSN Trust and Mrs. Nelson.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mrs. Nelson, as a faithful and supporting spouse of thirty years, had no reason to question Mr. Nelson regarding the true nature of the assets that he transferred from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson argues that the imposition of a constructive trust is barred in this instance because Mrs. Nelson benefitted from the creation and implementation of the trust and cites the Nevada Supreme Court ruling in DeLee v. Roggen, to support his argument. 111 Nev. 1453 (1995).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that in *DeLee*, the party seeking the imposition of the constructive trust made no immediate demands because he knew that his debtors would lay claim to the property. The court found that a constructive trust was not warranted because the creation of the trust was not necessary to effectuate justice. *Id.*, at 1457.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that unlike *DeLee*, Mrs. Nelson made no demand for the property because Mr. Nelson assured her that he managed the assets in the trusts for the benefit of the community. Consequently, Mrs. Nelson did not have notice that the LSN Trust should reclaim the property.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while Mr. Nelson acted as the investment trustee for both the ELN and LSN Trust respectively, the properties never effectively left the community. Consequently, Mrs. Nelson never thought that she needed to recover the properties on behalf of the LSN Trust. Mrs. Nelson was not advised that she was not entitled to

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FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 the benefit of the assets transferred from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust under the direction of Mr. Nelson until the ELN Trust joined the case as a necessary party.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that allowing the ELN Trust to acquire property from the LSN Trust under the guise that these property transfers benefitted the community, effectively deprives Mrs. Nelson of the benefit of those assets as beneficiary under the LSN Trust, and will ultimately result in Mr. Nelson, as beneficiary of the ELN Trust, being unjustly enriched at the expense of Mrs. Nelson.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, as addressed in detail below, the Court will impose a constructive trust on the following assets: (1) 5220 East Russell Road Property; (2) 3611 Lindell Road.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that as to the Russell Road property, according to the report prepared by Larry Bertsch, the court-appointed forensic accountant, Mr. Nelson, as the investment trustee for the LSN Trust, purchased the property at 5220 E. Russell Road on November 11, 1999, for \$855,945. Mr. Nelson's brother, Cal Nelson, made a down payment of \$20,000 and became a 50% owner of the Russell Road Property despite this paltry contribution. Cal Nelson and Mrs. Nelson later formed CJE&L, LLC, which rented this property to Cal's Blue Water Marine. Shortly thereafter, CJE&L, LLC obtained a \$3,100,000 loan for the purpose of constructing a building for Cal's Blue Water Marine.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that in 2004, Mrs. Nelson signed a guarantee on the flooring contract for Cal's Blue Water Marine. She subsequently withdrew her guarantee and the LSN Trust forfeited its interest in the property to Cal Nelson. While Mr. Nelson argues that the release of Mrs. Nelson as guaranter could be consideration, the flooring contract was never

⁵ Mr. Nelson testified that Cal Nelson also assumed a \$160,000 liability arising from a transaction by Mr. Nelson involving a Las Vegas Casino.

⁶ Defendant's Exhibit GGGGG

produced at trial and no value was ever assigned as to Mrs. Nelson's liability. Furthermore, the Declaration of Value for Tax Purposes indicates that it was exempted from taxation due to being a "transfer without consideration for being transferred to or from a trust." As such, the alleged consideration was never established and appears to be illusory, and, accordingly, the LSN Trust received no compensation from the Russell Road transaction.⁸

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that in February 2010, Mr. Nelson purchased a 65% interest in the Russell Road property, with Cal Nelson retaining a 35% interest in the property.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that on May 27, 2011, the Russell Road property was sold for \$6,500,000. As part of the sale, Mr. Nelson testified that the ELN Trust made a \$300,000 loan to the purchaser for improvements to the property, however, a first note/deed was placed in the name of Julie Brown in the amount \$300,000 for such property improvement loan. Due to the ambiguity as to who is entitled to repayment of the \$300,000 loan (ELN Trust or Julie Brown), the Court is not inclined at this time to include such loan into the calculation as to the ELN Trust's interest in the property.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that a second note/deed was placed on the Russell Road property in the amount of \$295,000 to recapture all back rents and taxes.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that through a series of notes/deeds, the ELN Trust is currently entitled to 66.67% of the \$6,500,000 purchase price and 66.67% of the \$295,000 note/deed for rents and taxes. Therefore, the ELN Trust and Mr. Nelson are entitled to proceeds in the amount of \$4,530,227 (\$4,333,550 + \$196,677) from the Russell Road property transaction.

⁷ Defendant's Exhibit UUUU

[°] Id

⁹ Defendant's Exhibit GGGG.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that because the LSN Trust was not compensated for transferring its interest in Russell Road, under the advice and direction of Mr. Nelson, it would be inequitable to allow the ELN Trust to retain its full 66.67% interest in the property to the detriment of the LSN Trust. Therefore, the Court hereby imposes a constructive trust over half of the ELN Trust 66.67% ownership interest in the Russell Road property on behalf of the LSN Trust. As such, the LSN Trust is entitled to a 50% interest of the ELN Trust's 66.67% ownership interest, resulting in the LSN Trust effectively receiving an overall one-third interest in the Russell Road property with a value of \$2,265,113.50 (\$4,333,550 + \$196,677 x 1/2).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that as to the 3611 Lindell property, on August 22, 2001, the entire interest in the property was transferred to the LSN trust from Mrs. Nelson's 1993 revocable trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that on March 22, 2007, a 50% interest in the Lindell property was transferred to the ELN Trust at the direction of Mr. Nelson without any compensation to the LSN Trust. Review of the Grant, Bargain, Sale Deed allegedly executed by Mrs. Nelson on said date clearly reflects a signature not consistent with Mrs. Nelson's signature when compared to the numerous documents signed by Mrs. Nelson and submitted to this Court. As such, the validity of the transfer of the 50% interest of the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust is seriously questioned. ¹⁰

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while Mr. Gerety testified that consideration for the 50% interest being transferred to the ELN Trust was the transfer of the Mississippi property to the LSN, the court did not find such testimony credible as it appears that the transfer of the Mississippi property occurred in 2004, whereas, the Lindell transfer to the ELN Trust was in 2007. In addition, the testimony was not clear as to which Mississippi properties were involved

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¹⁰ Defendant's Exhibit PPPP.

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FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 in the alleged transfer and no credible testimony as to the value of the Mississippi property was presented. Accordingly, any alleged consideration for the transfer of the 50% interest in the Lindell property from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust is illusory.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that because the LSN Trust was not compensated for transferring a 50% interest in the Lindell property to the ELN Trust, under the advice and direction of Mr. Nelson, it would inequitable to allow the ELN Trust to retain a 50% interest in the property.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Court imposes a constructive trust over the ELN Trust's 50% interest in the Lindell property; therefore, the LSN Trust is entitled to 100% interest in the Lindell property, with an appraised value of \$1,145,000.

Unjust Enrichment

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that to allow the ELN Trust to retain the benefits from the sale of the High County Inn, which will be addressed hereinafter, to the detriment of the LSN Trust, would result in the unjust enrichment of the ELN Trust at the expense of the LSN Trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that on January 11, 2000, the High Country Inn was initially purchased by Mrs. Nelson's Revocable 1993 Trust. While multiple transfer deeds were executed with related parties (e.g. Grotta Financial Partnership, Frank Soris) at the direction of Mr. Nelson, the LSN Trust owned the High Country Inn. On January 18, 2007, Mr. Nelson, as investment trustee for both the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust, was the sole orchestrator of the transfer of the High Country Inn from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust.

¹¹ The Nelson Trust would later transfer its interest in the High Country Inn to the LSN Trust on 5/30/01.

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FRANK A SULLIVAN
DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 88101 THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that on January 19, 2007, the ELN Trust sold the High Country Inn for \$1,240,000 to Wyoming Lodging, LLC, with the proceeds from the sale being placed directly into the bank account of ELN Trust, 12 without any compensation being paid to the LSN Trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that in a fashion similar to the Russell Road transaction, the ELN Trust provided no consideration to the LSN Trust. Further, it is quite apparent that Mr. Nelson never intended to compensate the LSN Trust as evidenced by Mr. Nelson's 2007 Tax Return Form, which listed both the sale of "Wyoming Hotel" (High Country Inn) and "Wyoming OTB" (Off Track Betting) on his Form 1040 Schedule D.¹³

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that allowing the ELN Trust to retain the benefit of the proceeds from the sale of the High Country Inn would be unjust, and, accordingly, the LSN Trust is entitled to just compensation. As such, an amount equal to the proceeds from the sale, or in the alternative, property with comparable value, should be transferred to the LSN Trust to avoid the ELN Trust from being unjustly enriched.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson created Banone, LLC on November 15, 2007, the same year that he sold High Country Inn. ¹⁴ The Operating Agreement lists the ELN Trust as the Initial Sole Member of the company, meaning that Banone, LLC is an asset of the ELN Trust and that all benefits received from the managing of this company are conferred to Mr. Nelson, as beneficiary of the ELN Trust.

¹² On January 24, 2007, Uinta Title & Insurance wired proceeds in the total amount of \$1,947,153.37 (\$1,240,000 for High Country Inn and \$760,000 for the Off Track Betting Rights) to the ELN Trust's bank account.

Defendant's Exhibit NNNN.
 Plaintiff's Exhibit 10K.

FRANK P. SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NY 89101 THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Banone, LLC, currently holds seventeen Nevada properties worth \$1,184,236.¹⁵

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that equity and justice demands that the LSN Trust receive just compensation in the amount of \$1,200,000 for the sale of the High Country Inn in order to avoid the ELN Trust from being unjustly enriched, and, therefore, the LSN Trust should be awarded the Banone, LLC, properties held by ELN Trust, with a comparable value of \$1,184,236.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that there were additional transfers from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust, without just compensation, which financially benefitted the ELN Trust to the detriment of the LSN Trust, specifically regarding the Tierra del Sol property, Tropicana/Albertson property and the Brianhead cabin.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that as to the Tierra del Sol property, the entire interest in the property was initially held in Mrs. Nelson's Revocable Trust and was subsequently transferred to the LSN Trust on or about October 18, 2001.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Tierra del Sol property was sold in August 5, 2005, for \$4,800,000. Out of the proceeds from the first installment payment, Mr. Nelson had a check issued from the LSN Trust account in the amount of \$677,717.48 in payment of a line of credit incurred by Mr. Nelson against the Palmyra residence, which was solely owned by the LSN Trust. From the proceeds for the second installment payment, the ELN Trust received proceeds in the amount of \$1,460,190.58. As such, the ELN Trust received proceeds from the sale of the Tierra del Sol property despite having no ownership interest in the property.

¹⁵ Defendant's Exhibit GGGGG.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while Mr. Gerety testified that the ELN Trust paid federal taxes in the amount of \$509,400 and Arizona taxes in the amount \$139,240 for a total of \$648,640 on behalf of the LSN Trust from the proceeds received by the ELN Trust from the sale of the Tierra del Sol property, that would still leave over \$800,000 that the ELN Trust received despite having no ownership interest in the Tierra del Sol property.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that as to the Tropicana/Albertson's property, the ELN Trust transferred a 50% interest in the property to the LSN Trust in November of 2004 in consideration of an \$850,000 loan to the ELN Trust from the LSN Trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Minutes dated November 20, 2004, reflected that all Mississippi property and Las Vegas property owned by the ELN Trust was transferred to the LSN trust as final payment on the 2002 loans from the LSN to the ELN Trust and to "level off the trusts." It must be noted that in November of 2004 the only Las Vegas property owned by the ELN Trust was the Tropicana/Albertson property.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that in 2007, Mr. Nelson had the LSN Trust deed back the Tropicana/Albertson property to the ELN Trust, without compensation, and then sold the property the same day, resulting in the ELN Trust receiving all the proceeds from the sale of the property in the amount of \$966,780.23.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that as to the Brianhead cabin, the entire interest was held by the LSN Trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that on May 22, 2007, a 50% interest in the Brianhead cabin was transferred to the ELN Trust at the direction of Mr. Nelson without any compensation to the LSN Trust.

TANK R SULLIVAN

DISTRICT JUDGE AMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101

FRANK P. SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while Mr. Gerety testified that consideration for the 50% interest in the Brianhead cabin being transferred to the ELN Trust was the transfer of the Mississippi property to the LSN, the court did not find such testimony credible as it appears that the transfer of the Mississippi property occurred in 2004, whereas, the Brianhead cabin transfer to the ELN Trust was in 2007. In addition, the testimony was not clear as to which Mississippi properties were involved in the alleged transfer and no credible testimony as to the value of the Mississippi property was presented. Accordingly, any alleged consideration for the transfer of the 50% interest in the Brianhead cabin property from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust is illusory.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the transfers from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust regarding the Tierra del Sol property, the Tropicana/Albertson property and the Brianhead cabin all financially benefitted the ELN Trust to the financial detriment of the LSN Trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that throughout the history of the Trusts, there were significant loans from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust, specifically: \$172,293.80 loan in May of 2002; \$700,000 loan in October of 2003; \$250,000 loan in December of 2005 which resulted in a total amount of \$576,000 being borrowed by the ELN Trust from the LSN Trust in 2005.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while testimony was presented regarding repayments of the numerous loans via cash and property transfers, the Court was troubled by the fact that the loans were always going from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust and further troubled by the fact that the evidence failed to satisfactorily establish that all of the loans were in fact paid in full.

FRANK R SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the evidence clearly established that Mr. Nelson exhibited a course of conduct in which he had significant property transferred, including loans, from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust which benefited the ELN Trust to the detriment of the LSN Trust, and, as such, justice and equity demands that the LSN Trust receive compensation to avoid such unjust enrichment on the part of the ELN Trust.

Credibility

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that during the first six days of trial held in 2010, Mr. Nelson repeatedly testified that the actions he took were on behalf of the community and that the ELN Trust and LSN Trust were part of the community.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that during the last several weeks of trial in 2012, Mr. Nelson changed his testimony to reflect his new position that the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust were not part of the community and were the separate property of the respective trusts.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson failed to answer questions in a direct and forthright manner throughout the course of the proceedings.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson argued in the Motion to Dissolve Injunction requesting the release of \$1,568,000, which the Court had ordered be placed in a blocked trust account and enjoined from being released, that the ELN Trust "has an opportunity to purchase Wyoming Racing LLC, a horse racing track and RV park, for \$440,000.00; however, the ELN will be unable to do so unless the Injunction is dissolved."

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that despite the Court's denial of the request to dissolve the injunction, the ELN Trust via Dynasty Development Group, LLC, completed the transaction and reacquired Wyoming Downs at a purchase price of \$440,000. The completion

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of the purchase, without the dissolution of the injunction, evinced that Mr. Nelson misstated the ELN Trust's financial position, or at the very least was less than truthful with this Court.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that it should be noted that in an attempt to circumvent this Court's injunction regarding the \$1,568,000, Mr. Nelson had a Bankruptcy Petition filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Nevada, on behalf of the Dynasty Development Group, LLC, requesting that the \$1,568,000 be deemed property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate; however, the bankruptcy court found that this Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the \$1,568,000 and could make whatever disposition of the funds without regard to the Debtor's bankruptcy filing.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that based upon Mr. Nelson's change of testimony under oath, his repeated failure to answer questions in a direct and forthright manner, his less that candid testimony regarding the necessity of dissolving the injunction in order to purchase the Wyoming race track and RV park, and his attempt to circumvent the injunction issued by this Court clearly reflect that Mr. Nelson lacks credibility.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that United States Bankruptcy Judge, Neil P. Olack, of the Southern District of Mississippi, cited similar concerns as to Mr. Nelson's credibility during a bankruptcy proceeding held on June 24, 2011, regarding Dynasty Development Group, LLC. Specifically, Judge Olack noted that as a witness, Mr. Nelson simply lacked credibility in that he failed to provide direct answers to straight forward questions, which gave the clear impression that he was being less than forthcoming in his responses. 16

¹⁶ Defendant's Exhibit QQQQQ.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Bankruptcy Judge Olack found that the evidence showed that Mr. Nelson depleted the assets of Dynasty on the eve of its bankruptcy filing in three separate transfers, and, subsequently, dismissed the Bankruptcy Petition.¹⁷

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson's behavior and conduct during the course of these proceedings has been deplorable. This Court has observed Mr. Nelson angrily bursting from the courtroom following hearings.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson has repeatedly exhibited inappropriate conduct towards opposing counsel, Mr. Dickerson, including, cursing at him, leaving vulgar voice messages on his office phone and challenging him to a fight in the parking lot of his office.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson's deplorable behavior also included an open and deliberate violation of the Joint Preliminary Injunction that has been in place since May 18, 2009. On 12/28/2009, Mr. Nelson purchased the Bella Kathryn property and subsequently purchased the adjoining lot on 8/11/2010. Currently, with improvements to the properties factored in, a total of \$1,839,495 has been spent on the Bella Kathryn property.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson was living in the Harbor Hills residence upon his separation from Mrs. Nelson and could have remained there indefinitely pending the conclusion of these proceedings, however, he chose to purchase the Bella Kathryn residence in violation of the JPI simply because he wanted a residence comparable to the marital residence located on Palmyra.

17 Defendant's Exhibit QQQQQ.

FRANK R SULLIVAN

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O

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FRANK R SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that due to Mr. Nelson's willful and deliberate violation of the JPI, the Bella Kathryn property will be valued at its "costs" in the amount of \$1,839,495 and not at its appraised value of \$925,000 as a sanction for Mr. Nelson's contemptuous behavior.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that as to Mr. Daniel Gerety, who testified as an expert witness on behalf of the ELN Trust and Mr. Nelson, he based his report solely on information and documentation provided to him by Mr. Nelson. It appears that Mr. Gerety made no effort to engage Mrs. Nelson or her counsel in the process. In the Understanding of Facts section of his report, Mr. Gerety repeatedly used the phrases "I have been told" or "I am advised". Since Mr. Gerety considered statements from Mr. Nelson and others who were in support of Mr. Nelson, an impartial protocol would dictate that he obtain statements from Mrs. Nelson and her counsel in order to have a full and complete framework to fairly address the issues at hand.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Gerety has maintained a financially beneficial relationship with Mr. Nelson dating back to 1998. This relationship, which has netted Mr. Gerety many thousands of dollars in the past and is likely to continue to do so in the future, calls in question his impartiality.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while Mr. Gerety submitted documentation allegedly outlining every transaction made by the ELN Trust from its inception through September 2011, and "tracing" the source of funds used to establish Banone, LLC, this Court found that Mr. Gerety's testimony was not reliable, and, as such, the Court found it to be of little probative value.

¹⁸ Intervenor's Exhibit 168.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that as to Rochelle McGowan, she has had an employment relationship with Mr. Nelson dating back to 2001, and was the person primarily responsible for regularly notarizing various documents executed by Mr. and Mrs. Nelson on behalf of the ELN Trust and LSN Trust, respectively.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that it was the regular practice for Mr. Nelson to bring documents home for Mrs. Nelson's execution and to return the documents the following day to be notarized by Ms. McGowan.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the testimony of Ms. McGowan indicating that she would contact Mrs. Nelson prior to the notarization of her signature is not credible as the Court finds it difficult to believe that Ms. McGowan would actually contact Mrs. Nelson directly every time prior to notarizing the documents.

Lack of Trust Formalities

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the formalities outlined within the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust were not sufficiently and consistently followed. Article eleven, section 11.3, of both trusts provides that Attorney Burr, as Trust Consultant, shall have the right to remove any trustee, with the exception of Mr. Nelson and Mrs. Nelson, provided that he gives the current trustee ten days written notice of their removal.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Attorney Burr testified that on February 22, 2007, at Mr. Nelson's request, he removed Mr. Nelson's employee, Lana Martin, as Distribution Trustee of both the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust and appointed Mr. Nelson's sister, Nola Harber, as the new Distribution Trustee for both trusts. Attorney Burr further testified that he did not provide Ms. Martin with ten days notice as specified in the trusts documents. In June 2011, at Mr. Nelson's request, Attorney Burr once again replaced the

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Distribution Trustee for the ELN Trust, without providing ten days notice, by replacing Nola Harber with Lana Martin.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the ELN Trust and LSN Trust documents require that a meeting of the majority of the trustees be held prior to any distribution of trust income or principal. During the meetings, the trustees must discuss the advisability of making distributions to the ELN Trust Trustor, Mr. Nelson, and the LSN Trust Trustor, Mrs. Nelson. At that time, a vote must take place and the Distribution Trustee must provide an affirmative vote.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the testimony of Lana Martin and Nola Harber indicate that neither one of them ever entered a negative vote in regards to distributions to Mr. Nelson or Mrs. Nelson. The testimony also reflected that neither one of them ever advised Mr. Nelson or Mrs. Nelson on the feasibility of making such distributions.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while Ms. Martin and Ms. Harber testified that they had the authority to approve or deny the distributions to Mr. Nelson under the ELN Trust and to Mrs. Nelson under the LSN Trust, that despite literally hundreds of distributions requests, they never denied even a single distribution request. Therefore, Ms. Martin and Ms. Harber were no more than a "rubber stamp" for Mr. Nelson's directions as to distributions to Mr. Nelson and Mrs. Nelson.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while the ELN Trust produced multiple Minutes of alleged meetings; this Court seriously questions the authenticity of the submitted documentation. Specifically, several of the Minutes were unsigned, the authenticity of the signatures reflected on some of the Minutes were questionable, and several of the Minutes reflected that the meetings were held at the office of Attorney Burr while the testimony clearly established that no such meetings ever occurred at his law office.

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FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Daniel Gerety testified that he had to make numerous adjustments to correct bookkeeping and accounting errors regarding the two trusts by utilizing the entries "Due To" and "Due From" to correctly reflect the assets in each trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the numerous bookkeeping and accounting errors, in conjunction with the corresponding need to correct the entries to accurately reflect the assets in each trust, raises serious questions as to whether the assets of each trust were truly being separately maintained and managed.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the lack of formalities further emphasizes the amount of control that Mr. Nelson exerted over both trusts and that he did indeed manage both trust for the benefit of the community.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while the Court could invalidate both Trusts based upon the lack of Trust formalities, this Court is not inclined to do so since invalidation of the Trusts could have serious implications for both parties in that it could expose the assets to the claims of creditors, thereby, defeating the intent of the parties to "supercharge" the protection of the assets from creditors.

Liabilities

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while Mr. Nelson argued that he and the ELN Trust were subject to numerous liabilities, this Court did not find any documented evidence to support such claims except for the encumbrance attached to the newly reacquired Wyoming Downs property.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Bertsch's report addresses several unsupported liabilities alleged by Mr. Nelson. Specifically, Mr. Nelson reported a contingent liability attached to the property located in the Mississippi Bay, however, no value was given to the liability.¹⁹

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Bertsch report indicated that several of the liabilities were actually options held by subsidiaries that Mr. Nelson owns or options held by relatives of Mr. Nelson, and, as such, were not true liabilities.²⁰

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while Mr. Nelson represented that a \$3,000,000 lawsuit was threatened by a third-party in regards to a transaction involving the Hideaway Casino, no evidence was submitted to the Court that any such lawsuit had in fact been filed.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the only verified liability is the loan attached to Wyoming Downs. As mentioned above, Mr. Nelson, via Dynasty Development Group, purchased Wyoming Downs in December 2011 for \$440,000 and subsequently obtained a loan against the property.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that outside of the encumbrance attached to the Wyoming Downs property, the liabilities alleged by Mr. Nelson have not been established as true liabilities and are based on mere speculations and threats.

Community Waste

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Nevada Supreme Court case of Lofgren v.

Lofgren addressed community waste and found that the husband wasted community funds by making transfers/payments to family members, using the funds to improve the husband's home and using the funds to furnish his new home. Lofgren v. Lofgren, 112 Nev. 1282, 1284 (1996).

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¹⁹ Defendant's Exhibit GGGGG.

²⁰ Id

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FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that evidence was adduced at trial that the transfers to Mr. Nelson's family members were to compensate them for various services rendered and for joint-investment purposes, and while some of the family transfers were indeed questionable, Mr. Bertsch, the forensic accountant, testified that 1099s were provided to document income paid and loan repayments to Mr. Nelson's family members.²¹

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that transfers to Mr. Nelson's family members appear to have been part of Mr. Nelson's regular business practices during the course of the marriage and that Mrs. Nelson has always been aware of this practice and never questioned such transfers prior to the initiation of these proceedings.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mrs. Nelson failed to establish that the transfers to Mr. Nelson's family members constituted waste upon the community estate.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that as to Mr. Nelson's purchase, improvement and furnishing of the Bella Kathryn residence via the ELN Trust, the ELN Trust and Mr. Nelson are being sanctioned by this Court by valuing such property at "costs" in the amount of \$1,839,495 instead of at its appraised value of \$925,000, and, accordingly, it would be unjust for this Court to further consider the Bella Kathryn property under a claim of community waste.

Child Support

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mrs. Nelson is entitled to child support arrears pursuant to NRS 125B.030 which provides for the physical custodian of the children to recover child support from the noncustodial parent.

²¹ Mr. Bertsch did not confirm whether or not the 1099s were filed with the IRS as that was not within the scope of his assigned duties.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the parties separated in September of 2008 when Mr. Nelson permanently left the marital residence, and, therefore, Mrs. Nelson is entitled to child support payments commencing in October 2008.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson's monthly earnings throughout the course of these extended proceedings exceeded the statutory presumptive maximum income range of \$14,816 and places his monthly child support obligation at the presumptive maximum amount which has varied from year to year.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson's child support obligation commencing on October 1, 2008 through May 31, 2013, inclusive, is as follows:

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October 1, 2008 - June 30, 2009 = [(2 children x $968) x 9 months] = $17,424 July 1, 2009 - June 30, 2010 = [(2 children x $969) x 12 months] = $23,256 July 1, 2010 - June 30, 2011 = [(2 children x $995) x 12 months] = $23,880 July 1, 2011 - June 30, 2012 = [(2 children x $1010) x 12 months] = $24,240 July 1, 2012 - May 31, 2013 = [(2 children x $1040) x 11 months] = $22,880 Total = $111,680
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THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Bertsch's report indicates that Mr. Nelson has spent monies totaling \$71,716 on the minor children since 2009, to wit:

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2009: Carli = $14,000; Garrett = $5,270;
2010: Carli = $9,850; Garrett = $29,539;
2011: Carli = $8,630; Garrett = $4.427
Total = $71,716
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THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that NRS 125B.080(9) describes the factors that the Court must consider when adjusting a child support obligation. The factors to consider are:

- (a) The cost of health insurance;
- (b) The cost of child care;
- (c) Any special educational needs of the child;
- (d) The age of the child;
- (e) The legal responsibility of the parents for the support of others;
- (f) The value of services contributed by either parent;
- (g) Any public assistance paid to support the child;
- (h) Any expenses reasonably related to the mother's pregnancy and confinement;
- (i) The cost of transportation of the child to and from visitation if the custodial parent moved with the child from the jurisdiction of the court which ordered the support and the noncustodial parent remained;
- (i) The amount of time the child spends with each parent;
- (k) Any other necessary expenses for the benefit of the child; and
- (1) The relative income of both parents.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, while the information provided to the Court does not itemize the exact nature of the expenditures by Mr. Nelson on behalf of the children, NRS 125B.080(9)(k) does provide for a deviation for any other necessary expenses for the benefit of the child.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that considering the fact that \$71,716 is a relatively large sum of money, it would appear that fairness and equity demands that Mr. Nelson be given some credit for the payments he made on behalf of the children. Therefore, the Court is inclined to give Mr. Nelson credit for \$23,905 (one-third of the payments made on behalf of the children), resulting in child support arrears in the amount of \$87,775.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, while Mr. Nelson did spend a rather significant amount of monies on the children dating back to 2009, Mr. Nelson did not provide any monies whatsoever to Mrs. Nelson in support of the minor children, and, as such, crediting Mr. Nelson with only one-third of such payments on behalf of the children seems quite fair and reasonable.

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FRANK R. SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mrs. Nelson is entitled to current child support in the amount of \$1,040 a month per child commencing June 1, 2013 through June 30, 2013 for a monthly total of \$2,080.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that subject minor, Garrett, is 18 years old and will be graduating from high school in June of 2013, and, as such, Mr. Nelson's child support obligation as to Garrett ends on June 30, 2013.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that beginning July 1, 2013, Mr. Nelson's child support obligation as to Carli will be \$1,058 per month.

Spousal Support

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that NRS 125.150 provides as follows:

1. In granting a divorce, the court:

(a) May award such alimony to the wife or to the husband, in a specified principal sum or as specified periodic payments, as appears just and equitable; and

(b) Shall, to the extent practicable, make an equal disposition of the community property of the parties, except that the court may make an unequal disposition of the community property in such proportions as it deems just if the court finds a compelling reason to do so and sets forth in writing the reasons for making the unequal disposition

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Nevada Supreme Court has outlined seven factors to be considered by the court when awarding alimony such as: (1) the wife's career prior to marriage; (2) the length of the marriage; (3) the husband's education during the marriage; (4) the wife's marketability; (5) the wife's ability to support herself; (6) whether the wife stayed home with the children; and (7) the wife's award, besides child support and alimony. Sprenger v. Sprenger, 110 Nev. 855, 859 (1974).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Nelsons have been married for nearly thirty years; that their earning capacities are drastically different in that Mr. Nelson has demonstrated excellent business acumen as reflected by the large sums of monies generated through his multiple business ventures and investments; that Mrs. Nelson only completed a year and a half

of college and gave up the pursuit of a career outside of the home to become a stay at home mother to the couple's five children; that Mrs. Nelson's career prior to her marriage and during the first few years of her marriage consisted of working as a receptionist at a mortgage company, sales clerk at a department store and a runner at a law firm, with her last job outside of the home being in 1986;

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mrs. Nelson's lack of work experience and limited education greatly diminishes her marketability. Additionally, Mrs. Nelson solely relied on Mr. Nelson, as her husband and delegated investment trustee, to acquire and manage properties to support her and the children, and, as such, Mrs. Nelson's ability to support herself is essentially limited to the property award that she receives via these divorce proceedings.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while Mrs. Nelson will receive a substantial property award via this Divorce Decree, including some income generating properties, the monthly income generated and the values of the real property may fluctuate significantly depending on market conditions. In addition, it could take considerable time to liquidate the property, as needed, especially considering the current state of the real estate market. As such, Mrs. Nelson may have significant difficulty in accessing any equity held in those properties.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that conversely, Mr. Nelson has become a formidable and accomplished businessman and investor. Mr. Nelson's keen business acumen has allowed him to amass a substantial amount of wealth over the course of the marriage.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the repurchase of Wyoming Downs by Mr.

Nelson via Dynasty Development Group and his ability to immediately obtain a loan against the property to pull out about \$300,000 in equity, clearly evidences Mr. Nelson's formidable and accomplished business acumen and ability to generate substantial funds through his

FRANK R SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

investment talents. This type of transaction is not atypical for Mr. Nelson and demonstrates his extraordinary ability, which was developed and honed during the couple's marriage, to evaluate and maximize business opportunities and will ensure that he is always able to support himself, unlike Mrs. Nelson.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that based the upon the findings addressed hereinabove, Mrs. Nelson is entitled to an award of spousal support pursuant to NRS 125.150 and the factors enunciated in Sprenger²²

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that during the marriage, at the direction of Mr. Nelson, Mrs. Nelson initially received monthly disbursements in the amount of \$5,000, which was increased to \$10,000 per month, and ultimately increased to \$20,000 per month dating back to 2004. The \$20,000 per month disbursements did not include expenses which were paid directly through the Trusts.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that based upon the distributions that Mrs. Nelson was receiving during the marriage, \$20,000 per month is a fair and reasonable amount necessary to maintain the lifestyle that Mrs. Nelson had become accustomed to during the course of the marriage.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that based upon the property distribution that will be addressed hereinafter, Mrs. Nelson will receive some income producing properties (Lindell, Russell Road, some of the Banone, LLC properties).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while the evidence adduced at trial reflected that the Lindell property should generate a cash flow of approximately \$10,000 a month, the evidence failed to clearly establish the monthly cash flow from the remaining properties.

However, in the interest of resolving this issue without the need for additional litigation, this

Frank R Sullivan District judge

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. 0

²² Sprenger v. Sprenger, 110 Nev. 855 (1974).

FRANK R SULLIVAN

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 Court will assign an additional \$3,000 a month cash flow from the remaining properties resulting in Mrs. Nelson receiving a total monthly income in the amount of \$13,000.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that based upon a monthly cash flow in the amount of \$13,000 generated by the income producing properties, a monthly spousal support award in the amount of \$7,000 is fair and just and would allow Mrs. Nelson to maintain the lifestyle that she had become accustomed to throughout the course of the marriage.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mrs. Nelson is 52 years of age and that spousal support payments in the amount of \$7,000 per month for 15 years, which would effectively assist and support her through her retirement age, appears to be a just and equitable spousal support award.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that NRS 125.150(a) provides, in pertinent part, that the court may award alimony in a specified *principal sum* or as specified periodic payment (emphasis added).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Nevada Supreme Court has indicated that a lump sum award is the setting aside of a spouse's separate property for the support of the other spouse and is appropriate under the statute. Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 229 (1972). In Sargeant, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to award the wife lump sum alimony based on the husband short life expectancy and his litigious nature. The Supreme Court, citing the trial court, highlighted that "the overall attitude of this plaintiff illustrates some possibility that he might attempt to liquidate, interfere, hypothecate or give away his assets to avoid payment of alimony or support obligations to the defendant" Id. at 228.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson's open and deliberate violation of the Joint Preliminary Injunction evidences his attitude of disregard for court orders. The Court also takes notice of Bankruptcy Judge Olack's finding that Mr. Nelson attempted to deplete the assets of Dynasty Development Group on the eve of the bankruptcy filing, raising the concern that Mr. Nelson may deplete assets of the ELN Trust precluding Mrs. Nelson from receiving a periodic alimony award.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson has been less than forthcoming as to the nature and extent of the assets of the ELN Trust which raises another possible deterrent from Mrs. Nelson receiving periodic alimony payments.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, as addressed hereinbefore, the ELN Trust moved this Court to dissolve the injunction regarding the \$1,568,000 because it "has an opportunity to purchase Wyoming Racing LLC, a horse racing track and RV park, for \$440,000.00; however, the ELN will be unable to do so unless the Injunction is dissolved."

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that despite the representation to the Court that the injunction needed to be dissolved so that the ELN Trust would be able to purchase Wyoming Downs, less than a month after the hearing, the ELN Trust, with Mr. Nelson serving as the investment trustee, completed the purchase of Wyoming Downs. This leads this Court to believe that Mr. Nelson was less than truthful about the extent and nature of the funds available in the ELN Trust and such conduct on the part of Mr. Nelson raises serious concerns about the actions that Mr. Nelson will take to preclude Mrs. Nelson from receiving periodic spousal support payments.

FRANK R SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

Frank R Sullivan District Judge

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson alleged numerous debts and liabilities worth millions of dollars, but forensic accountant, Mr. Bertsch, found that these alleged debts and liabilities were based solely on threats and speculations.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson's practice of regularly transferring property and assets to family members, as highlighted in the transactions involving the High Country Inn and Russell Road properties, contributes to this Court's concern that Mr. Nelson may deplete the assets of the ELN Trust via such family transfers, and, thereby, effectively preclude Mrs. Nelson from receiving a periodic spousal support award.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson's overall attitude throughout the course of these proceedings illustrates the possibility that he might attempt to liquidate, interfere, hypothecate or give away assets out of the ELN Trust to avoid payment of his support obligations to Mrs. Nelson, thereby justifying a lump sum spousal support award to Mrs. Nelson based on the factors addressed hereinabove and the rationale enunciated in Sargeant.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that calculation of a monthly spousal support obligation of \$7,000 for 15 years results in a total spousal support amount of \$1,260,000 which needs to be discounted based upon being paid in a lump sum. Accordingly, Mrs. Nelson is entitled to a lump sum spousal support award in the amount of \$800,000.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the ELN Trust should be required to issue a distribution from the \$1,568,000 reflected in the account of Dynasty Development Group, LLC, and currently held in a blocked trust account pursuant to this Court's injunction, to satisfy Mr. Nelson's lump sum spousal support obligation and to satisfy his child support arrearages obligation.

FRANK R SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. 0 LAS VEGAS NV 89101 THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson argues that Dynasty Development Group, LLC, is 100% held by the ELN Trust, and, therefore, he has no interest in Dynasty nor the funds reflected in the Dynasty account as all legal interest rests with the ELN Trust.²³

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that various statutes and other sources suggest that the interest of a spendthrift trust beneficiary can be reached to satisfy support of a child or a former spouse. ²⁴ Specifically, South Dakota, which also recognizes self-settled spendthrift trust, has addressed the issue in South Dakota Codified Law § 55-16-15 which states:

Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 55-16-9 to 55-16-14, inclusive, this chapter does not apply in any respect to any person to whom the transferor is indebted on account of an agreement or order of court for the payment of support or alimony in favor of such transferor's spouse, former spouse, or children, or for a division or distribution of property in favor of such transferor's spouse or former spouse, to the extent of such debt (emphasis added).

Wyoming, which also allows self-settled spendthrift trust, has also addressed the matter through Wyoming Statutes Annotated § 4-10-503(b):

(b) Even if a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a person who has a judgment or court order against the beneficiary for child support or maintenance may obtain from a court an order attaching present or future distributions to, or for the benefit of, the beneficiary.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, while not binding on this Court, these statutes clearly demonstrate that spouses entitled to alimony or maintenance are to be treated differently than a creditor by providing that the interest of a spendthrift trust beneficiary can be reached to satisfy support of a child or a former spouse.

²³ NRS 166.130

²⁴ Restatement (Third) of Trust § 59 (2003).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that in *Gilbert v. Gilbert*, 447 So.2d 299, the Florida Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order that allowed the wife to garnish the husband's beneficiary interest in a spendthrift trust to satisfy the divorce judgment regarding alimony payments.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the *Gilbert* court found that while "the cardinal rule of construction in trusts is to determine the intention of the settler and give effect to his wishes . . . there is a strong public policy argument which favors subjecting the interest of the beneficiary of a trust to a claim for alimony." The Court went on to state that the dependents of the beneficiary should not be deemed to be creditors as such a view would "permit the beneficiary to have the enjoyment of the income from the trust while he refuses to support his dependents whom it is his duty to support." The Gilbert court went on to state that a party's responsibility to pay alimony "is a duty, not a debt."

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that there is a strong public policy argument in favor of subjecting the interest of the beneficiary of a trust to a claim for spousal support and child support, and, as such, Mr. Nelson's beneficiary interest in the ELN Trust should be subjected to Mrs. Nelson award of spousal support and child support.

Attorney's Fees

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that NRS 18.010(2)(b) provides, in pertinent part, for the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party: "when the court finds that the claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint or defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party."

²⁵ Id at 301.

²⁶ Gilbert v. Gilbert, 447 So.2d 299, 301

²⁷ Id at 301.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson, as the Investment Trustee for the ELN Trust, was the person authorized to institute legal action on behalf of the Trust.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson did not request that the ELN Trust move to be added as a necessary party to these proceedings until almost two years after initiating this action and following the initial six days of trial. It is apparent to this Court that Mr. Nelson was not satisfied with the tenor of the courts preliminary "findings" in that it was not inclined to grant his requested relief, and, consequently, decided to pursue a "second bite at the apple" by requesting that the ELN Trust pursue being added as a necessary party.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that adding the ELN Trust as a necessary party at this rather late stage of the proceedings, resulted in extended and protracted litigation including the re-opening of Discovery, the recalling of witnesses who had testified at the initial six days of trial, and several additional days of trial.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Mr. Nelson's position that he had a conflict of interest which prevented him from exercising his authority to institute legal action on behalf of the ELN Trust was not credible as he had appeared before this Court on numerous occasions regarding community waste issues and the transfer of assets from the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust and had never raised an issue as to a conflict of interest.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while both parties were aware of the existence of the ELN and LSN Trusts from the onset of this litigation, and, as such, Mrs. Nelson could have moved to add the ELN Trust as a necessary party, Mr. Nelson had consistently maintained throughout his initial testimony that the assets held in the ELN Trust and the LSN Trusts were property of the community.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, while this Court fully respects and supports a party's right to fully and thoroughly litigate its position, Mr. Nelson's change in position as to the character of the property of the ELN Trust and LSN Trust in an attempt to get a "second bite of the apple", resulted in unreasonably and unnecessarily extending and protracting this litigation and additionally burdening this Court's limited judicial resources, thereby justifying an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs in this matter.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that in considering whether or not to award reasonable fees and cost this Court must consider "(1) the qualities of the advocate: his ability, his training, education, experience, professional standing and skill; (2) the character of the work to be done: its difficulty, its intricacy, its importance, time and skill required, the responsibility imposed and the prominence and character of the parties where they affect the importance of the litigation; (3) the work actually performed by the lawyer: the skill, time and attention given to the work; (4) the result: whether the attorney was successful and what benefits were derived." Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349 (1969).

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS Attorney Dickerson has been Mrs. Nelson's legal counsel continuously since September 2009 and is a very experienced, extremely skillful and well-respected lawyer in the area of Family Law. In addition, this case involved some difficult and complicated legal issues concerning Spendthrift Trusts and required an exorbitant commitment of time and effort, including the very detailed and painstaking review of voluminous real estate and financial records. Furthermore, Attorney Dickerson's skill, expertise and efforts resulted in Mrs. Nelson's receiving a very sizeable and equitable property settlement.

FRANK R SULLIVAN

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that upon review of attorney Dickerson's Memorandum of Fees and Costs, this Court feels that an award of attorney fees in the amount of \$144,967 is fair and reasonable and warranted in order to reimburse Mrs. Nelson for the unreasonable and unnecessary extension and protraction of this litigation by Mr. Nelson's change of position in regards to the community nature of the property and his delay in having the ELN Trust added as a necessary party which added significant costs to this litigation.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that while the Court could invalidate the Trusts based upon Mr. Nelson's testimony as to community nature of the assets held by each Trust, the breach of his fiduciary duty as a spouse, the breach of his fiduciary duty as an investment trustee, the lack of Trust formalities, under the principles of a constructive trust, and under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, the Court feels that keeping the Trusts intact, while transferring assets between the Trusts to "level off the Trusts", would effectuate the parties clear intentions of "supercharging" the protection of the assets from creditors while ensuring that the respective values of the Trusts remained equal.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that in lieu of transferring assets between the Trusts to level off the Trust and to achieve an equitable allocation of the assets between the Trusts as envisioned by the parties, the Court could award a sizable monetary judgment against Mr. Nelson for the extensive property and monies that were transferred from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust, at his direction, and issue a corresponding charging order against any distributions to Mr. Nelson until such judgment was fully satisfied.

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FRANK R SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

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FRANK R SULLIVAN
DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Court has serious concerns that Mrs. Nelson would have a very difficult time collecting on the judgment without the need to pursue endless and costly litigation, especially considering the extensive and litigious nature of these proceedings.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that due to Mr. Nelson's business savvy and the complexity of his business transactions, the Court is concerned that he could effectively deplete the assets of the ELN Trust without the need to go through distributions, thereby circumventing the satisfaction of the judgment via a charging order against his future distributions.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that its concern about Mr. Nelson depleting the assets of the ELN Trust seems to be well founded when considering the fact that Bankruptcy Judge Olack found that Mr. Nelson depleted the assets of Dynasty on the eve of its bankruptcy filing.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that upon review of Mr. Bertsch's Second Application of Forensic Accountants for Allowance of Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses for the Period from April 1, 2012 through July 25, 2012, Mr. Bertsch is entitled to payment of his outstanding fees in the amount of \$35,258.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that in preparing this Decree of Divorce, the monetary values and figures reflected herein were based on values listed in Mr. Bertsch's report and the testimony elicited from the July and August 2012 hearings.²⁸

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that as to the repurchase of Wyoming Downs by the ELN Trust via the Dynasty Development Group, this Court is without sufficient information regarding the details of the repurchase of the property, the value of the property and the encumbrances on the property to make a determination as to the disposition of the property,

²⁸ Supra, note 6.

and, accordingly, is not making any findings or decisions as to the disposition of the Wyoming Downs property at this time.

Conclusion

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the bonds of matrimony now existing between Eric and Lynita Nelson are dissolved and an absolute Decree of a Divorce is granted to the parties with each party being restored to the status of a single, unmarried person.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Brianhead cabin, appraised at a value of \$985,000 and currently held jointly by the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust, is to be divided equally between the Trusts.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties shall have the right of first refusal should either Trust decide to sell its interest in the Brianhead cabin.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 66.67% interest in the Russell Road property (\$4,333,550) and the 66.67% interest in the \$295,000 note/deed for rents and taxes (\$196,677) currently held by the ELN Trust, shall be equally divided between the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties shall have the right of first refusal should either Trust decide to sell its interest in the Russell Road property.

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FRANK R SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FRANK R SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following properties shall remain in or be

transferred into the ELN Trust:

Property Awarded	Value
Cash	\$ 80,000
Arizona Gateway Lots	\$ 139,500
Family Gifts	\$ 35,000
Gift from Nikki C.	\$ 200,000
Bella Kathryn Property	\$1,839,495
Mississippi Property (121.23 acres)	\$ 607,775
Notes Receivable	\$ 642,761
Banone AZ Properties	\$ 913,343
Dynasty Buyout	\$1,568,000
1/2 of Brianhead Cabin	\$ 492,500
1/3 of Russell Road (+ note for rents) \$2,265,113.50 (\$2,166,775 + \$98,338.50)	
Total	\$8,783,487.50

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following properties shall remain in or be

transferred into the LSN Trust:

Property Awarded	Value
Cash	\$ 200,000
Palmyra Property	\$ 750,000
Pebble Beach Property	\$ 75,000
Arizona Gateway Lots	\$ 139,500
Wyoming Property (200 acres)	\$ 405,000
Arnold Property in Miss.	\$ 40,000
Mississippi RV Park	\$ 559,042
Mississippi Property	\$ 870,193
Grotta 16.67% Interest	\$ 21,204
Emerald Bay Miss. Prop.	\$ 560,900
Lindell Property	\$1,145,000
Banone, LLC	\$1,184,236
JB Ramos Trust Note Receivable	\$ 78,000
½ of Brianhead Cabin	\$ 492,500
1/3 of Russell Road (+ note for rents)	<u>\$2,265,113.50</u> (\$2,166,775 + \$98,338.50)
Total	\$8,785,988.50

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that due to the difference in the value between the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust in the amount of \$153,499, the Trusts shall be equalized by transferring the JB Ramos Trust Note from the Notes Receivable of the ELN Trust, valued at \$78,000, to the LSN Trust as already reflected on the preceding page.²⁹

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the injunction regarding the \$1,568,000 reflected in the account of Dynasty Development Group, LLC, ("Dynasty Buyout") and currently held in a blocked trust account, is hereby dissolved.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the ELN Trust shall use the distribution of the \$1,568,000, herein awarded to the ELN Trust, to pay off the lump sum spousal support awarded to Mrs. Nelson in the amount of \$800,000. Said payment shall be remitted within 30 days of the date of this Decree.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mrs. Nelson is awarded child support arrears in the amount of \$87,775 and that the ELN Trust shall use the distribution of the \$1,568,000, herein awarded to the ELN Trust, to pay off the child support arrears awarded to Mrs. Nelson via a lump sum payment within 30 days of issuance of this Decree.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the ELN Trust shall use the distribution of the \$1,568,000, herein awarded to the ELN Trust, to pay Mr. Bertsch's outstanding fees in the amount of \$35,258 within 30 days of issuance of this Decree.³⁰

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the ELN Trust shall use the distribution of the \$1,568,000, herein awarded to the ELN Trust, to reimburse Mrs. Nelson for attorney's fees paid to Attorney Dickerson in the amount of \$144,967 in payment of fees resulting from Mr.

²⁹ Defendant's Exhibit GGGGG.

³⁰ Second Application of Forensic Accountants for Allowance of Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses for the Period from April 1, 2012 through July 25, 2012.

Nelson's unreasonable and unnecessary extension and protraction of this litigation. Said payment shall be remitted to Mrs. Nelson within 30 days of the date of this Decree.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the funds remaining, in the amount of approximately \$500,000, from the distribution of the \$1,568,000, herein awarded to the ELN Trust, after the payment of the spousal support, child support arrears, Mr. Bertsch's fees and reimbursement of the attorney fees to Mrs. Nelson, shall be distributed to Mr. Nelson within 30 days of issuance of this Decree

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Nelson shall pay Mrs. Nelson \$2080 in child support for the month of June 2013 for their children Garrett and Carli.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Nelson shall pay Mrs. Nelson \$1,058 a month in support of their child Carli, commencing on July 1, 2013 and continuing until Carli attains the age of majority or completes high school, which ever occurs last.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Nelson shall maintain medical insurance coverage for Carli.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any medical expenses not paid by any medical insurance covering Carli shall be shared equally by the parties, with such payments being made pursuant to the Court's standard "30/30" Rule.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall equally bear the private education costs, including tuition, of Carli's private school education at Faith Lutheran.

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FRANK R SULLIVAN

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall keep any personal property now in their possession and shall be individually responsible for any personal property, including vehicles, currently in their possession.

Dated this <u>I</u> day of June, 2013.

Honorable Frank P. Sullivan District Court Judge – Dept. O

FRANK R SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

NOLA HARBER, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001

Petitioners,

VS.

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, CLARK COUNTY, and THE HONORABLE FRANK P. SULLIVAN, DISTRICT JUDGE,

Respondents,

and

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ERIC L. NELSON and LYNITA S. NELSON, individually, and LSN NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001, LARRY BERTSCH,

Real Parties in Interest.

Electronically Filed Jul 09 2013 11:05 a.m. Tracie K. Lindemah Clerk of Supreme Court

Case No. 63432

OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY MOTION UNDER NRAP 27(e) FOR STAY TO ISSUE BY 2:00 P.M. ON JUNE 21, 2013, PENDING RESOLUTION OF WRIT AND

OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY MOTION UNDER NRAP 27(e) FOR STAY TO ISSUE BY 5:00 P.M. ON JUNE 27, 2013, PENDING RESOLUTION OF WRIT

THE DICKERSON LAW GROUP

ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ. Nevada Br No. 010634 KATHERINE L. PROVOST, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 008414 1745 Village Center Circle
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Telephone: (702) 388-8600
Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest LYNITA NELSON and the LSN NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001

I. INTRODUCTION

This Opposition should be reviewed contemporaneously with the Answer to Petition for Writ of Prohibition being filed concurrently with this Opposition, as the Petition for Writ of Prohibition ("Petition") and both of the emergency motions for stay ("Motions") filed by Petitioner/Movant, Nola Harber, as purported Distribution Trustee of the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust, dated May 30, 2001 ("ELN Trust"), 1 go hand in hand.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The majority of facts related to the underlying divorce action, which spanned over four (4) years, and encompassed fifteen (15) days of trial, are set forth in the Answer to Petition for Writ of Prohibition ("Answer to Petition"), and are not restated herein. Instead, the "Statement of Facts and Procedural History" set forth in the Answer are incorporated herein by reference.² This summary of facts will only highlight some of the more important facts which are relevant to the requests for stay, and discuss those additional facts which are relevant to the requests for stay which were not included in the Answer.

On June 3, 2013, the Honorable Frank P. Sullivan, Eighth Judicial District

¹ As will be discussed below, at all times prior to the divorce issued by the District Court, Lana Martin, as Distribution Trustee of the ELN Trust, was the named party for the ELN Trust in this action, and Nola Harber has never been substituted into this action as required by Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25(c) (2013).

² As a practical matter, it would not be possible to include a complete summary of facts for such a lengthy underlying litigation in the ten (10) page limitation provided for under Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 27(d)(2) (2013). It must be noted that while NRAP 27(d)(2) limits a motion to ten (10) pages, "unless the [C]ourt permits or directs otherwise," the Motion for Emergency Stay filed June 21, 2013, was twenty-seven (27) pages long in violation of NRAP 27(d)(2).

Court, entered a fifty (50) page Decree of Divorce ("Decree"), which included extensive and detailed factual findings. A copy of the Decree is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**. In the Decree, the District Court, in part, made the following relevant findings:

- (1) During the first phase of trial, Eric, individually, and as Trustor and Investment Trustee of the ELN Trust, testified repeatedly that the assets held by ELN and LST Trusts were community property and should be divided by the Court. **Exhibit A**, pg. 6, line 7, to pg. 7, line 24.
- (2) After six (6) days of trial, Eric sought to have the ELN and LSN Nevada Trust, dated May 30, 2001 ("LSN Trust"), joined to the divorce action, not satisfied with the way the proceedings were heading, and in a legal tactic intended to give him a second chance of denying Lynita a large share of the Parties' community assets. **Exhibit A**, pg. 42, lines 2-26.
- (3) In 2001 Eric and Lynita, upon the advice and counsel of Jeffrey Burr, Esq., created the ELN Trust and LSN Trust. Exhibit A, pg. 4, lines 12-15, 20-23. The Parties' testimony "clearly established that the intent of creating the spendthrift trusts was to provide maximum protection from creditors and was not intended to be a property settlement in the event that the parties divorced." Exhibit A, pg. 5, lines 16-18. Attorney Burr suggested that the Parties periodically level off or equalize the property in the ELN and LSN Trusts. Exhibit A, pg. 8, lines 2-4. The Parties intended to maintain an equal allocation of assets between the trusts as reflected in Minutes from a Trust Meeting, dated November 20, 2004, wherein it was stated that property was transferred from the ELN Trust to the LSN Trust, in part, to "level off the trusts." Exhibit A, pg. 8, lines 9-16.
- (3) That on "numerous occasions, [Eric] requested that [Lynita] sign documentation relating to the transfer of LSN Trust assets to the ELN Trust." **Exhibit**

A, pg. 9, lines 2-4.

- Trustee and Trust Adviser to the LSN Trust, and as Lynita's husband, by failing to discuss the factors relating to the numerous transfers from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust. **Exhibit A**, pg. 9, lines 14-17; pg. 11, lines 22-27; pg. 12, lines 2-4. That Eric was able to exercise control over properties in the LSN Trust and ELN Trusts, and freely transfer same, under the "guise that [such] property transfers benefitted the community," and because he "assured [Lynita] that he managed the assets in the trusts for the benefit of the community." **Exhibit A**, pg. 15, lines 4-9; pg. 14, lines 19-21. That Lynita "was not advised [by Eric] that she was not entitled to the benefit of assets transferred from the LSN Trust to the ELN Trust under the direction of [Eric] until the ELN Trust joined the case as a necessary party." **Exhibit A**, pg. 14, line 27, to pg. 15, line 3.
- (5) That prior to the Parties' divorce action, millions of dollars worth of properties were taken by Eric from the LSN Trust and transferred to the ELN Trust without compensation, and the retention of same by Eric and the ELN Trust would result in unjust enrichment and injustice. **Exhibit A**, pgs. 12-20.
- (6) That Eric failed to follow the formalities of the ELN and LSN Trusts, and had complete and unfettered access to the properties contained within such trusts. **Exhibit A**, pg. 27, line 15, to pg. 29, line 12.
- (7) That Eric lacked credibility, and during the divorce proceedings: (a) "failed to answer questions in a direct and forthright manner," (b) violated the District Court's injunction; and (c) "misstated the ELN Trust's financial position, or at the very least was less than truthful with [the District Court]." In fact, the District Court referenced Eric's lack of credibility, violation of Orders, and deplorable behavior during the divorce action throughout its Decree, and even included a whole

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subsection concerning his lack of credibility. Exhibit A, pg. 23, line 9, to pg. 25, line

Based upon the findings set forth in the Decree, the District Court Ordered an approximately equal division of the properties held in the ELN and LSN Trusts. As pointed out in the Motions and Petition filed by the ELN Trust, the District Court's division of property was accomplished by Ordering properties transferred between the two (2) trusts, and imposing constructive trusts, without specifically invalidating the trusts. What the Petition omits (presumably intentionally), however, is that the District Court also found that the ELN and LSN Trusts were sham trusts and essentially Eric's alter egos (based on the findings cited above), and that it would have been wholly justified in invalidating such trusts. Exhibit A, pg. 29, lines 13-18; pg. 44, lines 9-17.

In addition to dividing the Parties' property, the District Court in its Decree also awarded Lynita \$800,000 for lump sum alimony, \$87,775 in child support arrears and \$144,967 for attorneys' fees and costs. Exhibit A, pgs. 48-49. To ensure that Lynita received her alimony, child support arrears and attorneys' fees, the District Court Ordered that such payments be made by the ELN Trust within thirty (30) days from the date of Decree from the monies previously enjoined in David Stephens, Esq.'s trust account. Exhibit A, pg. 48, line 10, to page 49, line 3. Said monies were first enjoined by the District Court at a hearing held April 4, 2011, and remained in said account until sometime shortly after the District Court issued its Decree on June 3, 2013. To allow the ELN Trust and Eric to access the \$1,568,000 and make the aforementioned payments, the District Court also dissolved the prior injunction freezing the \$1,568,000 in Mr. Stephens' trust account. Exhibit A, pg. 48, lines 6-9. The District Court Ordered that the remaining approximately \$500,000 from the

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previously enjoined funds would be distributed to Eric within thirty (30) days. **Exhibit A**, pg. 49, lines 4-9.

Based on the history of the underlying litigation, and Eric's never ending attempts to defeat the efficacy of Court Orders and take advantage of the legal system, Lynita and her counsel knew that Eric and the ELN Trust would immediately accept the benefit of the dissolved injunction by withdrawing the \$1,568,000 previously enjoined in Mr. Stephens' trust account, and then refuse to pay Lynita the portion of said funds awarded to her in the Decree. Accordingly, on June 5, 2013 (only two (2) days after the Decree was entered), Lynita filed her Motion for Immediate Payment of Funds Belonging to Defendant Pursuant to Court's Decree to Ensure Receipt of Same, and for Immediate Payment of Court Appointed Expert ("Motion"), requesting direct and/or immediate payment of the alimony, child support arrears, and attorneys' fees totaling \$1,032,742, and direct and immediate payment of the District Court appointed expert, Larry Bertsch's fees (which the ELN Trust was also Ordered to pay from the previously enjoined funds). In making her request, Lynita informed the District Court that she had only approximately \$19,000 in her bank account, but had outstanding credit card balances of \$53,674, current household bills of \$3,130, and outstanding attorneys fees of \$140,000.3

On June 19, 2013, the District Court conducted a hearing on Lynita's Motion. During the hearing, the District Court confirmed that its intent in Ordering in the Decree that the \$1,568,000 be used to pay Lynita's alimony, child support, and attorneys' fees was to ensure payment of such obligations directly to Lynita, as a

Lynita had become accustomed to a lifestyle which required \$20,000 per month to

maintain. Exhibit A, pg. 36, lines 16-19.

³ The District Court specifically found in the Decree that during the marriage

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direct distribution from the enjoined funds. **Exhibit B**, Transcript from June 19, 2013 Hearing, pg. 7, lines 6-10. It was never the District Court's intent for the ELN Trust to take the enjoined funds, or for Lynita not to have access to the monies immediately. **Exhibit B**, pg. 11, line 19, to pg. 12, line 4. In fact, the District Court was very concerned when it found out that the ELN Trust had already accessed the funds in Mr. Stephens' trust account without paying Lynita as it had intended:

[] [Eric] has been controlling the estate essentially since day one. Now he's losing control of the estate. And no disrespect to him. I expect a lot of problems trying to get payment. That's why I did lump sum with my findings, because I can see this going on til the world ended to be honest

Exhibit B, pg. 19, lines 19-24. Accordingly, the District Court granted Lynita's Motion, and Ordered the ELN Trust and/or Eric to pay Lynita and Mr. Bertsch within forty-eight (48) hours. The District Court also denied the ELN Trust's request for a stay pending resolution of an appeal, finding, in part, that the Court had "serious concerns with that money being transferred into the trust that . . . money would dissipate" Exhibit B, pg. 19, lines 9-11. In denying the ELN Trust's request for stay the District Court noted that it did not believe that "the release of those funds put you at any risk from the trust, because I do believe that Ms. Nelson has significant resources that will could be able to be collateral if -- if you need that. And so I don't think I've identified any wrongdoing on Ms. Nelson that she would try to get rid of funds and not pay any funds if the supreme court was indeed overturned it and said she was not entitled to said funds." Exhibit B, pg. 21 lines 15-23.

On June 21, 2013, before the forty-eight (48) hours expired, Nola Harber, as purported Distribution Trustee of the ELN Trust, filed her Petition and first Motion for Stay. A second Motion for Stay was subsequently filed on June 27, 2013. A temporary stay was granted by this Court pending oppositions to the Motion, and an answer to the Petition.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Movant, Nola Harber, Lacks Standing To Maintain The Motions

At all times during the Parties' divorce action, Lana Martin was the named party as Trustee of the ELN Trust, authorized to defend and maintain the District Court proceedings on behalf of the ELN Trust. The instant Motions, however, were filed by Nola Harber as purported Distribution Trustee of the ELN Trust. Ms. Harber was never substituted in the place and stead of Ms. Martin, nor has there been any showing that (1) Ms. Harber is the actual Distribution Trustee of the ELN Trust, and (2) is authorized to maintain these proceedings and defend this action despite such functions being afforded to the Investment Trustee under the terms of the ELN Trust.

NRCP 25(c) provides:

(c) Transfer of Interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, **unless the court upon motion** directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. Service of the motion shall be made as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule.

(Emphasis added). Under NRCP 25(c), "the original party continues the action unless the new party in interest is substituted on motion." *Hilbrands v. Far East Trading Co.*, 509 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1975) (interpreting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25(c), the federal counterpart to NRCP 25(c)). There has never been any motion to substitute Ms. Harber in the place of Ms. Martin. Accordingly, Ms. Harber does not have standing to maintain the instant Motions.

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⁴ "Federal cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 'are strong persuasive authority, because the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure are based in large part upon their federal counterparts." *Exec. Mgmt., Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins.*, 118 Nev. 46, 38 P.3d 872, 876 (2002).

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B.

Even If Movant Had Standing To Pursue The Motion, A Stay Is Not Supported Legally Or Factually.

In deciding whether to issue a stay or injunction, the Supreme Court will generally consider the following factors: (1) whether the object of the appeal or writ petition will be defeated if the stay or injunction is denied; (2) whether appellant/petitioner will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay or injunction is denied; (3) whether respondent/real party in interest will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay or injunction is granted; and (4) whether appellant/petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits in the appeal or writ petition.

NRAP 8(c).

- (1) The object of the writ petition will not be defeated if the requested stay is denied. The object of the writ petition is a holding by this Court that the District Court erroneously required monies to be paid from the ELN Trust to Lynita to satisfy Eric's spousal support and other obligations to Lynita, and monies to be paid from the ELN Trust to satisfy the outstanding obligation to the District Court's appointed expert, Larry Bertsch. As set forth in the Answer to Petition, Movant has an adequate remedy at law that precludes the Court from granting the request for a writ of prohibition, specifically, an appeal. If the stay is denied, the object of the writ petition (a finding of error on the part of the District Court) will not be defeated, as the argument of error can still be advanced through the writ petition (assuming Movant has standing to maintain such writ petition), or more appropriately, an appeal.
- (2)The ELN Trust will not suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is denied. Although Movant cites several cases from outside of Nevada to attempt to support the proposition that the potential loss of money will cause irreparable or serious injury, it is well-settled in Nevada that the potential loss of money is not enough to show irreparable harm. See, e.g., Hansen v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 650, 6 P.3d 982, 987 (2000).

In their first Emergency Motion for Stay the ELN Trust argues that the payment

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of the funds due to Lynita and Mr. Bertsch "will also impede or make impossible the ELN Trust's ability to maintain and run the day-to-day operations of entities wholly owned by the ELN Trust" and that "if the Emergency Motion is not granted the ELN Trust will have little, if any, capital to conduct business with." This is an interesting argument to make coming from an entity that has managed to support its business operations, inclusive of purchasing new assets, for the duration of this four plus year divorce, including the more than two (2) year period which has elapsed since the \$1,568,000 was originally enjoined. Additionally, a lack of funds did not place a damper upon or cancel Eric Nelson's ability to take three (3) of his minor children on a multi-week trip to Thailand immediately following entry of the Decree of Divorce. **Exhibit B** at pg. 8, lines 22-24.

(3) Finally, and as discussed through the Answer to Petition, Movant does not have a likelihood of success on the merits of the Petition for Writ of Prohibition. The Petition was maintained by Nola Harber, who is not a party to this action. Additionally, Movant did not satisfy the legal requirements for issuance of a writ as there is an adequate remedy available to Movant, an appeal of the judgment set forth in the Decree of Divorce. Finally, Movant is barred from post-judgment relief from the Decree of Divorce as Movant has accepted certain benefits afforded by the Decree, and should be collaterally and judicially estopped from obtaining the requested relief.

B. Should A Stay Issue A Supersedeas Bond Should Be Required NRCP 62(c) provides:

When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay subject to the exceptions contained in subdivision (a) of this rule. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay if effective when the supersedeas bond is filed.

⁵ June 21, 2013 Motion at page 13, lines 18-21 and 27-28.

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Furthermore, the Supreme Court may condition a party's request for a stay of a judgment or order on the party's filing of a bond or other appropriate security in the district court. NRAP 8(a)(2)(E).

The District Court, in both the Decree of Divorce and at the June 19, 2013 hearing, as specifically detailed and set forth in the Answer to Petition, found that Eric and the ELN Trust have consistently attempted to avoid court orders through continual gamesmanship and abuse of the judicial process. The District Court further has consistently expressed its concerns about whether Eric and the ELN Trust will comply with future orders, which in part caused the District Court to award Lynita lump sum alimony, and which formed the basis for the District Court's Order that Lynita would be paid directly from the previously enjoined funds. Absent a bond. it is likely that Lynita will never be able to recover the judgment awarded to her by the Decree of Divorce regardless of the outcome of this writ proceeding or any subsequent appeal. Indeed the District Court found at the June 19, 2013 hearing that it will require a supersedeous bond in the event Eric or the ELN Trust appealed its judgment, and the District Court not only agreed with Lynita's counsel that a supersedeas bond be posted for the amount of the judgment being appealed, but the District Court would add interest on that at five and a quarter percent, for two years time, plus costs of anywhere between \$50,000 and \$100,000. Exhibit B at pg.10, line 21 through pg. 11, line 18. Thus, if this Court is inclined to grant a Stay pending disposition of any appeal, it should require Eric and the ELN Trust to post of a supercedeous bond as outlined by the District Court during the June 19, 2013 hearing.

IV. **CONCLUSION**

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should deny the Motions for Stay, and dissolve the temporary stay previously issued.

DATED this Aday of July, 2013.

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TRUST dated May 30, 2001

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of The Dickerson Law Group, and that, on the 2 day of July, 2013, I served a true and correct copies of OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY MOTION UNDER NRAP 27(e) FOR STAY TO ISSUE BY 2:00 P.M. ON JUNE 21, 2013, PENDING RESOLUTION OF WRIT, AND OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY MOTION UNDER NRAP 27(e) FOR STAY TO ISSUE BY 5:00 P.M. ON JUNE 27, 2013, PENDING RESOLUTION OF WRIT via United States Mail, with postage fully prepaid, to:

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