

Case No. 63614

In the Supreme Court of Nevada

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company,

Appellant,

U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking
association as Trustee for the
Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo
Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
AR4, a Nevada non-profit corporation,

Respondent.

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Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court

APPEAL

from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County
The Honorable SUSAN SCANN, District Judge
District Court Case No. A-13-678814-C

JOINT APPENDIX, VOLUME VI

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2	14	4/29/2013	Affidavit of Service [Lucia Parks]	JA226 – JA227
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1	7	4/1/2013	Affidavit of Service [U.S. Bank, N.A.]	JA036
1	8	4/3/2013	Affidavit of Service [U.S. Bank, N.A.]	JA037
1	11	4/19/2013	Answer to Complaint for Quiet Title and Injunctive Relief	JA054 – JA062
1	3	3/27/2013	Application for Temporary Restraining Order on Order Shortening Time and Motion for Preliminary Injunction	JA014 – JA028
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5	31	5/30/2013	Certificate of Mailing [Defendant, U.S. Bank, N.A.'s, Reply in Support of the Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice the Plaintiff's Complaint]	JA757 – JA758
5	39	6/27/2013	Certificate of Service [Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment]	JA875 – JA876
4	29	5/28/2013	Certificate of Service [Opposition to U.S. Bank, N.A.'s Motion to Dismiss]	JA657
3	24	5/14/2013	Certificate of Service [Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction]	JA493 – JA494

6	44	7/24/2013	Certificate of Service [Reply in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Notice of Errata]	JA1008 – JA1009
5	33	5/31/2013	Certificate of Service [Supplement to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss]	JA790
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3	26	5/17/2013	Court Minutes	JA501 – JA502
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6	41	7/17/2013	Defendant, U.S. Bank, N.A.’s, Opposition to the Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment	JA879 – JA893
5	30	5/29/2013	Defendant, U.S. Bank, N.A.’s, Reply in Support of the Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice the Plaintiff’s Complaint	JA658 – JA756
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6	48	9/25/2013	Notice of Entry of Order [Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment]	JA1019 – JA1023
2	18	5/3/2013	Notice of Entry of Order [Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining Sale and Order Setting Briefing Schedule for Preliminary Injunction]	JA257 – JA262
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3	23	5/14/2013	Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction	JA385 – JA492
6	43	7/23/2013	Reply in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment	JA901 – JA1007
6	42	7/18/2013	Response and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment; and Joinder in Defendant US Bank’s Opposition	JA894 – JA900
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6	46	7/29/2013	Supplement to Response and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment; and Joinder in Defendant US Bank's Opposition	JA1012 – JA1016
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
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TAB 41



CLERK OF THE COURT

OPP

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Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL, LLC, a Nevada
limited liability company

Plaintiff,

vs.

US BANK, N.A., a national banking association
as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Wells
Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4,
and LUCIA PARKS, an individual; DOES I
through X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I
through X, inclusive.

Defendants.

Case No.: A-13-678814-C

Dept. No.: XVIII

DEFENDANT, U.S. BANK, N.A.'S,
OPPOSITION TO THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT

The Defendant, U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo
Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4 (hereinafter
"U.S. Bank"), by and through their attorney of record, Chelsea A. Crowton, Esq. of the law firm
of Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP, hereby submits its Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment.

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
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1 This Opposition is based on the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all
2 papers and pleadings on file herein, all judicially noticed facts, and on any oral or documentary
3 evidence that may be presented at a hearing on this matter.

4 DATED this 17th day of July, 2013.

5 WRIGHT, FINLAY & ZAK, LLP



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7 Nevada Bar No. 11547

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10 *Attorney for Defendant, U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee*
11 *for the Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo Asset*
12 *Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through*
13 *Certificates, Series 2006-AR4*

14 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

15 I. LEGAL ARGUMENTS

16 A. THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED 17 BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF FAILS TO INTRODUCE NEW EVIDENCE THAT 18 REFUTES THE LEGAL REASONING ASSERTED IN THE ORDER GRANTING 19 THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT.

20 a. THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 21 DENIED BECAUSE THE 2013 LEGISLATIVE SESSION FAILS TO 22 LEND SUPPORT TO THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.

23 The Plaintiff asserts that the 2013 Legislative Session provides proof that U.S. Bank's
24 first, position Deed of Trust was extinguished by the HOA Sale.¹ The legislative bills and legal
25 arguments asserted in the Motion fail to lend support to the "extinguishment" theory proffered by
26 the Plaintiff in the Complaint. Senate Bill 332 was never heard on the nature of the bill or the
27 amended language nor was Senate Bill 332 passed by the Legislature. Senate Bill 332's
28 language anticipates a second foreclosure by the first, position Deed of Trust. Therefore, Senate
Bill 332 supports Wells Fargo's theory and negates the theory that the HOA sale extinguishes a
first, position Deed of Trust. Assembly Bill 98 was passed by the Legislative Session and all the

¹ See Motion at pgs. 8-11.

1 language relating to N.R.S. 116.3116 was excluded from the final version of the assembly bill.
2 The Legislature never held a hearing on the amended language to AB 98, which dealt with
3 N.R.S. 116 or the inclusion of notices to the first Deed of Trust. Senate Bill 280 fails to lend
4 support to the Plaintiff's Complaint, for final version of Senate Bill 280 failed to include any
5 revisions to N.R.S. 116.3116.

6 Senate Bill 280 provides divergent viewpoints on the issue regarding whether N.R.S.
7 116.3116 extinguishes a first, position Deed of Trust. The Assembly viewed the "Super-
8 Priority" Lien as not extinguishing U.S. Bank's Lien whereas the Senate disagreed with this
9 theory. Ultimately Senate Bill 280 failed to amend the language in N.R.S. 116.3116 and merely
10 added two new amendments that fail to offer support to the "extinguishment" theory proffered in
11 the Complaint. Senate Bill 280 is merely one more example of the lack of substantive support to
12 the "extinguishment" theory. The escrow impoundment and payoff amendments to Senate Bill
13 280 fail to support the "extinguishment" theory. The ability to impound money and escrow
14 money has been a viable option for the banks since the execution of the Deed of Trust by the
15 original Borrower. The ability to collect money to pay off the HOA Lien fails to equate with the
16 "extinguishment" theory, for the wantonness to pay the HOA Lien prior to sale can also be
17 attributable to avoiding the herein litigation. In addition, the ability for the Lender to obtain a
18 payoff demand fails to equate with the "extinguishment" theory, for this law merely allows a
19 Lender, whom chooses to avoid the herein litigation, to obtain accurate information on the HOA
20 Lien, which would otherwise have been denied due to the collection companies. These
21 amendments do not mention nor imply that the Legislature intended the HOA lien to extinguish a
22 first, position Deed of Trust. Plus, Senate Bill 273 fails to lend support to the Plaintiff's
23 Complaint because the bill dealt with the interaction between an HOA sale and the foreclosure
24 mediation program and the bill was never passed by the Legislature.

25 The 2013 Legislative Session fails to lend support to the "extinguishment" theory
26 because the Legislature never held a hearing nor passed the amended language that specifically
27 dealt with N.R.S. 116. The Plaintiff fails to present any substantive evidence that shows that the
28 bills passed by the Legislature support the extinguishment theory. The nature of a bill not being

1 heard or not passing is based on a multitude of variant factors. The comments asserted by the
2 Plaintiff in the Motion are all based on the interpretation of interested parties. Without the
3 Legislative Session hearing arguments or passing the bills, these comments are meaningless and
4 fail to support the Plaintiff's "extinguishment" theory. The failure to pass a bill including
5 language that "spells out" the inclusion or lack thereof of the extinguishment of a first, position
6 Deed of Trust after an Homeowner's Association Lien does not equate with evidence that the
7 Legislative intended the "Super-Priority" to eliminate U.S. Bank's Lien. The 2013 Legislative
8 Session failed to amend or modify the language or legislative intent of N.R.S. 116.3116. The
9 lack of an amendment to N.R.S. 116 requires the Court to rely on the 2009 legislative history and
10 statutory language of N.R.S. 116.3116 et seq. Based on the legislative history of N.R.S.
11 116.3116 and the statutory language, the Plaintiff acquired title subject to U.S. Bank's Lien
12 because the HOA lien is merely a payment priority lien and U.S. Bank's Lien meets the
13 requirements under N.R.S. 116.3116(2)(b).

14 The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act was enacted in a state that has judicial
15 foreclosures on HOA Lien. The herein case does not deal with a judicial foreclosure on an HOA
16 Lien, therefore, the comments by Mr. Lisman and the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act
17 are misplaced and fail to lend support to the Complaint. The Lisman Affidavit is the subjective
18 opinion of one of the drafters of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act. It is important to
19 note that the Plaintiff has failed to attach any legislative history or comments for the session that
20 enacted the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act. The hindsight opinion of one of the
21 drafters as to the intent behind the Act does not equate with the discussions and intent of the
22 legislatures at the time of the passing of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act. Carl
23 Lisman's opinion is one of many individuals involved with the passage of the Uniform Common
24 Interest Ownership Act; however, the Plaintiff fails to attach the legislative history and
25 comments during the sessions that enacted the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act.
26 Similar to the Nevada Real Estate Advisory Opinion, Carl Lisman's hindsight opinion is nothing
27 more than one subjective opinion regarding the "extinguishment" theory proffered in the
28 Complaint. The intent behind the passage of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act does

1 not negate the legislative history of N.R.S. 116.3116. The Plaintiff relies heavily on the opinions
2 of Carl Lisman regarding the enactment of a statute in a different state and fails to argue or cite
3 to any Nevada legislative history regarding the enactment of N.R.S. 116.3116 or the 2009
4 amendment. The Court should only rely on the intent and comments in the Nevada Legislature
5 regarding the enactment of N.R.S. 116.3116, wherein the legislative comments fail to include
6 any discussions regarding the extinguishment of a first, position Deed of Trust and merely focus
7 on establishing a means to enable the HOA to have a payment priority, upon a foreclosure of the
8 Property.

9 In interpreting the Uniform Common Interest Community Act super-priority exception,
10 which Nevada has adopted, Professor Andrea Boyack explains:

11 The drafters of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act ("UCIOA"), recognizing
12 that assessment liens would ordinarily be junior in priority to individual first mortgage
13 liens, crafted an "innovative" solution to the problem of assessment nonpayment during
mortgage default: the six-month "limited priority lien."

14 The six-month capped "super priority" portion of the association lien does not have a true
15 priority status under UCIOA since this six month assessment lien cannot be foreclosed as
16 senior to a mortgage lien. Rather, it either creates *a payment priority* for some portion of
17 unpaid assessments, which would take the first position in the foreclosure repayment
"waterfall," or grants *durability* to some portion of unpaid assessments, allowing the
18 security for such debt to survive foreclosure. Andrea J. Boyack, Community Collateral
Damage: A Question of Priorities, 43 Loy. U. Chi. LJ. 53, 98 (Fall 2011) (emphasis
19 added).

20 Thus, as explained by Professor Boyack, the super-priority exception affords the HOA
21 "payment priority" over a first mortgage for a portion of assessments, but not "lien priority."
22 This interpretation and construction makes sense under N.R.S. § 116.3116(2)(c), as the super-
23 priority interest is expressly limited, in part, "to the extent of nine months of common
24 assessments and nothing within the provision states that the interest can eliminate a first
25 mortgage. Further, there is no specific guidance or requirement under N.R.S. § 116 et seq.
26 directing the HOA to record a separate notice of a super-priority lien interest or to provide notice
27 to a first mortgage holder prior to foreclosure. It is unfathomable that the drafters of the UCIOA
28 and the Nevada legislature would allow an HOA to extinguish a first position deed of trust while

1 not requiring that the HOA first disclose the amount of that super-priority lien or even require the
2 provision of notice to the first position trust deed holder. Indeed the practical effect of a true
3 super-priority lien within an assessment lien would result in the HOA wiping out a large portion
4 of its own lien.

5 Therefore, the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend should be denied because the Plaintiff fails to
6 introduce any new substantive evidence to negate the ruling by the Court.

7 **B. THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE IT**
8 **IS NOT MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO EXPUNGE THE LIS PENDENS FROM**
9 **THE CHAIN OF TITLE FOR THE PROPERTY.**

10 The Plaintiff asserts that it would be manifest injustice to uphold the Order expunging the
11 Lis Pendens because without the Lis Pendens any third party purchaser would be a bona fide
12 purchaser.² The Plaintiff fails to state that a second Notice of Lis Pendens has been recorded in
13 the chain of title, which clearly provides notice to third parties of the ongoing dispute regarding
14 title to the Property. Lucia Parks has an ongoing case involving the HOA and the Plaintiff in this
15 case. On March 22, 2013, Lucia Parks filed a Complaint alleging wrongful foreclosure and was
16 assigned Case Number A-13-678794-C. Lucia Parks has filed and recorded in the Clark County
17 Recorder's Office a Notice of Lis Pendens as Book and Instrument Number 20130325-0000590.³
18 The recording of the second lis pendens provides sufficient notice to third parties of the ongoing
19 litigation surrounding title to the Property. The second Lis Pendens provides sufficient notice to
20 third parties to negate any manifest injustice, for the Notice states that Lucia Parks is asserting an
21 adverse claim against the Plaintiff in the herein case.⁴ Therefore, the recording of the second lis
22 pendens provides sufficient notice to third parties of the ongoing litigation surrounding title to
23 the Property and the Court should uphold the Order granting the Motion to Expunge the Lis
24 Pendens.

25
26
27 ² See Motion at pgs. 13-14.

28 ³ See Notice of Lis Pendens attached to the Defendant's Opposition as **Exhibit A.**

⁴ See Notice of Lis Pendens attached to the Defendant's Opposition as **Exhibit A.**

1 Plus, the herein Complaint fails to allege sufficient grounds to meet the requirements
2 under N.R.S. 14.015. N.R.S. § 14.015, requires the establishment of all of the following
3 elements:

- 4 (a) The action is for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon the real property
5 described in the notice or affects the title or possession of the real property
described in the notice;
6 (b) The action was not brought in bad faith or for an improper motive;
7 (c) He will be able to perform any conditions precedent to the relief sought in
the action insofar as it affects the title or possession of the real property;
8 and
9 (d) He would be injured by any transfer of an interest in the property before
the action is concluded.⁵

10 In addition to each of the four elements listed above, the party that recorded the lis
11 pendens must also establish:

- 12 (a) That he is likely to prevail in the action; or
13 (b) That he has a fair chance of success on the merits in the action and the
14 injury ... would be sufficiently serious that the hardship on him in the
15 event of a transfer would be greater than the hardship on the defendant
resulting from the notice of pendency, and that if he prevails he will be
entitled to relief affecting the title or possession of the real property.⁶

16 The Court's Order granting dismissal of the Plaintiff's Complaint and expunging the Lis
17 Pendens based its decision on the fact that the HOA Lien created under N.R.S. 116.3116(2) only
18 created a payment priority lien that cannot extinguish a prior recorded Deed of Trust and that the
19 super-priority status has not attached to the HOA Lien because "an action" has not been
20 commenced by the HOA.⁷ The reasoning of the Court is supported by the legislative history and
21 statutory construction of N.R.S. 116.3116. As stated in U.S. Bank's pleadings, the legislative
22 history and statutory construction of N.R.S. 116.3116 merely creates a payment priority lien
23 whereby the Plaintiff takes title subject to N.R.S. 116.3116(2)(a) and (2)(b). The Plaintiff has
24 failed to assert in the Motion any new evidence whereby the Nevada Legislature or statute
25 mandates that N.R.S. 116.3116 extinguishes a first, position Deed of Trust.

26
27 ⁵ N.R.S. § 14.015(2).

28 ⁶ N.R.S. § 14.015(3).

⁷ See Order entered on 6-11-2013.

1 In addition, the language of N.R.S. 116.3116 is clear, namely, that the interest is created
2 upon the "institution of action to enforce the lien." See NRS 116.3116(2)(c). Statutory terms are
3 generally interpreted according to their ordinary meaning unless otherwise defined in the statute.
4 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 42 (1979). The term "action" in the ordinary sense means to
5 file or bring a lawsuit. See N.R.C.P. and 3; Seaborn v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 29 P.2d 500,
6 505 (Nev. 1934) ("An 'action' is a judicial proceeding, either in law or equity, to obtain certain
7 relief at hands of court"); BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006) ("The key terms
8 in this provision-'action' and 'complaint'-are ordinarily used in connection with judicial, not
9 administrative, proceedings"); Black's Law dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (the phrase "bring an
10 action" is defined as "to sue; institute legal proceedings"). Other portions of N.R.S. 116.3116
11 refer to the term "action" as a judicial proceeding. Specifically, N.R.S. 116.3116(7) states "[a]
12 judgment or decree in any *action* under this section must include costs and reasonable attorney's
13 fees for the prevailing party." Even further N.R.S. 116.3116(10) provides that an HOA may
14 institute an action to collect delinquent assessments and to foreclose a lien and the court may
15 appoint a receiver to collect rents during the pendency of the action. The plain meaning and the
16 context of the term "action" under N.R.S. 116.3116 therefore means to commence or institute a
17 lawsuit or judicial action.

18 The requirement that the HOA commence judicial foreclosure prior to attaining super
19 priority status on its lien makes logical sense from a due process standpoint under the statutory
20 scheme. A judicial foreclosure action requires the service of a summons and complaint on all
21 interested parties in the case, including junior lien holders. See Arabia v. BAC Home Loan
22 Servicing, LP, 208 Cal. App. 4th 462, 474, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 678,687. When a junior lienholder
23 has been omitted from a senior judicial foreclosure action and sale, "[the foreclosure and sale are
24 not void but are ineffective in foreclosing as far as the junior lien is commenced); citing
25 Carpentier v. Brenham (1870) 40 Cal. 221, 225-226; Fox v. California Title Ins. Co., (1932) 12
26 Cal. App. 264, 266-267, 7 P.2d 722.) This undoubtedly affords the first mortgage an opportunity
27 to appear and/or protect its lien interest in the property with the supervision of the court.
28

1 However, under a non-judicial foreclosure of an HOA lien, the HOA is not absolutely
2 required to send notice of the lien and sale to the first mortgage lien holder. *See* NRS
3 116.311635(1)(b)(2). This is at odds with the general non-judicial foreclosure procedures under
4 a deed of trust where all junior lien holders or subordinate interests to the foreclosing deed of
5 trust must be sent notice of default and sale. *See* NRS 107.090(3)-(4). Thus, the non-judicial
6 foreclosure process on HOA liens does not afford first mortgage lien holders adequate due
7 process to protect its lien interest unlike a judicial foreclosure action. Accordingly, the Court
8 must construe N.R.S. 116.3116(2)(c) to require a judicial action to be filed prior to an HOA
9 foreclosing on a super-priority lien interest. In this case, Plaintiff cannot show that a judicial
10 action was ever commenced to enforce the HOA's lien and to establish the HOA's super-priority
11 lien. Rather, Plaintiff acquired its ownership interest through a non-judicial foreclosure sale.
12 Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot claim that it acquired title through foreclosure on a super-
13 priority lien. Therefore, the Court's Order dated June 11, 2013 does not equate with manifest
14 injustice due to the legislative history and statutory construction of N.R.S. 116.3116.

15 Based on the failure to introduce any new additional information and the analysis by the
16 Court in its Order dated June 11, 2013, the Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood or fair chance of
17 success on the merits of the Complaint. Therefore, the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend should be
18 denied by this Court and the Court should uphold the Order expunging the Lis Pendens.

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1 II. CONCLUSION

2 Based on the above, the Court should deny the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and uphold
3 the Order granting dismissal of the Complaint as to U.S. Bank and Expunging the Lis Pendens
4 recorded against the Property.

5 DATED this 17th day of July, 2013.

6 WRIGHT, FINLAY & ZAK, LLP

7 
Chelsea A. Crowton, Esq.

8 Nevada Bar No. 11547

9 5532 South Fort Apache Road, Suite 110

10 Las Vegas, Nevada 89148

11 *Attorney for Defendant, U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee*
12 *for the Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo Asset*
13 *Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through*
14 *Certificates, Series 2006-AR4*

15 AFFIRMATION


16 Pursuant to N.R.S. 239B.030

17 The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding DEFENDANT, U.S. BANK,
18 N.A.'S, OPPOSITION TO THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND

19 JUDGMENT filed in Case No. A-13-678814-C **does not** contain the social security number of
20 any person.

21 DATED this 17th day of July, 2013.

22 WRIGHT, FINLAY & ZAK, LLP

23 
Chelsea A. Crowton, Esq.

24 Nevada Bar No. 11547

25 5532 South Fort Apache Road, Suite 110


26 Las Vegas, NV 89148

27 *Attorney for Defendant, U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee*
28 *for the Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo Asset*
Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-AR4

1 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of WRIGHT, FINLAY & ZAK, LLP;
3 that service of the foregoing DEFENDANT, U.S. BANK, N.A.'S, OPPOSITION TO THE
4 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT was made on the 17th day
5 of July, 2013, by depositing a true copy of same in the United States Mail, at Las Vegas,
6 Nevada, addressed as follows:

7 Howard C. Kim, Esq.
8 Diana S. Cline, Esq.
9 Jacqueline A. Gilbert, Esq.
10 HOWARD KIM & ASSOCIATES
11 400 N. Stephanie St., Suite 160
12 Henderson, Nevada 89014
13 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*



14
15
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18
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24
25
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27
28
An Employee of Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

(3)

APN: 178-19-712-012

Inst #: 201303250000590
Fees: \$19.00
N/C Fee: \$0.00
03/25/2013 10:58:14 AM
Receipt #: 1546688
Requestor:
ALBRIGHT STODDARD ET AL
Recorded By: GILKS Pgs: 3
DEBBIE CONWAY
CLARK COUNTY RECORDER

Title of Document: Notice of
Lis Pendens

Recording requested by:

Albright, Stoddard, Warnick & Albright


Return to:

Albright, Stoddard, Warnick & Albright
Attention: D. Chris Albright, Esq.
801 South Rancho Drive, Suite D-4
Las Vegas, Nevada 89106

This page added to provide additional information required by NRS 111.312 Sections 1-2.
(Additional recording fee applies).

This cover page must be typed or printed clearly in black ink only.

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CLERK OF THE COURT

1 NOLP

2 APN 178-19-712-012

3 D. CHRIS ALBRIGHT, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 004904

4 ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRIGHT
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5 Las Vegas, NV 89106

6 Tel: (702) 384-7111

7 Fax: (702) 384-0605

dca@albrightstoddard.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

11 LUCIA PARKS, individually,

12 Plaintiff,

13 vs.

14 NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES,
15 INC., a Nevada corporation; COPPER
16 RIDGE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, a
17 Nevada non-profit corporation; SFR
18 INVESTMENTS POOL I, LLC; a Nevada
19 limited liability company; JOHN DOES I
20 through X; and ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES I
21 through X,

Defendants.

CASE NO. A - 13 - 678794 - C
DEPT NO. XXVI

NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

20 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

21 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on March 22, 2013, an action was commenced in the
22 above-entitled Court, which action is now pending. By virtue of said action, LUCIA PARKS asserts
23 a claim adverse to SFR INVESTMENTS POOL I, LLC in and to the title, and right to possession, to
24 that certain real estate situated in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, commonly known as 2270
25 Nashville Avenue, Henderson, Nevada 89052, with APN 178-19-712-012, and more particularly
26 described as:

27 ///

28 ///

G:\DCA Mailer\IDCA\Parks (HOA Foreclosure) (10274 0010)\Lis Pendens 032213.npd

LAW OFFICES
ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRIGHT
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
QUAIL PARK, SUITE D-4J
801 SOUTH RANCHO DRIVE
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89106

1 GREEN VALLEY RANCH, PHASE 3, PARCEL 40, PLAT BOOK

2 71, PAGE 68, LOT 5, BLOCK 5, Clark County, Nevada.

3 DATED this 22nd day of March, 2013.

4 ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK
5 & ALBRIGHT

6 By DCA
7 D. CHRIS ALBRIGHT, ESQ.

8 Nevada Bar No. 004904

9 801 South Rancho Drive, Suite D-4

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11 (702) 384-7111

12 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*


13 CERTIFIED COPY
14 DOCUMENT ATTACHED IS A
15 TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
16 OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE

17 Attorney's Signature
18 CLERK OF THE COURT

19 MAR 25 2013

LAW OFFICES
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TAB 42



CLERK OF THE COURT

RSPN
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WILLIAM H. STODDARD, JR.
Nevada Bar No. 008679
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dca@albrightstoddard.com
Attorneys for Defendant Lucia Parks

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

vs.

US BANK, N.A., a national banking
association as Trustee for the Certificate
Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities
Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-AR4, and LUCIA
PARKS, an individual, DOES I through X;
and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,
inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-13-678814-C
DEPT NO. XVIII

**RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER
OR AMEND JUDGMENT; and
JOINDER IN DEFENDANT
US BANK'S OPPOSITION**

Date of Hearing: July 30, 2012
Time of Hearing: 8:15 a.m.

COMES NOW Defendant LUCIA PARKS, an individual (hereinafter "Defendant Parks"), by and through her undersigned counsel, ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRIGHT, and, having filed a notice of joinder in Defendant U.S. Bank N.A.'s motion to dismiss with prejudice the Complaint of Plaintiff (SFR Investment Pool 1, LLC, sometimes hereinafter "SFR") in this action, as well as U.S. Bank's Motion to expunge lis pendens, hereby responds to the Motion of the Plaintiff SFR to Alter or Amend Judgment, which Judgment was issued by this Court pursuant to its Orders on the foregoing Motions. Defendant Parks also hereby joins in U.S. Bank's Opposition to SFR's Motion to Alter or Amend.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff's complaint herein asserted that Plaintiff is now the owner of the real property commonly known as 2270 Nashville Avenue, Henderson, Nevada 89052 (APN 178-19-712-012) (the "Property"), as a result of its purchase at a flawed, invalid, non-judicial foreclosure of an allegedly delinquent homeowners' association lien, at which foreclosure Plaintiff claims to have purchased the Property. Parks had, before the filing of this suit, filed her own separate suit against SFR and the HOA and its agent (*Lucia Parks v. Copper Ridge Community Association, et al.*, Clark County Case No. A-13-678794-C), and also filed an Answer in this suit, contending that the Property is, in fact, owned by Defendant Parks, who purchased it in December of 2005 for \$331,500.

Plaintiff's winning bid at the flawed homeowners' association lien foreclosure sale was \$14,000.00. This SFR action therefore sought to quiet title to the Property in Plaintiff and allow it to secure a windfall, free and clear of any liens and encumbrances, in the Property. However, now that Defendant U.S. Bank has been adjudicated by this Court as holding a prior claim to that of SFR, and that bank has, upon information and belief, now foreclosed and sold the home at auction (today July 18, 2013), SFR's claims against Lucy Parks herein are now moot. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion should be denied.

ANALYSIS

Defendant has been attempting to settle this matter and therefore did not heretofore believe that a response to this Motion would be necessary. Furthermore, Lucy Parks had no objection, prior hereto, to the relief apparently sought in the Motion with respect to Parks, namely, that the order dismissing SFR's Complaint as against Parks be vacated, since Parks would have heretofore agreed that the SFR Complaint against Parks had not yet been adjudicated on the merits and should remain open.

However, the parties' prior settlement discussions have now been terminated based on a variety of changed circumstances and unmet contingencies. Moreover, there is now, based on changed circumstances which, upon information and belief, occurred today, July 18, 2013, no longer any need for this Court to consider reinstating SFR's quiet title claims against Parks, as neither party now has any claim to the title thereto.

Therefore, including based on these newly changed and newly learned of circumstances, Defendant Parks now responds to and opposes the motion.

A. Parks Had No Objection to the SFR's Claims Against Parks Being Reinstated In this Action, For *Future* Adjudication on the Merits, but Now Notes that those Claims Are Now Moot, and Should Therefore Now Be Dismissed.

To the extent that Plaintiff SFR's Motion (as to Parks) merely wishes to clarify that this Court's Judgment should not have dismissed Lucy Parks as a Defendant herein because the merits of the claims by and between Parks and SFR were not presented as part of U.S. Bank's motion, Parks would not heretofore have opposed that relief. More particularly, if the only element of the Motion which directly impacts Parks is the 2nd requested order from this Court listed on page 14 and 15 of the Motion, that the order dismissing SFR's Complaint as against Parks should be vacated, and that, as per points 4 and 6 of SFR's Motion's Conclusion, the Complaint against Parks and the trial against Parks should be reinstated, Defendant Parks would agree to such relief. The quiet title claims by and between SFR and Lucy Parks were not based on the same facts or arguments as the priority and quiet title claims between SFR and U.S. Bank which had been at the core of the issues in U.S. Bank's granted Motion leading to this Court's recent judgment of dismissal. Thus, the Judgment of Dismissal may have been overbroad in dismissing the Plaintiff's claims against Parks.

Defendant had joined in U.S. Bank's motions to ensure that U.S. Bank would not lose its ability to offset any potential future deficiency claim against Lucy Parks from the proceeds of a sale of the security, which would obviously impact Lucy Parks, as possibly subjecting her to a far greater future deficiency judgment than would be at issue otherwise. Defendant Lucy Parks, however, did not feel that the merits of her own quiet title claims and defenses, vis-a-vis SFR, were directly at issue in that U.S. Bank motion (the factual and legal questions surrounding Parks' defenses having to do with claims by Lucy Parks that she was not properly served with the HOA invoices and sale notices, rather than legal questions surrounding the HOA "superpriority" statute). Thus, Parks would not have heretofore objected if SFR's quiet title claims against Lucy Parks in the present case were reinstated and remained intact, for *future* discovery and a *future* adjudication on the merits, either in this action or in Lucy Parks' own previously filed action against SFR, which is still pending (*Lucia Parks v. Copper Ridge Community Association, et al.*, Clark County Case No. A-13-678794-C), which appears to be the only direct relief sought against Parks. If that were the only direct effect of SFR's present motion, with respect to Defendant Lucy Parks, then, based on her presumption that U.S. Bank could handle its own opposition to the remainder of the Motion as to the superpriority issues, and would

1 likely prevail thereon, Parks would not have filed an opposition regarding those elements of the present
2 motion which would merely have led to a reinstatement of the SFR quiet title claims against Parks,
3 for future adjudication. Rather, upon reinstatement of the SFR quiet title claims against Parks in this
4 lawsuit, Parks would have moved to consolidate this case with her own previously filed case against
5 SFR as to the same disputes, and the claims could then hereafter have been adjudicated therein on the
6 merits.

7 However, this Court should be aware that Parks has been informed that the Property was
8 apparently foreclosed on and sold at auction today, July 18, 2013, by a trustee acting on behalf of
9 Defendant U.S. Bank, or its servicer, Wells Fargo. Therefore, Parks hereby avers, upon information
10 and belief, that the home is now sold (or upon information and belief, will be prior to the hearing on
11 this Motion) and her own claims with respect to any title thereto have now therefore been divested.
12 (Defendant will file a supplemental exhibit to this motion as soon as documentation becomes
13 available.) This fact renders the SFR claims to quiet title against Parks moot, since neither party
14 currently has any claim with respect to any current ownership in the Property/home. SFR's quiet title
15 claims have now been wiped out, as have any title claims of Lucy Parks, by this foreclosure auction
16 sale.

17 On this basis it now appears that it would in fact now be appropriate to leave the Judgment
18 issued by this Court, including the dismissal of the claims against Parks, fully standing, since there is
19 no longer any basis for SFR to pursue a quiet title action against Parks herein. Parks can then go
20 forward with any monetary (non quiet-title) claims she may have against SFR in her earlier, already
21 pending, litigation against SFR and the HOA and the HOA's agent, based on any evidence that may
22 exist (including the mysterious fact that SFR's post-purchase notice listed the wrong HOA as having
23 sold the home) suggesting any collaboration on behalf of SFR with the HOA and its agent, which
24 Parks avers caused her monetary damages, including based on upsetting previously existing
25 arrangements between Parks and the bank.

26 Therefore, Parks now does oppose the Plaintiff's Motion, on the grounds of new facts, of which
27 Parks has only recently learned, and which, upon information and belief, occurred today, the date of
28 this opposition and response, divesting Parks or SFR of any claimed title to the Property.

//

B. To the Extent SFR's Present Motion Seeks Adjudication on the Merits of this Case, Beyond Simply Vacating the Judgment Dismissing the Claims Against Parks, the Motion Should Be Denied As Premature.

The relief sought by SFR, directly against Parks, in its instant motion, as described in the final two pages thereof, is relatively innocuous, and appears to simply seek an order vacating this Court's prior order and reinstating the claims by SFR against Parks, for future adjudication. As stated above, Parks had no objection to such an Order issuing if its effect would have been to simply allow future adjudication of the claims by and between Parks and SFR, on the merits, after discovery. However, now that the SFR Quiet Title claims against Parks have been rendered moot by the sale of the property on behalf of the bank with a priority lien, there is no good reason to reinstate those now mooted claims.

It should however also be noted that, despite the limited relief requested by SFR's Motion as to Parks, some of the Points and Authorities in the Motion attempt to set forth the factual basis for a claim against Parks on the merits, with respect to claims that Parks received statutorily proper and adequate notice. These points and authorities go far beyond that which would be proper to simply set aside the Orders and Judgments of this Court issued upon hearing U.S. Bank's prior motion, and, to the extent that SFR intended its current motion as a surreptitious motion for summary judgment on the merits of its own claims, against Parks or U.S. Bank or otherwise, Parks objects thereto. No meaningful discovery has yet taken place or even been initiated in this action and, pursuant to NRCP 56(f), further time for discovery would be warranted before a summary judgment could properly be filed. If this Court's Judgment of Dismissal had been issued after discovery, and after trial, then it may have been proper, in the context of a 59(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment, to seek not only an order vacating that judgment, but an order and judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the merits. However, no such procedures having yet taken place, it is not proper for Plaintiff to seek relief beyond simply setting aside this Court's prior order granting a motion to dismiss, and judgment, at this time.

Defendant Parks objects to and denies and disagrees with the factual averments, on the merits, set forth in Plaintiff SFR's Motion, and intends to pursue an adjudication of those matters, on the merits, either in this case or her own earlier filed suit, after discovery has been completed. No Order should issue herein on the basis of disputed factual averments now being made on the merits without the benefit of discovery.

C. THE REMAINDER OF SFR'S MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED ON THE BASES SET FORTH IN THE OPPOSITION FILED BY DEFENDANT U.S. BANK.

With respect to the remainder of the relief sought in Plaintiff's Motion, Parks hereby incorporates by reference her own prior joinders in and to U.S. Bank's prior motions to dismiss and to expunge lis pendens. Parks also hereby joins in and incorporates by reference Defendant U.S. Bank, N.A.'s July 17, 2013 Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. U.S. Bank's priority security interest in the Property having been recognized by this Court's prior Order, and no legitimate argument having been raised to refute the same, this Court should continue to uphold the priority of U.S. Bank's recently foreclosed upon deed of trust, pursuant to which the Property has now, upon information and belief, been auctioned and sold.

Refusing to uphold its prior Order and Judgment in this case would potentially require the U.S. Bank foreclosure sale of July 18, 2013 to be unwound, and would leave U.S. Bank with no security in support of its loan claims against Lucy Parks, thereby potentially seriously increasing the amount of such deficiency claims, as now equivalent to the full value of the loan, without any mitigation or reduction from a sale of the security available to protect both U.S. Bank and Parks. This would unfairly and inequitably affects both U.S. Bank and Lucy Parks.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, and for the reasons set forth in U.S. Bank's Opposition, Plaintiff SFR's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment should be denied.

DATED this 18th day of July, 2013.

ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRIGHT



D. CHRIS ALBRIGHT, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 004904

WILLIAM H. STODDARD, JR.

Nevada Bar No. 008679

801 S. Rancho Drive, Suite D-4

Las Vegas, Nevada 89106


Attorneys for Defendant Parks

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that on this 18th day of July, 2013, I deposited a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT; and JOINDER IN DEFENDANT US BANK'S OPPOSITION for mailing in the U.S. Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid and addressed to:

Howard C. Kim, Esq.
Diana S. Cline, Esq.
Victoria L. Hightower, Esq.
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400 N. Stephanie St., Suite 160
Henderson, Nevada 89014
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89148
Attorney for Defendant US Bank, N.A.


An Employee of Albright, Stoddard, Warnick & Albright

TAB 43


CLERK OF THE COURT

RPLY

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Facsimile: (702) 485-3301
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC a
Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

vs.

U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking
association as Trustee for the Certificate
Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities
Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-AR4, a Nevada non-
profit corporation and LUCIA PARKS, an
individual, DOES I through X; and ROE
CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: A-13-678814-C

Dept. No.: XVIII

**REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT**

Hearing Date: July 30, 2013
Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC (“SFR”) hereby submits its Omnibus Reply in Support of its Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (“Motion”).¹ This Reply is made pursuant all papers and pleadings on file herein, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and any oral argument that may be made by counsel at the time this matter is heard.

¹ Defendant U.S. Bank, N.A. (“U.S. Bank”) filed an opposition to the Motion (“Opposition” or “Opp.”) and and Lucia Parks (“Parks”) filed a response and opposition (“Response” or “Resp.”). This Reply will address issues raised in both oppositions.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

All parties agree that Defendant Lucia Parks should not have been dismissed through this Court's June 11, 2013 "Order for Dismissal and Cancellation of Notice of Pendency of Action" (the "Order"). The fact that U.S. Bank recently sold the real property that is the subject of this litigation, 2270 Nashville Avenue, Henderson, Nevada 89052, Parcel No. 178-19-712-012 (the "Property") does not moot the need to alter or amend the Order.² Plaintiff's motion should be granted for three reasons. **First**, the Order should be amended so that Plaintiff's claims against Parks can be properly adjudicated. Plaintiff has appealed the denial of its motion for preliminary injunction.³ If the Nevada Supreme Court agrees with the Nevada Real Estate Division and SFR that U.S. Bank's interest was extinguished, SFR will be entitled to have title quieted in its name—without interference from Parks. **Second**, the portion of the Order expunging the lis pendens should be amended, or at least stayed, because litigation over the title to the Property continues in Plaintiff's appeal. **Third**, the faults in U.S. Bank's interpretation is exposed by its reliance on theories based on statutes with no similarity to the language in NRS 116. . This Court should review its prior order and amend it based on the information provided in the Motion.

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. THE CLAIMS AGAINST PARKS SHOULD EITHER BE REINSTATED OR DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Parks agrees that the Order was overbroad and that the claims against her should not have been dismissed, but should have been allowed to continue on the merits. *See* Resp., 3:4-14. U.S. Bank does not dispute that SFR's claims against Parks should survive. *See, generally*, Opposition. SFR is entitled to continue litigating its claims against Parks in this action,⁴ in the

² *See* Sales Results, National default Servicing Corporation, available at <http://www.ndscorp.com/FsSales/SalesResults.aspx> (search for address contains "Nashville"), last accessed by undersigned counsel on July 23, 2013.

³ SFR has also appealed the Court's June 11, 2013 Order, understanding that it is premature while this Motion is pending.

⁴ If this Court grants Plaintiff's Motion to reinstate the claims against Parks or dismisses those claims without prejudice, as it should, but denies the Motion as to U.S. Bank, Plaintiff will need NRCP 54(b) certification to appeal the Order. To the extent that the Order adjudicates all claims

action brought by Parks against the Association and SFR—*Parks v. Copper Ridge Community Ass’n*, Clark County Case No. A-13-678794-C—or to re-file its claim to quiet title against Parks at a later time, if more appropriate. As Parks noted, U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss did not fully adjudicate the issues related to the Association’s sale and its effect on Parks. *See Resp.*, 3:9-14; 5:1-27. SFR is a bona fide purchaser of the Property. Because of this, SFR believes that it could prevail on a motion for judgment on the pleadings or motion for summary judgment against Parks for the reasons stated in the Motion. However, it is not seeking adjudication on the merits through this Motion. The Court need not consider any dispute over factual allegations relating to the Association’s foreclosure sale through this Motion. It need only amend its Order so that the parties can continue to litigate the claims if they choose. As it stands, the Order dismisses Parks with prejudice and would have a preclusive effect. SFR seeks to defend itself in the *Parks* case, seek relief there if proper, and, if necessary, re-file its claims against Parks in the future, depending on the outcome of any appeal. Because the *Parks* case was filed first, consolidation of SFR’s claims into that case is likely appropriate. Therefore, amendment of the Order to dismiss SFR’s claims without prejudice would allow SFR to pursue its claims in that case.

B. THE ORDER AS TO U.S. BANK SHOULD BE ALTERED OR AMENDED

Based on the evidence purpose and meaning of the UCIOA that was adopted by the Nevada Legislature, this Court should amend its Order.⁵ At the time of the original briefing, the Affidavit of Carl Lisman, one of the drafters of the UCIOA was not available for this Court’s consideration. Despite Defendant’s assertion, the UCIOA was enacted in a number of states, not just those with judicial foreclosures. *See Opp.* 4:14-15; *see also* Lisman Aff. ¶ 13, n.3. Thus, the comments to the UCIOA, and the understanding of the drafters is relevant to this case.

_____ (continued)

against U.S. Bank, there is no just reason for delay in entering judgment in favor of U.S. Bank. Of course, should this Court review its interpretation of NRS 116.3116 in light of the evidence presented in the Motion, then Rule 54(b) certification is unnecessary.

⁵ No one is arguing that the first security interest loses its right to payment on its loan--just that the lien against the Property itself is extinguished. Instead, the lien attaches to the proceeds of the sale, and the holder of the first security interest may seek a deficiency judgement against its borrower to recover the remaining monies it is owed.

Lisman makes at least two key points that, if accepted as persuasive authority, should result in an order denying U.S. Bank's motion to dismiss. *See* Lisman Affidavit, attached to Motion as Ex. 2

First, the UCIOA never intended for non-judicial foreclosure states to require associations to file lawsuits. Lisman explained that the phrase "institution of an action" was deliberately included in the UCIOA "in order to ensure the triggering event [was] not limited to the initiation of a judicial action." *See id.* at ¶ 20.

Second, the UCIOA never intended the super priority portion of an association's lien to be "merely a payment priority." *See id.*, at ¶ 17. Instead, the UCIOA and NRS 116 require real property laws, including foreclosure common law, to supplement the statutory provisions. *See id.* at ¶ 23; NRS 116.1108.

In its opposition, U.S. Bank, cites to, but does not attach, a law review article by Andrea J. Boyack, COMMUNITY COLLATERAL DAMAGE: A QUESTION OF PRIORITIES, 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 53. *See* Opp., 5:9-24. U.S. Bank omits all of the internal citations, most likely because the analysis falls apart when it becomes clear that **the author's conclusions are based on a Minnesota statute that specifically requires a first mortgage to foreclose for a homeowner's association to obtain payment on the super priority portion of its lien. This language is not included anywhere in NRS 116 or in the UCIOA 3-116.**

U.S. Bank quotes:

The drafters of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act ("UCIOA") recognizing that assessment liens would ordinarily be junior in priority to individual first mortgage liens, crafted an "innovative" solution to the problem of assessment nonpayment during mortgage default: the six-month "limited priority lien."

The six-month capped "super-priority" portion of an association's lien does not have a true priority status under UCIOA since this six month cannot be foreclosed as senior to a mortgage lien. Rather, it either creates *a payment priority* for some portion of unpaid assessments, which would take the first position in the foreclosure repayment "waterfall," or grants *durability* to some portion of unpaid assessments, allowing the security for such debt to survive foreclosure.'

Motion, 9:5-11 (quoting Andrea J. Boyack, COMMUNITY COLLATERAL DAMAGE: A QUESTION OF PRIORITIES, 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 53 (Fall 2011), 100 (emphasis in original),

1 a copy of which is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.

2 To support her conclusion that only a payment priority is created under UCIOA, Boyack
3 inexplicably cites to Minn. Stat. Ann. § 515A.3-115, Minnesota's version of the Uniform
4 Condominium Act, which does not provide any priority over a first security interest for the
5 condominium association's lien. Ex. 1, Boyack, 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. at 99, fn. 217. Minnesota
6 did adopt the UCIOA in Minn. Stat. Ann. § 515B. However, its statute does not mirror the
7 language in the UCIOA 3-116 like NRS 116.3116. Instead, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 515B.3-116(c)
8 specifically references the foreclosure of a first mortgage:

9 **If a first mortgage on a unit is foreclosed, . . . the person who acquires title . . . shall**
10 **take title to the unit subject to a lien in favor of the association for unpaid**
11 **assessments for common expenses levied pursuant to section 515B.3-115(a), (e)(1) to**
(3), (f), and (i) which became due, without acceleration, during the six months
immediately preceding the end of the owner's period of redemption.

12 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 515B.3-116(c) (emphasis added).

13 It *does not* state that an association lien "**is also prior**" to the first security interest like
14 Nevada's statute and like UCIOA § 3-116. A close inspection of Boyack's article shows that it
15 suffers the same defect as many of the orders that conclude that a purchaser at an association's
16 foreclosure sale in Nevada takes subject to the first security interest: no statutory analysis. The
17 Boyack article makes generalized, conclusory statements about an association's ability to
18 foreclose under UCIOA without any reference to the language in UCIOA or any authority
19 supporting the author's position. *See* Ex. 1, Boyack, 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. at 99.

20 The article does cite to a presentation by Mr. Lisman, but glosses over the substance of
21 his comments stating only: "Lisman seems to believe that the UCIOA limited priority lien solves
22 the problem of non-payment of assessments, noting that 'we are now convinced that we are more
23 brilliant than we thought we were.'" *Id.* at 98, fn. 213. Had Boyack included the substance of
24 Lisman's comments in her analysis, the article could not have reached the conclusion that an
25 association's lien "does not have true priority status under UCIOA since this six-month
26 assessment lien cannot be foreclosed as a senior mortgage lien." *Id.* at 99. Mr. Lisman
27 explained that an HOA's super priority lien, like municipal taxes, will be paid by a first security
28 interest holder so that its interest won't be foreclosed:

[T]he Association has a lien against the owners unit or lot for unpaid assessment[s]. The problem with that, if we stop right there is that more likely than not there's going to be a mortgage on the unit or the lot and that mortgage is going to have a priority ahead of the association's lien. **By analogy we looked to municipal taxes in home mortgages and came up with what we thought at the time a very innovative and good solution.** We are now convinced that we are more brilliant than we thought we were. **The analogy with home mortgages and taxes is lenders who have a first mortgage will never want to see the property sold for unpaid property taxes, use their powers in mortgaging under the mortgage to pay the taxes and then stick it to the homeowners owner who hasn't paid.** They add the balance to the notes of the mortgage. So what we did is we came up with the concept of the super lien. **We said that the Association has a priority for unpaid Assessments up to and about equal to 6 months of unpaid assessments and ahead of the first mortgage and what happens of course is the Association contacts the bank, the bank doesn't want to see the unit foreclosed and have their mortgage lowered in priority, the bank advances the unpaid assessments and deals with its delinquent borrower in that context.**

Carl Lisman, Chair of the UCIOA's Drafting Comm., Presentation to the Maryland Task Force on Common Ownership Communities-Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development on January 23, 2006: The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (emphasis added), attached as **Exhibit 2**.

The concept of a "payment priority" urged by U.S. Bank in its earlier papers and again in its opposition, appears to be rooted in Boyack's law review article rather than any statutory analysis or authority. In fact, the words "payment priority" are not used anywhere in the UCIOA or NRS 116.3116. As Mr. Lisman explains, "Had we intended that the priority be only for payment, we would have said so. A payment priority would not serve the goal we were seeking." Lisman Aff., at ¶ 17. Because the Boyack article fails to provide more than conclusory statements based on inapposite statutory language from Minnesota, it should be disregarded. Further, Boyack's take on what the drafters of the UCIOA intended by creating the super priority lien directly contradicts the purpose and application of the super priority lien as stated by the Chair of the UCIOA's drafting committee.

U.S. Bank argues that NRS 116 does not require notice to the first security interest holder. *See Opp.*, at 5:25-6:4. This argument requires the Court to ignore the plain language of the statute. The first security interest receives notice of the association's lien three different

times through to two different statutes. **First**, pursuant to NRS 116.3116(4) when the association records its declaration of CC&Rs, it perfects its lien and provides record notice of the lien to the world. In this case, notice of the lien occurred before any deed of trust was recorded on the Property..’); **Second**, NRS 116.31168(1) requires the association give notice to junior lienholders, including the first security interest holder, in the same way the first security interest holder must give notice when it non-judicially forecloses. (“The provisions of NRS 107.090⁶ apply to the foreclosure of an association’s lien as if a deed of trust were being foreclosed.”) As a junior lienholder to the association, the first security interest is given the same notice that a second deed of trust holder would receive if the first were foreclosing. Through this provision, the first security interest holder receives both a notice of default and a notice of sale.⁷

NRS 116 provides U.S. Bank and other first security interest holders with the notice they need to protect their interests. It is the very same notice that they are required to provide to junior lienholders when they foreclose. Accordingly,, this Court should amend its order to deny U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss.

C. THE LIS PENDENS SHOULD BE REINSTATED BECAUSE THERE IS NO NOTICE OF THE ONGOING DISPUTE RELATED TO SFR’S CLAIMS AGAINST US BANK

U.S. Bank suggests that Parks’s lis pendens is sufficient to give notice to the world of the ongoing disputes regarding the property. Opp. at 6:9-24. SFR disagrees. Notice of a dispute between the former homeowner, who now admits she has lost her interest in the Property to U.S. Bank’s foreclosure, does not give record notice to the world of the ongoing dispute over NRS

⁶ NRS 107.090 provides in pertinent part:

3. The trustee or person authorized to record the notice of default shall, within 10 days after the notice of default is recorded and mailed pursuant to NRS 107.080, cause to be deposited in the United States mail an envelope, registered or certified, return receipt requested and with postage prepaid, containing a copy of the notice, addressed to:

(a) Each person who has recorded a request for a copy of the notice; and

(b) Each other person with an interest whose interest or claimed interest is subordinate to the deed of trust.

One need only substitute the words “association” for “deed of trust” in subsection (b) to see that the association must provide notice to the first security interest holder.

⁷ Just as the holder of a second deed of trust would have to call the first to get a payoff amount, so must the first security interest contact the association for the same information. This is because, often, only the holder will know if the first security interest is a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac loan, requiring the first security interest holder to pay only six months of assessments instead of nine months to protect its interest. NRS 116.3116(2).

1 116.3116. SFR has already filed its notice of appeal. Currently, there is nothing to stop U.S.
2 Bank's purchaser from selling, conveying or otherwise transferring the Property in the
3 meantime. This litigation is far from over. Until the Nevada Supreme Court finally decides the
4 proper interpretation of NRS 116.3116, SFR should have, at the very least, the protection of a lis
5 pendens to prevent anyone from claiming bona fide purchaser status before litigation is
6 concluded. Allowing the lis pendens to be reinstated does not harm U.S. Bank in any way at this
7 juncture. It has already sold the property. SFR simply seeks to preserve its ability to recover the
8 Property when, and if, it prevails on appeal.

9 **III. CONCLUSION**

10 To correct a mistake of law and to prevent manifest injustice, SFR requests this Court
11 grant the Motion to Alter or Amend.

12 DATED July 23, 2013.

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Ex. 1

EXHIBIT 1

Ex. 1

Community Collateral Damage: A Question of Priorities

Andrea J. Boyack*

Today's soaring mortgage default rate and the uncertainty and delay associated with mortgage foreclosure proceedings threaten to cause financial tragedies of the commons in condominiums and homeowner associations across the country. Assessment defaults in privately governed communities result in an inequitable allocation of upkeep costs—a phenomenon that current law has failed to prevent. But the collateral damage caused by delayed foreclosures and insufficient recoveries can be minimized by increasing the payment priority of the association lien.

In a majority of states, association liens are completely subordinate to the first mortgage lien. At foreclosure of the mortgage lien, the junior priority assessment lien will be extinguished whether or not there are sufficient proceeds to reimburse for community charges. Assessment delinquencies grow over time, so the longer it takes to complete foreclosure, the greater the costs to the neighborhood. Although several states have adopted a limited lien priority for up to six months' worth of unpaid assessments, foreclosures today take far longer than six months, and the amount ultimately owed to a community can be significant and far exceed that cap. Federal housing policy affects the resolution of the issue because the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA"), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac only permit qualifying mortgages to be subject to a six-month assessment lien priority. The decelerating pace of foreclosure further exacerbates the already unjustifiable financial impact borne by non-defaulting neighbors. The lien priority status quo fails to adequately protect communities in today's context of widespread, delayed foreclosures and

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under-collateralized mortgage loans. Decreasing the first mortgage lien's priority during a foreclosure delay would mitigate the harm.

Lien priority statutory changes could protect association finances in the future, and such provisions might be applied retroactively as well. In other contexts, states have held that changes to a lien priority regime could apply to existing associations and existing mortgages without unconstitutionally impairing contract or property rights. This has been particularly true where the association's lien was deemed to have been created on the date the community's organizational documents were recorded (prior to any unit's mortgage). Historically, bank lobbyists have opposed any enhanced assessment lien priority. However, supporting property upkeep and making assessments more predictable and collectible would actually benefit lenders by shoring up the value of their collateral. Moreover, increased certainty with respect to homeowner payment obligations would enable more responsible credit underwriting and contribute to economic recovery. Shoring up assessment lien priority would not only ensure a fair allocation of community costs, but also would help to contain the current housing market decline.

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INTRODUCTION

Culpable parties in today's housing crisis are legion,¹ but innocent bystanders are directly and tangibly harmed by the fallout. Nonpayment of upkeep charges by financially strapped owners forces guiltless neighbors to fund the community budget revenue gap. The problem is exacerbated by foreclosure delay, since a property conveyance would replace an insolvent owner with a solvent one. Whether a foreclosure delay results from mortgage lenders' strategic behavior² or from procedural missteps by servicers,³ the result is the same—hard-working,

1. Mortgage brokers pushed unrealistic loans. Steven Krystofiak, President, Mortgage Brokers Ass'n for Responsible Lending, Statement at the Federal Reserve (Aug. 1, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/secre/2006/august/20060801/op-1253/op-1253_3_1.pdf. Appraisers validated unrealistic prices. See Jonathan R. Laing, *The Bubble's New Home*, BARRON'S ONLINE (June 20, 2005), <http://online.barrons.com/article/SB111905372884363176.html> (discussing economist Robert Shiller's forecast of the housing market). Homeowners borrowed money they could not repay, and lenders lent funds while ignoring credit and market risks. Ben Steverman & David Bogoslaw, *The Financial Crisis Blame Game*, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 18, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/oct2008/pi20081017_950382.htm. Secondary market purchasers and investors overly relied on securitization, and regulators and credit rating agencies blessed the entire system in error, negligence, or both. See, e.g., Carol Ann Frost, *Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of Research Evidence on Selected Criticisms of the Agencies*, J. ACCT., AUDITING, & FIN. (forthcoming 2006), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=941861> (analyzing the criticism of the credit rating agencies); John Patrick Hunt, *Credit Rating Agencies and the "Worldwide Credit Crisis": The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement*, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 114 (2009) ("It is not plausible to argue that rating agencies have a valuable reputation for rating instruments they have never rated before."); Robert T. Miller, *Morals in a Market Bubble*, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 113, 136 (2009) ("Alan Greenspan and his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee made some mistakes in the early years of this decade by keeping interest rates very low for a very long time."); Randolph C. Thompson, *Mortgage Backed Securities, Wall Street, and the Making of a Global Financial Crisis*, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. BRIEF 51, 53 (2008) (providing an overview of the "misguided confidence in these debt instruments."); Jeff Madrick, *How We Were Ruined & What We Can Do*, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 12, 2009, available at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/feb/12/how-we-were-ruined-what-we-can-do/> (providing an overview of the securitization and the financial crisis); Ronald Colombo, *A Crisis of Character*, HUFFINGTON POST (May 12, 2009, 4:58 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/ronald-j-colombo/a-crisis-of-character_b_202562.html (lamenting the erosion of morals in the modern economy).

2. In a normal housing market, pushing foreclosures through quickly is in a lender's best interest. But in a depressed market, lenders have discovered that a foreclosure with a low prospect of a quick resale actually causes them to lose money. In 2009, lenders canceled up to 50% of foreclosure sales in some parts of the country, and many of these delays were inspired by the desire to avoid upkeep costs (maintenance, community assessments, and property taxes) while awaiting a market rebound. Todd Ruger, *Lenders' Latest Foreclosure Strategy: Waiting*, HERALD TRIB., July 12, 2009, at A1.

3. In early October 2010, three of the largest mortgage lenders in the United States—Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Ally Financial—announced moratoriums in the twenty-three states that require court-ordered sales to foreclose on mortgages. This was in reaction to

financially responsible homeowners are forced to pay significant, additional amounts of money merely because of their neighbors' payment defaults, and in the many cases where foreclosure sale proceeds do not even cover the loan,⁴ such amounts may never be recovered. The additional burden on the non-defaulting neighbors possibly forces such homeowners into their own financial distress. Allocating the cost of a delinquent owner's upkeep share to the paying neighbors is inefficient and unfair.⁵ Furthermore, inequitable cost allocation will ultimately lead to additional owner defaults and further impairment of collateral value for every lender.

increased judicial scrutiny of sloppy—or even fraudulent—servicer foreclosure procedures. See Ariana Eunjung Cha & Brady Dennis, *Judges Revisiting Foreclosure Cases May Help Owners but Clog Market*, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2010, at A9 (referencing a Florida case). Within a week of the initial announcements of these servicer-initiated moratoriums, Bank of America expanded its freeze on foreclosures nationwide, and attorneys general in all fifty states begun investigative probes into the extent of servicer misconduct in foreclosure procedures. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Steven Mufson & Jia Lynn Yang, *Momentum Builds for Full Moratorium on Foreclosures*, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2010, at A11 (reporting that national civil rights groups had called for a government-mandated national moratorium on foreclosures); Jia Lynn Yang & Ariana Eunjung Cha, *Obama Vetoes Foreclosure Bill as Anger Grows*, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2010, at A1 (reporting that federal legislation intended to streamline foreclosure proceedings had been vetoed by President Obama, further lengthening the foreclosure process). While moratoriums have now been lifted, the concern that prompted them hangs over foreclosure proceedings, and the increased servicer scrutiny operates to lengthen the foreclosure timeline. See Carrie Bay, *Self-Evident Truth in Market Variables: Longer Foreclosure Timelines*, DSNNEWS.COM (Apr. 12, 2011), <http://www.dsnews.com/articles/self-evident-truth-in-market-variables-longer-foreclosure-timelines-2011-04-12> (stating that the time period from default to foreclosure continues to increase across the country).

4. According to the Rasmussen Report, 31% of U.S. homeowners with a mortgage owed more on their homes than their homes were worth at the end of 2010. Peter Schroeder, *Poll: Nearly One-Third of Homeowners Underwater on Mortgage*, THE HILL (Mar. 21, 2011, 1:29 PM), <http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/801-economy/151039-poll-nearly-one-third-of-homeowners-underwater-on-mortgages>. Deutsche Bank predicts that 48% of American homes could have negative equity by the end of 2011. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, *Housing Crisis Represents the Greatest Threat to Recovery*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 27, 2011), <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2011/01/27/housing-crisis-represents-the-greatest-threat-to-the-recovery>.

5. The concept that an unfair enjoyment of benefits by parties not bearing associated costs (free-riding) is inequitable and “wrong” was articulated by H.L.A. Hart in 1955 and was termed the “principle of fairness.” H.L.A. Hart, *Are There Any Natural Rights?*, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 185–86 (1955). This concept has been favorably cited by John Rawls. JOHN RAWLS, *A THEORY OF JUSTICE* 96 (rev. ed. 1971). Fair allocation of cost demands that all beneficiaries of a cooperative enterprise bear pro rata responsibility for the costs of such enterprise. This formulation of fair allocation is well-suited to the case of upkeep expenses of a common interest community such as a homeowner association or condominium. Unfair cost allocation in communities creates neighborhood contention and lowers quality of life for members of an association. Michelle Conlin & Tamara Lush, *Neighbor vs. Neighbor as Homeowner Fights Get Ugly*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 10, 2011, available at <http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Neighbor-vs-neighbor-as-apf-2524543580.html?x=0>.

Today, defaulting neighbors cause millions of blameless homeowners around the country to face such inequitable and unexpected financial burdens.⁶ An increasing number of new developments nationwide have adopted a private governance model.⁷ Approximately 62,000,000 people in the United States (20% of the country's population) live in one of the 309,600 privately governed common interest communities ("CICs").⁸ Nationally, home loan delinquency rates are now between 10% and 13% of all mortgages.⁹ Mortgage defaults are concentrated in certain geographic areas, however, so the mortgage delinquency rate in

6. Numerous media accounts have highlighted the stories of suffering by such non-delinquent neighbors. *See, e.g.*, Christine Dunn, 'Nightmare' Condo Fees After Foreclosure, PROVIDENCE J., July 6, 2008, at G1 (discussing a Rhode Island foreclosure); Christine Haughney, *Collateral Foreclosure Damage*, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2008, at C1 (examining the plight of a Miami woman); Sarah Ryley, *New Manhattan Condos See Rise in Foreclosures*, THEREALDEAL.COM (Mar. 8, 2010, 11:00 AM), <http://therealdeal.com/newyork/articles/new-manhattan-condos-see-rise-in-foreclosures--2> (reporting on New York foreclosures); David Sutta, *Condos Demanding Foreclosure On Abandoned Units*, MFI-MIAMI (Apr. 28, 2010), <http://www.mfi-miami.com/2010/04/condos-demanding-foreclosure-on-abandoned-units/> (discussing the predicament of a Florida woman).

7. More than 80% of newly built homes across the country are in a CIC. Conlin & Lush, *supra* note 5. The prevalence of condominiums increased markedly over the decade ending in 2005. However, since the housing crisis began, the percentage of occupied housing stock within a condominium has notably declined. *See* JENNIFER COMNEY, CHRIS NARDUCI & PETER TATIAN, URBAN INST., STATE OF WASHINGTON, D.C.'S NEIGHBORHOOD 2010 26–29 (Nov. 2010) (showing how Washington, D.C.'s housing stock has followed the national trend).

8. "Common interest community" is defined by the Restatement (Third) of Property to be a "development or neighborhood in which individually owned lots or units are burdened by a servitude" that cannot be avoided by nonuse or withdrawal. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000). Common interest communities include condominiums and homeowner associations—also known as planned unit developments ("P.U.D.s"). Data regarding the number of U.S. common interest communities and their residents is tracked by the Community Associations Institute ("CAI"). *Industry Data*, CMTY. ASS'NS INST., <http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx> (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) [hereinafter CAI Industry Data]. CAI's data indicate that the number of residents of common interest communities has increased from 2.1 million in 1970 to 62.0 million in 2010. This figure represents 20.2% of the population of the United States, estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau to be 307 million in 2009. *Population Finder*, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, <http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFPopulation> (last visited Aug. 16, 2011).

9. Based on figures provided by Lender Processing Services, as reported at PR Newswire, Press Release, Lending Process Services, Inc., LPS September 'First Look' Mortgage Report: August Month-End Data Shows More Delinquent Loans Entering Foreclosure Process (Sept. 15, 2010), *available at* www.reuters.com/article/idUS224331+15-Sep-2010+PRN20100915. Another article reporting these figures calculates that this rate indicates more than 7.2 million mortgage loans are behind on their payments. Carrie Bay, *Residential Mortgage Delinquency Rate Surpasses 10%: LPS*, DSNEWS.COM (Feb. 4, 2010), <http://www.dsnews.com/articles/mortgage-delinquency-rate-surpasses-10-lps-2010-02-04>. The foreclosure rate is ten times pre-crisis levels, and the aggregate number of foreclosure sales in one month (around 100,000 nationwide) is now similar to the number of pre-crisis foreclosure sales for an entire year. Alex Viega, *Foreclosure Rate: Americans on Pace for 1 Million Foreclosures in 2010*, HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2010, 5:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/15/foreclosure-rate-american_n_647130.html.

those areas is much higher.¹⁰ The states with recent growth booms are the ones dealing with the steepest mortgage default rate.¹¹ Notably, these states also have the highest percentage of citizens residing in privately governed CICs.¹² People who have stopped paying their mortgages have, almost invariably, previously stopped paying their community association assessments.¹³ The precipitous rise in mortgage

10. See Shayna M. Olesiuk & Kathy R. Kalser, *The 2009 Economic Landscape, The Sand States: Anatomy of a Perfect Housing-Market Storm*, 3 FDIC Q., no. 3, 2009 at 26, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2009_vol3_1/Quarterly_Vol3No1_entire_issue_FI_NAL.pdf (discussing the acute nature of the housing downturn in Arizona, California, Nevada, and Florida); see also Dina ElBoghdady, *Foreclosure Activity Rises in Most Major Metropolitan Areas*, WASH. POST, July 30, 2010, at A14 (“The 20 regions with the worst foreclosure rates were in the four states—Florida, California, Nevada and Arizona.”); Brad Heath, *Most Foreclosures Pack into Few Counties*, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 2009, 7:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2009-03-05-foreclosure_N.htm (explaining that properties concentrated in a mere thirty-five counties accounted for half of the country’s foreclosure actions, and eight counties in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada were the source of a quarter of the nation’s foreclosures in 2008). As of July 2010, 1 in 200 households in California were in foreclosure; 1 in 171 households in Florida were in foreclosure; 1 in 167 households in Arizona were in foreclosure; and 1 in 82 households in Nevada were in foreclosure. *States with Highest Foreclosure Rates*, CNBC.COM, http://www.cnbc.com/id/29655038/States_with_the_Highest_Foreclosure_Rates (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) (citing data from RealtyTrac’s U.S. Foreclosure Market Report).

11. In the last decade, many cities in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada have experienced both a double-digit rise in prices as well as a double-digit decline in prices. See *House Price Index*, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, <http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87> (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) (providing an index of housing transactions by state); S&P/CASE-SHILLER, HOME PRICE INDICES 2009, A YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (Jan. 2010), available at <http://www.standardandpoors.com/> (follow “S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices” hyperlink; then follow “S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices: 2009 A Year In Review” hyperlink) (reporting on 2009). Conversely, cities such as Boston, Charlotte, Cleveland, Dallas, and Denver never experienced double-digit price rises nor have they experienced double-digit declines. See Heath, *supra* note 10 (explaining that in some parts of the country, “the foreclosure wave was barely a ripple”).

12. For example, an estimated 25% or more of Californians reside in a condominium or homeowner association. See Carol Lloyd, *Condominium Homeowners Face Rising Condo Fees and Special Assessments*, SFGATE.COM (Aug. 3, 2007), http://articles.sfgate.com/2007-08-03/entertainment/17255445_1_affordable-housing-new-homeownership-inclusionary (reporting on increases in special assessments). Tomas Musil, director of the Shenehon Center for Real Estate at the Opus College of Business at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, explains that while “the problem is national in scope, it is more pronounced in Florida, California, Texas, and Colorado,” where CIC developments were more popular. Tom Bayles, *After Foreclosure, It’s Time for Neighbors to Pay*, HERALD TRIB. (Sept. 23, 2008, 1:26 AM), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20080923/ARTICLE/809230372/2055/NEWS?Title=When_foreclosure_is_finished__it_s_time_for_neighbors_to_pay (quoting Musil). The Policy Institute of California asserts that 38% of the housing units in California’s “Inland Empire” exist in homeowner association communities. Jim Wasserman, *HOAs Struggle with Gotchas*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, <http://www.calhomelaw.org/doc.asp?id=463> (last visited Aug. 16, 2011). Wasserman also points out that more than half of the nation’s CIC housing is in five states (California, Florida, Texas, Arizona, and Nevada). Jim Wasserman, *California Eyes HOA Changes*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (July 8, 2004), available at http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=141x2045calhomelaw.org/doc.asp?id=646.

13. Trevor G. Pinkerton, *Escaping the Death Spiral of Dues and Debt: Bankruptcy and*

default rates therefore indicates an even steeper rise in assessment delinquencies, which will continue until solvent owners replace delinquent owners.¹⁴

All types of CICs, from high-rise residential condominiums to multiple-zip-code single-home developments, share the same essential service and payment structure: homeowner-elected directors manage common upkeep, and all homeowners contribute their pro rata portion of the common costs.¹⁵ The CIC structure enables more community amenities and upkeep, permitting neighborhoods to self-fund and allowing local governments to avoid raising taxes in response to more housing developments.¹⁶

Owners in condominiums and homeowner associations expect to be financially independent of their neighbors.¹⁷ Architects of CIC-enabling legislation did not intend to create financial co-dependence nor cause significant financial entanglement because default in a well-functioning market would lead expeditiously to foreclosure and title transfer to a successive solvent homeowner. If a credit-worthy party quickly takes over a defaulting owner's share of upkeep obligations and begins to pay allocated assessments, the community would suffer only limited financial loss due to a member's mortgage default. But it often does not work that way in today's market. Now, contrary to original

Condominium Association Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 125, 142–43 (2009); Monica Hatcher, *Mediators Foresee Gloom, Doom in Condo Industry*, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 4, 2009, at 1H; Press Release, PR.com, Concerned Homeowners Association Members Coalition Forms (Feb. 18, 2011), available at <http://www.pr.com/press-release/299084>; Donna Gehrke-White, *Homeowner Associations Step Up Foreclosure Filings*, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 20, 2011), <http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/02/20/2062656/homeowner-associations-step-up.html>; Daniel Vasquez, *Should Delinquent Condo Owners Lose Internet, TV Service?*, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 1, 2011, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-03-01/business/fl-cable-tv-condocol-20110301_1_delinquent-condo-owners-associations-maintenance-fees.

14. See *infra* notes 80–84 and accompanying text (illustrating that because assessments are the primary source of funding for community associations, delinquent payments usually cause increases in the assessments of all other homeowners to offset this financial imbalance).

15. See WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 11 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the power of an elected board of directors); WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 105, 121 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing assessments and other collection devices).

16. See generally CLIFFORD TREESE, ROBERT DIAMOND & KATHERINE ROSENBERRY, RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS. AM., CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION MORTGAGE UNDERWRITING AND CREDIT ANALYSIS 3 (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.housingamerica.org/RIHA/RIHA/Publications/48502_ChangingPerspectivesonCommunityAssociationMortgageUnderwriting.pdf (discussing methods that communities utilize to minimize taxes); CAI Industry Data, *supra* note 8 (indicating the number of residents of common interest communities).

17. See *infra* notes 97–100 and accompanying text (discussing the negative aspects of economic entanglement).

intent and expectations, foreclosure is slow in coming and sometimes deliberately or negligently delayed, and community assessments can accrue and remain unpaid for months or years.¹⁸ Furthermore, the sheer number of owners who are currently in default on their payment obligations—some ten times higher than pre-crisis—means that an association could be suffering from widespread assessment delinquency, both increasing its budgetary shortfall and decreasing the number of owners shouldering the burden of bridging that gap.¹⁹ Paying additional upkeep costs harms homeowners. Furthermore, uncertainty in association funding threatens the viability of the community itself.

In the context of today's lengthy mortgage foreclosure timelines, neighbors in CICs have become truly financially interdependent, and the failure of some owners to pay their fair share of common costs requires a greater financial contribution by the others.²⁰ During the months or years that mortgage foreclosure on a unit is threatened or pending, the association still must pay for upkeep, utilities and necessary repairs; its only source of revenue is increased assessment payments by those owners who are still able to pay.²¹ Increased assessments, triggered by chronic non-payments, essentially result in forced inter-neighbor loans. Because foreclosure of the first mortgage wipes away the association's junior lien for assessments,²² these forced loans typically end up being forced inter-neighbor permanent subsidies.

Requiring owners to pay their neighbors' debts is wrong, inefficient, and destabilizing for the hundreds of thousands of CICs in the United

18. Shuang Zhu & R. Kelley Pace, *The Influence of Foreclosure Delays on Borrower's Default Behavior* 3 (Apr. 19, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), *available at* <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1717127>; *see also* Brent Ambrose, Richard Buttimer, Jr. & Charles Capone, *Pricing Mortgage Default and Foreclosure Delay*, 29 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 314, 319–20 (1997) (providing an overview of foreclosure delay).

19. RealtyTrac's Year-End 2010 U.S. Foreclosure Market Report shows a total of 3,825,637 foreclosure filings (including default notices, scheduled auctions, and bank repossessions) reported on a record 2,871,891 U.S. properties in 2010, an increase of nearly 2% from 2009 and an increase of 23% from 2008. Press Release, RealtyTrac, Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in December (Jan. 12, 2011), *available at* <http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/2010-year-end-foreclosure-report-6309>. The report also shows that nearly 2.23% of all U.S. housing units (1 in 45) received at least one foreclosure filing during the year, up from 2.21% in 2009, 1.84% in 2008, 1.03% in 2007, and 0.58% in 2006. *Id.* Today, at least 8 million Americans are behind on their mortgage payments, and the threat of further housing price decline (the so-called "double dip") has been called the "greatest strategic threat to the recovery of the economy." Zuckerman, *supra* note 4.

20. *See infra* Part I.B.2 (discussing the communal burden of assessment default in a CIC).

21. *See infra* notes 80–84 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of assessment payments to meet an association's budgetary needs).

22. *See infra* notes 187–97 and accompanying text (explaining the treatment of an assessment lien during first mortgage foreclosure).

States and the millions of homeowners who live in them.²³ The current system forces people who completely lacked the ability to foresee, control, or avoid their neighbors' defaults to bear increasing costs due to irresponsible mortgage lending. These same owners end up effectively subsidizing their neighbors' mortgage lenders whose collateral they pay to maintain, insure, and protect through association expenditures. Current laws fail to protect innocent, non-defaulting owners from being forced to provide their own private mortgage lender and neighbor bailouts. These bailouts are not ultimately reimbursed by the federal government or paid back by the home's foreclosing lender or foreclosure buyer. If neighbors refuse to privately fund deficiencies, lack of association funding for maintenance, insurance, and management of common property will eventually lead to a deterioration of the housing stock.²⁴

Several states have responded to the dual problem of under-funded associations and inequitable cost allocation by providing for a capped amount of assessment deficiency (typically six months of unpaid assessments) to be repaid at or after foreclosure of the first mortgage on defaulting homes.²⁵ Often, this is not enough. Such limited obligations fail to adequately protect associations and their paying members from the costs of neighbor delinquency, in terms of both short-term uncertainty and ultimate association recoveries.²⁶ Changing the lien priority regime—to allow the first mortgagee's priority to decrease as foreclosure is delayed—is a better solution. Freeing post-foreclosure assessment claims from a dollar-capped limit would permit an association to ultimately recover the lenders' share of upkeep costs.

Decreasing a lender's priority based on the interval between mortgage default and foreclosure would likely incentivize more expeditious foreclosure sales. At first glance, this seems to run against conventional wisdom and current politics. Although lenders could choose to delay foreclosure and pay collateral carrying costs, increased lender costs pre-foreclosure could lead to faster foreclosures and faster home loss for defaulting borrowers. Even so, making lenders bear the costs of maintaining their collateral and encouraging transfer of title to

23. Hart, *supra* note 5, at 185–86; CAI Industry Data, *supra* note 8; *see also infra* Parts I.B & II.B.1 (illustrating how assessment delinquencies can lead to housing devaluation).

24. For example, one Florida CIC was a “dreamy little spot” with affordable amenities before the foreclosure crisis and before “the rats started chewing through the toilet seats in vacant units and sewage started seeping from the ceiling.” Conlin & Lush, *supra* note 5; *see also infra* Parts I.B.2–3 (discussing how some states have adopted the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, which gives assessment liens a limited priority upon foreclosure).

25. *See infra* Part II.A.1.a (describing the six-month limited priority lien).

26. *See infra* Part II.A.1.d (discussing the inadequacy of limited priority liens).

solvent owners is the only way to contain a community's financial distress.²⁷ Whether foreclosure delays are caused by default volume, inadequate lender documentation, faulty procedure, predictions regarding resale, or the lender's desire to retain the defaulted loans as performing on the balance sheet, equity demands that the procrastination costs be allocated to the mortgagee rather than to the community as a whole. Lender funding of the upkeep of their own collateral avoids unjust enrichment and places costs on the parties who could have reasonably foreseen and prevented the assessment delinquencies in the first place—the lenders who should have been underwriting their potential borrowers.²⁸ Creating a legal means for ultimate recovery and reimbursement of neighbor-funded budget deficiencies will shore up the finances of communities and non-defaulting homeowners and help stabilize the housing market.

Part I of this Article explains the negative externalities of foreclosures and defaults in the context of CICs, as well as the limited remedies currently available to community associations under disparate state statutes. Part II.A discusses some attempted and proposed solutions to the problem of assessment nonpayment and foreclosure delay, including judicial attempts to resolve the issue through application of equity and legislative efforts to increase limited lien priority coverage. Finally, Part II.B advocates a more nuanced and targeted approach to solving the problem: capping the community's losses by allowing the first mortgage lien's priority to gradually erode during the assessment default period.

While foreclosure procedure must be closely monitored and stringently followed to protect mortgage borrowers, promoting foreclosure sales within such procedural limits helps combat negative externalities created by defaulting community members. Laws that incentivize prompt, procedurally perfect foreclosures and allow for open-ended assessment lien priority would ultimately benefit homeowners, communities, and mortgage lenders. Systematic erosion

27. See *infra* Part II.B.2 (explaining how a community stands to benefit from an expedited foreclosure process). Furthermore, foreclosure delays result in a “free ride” for mortgagors and their lenders during the time that assessment obligations are not paid on behalf of the defaulted property. See Hart, *supra* note 5, at 182 (articulating the idea of “moral property”). While public policy might justify giving defaulting homeowners reasonable time to relocate, economically and philosophically, there is no justification for substantial foreclosure delays that create “collateral damage” on the surrounding community, due to upkeep costs being allocated inequitably. There is no equitable reason to give either cost-free occupancy to borrowers or cost-free collateral preservation to their lenders. In fact, the very definition of “fair allocation” would demand otherwise. See RAWLS, *supra* note 5, at 96 (articulating moral principles).

28. See *infra* notes 378–79 and accompanying text (discussing why shifting the financial burden to the lender would be beneficial to individuals and the economy as a whole).

of mortgage priority during foreclosure delay promotes equitable allocation of upkeep costs and efficient property transfers, and keeps lenders from getting a free ride. Compared to other potential solutions, first mortgage lien priority erosion is the best way to remedy the inequitable and community-destabilizing status quo.

I. THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE AND MEMBER DEFAULTS

A. *Negative Externalities of Default*

A property owner's failure to meet assessment payment obligations creates significant negative externalities.²⁹ Widespread payment defaults destabilize communities, depress property values, lower local property tax revenue, and impose additional costs on public agencies that provide municipal services.³⁰ Although the problem of contagious declines in property values and neighborhood upkeep is often couched in terms of the spillover effect of foreclosures,³¹ the most significant external harm arises not from the foreclosure sale itself, but from the default in homeowner payment obligations that preceded it.³² Below-market foreclosure sales may temporarily reduce real estate market pricing of real estate in the immediate vicinity of the foreclosed parcel.³³ But the adverse neighborhood effect of a property in limbo (foreclosure is pending while upkeep is lacking) is both more tangible and longer-lasting.³⁴ The true risk of contagion, therefore, comes from default and delay rather than from the ultimate property transfer.

29. See, e.g., ALLAN MALLACH, BROOKINGS INST., METRO. POL'Y PROGRAM, ADDRESSING OHIO'S FORECLOSURE CRISIS: TAKING THE NEXT STEPS 35 (June 2009), available at http://www2.safeguardproperties.com/pub/Alan_Mallach.pdf (reporting on the consequences of Ohio foreclosures).

30. See *City of Cleveland v. Ameriquist Mortg. Sec., Inc.*, 621 F. Supp. 2d 513, 536 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (involving a lawsuit brought by the City of Cleveland against several lending institutions), *aff'd en banc*, 615 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2010), *cert. denied*, 131 S. Ct. 1685 (2011); see also JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES HARV. U., AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 3 (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/rh08_americas_rental_housing/rh08_americas_rental_housing.pdf (describing the destabilization of certain communities).

31. In a May 5, 2008 speech, for example, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke warned that "high rates of delinquency and foreclosure can have substantial spillover effects on the housing market, the financial markets, and the broader economy." Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at Columbia Business School 32nd Annual Dinner (May 5, 2008) (transcript available at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20080505a.htm>).

32. See *infra* Part I.A.2 (discussing constructive abandonment).

33. See *infra* notes 38–39 and accompanying text.

34. See *infra* Part II.A.2 (describing the effects of a prolonged foreclosure).

1. Lower Comparable Sales Valuation

In general, property sells at foreclosure for a significant amount below an arm's-length market transaction.³⁵ Because the market traditionally prices homes based on comparable sales within the same community, any below-market sale creates a drag on neighboring values and sale prices.³⁶ In addition, mortgage default and foreclosure increases the supply of homes for sale in the given neighborhood, and increasing supply with static demand lowers market prices as well. Research published by Fannie Mae in 2006, focusing on the effect of subprime foreclosures, estimated that 41 million properties in the United States faced declining property values due to foreclosure of nearby parcels, resulting in an aggregate loss of \$200 billion in value.³⁷ The study found that homes within one-eighth of a mile of a foreclosed property experience a 0.9% decline in value after the foreclosure sale.³⁸ More recent empirical studies have questioned this figure—particularly in terms of the geographic scope and duration of the foreclosure effect—arguing that the depreciation is closer to 0.5%, can quickly rebound, and that the farther away a “good standing” home resides from a foreclosed home, the smaller the psychological and market pricing impact of the foreclosure sale.³⁹

Interestingly, while neighboring homeowners may decry falling property values, the downward price pressure of foreclosure sales may actually help rather than hurt the housing market as a whole. Housing prices in this country are likely still inflated above market

35. See John Y. Campbell, Stefano Giglio & Parag Pathak, *Forced Sales and House Prices 2* (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14866, 2009), available at <http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/3914> (showing that foreclosure sales prices averaged 27% lower than the appraised value for the home). The depressed purchase price at foreclosure, however, is almost never cause to avoid the sale. See, e.g., *B.F.P. v. Resolution Trust*, 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994) (“We deem, as the law has always deemed, that a fair and proper price, or a ‘reasonably equivalent value,’ for foreclosed property, is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of the State’s foreclosure law have been complied with.”).

36. See John Harding, Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent Yao, *The Contagion Effect of Foreclosed Properties*, 66 J. URB. ECON. 164, 172 (2009) (providing statistics). For a description of comparative sales methodology, see James Kimmons, *The Sales Comparison Method of Real Estate Appraisal and Valuation*, ABOUT.COM, http://realestate.about.com/od/appraisalandvaluation/p/compare_method.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) (discussing factors to consider in comparing properties).

37. Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, *The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values*, 17 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 57, 57 (2006).

38. *Id.*; see also *Chart of the Day: Foreclosure Contagion*, PORTFOLIO.COM (Jul. 18, 2008, 12:00 AM), <http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/odd-numbers/2008/07/18/chart-of-the-day-foreclosure-contagion/#ixzz10I33> (discussing the effects of foreclosure on neighboring property values).

39. Harding et al., *supra* note 36, at 164–65.

“equilibrium”—meaning that the ratio of a home’s value based on rental income is well below the comparable sale value of a given home.⁴⁰ Even though rents have gone up and prices have gone down, in many cases rents still cannot cover purchase-money mortgage payments, suggesting that real property prices have not yet decreased sufficiently to reach a stable, rent-neutral level.⁴¹ There is, therefore, a systemic (market stability-based) upside to this particular aspect of foreclosure “contagion.”

2. Constructive Abandonment

Comparable sales values of homes are notoriously finicky and fragile, and the foreclosure-related value losses likely represent unsustainable prior gains due to housing speculation.⁴² Far more long-lasting and tangible costs arise from homeowners defaulting on their property upkeep obligations. Our system of homeownership involves both rights and responsibilities of homeowners,⁴³ and when owners abandon their homes, either literally, by ceasing to reside there, or figuratively, by ceasing to maintain the property, the community suffers tangible and permanent losses in value,⁴⁴ homes and neighborhoods deteriorate, and

40. See Suzanne Stewart & Ike Brannon, *A Collapsing Housing Bubble?*, 29 REG. 15, 16 (2006) (“A reading well below or above 100 indicates a market that is out of equilibrium: if the reading is below 100, renting is a bargain.”). In 2005, the average rental value of homes was only 70% of the purchase price nationwide and was the lowest since the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”) began the index in 1985—with the next-lowest annual ratio (1989) being roughly 91%. *Id.* The rental-sale price disequilibrium was far more pronounced in certain areas of the country, such as California, Nevada, Arizona, and Florida, where home prices in the prior decade had increased by over 99%. See OLESIU & KALSER, *supra* note 10 (providing statistics); see also Anthony Sanders, *The Subprime Crisis and its Role in the Financial Crisis*, 17 J. HOUS. ECON. 254, 254 (2008) (providing statistics).

41. See, e.g., Emma L. Carew, *To Woo A Renter: Homeowners Who Punt on Selling Face Challenge as Tenants Get Choosier*, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2009, at E1 (providing an example from the Washington, D.C. area); see also Stewart & Brannon, *supra* note 40, at 16.

42. See Andrea J. Boyack, *Lessons in Price Stability from the U.S. Real Estate Market Collapse*, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925, 933–34 (2010) (discussing speculation and overpricing).

43. Owners of real property are obligated to pay property taxes, are required to protect against hazards and nuisance on their properties, and face liabilities related to environmental hazards thereon. Real property cannot be abandoned. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 504 cmt. a (1944) (explaining why easements may be abandoned more easily than other land interests); see also, e.g., *Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie*, 667 A.2d 233, 235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (discussing the law of abandonment in Pennsylvania). Property law requires that some entity always hold seisin, because the holder of seisin is the gatekeeper, or responsible party, with respect to that parcel of realty. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, *PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES* 201 (2007) (discussing the role of gatekeeper as it relates to adverse possession).

44. See Ivana Kottasova, *A House Dies and a Block Sinks*, BROOK. INK (Mar. 9, 2011), <http://thebrooklynink.com/2011/03/09/23899-a-house-dies-and-a-block-sinks/> (“Vacant properties are often not maintained properly and show signs of physical distress That itself causes property values to go down—and then the area becomes less attractive for residents.” (quoting Josiah

the absence of a vigilant gatekeeper for the property allows vandalism and other crime to increase.⁴⁵ A defaulting homeowner facing imminent or even eventual mortgage foreclosure has little incentive to invest anything in the home and, thus, will forego many socially desirable activities: painting shutters, cleaning gutters, mowing the lawn, or fixing broken appliances or cabinets.⁴⁶

The mere drop in home value itself can start the trend toward owner constructive abandonment because once a property is “upside-down” or “underwater” (more is owed on a mortgage loan than the property is worth), any improvements or maintenance made on a home effectively becomes “sweat debt” (value created for the lender) rather than “sweat equity” (value created for the owner). Some commentators have suggested that a typical borrower will consider walking away from a mortgage when the home value falls below 75% of the amount owed on the mortgage.⁴⁷ More than 5 million homeowners in the United States

Madar)). The negative externalities caused by failure of an owner to exercise adequate property oversight are among the many justifications for the doctrine of adverse possession. See John G. Sprankling, *An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession*, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 816 (1994) (advocating an environmental reform of the adverse possession doctrine).

45. See, e.g., John Cutts, *Neighborhood Cleanup Might Improve Cheap Houses for Sale Numbers*, REAL ESTATE PRO ARTICLES (July 7, 2010, 10:15 AM), <http://www.realestateproarticles.com/Art/19024/278/Neighborhood-Cleanup-Might-Improve-Cheap-Houses-for-Sale-Numbers.html> (discussing foreclosures in San Antonio); Seth Slabaugh, *High Vacancy Rates in Inner-City Muncie*, STAR PRESS (Feb. 26, 2011), <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/thestarpress/access/2276988201.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Feb+26%2C+2011> (reporting on the numerous vacancies in Muncie, Indiana); Yepoka Yeebo, *Coping With Chicago's Foreclosure 'War Zones'*, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Mar. 2, 2011, 9:49 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/02/chicago-vacant-reo-property_n_829343.html (lamenting vacancies in Chicago).

46. See Steve Vitali, *HOA's are Important to Our Valley Communities*, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.lvrj.com/real_estate/hoas-are-important-to-our-valley-communities-117848853.html?ref=853 (describing efforts by the Nevada legislature); Tammy Leonard, *Home Appreciation, Default Risk and Neighborhood Upkeep 3* (June 10, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.utdallas.edu/~murdoch/NeighborhoodChange/Tammy/Appreciation_Default_Upkeep_v11.pdf (examining the relationship between household maintenance expenditures and default risk). Some homeowners who have defaulted on their mortgages and know that they will ultimately lose their home in foreclosure affirmatively and permissively create waste—some homeowners rip out fixtures and actively destroy improvements on the real property. See *Report: Owners of Foreclosed Homes Steal Appliances, Leave Houses in Disarray*, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 4, 2009), <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,487884,00.html> (reporting that some homeowners retaliate against lenders by damaging and looting their homes prior to foreclosure sales); James Thorner, *In home foreclosure, if it's not nailed down...*, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.sptimes.com/2008/02/19/Business/In_home_foreclosure_.shtml (reporting that, in Florida, 20% of owners strip their houses prior to foreclosure); James Walsh, *Monsey, NY—House Demolished Just Before Auction for Mortgage Default*, VOS IZ NEIAS? (Feb. 4, 2009, 8:41 AM), <http://www.vosizneias.com/26875/2009/02/04/monsey-ny-house-demolished-just-before-auction-for-mortgage-default/> (reporting a situation where homeowners destroyed their entire house before a foreclosure sale).

47. David Streitfeld, *No Aid or Rebound in Sight: More Homeowners Just Walk Away*, N.Y.

reached this “tipping point” of underwater valuation by the third quarter of 2009.⁴⁸

According to the Rassmussen Report, 31% of U.S. homeowners with a mortgage owed more on their homes than their homes were worth as of the end of 2010.⁴⁹ Deutsche Bank predicted that 48% of American homes could have negative equity by the end of 2011.⁵⁰ Along with the numerous defaults on home mortgages caused by the inability to pay, more and more borrowers who are financially able to pay are strategically defaulting on their mortgages.⁵¹ When the lender holds 100% (or more) of the current value of a home, many homeowners feel that there is no financial incentive to continue to pay the mortgage or, for that matter, the community association assessments.⁵²

3. Government Rescue Efforts

The negative externalities of homeowner constructive abandonment have been cited to justify policies and programs aimed at helping homeowners facing foreclosure.⁵³ Many of these programs create additional incentives for lenders to pursue loan modifications or permit

TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A1.

48. *Id.*; see also Thompson, *supra* note 1, at 55 (“Housing prices peaked in the United States in early 2005 and began declining in 2007. Foreclosures then increased in the United States at record levels throughout 2006, continuing throughout 2008.”); *Negative Equity Report for Q3*, CALCULATED RISK (Nov. 24, 2009, 4:00 PM), <http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/11/negative-equity-report-for-q3.html> (“Nearly 10.7 million, or 23 percent, of all residential properties with mortgages were in negative equity as of September, 2009.”).

49. Peter Schroeder, *Poll: Nearly One-Third of Homeowners Underwater on Mortgage*, THE HILL (Mar. 21, 2011, 1:29 PM), <http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/801-economy/151039-poll-nearly-one-third-of-homeowners-underwater-on-mortgages>. Previously, in the first quarter of 2010, Zillow.com had estimated that 23% of homes in the United States were worth less than mortgage loan amounts secured by the property. Brian Louis, *U.S. Mortgage Holders Owing More Than Homes Are Worth Rise to 23% of Total*, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2010, 3:31 AM), <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-10/u-s-mortgage-holders-owing-more-than-homes-are-worth-rise-to-23-of-total.html>.

50. Zuckerman, *supra* note 4.

51. See Gail Marks-Jarvis, *Ethics of Strategic Default are Really Hitting Home*, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2010, at 7.1 (“Morgan Stanley recently estimated that about 18 percent of defaults will be strategic.”).

52. Underwater homeowners have no incentive to pay property taxes either, but counties are always first in line to collect unpaid tax amounts from foreclosure proceeds. There is no cap on the amount of unpaid property taxes that a county can collect from the purchase price at a foreclosure sale.

53. See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, EVALUATING PROGRESS ON TARP FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS, APRIL OVERSIGHT REPORT (2010) [hereinafter APRIL OVERSIGHT REPORT] (discussing the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) and its successes and failures over the first year); see also David Streitfeld, *Program to Pay Homeowners to Sell at a Loss*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, at A1 (stating that the Obama Administration’s latest program “will allow owners to sell for less than they owe and will give them a little cash to speed them on their way”).

short sales in lieu of foreclosure.⁵⁴ To the extent that loan modifications create true incentives for owners to remain invested in their property by reassuming the gatekeeper role and paying upkeep costs and the like, such modifications would help eliminate the property value losses discussed above and should be promoted as sound policy. To the extent that short sales would streamline the process of replacing insolvent owners with financially capable “gatekeepers,” short sale incentives would also benefit the community and deserve to be encouraged.⁵⁵ Unfortunately, however, these government efforts have mostly failed to create viable mortgages and ensure homes are held by owners able to meet their assessment obligations. Even with payment reductions and government assistance, more than three-quarters of the mortgage loans that were modified under the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) remained underwater in April 2010.⁵⁶ The initiative for expedited short sales likewise has been mostly unsuccessful.⁵⁷

One obstacle to greater success through loan modifications and/or short sales is the problem of junior liens.⁵⁸ Not only do many financially imperiled homes today have subordinate liens from second mortgages and home equity lines, but the community association in any CIC will have a lien securing its rights to recover unpaid assessments.⁵⁹ Junior lienors, including community associations, can stymie modification plans by withholding consent to proposed changes to the senior loan.⁶⁰ A community association’s board might lack the

54. Short sales are tri-party agreements amongst a defaulting mortgage borrower, the mortgage lender, and a third-party purchaser, whereby the purchaser agrees to buy the property for less than the outstanding loan amount, and the lender agrees to accept payment of the buyer’s purchase price in full satisfaction of the borrower’s mortgage loan.

55. Streitfeld, *supra* note 53, at A1.

56. APRIL OVERSIGHT REPORT, *supra* note 53, at 39.

57. Andrew Jeffrey, *Housing Market: Foreclosure Relief Programs Under Fire*, MINYANVILLE (Mar. 14, 2011, 10:00 AM), <http://www.minyanville.com/businessmarkets/articles/foreclosure-forelcosure-relief-program-homeowners-loan/3/14/2011/id/33322>.

58. Loan modifications without junior lienor consent can result in a complete loss of priority for the senior lienholder. Short sales are made subject to all junior liens, if these are not paid off or voluntarily released, as part of the sale. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, *REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW* 871–76 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing the relationship between junior and senior liens); see also Robert Kratovil & Raymond J. Werner, *Mortgage Extensions & Modifications*, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 610 (1975) (stating that an original clause in the record granting the senior lienor the ability to increase the interest rate on the giving of any extension will not be sufficient for priority for that increased interest over junior lienors, due to prejudice).

59. Many properties in default have other junior lienors as well, including second purchase money mortgages or home equity lines of credit. In many, but not all, states, second mortgages are junior in priority to the association’s lien.

60. Loan modifications occurring without the consent of junior lienors are vulnerable to priority loss should a court determine that the modification adversely impacts the secured position of the junior lienor. Many loan modifications, however, have been upheld as non-prejudicial to a

authority to engage in debt forgiveness with respect to delinquent assessments, since this effectively imposes more costs on the remainder of the community and violates the payment allocation provisions of the CIC's governing documents.⁶¹ The argument that in a bad mortgage debt situation, both a borrower and a lender should compromise by giving up value (in terms of lost equity and lost loan proceeds) is compelling.⁶² But no similar logic supports a claim that non-party neighbors should be forced to bear losses due to other people's poorly conceived loans. This is one reason the "Helping Families Save their Homes Act of 2009" was voted down in the U.S. Senate: the proposed law would have given bankruptcy judges the ability to mandate massive write-downs on unpaid assessment liens, essentially blocking the already limited ability of associations to collect delinquent assessments and continue to perform their essential functions.⁶³ If the government truly wants to encourage short sales or modifications in privately governed communities, it must ensure that the workout (a) ultimately stabilizes the community and (b) is not forcibly financed by the non-delinquent neighbors.

Government programs that encourage property to be efficiently conveyed to solvent and responsible owners ameliorate the harm caused

community association. *See, e.g.,* Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., F.S.B. v. Levy, 615 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that a modification extending the first mortgage loan term remained a first priority lien, and short sales required cooperation of junior lienors (or full repayment of such obligations) to transfer unencumbered title to the proposed buyer).

61. *See* ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 437 (1989) (discussing the impact of association conduct on the value individual condominium units); *see also* HYATT & FRENCH, *supra* note 15, at 319, 567–68 (stating that homemakers of a community generally rely on uniform enforcement of covenants that are in furtherance of the original developmental scheme).

62. This argument is often used to promote modifications and short sales. *See* David Benoit, *Bank Of America Begins Mortgage Principal Reduction Program in Arizona*, FOX BUS. (Mar. 2, 2011), <http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2011/03/02/bank-america-begins-mortgage-principal-reduction-program-arizona/> (discussing Arizona's program "using federal money to get Bank of America to lower the amount borrowers owe on their mortgages"); Dave Clarke, *U.S. Regulators Strike Deal on Mortgage Risk Rule*, REUTERS, Mar. 1, 2011, *available at* <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/01/financial-regulation-qrm-idUSN0113980220110301> (examining banking regulator's provision forcing services to modify loans if it would save the lenders and borrowers money); Abigail Field, *What the Mortgage Mess Settlement Proposal Really Means*, DAILY FIN. (Mar. 9, 2011, 12:20 AM), <http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/credit/what-the-mortgage-mess-settlement-proposal-really-means/19872233/> ("Servicers have to show their math when announcing if a modification is denied."); David McLaughlin & Lorraine Woellert, *Attorney Generals Push for Loan Reductions, Seek Bank Accord*, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2011, 12:01 AM), <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-07/foreclosure-settlement-said-to-be-sought-by-states-u-s-within-two-months.html> (discussing how state attorneys general are pushing for reduced balance settlements between lenders and borrowers).

63. H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. §§ 202–03, 532 (2009) (defeated in a Senate vote on April 30, 2009).

by owner payment defaults.⁶⁴ But most government attempts to mitigate the damage caused by mortgage defaults have failed to adequately address the problems caused by upkeep reduction, and, in fact, some have exacerbated the spillover effects of default. For example, although purporting to help homeowners, foreclosure moratoriums can perpetuate the constructive abandonment maintenance problem.⁶⁵ Forced loan modifications—to the extent they merely postpone the inevitable and leave a borrower unable (or unwilling) to pay assessments—do the same.⁶⁶ Any government interference that slows foreclosure may (at least in the short-run) help an individual defaulting mortgagor and might, in a temporarily “down” market, even help the mortgage holder ultimately recover more on its loan, but in CICs, these benefits are funded by the neighbors. Keeping an ultimately doomed mortgage loan on this sort of life support increases current and carrying costs borne by neighboring owners, increases CIC assessment levels, and drives down property values.

64. Unlike HAMP and the initiative promoting short sales, the Neighborhood Stabilization Program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) has focused on infusing money into communities directly, buying abandoned homes, renovating them, and contributing to the community’s upkeep and property values. This HUD program is effectively the antithesis of foreclosure moratoriums: it encourages sales of constructively abandoned properties to prevent communities from bearing the negative externalities such properties cause. HUD provided \$6 billion in two rounds of Neighborhood Stabilization Program funding, some of which was supplemented by state funds to create successful and effective localized programs. For example, \$5.6 million in federal funds combined with \$30 million in resources from the Twin Cities Community Land Bank created an entity able to buy up 250 blighted and defaulting properties in targeted neighborhoods. These properties were rehabilitated (updated to green standards) and sold to “responsible homeowners.” Shaun Donovan, *Fighting Foreclosures and Strengthening Neighborhoods*, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010), <http://portal.Hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/press/blog/> (discussing the effectiveness of The Neighborhood Stabilization Program as an example of a fairer and more forward-looking approach to the contagion effects of mortgage defaults in communities).

65. Moratoriums can perpetuate the tenure of owners who are unwilling or unable to bear the costs of ownership, including paying community assessments, property taxes, and basic property upkeep costs, delaying the conveyance of property owning responsibilities to an owner willing to assume such responsibilities. See, e.g., Jennifer Slosar, *Chicago Couple Deals with Toxic Mold, Unresponsive Bank*, CHI. J. (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.chicagojournal.com/News/10-06-2010/Chicago_couple_deals_with_toxic_mold_unresponsive_bank (“As the foreclosure process stretches past the two-year mark, they are struggling to maintain the empty unit and stanch the bleeding in their homeowners association fund from lost assessments.”); see also Zhu & Pace, *supra* note 18, at 12–17 (stating that foreclosure delays encourage mortgage default and lack of owner upkeep and investment in the property, all of which drives down the value of homes and drives up costs of financing and “may impede the recovery of the housing market”).

66. This is because the longer a non-payment problem persists in a community, the more costs are inequitably borne by paying neighbors. If a modification merely delays an ultimate, inevitable foreclosure, it is unlikely that a neighbor will bring his or her association assessments current in the interim, and the threat of permissive and affirmative waste remains.

Foreclosure rescue efforts have mostly failed to create viable long-term mortgage loans, and the most worrisome contagious effects of homeowner defaults remain, since true losses arise not from foreclosure sales themselves, but from a chronic reduction in neighborhood upkeep and inequitable upkeep costs.⁶⁷ This fact reinforces the main contention of this Article: delaying foreclosure and allowing property to deteriorate is a lose-lose scenario, avoidable only by ensuring that properties are owned by people who are able and willing to maintain the property and pay association assessments. This is particularly true in CICs where there are additional, direct and compelling cost externalities with respect to payment defaults, so the contagion effect is more pronounced.⁶⁸

B. Financial Entanglement

1. The CIC Ownership, Assessment, and Services Model

The CIC structure is a privatized governance solution to the collective action and free-rider problems often termed the “tragedy of the commons.”⁶⁹ Widespread private property ownership in the United States has minimized the number of publicly maintained “commons,”⁷⁰ and until recently, federal, state, or local governments maintained most of those areas that could not be divided and privatized.⁷¹ In the past

67. Harding et al., *supra* note 36, at 165, 172, 178; *see also supra* Part I.A.2 (discussing the notion of constructive abandonment).

68. *See infra* notes 83–88 and accompanying text (describing why delayed foreclosure is particularly harmful in CICs).

69. Garret Hardin, *The Tragedy of the Commons*, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 (1968); *see also* Thrainn Eggertsson, *Open Access versus Common Property*, in TERRY L. ANDERSON & FRED S. MCCHESENEY, *PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND LAW*, 74–82, 84–85 (2003) (discussing the tragedy of subsequent empirical studies as a result of Garret Hardin’s *The Tragedy of the Commons*); James E. Krier, *The Tragedy of the Commons, Part II*, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 325 (1992) (acknowledging Garret Hardin as having addressed the problem of coordinating human behavior as it affects environmental quality); Mark A. Lemley, *Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding*, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (2005) (“The tragedy of the commons is a specific example of the more general preoccupation of the economic literature on real property with the internalization of externalities and with the use of property law to achieve that end.”).

70. Throughout U.S. history, the government has aggressively sought to sell land to private owners. This was the impetus behind Thomas Jefferson’s Land Ordinance Act, for example. *Land Ordinance of 1785*, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 123–24 (Henry S. Commager ed., 1940); *see* Richard P. McCormick, *The “Ordinance” of 1784?*, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 112, 116–17 (1993) (discussing the scheme for selling and disposing of land acquired under the Ordinance as a reason why it was not adopted in its original form).

71. *See, e.g.*, 39 AM. JUR. 2D *Highways, Streets, and Bridges* § 212 (2011) (discussing usage rights for public property adjacent to private property); 59 AM. JUR. 2D *Parks, Squares, and Playgrounds* § 23 (2011) (discussing the proper use of property such as parks and squares); *see also* Lemley, *supra* note 69, at 1038 (discussing government regulation of property rights due to

century, courts began to routinely hold that community covenants creating payment obligations for common area upkeep were servitudes running with the land.⁷² This judicial interpretation enabled the rise of private governance and assessment systems across the United States. In privately governed neighborhoods, common space and amenities are maintained by an association, which assesses each owner a share of the upkeep costs.⁷³ The association provides sufficient governance to solve the tragedy of the commons by controlling overuse and creating a mechanism for maintenance and shared costs,⁷⁴ which in turn permits communities to avoid the economic downside of public goods, meaning that a neighborhood can enjoy better amenities at lower prices.⁷⁵ The association is essentially a mini-government, performing public functions: upkeep of common areas and amenities, rule-making, and dispute resolution.⁷⁶ Association assessments are therefore, to some extent, the equivalent of property taxes, a mechanism to fund common

negative externalities).

72. *Neponsit Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank*, 15 N.E.2d 793, 797 (N.Y. 1938). Prior to *Neponsit*, covenants to pay money were viewed as personal, not running with the land because they did not adequately “touch and concern” real property. The *Neponsit* characterization of this covenant as creating a real property servitude, however, spurred the growth of suburban communities across the country. Enforcing payment obligations as servitudes on real property is now *de rigueur*. See, e.g., *Regency Homes Ass'n v. Egermayer*, 498 N.W.2d 783, 788–93 (Neb. 1993) (holding that a covenant to pay dues to a community association to maintain recreational facilities is a real covenant that runs with the land).

73. Most associations' governing documents explicitly provide for assessment funding of association obligations. HYATT, *supra* note 15, at 108 (“Generally, covenants in the declaration provide authority for the association to collect assessments from each owner.”). Even in situations where governing documents for community associations have failed to provide for assessments, courts find the power to assess implicit in the structure of a CIC. See, e.g., *Fogarty v. Hemlock Farms Cmty. Ass'n*, 685 A.2d 241, 244 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (“[A]bsent language in the deed covenant prohibiting HFCA from levying special assessments for capital improvements, the [property owners] may be assessed their proportionate costs to construct the new improvements.”); *Meadow Run & Mountain Lane Park Ass'n v. Berkel*, 598 A.2d 1024, 1027 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding that inherent in the duty to provide maintenance is the power to assess costs to property owners). But see, e.g., *Bd. of Dirs. of Carriage Way Prop. Owners Ass'n v. W. Nat'l Bank of Cicero*, 487 N.E.2d 974, 978–79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“[T]he [association] cho[os]ing to continue to maintain the common areas does not render the [property owners] unjustly enriched.”); *Wendover Road Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Kornicks*, 502 N.E.2d 226, 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (declining to apply quasi-contract or unjust enrichment theories to require a property owner to pay assessments when the deed conveying the property did not provide for such an assessment).

74. See HYATT, *supra* note 15, at 29–32 (“The community association allows innovation, provides for responsibility and obligation, and provides the necessary power to meet these responsibilities.”).

75. CAI INDUSTRY DATA, *supra* note 7; see TREESE ET AL., *supra* note 16, at 6 (noting that common upkeep also allows a community to take advantage of cost savings from economies of scale).

76. See TREESE ET AL., *supra* note 16, at 6 (discussing the municipal responsibilities the associations now assume).

costs, and are treated as such by the income tax laws of at least two states.⁷⁷

For condominiums, a private governance and assessment system is not only beneficial, it is essential. Once states passed statutes allowing fee simple ownership of a three-dimensional “box” of space,⁷⁸ multiple individuals could become owners of distinct units within one building. But having many owners within one building mandates certain jointly-held property: the roof, lobby, elevators, hallways, laundry rooms and, in some buildings, water, sewer, trash, electricity, and gas, as well as hazard insurance on the building itself. The mechanism of private community governance provides and pays for all such commons equitably and efficiently.⁷⁹

Typically, CIC governing documents explicitly vest the association with broad authority to assess members according to budgetary needs,⁸⁰ and courts have found that even when an association’s documents lack explicit authorization, assessment power is implied.⁸¹ As long as the assessments are authorized, it is clear that the obligation to pay assessments is both an *in personam* obligation of a homeowner and an *in rem* affirmative covenant that runs with the land and is binding on all successor owners of the property.⁸² The obligation to pay assessments is the most vital obligation in a privately governed community because

77. In New Jersey, the correlation of community assessments and property taxes has been acknowledged by the legislature, which now permits a portion of community assessment payments to offset local property tax assessments. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:67-23.2-23.3 (West 1993); *see also* K. Kennedy & B. Lambert, *New Developments in Municipal Services Equalization*, 3 J. CMTY. ASS’N L. 1 (2000) (illustrating that the New Jersey Municipal Services Act, which requires a municipality to provide certain public services to private communities, provides a framework for the eradication of the double taxation of these communities). Recently, Pennsylvania’s legislature followed suit, passing a law that allows a unit owner in a CIC to deduct 75% of association assessments from state income taxes. H.R. 675, 2009 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009). On the other hand, many of the community-provided services supplement local governmental functions rather than replace them and instead operate to replace individual upkeep costs. The trend toward municipal services equalization legislation—refunding members of a CIC local government taxes for items paid for by the association—is discussed in TREESE ET AL., *supra* note 16, at 3.

78. Under the common law, real property is owned in a column of space defined with respect to a two-dimensional real property mapping description, indicating a closed figure on the face of the earth.

79. *See* Robert C. Ellickson, *Cities and Homeowner Associations*, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1522–23 (1982) (discussing the method of assessments and distribution of costs amongst property owners).

80. Associations meet their budget requirements through a combination of regular assessments, special assessments, and transfer fees.

81. HYATT, *supra* note 15, at 105–09. *See, e.g., supra* note 73 (discussing whether an association has the authority to demand assessments from its members).

82. HYATT, *supra* note 15, at 105–17.

assessments are a community's "lifeblood" and its primary (and sometimes only) funding source.⁸³ As Wayne Hyatt, author of the seminal treatise on CICs, explains, "when one member of the community chooses not to pay the assessments, everyone in the community pays the price through increased assessments, decreased services, and declining community appearance and quality of living."⁸⁴

Two aspects of association assessments are important for purposes of this discussion: their collectability and their durability. The ability to collect delinquent assessments is of crucial importance in a context—such as today—where increasing mortgage defaults indicate an even steeper increase in assessment delinquency.⁸⁵ In addition to the ability to assess charges, associations have the power to place a lien on a member's real property to secure the assessment payment obligation.⁸⁶ In some states, such liens arise and are perfected on the date the association's documents are recorded in the land records.⁸⁷ In other states, the lien arises and is perfected automatically at the time an assessment comes due.⁸⁸ Still, in other states, perfection of an assessment lien requires filing a notice of the lien in the appropriate land records.⁸⁹ Whether this lien has payment priority over a first mortgage can determine whether an association will be able to ultimately collect. Assessment liens are generally junior in priority to first mortgage liens on the units,⁹⁰ and junior interests are extinguished upon the foreclosure of a senior priority lien.⁹¹

83. *Id.* at 105, 121.

84. *Id.* at 121.

85. Association assessment defaults are usually well in advance of loan payment delinquencies. *See* Pinkerton, *supra* note 12, at 142–43 (discussing how dues and debts create a "death spiral").

86. HYATT, *supra* note 15, at 120–21.

87. For example, in Colorado, a perfected association lien exists as of the date of filing the declaration. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-316 (2009). Although this perfected lien could be essentially an "empty bucket" securing no indebtedness, it has statutory priority relating back to the date the community was created. First mortgages on units in such states, however, enjoy a special statutory super-priority over the pre-existing association lien.

88. Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act § 3-116 (1994) (amended 2008), recording of the declaration creating a common interest community constitutes record notice and perfection of the lien for all future assessments. *See also infra* note 190 and accompanying text (explaining that the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act takes the position that assessment liens are considered automatically perfected with the date of perfection relating back to the date the association was formed).

89. *See, e.g.,* F.N. Realty Servs., Inc. v. Or. Shores Recreational Club, Inc., 891 P.2d 671, 674 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that an association lien arises only upon recordation of notice of lien).

90. *See infra* Part I.C.2 (noting that liens on real property enjoy a priority based on the order in which they were perfected).

91. NELSON & WHITMAN, *supra* note 58, at 872–73 ("[I]f a junior lienor is forced to satisfy

CICs are contractually bound to maintain the property and provide other services mandated by the documents creating the servitude regime.⁹² State and local laws may mandate the provision of other services and/or a certain level of association reserves, in addition to document-based requirements.⁹³ The FHA will only insure loans secured by units in communities with sufficient reserve funding.⁹⁴ Although reserve requirements support an association's future financial health, increasing the required reserves means that the association must collect additional funds today. Raising the reserve requirement can exacerbate the problem of increasing assessments for paying members in an environment of widespread payment defaults.⁹⁵ The upkeep and reserve funding obligations of the association are not contingent on the condition of the economy or the payment participation of all members, and assessments are the association's sole source of income.⁹⁶

2. Tragedy of the Financial Commons

The legal structure of CICs was an attempt to solve the tragedy of the commons by establishing a government that could manage common resources, preventing overuse and under-maintenance.⁹⁷ Such a private consortium democracy with governance obligations and powers theoretically can create a better neighborhood for all. But since the homeowners in CICs jointly bear funding responsibilities for essential

the senior mortgage in order to protect his or her position, the amount required for such satisfaction will be more than could have been contemplated at the time the junior interest was acquired.”).

92. HYATT, *supra* note 14, at 43.

93. States require reserve studies by condominiums and homeowner associations to ensure adequate reserves are collected. *See, e.g.*, VA. CODE ANN. § 55-514.1 (2002) and § 55-79.83.1 (1993) (requiring a condominium's executive organ or a homeowner association's board of directors to conduct a study to determine the necessity and amount of reserves required at least once every five years and review the results of that study at least annually).

94. Reserve requirements are 60% of the annual budget for established condominiums and 100% of the budget for new projects. Letter from Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant Sec'y for Hous., Fed. Hous. Comm'r, to All Appr. Mortgagees and All FHA Roster Appraisers (June 12, 2009) (on file with author).

95. *See, e.g.*, Josh Brown, *Condo Assessments are the Breaking Point for Some*, VA. PILOT (Sept. 20, 2009), <http://hamptonroads.com/2009/09/condo-assessments-are-breaking-point-some> (explaining that a homeowner faced loss of home through association foreclosure because of an inability to pay an assessment increase to fund the increased reserve requirement mandated by statute).

96. Some associations charge user fees, but most association costs are covered exclusively by assessments paid by unit owners. *See* HYATT & FRENCH, *supra* note 14, at 319 (stating that the most common approach to financing the operations of community associations is the assessment of a share of common expense); HYATT, *supra* note 14, at 121 (noting that assessments are generally the primary funding source).

97. MERRILL & SMITH, *supra* note 43, at 772.

commons upkeep, the fiscal fortunes of the members of a community are intertwined. A change in the economic fortunes of one owner can therefore impact the other owners. Defaults of members on payment obligations cause a direct and devastating impact on the other members of the community who must fund the difference. Sam Chandan, chief economist at the real estate research firm Reis, explained the connection between the upside of joint maintenance and the downside of economic entanglement:

What motivated people to go into the condo market in a way that led to overbuilding was the expectation that it would be easier than owning a home on a maintenance basis. The downside is that your fate is tied to 50 to 100 other people who may stop making their condo payments.⁹⁸

Although the possibility of member assessment default had long been understood, before 2006, no one anticipated that so many highly leveraged mortgages taking so long to foreclose would eventually put a huge strain on community associations.⁹⁹ But today's delinquency rate for assessments has caused many of these associations to fail.¹⁰⁰ Their failure leaves the community without its expected amenities and upkeep and leaves the commons to its natural economic "tragedy" because local municipalities need not provide public services that were previously left to private associations to fund and provide.

Most courts have held that CIC associations cannot declare bankruptcy as long as they retain the power to assess for budgetary shortfalls.¹⁰¹ Thus, solvent owners must fund their delinquent neighbors' deficiencies. Delinquency levels in some parts of the country have seen astronomical increases since 2005. One management firm in the Boston area reported a 150% increase in delinquent assessments from 2006 to 2007.¹⁰² Vulnerability to increased assessments to fund neighbor shortfalls and the inability of an

98. Haughney, *supra* note 6, at C1 (quoting Chandan).

99. The closest precedent is New England in the late 1980s and early 1990s when many associations were left with debilitating budgetary shortfalls as many owners defaulted on their mortgages and other payment obligations. It was this regional crisis among CICs that led Massachusetts to adopt a six-month lien priority for CIC association liens. *See infra* note 213 (explaining that the six-month super priority in UCIOA was meant to solve this same issue, but the authors of that model legislation did not foresee that in today's climate of extensive and long-delayed foreclosure, six months would generally be inadequate).

100. *See* Pinkerton, *supra* note 12, at 125 (discussing the "crushing" nature of association debt).

101. *See infra* Part I.B.4 (explaining why it is unfeasible for condominium associations to file for bankruptcy).

102. Sacha Pfeiffer, *Delinquencies at Condos Can Cost Neighbors*, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 16, 2007, at C1.

association to perform contractually required maintenance in the face of member default causes a significant adverse impact on the value of properties within a CIC.¹⁰³

Where available, statistics regarding the problem of assessment delinquencies underscore the magnitude of the problem. According to a study cited by *The Miami Herald*, more than 60% of Florida condominiums and homeowner associations reported in March 2010 that at least half of their units were at least two months behind in paying their assessments.¹⁰⁴ Losing half of the required revenue completely hamstring the operation of these associations. For example, Parkview Point Condominium in Miami Beach suffered a large enough loss of assessment revenue that it was unable to pay water bills for the building, and the unit owners nearly had their water cut off before solvent owners were able to raise funds to pay the arrearage.¹⁰⁵ The lobby ceiling repairs, however, were stopped mid-repair, leaving wiring and ducts exposed.¹⁰⁶ On the nation's other coast, Gas Lamp City Square in downtown San Diego awaits pending foreclosure sales on multiple units in the building while the association struggles with a \$115,000 budgetary shortfall because of unpaid dues.¹⁰⁷ In Union City, California, a special assessment for roof repairs in Alvarado Village ended up costing each paying owner \$18,494.27.¹⁰⁸ A couple in San Francisco reports that over the past three years, their special assessments have exceeded \$100,000.¹⁰⁹

Pervasive assessment default unfairly impacts the paying neighbors financially and psychologically, and anecdotal evidence underscores the reality behind the troubling statistics of unpaid community dues. Ana Martinez, for example, reported that she no longer felt safe living in her own home—a unit within a South Florida condominium that was deteriorating in the face of the association's inability to pay for

103. See, e.g., *Bd. of Dirs v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.*, 581 S.E.2d 201, 206 (Va. 2003) (Lacy, J., dissenting) ("Part of the value of a condominium unit comes from the ability of the condominium association to maintain the common areas of the development The ability to maintain these elements is directly related to the association's ability to secure payment of assessments from the individual unit owners.").

104. Rachael Lee Coleman, *Desperate Condos Thrown a Lifeline*, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 7, 2010, at 1A.

105. Haughney, *supra* note 6, at C8.

106. *Id.*

107. *Id.*

108. James Temple, *Neighborhood Fees Go Through the Roof*, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (May 29, 2006), <http://www.calhomelaw.org/doc.asp?id=487>. The Alvarado Village association also blamed the large special assessment on the property developer who they claim failed to adequately fund reserves. *Id.*

109. Lloyd, *supra* note 11.

maintenance.¹¹⁰ Some of Ana's neighbors had literally abandoned their units, leaving behind not only unpaid and underwater mortgage loans, but also months of unpaid condominium assessments.¹¹¹ Ana's monthly assessment tripled in response to the condominium's budget shortfall, and her property's value fell and continues to plummet in the face of lower occupancy, higher crime, and substandard common area maintenance.¹¹²

In a modest, low-income area of Providence, Rhode Island, Debra McGarry was forced to take out a \$4800 personal credit card loan to keep water, gas, and electricity from being cut off in the eight-unit condominium building in which she lives.¹¹³ Two of the owners in the building stopped paying dues and abandoned their homes, nearly bankrupting the small condominium.¹¹⁴ Even doubling the condominium fees that the remaining six paying owners were assessed failed to generate enough capital to keep the building afloat.¹¹⁵ The "affordable" unit Debra and her husband Bernard, a disabled veteran, bought in 2006 ended up being their financial "nightmare" since Debra and her solvent neighbors were left to personally pick up the tab left by lenders who failed to foreclose on strategically defaulted mortgages.¹¹⁶

The problem of assessment delinquencies is not confined to lower income owners. Many owners of ritzy Manhattan condominiums that come with top-flight amenities (gym membership, butler and maid service, billiards room, and library) can no longer afford the cost of such services because of a rash of unit owner assessment defaults.¹¹⁷ In the past year, foreclosure filings for Manhattan condominiums doubled, and now, one in every thirteen units are in some stage of foreclosure.¹¹⁸ Foreclosures in New York take longer than in any other state, and at the current pace, it would take lenders sixty-two years to complete foreclosure on the 213,000 homes now in severe default.¹¹⁹ During the

110. Sutta, *supra* note 6.

111. *Id.*

112. *Id.*

113. Dunn, *supra* note 6, at G1.

114. *Id.*

115. *Id.*

116. *Id.*

117. Ryley, *supra* note 6.

118. *Id.*

119. David Streitfeld, *Backlog of Cases Gives a Reprieve on Foreclosures*, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2011, at A1 (citing calculations by LPS Applied Analytics, a real estate data firm). Even before the housing crisis, it took up to two years for property to be sold at a foreclosure sale under New York law. In the first half of 2011, the average time to complete a foreclosure in New York was 966 days, and the average time to foreclose in Florida was 676 days. While the number of foreclosure sales dropped dramatically in the first half of 2011, this does not indicate a market

several years foreclosure is pending in the current market, the non-defaulting owners in these glamorous buildings will see their own assessments increase to close the association's budgetary gap while the building services and amenities simultaneously disappear. In one Manhattan condominium, the nonpayment of just one investor—who held title to a dozen units in the building—caused the remaining members' monthly charges to jump by 15%.¹²⁰

3. Barriers to Market Recovery

The housing market continues to implode in many localities. Sustainable home pricing and the expeditious placement of owners willing and able to meet a property's upkeep obligations are the only way out.¹²¹ But predictable credit costs and upkeep charges are a prerequisite to stable home pricing and residential real estate investment.¹²² Volatile CIC assessments stymie economic recovery. Would-be buyers, faced with uncertain future assessment increases due to financial entanglement in a CIC, are unwilling and unable to manage certain risks. Loan modifications for overburdened borrowers do not

recovery, but is rather further testament to rampant processing delays and lender strategic delays. Les Christie, *Foreclosures Plunge in First Half of 2011*, CNN MONEY (July 14, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/14/real_estate/housing_market_foreclosures/index.htm.

120. Ryley, *supra* note 6. The situation is different for cooperative buildings because assessment payments are characterized as rent. Thus, the cooperative can evict a defaulting owner and need not wait for the owner's lender to foreclose. In condominiums, however, the association lien is subordinate to the first mortgage lien, and typically, the association's assessment will not be paid upon foreclosure.

121. See BEN BERNANKE, CHAIRMAN, U.S. FED. RESERVE, SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 2 (July 13, 2011), available at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20110713a1.pdf> (opining that one key roadblock to economic recovery is "the continuing depressed condition of the housing sector"); Steven Pearlstein, *To Sort this Mess, Both Banks and Borrowers Must Own Their Mistakes*, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2010, at A09 (explaining that "the longer the foreclosure process goes on, the longer it will take for the excess supply of houses to be absorbed, for prices to stabilize and for the real estate market to return to something closer to a normal equilibrium"); Alexander Eichler, *Foreclosure Processing Time Has Doubled Since 2007, Backlogging Housing Market*, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/01/home-foreclosure-backlog_n_888655.html (citing *The Atlantic's* Daniel Indiviglio's opinion that "the more foreclosures pile up, the longer it will take for the housing market to hit bottom and begin recovering").

122. While the costs of real estate investment are usually cited as high transaction costs and illiquidity, predictability of future costs and returns is often cited as one of the benefits of real estate investment. It therefore stands to reason that eroding this benefit will decrease the attractiveness of investment in the real property sector. See Christian Rehring, *Real Estate in a Mixed-Asset Portfolio: The Role of the Investment Horizon*, REAL ESTATE ECON., June 30, 2011, at 22 (finding that return predictability is very important to attracting real estate investors); cf. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES HARV. U., *THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING* 4–5 (2011) (chronicling the declining confidence and investment in the housing sector of the economy as prices remain uncertain).

work when assessments rise so quickly that borrowers still cannot meet their reduced mortgage debt obligations while also paying association assessments. Lenders resist financing and refinancing in communities where assessment levels and the fiscal health of the association are both uncertain.¹²³ The possibility (or reality) of steeply rising assessments makes investors hesitant to purchase a unit when rents may not cover additional increases. As one example: the common charge for a 601 square foot studio in one Manhattan CIC is now \$1095 per month, and this substantial cost has discouraged investor purchasers and financiers, even when the purchase price for the unit is set at a tremendous discount.¹²⁴ When rents will not cover assessments, ownership of a unit generates a monthly financial loss.

Lenders are as wary of the uncertain financial future of CIC properties as are would-be buyers. Mortgage financing or refinancing of a unit in a condominium or a house in a privately governed community has become vastly more difficult as banks seek information not only about the creditworthiness of their borrower, but the credit of the other members of the financially linked community.¹²⁵ Lenders have started to scrutinize a community's reserve amounts and assessment delinquency levels in an attempt to quantify the risk of assessments materially increasing.¹²⁶ A buyer of a new condominium unit in New York reported that Bank of America denied her application to refinance because the condominium association's reserve account was depleted, and 17% of the owners in her building were delinquent in paying their assessments.¹²⁷ Most lenders require that reserves be sufficiently funded and that no more than 15% of homeowners be more than thirty days delinquent on homeowner assessments before they will agree to lend on any property located in the community.¹²⁸

123. See Dina ElBoghdady, *New Condo Loan Rules Put More Scrutiny on Neighbors*, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2009, at A01 (noting that financing availability depends on the credit of neighboring owners in a condominium); *infra* Part II.A.1.b (discussing lending policies and risk assessment).

124. Ryley, *supra* note 6. Ryley also gives the example of a Manhattan studio that rents for \$3000 a month costing \$5750 a month in mortgage payments, taxes, and common charges.

125. See, e.g., Lorraine Ash, *People Facing Foreclosure Should Seek Help Early*, DAILY RECORD (Mar. 19, 2011, 6:35 PM), <http://www.dailyrecord.com/article/CN/20110319/NJNEWS/103190343/People-facing-foreclosure-should-seek-help-early> (noting that banks look at the association finances); Matt Tomsic, *Homeowners Associations Stepping Up Legal Pressures with Foreclosures*, STARNEWS (Mar. 5, 2011, 5:01 PM), <http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20110305/ARTICLES/110309754> (noting that lenders look at the financial help of associations).

126. Ryley, *supra* note 6.

127. *Id.*

128. *HOA Delinquencies in Condos*, FREE ADVICE (Apr. 14, 2010), <http://forum.freeadvice.com/buying-selling-home-40/hoa-delinquencies-condos-512763.html>. See also *infra* notes 129–32 and accompanying text.

The two giants of the secondary residential mortgage market—the government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—likewise demand certain thresholds of reserves and non-delinquencies for CICs in which their prospective mortgage loan purchases are located.¹²⁹ For example, Freddie Mac’s Condominium Unit Mortgages Project Analysis requires a budget and certification of a working capital fund, appropriate assessments levied with a minimum of 10% of the budget designated for replacement reserves and deferred maintenance, a working capital fund in an amount consistent with the remaining life of the common elements, and no more than 15% of assessments delinquent more than thirty days.¹³⁰ Freddie Mac also mandates that common elements be consistent with the nature of the project and competitive with the local market, and it requires the community to be in good financial and physical condition.¹³¹

The lack of financing alternatives and the threat of instability that would result if assessment delinquencies reach 15% have chilled investment in condominium properties.¹³² Some investors report that they will pay only cents on the dollar because of the possibility that neighboring owners will default in paying their pro rata share of maintenance costs, rendering all units in the CIC unfinanceable.¹³³ Before he would agree to buy, one investor from Italy reportedly demanded a “written guarantee” from the association that he would not

129. Fannie Mae (formerly the Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) were chartered by Congress and regulated by federal agencies. Although technically still owned by private shareholders, in September 2008, the Treasury Department placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, reorganizing the enterprises and infusing them with new capital. At the time, this was the largest state rescue in history, to the tune of \$100 billion. See Herbert M. Allison, Jr., President and CEO, Fannie Mae, Oversight Hearing to Examine Recent Treasury and FHFA Actions Regarding the GSEs (Sept. 25, 2008) (addressing how Freddie Mac pursued its mission to support the mortgage market, provide liquidity, and prevent foreclosures since the conservatorship began); James Lockhardt, Acting Dir., Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight (OFHEO), Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0409-Lockhart.pdf (explaining the Freddie Mac remediation process). See generally Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Questions and Answers on Conservatorship, <http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/35/FHFACONSERVQA.pdf> (explaining conservatorship and how it will affect the Federal Housing Finance Agency).

130. FREDDIE MAC, FREDDIE MAC CONDOMINIUM UNIT MORTGAGES 1, 3 (Apr. 2011), available at <http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/pdfs/uw/condo.pdf>.

131. *Id.*

132. Some areas of the country—New England and Manhattan in particular—faced a breakdown in the early 1990s. There is anecdotal evidence of New Yorkers during that crisis “handing over their Fifth Avenue apartments for \$1 because they could not afford the maintenance fees.” Haughney, *supra* note 6, at C1.

133. *Id.*

have to pay larger fees in the future (although such a guarantee is likely not enforceable against the association).¹³⁴ The fact that no one—neither banks nor buyers—willingly takes on this uncontrollable risk is more evidence that the current system is broken.¹³⁵

Some associations have responded to their community's budgetary crisis by in-sourcing all possible costs.¹³⁶ For example, homeowners may be required to take turns mowing common area lawns, caring for common area maintenance, or even staying up all night to serve as a doorman or security guard. While these efforts may reduce the dollar contributions associations need to function, in-sourced upkeep actually replicates the very same collective action and free-rider problems that community governance was designed to eliminate: some people will contribute more than others, and others will be unjustly enriched by their efforts. In-sourcing just replaces the problem of increased assessments of money with the problem of increased "assessments" made in kind, and it is equally inequitable. Either way, the non-defaulting homeowners pick up the costs of the defaulting owners mortgage lenders' free ride.¹³⁷

As an alternative to increasing assessments, associations may reduce the level of services offered to members of the community by decreasing maintenance, closing amenities, or starting to charge amenity user fees. In 2008, the Community Associations Institute conducted an informal poll and found that nearly 40% of the associations nationwide had delayed capital expenditures, and nearly 35% had raised assessments—in each case because of an increase in delinquent assessments.¹³⁸ Three years later, these numbers are likely even higher. The end result of the efforts to cut services and impose

134. *Id.* Associations cannot guarantee limitations on future assessments unless the documents so permit because any limitation to one unit owner's obligations necessarily burdens other owners with greater costs should the association's revenue requirements increase.

135. Condominiums as a real estate product type have incurred the biggest losses in terms of market value and transactional volume. CLIFFORD TREESE, METRICS FOR THE DEPRESSED (May 2011), available at https://spreadsheets.google.com/spreadsheet/pub?hl=en_US&hl=en_US&key=0Apv0sov_B8cSdGpwVTd4TEwybGJFd2J3QUQ2ZnRFbXc&output=html. According to statistics compiled by LM Funding from the Hillsborough Property Appraiser's Office and Zillow.com, average values for condominiums have dropped 34% from the peak in 2005 to 2009. *Id.*

136. *Housing Associations*, DUE NORTH, <http://www.due-north.com/Industries/housing-associations.aspx> (last visited Mar. 21, 2011); Michelle Rindels, *Nevada Legislators Considering Reform for HOAs*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 25, 2011, available at http://www.kolotv.com/home/headlines/Nevada_Legislators_Considering_Reform_for_HOAs_116980213.html; Vitali, *supra* note 46.

137. See Lemley, *supra* note 69, at 1057 (discussing the consequences of free riding); *infra* Part II.B.1 (discussing how lenders benefit from upkeep pre-foreclosure).

138. Bayles, *supra* note 11.

more costs on owners is the same: significant decline in a community's property values and a community government that ceases to function effectively.¹³⁹

4. Association Bankruptcy

Community associations cannot seek relief from their financial obligations in bankruptcy, even if their obligations outpace their revenues. Condominium associations typically have no assets of their own,¹⁴⁰ and homeowner associations are prohibited by their governing documents from selling their assets or otherwise seeking to raise revenues in ways not foreseen and explicitly authorized in their covenants.¹⁴¹ These entities perform primarily (or exclusively) governance and maintenance roles. Although it is nearly impossible to file bankruptcy as a pass-through entity, it is also practically impossible for an association to function if a significant amount of the units are in arrears. Once more than 15% of unit owners are delinquent in their assessment payments, FHA insurance and Fannie Mae loan qualification becomes unavailable for purchaser mortgages on units in that community.¹⁴² At that level of delinquency, neither associations nor their member owners can obtain financing.

Bankruptcy law currently offers no good solution.¹⁴³ Courts generally disallow bankruptcy filings by community associations

139. See HYATT, *supra* note 14, at 121 (stating that cutting services and charging user fees for amenities may cause disrepair of the common and recreational facilities, resulting in a decline in property values within the community). A similar fate befell Alaskan condominiums when workers abandoned their units and moved away after the completion of the Alaska pipeline. See MIN DIXON, WHAT HAPPENED TO FAIRBANKS? THE EFFECTS OF THE TRANS-ALASKA OIL PIPELINE ON THE COMMUNITY OF FAIRBANKS, ALASKA 295–96 (1980) (explaining that a housing shortage resulted from a lack of certainty regarding the housing that an industry was to supply its employees and the disposition of that housing after the construction period had terminated).

140. In condominium ownership, the unit owners hold title to all common areas as tenants-in-common, and the association's role is purely one of governance.

141. HYATT, *supra* note 14, at 109–12.

142. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., MORTGAGEE LETTER 2009-19, CONDOMINIUM APPROVAL PROCESS—SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING (June 12, 2009), available at <http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/09-19ml.doc>; U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., MORTGAGEE LETTER 2009-46 A, TEMPORARY GUIDANCE FOR CONDOMINIUM POLICY (Nov. 6, 2009), available at <http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/09-46aml.pdf>; U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., MORTGAGEE LETTER 2009-46 B, CONDOMINIUM APPROVAL PROCESS FOR SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING (Nov. 6, 2009), available at <http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/09-46bml.pdf>.

143. Professor Evan McKenzie calls association bankruptcy attempts “disaster[s]” that accomplish nothing. Joseph Dobrian, *Condominium Associations Hard Hit by Foreclosures Consider Bankruptcy*, J. PROP. MGMT., May/June 2010, at 32 (quoting McKenzie). Recently, scholars have called for reformation of the Bankruptcy Code to offer some relief to beleaguered condominium associations. Pinkerton, *supra* note 13, at 142–46 (citing the inescapable “death

because the associations have assessment powers, and courts can force associations to levy assessments on unit owners to pay for association debt.¹⁴⁴ Because an association can theoretically make special assessments to make up any budgetary shortfall, an association's inability to pay its obligations is seen as a revenue problem rather than as a debt or asset problem. Only if all the members of the association are themselves insolvent does the actual ability of an association to meet its debts become imperiled.¹⁴⁵

There have been very few exceptions to this general rule, and each has presented an atypical case. For example, in the recent bankruptcy case filed in Florida by Maison Grande Condominium, the association entered into a long-term recreation lease with an escalation clause and faced inability to meet this obligation when 25% of its units became delinquent while lease fees rose astronomically.¹⁴⁶ The association filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy seeking to reject the lease, and the bankruptcy judge in that case permitted the lease rejection.¹⁴⁷ The court noted that the board of directors had concluded that further increases of assessments would be unavailing because unit owners had advised the board that they lacked the ability or willingness to pay.¹⁴⁸

spiral" of association unpaid dues and debt).

144. See *White v. Cox*, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259, 263 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (stating that a condominium owner may satisfy his portion of any liability arising from the association by the payment of his proportionate share of the liability); HYATT & FRENCH, *supra* note 14, at 591; NATELSON, *supra* note 61, at 328–31; Donald L. Schreifer, *Judicial Action and Condominium Unit Owner Liability: Public Interest Considerations*, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 255, 262–65 (1986) (explaining that at least a share of the debt may be collected from any member who has been named and served in the absence of a statute to the contrary); Jessica Meyers, *HOA Bills Start to Get Spotlight*, DALL. NEWS (Mar. 7, 2011, 10:05 AM), <http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2011/03/hoa-bills-start-to-get-spotlig.html>; cf. *In re Rivera*, 256 B.R. 828, 830–36 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (denying as moot and unnecessary a homeowner association's "Motion for Reconsideration of Order denying Motion to Compel Debtor to Reaffirm, to Redeem, or to Surrender, and to Withhold Entry of the Discharge Pending Consideration of this Motion or Alternately to Dismiss," because post-petition homeowner association assessments survived a Chapter 7 discharge as a condition of continued ownership of a lot subject to such assessment), *superseded by statute*, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2006).

145. See Pinkerton, *supra* note 13, at 147–64 (discussing the insolvency and condominium association debtors).

146. *In re Maison Grande Condo. Ass'n*, 425 B.R. 684, 687–88 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010).

147. *Id.* at 689, 707.

148. *Id.* at 688 ("Some owners advised members of the Board that they lacked the financial resources to pay additional assessments. Others advised the Board that they would refuse to pay additional assessments that were only necessitated by other owners not paying their fair share. The Board also took into consideration the demographics of the unit owners, including the fact that many [were] elderly and on fixed incomes." (citation omitted)). Chapter 11 Bankruptcy offers an association the only hope of bankruptcy relief, but even that avenue is uncertain and perilous. See Pinkerton, *supra* note 12, at 155–65 (asserting that Chapter 7 is "not a good option for condominium associations" and that while Chapter 11 "might work," the association faces many problems with that route as well); see also Kristen L. Davidson, *Bankruptcy Protection for*

This case, however, is an anomaly and upon closer reading, seems to be predicated on a finding that the subject lease's escalation clause was unenforceable in Florida as against public policy.¹⁴⁹

More typical is the approach of another Florida bankruptcy case, in which the court adamantly rejected the association's proposed Chapter 7 bankruptcy.¹⁵⁰ In this case, the association sought to dissolve and reform to avoid payment obligations to a roofing vender that it could not meet without significant increases to assessments.¹⁵¹ The court rejected this plan, calling the association's attempt to avail itself of bankruptcy protection bad faith.¹⁵² Carla Barrow, counsel to the roofing company, noted that at least eight other condominiums had also filed for some sort of bankruptcy protection in South Florida, attempting to avoid paying for roof repairs,¹⁵³ but such attempts are unlikely to be successful. In 2010, Florida passed the Distressed Condominium Relief Act, which, among other things, specifically empowers associations to take stronger measures to recover revenues from non-paying owners and permits "bulk assignees" and "bulk buyers" to take over unsold developer condominium inventory, assuming assessment obligations but not other liabilities of the original developer.¹⁵⁴

Without bankruptcy as a potential escape from financial obligations in excess of collected funds, associations with assessment delinquencies are left with only one alternative: increase assessment amounts and hope the paying members will make up the shortfall. Charging paying members more to make up for neighbor defaults is not only unfair,¹⁵⁵ but it is unlikely to actually save the community from de facto insolvency. As the court in *Maison Grande* noted, increased assessments will likely increase delinquencies.¹⁵⁶ Increased delinquencies lead to increased assessments that can further increase delinquencies, requiring still greater increases of assessments (*ad infinitum*). Barring some ability to actually recover from non-paying

Community Associations as Debtors, 20 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 583, 616–25 (2004) (discussing the difficulty that courts have in applying bankruptcy laws to community associations).

149. *In re Maison Grande*, 425 B.R. at 702.

150. *In re Boca Village Ass'n*, 422 B.R. 318, 327 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).

151. *Id.* at 325.

152. *Id.* at 321–25.

153. Dobrian, *supra* note 143, at 33.

154. S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010) (adding new Sections 718.701–708 to the Florida Statutes through the "Distressed Condominium Relief Act").

155. See Hart, *supra* note 5, at 185 ("[W]hen a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission.").

156. *In re Maison Grande Condo. Ass'n*, 425 B.R. 684, 688 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010).

owners or properties, the only remaining solution is to have a public (state, local, federal) government step in and bail out communities that are unable to collect sufficient revenues from their members.¹⁵⁷ Private government failure mirrors local government failure (when tax revenues are insufficient to maintain the community), but unlike community associations, municipalities can, in fact, declare bankruptcy.¹⁵⁸

C. Payment Collection and Lien Priority

1. Association Collection Efforts

Because of the difficulty of enforcing payment obligations in privately governed communities, conventional wisdom holds that an association board should act quickly in response to nonpayment of assessments. An association with delinquent members has the ability to enforce its payment obligation in several ways. Associations may be able to use self-help by denying a delinquent owner the right to use common elements or by suspending the owner's voting rights.¹⁵⁹ For example, a nonpaying unit owner may be barred from using a community amenity such as a swimming pool or health club. The

157. See Dobrian, *supra* note 143, at 34 (“The main burden of dealing with troubled condo associations will fall on local governments, which are seldom experienced in such matters.”) (quoting Professor Evan McKenzie).

158. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2006). Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for reorganization of municipalities, which includes cities, towns, villages, counties, taxing districts, municipal utilities, and school districts. *E.g.*, *Municipality Bankruptcy*, U.S. COURTS, <http://www.uscourts.gov/federalcourts/bankruptcy/bankruptcybasics/chapter9.aspx> (last visited Aug. 16, 2011). It does not, however, cover common interest communities. Municipal bankruptcy legislation has a history of constitutional fragility. *See, e.g.*, *Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1*, 298 U.S. 513, 530–32 (1936) (striking down as incompatible with the Tenth Amendment the initial attempt by Congress to craft bankruptcy protection for local governments). According to the federal government, in the more than sixty years since Congress established a constitutionally viable municipal bankruptcy procedure, there have been less than 500 governmental bankruptcy petitions filed. *Municipality Bankruptcy, supra*. Those filings that do occur, however, are typically extreme cases in large municipalities (e.g., Orange County, CA) and can involve many millions of dollars in municipal debt. MARK BALDASSARE, *WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY* 7 (1998).

159. HYATT, *supra* note 14, at 121–22; *see also* *How v. Mars*, 513 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Neb. 1994) (holding that both the association bylaws and Nebraska's nonprofit corporations code permitted the association to deny delinquent owners the right to vote in the community). *But see* *Mountain Home Props. v. Pine Mountain Lake Ass'n*, 185 Cal. Rptr. 623, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that California law bars a community association from denying membership privileges to a new member because of the unpaid association debts of the new member's predecessors in interest). In most cases, private governments are able to suspend voting rights of members due to non-payment of assessments even though public governments may not suspend the right to vote based on non-payment of taxes. For example, a Florida law passed in July 2010 clarifies the availability of this type of self-help in that state. S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010). For further discussion of how assessments in communities are similar to and yet distinct from taxes, *see infra* Part II.A.3.

extent to which services may be denied, however, depends on state law. For example, a Texas court permitted an association to turn off the utilities of a delinquent owner,¹⁶⁰ but few states permit the discontinuance of essential services, such as heat, water or electricity.¹⁶¹

If such efforts fail, an association can commence an action to collect a debt against the non-paying owner. Federal case law is split on the issue of whether association assessments are debts for the purposes of the 1966 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006), which would require certain explicit warnings and notices to be served prior to collection efforts.¹⁶² To the extent an association complies with any such applicable laws, it can thereafter bring lawsuits against delinquent owners personally, claiming breach of contract and seeking damages equal to the unpaid assessment amounts.¹⁶³ Collection based on a judgment against the owner can proceed like any other debt collection (garnishing wages, seizing assets, enforcing a judgment lien, etc.).¹⁶⁴ Bringing a lawsuit, however, can be costly to the association in terms of time and attorney fees, and the paying owners—those who are already bearing the costs of their neighbors' delinquencies—will have to foot that bill unless the delinquent owner or responsible party can

160. *San Antonio Villa Del Sol Homeowners Ass'n v. Miller*, 761 S.W.2d 460, 465 (Tex. App. 1988) ("Clearly, a condominium dweller who does not pay his share of the maintenance fee, admits that the other owners are in essence paying his way, and fails to respond to notice of disconnection is in violation of the meaning and intent of the [by-laws]. The Association took appropriate action to abate this condition.").

161. *See, e.g.*, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eee(4) (McKinney 2011) (prohibiting a property owner who wishes to convert a building to cooperative or condominium ownership from the "interruption or discontinuance of essential services, which substantially interferes with or disturbs the comfort, repose, peace or quiet of any tenant in his use or occupancy of his dwelling unit or the facilities related thereto."). Among property managers, the belief is that the most efficient way to collect unpaid assessments is to turn off community-provided cable or satellite television services where law permits. *See* Polyana da Costa, *Associations Get Creative in Punishing Delinquencies*, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Nov. 23, 2010, at A1 (discussing legal and prohibited methods of encouraging assessment compliance); *see also* Mark Leen, *Condo Utilities May Be At Mercy of Assessments*, KING CNTY. BAR ASS'N BAR BULLETIN, 2009, available at <http://www.kcba.org/newsevents/barbulletin/archive/2009/09-07/article18.aspx> (discussing why cutting services off to a unit is "particularly effective").

162. *Compare, e.g.*, *Bryan v. Clayton*, 698 So. 2d 1236, 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (assessments are not covered by the Act) *with* *Newman v. Boehm, Pearlstein & Bright, Ltd.*, 119 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that a past due assessment is a "debt" under the Act).

163. *See* HYATT, *supra* note 14, at 119 (discussing a typical collection process for an association against a delinquent owner, including filing a lawsuit against the delinquent owner personally, in addition to filing a lien on the delinquent owner's unit).

164. *See infra* Part I.C.1 (discussing association collection efforts). The priority of any such judgment lien, however, will be subordinate to any mortgages or other obligations currently secured by the property, and thus, perfecting the association's assessment lien likely offers a better chance for ultimate recovery.

obtain the costs of collection.¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, these sorts of collection actions are how the bulk of unpaid assessments are eventually collected.¹⁶⁶

The lien on the defaulting owner's property that association covenants create for delinquent assessments is another tool for delinquency recovery.¹⁶⁷ The lien guarantees that the association will be paid out the proceeds of any resale, after all senior interests are satisfied. Furthermore, a lien for unpaid assessments clouds the owner's title and can be used as leverage to convince an owner who is seeking clear title (for sale or financing) to pay up. A last resort for associations is to foreclose on the property lien securing the assessment obligation.¹⁶⁸

165. See HYATT, *supra* note 14, at 121 (discussing the substantial amount of time it takes to foreclose on a lien and collect a judgment, the low price a sheriff's sale may generate, and that the availability of wage garnishment is dependent on the delinquent owner having an income).

166. See, e.g., KATZMAN GARFINKEL & BERGER, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION ASSESSMENT COLLECTION AND FORECLOSURE 14–15 (2011), available at http://www.canfl.com/pdfs/KGBcollFAQs_sm.pdf (explaining the benefits of collection actions).

167. See Pinkerton, *supra* note 13, at 143 (“Functionally, condominium associations only possess one remedy to recover their expenses from delinquent unit owners. They can obtain a lien on the unit for the amount owed to the association by that unit owner. The association can then foreclose on its lien if the debt remains unpaid. However, this remedy is not very useful in the face of many states’ laws concerning the relative priority of mortgages.”). The association lien has always been used as a practical means to induce voluntary compliance with assessment obligations rather than as a means to collect from the asset’s value directly via foreclosure (although the viable threat of foreclosure can motivate payment). The problem arises in situations where a homeowner is already facing foreclosure (under the mortgage) and the owner’s equity is gone. The association in such cases loses its power to motivate compliance. At this point, the only other interest holder of the property who still has a stake in its value is the first mortgagee, which is why eroding that priority position may incentivize a lender to pay, or cause a borrower to pay, assessments. A lender would be motivated to pay to preserve its own collateral value if its claim on the property would diminish should assessments remain delinquent.

168. See, e.g., UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 (amended 2008) (outlining enforcement of lien for sums due the association, including foreclosure); *Societe Generale v. Charles & Co. Acquisition, Inc.*, 597 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (“[A] condominium’s lien for unpaid common charges may be foreclosed in the same manner as a mortgage on real property . . .”). Some state laws limit recovery for debt repayment from foreclosure of a homestead. Homestead exemptions protect a certain amount of equity from sale to satisfy a debt. In Missouri, for example, the first \$15,000 of debt is exempted as the owner’s homestead. MO. REV. STAT. § 513.475 (2002). Florida, Texas, Oklahoma and Colorado have virtually unlimited homestead exemptions. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (West 2010) (providing that a homestead is “exempt from seizure for the claims of creditors except for encumbrances properly fixed on homestead property,” which include: (1) purchase money; (2) taxes on the property; (3) work and material used in constructing improvements on the property; (4) an owelty of partition; (5) the refinance of a lien against the homestead; (6) an extension of credit subject to certain conditions including security by a voluntary lien; and (7) a reverse mortgage which meets certain requirements); *Id.* § 52.001 (attaching judgment liens to real property except that property exempt from seizure or forced sale under Chapter 41, the Texas Constitution, or any other law). Mortgage lenders typically require an explicit waiver of this statutory protection of borrower equity.

How useful association foreclosure is as an enforcement tool depends greatly on the perfection and priority regime of the applicable state.¹⁶⁹ A first mortgage loan on a particular unit in a CIC enjoys senior priority to the association's assessment lien in all states, although the first mortgage priority is subject to a capped payment priority association lien in several states.¹⁷⁰ In those states lacking a six-month super-priority for assessment liens, the association will only be able to recover from the sale if foreclosure proceeds exceed the senior loan amount.¹⁷¹

Depending on the jurisdiction, lien foreclosures are effected either by a sale in a court action in equity or by private power of sale granted in the security instrument.¹⁷² Judicial foreclosure is the exclusive method of foreclosure in over one-third of the states,¹⁷³ and it is available in

Similarly, association declarations may purport to waive application of the homestead exemption for foreclosure of the association lien. Many states have passed statutes explicitly carving out CIC associations from the applicability of such limitations. The Colorado statute expressly authorizes an association to ignore the homestead exemption otherwise applicable in that state. *BA Mortg., LLC v. Quail Creek Condo. Ass'n*, 192 P.3d 447, 451 (Colo. App. 2008). Texas, a state with a very broad homestead exemption, allows association foreclosure to circumvent this limitation. *Inwood N. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Harris*, 736 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Tex. 1987). In other states, the applicability of the homestead exemption to association lien foreclosure proceedings is less clear. *See, e.g., Andres v. Indian Creek Phase III-B Homeowner's Ass'n*, 901 So.2d 182, 182–83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (expressing, in dicta, doubt that covenants purporting to waive the state's homestead exception would be effective); *Knolls Condo. Ass'n v. Harms*, 781 N.E.2d 261, 267–69 (Ill. 2002) (holding that the homestead exemption did not preclude the association suing for possession of a defaulting unit but not reaching the question of whether it would preclude foreclosure of the association's lien).

169. *See* HYATT, *supra* note 14, at 120–21 (discussing the practical value of an association's lien rights as dependent upon the state law authority for the lien, procedures for perfection and enforcement, and lien priority). In some states, perfection of the lien is automatic. In other states, a filing is required to perfect the lien. State law may require re-filing to maintain perfection. For example, in New Hampshire, a notice of an association's lien must be re-filed every six months to retain perfection. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:46, III (LexisNexis 2010). States specifically prescribe the method of foreclosure and the process required in order to legally foreclose on real property. In addition, certain states have attempted to limit the power of associations to foreclose based on unpaid assessment liens. For example, in 2004, a bill in California that would have set a threshold of \$2500 of unpaid assessments before an association could pursue foreclosure was vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. *See* Jim Wasserman, *Schwarzenegger Rejects Ban on Foreclosures*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 1, 2004, available at <http://www.calhomelaw.org/doc.asp?id=462> (discussing Governor Schwarzenegger's veto of a bill that would have required associations to use small claims courts, instead of nonjudicial foreclosure, to collect unpaid debts under \$2500).

170. *See infra* Part I.C.2 (discussing assessment lien priority).

171. *See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Olde Salem Homeowners Ass'n v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs*, 589 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding that a buyer at a mortgage foreclosure took the property free of assessments accruing prior to recording of the deed, which were extinguished by the foreclosure action); *Long Island Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gomez*, 568 N.Y.S.2d 536, 537 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (finding that an association's junior lien was extinguished by foreclosure of the senior priority mortgage).

172. NELSON & WHITMAN, *supra* note 58, at 600–01, 633.

173. *Id.* at 601 n.1. Judicial foreclosure is the exclusive or generally used method in

every jurisdiction.¹⁷⁴ Judicial foreclosures are complicated, costly, and time-consuming compared with non-judicial foreclosures pursuant to a power of sale.¹⁷⁵ Some states that permit a mortgage containing an explicit power of sale to be non-judicially foreclosed will likewise permit non-judicial foreclosure of association liens. Such states have a separate foreclosure statutory provision dealing solely with association liens.¹⁷⁶

Most associations, as well as owners and legislatures, view the foreclosure of an assessment lien as “a last resort” for two reasons.¹⁷⁷ First, foreclosure proceedings—even in states permitting non-judicial foreclosure of association liens—involve significant upfront costs such as advertising, auction, and legal fees. These costs would have to be borne by the neighborhood as a whole, unless they can be recovered from the delinquent owner. Second, a buyer who purchases at an association foreclosure would take the property subject to a first priority mortgage lien unless that loan amount is paid off.¹⁷⁸ This vastly

Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. In two other states, Connecticut and Vermont, foreclosure is judicial but is not a public sale; rather, it is a transfer of ownership to the lienor (called strict foreclosure).

174. In some states, an explicit statutory right to foreclose through the court exists. In others, judicial foreclosure is available as an incident to the jurisdiction of courts of equity. *See* *Lansing v. Goelet*, 9 Cow. 346, 366, 403 (N.Y. 1827) (holding that the decree for the sale of mortgaged premises was within the inherent powers of a court of equity, in addition to a statutory right to foreclose through the court).

175. STEVEN W. BENDER ET AL., *MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND LAND TRANSFER* 419–21 (4th ed. 2008); NELSON & WHITMAN, *supra* note 58, at 601–02.

176. *E.g.*, Property Owners’ Association Act, VA. CODE ANN. tit. 55 § 516 (2007) (titled “Lien for Assessments”); Maryland Condominium Act, MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-110 (West 2003), *amended by* Act of May 10, 2011, ch. 387, H.B. 1246 (effective Oct. 1, 2011).

177. Benny L. Kass, *Condo Board Can Foreclose for Delinquent Fees*, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2009, at F4; *see also* *Baker v. Monga*, 590 N.E.2d 1162, 1164–65 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that a unit valued at \$350,000 could be foreclosed for the owner’s nonpayment of assessments totaling less than \$3000). A recent unsuccessful bill in California attempted to place a significant cost threshold on when an association could pursue foreclosure to enforce its lien for unpaid assessments. S.B. 1682, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).

178. Junior priority liens are wiped out by foreclosure and, after paying amounts owed to the association, are distributed to such lienors in order of priority, but buyers at the foreclosure of a junior lien take subject to senior liens. Most courts have held, and scholars have opined, that this “subject to” means that a junior lien foreclosure transfers the property with the senior liens intact but unpaid. NELSON & WHITMAN, *supra* note 58, at 611–14; *see also, e.g.*, *Shaikh v. Burwell*, 412 S.E.2d 924, 926 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (“If the trustee is only foreclosing on the junior deed of trust, the senior lien continues with the property and the trustee must sell subject to the senior lien.”). In a puzzling recent Virginia decision, however, foreclosure of an association’s junior lien was misinterpreted to mandate payment of the first mortgage, rather than as a sale of property subject to a first mortgage lien. *Bd. of Dirs. of the Colchester Towne Condo. Council of Co-Owners v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.*, 581 S.E.2d 201, 206 (Va. 2003). The Supreme Court of Virginia, over a vigorous dissent, interpreted the statutory authority to foreclose the unit “subject to prior liens” to mean that proceeds of the association’s foreclosure sale must be used first to

decreases the ability of the association to find a third-party buyer at such a sale. In fact, in today's environment of underwater properties, finding an interested third-party buyer at a junior lien foreclosure would be unlikely at best.

In the absence of a third-party buyer, the association in an assessment foreclosure would be forced to take title to the unit itself. While this strategy might allow an association to rent out a unit and pay rental proceeds toward association costs, this approach is risky.¹⁷⁹ Once an association takes title to a unit, it becomes responsible for the assessments on that unit, which means that the unit's assessment obligations will continue to be spread among the paying owners in the community—precisely the unsatisfactory result that collection efforts against the prior owner were trying to avoid in the first place. As the owner, the association also becomes liable for property taxes, meaning that yet another cost is passed on to the community. Although the association could theoretically mitigate these costs by renting out the unit, this would entail the association becoming a landlord, exposing the community to the various risks and liabilities of assuming that role.¹⁸⁰ Even if an association is willing to serve as a landlord, rental properties

satisfy the lien of the first deed of trust before any delinquent assessments are reimbursed. *Id.* at 203–04. The doctrinal basis of this holding seems misconstrued. The majority cites principles of interpretation—that a statute should be read to be internally consistent—to support its conclusion. *Id.* at 203. But the asserted inconsistency seems to arise from the court's complete misunderstanding of secured transactions law. The court states that by granting first mortgage liens super priority in Virginia Code section 55-79.84(A), the Virginia Legislature implicitly required the judicial reformation of the statutory repayment waterfall in an association foreclosure, as contained in Virginia Code section 55-79.84(I)(5)(c). *Id.* at 203–04. As the dissent noted, this interpretation “is inconsistent with that phrase's well-understood and long accepted meaning.” *Id.* at 205 (Lacy, J., dissenting). Justice Lacy also notes that there is nothing ambiguous or inconsistent in the statute that requires judicial re-writing of the language to reach the majority's result, chiding that “we generally do not engage in adding words to a statute.” *Id.* While this decision runs contrary to nearly every other interpretation of the term “subject to,” the Virginia General Assembly has thus far been unable to pass legislation correcting this judicial precedent. *See* S.B. 411, 2010 Sess. (Va. 2010) (stricken Jan. 27, 2010) (attempting to clarify the statute by adding language that states that the term “subject to” means that liens to which an association's lien is subordinate “shall survive the sale and be binding upon the purchaser at such sale”).

179. *See, e.g.,* Daniel Vasquez, *Should Condo Associations Rent Units in Foreclosure?*, SUN SENTINEL (Mar. 18, 2009), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2009-03-18/news/0903170451_1_rent-units-condo-associations-foreclosure-action (explaining the various costs and liabilities that an association incurs when it becomes a landlord of units it acquires in assessment foreclosure proceedings).

180. *See, e.g.,* Matt Humphrey, *HOA Foreclosing to Rent Units? First Know the Risks*, HOALEADER.COM (Mar. 25, 2011), <http://www.hoaleader.com/public/554.cfm> (warning that an association becoming a landlord of a unit acquired in foreclosure is “very dangerous” because it “opens the association up to economic liability”). *But see* Gehrke-White, *supra* note 13 (explaining that in the context of long bank foreclosure delays, condominium association foreclosure and renting of units is the only way to obtain assessment funds from defaulting units).

that are subject to pending mortgage foreclosure—and therefore potentially terminable with little advance notice—would likely fetch rentals that are far below market. The depressed rental revenue may not be enough to pay property taxes and assessment charges on the unit.¹⁸¹

Generally, senior lienholders cannot be joined in a foreclosure action involuntarily.¹⁸² Some dated case law supports the contention that a junior lienor may join a senior lienor in a combined foreclosure proceeding when the senior loan is also in default and is due and payable.¹⁸³ In the unlikely event that this doctrine would gain new traction, it could permit foreclosing associations to join a lender and potentially safeguard its lien in a sufficient sale or, at least, speed the process of senior lien foreclosure, giving associations the legal ability to self-protect in an environment of lender foreclosure delays. Most courts today, however, agree that a lienor has the right to choose the timing of foreclosure of its lien.¹⁸⁴

2. Priority Baseline

As a general rule, liens on real property enjoy a priority based on the order in which they were perfected.¹⁸⁵ This first-in-time basic presumption is usually subject to a handful of exceptions under state law, including municipal real property taxes, which always enjoy the highest lien priority.¹⁸⁶ In addition, most states set the priority of a mechanic's lien supporting payment obligations for work done to the

181. See Bruce Rogers, *Collecting Delinquent Assessments: Why the Old Ways Won't Work and How to Play the Association's Cards in the Great Recession*, LM FUNDING LLC, 1, <http://www.lmfunding.com/assets/Collecting-Delinquent-Assessments-in-Todays-Market.pdf> (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (explaining that current economic reality is why only 4% of associations with delinquent assessments foreclose on their liens).

182. NELSON & WHITMAN, *supra* note 58, at 611; see also, e.g., *Osage Oil & Ref. Co. v. Mulber Oil Co.*, 43 F.2d 306, 308 (10th Cir. 1930) (holding that the junior lienor cannot enforce a sale for more than its own equity of redemption without consent of the senior lienor).

183. See, e.g., *Hefner v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co.*, 123 U.S. 747, 754 (1887) (holding that when a first mortgagee's debt is due and payable, the first mortgagee may be made a party); *Hagan v. Walker*, 55 U.S. 29, 37 (1852) (holding that a senior lienor may be a "necessary party" to a foreclosure, when the senior lienor is also in default, so that "a sale may be made of the whole title"); *Masters v. Templeton*, 92 Ind. 447, 451–52 (1883) (allowing a junior mortgagee to join a senior mortgagee so that the "ultimate rights of the parties" may be determined in one action); *Peabody v. Roberts*, 47 Barb. 91, 102 (N.Y. 1866) (allowing a junior mortgagee to proceed with a foreclosure action despite a prior foreclosure and sale under the senior mortgage). Even as late as 1992, the court in *Shaikh v. Burwell* cited six possible "special circumstances" that would enable a junior lienor to join a senior lienor in a foreclosure action. *Shaikh*, 412 S.E.2d at 927–28.

184. NELSON & WHITMAN, *supra* note 58, at 612. This creative approach is similar to the "mortgage terminator" approach that has recently been used on occasion in Florida. See *infra* Part II.A.2 (discussing creative strategies used by attorneys in seeking recovery for their clients).

185. BENDER ET AL., *supra* note 175, at 123.

186. *Id.* at 271–73.

real property itself as relating back to the date on which such work was commenced.¹⁸⁷ In the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary, assessment liens follow the general first-in-time priority rule, and because mortgage loans are typically funded prior to assessment delinquencies, such first mortgage liens are senior to assessment liens.¹⁸⁸ The California Condominium Act, for example, explicitly follows the first-in-time rule, setting lien priority according to the time a separate “notice of delinquent assessment” is filed in the land records.¹⁸⁹

In some states, assessment liens are considered automatically perfected with the date of perfection relating back to the date on which the association was formed (when the declaration was filed in the land records).¹⁹⁰ However, statutes defining priority in such states specifically make an exception for first mortgage liens on individual units within the community, permitting the first mortgage to always enjoy a priority senior to the association lien, even though the first-in-time rule would otherwise deem the related-back perfected association lien to be first.¹⁹¹ For example, the Virginia Condominium Act provides that the assessment lien is subordinate to “sums unpaid on any first mortgages or first deeds of trust recorded prior to the perfection of said lien for assessments and securing institutional lenders.”¹⁹²

187. *See, e.g.*, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3134, 3137 (West 1993) (providing that liens for site improvements have priority based on the commencement of site improvements); 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/16 (West 1989) (providing that no encumbrances placed upon land shall operate before a lien in favor of work done or materials furnished has been satisfied).

188. An increasing number of states have statutorily created a limited priority for such liens. *See infra* Part II.A (discussing some attempted and proposed solutions to the problem of assessment nonpayment and foreclosure delay). Some states define the time of perfection for association liens as relating back to the date on which the assessment was due. *See infra* note 190 and accompanying text.

189. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1367.1(b), (d) (West 2011).

190. The UCIOA takes this approach. *See* UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 (1994), available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ucioa94.htm> (stating that recording of the declaration constitutes record notice and perfection of the lien); *see also* FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116(15)(a) (West 2011) (providing that the lien is effective dating back to the recording of the original declaration); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.113 (West 1997) (providing that the association’s lien for assessments is created by recordation of the declaration, which constitutes perfection); *see also, e.g.*, *American Holidays, Inc. v. Foxtail Owners Ass’n*, 821 P.2d 577, 580 (Wyo. 1991) (deeming the date the declaration was recorded as the date of perfection for assessment lien).

191. *See, e.g.*, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-33.3-316 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing that any security interest created before the assessment becomes delinquent has priority over the assessment lien). This way of conceptualizing the priority of association liens likely originated with the FHA Model Condominium Act of 1961. In some cases, the priority granted to first mortgage liens is subject to a capped super-priority. *See infra* Part II.A (discussing capped “super priority” liens).

192. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.84A (LexisNexis 2007).

Arizona's Condominium Act protects first mortgage priority even further, providing that such liens are always superior to assessment liens regardless of when they arose.¹⁹³ Maryland and North Carolina also deem an association lien completely subordinate to first mortgage liens on units within the community.¹⁹⁴ In states where the statute is arguably vague as to the priority position of the first mortgage, courts have clarified that even an assertion of super-priority in the declaration establishing the community will not create a priority superior to a first mortgage lien.¹⁹⁵ Thus, regardless of jurisdiction, first mortgages on units within a community are senior in priority to association liens for unpaid assessments. Legislatures and courts cite a policy of promoting financing availability as the motivation for this priority scheme.¹⁹⁶

Holders of junior claims on the property (both liens and holders of equity) must be joined in a foreclosure proceeding to terminate their rights.¹⁹⁷ Because the association is a junior lienor, a foreclosing first mortgage loan is required to name the association as a necessary party to the foreclosure proceeding, and any excess sale proceeds beyond the amount owed on the first mortgage will be applied to the association's claim. However, where mortgages are under-collateralized, foreclosure sales typically do not obtain sufficient proceeds to pay off the first mortgage, let alone junior liens. Whether paid off or not, junior liens are wiped out in foreclosure of the senior lien.

Courts and legislatures in some states have attempted to limit the extent of association losses and protect community members against non-payment of assessments, even those lacking any priority protection with respect to first mortgages.¹⁹⁸ In New York, for example, the

193. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1256B (West 2007) (effective through Jan. 1, 2012).

194. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-110 (LexisNexis 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47C-3-116 (LexisNexis 2009). Maryland recently enacted a three-month capped priority for unpaid assessments. *See infra* notes 290–92 and accompanying text.

195. *See Holly Lake Ass'n v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n*, 660 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 1995) (holding that an assessment lien relating back to the date of declaration would expose lenders to unknown risks and therefore cannot have priority); *Tally Arms Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Breland*, 854 So. 2d 28, 30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a subsequent assessment lien cannot have priority over a mortgage lien); *First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Charleston v. Bailey*, 450 S.E.2d 77, 81 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that assessments fixed or determined subsequent to a mortgage lien are subordinate to the assessment lien).

196. *See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Colchester Towne Condo. Council of Co-Owners v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., et al.*, 581 S.E.2d 201, 202 (Va. 2003) (explaining that “the realities of the marketplace require that such lenders be encouraged to provide the desired financing for individual condominium units by granting priority to the lien of their first mortgages or first deeds of trust”).

197. NELSON & WHITMAN, *supra* note 58, at 570–73, 602–08.

198. A limited priority lien for assessment liens has been proposed multiple times to the New York legislature, but lenders have lobbied against the adoption of the measure. The first year it

statutory lien securing all unpaid condominium assessments is junior in priority to first mortgage liens,¹⁹⁹ and New York case law has confirmed that all sums related to a first mortgage lien (including collection costs, fees, etc.) on a unit within a community take priority over an association lien.²⁰⁰ If a unit is delinquent on assessments in New York, however, legislation provides that the association may obtain a court-appointed receiver to pay regular assessments to the association *prior to* making any mortgage payments, and collect rents directly from a tenant.²⁰¹ Case law clarified that this provision does not apply to special assessments that are payable by a receiver only after mortgage loan payments are made.²⁰²

Even without appointing a receiver or foreclosing its lien, associations in Florida, like New York, can collect rents directly from any tenants living in units owned by defaulting members.²⁰³ The 2010 amendment to the Florida Common Interest Community Act provides that associations can collect rent payments directly from tenants when the owner of a unit is delinquent and further provides that if tenants do not pay rent to the association, the board can evict them.²⁰⁴ The revised law also explicitly permits associations to suspend voting privileges for owners who are ninety days delinquent in their assessments and clarifies

was proposed, the measure was allowed to die in committee. The next year, it was defeated on the floor. See Ronald A. Sher, Esq., *Habitat Board Leadership Conference Seminar: Condo Collections*, HIMMELFARB & SHER LLP, http://www.himmelfarb-sher.com/options/condo_collections.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) (discussing a proposed law that would give assessment liens a limited priority for six months).

199. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-z (McKinney 2006).

200. *Bankers Trust Co. v. Bd. of Managers of Park 900 Condo.*, 616 N.E.2d 848, 849 (N.Y. 1993).

201. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS § 1325(2) (McKinney 2006).

202. See *First N.Y. Bank for Bus. v. 155 E. 34 Realty Co.*, 158 Misc. 2d 658, 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that special assessments are generally for capital improvements well beyond the period of receivership, and thus, obligation for the special assessments cannot be placed on the receiver).

203. See S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010) (effective July 1, 2010).

204. S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010) (codified at Fla. Stat. § 718.116 (2011)). The newly amended Florida provision attempts to permit associations to walk the fine line between incurring landlord liability and having the authority to collect rents and evict tenants. Tenants in Florida and New York, however, raise a valid complaint that they have no contractual or property relationship with the association (except indirectly through their landlord) and that even though the statute in question purports to immunize tenants who pay rents to the association against eviction by the landlord, landlords can do much to lower a tenant's quality of life while still acting within the strict "letter of the law" of a lease. See Kenric Ward, *Condo Associations Put 'Hammer' Down on Renters*, SUNSHINE STATE NEWS (June 2, 2010), <http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/condo-associations-put-hammer-down-renters> (highlighting the potential pitfalls of the new law for tenants).

that associations can restrict delinquent owners' use of common areas.²⁰⁵

Bankruptcy of a delinquent owner may impact an association's ability to collect delinquent assessments, particularly under Chapter 12, which permits junior liens to be "stripped" of their collateral claims when the collateral's value is less than the amount owed on a senior debt.²⁰⁶ In a November 2010 decision, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ordered that a community association be stripped of its unpaid assessment lien in the amount of nearly \$7000 because the property was subject to a first mortgage debt that exceeded its current county-assessed value, which, the court opined, left no excess security to which the association's lien could attach.²⁰⁷ Although the association argued that the cited real estate value for the property was "artificially low" because of a depressed housing market,²⁰⁸ the court refused to preserve the lien "based solely on anticipated future increase in the value of a secured creditor's collateral."²⁰⁹ The court held that while under-secured creditors' liens are generally valid, in the case of a party whose secured claim has "inconsequential value," a bankruptcy filing should cause the lien to disappear.²¹⁰ The operation of the Bankruptcy Code in this case further bolsters the argument that a junior priority for association liens is inequitable, particularly in cases of homes securing under-collateralized mortgages.

205. S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010).

206. See *In re Cook*, No. 10-10113-SSM, 2010 WL 4687953 at *1-2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2010) (holding that Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code makes any junior lien void upon a prior lien exhausting a creditor's collateral); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2006). Although Congress has specified that post-petition assessments are non-dischargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcies, this carve-out specifically does not apply to pre-petition debts including assessments. *Id.*

207. *In re Cook*, 2010 WL 4687953, at *2. Interestingly, county tax assessed value is not how a property's value is typically determined. Market players typically price according to comparable sales or stream-of-income value for a property, and even judicial review of foreclosure sale prices admits that there is no precise benchmark for real property valuation. See *B.F.P. v. Resolution Trust Corp.*, 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994) (mentioning that there are several ways to determine a property's fair market value).

208. The association cites the "economic crisis that was triggered by the sub-prime mortgage loan meltdown" as having caused the drop in property valuation. *In re Cook*, 2010 WL 4687953, at *2.

209. *Id.*

210. The court also noted that "[a]lthough there may well be policy arguments favoring preservation of liens for pre-petition assessments when debtors in reorganization cases propose to retain the property, such arguments are properly addressed to Congress." *Id.*

II. ALTERNATIVES TO FAILED PRIVATE GOVERNANCE

Under current laws, owners in a CIC face financial uncertainty stemming from the ownership structure and assessment model of their community. Linked fiscal fortunes means that owners face the threat of ever-increasing assessments due to their neighbors' delinquencies, and these unpaid assessments may never be recovered because of such neighbors' mortgage defaults. The status quo in most states is not only destabilizing, it is also inequitable. Association maintenance preserves the value of a lender's collateral, and passing the pro rata share of upkeep costs onto non-defaulting owners results in unjust enrichment of the lenders.²¹¹ Courts and legislatures have struggled to resolve such unfairness, particularly now that the current crisis has highlighted this deficiency in the CIC assessment system.

A. Other Attempted and Proposed Solutions

1. Limited Priority Liens

a. UCIOA and Six-Month Limited Priority Lien

The drafters of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act ("UCIOA"),²¹² recognizing that assessment liens would ordinarily be junior in priority to individual first mortgage liens, crafted an "innovative" solution to the problem of assessment nonpayment during mortgage default: the six-month "limited priority lien."²¹³ The UCIOA model, which has been adopted by eight states to date,²¹⁴ provides that

211. See generally RAWLS, *supra* note 5, at 96 (advocating that beneficiaries of a cooperative venture should bear the costs of such a venture on a *pro rata* basis); Hart, *supra* note 5, at 185–86 (arguing that enjoyment of benefits by parties not bearing associated costs is inequitable).

212. See generally UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT (1994) [hereinafter UCIOA]. In 1977, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began drafting the Uniform Condominium Act based on the 1974 Virginia model. Subsequently, the Conference prepared three uniform laws governing condominiums, cooperatives, and homeowners associations—the three forms of privately governed communities with different ownership structures. These were the Uniform Condominium Act, the Uniform Planned Community Act, and the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act. The Conference then combined the three acts, resulting in the UCIOA. This Act contains provisions governing condominiums, planned unit development/homeowner associations, as well as cooperatives.

213. Carl Lisman, Chair of UCIOA's Drafting Comm., Presentation to the Maryland Task Force on Common Ownership Communities—Maryland Dep't of Hous. and Cmty. Dev. at the American Homeowners Resource Center: The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (June 9, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.epohoa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=104:formation-1975-a-birth-of-ucioa&catid=93:news&Itemid=111). Lisman seems to believe that the UCIOA limited priority lien solves the problem of non-payment of assessments, noting that "we are now convinced that we are more brilliant than we thought we were." *Id.*

214. See *infra* notes 221–28 (explaining that these eight states include Nevada, Alaska,

an assessment lien, which is normally subordinate in priority to first mortgages on units, is given limited priority upon foreclosure of the first priority mortgage lien “to the extent the common expense assessments based on the periodic budget adopted by the association . . . would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the six months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien.”²¹⁵ Thus, an association under UCIOA would have a priority position arising at a mortgage foreclosure sale for unpaid assessments up to an amount equal to six months of regular-assessment assessments.²¹⁶

The six-month capped “super priority” portion of the association lien does not have a true priority status under UCIOA since this six-month assessment lien cannot be foreclosed as senior to a mortgage lien. Rather, it either creates a *payment* priority for some portion of unpaid assessments,²¹⁷ which would take the first position in the foreclosure repayment “waterfall,” or grants *durability* to some portion of unpaid assessments,²¹⁸ allowing the security for such debt to survive foreclosure.²¹⁹

The UCIOA priority portion does not include costs incurred by the association to collect delinquent assessments, such as attorney fees. Some states, however, have enacted statutory variations that include such costs.²²⁰ According to Washington, D.C. lawyer Catherine Park,

Colorado, West Virginia, Connecticut, Vermont, Minnesota, and Delaware). Legislative proposals to adopt UCIOA are pending in six more states: Utah, Indiana, New Jersey, South Carolina, Kentucky, and Ohio.

215. UCIOA § 3-116.

216. *Id.* Under such a capped priority arrangement, the priority position of the association lien is split: a super-priority position is given to up to six months of unpaid assessment amounts, and the remainder of unpaid amounts is accorded the typical priority position of the association lien, namely subordinate to the first mortgage lien. *Id.*

217. *See, e.g.,* MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.3-115 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010), *amended by* H.F. 1023, ch. 116, 2011 MINN. SESS. LAW SERV. (West) (providing that the lien does not have priority over a senior mortgage lien, but allows for recovery of assessments for a period of six months). Under this interpretation, six months of unpaid assessments are paid out of foreclosure proceeds prior to repayment of the first mortgage.

218. Under this interpretation, a lien securing six months of unpaid assessments would survive the first mortgage foreclosure. One problem with this second interpretation of the super-priority provision is that post-foreclosure, an association often still has to bring a lawsuit against the buyer or lender to recover the six months of allowable unpaid assessments. This can be onerous for the association. For example, in Georgia, an association cannot recover the costs of bringing an action to recover the six months’ worth of assessments against the lender. *First Fed. Sav. Bank of Ga. v. Eaglewood Court Condo. Ass’n, Inc.*, 367 S.E.2d 876, 878 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the statutory language limited recovery from the lender at six months of assessments, not including the costs of collecting such assessments).

219. The effect depends on a state’s interpretation of the provision.

220. *See, e.g.,* MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183A, § 6 (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-258 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (allowing for recovery of attorney’s fees within the priority portion).

who specializes in condominium law and litigation, the failure of strict UCIOA states to include attorney costs can be exploited by mortgage lenders, which gamble that an association will not hire an attorney to recover “a mere six months” of unpaid assessments.²²¹

The lien priority concept contained in UCIOA has gained traction even in states that have not otherwise enacted these uniform acts. Today, in the eight UCIOA states (Alaska,²²² Colorado,²²³ Connecticut,²²⁴ Delaware,²²⁵ Minnesota,²²⁶ Nevada,²²⁷ Vermont,²²⁸ and West Virginia²²⁹), in ten more states (Alabama,²³⁰ Florida,²³¹ Illinois,²³² Maryland,²³³ Massachusetts,²³⁴ New Jersey,²³⁵ Pennsylvania,²³⁶ Rhode Island,²³⁷ and Washington²³⁸), and in the

221. Catherine Park, “*Super Lien*” Legislation: How Super is it Really? And Why Isn’t the Mortgage Industry Complying with the Legislation?, LAW OFFICE OF CATHERINE PARK (July 10, 2010), <http://cparklaw.com/condolaw/2010/07/10/super-lien-legislation-how-super-is-it-really-and-why-isnt-the-mortgage-industry-complying-with-the-legislation>. According to Park, the only way for would-be homeowners to protect themselves in such jurisdictions is to “avoid buying in a small community” and thereby hope to minimize the budgetary impact of assessment defaults. *Id.*

222. ALASKA STAT. § 34.08.470 (2010).

223. Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-316 (LexisNexis 2010); *see infra* notes 241–46 and accompanying text.

224. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-258.

225. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 81-316 (2009).

226. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515B.3-115(a), (e)(1)–(3), (f), (i) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010), *amended by* State Agencies–Courts And Common Interest Ownership Act, ch. 116, sec. 16, § 515B.3-115, 2011 MINN. SESS. LAW SERV. (West).

227. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2010), *amended by* Uniform Laws–Amendments–Common Interest Communities Act, ch. 389, sec. 49, § 116.3116, 2011 Nev. Legis. Serv. (West); *see infra* notes 273–74 and accompanying text.

228. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 1323 (2006).

229. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36B-3-116 (LexisNexis 2005).

230. ALA. CODE § 35-8A-316 (LexisNexis 1991).

231. FLA. STAT. ANN. (West 2011); *see infra* notes 280–86 and accompanying text.

232. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/9 (West 2009). Section 9(g) of the Illinois Condominium Property Act requires the association board to have “taken action” to trigger the requirement that subsequent purchasers of a foreclosed unit pay six months of unpaid assessments. *Id.*

233. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-110 (LexisNexis 2010), *amended by* Condominiums and Homeowners Associations—Priority of Liens Act, ch. 387, sec. 2, § 11-110, 2011 Md. Legis. Serv. (West) (granting a mere four-month, \$1200-capped priority to association assessment liens at mortgage lender foreclosure).

234. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183A, § 6 (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2002). The Massachusetts statute includes a provision for attorneys’ fees together with a dollar-amount cap. *Id.*

235. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-21 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).

236. 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3314 (West 2004).

237. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-3.16 (1956 & Supp. 2010).

238. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.34.364 (West 2005).

District of Columbia,²³⁹ community association liens enjoy a limited priority, typically capped at six months or less. Legislatures in five states (Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, South Carolina, and Utah) have been considering adopting a UCIOA-based statute that would include a six-month lien priority for unpaid assessments.²⁴⁰ Even with these progressive statutory developments in many states, more than thirty states lack any lien priority for association assessments.

To illustrate the typical UCIOA lien priority approach, consider the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act (“CCIOA”).²⁴¹ Under the Act, association liens, which include assessments and all collection costs, are considered automatically perfected as of the date the association was created.²⁴² This type of lien is subordinate to property tax liens and to a first deed of trust on the property, but it is superior to all other encumbrances of record, regardless of when such other lien is filed.²⁴³ At foreclosure of a first deed of trust on a property,²⁴⁴ the association lien will be paid according to a limited priority position to the extent of six months of budgeted assessment amounts.²⁴⁵ Colorado courts have held that the lien may be more than assessments alone, as it also includes “attorney fees, interest & other allowable items.”²⁴⁶ In

239. D.C. CODE § 42-1903.13 (2001).

240. See MALLACH, *supra* note 29, at 12 (advising state policymakers to consider allowing borrowers of mortgages in foreclosure a six month forbearance period).

241. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-316 (2011). The 1992 version of the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act (“CCIOA”) automatically applies to associations created after 1992, but any pre-1992 association can elect to avail itself of the protections and provisions of the Act. By electing to come under the 1992 CCIOA, an association can effectively change the provisions in its own governing documents, without filing an amendment, since application of the law is deemed to change inconsistent declaration language in order to conform to the Act.

242. *Id.* The automatically perfected lien applies to “any assessment levied against that unit or fines imposed against its unit owner,” which includes fees, late charges, attorneys’ fees, and interest. *Id.* § 38-33.3-316 (1). There are no limits on late fees and interest, but it is arguably unclear whether the statutory language includes attorney fees.

243. *Id.* § 38-33.3-316 (3). This is because the priority timing for the association lien relates back to the recordation of the declaration. This applies only to liens for deeds of trust recorded after 1992 when CCIOA was created. For all such provisions, the super-priority six-month lien applies, regardless of language in the community documents or the deed of trust to the contrary. *Id.*

244. A deed of trust is essentially a mortgage. The common foreclosure method for mortgage liens in Colorado is non-judicial foreclosure through power of sale in a deed of trust. The only way to foreclose an association lien, however, is through a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., ORTEN CAVANAGH RICHMOND & HOLMES, LLC, COLO. FORECLOSURE LAWS 1–2, 8 (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.ocrhlaw.com/library/Colorado_Foreclosure_Laws.pdf (explaining the non-judicial foreclosure procedure in Colorado and contrasting the non-judicial procedure to the mandated judicial foreclosure procedure for association liens).

245. *Id.* at 8.

246. First Atl. Mortg., LLC v. Sunstone N. Homeowners Ass’n, 121 P.3d 254, 255 (Colo. App. 2005) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-316 (2)(b) (2010)).

Colorado, the lien is not payable out of foreclosure proceeds, but rather survives the foreclosure of the first deed of trust (a durability interpretation of the UCIOA lien priority provision).²⁴⁷

Within non-UCIOA states, some lien priority statutory provisions originated in response to past housing crises imperiling community associations in that jurisdiction. For example, Massachusetts' lien priority law grew out of the state's real estate boom and bust of the late 1980s and early 1990s.²⁴⁸ Two decades ago, associations in Massachusetts struggled with massive budget shortfalls when homeowners abandoned units they could no longer afford, forcing the communities to increase assessments on the remaining owners to keep the association afloat. The remaining owners often could not afford to make up extra payments to bridge the budgetary gap, which led to a domino effect of assessment and mortgage delinquencies.²⁴⁹ Today, CIC liens in Massachusetts have a capped super-priority because of judicial and legislative efforts to protect communities during the 1990s.²⁵⁰

247. This follows logically from the limitation on non-judicial foreclosure of association liens. *See supra* notes 201–02 (explaining that New York case law provides that all sums related to a first mortgage lien on a unit within a community, including collection fees and costs, take priority over an association lien). However, New York legislation provides that if a unit is delinquent on assessments, the association is able to obtain a court-approved receiver to pay regular assessments to the association before making any mortgage payments. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1325(2) (McKinney 2006). The association may also collect rents directly from a tenant. *Id.*

248. MICHAEL GOODMAN & JAMES PALMA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UMASS DONAHUE INST., WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING MARKET: A STUDY FOR CITIZENS' HOUSING AND PLANNING ASSOCIATION AND THE MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING PARTNERSHIP 2 (2004), available at <http://www.massbenchmarks.org/publications/studies/pdf/housingmarket04.pdf>.

249. *See* Grahame K. Wells, *The Use of Super-Liens to Promote Cooperation Between Condominium Associations and Lenders*, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 477, 477–78 (1994) (citing Henry L. Judy & Robert A. Wittie, *Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues*, 13 REAL PROP., PROB., & TR. J. 437, 475 (1978)). The troublesome state of the economy during the late 1980s and early 1990s left many condominium owners with severe financial problems, which in turn, led those owners to stop paying condo fees. Subsequently, the condos could no longer afford to perform proper maintenance or pay utility bills, the utilities were shut off by their providers, and local governments condemned the buildings. *Id.*; *see also* James Winokur, *Meaner Lienor Community Associations: The "Super Priority" Lien and Related Reforms Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act*, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 355 (1992) (discussing the real estate economy of the 1990s as a catalyst for creating limited lien priorities in several states).

250. *Baker v. Monga*, 590 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that owners had an absolute obligation to pay assessments and that owners lack the right to withhold payments); *see also* *Trs. of Prince Condo. Trust v. Prosser*, 592 N.E.2d 1301, 1302 (Mass. 1992) (reiterating the *Monga* court's holding, stating that "[f]or the same reason that tax payers may not lawfully decline to pay lawfully assessed taxes because of some grievance or claim against the taxing governmental unit, a condominium unit owner may not decline to pay lawful assessments"). The Massachusetts legislature attempted to further mitigate the harm felt by associations losing their

Rhode Island's lien priority law is one of the newest in the nation, and it passed unanimously in the state's House and Senate in June 2008.²⁵¹ This legislation increased the capped foreclosure and collections cost amount to \$5000 and \$7500, respectively (inclusive of legal fees), and provided for a six-month lien priority for assessment liens upon foreclosure of the first mortgage.²⁵² Before the measure came to a vote, and when seeking the governor's veto thereafter, the Rhode Island Mortgage Bankers Association strenuously objected to the new law's lien priority provisions, claiming that they would spell the end of residential mortgage finance for community association housing in Rhode Island.²⁵³ Legislative counsel to the Bankers Association bemoaned the measure, claiming that "it's basically picking the lenders' pockets, at the end of the day."²⁵⁴ Rhode Island disagreed and passed the measure.

By crafting legislation that creates a six-month limited lien priority for assessments, state legislatures hope to motivate first mortgage lenders to help pressure non-paying owners to pay their delinquent obligations. If their borrowers make all their association payments, lenders can avoid paying six months' worth of assessments out of their foreclosure proceeds. If, however, the property is under-collateralized and mortgage foreclosure takes vastly longer than six months, the six-month priority cap actually may (perversely) induce a lender to further delay foreclosure until there is a ready third-party purchaser on hand. This is because a lender purchasing at foreclosure will be liable for all subsequent assessments, and the foreclosure will also trigger the six-month payment obligation, increasing the prospective lender costs of foreclosing. Also, a lender is still likely to recover more in an upside-down loan if a borrower makes payments on the mortgage rather than association deficiencies because the lender will only have to reimburse a six-month capped amount of association deficiencies at some future time.

entire assessment lien by passing legislation that provides for a six-month lien priority arising at closing. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183A, § 6 (LexisNexis 2011).

251. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-3.16 (2010). The previous law not only failed to provide any lien priority for assessment liens, but capped an association's reimbursement for foreclosure costs at \$2500, with any additional costs having to be paid by the community as a whole. Patricia Antonelli, *Changes to Rhode Island Law Affect Foreclosures, Priority of Condominium Liens for Assessments, Mortgage Escrow Accounts and Reverse Mortgages*, PARTRIDGE SNOW & HAHN LLP (July 2008), <http://www.psh.com/content345>.

252. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-3.16 (2010).

253. Dunn, *supra* note 6, at G1 (quoting Terrance Martiesian, a lawyer for the Rhode Island Mortgage Bankers Association, who remarked that "[a] bank is not going to take second place . . . in the chain of liens against the property. . . . They want to be first.").

254. *Id.* (quoting James Hahn).

b. Federal Housing Impacts on Association Fiscal Recovery

Federal agencies and GSEs, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, insure or guarantee more than nine out of every ten mortgages that have been originated since the meltdown in credit markets in 2008.²⁵⁵ The FHA now insures nearly 50% of all residential mortgages, up from 1.7% of the market in 2006.²⁵⁶ As the buyer or insurer of nearly every currently originated mortgage loan, these federal policies regarding lending risk have an enormous impact in terms of capital availability. The policies of the FHA and the GSEs impact the resolution of the community assessment issue in two ways: first, by requiring any super-priority of assessment liens to be limited at six months' worth of assessments and, second, by prohibiting loans secured by units located in condominiums with high rates of neighborhood mortgage defaults.²⁵⁷

The GSE secondary market purchasers and the FHA insurers specifically define qualifying mortgages as a mortgage subject to no greater than a six-month capped assessment lien priority.²⁵⁸ This effectively prevents association recovery beyond that threshold.²⁵⁹

255. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., REFORMING AMERICA'S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2011), *available at* <http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Reforming%20America%27s%20Housing%20Finance%20Market.pdf> [hereinafter TREASURY/HUD REPORT]; *see also* CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A RESPONSIBLE MARKET FOR HOUSING FINANCE: A PROGRESSIVE PLAN TO REFORM THE U.S. SECONDARY MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 2 (2011), *available at* <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/01/pdf/responsiblemarketforhousingfinance.pdf> (explaining that "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also now purchase more than 80 percent of all multifamily mortgages, loans to owners, and developers of rental residential properties").

256. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, *supra* note 255, at 44–45; *see also* *Government Affairs Update: FHA Condo. Recertification Requirements*, NAT'L ASS'N OF REALTORS, <http://www.realtor.org/wps/wcm/connect/15f94c8044f67a04b112f35d6aeab3b5/FHA%2BCondo%2BRecertification%2BRequirements%2B12.8.10.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=15f94c8044f67a04b112f35d6aeab3b5> (last visited Aug. 16, 2011); Rick Newman, *Kill Fannie and Freddie? Not Likely*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 21, 2011, 12:12 PM), <http://money.msn.com/investing/kill-fannie-and-freddie-not-likely-usnews.aspx> (explaining that most mortgages issued are currently supported by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or the FHA). In contrast, private lenders handled twenty percent of mortgages during "normal" times. *Id.*

257. *See infra* notes 258–59 and accompanying text.

258. *See* FANNIE MAE, FORM 1054 (1208): WARRANTY OF CONDOMINIUM PROJECT LEGAL DOCUMENTS, *available at* <https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/forms/pdf/projectrevs/1054.pdf> (specifying that in order for a loan to be qualifying, "[a]ny first mortgagee who obtains title to a condominium unit pursuant to the remedies in the mortgage or through foreclosure will not be liable for more than six months of the unit's unpaid regularly budgeted dues or charges accrued before acquisition of the title to the unit by the mortgagee"); *see also* *Condominium Unit Mortgages—Project Analysis*, FREDDIE MAC (Apr. 2011), <http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/pdfs/uw/condoprojectanalysis.pdf> (requiring that the first mortgagee obtaining title to the unit be liable "for no more than six months of unpaid, regularly budgeted assessments or charges (for late fees and collection costs) accrued before acquisition").

259. Financing for non-qualifying loans is increasingly hard to obtain in the current economic climate. *See* Dunn, *supra* note 23, at G1 (discussing Rhode Island foreclosure).

These definitions of qualifying mortgages make it impossible for a state to increase the priority of a community assessment. Such funding or insuring requirements therefore indirectly, but effectively, limit a community's ability to fully recover delinquent assessments at foreclosure of an underwater unit. These federal guidelines drive the bulk of all mortgage lending and unless the six-month limitation is changed, will prevent state legislatures from acting to solve the community assessment delinquency problem.

In addition to their priority requirements for qualifying mortgages, policies of these entities significantly limit finance capital availability for condominium units. The Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") maintains a list of "Approved Condominium Projects," and FHA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac will not insure or purchase mortgages to units in condominiums that are not on the approved list.²⁶⁰ The new approval process implemented in the wake of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 now disallows "spot loan" approvals—approvals based on applications for individual unit mortgages rather than the condominium as a whole.²⁶¹ Condominium projects will not be approved unless, *inter alia*, no more than 15% of the total units are in arrears (more than thirty days past due) of their association assessments.²⁶² An association with more than 15% delinquent owners can go after those owners personally for the unpaid amounts and would be wise to do so.²⁶³ But if the owners are unable to

260. See Mortgagee Letter 2009-19 from Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant Sec'y for Hous.—Fed. Hous. Comm'r, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., to All Approved Mortgagees & All FHA Roster Appraisers 1 (June 12, 2009), *available at* <http://www.bestfhalender.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/09-19ml.pdf> [hereinafter Montgomery, Mortgagee Letter 2009-19] (stating that the FHA "will now allow lenders to determine project eligibility, review project documentation, and certify to compliance . . . HUD will continue to maintain a list of Approved Condominium Projects"); Mortgagee Letter 2009-46A from David H. Stevens, Assistant Sec'y for Hous.—Fed. Hous. Comm'r, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., to All Approved Mortgagees 1 (Nov. 6, 2009), *available at* <http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/09-46aml.pdf> ("This Mortgagee Letter (ML) waives five provisions of that guidance and serves as a temporary directive to address current housing market conditions."); Mortgagee Letter 2009-46B from David H. Stevens, Assistant Sec'y for Hous.—Fed. Hous. Comm'r, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., to All Approved Mortgagees and All FHA Roster Appraisers 1 (Nov. 6, 2009), *available at* <http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/09-46bml.pdf> [hereinafter Stevens, Mortgagee Letter 2009-46B] (stating that the FHA will allow lenders to determine project eligibility, review project documentation, and certify compliance, but FHA will continue to have a list of approved condominium projects).

261. See *supra* note 260. Previously, individual loans in a community could earn HUD approval even if the community as a whole did not get blanket approval from HUD. Such per-unit approval is no longer an option.

262. Stevens, Mortgagee Letter 2009-46B, *supra* note 260, at 4.

263. See *supra* notes 159–77 and accompanying text (discussing association collection efforts).

pay, the paying members make up the budgetary shortfall, while they are simultaneously denied access to financing because of their neighbors' default. Even if a community earns a coveted spot on HUD's "Approved" list, that approval expires in two years unless all requirements are re-certified to the satisfaction of HUD.²⁶⁴

Other requirements for condominium project approval also impact the resolution of the assessment delinquency issue and have contributed to a slowdown in condominium unit sales in an already sluggish market.²⁶⁵ HUD requires that "[n]o more than 10 percent of the units" be owned by one entity, and states that "[a]t least 50 percent of the units of a project must be owner-occupied."²⁶⁶ Such limitations may practically limit the ability of a condominium association to foreclose on liens for unpaid assessments and rent out units in the community in order to attempt to recover some amounts toward the delinquency while also prohibiting troubled owners from generating income from property rental to meet obligations.²⁶⁷ Furthermore, such restrictions make it more difficult for a unit to be sold, since once a community passes the 15% delinquency tipping point (or the 50% rental tipping point), financing for would-be purchasers is essentially no longer available. And most ironically, if a condominium's documents restrict a unit owner's freedom to rent a unit, which it must do to ensure compliance with HUD's 50% rental limitation, the FHA has deemed the documents

264. See Montgomery, Mortgage Letter 2009-19, *supra* note 260 (explaining that the recertification deadline for previously approved condominiums, previously set for December 7, 2010, was extended to dates from December 31, 2010 to March 31, 2010, staggered according to the original project approval date); see also *Government Affairs Update: FHA Condominium Recertification Requirements*, NAT'L ASS'N OF REALTORS (Dec. 8, 2010), <http://www.realtor.org/wps/wcm/connect/15f94c8044f67a04b112f35d6aeab3b5/FHA%2BCondo%2BRecertification%2BRequirements%2B12.8.10.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=15f94c8044f67a04b112f35d6aeab3b5> ("Mortgage Letter 2009-46B states that FHA approved condominium projects must be recertified every two years").

265. See, e.g., Mandyvilla, Comment to *New FHA Condo Guidelines*, BROKER OUTPOST MORTGAGE FORUMS (Dec. 20, 2009, 7:55 AM), <http://forum.brokeroutpost.com/loans/forum/2/283263.htm> ("[Realtors should] motivate sellers to slash the price [of condominium units offered for sale] NOW on their listings before the market does it for them. . . . This is going to be the nail in the condo market. Values are going to plummet around here due to the number of projects that are at 51% concentration [of investor owners] and above.").

266. Montgomery, Mortgage Letter 2009-19, *supra* note 260, at 4.

267. See DAVID H. STEVENS, ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR HOUS./FED. HOUS. COMM'R, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV'T.: CONDO APPROVAL PROCESS (May 2010), *available at* <http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=MAY2010.pdf> (noting that although David Stevens, Assistant Secretary of HUD, explained in May 2010 that HUD modified this "50% owner occupancy requirement to allow the exclusion of vacant and tenant-occupied REOs from the calculation," such exclusions do not apply to real estate owned by *associations* rather than *lending banks*).

as violating the “free transferability” provisions.²⁶⁸ The result is that it is impossible for a condominium to be adequately approved for FHA insurance, either because it allows rentals or because it does not. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require similar owner-occupancy percentages, and thus, a condominium today cannot simultaneously satisfy the criteria of the GSEs and the FHA.²⁶⁹

Because nearly half of all mortgage loans are now insured by the FHA, and almost the entire remainder is sold on the secondary market to either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, the policies of the FHA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac hugely impact resolution of the issue of assessment recovery.²⁷⁰ The current requirements for loans, however, work at cross-purposes: while the delinquency rate is used as a proxy for community fiscal health, the priority limits on association assessments remove from a community a potentially crucial tool for ensuring the association’s financial well-being. In recognition of the harm to communities and lenders that can result from a community with excessive delinquencies, it seems that the FHA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac should use their market power and definitions of qualifying mortgages to support community health rather than place roadblocks to recovery.

c. State Efforts to Add or Enhance Lien Priority

Because capped lien priority typically protects only six months’ worth of assessments, the longer it takes to get a paying owner to take title to the unit, the less protection the law provides. In early 2010, Lender Processing Services, Inc. estimated that on average, it took fifteen months for a home loan to go from being thirty days late to the property being sold in foreclosure.²⁷¹ The lengthy foreclosure timeline is caused in part by the sheer magnitude of the increase in foreclosure

268. 24 C.F.R. § 203.41 (2011).

269. Letter from Loura K. Sanchez, Managing Partner, Hindman Sanchez, to Comm. Ass’n’s Inst. (Nov. 23, 2010) (on file with author).

270. See TREASURY/HUD REPORT, *supra* note 255, at 12 (explaining that the lack of private capital in the housing market since 2008 has led government agencies to insure or guarantee the vast majority of new mortgages); Jody Shenn & John Gittelsohn, *FHA Home-Loan Volume Is Sign of ‘Very Sick System,’ Agency’s Stevens Says*, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2010), <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-24/fha-home-loan-volume-is-sign-of-very-sick-system-agency-s-stevens-says.html> (noting that the FHA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been financing more than 90% of U.S. home lending since the 2008 market collapse); Saskia Scholtes, *Fannie and Freddie Drive Home Loans*, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2008, 7:23 PM), <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/65e8ab08-00dd-11dda0c5000077b07658.html#axzz1TWkKq6Y> (discussing how government-sponsored mortgage companies have become the “backbone” of the U.S. mortgage market); see also *infra* Part II.A.1.c.

271. Viega, *supra* note 8.

volume over the past few years—in 2010, there were more foreclosures commenced each month than were typically commenced in an entire year prior to 2005.²⁷² The recent foreclosure moratoriums and government investigations into bank procedures, introduced in all fifty states in October 2010, significantly lengthened the time needed to complete foreclosure,²⁷³ as lenders have (appropriately) responded to increased procedural scrutiny by slowing the process to ensure validity of the foreclosure.²⁷⁴

Some states have responded to the longer foreclosure timeline and the financial dire straits of associations by increasing the capped amount of their lien priority statutes. Nevada increased the six-month period to nine months,²⁷⁵ and Florida increased its cap to the lesser of twelve months' worth of assessments or 1% of the outstanding mortgage loan amount.²⁷⁶ Although both of these enhanced lien priority measures increased ultimate recovery by an association, they failed to solve the underlying problem that still plagues the six-month capped priority laws: once the designated period has elapsed (be it six or nine or twelve months), lenders have no further incentive to contribute to property upkeep or to expeditiously foreclose so that someone new can take title.

The housing crash prompted the Nevada Legislature to swiftly pass legislation strengthening lien priority protection for assessment liens, increasing the six-month lien priority to a nine-month priority, effective October 1, 2009.²⁷⁷ The state legislators were mindful of the FHA and GSE guidelines, however, so the Nevada statute has an automatic carve-out for mortgages purchased by the GSEs, limiting the lien priority to the maximum allowed by such entities' guidelines (namely, six

272. See *supra* notes 18–19 and accompanying text (reporting 2010 foreclosure statistics).

273. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Dina Elboghady, *50 State Attorneys General Announce Foreclosure Probe*, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2010, at A13.

274. Ensuring compliance with foreclosure procedure is crucial to protecting borrower rights and equity. Because the sale price at a foreclosure is not subject to substantive review, strict adherence to procedural safeguards is the only way that the system can ensure the price obtained is fair and that the borrower is given all notice and the right to redeem, which statutory law and equity require. See, e.g., *BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.*, 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994) (refusing to review the adequacy of a foreclosure sale price and instead focusing exclusively on the foreclosure process, stating, “[w]e deem, as the law has always deemed, that a fair and proper price, or a ‘reasonably equivalent value,’ for foreclosed property, is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of the State’s foreclosure law have been complied with”).

275. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(2)(c) (2010).

276. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011), *preempted by In re Spa at Sunset Isles Condo. Ass’n, Inc.*, No. 10-33758-PGH, 2011 WL 3290239 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 13, 2011).

277. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(2)(c) (2010).

months).²⁷⁸ This carve-out undercuts the statute's effectiveness dramatically, as the vast majority of residential mortgage loans are originated for resale on the secondary market.²⁷⁹ In addition, increasing the cap to nine months, even when applicable, rapidly became insufficient recovery as the post-default/pre-foreclosure duration of mortgages in the state increased.

Florida was the next state to increase the assessment lien priority cap amount. The Florida Distressed Condominium Relief Act of 2010, effective July 1, 2010, provides that a first mortgagee taking title to property through foreclosure is liable for the twelve months of unpaid common expenses and regular periodic assessments that came due during the immediately preceding year.²⁸⁰ The total potential exposure of lenders under this statute, however, is capped at 1% of the outstanding mortgage debt.²⁸¹ While the previous change in the law implementing a six-month cap inspired widespread adherence among lenders who have not contested its retroactive application, Florida courts have not yet stated definitively that the Florida amendment creating a twelve-month cap can be applied retroactively.²⁸² In addition, although states like Colorado have specified that their statutory lien priority provisions trump association documents with provisions to the contrary, it is unclear whether this is true in Florida or whether Florida associations must amend their documents to take

278. *Id.*

279. See TREASURY/HUD REPORT, *supra* note 255, at 2. Secondary resales today are primarily through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. *Id.*

280. Distressed Condominium Relief Act, 2010 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 36 (codified at Fla. Stat. Ch. 718.701–08). Previous modifications in the law increased the cap to twelve months for single family homes in CICs but left the cap at six months for condominium units. The 2010 amendment equalized recovery in both types of CICs. *Id.*

281. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116(1)(b)2 (2011). According to some Florida lawyers, the new law permits unlimited recovery of unpaid assessments from third-party buyers at mortgage foreclosure (unlimited durability of the association lien) and caps recovery only from lenders. Telephone interview with Ben Solomon, Attorney, Association Law Group, P.L., North Bay Village, Fla. (Sept. 28, 2011) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Solomon Interview]. Other Florida attorneys dispute this reading of the law, noting that the twelve-month cap applies to all foreclosure sales, regardless of the identity of the buyer, and expressing doubt that the new twelve-month limit will apply to foreclosures of mortgages originated before 2010. Telephone interview with Chuck Edgar, Attorney, Cherry, Edgar & Smith, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, Fla. (Sept. 27, 2010) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Edgar Interview]. Edgar agrees that the statutory language is ambiguous on this point but notes that there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Florida legislators intended to create a different rule for lender and third-party foreclosure buyers. *Id.*

282. Edgar notes that “Everyone is collecting the six months of assessments, and lenders aren’t fighting it.” Edgar Interview, *supra* note 281. But Edgar also opines that the twelve-month cap may not apply to mortgages originated prior to July 2010 and believes that the legislature in Florida cannot retroactively impose the cap, and only the federal government, not a state government, could pass a law that effects such an “impairment of contract.” *Id.*

advantage of the enhanced lien priority if the documents reference the prior (six-month) capped level.²⁸³ The flaws of Florida's newly amended statute are already apparent, and less than a year later, new legislation has been introduced to "refund and expand upon those amendments and to clarify other condo association issues."²⁸⁴

Florida has been coping with perhaps the worst volume and quality of foreclosures in the nation during the past few years, and the large quantity of foreclosures and many lender missteps have so far discouraged lenders at foreclosure from challenging the law or its application.²⁸⁵ Even if unchallenged, the long delay between commencing and completing foreclosure proceedings in Florida makes the twelve-month capped priority still inadequate in many cases anyway.²⁸⁶ In Florida, as in other states, the best way to ensure repayment of assessment amounts is to immediately start legal proceedings when a homeowner has not paid his dues to get a personal money judgment against the owner in order to compel collection. Pursuing a money judgment is often the cheaper and easier route for an association to take to recover unpaid assessments.

The Florida law is so new that the state's mortgage market has not yet reacted to the change. Interestingly, Florida's twelve-month limit does not have a GSE limit carve-out like the Nevada provision.²⁸⁷ It is unclear how this limitation will play out in Florida with respect to availability of mortgage capital, since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac specifically exclude debts for which a lender could be liable for more than six months of assessment charges from pools of qualifying mortgages.²⁸⁸ Mortgage originators today almost never originate non-

283. *See id.* (noting that everyone is taking advantage of the six-month cap, despite the fact that it is unclear whether or not Florida associations need to amend their documents to take advantage of the enhanced lien priority); Solomon Interview, *supra* note 281 (stating that Florida law permits unlimited recovery of unpaid assessments from third-party buyers at mortgage foreclosure and caps recovery only from lenders).

284. Joshua Krut, *Board of Contributors: After Sweeping Changes in Florida's Condo Law, Expect New Revisions*, DAILY BUS. REV. (Feb. 23, 2011), <http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202482933797> (calling this pending legislation the "glitch bill" because it is designed to clarify unanswered questions relating to the amendments of the prior year).

285. *See* Edgar Interview, *supra* note 281 (agreeing that the statutory language is ambiguous but that the legislature did not intend to create a different rule).

286. *See, e.g., supra* notes 110–12 and accompanying text (identifying incidents in which enhanced lien priority statutes failed to protect condominium associations).

287. It does, however, have a dollar-based cap of 1% of the mortgage loan amount. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(b)2 (2010).

288. Section B4-2.1-06 of Fannie Mae's lending guidelines explicitly states that Fannie Mae will not purchase debt if the holder of the mortgage could be liable for more than six months of regular common expenses charged by a community association. *See* FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE 575–76 (June 28, 2011).

FHA loans that they cannot sell on the secondary mortgage market, and the only truly active secondary residential mortgage market purchasers are the GSEs.²⁸⁹ It remains to be seen if the Distressed Condominium Act adversely impacts the availability of mortgage financing in CIC homes in Florida, or if the GSEs will not enforce these guidelines there or will change their mandates.

After facing much resistance from lender lobbyists, the Maryland General Assembly approved a statute to grant CIC assessment liens a capped priority in mortgage lender foreclosure sales.²⁹⁰ The new law requires that \$1200 of assessments (or up to four months of assessments, if less) be paid to an association prior to payment on the mortgage debt at foreclosure.²⁹¹ Since foreclosure in Maryland takes a minimum of five months to complete,²⁹² this capped assessment liability is clearly inadequate to cover all of an association's costs during the pendency of foreclosure.

Bills specifically aimed at creating six-month limited priority for association assessment liens are currently pending in Ohio and Missouri. Each case is strongly supported by individuals who reside in CICs and community association lobbies, and each case is strongly opposed by bank lobbies. In Ohio, efforts to pass a UCIOA-based lien priority for assessments (House Bill 408) failed to achieve legislative action in the legislature's 2010 session.²⁹³ The efforts are still alive, and proponents of the measure hope that 2011 will see passage of a law creating a provision for six months of assessments plus attorney fees, costs, and expenses to enjoy lien priority superior to all liens but those for property taxes. National and state lenders in Ohio have strongly opposed the bill, contending that it will increase lending costs and complexity and will chill mortgage lending in an already semi-frozen housing capital market.²⁹⁴

289. See TREASURY/HUD REPORT, *supra* note 255, at 2 (discussing how the new plan developed by the administration will bring private capital into the market and decrease the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).

290. H.B. 1246, 428th Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2011). The original bill set the priority cap higher—six months plus late fees and collection costs—but this proposal met vigorous opposition by the Maryland Bankers Association. *Community Association Law Letter*, THOMAS SCHILD LAW GROUP LLC, 1 (Spring 2011), <http://www.schildlaw.com/Spring%202011%20Newsletter.041811.pdf>. The legislature cut down the cap in an effort to appease the mortgage lender lobby. *Id.*

291. Md. H.B. 1246.

292. See Mallory Malesky, *How Long Does Foreclosure Take in Maryland*, EHOW (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.ehow.com/info_8098323_long-foreclosure-maryland.html (explaining Maryland foreclosure procedures).

293. See MALLACH, *supra* note 29 (discussing the foreclosure crisis in Ohio).

294. See Ann Fisher, *Condo Associations Want Plan to Make Owners Pay*, THE COLUMBUS

Banks are also concerned with potential retroactive application of the priority law with respect to loans that have already been funded.²⁹⁵ While active debates on limited priority statutes remain in Ohio and Missouri, in many other states, efforts to create a limited lien priority for association assessments have never gained traction.²⁹⁶

d. Inadequacy of Limited Priority Liens

The priority law for community assessment liens varies among the states, but this problem has been insufficiently addressed in all of them. When unpaid upkeep costs are potentially unlimited, capped losses for the lender necessarily result in unlimited losses allocated to the members of the community. Thus, even a “super-priority” piece allocated to assessment liens becomes inadequate once that period has expired.

When foreclosure takes longer than six months and when foreclosure proceeds are inadequate to pay off a first mortgage—and both of these factors are more and more common today—only a fraction of unpaid assessments are paid, requiring paying members of the association to fund the remainder.²⁹⁷ Furthermore, even in some jurisdictions with a limited association lien priority, proceeds at foreclosure do not automatically apply to unpaid assessments (the capped portion being deemed a durability rather than payment priority provision), and thus the association has to bring a lawsuit—and incur more community costs—just to recover the amounts that are legally theirs. Miami Beach Commissioner Jerry Libbin calls this problem an “outrageous loophole” in the law.²⁹⁸

DISPATCH, July 5, 2009, at 01B.

295. *See id.* (“Banks and other lenders typically have opposed such laws, contending that they increase the cost and complexity of lending.”).

296. *See, e.g.,* S.B. 411, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010) (stricken Jan. 27, 2010) (establishing limited lien priority for condominium association assessments).

297. *See* Coleman, *supra* note 104, at 1A (noting that condominium owners in good standing are often charged “special assessments” to make up for unpaid fees from delinquents owners).

298. Admin, Comment to *Ruling May Help Homeowner Associations*, HISTORIC CITY NEWS (Feb. 6, 2010, 2:31 PM), <http://www.historiccity.com/2010/staugustine/news/florida/ruling-may-help-homeowner-associations-2546>. Libbin heralded the reverse foreclosure tactic, *see infra* Part II.A.2, as an important step toward protecting owners in condominiums. *See id.* (noting that Libbin applauded a Miami-Dade Circuit court ruling ordering a “reverse foreclosure”). Florida’s legislature considered a bill that would have required banks to complete foreclosure after a year of filing or pay all unpaid assessments, but this proposal never came to a vote. *See* Rob Samouce, *Laws Needed to Get Delinquent Properties Back on Market*, NAPLES DAILY NEWS (Jan. 2, 2010), <http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2010/jan/02/laws-needed-get-delinquent-properties-back-market/> (noting that strong bank lobbying was the cause of legislative inaction on the bill); *see also* HOA’s Forcing “Reverse Foreclosures,” TITLE SEARCH BLOG (Mar. 1, 2010, 10:26 AM), <http://titlesearchblog.com/2010/03/01/hoas-forcing-reverse-fore-closures/> (remarking that the bill

The general problem of unpaid assessments is dramatically exacerbated in the current market context where lenders (sometimes deliberately) delay foreclosure on defaulting properties.²⁹⁹ Lenders can—and today often do—delay foreclosure. It is true that foreclosure can take a long time for other reasons: mortgage loan servicers are currently overwhelmed with the number of defaulting borrowers, and lenders look hopefully to future market price rebounds to recover under-collateralized loan amounts. In addition, mortgage servicers' faulty record-keeping and failure to follow legally-mandated procedures operate to stretch out the foreclosure timeline as well.³⁰⁰

But lenders also sometimes strategically delay based on their calculation that they will be unable to sell the property at foreclosure or resell the property afterwards because of the sluggish housing market.³⁰¹ Procrastination can help lenders avoid incurring the obligations of home ownership, including property taxes and community association assessments. This is particularly true in cases where there is a very real risk that the ultimate sale price for the property will not reimburse such costs. Once the lender owns the real estate (real estate owned, or "REO" properties), the lender itself is responsible for assessment charges and, unlike insolvent mortgage borrowers, can typically be sued successfully for assessment payments they neglect to make.³⁰² Because this obligation is assumed upon taking title, lenders in many cases prefer to postpone foreclosure,

"never saw the light of day for a vote by the legislature").

299. See, e.g., Marshall L. Jones, *Condo Associations Battle Deadbeat Owners, Balky Banks in Collecting Fees*, REAL EST. L. & INDUS. REP., Apr. 6, 2010, at 3 ("As lenders institute foreclosure proceedings against defaulting condominium owners, some condominium associations are seeing lenders delay in completing the foreclosure process.").

300. See *supra* note 3 and accompanying text. In addition to servicer and bank moratoriums on foreclosures, several states, including Connecticut and Texas, froze all foreclosures in October 2010 pending inquiry into faulty and fraudulent loan servicing procedures. Several other states stopped foreclosures by J.P. Morgan Chase, GMAC and Ally Financial, the institutions tainted with the "robo-signing" scandal. See Cha, *supra* note 3, at A9 (noting that the moratoriums have now been lifted, but the pace of foreclosure remains slow).

301. See Coleman, *supra* note 104, at 1A (noting that some banks deliberately delay taking back property worth less than the outstanding mortgage); Benny L. Kass, *Condo Associations Saddled with Unpaid Dues Demand that Banks Stop Delaying Foreclosures*, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2010, at E3 (noting that condo associations are often left with unpaid dues when banks, wanting to avoid assuming liability on unpaid condominium dues and taxes, delay foreclosure on a unit).

302. See, e.g., Leigh Katzman, *Waiting for the Bank to Foreclose: A Modern Day Story*, KATZMAN GARFINKEL ROSENBAUM, 1–3, [http://kgblawfirm.com/pdfs/Waiting for the bank to foreclose-LCK.pdf](http://kgblawfirm.com/pdfs/Waiting%20for%20the%20bank%20to%20foreclose-LCK.pdf) (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (detailing all the costs that a lender will incur upon taking title to real estate at a mortgage foreclosure sale and concluding that "the bank can comfortably delay completing its foreclosure action knowing the full extent of its liability for past due assessments").

hoping that the market will improve and property resale will be more quickly forthcoming. As Florida attorney Ben Solomon explains, “[t]he bottom line is the banks don’t want to assume the liability associated with the unit, including the obligation to pay maintenance assessments to the association.”³⁰³ In the meantime, collateral values are preserved through assessments that lenders neither pay nor reimburse.

Today, the delay between initial mortgage default and actual foreclosure sale is longer than ever before. Since bank liability for previously unpaid assessments is capped—or, in many places, non-existent—mortgage lenders receive an unjust enrichment of collateral upkeep at the cost of other members of the community. Currently, there is nothing in the law to prevent such an outcome.

Foreclosure delays increase the ultimate charges borne by the non-defaulting neighbors but also cause neighboring owners to suffer in other ways. As unpaid assessments increase, dues increase, units fall into disrepair, and abandonment increases the likelihood of vandalism and squatters. When foreclosure finally happens, both property values and quality of life for the community have declined.³⁰⁴

Focusing on the complete lack of even a capped assessment priority in a majority of states, Washington, D.C. association law expert and syndicated columnist Benny Kass has publicly called for nationwide campaigns to create UCIOA-like provisions in those states that have not yet passed such a law.³⁰⁵ But even if the thirty-three states with no limited priority passed UCIOA-based six-month (or larger) caps, the underlying problem would persist: lenders can offload a theoretically unlimited amount of upkeep costs of their collateral onto innocent members of the community with no adequate recourse at law for the community and its paying members. And since the limited priority of assessment liens under UCIOA and similar statutes only takes effect upon a first mortgage foreclosure, the limited priority lien fails to force the bank’s hand and achieve a more expeditious resolution through conveying the unit to an owner willing and able to contribute to community costs.³⁰⁶

303. Sutta, *supra* note 6.

304. See, e.g., Rogers, *supra* note 181, at 1–3 (describing the course of foreclosure proceedings); *supra* Part I.B.2 (discussing the financial tragedy of the commons associated with foreclosures in condominium associations).

305. See Kass, *infra* note 356 (stating that such monthly-based limited priority lien systems “must be enacted all over the country as soon as possible”).

306. Note that some creative litigators have attempted to do just that, with some limited success in Florida. See *infra* Part II.A.2.

State legislatures could close this “loophole” by mandating true priority for community assessment liens (at least with respect to dues that are unpaid during a period of mortgage default) or by making CIC assessment liens non-extinguishable in foreclosure. Capping community losses rather than lender losses would eliminate the distortion that the current potential “free ride” creates for lenders weighing the costs of foreclosure. This would encourage lenders to pay community assessments during borrower defaults, whether or not it also encourages the pace of foreclosure to increase. Either way, the community’s losses and contagion effects of the distressed properties is contained: at some defined point in time, a solvent interest-holder in a unit will be encouraged to pay the unit’s equitable allocation of costs. This type of limited priority would be vastly more equitable than the UCIOA-type of total-amount capped lien, both in terms of allocating upkeep costs and in terms of efficiently motivating housing rollover and market stability.

2. Creative Litigation Strategies

Florida is perhaps the epicenter of the CIC assessment crisis.³⁰⁷ Florida was the site of one of the largest housing booms over the past few decades.³⁰⁸ In particular, condominium development and financing flourished in Florida through 2007.³⁰⁹ Condominiums in Florida

307. See ElBoghdady, *supra* note 10, at A14 (noting that nine of the twenty regions with the worst foreclosure rates were in Florida); Brad Heath, *Most Foreclosures Pack into a Few Counties*, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2009, at 1A (noting that eight counties in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada were responsible for one quarter of all foreclosures in the U.S. in 2008). See generally Prashant Gopal, *Florida Condo Owners Footing Bill for Foreclosures*, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Nov. 29, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/hotproperty/archives/2007/11/florida_condo_o.html (detailing results of the 2009 Florida Community Association Mortgage Foreclosure Survey). Florida is also one of the states most impacted by the housing crisis in general.

308. See MAUREEN F. MAITLAND & DAVID M. BLITZER, S&P/CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE INDICES 2009, A YEAR IN REVIEW 5–6 (2010), available at <http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/index-research/en/us/?type=All&category=Economic> (follow “S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices: 2009 A Year In Review (PDF)” hyperlink) (showing double-digit rise in home prices in Florida, followed by a precipitous decline as the real estate market went into crisis); Haya El Nasser, *Florida Growth Outpaces National Trend*, USA TODAY (Mar. 22, 2011, 3:25:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/census/2011-03-17-florida-census_N.htm (comparing growth rates in Florida to the rest of the country); see also *South Florida Absorbs Growth Across the Board*, SE. REAL EST. BUS. (Sept. 2005), <http://www.southeastrealestatebusiness.com/articles/SEP05/highlight2.html> (enthusiastically discussing the robust growth of the real estate market in Florida—which in hindsight seems ironic and naïve).

309. See, e.g., Richard Peep, *Condo Culture: How Florida Became Floridistan*, NEWGEOGRAPHY (May 22, 2011), <http://www.newgeography.com/content/002245-condo-culture-how-florida-became-floridistan> (telling of the appeal and growth of condominium developments and investment properties in Florida in the 1990s).

attracted many real estate investor-buyers,³¹⁰ and the demographics of the state—in particular, the high percentage of retired persons—made low-maintenance/high amenity housing particularly appealing. But this same demographic makes the population more vulnerable to escalating monthly housing costs. Because of these factors, Florida today presents the most extreme case of foreclosure delay spillovers and community governance insolvency. This foreclosure delay is rampant: there are ample news reports of lenders’ strategic postponement of public auctions,³¹¹ and the average foreclosure now takes longer than a year and a half.³¹² Although the amended Florida law permits a capped recovery after mortgage foreclosure of an amount equal to the lesser of twelve months’ worth of unpaid association assessments or 1% of the outstanding mortgage loan amount,³¹³ in most cases this limited amount will not cover all of an association’s unpaid assessments.

Florida attorneys representing community associations have become very creative in seeking recovery for their clients. One particularly interesting tactic has been termed a “reverse foreclosure.”³¹⁴ To achieve a reverse foreclosure, the association must first foreclose on its assessment lien and take title to a delinquent unit subject to the first mortgage lien.³¹⁵ The association, as now-owner of the property, files a motion for summary judgment in the mortgage lender’s own foreclosure action, seeking judgment in favor of the lender.³¹⁶ The association

310. A majority of the condominium units in Florida in 2007 were non-owner occupied (investor properties). See Shimberg Ctr. for Affordable Hous., *State of Florida’s Housing, 2007 Executive Summary*, AFFORDABLE HOUS. ISSUES, Apr. 2008, at 1, 3, available at <http://www.shimberg.ufl.edu/pdf/Newslet-Apr08.pdf> (listing statistics for owner-occupied condos in Florida).

311. See, e.g., Coleman, *supra* note 104, at 1A (“[L]enders are in no hurry to take back delinquent units, only to have to turn around and sell them amid a market that has crashed.”).

312. Interview with Kevin Miller, Attorney (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter Miller Interview] (notes on file with author).

313. S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 718.116 (2010)).

314. See Coleman, *supra* note 104, at 1A (describing reverse foreclosures as a “a tool that can force banks to pay association maintenance fees when unit owners don’t”); Susannah Nesmith, *Ruling Could Give Embattled Associations Relief*, DAILY BUS. REV. (Jan. 27, 2010), <http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202466596282> (describing a “reverse foreclosure” ruling in a Miami-Dade Circuit Court case forcing a bank to take title to a property from a homeowner association); Paul Brinkman, *Miami Judge Grants Reverse Foreclosure*, S. FLA. BUS. J. (Jan. 25, 2010, 4:04 PM), <http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/stories/2010/01/25/daily10.html> (quoting attorney Ben Solomon, who notes that reverse foreclosures reverse “will finally help associations force banks to take title to financially upside down units much faster than ever before”); “Reverse Foreclosure” Makes Banks Accountable to HOA, FLA. L. J. (Jan. 25, 2010), <http://www.thefloridalawjournal.com/2010/01/reverse-foreclosure-makes-banks-accountable-to-hoa/> (noting reverse foreclosure is a legal strategy for condominium and homeowners associations to prevent banks from stalling foreclosures).

315. See Nesmith, *supra* note 314 (describing the procedures for enforcing a reverse foreclosure).

316. *Id.*

waives all claims for notice and sale of the property under Florida's foreclosure laws and moves that the court immediately order the title to be transferred to the lender.³¹⁷

Keys Gate Community Association successfully employed the reverse foreclosure approach on a home to which it had taken title in 2007 after the owners stopped paying assessments.³¹⁸ The first mortgage lender on the unit, HSBC Bank USA, filed its own notice to foreclose two months after the association took title, but the foreclosure sale never happened.³¹⁹ Finding itself stuck with an empty house and two-and-one-half years worth of unpaid dues (over \$5000), the association attempted the new strategy of moving for summary judgment in favor of the mortgage lender.³²⁰ In January 2010, Miami-Dade Circuit Judge Jerald Bagley accepted the association's argument and ordered title immediately transferred to HSBC, making it liable for all future community assessments.³²¹ The court also ordered HSBC to pay the association's legal fees and court costs in connection with the reverse foreclosure action as well as the capped lien priority amount that trumped the first mortgage lien. Because this amount was capped, the association had to write off \$3820 in unpaid fees, but at least the long delay in finding a financially responsible unit owner was finally over.³²² As Keys Gate attorney Ben Solomon put it, "[t]he quicker we can move these distressed properties through the process and into the hands of somebody who will pay a mortgage and pay taxes and pay their dues, the quicker we can get the economy back on track."³²³

In the wake of the Keys Gate success, the reverse foreclosure strategy gained popularity during early 2010.³²⁴ Ben Solomon's firm, Association Law Group, filed eighty-three foreclosures around the state,

317. *Id.*; Paul Owers & Lisa J. Huriash, *Fighting Over Foreclosures—Homeowner Associations Target Delinquent Tenants, Lax Lenders*, SUN SENTINEL, Aug. 10, 2010, at 1A.

318. HSBC Bank USA v. Keys Gate Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. No. 07-18411 CA 09 (Fla. Jan. 12, 2010).

319. *Id.*

320. Coleman, *supra* note 104, at 1A.

321. Peter L. Mosca, *Florida Court Decision Could Impact Builders and Bank Foreclosure Processes*, REALTY TIMES (Feb. 17, 2010), http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20100217_florida_court.htm.

322. *Id.*; *see also* Coleman, *supra* note 104, at 1A (describing Keys Gate Community Association's use of the reverse foreclosure tactic).

323. Nesmith, *supra* note 314.

324. *See Ruling May Help Homeowner Associations*, HIST. CITY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2010), <http://www.historiccity.com/2010/staugustine/news/florida/ruling-may-help-homeowner-associations-2546> (noting that some firms have been in favor of reverse foreclosure to avoid paying past due fees).

with varying success.³²⁵ The reverse foreclosure concept is novel, and both judges and lenders were confused by the summary judgment motion.³²⁶ Some courts did not realize that the association in such cases was arguing for judgment for the lender; some lenders did not realize this either. While the Miami-Dade judges have been receptive to the idea of a reverse foreclosure, no district court has yet considered and approved the tactic.³²⁷

In some cases, the exotic nature of the reverse foreclosure claim caused lenders to just walk away. For example, Citibank responded to a reverse foreclosure motion by just writing off the entire mortgage debt, leaving the association owners owning the unit.³²⁸ However, the association had hoped to win a financially competent owner by losing the foreclosure case, and by winning the case, the association lost access to the bank's deep pocket for future assessment costs.³²⁹

The reverse foreclosure strategy is interesting, but it is legally cumbersome and unpredictable. In addition, this judicial tactic is limited to situations where (a) the association has previously foreclosed on its lien, subject to a first mortgage lien, and (b) the first mortgagee has already filed a foreclosure action. If a lender has not yet commenced a court action for foreclosure, no summary judgment motion can be filed. In addition, the reverse foreclosure requires the unreimbursed costs of the association's own foreclosure action. Furthermore, the entire recovery by the association in Florida is capped at 1% of the outstanding mortgage loan or twelve months of assessment costs.³³⁰ If the unit in default already has a tenant, there is an even better option available to the association. Under the 2010 amendment, the association can collect rents from a defaulting unit without having to foreclose or file a motion in a lender's proceeding, which may permit a more immediate and greater recovery for the community.³³¹

Association lawyers in Florida have made other attempts to find an avenue for recourse within the existing legal framework. The Association Law Group pioneered a tactic they call "The Mortgage Terminator" to wipe out a mortgage lien in cases where an association has foreclosed on the unit and the mortgage lender has not commenced

325. Solomon Interview, *supra* note 281.

326. *Id.*

327. Miller Interview, *supra* note 312.

328. Sutta, *supra* note 6.

329. *See id.* (discussing Citibank's willingness to hand over title).

330. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116(1)(b)(1)(a)-(b) (West 2011).

331. *Id.*

foreclosure proceedings.³³² The association title-holder of the property brought its own case against Wells Fargo in a Broward County case in 2010, claiming that the bank lost its equitable claim to its real estate collateral by deliberately delaying commencement of foreclosure proceedings.³³³ The court agreed and wiped out the mortgage lien.³³⁴

In another case where the lender strategically delayed foreclosure, the condominium association sued to force the lender to act. The trial court, in *United States Bank National Ass'n v. Tadmire*, found the association's arguments compelling and ordered the lender to "diligently proceed with the pending foreclosure action . . . or pay monthly maintenance fees on the condominium unit in foreclosure."³³⁵ The court based its holding on its general equitable powers, concluding that the association was unreasonably prejudiced by the lender's deliberate delay in pursuing foreclosure.³³⁶ Thus, the court reasoned that it was fair and equitable to order the lender to pay monthly assessments even prior to foreclosure.³³⁷ The trial court decision in *Tadmire* at first sparked a flurry of interest in the concept of using equity to force an expeditious foreclosure, but the holding was short-lived. The appellate district court in *Tadmire* reversed, holding that the lender could not be obliged to pay condominium assessments on a unit it did not (yet) own.³³⁸ There was no contractual obligation to pay those fees, and no obligation would arise until the lender acquired title.³³⁹ Although the association's claim was made in equity, the court of appeals held that equity could only follow the law, not divert from it.³⁴⁰

Other associations pin their hopes on provisions in the Florida foreclosure statute that mandate a foreclosure sale to be scheduled no sooner than twenty and no later than thirty-five days after court

332. Daniel Vasquez, *Broward Case May be First of Many*, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 10, 2010), <http://www.algpl.com/news/press/MH-Oct-10-2010.pdf>.

333. *Id.*

334. *Id.*

335. *U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Tadmire*, 23 So. 3d 822, 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).

336. *Id.* at 823.

337. *Id.*

338. *Id.*

339. *Id.*

340. The court noted that "equity follows the law" and reasoned that therefore, equity "cannot be utilized to impose this obligation without limitation before title is passed." *Id.* While the *Tadmire* approach was creative, it is unsurprising that the trial decision was reversed. There is a long-standing view that each lienholder can determine its own foreclosure timing. See NELSON & WHITMAN, *supra* note 58, at 612 (stating that a foreclosure on a junior lien cannot affect a senior mortgagee's interest because the senior should be allowed to choose when to sell).

filing.³⁴¹ Although Florida attorney Kevin Miller opines that an association might be able to claim violation of this provision when foreclosure is unduly delayed, lenders uniformly have maintained that the provision creates remedies for the mortgagee alone.³⁴² In addition, an association, as a junior lienholder, could ask the court for a management conference for the foreclosure case according to a procedural rule designed to move cases along.³⁴³

The Florida statute leaves unanswered the question of how far association documents can go to enhance the scope and priority of the assessment lien.³⁴⁴ Citing the statutory provision giving mortgage lenders priority over association liens,³⁴⁵ the court in *Coral Lakes Community Ass'n, Inc. v. Busey Bank, N.A.*, for example, refused to hold a foreclosing lender jointly and severally liable with its borrower for unpaid assessments despite language in the declaration to that effect.³⁴⁶ In an earlier case with similar declaration language, however, a Florida district court held that a wholly-owned subsidiary of the mortgage lender who acquired title at foreclosure would be deemed a third party not entitled to protection by the assessment priority cap³⁴⁷ and thus, could be sued personally for the entire unpaid assessment amount.³⁴⁸ The details of which entities could and could not be sued personally for unpaid assessments, based on language in the association's declaration, could end up being quite complicated as the disputes regarding transfer of mortgages muddy the question of which entity holds what interest in the property. The Florida statute is unclear, and Florida laws are inconsistent on this point.

341. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.031 (1) (a) (West 2011).

342. Miller Interview, *supra* note 312. Even if courts agreed with the association's arguments with respect to this provision, there would be no way to use the statute to force lenders to commence a foreclosure proceeding.

343. *Id.*

344. A fifteen-year-old Florida case suggests that total super-priority of an association lien could be created by the association declaration. *Holly Lake Ass'n v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n*, 660 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 1995). The hope that such precedent would endure has been chilled by a more recent Florida decision where the association documents provided that any subsequent parcel owner "regardless of how his or her title has been acquired, including by purchase at a foreclosure sale" is personally, jointly and severally liable for all unpaid assessments, along with the prior delinquent owner. *Coral Lakes Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Busey Bank, N.A.*, 30 So. 3d 579, 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).

345. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3085 (6) (West 2010).

346. *Coral Lakes Cmty. Ass'n, Inc.*, 30 So. 3d at 584.

347. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116(1) (West 2010).

348. Strangely, the court held that the statutory limitation on post-foreclosure recovery of assessments applied only to limit a lender-purchaser at foreclosure, leaving a third-party foreclosure purchaser fully responsible for unpaid assessments. *Bay Holdings, Inc. v. 2000 Island Blvd. Condo. Ass'n*, 895 So. 2d 1197, 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).

3. True Lien Priority: An Analogy to Property Taxes

Community associations function like governments: they perform public functions and are funded by assessments paid by their citizenry. In fact, the trend over the past few decades has been for public governments to assign to private communities more and more responsibility for services that a municipality would otherwise provide.³⁴⁹ Community governance and upkeep costs incurred by municipalities are funded through property taxes, and unpaid property taxes are secured by a lien on the subject property that enjoys true super-priority status. Unpaid taxes are therefore paid first (or remain burdening the property) at the foreclosure sale. The simplest solution to the CIC tragedy of the commons posed by unpaid and uncollectable assessments would be to grant true priority to liens securing such amounts, analogizing the assessments to property taxes. If association liens were granted complete and true priority over mortgage liens, then the association foreclosure would necessarily bring mortgage lenders “to the table” to pay for their collateral upkeep charges or to participate in a joint foreclosure proceeding.

On the one hand, an analogy between community assessments and property taxes is compelling; both governments offer public upkeep to a community such as paving, snow removal, and open space maintenance. In these ways, the community functions like a municipality proxy by providing services to the public.³⁵⁰ In fact, taxpayers who live in New Jersey CICs have successfully claimed the right to offset a portion of their community assessments from property taxes based on a double taxation complaint.³⁵¹ However, this analogy can only be taken so far. Many community-provided amenities are actually a supplement to municipal services rather than their replacement, and in the vast majority of states, assessments are not legally considered local “taxes.”³⁵² To the extent that community services provide private community benefits (such as amenity upkeep), they represent individual

349. See TREESE ET AL., *supra* note 16, at 6 (stating that government privatizes its functions, requiring community associations to fulfill an otherwise municipal obligation).

350. The town of Reston, Virginia was the first CIC and provides many municipal government services. RESTON ASSOCIATION, <http://www.reston.org/default.aspx?qenc=HzT9ACzZbNs%3d&qenc=HzT9ACzZbNs%3d> (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).

351. See HYATT, *supra* note 15, at 133 (citing *Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Estate of Allison*, 174 A.2d 631, 640 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1961)) (reasoning that a property’s true value does not include value of public rights transferred to a community).

352. Assessments are not deductible from federal and state tax impositions, for example, even when the community association services are a proxy for services normally provided by local municipalities. See HYATT, *supra* note 14, at 106 (arguing that community associations target assessments in a manner that local government cannot).

property-carrying costs rather than funding a benefit to the broader public, akin to property taxes.

Lenders would likely have strong objections to the idea that community assessments should be granted true priority by virtue of their tax-like function and likely will predict the disappearance of home mortgage credit should such a rule be adopted.³⁵³ Nevertheless, having property taxes prime the mortgage lien has not dissuaded lenders from making mortgage loans. Lenders routinely protect themselves against any superior-priority payment obligation of their borrowers through establishing property tax escrow accounts. Lenders could demand similar escrow accounts for community assessments.³⁵⁴ In fact, current Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac forms already specifically anticipate escrow account mandates for such amounts.³⁵⁵

4. Consent and Control by Community Members

Unlike a mortgage lender, who has the ability to perform a credit inquiry and refuse to lend money to a financially risky borrower, homeowners in condominiums and homeowner associations have no ability to force their neighbors to disclose the details of their finances. Even if this information were available, owners currently have little ability to control who buys properties in their community. One potential solution to the problem of financial interdependence in privately governed communities, however, would be to permit communities to perform credit diligence regarding prospective new members and control entry into the association. Washington, D.C. lawyer Benny Kass has suggested this type of solution: enable community boards of directors to approve or disapprove all potential purchasers of units.³⁵⁶

353. The vigorous opposition mounted by the mortgage banking lobbyists to attempts to institute even a limited lien priority in states such as Ohio is a case in point. *See Fisher, supra* note 294, at 01B.

354. Such escrow accounts, however, might be more administratively expensive than those for insurance and taxes because many CICs assess monthly rather than yearly or bi-yearly.

355. *See* EFANNIEMAE.COM, https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/sec_instruments/ (last visited July 30, 2011) (providing mortgage documents by state). Associations, on the other hand, are vastly more limited in their ability to create property-specific escrow accounts upon, say, resale. Unless community documentation so provides, any efforts would be struck down as *ultra vires*.

356. Benny Kass, *Foreclosures are Impacting Condominium Projects*, REALTY TIMES (Apr. 30, 2007), <http://realtytimes.com/rtnews/reu2pages/bennylkass.htm?open&Vol=32&ID=715> (posing the question: "If the lenders will not screen their borrowers, why should a community association have to suffer by having a new owner who will not be able to meet his/her financial obligations to the association?").

Cooperatives have long had such ability to control the identity of their members.³⁵⁷ New York cases have repeatedly upheld pre-approval provisions in cooperative documents and even individual denials of approval for cooperative membership based on criteria as indirectly relevant as an applicant's fame or legal training.³⁵⁸ The justification for legally permitting such practices in cooperatives is typically its disparate ownership structure: owners are co-investors in an entity that holds title to the building in addition to being tenants of their particular unit. Financing of the building occurs at two levels: through the entity title holder and at the individual-unit-owner level. Because of this increased financial interconnectedness, courts have opined that cooperatives should be able to self-select their members.³⁵⁹ In the context of condominiums and homeowner associations, however, power to disapprove would-be unit purchasers would be more problematic, opening a Pandora's Box of discrimination. The possible danger posed by such a solution underscores the importance of finding and enacting a viable solution through the priority law instead.

Property law is hostile to restraints on alienation, and courts suspiciously scrutinize restrictive covenants limiting the ability of an owner to sell his or her property. Economic theory in general argues for

357. Cooperatives must still abide by the Fair Housing Act and may not discriminate based on membership in a protective class. *Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc.*, 610 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1979).

358. *See, e.g., Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp.*, 160 N.E.2d 720, 724 (N.Y. 1959) (“[T]here is no reason why the owners of the co-operative apartment house could not decide for themselves with whom they wish to share their [building].”); *DeSoignies v. Cornasesk House Tenants’ Corp.*, 800 N.Y.S.2d 679, 682 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (upholding the board’s absolute right to control leasing “for any reason or no reason”); *Simpson v. Berkley Owner’s Corp.*, 623 N.Y.S.2d 583, 583 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (the cooperative board “had the right to withhold their approval of petitioners’ purchaser for any reason or no reason”); *Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights*, 481 N.Y.S.2d 858, 859–60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (upholding the denial of a transfer of shares in an apartment because it was not discriminatory); *Goldstone v. Constable*, 443 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381–82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (holding that “directors of this cooperative housing corporation have the contractual and inherent power to approve or disapprove the transfer of shares and the assignment of proprietary leases, absent discriminatory practices prohibited by law”). Cooperative boards have refused to permit owners to transfer units to many famous individuals, including Madonna, Gloria Vanderbilt, Mariah Carey, Calvin Klein, Antonio Banderas, Melanie Griffith, and former President Richard Nixon. MARRIANE M. JENNINGS, *REAL ESTATE LAW* 255 (8th ed. 2008) (citing Ellen Wulforst, *New York Apartment Buyers Face Powerful Co-Op Boards*, EPOCH TIMES, Jan. 27–Feb. 2, 2005, at 13); *see also* Harvey S. Epstein, Note, *Weisner Revisited: A Reappraisal of a Co-op’s Power to Arbitrarily Prohibit a Transfer of its Shares*, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 477, 481–85 (1985–1986) (explaining that cooperative boards in New York arbitrarily prohibit transfer of residences, and applicants are subject to increasing scrutiny). For a current dispute involving the famous Dakota complex in Manhattan’s Upper West Side, *see* Basil Katz, *Lawsuit Peeks into World of New York City Co-ops*, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 2011, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/03/us-housing-newyork-idUSTRE7129IR20110203>.

359. Subject to anti-discriminatory limitations imposed by the Fair Housing and the Civil Rights Acts.

free alienation of property so that society may achieve the property's highest and best use, as well as maximize its value.³⁶⁰ Although free alienation increases individual member risks in the context of the entangled finances of a common interest community, courts typically strike down consent requirements as incompatible with fee simple absolute ownership rights.³⁶¹ Even explicit contract regimes restricting free transferability in the name of community, harmony, and joint objectives have been struck down as a restraint on alienation that is repugnant to the fee simple.³⁶² Retaining the right to approve purchasers through a covenant regime impermissibly recalls feudal controls; courts have consistently refused to enforce such restrictions.³⁶³

An association's right of first refusal to purchase a unit has been upheld, however, because an owner can be made economically whole by selling to the association in lieu of an objectionable buyer.³⁶⁴ But such a provision will inadequately protect the financial interests of the community because it requires the community itself to fund the purchase and upkeep of a unit as the only way to block a prospective buyer. This is even more financially burdensome than permitting a prospective buyer to take title and then incur the costs of enforcing assessment obligations.

Although it is difficult to force bare approval requirements limiting an owner's ability to sell his unit in a condominium or homeowner association, it is very ordinary in a common interest community to control an owner's ability to rent a unit. Absolute prohibitions on renting are sometimes claimed to be an unreasonable restriction of fee title, but courts typically enforce initial limits on renting (an owner must occupy the unit for the first year, for example); limits on short-term

360. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 450 (4th ed. 2006).

361. *See, e.g.,* Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 144 A. 245, 246 (Md. 1929) (holding that limitations on restraint of alienation are invalid).

362. *See, e.g.,* Riste v. E. Wash. Bible Camp, Inc., 605 P.2d 1294, 1295 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a clause preventing a grantee from transferring title for fee simple without approval from the grantor is a restraint on alienation and therefore void).

363. *See, e.g.,* Aquarian Found., Inc. v. Sholom House, Inc., 448 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an association's right to withhold consent to a unit's transfer was "obviously an absolute restraint on alienation" because the association was not required to purchase the unit at fair market value itself upon refusing consent); *Northwest Real Estate Co.*, 144 A. at 246 (striking down as "clearly repugnant to fee-simple title" a deed covenant providing that land may not be subsequently sold without consent of the grantor); *Riste*, 605 P.2d at 1294 (refusing to enforce a restriction for a CIC limiting sale of land to persons approved by the seller church).

364. *See, e.g.,* Wolinsky v. Kadison, 449 N.E.2d 151, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that an association may exercise its right of first refusal after considering a prospective buyer's qualifications).

leasing (no leases with a term less than six months, for example); and even limits on the number of units in a community that can be rental-occupied at any time.³⁶⁵ Such leasing limitations are typically upheld even when they are created in non-unanimous amendments to the governing documents.³⁶⁶ Not only do courts enforce aggregate limitations on the percentage of units in a CIC that can be rented at any one time, but Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA have issued guidelines that limit the percentage of a community that can be rented out, likely as a proxy for financial health of the community.³⁶⁷

Although permitting association boards to exercise approval rights over sales might be judicially justified as an extension of the broad enforcement of leasing restrictions boards already can exercise in any case, it would be bad policy to rely on board diligence and approval as a way to protect the community's financial health, and this approach should be avoided. From a legal standpoint, requiring prior approval of purchasers would create a hardship for owners who are trying to sell, and indeed the approval right is repugnant to the fee. Such a requirement would mean that a would-be seller would not only have to find a willing buyer, but would also have to prove that the candidate was a credible financial risk. In a tight market, the hardship and delay caused by this requirement would further freeze out sales of units and would increase the possibility that an owner would default instead of re-selling.

In addition, the power to approve buyers is fraught with the potential for abuse by other members of the association, and to solve one problem (uncollectable assessments) by creating others (too much board power limiting freedom to transfer property and the potential for insidious discrimination) is nonsensical. These problems are already rampant and difficult to resolve in co-ops.³⁶⁸ Further, using the CIC structure to

365. *Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Jahn*, 806 So. 2d 452, 462 (Fla. 2002) (holding that a leasing restriction was reasonable).

366. *See Apple II Condo. Ass'n v. Worth Bank & Trust*, 659 N.E.2d 93, 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that the leasing restrictions were a valid exercise of association authority). Even disparate impact based on race does not invalidate a leasing restriction. *See Villas West II of Willowridge v. McGlothlin*, 841 N.E.2d 584, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (refusing to hold that every discriminatory action is illegal), *vacated*, 885 N.E.2d 1274 (Ind. 2008).

367. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will not buy loans secured by properties in common interest communities where more than 49% of the units are occupied by tenants rather than owners. *See FANNIE MAE, CONDOMINIUM PROJECT REVIEW: OPTIONS FOR PROJECT APPROVAL 1-2* (2010), *available at* <https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/refmaterials/approvedprojects/pdf/condoprojectreview.pdf> (outlining the requirements for project approval); *FREDDIE MAC, FREDDIE MAC CONDOMINIUM UNIT MORTGAGES 3* (2011), *available at* <http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/pdfs/uw/condo.pdf> (outlining more requirements for project approval).

368. *See* Matt Chaban, *Board to Death: As Co-ops Swagger Back from the Brink, Brooklyn Pals Plot Their Demise*, N.Y. OBSERVER (Apr. 26, 2011), <http://www.observer.com/2011/real->

create legal limits on a seller's right to transfer to certain types of borrowers harkens back to the days of racial discrimination because the perpetuation of racial segregation was the initial motivation for forming many early suburban CICs.³⁶⁹

The unsavory history of homeowner associations—still obvious from many first-generation restrictive covenants in the land records—reveals a dark side of private governments: racially segregated neighborhoods where restrictive covenants contractually barred would-be sellers from selling to certain would-be buyers based on pernicious discriminatory criteria. The U.S. Supreme Court in *Shelley v. Kraemer* held with tortured legal reasoning that racially-based restrictive covenants were unenforceable under the Fourteenth Amendment because the enforcement of a contract to discriminate would amount to government action.³⁷⁰ Then, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, which made discriminatory sale restrictions illegal and invalid.³⁷¹ Today, because of that Act, decisions to rent or sell housing may not lawfully be based on “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”³⁷²

estate/board-death-co-ops-swagger-back-brink-brooklyn-pols-plot-their-demise (reporting that cooperative boards in New York need not disclose the reason for disapproving a prospective member and that it remains difficult and unpredictable to obtain board approval and sell or buy in a cooperative in New York); *see also* Bay Holdings, Inc. v. 2000 Island Blvd. Condo. Ass'n, 895 So. 2d 1197, 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Ap. 2005) (upholding a statutory cap that limits a first mortgagee's liability for unpaid assessments). A current bill proposes requiring cooperatives to provide a statement of the reasons for refusing consent to a transfer. A. 8347 § 1, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at <http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/api/1.0/lrs-print/bill/A8347-2011>. Several such bills have been introduced in the past. John Barone, *Limiting the Autonomy of Cooperative Apartment Corporation Governing Boards*, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 179, 179 (2004).

369. In fact, many community association documents on the land records still contain racial occupancy clauses. Even though such clauses have no legal force today, their continuing existence in the chain of title serve as an unfortunate reminder of one of the initial motives of community ownership structures. It is well near impossible to strike such language from the record. *See* Stephen Magagnini, *Reminders of Racism, Old Covenants Linger on Records*, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 17, 2005, at A1 (reporting on the difficulty of removing a restrictive racial occupancy clause from a Sacramento community association's property records).

370. 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) (holding that state action existed when a court enforced racial restrictions). The holding of *Shelley* has continually perplexed legal theorists because it was decided in the 1940s. *See, e.g.,* Francis A. Allen, *Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer: Of Public and Private Worlds*, 67 WASH. U. L. Q. 709, 710–12 (1989) (arguing that the significance of *Shelley* changes over time); Lino Graglia, *State Action: Constitutional Phoenix*, 67 WASH. U. L. Q. 777, 787 (1989) (stating that of the Supreme Court cases regarding state action, the *Shelley* holding is the most criticized); Mark Tushnet, *Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality*, 33 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 383, 384–85 (1988) (arguing that the substantive holding in *Shelley* was identical to the state action holding).

371. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006).

372. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).

On the one hand, it is perhaps too soon in our history to give blanket membership approval power to community associations because the original *raison d'être* of homeowner associations was to keep certain people out of them.³⁷³ If such power existed, courts would necessarily need to exercise some sort of oversight scrutiny to assess the reasonableness of any approval or denial to make sure it did not violate the provisions of the Fair Housing Act or otherwise impermissibly bar alienability of property. The benefits of any self-protecting membership approval empowerment, therefore, must be balanced against the costs of potential discrimination and the cost of judicial efforts needed to police appropriate disapprovals of neighbor sales.

Mortgage lenders (theoretically) already do credit diligence on would-be buyers in communities as part of their underwriting.³⁷⁴ It would be costly and difficult to force an association to inquire as to credit scores, employment, and salary. Such inquiries would also be unnecessary in cases where another entity is already assessing these exact same criteria for a would-be buyer—namely, his or her mortgage lender. It would be wasteful and inefficient to require the non-expert volunteer directors to try to replicate this effort.

Because neighbors do not (and probably should not) have the ability to do financial investigations of would-be buyers in their community, association members cannot manage their own risks in this regard. Mortgage lenders, on the other hand, are best able to do such investigations at the lowest cost because they specifically assess the financial health of potential borrowers and can set the terms or limit the availability of mortgage loans accordingly.³⁷⁵

373. See *supra* note 370 and accompanying text.

374. From 2000 to 2007, many mortgage originators neglected to do any credit diligence or at least did a terrible job. See Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, *Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis*, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1848, 1873–75 (2011) (showing a decrease in the spread between prime and subprime mortgages, which is typically used to compensate lenders for the increased risk of subprime mortgages, concluding that the decrease in this spread was not sustainable, and indicating that loosening underwriting standards was one of the factors). In 2006, Steven Krystofiak, president of the Mortgage Brokers Association for Responsible Lending, submitted a written statement into the record of a Federal Reserve public hearing on mortgage regulation, reporting that his organization had compared a sample of 100 stated income mortgage applications to IRS records and found almost 60% of the sampled loans had overstated their income by more than 50%. *Inside the Liar Loan: How the Mortgage Industry Nurtured Deceit*, SLATE MAG. (Apr. 24, 2008, 11:25 AM), <http://www.slate.com/id/2189576> (citing Written Statement of Krystofiak, President, Mortgage Bankers Association for Responsible Lending, Building Sustainable Homeownership: Public Hearing on the Home Equity Lending Market Before the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (June 16, 2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/secrs/2006/august/20060801/op-1253/op-1253_3_1.pdf).

375. Mortgage lenders also perform collateral due diligence (property appraisals) and are therefore well-situated to prevent a property from being so over-burdened with debt that a

B. Eroding Mortgage Priority

1. Equitable Reallocation of Payment Default Costs

Capped recoveries and limited priority liens are ineffective in a climate of underwater loans and long foreclosure timelines. Reverse foreclosures and other creative litigation strategies may obtain relief in certain situations but are inadequate to generally protect communities from the fallout of foreclosure freezes. Although there is some appeal to analogizing assessments to property taxes and granting a true priority status to assessment liens, it would be almost impossible for such a proposal to garner sufficient political support to pass. Allowing community members more extensive approval rights over property transfers within their community raises property and liberty rights concerns that vastly outweigh the benefits of permitting self-policing due diligence in sales. The best party to perform credit diligence of new (or refinancing) members in a CIC is the party already performing this role: the mortgage lender.³⁷⁶ The best party to control for unrealistic loans, sloppy foreclosure proceedings, and unwarranted delays is also the mortgage lender. Thus, the mortgage lender should bear costs occasioned by its failure to diligently protect against the foreseeable externalities of its lending activities. In a situation where the property is underwater, the only party with a valuable interest in the property is the mortgage lender. The lender, as the sole property interest holder in this case, should bear the upkeep costs that protect and enhance the value of its security pending foreclosure.

Statutes should be passed in each state to create proper incentives for lenders to monitor or pay assessment delinquencies. Rather than relying on limited-priority liens, this proposal—an eroding first priority for first mortgage liens—would treat the priority position of a lender’s first lien as conditioned upon foreclosure within a certain amount of time after mortgage default (e.g., six months). Thereafter, every month of unpaid assessments would become secured by a lien superior in payment priority to the first mortgage. Importantly, such a lien would have no upside cap, meaning recovery by the association would theoretically be unlimited, while the maximum paid by the neighbors would be limited. Such an eroding mortgage approach would cap the loss to the association rather than the loss to the lender, which is appropriate because it is the lender who controls the timing of the foreclosure sale.

foreclosure sale will not net sufficient proceeds to cover obligations secured by the property.

376. See *supra* note 375 and accompanying text (noting that mortgage lenders perform collateral due diligence).

Under this proposal, the priority of the assessment lien would effectively erode the first priority of the mortgagee. This would likely incentivize lenders to pay assessments on behalf of their borrowers who are delinquent and add such costs to the debt. Most mortgage instruments already permit lenders to do this. Increased lender responsibility for its share of community upkeep might also motivate more expeditious foreclosure proceedings. Either way, the costs borne by an association would be minimized.³⁷⁷ This better cost allocation regime would make sure that lenders are no longer distorted in their foreclosure timing analyses, which would ensure that delays in foreclosure result from relevant loan and market factors, not from a lender's mere desire to free-ride by avoiding collateral upkeep costs.

Lenders would reasonably respond to such a law by making a better credit evaluation prior to advancing funds regarding a borrower's ability to pay not only the mortgage loan but also the applicable assessments. Lenders would also have even more reason to ensure an accurate appraisal of collateral value. Any change in the legal framework of home lending that achieves this outcome is likely beneficial to individuals and the economy as a whole.³⁷⁸ Also, such an evaluation currently cannot be done by the association itself, but it can be easily and cheaply achieved by lenders.³⁷⁹ Lenders might respond to such a law by establishing an escrow account for association assessments, similar to accounts lenders already require for property tax and insurance amounts (and as already anticipated by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac form instruments).³⁸⁰ Finally, this law would motivate lenders during foreclosure to pay outstanding assessments to avoid incurring additional costs and fees. Having an assessment back-up source would benefit all property values in the community and keep other owners from being penalized for having delinquent neighbors. Lender-funded upkeep also avoids the situation of unjust enrichment that currently exists when neighbors end up paying for the upkeep on mortgaged properties for which they hold no interest.

Allowing a first mortgage lender's priority to erode over time as foreclosure is delayed is therefore both equitable and efficient.

377. Reasonable collection costs should be included in the priority lien amount; however, this proposal does raise the important question of collection cost and late fee abuses, discussed *infra* Part II.B.4.

378. See generally *supra* Part I.A.2 (discussing the negative externalities of constructive abandonment).

379. Lenders today are evaluating not only their borrowers' ability to pay assessment obligations, but also the ability of all other owners in the community to pay their assessments.

380. See *supra* note 354 and accompanying text (noting that lenders routinely establish property tax escrow accounts to protect themselves against superior priority payment obligations).

Uncapping lender liability for assessments will lead to assessment obligations being met more frequently by someone. This approach will also create a disincentive for irresponsible delays in foreclosure and, unlike the six-month limited-priority regime, will continue to be effective even if foreclosure does take a long time to complete. A system of eroding mortgage priority could allocate some limited portion of unpaid assessments to a community or could allocate all unpaid amounts to the lender, depending on when the lien erosion “clock” would start.³⁸¹

Unlike the limited lien priority system, an eroding first priority system will not merely reduce association losses—it will tangibly improve community stability. Because responsible neighbors will be insulated from default spillover, recovery can occur; investors can purchase units secure in the knowledge that their investment is not subject to the unforeseeable and uncontrollable default rates of neighboring property loans. Lenders can lend on units in CICs knowing that the community will continue to be maintained and property values will be preserved, all at a cost allocation that is fair and equitable.

Ultimately, this system even benefits the first mortgage lenders who bear priority erosion losses as well because the value of their collateral will be preserved. Eroding lien priority should lead to a better recovery in foreclosure sales, which should offset the priority losses the system entails. For this reason, the GSEs should revise their policies and permit uncapped lender responsibility for collateral upkeep. Although a six-month limit is easier for a lender to prospectively quantify (because the maximum amount of foreclosure proceeds paid to an association is pre-determined), this approach depresses the property’s value and limits capital availability to the entire community. Allowing a fairer allocation of community costs justifiably supports values and stability in the community—an outcome beneficial for the community’s lenders as well as its owners.

2. Promoting Foreclosure as Policy

One effect of the eroding mortgage priority solution is that lenders will be discouraged from delaying foreclosure just to avoid payment of community assessments. A possible result is that foreclosures of community association properties may proceed more expeditiously,

381. In lieu of having a front-end delay before erosion of a lien begins, a state could choose a shared-liability approach to assessments, mandating that a certain percentage of all unpaid assessments at foreclosure enjoy a payment priority. Under this system, the cost to a neighborhood would continue to grow as foreclosure is delayed, but so would the cost to a lender. This approach, however, would at least somewhat curtail the lender’s collateral upkeep free-ride.

which is arguably harder on defaulting homeowners who face losing their homes more quickly. Although it is politically difficult for governments to push for quicker foreclosures (which is seen as making the poor owners lose vis-à-vis the banks), providing an incentive for banks to foreclose promptly is actually good in terms of the neighbors and the community as a whole.³⁸²

In some ways, both defaulting borrowers and mortgage lenders benefit from foreclosure delays, all at the expense of the community.³⁸³ Delinquent owners can stay in their homes, cost-free,³⁸⁴ and lenders can wait out a bad market while avoiding the carrying costs on a property.³⁸⁵ The people who really lose from this delay are those least able to control for it: the innocent neighbors who fund the unpaid assessment bills.

Undue foreclosure delays adversely affect the wider market as well. Without lower-priced sales to pull down comparable sale values of homes, housing prices remain propped up at unsustainable levels. Delaying foreclosure sales, therefore, also delays the housing market

382. Politicians frequently balk at this approach of “getting it over with,” and economists disagree about whether it is better to allow borrowers rent-free possession during a general market downturn or not. *See, e.g.*, Brady Dennis & Ariana Eunjung Cha, *Pelosi Calls for Federal Inquiry on Mortgage Lenders*, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2010, at A15 (discussing political reasons to push for foreclosure moratoriums while quoting Guy Cecala, the publisher of *Inside Mortgage Finance*, as warning that further slowdown in foreclosure sales would “delay significantly any recovery of the housing market”); Dina ElBoghdady, *Anxiously Waiting for the Sale to Go Through*, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2010, at A11 (discussing why foreclosure delays increase market uncertainty and the problems that result); Pearlstein, *supra* note 121, at A09 (explaining that “the longer the foreclosure process goes on, the longer it will take for the excess supply of houses to be absorbed, for prices to stabilize and for the real estate market to return to something closer to a normal equilibrium”).

383. At the least, the parties benefit from delays where there is not a third party to buy the property from the lender at foreclosure or soon thereafter.

384. News stories tell of increasing numbers of homeowners who stop paying their mortgages, betting that it will take the lender a very long time to foreclose and explain that the threat of foreclosure is so temporally remote that it becomes merely “theoretical.” *E.g.*, David Streitfeld, *Owners Stop Paying Mortgages . . . and Stop Fretting About It*, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2010, at A1 (“A growing number . . . are fashioning a sort of homemade mortgage modification, one that brings their payments all the way down to zero.”).

385. *See* Ruger, *supra* note 2, at A1 (“[B]anks put off the foreclosure sales in many cases because once they take the property, they become liable for taxes, fees and maintenance.”). Some banks even delay after acquiring the property at a foreclosure sale, waiting as long as possible to record the deed in order to procrastinate the day they are legally required to contribute to property upkeep. In the past year, some states legislatures have proposed laws to address this trend, requiring that deeds be filed within thirty or ninety days of a foreclosure sale. *See, e.g.*, S.B. 141, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (requiring foreclosure deeds to be recorded within ninety days); S.B. 128, 75th Sess. (Nev. 2009) (requiring foreclosure deeds to be recorded within thirty days).

from reaching equilibrium.³⁸⁶ Only when prices reflect fundamental values will the market start recovering in earnest.

Undue foreclosure delays also discourage home buyers and investors who face uncertain timing and title.³⁸⁷ Lenders avoid financing because of the uncertainty posed by community properties left in limbo.³⁸⁸ In addition, delaying foreclosures also keeps the capital markets from establishing accurate pricing for mortgage-backed securities products, slowing the recovery in that market as well.³⁸⁹

During the limbo of threatened foreclosure, properties are generally not maintained at the optimal level.³⁹⁰ This threat to quality of our housing stock is nowhere greater than in CICs, where a few delinquent properties can actually cause a decrease in the upkeep of the entire community. Our housing stock is at risk of deterioration if responsible “gatekeepers” are not funding its upkeep. The longer the limbo is drawn out, the more extreme upkeep problems will be.

It sounds draconian, but the best thing for the community in the case of a nonpaying unit owner facing foreclosure is to have the foreclosure sale take place as swiftly as possible. Unnecessary delay costs the entire community money and increases uncertainty. Any benefits accruing to the lender (or borrower) from such delay are purchased with other people’s money. Plus, perceived lender benefits may be illusory because decline in collateral upkeep and increase in community assessment deficiencies will significantly drive down the value of the property and the lender’s ultimate recovery at foreclosure.

3. Lender Disorganization and Misbehavior

Blame for the financial troubles of associations—like blame for the housing crisis—targets the mortgage lenders,³⁹¹ but the eroding lien

386. In 2006, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”) calculated the ratio of equivalent rents to home prices (comparing the amount for which a given home would rent to the home’s purchase price) and found that nationwide, the average rental value of homes was only 70% of the purchase price. Stewart & Brannon, *supra* note 40, at 16 fig.1.

387. See *supra* note 122 and accompanying text (discussing how the uncertainty of assessments affects would-be buyers and new investors).

388. See *supra* notes 260–64 and accompanying text (describing the obstacles to financing faced by condominiums that are in limbo).

389. See *supra* notes 4 and 10 and accompanying text (discussing how many foreclosure sales do not even cover the amount owed on the mortgages and how the amount of mortgages in default force a fewer number of individuals to cover the burden of upkeep costs).

390. See *supra* Part I.A.2 (noting that a defaulting homeowner facing foreclosure has little incentive to make improvements on the home).

391. Miami Beach City Commissioner Jerry Libbin, for example, blames “greedy banks” that “refuse to take financial responsibility for their reckless lending” for causing the mass of association delinquencies that end up saddling the remaining owners of condominium units with

proposal is not punitive. Rather, proper upkeep allocation is a prerequisite to market recovery. Thus far, mortgage lenders have strongly objected to being forced to pay assessments on behalf of properties they are unable to sell quickly,³⁹² although their own self-interest leads banks to take on maintenance obligations for collateral not located in privately-governed communities. Governments and consumer protection groups have begged lenders to cut homeowners a break, yet homeowners face being sued by Florida associations for not foreclosing quickly enough.³⁹³ The volume of defaulted properties is itself a barrier to expeditious foreclosure.³⁹⁴ Servicers are overwhelmed with as many new mortgage defaults each month as previously occurred in an entire year.³⁹⁵

In the case of homes not located in CICs, lenders cannot avoid maintenance of constructively (or literally) abandoned properties prior to foreclosure. To prevent the ravages of permissive waste, lenders hire a manager to maintain such properties, buy insurance on the properties, and even pay to have necessary repairs done. Such collateral preservation steps are merely prudent business decisions and do not necessarily force lenders to foreclose at a time other than their choosing. Alternately, lenders can decide to modify loan obligations to free up borrower capital to meet needed upkeep costs. Lenders outside of CICs regularly act upon the clear understanding that maintenance of collateral value is in their own best interest. The only reason lenders do not incur such costs in CIC properties is that someone else is already doing the maintenance and picking up the tab.

“huge special assessments.” *Miami Beach Commissioner Jerry Libbin Applauds ‘Reverse Foreclosure’ Ruling, Renews Call for State Lawmakers to Enact Comprehensive Foreclosure Reforms*, PR NEWswire (Jan. 27, 2010), <http://www.historiccity.com/2010/staugustine/news/florida/ruling-may-help-homeowner-associations-2546>. Libbin has been “spearheading a state-wide campaign to protect condominium unit owners from unfair assessments levied on them” because of the housing meltdown, claiming that “loopholes in laws have allowed banks to escape from paying their fair share—forcing tens of thousands of Florida condo unit owners in good standing to pick up the tab.” *Id.*

392. Alex Sanchez, president and CEO of the Florida Bankers Association, explains the lender perspective: “We get hit from every side. Some people say we’re foreclosing too fast; others say we’re foreclosing too slow [sic]. Bankers want to keep Florida families in their homes. Foreclosure is a last remedy.” Coleman, *supra* note 104, at 1A.

393. See *supra* Part II.A.1.c (discussing government efforts to extend foreclosure timelines).

394. See Eunjung Cha & Dennis, *supra* note 3, at A9 (warning that uncertainty in foreclosure procedures scares away buyers and creates an even more “traumatic market” situation, where foreclosure buyers are even more scarce); Gretchen Morgenson & Geraldine Fabrikant, *Florida’s High Speed Answer to a Foreclosure Mess*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2010, at BU1 (explaining that the huge backlog of foreclosure cases in Florida has led to some corner-cutting by the judicial department as well as lenders and that the backlog continues to increase anyway).

395. Viega, *supra* note 9.

Foreclosures cannot proceed when it is unclear who owns what loans.³⁹⁶ Because a mortgage follows the note, only ownership (and, typically, possession) of the note evidencing the debt can permit an entity to foreclose on the mortgage. Before the advent of the secondary mortgage market and securitization, note ownership was easy to track because in most cases loan originators remained holders of the instrument. But with the growth of the secondary market and the innovation of mortgage-backed securitization and its related products, ownership of mortgage debt was passed on post-closing and became segmented through pools of loans.³⁹⁷ By the mid-1990s, most mortgage

396. On October 13, 2010, all fifty states began a joint investigation into mortgage foreclosures. This investigation was sparked by the “robo-signing” scandal. Robo-signing refers to the practice of having employees sign off on thousands of foreclosure affidavits, stating that they had reviewed the underlying paperwork when, in fact, they had not. See Eunjung Cha & Dennis, *supra* note 382, at A15 (discussing House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s call for the Justice Department to investigate mortgage lenders and how Maryland joined other states that sought to halt foreclosure sales while lender forgery and fraud claims were fully explored). The robo-signing scandal and associated moratoriums slowed down the foreclosure process significantly and left millions of homes “in limbo.” *Id.*; see also *Congressional Oversight Panel: Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs*, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) (testimony of Julia Gordon, Center for Responsible Lending) (stating that servicers engaged in “shoddy, abusive, and even illegal practices related to the foreclosure process” cause a lack of confidence in the process among buyers, which slows the absorption of real estate-owned inventory and an overall recovery of the housing market); Eunjung Cha, Mufson & Yang, *supra* note 3, at A11 (discussing the political pressure for the federal government to impose a full moratorium on foreclosures due to concerns over banks’ foreclosure procedures); *supra* note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the moratoriums on mortgage foreclosures announced by large lenders due to sloppy or fraudulent servicer foreclosure procedures, describing the political reaction to the moratoriums, and stating that the procedural concerns prompting the moratoriums still linger despite the fact that the moratoriums have since been lifted). Although the moratoriums have now been lifted, the pace of foreclosure has significantly slowed in the wake of such scandals, resulting in a renewed focus on foreclosure procedure and mortgage ownership. For a more detailed discussion of some of the problems of note ownership and chain of title for mortgage notes in the secondary market and a proposal regarding possible future systemic solutions, see Dale A. Whitman, *How Negotiability has Fouled up the Secondary Mortgage Market, and What to Do About It*, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 757–69 (2010).

397. The securitization concept basically holds that by splitting a group (pool) of mortgage loans into multiple classes (tranches) with a hierarchy of repayment rights (the top tranche has the least risky position in terms of credit and repayment risk), the mere grouping and tranching of the pool will dramatically reduce risks for investors holding the top tier position because the lower-positioned investors provide a buffer by bearing the first loss. Theoretically, this is true even if the entire pool is made up of risky mortgage loans: the lower tranches act as a risk shock absorber. Wall Street opined that pooling and tranching can be done several times, supposedly reducing risk of top-tiered securities with each re-tranching. This theory, widely accepted in the dawn of the twenty-first century, seems to work less well under real market stress—as seen in the meltdown of the subprime market. The structure of securitization in the abstract was not the problem, it was rather the valuation model for securitized products that was inadequate. For an overview comparison of securitization and traditional bank lending, see Gerald Hanweck, Anthony Sanders & Robert Van Order, *Securitization Versus Traditional Banks: An Agnostic View of the Future of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Banks*, FINREG21 (Sept. 28, 2009), <http://www.finreg21.com/lombard-street/securitization-versus-traditional-banks-an-agnostic->

banks no longer intended to originate mortgages for their own portfolios but rather acted as intermediaries—originating mortgages in order to sell them on the secondary market in turn.³⁹⁸

Loan ownership changes, through secondary market sales of mortgage loans, pooling, tranching, and securitization sales of pieces of those loans, were supposedly all tracked through the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”).³⁹⁹ Although MERS records of loans often do permit ownership to be tracked, the individual notes have in many cases become lost along the way.⁴⁰⁰ Because the lien (the mortgage) follows the payment obligation (the note), production of the note or a court-allowed substitute is a prerequisite to commencing a foreclosure proceeding.⁴⁰¹

The delay is unfortunate but unavoidable: foreclosure as a process requires strict adherence in order to assure the fairness of the result.⁴⁰² If foreclosures must slow down to ensure procedural due process, then a slower timeline is essential.⁴⁰³ The costs of these foreclosure delays, however, should be borne by the entities who could have avoided the problems causing the delays—namely, the lenders or servicers. Hopefully, foreclosures will not be delayed more than necessary as a result of political posturing because foreclosure delay causes far more problems than it solves.⁴⁰⁴

Many of the problems plaguing the housing market today—from the robo-signing scandal to the poorly-underwritten loans in the first place—are products of lender sloppiness, disorganization, and (sometimes) misbehavior. The structure of the market itself encouraged

view-future-fannie-mae-freddie-ma (providing a concise description of the development of mortgage-backed securitization); see also Kurt Eggert, *Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine*, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 535–51 (2002) (providing a summary of the basics of loan securitization).

398. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, *REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS* 381–82 (3d ed. 2007). See generally ANDREW DAVIDSON, ANTHONY B. SANDERS & LAN-LING WOLFF, *SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS* (2003).

399. See Whitman, *supra* note 396, at 765 n.157 (describing MERS, which was “created by the major participants in the secondary mortgage market to maintain an electronic, on-line registry of mortgage assignments”).

400. *Id.* at 757.

401. *Id.* at 757–59.

402. This is very similar to how election law procedures assure fair election results and how trial procedures assure viable findings of fact.

403. It is paramount to ensure that foreclosure sales are valid because flawed foreclosures raise three problems that threaten housing markets and the broader economy: the foreclosure itself may not be warranted or conducted correctly (with proper parties); buyers at foreclosure are not assured of good title; and lack of confidence in titles to land slows housing market recovery.

404. See *supra* Part I.A.2 (discussing the negative impact of constructive abandonment).

risk-taking at the originating lender level. Because borrower credit risk was assumed by the secondary market purchaser and securitizer of the loans, often with insurance companies providing credit enhancement to the mortgage pool, and was then passed on (in whole or in part) to investors in the pool that provided the actual funds through purchasing mortgage-backed securities,⁴⁰⁵ there was very little incentive for mortgage lenders to perform sufficient due diligence before advancing funds. The *New York Times* decries sloppy lending, property appraisals, and securities ratings, pointing out that “[s]ince we trust, why verify?” seems to have been the industry motto.⁴⁰⁶

Again, there were many guilty parties in sloppy lending and loan transfers. But as between the mortgage lenders and the borrower’s neighbors, the lenders clearly emerge as more culpable. Thus, between these two categories of parties, the choice for cost allocation is likewise clear: the mortgage lender is the only party who can avoid similar problems in the future. As the least-cost avoider, economic theory supports the equitable judgment here: lenders should bear costs caused by their failure to carefully underwrite their lending, properly document their mortgage sales and securitizations, and promptly and correctly foreclose.⁴⁰⁷

Lenders uniformly lobby to keep the system as-is, particularly in states with no limited lien priority for assessments. But in reality, bankers’ associations that decry a viable solution to private governance failure are acting against their own long-term interest. Although lenders may see themselves as paying the price of revisions in the lien priority scheme, they very well could also be lenders on non-defaulting units currently being burdened with increasing assessments or, at the very least, facing the uncertainty of assessment increases in the future. A lender may desire to make a loan on a unit in a community where a large percentage of owners could stop paying assessments at any time. This uncertainty hurts owners and their lenders.⁴⁰⁸

Alternatively, if the community could ensure the expected revenue stream, the risk to all lenders decreases even though their exposure in

405. See *supra* note 397 (describing the securitization concept involving pools and tranches).

406. Floyd Norris, *Banks Stuck with Bill for Bad Loans*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010, at B1.

407. This is not to say that uncertain foreclosures should be permitted. Strict procedural protections and requirements must be maintained. But any additional community costs incurred by lender missteps must be borne by lenders alone—not by the neighborhoods in which their collateral is located.

408. This is why Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA, and other lenders impose a limit on the percentage of delinquencies before they will purchase or insure (or originate) loans in a community association. It is also why the GSEs want to approve community reserves levels. See *supra* Part II.A.1.b (discussing how lender policies affect assessment recovery).

terms of their non-paying borrowers goes up. The downside, however, should not pose a problem; lenders can manage this risk much more easily than the uncertainty risk related to potentially unrecoverable assessments. Lenders already take measures to protect themselves against property tax amounts that can accrue and are payable prior to their mortgage loan out of foreclosure proceeds. Lenders need only to set up reserve accounts and affirmatively require payment of association assessments to control for borrower misbehavior and their own loss exposure from the loss of lien priority.

Lenders also benefit from legislation empowering associations to ultimately recover their upkeep costs because, by keeping the community association solvent and active, lenders reap the benefits of supported property values and well-maintained communities. Even when lenders “save” money by delaying foreclosure to avoid paying assessments, they drive down the property value of their own collateral by causing community assessments to increase while services decline. In essence, lenders commit their own waste when they fail to ensure payment of association assessments.

4. Association Assessment Abuses

Some commentators target association expenditures in general as wasteful spending, but statutory oversight of association budgeting and amenities is not a good idea. Rather than pass laws requiring communities to tighten their belts, this is best left to the governance system in place. There is nothing preventing members from voting to cut back services and save community funds. Furthermore, if a lender begins paying assessments after foreclosure, the lender will be able to assert the unit’s voting rights and have some input into community costs and fees.

Associations are typically empowered to charge late fees and collection costs in addition to delinquent assessments.⁴⁰⁹ Clearly, associations must be able to recoup the costs of collecting delinquent assessments. Some assert, however, that late fees and collection costs are out of control.⁴¹⁰ Allegations abound that community associations hire lawyers who abuse the system by charging outrageous fees.⁴¹¹

409. HYATT, *supra* note 15, at 121–22 (describing two methods of imposing late fees in CIC associations: flat rate and monthly interest fees).

410. See, e.g., Ngoc Nguyen, *Hard-Pressed Homeowners Facing Another Financial Threat*, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2011, at A19A (depicting cases where association debts were “turned over” to collection agencies and the tenfold increase in the amount owing due to fees and interest).

411. *Id.*; see also Shirley Wise, *Reverse Foreclosures—Are the Associations the Victims Here?*, EZINEARTICLES (Aug. 30, 2010), <http://ezinearticles.com/?Reverse-Foreclosures---Are-the-Associations-the-Victims-Here?&id=4879390> (reporting that “the association attorneys add

Some California lawmakers, for example, have highlighted the danger of so-called “foreclosure factories”—law firms and collection agencies that charge an association \$1500 to \$2000 for taking over a foreclosure proceeding against a delinquent owner.⁴¹² The associations tack the amount paid to assessment collectors onto the delinquent charges, and the collection cost amounts can be “shockingly high.”⁴¹³

Current government oversight of collection cost charges is minimal: only the California State Legislature has considered specifically limiting debt collection practices of CIC associations.⁴¹⁴ Recent attention to the plight of both association residents and nonpaying owners facing foreclosure suggests that additional state regulation of assessment collection may be on the horizon.⁴¹⁵

Concern over unconscionably high late fees and collection costs may be warranted, as there are few legal limits on what a CIC association can impose on its members as long as it follows the procedures set forth in its governing documents.⁴¹⁶ If mortgage lenders are on the hook for

outrageous fees for their services,” are “unwilling to discount the amount not even by a dollar” and that these unfair practices “need to be questioned”). *See generally* EVAN MCKENZIE, *PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT* (1996) (criticizing the entire governance system of CICs as prone to abuse).

412. *Id.*; *see also* Wasserman, *supra* note 12 (describing the problems related to associations that can easily foreclose on homes and describing recent legislative efforts to make foreclosure more difficult).

413. Ngai Pindell, *Tensions Between HOA Super Liens and Purchasers at Foreclosure*, LAND USE PROF BLOG (Jan. 29, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2010/01/tensions-between-hoa-super-liens-and-purchasers-at-foreclosure.html. Collection costs charged by associations are much maligned. Professor Pindell opines that “the only entities capable of engendering more ill will than over-zealous lenders are HOAs” and notes that “many see these perceived, excessive HOA charges as yet another manifestation of unchecked and intrusive power over homes and communities.” *Id.*

414. *See* S.B. 561, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (providing that “an association shall not voluntarily assign or pledge the association’s right to collect payment or assessments to a third party . . . [unless] the third party agrees in writing to collect payments or assessments on behalf of the association in the manner set forth in this chapter” and prohibiting “a third party that has contracted with an association to collect assessments, fees, or payments . . . [from] act[ing] as trustee in foreclosure proceedings”); *see also* Nguyen, *supra* note 411, at A19A (reporting that “the California Senate Judiciary Committee passed a bill to curtail predatory practices by collection agencies” for homeowner association debt). The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act may also apply to limit the tactics an association may employ to collect unpaid assessments. *See* Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006); *supra* note 162 and accompanying text (discussing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).

415. Pending bills in Utah and Arizona bar the use of debt collectors to obtain unpaid assessments. Conlin & Lush, *supra* note 5.

416. *See, e.g.,* O’Buck v. Cottonwood Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 750 P.2d 813, 818 (Alaska 1988) (upholding association rule banning television antennae in spite of no showing of adverse effect on the value of units and holding that owners of units in CICs “consciously sacrifice some freedom of choice in their decision to live in this type of housing”); Villa de las Palmas Homeowners Ass’n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1234–35 (Cal. 2004) (upholding amendment to

unpaid assessments plus fees, such lenders might validly complain that an association might manipulate costs in order to obtain coverage of community expense from lenders' deep pockets. There may therefore be compelling reasons to have statutory limits on late fees and charges that an association can impose in order to prohibit a paying majority from unfairly allocating association costs. Some statutory oversight would be particularly warranted in cases where such charges are ultimately recoverable in full from a first mortgage lender in its foreclosure sale. Just as the current inequitable allocation of costs among members is unfair, it would be equally unfair to pass on a lion's share of community costs to lenders.

CONCLUSION

Today's unprecedented delay in foreclosures of vast numbers of financially underwater property harms non-defaulting owners in privately governed communities. The financial "commons" of entangled fiscal fortunes in such neighborhoods illustrates a fundamental flaw in the common interest community system of ownership that must be remedied to prevent the potential failure of such governance forms during periods of great economic stress. The adverse external impact of community assessment delinquencies is an important but often overlooked problem, which under the current housing crisis is reaching critical levels in some localities. Certain government and market actions, including current foreclosure moratoriums and delays, exacerbate the problem, spreading financial distress to innocent homeowners and bringing property values down in a tangible and significant way. Leaving community associations effectively bankrupt is a lose-lose scenario and we need prompt legislative action to prevent this result.

Current lien priority laws fail to protect the interests of such communities and their paying members. Even in the handful of states that have enacted protective limited lien priority provisions with respect to community association assessments, assessment lien priority is almost always capped at six months' worth of delinquent assessments. Because foreclosures take months or years longer than the time period representing the recoverable assessment amounts, such laws provide no real incentive for lender responsibility or expeditious foreclosure sales. As foreclosure is delayed, costs continue to mount while neighbors pay the costs left unpaid by delinquent owners.

condominium declaration banning pets despite statute providing that no declaration can prohibit all pets).

To effectively preserve property values and protect blameless homeowners in planned communities, states across the nation must adopt measures to enable private governments to perform their roles. Allowing delayed foreclosures to erode the lien priority of a first mortgage achieves the needed result with the most contained and best-allocated costs. Although creating incentives for prompt foreclosures may at first glance seem perverse in a difficult economy, it is the only answer to the insolvency contagion threatened by assessment delinquencies and foreclosure delays. Finding solvent owners to replace those who hold title to houses they can ill afford—both in terms of financing and upkeep costs—is paramount. Continuing to mandate that paying members of a community association provide private financial support to the defaulting homeowners is unfair, inefficient, and poor policy indeed.

Ex. 2

EXHIBIT 2

Ex. 2

Articles



Background on the formation [1975] & birth[1982*] of :

The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act

– in West Virginia it is known as WV Code §36B

The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA)

A presentation by Carl Lisman, Chair of the Drafting Committee of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA)

June 09, 2006

By Carl Lisman (802) 864-5756 clisman@lisman.com (<http://www.lisman.com/Carl.html>)

Crownsville, Maryland -

The following is a presentation that Carl Lisman , Chair of the Drafting Committee on Amendments to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA).and Treasurer of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws presented to the Maryland Task Force on Common Ownership Communities - Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development on January 23, 2006. There were 21 people present at the meeting. A CAI survey was taken and discussed. Roger Winston Task Force Member.member introduced Mr. Carl Lisman.

Introduction of Guest - Roger Winston: "Mr. Carl Lisman is a shareholder in Lisman, Webster, Kirkpatrick & Leckerling, P.C. in Burlington, Vermont. He served as an Adjunct Professor at the Vermont Law School from 1982 to 1998, teaching real estate transaction law to third year students. He is a Vermont Commissioner on Uniform State Laws and Treasurer of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. As a Uniform Law Commissioner, he chaired the drafting committees on the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (1994) and the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act. He is co-chair of the Joint Editorial Board for Real Property Acts. He received his B.A. from the University of Vermont and his J.D. from Harvard Law School."

Mr. Carl Lisman: Roger's given you a pretty good back ground for those of you who don't know about the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It's an organization of the states. It was founded over more than 125 years ago and it is the body that brings to the states legislation, carefully thought through legislation we hope, for adoption by the states and most of the laws begin with the word "uniform" like Uniform Commercial Code, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and the topic which we are about to discuss, the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, and the Condominium Act.

I became a uniform laws Commissioner in 1976, I knew very little about the organization and shortly after my appointment I received a letter congratulating me on being appointed a Commissioner, telling me that my first committee meeting will be the meeting of the Uniform Condominium Act Committee in the fall of 1976. I did not know then what a condominium was; it was a word that I had heard there weren't many of those things in Vermont at the time and those that were, were sort of thought to be weird and not anything that would gain traction in the housing market. Times have changed and I'm glad that we went through the true false test, I may be preaching to the choir but more than half the homes started in the United States are homes that will end up in Common Ownership Communities and this gets bigger and bigger everyday and it needs more and more attention on a legislation level.

We finished drafting the Uniform Condominium Act in 1975 and immediately went back and started all over again in 76 and did some further amendments. What we discovered in the states that adopted the Uniform Condominium Act is that people who tried to evade, not avoid but evade, the act were creating what we called planned communities. This might be the time to pause for a second and get our terms straight. I'm going to talk mostly about the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, known by it's acronym UCIOA which is an amalgam of three different Uniform laws. Uniform Condominium Act, Uniform Planned Community Act and the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act.

In a condominium unit owners own their own unit; together they are members of an Association. The Association manages the common elements for that property because the unit owners own the common elements together. Tenants on the old law, Tenants and Condominium we don't use that term anymore.

In a planned community the unit owners own their own units and they are members of Associations and the Association owns the common elements. And what the Uniform Act refers to the Real Estate Co-operative, the Association owns the real estate and the units and by virtue of a document frequently called a Proprietary Lease, members have rights to occupy particular units. Those are the big three Common Interest Communities and that's the subject matter of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Community Act.

We discovered after we did the condo act that people were evading the provisions of the condo act by vesting title to the elements in the Association since the definition of condominiums under the condominium act excluded that. They were of use so we came out with the Planned Community Act and right afterwards the Real Estate Co-op Act. When those were done we asked ourselves the obvious questions, can we smoosh this stuff altogether. Smoosh by the way is a defined legal term.

We smooshed this altogether and came up with the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act. We also discovered in the smooshing process that we had different rules that made little sense for otherwise physically identical pieces of property. I used to try and trick my students at the Vermont Law School by drawing on the board little stick figures of a box, a house on top, one line going down and one line going across so that it looked like a two story house. I'd draw three of them on the black board and ask which one is the condominium, which one is the planned community and which one was the co-op, and of course you couldn't answer that by looking at the picture because physically identical property can take different forms of the ownership and then if you took that black board and placed it on its side that funny looking figure of the house now becomes a sub-division and with a triangle on them they now become a property and we soon realized that from a legal stand point it made little sense to have the law perpetuate the myth. The myth being that condominiums are high rise buildings, that planned communities are sub-divisions, and that co-ops look

like apartments. Because none of them from a legal stand point has to, and for a variety of good reasons should not be required to fit the mold.

Let me tell you the three basic principles of Common Interest Ownership Act. Remember these and you will pass my course.

The first is that UCIOA is a disclosure law not a regulatory law. Although there is an optional part 5 to UCIOA it is essentially self enforcing through private mechanism. There is no governing overlay in creating a common interest community.

Secondly it's long. You ask yourself, why that is a guiding principle? It's long because many of the provisions of the act begin with the phrase "Unless the declaration otherwise provides." We wanted to create default rules, we wanted to be able to shorten legal documents, we wanted to try to get the process started so that people could make intelligent decisions about whether to buy or lend based on the legal documentation as between 2 physically such as they are, identical projects where the price point is the same, the units are the same, and they really are right next to one another. What is there to differentiate one from the other from a buyer's perspective? We thought that attempting to standardize documentation we could help people see what's outside the norm and then let the market deal with whether or not outside the norm would be attracted to buyers and to lenders. So that we have a document called the Uniform Form 1, a Simple Condominium declaration. Simple Condominium Declaration is 3 ½ pages because the law otherwise fills in all the blanks.

And finally and perhaps most importantly in the underlying principles, when UCIOA was written we believed it to be a very balanced and fair act to all of the constituents who have an interest in common interest ownership communities. Developers to developer's, lenders to buyers, to sellers, units managers to officers and directors to Associations and to some degree to the municipalities that interact with the Associations. It's balanced because of the political realities of getting a very long and complicated law passed through a legislature that is probably not going to say this is not their number one priority or not their number two priority.

I testified in a number of states where the legislative reaction has been it's too long and too complicated and that's a real issue for UCIOA. Once people read it they see how well it works, how balanced it is for all who have an interest. So for those of you who have not read it let me try to distill it for you within just a few minutes of time. I'm going to do it in the context of the four major constituencies in a common interest community.

The developers, the associations, the lenders and the owners. Mostly in that order because that's mostly the order in which the act current deals with these constituency groups. That's not intended to suggest that the developers are more important than others or that lenders should have a lower priority than the association. First, the developer, which under the Uniform Act we call a Declarant. Declarant declares the declarations that's why we call it the declarant. The Declarant gets flexibility and protection. That's probably the most important benefit of the Act to a developer.

Let me point out to you that on the disclosure principle of the Act we go a long way to separate what goes into the Declaration, which gets reported in the land record on the one hand, from what is meaningful information to a perspective buyer or a unit lender on the other hand. We see the Declaration as being a title

document, we don't typically ask home buyers to read title documents. We leave that to abstractors and lawyers, and title insurance companies, they comment on them and they may call something to the attention of a buyer or owner but they're not trained to read those types of documents. Those other folks are.

So, in the first instance we focus on the declaration of the Uniform Act and we say to the developer here's a list of eighteen things that you have to put in every declaration regardless of the type of the project-condo plans, community, co-op, high rise, sub-division, garden apartments, lots, whatever it is under the scope of the act you have to put these things in your declaration. Most of them are pretty basic stuff legally sufficient description of real estate, reference to a plat that shows the boundaries of common interest community, and so forth. But there are a couple of provisions that has to be in the declaration. For title purposes they also have a minor disclosure. As long as developer reserves the right in a declaration to do enumerated events, that developer has a right to do that and that right can not be taken away.

The association says ahah we have wrested control from the associated developer let's take away the developer's rights to build the next building. We call those rights development rights.

Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act the development rights are the rights to

- 1) Add real estate once identified in the declaration to the common interest community;
- 2) remove portions of the common interest community from the reach of the declaration;
- 3) to create units common elements and limited common elements within the region;
- 4) sub-divide units;
- 5) to convert units into common elements and vice versa; and as long as the developer specifies in the declaration which or all of those rights it wants to have and the time period in which to exercise them the developer does have those rights. That's a very valuable tool for a developer.

The developer says I'm going to build a 12 story high rise and I'm going to put residential units on all of the floors, the market may change as the project is being build-out, interest rates may change, circumstances may change, outside the project a smart developer will reserve the right to change the size of the units and maybe the floor plans of those units to meet changed market demands.

Becky Bowman: Do you specify a time period that the developer obtain these rights? And how does that work with the representations being made to the purchasers of the units?

Mr. Lisman: Good question for those of you who did not hear the question. Is there a time frame on the exercise on the Developer's rights and how do you deal with the representations that were made to the initial purchasers? Yes, there's time frame when we did the original Uniform Condominium Act we looked intensely at the Virginia Condominium Act which was relatively new at the time and under the Virginia Act it said that those rights can be exercised if at all only within 7 years. We put that in the original Condominium Act and decided after a while that was a really bad idea. Every project is of a different size and complexity. They all change so we finally concluded that the right answer was to say let the developer choose the time period and as long as the developer discloses it, then buyers will know, and they will make a meaningful decision. I've seen documents where the developer's rights have been reserved for 99 years. I've seen disclosure in the public offer statement but I've never seen anybody well and appropriately disclosing a 99 year reservation. I think a 99 year reservation really borderlines in violating the act.

So giving the Developer this flexibility really, really, really is important for developers because they now have a statutory safe harbor which they might not have in common law because judges may say this is unreasonable when the statute says you may do it. In addition to development rights the Act also goes into a concept of special declarant rights. There are too many instances over time where Associations and developers were at odds very early in the process and the Associations tried to stop the developers from finishing the projects. Taking away the right to build Tower C, refusing to let the Developer's construction vehicles on private road way, it goes on and on and on.

So there are a whole bunch of special declarant rights that at least the Act statutorily creates and can not be taken away including the right to complete improvements shown on the plan. A right to go on the common elements for that purpose, it's a pretty extensive list and it's very valuable list because it tells the developers that they are protected. Third point on what the Act is to developers is a statutory right to control the association board for a period of time during build-out and sell-out. The Act is pretty specific about when a certain percentage of the units have been sold that one person has to go on board from among the owners.

Then when a second percentage is reached and so forth until that at a particular point there is a transition where the unit owners have taken control of the Association and there are two important factors here from the Developer's stand point during build-out and sell-out. Controlling the Association, essentially having a veto over the Association, at least with respect to the relationship with the Developer, is a very valuable and comforting asset. But developers don't get away with just getting the asset without having the liability to balance. The liability that balances that right to obtain control are two. One is Directors on the Association Board were appointed by the developer having a higher duty of care than those who are elected by the Unit Owners, they're held to a higher standard. And the second is for so long as the developers retain control over the board, the statute of limitations doesn't begin to run on claims for construction defects with respect to the common owners.

So let me stop there and move to what the Associations get. Under the Uniform Act they get really two things that they wouldn't otherwise. One is there is an extensive list of the numerated powers of the Association. Power to fine, after notice and opportunity to have been heard. In many States' associations have no authority to fine. There's a Virginia Supreme Court decision that says that only the state could fine. Private associations couldn't. Extensive list of the numerated power, sue be sued, own real estate, convey real estate and so forth, because not all associations are incorporated, and because they are not all incorporated there are a number of issues about the power of an association.

And even if they are incorporated there are a number of issues about of what an association can and can not do. Secondly, and also of great importance, the Uniform Act came up with the concept of the super Lien. The Association has the power to assess, maintenance fees, annual assessments what ever you call them. It has a lien either by statute or common law and the declaration especially if it's a planned community. It says that the Association has a lien against the owners unit or lot for the unpaid assessment. The problem with that, if we stop right there is that more likely than not there's going to be a mortgage on the unit or the lot and that mortgage is going to have a priority ahead of the association's lien.

By analogy we looked to municipal taxes in home mortgages and came up with what we thought at the time a very innovative and good solution. We are now convinced that we are more brilliant than we thought we were.

The analogy with home mortgages and taxes is lenders who have a first mortgage will never want to see the property sold for unpaid property taxes, use their powers in mortgaging under the mortgage to pay the taxes and then stick it to the homeowners owner who hasn't paid. They add the balance to the notes of the mortgage. So what we did is we came up with the concept of the super lien. We said that the Association has a priority for unpaid Assessments up to and about equal to 6 months of unpaid assessments and ahead of the first mortgage and what happens of course is the Association contacts the bank, the bank doesn't want to see the unit foreclosed and have their mortgage lowered in priority, the bank advances the unpaid assessments and deals with its delinquent borrower in that context. It really is important for almost every Association that there not be one or two or three people who don't pay their assessments.

These Associations' budgets, and I'm not talking about Columbia where one or two or three people won't make a difference, I'm talking about the average size Association in the United States today where somebody isn't paying and the Association can't do something that they expect them to do when they adopted the last budget. Otherwise other folks have to subsidize that's not a fair result. So the super lien gives the association some power of great importance. What do lenders get? They get the comfort of good title.

Every state has a law on what lenders can lend for and what collateral they can take and loan value ratios and interest limitations and stuff like that. For a long time there was a question in the legal world as to whether or not you could have what we now label the flying freeholds. That is to say if you have an interest in real estate, the unit that starts on the third floor, your unit doesn't touch the ground it's held up by steel girds, steel girds go into the ground but no part of your unit is attach directly to the ground. The Uniform Act and the predecessor FHA Model Act both legitimize flying freehold. The other area in which they give comfort on title is Unreasonable Restraints on alienation and the Rule Against Perpetuities. For those of you who are lawyers, remember law school was the last time you thought about the Rule Against Perpetuities. Both of those deal with tying interest together over a period of time. In the case of a condominium the tying of the Common Ownership Interest with a unit lasts forever.

We talked about development rights and how important those were to developers and we talked briefly about special declarants rights, of which the developer's rights are a sub-set. Suppose you are a construction lender, you commit to a 25 million dollar construction loan, ABC Inc. is going to build the XYZ condominium project. The whole project is declared without any phasing or reservation of developers rights, the developer starts construction, starts with the infrastructure the water, sewer, the roads and so forth and about a third through the project the developer goes belly up. The loan got out of balance, there was no way that developer would have 2 nickels to rub together, it just didn't work, so now the lender is sitting there saying I've got a project that's 1/3 built. What am I going to do?

Well, one thing the lender could do is go to its own default department and deputize someone there to be the new developer and build the project up. That's happened but lenders don't like to do that because that's not their business, because they are not developers. They are lenders. So the second alternative is to find someone to buy the project. That's where the rub comes. That buyer is going to want to be able to stand in the shoes of the original developer in so far as having all of the rights of the original developer, but if that subsequent developer thought about it for more than 7 seconds, the subsequent developer wouldn't want to have all of the liabilities of the failed original developer. But one of the issues is, should that subsequent developer be responsible for the warranty obligations of the failed developer? And then, just to stir the pot a little more, think of the poor lender.

Because, if the lender, by transferring the developing rights to a successor developer it's deemed itself to be the successor developer, now there are 2 successor developers. If that lender is a successor developer it's the biggest target in town and everything that's wrong with that project is going to result in a law suit with the bank. Now if you want banks to lend to people who build common interest communities then you've got to give them some protection. What we came up with was the concept of Transfer of Special Declarant Rights, which says that if a lender takes the developer's special declarant rights at the time the loan is given and then after default transfer them without exercising them, then that lender is not a successor declarant, and has no liability for what the original developer did or did not do or the subsequent developer will do or doesn't do. It's a way to encourage lenders to lend and a way to make sure that failed projects at least in the construction phase find a new home and a new developer so that they could be built out.

Third, five unit condominium projects, row houses, one right next to the other there's a leak in the roof and the insurance doesn't cover it so the president of the association walks down the street to the bank and says we need a \$100,000 to replace the roof, the lender looks at the president of the association and says, great we will be pleased to make you the loan, you have five owners, that's fine just get all five owners to sign the loan. It can be done but it is really difficult and why does the lender say that he wants all five units to sign the mortgage? Because in a condominium the association doesn't own the common units, the unit owners own them. How can an Association give a mortgage on the units, only the unit Owners can so the president rings the door bells and comes back to the bank and says I can't get everybody to sign but we still need the new roof then the bank says no problem I'll give you the money just sign this guarantee right here. The treasurer would have to sign the guarantee too. People don't volunteer for those kinds of reasons. So that left the association between a rock and a hard place especially when the circumstances are dramatic where do you get the money from?

So the Uniform Act says what if the association has a condo playing community collateral? That's really its most valuable asset. The most valuable assess in the association was its ability to assess its members. Backed up by that Assessment plan including a 6 month priority. So the uniform act say that if the declaration authorizes it, the association may pledge the income stream of the association as collateral, it's great for the bank and also great for the association because it means that you don't have to go through all kinds of silly hoops and there's a statutory basis for doing this. We do association loans all the time in states where there is a uniform act, and in states where there isn't, but it's a lot more comforting to the lender when you have this statutory basis.

Finally, what do the owners get? First they get a public offering statement. They're buying from the developer, the developer is required to deliver the purchaser the public offering statement. Understanding what the contract purchaser says there's a contract decision period measured from when the buyer gets the public offering statement. It's a disclosure document we go on in great length about what it is that is suppose to go in the disclosure document. But from a practical perspective it's the kind of information that you or I, if we were going to be buying in a common interest community, would want to know about. Public offering statement is real meat and potatoes.

If you are buying a resale not from the developer but from another unit owner you get a resale certificate. Some what less information than a public offering statement but none the less very meaningful information.

Secondly buyers from the developers get statutory warranties. If there's a model that the unit owner is showing off then the unit that gets actually sold needs to conform to what that actual model looks like, if there are representations made what the units will be and what will be in them and what the view will be those expressed warranties and representations are actionable.

Third there is a requirement that plans be labeled "must be built" or "need not be built" so that the swimming pool or the tennis court, golf course, recreational building whatever it may be shows up on that nice glossy brochure. There has to be a label on there showing these people that I have no intention of building it. Finally for those of you who have experience in condominiums, in planned communities, one of the things you will notice when you compare documents, for what might otherwise be physically identical projects, is that votes in the association common expense liability in the condominium, and ownership interest in the common owners, are treated differently.

Under the old FHA Model Act which was the law and 2/3 of the states used until the Uniform laws started to be adopted, it said that those who we call now allocated interest have to be the same for every unit. That is to say if it was 3.4% Ownership Interest in the common elements, it's 3.4% interest common expense liability and 3.4% of the votes whatever the allocations may be. The problem with that is it does not make a whole lot of sense in these communities frequently in planned communities 1 unit, 1 vote or the amount of expenses it pays in assessments in the associations so one of the great steps forward in the Common Interest Ownership Act is this creation of concept of allocated interests and allowing the developer to specify in the declaration the basis for the allocations, so that more often than not the uniform state gets 1 unit and 1 vote without regard to the size of its common elements.

Its common expense liability is probably more lined up with the appropriate share of the common expenses, the replacement size of the value, and the ownership of the common elements may be based on the original pricing but the advantage of the allocation that way is that it fits better with reality. It stops forcing round pegs into square holes. I've got one more topic that I want to talk about when we wrote the original Uniform condominium Act and even when we were doing the original version of the Common Interest Ownership Act the big issue in the world for common interest communities was the developer overreaching.

That issue hasn't gone away, but it still was the biggest issue, every other issue paled in comparison so much of those laws were written to deal with overreaching developers and I think that you will discover that if you ask folks practicing in the states with the law, the developer overreaching is now not an issue. But in the last 5 or 10 years, another issue has risen we didn't anticipate when we started writing these laws in the early 70's, and that is overreaching or perceived overreaching by the board and prospective unit owners.

It is really a hot button issue and I say perceived because in some cases I don't think that it's real but in other cases I know that it is real so we now have a committee that's hard at work drafting what we call a Homeowners Bill of Rights a lot of it is procedure stuff. In the procedural stuff is a lot of substance by way of example requiring the board to give notice to the unit owners before adopting the rule, requiring the association to give notice to the unit owners to before commencing litigation, mandating that an association can not act arbitrarily, requiring open board meetings, dealing with the whole contentious issue of foreclosures with regard to assessments needs. You have figured out and we have too that associations come in all sizes and one law has to fit all sizes so there's a lot of flexibility built into what we are doing and what we have done to achieve positive results.

For more information, please check out the articles listed below:

- Maryland Task Force on Common Ownership Communities to Hold Public Hearings - Jeanne N. Ketley
- The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws - NCCUSL - UCIOA
- Robert H. Nelson - proponent for creation of homeowner association private governments
- Maryland Homeowner's Association
- Maryland Dept of Housing & Community Development (DHCD) Task Force on Common Ownership Communities
- Maryland DHCD Task Force on Common Ownership Communities Appointees - 2006
- Maryland Mediation and Conflict Resolution Office - Louis G. Gieszl, Deputy Director
- Issues Homeowners Have With Common Interest Developments - Bob Lewin
- A New Jersey Homeowner Association Bill Announcement - Wilfredo Caraballoo & Joseph V. Doria Jr.
- Carl H. Lisman - Lisman, Webster, Kirkpatrick & Leckerlin


SEE ATTACHED PDF w/hot links to the above references within this document.

Description
The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA) - A presentation Carl Lisman a Uniform Laws Commissioner and Treasurer of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

REFERENCE SOURCE: 4/3/2011

**Birth [1982] reference: David A. Kahne, Law Offices of David A. Kahne with Professor Susan French- e.g. AARP Public Policy Institute, A Bill of Rights for Homeowners in Associations.
July 2006, 69 pages.*

TAB 44



CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC a
Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

vs.

U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking
association as Trustee for the Certificate
Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities
Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-AR4 and LUCIA
PARKS, an individual, DOES I through X;
and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. A-13-678814-C

Dept. No. XVIII

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of July, 2013, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I served via
first class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and via email the **Reply in Support of Motion to Alter
or Amend Judgment and Notice of Errata** filed on July 23, 2013 and July 24, 2013,

///

///

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///

///

HOWARD KIM & ASSOCIATES

400 N. STEPHANIE ST, SUITE 160

HENDERSON, NEVADA 89014

(702) 485-3300 FAX (702) 485-3301

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respectively, to the following parties:

Chelsea A. Crowton, Esq.
WRIGHT, FINLAY & ZAK, LLP
5532 South Fort Apache Road, Suite 110
Las Vegas, NV 89148
Attorney for U.S. Bank, N.A.

D. Chris Albright, Esq.
William H. Stoddard, Jr.
ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRIGHT
801 South Rancho Drive, Suite D-4
Las Vegas, NV 89106
Attorneys for Defendant Lucia Parks

/s/ Andrew M. David
An Employee of Howard Kim & Associates

TAB 45


CLERK OF THE COURT

ERR

HOWARD C. KIM, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 10386
E-mail: howard@hkimlaw.com
DIANA S. CLINE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 10580
JACQUELINE A. GILBERT, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 10593
E-mail: diana@hkimlaw.com
HOWARD KIM & ASSOCIATES
400 N. Stephanie St, Suite 160
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Telephone: (702) 485-3300
Facsimile: (702) 485-3301
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

vs.

U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking
association as Trustee for the Certificate
Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities
Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-AR4, a Nevada non-
profit corporation and LUCIA PARKS, an
individual, DOES I through X; and ROE
CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: A-13-678814-C

Dept. No.: XVIII

NOTICE OF ERRATA

TO: ALL DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD

Plaintiff SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC files this errata to its Reply in Support of
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment to correct the hearing time which was listed at 9:00 a.m. on

///

///

///

///

1 July 30, 2013. The correct time is **8:15 a.m. on July 30, 2013.**

2

3 DATED July 24th, 2013.

4

HOWARD KIM & ASSOCIATES

5

/s/Diana S. Cline

6

Howard C. Kim, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 10386

7

Diana S. Cline, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 10580

8

Jacqueline A. Gilbert, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 10593

9

400 N. Stephanie St., Suite 160

Henderson, Nevada 89014

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Phone: (702) 485-3300

Fax: (702) 485-3301

11

Attorneys for SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC

12

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
27

28

TAB 46

1 **RSPN**
2 D. CHRIS ALBRIGHT, ESQ.
3 Nevada Bar No. 004904
4 WILLIAM H. STODDARD, JR.
5 Nevada Bar No. 008679
6 **ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRIGHT**
7 801 South Rancho Drive, Suite D-4
8 Las Vegas, NV 89106
9 Tel: (702) 384-7111
10 Fax: (702) 384-0605
11 dca@albrightstoddard.com
12 *Attorneys for Defendant Lucia Parks*

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07/29/2013 12:24:54 PM



CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

11 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a
12 Nevada limited liability company,

13 Plaintiff,

14 vs.

15 US BANK, N.A., a national banking
16 association as Trustee for the Certificate
17 Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities
18 Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
19 Certificates, Series 2006-AR4, and LUCIA
20 PARKS, an individual, DOES I through X;
and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,
inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-13-678814-C
DEPT NO. XVIII

**SUPPLEMENT TO RESPONSE AND
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO ALTER
OR AMEND JUDGMENT; and
JOINDER IN DEFENDANT
US BANK'S OPPOSITION**

Date of Hearing: July 30, 2012
Time of Hearing: 8:15 a.m.

21 COMES NOW Defendant LUCIA PARKS, an individual (hereinafter "Defendant Parks"), by
22 and through her undersigned counsel, ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRIGHT, and,
23 having filed an Opposition to Plaintiff SFR Investment Pool 1, LLC to Alter or Amend Judgment,
24 which referenced a foreclosure sale of the subject property having taken place on July 18, 2013,
25 Defendant Parks hereby supplements that opposition to include, as **Exhibit "A"** hereto, such
26 information confirming that sale, and the terms and date thereof, as currently exists and is available

27 ///

28 ///

1 from public records, pending the availability of any further official notices or documentation which
2 may become available hereafter.

3 DATED this 29th day of July, 2013.

4 **ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRIGHT**

5 

6 D. CHRIS ALBRIGHT, ESQ.

7 Nevada Bar No. 004904

8 WILLIAM H. STODDARD, JR.

9 Nevada Bar No. 008679

10 801 S. Rancho Drive, Suite D-4

11 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106

12 *Attorneys for Defendant Parks*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that on this 29th day of July, 2013, I deposited a true and correct copy of the foregoing **SUPPLEMENT TO RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT; and JOINDER IN DEFENDANT US BANK'S OPPOSITION** for mailing in the U.S. Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid and addressed to:

Howard C. Kim, Esq.
Diana S. Cline, Esq.
Victoria L. Hightower, Esq.
HOWARD KIM & ASSOCIATES
400 N. Stephanie St., Suite 160
Henderson, Nevada 89014
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Chelsea A. Crowton, Esq.
WRIGHT FINLAY & ZAK
5532 S. Fort Apache Road, Suite 110
Las Vegas, Nevada 89148
Attorney for Defendant US Bank, N.A.


An Employee of Albright, Stoddard, Warnick & Albright

EXHIBIT “A”



Clark County NV Search Listings Today's Listings Common Status Codes Printer Friendly Export to Excel Edit Profile Logout





Linda Avila
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Select Professionals To Assist Your Success


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Location	<input type="text"/>	Bd	<input type="text"/>
APN	<input type="text"/>	Ba	<input type="text"/>
TS# Sale Number	<input type="text" value="1040866WFRNV"/>	Sq Ft	<input type="text"/>
Est Bid	<input type="text"/>	Yr B	<input type="text"/>
Opening Bid	<input type="text"/>	Lot	<input type="text"/>
Status	<input type="text"/>	Gar	<input type="text"/>
Has A Pool <input type="checkbox"/>			

(Today) (Tomorrow) or Sale Date between and
 Search (*) Show all
☒ Exact phrase ☐ All words ☐ Any word or Comma Separated Multiple Zip Codes

Page 1 of 1 Records 1 to 1 of 1 Page Size 500

Trustee	APN (*)	TS# Sale Number	Rank (*)	Location (*)	Map	Zip (*)	Lot	Yr B	Sq Ft	Pool	Bd	Ba	Gar	Status	Sale Date	To Date	Est Bid	Opening Bid (*)	Tgt	Sold Amt	Notes
NATIONAL	178-19-712-012	1040866WFRNV	Rank	2270 Nashville Ave		89052	0.15	1998	2078	N	4	3F	403	SLD	07/18/2013	07/18/2013	\$381,598	\$170,000	\$	\$170,000	Add Note

TAB 47



CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDER

HOWARD C. KIM, ESQ.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC a
Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

vs.

U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking
association as Trustee for the Certificate
Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities
Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-AR4, a Nevada non-
profit corporation and LUCIA PARKS, an
individual, DOES I through X; and ROE
CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: A-13-678814-C

Dept. No.: XVIII

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT**

Hearing Date: July 30, 2013

Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

This matter came before the court on Plaintiff SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC's ("Plaintiff" or "SFR") "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment" (the "Motion") of the "Order for Dismissal and Cancellation of Notice of Pendency of Action" (the "Order") entered on June 11, 2013. Following full briefing, the court heard argument on the above-referenced date and time.

Having considered the motion, opposition, reply, the papers on file in this case, and argument of counsel, good cause appearing therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AS FOLLOWS:

1. The Order for Dismissal and Cancellation of Notice Pendency of Action shall be amended such that the DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT LUCIA PARKS SET FORTH THEREIN SHALL BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. The remainder of the relief requested by Plaintiff is hereby DENIED.

DATED this 18 day of September, 2013.

DISTRICT JUDGE

Submitted by:

HOWARD KIM & ASSOCIATES

Howard C. Kim, Esq. (SBN 10386)
Diana S. Cline, Esq. (SBN 10580)
Jacqueline A. Gilbert, Esq. (SBN 10593)
400 N. Stephanie St., Suite 160
Henderson, Nevada 89014
(702) 485-3300
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Approved as to form, appeal rights reserved


WRIGHT, FINLAY & ZAK

/s/Chelsea A. Crowton
Chelsea A. Crowton, Esq. (SBN 11547)
5532 South Fort Apache, Suite 110
Las Vegas, Nevada 89148
(702) 475-7964
*Attorney for Defendant U.S. Bank, N.A., as
Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Wells
Fargo Asset Securities Corporation,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-AR4*

ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK &
ALBRIGHT

/s/D. Chris Albright
D. Chris Albright, Esq. (SBN 004904)
William H. Stoddard, Esq. (SBN 008679)
801 South Rancho Drive, Suite D-4
Las Vegas, Nevada 89016
(702) 384-7111
Attorneys for Defendant Lucia Parks

TAB 48



CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **NEO**
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3 DIANA S. CLINE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 10580
4 E-mail: diana@hkimlaw.com
JACQUELINE A. GILBERT, ESQ.
5 Nevada Bar No. 10593
E-mail: jackie@hkimlaw.com
6 HOWARD KIM & ASSOCIATES
1055 Whitney Ranch Dr, Suite 110
7 Henderson, Nevada 89014
Telephone: (702) 485-3300
8 Facsimile: (702) 485-3301
Attorneys for Plaintiff

9
10 **DISTRICT COURT**
11 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

12 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL1, LLC a Nevada
13 limited liability company,

14 Plaintiff,

15 vs.

16 U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking
association as Trustee for the Certificate
17 Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities
Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
18 Certificates, Series 2006-AR4 and LUCIA
PARKS, an individual; DOES I through X;
19 and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,
inclusive,
20

21 Defendants.

Case No. A-13-678814-C

Dept. No. XVIII

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

22 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's
23
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HOWARD KIM & ASSOCIATES

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Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment was entered by this Court on September 25, 2013. A copy of said order is attached hereto.

DATED September 25, 2013.

HOWARD KIM & ASSOCIATES

/s/ Diana S. Cline
Howard C. Kim, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 10386
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Nevada Bar No. 10580
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HENDERSON, NEVADA 89014

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of September, 2013, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I served the following parties listed below by depositing via U.S. mail first class a true and correct copy of the foregoing **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER**, postage prepaid and addressed to:

Chelsea Crowton
Wright, Finlay, & Zak
5532 S. Fort Apache Rd.
Las Vegas, NV 89148

D. Chris Albright
Albright Stoddard Warnick & Albright
801 S. Rancho Dr., Suite D-4
Las Vegas, NV 89106

/s/ Tommie Dooley

An employee of Howard Kim & Associates



CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDER

HOWARD C. KIM, ESQ.
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E-mail: howard@hkimlaw.com
DIANA S. CLINE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 10580
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JACQUELINE A. GILBERT, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 10593
jackie@hkimlaw.com
HOWARD KIM & ASSOCIATES
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Telephone: (702) 485-3300
Facsimile: (702) 485-3301
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC a
Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

vs.

U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking
association as Trustee for the Certificate
Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities
Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-AR4, a Nevada non-
profit corporation and LUCIA PARKS, an
individual, DOES I through X; and ROE
CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: A-13-678814-C

Dept. No.: XVIII

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT**

Hearing Date: July 30, 2013

Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

This matter came before the court on Plaintiff SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC's ("Plaintiff" or "SFR") "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment" (the "Motion") of the "Order for Dismissal and Cancellation of Notice of Pendency of Action" (the "Order") entered on June 11, 2013. Following full briefing, the court heard argument on the above-referenced date and time.

Having considered the motion, opposition, reply, the papers on file in this case, and argument of counsel, good cause appearing therefor,

1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment is
2 GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AS FOLLOWS:


- 3 1. The Order for Dismissal and Cancellation of Notice Pendency of Action shall be
4 amended such that the DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT LUCIA PARKS SET FORTH
5 THEREIN SHALL BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
6 2. The remainder of the relief requested by Plaintiff is hereby DENIED.

7
8
9 DATED this 18 day of September, 2013.

10
11 
12 DISTRICT JUDGE 

13 Submitted by:

14 **HOWARD KIM & ASSOCIATES**

15 
16 Howard C. Kim, Esq. (SBN 10386)

17 Diana S. Cline, Esq. (SBN 10580)

18 Jacqueline A. Gilbert, Esq. (SBN 10593)

19 400 N. Stephanie St., Suite 160

20 Henderson, Nevada 89014

21 (702) 485-3300

22 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

Approved as to form, appeal rights reserved

WRIGHT, FINLAY & ZAK

23 /s/Chelsea A. Crowton

24 Chelsea A. Crowton, Esq. (SBN 11547)

25 5532 South Fort Apache, Suite 110

26 Las Vegas, Nevada 89148

27 (702) 475-7964

28 *Attorney for Defendant U.S. Bank, N.A., as
Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Wells
Fargo Asset Securities Corporation,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-AR4*

**ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK &
ALBRIGHT**

/s/D. Chris Albright

D. Chris Albright, Esq. (SBN 004904)

William H. Stoddard, Esq. (SBN 008679)


801 South Rancho Drive, Suite D-4

Las Vegas, Nevada 89016

(702) 384-7111

Attorneys for Defendant Lucia Parks

TAB 49



CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1 LLC,)
)
Plaintiff,)
vs.)
)
US BANK,)
)
Defendant.)
_____)

CASE NO. A678814
DEPT NO. XVIII

**TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS**

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID BARKER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MOTIONS

THURSDAY, MAY 16, 2013

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: DIANA S. CLINE, ESQ.
JACQUELIN GILBERT, ESQ.

For the Defendant: CHELSEA A. CROWTON, ESQ.

RECORDED BY CHERYL CARPENTER, COURT RECORDER
TRANSCRIBED BY: KARR Reporting, Inc.

KARR REPORTING, INC.

JA1024

1 **LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, MAY 16, 2013, 8:20 A.M.**

2 *** * * * ***

3 THE COURT: 678814, SFR Investment Pool 1, LLC vs. US
4 Bank. Can we have parties state their appearances for the
5 record, please.

6 MS. CLINE: Good morning. Diana Cline on behalf of
7 SFR Investments.

8 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Cline.

9 MS. GILBERT: Jacqueline Gilbert on behalf of SFR
10 Investments.

11 THE COURT: Thank you.

12 MS. CROWTON: And Chelsea Crowton on behalf of the
13 defendant, US Bank.

14 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Time set,
15 plaintiff's motion, SFR Investments' motion for preliminary
16 injunction. Who's going to argue; Ms. Cline?

17 MS. CLINE: Yes.

18 THE COURT: All right.

19 MS. CLINE: Good morning. This is SFR's motion for
20 preliminary injunction. SFR purchased the property at a
21 foreclosure of an HOA sale, and now is facing foreclosure by
22 the first deed of trust, which according to NRS 116.3116, was
23 extinguished at the time of the HOA foreclosure sale.

24 NRS 116.3116 creates a lien that the HOA has on a
25 property that is perfected and noticed at the time the

1 declaration and -- of CCNRs are recorded on the property. So
2 basically, whenever the HOA is formed, there is record notice
3 of this lien, and that in this case was before the deed of
4 trust was recorded on the property.

5 THE COURT: Oh, I see. I didn't -- I didn't think
6 about that timeline. I got to tell you, I've been dealing
7 with these and becoming more educated and schooled on it. And
8 cutting to the chase, if I do, if I follow that reasoning,
9 doesn't it kind of throw the entire process of -- and maybe
10 this is just too broad and maybe this is too simplistic, but
11 that's the way I have to play.

12 Doesn't it throw the whole process of securing real
13 estate loans out the window? I mean, if I say that
14 everything's extinguished, I mean, it's chaos arguably,
15 isn't it? This kind of chaos -- and again, that's my word.
16 That's a simple way of putting it.

17 MS. CLINE: Well, according to the comments to the
18 Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act, which the Nevada
19 legislature used to adopt NRS 116 --

20 THE COURT: Right.

21 MS. CLINE: -- it is a significant departure.

22 THE COURT: Yeah.

23 MS. CLINE: But it's something that has been around
24 actually since 1980, where the uniform act, it was adopted
25 because HOAs are similar to taxing entities, and it's very

1 common for a taxing entity and a tax lien to be able to
2 extinguish a first security interest. That's why you hardly
3 ever see tax sales and when you do, it's when there isn't
4 already a first security interest on the property.

5 THE COURT: Okay.

6 MS. CLINE: It's something that's been accepted by
7 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They have procedures that -- for
8 their servicers to go ahead and pay the six months of the
9 super priority portions in order to protect their liens. But
10 you're right, it is a significant departure.

11 But it's there to balance the needs of the HOA to run
12 on assessments, because they have a budget that they make
13 quarterly, yearly, however often they do that, they need in
14 order to provide the services that -- that they're required
15 to. If the HOAs weren't providing those services, then it
16 would fall back on the city or the county or the state in
17 order to do that.

18 In Nevada, the majority of homes and residences are
19 part of HOAs, and it's something that the legislature chose to
20 adopt because that's how Nevada grew, was allowing the
21 developers and the HOAs to come in and take care of the roads,
22 take care of garbage pickup, take care of maintenance of the
23 common areas, so that it's -- it was a burden that the county
24 and the cities didn't have to take care of.

25 THE COURT: Okay.

1 MS. CLINE: And it is a limited amount that a first
2 security interest has to come in and pay. 116.3116 creates a
3 lien that is prior to all encumbrances. That's the general
4 rule. There are exceptions. One exception is for tax liens.
5 Another exception is for anything that was recorded before the
6 CCNRs were formed.

7 So if you've got an old house in a new neighborhood
8 that became a CCNR and you have a deed of trust on that
9 property, it's not going to be subject to the CCNRs or to the
10 lien under NRS 116. So there is no -- nobody made a loan on a
11 property in a Nevada HOA without being on notice of NRS 116
12 and the super priority lien, or the fact that there was
13 actually a HOA there.

14 THE COURT: Okay.

15 MS. CLINE: All the bank has to do is pay nine months
16 of assessments and also any charges for abatement. Now, when
17 you're looking at NRS 116, and I'm sure we've -- we both
18 attach a lot of different cases and authority, there's nothing
19 binding. There's nothing binding on this Court, and this
20 Court --

21 THE COURT: Nothing.

22 MS. CLINE: There is absolutely nothing binding.

23 THE COURT: And everybody's all over the place. My
24 brothers and sisters in this building are all over the place.
25 And I've got to tell you, there's been great debate. We're

1 all talking about it back in the halls. Okay. We are,
2 because we're trying to find -- we're trying to do the right
3 thing.

4 MS. CLINE: Right. And I understand. But what we do
5 have is we have the real estate division's opinion, which,
6 according to the Nevada Supreme Court, is entitled to great
7 deference because they are the agency that is charged with
8 interpreting the extent and priority of an HOA lien. So you
9 can keep that in consideration. But even their opinion Your
10 Honor can review de novo, and so it's just a matter of
11 statutory construction.

12 The plain language does create priority over a first
13 security interest. It's limited in the amount that the bank
14 needs to pay. They don't have to take care of the entire
15 lien. They only have to take care of those two pieces in
16 order to maintain priority or obtain priority over the HOA
17 lien. And it's ongoing, because HOA assessments are ongoing
18 just like taxes are.

19 If you look at the plain language, it's prior. So if
20 Your Honor looks and says also prior means that an HOA lien is
21 senior, then Your Honor can look and say if that senior lien
22 forecloses, just like basic property law, anything that's
23 junior is extinguished. If it's ambiguous, then Your Honor
24 can look at the legislative history, look at comments to the
25 uniform act that were in front of the legislature when it was

1 adopted back in 1991.

2 And just to point you to the abatement provisions
3 that were adopted in 2009, if you look at that and the way --
4 it's starting on page 5 of our reply brief. If you look at
5 that, the way that the abatement provisions were incorporated
6 into NRS 116.3116 and the discussion that took place during
7 that legislative hearing, it's clear that when an HOA has this
8 super priority, then it can foreclose non-judicially. And
9 anything that is junior, including the first security
10 interest, can be extinguished by the foreclosure.

11 I know that part of the conversation with the judges
12 and the response that we've gotten back in different orders in
13 different cases is that is there really notice to the first
14 security interest holder, is there due process based on this.
15 Now again, this Section 3116, the super priority lien, the
16 concept came from the uniform act, which was later
17 incorporated into the Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act,
18 and the original language was based on, as I said, the taxes.

19 That was the whole idea. This is a tax. This is a
20 taxing entity, or a quasi taxing entity anyways. When the
21 legislature adopted 3116 in 1991, one of the provisions that
22 was included was NRS 116.31168(1). And on page 13 of our
23 reply brief, it shows you that the NRS 107.090 is directly
24 incorporated into the non-judicial foreclosure scheme for the
25 HOAs.

1 NRS 107.090(3)(b) specifically requires notice to
2 each other person with an interest whose interest or claimed
3 interest is subordinate to the deed of trust, or in the HOA's
4 case, subordinate to the HOA lien. Notice is required by the
5 statute. It's also given. It's something that's -- I've
6 never heard of any first security interest holder come in and
7 say, you know, I had no idea, I was never sent this notice.
8 It's something that it's been a practice since 1991, because
9 it is required by the statute.

10 In 1993, the legislature maybe confused things a
11 little by adding a section to say that the HOA is also
12 required to give notice to any security interest holder who
13 requests it. Again, that's something that came later and it
14 didn't change the requirements in NRS 116.31168(1)(a).

15 Just another quick thing to point out, Your Honor,
16 the real estate division's opinion in December was mainly
17 directed at, you know, what costs of collection and other
18 things may be included in the super priority lien. So it was
19 mainly directed towards that, as counsel -- or as defendant
20 points out. But it did have a section that said no lawsuit is
21 necessary.

22 This kind of goes along the same lines as due
23 process, the due process question that the courts have been
24 wondering about in this case. No action is necessary. The
25 Nevada legislature has adopted non-judicial foreclosure and

1 procedures for that, those statutory procedures for NRS 116
2 and also NRS 107, which the banks rely on to foreclose on
3 their deeds of trust.

4 And if you look at again, page 13 of our reply, it
5 kind of shows you how NRS 116 and the requirements there track
6 the non-judicial foreclosure process for deeds of trust. And
7 again, the NRS 107.080 has changed over the last, you know,
8 five or six years mainly, you know, due to, you know,
9 perception that the banks may have been abusing the process.
10 But when it was adopted, when NRS 116 was adopted back in
11 1991, it very -- like I said, it very closely tracked it and
12 it has up until the last few years.

13 So the requirements are the same. There is due
14 process. And I don't think you're going to get any bank
15 arguing that NRS 107.080 violates the constitution on its
16 face. And that's kind of what we're looking at in this case.
17 The requirements are the same, as the banks are given notice
18 and they are aware, based on the adoption of the statute, that
19 there is a super priority lien.

20 Now, the real estate division, in testimony on May 6,
21 so last week, clarified some of their as -- you know, some of
22 the sentences that they included in the original real estate
23 division opinion in December, that it was -- that the first
24 security interest is extinguished. And they give reasoning as
25 to why that was -- why that is the case and why -- why Your

1 Honor should look at this statute and read it in a way that an
2 HOA lien that includes super priority amounts can extinguish a
3 first security interest.

4 They said, "The division believes that the purpose of
5 the super priority lien is to give associations leverage over
6 a first security. For that reason, the division takes the
7 position that the association's foreclosure of its super
8 priority lien would extinguish the first secured if the first
9 secured does not pay the priority lien amount before the
10 sale."

11 Similarly, the comments to the uniform act on page 8
12 of our reply say, As a practical matter, secured lenders will
13 most likely pay the six months assessments demanded by the
14 association rather than having the association foreclose on
15 the unit. If the lender wishes, an escrow for assessments can
16 be required.

17 Since the provision may conflict with the provisions
18 of some state statutes which forbids the lending institutions
19 from making loans not secured by the first secure -- excuse
20 me, by first priority liens, the law of each state should be
21 reviewed and amended when necessary.

22 There's no reason for the comments to talk about, you
23 know, the danger of foreclosure of a first security interest,
24 or amending state laws, or requiring escrow, if there wasn't
25 the possibility that this portion of the HOA lien that is

1 prior to a first security interest could actually extinguish
2 the first security interest through a foreclosure.

3 THE COURT: Okay. Counsel's reply.

4 MS. CROWTON: Thank you, Your Honor. I think what
5 the plaintiff also fails to address is 2(b) at all, Your
6 Honor. If we look at 116.3116(2)(b), it specifically says
7 that US Bank's lien has priority over an HOA lien if their
8 lien was properly recorded and perfected in the Clark County
9 recorder's office prior to the date upon which the assessments
10 became delinquent in this case.

11 Now, the plaintiff asserts that the CCNRs are in some
12 way notice of a delinquent assessment lien before the actual
13 borrower may even exist at this property or become delinquent
14 with the HOA, and that just simply isn't the case. 2(b) says
15 something completely different. It's the date upon which the
16 borrower defaults on those assessments and dues. And there's
17 been no refute from the plaintiff that 2(b) has been met by US
18 Bank.

19 In this instance we have a December 2005 deed of
20 trust recorded in the Clark County recorder's office. Over
21 six years after that we get the recording of a notice of
22 delinquent assessment lien by the HOA. So clearly 2(b) has
23 been met. Now, under 2(c) there is an exception to that, this
24 super priority lien. But what that is, is a payment priority
25 lien.

1 The HOA has this atypical non-judicial foreclosure
2 right which allows them the power of sale to establish and
3 collect on that payment priority lien. And the plaintiff
4 fails to point to any legislative history or language in the
5 specific statute that supports this extinguishment theory that
6 they're proffering in the complaint.

7 And the reason for that is if you look at the
8 legislative history, the concern is without 2(c), without this
9 power of sale, without this payment priority lien, if the HOA
10 were to attach a lien to the property, it would really be up
11 to the borrower or the banks to pay it off, because if that
12 first were to foreclose, it would extinguish it.

13 So to protect the HOA and to allow them to collect on
14 the maintenance and preservation of the property, they
15 establish this payment priority lien. If it's not paid
16 through the HOA sale, then it would be subject to the first
17 foreclosing after the HOA sale. And that's the equitable
18 balance between 2(b) and 2(c), is they get this payment
19 priority lien with the power of sale, but the plaintiff and
20 any third party purchaser takes title subject to 2(b) and
21 2(a).

22 In fact, the plaintiff doesn't provide any theory as
23 to why 2(b) or 2(a) is even in the statute if 2(c)
24 extinguishes all junior liens, including a first position deed
25 of trust. And the reason they don't point to anything is

1 because that purchaser takes title subject to 2(b). They
2 essentially step into the shoes of the previous title holder
3 or borrower.

4 The foreclosure deed language that the plaintiff
5 relies on attests to that fact. The borrower loses any rights
6 or interest without equity or right of redemption. What the
7 plaintiff purchases is what the title holder had, and the
8 title holder had a temporary possessory interest subject to US
9 Bank's lien.

10 And they focus on the Uniform Common-Interest
11 Ownership Act and the comments section to that, but it's --
12 it's important to note that on page 6, I believe, of
13 Exhibit 3 --

14 (Pause in proceeding.)

15 MS. CROWTON: I'm sorry. Exhibit 4, it attests to
16 the fact -- of their reply, Your Honor. Exhibit 4 of their
17 reply, page 6. It attests to the fact that the Uniform
18 Common-Interest Ownership Act shouldn't be relied on by these
19 third party purchasers because their basis for that act was
20 judicial foreclosures with these HOA sales. And this is a
21 non-judicial foreclosure by the HOA.

22 So to rely on that is simply -- doesn't support the
23 extinguishment theory. And if it was so obvious that it would
24 extinguish a first position deed of trust, which is what the
25 plaintiff seems to attest to with these comments, we would see

1 a mandate in these comments that you must pay it off, that you
2 have to pay it off or you'll lose title. But that's not the
3 case here.

4 It says if there is a potentiality that your specific
5 state may be affected, your priority lien, you would have --
6 we recommend that you would pay it off. That could be to
7 forestall the herein litigation and the costs. But in this
8 case it's not affected by title because of 2(b). So the
9 comments to the Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act just
10 don't support the plaintiff's theory.

11 Now, they rely, Your Honor, on the Nevada Real Estate
12 opinion to establish this fact, and as we pled in our
13 opposition, we won't go into much detail about it, is it
14 really doesn't focus on the facts at hand. It doesn't focus
15 on the interaction between 2(b) and 2(c). It's a subjective
16 opinion by an administrative body and disclaims its
17 applicability at the very end.

18 And it's inconsistent, Your Honor. You have the
19 sentence that says that it extinguishes a security interest,
20 but on page 8 of that opinion it also says that if the lender
21 doesn't pay or foreclose, it may lose its security interest.
22 Well, that's exactly what US Bank is trying to do here.
23 They're trying to foreclose.

24 If you look at the chain of title, there's a notice
25 of default certificate, notice of trustee sales even before

1 the notice of delinquent assessment lien was recorded. In
2 fact, their foreclosure deed was recorded on May 6, I believe,
3 of this year. And then on May, I think it was 16th or the
4 11th, another trustee sale was posted by US Bank. So US Bank
5 is actively trying to protect and trying to foreclose but for
6 the actions of the plaintiff in this case.

7 And I just want to touch on real briefly the CCNRs.
8 The actual rules and regulations governing this sale by the
9 HOA specifically state that we're not trying to displace these
10 first recorded mortgages, we're just establishing this payment
11 priority lien. Now, the plaintiff goes into great detail to
12 say that this conflicts with the language in NRS 116. But
13 what it really conflicts with is their assertion of what that
14 interpretation of those statutes are.

15 But it really supports our theory in the aspect of
16 it's only a payment priority lien, so a third party purchaser
17 only has that possessory title interest subject to US Bank's
18 lien. Since that's all that the plaintiff purchased, they
19 won't suffer any irreparable harm if this injunction is denied
20 in this case. Based on that, Your Honor, we would request
21 that it be denied.

22 THE COURT: This is your motion. Final word.

23 MS. CLINE: Thank you. First of all, Your Honor,
24 plaintiff -- or I apologize. The former homeowner in this
25 case has been delinquent since 2009. And, you know, while US

1 Bank says that they have been actively foreclosing, they may
2 have recorded notices, but it did not go to foreclosure until
3 after the HOA foreclosed on their lien.

4 An HOA has only three years in order to enforce its
5 assessments. They have to take action, according to 3116(5),
6 I believe, otherwise those assessments go away and they can't
7 be collected. So the HOA can't just wait for four years in
8 order to -- in order for the first security interest holder to
9 foreclose before they can enforce their lien.

10 Now, going back to NRS 116.3116(2)(b), if the first
11 security interest holder had not recorded their deed of trust
12 before the delinquents became a -- or the assessments became
13 delinquent, then we wouldn't even be having this conversation.
14 The entire lien, the entire HOA lien would be prior to the
15 first deed of trust.

16 So the way that the language works is you can't
17 ignore 2(b), and you also can't ignore what comes after the
18 arrow in 3116(2). They work together. It's a qualified
19 exception.

20 As I said, you know, it's true we don't dispute that
21 the US Bank deed of trust was recorded before the notice of
22 delinquent assessments was recorded on the property. However,
23 as I said before, if that hadn't been the case, then the
24 entire HOA lien would have been prior. Then there wouldn't be
25 the super priority portion. It would be the entire lien.

1 As far as the plain language of the statute saying
2 that the HOA lien extinguishes a first deed of trust, it's not
3 something that is normally included in non-judicial
4 foreclosure statutes.

5 If you look on page 4 of our reply brief, there's a
6 box there that shows the language about the type of title
7 that's passed on to a purchaser at an HOA foreclosure sale,
8 and it compares it with NRS 107.080(5), that describes the
9 type of title that's passed on to a purchaser at a bank
10 foreclosure sale. These use the very same language.

11 The only thing that's different is in the HOA version
12 it talks about a unit's owner, and in the bank's version it
13 talks about a grantor. A grantor is a homeowner. A unit's
14 owner is a homeowner. In either case, it vests title in the
15 purchaser without equity or right of redemption. These are
16 the same types of title.

17 The only question is, is the HOA lien or a portion of
18 the HOA lien, whether it's a dollar or a thousand dollars, is
19 it prior, does it have priority, is it superior to the first
20 security interest. And according to NRS 116.3116(2),
21 combining 2(b) and the information after the arrow, at least a
22 portion of the HOA lien has priority.

23 So what happens is when a senior lien forecloses, all
24 of the junior liens or encumbrances are extinguished. That's
25 not spelled out in the statute because that's something that's

1 based on common law. It is basic property law. It is not
2 something that the legislature felt like it needed to do back
3 in 1991. They may feel like they need to do it now, but at
4 that time and when they adopted NRS 107.080(5), it wasn't
5 necessary.

6 The legislature also knows how to -- how to make part
7 of a lien or a lien not have the ability to foreclose, which
8 is essentially what's saying this is -- a payment priority is.
9 If you have a lien, it's prior, it can't be extinguished when
10 a junior lien is foreclosed.

11 That's basically what defendant is saying, is that
12 there's a lien, it's there, it won't be extinguished, but
13 there is no power to foreclose and extinguish the junior
14 liens. The legislature knows how to do that.

15 And NRS 116.31162(4), it specifically said that you
16 cannot foreclose, HOA, for violations of the CCNRs unless it's
17 one of these abatement issues that we're talking about that's
18 there. They didn't do that. They didn't provide any language
19 saying that there -- you cannot foreclose on the super
20 priority lien.

21 In addition, the Uniform Common-Interest Ownership
22 Act left open whether or not the legislatures could choose
23 judicial or non-judicial foreclosure. If you look at the
24 comments, if you look at the entire text of the UCIOA, it
25 shows you there are brackets. There are places where you can

1 choose to insert judicial, non-judicial, or as they refer to
2 it, power of sale in those comments.

3 That just isn't -- isn't something that our
4 legislature considered, because they definitely chose to go
5 with the non-judicial process and, as we discussed before, it
6 does provide due process. It does allow the -- all of the
7 interested parties notice and the ability to come in and cure
8 if they so choose to.

9 Now, the CCNRs purport to waive the super priority
10 lien. But the purpose of the common act -- of the Uniform
11 Common-Interest Ownership Act was to have everything be the
12 same. And for that reason they put in a specific provision,
13 NRS 116.1104, that provides that you can't waive in the CCNRs
14 or by agreement. You can't waive the provisions of the
15 statute. It's not possible. There has been no authority
16 provided by defendant showing that that just doesn't apply.

17 It also -- NRS 116 also makes it so that, you know,
18 that the HOAs don't have to amend their CCNRs every time there
19 is a change to NRS 116, or if, you know, they included some
20 terms in their CCNRs that are different than what's allowable
21 under the law. And the Nevada Supreme Court has said that if
22 there is a conflict, then NRS 116 trumps. That's just the way
23 that it is. That is in Boulder Oaks Community Association vs.
24 B & J Andrews Enterprises, LLC.

25 THE COURT: All right. I'm letting you build your

1 record. What I'm going to do is take this under advisement.
2 I'm going to enter a minute entry this afternoon that
3 articulates to where I view I need to go in this motion for
4 preliminary injunction.

5 I also know there's a motion to expunge the lis
6 pendens that's -- and I'm going to let the bank, that is your
7 motion, build any record you need. I have a direction or a
8 vision where I'm going to go on that as a function of what I'm
9 doing here.

10 MS. CROWTON: We discussed the issue with plaintiff.
11 There's a motion to dismiss hearing coming up, I think, I
12 believe June 4.

13 MS. CLINE: 4th or 5th.

14 THE COURT: Yeah.

15 MS. CROWTON: Yeah. If we could just push that to
16 that date, I think it goes well with that. And whatever is
17 decided here will --

18 THE COURT: Right.

19 MS. CROWTON: -- influence that anyways.

20 THE COURT: I'm not going to leave you hanging. We
21 can push that to the 4th at the request of parties.

22 MS. CROWTON: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

23 THE COURT: I'm not going to leave you dangling too
24 long. I'll make this decision and enter a minute order this
25 afternoon. All right.

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MS. CROWTON: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. CLINE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you both.

(Proceedings concluded at 8:49 a.m.)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.


AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

**KARR REPORTING, INC.
Aurora, Colorado**


KIMBERLY LAWSON

TAB 50



CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC,

Plaintiff,

vs.

U.S. BANK and LUCIA PARKS,

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-13-678814

DEPT. XVIII

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID BARKER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 2013

RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS:

DEFENDANT LUCIA PARKS' JOINDER IN U.S. BANK'S MOTION TO DISMISS
WITH PREJUDICE; DEFENDANT U.S. BANK'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS
PENDENS; DEFENDANT LUCIA PARKS' NOTICE OF JOINDER IN DEFENDANT
U.S. BANK'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS; DEFENDANT U.S. BANK'S
MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff SFR Investments:

DIANA S. CLINE, ESQ.

For Defendant U.S. Bank:

CHELSEA A. CROWTON, ESQ.

For Defendant Lucia Parks:

CHRIS D. ALBRIGHT, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: CHERYL CARPENTER, COURT RECORDER

1 TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 2013 AT 8:13 A.M.

2
3 THE COURT: Page 2 is 678814, SFR Investment Pool 1, LLC versus U.S.
4 Bank. Could I have parties state their appearances for the record, please?

5 MS. CROWTON: Chelsea Crowton appearing on behalf of the Defendant
6 U.S. Bank.

7 THE COURT: Thank you.

8 MS. CLINE: Good morning. Diana Cline on behalf of SFR Investments.

9 THE COURT: Thank you. This is time set for Defendants' motions to dismiss
10 and joinder. Counsel, you have the floor.

11 MS. CROWTON: Thank you, Your Honor.

12 Just to summarize our arguments, because we've heard it at the
13 preliminary injunction hearing, so just briefly. Under NRS 116.3116(2)(b) it states
14 that U.S. Bank's lien has priority over an HOA lien if it was recorded and perfected
15 prior to the date upon which the assessments became delinquent.

16 In this case the deed of trust was recorded in December of 2005 and
17 almost -- over six years after that was the recording of the delinquent assessment
18 lien in May of 2012. Now, there is an exception to that under (2)(c), which is that
19 super-priority lien. And the super-priority lien is a payment priority lien which gives
20 the HOA the power of sale in a typical non-judicial foreclosure.

21 Now, when we look at the legislative history and the statutory language,
22 there's no extinguishment clause anywhere in the legislative history or statutory
23 language and the reason for that is really the concern is to have this HOA be paid.
24 If it -- if the super-priority lien was not there, then the HOA would be at the mercy of
25 the banks or the borrower to pay it off prior to the first foreclosure. So what we have

1 is this payment priority lien.

2 Now, the Plaintiff fails to argue in the opposition why there would be an
3 inclusion of (2)(b) if (2)(c) extinguished all junior liens including a deed of trust. And
4 the reason for that is because (2)(b) and (2)(a), the Plaintiff took title subject to those
5 provisions.

6 Now, the Plaintiff relies on Section 1 of the Uniform Common Interest
7 Ownership Act and the abatement liens. So I'm going to briefly touch on those as
8 well. If you look at comment one to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act,
9 the history behind that deals with judicial foreclosures in that state. And if it was a
10 mandate, as the Plaintiff would like to suggest with this extinguishment theory, we
11 would see language in there about may, or instead of may or must, we would see
12 that it shall or you have to pay this assessment lien. Because that's not present in
13 this case or in the comment one, it is really an option to pay this assessment lien,
14 not a mandate.

15 With regards to the abatement lien, if we look at the legislative history
16 with NRS 116.310, 312, same thing as NRS 116.3116. It's a payment priority lien.
17 It's to establish and preserve the HOA for having to maintain these properties that
18 are either vacant or in the process of foreclosure. So the abatement lien fails to
19 provide any support to the Plaintiff's extinguishment theory.

20 Now, they also rely on the legislative letter and the Nevada Real Estate
21 opinion. The legislative letter, as stated in our pleadings, actually anticipates a
22 second foreclosure so that fails to lend support. The Nevada Real Estate opinion is
23 really a subjective nonbinding opinion that doesn't deal with interaction between a
24 super-priority lien and a first position and is inconsistent and contradicts itself
25 throughout the actual opinion itself.

1 Now, the relationship to 107.080, even if there are similarities between
2 the non-judicial foreclosure under a regular deed of trust and the HOA, those
3 similarities don't mean that there's an extinguishment there that the Plaintiff is
4 proffering in the complaint.

5 So based on this fact the Plaintiff can't support going for quiet title,
6 declaratory relief or even unjust enrichment because Wells Fargo isn't retaining any
7 benefit that is to the Plaintiff. Based on this fact, we would request the motion to
8 dismiss be granted with prejudice and the motion to expunge lis pendens.

9 THE COURT: Response.

10 MS. CLINE: Thank you, Your Honor.

11 Defendant argues that the first security interest is prior to the HOA lien
12 because it was recorded and perfected before the HOA lien. This is just false. The
13 HOA lien --

14 THE COURT: You can't -- you don't disagree it was recorded?

15 MS. CLINE: I do -- I don't disagree that it's recorded but the HOA lien was
16 perfected when the declaration of CC&Rs of the HOA were recorded on the property
17 and that was before the first security interest was recorded.

18 THE COURT: Okay. All right.

19 MS. CLINE: Counsel argues that (2)(b) wouldn't be there if the rest of the
20 statute could extinguish the lien.

21 Now, the reason why there's (2)(b) and also the language after the
22 arrow in 2 is because it's a balance. The first security interest doesn't have to pay
23 off the entire HOA lien in order to maintain its priority over an HOA lien. It only has
24 to make sure that the HOA has paid its assessments and just the common
25 assessments, not any of the other things that are included in the HOA lien, just the

1 common assessments that are budgeted by the HOA that they need to provide the
2 services to all of the homeowners in the property, in the community. The concern is
3 to have the HOA be paid its assessments but it's not just to be paid whenever the
4 first security interest gets around to foreclosing or a homeowner decides to sell the
5 property.

6 There is, as Your Honor is aware, the testimony from the Nevada Real
7 Estate Division that also supports the --

8 THE COURT: Yeah, I know. You've briefed me well on that.

9 MS. CLINE: Your Honor, and just to call your attention to the supplement that
10 we filed at the end of last week which has information that was requested from the
11 State Bar of Nevada Common Interest Community Division from one of the drafters
12 of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act. It spells it out. It explains that the
13 super-priority portion of the HOA lien is there not just as a payment priority but to
14 foreclose. And that is the stick that the HOA has in order to get the bank to come to
15 the table and pay.

16 Counsel argues that because it doesn't say shall pay the assessment
17 lien it's not a mandate. It's just something that they may do. I agree. It is not a
18 mandate. The banks don't have to pay. They can choose -- they can have a -- they
19 can --

20 THE COURT: To their own detriment.

21 MS. CLINE: Right. They can. It's a business decision. There may be a
22 property that they do not want to put any additional money into. They're not getting
23 their mortgage payment. They -- it's not worth it. There's an environmental hazard
24 on the property. They don't have to pay the assessments. It is something that they
25 do if they want to protect their security interest.

1 The legislature just recently considered NRS 116.3116 and looked at
2 changing the law from what it is now to something that would make it a payment
3 priority. They ultimately chose not to. But the Legislative Counsel Digest at the
4 beginning of that proposed amendment says: Under existing law, a homeowners'
5 association has a lien on a unit for certain amounts due to the association.
6 Generally, the association's lien is not prior to the first security interest on the unit
7 recorded before the date on which the amount sought to be enforced began
8 delinquent. However, the association's lien is prior to the first security interest on
9 the unit to the extent of certain maintenance and abatement charges and a certain
10 amount of assessments for common expenses. The portion of the association's lien
11 that is prior to the first security interest on the unit is commonly referred to as the
12 super-priority lien. NRS 116.3116. Existing law authorizes the association to
13 foreclosure its lien by sale and prescribes the procedures for such a foreclosure.
14 And that is what the existing law is according to the legislative counsel bureau. It
15 goes on to say what would happen with the amendment which included making it so
16 that it is just triggered by the foreclosure of the first security interest.

17 Ultimately, the legislature chose not to adopt that. What they did adopt
18 was -- were two provisions that, one, that encourages banks to open escrow
19 accounts and escrow the assessments for the homeowners' associations and also a
20 clarification that they -- that the association and their collection companies need to
21 provide payoff demands, accurate payoff demands, to any security interest holder.

22 And Your Honor is familiar with the arguments. I just point you to Judge
23 Tao's order.

24 THE COURT: I'm sure you do.

25 MS. CLINE: I do. It explains that, you know, if you agree that a loan is prior,

1 if it has seniority, then the foreclosure of that lien follows the basic property, real
2 property law concepts and extinguishes the first security interest.

3 THE COURT: Okay. Frankly, this is your motion. Final word.

4 MS. CROWTON: Just to briefly touch on the CC&Rs' argument that that's the
5 date upon which the perfection of the HOA lien. Even in the Legislative Digest the
6 Plaintiff's counsel had read it specifically states that the perfection occurs on the
7 date that the delinquent assessments become due. And the specific language in
8 (2)(b) is that language where it's a perfection on the date on which the assessments
9 became delinquent.

10 And the equitable balance argument the Plaintiff is asserting is this
11 argument that we are asserting in our motion to dismiss which is this payment
12 priority lien where if (2)(b) and (2)(a) are met, the Plaintiff takes subject to those
13 conditions at the sale of the HOA. So based on that we would request that our
14 motion to dismiss be granted.

15 THE COURT: All right. I'm well-briefed on these issues and now I'm
16 schooled on them as well. I've reviewed all the -- or most of the decisions we've
17 pulled from -- that have been generated as a function of these actions in this
18 building and I'm going to weigh-in.

19 I know I have -- I denied the motion for preliminary injunction and I'm
20 going to set a date for decision and entry of order that I'm going to draft, or we're
21 going to draft. What's that date?

22 THE LAW CLERK: I believe it was 30 days from the 17th, June 17th.

23 THE COURT: Could we just check Odyssey under this case number?

24 Counsel, do either one of you have that date? I didn't pull it up this
25 morning.

1 MS. CLINE: What date are we looking for?

2 THE COURT: I actually didn't set it for a future hearing date. I just set --

3 MR. ALBRIGHT: It was 30 days from the date of service of the notice of entry

4 of the ordering denying preliminary injunction, so.

5 THE COURT: Do you have that date noted?

6 MR. ALBRIGHT: I'm not sure when the notice of --

7 THE COURT: Well, then it doesn't matter. Let's just go 20 from today,

8 approximate.

9 MR. ALBRIGHT: I don't think it's gone out yet, the notice.

10 THE COURT: Counsel, do you want to state your appearance for the record,

11 please?

12 MR. ALBRIGHT: Sure. Chris Albright on behalf of Lucia Parks. We had

13 joined in the motion.

14 THE COURT: Right. I'll address the joinder too as a function of the decision.

15 [Colloquy between the Court and the Court Clerk]

16 MR. ALBRIGHT: I don't think a notice of entry of the other order has gone out

17 yet and it was 30 days from that date.

18 THE COURT: Oh, okay.

19 MR. ALBRIGHT: So I don't think we have a specific date.

20 THE COURT: So it wouldn't have. Just give me a 30-day date.

21 THE COURT CLERK: A 30-day date is going to be July 9th.

22 THE COURT: July 9th but anticipate it before that, much before that.

23 Anything else I can do for parties today?

24 MS. CROWTON: No, Your Honor.

25 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

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MS. CLINE: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

[Proceedings concluded at 8:25 a.m.]


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ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/visual proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.



Cheryl Carpenter,
Court Recorder

TAB 51



CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC,

Plaintiff,

vs.

U.S. BANK and LUCIA PARKS,

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-13-678814

DEPT. XVIII

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID BARKER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2013

RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS:

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff SFR Investments:

DIANA S. CLINE, ESQ.

For Defendant U.S. Bank:

CHELSEA A. CROWTON, ESQ.

For Defendant Lucia Parks:

CHRIS D. ALBRIGHT, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: CHERYL CARPENTER, COURT RECORDER

1 TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2013 AT 8:13 A.M.

2
3 THE COURT: This is A678814, SFR Investment Pool 1, LLC, versus U.S.
4 Bank. Could I have parties state their appearance for the record, please?

5 MS. CLINE: Good morning. Diana Cline on behalf of SFR.

6 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Cline.

7 MR. ALBRIGHT: Chris Albright on behalf of Lucia Parks.

8 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Albright.

9 MS. CROWTON: And Chelsea Crowton on behalf of U.S. Bank, Your Honor.

10 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Crowton.

11 All right. This is Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend judgment. Ms.
12 Cline, you have the floor.

13 MS. CLINE: Yes, Your Honor.

14 Plaintiff seeks to alter or amend the judgment for two reason; one, for
15 the Court to reconsider the dismissal of its claims against U.S. Bank.

16 Second, and more importantly, to reconsider the order dismissing Lucia
17 Parks with prejudice from this case and also expunging the lis pendens.

18 As explained in our papers, the parties don't disagree that there wasn't
19 a basis to dismiss Lucia Parks from this action. Parks argues that now that the
20 foreclosure --

21 THE COURT: Moot.

22 MS. CLINE: -- sale has taken place, it's moot but that isn't the case. We're
23 still working through the issues with U.S. Bank on appeal and that is relevant after
24 that appeal is complete.

25 THE COURT: So what I just heard you tell me is you'd be satisfied if my

1 decision was to make this dismissal without prejudice.

2 MS. CLINE: That's correct, Your Honor. Parks has another pending case --

3 THE COURT: Right.

4 MS. CLINE: -- that in all likelihood it would need to be consolidated with this
5 case and I think since that case was filed a couple hours before our case, it would
6 be consolidated into that court.

7 THE COURT: Mr. Parks.

8 MR. ALBRIGHT: And I'm --

9 THE COURT: Or Mr. Albright, excuse me.

10 MR. ALBRIGHT: And I'm fine with the resolution of simply having the
11 dismissal against Parks stand but be without prejudice in case something happens
12 on appeal that causes it to longer be moot.

13 THE COURT: Ms. Crowton, how do you fell about that?

14 MS. CROWTON: That's fine, Your Honor.

15 THE COURT: That's my order.

16 MS. CLINE: Your Honor, also we're asking to have the lis pendens either
17 reinstated or the order dismissing the lis pendens stayed during the appeal.

18 THE COURT: Counsel, how -- Mr. Albright, Ms. Crowton, how do you feel
19 about that? I mean my vision has always been that you move forward on appeal.
20 You know, these issues are of first impression, but I don't know how practically that
21 would work, frankly. The property is sold; right?

22 MS. CLINE: The property has been sold. What we want to do is prevent a
23 transfer to another third party who would become a bona fide purchaser and if and
24 when SFR prevails on its appeal, then it would not be able to obtain the property.

25 THE COURT: Okay. So --

1 MR. ALBRIGHT: We would prefer that, to have the property sold so that the
2 deficiency decreases again if there's another seller out there the bank is able to
3 pass it to, but.

4 THE COURT: It just seems to mess up the -- it'd mess up the situation even
5 more.

6 MR. ALBRIGHT: That may be, Your Honor.

7 I think our main concern is simply that the dismissal against Lucia Parks
8 remain in place. If it's without prejudice, that's fine. I don't really have an opinion on
9 the lis pendens.

10 THE COURT: Ms. Crowton, you've been patient. Any word on your side?

11 MS. CROWTON: I mean there's no necessity to have a lis pendens be
12 recorded. There is already a lis pendens on there to provide notice. I know that the
13 Plaintiff's claims is that it's not specific to U.S. Bank but it does provide clear notice
14 there that there is a cloud on the title in this case. Plus if the goal is we should just
15 do this on appeal, Your Honor --

16 THE COURT: That is the goal. That's been my stated goal but maybe the
17 best way to make that happen is to grant your request to allow that lis pendens to be
18 lodged. So I'm going to allow that to happen as well. All right?

19 MS. CLINE: Thank you, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: All right. Prepare the order Ms. Cline and run it by opposing
21 counsel.

22 MS. CLINE: Thank you.

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MS. CROWTON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

[Proceedings concluded at 8:18 a.m.]

* * * * *

ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/visual proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.



Cheryl Carpenter,
Court Recorder