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MLIM
STEVEN T. JAFFE
Nevada Bar No. 007035
sjaffe@lawhjc.com
JACOB S. SMITH
Nevada Bar No. 010231
jsmith@lawhjc.com
JACOB B. LEE
Nevada Bar No. 012428
jlee@lawhjc.com

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HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

7425 PEAK DRIVE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128 (702) 316-4111 FAX (702) 316-4114

Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

MARGARET G. SEASTRAND,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES 1 through 10; and ROE ENTITIES 11 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-11-636515-C DEPT NO. XXX

DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4: TO LIMIT PLAINTIFF'S PRESENTATION OF PAST MEDICAL SPECIAL DAMAGES AT TRIAL TO AMOUNTS ACTUALLY PAID BY OR ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

Defendant, Raymond Riad Khoury, by and through his counsel of record, Hall Jaffe & Clayton, LLP, hereby moves *in limine* for an Order limiting Plaintiff's presentation of past medical special damages at trial to those amounts actually paid either by Plaintiff or on her behalf as compensation in full for the treatment rendered to Plaintiff by her treating medical providers.

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This Motion is made and based upon the Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto, the papers and pleadings on file herein, and any oral argument the Court may entertain at the hearing on this matter.

DATED this 1st day of May, 2013.

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

Bv

STEVEN T.VAFFE Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH Nevada Bar No. 010231

JACOB-B. LEE

Nevada Bar No. 012428 7425 Peak Drive

Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: MARGARET SEASTRAND, Plaintiff; and

TO: RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ., her attorney of record:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that undersigned will bring the foregoing **DEFENDANT'S MOTION**

IN LIMINE NO. 4: TO LIMIT PLAINTIFF'S PRESENTATION OF PAST MEDICAL SPECIAL

DAMAGES AT TRIAL TO AMOUNTS ACTUALLY PAID BY OR ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF
4 th

on for hearing in Department XXX of the Eighth Judicial District Court on the ____ day of ______ day of ______, 2013, at the hour of ______, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

DATED this 1st day of May, 2013.

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HALL JAFFE & CVAYTON, LLP

By

STEVEN T. JAFFE

Nevada Bar Nb. 007035

JACOB S. SMITH

Nevada Bar No. 010231

JACOB B. LEE

Nevada Bar No. 012428

7425 Peak Drive

Las Vegas, Nevada 89128

Attorneys for Defendant

Raymond R. Khoury

3

AFFIDAVIT OF JACOB S. SMITH, ESQ. IN COMPLIANCE WITH EDCR 2.47 2 STATE OF NEVADA) ss: COUNTY OF CLARK 3 4 JACOB S. SMITH, being first duly sworn, under oath, deposes and says: 5 1. Affiant is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, and is an attorney with 6 the law firm of HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP, counsel of record in this matter for Defendant Raymond 7 Riad Khoury; 8 2. On April 23, 2013, prior to submitting Defendant's instant Motion in Limine, I contacted 9 counsel for Plaintiff Margaret Seastrand to discuss the contents of the motion. Specifically, I spoke with 10 Alison A. Brasier, Esq. of Richard Harris Law Firm, pursuant to EDCR 2.47, to discuss the content of the 11 Motion and to make a good faith effort to resolve the issues addressed in the Motion. Ms. Brasier and I were 12 unable to resolve the issues addressed in the Motion, thereby necessitating its filing. 13 FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 14 15 JACOB S. SMITH ESO. 16 17 18 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me day of May, 2013. 19 **NOTARY PUBLIC** 20 STATE OF NEVADA County of Clark LISA C. RICO 21 My Appointment Expires Aug. 10, 2010 COUNTY and STATE 22 23 ///24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 13, 2009, in Las Vegas, Nevada. Plaintiff, Margaret Seastrand ("Plaintiff") alleges that, on that date, Mr. Khoury negligently operated a motor vehicle in a manner that caused a collision with Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff further alleges that she has suffered serious and disabling injuries as a result of the collision.

In her most recent NRCP 16.1 disclosures, Plaintiff alleged that she has incurred \$433,213.02 in past medical special damages. (See Plaintiff's 2nd Supplement to Initial Early Case Conference List of Witnesses and Documents (statement only), attached hereto as **Exhibit "A"**). Prior to that disclosure, Mr. Khoury served written discovery requests on Plaintiff, including Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, seeking information regarding the amounts paid to and/or accepted by each treating medical provider and facility that rendered treatment to Plaintiff for the injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of the subject accident, as well as information regarding any liens held by Plaintiff's treating medical providers. (See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Second Requests for Production to Plaintiff Margaret Seastrand, attached hereto as **Exhibit "B"**; Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Raymond Khoury's Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff Margaret Seastrand, attached hereto as **Exhibit "C"**).

Plaintiff responded identically to each request, as follows:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

(Exhibits "B" and "C"). After Plaintiff declined to supplement her responses, Mr. Khoury filed a motion to compel, which this Court ultimately granted in part. In her Report and Recommendations, the Discovery Commissioner addressed only Mr. Khoury's request for medical liens held by Plaintiff's treating medical providers, granting Mr. Khoury's requests for documents and information regarding the liens, and denying Mr. Khoury's request that Plaintiff provide documents and information regarding the sale of any such liens to third-party purchasers that was not already in Plaintiff's possession. (See Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations, attached hereto as Exhibit "D"). The Report did not address Mr. Khoury's

request for documents and information regarding the amounts accepted by Plaintiff's treating medical providers as payment in full for their services. (Exhibit "D").

Mr. Khoury believes that Plaintiff is responsible for paying an amount less than the total that was billed by her treating medical providers. In other words, Mr. Khoury believes that some or all of Plaintiff's treating medical providers have in reality accepted an amount far below the \$433,213.02 they billed to Plaintiff for the services collectively rendered to her, and that these providers have, in turn, written off the remaining sums.

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. Standard for Motion in Limine.

NRS. 47.080 provides:

In jury cases, hearings on preliminary questions of admissibility, offers of proof in narrative or question and answer form, and statements of the judges showing the character of the evidence shall to the extent practicable unless further restricted by NRS 47.0090, **be conducted out of the hearing of the jury**, to prevent the suggestion of inadmissible evidence. (Emphasis added).

See also EDCR 2.47 (allowing for motions in limine). The Nevada Supreme Court has tacitly approved the use of motions in limine to be within the purview of the district court's discretionary power concerning rulings on the admissibility of evidence. State ex. rel Dept. of Highway v. Nevada Aggregates & Asphalt Co., 92 Nev. 370, 551 P.2d 1095 (1976).

The advantage of such motions "is to avoid the obviously futile attempt to "unring the bell" in the event a motion to strike is granted in the proceedings before a jury." *Hyatt v. Sierra Boat Co.*, 79 Cal.App.3d. 325, 337 (1978). Motions *in limine* also allow a more careful consideration of evidentiary issues than would take place during a trial. Furthermore, by resolving potentially critical issues at the outset, pre-trial motions enhance the efficiency of trials and possibly promote settlements. "The usual purpose of motions *in limine*," however, "is to preclude the presentation of evidence deemed inadmissible and prejudicial to the moving party." *Kelly v. New West Federal Savings*, 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 669-670 (1996).

All evidence presented by Plaintiff must meet the threshold requirement of relevance. NRS 48.205(2) provides that "[e]vidence that is not relevant is not admissible." Relevant evidence, as defined by NRS 48.015, is:

[e]vidence having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without be the evidence.

NRS 48.035 further provides:

- 1. Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.
- 2. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

The determination of whether the prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. *Anderson v. State*, 92 Nev. 21, 554 P.2d 1200 (1975). Arguments which unfairly prejudice a party must be excluded. *Givens v. State*, 99 Nev. 50, 657 P.2d 97 (1983).

On April 23, 2013, counsel for Mr. Khoury spoke with Plaintiff's counsel in an attempt to secure an agreement regarding the need to file this Motion *in Limine* prior to filing the same with the Court. After much discussion, no such agreement could be reached. (*See* Affidavit of Jacob S. Smith submitted in compliance with EDCR 2.47, as set forth above).

- B. Plaintiffs' Presentation of Past Medical Damages Should be Limited to Those Amounts Actually Paid Out, Either by Plaintiff or on Her Behalf.
 - 1. The collateral source rule has no bearing on amounts billed by medical providers but for which Plaintiffs incurred no actual liability because the providers agreed to accept a lesser amount as payment in full.

Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions in her responses to Mr. Khoury's written discovery requests discussed above, the collateral source rule has no bearing on amounts for which Plaintiff was billed, but for which Plaintiff never incurred liability, because her medical providers accepted lesser amounts as full payment. *Howell v. Hamilton Meats and Provisions, Inc.*, 52 Cal. 4th 541, 548, 257 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Cal. 2011). In *Howell*, the plaintiff sustained serious injuries when he was struck by the defendant's driver. The defendant conceded liability at trial, but disputed the amount of past medical damages claimed by the plaintiff. *Id.* The defendant moved *in limine* to exclude evidence of those portions of his medical bills that neither the plaintiff nor his health insurer paid due to pre-existing agreements between the insurer and the plaintiff. *Id.* The trial court denied the motion and allowed the plaintiff to present the full amount billed as his past medical damages, but later reduced the jury award by the billed but unpaid amount upon motion

by the defendant. *Id.* at 549-50, 257 P.3d at 1133-34. The court of appeals reversed the reduction as a violation of the collateral source rule. *Id.* at 550-51, 357 P.3d at 1134. The California Supreme Court, however, held that a plaintiff can recover as past medical damages no more than the amount accepted by his medical providers as payment in full for their services. *Id.* (Emphasis added).

Limiting Plaintiff's presentation of medical special damages to the amounts actually paid to her treating medical providers, whether by Plaintiff, on her behalf, or by a third-party medical lien purchaser, as payment in full for their services does not violate the collateral source rule, because such a limitation does not amount to an after-the-fact reduction of the amount Plaintiff would otherwise recover as damages. "Because they do not represent an economic loss for [Plaintiff], they are not recoverable in the first instance." *Howell*, 52 Cal. 4th at 548, 357 P.3d at 1133. Mr. Khoury, therefore, respectfully requests that this Court preclude Plaintiff from introducing evidence at trial of the full amount billed by her healthcare providers for treatment of her alleged injuries and restrict her to introducing only those amounts actually paid, whether by Plaintiff, on her behalf, or by a third-party medical lien purchaser, as payment for those services.

2. Only the "reasonable value" of medical care "necessarily incurred" is recoverable by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff may recover only "[t]he reasonable medical expenses [she] has necessarily incurred as a result of the accident." Nev. J.I. 5PID.1(1) (emphasis added). If, as alleged herein, Plaintiff's medical providers have agreed to accept reduced amounts as payment in full for services provided, Plaintiff cannot be said to have incurred medical expenses in the amount of the difference between what was billed and what was paid because no one, including Plaintiff, was or ever will be liable for that amount. Howell, 52 Cal. 4th at 556, 257 P.3d at 1138; see also Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Medical Center, 765 A.2d 786, 789 (Pa. 2001) (holding that "where, as here, the exact amount of expenses has been established by contract and those expenses have been satisfied, there is no longer any issue as to the amount of expenses for which the plaintiff will be liable. In the latter case, the injured party should be limited to recovering the amount paid for the medical services."). The amount recoverable by Plaintiff, therefore, should only include those amounts paid by Plaintiff or paid on her behalf, because "to award more [would be] to place [her] in a better financial position than before the tort was committed." Howell, 52 Cal. 4th at 553, 257 P.3d at 1136, citing Hanif

v. Housing Authority, 200 Cal.App.3d 635, 640-641, 246 Cal.Rptr. 192 (1988); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 911, comment h, pp. 476-477 (although the measure of recovery for services rendered is usually their reasonable value, "[i]f the person paid less than the exchange rate, he can recover no more than the amount paid, except when the low rate was intended as a gift to him.").

To allow Plaintiff to present evidence to the jury that her past medical expenses total the full amount billed (but not paid) would violate Nevada law, which requires not only that past medical expenses be reasonable, but that they actually be *incurred*. Nev. J.I. 5PID.1(1), *supra*. Should Plaintiff recover the higher claimed amount as damages, she will have been placed in a <u>better</u> financial position than she was in before the alleged tort was committed. Such a result would amount to a denial of justice by unfairly penalizing Mr. Khoury and making him liable for costs for which Plaintiff, herself, never was and never will be liable. Even if the question of liability is ultimately decided against Mr. Khoury, he should not be required to overcompensate Plaintiff (with respect to Plaintiff's claimed past medical expenses) by paying her more than is necessary to put her in the same financial position she occupied prior to the alleged injury.

3. Restricting Plaintiff's damages in this way will not result in a windfall to Mr. Khoury.

Limiting Plaintiff to presenting evidence of the amounts actually paid as past medical expenses would not result in a windfall to Mr. Khoury because, in the event Plaintiff were to prevail at trial, Mr. Khoury would still be required to pay Plaintiff the full amount of the actual loss incurred as a result of her injuries, as described above. Plaintiff could only plausibly argue that limiting her potential recovery to the amounts actually paid would be an injustice to her <u>if</u> she could prove that the amount paid is in reality far below the reasonable value of the treatment she received. *Howell*, 52 Cal. 4th at 561-62, 257 P.3d at 1142.

The truth of the matter is that medical charges are determined in consideration of a wide range of factors and competing interests. *Howell*, 52 Cal. 4th at 560, 257 P.3d at 1141 (*citing* Dobson et al., *A Study of Hospital Charge Setting Practices* p. v (2005) http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Dec05_ Charge_setting.pdf (as of Aug. 18, 2011)). Health insurers typically negotiate significant discounts off of the standard charges. *Id.* (*citing* Hall & Schneider, *Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace*, 106 Mich. L.Rev. 643, 663 (2008) (footnotes omitted)). Even uninsured patients typically receive a discount on the services provided to them, often bringing their bills down to the level of

insured patients, leading to a characterization of hospital bills as "insincere, in the sense that they would yield truly enormous profits if those prices were actually paid." *Id.* (*citing* Reinhardt, *The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy*, 25 Health Affairs 57, 62-63 (2006)). Furthermore, the amount billed, itself, can vary significantly from one provider to the next. *Id.* at 561-62, 257 P.3d at 1142 (*citing* Reinhardt, *The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services* at 58). Thus, "it is not possible to say generally that providers' full bills represent the real value of their services, nor that the discounted payments they accept from private insurers are mere arbitrary reductions." *Id.*

Given the realities of medical billing and payment, then, it makes more sense to make the price negotiated, paid, and accepted between medical providers the barometer of Plaintiff's recovery, rather than relying on potentially inaccurate and misleading billing statements issued by the medical providers when such bills were not and never will be paid by Plaintiff or anyone else. *Howell*, 52 Cal. 4th at 562, 257 P.3d at 1142. By limiting Plaintiff's presentation of damages to those costs actually paid, whether by her, on her behalf, *i.e.* those losses actually incurred by her, Plaintiff is able to recover the loss incurred as a result of her injuries without giving Mr. Khoury a windfall. In doing so, it is not necessary to disclose the source of either the payments or the write-downs, as the evidence can be presented simply in terms of what amounts Plaintiff's medical providers accepted as payment for their services. In this manner, conflict with the collateral source rule can be avoided.

C. Evidence Of Amounts Billed To Plaintiffs But Not Paid (Or Incurred) Is Not Relevant, And Failure To Limit Plaintiff's Presentation Of Damages To Amounts Actually Paid Would Mislead and Confuse The Jury And Result In Unfair Prejudice To Mr. Khoury.

Evidence of amounts billed by Plaintiff's medical providers, but not paid, are not relevant to the issue of damages, or to any other issue in this case. *See* NRS 48.015 (stating that relevant evidence is any evidence that makes the existence of a material fact more or less probable). Such amounts are not losses incurred by Plaintiff, as discussed above; they are not damages she would otherwise have collected from Mr. Khoury because they are not amounts expended by Plaintiff or on her behalf. *Howell*, 52 Cal. 4th at 548, 257 P.3d at 1133. Thus, any amounts above those actually paid are not admissible and must be excluded from trial. NRS 48.025(2) (stating that irrelevant evidence is not admissible).

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In the unlikely event that this Court should consider those amounts relevant, they should still be excluded because their probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and potential to mislead the jury, making them subject to mandatory exclusion. NRS 48.035 (stating that evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury is not admissible). Presenting the jury with inflated figures that do not accurately represent Plaintiff's actual losses would not only result in a trumped-up award for past medical special damages, but would invariably affect the jury's deliberations over other damages, such as pain and suffering. The higher Plaintiff's claimed medical expenses climb, the more serious her injuries will appear to the jury, and the more the jury will presume that Plaintiff has suffered. Although pain and suffering damages may potentially be appropriate in the event the jury were to find for Plaintiff, this does not mean Plaintiff should be permitted to mislead the jury by presenting over-inflated, inaccurate, and misleading figures. Such a result would unfairly prejudice Mr. Khoury. Mr. Khoury, therefore, respectfully requests that this Court exclude evidence of the amounts of Plaintiff's claimed medical expenses that were billed but never paid, either by Plaintiff or on her behalf.

III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Khoury respectfully requests that this Court issue an Order limiting Plaintiff's presentation of her past medical special damages to those amounts that were actually paid, either by her or on her behalf, to her treating medical providers as payment in full for their services, rather than the amounts billed by those providers.

DATED this 1st day of May, 2013.

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLI

Bv

STEVEN F. JAFFE Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH Nevada Bar No. 010231 JACOB B. LEE

Nevada Bar No. 012428

7425 Peak Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89128

Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

EXHIBIT "A"

1	SUPP	
2	RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 505	
3	ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ.	
5	Nevada Bar No. 10522 RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM	•
6	801 South Fourth Street	
7	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Phone (702) 444-4444	
8	Fax (702) 444-4455	
	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	DISTRICT C	OURT
10	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
11		
12	MARGARET G. SEASTRAND,	CASE NO.: A-11-636515-C
13	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: XXX
14	vs.	
15	RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES I-X, and	PLAINTIFF'S 2 nd SUPPLEMENT TO
16	ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,	INITIAL EARLY CASE CONFERENCE LIST OF
17	Defendants.	WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS
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20	Plaintiff, by and through her attorneys of re-	cord, the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM,
21	hereby produces the following supplement to list	t of witnesses and documents pursuant to
22		
23	N.R.C.P. Section 16.1.	
24	(Supplements are in bold)	
25	DOCUME	NTS
26 .	Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Depar	rtment, State of Nevada Traffic
27	Accident Report.	
28	6 color photographs depicting damag subject crash. 1	es to Plaintiff's vehicle as a result of the

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3.	Property damage estimate prepared by Classic Body & Pain Inc. B East.
4.	Medical records and bills from Las Vegas Fire & Rescue.
5.	Medical records and bills from Mountain View Hospital.
6.	Medical records and bills from Radiology Specialist, Ltd.
7.	Medical records and bills from Fremont Emergency Services.
8.	Medical records and bills from Primary Care Consultants.
9.	Medical records and bills from Neck & Back Clinic.
10.	Medical records and bills from Nevada Imaging Company.
11.	Medical records and bills from Marjorie E. Belsky, M.D. (Updated billing)
12.	Medical records and bills from Surgery Center of Southern Nevada.
13.	Medical records and bills from Mario Tarquino, M.D.
14.	Medical records and bills from William S. Muir, M.D.
15.	Medical records and bills from Las Vegas Radiology/Sierra Meds Services.
16.	Medical records and bills from Summerlin Hospital Medical Center.
17.	Medical records and bills from Russell Shah, M.D.
18.	Medical records and bills from Leo Langlois, M.D
19.	Medical records and bills from Nevada Spine Clinic.
20.	Medical records and bills from St. Rose Dominican Hospital.
21.	Medical records and bills from Eddy Luh, M.D.
22.	Medical records and bills from Matt Smith Physical Therapy.

All radiology films, floral images of selective nerve root blocks, x-rays, MRI, 22. CT scans, videos, and diagnostic testing/documentation taken in connection with the care and treatment rendered to Plaintiff as a result of the subject incident.

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23.	treatises, me reports, com medical refe	pects to utilize any and all writings, published works, journals, edical texts, affidavits, films, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs uputer tapes, computer discs, and other data compilations, and other erence materials which Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's expert use in Plaintiff's allegations.
24.		y offer at trial certain exhibits for demonstrative purposes, including ted to the following:
	a.	Video, storyboards, and/or power point images, blow ups and/or transparencies of exhibits;
	ь.	Diagrams and/or models of the human body, specifically related to Plaintiff's injuries;
	c.	Samples of hardware used for and during surgery;

- Photographs and videos of surgical procedures and other d. diagnostic tests;
- Actual diagnostic studies; e.
- Samples of tools used in surgical procedures; f.
- Diagrams, drawings, pictures, photos, film, video, DVD g. CD ROM of various parts of the human body, diagnostic tests and surgical procedures; and,
- Power point images, drawings, diagrams, animations, storyboards, h. of the vehicles involved, the parties involved, the location of the motor vehicle accident, and/or re-enactments of the motor vehicle accident at issue.

WITNESSES

1. Margaret Seastrand c/o Richard Harris Law Firm 801 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101

Plaintiff is expected to testify regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident at issue herein.

2. Raymond Khoury c/o Steven T. Jaffe, Esq. Jacob S. Smith, Esq. HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP. 7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460 Las Vegas, NV 89128

Defendant is expected to testify regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident at issue herein.

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Investigating Officer, T. Conn (I.D. No. 8101)
 Investigating Officer, John Hines (I.D. No. 4350)
 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
 400 E. Stewart
 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Officer T. Conn and/or Officer John Hines are expected to testify regarding his/her investigation of the subject crash, and their report regarding same.

Gary Forsberg and/or
Person(s) Most Knowledgeable
c/o Classic Body & Pain Inc.
2540 North Nellis Blvd.
Las Vegas, Nevada 89156

Gary Forsberg and/or PMK are expected to testify regarding his/her evaluation of damages to the vehicles involved in the subject crash, and their report regarding same.

Jerry and Karly Busby
 6445 Spanish Garden Court
 Las Vegas, Nevada 89110

This witness is expected to testify regarding his/her knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject crash, and how Plaintiff's injuries affected her quality of life.

Cari Jepson
 523 Moon Chase Street
 Las Vegas, Nevada

This witness is expected to testify regarding his/her knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject crash, and how Plaintiff's injuries affected her quality of life.

Sharla Isle
 1663 English Road Drive
 Las Vegas, Nevada 89142

This witness is expected to testify regarding his/her knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject crash, and how Plaintiff's injuries affected her quality of life.

Larry and Jackie Snowden
 518 Benedict Drive
 Las Vegas, Nevada 89110

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These witness is expected to testify regarding his/her knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject crash, and how Plaintiff's injuries affected her quality of

9. Chalice Lundquist 4924 Vega Lane Las Vegas, Nevada 89130

This witness is expected to testify regarding his/her knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject crash, and how Plaintiff's injuries affected her quality of

10. Doug Seastrand 6440 Spanish Garden Court Las Vegas, Nevada 89110

This witness is expected to testify regarding his/her knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject crash, and how Plaintiff's injuries affected her quality of

Beth Seastrand 11. 6441 Spanish Garden Court Las Vegas, Nevada 89110

This witness is expected to testify regarding his/her knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject crash, and how Plaintiff's injuries affected her quality of life.

12. Shirley Seastrand 6450 Spanish Garden Court Las Vegas, Nevada 89110

This witness is expected to testify regarding his/her knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject crash, and how Plaintiff's injuries affected her quality of life.

13. Scott Seastrand 6465 Spanish Garden Court Las Vegas, Nevada 89110

This witness is expected to testify regarding his/her knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject crash, and how Plaintiff's injuries affected her quality of life.

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Plaintiff hereby reserves the right to call any and all witnesses identified by Defendant or any other parties to this action at the time of trial of this matter.

Plaintiff further reserves the right to supplement and/or amend the above listed witnesses, as discovery is continuing.

MARGARET SEASTRAND'S HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS

- Paramedic and/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable
 City of Las Vegas C EMS
 400 East Stewart Avenue
 Las Vegas, NV 89101
- 15. Mark Ferdowsian, D.O.; Linda Sarson, R.N. David P. Gorczya, M.D. / Lindsey C. Blake, M.D. Mountainview Hospital 3100 North Tenaya Way Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
- David P. Gorczya, M.D. / Lindsey C. Blake, M.D. Radiology Specialists, Ltd. P.O. Box 50709 Henderson, Nevada 89016
- 17. Dr. Mark Ferdowsian, D.O. And/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable Fremont Emergency Services P.O. Box 1569 Las Vegas, NV 89125
- Timothy Knauff, PA-C and/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable Primary Care Consultants 9975 South Eastern Avenue, Suite 110B Las Vegas, NV 89183
- Matthew C. Olmstead, D.C. / Dr. Benjamine S. Lurie and/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable Neck & Back Clinic 2425 North Lamb Blvd., Suite 100 Las Vegas, NV 89115

2	20.	William Orrison, M.D. And/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable Nevada Imaging
3		5495 South Rainbow Blvd., Suite 101 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118
5		
, 6	21.	Majorie Belsky, M.D. Mario F. Tarquino, M.D.
7		And/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable 3111 South Maryland Parkway, Suite 200
8		Las Vegas, NV 89109
9		
10	22.	Marjorie Belsky, M.D. / Mario F. Tarquino, M.D. And/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable
11		Surgery Center of Southern Nevada
12		2250 Flamingo, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119
13		
14	23.	Mario Tarquino, M.D. (Anesthesia) And/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable
15		3111 South Maryland Parkway, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
16		
17	I .	William S. Muir, MD And/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable
18 .	-	653 N. Town Center Drive #210 Las Vegas, NV 89144
19		
20	25.	Sonny Patidar, M.D. And/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable
21		Las Vegas Radiology 7500 Smoke Ranch Road, Suite 100
22		Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
23	26.	Treating Physicians
24		And/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable Summerlin Medical Center
25		657 Town Center Drive
26		Las Vegas, Nevada
27	27.	Russell J. Shah, M.D. 10624 South Eastern Avenue, Suite A425
28		Henderson, Nevada 89052

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28.	Leo P. Langlois, M.D.
	And/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable
	Kern Island Pain Medicine
	2920 H Street
	Bakersfield, CA 93301

- 29. Yevgeniy A. Khavkin, M.D. Jaswinder S. Grover, M.D. And/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable Nevada Spine Clinic 7140 Smoke Ranch Road, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89128
- 30. Yevgeniy Khavkin, M.D.; Eddy Luh, M.D. Jaswinder Grover, M.D.; Mario Fojtik, NCST Dr. Matthew Treinen (Radiologist) And/or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable St. Rose Dominican Hospital 8280 W. Warm Springs Las Vegas, NV 89113
- Matt Smith Physical Therapy
 727 N. Nellis Blvd.
 Las Vegas, Nevada 89110
- Custodian of Records
 ALL ABOVE FACILITIES

These individuals will testify as to the completeness and accuracy of records, and the medical records and bills generated in the normal course of business.

The above medical providers are expected to testify to Plaintiff's injuries, diagnosis, treatment and prognosis, as well as the authenticity of their medical records and bills.

Plaintiffs treating physicians are expected to offer testimony regarding the Plaintiffs diagnosis, treatment and prognosis for any and all services rendered as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. Plaintiffs treating physicians will not prepare expert reports, but will rely upon medical records generated as a result of the treatment for Plaintiffs injuries. The

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doctor will opine, to a reasonable degree of medic probability, that the medical treatment was reasonable and necessary.

Plaintiff hereby reserves the right to call any and all medical providers identified by Defendant or any other parties to this action at the time of trial of this matter.

Plaintiff further reserves the right to supplement and/or amend the above listed medical providers, as discovery is continuing.

COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES PURSUANT TO NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(C)

PROVIDER	DATE OF SERVICE	AMOUNT INCURRED
Las Vegas Fire & Rescue	03/13/09	\$ 772.00
Mountain View Hospital	03/13/09	\$ 4,468.45
Radiology Specialist, Ltd.	03/13/09	\$ 215.00
Fremont Emergency Services	03/13/09	\$ 275.00
Primary Care Consultants	03/30/09	\$ 300.00
Neck & Back Clinic	03/20/09 -07/22/09	\$ 3,500.00
Nevada Imaging Company	04/03/09	\$ 2,743.00
Marjorie E. Belsky, M.D.	05/05/09 - 12/15/09	\$ 27,570.00
Mario Tarquino, M.D.	05/20/09 - 12/09/09	\$ 3,600.00
Surgery Center of Southern NV	09/16/09 - 12/09/09	\$ 52,923.07
William S. Muir, M.D.	08/24/09 - 01/25/09	\$ 49,714.00
Sierra Meds Services	10/13/09	\$ 1,650.00
Summerlin Hospital	01/22/10 - 01/27/10	\$ 58,495.00
Russell Shah, M.D.	12/10/09 - 01/07/10	\$ 7,995.00
Leo Langlois, M.D.	04/02/10 - 04/14/10	\$ 1,631.00
Nevada Spine Clinic	04/29/10 - 12/14/10	\$ 39,617.50
St. Rose Dominican Hospital	05/12/10 - 05/16/10	\$ 168,074.00
Eddy Luh, M.D.	05/17/10 - 06/08/10	\$ 7,790.00
Matt Smith Physical Therapy		\$ 1,880.00
TOTAL		*\$ 433,213.02

*This total amount does not include Plaintiff's lost wages, future and/or residual damages, and medical bills not yet received. However, as previously stated above, Plaintiff reserves

1	the right to supplement and/or amend this Comp	outation of Damages as discovery is
2	continuing.	
3		
5	LOSS OF HOUSEHOLD SERVICES	\$221,129.00
6	LOSS OF EARNINGS / LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY	\$413,634.00
7	FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES	\$602,558.00
9	PAIN AND SUFFERING	To be determined by trier of fact
10	Plaintiff will make a claim for general pain:	and suffering, in an amount to be determined
11		and building, in the time time to be determined
12	at trial. DATED this 2 day of January, 2013.	
	day of variety, 2013.	
14		RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM
15 16		apon o -
17		By: NICHARD A HARRIS ESO
18		RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 505
19		ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10522
20		801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
21		Phone (702) 444-4444
22		Fax (702) 444-4455 Attorneys for Plaintiff
23 .	·	
24		
25		
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
Pursuar	nt to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of RICHARD HARRIS		
LAW FIRM ar	LAW FIRM and that on the day of January, 2013, I caused the foregoing PLAINTIFF's		
2 nd SUPPLEM	MENT TO INITIAL EARLY CASE CONFERENCE LIST OF WITNESSES		
AND DOCUMENTS to be served as follows:			
[X]	by placing a true and correct copy of the same to be deposited for mailing in the U.S. Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid; and/or		
[]	pursuant to EDCR 7.26, by sending it via facsimile; and/or		
[]	by hand delivery		
to the attorney	s listed below:		
Steven T. Jaffe, Esq. Jacob S. Smith, Esq. HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP. 7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendants			

An employee of the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

EXHIBIT "B"

1	TO AT A TO
1.	RESP RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ.
2	Nevada Bar No. 505
3	JOSHUA R. HARRIS, ESQ.
5	Nevada Bar No. 9580 ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ.
6	Nevada Bar No. 10522
7	RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 South Fourth Street
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
8	Phone (702) 444-4444 Fax (702) 444-4455
9	Attorneys for Plaintiff
10	
11	DISTRICT COURT
12	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
13	MARGARET G. SEASTRAND,) Case No.: A-11-636515-C
14	Dept. No.: XXX.
15	Plaintiff,)
16	vs.
17	RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES)
18	I through 10, and ROE ENTITIES 11) through 20, inclusive,
19)
20	Defendants.
21	
22	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND
23	REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND
24	TO: Defendant RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; and
25	TO: Jacob S. Smith, Esq. of HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP, his counsel of record.
. 26	COMES NOW, Plaintiff MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, by and through her counsel of
27 28	record, Richard A. Harris, Joshua R. Harris and Alison M. Brasier, of the RICHARD HARRIS
20	
	LAW FIRM, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby provides
	the following Responses to Defendant's Second Requests for Production to Plaintiff:

Plaintiff, MARGARET G. SEASTRAND has not yet completed her discovery and investigation for the preparation of this case for trial. Accordingly, the answers set forth herein are provided without prejudice to the responding party's right to produce any subsequent discovered facts or interpretations thereof and/or to add, modify or otherwise change or amend the answers herein. The information hereinafter set forth is true and correct to the best of the responding party's knowledge at this particular time, but it is subject to correction for inadvertent errors or omission, if any such error or omissions are found to exist

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 16:

All executed liens with each and every medical provider and facility.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 16:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 17:

All documents demonstrating the amounts paid by any source to the medical providers and/or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 17:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

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REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 18:

All documents demonstrating the amounts of payments accepted by the medical providers and/or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 18:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 19:

All documents demonstrating the amounts accepted by each medical provider and/or facility which sold its liens to any other person or entity for the treatment rendered in this case.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 19:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2012.

RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

JOSHUA R. HARRIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9580

ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 10522

801 South Fourth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiff

JA 0572

MRICHARD HARRIS

, a

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of RICHARD HARRIS

LAW FIRM and that on the day of April, 2012, I caused the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO

PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND to be served as follows:

- [X] by placing a true and correct copy of the same to be deposited for mailing in the U.S. Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid; and/or
- pursuant to EDCR 7.26, by sending it via facsimile; and/or
- [] by receipt of copy

to the attorneys listed below:

Steven T. Jaffe, Esq.
Jacob S. Smith, Esq.
HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP
7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460
Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
Attorneys for Defendant

An employee of the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

EXHIBIT "C"

1 2 3 5 6 7 8	RESP RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 505 JOSHUA R. HARRIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9580 ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10522 RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Phone (702) 444-4444 Fax (702) 444-4455		
10	Attorneys for Plaintiff		
11	MISTRICT CALIBY		
12	DISTRICT COURT		
13	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
14	MARGARET G. SEASTRAND,) Case No.: A-11-636515-C) Dept. No.: XXX		
15	Plaintiff,		
16	vs.		
17	RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES)		
18	I through 10, and ROE ENTITIES 11) through 20, inclusive,		
19	Defendants.		
20	Defendants.		
21			
22	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT RAYMOND KHOURY'S		
23	SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND		
24	TO: Defendant RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; and		
25	TO: Jacob S. Smith, Esq. of HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP, his counsel of record.		
26			
27	COMES NOW, Plaintiff MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, by and through her counsel of		
28	record, Richard A. Harris, Joshua R. Harris and Alison M. Brasier, of the RICHARD HARRIS		

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LAW FIRM, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby provides the following Responses to Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiff, MARGARET G. SEASTRAND has not yet completed her discovery and investigation for the preparation of this case for trial. Accordingly, the answers set forth herein are provided without prejudice to the responding party's right to produce any subsequent discovered facts or interpretations thereof and/or to add, modify or otherwise change or amend the answers herein. The information hereinafter set forth is true and correct to the best of the responding party's knowledge at this particular time, but it is subject to correction for inadvertent errors or omission, if any such error or omissions are found to exist

INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Set forth the amounts paid by any source which each and every medical provider or facility accepted as payment for the services which they rendered.

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RICHARD HARRIS

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RESPOND TO INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral source. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2012.

RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 505 JOSHUA R. HARRIS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 9580

ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 10522

801 South Fourth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiff

RICHARD HARRIS

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM and that on the 23 day of April, 2012, I caused the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT RAYMOND KHOURY'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND to be served as follows:

- [X] by placing a true and correct copy of the same to be deposited for mailing in the U.S. Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid; and/or
- [] pursuant to EDCR 7.26, by sending it via facsimile; and/or
- [] by receipt of copy

to the attorneys listed below:

Steven T. Jaffe, Esq.
Jacob S. Smith, Esq.
HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP
7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460
Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
Attorneys for Defendant

An employee of the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

EXHIBIT "D"

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NEO 1 STEVEN T. JAFFE, ESQ. **CLERK OF THE COURT** sjaffe@lawhjc.com Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH, ESQ. 3 ismith@lawhic.com Nevada Bar No. 010231 4 5 HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP 6 7425 PEAK DRIVE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128 7 (702) 316-4111 FAX (702) 316-4114 8 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 11 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 12 CASE NO. A-11-636515-C MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, DEPT NO. XXX 13 Plaintiff, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DISCOVERY 14 COMMISSIONER'S REPORT and RECOMMENDATIONS 15 RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES 1 through 10; and ROE ENTITIES 11 through 16 Hearing Date: December 5, 2012 20, inclusive, Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m. 17 Defendants. 18 19 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations was 20 entered by this Court on the 14th day of March, 2013. A copy of which is attached hereto. 21 DATED this day of April, 2013. 22 TON, LLP HALL JAFF 23 24 BySTEVEN TO JAFFE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH, ESQ. 25 26 Nevada Bar No. 010231 7425 Peak Drive 27 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant 28

Raymond R. Khoury

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I hereby certify that service of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT and RECOMMENDATIONS was made on the day of April, 2013, by depositing a true and correct copy of the same by U.S. Mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, addressed, stamped, and mailed to the following:

Richard A. Harris, Esq.
Alison Brasier, Esq.
RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM
801 South Fourth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorneys for Plaintiff

An Employee of HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP



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Electronically Filed 03/14/2013 03:32:16 PM

DCRR STEVEN T. JAFFE sjaffe@lawhjc.com Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH jsmith@lawhjc.com

Nevada Bar No. 010231

Attorneys for Defendant

MARGARET G. SEASTRAND,

Raymond R. Khoury

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

7425 PEAK DRIVE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128

> (702) 316-4111 FAX (702) 316-4114

CLERK OF THE COURT

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vs.

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO. A-11-636515-C DEPT NO. XXX

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT and RECOMMENDATIONS

[BEFORE THE DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER]

Hearing Date: December 5, 2012 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

through 10; and ROE ENTITIES 11 through

RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES 1

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

20, inclusive,

For Plaintiff: MARGARET SEASTRAND

For Defendant:

RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY

RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM Alison Brasier, Esq.

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP. Jacob S. Smith, Esq.

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CASE NAME: Seastrand v. Khoury CASE NUMBER: A-11-636515-C

I,

FINDINGS

This matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE BONNIE BULLA, Discovery Commissioner, on the 5th day of December, 2012 at 9:00 a.m., on <u>Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and Production of Documents re: Plaintiff's Medical Liens.</u> Defendant filed its Motion to Compel on November 1, 2012, seeking to compel responses to various requests for production and interrogatories pertaining to the Plaintiff's medical liens and treatment on liens. Plaintiff filed her opposition on November 20, 2012, asserting that the requested documents and information were protected under the collateral source rule and were not discoverable. On November 30, 2012, Defendant filed his Reply asserting that the documents and information was arguably both discoverable and admissible, but was certainly discoverable even under the most stringent interpretations of Nevada law.

At the hearing on the matter on December 5, 2012, Jacob S. Smith, Esq. appeared on behalf of Defendant and Alison Brasier, Esq. appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.

The Court, having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file, and having considered the oral argument made by counsel at the hearing on this matter, and having considered the case law and other authority presented in the parties' briefings on this issue, hereby makes the following recommendations:

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RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Protection from Defendant's Notice of Plaintiff's Deposition is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff must supplement her responses to Defendant's Interrogatories with any and all information in her possession pertaining to the liens and/or lien amounts which correspond with any injuries and/or treatment allegedly arising as a result of the subject accident.

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Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

CHARD A. HARRIS

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff

ALISON BRASIER 801 S. Fourth Street

Vegas, Newada 89128

Approved as to Form and Content: RÎCHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

5 Peak Drive

20 21

22 23

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27 28 CASE NAME: Seastrand v. Khoury CASE NUMBER: A-11-636515-C

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff must supplement her responses to Defendant's Requests for Production by producing all documentation in her possession pertaining to the liens and/or lien amounts which correspond with any injuries and/or treatment allegedly arising as a result of the subject accident; and

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff is not obligated to procure any documentation from third-party purchasers of the liens which is not already in her possession.

The Discovery Commissioner, having met with counsel for the parties, having discussed the issues noted above and having reviewed any materials proposed in support thereof, hereby submits the above recommendations.

DATED this // day of January, 2013.

TON, LLP

(A)

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER

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CASE NAME: Seastrand v. Khoury CASE NUMBER: A-11-636515-C

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff must supplement her responses to Defendant's Requests for Production by producing all documentation in her possession pertaining to the liens and/or lien amounts which correspond with any injuries and/or treatment allegedly arising as a result of the subject accident; and

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff is not obligated to procure any documentation from third-party purchasers of the liens which is not already in her possession.

The Discovery Commissioner, having met with counsel for the parties, having discussed the issues noted above and having reviewed any materials proposed in support thereof, hereby submits the above recommendations.

DATED this _____ day of January, 2013.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

STEVEN T. JAFFE JACOB S. SMITH 7425 Peak Drive

Prepared by:

Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

Approved as to Form and Content: RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

RICHARD A. HARRIS ALISON BRASIER 801 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff



 CASE NAME: Seastrand v. Khoury CASE NUMBER; A-11-636515-C

NOTICE

Pursuant to NRCP 16.1(d)(2), you are hereby notified you have five (5) days from the date you receive this document within which to file written objections.

Pursuant to E.D.C.R. 2.34(f) an objection must be filed and served no more than five (5) days after receipt of the Discovery Commissioner's Report. The Commissioner's Report is deemed received when signed and dated by a party, his attorney or his attorney's employee, or three (3) days after mailing to a party or his attorney, or three (3) days after the clerk of the court deposits a copy of the Report in a folder of a party's lawyer in the Clerk's office. See E.D.C.R. 2.34(F)

A copy of the foregoing Discovery Commissioner's Report was:

Mailed to Plaintiffs/Defendants at the following add	iress on the	da	ay of	
2012.				

X	Placed in the	folder of Plair	tiffs'/Defendants'	counsel in the	Clerk's offic	ce on the <u>\7</u>	day of
	Jan	_, 20,12, ¹³					

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF COURT





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 CASE NAME: Seastrand v. Khoury CASE NUMBER: A-11-636515-C

ORDER

The Court, having reviewed the above report and recommendatio

ns	prepared	b	yy th	e	Discovery	Commiss	ioner	and,
----	----------	---	-------	---	-----------	---------	-------	------

The parties having waived the right to object thereto,

No timely objection having been received in the office of the Discovery Commissioner pursuant to E.D.C.R. 2.34(t),

Having received the objections thereto and the written arguments in support of said objections, and good cause appearing,

AND

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations are affirmed and adopted.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations are affirmed and adopted as modified in the following manner. (attached hereto)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a hearing on the Discovery Commissioner's Report is set for 201, at : a.m.

DATED this 13t day of March 2012.

DISTRICTIONGE

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New England Medical Legal Liaison LLC

286 Stepstone Hill Road Guilford, CT 06437-2041 (203) 675-3032

January 6, 2010

Richard Harris Law Firm 801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101

Re: Margaret Seastrand - Assignment Agreement between Surgery Center of Southern Nevada and New England Medical Legal Liaison LLC

Dear Sirs:

I am writing with respect to the above-referenced agreement (the "Agreement") which New England Medical Legal Liaison LLC ("NEMLL"), entered into with Surgery Center of Southern Nevada as of April 1, 2009.

I am writing to inform you that, pursuant to the Agreement, Surgery Center of Southern Nevada has assigned to NEMLL (i) all of Surgery Center of Southern Nevada's right, title and interest in, to and under the Letters issued by your client and/or firm, and with respect to patient Margaret Seastrand, and (ii) all of Surgery Center of Southern Nevada's rights to any benefits accruing or paid under any of such Letters with respect to such patients.

Please direct to NEMLL (at the address below) all communications concerning, and all payments with respect to your client's outstanding balance.

NEMLL 286 Stepstone Hill Road Guilford, CT 06437 Phone (203) 675-3032 Fax (203) 458-2027 deanc@nemll.com

This notice is provided with the approval of Surgery Center of Southern Nevada's pursuant to the Agreement. I am available if you have any questions. Thank you,

Dean Clayton NEMLL LLC Nov 29 10 12:51p

New England Medical Legal Liaison LLC

286 Stepstone Hill Road Guilford, CT 06437-2041 (203) 675-3032

November 17, 2010

Oustanding Surgery Center of Southern Nevada bill for Margaret Re: Seastrand

Facility: Surgery Center of Southern Nevada

Date of Procedure: 9/16/2009

Outstanding Bill Amount: \$31,763.52

Firm Representing Patient: Richard Harris Law Firm

Dear Sirs:

New England Medical Legal Liaisons is in the process of reviewing outstanding bills from the Surgery Center of Southern Nevada for patients involved in litigation to determine which accounts are still being represented by their attorneys and are pending and which accounts need to be sent to collections.

Currently, our records indicate that the bill for Margaret Seastrand is still open and pending and that your firm is still representing the patient. If that is still the case, we will keep this account open and not send through for collections. Can you please take a moment and confirm this information on the bottom of this letter and fax back to the number indicated.

If for some reasons our records are incorrect, please indicate any incorrect information on this bottom of this form as well. Thank you for your time and attention. This firm still represents Margaret Seastrand and this case is still pending. Please keep this account open until further communications from this firm

Other - Please indicate incorrect information.

Please fax back this page to NEMLL at (203) 458-2027



MEDICAL LIEN CONTRACT

dutions for Doctors, Attorneys and Potlents	
Date 10-13-09	Patient Acct.#
То	Patient's Birth Date 12-27-09
services rendered by medical person my medical care, regardless of whet	("Attorney"), my attorney Rescuelation ("Provider") such Provider for all/Treatment - which includes, but is not limited to, all nel, facility charges, and any supplies (including implants) associated with her such supplies are provided by the facility, the physician and/or any 1 received as a result of the personal injuries I suffered on
any settlement, judgment, court rulis	of Provider: Patient further instructs Attorney to withhold such sums from ag, or verdict relating to the Incident to compensate Provider and shall efore disbursing any payment to Patient.
event Patient retains a new lawyer to	at acknowledges that he or she is responsible for notifying Provider in the prepresent Patient in connection with the Incident. If Patient retains a new Provider in writing within forty-eight (48) hours of the retention that the he terms of this Medical Lien Contract.
sole and absolute discretion, to assign Receivable to a third-party (the "As Attorney further acknowledge that the Assignee is the Provider. The amount of the billed charges.	neet Patient and Attorney acknowledge that Provider reserves the right, in its gn its rights under this Medical Lien Contract and the underlying Accounts signea") for any consideration that Provider deems sufficient. Patient and they will be bound by this Medical Lien Contract to the Assignee as if ant Assignee pays Provider for Patient's Treatment will not necessarily be the The negotiated payment between an Assignee and Provider shall not change seignee under the terms of this Medical Lien Contract, which are the billed
Authorization for Release of Med the status of Patient's case to Provi authorization/release to accomplish hereby authorizes Provider to release acknowledges and consents that the Genetic testing, AIDS information,	lical Records: Patients authorizes Attorney to disclose information regarding der or Assignee, if an assignment has been made, and agrees to execute an this disclosure. In the event of an assignment by the Provider, Patient se any and all of Patient's medical records to the Assignee. Patient e released information may contain alcohol, drug abuse, psychiatric, STDs, or other abuse related information. This authorization for release of medical full to Provider or Assignee. Patient may revoke the authorization for me upon request. However, in the event Patient revokes the authorization,
	Phone: 702 382.3272 Fax: 702 382.4260
and the second	Plut C Cirke 150 (ac Vanas NV 89101 - www.sierramedservices.com



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Patient shall be responsible for immediate payment in full of all amounts due and owing to Provider or Assignee. Further, the revocation of this authorization will not have any affect on any actions taken prior to receiving the revocation. Patient acknowledges that he or she may refuse to sign this authorization and that it is strictly voluntary. Patient further directs Attorney to do everything necessary to ensure compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).

Patient Initials: _M/33

Granting of Lien Rights: Patient hereby grants Provider a lien, pursuant to Nevada law, inclusive, upon any sums awarded to Patient or his/her personal representative, by judgment or pursuant to a settlement or compromise in the amount and to the extent of Provider's billed charges. This lien includes, but is not limited to, the charges for services rendered by medical personnel, facility charges, and any supplies (including implants) associated with the medical care of Patient, regardless of whether such supplies are provided by the facility, the physician and/or any third-party vendor which, in some cases, may be invoiced to the Assignee separately. Patient authorizes Provider or Assignee to disclose whatever information is necessary in order to protect and/or perfect the lien rights granted hereunder.

Patient Initials: MAS

Provider Assumes Full Responsibility for Treatment: Patient expressly acknowledges that no Assignte (actual or potential) has directed, counseled or otherwise given advice to Patient or Provider as to the medical services, treatment and/or supplies to be provided to Patient. All decisions regarding the care and treatment of Patient have been and are being made solely by Patient and Provider. Patient further acknowledges and agrees that Assignee neither assumes nor bears any liability for any professional negligence by any health-care provider participating in the medical services and related medical treatments nor has any Assignee counseled or given advice to Patient with respect to any medical services to be provided.

Patient Initials: MAS

Representation Concerning Medical Insurance: It is expressly understood by Patient that a potential or actual Assignee relies upon Patient's representation that no health insurance coverage exists when determining whether to obtain an assignment from the Provider.

Patient Initials: MAS

Representation Regarding Insurance: Patient hereby understands that if health insurance information is not presented at the time of service and the Patient's account/accounts receivable is assigned at some time in the future to an assignee who pays consideration to acquire the account/accounts receivable inquire and assume financial cost and risks, Patient will not later claim that health insurance should have covered the service provided, nor shall Patient seek a discount from the assignee so as to pay an amount that an insurance payor would have purportedly paid if health insurance information had been initially furnished to Provider and Assignee shall have the right to collect the full amount of the billed charges.

Patient Initials: MAS

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Representation Regarding Insurance: Patient further affirmatively represents that no person has stated, recommended, counseled, advised or otherwise suggested that Patient should not utilize any health insurance for treatment to be rendered to Patient.

Patient Initials: WAS

Direct Payment to Provider or Assignee: Patient acknowledges that Assignee has the right to endorse and deposit checks made payable to Provider or Patient for Treatment rendered by Provider to Patient on dates of service for which Assignee has purchased from Provider the right to payment for those services. Patient further authorizes Provider and Assignee to bill directly any applicable insurance company for any medical payment or other benefits to which Patient may be entitled under Patient's motor vehicle insurance.

Waiver of Time Bar Defenses: Patient expressly waives any applicable time limitation defense, including any statute of limitations, statute of repose, or the equitable defense of laches regarding Provider or Assignee's right to recover payment for the Treatment rendered by Provider to Patient.

Entire Agreement: This Medical Lien Contract constitutes the final, complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement between the parties. No party has been induced to enter into this Medical Lien Contract by, nor is any party relying on, any representation or warranty outside those expressly set forth in this Medical Lien Contract. Further, this Medical Lien Contract may not be changed orally, but only by a written instrument executed by all parties to this Medical Lien Contract.

Construction: The terms and conditions of this Medical Lien Contract shall be construed as a whole according to its fair meaning and not strictly for or against any party. Patient, Attorney, and Provider acknowledge that each of them has reviewed this Agreement and has had the opportunity to have it reviewed by their attorneys and that any rule or construction to the effect that ambiguities are to be resolved against the drafting party shall not apply in the interpretation of this Subrogation Contract, including any amendments.

Attorney's Fees: In any proceeding to enforce the terms of this Medical Lien Contract or to redress any violation of this Medical Lien Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover as damages its attorney's fees and costs incurred, whether or not the action is reduced to a final award or to judgment. For the purposes of this provision, the "prevailing party" shall be that party who has been successful with regard to the main issue, even if that party did not prevail on all the issues.

Binding Effect: This Medical Lien Contract shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon Patient, Attorney, Provider and their respective heirs, successors, and assigns. Except as specifically provided herein, this Medical Lien Contract is not intended to create, and shall not create, any rights in any person who is not a party to this Medical Lien Contract.

Phone: 702 382 3272 Fax: 702 382,4250

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To: 6852799

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Governing Law and Forum: The laws of the Sixte of Nevada applicable to contracts made or to be wholly performed there (without giving effect to choice of law or conflict of law principles) shall govern the validity, construction, performance and effect of this Agreement.

Partial Invalidity: It say term of this idedical Lico Contract or the application of any term of this Medical Lico Contract should be hald to be invalid, void or unenforceable, all provisions, coverants and conditions of this Agreement, and all of its applications, not held invalid, void or unenforceable, shall continue in full force and effect and shall not be affected, impaired or invalidated in any way.

Necessary Action: Putient, Attorney, and Provider shall do any act or thing and execute any or all documents or instruments necessary or proper to effectuate the provisions and intent of this Medical Lion Contract.

Arbitration: In the spent of any conneversy or claim arising under the terms of this Subrogation Contract, Provider, Automey, and Patient agree to resolve the dispute through binding arbitration in Clark County, Nevada, pursuant to the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.

PATIENT REPRESENTS TO PROVIDER AND ASSIGNEE THAT PATIENT WAS BEEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE HIS OR HER LEGAL COUNSEL REVIEW THIS MEDICAL LIEN CONTRACT AND HAS EITHER DONE SO OR HEREBY WAIVES THE RIGHT TO DO SO AND EXECUTES THIS SUBROGATION CONTRACT WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OP ITS TERMS AND CONDITIONS, AND AGREES TO SE BOUND BY ITS TERMS AND

Marganet 6 Seestrand	10-13-2009
Passaria Sandure	Date
Patients Kine (plans princ) Gerd Cd.	
Petient's Address C	283-1083
Patient's Telephone Number	

The undersigned, being attorney of record for the above Patient, does hereby agree to withhold from any settlement, judgment court rating, or vorder issued, rendered, or agreed to relating to the Incident sufficient funds in compensate Provider or Assignee and shall tender payment in fall to Provider or Assignee before disbursing any payment to Patient. Anomey agrees that if there is a dispute between parties, such dispute shall be governed by Nevada law. Anomey acknowledges that Assignee has not counseled nor given advice to Anomey with respect to the provision of any legal services. If Attorney is discharged from representation of Patient, withdraws from the representation of Patient, or closes Patient's file without receiving any payments, then Attorney agrees to notify Provider or Assignee within forty-eight (48) hours of such discharge, withdrawal, or closing.

Anorony's Signature Case Manager

Date 10/20/09

Phone: 702 382 3272 For 702 382 4250

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By Tracey Villalobos

Individual Assignment of Account Receivable

This Individual Assignment of Account Receivable ("Individual Assignment") is subject to the terms and definitions of the Master Assignment Agreement executed by LAS VEGAS RADIOLOGY ["Provider"] and Sterra Medical Services, LLC, on ______. Provider declares that the information contained in this Individual Assignment is true and correct and that this Qualifying Patient's Account Receivable is not delinquent or in default as of the date of this instrument. Provider further declares that this Qualifying Patient's Account Receivable is presently held as follows: 10/13/2009 Margaret Seastrand Date(s) of Treatment Qualifying Patient's Name 530-80-5229 21156 Qualifying Patient's Social Security # Qualifying Patient's Account Number \$ 1,650.00 Non-Discounted Value of Account Receivable Description of Treatment Rendered: MRI L. SPINE THEREFORE, FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION RECEIVED, Provider hereby assigns, grants, transfers, and conveys the Account Receivable listed above, including any and all rights Provider has under a Medical Lien Contract and/or under law, to Sierra Medical Services, LLC, pursuant to the terms and definitions of the Master Assignment Agreement. Dated Sierra Medical Services, LLC Dated October 16, 2009

Phone: 702 382,8272 Fax: 702 382,4260

801 Las Vegas Bivd. S., Suita 150, Las Vegas, NV 89101 - www.sierramedservices.com

SMSL-00008

EXHIBIT "I"

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TRAN

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA * * * * *

MELISSA CORDARO,

CASE NO. A608180

Plaintiff,

DEPT NO. VI

VS.

JUAN HERNANDEZ,

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELISSA F. CADISH, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MOTIONS

THURSDAY, JANUARY 10, 2013

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: DAVID MARTIN, ESQ.

For the Defendant:

STEVEN T. JAFFE, ESQ. KRISTEN HENRICHS, ESQ.

RECORDED BY JESSICA KIRKPATRICK, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: KARR Reporting, Inc.

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, JANUARY 10, 2013, 8:39 A.M.
2	* * * *
3	THE COURT: Okay. Cordaro versus Hernandez.
4	MR. MARTIN: Good morning, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Good morning. Go ahead and state
6	appearances.
7	MR. MARTIN: Good morning, Your Honor. David Martin
8	for the Plaintiff, which is Melissa Cordaro.
9	MR. JAFFE: Good morning, Your Honor. Steven Jaffe.
10	Hall, Jaffe and Clayton for defendants, Juan Reinoso Hernandez
11	and Commercial Roofers.
12	MS. HENRICHS: Kristen Henrichs for defendants, also.
13	THE COURT: Okay. So we've got a bunch of motions in
14	limine to resolve today.
15	MR. MARTIN: Just a couple, Your Honor.
16	THE COURT: Yeah, like, 18. Okay. All right.
17	MR. JAFFE: I think some of these we should be able
18	to fly through.
19	THE COURT: I think that's probably right. So, let's
20	see, start with plaintiff's motions. Okay.
21	MR. JAFFE: Your Honor, may I just ask one
22	clarification before we start. There's a couple of the
23	motions between plaintiff and defense that I think sort of
24	piggyback each other, and I want — I'm not sure if you're
25	going to want to handle them both together because it's — the

arguments sort of blend in with each other.

THE COURT: Well, they do, but - I don't, I mean -

MR. JAFFE: Okay.

THE COURT: I mean, if we just — if we go in order — I mean, I just need to take them each up, but, obviously, you know, to the extent they're inner-related, it wouldn't take very long to do it the second time.

MR. JAFFE: Sure.

MR. MARTIN: And with the need for individual rulings on each of the motions, I believe that, though, when we come to something that overlaps a little bit, we'll be able to get through it rather quickly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right, I think so. Okay. So Plaintiff's No. 1 is to preclude any argument or suggestion that plaintiff was injured by any alleged negligence of Dr. Forage. Now let me just clarify. I don't think you're trying to preclude them from — I mean, obviously, the fact that the sacrum was fractured, apparently, in the course of that surgery you're not trying to preclude, are you?

MR. MARTIN: No, it was — it was —

THE COURT: It happened and then there's subsequent surgeries dealing with that.

MR. MARTIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The issue you're addressing is pointing the finger at him, at that doctor, and saying he was

negligent?

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MR. MARTIN: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARTIN: And may I proceed on that, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Briefly.

MR. MARTIN: Thank you. As we stated in our opposition, which I know the Court's read everything so we'll be brief on this.

THE COURT: This is your motion, so I don't think you filed an opposition.

MR. MARTIN: I mean — I've been reading back and forth on things, so. On our motion I know the Court's read all the pleadings on this case. It's well accepted that subsequent treatment to an accident, to an incident, whether it causes aggravation of the condition or whether medical malpractice occurs is, in fact, foreseeable and it does relate back to that initial negligence.

And the Nevada case on that, it kind of touches on it, is the Hanson Collette decision, and further, as we stated in our reply and our moving papers, that there's a long list of authority out there from several jurisdictions. It even dates back to the restatement which holds forth that aggravation or medical malpractice done by a treating physician treating that initial injury, is foreseeable, and it all goes back to that initial defendant.

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THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Jaffe. Because a lot of your — and I clarified with him because a lot of your oppositions seem to be focused on, well, obviously, there's this, you know, fracture, and it's going to come out.

MR. JAFFE: Of course.

THE COURT: And the issue is that that he's trying to preclude is the argument or development of evidence that the doctor was negligent in doing it.

MR. JAFFE: Your Honor, I don't think we've even suggested in any of our moving papers that there is factual or expert evidence against Dr. Forage at this point as being negligent. The point — there's two points I need to raise.

Number one, again, we can't just treat this in a vacuum and suggest that, you know, we're going to turn a blind eye to the fact that Dr Forage did this. I mean, Dr. Grover made it very clear, but for that, the other five surgeries never would have taken place.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JAFFE: The problem that I've got, though, is this. My — depending upon what the jury rules in this case, my client has contribution rights that they're entitled to perfect within one year after the conclusion of the case.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JAFFE: And, so, I need to, at least, be able to bring this out during the course of the trial so that --

THE COURT

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THE COURT: Bring what out?

MR. JAFFE: The fact that the — the fracture

occurred, that it was at Dr. Forage's hands, and that Dr.

Grover's surgeries would not have occurred but for that, so

that I can, at least, later, if necessary, proceed with

contribution action against Dr. Forage. That's — I've made

But, at this point, Your Honor, I certainly have no evidence and I do not intend to stand in front of the jury and say, ladies and gentlemen, Dr. Forage is the man that should have been at this table, not Commercial Roofers or Juan Reinoso Hernandez. And I'm not going to make those types of arguments, but I do need to bring out those facts. It is —

that very clear to Mr. Henness all along and I've told him

THE COURT: Right. And, I mean, if — if that first surgery that Dr. Forage did —

MR. JAFFE: Uh-huh.

that's why I needed to oppose this motion.

THE COURT: — was your client's fault, and, obviously, that's disputed — if that first surgery was your client's fault —

MR. JAFFE: Right.

THE COURT: — then the other surgeries as a result of whatever happened in that first one would still be recoverable damages, if all that were true.

MR. JAFFE: Well, listen, I mean, that's Nevada law.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. Good.

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MR. JAFFE: And I'm certainly not at this point suggesting that I'm going to deviate from what is longstanding law. Like I said, I just need to preserve my rights so that if a contribution action against Dr. Forage becomes necessary down the line, that my right is preserved.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. One of the concerns here is that by Mr. Jaffe preserving the record for the future contribution action, which he may or may not bring, and has the ability to, it's going to skirt away and have the jury thinking, wow, if it wasn't for Dr. Forage, the medical specials in this case would be much, much lower, and that she wouldn't need these subsequent surgeries. Because the medical specials in this case are very, very high because of those additional surgeries.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARTIN: And the law is very, very clear on that that if the jury finds that they're negligent and that the the injuries -

THE COURT: Right. We all agree.

MR. MARTIN: I'm just not sure how Mr. Jaffe believes that he can bring that out without skirting and saying, yes, even though all this happened under the law, they're still responsible. And I just see him making a switch on that and

I'm very — and that's what Mr. Henness was also cautious
about is that now the — now the focus is going away from what
happened in this case and it's going towards subsequent
surgeries. And why were these additional five surgeries
needed? Well, it's because during surgery number one the
sacrum was fractured.

THE COURT: Right. So you're saying — I mean, that

— any doctor who did those subsequent surgeries, aren't they
going to say it's because she had a fractured sacrum?

MR. MARTIN: Yes.

THE COURT: So how is that not going to come out?

MR. MARTIN: I just want to make sure that that defendants aren't able to — to state and say, you know, look, this doctor caused all the problems; Dr. Forage is the one that caused all these problems.

THE COURT: But clearly not.

MR. JAFFE: I think I just said, Your Honor, I have no intention of saying that.

MR. MARTIN: I just want to make sure that's clear, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So to the extent the motion in limine, and as stated, was to preclude any argument that these subsequent injuries were caused by the negligence of Dr. Forage, I'm granting that. There's not going to be an argument or evidence presented going to whether Dr. Forage was

negligent.

However, they can present evidence that there was a fractured sacrum during the course of that doctor's surgery, that that resulted in the need for additional surgeries. But, yeah, there's not going to — you can't argue that's — that cuts off liability somehow or anything like that. Okay.

No. 2, there are several similar on this. So No. 2 by plaintiff addresses trying to preclude argument or discussion about plaintiff being sexually assaulted at the age of 17. Now I can't imagine any attorney arguing and any jury thinking that she would somehow be at fault or of bad character because she was sexually assaulted at 17. So what's the unfair prejudice that you're concerned about here?

MR. MARTIN: Thank you, Your Honor. I believe that they're not necessarily bringing it forth as character evidence under prior bad acts. I think the focus of this is going towards — towards two factors. The first is her truthfulness and veracity because after the rape —

THE COURT: Well, I know why they're trying to bring it in. Why are you trying to preclude it?

MR. MARTIN: I'm trying to preclude it because it has absolutely nothing to do with this case. It — it is now skirting the issue. It is now looking to see, well, back 21 years ago you were raped and attempted suicide, but then when you were in deposition you didn't give enough information that

says, oh, yeah, on two other occasions you also tried to commit suicide. So they're looking at it for truthful and veracity, and there are other ways to do that and it's not essential to this case.

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THE COURT: Okay. She's coming to trial claiming that she's got emotional distress damages as a result of the events of this accident and subsequent medical issues, right?

MR. MARTIN: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So other stressors, other signs of depression and emotional distress, how is that not relevant?

MR. MARTIN: It is relevant, but the — even though evidence is relevant, it is unduly prejudicial because —

THE COURT: What's the unfair prejudice?

MR. MARTIN: The unfair prejudice is now she's being put on trial for her depression, her attempts at suicide, and, in fact, Your Honor, the person who could best talk about this is defendant's Doctor Mortillaro who is no longer testifying in this case. If anybody was qualified to talk about how her prior psychological condition, depression, was, it's a doctor who's no longer testifying here.

So now she's being put up on the stand and asked about whether or not she committed — she attempted to commit suicide on two subsequent occasions when the medical records say so. What it is, it's just nothing but character assassination on the end of the defendants to try to skirt the

issue away from what's essential in this case. And they're saying, well, you know, you were depressed and you committed — and you were attempting suicide before and life was not as rosy as we expected it.

THE COURT: Is she claiming she was depressed after this accident because of this accident?

MR. MARTIN: She is claiming damages to that.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jaffe.

MR. MARTIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. JAFFE: Your Honor, and I guess part of this argument has bled into Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 6.

THE COURT: Yeah, there is several related.

MR. JAFFE: Talking about the suicide.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JAFFE: The suicide attempts, rather. Again, Your Honor, this is germane for two reasons. Counsel has already admitted that this is relevant evidence, so, I mean, relevance, obviously, I'm not even going to bother dealing with if they're going to concede and stipulate that point.

The point is that she is raising depression as an issue in this case. She is claiming that she's very severely depressed and at one of her depositions, I mean, she certainly seemed very much that way, just in her very flat affect.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JAFFE: Clearly, we're entitled to bring up the

fact that she has had other psychological stressors causing depression in her life if she's going to be seeking damages for that in this, that's relevance. On top of that, Your Honor, she was not truthful about it in her deposition. Now I'm not putting her on trial for a rape.

THE COURT: You're not going to claim she invited a rape, I mean.

MR. JAFFE: Of course not. Your Honor, I've tried cases in front of you before.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JAFFE: I think you've got an understanding and feel for what I do in a courtroom, and I'm certainly not going to assault this woman for having been the unfortunate victim —

THE COURT: It's an awful thing that happened to her and understandably she had problems as a result.

MR. JAFFE: Of course. And all I want to do is bring out to the jury the fact that she has had these problems. It does go to her psychological condition and her depression, but it also does go to the fact that she hid that from us in a deposition despite the fact that there were medical records to that point.

THE COURT: And, I'm sorry, this is sort of off
point, but since you mentioned about trying — are you trying
this case?

1	MR. JAFFE: Yes.
2	THE COURT: Okay. Because I wasn't necessarily clear
3	about who was trying it when new counsel came in.
4	MR. JAFFE: No, no, no.
5	THE COURT: Just curious.
6	MR. JAFFE: Your Honor, just so that the Court -
7	THE COURT: And I have no problem with them, either.
8	For the record, they've tried cases here, too.
9	MR. JAFFE: Right. So just so Your Honor
10	understands, there's two insurance companies involved here.
11	THE COURT: Okay.
12	MR. JAFFE: There's the primary policy and excess
13	policy.
14	THE COURT: Got it.
15	MR. JAFFE: I've been retained by the primary. The
16	excess policy has asked them to oversee because of the
17	potential exposure in this case.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	MR. JAFFE: Because we think plaintiff may even be
20	asking for more than a million in this one, so.
21	THE COURT: Okay. Right.
22	MS. HENRICHS: Yeah. My understanding is we're
23	taking more of a monetary role in this case.
24	THE COURT: Okay. All right. Sorry. It was sort of
25	off the point, but since you mentioned about trying the case,

I was curious.

MR. MARTIN: And, Your Honor, I'm Mr. Henness' associate and Mr. Henness came down with a bad flu and did not want to contaminate the courtroom so that's why —

THE COURT: I appreciate that.

MR. MARTIN: - that's why I'm here today.

THE COURT: And I have no problem with you being here, either. I understand. Okay. So, look, I mean, I don't expect anyone in the course of this trial to be going through the details of a sexual assault that happened to this woman, okay? And no one is going — I don't expect anyone to be trying to do that.

But, having said that, the fact that she was sexually assaulted, had resultant psychological issues, including a suicide attempt, I think, is relevant given her claim of depression and emotional distress damages in this case and, more over, I don't see that it is — evidence can be precluded even if relevant if it is the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the relevance and — I don't see any unfair prejudice from this evidence.

I mean, it may affect what the jury thinks about damages, but that arises out of the actual relevance, that's not an unfair prejudice, and I certainly don't expect the jury to, I don't know, to think she's an unworthy person or, in some way, or a bad person because she has had psychological

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to talk about it, so go ahead and discuss it while you're thinking about it. Go ahead.

MR. MARTIN: Okay. It's one of these ones where it just kept — kept overlapping.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. JAFFE: This is one of the ones that bleeds into our motion.

THE COURT: Okay. Fine. We can talk about them all, about all those issues.

MR. MARTIN; Private insurance clearly falls within the collateral source rule. It's clearly under Proctor Casinelli [phonetic] and it should be excluded.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARTIN: Now the sub issue to that is whether the write-off amount is presented to the jury or the total amount. Now the Supreme Court recently came down with the Tri County case, and they just addressed the write-down amount in focusing on how it works with the Workers' Compensation statute, and they declined to extend it any further.

So there's no Nevada law on that. I did point to, in my papers, Justice Gibbons' concurring opinion where he seemed to address the issues that come forward in cases like this, in which he said write downs create the same risk of prejudice that the collateral source is meant to combat.

And if there's going to be a benefit or a windfall to

any party, as it goes with the general overall theme of — in the public policy considerations of the collateral source rule, if one party's benefiting, it should be the injured victim and not the tort feasor.

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As such, any private insurance is a collateral source and even though it's not specifically addressed in Tri County, it appears that since Nevada follows the majority rule in that aspect, that the write-down amount would not be presented to the jury, but the full amount of the medical treatment covered under insurance:

On the second sub issue, in this case a medical finance company has bought several of the liens from the doctors, commercial paper. It happens all the time. So the issue is, is whether it's the amount that is being billed initially or the amount which the medical finance company paid.

So even though in this case, and I pointed it out in the — in the — in our pleadings, that even though there is that amount that was paid, Ms. Cordaro is still responsible for the entire amount there. So it is akin to the collateral source rule and because a finance company, an arrangement between a doctor and a finance company, they decided to sell it at whatever the going rate is, she is still ultimately responsible for that amount.

And to bring it out that -- during trial that a

medical finance company bought a doctor's lien for, let's say, thirty cents on the dollar, now that's getting into insurance. Now it's getting into, well, why did this doctor buy it? Why are they buying it at thirty cents on the dollar? What's the purpose of that?

And it creates a whole murky swamp, shall we say, of issues dealing with this intricate things on liens, health insurance, doctors' liens, which should be kept out because of the confusion that it causes and it puts the emphasis not on the collateral source, but the defendants attempting to benefit from that.

The third sub issue is that there are some physicians in this case who still hold — still hold their liens and they haven't sold them, okay? And in the opposition, Mr. Jaffe seems to refer to them as contingent witnesses, meaning that they have an outcome in this case based upon whether the plaintiff recovers or not.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MARTIN: The defendant points out something very interesting in page 3 of their opposition. That if plaintiff prevails, they'll receive more money than they would have under insurance. This is, once again, clearly opening up the door to say, there is this difference out there between what Medicare pays, what insurance pays, what good insurance pays, what bad insurance pays.

So what's the amount? What is the reasonable amount? Well, it's the amount that the doctor billed. And to get into that and say — and to get into that area of contingent witnesses and saying, well, doctor, you know, if you — if Ms. Cordaro prevails on this, you're going to receive this amount. But, really, you know, if you would have done it under any other kind of way, you're making three times more on this.

And then it gets into the fact that some people cannot — have to treat under these doctors' liens. It's a necessity, especially in today's complex healthcare world when some medical health insurance do not even allow their coverage to go under a personal injury and they have to take these alternate routes.

And all three of these aspects, the insurance, the amount held by medical finance companies, and then, finally, the amount that's still held by the doctors, it's all under the guise, it's all under that umbrella of collateral source that somebody else is paying, somebody else holds these.

And, in fact, there's been no kind of evidence, no kind of testimony brought forward that any of the doctors who still hold their treatment on a lien that they haven't sold are somehow going to change their testimony or bolster their testimony because now, according to defense, that now — now they have a stake in the game because if there's no recovery, there's no payment. And I'll submit on that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jaffe.

MR. JAFFE: You know, Your Honor, I love the phrase that counsel just used. I absolutely loved it and I'm going to have to steal it from him in so many other arguments because it's so legitimate. He called this a murky swamp and that is exactly true. But it's not the defense creating the murky swamp.

The murky swamp is the existence of the entire way that this whole thing is being handled. It's by the — by the doctors charging a rate that they know that nobody's going to pay privately, that they know that they cannot possibly contract with any third-party payer, that they know that they're selling to another company for pennies on the dollar, that they know that they're going to compromise if there's a settlement in a case because they do it every time, but it's simply to jack up costs in an attempt to tell this jury that something is what it is not.

And, Your Honor, what they're now asking you to do is focus on this murky swamp and turn a blind eye to reality, whether or not there's collateral sources involved, whether or not there's third party payers, whether or not there's another company writing the checks or not because the money that is being put up there has no reality to it.

It has no foundation to it. It has no basis to it. The doctors are not getting paid that amount of money

privately. So, Your Honor, there is a legitimacy to the whole concept of putting in front of the jury the amounts paid versus the amount charged when there's no foundation behind it.

Half the time — and Dr. Grover, I'm sorry, is without a doubt, the worst in this community when it comes to that. And, I mean, he's testifying more and more. You're seeing him constantly in these cases with the exact same issues. I mean, he — I even brought in a doctor in another —

THE COURT: Bring in an expert who says it's not a reasonable and necessary fee for that service.

MR. JAFFE: You know what, that is another contribution action that we're looking at. There's a contribution claim against him for those exact points and issues, but —

THE COURT: But, I mean, they have to show it's reasonable and necessary to recover it here.

MR. JAFFE: No, and I understand that. But the point is this, Your Honor, that a third-party payer is paying them and they're accepting less on the dollar. That they've charged the plaintiff is a pertinent point because when the plaintiff is sitting there signing a lien agreement with them saying I'm going to pay you the amounts received at the end, and the doctor is now selling off that lien to somebody else

who's now going to say, I want that, who's not coming into this courtroom to testify, that now is germane.

That is pertinent. That does go to what the actual damages are in the case, and that's why, Your Honor, I believe that, and again, this is bleeding over into our motion, that the amounts paid as opposed to the amounts billed is a very important aspect of this. And I agree, Tri County did not go into that issue.

The Supreme Court has not yet touched on what California has touched on. But that, Your Honor, is a very significant piece of this and, again, it's the doctors who've created this murky swamp by almost encouraging it through saying we're going to help you put on massive numbers so that you can alarm a jury —

THE COURT: I don't know about that. I mean, I have no personal injury case pending and every doctor I ever go to charges far more than my insurance company ends up paying them, and it's not because of any case, so, that's just the medical field at the moment.

MR. JAFFE: But — but the point is when they're — when they're contracting for, you know, maybe thirty cents on what they're telling in court that they're going to charge, I'm not going to presume to know what you're getting billed on your excess charges, but I highly doubt that it's seventy percent of what the bills would have been.

They're contracting that away and they're reducing it so that even what's left over on private insurance is still not the same as what they're telling people in court. Your Honor, liens are certainly important for this. If a doctor does have a stake in a litigation by a lien that could potentially go to their credibility, we're entitled to explore that. We're entitled to argue that point.

THE COURT: All right. So, but — so you're saying if they come in and they're treating on a lien, then you can bring it up because it goes to bias or prejudice, right?

MR. JAFFE: Absolutely.

THE COURT: Okay. And then, if they're no longer treating on a lien because they sold off the paper to someone else, then they don't have a stake in it anymore.

MR. JAFFE: No, but if that's the case, then I think what we should be able to bring in is the fact that they sold it off, number one; and, number two, what they accepted. So that if Dr. Grover is going to sit here and say my bills are \$350,000, but I accepted a hundred thousand dollars in payment from a private individual, not an insurer, that's a different circumstance and that is something that we should be allowed to bring in front of the jury.

THE COURT: And because you think that that's relevant to what reasonable and necessary charges are?

MR. JAFFE: Well, it goes to an argument as to it

because if he's going to sit here and say 350,000 is reasonable and necessary for my — for my bill, for my services, but I accepted a hundred thousand dollars from a private individual subsidizing these surgeries on behalf of the plaintiff, I think that goes — that's a legitimate argument as to what he honestly believes is reasonable and necessary.

Because if he's going to sit here and say 350 is, but then sit here and say but I took a hundred thousand dollars for whatever reason it may very well be. Maybe he doesn't want to have a stake in the game anymore. Maybe he doesn't — maybe he honestly believes that's what I'm willing to accept because that's what other private insurance companies or Medicare or Worker's Comp, or whatever it may very well be, is paying and I accept it there, I think that that's pertinent to go to whatever they may testify as may very well be indicative of a reasonable and necessary cost, at least within their own practice.

MR. MARTIN: So the question arises that if we're going to explore the three different areas, how does it get conveyed to the jury when just from the oral argument here we brought up the fact that, oh, well, insurance is definitely going to charge a lot less. I mean, for example, I was in the hospital for four days, I have Health Plan Nevada, I was at Spring Valley Hospital, the bill was \$40,000, my insurance

paid six.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARTIN: Six thousand dollars on it, you know.

There's these write-offs all over the place and that

definitely gets into the collateral source. And it's

interesting with California, with the California decision,

there's good parts to it and there's bad parts of it. That

Howell Hamilton Meats decision actually specifically addressed

medical liens.

Page 5 of our — of our reply, quote, "the intervention of a third party in purchasing a medical lien does not prevent a plaintiff from recovering the amounts billed by the medical provider for care and treatment as long as the plaintiff legitimately incurs those expenses and remains liable for their payment."

Medcare Solutions bought it, she owes them. They transferred that paper over. So now they're the holder of the paper. She's still liable for it. You know, Mr. Jaffe, you know, states what's known to everybody here that, yes, in a lot of these cases, these get negotiated down, just like health insurance, just like about everything else.

The problem is that the finder of fact doesn't know that, the jury doesn't know that, and they have not brought any evidence to state that any of these charges are unreasonable and necessary. They could have brought somebody

1 else in. I just had a deposition yesterday where I deposed a 2 medical biller who was saying that charges were high, and they could have brought that in in this case. They could have Dr. 3 Barolat talk about that, but they didn't. So we'll submit on 4 that, Your Honor. 5 6 THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. I'm not finding the 7 full cite in your reply to this Howell decision. Is it -it's — Howell isn't a Nevada case or is it? 8 9 MR. JAFFE: It's a California case. Your Honor, I think we actually cite it in one of our motions. 10 THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. I'm sure it's here. 11 12 That's fine. MR. MARTIN: Yeah, it is one of yours. 13 MR. JAFFE: I think it's in our first motion in 14 15 limine. THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's fine. Don't 16

kill yourself.

MR. JAFFE: Actually, it's on page 5 of that motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. MARTIN: Yeah. Howell v. Hamilton, 52 Cal 4, It's a 2011 decision. 541.

THE COURT: Okay. I was just confirming that there wasn't a Nevada decision out there I wasn't aware of. So, I quess, has she had some — has some of her expenses been paid through insurance and/or been reduced because of insurance? I

mean, because — is that — you mentioned, I think, one of the issues was private insurance.

MR. MARTIN: Yeah. And with my limited involvement, I — I don't know the answer to that, but more likely than not, it's —

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. MARTIN: — they — they definitely — there's definitely probably write downs and Mr. Jaffe could probably speak to that since he's looked at the medical billing.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JAFFE: Your Honor, she did have some private health insurance involved in, at least, some of her coverage.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So, clearly, one thing that is clear is the insurance payments are not coming into evidence and are barred by collateral source. And in my view, any reductions in those bills through insurance contract with providers, also, is a collateral source that will not come into evidence because, to me, the fact that, just as, you know, if the insurance paid the bill and she doesn't owe it anymore, you know, it's the relationship insurance company has with their preferred providers, or whatever, that makes the reduction in the bills because of the contract they have, to me, that's just — just as if the insurance company paid it.

It's a benefit from having that insurance, so I'm not going to allow that it in. Now to the extent that the

treating doctors have liens, have treated on a lien and continue to hold liens on the case, I think that is relevant and can come in as to bias or prejudice, so I'm denying the motion to that extent.

The one that I've not dealt with before, which is an interesting issue, is when the liens been purchased and by a private company not related to insurance. I don't think it has the same collateral source issue and, but, at the same time it doesn't — it also doesn't affect what she owes.

I mean, she owes it to a different party now who bought the paper, but she still owes it. But so the potential relevance, as I understand it then, is really to go to whether the doctors' bills are, I guess, reasonable and necessary if they're willing to take a significant discount on it when they sell it.

I mean, I suppose — I don't know, I mean, that's — it's not clear to me that that necessarily means that it's not what's reasonable to charge if they recognize financial realities and sell it. Having said that, though, relevant evidence just has to be somewhat probative to make any fact an issue more or less likely, and I suppose it is relevant and, I guess, given that it doesn't have the collateral source issues and insurance issues, I think I'm going to deny the Motion in Limine as to that issue, as well.

So, to go back, I'm granting the motion in limine to

raise an issue as to, you know, documents to be admitted. So I think we're going to need to — we'll figure it out —

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. JAFFE: — what needs to be done consistent with your ruling, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right, but — but I — yeah, I mean, yes, I'm not trying to give them the incorrect impression that she doesn't owe the money anymore. That it goes to, in terms of damages, whether, you know, this amount is reasonable and necessarily reasonable charge for the services provided by this doctor.

MR. JAFFE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No. 4, prior and subsequent injuries.

Now, although the name of the motion is fairly broad, the two specific ones that seem to be addressed by the plaintiff in the motion are this 1990 incident and a 2012 incident which defendant did not oppose those two items, although wanted to point out a different incident that they do intend to present.

So to the extent the motion is focused on the 1990 and 2012 issues, which I think is what was sought, it's granted as unopposed. I guess, if you were seeking to exclude the back issues she had just a few weeks before this accident, that's not being granted and I'm not even sure you were asking for that.

MR. MARTIN: No, because we know that that was - we

know that that was coming in, it was just these two specific.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARTIN: And I just think out of an abundance of caution.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARTIN: On the — on the opposition to that.

But those are the only two instances we feel are unrelated.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So the 1990 and 2012 are precluded. The motion is granted. No. 5, as to Dr. Mortillaro is unopposed, so it's granted. No. 6, attempt suicide, consistent with my ruling on No. 2, I am denying that.

No. 7, Dr. Hake's testimony — well, the way it's phrased in the name of the motion is to limit his testimony to matters within the scope of his expertise and qualifications as a radiologist. Certainly, I would say, and consistent with Nevada law, he can only testify as an expert within his area of expertise, but, obviously, there's more detail involved than that. So why don't you go ahead and speak to what you're really trying to keep out here.

MR. MARTIN: Okay. Dr. Hake was retained in this case as a radiologist and, essentially, arrived at three opinions. Two of these opinions are not at issue. They fit squarely within what radiologists do. He's well-qualified. Meets all the criteria of Hallmark and in the statute to

render opinions regarding his interpretation of the MRI films and the changes or absence thereof that he believes are reflected on those two MRIs. That's not at issue.

It's the third opinion that Ms. Cordaro would have needed surgery even in the absence of this collision, which is what's at issue in this motion. Under the third prong of the Hallmark criteria, which is the limited scope requirement, Dr. Hake's testimony must be limited to matters with inside the scope of his specialized knowledge.

And here he is a radiologist who interprets diagnostic films and renders opinions as to whether — and he stretches that out by rendering opinions as to whether she would need surgery. Now he is not an interventional radiologist. He is a radiologist in the purest form.

So during his deposition on page 7, he was asked whether he exams, treats or follow patients, particular note he was asked, "how often do you provide actual treatment for patients who present solely with symptoms of back pain?" He responded, "I don't."

His expertise as a radiologist is to look at a patient's diagnostic films which provide that snapshot in time. It's the way the condition the spine was on this date, this is the way it was on this date. Once he goes outside of that, radiologists, he never sees the patient, let alone monitors their treatment and that's part of his usual

practice.

On page 8 of our motion, we made a listing because we asked him specifically what he does as a radiologist. He stated that he never hears from the patient again. He never even knows if they had surgery. He admits that not all people go to surgery. He even admitted that a small percentage of Ms. Cordaro's — people with Ms. Cordaro's prior condition don't have surgery and that he never recommends surgery as a radiologist.

Now on the second prong of Hallmark is whether his testimony will assist the trier of fact. His testimony will assist the trier of fact for those first two opinions regarding his comparison of the films, but not this third opinion about the need for surgery.

Based upon the limited scope of his area of practice, and his absence of interaction with patients, and just seeing the films as snapshots in time and doing comparisons even in his practice, and also as an expert in this case, any conclusions regarding the need for surgery is based upon assumption and generalization of facts.

You know, he is an MD, he is a radiologist, but that does not allow him to go over into areas of the necessity for surgery because, as he admits in his deposition, readily so, that's not what he does. So two of his three opinions, I think, are valid and well-qualified under the Hallmark

1 criteria, but it's that third, addressing the need for surgery, which I think needs to be limited in this case and 2 3 that's why we presented this motion. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Jaffe. 5 MR, JAFFE: Yes, Your Honor. Counsel just said that 6 the key issue is his lack of interaction with patients because 7 he's a radiologist and not an interventional radiologist. He is an interventional radiologist. That is his background. 8 That's his credentials. That's his experience. He does 9 10 interventional procedures routinely and he does interact with

THE COURT: What's his basis for saying that based on reading these films that she would have needed surgery?

MR. JAFFE: Pardon me? 1'm sorry.

THE COURT: What's his basis for saying she would have needed surgery?

MR. JAFFE: Well, it's his knowledge, experience, training and background as an interventional radiologist.

THE COURT: Can you be more specific?

MR. JAFFE: Well -

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patients. So -

THE COURT: I mean, has he actually — I mean, how does he know that based on this film she would have needed surgery? Does — does he have experience where he knows people that have had this showing then, you know, develop a worse problem that results in surgery? How does he knows?

MR. JAFFE: Well, Your Honor, here's — here's the long and short of that, is right now I cannot make firm representations to that point to the Court because I'd be shooting from the hip, and I'm not about to do tat.

THE COURT: Okay. Wait, help me, because that's — I mean, because that's the heart of the issue is how does — I mean, he can certainly look and see what is showing on these films and what — what, you know, condition —

MR. JAFFE: Sure.

THE COURT: — she had that he's able to report back.

But how does he know from — from that point to say, oh, yeah,

she would have needed surgery?

MR. JAFFE: What I believe Dr. Hake would testify is that based upon, obviously, his background, his knowledge, his training, experience, as a radiologist who's read these films hundreds and thousands of times, and dealt with patients as an interventional radiologist, as well as knowing who and what has had surgery, knowing the conditions that are presented on the films.

The fact she's got this one horribly dessicated disc that's clearly degenerative, pre-existing, that he sees a tear, that she's got a spondylolisthesis with a pars defect and, basically, what a spondylolisthesis is, is you've got the two vertebrae, typically they're in alignment, and the pars are bones that come in the back to pretty much hold the joint

in place.

The defect, which can be either traumatic, congenital, or a — or degenerative condition. The pars is not sitting the way it's supposed to, those two bones. So the — the vertebrae has shifted and when you see listhesis means a movement or shift. So the spondylolisthesis, spondylo suggests it's a degenerative shift or congenital shift.

It's basically something she was either born with or developed over time, and the bones have shifted, and because of that shift, combined with the disc in its condition, combined with the defect, what Dr. Hake is talking about is the fact that she's going to need this surgery in all likelihood because of that condition, irrespective of any traumatic episode, and I believe that's based upon, again, his knowledge, training and experience.

What I — what I would ask, Your Honor, then is this, since the Court has questions on this point that I truly cannot honestly address and make representations to, I don't know if Your Honor would be willing to continue this motion so that I can get an answer from Dr. Hake in the form of an affidavit or in some way to allow the Court to make a more informed decision on that point.

THE COURT: Tell me - I mean - I mean, I saw the information in the briefs about he's an interventional radiologist.

MR. JAFFE: Yes.

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THE COURT: Fine. How does that affect his qualification to give this opinion?

MR. JAFFE: Because some of the interventional radiology that he performs is due to spinal pain conditions and I believe that there's a crossover between that and what's shown here that allows him to bridge that gap.

THE COURT: Let me dig down here a minute.

MR. JAFFE: Your Honor, we do have a little luxury of time given the fact that the trial's now moved to a firm date for May 20th. So if I can supplement this in some way to allow the Court to make a more informed decision, I'd appreciate that opportunity.

THE COURT: All right. I'm concerned. I mean, obviously, I mean, we know he didn't examine this particular patient, and he doesn't generally treat back patients, that's not his role, not his — his speciality. So the question is, you know, so he can look and say, yeah, this is a serious, you know, this is what I see as in terms of the back and this condition that I'm not going to attempt to pronounce, but — but, I guess, you know, does he know and have a basis in his practice to know how often does this condition result in surgery and — and, if so, how long?

Like, is that something, yeah, people in this condition, you know, are going to have it, you know, in the

next year or, you know, twenty years down the road? I don't know. You know, so, I guess, the concern that I had after reading this motion was, you know, what is his basis based on his experience and expertise to form that opinion that it requires surgery to address.

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You know, I mean, obviously, I'm no doctor. You know, if it's something, you know, I mean, if you look at a film of a broken arm as a radiologist, you can pretty much probably definitively say, yep, it's going to be put in a cast, you know, because that's what happens.

You know, I don't know if it's something as straight forward as, yeah, well, you know, everyone knows if you have this condition, you need surgery to fix it, and if that's the — you know, and he, has the experience to know that as opposed to, you know, some — some other, you know, usually before a surgical decision is made there's, you know, a bunch of factors including, you know, the level of pain, and other failed conservative treatments, and things like that, and I just don't know what his basis is for concluding this would have resulted in a surgery.

MR. MARTIN: Brief reply, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MARTIN: I'd like to point to page 7 of our motion, midway down where we provided deposition testimony, and here we are dealing with a case with spondylolisthesis and

he was asked if he ever treated patients for that, he said no.

THE COURT: I mean, clearly, he's not — he's not a back doctor. I mean, that's not what he's doing. All right.

MR. MARTIN: He doesn't examine the patients that come in with this type of condition.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARTIN: He doesn't provide any kind of treatment. So as an interventional radiologist he's, essentially, reading the films. He's not providing any kind of treatment.

THE COURT: And maybe this is my ignorance. I mean, I don't know — I mean, a radiologist who reads the films, I mean, do they go back with a reading that says, you know, this is what I see and this is something that's going to — well, you know, should be addressed surgically. I mean, I don't know if that's something a radiologist would ever say. I have no idea, but —

MR. JAFFE: Your Honor, if that's the case, may I have an opportunity to supplement this with an affidavit from Dr. Hake addressing your concerns and defer this motion?

THE COURT: All right. Yeah, I mean, I think it should have come in the opposition, but having said that, the trial is put off a couple months, so I'm not going to put it on for another hearing, but I'll give you ten days to supplement with just specifically focused on what's his basis

for concluding that she would have needed surgery anyway, and — and as it relates to what his experience and qualifications are to make that specific conclusion.

So if you have ten days from today, so that would be the 20th, which is a Sunday, of course, and Monday is a holiday. So I guess we're given until the 22nd to supplement and give you time to respond to that, so I'll give you til February 4th.

MR. MARTIN: Pardon me, Your Honor. February?

THE COURT: Fourth. Sorry.

MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT: Hold on just a second. And then I'm going to put it on my chambers calendar for February 12th to make a final ruling on that. Okay. Okay. So which brings us to No. 8, Dr. Peles.

MR. MARTIN: Just on the previous motion, Your Honor,
I'd just like to lodge an objection that it should have been
included in the opposition.

THE COURT: I do appreciate that, and, yes, it should, but, I guess having said that, I want to get it right, so. Anyway, noted. No. 8, Dr. Peles.

MR. MARTIN: Thank you, Your Honor. This goes back to the Hallmark case. Not only looking at the — the requirements of a biomechanical — of — the requirements for just general experts, but, actually, it deals with

biomechanical, which is what we're dealing with in this case.
Hallmark can be applied for those principles.

Since 1964 in the Levine case; 1970 in the Choke case; '75 with the Gordon case, up through Hallmark, the Nevada Supreme Court has consistently been very weary of accident reconstructionists and biomechanical experts.

Hallmark gave the bar a list of criteria that we can look at, the requirements that are needed for biomechanical testimony.

And it's clear from Dr. Peles' testimony they did not meet several of those requirements that are specifically stated directly on point and it relates to the nature of his testimony in this case. These are critical requirements as they are and they provide the basis for the testimony to make sure that the testimony regarding biomechanics accident reconstruction is reliable.

To note in the other cases, in the Levine case, the Court ruled that looking at photographs is just not enough. In Choke, the Court ruled that there must be a thorough investigation of the accident scene because the appearance of the car would just amount to a mere guess. In Gordon, the Court required more than just the point of impact, the lack of skid marks, acceleration, and braking characteristics of the vehicles.

Hallmark looked at specific things. Actual inspection of the vehicles. Determination of the area — area

and the angle of impact. Identification of the speed at the time. The length of time the vehicles were in contact, and the knowledge of the vehicle's starting position. As stated in our motion, Dr. Peles admitted in his deposition that he never inspected the vehicles, didn't look at the angles, and did not know the amount of time that the vehicles were in contact.

Those were critical factors spelled out directly by
the Hallmark decision. That's what's required for
biomechanical testimony. Now dealing with the angle of
contact. It's particularly important in this case because Dr.
Peles stated this was just a minor sideswipe. However, during
his deposition he was asked if — if this was a sideswipe,
then why was there no damage o the passenger side.

He couldn't answer that. That's stated on page 11 of our motion. So just on that point of impact and angle, his testimony is unreliable in that because he's just coming up with assumptions, and that's what the gatekeeping key of the Court is in dealing with people who perform to be experts but who aren't relying on sound methodology, and just saying, well, because I have a PhD, because I'm an engineer, I say so, and that's how it goes.

Then, it's clear that Dr. Peles just makes up facts.

His unsupported premise in the case is that plaintiff

initially saw defendant and that defendant started to move his

vehicle out from the stop sign. This is a T-bone type accident. That she saw him, he moved out, and she should have reacted. So we followed up on that in the deposition.

He admitted that defendant started to move when she first saw the defendant, so he created a fact in order to fit into his calculations to say, oh, well, she had time to react. That is why biomechanical testimony is unreliable, especially in this case, because he's not coming up with learned assumptions or learned hypothesis.

He's just making stuff up as he goes along, throws some math figures on it, and that's it, and says, oh, this is sound. It's junk. He admitted during the testimony that the calculations he used are not supported by Plaintiff's testimony, but by his own speculation and assumptions. He says that directly in his testimony on page 60 and 61.

For that reason alone, he should be struck. As a proclaimed biomechanical expert, he didn't even reach a conclusion regarding the amount of force. How much force was exerted during this crash? He didn't even both to do that.

Page 82 of his deposition sums it up perfectly.

Question, "And just for example, your entire analysis in this case relies upon various estimations, true?" Answer, "Correct, or assumptions." That's his testimony. He's readily admitting that not only is it relying upon estimations, but assumptions, and I pointed out those

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he believes happened.

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assumptions that he's made. There's self-serving facts that's just reaching, misreading, or just making stuff up to fit what

And that's why Hallmark is important in this case because as a regular expert he should get struck just because he doesn't meet that criteria. But when we start looking at those critical factors, he pretty much fails on all of those. And this is consistent with the case law from back in 1970, '75, '64, and 2008, it's been pretty consistent here. And we'll submit on that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr Jaffe.

MR. JAFFE: Sure. Your Honor, Plaintiffs have completely missed the boat on Dr. Peles and what he's coming in here to do and, I guess, I'm a bit concerned that counsel keeps interchangeably referring to biomechanics and accident reconstruction. While Dr. Peles is a biomechanical engineer, he's not being brought into discuss biomechanics.

He's being brought into discuss accident reconstruction, that's all. He's not going to be rendering a biomechanical opinion on causation. He's talking about accident reconstruction. What I hired him to do was to say assuming that the Plaintiff's testimony is correct, was she in part a cause of this accident? And that was the focus of his opinion, his testimony, and his report.

That's effectively what he's done. So he's not

this is not a Levine scenario and certainly not a Hallmark scenario. Dr. Peles is going to, basically, talk about the assumptions being the Plaintiff's testimony. The estimates being the Plaintiff's testimony and giving her the benefit of the doubt to say that assuming that what she testified to is accurate, she did not reasonably respond to the vehicle.

she did not timely take action. She could have assisted in avoiding this accident or even avoid it entirely. Now to that extent, did he look at photographs? Yes. Did he inspect the vehicles? No. He did not perform, though, a traditional accident reconstruction of saying that the angle of impact was this, the force was that, et cetera, et cetera.

All he's doing is basically saying that if you want to accept what she said as true, then these are my opinions. To do that, he does have to rely on certain general accident reconstruction principles and certain accident reconstruction aspects of information gleaned from the photographs, from the repair estimates, from the police report, things of that nature, there's no dispute about that.

But he is not doing a traditional accident reconstruction and he's not coming in as a biomechanical engineer. So the Hallmark analysis doesn't apply. That has nothing to do with it. The Levine and Remoloff [phonetic] analysis has nothing to do with this. It doesn't apply. And I'm thrilled to hear that counsel's position about accident

reconstruction is, in general, is what it is because we're going to be talking about that with Dr. Freeman before the end of the morning, who is brought in as a traditional accident reconstructionist.

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So, anyway, Your Honor, Dr. Peles' role in this case is going to tell the jury that, had — if we accept what the plaintiff testified was true, she contributed to causing this accident based upon general accident reconstruction principles, the math, the physics, the et cetera behind them, as well as her own testimony. Now, because of that, we don't need to get into forces. We don't need to know how long the vehicles were in contact. We don't need to know all these other things that Mr. Martin pointed out because those go to biomechanics.

THE COURT: Okay. Oh, I mean, those things, like, even for an accident reconstruction, I mean, if you were coming in after the fact to say how fast was so and so going at the time of the accident, you'd have to look at, as you said, you know, where's the initial contact, where did they end up, what's the crush damage, undo that to back out into how fast must they have been going when they came together.

MR. JAFFE: That's right.

THE COURT: But that's not what he did?

MR. JAFFE: That's not -

THE COURT: That's not what his conclusions are?

MR. JAFFE: That's not what he's going to do in the courtroom. Now I'm not going to sit here and say that there isn't some general accident reconstruction that goes along with it, because there is, but that has to occur anyway, and it's just talking about the physics, the science, the math

that goes along with that.

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But, his general premise is to testify about her conduct based upon her admissions within the context and field of accident reconstruction to show that Ms. Cordaro contributed to causing this accident.

MR. MARTIN: Dr. Peles, according to defendant, is going to come in and talk about what she saw, how she reacted, and that it's her fault without reconstructing the accident. I don't think that makes any kind of sense at all. He's got to go to the accident scene. He's got to look at — he's got to look at the vehicles to see — if he's going to say that Ms. Cordaro was proceeding down the street at a certain miles per hour and that she should have seen him —

THE COURT: He's going to say she testified she was going down the street at a certain miles an hour, right?

MR. JAFFE: That's generally it, yes, Your Honor.

MR. MARTIN: Correct. And then he made an incorrect - incorrect statement, as I brought up in the first part of my argument, where he stated that his assumption was completely wrong on that. His testimony is unreliable just

across the board. So Mr. Jaffe admitted that he's going to apply some accident reconstruction principles in this case.

Well, the accident reconstruction principles include looking at the car. Going to the actual scene of the accident, seeing it. He's trying to guise this into saying, well, he's an accident reconstructionist and a biomechanical expert, but he's not going to talk about either of those.

Then what's he going to talk about.

That's what's puzzling in this case. He's just going to say that she contributed to the accident. Well, what's the basis for that? Well, the basis is, according to Mr. Jaffe, that she should have reacted more, that she should have seen something differently? That's all accident reconstruction, and the Court is very, very strict on what is allowed in that case even before the term biomechanical experts came out, back when it was just accident reconstructionist.

He didn't even go to the scene, which is required to do accident reconstruction even in the limited scope to which Mr. Jaffe believes that Dr. Peles is going to testify.

There's no basis for his testimony because he's trying to hybrid it. He's trying to take a cafeteria plan, picking and choosing to circumvent around all of the case law that says this kind of testimony doesn't come in because you got to go to the accident scene, you got to take a look at the cars.

And I'll submit on that, Your Honor.

I think that he can give testimony and say, you know, she testified she was going thirty to thirty-five miles an hour, I'll use that as an assumption. She said she saw — she was here when she saw him and this is what I saw happen, and he can say assuming those things are true, this is what she would have seen.

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You can come back and say, well, she didn't really say that. I mean, you can — in a jury instruction, which I'm sure we'll give, about hypothetical questions to an expert for that instruction says for the jury to evaluate if the assumptions in that hypothetical were proven or not proven and that they have to take that into account in making that decision.

But I think that given the nature of his opinions that he sufficiently meets the legal standard for testimony as an expert. So I'm denying No. 8. All right. Let's move on to Defendant's motions. Limit Plaintiff's presentation

MR. JAFFE: I think this one has already been addressed --

THE COURT: We've already covered --

MR. JAFFE: — by plaintiff.

THE COURT: So that's -- No. 1's denied.

MR. JAFFE: [Inaudible.]

THE COURT: Two --

MR. JAFFE: Well, I'm submitting the ruling on that is going to be consistent with the ruling in plaintiff No. 3 since we —

THE COURT: No. 2?

MR. JAFFE: No, No. 1.

THE COURT: Yes. I just denied it. Let's go — so 2 is about the scope of testimony of treating doctors.

MR. JAFFE: Basically, Your Honor, and to some extent this is going to dovetail in with another one that we've filed, which is —

THE COURT: Four?

MR. JAFFE: Yeah, I was looking — yes, No. 4. What — what — the whole premise behind these are simply this. We've taken depositions of the doctors, of the treating doctors. We've got their clinical charts. We've got their reports and their opinions. At some point, there's got to be a limit as to what they can say.

Now I understand that certainly as treating doctors they are accorded various privileges as experts where they don't have to write reports. That's the law. That's the rules. That's fine. But when it comes to going beyond and expressing additional opinions that exceed what is in the clinical chart, or exceed what was stated in depositions, that's where I have a problem because that's where we need to have had some advanced evidence. I mean —

THE COURT: So what specifically are you trying to exclude? For example, that you — you acknowledge they can testify to prognosis.

MR. JAFFE: Absolutely.

THE COURT: And, so, they could say, you know, I'm treating her for this problem and, you know, in the — so they can — a doctor, treating doctor can say in the future I anticipate x, y and z treatment for this.

MR. JAFFE: As long as they have said that in their clinical chart.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JAFFE: Or in their deposition, that I would agree with. I have no problem.

THE COURT: And they can say \times , y and z treatment that I think will be necessary will cost, you know, \$500,000, whatever.

MR. JAFFE: Sure. And if — if I've had some advanced notice that this is going to be an issue, and if I didn't ask what that's going to cost, well, you know, then too bad so sad on my part, I should have done that.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JAFFE: I don't believe that that was the case.

But, again, if — if — what I don't want is, you know, Dr.

Grover coming in and saying she's going to need spine.

replacement surgery ten years down the line or, obviously, I'm

being, you know, grossly exaggerative.

THE COURT: That would be interesting. Yes.

MR. JAFFE: But what would Dr. Grover — no.

THE COURT: Now, now, come on now.

MR. MARTIN: I knew you were going to go there.

MR. JAFFE: Okay. Come on, I got to have a little fun. Okay. Your Honor, my — my point is if doctors are going to come in now talking about completely new procedures that we've had no notice about, no idea about, no issue about, that's — that's where I have a problem, and when we've gone to the trouble and costs of taking the depositions.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JAFFE: When we've gotten the clinical charts, you know, on our own, separate and apart from plaintiff's counsel, and — and I'm by no means implying that plaintiff's counsel would not have given us everything. My only concern is that what ends up happening sometimes is when you get records — somebody gets records from a doctor or a medical office, and then you get a subpoena, and then all of a sudden somebody's got additional records that weren't provided or whatever.

My whole point is I want to make sure that I'm not getting blind—sided and ambushed by a doctor coming in with something completely new that we should have known about before the trial started and while we were still engaged in

discovery.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JAFFE: To the — I'll hold off on the other issue regarding rebutting our experts until that second motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, Mr. Jaffe's correct in the parameters which are allowed by a treating physician, and I pointed to what does that include? It's not necessarily the four corners of the medical record, and I pointed to on page 6, the Kirkland Union Pacific decision by Judge Hunt up in Federal Court where he talked about the — the scope of the treating physician.

Cause of injury, examination — based upon the examination of the patient, the degree of injury, extent of disability in the future, prognosis of the patient, what tasks they'll be able to perform are legitimate opinions which come within the parameters of opinions. And I just want to make sure that —

THE COURT: I would agree with that comment.

MR. MARTIN: — the — the definition of treating physician encompasses those, and as long as it was obtained during the course of treatment.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARTIN: And I recognize the Gazory [phonetic]

pool case where the doctor did one injection, counsel had the need because of the VA to get everything in, so they all of a sudden hand him a stack of records.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARTIN: That's not the case. I mean, we understand the limitations of that. But if it was obtained during the course of treatment, it naturally flowed through the chart, and according to that scope as stated in — in the Kirkland decision by Judge Hunt, then there's — then there's no issue here.

And we don't anticipate the treating physicians from stepping outside of what they've said in their deposition testimony, or what anyone said in their report, and Mr. Jaffe can certainly cross—examine on that and say why didn't you tell me this when I said do you have any more opinions.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, they're not going to come in now and say there's some different treatment or something needed that hasn't been disclosed.

MR. MARTIN: No, no, everything — everything has been disclosed, the extent of her treatment. There's, joking aside, Dr. Grover's not going to come in and say she needs a bionic spine put in.

THE COURT: Okay. Good. We have that on the record.

MR. MARTIN: We have the bionic spine taken care of.

THE COURT: So here's what I'm going to say. I mean,

1 I guess, I'm granting No. 2, yes, they're limited, a treating 2 doctor's testimony is limited to, you know, the scope of their 3 treatment as disclosed in their records and deposition 4 testimony. But, yes, that includes their treatment, 5 prognosis, observations, you know, so that includes, you know, 6 future treatment, the cost of future treatment, if they've 7 already — if it's something they've raised already, they're 8 not going to come in and come up with something new that's not 9 been disclosed.

And, additionally, they've got to testify within the scope of their treatment so they can't suddenly start testifying about somebody else's treatment or somebody else's area outside of what they reviewed and dealt with in the course of their actual treatment as a treating physician.

That's the best I can do in the abstract.

MR. JAFFE: Okay. Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. MARTIN: And no bionic spine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No. 3. Okay. Now No. 3, to preclude Plaintiff's treating medical providers from offering biomechanical opinions, slash, testimony. I don't know what you're actually asking for.

MR. JAFFE: Here's my concern, Your Honor.

Especially in a situation now where we've got a prior incident two months before that resulted in the plaintiff getting some

significant pain management treatment, undergoing MRIs, and especially with an MRI that was later used by her first treating surgeon to recommend the surgery, you know, an MRI that predated even the accident we're here for.

What I'm concerned about is doctors getting on the stand who have not done a biomechanical analysis, but who are effectively going to be telling the jury her presentation, her condition, her incident, her injuries, her symptoms, any of these things are consistent with the accident as described by her because that's now talking about the biomechanics and the movement of the spine and what forces she would have experienced in an accident.

For a doctor to now say, well, it's consistent with what she would have experienced, it's consistent with her injuries, it's consistent with her symptoms or her treatment because if they haven't looked at the vehicles, if they haven't looked at the forces, if they haven't done a biomechanical analysis, they should not be able to render opinions saying that what she told them is consistent because it relies upon her self-reporting to them about what she experienced and them now drawing a further conclusion to say, well, in car accidents this can happen, that can happen, what may very well be, without knowing the specifics or talking about the specific biomechanics in this case.

Because, obviously, there's a lot of different things

that can happen to a person, or the spine, with the movements in an accident, but without the doctors having done biomechanical analysis, I'm concerned that they should not be allowed to tell the jury that what she told them is consistent with an injury in an accident.

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That becomes even more glaring problem that we've got this prior incident where she hurt her back moving or lifting these boxes, cleaning her husband's office out after his business collapsed, and trying to say, no, I was fine, I was back perfect, you know, dancing in the fields and ready to live my life normally, and then this accident put me right, you know, put me over the edge and now all of a sudden I'm a horrible mess because of this.

And if a doctor's going to get on the stand and say, yes, it's consistent with that and it's inconsistent with the box lifting or box moving incident, that's a problem because that is biomechanics. If they want to say that, you know, she reported this, she reported that, I treated her for these injuries, I have no problem with that.

But to sit here and say — to — to tie it in causally to the car accident that it must be and saying it's inconsistent with the box lifting when they haven't done a biomechanical analysis and they haven't looked at the cars and the vehicles and taken all of those things into consideration, I think that's highly problematic, and I think that's where

we're asking the Court to draw the line so that they don't tell this jury that this accident —

THE COURT: But you're saying they can't say, you know, yeah, I didn't go out and do an analysis, but she told me, you know, she told me I got hit at fifty miles an hour, and, yeah, that could cause this injury. I mean —

MR. JAFFE: Yes, I have no problem with them saying could cause.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JAFFE: But if they sit here and say her — her injuries are consistent with this accident, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, as opposed to generally saying, yes, you can hurt your back, you can be hurt in a car accident — well, we all know that. But —

THE COURT: You know, I've treated people, you know, for similar conditions who have been in car accidents.

MR. JAFFE: That's exactly right. But to sit here and say that what she talked about is uniquely consistent with this accident and the dynamics of this accident, that's going over the line and going into biomechanics because what they're now trying to do is necessarily exclude the prior accident when they don't know the mechanics and the dynamics of either of them.

THE COURT: Right. Now a treating doctor, because, you know, a treating doctor is probably going to come in and

say, well, you know, she told me that her back felt better after this treatment I had for that injury.

MR. JAFFE: And I have no beef with that.

THE COURT: And then, she had a car accident and was hurt, so, based on that, I think it was from the car accident.

MR. JAFFE: Right. I have no beef with that.

THE COURT: Okay. Because that happens all the time.

MR. JAFFE: Right. And I have no beef with that, but if they're going to come in here and say that the dynamics of this accident are consistent with their presentation and I'm causally relating it because of that, that's where I have the problem because now it's trying to say that there was something that occurred in this accident uniquely that caused this injury or this problem, or this symptom, or caused the need for this treatment, at the exclusion of the box lifting incident, or her congenital disorders, all of those things, that's where I have the problem.

Because, yes, if it's generally, you know, people hurt their backs in accidents, I treat them, I see them all the time, yes, she told me this, she told me that, so because of that I'm tying it in, no problem. It's making that further leap into the biomechanics and dynamics of the accident specifically.

THE COURT: Have they testified along those lines?

MR. JAFFE: No, but I hear doctors do it all the time

and they come into court and they'll sit here and say that, 1 2 you know, this accident caused it because -THE COURT: Okay. Sorry, I'm going to cut you off 3 because I've got a trial starting at 10:30, so just -4 5 MR. JAFFE: Okay. THE COURT: I want to be clear. In their deposition 6 testimony, did they offer opinions along those lines that 7 you're specifically concerned about? 8 MR. JAFFE: No, but I've seen them do it in court. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. MR. JAFFE: Gratuitously - enough time said -11 THE COURT: You're just trying to head it off. 12 MR. JAFFE: That's exactly where I'm going. 13 THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to be clear that it 14 15 wasn't something they already said. Okay. MR. MARTIN: I'll be brief. The doctors are going to 16 testify with the extent to which they did in their testimony. 17 They're not going to offer biomechanical. I'm just concerned 18 that it's taking away the medical causation which is - which 19 is allowed, and I just want to make sure that the doctors can 20 testify to what they normally do. 21 That, yes, she presented for this and I'm relating it 22 to this accident through medical causation. And if - if 23 that's the extent of what's normally accepted, I know that Mr. 24

Jaffe's probably seen things go off on a tangent a lot more

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than I have and that's why he's being — that's why he's being overly cautious with it, because I've never — I've never seen it, but I'm sure he has, but that's nothing that we're going to get into.

THE COURT: All right. So, right, the doctors can testify about, you know, what she reported to them and they can tie in causation, as I'm sure they've testified to in their depositions already, but they cannot offer biomechanical opinions and start getting into that there's something unique about the way this accident happened that would cause this particular kind of injury.

That's beyond the scope of their expertise and, frankly, that would put them into a — beyond a treating physician expert, so, that's granted. Four, okay, so now — so rebutting defense medical expert. Now, I mean, a treating doctor has his opinion about diagnosis and treatment and causation. Your expert disagrees with that.

MR. JAFFE: Correct.

THE COURT: So, obviously, they're going to say I've read that report and I still think it's from this.

MR. JAFFE: Well, no, but that's where I have the problem because I don't think — if they're going to sit here and rebut a named expert, that's where they should have done an expert report specifically as an expert. That's taking them outside the realm. I have no problem with them sitting

there saying my opinion is this, this, this, and this, and to the — but whether they say, but I've read Dr. Barolat's report, and Dr. Barolat is wrong, and I disagree with him, and here's why, that's where they've now crossed the line into a forensic expert because to rebut —

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THE COURT: But if Barolat's report is about what they did, then they're still just talking about what they did.

MR. JAFFE: But, you see, Barolat's report is all about causation.

THE COURT: Okay. So, sorry, I don't know who's who.

MR. JAFFE: Dr. Barolat's a neurosurgeon who's going to talk about — he's going to suggest — all he's going to talk about is that the surgery was not related to this accident, but was related to a pre-existing congenital condition in the box incident from two months before and saying she was going to need the surgery irrespective of this.

My concern is that if Dr. Grover or Dr. Forage or any other doctor is going to come in here and say Dr. Barolat's wrong and here's why, that's now moving into an area where they should have given us an expert report talking about that without — and that they should not be allowed to specifically address Dr. Barolat and his opinions.

If they want to sit here and generally give a causation opinion, like we talked about in No. 2, I'm fine with that, because that — that's what they can do.

THE COURT: Well, but, if they're giving a causation opinion and someone else is coming in and saying for these reasons I disagree, it's not the cause.

MR. JAFFE: Then -- then --

THE COURT: I mean, they can' say, well, in my treatment I saw x, y and z and I think that, you know, I disagree and I think they missed this in my records here.

MR. JAFFE: Well, the point is that's where they now become a — more than a treating physician as an expert.

They're now rendering an opinion as an expert contradicting and rebutting a named expert. This is no longer relying upon their medical records and their charts and their clinical documents.

This is now them specifically addressing an opinion raised by an expert which would have needed to have been disclosed in an expert report. It's — if they're going to sit here and start talking about my experts and their opinions and rebutting them, that should have been in a report because it's now taking them outside the realm of the confines of the treating physician, testifying as a treating physician.

THE COURT: If those — okay. Sorry. So if those opinions that they're rebutting are opinions about their treatment, so the rebuttal of it is just talking about something within their treatment.

MR. JAFFE: And I have no problem with them talking

about their treatment, why they believed it was necessary, why they believed it was appropriate, why they believed it's related to this incident. But when they start talking about my expert and contradicting my expert, especially before my expert's even testified, and they're putting in what is effectively a rebuttal of my expert before the jury's heard it, that's where I have a problem because that's what should have bee disclosed as expert evidence and expert testimony in an expert report as required by Rule 16 and Rule — 16.1 and Rule 26. I think that's crossing the line, Judge.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MARTIN: It seems that defense counsel is stating that any time the doctor says I disagree with Dr. Barolat, that that becomes a rebuttal opinion. The rules do not say anything about treating physicians having to do rebuttal reports, okay. First off, it is all based upon their treatment.

It's based upon everything that's learned through their treatment, through the course of treatment through their chart, and if Dr. Barolat stands up there and says something that is completely contradictory to the medical records, by all means, the treating physician should be able to say, well, no, when she presented on this day, or on this case, this medical record says something.

He just wants — it seems that defense counsel

doesn't want any kind of criticism from her actual treating physicians regarding his opinions which he formed in a vacuum by just reviewing medical records and doing his test. Second, Mr. Jaffe knows their opinions. He took their depositions. He took rather extensive depositions.

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So where's the — there's no prejudice in it because he knows exactly what they're going to say. Rather than them distilling it into two paragraphs in a formal report, he went and actually talked to them. He has their complete opinions that he stated — that they stated during their deposition testimony, and I'm pretty much certain he says, doctor, do you have anything else to add, is this the totality of your opinions; and they probably said, yes, that's it.

And some of it was a criticism of Dr. Barolat, or saying why they believed that Dr. Barolat's opinions regarding the different causations, the pre-existing is different. So there's no indication in the rules that a treating physician cannot defend their own position against another medical expert. And I'll submit on that, Your Honor.

MR. JAFFE: Real quick, Judge. First of all, just because they're a treating doctor doesn't mean that they've got carte blanche to say anything they want in a courtroom. At some point they cross the line —

THE COURT: Within the scope of their treatment.

MR. JAFFE: Right, but -- but -- and that's the point

is once you start talking about another expert's opinions and rebutting them, you're now going beyond the scope of your treatment into an expert debate and analysis, that's number one. Number two, I did take the depositions of Dr. Grover and Dr. Forage, and both of them had not seen my expert's report, were not in a position to comment upon it, and did not do so in their deposition other than to generally state their own testimony about their own treatment and their own opinions raised during the course of treatment.

And to the extent that that it happened to conflict with anything my expert's would have had to have said, then they just stood on that. And that's where I'm fine, and that's where I think they should be allowed to go because if they're going to testify that happens to be inconsistent with my experts, that's one thing.

But if they're going to go so far to say that my expert is wrong because of this, this, and this, that's where they've crossed the line into a testifying expert and it needed to have been stated in a report because that is a rebuttal to a direct expert that should have been on notice.

THE COURT: All right. I guess, I'm sort of granting in part. I would say the doctors — to the extent that the defense expert has disagreed with their expressed opinions as treating physicians, they are — they can rebut that expert to the extent that it's within the scope of their treatment, the

scope of their testimony as treating physicians as I discussed on Motion in Limine No. 2.

However, they certainly can't, you know, to the extent that there's a defense expert that's talked about matters outside the scope of a particular doctor's treatment, they can't suddenly say, you know, I've said everything I want to say about my treatment, and by the way, he's wrong about this other doctor's treatment.

Clearly, the can't go to that extent and go outside their treatment. But I will allow them to the extent that there's disagreements between them and defense expert about matters they were allowed to opine on within the scope of their treatment, I'm going to allow them to do so.

No. 5, video or animated — okay. So there's a video of the actual surgery. First, I'm assuming this was a lengthy surgery? Maybe I'm incorrect.

MR. JAFFE: There were six surgeries. I don't even know which --

THE COURT: So why don't we start there. What videos do you have, do you know?

MR. MARTIN: I don't know, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Good. So I'm certainly not going to sit during this trial through a five-hour surgery video. I have no idea if that's what's involved or not.

MR. MARTIN: And I don't think Mr. Henness would

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they're using, without having to show a bloody hole in her

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back or on her front, moving her stomach, and other anatomic aspects out of the way to reach her spine. And all that's being done is to inflame the jury. It can be handled very easily through testimony and explanation.

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There's no need to show the jury so that they are, you know, disgusted by this, to try and say this is what this lady went through when she was out cold for the whole thing anyway. And for the doctors, I mean, they do it every day. I mean, there's — there's nothing extraordinary or extreme about it from their perspective.

The only ones who are going to be in this room that are going to be in any way affected by this are the people sitting in the jury and they're going to sit there and — and get queasy over watching a surgery that could just as easily be explained.

MR. MARTIN: It appears that Mr. Jaffe's abandoned his reliance on case law. Specifically, People v Prince, which we looked at and which he cited in support of his position, but in that case the Court actually allowed a video of a day in the life of a murder victim. Then in the reply, he brings forth the Blanche case, which was an animation of a brain surgery, which doesn't even apply.

Here's it's the actual surgery, and we provided a long list of citations throughout several jurisdictions which hold that inner operative videos are fine. Now we will not

present it for any kind of cumulative purpose. We're not going to present it to unduly waste time or just show a five-hour video. But the jury should be able to see what this surgery actually entails because it is spine surgery.

It is dealing with a lot of components. It's dealing with a lot of — with a lot of aspects. And if defense counsel's going to make the argument that, oh, well, she should have recovered from it, or she should have done better, that she's just malingering, that she, you know, she's not really in that much pain, well, take a look at the video, look what she went through.

Even though she's under anesthesia and she's not awake, she's still feeling that pain several days later. You know, anybody who's undergone surgery would know that, but not necessarily a juror. Especially in such a rare surgery in the multiples of surgeries which had been done in this case. Now we're not going to show six different surgeries.

We're not going to show them in their entirety, but the doctor should be able to state and provide that testimony via the actual surgery as to what he did in this case. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. JAFFE: Your Honor, first off, let me just say,
I'm acutely aware of the time. Your Honor's made it clear
you've got a trial coming in at 10:30. And simply because I
didn't talk about a particular case that I've briefed doesn't

mean I've abandoned it.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JAFFE: I'm just trying to -

THE COURT: Okay. Good.

MR. JAFFE: — be a little expedient for the Court's benefit. Your Honor, it is cumulative, and counsel's just said, what she went through, what she experienced, and that we've all had surgeries and been in pain. That's right. We've all had surgeries. We've all been in pain after surgery. We all know what post-operative pain is. And that she went through this while she was out cold offers nothing. It doesn't make clearer to the jury a fact that's in dispute.

THE COURT: You know, I mean, the fact that I had my wisdom teeth taken out isn't necessarily comparative to someone having a major spine surgery.

MR. JAFFE: I understand.

THE COURT: I mean -

MR. JAFFE: But, Your Honor, there could also be very, you know, very — very small surgeries that are very, very painful just because of what surgery was done and it doesn't necessarily have to be a spine surgery that's going to be painful. She can talk about it. The doctors can talk about it.

They can explain, patients are usually in a lot of pain afterwards. She can say I was in a lot of pain

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MR. JAFFE: Well, Your Honor, I think that a doctor

can certainly explain that well enough by saying that, you know, we've got to cut her in the front, move her stomach out of the way, get to the back, take these instruments, pull out pieces of her — of her disc, stick a metal cage in there, screw it in, close her up, flip her over, open her back up, put in the other half, take out the remainder of the disc.

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I mean, that can all be explained and a doctor is very adept at explaining that this is a major surgery. They were very good at doing it long before these were videotaped and shown in front of juries and jurors got a very clear picture and understood. This is unduly prejudicial simply to inflame the jury in an attempt to give an exaggerated award based upon a gross depiction of a surgery as shown to them. That's all this is.

having is it's difficult to say in the abstract without knowing what, how many, how long, and what they actually show, it's very difficult for me to say, yes, this is unduly prejudicial. I don't think in the abstract it necessarily is unfairly prejudicial. So, I mean, I'm going to deny the motion in limine, but having said that, I mean, there's got to be, you know, some limits on what's presented.

I don't want it to be too lengthy. I don't want it to be too much blood and gore, but it's hard to be more specific than that. So, I mean, I think that there should be,

you know, perhaps some edited portion that plaintiff focuses 1 on what they intend to show and go over that specifically with 2 counsel and we could take that up during trial if there's 3 still a - I mean, obviously, you dispute any of it showing. 4 MR. JAFFE: Right. 5 THE COURT: So, I get that, but -6 MR. JAFFE: But, given your ruling, would Your Honor 7 feel that there's a certain amount of time that this video 8 should be allowed to go? I mean, I don't even want a fifteen-9 or twenty-minute video. I mean, if all they're trying to show 10 is what she went through, one or two minutes should be 11 12 sufficient. THE COURT: It's hard — I don't know. I mean, I 13 don't - it's hard for me to say that without knowing - I 14 don't know how long it takes to show what they're trying to 15 16 show. MR. MARTIN: And, Your Honor, if I may, we'll 17 disclose well - well prior to trial the exact portion that we 18 intend to show and give -- and give adequate time to -- to 19 for counsel to both meet and confer, and then, if that's now 20. 21 able to happen.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. MARTIN: Then Mr. Jaffe can file the appropriate motion.

THE COURT: Well, or we could talk about it in court.

I mean, you know, I — I guess, I could at that point get a copy of whatever piece you're proposing and decide if I think this is okay or not okay, but.

MR. JAFFE: Can we say that it has to be provided, say, thirty days before trial?

THE COURT: When is this trial again?

MR. JAFFE: May 20th.

THE COURT: Yes. Thirty days before trial.

MR. JAFFE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm denying the motion, but, you know, understanding that we may need to further take up exactly what they're intending to present.

No. 6, we've already addressed, so that's to admit evidence and medical — that's granted. Seven, there was no opposition — well, to be clear, I'm granting and requiring that demonstrative exhibits be exchanged at your pretrial conference.

MR. JAFFE: Right. And when we're talking about demonstrative, we're not talking about Power Point text. Just any images of any nature that would otherwise have been shown.

THE COURT: Okay. Having said that, it's not a bad idea to talk about Power Points, at least before they're put on during an opening, but — but, I understand what you're saying, and so I'm granting it to the extent I've described.

MR. JAFFE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, also, just while — since you mentioned Power Point, just it's my practice that if do use a Power Point, I'll want to get a copy of it to make it a court exhibit at trial, just so there's a record of what was shown to the jury, just to keep in mind if you're going to do that.

No. 8, I can definitively say I will follow Nevada law throughout this trial, to the extent there was a motion in limine necessary for me to say that. Only appropriate voir dire questions in accordance with Nevada statutes and the EDCRs. Only opening statement is not time for argument. You introduce what the evidence will show. You don't make arguments.

And, in fact, in case, I'm not sure it was covered here, but closing arguments would only be within the scope as described by the Nevada Supreme Court in multiple decisions at this point. So I guess it's granted.

No. 9, traffic accident reports, citations, opinions of investigating officer, references to vehicle one, vehicle two, driver one, driver two. Go ahead.

MR. JAFFE: Okay. I mean, I'm assuming that citations are not going to be --

THE COURT: I don't think there's any dispute -

MR. JAFFE: — an issue.

THE COURT: — that the citations will not come into evidence.

MR. JAFFE: And I don't — I don't know what Your Honor's general position is about admissibility of the accident report even in a redacted form.

THE COURT: Generally — generally it's not

MR. JAFFE: But -

admissible.

THE COURT: It can be used to refresh recollection or —

MR. JAFFE: Yep.

THE COURT: — if there's a, you know, if you're impeaching and bringing out an inconsistent statement or something along those lines; generally not admissible.

MR. JAFFE: My biggest concern is an officer standing in front of the jury and testifying as to conclusions that he may have drawn based upon what he observed or what he heard. I have no problem with the officer testifying about his actual perceptions, but the conclusions are where I believe a line needs to be drawn.

And the problem is when an officer talks about somebody is vehicle one or vehicle two or driver one versus driver two, the jurors are astute enough to understand that "one" typically means the one that the officer felt was the most likely cause or the greater cause of the accident or the one who made the mistake.

I have no problem if he wants — he should talk about

it as the Cordaro vehicle, the Hernandez vehicle, the Lexus versus the truck. Those, I think, are appropriate definers 2 and those are certainly easy so that the jury can understand. 3 But if he's going to start talking about one versus two, 4 that's where I think there's a problem and that's what the 5 case law we cited from other jurisdictions has supported. 6 THE COURT: I should say, I mean, to the extent that 7 if - if Mr. Hernandez made statements at the scene, and I 8 9 don't - I mean, that would be a party admission that he 10 can ---MR. JAFFE: Right. 11 THE COURT: - report what your client said, and vice 12 versa, if you're calling him and 13 MR. JAFFE: Oh, yeah. No, no, I certainly have no 14 problem with his - with the officer's perceptions. If the 15 officer is going to give testimony about I observed this, I 16 saw skid marks of this nature, I saw debris over here. 17 THE COURT: Right, right, right. 18 MR. JAFFE: I saw a wet roadway --19 THE COURT: What I was saying though is 20 21 MR. MARTIN: Right. THE COURT: -- and I don't know if it happened, if 22 plaintiff puts the officer on the stand and Mr. Hernandez said 23

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something to the officer, I did it, it's my fault.

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MR. JAFFE: If you say I didn't think I had that much

tequila, sure, I have no problem him saying a comment that 1 2 would be an admissible hearsay exception. 3 THE COURT: Right. 4 MR. JAFFE: Sure. 5 THE COURT: Right, okay. All right. Anything to 6 add? 7 MR. MARTIN: No. We understand how [inaudible] works and the extent and we have no issue with instructing the 8 9 police officer to try to stay away from V1, V2. 10 THE COURT: Right. MR. MARTIN: Which I think is engrained in them, 11 12 anyway, so. THE COURT: Yes. Right. So they should avoid those 13 designations. He can - officer can be called to testify 14 15 about what the officer saw and perceived as a percipient witness, not to repeat inadmissible hearsay or to draw 16 17 conclusions from inadmissible hearsay. Okay. So, I guess, 18 that is granted. MR. MARTIN: Your Honor. 19 20 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. MARTIN: In regards to Mr. Jaffe's last motion, 21 22 given the time, is it possible that we could move this to 23 another date since it is going to take significantly longer. 24 It is one of the essential issues in this case and Plaintiffs

would ask that this be moved to another calendar date

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convenient to the Court.

Given that trial is in May, we believe there's plenty of time, but there are a lot of very, very important issues and it goes into depth much, much more than any of the other—any of the other motions and it would probably take, at least, a half an hour for briefing on both sides and oral arguments. So we would request that it just be a — moved to the next available calendar date.

THE COURT: Any objection to doing that? I think it does make sense.

MR. JAFFE: I think this one is going to take a little more time, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. So it looks like in two weeks from today on the 24th, I don't have anything on that morning.

MR. JAFFE: I think I'm good that day. I know — I know I'm in town that day. I know that much.

MR. MARTIN: That's all we can ask for sometimes.

THE COURT: Yeah. All right. Let's go ahead and put it on the 24th at 8:30 then for motion in limine — put Defendant's No. 10.

MR. JAFFE: If for some reason, Your Honor, I do have something going on.

THE COURT: Let us know and we'll find another day mutually convenient.

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CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

KARR REPORTING, INC. Aurora, Colorado

KIMBERLY LAWSON

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1	MLIM STEVEN T. JAFFE	Alun A. Chrim	
2	sjaffe@lawhjc.com	Den A. Comm	
3	Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH	CLERK OF THE COURT	
	jsmith@lawhjc.com		
4	Nevada Bar No. 010231 JACOB B. LEE		
5	jlee@lawhjc.com Nevada Bar No. 012428		
6			
7	HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP 7425 PEAK DRIVE		
8	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128 (702) 316-4111		
A	FAX (702) 316-4114		
9	Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury		
11	00-1K-1 Fe-1-477-2		
	DISTRICT COURT		
12	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
13		I a ramana i a a ramana a	
14	MARGARET G. SEASTRAND,	CASE NO. A-11-636515-C DEPT NO. XXX	
15	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3:	
16	vs.	TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF MEDICAL LIENS	
17	RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES 1		
	through 10; and ROE ENTITIES 11 through 20, inclusive,	Date of Hearing:	
18	Service in the service of the servic	Time of Hearing:	
19	Defendants.		
20	Defendant, Raymond Khoury ("Khoury"	'), by and through his attorneys of record, Hall Jaffe &	
21	Clayton, LLP, hereby submits his Motion for an C	Order, in Limine, to admit evidence of Plaintiffs's medical	
22	liens.		
23	///		
24	///		
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26	11/		
27	1111		
28	///		

This Motion in Limine is made and based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted herewith, and any oral argument the Court may entertain at the hearing on this matter.

DATED this 1st day of May, 2013.

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

Ву

STEVEN T. JAFFE Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH Nevada Bar No. 010231 JACOB B. LEE

Nevada Bar No. 012428 7425 Peak Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89128

Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

NOTICE OF MOTION MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, Plaintiff; and TO: 2 TO: RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ., her attorney of record. 3 YOU AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the 4 foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 3: TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF MEDICAL 5 4th day of LIENS on for hearing before the above-entitled Court on the 2013, at the 6 hour of 9; 00am or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. DATED this 1st day of May, 2013. 8 HALL JAFFE & C TON, LLP 9 10 11 Nevada Bar No. 007035 IACOP S. SMITH 12 Nevada Bar No. 010231 13 ACOB B. LEE Nevada Bar No. 012428 14 7425 Peak Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 15 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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AFFIDAVIT OF JACOB S. SMITH, ESQ. IN COMPLIANCE WITH EDCR 2.47

STATE OF NEVADA) ss:

JACOB S. SMITH, being first duly sworn, under oath, deposes and says:

- Affiant is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, and is an attorney with the law firm of HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP, counsel of record in this matter for Defendant Raymond Riad Khoury;
- 2. On April 23, 2013, prior to submitting Defendant's instant Motion in Limine, I contacted counsel for Plaintiff Margaret Seastrand to discuss the contents of the motion. Specifically, I spoke with Alison A. Brasier, Esq. of Richard Harris Law Firm, pursuant to EDCR 2.47, to discuss the content of the Motion and to make a good faith effort to resolve the issues addressed in the Motion. Ms. Brasier and I were unable to resolve the issues addressed in the Motion, thereby necessitating its filing.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

JACOB S. SMITH, ESQ.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \ day of May, 2013.

Notary Public of and for said

COUNTY and STATE

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NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF NEVADA
County of Clark
LISA C. RICO
My Appointment Expires Aug. 10, 2016

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 13, 2009, in Las Vegas, Nevada. Plaintiff alleges that, on that date, Mr. Khoury negligently operated a motor vehicle in a manner that caused a collision with Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff further alleges that she has suffered serious and disabling injuries as a result of the collision.

Plaintiff has treated with various providers, allegedly related to the subject accident. On or about March 21, 2012, Defendant served his second set of written discovery requests on Plaintiff, which included interrogatories and requests for production of documents pertaining to medical liens and the amounts of payment accepted by Plaintiff's medical providers. See, Defendant's Second Requests for Production and Second Set of Interrogatories, attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B," respectively. Specifically, the written discovery requested the following:

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 16:

All executed liens with each and every medical provider and facility.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 17:

All documents demonstrating the amounts paid by any source to the medical providers and / or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 18:

All documents demonstrating the amounts of payments accepted by the medical providers and / or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

REOUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 19:

All documents demonstrating the amounts accepted by each medical provider and / or facility which sold its liens to any other person or entity for the treatment rendered in this case.

[...]

INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Set forth the amounts paid by any source which each and every medical provider or facility accepted as payment for the services which they rendered.

See, Exhibits A and B.

On April 23, 2012, Plaintiff served her responses to these written discovery requests. Her response to each of these requests was identical:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive, and harassing to Plaintiff.

See, Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Second Requests for Production of Documents and Plaintiff's Responses to Second Set of Interrogatories, attached hereto as Exhibits "C" and "D," respectively.

Defendant attempted to obtain responsive answers to these requests from Plaintiff, but Defendant was ultimately unsuccessful. Accordingly, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel the responses to be heard by Discovery Commissioner Bulla. See, Motion to Compel, attached hereto as Exhibit "E." After reviewing the briefs and hearing oral argument, Discovery Commissioner Bulla ordered Plaintiff to supplement the requested discovery responses with the information in her possession relating to liens and allowed Defendant to subpoena the remainder, as the information was discoverable and not protected by the collateral source rule. See, Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations, attached hereto as Exhibit "F."

It is undisputed that Plaintiff underwent treatment on a medical lien basis. Accordingly, Defendant is aware that Plaintiff and/or her attorneys signed liens with respect to Plaintiff's treatment with the following providers:

Providers Who Hold Liens	Lien Amount
Nevada Imaging Centers	Unknown
Nevada Spine Clinic	Unknown
Radar Medical Group	Unknown
Surgery Center of Southern Nevada	Unknown
William Muir, M.D.	Unknown
Primary Care Consultants	Unknown

See, Medical Liens, attached hereto as Exhibit "G." There are also documents which suggest that some of Plaintiff's liens have been sold by some of the doctors to other entities, which are summarized as follows:

Entities Who Purchased Liens	Amount
Canyon Medical Billing	Unknown
New England Medical Legal Liaison, LLC	Unknown
Sierra Med Services	\$1,650.00

See. Liens Purchased, attached hereto as Exhibit "H." 2

Admitting evidence of either liens or documents related to the purchase of liens and amount purchased has been addressed at least once before by the Eighth Judicial District Court in the case styled Cordaro v. Hernandez, case number A608180. In that case, Judge Cadish allowed evidence of liens, liens purchased, and the amount purchased:

THE COURT: ... Now to the extent that the treating doctors have liens, have treated on a lien and continue to hold liens on the case, I think that is relevant and can come in as to bias or prejudice, so I'm denying the motion to that extent.

The one that I've not dealt with before, which is an interesting issue, is when the liens been purchased and by a private company not related to insurance. I don't think it has the same collateral source issue and, but, at the same time it doesn't – it also doesn't affect what she owes.

I mean, she owes it to a different party now who bought the paper, but she still owes it. But so the potential relevance, as I understand it then, is really to go to whether the doctors' bills are, I guess, reasonable and necessary if they're willing to take a significant discount on it when they sell it.

I mean, I suppose — I don't know, I mean, that's — it's not clear to me that that necessarily means that it's not what's reasonable to charge if they recognize financial realities and sell it. Having said that, though, relevant evidence just has to be somewhat probative to make any fact an issue more or less likely, and I suppose it is relevant and, I guess, given that it doesn't have the collateral source issues and insurance issues, I think I'm going to deny the Motion in Limine as to that issue, as well.

Defendant reserves the right to supplement these records with any new lien or lien purchase information received through trial.

²Defendant reserves the right to supplement these records with any new lien or lien purchase information received through trial.

So to go back, I'm granting this motion in limine to the extent that there was insurance payments or write-offs as a result of contracts with insurance payments, but denying it with respect to the liens issue.

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Right, but – but I – yeah, I mean, yes: I'm not trying to give them the incorrect impression that she doesn't owe the money anymore. That it goes to, in terms of damages, whether, you know, this amount is reasonable and necessarily reasonable charge for the services provided by this doctor.

See, Court Transcript Regarding Lien Evidence, attached hereto as *Exhibit "I,"* at 27:25-29:3; 30:6-11. (Emphasis added). Judge Cadish clearly ruled that evidence of liens is relevant as to the doctors' bias and/or prejudice, while the evidence that liens were purchased and the amount purchased was relevant with respect to whether the costs for medical treatment were reasonable. *Id.*

On April 18, 2013, counsel for Mr. Khoury spoke with Plaintiff's counsel in a good-faith attempt to secure an agreement regarding the need to file this Motion in Limine prior to filing the same with the Clerk of the Court. After discussion, no such agreement could be reached. (See, Affidavit of Jacob S. Smith, Esq., submitted in compliance with EDCR 2.47, as set forth above).

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. Legal Standard for Motions in Limine

The Nevada Supreme Court agrees that the resolution of motions in limine is within the purview of the district court's discretionary power concerning rulings on the admissibility of evidence. See, e.g., State ex. rel Dept. of Highway v. Nevada Aggregates & Asphalt Co., 92 Nev. 370, 551 P.2d 1095 (1976); see also EDCR 2.47 (allowing for motions in limine to exclude or admit evidence). "The usual purpose of motions in limine, is to preclude the presentation of evidence deemed inadmissible and prejudicial to the moving party." Kelly v. New West Federal Savings, 49 Cal. App. 4th 659, 669-670 (1996). Indeed, motions in limine allow a more careful consideration of evidentiary issues than would take place during a trial. Id. Furthermore, by resolving potentially critical issues at the outset, pre-trial motions enhance the efficiency of trials and possibly promote settlements. Id.

B. This Court should admit evidence of Plaintiff's medical treatment on a lien to rebut any argument that Plaintiff lacks funds for treatment.

Defendant is entitled to an order, *in limine*, allowing him to admit evidence showing that Plaintiff treated on medical liens, because evidence of treatment on a lien basis is relevant to rebut the potential

assertion by Plaintiff that she could not or cannot afford medical treatment which she relates to the accident. If Plaintiff underwent other treatments on medical liens, she cannot now assert that she cannot afford treatment related to the subject accident. If Plaintiff attempts to do so, then Defendant moves to admit evidence of treatment on medical liens. As such, to the extent that Plaintiff may assert that Plaintiff could not or cannot afford treatment relating the accident, Defendant requests that this Court allow Defendant to introduce evidence of the medical liens that Plaintiff used to obtain treatment for injuries she relates to the accident.

C. This Court should admit evidence of Plaintiff's medical treatment on a lien to show bias and interest.

Defendant is further entitled to admit evidence of these liens, because evidence regarding a witness' bias or interest in testifying in a certain manner is always relevant and is not collateral to the controversy for purposes of exclusion. *Lobato v. State*, 120 Nev. 512, 96 P.3d 765 (2004). In *Lobato*, the Nevada Supreme Court noted:

Although district courts have wide discretion to control cross-examination that attacks a witness's general credibility, a trial court's discretion is ... narrow[ed] where bias [motive] is the object to be shown, and an examiner must be permitted to clicit any facts which might color a witness's testimony. Generally, the only proper restriction should be those inquiries which are repetitive, irrelevant, vague, speculative, or designed merely to harass, annoy or humiliate the witness

Lobato. 120 Nev. at 520. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses includes the right to inquire and examine a witness about the bias and motivation behind his or her testimony. In Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19, 106 S.Ct. 292 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court found that a cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into a witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but "[also] ... allowed to impeach," i.e., discredit, the witness. Id.

Here, some of Plaintiff's medical providers are owed substantial sums of money, which expenses they have agreed to incur on a lien basis. The mere fact that a party treats on a medical lien is not necessarily indicative of the fact that they do not have medical insurance. Indeed, there have been many situations where medical providers treat patients on a lien *despite* the fact that the patient has medical or other insurance that would cover the cost of treatment.

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Given these types of financial arrangements between Plaintiff and her medical providers, there can be little doubt that the medical providers have actually acquired an interest in the case. As a result, these individuals have become "contingent" witnesses. In fact, in the event that Plaintiff recovers nothing, these "contingent" witnesses stand to receive nothing for all of the time and services they provided. If, on the other hand, Plaintiff prevails, these "contingent" witnesses stand to receive far more money for the exact same time and services than they would otherwise have received if they had simply submitted their bills to a medical or other insurance carrier, or if they had even provided treatment on a cash-up-front basis.

For these reasons, it is entirely appropriate to question Plaintiff's medical providers about the existence of a lien, the amount of the lien and the fact that medical providers have, in fact, acquired an interest in the outcome of the litigation. This issue has been ruled on in at least one prior case in the Eighth Judicial District Court: Cordaro v. Hernandez. There, Judge Cadish agreed that liens constituted evidence of bias and/or prejudice. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court consider Judge Cadish's ruling in Cordaro v. Hernandez and allow Defendant to introduce evidence of medical liens at trial.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court admit evidence of Plaintiff's Medical liens to rebut any claims that she could not afford treatment, to show the bias of the medical providers, and for any other purpose the Court determines to be reasonable.

DATED this 1st day of May, 2013.

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

By

STEVEN T.JAFFE Nevada Bar/No. 007035 JACOBIS SMITH Nevada Bar No. 010231

JACOB B. LEE

Nevada Bar No. 012428 7425 Peak Drive

Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

EXHIBIT "A"

STEVEN T. JAFFE siaffe@lawhic.com Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH 3 ismith@lawhic.com Nevada Bar No. 010231 4 HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP 5 7455 WEST WASHINGTON AVENUE, SUITE 460 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128 6 (702) 316-4111 FAX (702) 316-4114 7 Attorneys for Defendant 8 Raymond R. Khoury 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 MARGARET G. SEASTRAND. CASE NO. A-11-636515-C .12 DEPT NO. XXX Plaintiff. 13 DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO PLAINTIFF MARGARET 14 SEASTRAND RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES 1 15 through 10; and ROE ENTITIES 11 through 20, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 TO: MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, Plaintiff herein; and 19 TO: Richard A. Harris, Esq., of the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM, Plaintiff's attorney: 20 Defendant requests that Plaintiff MARGARET G. SEASTRAND respond to these 21 Requests for Production of Documents set out below in accordance with the provisions of Rule 34 of the 22 Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, fully and separately under oath, signed by the person or persons 23 making such Responses, and that a copy of such Responses be served upon the Defendant herein within 24 thirty (30) days after the service of the Requests for Production of Documents, unless the Court, by 25 Order, enlarges or shortens the time. 26 REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 16: All executed liens with each and every medical 27 provider and facility. 28 REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 17: All documents demonstrating the amounts paid by

any source to the medical providers and / or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 18: All documents demonstrating the amounts of payments accepted by the medical providers and / or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 19: All documents demonstrating the amounts accepted by each medical provider and / or facility which sold its liens to any other person or entity for the treatment rendered in this case.

These Requests For Production shall be deemed continuing so as to require reasonable supplemental Answers if the Plaintiff or his Attorney obtains further information between the time his Answers are served and the time of trial.

DATED: March 21, 2012

HALL JAFFE & TLAYTON, LLP

By

STEVEN T.J.AFFE Nevada Bay No. 007035 JACOB & SMITH

Nevada Bar No. 010231

7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460

Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I hereby certify that service of the foregoing <u>DEFENDANT'S</u>

SECOND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND was

made on March 21, 2012, by depositing a true and correct copy of the same by U.S. Mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, addressed, stamped, and mailed to the following:

Richard A. Harris, Esq. RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff

An Employee of

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

EXHIBIT "B"

STEVEN T. JAFFE 2 sjaffe@lawhjc.com Nevada Bar No. 007035 3 JACOB S. SMITH ismith@lawhjc.com Nevada Bar No. 010231 4 5 HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP 7455 WEST WASHINGTON AVENUE, SUITE 460 6 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128 (702) 316-4111 7 FAX (702) 316-4114 8 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 11 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 12 CASE NO. A-11-636515-C MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, DEPT NO. XXX 13 Plaintiff. 14 VS. 15 RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES 1 through 10; and ROE ENTITIES 11 through 16 20, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 DEFENDANT RAYMOND KHOURY'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO 20 PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND TO: MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, Plaintiff; and 21 RICHARD HARRIS, ESO. Of the RICHARD HARISS LAW FIRM, Plaintiff's attorney: 22 TO: 23 Defendant requests that Plaintiff MARGARET SEASTRAND answer these Interrogatories set out below in accordance with the provisions of Rule 33 of the Nevada Rules of Civil 24 25 Procedure, fully and separately under oath, signed by the person or persons making such Answers, and 26 that a copy of such Answers be served upon the Defendant herein within thirty (30) days after the service of the Interrogatories, unless the Court, by Order, enlarges or shortens the time. 27 28 In answering these Interrogatories, furnish such information as is available to you, not merely such information as is of your own knowledge. This means you are to furnish information which

is known by or in the possession of your attorney or any agents for you or your attorney.

INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Set forth the amounts paid by any source which each and every medical provider or facility accepted as payment for the services which they rendered.

These Interrogatories shall be deemed continuing so as to require reasonable supplemental Answers if the Plaintiff or his Attorney obtains further information between the time his Answers are served and the time of trial.

DATED this 21st day of March, 2012.

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

By

Nevada Bar No. 007035

ACOB'S SYUTH

Nevada Bar No. 010231

7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460

Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I hereby certify that service of the foregoing **DEFENDANT**

RAYMOND KHOURY'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF

MARGARET SEASTRAND was made on day of March, 2012, by depositing a true and correct copy of the same by U.S. Mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, addressed, stamped, and mailed to the following:

Richard A. Harris, Esq. RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

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EXHIBIT "C"

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RESP			
RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ.			
Nevada Bar No. 505 JOSHUA R. HARRIS, ESQ.			
Nevada Bar No. 9580			
ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ.			
Nevada Bar No. 10522 RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM			
801 South Fourth Street			
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101			
Phone (702) 444-4444 Fax (702) 444-4455			
Attorneys for Plaintiff			
DIS	STRICT	COURT	
CLARK	COUN	TY, NEVADA	
MARGARET G. SEASTRAND.	Λ.	Case No. :	A-11-636515-C
MARGARET G. SEASTRAIND,	3	Dept. No.:	XXX
Plaintiff,	j		
/S.)		
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RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES)		
through 10, and ROE ENTITIES 11 hrough 20, inclusive,	3		•
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Defendants.)		
PLAINTIFF'S RESPO	NSE TO	DEFENDAN	T'S SECOND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION	N TO PL	AINTIFF MA	RGARET SEASTRAND
TO: Defendant RAYMOND RIAD KI	HOURY	; and	
TO: Jacob S. Smith, Esq. of HALL JA	FFE & (CLAYTON, LL	P, his counsel of record.
COMES NOW, Plaintiff MARGA	ARET G	SEASTRAND	, by and through her counsel
record, Richard A. Harris, Joshua R. Har	rris and	Alison M. Brasi	er, of the RICHARD HARR)
LAW FIRM, pursuant to Rule 34 of the	Nevada	Rules of Civil I	Procedure, and hereby provide
the following Responses to Defendant's S	Second P	Lequests for Pro	duction to Plaintiff:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiff, MARGARET G. SEASTRAND has not yet completed her discovery and investigation for the preparation of this case for trial. Accordingly, the answers set forth herein are provided without prejudice to the responding party's right to produce any subsequent discovered facts or interpretations thereof and/or to add, modify or otherwise change or amend the answers herein. The information hereinafter set forth is true and correct to the best of the responding party's knowledge at this particular time, but it is subject to correction for inadvertent errors or omission, if any such error or omissions are found to exist

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 16:

All executed liens with each and every medical provider and facility.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 16:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 17:

All documents demonstrating the amounts paid by any source to the medical providers and/or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 17:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

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REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 18:

All documents demonstrating the amounts of payments accepted by the medical providers and/or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 18:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 19:

All documents demonstrating the amounts accepted by each medical provider and/or facility which sold its liens to any other person or entity for the treatment rendered in this case.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 19:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2012.

RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

JOSHUA R. HARRIS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 9580

ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 10522

801 South Fourth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursua	ant to	NRCP 5(b), I here	by certify th	iat I am an emp	oloyee	of RICHARD HA	RRIS
LAW FIRM	and tl	hat on the 💯 d	ay of April,	2012, I caused	the for	regoing PLAINT	IFF'S
RESPONSE	то	DEFENDANT'S	SECOND	REQUESTS	FOR	PRODUCTION	V TO
Control of the control of the							

PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND to be served as follows:

- [X] by placing a true and correct copy of the same to be deposited for mailing in the U.S. Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid; and/or
- [] pursuant to EDCR 7.26, by sending it via facsimile; and/or
- by receipt of copy

to the attorneys listed below:

Steven T. Jaffe, Esq. Jacob S. Smith, Esq. HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP 7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant

An employee of the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

EXHIBIT "D"

LAW FIRM, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby provides the following Responses to Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiff, MARGARET G. SEASTRAND has not yet completed her discovery and investigation for the preparation of this case for trial. Accordingly, the answers set forth herein are provided without prejudice to the responding party's right to produce any subsequent discovered facts or interpretations thereof and/or to add, modify or otherwise change or amend the answers herein. The information hereinafter set forth is true and correct to the best of the responding party's knowledge at this particular time, but it is subject to correction for inadvertent errors or omission, if any such error or omissions are found to exist

INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Set forth the amounts paid by any source which each and every medical provider or facility accepted as payment for the services which they rendered.

RICHARD HARRIS

RESPOND TO INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral source. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2012.

RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

P3.11451

RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 505

JOSHUA R. HARRIS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 9580

ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 10522

801 South Fourth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiff

RICHARD HARRIS

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursu	ant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of RICHARD HARRIS
LAW FIRM	and that on the 23 day of April, 2012, I caused the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S
RESPONSE	TO DEFENDANT RAYMOND KHOURY'S SECOND SET OF
INTERROG	ATORIES TO PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND to be served as
follows:	
[X]	by placing a true and correct copy of the same to be deposited for mailing in the U.S. Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid; and/or
[]	pursuant to EDCR 7.26, by sending it via facsimile; and/or
[]	by receipt of copy
to the attorne	ys listed below:

Steven T. Jaffe, Esq.
Jacob S. Smith, Esq.
HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP
7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460
Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
Attorneys for Defendant

An employee of the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

EXHIBIT "E"

Etectronically Filed 11/01/2012 03:27:30 PM

1 MOT STEVEN T. JAFFE CLERK OF THE COURT 2 siaffe@lawhic.com Nevada Bar No. 007035 3 JACOB S. SMITH ismith@lawhjc.com Nevada Bar No. 010231 4 JACOB B. LEE 5 ilee@lawhic.com Nevada Bar No. 012428 6 HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP 7 7425 PEAK DRIVE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128 8 (702) 316-4111 FAX (702) 316-4114 9 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury 10 11 DISTRICT COURT 12 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 13 MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, CASE NO. A-11-636515-C 14 DEPT NO. XXX Plaintiff. 15 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND VS. 16 PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS RE: PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL LIENS RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES 1 17 through 10; and ROE ENTITIES 11 through 20, inclusive, 18 [BEFORE THE DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER] Defendants. 19 Hearing Date: Hearing Time: 20 21 Date of Hearing: 22 Time of Hearing: 23 24 Defendant, Raymond Khoury ("Khoury"), by and through his attorneys of record, Hall Jaffe & 25 Clayton, LLP, hereby submits his Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and Production of Documents 26 With this Motion, Khoury seeks this Court's order granting the following relief: 27 28

- 1. For an order compelling the immediate provision of an answer to Interrogatory No. 32;
- 2. For an order compelling the immediate provision of documents in response to Defendant's Requests for Production Nos. 16 through 19;
- 3. For a reasonable award of attorney fees for the necessity of having to bring these matters before the Court and for attendance at the hearing pursuant to NRCP 37 and EDCR 7.60; and
 - For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable in the premises.

This motion is made and based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein, the points and authorities attached hereto, the affidavit of Jacob S. Smith, Esq., any oral argument the Court may see fit to allow at the time of the hearing and the entire record in this matter.

DATED this day of November, 2012.

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

STEVEN Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH

Vevada Bar No. 010231

ACOB B. LEE

Neyada Bar No. 012428

7425 Peak Drive

Las Vegas, Nevada 89128

Attorneys for Defendant

Raymond R. Khoury

NOTICE OF MOTION 1 MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, Plaintiff; and 2 TO: RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ., her attorney of record. 3 TO: YOU AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring 4 the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND 5 PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS RE: PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL LIENS on for hearing before 6 the DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER over the above-entitled Court on the 5th day of DEC, 2012, 7 at the hour of 9:00 AM, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 8 day of November, 2012. 9 DATED this HALL JAFFE & CLAYFON, LLP 10 11 STEVEN T. JAFFE 12 Nevada Bar Np. 007035 ACCIB'S. SMITH 13 evalia Bar No. 010231 JACOB B. LEE 14 Nevada Bar No. 012428 7425 Peak Drive 15 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant 16 Raymond R. Khoury 17 AFFIDAVIT OF JACOB S. SMITH IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL 18 STATE OF NEVADA 19 SS: COUNTY OF CLARK 20 JACOB S. SMITH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 21 I am a licensed attorney and am admitted to practice law in all courts in the State of 1. 22 Nevada. 23 I make this affidavit in support of Defendant's Motion to Compel. 2. 24 I have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this affidavit and could testify as a 25 competent witness, if called upon to do so. 26 On March 21, 2012, I served interrogatories and requests for production on Plaintiff. 27 Plaintiff responded to those discovery requests on April 23, 2012. 28

NOTARY PUBLIC

- 5. I considered Plaintiff's responses to Interrogatory No. 32 and Requests for Production Nos. 16 through 19 to be insufficient and stated such in a phone conversation with Plaintiff's counsel, Alison Brasier, Esq., on or about April 27, 2012. She agreed to look into the matter and get back with me
- 6. On June 8, 2012, I sent a letter to Plaintiff's counsel requesting supplemental responses and setting forth the legal basis for these requests. See June 8, 2012 letter, attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
- 7. With the issue still unresolved, I again called Plaintiff's counsel on October 29, 2012 to request supplemental responses to the above-listed discovery. Counsel against stated that she would further look into the matter and get back with me.
- 8. On October 30, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel and I appeared at the deposition of a potential witness in this matter. After the deposition concluded, we discussed this unresolved discovery issue. I reiterated that the responses were insufficient, and Plaintiff's counsel maintained that the responses sufficiently responded to the interrogatories and requests for production and did not require supplementation. The parties agreed that this meeting would serve as our 2.34 meet and confer regarding this issue.
- 9. Despite having conducted two separate EDCR 2.34 conferences, the parties have been unable to resolve these issues and will require the Court's assistance in resolving these pending discovery disputes.
- 10. I submit this Affidavit in compliance with EDCR 2.34 to demonstrate my compliance with the rule and to illustrate the efforts that were undertaken to try to resolve these issues without the need to involve the Court.

JACOB'S.

SMITH, ESO.

FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT

SUBSCRIBED, and SWORN to before me on this 15 day of November, 2012.

MAGEO BUTLER
Notary Public - State of Naveca APPT, No. 0717181
My App. Expires January 29, 2015

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 13, 2009, in Las Vegas, Nevada. Plaintiff alleges that, on that date, Mr. Khoury negligently operated a motor vehicle in a manner that caused a collision with Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff further alleges that she has suffered serious and disabling injuries as a result of the collision. Plaintiff has undergone extensive medical treatment to the tune of over \$420,000.00.

Following the subject incident, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Khoury, alleging negligence and other causes of action. In doing so, Plaintiff has made an issue of her alleged bodily injuries and symptoms, therefore, her records and billing statements which pertain to any prior injury, subsequent injury, and future prognosis are at issue in the case and should be discoverable. Khoury requests that the Court enter an Order compelling Plaintiff to respond to the interrogatories and requests for production of documents seeking information about her medical liens and payment for her treatments. Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 37 and Local Rule 7.60, Khoury further asks this Court for a reasonable award of attorney fees, costs, and expenses necessitated by the filing of this motion, attendance at the hearing, and preparation of the Report and Recommendations, and any further relief that this Court deems just and equitable.

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought claims for bodily injuries alleged to have resulted from a rear-ende accident which took place at the intersection of Craig and Rancho on or about March 13, 2009. According to Plaintiff, she injured her head, neck and back as a result of the incident. Thus, Plaintiff has placed her bodily injuries, including any prior or subsequent injuries, medical treatment, and future prognoses at issue in this lawsuit.

Defendant served his second set of written discovery requests on Plaintiff on or about March 21, 2012. These included interrogatories and requests for production of documents pertaining to medical liens and the amounts of payment accepted by Plaintiff's medical providers. See Defendant's Second Requests for Production and Second Set of Interrogatories, attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C", respectively. Specifically, the written discovery requested the following:

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 16:

All executed liens with each and every medical provider and facility.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 17:

All documents demonstrating the amounts paid by any source to the medical providers and / or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 18:

All documents demonstrating the amounts of payments accepted by the medical providers and / or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 19:

All documents demonstrating the amounts accepted by each medical provider and / or facility which sold its liens to any other person or entity for the treatment rendered in this case.

[...]

INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Set forth the amounts paid by any source which each and every medical provider or facility accepted as payment for the services which they rendered.

See Exhibits "B" and "C", attached hereto. On April 23, 2012, Plaintiff served her responses to these written discovery requests. Her response to each of these requests was identical:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive, and harassing to Plaintiff.

See Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Second Requests for Production of Documents and Plaintiff's Responses to Second Set of Interrogatories, attached hereto as Exhibits "D" and "E", respectively. The undersigned counsel deemed these responses insufficient and stated such in a letter to Plaintiff's counsel dated June 8, 2012. See Exhibit "A". After various "meet and confer" conversations via telephone and in person, the parties are unable to reach an agreement as to the relevance and/or discoverability of the requested information.

III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff Must be Required to Provide Valid Responses to Interrogatory No. 32 and Valid Responses to Requests for Production Nos. 16, 17, 18, and 19.

NRCP 33 provides that a party may serve interrogatories on any other party and the same are to be answered by the party served. NRCP 33(a). Interrogatories are to be answered separately and fully in writing under oath. NRCP 33(b)(1). NRCP 37(a) provides that, after reasonable notice, a party may move for an order compelling discovery, including sanctions in the form of attorney fees. NRCP 37(a)(4). Prior to filing such motion, however, a moving party must affirm that attempts were made, via personal conference or otherwise, to resolve the matter without the need for Court involvement; NRCP 37(a)(2)(A) and EDCR 2.34(d). The failure of a party to serve answers to Interrogatories or respond to Requests for Production of Documents and things may result in the imposition of sanctions that include, but are not limited to, an order designating specific facts to be established for purposes of the case, an order precluding the non-responsive party from introducing specific facts in evidence and an order striking pleadings or portions of pleadings, dismissing the action or entering judgment by default against the non-responsive party. NRCP 37(b)(2)(A)-(c) and NRCP 37(d). Sanctions are also available when a party unreasonably multiplies the proceedings to increase costs and fails to comply with the Court rules; EDCR 7.60(b)(3)-(4).

Pursuant to EDCR 2.40, copies of Defendant's Interrogatories and Requests for Production are set forth in Exhibits "B" and "C", attached hereto. Plaintiff's responses to interrogatories are set forth in Exhibit "D" and Exhibit "E" attached hereto.

Here, the undersigned served written discovery requests upon plaintiffs as permitted by the above-quoted rules. Plaintiff responded to the interrogatories and requests for production, but the given responses were insufficient.

Interrogatory No. 32 seeks information concerning Plaintiff's treating providers and whether or not they are lienholders. Plaintiff's counsel objects on the basis that this information is protected by the collateral source rule. With all due respect, opposing counsel's reliance on the collateral source rule is misplaced.

"The collateral source rule provides 'that if an injured party received some

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 compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor." *Proctor v. Castelletti*, 112 Nev. 88, 90 911 P.2d 853 (1996) citing *Hrnjak v. Graymar*, Inc., 4 Cal.3d 725, 94 Cal.Rptr. 623, 626, 484 P.2d 599, 602 (1971).

In Nevada, the collateral source rule bars the admission of any such evidence during trial. Id.

Khoury submits that lien information is not protected by the collateral source rule. A medical lien is not "compensation for injuries." Rather, it is an outstanding debt owed for services rendered. There is no payment to deduct from the damages which would otherwise be collected from Khoury. Therefore, the collateral source rule does not apply to medical liens.

Furthermore, even assuming the collateral source rule were to bar the admission of liens at trial—which it does not—that does not mean the information is not discoverable. As this Court is well aware, discoverability and admissibility are entirely separate and distinct concepts. NRCP 26(b)(1) provides the parameters for discoverability in Nevada:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(I), (ii), and (iii). (Emphasis added)

Thus, even if Plaintiff's response to Interrogatory No. 32 were to ultimately be deemed inadmissible at trial under the collateral source rule, the answer would still be discoverable if the information is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

Evidence concerning medical liens are relevant at the time of trial to show bias on the part of Plaintiff's treating providers. "The exposure of a witness's motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination." Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 144, 808 P.2d 522 (1991) citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The fact that Plaintiff's treating providers stand to gain from the instant litigation if they are a lien holder is certainly relevant to showing bias. As a result, such

information is clearly discoverable.

Evidence regarding a witness' bias or interest in testifying in a certain manner is, in fact, relevant and is not collateral to the controversy for purposes of exclusion. *Lobato v. State*, 120 Nev. 512, 96 P.3d 765 (2004). In *Lobato*, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that

"Although district courts have wide discretion to control cross-examination that attacks a witness's general credibility, a trial court's discretion is ... narrow[ed] where bias [motive] is the object to be shown, and an examiner must be permitted to elicit any facts which might color a witness's testimony. Generally, the only proper restriction should be those inquiries which are repetitive, irrelevant, vague, speculative, or designed merely to harass, annoy or humiliate the witness."

Lobato at 520. The right to confront and cross examine witnesses includes the right to inquire and examine a witness about the bias and motivation behind their testimony. In *Delaware v. Fensterer*, 474 U.S. 15, 19, 106 S.Ct. 292 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court found that a cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into a witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but [also] ... allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.

Here, some of Plaintiff's "treating providers" are presumably owed substantial sums of money, which expenses they have agreed to incur on a lien basis. The mere fact that a party treats on a medical lien is not necessary indicative of the fact that they do not have medical insurance. Indeed, the undersigned has seen many situations where medical providers treat patients on a lien despite the fact that the patient has medical or other insurance that would cover the cost of treatment.

Given these types of financial arrangements between Plaintiff and her treating providers, there can be little doubt that the providers have actually acquired an interest in the case. As a result, these individuals have become "contingent" witnesses. In the event that Plaintiff were to recover nothing, these "contingent" witnesses stand to receive nothing for all of the time and services they have provided. If, on the other hand, Plaintiff prevails, these "contingent" witnesses stand to receive far more money, for the exact same time and services, than they would otherwise have received if they had simply treated other patients and submitted their bills to a medical or other insurance carrier, or if they had even provided treatment on a cash-up-front basis.

Similarly, Khoury has requested that documents be disclosed demonstrating the amounts each

medical provider accepted for treatment and the amount paid by any source to the medical providers for treatment rendered relevant to Plaintiff's injuries allegedly sustained in the subject accident. These documents are relevant, as set forth above, because they expose what bias, if any, these medical providers have as a result of any contingent treatment. Moreover, they

It is entirely appropriate to question "contingent" witnesses about the existence of a lien, the amount of the lien and the fact that the "contingent" witness has, in fact, acquired an interest in the outcome of the litigation. Similarly, it is appropriate to request that Plaintiff provide all documentation pertaining to medical liens, amounts paid, and amount accepted by her medical providers, as this information provides the basis for the questions to these witnesses.

Therefore, Plaintiff's response to Interrogatory No. 32 as well as her Responses to Requests for Production 16 through 19 are insufficient and Khoury requests an Order compelling proper responses, including the production of the requested documentation.

Good faith efforts were made to try to resolve the matter without the need for Court involvement, without success, thereby necessitating this motion. Based upon the above-quoted rules, Defendant is entitled to an order compelling Plaintiff's response to Interrogatory No. 32 and Responses to Requests for Production 16 through 19. Defendant is also entitled to NRCP 37 sanctions for failure to participate in the discovery process.

B. Plaintiff should be required to produce the requested discovery immediately and by a date certain.

In Associates Capital Services v. Ponderosa Lawn Service, this Honorable Court recognized "classic discovery failure." In Discovery Opinion #4, this Honorable Court wrote "Discovery in a civil case must not wait upon the necessity of filing a Motion to Compel such discovery, thereby wasting the time and energy of diligent counsel, as well as the time of the Court." Here, Plaintiff has failed to provide the information and documentation necessary to address the bias of Plaintiff's treating physicians. As the depositions of these physicians and medical providers are upcoming, Plaintiff's continued refusal to provide the requested information and documentation has impacted Khoury's ability to properly evaluate and defend the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint. Unless Plaintiff is required to promptly produce this information, and do so prior to the depositions of her treating

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physicians, Khoury's purposes in defending against Plaintiff's claims will continue to be frustrated. "The duty rests upon the Plaintiff to use diligence and to expedite his case to a final determination." Walls v. Brewster, 112 Nev. 175, 178, 912 P.2d 261, 262 (1996), Thran v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 79 Nev. 176, 380 P.2d 297 (1963).

Given the above, Defendant requests that this Court compel Plaintiff to provide the requested responses immediately and by a date certain. Alternatively, Defendant requests an Order providing for an adverse inference at the time of trial if Plaintiff's refusal to disclose the requested documentation continues.

C. Plaintiff should be sanctioned for her failure to participate in discovery.

According to the above-quoted rules, Plaintiff has an affirmative legal obligation to participate in the discovery process and must do so in good faith. Despite numerous attempts to obtain compliance with the above-quoted rules, no compliance could be obtained. Plaintiff's refusal to participate in the discovery process has forced Khoury to unnecessarily incur attorney fees and costs, both in the process of ongoing attempts to obtain compliance, through the preparation and filing of this motion with the Court, and through the undersigned's attendance at the hearing thereon.

Given Plaintiff's refusal to participate in the discovery process, defendant requests that the Court enter appropriate NRCP 37 sanctions against her. Khoury requests a reasonable award of attorney's fees for the necessity of having to bring these matters before the Court, as well as such other and further NRCP 37 sanctions as this Court deems appropriate under the circumstances described herein. Finally, given the delays resulting from Plaintiff's refusal to participate in discovery, it is possible that a continuance and/or reopening of discovery may be required in the future in order to complete discovery.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Khoury respectfully requests this Court's order granting the following relief:

- For an order compelling the immediate provision of an answer to Interrogatory No. 32;
- For an order compelling the immediate provision of documents in response to Defendant's Requests for Production Nos. 16 through 19;
- 3. For a reasonable award of attorney fees for the necessity of having to bring these matters

before the Court and for attendance at the hearing pursuant to NRCP 37 and EDCR 7.60; and

For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable in the premises. day of November, 2012. DATED this

HALL JARFE & CLAYTON, LLP

Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH Nevada Bar No. 010231

IACOBIB. LIFE Neyada Bar No. 012428 7425 Peak Drive

Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

> Richard A. Harris, Esq. RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff

> An Employee of HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

EXHIBIT A

HJC HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Telephone 702,316.4111 • Facsimile 702.316.4114

June 8, 2012

Via Facismile: (702) 444-4455 Alison M. Brasier, Esq. RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Re:

Khoury adv. Seastrand

Dear Ms. Brasier:

As you are aware, we recently served some discovery requests and interrogatories on you with respect to the above-listed matter. This fetter will address the deficiencies in your responses to those discovery requests.

Specifically, on March 21, 2012 we propounded Defendant's Second Requests for Production of documents on your client: These included Requests to Produce Nos. 16, 17, 18, and 19, which read as follows:

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 16:

All executed liens with each and every medical provider and facility.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 17:

All documents demonstrating the amounts paid by any source to the medical providers and / or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 18:

All documents demonstrating the amounts of payments accepted by the medical providers and / or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter:

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 19:

All documents demonstrating the amounts accepted by each medical provider and/or facility which sold its liens to any other person or entity for the treatment rendered in this case.

RILEY A. CLAYTON STEVEN T. JAFFE '' MICHAEL R. HALL ' REVINIENCE

MARISA C. GUARINO
ASHUE L. SURUR
JAMES HARPER
JACOB SMITH
DAVID GLUTH
TAYLOR SELMI
PETRA AMEROSE
RONALD D. GREEN JR.
BRIANNA ISSURDETT
JACOB B. LEE
JEREMY M. WELLAND

OF Counsel
MICHAEL SHANNON
MONTE HALL

T-Alio Borrand in Amtonia (Also Kennel in Alexa Jersey 3-yeap Kreshed in Wilsonnia (-7kip Kenned Situlas Allison Brasier, Esq. Khoury adv. Seastrand June 8, 2012 Page 2 of 5

See Defendant's Second Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff Margaret Seastrand, attached hereto as Exhibit "A". You served your responses to these requests on April 23, 2012. See Plaintiff's response to Defendant's Second Requests for Production attached hereto as Exhibit "B". In that document, your response to each of these requests to produce was identical. Each of the responses reads as follows:

RESPONSE

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

Id. We also propounded an additional interrogatory on your client at this same time:

INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Set forth the amount paid by any source which each and every medical provider or facility accepted as payment for the services which they rendered.

See Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff, attached as Exhibit "C", attached hereto. Your response to this interrogatory was identical to your responses to the requests for production:

RESPONSE

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

See Plaintiff's Response to Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff, attached as Exhibit "D", attached hereto.

With all due respect, I believe your reliance on the collateral source rule is misplaced. Consider the language of the collateral source rule as set forth by Nevada's Supreme Court:

"The collateral source rule provides 'that if an injured party

Allison Brasier, Esq. Khoury adv. Seastrand June 8, 2012 Page 3 of 5

received some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor." *Proctor v. Custelletti*, 112 Nev. 88, 90 911 P.2d 853 (1996) citing *Hrnjak v. Graymar*, Inc., 4 Cal.3d 725, 94 Cal.Rptr. 623, 626, 484 P.2d 599, 602 (1971).

Moreover, the collateral source rule bars the admission of any such evidence during trial. Id.

While the collateral source rule clearly applies to health insurance, a medical lien is not "compensation for injuries." Rather, it is an outstanding debt owed for services rendered. There is no payment to deduct from the damages which would otherwise be collected from Defendant. In light of this, the collateral source rule does not apply to medical liens.

Furthermore, even assuming the collateral source rule bars the admission of liens at trial, it does not mean the information is not discoverable. As surely you are aware, discoverability and admissibility are entirely separate and distinct concepts. NRCP 26(b)(1) provides the parameters for discoverability in Nevada:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(I), (ii), and (iii). (Emphasis added)

Thus, even if the information and documents produced in response to the above-listed requests for production and interrogatories were ultimately deemed to be inadmissible at trial under the collateral source rule, the information would still be discoverable if it is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

Evidence concerning medical liens are relevant at the time of trial to show bias on the part of Plaintiff's treating providers. "The exposure of a witness's motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination."

Allison Brasier, Esq. Khoury adv. Seastrand June 8, 2012 Page 4 of 5

Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 107 Nev. 135, 144, 808 P.2d 522 (1991) citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The fact that your client's treating providers stand to gain from the instant litigation if they are a lien holder is certainly relevant to showing bias. As a result, such information is clearly discoverable, as bias constitutes admissible and relevant evidence.

Finally, we recently received your responses to Defendant's Third Request for Production of Documents. These Requests include Requests Nos. 2

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 20:

The 2010 and 2011 Federal Income Tax Returns for Margaret G, and Douglas R. Seastrand, including all Schedule C's and disclosures related to Hollywood Kids Academy.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 21:

Any and all business documents related to Hollywood Kids Academy from the time of its formation to the present, including but not limited to: profit and loss statements, balance sheets, accounts receivable, accounts payable, and payroll records.

See Defendant's Third Request for Production of Documents, attached hereto as Exhibit "E." In your amended response, you stated that you are "in the process of gathering these documents" and that the response "will be supplemented when the documents are located." See Amended Response to Third Request for Production of Documents, attached hereto as Exhibit "F." Please be mindful that these documents are necessary for review and analysis by our experts in conjunction with their overall financial analysis of your client's income as it relates to the Hollywood Kids Academy. As initial expert disclosures are currently scheduled for July 13, 2012, we need these documents as soon as possible. In the event we do not receive them promptly, we may have a basis for a second extension of the discovery deadlines as well as a continuation of the trial date.

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Allison Brasier, Esq. Khoury adv. Seastrand June 8, 2012 Page 5 of 5

I will calendar your supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 32 and Requests for Production Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 for June 15, 2012. If you feel you need additional time to prepare the response, please contact me and we may be able to accommodate you. Otherwise, please contact me to discuss these matter pursuant to EDCR 2.34 in preparation for a Motion to Compel.

STEVEN T. JAFFE JACOB S SMITH

JSS/pbs

ce: Raymond Khoury

Victoria Pearl, State Farm

EXHIBIT B

STEVEN T. JAFFE sjaffe@lawhjc.com Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH ismith@lawbjc.com 3 Nevada Bar No. 010231 4 HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP 7455 WEST WASHINGTON AVENUE, SUITE 460 5 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128 6 (702) 316-4111 FAX (702) 316-4114 7 Attorneys for Defendant 8 Raymond R. Khoury 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 CASE NO. A-11-636515-C MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, 12 DEPT NO. XXX Plaintiff, 13 DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO PLAINTIFF MARGARET 14 SEASTRAND RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES 1 15 through 10; and ROE ENTITIES 11 through 20, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, Plaintiff herein; and TO: 19 Richard A. Harris, Esq., of the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM, Plaintiff's attorney: TO: 20 Defendant requests that Plaintiff MARGARET G. SEASTRAND respond to these 21 Requests for Production of Documents set out below in accordance with the provisions of Rule 34 of the 22 Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, fully and separately under oath, signed by the person or persons 23 making such Responses, and that a copy of such Responses be served upon the Defendant herein within 24 thirty (30) days after the service of the Requests for Production of Documents, unless the Court, by 25 Order, enlarges or shortens the time. 26 REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 16; All executed liens with each and every medical 27 provider and facility. 28 REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 17: All documents demonstrating the amounts paid by

any source to the medical providers and / or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 18: All documents demonstrating the amounts of payments accepted by the medical providers and / or facilities for the freatment rendered in this matter.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 19: All documents demonstrating the amounts accepted by each medical provider and / or facility which sold its liens to any other person or entity for the treatment rendered in this case.

These Requests For Production shall be deemed continuing so as to require reasonable supplemental Answers if the Plaintiff or his Attorney obtains further information between the time his Answers are served and the time of trial.

DATED: March 21, 2012

HALL JAFFE & MAYTON, LLP

By

STEVEN T.JAFFE Nevada Barno 007035 JACOB S.SMITH

Nevada Bar No. 010231 7435 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460

Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.

Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I hereby certify that service of the foregoing <u>DEFENDANT'S</u>

<u>SECOND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND</u> was made on March 2/, 2012, by depositing a true and correct copy of the same by U.S. Mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, addressed, stamped, and mailed to the following:

Richard A. Harris, Esq. RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff

As Employee of HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

STEVEN T. JAFFE 2 siaffe@lawhic.com Nevada Bar No. 007035 3 JACOB S. SMITH ismith@lawhjc.com Nevada Bar No. 010231 4 5 HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP 7455 WEST WASHINGTON AVENUE, SUITE 460 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128 6 (702) 315-4111 FAX (702) 316-4114 Attorneys for Defendant 8 Raymond R. Khoury 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 12 CASE NO. A-11-636515-C MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, DEPT NO. XXX 13 Plaintiff. 14 15 RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES 1 through 10; and ROE ENTITIES 11 through 16 20, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 DEFENDANT RAYMOND KHOURY'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO 19 PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND 20 MARGARET G. SEASTRAND, Plaintiff; and TO: 21 RICHARD HARRIS, ESQ. Of the RICHARD HARISS LAW FIRM, Plaintiff's attorney: TO: 22 Defendant requests that Plaintiff MARGARET SEASTRAND answer these 23 Interrogatories set out below in accordance with the provisions of Rule 33 of the Nevada Rules of Civil 24 Procedure, fully and separately under oath, signed by the person or persons making such Answers, and 25 that a copy of such Answers be served upon the Defendant herein within thirty (30) days after the service 26 of the Interrogatories, unless the Court, by Order, enlarges or shortens the time. 27 In answering these Interrogatories, furnish such information as is available to you, not 28 mercly such information as is of your own knowledge. This means you are to furnish information which is known by or in the possession of your attorney or any agents for you or your attorney.

INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Set forth the amounts paid by any source which each and every medical provider or facility accepted as payment for the services which they rendered.

These Interrogatories shall be deemed continuing so as to require reusonable supplemental Answers if the Plaintiff or his Attorney obtains further information between the time his Answers are served and the time of trial.

DATED this 21st day of March, 2012.

HALL JAFFE & LAY TON, LLP

Nevida Bar No. 007035
JACOB S. SMUTH
Nevida Bar No. 010231
7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460

Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I hereby certify that service of the foregoing DEFENDANT

RAYMOND KHOURY'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF

MARGARET SEASTRAND was made on A day of March, 2012, by depositing a true and correct copy of the same by U.S. Mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, addressed, stamped, and mailed to the following:

Richard A. Harris, Esq. RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 S, Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaining

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

EXHIBIT C

is known by or in the possession of your attorney or any agents for you or your attorney.

INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Set forth the amounts paid by any source which each and every medical provider or facility accepted as payment for the services which they rendered.

These Interrogatories shall be deemed continuing so as to require reasonable supplemental Answers if the Plaintiff or his Attorney obtains further information between the time his Answers are served and the time of trial.

DATED this 21st day of March, 2012,

LAYTON, LLP HALL JAFFE

By

Nevada Bar No. 007035 IACOB S. SMITH Nevada Bar No. 010231

7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I hereby certify that service of the foregoing DEFENDANT

RAYMOND KHOURY'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF

MARGARET SEASTRAND was made on day of March, 2012, by depositing a true and correct copy of the same by U.S. Mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, addressed, stamped, and mailed to the following:

Richard A. Harris, Esq.
RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM
801 S. Fourth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorneys for Plaintiff

An Employee of HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

EXHIBIT D

14.

1	RESP
2	RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ.
2	Nevada Bar No. 505
3	JOSHUA R. HARRIS, ESQ.
	Nevada Bar No. 9580
5	ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ.
6	Nevada Bar No. 10522
0	RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM
7	801 South Fourth Street
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
8	Phone (702) 444-4444
9	Fax (702) 444-4455
	Atterneys for Plaintiff
0	33, 200

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

MARGARET G. SEASTRAND,	2	Case No. : Dept. No. :	A-11-636515-C
Plaintiff,	5	Dept. No.	AAA
vš.)		
RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES I through 10, and ROE ENTITIES 11 through 20, inclusive,)		Ç
Defendants.)		

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND

TO: Defendant RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; and

TO: Jacob S. Smith, Esq. of HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP, his counsel of record.

COMES NOW, Plaintiff MARGARET G. SBASTRAND, by and through her counsel of record, Richard A. Harris, Joshua R. Harris and Alison M. Brasier, of the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby provides the following Responses to Defendant's Second Requests for Production to Plaintiff:

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiff, MARGARET G. SEASTRAND has not yet completed her discovery and investigation for the preparation of this case for trial. Accordingly, the answers set forth herein are provided without prejudice to the responding party's right to produce any subsequent discovered facts or interpretations thereof and/or to add, modify or otherwise change or amend the answers herein. The information hereinafter set forth is true and correct to the best of the responding party's knowledge at this particular time, but it is subject to correction for inadvertent errors or omission, if any such error or omissions are found to exist

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 16:

All executed liens with each and every medical provider and facility.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 16:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 17:

All documents demonstrating the amounts paid by any source to the medical providers and/or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 17:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

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REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 18:

All documents demonstrating the amounts of payments accepted by the medical providers and/or facilities for the treatment rendered in this matter.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 18:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 19:

All documents demonstrating the amounts accepted by each medical provider and/or facility which sold its liens to any other person or entity for the treatment rendered in this case.

RESPOND TO REQUEST TO PRODUCE NO. 19:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, as it seeks to ascertain if some of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral sources. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2012.

RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

JOSHUA R. HARRIS, ESO.

Nevada Bar No. 9580

ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 10522

801 South Fourth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM and that on the 20 day of April, 2012, I caused the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO

PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND to be served as follows:

- [X] by placing a true and correct copy of the same to be deposited for mailing in the U.S. Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a scaled envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid; and/or
- pursuant to EDCR 7.26, by sending it via facsimile; and/or
- by receipt of copy

to the attorneys listed below:

Steven T. Jaffe, Esq.
Jacob S. Smith, Esq.
HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP
7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460
Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
Attorneys for Defendant

An employee of the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

EXHIBIT "E"

LAW FIRM, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby provides the following Responses to Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiff, MARGARET G. SEASTRAND has not yet completed her discovery and investigation for the preparation of this case for trial. Accordingly, the answers set forth herein are provided without prejudice to the responding party's right to produce any subsequent discovered facts or interpretations thereof and/or to add, modify or otherwise change or amend the answers herein. The information hereinafter set forth is true and correct to the best of the responding party's knowledge at this particular time, but it is subject to correction for inadvertent errors or omission, if any such error or omissions are found to exist

INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Set forth the amounts paid by any source which each and every medical provider or facility accepted as payment for the services which they rendered.

RICHARD HARRIS

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RESPOND TO INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory it seeks to ascertain if some parts of Plaintiff's expenses (medical bills) were paid by collateral source. As such, the question is not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; it is also burdensome, oppressive and harassing to Plaintiff.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2012.

RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

RICHARD A. HARRIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 505

JOSHUA R. HARRIS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 9580

ALISON M. BRASIER, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 10522

801 South Fourth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiff

RICHARD HARRIS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM and that on the 3 day of April, 2012, I caused the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT RAYMOND KHOURY'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF MARGARET SEASTRAND to be served as follows:

- [X] by placing a true and correct copy of the same to be deposited for mailing in the U.S. Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid; and/or
- pursuant to EDCR 7.26, by sending it via facsimile; and/or
- [] by receipt of copy

to the attorneys listed below:

Steven T. Jaffe, Esq.
Jacob S. Smith, Esq.
HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP
7455 West Washington Avenue, Suite 460
Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
Attorneys for Defendant

An employee of the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

EXHIBIT "F"

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NEO STEVEN T. JAFFE, ESQ. sjaffe@lawhjc.com Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH, ESQ. ismith@lawhic.com Nevada Bar No. 010231

CLERK OF THE COURT

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HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP 7425 PEAK DRIVE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128 (702) 316-4111

FAX (702) 316-4114

Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

MARGARET G. SEASTRAND,

Plaintiff,

RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES I through 10; and ROE ENTITIES 11 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-11-636515-C DEPT NO. XXX

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT and RECOMMENDATIONS

Hearing Date: December 5, 2012 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations was

entered by this Court on the 14th day of March, 2013. A copy of which is attached hereto.

DATED this day of April, 2013.

> TON, LLP HALL JAFFE

By

STEVEN T JAFFE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 010231 7425 Peak Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89128

Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(b), I hereby certify that service of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT and RECOMMENDATIONS was made on the He day of April, 2013, by depositing a true and correct copy of the same by U.S. Mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, addressed, stamped, and mailed to the following:

> Richard A. Harris, Esq. Alison Brasier, Esq. RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff

> An Employee of HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

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DCRR STEVEN T. JAFFE sjaffe@lawhic.com Nevada Bar No. 007035 JACOB S. SMITH jsmith@lawhjc.com Nevada Bar No. 010231

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CLERK OF THE COURT

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP 7425 PEAK DRIVE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128 (702) 316-4111 FAX (702) 316-4114

Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

MARGARET G. SEASTRAND,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY; DOES 1 through 10; and ROE ENTITIES 11 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-11-636515-C DEPT NO. XXX

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT and RECOMMENDATIONS

BEFORE THE DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER

Hearing Date: December 5, 2012 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff: 22 MARGARET SEASTRAND

23 For Defendant: RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY

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RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM Alison Brasier, Esq.

HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP. Jacob S. Smith, Esq.

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FINDINGS

This matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE BONNIE BULLA, Discovery Commissioner, on the 5th day of December, 2012 at 9:00 a.m., on <u>Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and Production of Documents re: Plaintiff's Medical Liens.</u> Defendant filed its Motion to Compel on November 1, 2012, seeking to compel responses to various requests for production and interrogatories pertaining to the Plaintiff's medical liens and treatment on liens. Plaintiff filed her opposition on November 20, 2012, asserting that the requested documents and information were protected under the collateral source rule and were not discoverable. On November 30, 2012, Defendant filed his Reply asserting that the documents and information was arguably both discoverable and admissible, but was certainly discoverable even under the most stringent interpretations of Nevada law.

At the hearing on the matter on December 5, 2012, Jacob S. Smith, Esq. appeared on behalf of Defendant and Alison Brasier, Esq. appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.

The Court, having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file, and having considered the oral argument made by counsel at the hearing on this matter, and having considered the case law and other authority presented in the parties' briefings on this issue, hereby makes the following recommendations:

П.

RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Protection from Defendant's Notice of Plaintiff's Deposition is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff must supplement her responses to Defendant's Interrogatories with any and all information in her possession pertaining to the liens and/or lien amounts which correspond with any injuries and/or treatment allegedly arising as a result of the subject accident.

CASE NAME: Seastrand v. Khoury CASE NUMBER: A-11-636515-C

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff must supplement her responses to Defendant's Requests for Production by producing all documentation in her possession pertaining to the liens and/or lien amounts which correspond with any injuries and/or treatment allegedly arising as a result of the subject accident; and

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff is not obligated to procure any documentation from third-party purchasers of the liens which is not already in her possession.

The Discovery Commissioner, having met with counsel for the parties, having discussed the issues noted above and having reviewed any materials proposed in support thereof, hereby submits the above recommendations.

DATED this _____ day of January, 2013.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER

Prepared by: HALL JAPPE & PLAYTON, LLP

STEVENT JAFFE JACOB S. SMITH 7425 Peat Drive

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorneys for Defendant

Raymond R. Khoury

Approved as to Form and Content: RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM

By RICHARD A. HARRIS ALISON BRASIER 801 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff

CASE NAME: Seastrand v. Khoury CASE NUMBER: A-11-636515-C

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff must supplement her responses to Defendant's Requests for Production by producing all documentation in her possession pertaining to the liens and/or lien amounts which correspond with any injuries and/or treatment allegedly arising as a result of the subject accident; and

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff is not obligated to procure any documentation from third-party purchasers of the liens which is not already in her possession.

The Discovery Commissioner, having met with counsel for the parties, having discussed the issues noted above and having reviewed any materials proposed in support thereof, hereby submits the above recommendations.

DATED this day of January, 2013. DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER

Prepared by: HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP

18 STEVEN T. JAFFE JACOB S. SMITH 19 7425 Peak Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 20 Attorneys for Defendant Raymond R. Khoury 21

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Approved as to Form and Content:

25 ALISON BRASIER 801 S. Fourth Street 26 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff 27



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27 28 CASE NAME: Seastrand v. Khoury CASE NUMBER; A-11-636515-C

NOTICE

Pursuant to NRCP 16.1(d)(2), you are hereby notified you have five (5) days from the date you receive this document within which to file written objections.

Pursuant to E.D.C.R. 2.34(f) an objection must be filed and served no more than five (5) days after receipt of the Discovery Commissioner's Report. The Commissioner's Report is deemed received when signed and dated by a party, his attorney or his attorney's employee, or three (3) days after mailing to a party or his attorney, or three (3) days after the clerk of the court deposits a copy of the Report in a folder of a party's lawyer in the Clerk's office. See E.D.C.R. 2.34(F)

A copy of the foregoing Discovery Commissioner's Report was:

Mailed to Plaintiffs/Defendants at the following address on the _____ day of ______

2012.

Placed in the folder of Plaintiffs'/Defendants' counsel in the Clerk's office on the 17 day of

Jon , 2012, 13

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF COURT

By MUSE DEFOTY CLERK



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27 28 CASE NAME: Seastrand v. Khoury CASE NUMBER: A-11-636515-C

ORDER

The Court, having reviewed the above report and recommendatio

ns prepared by the Discovery Commissioner and,

The parties having waived the right to object thereto,

No timely objection having been received in the office of the Discovery Commissioner pursuant to E.D.C.R. 2.34(f),

Having received the objections thereto and the written arguments in support of said objections, and good cause appearing,

AND

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations are affirmed and adopted.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations are affirmed and adopted as modified in the following manner. (attached hereto)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a hearing on the Discovery Commissioner's Report is set for 201, at a.m.

DATED this 13th day of March , 2012.

DISTRICT JUDGE

AB

EXHIBIT "G"

If you represent this client please sign this lien and fax to 702-942-1157 or billing will be transferred to patient's responsibility	Acc	ount #: 456677
NEVADA IMAGING CEN ATTORNEY LIEN AND AGR	TERS	
ATTENT'S NAME (Please Prim): Marguet 6. Social	word	SSI: \$
DATE OF INJURY: YVICACH 13, 2007	$LO_{t}G_{gj}$	3: 12/27/196/
VAMIN OF YOUR ATTORNEY: RICHORD HOLY	5	معييس لمددو الجابلية والمرابات القراطيان وجواست بايت بوجيت ويتنا
ATTORNET'S ADDRESS:	and the second s	
ATTORNEY'S PILE: 3855: 12100	PAX#:	452-4664
I do hereby authorize Nevada Imaging Centers to furnish you regard to the accident of the above-cited date of injury. I hereby authorize and direct you, my attorney, to pay directly any for medical service rendered me by reason of this needs or verdict as may be necessary to adequately protect Nevada to Nevada Imaging Centers against any and all proceeds of a you, my attorney, or myself, as the result of the injuries for w therewith.	y Nevada Imaging Clent and to withhold Imaging Centers. I I ny sottlement, judgn hich I have been tree	centers such sums as may be due and any sums from settlement, judgment hereby further give a lien on my case tent or verdict which may be paid to atod or injuries in connection
I agree never to rescind this document and that a rescission with the event another attorney is substituted in this matter, the and enforceable upon this case as if it were executed by him.		
I fully understand that I am directly and fully responsible to for service rendered me and this agreement is made solely for payment. I further understand that such payment is not commay eventually recover said. Any alterations to this agreement	tingent on any settle ent deem this agreen	ment, judgment or verdict by which i sent void.
1 waive the Statute of Limitations regarding Nevada Imaging Y Alogue I Cealad Signature of Palient (Parent's Signature if Minor)		1) are
The undersigned attorney of record for the above patient do agrees to withhold such funds from any seitlement, judgment imaging Centers. "Signature must be returned within		bserve all the terms of the above and be necessary to protect Nevada
1		

· Please fax, or mail lien to:

Signature of Anorney

NEVADA IMAGING CENTERS – GALLERIA CENTER 2835 South Jones Blvd, Suite 3 1.08 Vegas, Nevada 89146 PIII: (702) 597-1145 FAXI: (702) 942-1157

http://192.168.3.20:7777/xiris/main/acquisition/patient/240/240841/Attny_Lien__20090403.jpg

10/18/2010

Dute.

05-10-'10 14:02 FROM-Nevada Spine Clinic

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Linguidade, American poura of rum medicine
Pellowskip Trained Fall Specialist

Fellowship Trained Spinal Surgeon

manager street see in march

MARCHARL MARK

YEVGENIY A. KHAVKIN, M.D. Neurological Surgery Pollorathip Trained Spinal Surgeon 7140 Smoke Ranch Rd. Ste. 150, Las Vegas, NV 89128 10001 S. Eastern Ave. Ste. 208, Henderson, NV 89052 Ph: (702) 320-8111 Fax: (702) 320-8112

BABUK GHUMAN, M.D. Diplomate, American Sount of Avesthesiology Fellowship Troined Pole Specialist

DOCTORS/FACILITY LIEN

PATIENT PRINT: Seastrand		Margare FI		
SOCIAL SEC#: 530 805229	destrumination .	DOB: 12/2-	1/136/	
DATE OF INJURY: 3/13/2009				
LAW FIRM NAME RICK HAY	ris			
ATTORNEY NAME: RICK HE	arris			_,ESQ.
ATTORNEY ADDRESS				
ATTORNEY CITY/STATE/ZIP			-	
	a amount	FAX: (702)	385	9408
I hereby authorize the above-reference report of his examination, diagnosis, traccident/injury I was involved in. I hereby authorize and direct my attorn due and owing him for medical services reason of env other bills that are due in	d treating physic eatment, progno ey, to pay direct s rendered me b a his office and t	cians to furnish you, usls, etc., of myself in By to said physicians oth by reason of this o withhold such sur	such sums accident/l	as may b njury and settlemen
ATTORNEY PHONE: (792) 499 I hereby authorize the above-reference report of his examination, diagnosis, trackdent/injury I was involved in. I hereby authorize and direct my attorn due and owing him for medical services reason of any other bills that are due in judgment, or verdict as may be necessive a lien on my case to said physician or verdict which may be paid to your, in have been treated or injuries in connect fully understand that I am directly and bills submitted by him or his office for said doctor's additional protection and understand that such payment is not owhich I eventually may recover said feat	d treating physic eatment, prognoter, to pay direct service and tary to adequate in against any anticinety, or motion therewith. I fully responsible service rendered in consideration on an e.	cians to furnish you, usls, etc., of myself in ly to said physicians oth by reason of this o withhold such sum by protect such physicians all proceeds of any yself as a result of the to said treating plant in me and that this ago of his awaiting pay y settlements, judgments,	such sums accident/les from any clan. I here by settlemen he injuries from any investigation for the present is present. I further the present or version or version to the settlement.	as may be njury and settlement by further t, judgment or which it alt medic solely for her
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Name: Seastrand, Margaret

DOB: 12-27-1961 Date: 12-01-2009 Page 1 of 1

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RADAR MEDICAL GROUP, LLP dba University Urgent Care
Russell J. Shah, MD Ltd.
Dipti R. Shah, MD Ltd.
Dipti R. Shah, MD Ltd.
Internal Medicine/Nephrology Russell J. Shah, MD Ltd.

Heurology and Clinical Neurophysiology
Malling Address: 10624 S. Eastern Avenue, Ste. A-425 Henderson, Nevada 89052

Office: 702 644-0500 Fax: 702 641-4600 or 702 258-0566

ATTYODNEY I TENI

ALIO	
ATTORNEY Richard Harris Law Firm 801 S. Fourth St. Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702)385-1406 Fax: (702)385-94	RADAR MEDICAL GROUP, LLP dba University Urgent Care Russell J. Shah, MD Ltd. Dipti R. Shah, MD Ltd.
RE: MEDICAL RE	PORTS AND DOCTOR'S LIEN
PATIENT NAME: Seastrand, Margar	et DOI: 03-13-2009
	(Date of Injury)
I do hereby authorize the above doctor examination, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, was involved.	t to furnish you, my attorney, with a full report of his etc., of myself in regard to the accident in which I
Thereby surborize and direct you, my	attorney, to pay directly to said doctor such sums as
I hereby authorize and direct you, my a may be due and owing him for medical service reason of any other bills that are due his office judgment or verdict as may be necessary to a give a lien on my case to said doctor against a	te rendered me both by reason of this accident and be and to withhold such sums from any settlement, dequately protect said doctor. And I hereby further any and all proceeds of any settlement, judgment or ey or myself as the result of injuries for which I have
I hereby authorize and direct you, my a may be due and owing him for medical service reason of any other bills that are due his office judgment or verdict as may be necessary to a give a lien on my case to said doctor against a verdict which may be paid to you, my attorned been treated or injuries in connection therew. I fully understand that I am directly are submitted by him for service rendered to me doctor's additional protection and in consider understand that such payment is not conting may eventually recover said fee.	the rendered me both by reason of this accident and be and to withhold such sums from any settlement, dequately protect said doctor. And I hereby further any and all proceeds of any settlement, judgment or by or myself as the result of injuries for which I have ith. Indeed that this agreement is made solely for said that this agreement is made solely for said that on any settlement, judgment or verdict by which
I hereby authorize and direct you, my may be due and owing him for medical service reason of any other bills that are due his office judgment or verdict as may be necessary to a give a lien on my case to said doctor against a verdict which may be paid to you, my attorned been treated or injuries in connection therew. I fully understand that I am directly an submitted by him for service rendered to me doctor's additional protection and in consider understand that such payment is not conting may eventually recover said fee. DATE: 12/1/09 PATIENT SIGN	the rendered me both by reason of this accident and be and to withhold such sums from any settlement, dequately protect said doctor. And I hereby further any and all proceeds of any settlement, judgment or ey or myself as the result of injuries for which I have ith. Indeed fully responsible to said doctor for all medical bills and that this agreement is made solely for said that on any settlement, judgment or verdict by which the ent on any settlement, judgment or verdict by which want for the above patient does hereby agree to observe thold such sums from any settlement, judgment or

Medical lien/subrogating contract

Date: 9/16/09	Patient Acct: 110 9 5/6
TO: RICHARD HARRIS, ATTY SOIS. FOURTH STORET LAS VERAS, NV 89101	Patient SSN: <u>530-80-5529</u>
1.83 VEG AS, NV 89111	

I, MADARET SERSTURAL) "patient") hereby authorize and direct to you in the life ("attorney"), my attorney to pay directly to Surgery Center of Southern Nevada ("provider") such amounts as may be due and owing for all medical treatments or other services rendered to me as a result of the personal injuries I suffered on Mark (3 CM. You, my attorney, are further instructed to withhold such sums from any settlement, judgment, court ruling or verdict to compensate provider and shall tender payment in full to provider before disbursing any payment to me.

I fully understand that I remain directly and fully responsible to provider for all bills submitted by it for treatment or other services rendered to me, and the purpose of this agreement is solely for provider's protection and consideration of awaiting payment. I further understand that the amount I owe to provider is not contingent upon any settlement, judgment, court rulings or verdict by which I may eventually recover.

My attorney is authorized to disclose any and all information regarding my case with provider or Assignee. If my attorney refuses to honor this agreement, provider will not await payment and I will be required to pay provider in full. It is my responsibility to keep provider notified in the event I change attorneys. Upon such circumstance, my new attorney shall notify provider within 48 hours of engagement that this agreement will be upheld. If provider is not provided with such notification, I will be responsible for immediate payment to provider as discussed herein.

Patient Initials 1

This lien includes, but is not limited to, the charges for services rendered by medical personnel, facility charges, and any supplies (including implants) associated with the treatment, regardless of whether such supplies are provided by the facility, physician and/or any third-party vendor which, in some cases, may be invoiced to the assignee separately. It is expressly understood that Assignee has not directed, counseled or otherwise given advice to Patient or Provider as to the medical services, treatment and/or supplies to be provided to Patient.

Patient Initials

Patient affirmatively represents to provider that no health insurance coverage exists for the treatment to be rendered to patient and that no insurance benefit information has been furnished by patient to provider. Patient further authorizes provider (and or its assignee) to bill directly any applicable insurance company for any automobile/motorcycle/or other vehicle "med-pay" related benefits to which patient may be entitled. Patient further acknowledges and agrees no assignee of provider assumes nor bears any liability for professional negligence by any health care provider participating in the medical services and related medical treatments nor has any assignee counseled or given advice to patient with respect to any medical services to be provided.

Patient Initials ///

09/21/2009

Patient and attorney acknowledges that provider reserves the right to assign its rights under this agreement and the underlying accounts receivables at any rate or for any consideration that provider deems sufficient; that the patient and the attorney will continue to be bound by this agreement to provider's assignee is the original party to this agreement. Further, patient agrees to remain flable for the full billed charges and/or value of any medical treatment, services, and procedures rendered to the patient. Patient hereby authorizes provider to release any and all of patient's medical records to provider's assignee. The amount the assignee pays provider for patient's treatment will not necessarily be the amount billed to the patient. The negotiated payment between the assignee and the provider shall not change the patient's financial obligations to the assignee under the terms of this agreement which is the full billed charges of medical services rendered. Patient hereby authorizes the Assignee to receive a police report of requested.

Patient Initials	
I waive the statute of limitations regarding provider's right to re provider may assign this agreement to a third party at any time. assignee will notify my attorney in writing. Upon provider's assigned to provide or at law.	in the event this agreement is assigned, the
Patient's signature: Man 9550	Date: 9-16-09
Patient's Name: (please print) Manda et 6.	Seadrad
Patient's Address: 6440 Spanish Gars LV WV 89110	L-CL
Patient's phone number:	
The undersigned, being attorney of record for the above patient disettlement, judgment, or verdict as may be necessary from patient compensate the provider. I acknowledge that the assignee has no with respect to any legal services to be provided. I agree to representation, if I withdraw my representation, or if I close the payments immediately within 48 hours of severing the relationship	ent and pay to provider for its assignee; to at counseled nor given advice to the attorney o notify provider if I am discharged from the above client's file without receiving any
Attorney's Signature:	Date:
with respect to any legal services to be provided. I agree t representation, if I withdraw my representation, or if I close the	o notify provider if I am discharged from he above client's file without receiving any . Date:

Please note that we will make every errort to but an contingent upon said information being provided by the patient or his/her attorney at the time of the first visit.

If you have any questions regarding this information please contact our office at 702-369-6784.

A fax or photocopy of this document shall be considered as valid as the original.

WILLIAM S. MUIR, M.D. 653 N. Town Center Dr. Suite 210 Las Vegas, NV 89144 P 702-254-3020 F 702-255-2620

DOCTOR'S LIEN

PATIENT: Margaret Seastrand DOI: 3/13/09

TO: Richard Harris Law Group 201 S 4th St. LV, NV. 89101 P: (702) 444-4444 F: (702) 444-4455

RE: LIEN AND MEDICAL REPORTS

I hereby authorize the above-referenced treating physicien to furnish you, my attorney, with a full report of his examination, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, etc., of myself in regard to the accident/injury which I was involved in.

I hereby authorize and direct you, my attorney, to pay directly to said doctor such sums as may be due and owing him for medical services rendered me both by reason of this accident/injury and reason of any other bills that are due in his office and to withhold such sums from any settlement, judgment, or verdict as may be necessary to adequately protect such doctor. I hereby further give a lien on my case to said doctor against any and all proceeds of any settlement, judgment, or verdict with may be paid to you, my attorney, or myself as a result of the injuries for which I have been treated or injuries in connection therewith.

I fully understand that I am directly and fully responsible to said treating physician for all medical bills submitted by him or his office for services rendered to me and that this agreement is made solely for said doctor's additional protection and in consideration for his awaiting payment, I further understand that such payment is not contingent on any settlement, judgement or verdict by which I eventually may recover said fee.

DATED. 864/09

PATIENT'S SIGNATURE:

The undersigned, being attorney of record for the above patient, does hereby agree to observe all the terms of the above and agrees t withhold such amount from any settlement judgment or verdict as may be necessary to adequately protect said treating physician.

DATED:

_ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE:

Case Manager

PRIMARY CARE CONSULTANTS ATTORNEY LIEN

TO ATTORNEY:	
0 1/	9975 S Eastern Ave #110B
Killtons	9975 S Bastelli Ave #110D
9.00	\$ 17 MT 90102
the state of the s	Las Vegas NV 89123
A STATE OF THE STA	Phone - (702) 644-3333
	Fax - (702) 644-3336
1/8	
do hereby authorize the above Doctor to furnish	you, my attorney, with a full report of his
examination, diagnosis treatment, prognosis, etc.	of myself in regard to the accident in which I was
nvolved.	
hereby authorize and direct you, my attorney to	A Company of the Comp
as may be due and owing him for medical services and by reason of any other bills that are due his osettlement, judgment o verdict as may be necessary and I hereby further give a lien on my case to said	broke and to withhold seen sums from any to adequately protect said Doctor/Therapist.
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Primary Care Consultants

PATIENT LIEN

Date: 3 20 09	
Patient Name: Margaret G. Seastrand S	s#: 530 80 5729
Third-Party Insurance Information: Insurance Company: Fortier State Claim No.	am
Adjuster Name:	mber:
Phone:Fax:	
Address:	
Your Insurance Information:	•
Insurance Company: USAA	
Adjuster Name: Claim Nu	umber:
Phone: Fax:	
Address:	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
We are not contracted with any Insurance Companies, a Med Pay through your Automobile Insurance, a	
Consultants*, directly upon a settlement being made, for any/all treat incurred due to a motor vehicle accident/injuries on 3/13/09 Date of Accident Consultants* for all treatment costs incurred with regards to the treat motor vehicle accident/injuries in which I was involved on 3/13/09 Date of Accident Date of Accident	ment costs that are outstanding, J. agree to pay Primary Care ment received for and relating to the fent
I agree to start making monthly payments on my account six month until a settlement is reached or my account is paid in full, whichever	ns following the start of treatment comes first.
I, Marchel Slattond, also understand/agree that if no patient Name company that I am ultimately responsible for all outstanding medical primary Care Consultants office. In the event that a settlem stated doctor/office for all outstanding medical bills.*	settlement is reached with an insurance cal bills, relating to the treatment I
I agree to pay said doctor within 10 days of a settlement being	made.
Margaret Seated	3/20/05 Date
Signature of Patient/Guardian Print	37
	Date
Signature of Witness Print	Data.

^{*}All payments should be made to: Primary Care Consultants, P.O. Box 778195, Henderson, Nevada 89077-8195

EXHIBIT "H"

MEDICAL LIEN/SUBROGATING CONTRACT

DATE: 5 20.09

PATIENT ACCT# 110946

ro: Richard Harris Low Firm

PATIENT SS# 530-60-5229

I. WAYOUVEL SCASHOULD ("PATIENT"), HEREBY AUTHORIZE AND DIRECT YOU. RECLACIO HOLFI'S LOW FILM ("ATTORNEY"), MY ATTORNEY, TO PAY DIRECTLY TO SURGERY CENTER SOUTHERN NEVADA ("PROVIDER") SUCH AMOUNTS AS MAY BE DUE AND OWING FOR ALL MEDICAL TREATMENTS OR OTHER SERVICES RENDERED TO ME AS A RESULT OF THE PERSONAL INJURIES I SUFFERED ON YOU, MY ATTORNEY, ARE FURTHER INSTRUCTED TO WITHHOLD SUCH SUMS FROM ANY SETTLEMENT, JUDGMENT, COURT RULING, OR VERDICT AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO COMPENSATE PROVIDER, AND SHALL TENDER PAYMENT IN FULL TO PROVIDER BEFORE DISBURSING ANY PAYMENT TO ME.

I FULLY UNDERSTAND AND THAT I AM AND WILL REMAIN DIRECTLY AND FULLY RESPONSIBLE TO PROVIDER AND/OR PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEES FOR ALL BILLS SUBMITTED BY IT AND/OR ITS ASSIGNEES FOR TREATMENT OR OTHER SERVICES RENDERED TO ME, AND THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT IS SOLELY FOR THE PROTECTION OF PROVIDER AND ITS ASSIGNEES FOR THE PERIOD DURING WHICH PROVIDER AND/OR PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE IS AWAITING PAYMENT FOR THE MEDICAL SERVICES RENDERED PURSUANT TO, IN CONNECTION WITH, AND/OR IN RELIANCE ON THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THE AMOUNT I OWE PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT CONTINGENT UPON ANY SETTLEMENT, JUDGMENT, COURT RULINGS, OR VERDICT BY WHICH I MAY EVENTUALLY RECOVER AND/OR RECEIVE.

MY ATTORNEY IS AUTHORIZED TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION REGARDING THE STATUS OF MY CASE TO PROVIDER AND/OR PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE. IF MY ATTORNEY REFUSES TO HONOR THIS AGREEMENT, PROVIDER AND/OR PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE WILL NOT AWAIT PAYMENT AND I WILL BE REQUIRED TO PAY PROVIDER AND/OR PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE IN FUIL. IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP PROVIDER AND/OR PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE NOTIFIED IN THE EVENT I CHANGE ATTORNEYS. UPON SUCH CIRCUMSTANCE, MY NEW ATTORNEY SHALL NOTIFY PROVIDER AND/OR PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE WITHIN 48 HOURS OF BEING SO ENGAGED THAT THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE UPHELD AND HONORED BY MY NEW ATTORNEY. IF PROVIDER AND/OR PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE IS NOT PROVIDED SUCH NOTIFICATION, I WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR IMMEDIATE PAYMENT TO PROVIDER AND/OR PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE AS DISCUSSED HEREIN.

PATTENT AND ATTORNEY HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THAT PROVIDER RESERVES THE RIGHT TO ASSIGN ALL OR ANY PORTION OF ITS RIGHTS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLES UNDERLYING THIS AGREEMENT - EACH AN ASSIGNMENT") FOR SUCH CONSIDERATION AS PROVIDER, IN PROVIDER'S SOLE AND ABSOLUTE DISCRETION, SHALL DETERMINE.

PT. INITIALS MAS

B. THAT THE CONSIDERATION PAID BY ANY OF PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEES WITH RESPECT TO ANY ASSIGNMENT WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE OR EQUATE TO THE AMOUNT THAT PROVIDER HAS OR WILL BILL TO PATIENT; RATHER, THE NEGOTIATED PAYMENT BETWEEN THE PROVIDER AND PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE WILL NOT IN ANYWAY AFFECT PATIENT'S FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AS SET FORTH IN THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS EQUATE TO THE FULL BILLED CHARGES OF MEDICAL SERVICES RENDERED PURSUANT TO, IN CONNECTION WITH, OR OTHERWISE IN RELIANCE ON, THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT.

P.003/004

PT. INTTIALS MAKE

C. THAT IN THE EVENT PROVIDER ENTERS INTO ANY ASSIGNMENT, THE PATIENT AND THE ATTORNEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE BOUND BY THIS AGREEMENT AND HEREBY AGREE TO BE BOUND DIRECTLY TO PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE AS THOUGH PATIENT ENTERED INTO THIS AGREEMENT DIRECTLY WITH SUCH ASSIGNEE.

PT. INITIALS MAS

D. THAT PATIENT SHALL REMAIN LIABLE TO PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE FOR THE FULL BILLED CHARGES AND/OR VALUE OF ANY MEDICAL TREATMENT, SERVICES, AND/OR PROCEDURES RENDERED TO THE PATIENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH, OR OTHERWISE WITH RESPECT TO THIS AGREEMENT.

PT. INITIALS MASS

E. THAT PATIENT HEREBY AUTHORIZES PROVIDER TO RELEASE ANY AND ALL OF PATIENT'S MEDICAL RECORDS TO PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE IN THE EVENT PROVIDER ENTERS INTO AN ASSIGNMENT WITH RESPECT TO ALL OR ANY OF ITS RIGHTS PURSUANT TO OR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT.

PT. INITIALS MAS

PATIENT AFFIRMATIVELY REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS TO PROVIDER THAT NO HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE EXISTS (OTHER THAN MEDICAL PAYMENTS COVERAGE UNDER ANY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY) FOR THE TREATMENT TO BE RENDERED TO PATIENT IN CONNECTION WITH, PURSUAN TO, OR OTHERWISE IN RELIANCE ON THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT. PATIENT FURTHER REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS TO PROVIDER THAT NO INSURANCE BENEFIT INFORMATION HAS BEEN FURNISHED BY PATIENT TO PROVIDER.

PT. INITIALS MAS

IN THE EVENT PROVIDER ENTERS INTO AN ASSIGNMENT, PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO ENDORSE AND DEPOSIT CHECKS RECEIVED WITH RESPECT TO THE MEDICAL SERVICE RENDERED PURSUANT TO, IN CONNECTION WITH, OR IN RELIANCE ON THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT.

PT. INITIALS MAN

PATIENT AND ATTORNEY HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT PROVIDER'S RIGHTS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE ASSIGNED BY PROVIDER TO <u>CANYON MEDICAL BILLING, LLC</u>, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY.

PT. INITIALS MAS

WITH RESPECT TO ANY MEDICAL SERVICE PROVIDED PURSUANT TO, IN CONNECTION WITH, AND/OR IN RELIANCE ON THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, PATIENT HEREBY AUTHORIZES PROVIDER (AND/OR PROVIDER'S ASIGNEE) TO DIRECTLY BILL THE SERVICES SO PROVIDED TO AND COLLECT FOR THE SERVICES SO PROVIDED FROM ANY INSURANCE COMPANY THAT MAY PROVIDE AUTOMOBILEMOTORCYCLE/OTHER VEHICLE "MED-PAY" COVERAGE-AND/OR RELATED RENEFITS TO WHICH PATIENT MAY BE ENTITLED.

PT. INITIALS MAS.

[CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE]

05/20/2009 06:00

(FAX)19094221123

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I WAIVE THE STATUE OF LIMITATIONS REGARDING PROVIDER'S RIGHT TO RECOVER PAYMENT. I PURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT PROVIDER MAY ASSIGN THIS AGREEMENT TO A THIRD PARTY AT ANY TIME, IN THE EVENT THIS AGREEMENT IS ASSIGNED, PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE WILL NOTIFY MY ATTORNEY IN WRITING. UPON SUCH AN ASSIGNMENT, PROVIDER'S ASSIGNEE SHALL ACQUIRE ALL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES AVAILABLE HEREIN TO PROVIDER OR AT LAW.

PATIENT'S SIGNATURE: Man State DATE: 5/20/2009

PATIENT'S NAME (PLEASE PRINT): Margaret G. Seastrand

PATIENT'S ADDRESS: 640 Spanish Garden Cf.

PATIENT'S TELEPHONE NUMBER: 702-452-4665

THE UNDERSIGNED, BEING ATTORNEY OF RECORD FOR THE ABOVE PATIENT DOES HEREBY AGREE TO WITHHOLD SUMS FROM ANY SETTLEMENT, JUDGMENT, OR VERDICT AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO COMPENSATE PROVIDER, I AGREE TO NOTIFY PROVIDER IF I AM DISCHARGED FROM REPRESENTATION, IF I WITHDRAW MY REPRESENTATION, OR IF I CLOSE THE ABOVE CLIENT'S FILE WITHOUT RECEIVING ANY PAYMENTS IMMEDIATELY WITHIN 48 HOURS OF THE SEVERING OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

ATTORNEY'S SIGNATURE:	
- OIOINII DALL,	DATE:
PRINT NAME:	

PLEASE NOTE THAT WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BILL ALL AVAILABLE INSURANCE FOR THE PATIENT, CONTINGENT UPON SAID INFORMATION BEING PROVIDED BY THE PATIENT OR HIS/HER ATTORNEY AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST VISIT.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CONTACT OUR OFFICE REGARDING THIS INFORMATION.

A FAX OR PHOTOCOPY OF THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS VALID AS THE ORIGINAL.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RAYMOND RIAD KHOURY,

Supreme Court Case No. 64702

Appellant,

Supreme Court Case Electronically Filed Nov 13 2014 08:10 a.m.

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Supreme Court Case Nrage K2 Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

VS.

MARGARET SEASTRAND,

Respondent.

APPEAL

from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County

The Honorable Jerry Weise, District Court Judge

District Court Case No. A-11-636515-C

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME III

STEVEN T. JAFFE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 007035
JACOB S. SMITH, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 010231
HALL JAFFE & CLAYTON, LLP
7425 Peak Drive
Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
Attorneys for Appellant Raymond Riad Khoury

VOLUME INDEX VOLUME III Exhibit 11 May 1, 2013, Defendant's Motion in Limine JA 0365-0545 No. 3: To Admit Evidence of Medical Liens Exhibit 12 May 1, 2013, Defendant's Motion in Limine JA 0546-0587 No. 4: To Limit Plaintiff's Presentation Of Past Medical Special Damages At Trial to Amounts Actually Paid By Or On Behalf of Plaintiff