#### IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA

DEANGELO R. CARROLL, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 64757

Electronically Filed Oct 29 2014 03:45 p.m. Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

### Appeal

From the Eighth Judicial District Court Clark County The Honorable Valerie Adair, District Judge

# APPELLANT'S APPENDIX (Volume 2)

MARIO D. VALENCIA Nevada Bar No. 6154 1055 Whitney Ranch Dr., Ste. 220 Henderson, NV 89014 (702) 940-2222 Counsel for Deangelo R. Carroll

## ${\bf TABLE\ OF\ CONTENTS-Chronological}$

Title	Volume	Pages
Transcript – Preliminary Hearing (Carroll et al.) (2005-06-13)	1	1–133
Criminal Bindover (Carroll) (2005-06-17)	1	134–53
Information (Carroll, Counts, et al.) (2005-06-20)	1	154–57
Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty (Carroll) (2005-07-06)	1	158–61
Transcript – Preliminary Hearing (Taoipu) (2005-12-06)	1	162–201
Criminal Bindover (Taoipu) (2005-12-09)	1	202-20
Information (Taoipu) (2005-12-12)	1	221–23
Amended Information (Taoipu) (2007-06-06)	1	224–26
Transcript – Change of Plea (Taoipu) (2007-06-06)	1	227–39
Guilty Plea Agreement (Taoipu) (2007-06-06)	1	240–47
Motion to Strike Death Penalty Aggravators (Carroll) (2007-08-16)	2	248–56
State's Opposition to Motion to Strike Death Penalty Aggravators (Carroll) (2007-10-04)	2	257–95
Transcript – Hearing on Motion to Strike Death Penalty Aggravators (Carroll) (2007-10-09)	2	296–304
State's Amended Notice of Evidence in Aggravation (Carroll) (2007-11-14)	2	305–13
Order Denying Motion to Strike Aggravators (Carroll) (2007-11-27)	2	314–15
State's Amended Notice of Evidence in Support of Aggravating Circumstances (Carroll) (2008-01-09)	2	316–20
Second Amended Information (Counts) (2008-01-29)	2	321–23
Third Amended Information (Espindola) (2008-02-04)	2	324–25
Guilty Plea Agreement (Espindola) (2008-02-04)	2	326–333
Transcript – Change of Plea (Espindola) (2008-02-04)	2	334–41
Verdict (Counts) (2008-02-08)	2	342-43
Indictment (Hidalgo Jr.) (2008-02-13)	2	344–47
Transcript – Sentencing (Counts) (2008-03-20)	2	348–64

## ${\bf TABLE\ OF\ CONTENTS-Chronological}$

Title	Volume	Pages
Judgment of Conviction (Counts) (2008-03-31)	2	365–66
Judgment of Conviction (Taoipu) (2008-03-31)	2	367–68
State's Motion to Consolidate Cases (Hidalgo Jr.) (2008-06-25)	2	369–81
Amended Notice to Seek Death Penalty (Carroll) (2008-10-20)	2	382-85
Transcript – Motion Hearing re Death Penalty (Hidalgo Jr. & Hidalgo III) (2009-01-16)	2	386–93
Order Granting Motion to Consolidate Cases (Hidalgo Jr. & Hidalgo (III) (2009-01-16)	2	394–95
Fourth Amended Information (Hidalgo Jr.) (2009-01-26)	2	396–99
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 9 (Hidalgo Jr.) (2009-02-06)	2	400-30
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 14 (Hidalgo Jr.) (2009-02-17)	2	431–38
Verdict (Hidalgo III) (2009-02-17)	2	439-40
Motion for Own Recognizance Release, For House Arrest (Espindola) (2009-02-18)	2	441–46
Transcript – Sentencing (Hidalgo Jr. and Hidalgo III) (2009-06-23)	2	447–78
Judgment of Conviction (Hidalgo III) (2009-07-10)	2	479–80
Amended Judgment of Conviction (Hidalgo Jr.) (2009-08-18)	2	481–82
Seconded Amended Notice of Evidence in Aggravation (Carroll) (2010-04-19)	2	483–92
Motion to Suppress (Carroll) (2010-04-30)	3	493–634
State's Opposition to Motion to Suppress (Carroll) (2010-05-04)	3	635–46
Transcript – Motion Hearing re Motion to Suppress (Carroll) (2010-05-11)	3	646–54
Order Denying Motion to Suppress (Carroll) (2010-05-11)	3	655
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 1, Part 1 (Carroll) (2010-05-17)	4	656–895
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 1, Part 2 (Carroll) (2010-05-17)	5	896–958
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 2 (Carroll) (2010-05-18)	5	959–1142

## ${\bf TABLE\ OF\ CONTENTS-Chronological}$

Title	Volume	Pages
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 3, Part 1 (Carroll) (2010-05-19)	6	1143–382
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 3, Part 2 (Carroll) (2010-05-19)	7	1382–420
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 4 (Carroll) (2010-05-20)	7	1421–586
Fifth Amended Information (Carroll) (2010-05-21)	8	1587–90
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 5 (Carroll) (2010-05-21)	8	1591-802
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 6 (Carroll) (2010-05-24)	9	1803–945
Jury Instructions (Carroll) (2010-05-25)	9	1946–93
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 7 (Carroll) (2010-05-25)	9	1994–99
Verdict – Guilt Phase (Carroll) (2010-05-25)	9	2000-01
Transcript – Penalty Phase, Day 1 (Carroll) (2010-06-02)	10	2002–213
Transcript – Penalty Phase, Day 2 (Carroll) (2010-06-03)	11	2214-401
Transcript – Penalty Phase, Day 3 (Carroll) (2010-06-04)	11	2402-07
Special Verdict – Mitigating Circumstances (Carroll) (2010-06-04)	11	2408–10
Special Verdict – Aggravating Circumstances (Carroll) (2010-06-04)	11	2411
Verdict – Penalty Phase (Carroll) (2010-05-25)	11	2412
Transcript – Sentencing (Carroll) (2010-08-12)	11	2413–18
Judgment of Conviction (Carroll) (2010-09-08)	11	2419–20
Transcript – Sentencing (Espindola) (2011-02-10)	11	2421–29
Judgment of Conviction (Espindola) (2011-02-17)	11	2430-31
Amended Judgment of Conviction (Carroll) (2011-03-23)	11	2432–33
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (Carroll) (2014-01-03)	11	2434-40
Notice of Appeal (Carroll) (2014-01-06)	11	2441

## $TABLE\ OF\ CONTENTS-Chronological$

Title	Volume	Pages
State's Exhibit 244 – Wire Transcript (2005-05-24)	12	2442-43
State's Exhibit 245 – Wire Transcript (2005-05-23)	12	2444-62
State's Exhibit 246 – Transcript of Carroll's Statement (2005-05-24)	12	2463–577
Stills from State's Exhibit 243 – Video of Carroll's Statement (2005-05-24)	12	2578-80

# $TABLE\ OF\ CONTENTS-Alphabetical$

Title	Volume	Pages
Amended Information (Taoipu) (2007-06-06)	1	224–26
Amended Judgment of Conviction (Carroll) (2011-03-23)	11	2432 - 33
Amended Judgment of Conviction (Hidalgo Jr.) (2009-08-18)	2	481 – 82
Amended Notice to Seek Death Penalty (Carroll) (2008-10-20)	2	382 - 85
Criminal Bindover (Carroll) (2005-06-17)	1	134–53
Criminal Bindover (Taoipu) (2005-12-09)	1	202-20
Fifth Amended Information (Carroll) (2010-05-21)	8	1587-90
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (Carroll) (2014-01-03)	11	2434–40
Fourth Amended Information (Hidalgo Jr.) (2009-01-26)	2	396–99
Guilty Plea Agreement (Espindola) (2008-02-04)	2	326–333
Guilty Plea Agreement (Taoipu) (2007-06-06)	1	240–47
Indictment (Hidalgo Jr.) (2008-02-13)	2	344-47
Information (Carroll, Counts, et al.) (2005-06-20)	1	154–57
Information (Taoipu) (2005-12-12)	1	221–23
Judgment of Conviction (Carroll) (2010-09-08)	11	2419–20
Judgment of Conviction (Counts) (2008-03-31)	2	365–66
Judgment of Conviction (Espindola) (2011-02-17)	11	2430-31
Judgment of Conviction (Hidalgo III) (2009-07-10)	2	479–80
Judgment of Conviction (Taoipu) (2008-03-31)	2	367–68
Jury Instructions (Carroll) (2010-05-25)	9	1946–93
Motion for Own Recognizance Release, For House Arrest (Espindola) (2009-02-18)	2	441–46
Motion to Strike Death Penalty Aggravators (Carroll) (2007-08-16)	2	248-56
Motion to Suppress (Carroll) (2010-04-30)	3	493–634
Notice of Appeal (Carroll) (2014-01-06)	11	2441
Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty (Carroll) (2005-07-06)	1	158–61

## $TABLE\ OF\ CONTENTS-Alphabetical$

Title	Volume	Pages
Order Denying Motion to Strike Aggravators (Carroll)	9	014 15
(2007-11-27)	2	314–15
Order Denying Motion to Suppress (Carroll) (2010-05-11)	3	655
Order Granting Motion to Consolidate Cases (Hidalgo Jr. & Hidalgo (III) (2009-01-16)	2	394–95
Second Amended Information (Counts) (2008-01-29)	2	321–23
Seconded Amended Notice of Evidence in Aggravation (Carroll) (2010-04-19)	2	483–92
Special Verdict – Aggravating Circumstances (Carroll) (2010-06-04)	11	2411
Special Verdict – Mitigating Circumstances (Carroll) (2010-06-04)	11	2408–10
State's Amended Notice of Evidence in Aggravation (Carroll) (2007-11-14)	2	305–13
State's Amended Notice of Evidence in Support of Aggravating Circumstances (Carroll) (2008-01-09)	2	316–20
State's Exhibit 244 – Wire Transcript (2005-05-24)	12	2442 - 43
State's Exhibit 245 – Wire Transcript (2005-05-23)	12	2444-62
State's Exhibit 246 – Transcript of Carroll's Statement (2005-05-24)	12	2463–577
State's Motion to Consolidate Cases (Hidalgo Jr.) (2008-06-25)	2	369-81
State's Opposition to Motion to Strike Death Penalty Aggravators (Carroll) (2007-10-04)	2	257–95
State's Opposition to Motion to Suppress (Carroll) (2010-05-04)	3	635–46
Stills from State's Exhibit 243 – Video of Carroll's Statement (2005-05-24)	12	2578-80
Third Amended Information (Espindola) (2008-02-04)	2	324–25
Transcript – Change of Plea (Espindola) (2008-02-04)	2	334–41
Transcript – Change of Plea (Taoipu) (2007-06-06)	1	227–39
Transcript – Hearing on Motion to Strike Death Penalty Aggravators (Carroll) (2007-10-09)	2	296–304
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 1, Part 1 (Carroll) (2010-05-17)	4	656–895

## $TABLE\ OF\ CONTENTS-Alphabetical$

Title	Volume	Pages
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 1, Part 2 (Carroll) (2010-05-17)	5	896–958
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 14 (Hidalgo Jr.) (2009-02-17)	2	431–38
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 2 (Carroll) (2010-05-18)	5	959–1142
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 3, Part 1 (Carroll) (2010-05-19)	6	1143–382
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 3, Part 2 (Carroll) (2010-05-19)	7	1382-420
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 4 (Carroll) (2010-05-20)	7	1421–586
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 5 (Carroll) (2010-05-21)	8	1591-802
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 6 (Carroll) (2010-05-24)	9	1803–945
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 7 (Carroll) (2010-05-25)	9	1994–99
Transcript – Jury Trial, Day 9 (Hidalgo Jr.) (2009-02-06)	2	400–30
Transcript – Motion Hearing re Death Penalty (Hidalgo Jr. & Hidalgo III) (2009-01-16)	2	386–93
Transcript – Motion Hearing re Motion to Suppress (Carroll) (2010-05-11)	3	646–54
Transcript – Penalty Phase, Day 1 (Carroll) (2010-06-02)	10	2002–213
Transcript – Penalty Phase, Day 2 (Carroll) (2010-06-03)	11	2214-401
Transcript – Penalty Phase, Day 3 (Carroll) (2010-06-04)	11	2402-07
Transcript – Preliminary Hearing (Carroll et al.) (2005-06-13)	1	1–133
Transcript – Preliminary Hearing (Taoipu) (2005-12-06)	1	162-201
Transcript – Sentencing (Carroll) (2010-08-12)	11	2413–18
Transcript – Sentencing (Counts) (2008-03-20)	2	348-64
Transcript – Sentencing (Espindola) (2011-02-10)	11	2421–29
Transcript – Sentencing (Hidalgo Jr. and Hidalgo III) (2009-06-23)	2	447–78
Verdict – Guilt Phase (Carroll) (2010-05-25)	9	2000-01
Verdict – Penalty Phase (Carroll) (2010-05-25)	11	2412
Verdict (Counts) (2008-02-08)	2	342-43
Verdict (Hidalgo III) (2009-02-17)	2	439–40

DAYVID J. FIGLER Nevada Bar #04264 BUNIN & BUNIN, LTD. 626 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 386-0333

Attorneys for the Defendant

OPEN COURT

Case No. C212667

Dept. No. XIV

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

8 THE STATE OF NEVADA

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

vs.

11 DEANGELO CARROLL

12

13

MOTION TO STRIKE DEATH PENALTY AGGRAVATORS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AND/OR MOTION FOR STAY

COMES NOW, DAYVID J. FIGLER, attorney for the above-captioned person, and respectfully moves this Honorable Court to set dismiss the two aggravators set forth in the State's Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty or in the alternative, Defense Motion to Continue and/or Motion for Stay. This motion incorporates all pleadings filed and proceedings that have transpired in this case. This motion is further based upon the attached points and authorities and any oral argument this Court may deem necessary.

Respectfully submitted by:

DAYVID JOFIGLER Nevada Bar #04264 BUNIN & BUNIN, LTD. 626 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 386-0333 Attorneys for the Defendant

Volume 2 - 248

9

10

14

15 16

17 18

19

20 21

22

23 24

25

26

27

28

#### POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS

2

1

3

4 5 6

7

8

10 11

12

13

14 15

16 17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25

26 27

The State asserts that on or about May 19, 2005, Kenneth Counts shot and killed Timothy Hadland. The State's theory is that Hadland was killed at the direction of the owner and/or management of the Palomino Club, to wit, Luis Hildago, Jr., Luis Hidalgo III (his son) and Anabel Espindola, using Palomino employee DeAngelo Carroll as the

go-between with the actual shooter, Counts. Carroll is alleged to have driven the van to Lake Mead as part of the alleged conspiracy.

In the van at the time were Carroll, Counts, and two juveniles, Jason Taoipu and Rontae Zone. Luis Hildago, Jr. and Rontae Zone are unnamed

in the Information.

Hadland once was an employee of the Palomino club.

The State filed a Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty against each of the co-defendants (with the exception of juvenile, Jason Taoipu) and have asserted the existence of circumstances of murder for hire (being hired by Luis Hildago III and Anabel Espindola to beat and/or kill Timothy Hadland AND procuring and/or hiring Kenneth Counts to beat and/or kill Timothy Hadland; and prior conviction of violent offense, to wit, conspiracy to commit robbery.

#### LEGAL ARGUMENT

There are two basic legal questions regarding the State's Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty. (1) Can the so-called "murder for hire" aggravator apply to DeAngelo Carroll as both hired and hirer, and can the State even seek the Death Penalty if Carroll merely procured or acted as a go-between? (2) Is conspiracy to commit a

1 robbery a crime of violence under NRS 200.033(2)(b) and was it plead with sufficient notice as required?

2

3

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Capital punishment is reserved for the most heinous of murders. Not all murders qualify for death as the punishment. "Death is different" goes the famous and oft-quoted citation of the United States Supreme Court. Not surprising, the United States Supreme Court has relied upon this principle and its application to Eight Amendment implications for decades. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002).

The Nevada Supreme Court also recognized its "obligation to ensure that aggravators are not applied so liberally that they fail to perform their constitutionally required narrowing function." Redeker v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 122 Nev. , 127 P.3d 520, 526 (2006) (citations omitted). In interpreting the statute at issue, the Nevada Supreme Court looks to the plain language of the statute. State v. Colosimo, 122 Nev. 142 P.3d 352 (2006) (citing State v. Washoe County, 6 Nev. 104, 107 (1870)). penal ambiquous, "rules statute is of interpretation...require that provisions which negatively impact a defendant must be strictly construed, while provisions which positively impact a defendant are to be given a more liberal constructions." Colosimo, 122 Nev. At , 142 P.3d at 359 (quoting Mangarella v. State, 117 Nev. 130, 134, 17 P.3d 989, 992 (2001)).

1. Prior conviction involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another.

Defendant Carroll was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, not robbery. Understandably, the State has alleged in the Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty the "underlying" facts of the conviction to which the Defendant plead guilty, however, the State does not allege how a conspiracy, the crime for which the judgment of conviction was entered is a crime of violence in and of itself which is required to proceed under the death penalty. See <u>Redeker v. Eighth</u>

<u>Judicial District Court</u>, 122 Nev. , 127 P.3d 520(2006).

28 |

Conspiracy is defined as "an agreement between two or more persons for an unlawful purpose." **Bolden v. State**, 121 Nev. 908, 124 P.3d 191 (2005). Simply stated, and irrespective of the underlying facts averred in the information, an agreement cannot contain an actus reus of violence by definition. The act of violence, or the threat of violence is not an element of the offense of conspiracy.

The State cannot offer any authority for the proposition that the Nevada Supreme Court has authorized a conspiracy charge to stand for the narrowing required to make it an death eligible aggravator. Indeed, to the contrary, the Nevada Supreme Court seems to have indicated that the moment of striking aggravators for failure to narrow is at hand. See **Leslie v. Warden**, 118 Nev. 773, 59 P.3d 440 (2002) (Maupin concurring opinion).

NRS 200.033(2)(b) is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and in its application to this case. Under these circumstances the aggravating factor of conspiracy to commit robbery is invalid. Further, the State cannot provide any meaning to "use or threat of violence" and whether that phrase provides a principled guide for the choice between death and a lesser penalty as required by <u>Maynard v.</u> Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-364 (1988) and <u>Godfrey v. Georgia</u>, 446 U.S. 429 (1980).

A statute violates due process if it is so vague that it fails to give persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct

is prohibited and fails to provide law enforcement officials with adequate guidelines to prevent discriminatory enforcement." Hernandez v. State, 118 Nev. 513, 524 (2002).

#### 2. Murder for Hire / Pecuniary Gain

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

From the onset it should be noted that this aggravator (albeit plead differently at least at it relates to the co-defendants) has already been challenged by the co-defendants, Luis Hidalgo III and Anabel Espindola, in this court and now on appeal as a writ of mandamus, or in the alternative, as a writ of prohibition. extent that this court will allow, Defendant Carroll, incorporates by reference the legal argument set forth in the co-Defendants motion to strike aggravating circumstances. Additionally, Defendant Carroll would set forth that at least one portion of the State's averment must be stricken from the record in that he is listed as both hirer and hiree and the plain language of the statutory aggravator at issue, NRS 200.033(6) cannot be applied on both ends of the equation. there is no dispute that Defendant Carroll did not physically kill Timothy Hadland, nor is it alleged that it was his plan to kill Timothy Hadland. Rather the State is seeking to establish liability for murder under aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories, though there is no authority that a go-between who did not do the original hiring or who did not do the actual killing is exposed to this aggravator.

#### 3. MOTION FOR A STAY OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE A MOTION TO CONTINUE

In that there are two aggravators at issue in the Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty, and both are potentially infirm, statutorily and constitutionally — and since the Nevada Supreme Court is currently considering the validity of both the "act of or threat

of violence" aggravator as well as the "murder for hire/pecuniary gain" aggravator - it only makes sense to stay these proceedings under at least word comes down from the Nevada Supreme Court on these issues. Further, the Defendant intends to appeal this Court's ruling if it is denied to grant the specific relief sought. Defendant Carroll will suffer irreparable harm by having to stand trial for a capital case despite the invalid Notices of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty. Because this is currently a capital case, he is being held without bail and may not be released from custody and is therefore unable to assist his counsel in preparation for his defense in an effective manner. Further, court resources will be unnecessarily expended by the potentially lengthy proceedings concerning the capital penalty hearing, a lengthy and complicated jury selection process, transcript expenses and other costs incurred by this case which would not be incurred if the Notices of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty are dismissed. Finally, there is a prejudice to the Defendant in facing a "death-qualified" jury. To the contrary, the State in the interest of justice should be sure that the aggravators being used to potentially execute a human being are valid.

1

2

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Finally, in any event, the Defense requests anew another continuance in this matter in that there have been a number of changes since the Court last set the trial date approximately two months ago.

First, co-Defendant Kenneth Counts did not get tried as was set.

Second, co-Defendant Jason Taoipu has apparently changed his mind and will not be waiving his 5<sup>th</sup> Amendment rights after entering a guilty plea though his testimony was generally favorable to the Defendant.

Third, it has become apparent to the Defense that there were meetings that took place with the Defendant with various members of the

Metropolitan Police Department, the FBI and the Clark County District Attorneys office which resulted in numerous statements by the Defendant and the Defendant's agreement to cooperate with the investigation to the extent that he wore a wire and risked his own personal safety to assist the prosecution. As it turns out one of those representatives of the District Attorneys office was the current prosecutor in this case. What's new between the last court date and the current one is that no statements of the Defendant have been produced by the State and they did not exist in the homicide detective notebooks or the DA's "open file" which was inspected by the Defense attorneys. Fourth, an alternative suspect was identified and a deposition was apparently taken although defense counsel's request to be involved and a modest accommodation were denied by Judge Stewart Bell. Fifth, the Defendant was only recently provided with hundreds of hours of jailhouse telephone calls. Sixth, the Defense has yet to file numerous motions in the District Court in addition to those suggested by the above-referenced reasons for a continuance. Seventh, the Defense has not yet completed the mitigation investigation and anticipates that it will take approximately 60 days to do that -Defendant has not yet seen a psychologist nor have subpoenas been served on any individuals the Defense team has been seeking to call on the Defendant's behalf. Eighth, the Defense has not yet been able to utilize its investigator to interview witness offered by the State as evidence in support of aggravation as there were numerous events, many of which if not most of which include when the Defendant was a This is vital as the Defendant is placed in the position to defend again against these allegation and offer mitigating evidence regarding the facts and circumstances of these events. **Ninth**, a

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

"snitch" witness has been listed as a witness on August 13, 2007, who has apparently provided information to the State that DeAngelo Carroll was the shooter in the case.

EDCR 7.30 (a) allows the court for good cause to grant an order continuing the day set for trial.

#### CONCLUSION

It's hard to understand why the State has asked for death penalty against all the adult defendants in this particular case when typically the death penalty is reserved for the "worst of the worst." Clearly within a group of five people, four of whom never pulled a trigger - the State would be hard pressed to call them all "the worst of the worst." Nonetheless, the State has chosen to embark upon this costly and potentially irreversible venture and by their actions provide fodder for many future cases to come to show that a real narrowing is not important to the State. In other words, what kind of "narrowing" takes place when every adult defendant in a case is facing the death penalty?

In any event, the two aggravating circumstances ostensibly designed to narrow the class of persons against who the death penalty is sought is infirm in the present case. The Nevada Supreme Court will likely rule on this issue, hopefully soon, but this may not be a death penalty case at all against the Defendant and that makes thinks very difficult if he gets a death qualified jury.

Hopefully this court will strike the two aggravators and as a result many of the reasons necessary for a stay (and to an extent -- the continuance) will disappear. Nonetheless, the Defendant has offered numerous reasons why it is in the interest of justice to continue this matter. Mostly, it is because despite the two years

since the offense occurred, the case has not been dormant. As this Court is well aware, there have been a number of rapidly changing events and new information produced in just the last 60 days. As a result, the Defense chooses to do nothing except for make sure that DeAngelo Carroll gets a fair trial and is not sentenced to death. Some additional time to ensure that by the part of Defense counsel does not seem to be an unreasonable request.

DATED this 16th day of August, 2007.

BUNIN & BUNIN, LTD.

DAYVID J. FIGLER Nevada Bar #04264

626 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Electronically Filed 10/04/2007 02:04:08 PM

1 2 3 4 5 6	OPPS DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 MARC DiGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff	CLERK OF THE COURT
7	DISTRIC	CT COURT
8	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	)
10	Plaintiff,	CASE NO: C212667
11	-vs-	DEPT NO: XXI
12 13	DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL, #1678381	
14	Defendant.	) )
15	STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDA	ANT CARROLL'S MOTION TO STRIKE
16	DEATH PENALT	Y AGGRAVATORS
17		NG: October 9, 2007
18	TIME OF HEA	ARING: 9:30 am
19	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, 1	by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through
20	MARC DiGIACOMO, Chief Deputy Distri	ct Attorney, and hereby submits the attached
21	Points and Authorities in Opposition to I	Defendant's Motion To Strike Death Penalty
22	Aggravators.	
23	This Opposition is made and based up	oon all the papers and pleadings on file herein,
24	the attached points and authorities in supp	ort hereof, and oral argument at the time of
25	hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorab	le Court.
25 26	hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorab	le Court.
		ele Court.
26	///	ele Court.

C:\Program Files\Neevia.Com\Document Converter\temp\237082-296075.DOC

# 

#### **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

Just before midnight on May 19, 2005, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) received a 9-1-1 call concerning a homicide on North Shore Road near Lake Mead (Reporter's Transcript of the Preliminary Hearing (hereinafter "RTP"), 146). Upon arrival, they found the body of Timothy Hadland lying in the middle of the road with an apparent gunshot wound to the head. (RTP, 151). A later autopsy would reveal that the victim suffered two gunshot wounds to the head. (RTP, 157).

#### **Evidence Connects the Palomino Club to the Murder**

Just south of the body were several flyers from a strip club in North Las Vegas called the Palomino Club. Approximately thirty feet in front of the body, Hadland's Kia Sportage SUV was found. (RTP, 152). Inside, police located a cell phone. (RTP, 153). On May 19, 2005, at approximately 11:27 p.m., the phone received a direct Nextel connect from a number identified as "Deangelo." (RTP, 154). Based on an interview with Hadland's girlfriend, "Deangelo" was determined to be Defendant Deangelo Carroll.

During the course of the investigation, police learned that the number identified on the cell phone as Deangelo was registered to Defendant Anabel Espindola, (Espindola). The listed address was Simone's Auto Plaza, 6770 Bermuda, Las Vegas, Nevada. (RTP, 158). A computer search revealed that Espindola was a key employee at the Palomino Club. (RTP, 159).

Due to the fact that much of the information was linked to the Palomino Club, detectives contacted the owner of the club, Luis Hidalgo, Jr. (Mr. H.), the owner of the club. (RTP, 160). Mr. H. asked that detectives return when the floor manager, Ariel, could help them. (RTP, 162). From Ariel, police learned that Deangelo Carroll was a current employee of the Palomino Club. (RTP, 163). Police also learned that Hadland was a former employee. (RTP, 163). While detectives were interviewing Ariel, Defendant Carroll arrived at the club. (RTP 164). Defendant Carroll agreed to accompany detectives to the police station where he provided a taped statement. (RTP 164).

3 4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

#### The Phone Call and Offer

During his interview with police, Defendant Carroll explained that prior to arriving at work on May 19, 2005 he received a call from Luis Hidalgo III. Defendant Hidalgo told Carroll to bring two garbage bags and a baseball bat. (Exhibit 1, 58). Upon arrival at the Palomino Club, Carroll was called into the office by Mr. H. In the presence of Espindola, Mr. H. explained that the victim "was puttin' bad shit on his club and didn't like, so he tried to tell us, what, what, what he said is if you guys don't knock him out, at first he wanted us to beat him up, then he said that he wanted T.J.<sup>2</sup> knocked off." (Exhibit 1, 56). Mr. H explained that Hidalgo was very upset with the victim and wanted Carroll to "go take care of T.J." (Exhibit 1, 88). Additionally, Mr. H was offering cash for the people who actually killed T.J. (Exhibit 1, 61).

During the ride to the lake, Espindola contacted Carroll and told him "if [T.J's] by himself, then do him, if he isn't by himself, then just fuck him up, fuck him up and fuck up whoever's with him. (Exhibit 1, 92). Thereafter, the victim was lured to a remote location and executed by Kenneth Counts. After the killing, Counts demanded \$6000.00 for his services. Espindola provided the money to Carroll to pay Counts.

Carroll indicated that the motive behind killing T.J. was the allegation that T.J. was stealing from the club. (Exhibit 1, 59). Carroll received \$100 for his participation.

Rontae Zone is a nineteen year old friend of Deangelo Carroll. (R.T. 16). In May 2005, Rontae began working with Carroll as a flyer boy for the Palomino Club. (RTP, 17). A flyer boy passes out flyers and pamphlets to cab stops. The flyers come in a variety of colors. (RTP, 18). Rontae worked with Defendant Carroll approximately four (4) to five (5) times. In order to distribute the flyers, Defendant Carroll drove a white Chevy Astro van. On the first night, Rontae worked with Defendant Carroll and his cousin, Michael. (RTP, 19). Rontae received twenty dollars (\$20) for his services. After work was over, Rontae stayed at Defendant Carroll's home. (RTP, 20).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Also known as "Little Lou" <sup>2</sup> T.J. is the victim Timothy Hadland.

On May 19th, Rontae and Defendant Carroll were joined by "J.J.," later identified as Defendant Jayson Taoipu. (RTP, 25). While out promoting, Defendant Carroll told Rontae and Jayson that "Mr. H" wanted Defendant Carroll to kill someone. (RTP, p. 26). Rontae told Defendant Carroll that he was not willing to participate and specifically told him he would not participate. (RTP, 27). Defendant Taoipu, on the other hand, stated that he was willing to do it. (RTP, 28). Based upon that, Defendant Carroll gave Defendant Taoipu a .22 caliber revolver. Defendant Carroll tried to give Rontae the bullets to the gun, but Rontae wanted nothing to do with it and gave the bullets back to Defendant Taoipu. (RTP, 29).

Thereafter, the group went out to promote and pass out flyers. After passing out flyers, the group returned to Defendant Carroll's house. (RTP, 30). After a while, Defendant Carroll said it was time to go back to work. Concerned that he did not want to be involved in anything illegal, both Rontae and his girlfriend asked Defendant Carroll what they were leaving to do. (RTP, 31). Defendant Carroll told Rontae that they were only going to promote. The three, Rontae, Defendant Taoipu, and Defendant Carroll got into the white Chevy Astro Van. When they left, Defendant Carroll began driving to the west side, near E Street. (RTP, 31). On the way, Defendant Carroll told Defendant Taoipu and Rontae that "Mr. H's" son, Defendant Hidalgo, wanted the victim dead too, and that Defendant Carroll should grab baseball bats and trash bags. (RTP, 34).

Defendant Carroll stopped the van on E Street across the street from Defendant Carroll's mom's house. (RTP, 35). Defendant Carroll got out of the van and went into the house. Defendant Carroll spent approximately ten minutes inside the house. When he exited, he had "KC," later identified as Defendant Kenneth Counts, with him. Defendant Counts and Carroll got into the van. (RTP, 37). Defendant Carroll was driving, Defendant Taoipu was in the front passenger seat, Defendant Counts was in the rear passenger side seat and Rontae was behind the driver. (RTP, 40). From the west side, Defendant Carroll drove

27 // 28 //

the van toward Lake Mead. As he was driving, Defendant Carroll was talking to the victim, Timothy Hadland, on the phone. (RTP, 38). During this time period, the group smoked marijuana.<sup>3</sup>

While smoking the marijuana, Defendant Counts asked Rontae if he had a "burner," referring to a gun. (RTP, 59). Rontae told Defendant Counts that he did not have one. Defendant Counts then asked Defendant Taoipu if he had a gun however, Rontae did not hear Defendant Taoipu's response. (RTP, 60).

#### The Murder

As the van drove down the hill to the lake, Timothy began to approach them in his Kia Sportage. When Defendant Carroll saw Timothy, he pulled the van over and parked. Timothy did a U-turn and pulled in front of the van by about thirty (30) feet. (RTP, 62). Timothy then got out of his vehicle and walked back to the van. (RTP, 64). As Timothy approached the van, Defendant Counts "sneaked" out the sliding passenger door of the van. (RTP, 66). As he was sliding out of the van, Rontae saw Defendant Counts holding a black .357 firearm. After creeping out of the van, Defendant counts crept quietly around the front of the van, snuck up behind Timothy, raised up and shot Timothy as he was standing at the driver's side window. (RTP, 68). After Timothy fell, Defendant Counts fired another round into him when he hit the ground. (RTP, 69). After returning to the van, Defendant Counts instructed Defendant Carroll to drive. (RTP, 71). Defendant Carroll drove away.

#### Payment at the Palomino

As they were driving away, Defendant Counts confronted Defendant Taoipu about why he did not shoot. Defendant Taoipu said he was going to shoot, however Defendant Carroll was in the way. (RTP, 72). Thereafter, Defendant Counts asked Rontae where he lived. Defendant Carroll drove the van back to the Palomino Club.

Once back at the Palomino, Defendant Carroll and Counts entered the club. (RTP,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> It was at this point in the testimony where Defendant Counts', Hidalgo's and Espindola's attorneys demanded that the Court advise Rontae his rights and appoint counsel. After the appointment of Special Public Defender Randy Pike, Rontae continued his testimony as he wasn't the part of any conspiracy.

73). After about thirty (30) minutes, Defendant Counts exited the club and left in a cab. Thereafter, Defendant Carroll left the club and told Rontae and Defendant Taoipu that Defendant Counts got paid. (RTP, 75). Thereafter, Defendant Carroll, Taoipu and Rontae left and stayed at Defendant Carroll's house.

The next morning, Defendant Taoipu drove the van to a tire shop while Defendant Carroll followed in another vehicle. (RTP, 77). Defendant Carroll stabbed the tires on the van and had the tire shop replace the tires. (RTP, 78). Defendant Carroll paid and told Rontae that Defendant Espindola had given him a hundred dollars (\$100) to replace the tires. (RTP, 79).

Later in the day, Defendant Carroll went to Simone's Auto Plaza. (RTP, 84). Defendant Taoipu and Rontae went with him. At Simone's Auto Plaza, Defendant Carroll met with "Mr. H." (RTP, 95). The group then left in the Palomino Shuttle. (RTP, 96). Thereafter, Defendant Carroll went to work. (RTP, 99). The next time Rontae saw Defendant Carroll, he was with homicide detectives. Defendant Carroll, in the presence of homicide detectives, told Rontae to tell the truth.

#### **Confirmation of Deangelo and Rontae's Story**

Defendant Jayson Taoipu was located and interviewed. Taoipu confirmed most of the information provided by Defendant Deangelo Carroll; including calling the attack on T.J. a hit ordered by Mr. H; indicating that Defendant Luis Hidalgo, III called Defendant Deangelo Carroll and told him to bring garbage bags and baseball bats; confirming that Defendant Anabel Espindola called Defendant Deangelo Carroll as they were driving to the lake; and that Defendant Kenneth Counts and Deangelo Carroll were paid for their participation in the murder.

After interviewing Rontae and Defendant Taoipu, detectives set out to identify, locate and arrest "KC." Detectives knew from the description of where he was located that "KC," lived at 1676 E Street. (RTP, 167). Based upon this information, a search warrant was drafted for the residence. During the execution of the search warrant, "KC" was not located at 1676 E Street. (RTP, 171). During the execution of that warrant, detectives received

//

Information from Defendant Carroll that Defendant Counts was across the street at 1677 E Street. Contact was made with the occupants of 1677 E Street, however, efforts to contact Defendant Counts were unsuccessful. Therefore, a second search warrant was drafted and executed at that residence. (RTP, 172). After entry, Defendant Counts was found hiding in the attic. (RTP, 176). It took several hours and use of explosive devices to eventually get him out of the attic. Eventually, a hole in the ceiling had to be cut to extricate Defendant Counts. (RTP, 178).

After Defendant Counts was removed, a search was conducted of 1677 E Street. During the search, a black satchel containing several one hundred dollar (\$100) bills was found along with Defendant Counts' identification in front of a couch. (RTP, 181). Underneath the couch, in approximately the same general area as the satchel, were more money, some peach cigars as well as several VIP card from the Palomino Club.

#### Hidalgo and Espindola Solicit Carroll to Kill Co-conspirators

After the search, detectives once again met with Defendant Carroll. (RTP, 183). Defendant Carroll consented to wear a body recorder and he was provided one on May 23<sup>rd</sup>. (RTP, 184). After placing the body recorder on Defendant Carroll, Defendant Carroll was surveilled as he entered Simone's Auto Plaza. After a while, Defendant Carroll exited Simone's Auto Plaza and was surveilled back to his meeting with detectives. (RTP, 186). At that time, the body recorder was collected and analyzed. In addition, Defendant Carroll was in possession of fourteen hundred dollars (\$1400) in cash as well as a bottle of Tanqueray.

An enhanced version of the body recording was admitted at the preliminary hearing. (RTP, 250). On the recording, Defendant Espindola, Defendant Carroll and Defendant Hidalgo discuss the crime as well as request Defendant Carroll to kill Defendant Taoipu and Rontae Zone. In one part, Defendant Espindola indicates that Defendant Carroll was supposed to beat the victim. In another section, Defendant Hidalgo asks Defendant Carroll whether "KC" would be willing to kill Taoipu and Rontae:

1	<b>DEANGELO</b> : Who
2	LITTLE LOU: The people who are gonna rat.
3	<b>DEANGELO</b> : They're gonna fucking work deals for themselves, they're
4	gonna get me for sure cause I was driving, they're gonna get KC because he
5	was the fucking trigger man. They're not gonna do anything else to the other
6	guys cause they're fucking snitching.
7	LITTLE LOU: Could you have fucking KC kill them too, we'll fucking put
8	something in their food so they die rat poison or something
9	<b>DEANGELO</b> : We can do that to
10	LITTLE LOU: And we'll get KC last.
11	<b>DEANGELO</b> : It's gonna be impossible to find KC to kill these, He ain't even
12	at his house, KC fucking got his shit and fucking packed up shop I don't know
13	where the fuck KC is.
14	ANABEL: Here's the thing, we can take care of KC too KC is
15	asking for money, right ok, but here is the thing he's the mother fucking
16	shooter, people can pinpoint him
17	(State's Return to Writ Exhibit 2). Afterward, Defendant Hidalgo told Defendant Carroll to
18	put rat poisoning in a bottle of Tanqueray gin and have Defendant Taoipu and Rontae drink
19	it.4 Moreover, Defendant Espindola provided money to Defendant Carroll to keep
20	Defendant Taoipu and Rontae quiet as well as money for Defendant Carroll himself
21	Defendant Hidalgo told Defendant Carroll if he goes to prison for the crime, Defendant
22	Hidalgo will buy Defendant Carroll's family United States' savings bonds to help pay for his
23	family.
24	<u>Plan B and a Cover-up</u>
25	The next day, May 24 <sup>th</sup> , detectives decided to place another body recorder or
26	Defendant Carroll and he was sent back into Simone's Auto Plaza. (RTP, p. 190). When he
27	
28	<sup>4</sup> A transcript of this conversation, recorded May 23, 2005 will be presented at trial.

1	left Simone's Auto Plaza, he had approximately eight hundred dollars (\$800) in cash which
2	was recovered from him. After Defendant Carroll left Simone's Auto Plaza, detectives
3	waited for the other suspects to leave before executing various search warrants. (RTP, 191).
4	The first suspect to leave was Defendant Hidalgo. After leaving, Defendant Hidalgo was
5	stopped by a patrol officer. (RTP, 192). After that he was contacted by detectives and a
6	special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Defendant Hidalgo agreed to
7	accompany them to the homicide offices for an interview. (RTP, 193). After receiving his
8	Miranda warnings, Defendant Hidalgo was interviewed for several hours. (RTP, 210).
9	Sometime thereafter, Defendant Espindola left Simone's Auto Plaza with "Mr. H."
10	(RTP, 211). Eventually, she was brought down to the homicide offices and read her Miranda
11	warnings. (RTP, 212). Thereafter, Defendant Espindola admitted that she had spoken to
12	Defendant Carroll on the two previous days at Simone's Auto Plaza. (RTP, 215).
13	The recording from the May 24 <sup>th</sup> encounter at Simone's Auto Plaza where
14	Defendant's Espindola, Carroll and Hidalgo can once again be heard discussing the crime,
15	was admitted into evidence.
16	During this recording, Defendant Espindola tries to explain how she tried to call
17	Defendant Carroll and change the plan from killing the victim to only beating the victim:
18	<b>DEANGELO</b> : You know what I'm saying I did everything you guys asked me
19	to do you told me to take care of the guy and I took care of him
20	ANABEL: OK listen, listen
21	DEANGELO: I'm not
22	ANABEL: talk to him not fucking take care of him god damn it I
23	fucking called you
24	<b>DEANGELO</b> : Yeah and when I talked to you on the phone Ms. Anabel I said
25	I specifically said I said if he is by himself do you still want me to do him in.
26	You said yeah
27	ANABEL: I
28	//

1	<b>DEANGELO</b> : if he is with somebody you said if he is with somebody then
2	just beat him up
3	ANABEL: I said go to plan B fucking Deangelo and Deangelo you're just
4	minutes away I told you no I fucking told you no, and I kept trying to
5	fucking call you but you turned off your mother fucking phone
6	<b>DEANGELO</b> : I never turned off my phone
7	ANABEL: I couldn't reach you
8	<b>DEANGELO</b> : I never turned off my phone, my phone was on the whole
9	fucking night Ms. Anabel
10	ANABEL: Shh I couldn't fucking reach you as soon asspokenknew
11	where you fucking were I fucking tried calling you again and I couldn't
12	fucking reach you.
13	(State's Return to Writ Exhibit 2). After this discussion, Defendant Espindola got more
14	money for Defendant Carroll. Moreover, Defendant Espindola told Defendant Carroll to
15	deny everything and that if she is ever contacted; she is just going to deny any knowledge.
16	During the subsequent search of Simone's Auto Plaza, numerous items were located
17	which were relevant to the investigation. In room six (6), numerous pieces of identification
18	in the name of Defendant Hidalgo were located. In addition, thousands of dollars in United
19	States' saving bonds were located, all in the name of Defendant Hidalgo, along with a
20	variety of bottles of liquor. In Defendant Espindola's office, a check made out to Defendant
21	Carroll for twenty-four (24) hours of work was located. (RTP, 318).
22	During the recording of May 23 <sup>rd</sup> , Defendant Espindola told Defendant Carroll why
23	he is getting a check for twenty-four hours:
24	ANABEL: Right, fill out your time card from last week cause I didn't
25	get it, your time card last week, 3 days Monday, Tuesday,
26	Wednesday, 8 hours a day that's 24 hours, I'm gonna give you a check for that
27	because obviously there gonna be asking to see our records so It'll be much
28	easier that way I can prove you were there because Thursday you weren't there

1	because that was the day all the shit happened Friday
2	Thursday of the week before was the day that Timothy Hadland was killed. In
3	addition, inside a common area of Simone's Auto Plaza, a handwritten note was located
4	which stated, "Maybe we are being under surveill. Keep you mouth shut!!" (RTP, 315).
5	Outside Simone's Auto Plaza, the white Chevy Astro van was located. (RTP, 319).
6	Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty
7	On July 6, 2005, Notices of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty were filed against all
8	four adult charged Defendants. As to Defendants Espindola and Hidalgo, there were three
9	aggravating circumstances alleged. The first two aggravating circumstances alleged were:
.0	The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty
. 1	hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been
.2	convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of
.3	another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that
.4	felony, to-wit: Solicitation to Commit Murder
.5	See NRS 200.033(1). The basis for these two aggravating circumstances was that both
.6	Defendants solicited Defendant Deangelo Carroll to kill Witness Rontae Zone and
.7	Defendant Jayson Taoipu. The final aggravating circumstance alleged was:
.8	The murder was committed by a person, for himself or another, to receive
9	money or any other thing of monetary value
20	See NRS 200.033(6). The basis for this aggravating circumstance is that this is clearly a
21	case of murder for hire in which both the people doing the hiring as well as the people
22	receiving the money are subject to the aggravating circumstance.
23	Much like Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola, Defendant Carroll is alleged to have
24	the same two aggravating circumstances. However, the prior crime of violence as it applies
25	to Defendant Carroll stems from a prior felony conviction which Defendant Carroll sustained
26	and had just been released from probation shortly before the instant murder.
27	//
28	//

#### Facts Of Defendant Carroll's Prior Robbery

On May 18, 2002, Stephen Blodgett became the victim of a strong arm robbery in an alley on Fremont Street. On that date, Defendant Carroll and an unidentified Hispanic male adult attack Mr. Blodgett and began to beat him. There were several independent witnesses to the beating. While he was being beaten, Defendant Carroll removed Blodgett's wallet from his cowboy boot and fled the area with three (3) one hundred dollar (\$100) bills.

As he was fleeing, Defendant Carroll jumped a wall. On the other side of the wall were several Clark County Fire Department personnel that witnessed Defendant Carroll rifle through the wallet. Shortly thereafter, they saw Mr. Blodgett running up hollering that Defendant Carroll had robbed him. During a search incident to arrest, three (3) one hundred dollars (\$100) bills were recovered from Defendant Carroll's person. Defendant was arrested and charged with robbery.

Ultimately, Defendant Carroll negotiated his case to one (1) count of Conspiracy To Commit Robbery. The charging document specifically stated:

That DEANGILO CARROL, aka Deangelo Reshawn Carroll, the Defendant(s) above named, having committed the crime of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Felony - NRS 199.480, 200.380), on or about the 18th day of May, 2002, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, did then and there meet with others and between themselves, and each of them with the other, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire and agree to commit the crime of robbery, and in furtherance of said conspiracy, Defendant did take personal property, to-wit: wallet and contents, including lawful money of the United States, from the person of STEVEN BLODGETT, or in his presence, by means of force or violence, or fear of injury to, and without the consent and against the will of the said STEVEN BLODGETT.

In the guilty plea agreement, Defendant specifically admitted all of the facts contained in the

information. Additionally, he entered a plea to this crime and was sentenced to probation. During the entry of plea, Defendant's attorney acknowledged that the Conspiracy portion of

the crime was ficticious and in fact he was admitting to a robbery. (See Exhibit 1, p. 6).

#### **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Defendant Carroll asserts that the notice of intent to seek the death penalty should be stricken as the pecuniary gain aggravator does not apply to him (despite that he received money for engaging in the killing of the victim) and that his robbery of Stephen Blodgett does not qualify as a prior crime of violence. The majority of his argument appears to be an incorporation by reference to the arguments of Defendant Hidalgo and Espindola. Those Defendants' arguments are much more detailed and substantially different than that which can be asserted by Defendant Carroll, however, as he incorporates them, a response it necessary.

# THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANTS SUPPORT THE NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY AS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DEFENDANTS CONSPIRED TO COMMIT FIRST DEGREE MURDER IS A OUESTION FOR THE JURY

Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola argued that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes the imposition of the death penalty as Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola did not intend that a killing take place or intend that lethal force be employed. This argument would not seem to apply to Defendant Carroll as he claims the exact opposite, that there was a specific intent to kill by Hidalgo and Espindola, and that he was ordered to carry out that plan.

The case law is clear that if a person does not kill and never intended that a killing occur or deadly force be employed, then that Defendant is not eligible for the death penalty. *See* Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); and Doleman v. State, 107 Nev. 409, 418, 812 P.2d 1287, 1292-3 (1991). Unfortunately for Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Defendants, both of them at the very least joined a conspiracy where they intended that deadly force would be used. Defendant Carroll obviously intended a killing to occur.

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

be required to prove a specific intent to kill.

A. Evidence of Conspiracy to Use Lethal Force

Defendant Hidalgo specifically told Defendant Deangelo Carroll to come to work with baseball bats and garbage bags to beat T.J. As Rontae Zone testified at the preliminary hearing, "Well, he said that [Petitioner Hidalgo, III] wanted him dead also." (RTP, 34). Defendant Hidalgo's own father, Mr. H, indicated that Defendant Hidalgo was very upset and wanted Defendant Carroll to "go take care of T.J." In addition, on the recordings, Defendant Hidalgo expresses that he wants to hire Defendant Kenneth Counts to kill Zone and Taoipu "TOO." Thereafter, he provided Defendant Deangelo Carroll the method by which he is to have these two killed, i.e., rat poisoning in a gin bottle.

However, this argument is moot after the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden v.

State, 121 Nev.\_\_\_, 124 P.3d 191 (2005). Prior to Bolden, (which was decided after the

commencement of these proceedings), entering a conspiracy to commit a Battery With a

Deadly Weapon which resulted in one (1) co-conspirator committing First Degree Murder,

all co-conspirators would have been liable for 1st Degree Murder even though they did not

meet all of the specific intent requirements. This is due to the fact that the killing would be

the natural and probable consequences of the conspiracy. In that situation, there would be a

possibility that a defendant not specifically intending to kill would fact the death penalty.

Under the current state of the law, that factual scenario is impossible, because the state will

The evidence that Defendant Espindola intended for T.J. to be killed is even stronger. Defendant Espindola was present when Mr. H instructed Defendant Deangelo Carroll to kill T.J. While Defendant Carroll was driving the executioner to the scene of the murder, Defendant Espindola called Defendant Carroll. It was at this point that Defendant Espindola learned that T.J. was not at home as the original plan contemplated but out at the lake with potential witnesses. Upon learning this information, Defendant Espindola told Defendant Carroll, "If [T.J.'s] by his self, then do him, if he isn't by his self, then just fuck him up, fuck him up and fuck up whoever's with him." This information was confirmed by Defendant Espindola on the surreptitious recording when Defendant Carroll confronted her

with this statement, Defendant Espindola stated, "I told you to go to plan B!" Later in the 1 2 recordings, Defendant Espindola confirmed that her concern with killing T.J. in public was: 3 Well the bastards fucking right what about it, what about everything might as 4 well to lose it all, and if I lose the shop and I lose the club I can't help you or 5 your family... God Damn it your not that stupid you were playing with the in the car you should have fucking turned back **YOU HAD** 6 TOO MANY FUCKING EYES ON YOUR ASS WHAT THE FUCK 7 8 WERE YOU THINKING? 9 (State's Return to Writ Exhibit 2, p. 14). There is absolutely no question that all Defendants 10 intended deadly force to be utilized. Whether they intended to kill is a question for the jury. 11 B. Specific Intent to Kill is a Jury Question 12 It is well settled that it is the responsibility of the jury, not the court, to assess the 13 weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 14 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). The question of whether a defendant has formed the requisite 15 intent to kill is a question for the jury. Zessman v. State, 94 Nev. 28, 573 P.2d 1174 (1978). 16 In Sharma v. State, 118 Nev. 648, 56 P.3d 868 (2002), this Court examined the theory of aiding and abetting as a basis for criminal liability, in relation to the "natural and probable 17 18 In Sharma, this Court disavowed the natural and probable consequence doctrine." 19 consequence doctrine since it permitted a defendant to be convicted of a specific intent crime 20 where that defendant did not actually possess the statutory intent to commit that particular 21 offense. Id. The Court reasoned: "[I]n order for a person to be held accountable for the 22 specific intent crime of another under an aiding or abetting theory of principal liability, the 23 aider or abettor must have knowingly aided the other person with the intent that the other 24 person commit the charged crime." Sharma v. State, 118 Nev. 648, 655, 56 P.3d 868, 872 25 (2002). In other words, for a defendant to be found guilty of a specific intent crime of another, under an aiding or abetting theory of liability, the defendant must have knowingly 26 27 // 28 //

aided the other person with intent that the other person actually commit the charged crime. The focus is on whether a defendant who aids and abets has the specific intent to carry out the specific criminal act which occurs.

In <u>Bolden v. State</u>, 121 Nev.\_\_, 124 P.3d 191 (2005), the Court extended its holding in <u>Sharma</u> to defendants charged under a theory of coconspirator liability.<sup>5</sup> This Court held that to prove a specific intent crime, under a vicarious co-conspirator liability theory, the "State must show that the defendant actually possessed the requisite statutory intent" to commit that particular offense. <u>Bolden</u>, 124 P.3d at 200-01. The Court cited <u>Sharma</u> and stated:

[O]ur overarching concern in <u>Sharma</u> centered on the fact that the natural and probable consequences doctrine regarding accomplice liability permits a defendant to be convicted of a specific intent crime where he or she did not possess the statutory intent required for the offense. We are of the view that vicarious coconspirator liability for the specific intent crimes of another, based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, presents the same problem addressed in Sharma, and we conclude that <u>Sharma's</u> rationale applies with equal force under the circumstances of the instant case.

Bolden, 124 P.3d at 200.

In short, a defendant cannot be held liable for his cohort's specific intent crime, unless the defendant had the requisite intent to aid that individual in the commission of the charged crime. However, the Court limited its holding to specific intent crimes only. The Court reasoned that:

The mental state required to commit a general intent crime does not raise the same concern as that necessary to commit a specific intent crime. General intent is "the intent to do that which the law prohibits. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended the precise harm or the precise result which eventuated." On the other hand, specific intent is "the intent to accomplish the precise act which the law prohibits." To hold a defendant criminally liable for a specific intent crime, Nevada requires proof that he possessed the state of mind required by the statutory definition of the crime. Although we affirm Bolden's conviction for the general intent crimes of home invasion and robbery, we conclude that in future prosecutions, vicarious coconspirator liability may be properly imposed for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In the present case, the information was filed prior to the <u>Bolden</u> decision. However, the State recognizes that Bolden requires a jury finding that co-conspirator possessed the requisite intent.

//

general intent crimes only when the crime in question was a "reasonably foreseeable consequence" of the object of the conspiracy.

Bolden v. State, 124 P.3d 191, 201 (Nev. 2005) (emphasis added).

Defendant Hidalgo and Espindola argued that to the extent that their clients only intended to harm but not kill Timothy Hadland, they can not be subject to the death penalty. It doesn't appear that this argument would apply to Defendant Carroll as he specifically intended a killing to occur. However, whether Defendant's intended to kill or harm is a question for the jury. If Defendants did not intend to kill Timothy Hadland, they would only be guilty of the general intent crime of Second Degree Murder, and as such, not eligible for the death penalty. As the district court noted, this is "what trials are about."

II.

# THE NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY SPECIFICALLY ASSERTS THE FACTS WHICH MAY BE UTILIZED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE CRIME WAS A MURDER INVOLVING A PECUNIARY GAIN.

# A. The Aggravating Nature of the Crime Supports the Aggravating <u>Circumstance</u>

Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola asserted that the State has failed to assert how it intends to prove that the murder involved pecuniary gain for Hidalgo and Espindola. While the Notices of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty do clearly spell out that information, it isn't relevant to determining whether information was contained in the Notices to support the aggravating circumstance. Defendants referenced many cases, laws and court rules,

<sup>6</sup> Defendants also assert that the beating being discussed was merely a simple battery which flies in the face of all of the evidence against all Defendants. Defendant Hidalgo, III specifically ordered deadly weapons to be used, and the force described by Defendant Espindola was "fuck him up, fuck him up and fuck up whoever's with him." That is certainly contemplating more force than a simple battery. However, should a jury agree, they would have the option of involuntary manslaughter; however remote the possibility.

<sup>7</sup> Defendant Carroll indicates that he wishes to include all of the arguments of the co-defendants. Defendant Carroll may not wish to do so. During oral arguments, Defendant Espindola indicated that they believed that all of the aggravators were appropriate against Defendant Carroll as he clearly had an intent to kill and obviously procured the killing by offering financial gain. Defendant Espindola claim centered more on the issue of whether the "intent to kill" could actually be established.

8

11

10

12 13

14 15

16

17 18

19

20 21

22 23

24

25

26 27 28

however, once again missed the facts in arguing to the Court that there aren't specific facts contained in the notice upon which the State will rely. See SCR 250(4)(c).

Initially, Defendants argued that the notice of intent is defined by a statute which requires certain language in Informations and Indictments. See NRS 173.075. How that statute is relevant to the discussion is never explained. Next, Defendants argued that cases related to Informations and Indictments somehow control the language necessary for a Notice of Intent to Seek an Indictment. In fact, statutorily, no notice need be provided if, as here, the aggravating circumstance is based upon the aggravating nature of the crime itself. See NRS 175.552(3) (...The State may introduce evidence of additional aggravating circumstances as set forth in NRS 200.033, other than the aggravated nature of the offense itself, only if it has been disclosed to the defendant before the commencement of the penalty hearing). However, Supreme Court Rule 250 requires that even where the aggravator is based on the crime itself, notice must be provided to Defendant. However, Defendants confused the requirements of SCR 250(4)(c) with the notice requirement which is found in SCR 250(4)(f) which requires a detailed list of evidence be submitted at least fifteen (15) days prior to trial.

Additionally, Defendants misapprehended the Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty. Defendants asserted that the Notice provides theories of criminal liability which do not support an intent to kill. Pursuant to SCR 250(4)(C), theories are not in the Notice but "allege(s) with specificity the facts on which the state will rely to prove each aggravating circumstance." The State alleged that it will prove that they hired Deangelo Carroll to "beat or kill" T.J. Hadland because those are the facts. They were to kill him if he was alone, or beat him severely if he was will someone else. If the trial reaches the point where a penalty phase occurs, then the State will have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendants held the specific intent to kill.

The aggravating circumstance upon which the State is relying is that this was a situation where there was a murder for hire as well as where some of the participants were seeking financial gain from the killing. NRS 200.033(6) states that an aggravating

circumstance is appropriate where, "The murder was committed by a person, for himself or another, to receive money or any other thing of monetary value."

As opposed to Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola, Defendant Carroll appears to be arguing that he cannot be held to the aggravating circumstance because he was not the person doing the hiring, and he did not do the killing. In fact, both of those assertions are false. Defendant was hired to kill Timothy Hadland. In furtherance of his employment, he acquired at least two people to assist him in the killing. Defendant Carroll created a ruse to lure T.J. to the deserted area. Defendant Carroll drove the vehicle to the location and had T.J. approach the driver's side of the car, as Defendant Counts exited the side of the van, snuck up next to T.J. and executed him. As such, he was an active participant in the crime and liable as being the person contracted to commit a killing.

However, that is not all of the liability for the aggravator that Defendant Carroll is subjected. Defendant Carroll not only was the person contracted to commit the killing, he hired the gunman to commit the crime. Much like a sub-contractor, Defendant Carroll not only was the hiree, he was the hiror. As such, he is liable for the aggravator. See <u>Wilson v. State</u>, 99 Nev. 362, 664 P.2d 328 (1983).

Defendant Hidalgo and Espindola's argument was that they merely hired Defendant Carroll to commit a beating, and therefore the aggravator did not apply. Defendant Carroll's argument is that he merely passed along the information that Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola wanted a killing done so the aggravator does not apply. All persons involved in a murder for hire are liable for the aggravator.

#### B. The Murder was a "Contract Type Killing"

Here, Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola appear to be arguing that they should not be subject to the death penalty because they had the financial ability to pay another person to do their dirty work, and that Defendant Carroll is not liable as he was able to pass some of the responsibility for some of the acts to a third person. In this case, Defendants argue that Kenneth Counts should face the death penalty for a murder conceived, solicited, planned, and purchased by the Defendants.

This court has held that the offer to pay a person to assist in the commission of a murder is sufficient to support the aggravating circumstance of NRS 200.033(6). Wilson v. State, 99 Nev. 362, 664 P.2d 328 (1983). In Wilson, **Defendant offered to pay** two other conspirators \$3500.00 to assist in the murder of an undercover police officer. <u>Id.</u> Pursuant to their agreement **Defendant gave** two co-conspirators \$3500.00 for stabbing the victim. Id. The court stated, "Under these circumstances, we find that the killing of Hoff was in the nature of a 'hired gun' situation; therefore we decline to consider whether the issue is **limited** to contract-type killings." Id. (emphasis added). Much like Wilson, Defendant Carroll actually participated in the crime, and his ability to get co-conspirators was directly tied to his ability to get them compensation for the crime. In this case, as in Wilson, Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola procured the murder by paying money to the person who physically committed the crime, both Defendant Carroll and Defendant Counts. Additionally, as in Wilson, Defendant Carroll was able to acquire his confederates by a promise of money. As such, his is also person who committed the hiring, and is therefore liable under Wilson. Therefore, they are eligible for the death penalty under NRS 200.033(6).

In addition, other courts have held that where a person is convicted of murder-for-hire, the one who does the hiring is subject to the financial gain aggravating circumstance in a capital case. People v. Padilla, 11 Cal 4<sup>th</sup> 891, 906 P.2d 388 (1995); See also, State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447 (Tenn. 2002)(holding that Gunman's and accomplice's testimony that defendant hired the gunman to kill the murder victim established that defendant employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, as aggravating circumstance at capital murder sentencing). See also, Harris v. State, 632 So.2d 503 (where a defendant has been convicted of the capital offense of murder for hire, even though that person was the hirer and was convicted of the offense as an accomplice pursuant to the complicity statute, the aggravating circumstance that the capital offense was

27

28

25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> California's financial gain aggravator reads "The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain." Cal. Penal Code 190.2(1).

committed for pecuniary gain is established as a matter of law). In fact, the California Supreme Court has held that it's financial gain statute, does not require that the murderer receive a direct financial gain as long as a financial gain is received by someone. *See* People v. Michaels, 49 P.3d 1032 (Cal. 2002).

# C. The Legislature Intended the Person who Conceived and Planned a Contract Killing to Face the Death Penalty

The Nevada financial gain statute that provides one of the circumstances that aggravate First Degree Murder states, "The murder was committed by a person, for himself or another, to receive money or any other thing of monetary value." NRS 200.033(6). When the language of the statute is plain, its intention must be deduced from the language and the court has no right to go beyond it. State v. Colosimo, 122 Nev. \_\_\_\_\_, 142 P.3d 352 (2006). Where the language of the statute is susceptible of a sensible interpretation, it is not to be controlled by extraneous considerations. Id. When a statute is susceptible to reasonable but inconsistent interpretations, the statute is ambiguous and the court will resort to statutory interpretation to discern legislative intent. State v. Kopp, 118 Nev. 199, 43 P.3d 340 (2002). A statute should be construed in light of public policy and the spirit of the law, and the interpretation should avoid an absurd result. Id. Moreover, this court has consistently held that it will resolve any doubt concerning the legislature's intent in favor of what is reasonable versus what is unreasonable. Id.

Here, it is clear that the Nevada Legislature intended to include murder for hire in the narrow class of crimes eligible for the death penalty. However, they did not differentiate between the payer and the payee. Nor did they attempt to exclude the payer, or in this case, a sub-contractor. In subsections (a) and (b) of NRS 200.033(4), the legislature qualified the general language of the statute to specifically exclude a person who did not either kill, attempt to kill, or have reason to know that a life would be taken or lethal force would be used from facing the death penalty. Clearly, this represents a decision by the legislature to further narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. In NRS 200.033(6) no such exclusion exists. Therefore, it is clear that the legislature intended that any person who

*1*  is found culpable in a murder for hire be subject to the death penalty.

Finally, it would be absurd to conclude that the Nevada Legislature intended to punish the hit man greater than the affluent person who conceived, planned, and organized the murder, or his employee who found someone else willing to pull the trigger. In the case that halted capital punishment in the United States, Justice Douglas observed, "One searches our chronicles in vain for the execution of any member of the affluent strata of our society." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 252, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2733 (1972)(Douglas, J. concurring). This court has heard countless appeals that assert that the death penalty is disproportionately applied to the socioeconomically disadvantaged. To determine that those who can afford to hire a hit man can escape punishment would result in a disproportionate and disparate treatment between individuals based solely on their economic status.

### D. <u>Defendants' Motive was Pecuniary Gain</u>

The State need not prove, although there is support for it in the evidence, that the motive for the murder was for Defendants Espindola and/or Hidalgo to receive money. The State need only prove that there was pecuniary gain by **someone** in the murder. Here, Kenneth Counts received \$6000.00 to kill the victim, and Defendant Carroll received \$100 for the killing. Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. H. wanted T.J. killed because he was hurting the business of the Palomino Club. Both Defendants Espindola and Hidalgo, as well as Defendant Carroll agreed and participated in the killing to help support the business, its owner and employees, of which Defendants are all three.

#### III.

# DEFENDANT CARROLL'S CONVICTION FOR CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY FOR A ROBBERY WHICH OCCURRED ON MAY 18, 2002 QUALIFIES AS A PRIOR CRIME OF VIOLENCE

Defendant Carroll asserts that his prior crime of violence does not qualify for an aggravator as his charge was conspiracy to commit robbery. In support, he asserted during argument that the the arguments presented by Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola that the Supreme Court is reviewing on the Solicitation To Commit Murder counts contained in the Information apply to him as well. The legal analysis for the solicitation charge is completely

Carroll.

different from that of the crime for which Defendant Carroll is subject to the aggravator. However, even if the Supreme Court were to strike the aggravators based upon Defendant Hidalgo and Espindola's argument, the aggravator would still be valid against Defendant

### A. NRS 200.033(2) is not Vague or Ambiguous

Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola argued that because Justice Maupin stated in a dissenting opinion that NRS 200.033(4) is vague and ambiguous, it must mean that a statute less specific must also be vague and ambiguous. Unfortunately, Defendants missed the import of Justice Maupin's conclusions. Justice Maupin, of which he eventually got a majority on the Court in McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. \_\_\_\_\_, 102 P.3d 606 (2004), was concerned that NRS 200.033(4) removed the intent requirement for a First Degree Murder conviction. As such, NRS 200.033(4) was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous because it allowed the execution of someone who did not have the requisite intent to be eligible for the death penalty, as well as did not narrow the category of individuals who did have such intent. Such a concern does not underlie NRS 200.033(2) because none of the factors which concerned Justice Maupin are part of NRS 200.033(2).

NRS 200.033(2) is premised on the fact that it is relevant to sentencing whether or not an individual was violent in an isolated incident or whether there was violence in the past or present:

In general, "[a] defendant's character and record are relevant to the jury's determination of the appropriate sentence for a capital crime." Pellegrini v. State, 104 Nev. 625, 630, 764 P.2d 484, 488 (1988). Accordingly, a murder is aggravated if it is committed by an individual previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another. NRS 200.033(2). Such a conviction evinces a propensity for violence and is relevant to a determination of the appropriate sentence; more than one such conviction is likewise relevant.

Riley v. State, 107 Nev. 205, 808 P.2d 551 (1991)(emphasis added). Certainly, a rule

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The main difference is that Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola argued that because the crime was merely a solicitation, and Defendant Carroll was now an agent of the State, no real threat of violence existed to the victims. Such doesn't hold true for Defendant Carroll who beat a man and stole his wallet.

## 

## 

promulgated to determine whether a person has a propensity for violence is not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous. Moreover, it significantly limits the number of people eligible for the death penalty as this circumstance isn't usually tied to the facts underlying the murder charge.

## B. Solicitation To Commit Murder Is Clearly A Crime Involving The Threat of Violence To A Person

Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola argued that merely asking someone to kill another person is not a threat of violence against the person who may be killed based upon the request. They assert "solicitation is a crime of communication, not violence, and the nature of the crime solicited does not transform the crime of solicitation into an aggravating circumstance." *citing* State v. Ysea, 956 P.2d 499 (Ariz. 1998)(superseded by statute as stated in State v. Martinez, 999 P.2d 795 (2000)). <sup>10</sup>

NRS 199.500 expressly categorizes the punishment for solicitation by the nature of the crime solicited. The statute provides "A person who counsels, hires, commands, or otherwise solicits another to commit murder, if no other criminal act is committed as a result of the solicitation, is guilty of a category B felony." NRS 199.500(2). In contrast, a person who solicits another to commit kidnapping or arson is guilty of a gross misdemeanor in the same circumstances. NRS 199.500(1). Examples of other crimes punishable as a Category B felony include: Robbery, NRS 200.380(2); Burglary, NRS 205.060(2); Kidnapping, NRS 200.310; First Degree Arson, NRS 205.005; and Home Invasion, NRS 205.067. Notably, these crimes are identified in NRS 200.033(4) as crimes involving the threat or use of violence. Other crimes which are deemed to be Category B felonies include: Aggravated Stalking, NRS 200.575<sup>11</sup>; Mayhem, NRS 200.280; and Battery with the Intent to Kill, NRS 200.400. Clearly, the categorization of solicitation to commit murder along with these

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> As opposed to Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola, Defendant did commit an act of violence in his prior crime. Additionally, unlike solicitation, the crime is not complete upon the making of the request but continues until the coconspirators have successfully concealed their crime. See <u>Crew v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 38, 675 P.2d 986 (1984).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> A person who commits the crime of stalking and in conjunction therewith threatens the person with the intent to cause him to be placed in reasonable fear of death or substantial bodily harm commits the crime of aggravated stalking.

crimes against a person<sup>12</sup> which all manifest the threat or use of violence, demonstrates the legislature's belief that the solicitation to kill another person is a crime of violence.

As discussed above, NRS 200.033(2) was enacted so that individuals who have a higher propensity to engage in dangerous violent activity are more eligible for the death penalty. *See* Riley v. State, 107 Nev. 205, 808 P.2d 551 (1991). In addition, NRS 200.033(2)(a) makes it an aggravating circumstance if you are guilty of another murder. Obviously, the conception, planning, and hiring of another person to commit the murder does not militate the propensity for violence. The mere fact that a person has the resources to use a "hired gun" as a weapon of violence, rather than pulling the trigger themselves does not speak to that person's lack of violent propensities. Rather, it speaks to financial resources to carry out the threat.

If a person solicits another to commit murder, and the solicitation is carried out, then NRS 200.033(2) would demand an aggravating circumstance. However, Defendants assert that that the interruption of the crime by police which prevented the murder from occurring entitled them to a finding that they should not face an aggravating circumstance. Clearly, the solicitation to commit murder manifests a criminal intent to kill and an inherent danger to society, regardless of whether the act of murder is carried out by the person solicited. As such, agreeing that Solicitation to Commit Murder is not a felony involving a threat to a person would lead to an unreasonable application of NRS 200.033(2) and defeat its purposes.

Notwithstanding, Defendants argued to the Supreme Court that non-binding Florida and Arizona cases support the proposition that Solicitation To Commit Murder is not a violent felony, while analysis of those cases clearly distinguishes them from the instant matter. In Lopez v. State, 864 So.2d 1151 (Fla.App.2d Dist. 2003), an intermediate appellate Florida state court interpreted a Florida state statute that defined the violent habitual criminal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The State notes that other crimes, which are not crimes against a person, are categorized as category B felonies. These crimes are not relevant as they manifest other legislative goals. i.e.; protection of financial interests, protection of certain industries.

allegation to mean that, Solicitation To Commit Murder did not qualify under the catch-all provision. To support their conclusion, the <u>Lopez</u> court relied upon <u>Elam v. State</u>, 636 So.2d 1312 (Fla.1994). In <u>Elam</u>, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Florida law required actual force inherent in the crime which is aggravated. The <u>Elam</u> court reasoned that actual force is not a necessary component of a solicitation, and then even a solicitation to do a violent act didn't qualify under Florida law.

The Nevada Supreme Court has rejected requiring force to be inherent in the aggravating crime. *See* Weber v. State, 121 Nev. \_\_\_\_, 119 P.3d 107 (2005). In Weber, Defendant had been convicted of a Sexual Assault. The Supreme Court noted that a Sexual Assault as defined in Nevada does not require actual force inherent in its commission. However, because of the implied force, the Sexual Assaults did qualify for use as prior violent felonies. The implication of the Nevada Supreme Court as well as the purpose behind the statute, NRS 200.033(2), would appear to require Solicitation to Commit Murder to be a prior violent conviction.

Moreover, in reviewing all of the authority relied upon by Florida, it doesn't appear that any other jurisdiction has referenced, let alone followed the referenced cases. Other States allow for a conviction for Solicitation to Commit Murder to be used as a prior felony conviction involving the threat of force on a person for purposes of an aggravating circumstance. *See, e.g.,* Woodruff v. State, 846 P.2d 1124, 1143 (Okl.Cr.1993) and People v. Edelbacher, 47 Cal.3d 983, 1032, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 616 (Cal.,1989). 13

Likewise, Defendants' reliance of <u>Ysea</u> is misplaced. In <u>Ysea</u>, the Arizona Supreme Court examined whether defense counsel was ineffective when he recommended to the defendant that he plead guilty to avoid a possible death sentence. <u>Ysea</u>, at 501. The court held that it was unreasonable, in 1986, for counsel to believe that a prior solicitation conviction could serve as an aggravating factor. <u>Id.</u> The <u>Ysea</u> court noted that its case law required that "to constitute an aggravating circumstance, the prior conviction must be for a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Federal law also considers solicitation to commit murder a prior violent felony based on the federal habitual criminal statute 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). <u>See U.S. v. Kaluna</u>, 192 F.3d 1188 (C.A.9 HI.1999).

13 14

16

18

19

21 22

23

24

25

26

27

28

felony which by its statutory definition involves violence or a threat of violence to another person. Id. at 502 (emphasis in original). At the time, Arizona's solicitation statute<sup>14</sup> only referred to non-specific felony and misdemeanor crimes. A.R.S. 13-1002. In Nevada, the solicitation statute clearly delineates the crime solicited to be murder. NRS 199.500(2).

In addition, the Ysea court noted that the crime solicited, aggravated assault, is not always a crime of violence because it may be committed recklessly or negligently and without either the intention or knowledge about injuring anyone. Therefore, an attorney's assumption that aggravated assault was automatically a crime of violence was not supported by any authority. Ysea, at 503. However, in this case, it cannot be credibly maintained that murder is not a crime of violence.

Further, the Arizona statute of solicitation is distinct from the Nevada statute and this particular case in one glaring respect. Hidalgo and Espindola did not merely communicate their desire to kill Taoipu and Zone; they "hired" the person to commit murder. Under every definition of the word "hire" there is a payment of money for a particular service. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Ed; Merriam Webster's Dictionary of Law; Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th Ed. The service in this case is the commission of murder. The act of hiring the person was not complete until the payment of money was made.

Finally, this Court, unlike the Ysea court, is not limited to the statutory definition of the crime to determine whether the crime is a crime of violence. Dennis v. State, 116 Nev. 1075, 13 P.3d 434 (2000); (holding that second degree arson was a crime involving the threat of violence where the state presented documentary evidence and the testimony of victims.); cf. Redeker v. Eighth Judicial District, 122 Nev. , 127 P.3d 520, 526 (2006)(holding that second degree arson was not an aggravating circumstance where there was no evidence presented to support the "threat" of violence). In criminal law, a threat

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The Arizona statute read, "A person commits solicitation if, with the intent to promote of facilitate the commission of a felony or misdemeanor, such person commands, encourages, requests, or solicits another person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute a felony or misdemeanor or which would establish the other's complicity in its commission." A.R.S. 13-1002.

requires actual intent: "a threat includes almost any kind of expression of *intent* by one person to do an act against another person, ordinarily indicating an *intention* to do harm." <u>Id.</u> (emphasis in original). The question of whether a defendant has formed the requisite intent is a question for the jury. <u>Zessman v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 28, 573 P.2d 1174 (1978).

The facts of the present case demonstrate Defendants' specific intention to harm the victims, Taoipu and Zone. First, the Defendants solicited an individual who had only days before committed a violent murder based upon their solicitation. They suggested that he use the same triggerman that he had used in the prior homicide. They provided their hit man with an instrumentality to cause the death of the victims. Thereafter, they paid their hit man for his services. In addition, they told their hit man that if the witnesses talked, Mr. H would kill everyone, providing substantial motivation over and above that associated with remuneration for their hit man to complete the job. Clearly, the jury could conclude that, in this case, the solicitation to commit murder constituted a threat of violence.

### C. The Status of the Person Solicited is not Relevant

Defendants additionally argue that because they did not know that the person they were soliciting to kill two people was working for the police; they should receive a benefit from their ignorance. Such an argument would not give effect to the purposes behind NRS 200.033(2), and is unsupported by hundreds of years of jurisprudence in this country. Mistake of fact is not a defense to a crime unless it negates a state of mind. See Model Penal Code Sec. 2.04(1)-(2); Adler v. State, 95 Nev. 339, 594 P.2d 725 (Nev.1979). The mere fact that they believed they were actually hiring a hit man as opposed to an agent of the police does not in any manner negate their intent. Moreover, as discussed above, it is the Defendants propensity for violence which allows for the convictions to be used as aggravating circumstances, not whether the violence in fact occurred. Therefore, to agree with Defendants would allow for Defendants who got lucky to receive a different sentence than Defendants that got unlucky. Nothing in any of the jurisprudence of capital cases suggests that embracing such a construction would further the objects of the sentencing scheme.

Finally, Defendants argue that this Courts holding in <u>Myatt</u> should be extended to the crime of Solicitation to Commit Murder. In <u>Myatt</u>, this Court held that an informant is a feigned accomplice and therefore cannot be a coconspirator. <u>Myatt v. Nevada</u>, 101 Nev. 761, 763, 710 P.2d 720, 722 (1985). <u>Myatt</u> is not relevant in this case. Conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more people for an unlawful purpose. <u>Id.</u> Solicitation to Commit Murder does not require an agreement. Therefore, the status of the person solicited is irrelevant. Therefore, Defendants arguments should be rejected.

## D. <u>Defendant Carroll's Prior Conspiracy To Commit Robbery Is An</u> Aggravating Circumstance Under Redeker

Unlike the argument made by Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola, Defendant Carroll can not make an argument that his crime is merely a crime of communication. Defendant Carroll committed the crime of Robbery, and as a plea negotiation, pled to Conspiracy to Commit Robbery. However, in the plea, Defendant Carroll admitted to the use of force or violence. Therefore, under <u>Redeker</u>, by definition, it is a crime of violence.

As discussed, *supra*, Nevada does not require that the crime being alleged to qualify necessarily have the use or threat of violence in its elements pursuant to <u>Dennis</u> and <u>Weber</u>. Where a crime is such that it may or may not involve crimes of violence, more than the elements may be utilized. In <u>Redeker</u>, the Court explain which secondary sources must be reviewed. In <u>Redeker</u>, the Court held that for purposes of circumstance aggravating first degree murder that the accused had been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another, in determining whether a felony involved use or threat of violence to person of another, court may consider the prior felony's statutory definition, charging document, jury instructions, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented, and cannot consider police reports or complaint applications. <u>Redeker v. Eighth Judicial</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Although, certainly, a Conspiracy To Commit Robbery, by its very elements requires such use or threat of violence. Nobody disputes that a robbery must involve the use or threat of violence. A conspiracy requires an agreement to use force or violence. As such, a threat of violence always exists in a conspiracy to commit robbery. Particularly one that results in a robbery.

Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 164, 127 P.3d 520, 526 (2006).

Here, not only is the charging document clearly indicate that Defendant Carroll did commit force or violence upon the person of Mr. Blodgett. He acknowledged it in the guilty plea agreement. He acknowledged that act he committed utilized force during the plea canvass. (See Exhibit 1, pp. 5-6). Additionally, Defendant's attorney acknowledged that the conspiracy portion of the plea was ficticious. In other words, he was pleading to committing a robbery, but getting sentenced under a Conspiracy to avoid a harsher punishment. Certainly, that qualifies not just under <u>Redeker</u> but as exactly the type of crime anticipated by the Court in <u>Riley</u>. <sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the "threat of force" is inherent in a Conspiracy to Commit Robbery. Robbery is the taking by use or threat of force. A Conspiracy is an agreement to take property by the use or threat of force. As threat is merely an indication of intent, clearly that intent is established by the elements. That, combined with the fact that a Conspiracy extends beyond the agreement to the acts committed in furtherance, including efforts to conceal the crime, clearly establishes that at least the "threat" of force is always a necessary element in any Conspiracy to Commit Robbery. However, even if the Court were to consider that some Conspiracy to Commit Robbery may not include the use or threat of force, the records conclusively demonstrates that force was used in the instant matter.

#### CONCLUSION

Defendant Carroll is not similarly situated as Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola, as even those Defendants agree Defendant Carroll clearly is eligible for the pecuniary gain aggravator. Additionally, the basis for Defendants Hidalgo and Espindola's argument that Solicitation to Commit Murder does not qualify as an aggravating circumstance is a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Defendant asserted during argument that State should be required to establish a case where the Nevada Supreme Court has conclusively determined that a Conspiracy count can be a prior crime of violence. No Court that could be found has ever directly addressed this issue in either direction. The only discussion is whether the force is necessary under the elements of the offense or whether the underlying facts are appropriate to consider. However, the distinction in either case is irrelevant in this case as by definition, force or the "threat" of force is inherent in the elements of a Conspiracy to Commit Robbery. In addition, in this case, actual force was used, which is an appropriate consideration under Nevada law.

1	substantially different argument than Defendant Carroll's argument as it relates to his prior	
2	violent felony conviction. Defendant Carroll not only committed the murder of T.J. Hadland	
3	for his own pecuniary gain, he was aware that all the other individuals involved were	
4	committing the murder for pecuniary gain. He is not only a person hired to commit the	
5	murder, but he procures associates to help in the murder for pecuniary gain. Additionally,	
6	his prior felony conviction involved actual violence upon his victim. As such, the Court	
7	should deny his Motion To Strike Death Penalty Aggravators.	
8	DATED this 4 <sup>TH</sup> day of October, 2007.	
9	Respectfully submitted,	
10	DAVID ROGER	
11	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781	
12	BY /s/MARC DiGIACOMO	
13	MARC DiGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955	
14	Nevada Bar #006955	
15	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION	
16	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing, was made this $4^{th}$ day of	
17	October, 2007, by facsimile transmission to:	
18		
19	BUNIN & BUNIN ATTN: DAYVID FIGLER, ESQ.	
20	FAX #386-0344	
21		
22	/s/L. GUDEMAN	
23	Employee, District Attorney's Office	
24		
25		
26		
27	05FB0052D/MVU/lg	
28		

3
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA; TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 2002
8:45 A.M.
PROCEEDINGS
* * * * * *
THE COURT: Deangilo Carrol? He's in
custody.
Is that your true name, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: How old are you?
THE DEFENDANT: 21.
THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
THE DEFENDANT: Graduated.
THE COURT: Do you read, write, and
understand the English language?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand what you're
being charged with?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you waive a formal reading of
the charges against you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Are you prepared to enter a
plea?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did you sign a guilty plea

9:45A

	4
1	agreement?
2	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
3	THE COURT: Did you read it before you
4	signed it?
5	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
6	THE COURT: Did you understand it before you
7	signed it?
8	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
9	THE COURT: Do you think signing this is in
10	your best interests?
11	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
12	THE COURT: Did you sign it freely and
13	voluntarily?
14	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
15	THE COURT: State retains the right to argue
16	at sentencing; do you understand that?
17	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
18	THE COURT: Has no opposition to dismissal
19	of case number 02F07421X. And do you understand that your
20	agreement is contingent upon three additional conditions,
21	a violation of any one of which would allow the state to
22	argue at the time of sentencing?
23	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
24	THE COURT: Do you also understand, sir,
25	that as a result of your plea today you're looking at up

	]
1	to six years in prison?
2	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
3	THE COURT: And/or you'd be required to pay
4	an administrative assessment fee, restitution if
5	appropriate; do you understand that?
6	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
7	THE COURT: Did you sign this on page 5?
8	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
9	THE COURT: We note that fact.
10	We note the district attorney has signed off
11	on the same page.
12	We note your attorney has signed off on the
13	next page.
14	What did you do on or about May 18th of this
15	year that caused you to plead guilty to the crime of
16	conspiracy to commit robbery?
17	THE DEFENDANT: We attempted to take a
18	wallet, sir.
19	THE COURT: By means of force or fear?
20	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
21	THE COURT: Without the consent and against
22	the will of the owner of that wallet?
23	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
24	THE COURT: Here in Clark County, State of
25	Nevada?

9:46A

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 1 THE COURT: This is a fictitious plea? 2 3 MS. HUA: Yes, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right. The Court finds your 5 entry of guilty plea is freely and voluntarily made. We further find that you understand the 6 7 nature of the offense and the consequences of your plea. 8 We, therefore, accept your guilty plea. 9 MS. HUA: Your Honor, I have a question 10 about his bail status. The justice court had lowered his 11 bail down from \$10,000 to \$5,000. 12 However, I don't think the computer shows 13 that. Furthermore, Mr. Carrol would like the Court to 14 consider an O.R. for him. I don't have an intake service 15 report. We ordered one. I don't know if the Court has 16 one. But Mr. Carrol has no felony priors and according to his scope he has only one failure to appear. 17 MS. BROWN: Your Honor, well, certainly, we 18 19 won't oppose enforcing the order of justice court if that 20 was, in fact, the order. I don't have it in my notes. But we would request that any further reduction be put in 21 22 writing and we have a chance to respond in light of the 23 serious nature of the charges. 24 THE CORRECTIONAL OFFICER: I'm still showing 25 bail \$10,000.

9:47A

	1	THE COURT: Make if \$5,000. Since he
	2	entered a guilty plea.
	3	And you say you didn't get anything from
	4	intake.
	5	MS. HUA: We ordered intake but we haven't
	6	received a report yet.
	7	THE COURT: Why don't we order an intake and
	8	pass it to Thursday.
	9	Thank you very much.
	10	MS. BROWN: Request the motion be put in
	11	writing so we can respond in writing.
	12	THE COURT: Sure. Will do you that?
	13	MS. HUA: Sure.
	14	THE COURT CLERK: June 20th at 8:45 for
	15	sentencing as well as intake service for O.R. release.
	16	
9:48A	17	
	18	(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS WERE
	19	CONCLUDED)
	20	* * * * * *
	21	
	22	
	23	
	24	
	25	

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	STATE OF NEVADA)
3	:SS COUNTY OF CLARK)
4	I, PEGGY ISOM, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER,
5	DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I TOOK DOWN IN STENOTYPE ALL OF THE
6	PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE BEFORE-ENTITLED MATTER AT THE TIME
7	AND PLACE INDICATED, AND THAT THEREAFTER SAID STENOTYPE
8	NOTES WERE TRANSCRIBED INTO TYPEWRITING AT AND UNDER MY
9	DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION AND THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPT
10	CONSTITUTES A FULL, TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD TO THE BEST
11	OF MY ABILITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS HAD.
12	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO
13	SUBSCRIBED MY NAME IN MY OFFICE IN THE COUNTY OF CLARK,
14	STATE OF NEVADA.
15	
16	Dogg is love
17	PEGGY ISOM, RMR, CCR 541
18	PEGGI ISOM, RMR, CCR 541
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	

1	TRAN		FILED	
2				
3			Jan 22 4 ou PM *08	
4		STRICT COURT	CRICE	
5	CLARK	COUNTY, NEVADA	CLERIT THE COURT	
6				
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	)		
8	Plaintiff,	) ) CASE NO. C2	12667	
9	vs.	) DEPT. XXI )	Ŧ	
10	DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL	, <u>)</u>		
11	Defendant.	)		
12		)		
13		<del></del>		
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE V	ALERIE ADAIR, DISTI	RICT COURT JUDGE	
15	TUESDA	Y, OCTOBER 9, 2007		
16		TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE: CARROLL'S MOTION TO STRIKE		
17	N 499 W M	NALTY AGGRAVATOR		
18				
19	ADDEADANGEO			
20	APPEARANCES:	MARO BIOMOGNO	500	
21	FOR THE STATE:	MARC DIGIACOMO Deputy District Attors		
22	FOR THE DEFENDANT:	DAYVID J. FIGLER,	ESQ.	
23		•		
24				
<sup>25</sup> <b>A</b>	FREUSEBED BY: JANIE L. OLSEN,	COURT RECORDER	/TRANSCRIBER	
J	N 2 2 2008			
CLERK	OF THE COURT	-1-		

-1-

**Volume 2 – 296** 

THE COURT: This is the Deangelo Carroll matter. I've reviewed everything.

Does anyone have anything they'd like to add to what's already been

provided to the Court?

MR. FIGLER: I would, Your Honor, just like to respond orally to the State's opposition. We did receive it on Thursday. I honestly didn't expect it was going to

THE COURT: I know. I thought they kind of outdid themselves this time.

MR. FIGLER: I thought they did, but maybe just they protest a little too lengthily.

be 30 pages long, but I have had the opportunity to review it.

THE COURT: Well, actually, Mr. Figler, I have to tell you, everything I thought of, I thought, well, what about this, well, what about that, was addressed in the State's response.

MR. FIGLER: Well, I would like to point out two things, Your Honor, and then whatever order Your Honor was going to give and then obviously this is what we've been waiting for --

THE COURT: And go rushing upstairs.

MR. FIGLER: -- to go rush upstairs. I have an oral argument there tomorrow so maybe I'll just kill two birds with one stone.

Nonetheless, Judge, there's two things I wanted to point out to Your Honor before Your Honor was to rule.

With regard to the State's averment of facts, they do a really outstanding job in giving a record citation to pretty much every fact except for the one where they suggest that the pecuniary gain for Mr. Carroll was \$100. There is

averment that they make they do have a record citation, and that's because I believe it's at best implied and certainly doesn't fit in with any sort of realistic analysis of the actual facts of the case or something that would put someone on the hook for receiving money.

They have the allegation that Mr. Counts had received \$9,000 to do this

no fact or record citation for that particular averment, and yet for every other

murder, and then as an afterthought they state that Mr. Carroll received a hundred dollars, and yet there is no record citation as I'm looking through it yet again.

There's just no record citation that Mr. Carroll received a hundred dollars for his participation. They actually state it twice, and both times there's no record citation for it.

Secondly, you know, in this case at the crux of it is that Mr. Carroll was the conduit. Mr. Carroll is not accused of doing the murder, and Mr. Carroll is not accused of being the person who was going to receive or who put it in motion --

THE COURT: But as I understand the State's theory is that Mr. Carroll was retained, if you will, to do this, and then Mr. Carroll either wanted help or decided, well, hey, I'm not going to do it myself; I'm going to get these other people to do it, and so was -- I mean, is essentially that.

So to me I don't know that that's really a defense that, well, he didn't want to do it himself for whatever reason, or he needed help to do it, and so he got these other people to do it.

MR. FIGLER: Well, and here's the thing is that if you -- a strict reading of the statute even by its plain language doesn't contemplate a conspirator or an aiding or abettor liability.

It's very straight, a person for lawful money, etcetera. If they can't

prove that Mr. Carroll was to receive the pecuniary gain or that Mr. Carroll was the one who was paying the money, then I think it does fall into an ambiguity which by interpretation of the statute would have to go towards the defendant's favor.

So first of all factually --

THE COURT: Well, I agree with you, Mr. Figler. I mean, I think that they have to prove that Mr. Carroll stood to gain somehow financially by this. It's not a threshold amount of any particular amount.

But I disagree that, you know, to me if he, you know, gets asked to do it and then asks someone else to do it, I don't know that that necessarily is outside of the --

MR. FIGLER: Well, I mean, and that's the ultimate question which we're asking Your Honor to rule on with regard to the interpretation as far as it goes to the favor of defendant when there's any ambiguity.

I think when they are talking about that hundred dollars, they're talking about a hundred dollars that the codefendant Espindola gave to Mr. Carroll which later in the factual pleading by the State they said was to replace the tires on the van that was owned by the Palomino Club.

So above and beyond that hundred dollars that there is a record citation to that was given to Mr. Carroll to replace the tires on the vehicle with the facts most favorable to the prosecution, that's where that hundred dollars comes from.

So there's no averment with any record citation above and beyond that hundred dollars which was to the benefit of the Palomino Club. This wasn't even Mr. Carroll's personal van. This was a van that was registered to the club itself.

They just don't have any actual gain on the part of Mr. Carroll. Now, they do talk about later when Mr. Carroll was in a different situation after there was

police surveillance, etcetera, that he had received some money to go kill the coconspirators, but that's not the aggravator for this particular case.

So with regard to that issue, I just don't think factually they have it, and I think there's enough of an ambiguity that the conduit by way of a conspirator or an aider and abettor-type liability doesn't apply to Mr. Carroll, and therefore, that aggravator shouldn't apply to Mr. Carroll.

And then secondly or finally, with the regard to the other aggravator that Mr. Carroll had previously been convicted of a crime of violence, there's a lot of problems with that in that first of all the plea was a fictional plea.

Secondly --

THE COURT: Right because --

MR. FIGLER: -- but there were other people who were involved, and if you look at the actual language in the plea agreement, what Mr. Carroll basically says is, I attempted to take the wallet. I attempted to take the wallet.

And then the Court asked, Was that by use -- by means of force or fear, and he said, Yes, sir.

So quite frankly, a conspiracy or an attempt to take somebody's wallet by use of fear versus force to qualify that person because of that factual averment to get the death penalty seems to be a little far fetched as well, Your Honor, which makes me go back to my original, you know, very simple expression of dissatisfaction with the way that the State has proceeded in this case and that this is not a death penalty case, that Mr. Carroll did not kill anybody by his hand, that Mr. Carroll did not put the wheels in motion with regard to the desire to have Mr. Hadland dead and that Mr. Carroll's prior conviction was for something relatively so minor that it should not qualify him for the death penalty in this particular case.

THE COURT: I don't know if his conviction is something -- is for something relatively minor.

I mean, here's the thing, Mr. Figler. I would agree with you totally that if all it was was a conspiracy and nothing ever happened in furtherance of that, they just -- or the minimal -- something minimal happened in furtherance of that, you didn't get to actually violence or fear or something like that then, yeah, I think you might have a question.

But here, you know, the State did get him to admit to these various things that I think pushes you beyond just simply having an agreement and some simple steps toward furthering that.

Mr. DiGiacomo, do you have anything you want to add?

MR. DIGIACOMO: Just briefly. Judge, the only reason for the length of it is I know Mr. Figler's going to take this up, and clearly both the other codefendants have completely separate arguments from Mr. Figler.

As to the hundred dollars, so the record's completely clear, a good lawyer saying there's no citation in the record, well, he waived his prelim so his statement isn't in the record where he says, I got two, 100 dollar bills, one to pay for the tires and the hundred bucks where I took all the other co-conspirators or one co-conspirator and one witness out to breakfast with it. So there's substantial evidence of him actually receiving money.

And the last thing on that subject matter, if it only applied to the guy receiving money, then the aggravator wouldn't say, Or any other person received something of value. So obviously the aggravator includes more than that, and the Supreme Court has said so.

And lastly as to the conspiracy argument, well, he says, I attempted to

take it in the actual plea canvass. His plea agreement which he signed says, I admit all the facts which is, I did take it by force or violence, and that's in the Information, and I'll submit it to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. A couple of things. I'm going to consider this as to both further. I mean, I think I've sort of indicated my opinion, but I'm going to think about it. So you won't be able to run upstairs today, Mr. Figler, or to Carson City or wherever it is you need to go.

MR. FIGLER: Well, the fact that you're giving thought to it, Judge, is encouraging to the defense.

THE COURT: All right. Now, having said that, assuming you don't prevail, I'm not inclined to stay the case against Mr. Deangelo Carroll down here. So, I mean, obviously you can seek a stay in the Supreme Court if you want to do that, but assuming that's not granted, Mr. Figler, are you actively still preparing to go forward with the date that we had last set?

MR. FIGLER: We're actively doing that, Judge, and we will give you status updates --

THE COURT: Have there been any monkey wrenches thrown in your active preparation that you need to make either Mr. DiGiacomo or the Court aware of at this point in time so there's no surprises?

MR. FIGLER: We have retained Dr. Roitman. He is reviewing what he needs to do. He is setting a schedule with regard to Mr. Carroll.

The FBI did send us a Go-to-H letter with regard to our request for any access to the special agent who -- Shields -- who was involved in the -- in the investigation latter part with regard to Mr. Carroll. We felt that we had an absolute right to that discovery. They said, no, you don't.

We're going through the hoops with regard to the Freedom of Information Act. We're going through the hoops with regard to affidavit support for discovery and for information.

We're also going to be submitting an order to Your Honor to see if all that will allow them to loosen up for Special Agent Shields to at a minimum talk to us.

THE COURT: Yeah, it may just be that they want a court order on that. I don't know what the State's position is going to be, and --

MR. FIGLER: But we'll jump through all those hoops, and I'll keep --

THE COURT: -- they obviously have a right to be heard on that issue before the Court signs anything, I mean, it's not going to be an ex parte thing clearly.

And --

MR. FIGLER: No, and I'll keep Mr. DiGiacomo apprised --

THE COURT: -- you know, they may have someone from the US Attorney's office that wants to weigh in on that and not rely solely on Mr. DiGiacomo.

No disrespect, Mr. DiGiacomo.

MR. DIGIACOMO: That's fine. They've ignored my subpoenas before too, Judge.

THE COURT: So anyway, Mr. Figler, you're going forward on that in a timely manner?

MR. FIGLER: We're doing everything we can, and we'll keep the Court apprised of everything as it occurs.

THE COURT: All right. We'll make sure to have something decided by Thursday, but nobody needs to come back.

MR. FIGLER: Thank you. As long as we're informed of that so we can act

1	appropriately. I appreciate it, Your Honor. Appreciate your time.
2	THE COURT: Absolutely.
3	Thank you, Mr. DiGiacomo.
4	MR. DIGIACOMO: Thank you, Judge.
5	<b>-</b> oOo-
6	ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
7	audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
8	Jani Lolls
9	JANIE L. OLSEN RECORDER/TRANSCRIBER
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

Electronically Filed 11/14/2007 01:51:50 PM

1	NISD		CRay 805
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney		CLERK OF THE COURT
3	Nevada Bar #002781  MARC DIGIACOMO  Chief Deputy District Attorney		
4	Nevada Bar #006955 200 Lewis Avenue		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2211 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		
7	DISTRIC	CT COURT	
8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	INTY, NEVADA	
9	Plaintiff,	) CASE NO:	C212667
10	-vs-	DEPT NO:	XXI
11	DEANGELO CARROLL, #1678381	) BELLINO.	7771
12	πιστούσοι	{	
13	Defendant.	}	
14			

### AMENDED NOTICE OF EVIDENCE IN AGGRAVATION

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada by Clark County District Attorney DAVID ROGER, through MARC DIGIACOMO, Chief Deputy District Attorney, pursuant to Rule 250(4)(f) of the Nevada Supreme Court, hereby gives notice of the existence of the following evidence in aggravation to be presented at the penalty phase of the trial:

1. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony, to-wit: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY.

The evidence will consist of certified copies of judgments of conviction showing that Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL was convicted in Clark County, Nevada, on September 9, 2002, of the felony offense of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY in case number

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

200.033(2)(b)].

The testimony of the victim Steven Blodgett and/or police officers and/or other witnesses and/or exhibits, will be offered in support of this aggravating circumstance. Furthermore, the underlying facts of the conviction indicate that on or about May 18, 2002, Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to-wit: a wallet, contents and lawful money of the United States, from the person of Steven Blodgett, or in his presence, by means of force or violence, or fear of injury to, and without the consent and against the will of the said Steven Blodgett, to-wit: by Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL beating Steven Blodgett with his fists; thereafter, by his co-conspirator continuing to beat Steven Blodgett while defendant DEANGELO CARROLL removed a wallet from the boot of Steven Blodgett, thereafter, Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL fleeing from the scene with the property. [See NRS

2. The murder was committed by a person, for himself or another, to receive money or any other thing of monetary value, to-wit: by ANABEL ESPINDOLA (a manager of the PALOMINO CLUB) and/or LUIS HILDAGO, III (a manager of the PALOMINO CLUB) and/or LUIS HILDAGO, JR. (the owner of the PALOMINO CLUB) procuring Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL (an employee of the PALOMINO CLUB) to beat and/or kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; and/or LUIS HILDAGO, JR. indicating that he would pay to have a person either beaten or killed; and/or by LUIS HILDAGO, JR. procuring the injury or death of TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND to further the business of the PALOMINO CLUB; and/or LUIS HIDALGO, III telling Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL to come to work with bats and garbage bags; thereafter, Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL procuring KENNETH COUNTS and/or JAYSON TAOIPU to kill TIMOTHY HADLAND; thereafter, by KENNETH COUNTS shooting TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; thereafter, LUIS HIDALGO, JR. and/or ANABEL ESPINDOLA providing six thousand dollars (\$6,000.00) to Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL to pay KENNETH COUNTS, thereafter, KENNETH COUNTS receiving said money; and/or by ANABEL ESPINDOLA providing two hundred dollars (\$200.00) to Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL and/or by ANABEL ESPINDOLA

///

and/or LUIS HIDALGO, III providing fourteen hundred dollars (\$1400.00) and/or eight hundred dollars (\$800.00) to Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL and/or by ANABEL ESPINDOLA agreeing to continue paying Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL twenty-four (24) hours of work a week from the PALOMINO CLUB even though DEANGELO CARROLL had terminated his position with the club and/or by LUIS HIDALGO, III offering to provide United States Savings Bonds to Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL and/or his family. [See NRS 200.033(6)].

The basis for this aggravator is the aggravated nature of the crime itself. The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony and exhibits introduced during the guilt or penalty phase of the trial, as well as the verdicts from the guilt phase.

Regarding the establishment of aggravating circumstances under **Subsection 6 of NRS 200.033**, the State will rely upon the evidence to be adduced at the Guilt Phase of the Jury Trial. The State will file one or more witness lists in conformance with the Nevada Revised Statutes. The State has provided full discovery in this matter regarding said witnesses in this case. Rule 250(4)(f) requires filing of this Notice to summarize the evidence which the State intends to introduce at the "Penalty Phase" of the trial. Therefore, regarding establishment of aggravating circumstances under **Subsection 6 of NRS 200.033**, said Notice need not and does not summarize any evidence in addition to that which has already been identified and disclosed to the defense, and/or to be introduced or disclosed during the Guilt Phase of the Jury Trial.

The Defense is hereby invited to re-examine the file of the Clark County District Attorney for any and all discoverable information and evidence.

In addition to the evidence to be offered to establish the statutory aggravating circumstances, the State hereby also gives notice of evidence of other relevant circumstances in the Penalty Phase of the Jury Trial. Below, is a list of names of the individuals that will give testimony in support of the aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b) and the other circumstances and specifically what they will testify to:

1.	ALAN HADLAND, the victim's son, may appear and testify pursuant to NRS
176.015.	Photographs of the victim and his family may be admitted during the testimony of
this witne	ess.

- 2. ALEX HADLAND, the victim's son, may appear and testify pursuant to NRS 176.015. Photographs of the victim and his family may be admitted during the testimony of this witness.
- 3. ELENA HADLAND, the victim's daughter, may appear and testify pursuant to NRS 176.015. Photographs of the victim and his family may be admitted during the testimony of this witness.
- 4. JENNIFER HADLAND, the victim's daughter, may appear and testify pursuant to NRS 176.015. Photographs of the victim and his family may be admitted during the testimony of this witness.
- 5. DORI LUKKER, the victim's former wife, may appear and testify to circumstances relative to the victim as provided in NRS 175.552. Photographs of the victim and his family/friends may be admitted during the testimony of this witness.
- 6. PAJIT KARSON, the victim's girlfriend at the time of his murder, may appear and testify to circumstances relative to the victim as provided in NRS 175.552. Photographs of the victim and his family/friends may be admitted during the testimony of this witness.
- 7. CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS CLARK COUNTY DETENTION CENTER May testify and admit disciplinary records of Defendant while at the Clark County Detention Center pending trial. Specifically, the records reflect a number of rules violations, including the harassment of a fellow prisoner and a statement of intent to assault and/or batter another inmate in December of 2005.
- 8. CORRECTIONS OFFICER DENTON, P#8228 May testify to his involvement in the investigation of Defendant for rules violation including, but not limited to, his harassment of a fellow inmate and a statement of intent to assault and/or batter another inmate in December of 2005.
  - 9. LVMPD OFFICER D. VERSHALL, P#6350 and A. ECKEL, P#6929 May

testify to their investigation of a Conspiracy to Commit Robbery and Robbery under LVMPD event number 020518-0793, to which Defendant was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery in C184573. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including by not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD and/or the Clark County District Attorney's Office, including a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in case number C184573 and/or records of the Department of Parole and Probation, including a copy of the pre-sentence investigation report.

- 10. STEPHEN BLODGETT Victim, may appear and testify regarding the Conspiracy to Commit Robbery and Robbery under LVMPD event number 020518-0793, to which Defendant was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery in C184573. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD and/or the Clark County District Attorney's Office including a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in case number C184573 and/or records of the Department of Parole and Probation, including a copy of the presentence investigation report.
- 11. CAVE CHRISTOPHER, RICHARD HARDMAN, JERRY FERGUSON, LELAND HEN and SHARICE LOUKISHA Witnesses, may appear and testify regarding the Conspiracy to Commit Robbery and Robbery under LVMPD event number 020518-0793, to which Defendant was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery in C184573. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD and/or the Clark County District Attorney's Office, including a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in case number C184573 and/or records of the Department of Parole and Probation including a copy of the pre-sentence investigation report.
  - 12. LVMPD N. CHIO, P#5109 and J. PANNULLO, P#5455 May testify to their

investigation of a Possession of Stolen Vehicle under LVMPD event #000316-1323, in which Defendant was in possession of a stolen water truck, CA license CP59107. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD. This case not proceeded upon by the Clark County District Attorney's Office.

- 13. LVMPD OFFICER HICKS, P#6419 May testify to his investigation of a Possession of an Unregistered Firearm and Discharge of that Firearm under LVMPD event number 00119-2091, in which Defendant was in possession of an unregistered 9mm Parabellum, serial number R41512, which he discharged at 4817 Boulder Highway, Las Vegas, Nevada, which Defendant claimed he purchased off the street. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD as well as records of the Clark County District Attorney's Office or the Las Vegas Justice Court in case number 00M25388X. On June 7, 2001, Defendant pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge of possession of an unregistered firearm in 00M25388X.
- 14. CITY OF LAS VEGAS MARSHALL'S OFFICERS D. MAJOR, P#653, PEQUEEN, P#215 and R. ADAMS, P#603 May testify as to their investigation under event number 20020424-0003, in which Defendant was found to be in possession of marijuana, one bag of which Defendant claimed was his "personal stash," eight bags of individually wrapped marijuana, and a bag of twenty-four (24) pink pills, Defendant claimed were ecstasy. Officers may further testify that he responded to the Downtown Transportation Center in a response to a call from BILL BETTS, claiming that a person was attempting to sell drugs at that location. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD and/or Clark County District Attorney's Office. This case was dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations in

2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 0 |

///

16. LVMPD OFFICER LEDBETTER P#4984 – May testify to his investigation of
a Conspiracy to Commit Robbery and Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon under event
number 970125-0827 where Defendant, and two co-conspirators robbed JASON BRANDT
and MICHAEL PARRISH with a small black handgun. Said testimony will incorporate and
admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records,
physical evidence, photographs, reports or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD
and/or the Clark County District Attorney's Office. On May 20, 1997, Defendant was
adjudicated a delinquent for Conspiracy to Commit Robbery With A Deadly Weapon and
was committed to the Nevada Youth Training Center in Elko for one year. On May 20,
1998, Defendant was released on parole. In November 1998, his parole was revoked. In
November of 1999, he was released on parole again, and three months later, his parole was
terminated.

- 17. JASON BRANDT and MICHAEL PARRISH Victims, and may testify to Defendant and two co-conspirators robbing them at gunpoint on January 25, 1997, which was documented under LVMPD event number 970125-0827. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD, the Clark County District Attorney's Office, and/or the Nevada Department of Parole and Probation.
- 18. LVMPD OFFICER CANNON, P#6620 May testify to his investigation of Defendant for speeding, suspended driver's license and possession of marijuana under LVMPD event number 020516-2841. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD, the Clark County District Attorney's Office and/or the North Las Vegas Justice Court. Defendant pled guilty to speeding in case number 02MN0578X.

28

111

///

1	As to all of the items referenced in this notice are part of the Clark County District
2	Attorney's file. This notice hereby incorporates by reference all discovery in the case
3	submitted to counsel. Defendant's counsel is invited to come to the Office of the District
4	Attorney and review the file to ensure that they have all items listed in this notice.
5	DATED this 14 <sup>th</sup> day of November, 2007.
6	Respectfully submitted,
7	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781
8	Nevada Bar #002781
9 10	BY /s/ MARC DIGIACOMO
11	MARC DIGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955
12	Nevada Bar #006955
13	
14	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
15	I hereby certify that service of AMENDED NOTICE OF EVIDENCE IN
16	<b>AGGRAVATION</b> , was made this $14^{TH}$ day of November, 2007, by facsimile
17	transmission to:
18	
19	DAYVID FIGLER, ESQ. 386-0344
20	300-0344
21	/s/D. Daniels Secretary for the District Attorney's
22	Office Office
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

Volume 2 - 314

.	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion To Strike Death Penalty
1	Aggravators, shall be, and it is Denied.
2	
3	DATED this _27 day of November, 2007.
4	161 . 20.
5	DISTRICT JUDGE
6	
7	DAMD BOCCD
8	DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY
9	Nevada Bar #002781
10	
11	MARC DIGIALOMO
12	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

27

28

dd

Electronically Filed 01/09/2008 04:22:50 PM

1 2 3 4	NISD DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 GIANCARLO PESCI Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #007135		CLERK OF THE COURT
5 6	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		
7	D. 10 m		
8		RICT COURT DUNTY, NEVADA	
9			
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	)	
11	Plaintiff,	Case No.	C212667
12	-VS-	) Dept No.	XXI
13	DEANGELO CARROLL		
14	#1678381		
15	Defendant.	)	
16	AMENDED NOTICE O	— F EVIDENCE IN SUI	PPORT OF

# AMENDED NOTICE OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, through DAVID ROGER, Clark County District Attorney, by and through GIANCARLO PESCI, Chief Deputy District Attorney, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 250, NRS 175.552 and NRS 200.033, and declares its intention to present the following evidence in support of aggravating circumstance at a penalty hearing. Furthermore, the State of Nevada discloses that it will present evidence of the following aggravating circumstances:

1. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony, to-wit: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY.

The evidence will consist of certified copies of judgments of conviction showing that DEFENDANT DEANGELO CARROLL was convicted in Clark County, Nevada, on September 9, 2002, of the felony offense of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY in case number C184573. The testimony of the victim Steven Blodgett and/or police officers and/or other witnesses and/or exhibits, will be offered in support of this aggravating circumstance. Furthermore, the underlying facts of the conviction indicate that on or about May 18, 2002, DEFENDANT DEANGELO CARROLL did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property, to-wit: a wallet, contents and lawful money of the United States, from the person of Steven Blodgett, or in his presence, by means of force or violence, or fear of injury to, and without the consent and against the will of the said Steven Blodgett, to-wit: by DEFENDANT DEANGELO CARROLL beating Steven Blodgett with his fists; thereafter, by his co-conspirator continuing to beat Steven Blodgett while DEFENDANT DEANGELO CARROLL removed a wallet from the boot of Steven Blodgett, thereafter, DEFENDANT DEANGELO CARROLL fleeing from the scene with the property.

2. The murder was committed by a person, for himself or another, to receive money or any other thing of monetary value. to-wit by:

On or about May 19, 2005, the owner of the Palomino Club, Luis Hidalgo, Jr., located at 1848 North Las Vegas Boulevard, made it known to Deangelo Carroll, an employee of the Palomino Club, that he would pay someone to kill Timothy Jay Hadland, who was a former employee of the club. Luis Hidalgo, Jr., was angry with the victim, Timothy Jay Hadland, because after his firing from the club, Timothy Jay Hadland was hurting the club's business by "bad mouthing" the club by spreading rumors about Luis Hidalgo Jr., and about the club. Timothy Jay Hadland had a lot of contact with cab drivers and was telling cabbies not to bring their fares to the club in retaliation for his firing. The Palomino Club is not located on the Strip and its business relies heavily on customers being brought to the club by cabs. The club was losing money because of Timothy Jay Hadland's actions and as such Luis Hidalgo Jr., wanted him killed so that he, his business, and his employees would be better off

financially by the increased flow of clients after Timothy Jay Hadland was silenced. Based upon this initial conversation, Deangelo Carroll procured the assistance of Jayson Taoipu to commit the murder.

On the same date, after the initial conversation, Luis Hidalgo, III, a manager of the Palomino Club, called Deangelo Carroll and told him to come to the club and "bring baseball bats and garbage bags." When Defendant Carroll arrived at the Palomino Club, Defendant Espindola and Luis Hidalgo, Jr., hired Deangelo Carroll to kill Timothy Jay Hadland. After conveying this information and procuring Deangelo Carroll, Deangelo Carroll went to 1676 "E" Street to the residence of Kenneth Counts and enlisted Defendant Kenneth Counts to kill Timothy Jay Hadland. Defendant Deangelo Carroll then drove Defendants Kenneth Counts and Jayson Taoipu, as well as witness Rontae Zone, out to the area of North Shore Road at Lake Mead, where Defendant Kenneth Counts shot and killed Timothy Jay Hadland.

After the killing, the group drove back to the Palomino Club and Defendant Deangelo Carroll entered the club with Defendant Kenneth Counts. Defendant Deangelo Carroll went into Luis Hidalgo Jr.'s office and met with him and Defendant Anabel Espindola. At that time Defendant Deangelo Carroll announced that, "it was done" and that Defendant Kenneth Counts wanted to be paid. Luis Hidalgo Jr., then told Defendant Anabel Espindola to get the money, which Defendant Anabel Espindola did and which she provided to Defendant Deangelo Carroll who then provided the six thousand dollars (\$6,000) to Defendant Kenneth Counts. Defendant Kenneth Counts then left the club in a cab and Luis Hidalgo Jr., and Defendant Anabel Espindola then discussed with Defendant Deangelo Carroll what he should say if the police spoke to him. Additionally, Defendant Anabel Espindola and/or Luis Hidalgo, III, provided hundreds of dollars to Defendant Deangelo Carroll for his part in the crime.

These facts support the aggravator because the murder was committed for the purpose of improving the profits to the business and the employees of the Palomino Club. The owner of the club, Luis Hidalgo Jr., perceived that profits were being hurt by the victim, Timothy Jay Hadland "bad mouthing" him and the club. As such, Luis Hidalgo Jr., used employees,

Defendants Anabel Espindola, Luis Hidalgo, III, and Deangelo Carroll to carry out his wishes. Defendant Deangelo Carroll, as an employee of the Palomino Club would receive, "money or any other thing of monetary value" by the profits going back up by the silencing of Timothy Jay Hadland. Furthermore, Defendant Deangelo Carroll also was directly paid for his role in the killing of Timothy Jay Hadland. In addition, these facts support murder for hire under the aggravator as Defendants Kenneth Counts and Deangelo Carroll received money for killing Timothy Jay Hadland.

The basis for this aggravator is the aggravated nature of the crime itself. The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony and exhibits introduced during the guilt or penalty phase of the trial, as well as the verdicts from the guilt phase.

In filing this AMENDED NOTICE, the State incorporates all pleadings, witness lists, notices and other discovery materials already provided to Defendant by the Office of the District Attorney as part of its open-file policy as well as any future discovery received and provided to Defendant.

DATED this <u>9TH</u> day of January, 2008.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

BY /s/ GIANCARLO PESCI
GIANCARLO PESCI
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #007135

# CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

	I hereby	certify	that	service	of	AME	NDED	NOTI	CE	OF	INTENT	ТО	SEEK
DEAT	H PENA	LTY, wa	ıs mad	de this _	9TI	H_ day	of Jan	iuary, 2	2008,	, by t	facsimile	transi	mission
to:													

DAYVID FIGLER, ESQ. 386-0344

/s/ D. Daniels Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

C:\PEOGRAM FILES\NEEVIA.COM\DOCUMENT CONVERTER\TEMP\265325-326160.DOC

OPICIAL

1	INFO		
	DAVID ROGER		
2	Clark County District Attorney	FILED I	NOPEN COURT
3	Nevada Bar #002781	IAI	2 9 2008 20_
٦	MARC DIGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney	CLAD	IES I SHORT
4	Nevada Bar #006955	CLERK	OF THE COUBL
1170	200 Lewis Avenue	nv (,)	miserflished.
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500	BYYU	VISE HUSTEDUT
_	(702) 671-2500	DEI	(IDD III)
6	Attorney for Plaintiff		
7	DISTRICT	COURT	
	CLARK COUNT		
8			
_	THE OTHER OF MENTALS		
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	)	
10	Plaintiff,	Case No:	C212667
		Dept No:	XIV
11	-vs-	)	• :
12		SECON	D AMENDED
12	KENNETH COUNTS, aka	) BECOI	D THAIR ADED
13	Kenneth Jay Counts II, #1525643	INFO	RMATION
	Defendant.	)	
14			
1.5	STATE OF NEVADA )	,	
15	) ss.		
16	COUNTY OF CLARK		
.,	DAVID ROGER, District Attorney	within and for the C	County of Clark S
17	DAVID ROODR, District Attorney	THE COLUMN TO THE C	Journey of Clark, D

tate of Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs the Court:

That KENNETH COUNTS, aka Kenneth Jay Counts 11, the Defendant above named, having committed the crimes of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER (Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165); and MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165), on or between May 19, 2005, and May 24, 2005, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada,

COUNT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant KENNETH JAY COUNTS, aka Kenneth Jay Counts, II, and Co-Defendants LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, aka, Luis Alonso Hidalgo III, ANABEL ESPINDOLA, DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL and JAYSON TAOIPU did, on or

P;\WPDOCS\INF\OUTLYING\5B0\5B005203.DOC

between May 19, 2005 and May 24, 2005, then and there meet with each other and/or Co-Conspirator Luis Hildago, Jr. and between themselves, and each of them with the other, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire and agree to commit a crime, to-wit: murder, and in furtherance of said conspiracy, the Defendant and/or his Co-Conspirators, did commit the act as set forth in Count 2, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.

# COUNT 2 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Defendant KENNETH JAY COUNTS, aka Kenneth Jay Counts, II, and Co-Defendants LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, aka, Luis Alonso Hidalgo III, ANABEL ESPINDOLA, DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL and JAYSON TAOIPU did, on or about May 19, 2005, then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, a human being, by shooting at and into the body and/or head of said TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, the Defendant and/or their Co-Conspirators being liable under one or more of the following theories of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly or indirectly committing the acts with premediation and deliberation and/or lying in wait; and/or (2) by aiding and abetting the commission of the crime by, directly or indirectly, counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing or otherwise procuring each other to commit the crime, to-wit: by Co-Conspirators ANABEL ESPINDOLA and/or LUIS HILDAGO, III and/or Luis Hildago, Jr. procuring Co-Conspirator DEANGELO CARROLL to beat and/or kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; thereafter, Co-Conspirator DEANGELO CARROLL procuring Defendant KENNETH COUNTS and/or Co-Conspirator JAYSON TAOIPU to shoot TIMOTHY HADLAND; thereafter, Co-Conspirator DEANGELO CARROLL and Defendant KENNETH COUNTS and Co-Conspirator JAYSON TAOIPU did drive to the location in the same vehicle; thereafter, Co-Conspirator DEANGELO CARROLL calling victim TIMOTHY JAY

27 | ///

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Η

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

28 | ///

HADLAND to the scene; thereafter, by Defendant KENNETH COUNTS shooting TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND. MARE DIGIACOMO CHIEF DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #006955 DA#05FB0052A/dd LVMPD EV#0505193516 CONSP MURDER;MWDW - F (TK7)

ORIGINAL

ŀ			FILED IN	I OPEN COURT	Γ
1	INFO		FEB	0 4 2008	20
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney		CHAR!	FS J. SHORT OF THE COURT	<b>L</b>
3	Nevada Bar #002781 MARC DIGIACOMO		D1	use Alysua	ノ PUTY
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955		DENIS	er Hosten.	
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500				
6	Attorney for Plaintiff				
7		CT COUR			
8	CLARK COU	JNTY, NE	EVADA		
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	)			
10	Plaintiff,	}	Case No:	C212667	
11	-vs-	}	Dept No:	XIV	
12	ANABEL ESPINDOLA,	}	THIRI	) AMEND	ΕD
13	#1849750	{	INFC	RMATIO	N
14	Defendant.	_			
15	STATE OF NEVADA )				
16	COUNTY OF CLARK ) ss.				
17	DAVID ROGER, District Attorn	ey within	and for the	County of Cla	ark, S

DAVID ROGER, District Attorney within and for the County of Clark, State of Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs the Court:

That ANABEL ESPINDOLA, the Defendant above named, having committed the crime of VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.040, 200.050, 200.080, 193.165), on or about May 19, 2005, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, did then and there without authority of law, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, without malice and without deliberation kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, a human being, by shooting at and into the body and/or head of said TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, the Defendant and KENNETH JAY COUNTS, aka Kenneth Jay Counts, II, and LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, aka, Luis Alonso Hidalgo III,

\\SUPERMAN\DIGIACM\$\MYDOCS\MVU\PALOMINO\AMEND INFO ESPINDO

JAYSON TAOIPU, DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL, and/or Luis Alonso Hidalgo, Jr., being liable under one or more of the following theories of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by aiding and abetting the commission of the crime by, directly or indirectly, counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing or otherwise procuring each other to commit the crime, to-wit: by Defendant and/or LUIS HILDAGO, III and/or Luis Hildago, Jr. procuring DEANGELO CARROLL to beat and/or kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; thereafter, DEANGELO CARROLL procuring KENNETH COUNTS and/or JAYSON TAOIPU to shoot TIMOTHY HADLAND; thereafter, DEANGELO CARROLL and KENNETH COUNTS and JAYSON TAOIPU did drive to the location in the same vehicle; thereafter, DEANGELO CARROLL calling victim TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND to the scene; thereafter, by KENNETH COUNTS shooting TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; and/or (2) by conspiring to beat and/or kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND. BYNevada Bar #002781

DA#05FB0052C/ LVMPD EV#0505193516 CONSP MURDER;VMWDW - F (TK7)

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

FILED IN OPEN COURT 1 **GMEM** FEB 0 4 2008 DAVID ROGER CHARLES J. SHORT CLERK OF THE COURT 2 DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781 3 MARC DIGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #006955 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 5 6 Attorney for Plaintiff DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 9 CASE NO: Plaintiff, C212667 10 DEPT NO: XXI 11 -VS-12 ANABEL ESPINDOLA, #1849750 13 Defendant. 14 **GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT** 15 I hereby agree to plead guilty to: VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WITH USE 16 OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.040, 200.050, 200.080), as more 17 fully alleged in the charging document attached hereto as Exhibit "1". 18 My decision to plead guilty is based upon the plea agreement in this case which is as 19 follows: 20 The State agrees to make no recommendation at sentencing. Additionally, both sides 21 agree, as a condition of the plea, to fulfill their obligations contained in Exhibit two (2) to 22 this agreement. 23 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA 24 I understand that by pleading guilty I admit the facts which support all the elements of 25 the offense(s) to which I now plead as set forth in Exhibit "1". 26 I understand that as a consequence of my plea, the Court must sentence me to 27

imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a minimum term of not less than

 ONE (1) year and a maximum term of not more than TEN (10) years, plus an equal and consecutive minimum term of not less than ONE (1) year and a maximum term of not more than TEN (10) years for the use of a deadly weapon enhancement. The minimum term of imprisonment may not exceed forty percent (40%) of the maximum term of imprisonment. I understand that I may also be fined up to \$10,000.00. I understand that the law requires me to pay an Administrative Assessment Fee.

I understand that, if appropriate, I will be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty and to the victim of any related offense which is being dismissed or not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement. I will also be ordered to reimburse the State of Nevada for any expenses related to my extradition, if any.

I understand that I am eligible for probation for the offense to which I am pleading guilty. I understand that, except as otherwise provided by statute, the question of whether I receive probation is in the discretion of the sentencing judge.

I understand that if more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed and I am eligible to serve the sentences concurrently, the sentencing judge has the discretion to order the sentences served concurrently or consecutively.

I also understand that information regarding charges not filed, dismissed charges, or charges to be dismissed pursuant to this agreement may be considered by the judge at sentencing.

I have not been promised or guaranteed any particular sentence by anyone. I know that my sentence is to be determined by the Court within the limits prescribed by statute.

I understand that if my attorney or the State of Nevada or both recommend any specific punishment to the Court, the Court is not obligated to accept the recommendation.

I understand that if the State of Nevada has agreed to recommend or stipulate a particular sentence or has agreed not to present argument regarding the sentence, or agreed not to oppose a particular sentence, or has agreed to disposition as a gross misdemeanor when the offense could have been treated as a felony, such agreement is contingent upon my appearance in court on the initial sentencing date (and any subsequent dates if the sentencing

 is continued). I understand that if I fail to appear for the scheduled sentencing date or I commit a new criminal offense prior to sentencing the State of Nevada would regain the full right to argue for any lawful sentence.

I understand if the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty to was committed while I was incarcerated on another charge or while I was on probation or parole that I am not eligible for credit for time served toward the instant offense(s).

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty, if I am not a citizen of the United States, I may, in addition to other consequences provided for by federal law, be removed, deported, excluded from entry into the United States or denied naturalization.

I understand that the Division of Parole and Probation will prepare a report for the sentencing judge prior to sentencing. This report will include matters relevant to the issue of sentencing, including my criminal history. This report may contain hearsay information regarding my background and criminal history. My attorney and I will each have the opportunity to comment on the information contained in the report at the time of sentencing. Unless the District Attorney has specifically agreed otherwise, then the District Attorney may also comment on this report.

# **WAIVER OF RIGHTS**

By entering my plea of guilty, I understand that I am waiving and forever giving up the following rights and privileges:

- 1. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, including the right to refuse to testify at trial, in which event the prosecution would not be allowed to comment to the jury about my refusal to testify.
- 2. The constitutional right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, free of excessive pretrial publicity prejudicial to the defense, at which trial I would be entitled to the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained. At trial the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense charged.
- 3. The constitutional right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who would testify against me.

//

//

//

//

//

- 4. The constitutional right to subpoena witnesses to testify on my behalf.
- 5. The constitutional right to testify in my own defense.
- 6. The right to appeal the conviction, with the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained, unless the appeal is based upon reasonable constitutional jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings and except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of NRS 174.035.

# **VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA**

I have discussed the elements of all of the original charge(s) against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the charge(s) against me.

I understand that the State would have to prove each element of the charge(s) against me at trial.

I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest.

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency, except for those set forth in this agreement.

I am not now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this agreement or the proceedings surrounding my entry of this plea.

1	
2	My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and
3	its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my
4	attorney.
5	DATED this And day of January, 2008.
6	Januar March
7	ANABEL ESPÍNDOLA Defendant
8	. CD FUD TO DAY
9	AGREED TO BY:
10	2 O.J.
11	MARC DIGIACOMO
12	MARC DIGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

## CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL:

I, the undersigned, as the attorney for the Defendant named herein and as an officer of the court hereby certify that:

- 1. I have fully explained to the Defendant the allegations contained in the charge(s) to which guilty pleas are being entered.
- 2. I have advised the Defendant of the penalties for each charge and the restitution that the Defendant may be ordered to pay.
- 3. All pleas of guilty offered by the Defendant pursuant to this agreement are consistent with the facts known to me and are made with my advice to the Defendant.
  - 4. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Defendant:
    - a. Is competent and understands the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty as provided in this agreement.
    - b. Executed this agreement and will enter all guilty pleas pursuant hereto voluntarily.
    - c. Was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug at the time I consulted with the defendant as certified in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Dated: This \_\_\_\_\_ day of January, 2008.

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

1 **INFO** DAVID ROGER 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 3 MARC DIGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955 4 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 5 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 10 Plaintiff. Case No: C212667 Dept No: XIV 11 -vs-THIRD AMENDED 12 ANABEL ESPINDOLA. #1849750 INFORMATION 13 Defendant. 14 15 STATE OF NEVADA ss. 16 COUNTY OF CLARK DAVID ROGER, District Attorney within and for the County of Clark, State of 17 18 Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs the Court: That ANABEL ESPINDOLA, the Defendant above named, having committed the 19 20 crime of VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON 21 (Category B Felony - NRS 200.040, 200.050, 200.080, 193.165), on or about May 19, 2005, 22 within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes 23 in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, did then and there without authority of law, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, without 24

malice and without deliberation kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, a human being, by

shooting at and into the body and/or head of said TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, with a

deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, the Defendant and KENNETH JAY COUNTS, aka

25

26

27

28

Kenneth Jay=Counts

\\SUPERMAN\DIGIACM\$\\MYDOCS\\MVU\PALOMINO\AMEND INFO ESPINDO

ALONSO HIDALGO, aka, Luis Alonso Hidalgo III,

JAYSON TAOIPU, DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL, and/or Luis Alonso Hidalgo, Jr., being liable under one or more of the following theories of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by aiding and abetting the commission of the crime by, directly or indirectly, counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing or otherwise procuring each other to commit the crime, to-wit: by Defendant and/or LUIS HILDAGO, III and/or Luis Hildago, Jr. procuring DEANGELO CARROLL to beat and/or kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; thereafter, DEANGELO CARROLL procuring KENNETH COUNTS and/or JAYSON TAOIPU to shoot TIMOTHY HADLAND; thereafter, DEANGELO CARROLL and KENNETH COUNTS and JAYSON TAOIPU did drive to the location in the same vehicle; thereafter, DEANGELO CARROLL calling victim TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND to the scene: thereafter, by KENNETH COUNTS shooting TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; and/or (2) by conspiring to beat and/or kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND. BYRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781

DA#05FB0052C/ LVMPD EV#0505193516 CONSP MURDER;VMWDW - F (TK7)

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

#### DISTRICT COURT

# **ORIGINAL**

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

) DEPT. XXI

FILED IN OPEN COURT

FEB 0 7 2008 CHARLES J. SHORT CLEDA OF THE COURT ) CASE NO. C212667

THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff,

vs.

KENNETH COUNTS, aka KENNETH JAY COUNTS II, LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, aka LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO III, ANABEL ESPINDOLA ) DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL, JAYSON TAOIPU,

Defendants.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Monday, February 4, 2008

RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE: Espindola Plea

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE STATE:

MARK DIGIACOMO, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney

GIANCARLO PESCI, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney

FOR DEFENDANT ESPINDOLA: CHRISTOPHER ORAM, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: JANIE OLSEN, COURT RECORDER

KARReporting and Transcription Services 720-244-3978

TRANSCRIBED BY: KARReporting and Transcription Services

# LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2008, 9:02 A.M.

## PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: All right. The record will reflect the presence of the Defendant Anabel Espindola, along with her attorney, Mr. Oram; the presence of Mr. Pesci and Mr. DiGiacomo on behalf of the State.

And my understanding is that this matter has been resolved; is that correct?

MR. ORAM: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the Court is in possession of a written guilty plea and the third amended information. And was that filed this morning in open court?

MR. DIGIACOMO: It was, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

All right. Ms. Espindola, the Court, as I have stated, is in possession of a written plea of guilty which was signed by you. Before I may accept your plea of guilty, I must be satisfied that your plea is freely and voluntarily given.

Are you making this plea freely and voluntarily?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Other than what's contained in the written plea of guilty and the exhibits affixed thereto, have any

KARReporting and Transcription Services 720-244-3978

1	promises or threats been made to induce you to enter your plea?
2	THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: All right. Before you sign the written plea of
4	guilty, did you read it?
5	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Did you understand everything contained in the
7	written plea of guilty and the attachments thereto?
8	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
9	THE COURT: All right. Did you have a full opportunity to
10	discuss your plea of guilty with your attorney Mr. Oram?
11	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
12	THE COURT: Before the Court accepts your plea of guilty,
13	is there anything you would like to ask me about your plea or the
14	charge of voluntary manslaughter with use of a deadly weapon to which
15	you are pleading guilty?
16	THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: All right. We'll go through this then. Tell
18	me in your own words what you did on or about May 19, 2005 within
19	Clark County, Nevada that causes you to plead guilty to the reduced
20	charge of voluntary manslaughter with use of a deadly weapon.
21	MR. ORAM: Your Honor, this
22	THE COURT: And this is a fictional plea.
23	MR. ORAM: It is a fictional plea.
24	THE COURT: All right. I'm going to have her plea and
25	the reason you're pleading fictionally is this is obviously a lesser
	lí

1	charge than the original charges which the State would be proceeding
2	against you on; is that correct?
3	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: And after discussing this with your attorney,
5	Mr. Oram, you have concluded that it's in your best interest to enter
6	this fictional plea; is that right?
7	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
8	THE COURT: All right. The way we're going to do this is
9	I'm going to have you tell me what you did and that will be the basis
10	for the plea to be reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter with use
11	of a deadly weapon.
12	THE DEFENDANT: I assisted all the co-conspirators.
13	THE COURT: Okay. So you conspired and aided and abetted
14	the following individuals: Kenneth Counts, Luis Hidalgo, Jayson
15	Taoipu, and Deangelo Carroll; is that correct?
16	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
17	MR. DIGIACOMO: Judge, both Luis Hildalgos.
18	THE COURT: Oh, all right.
19	MR. DIGIACOMO: You can ask her as to both Luis Hildalgos.
20	THE COURT: All right.
21	MR. DIGIACOMO: The third and Junior.
22	THE COURT: The third and Luis Hidalgo, Sr.; is that
23	correct?
24	THE DEFENDANT: Junior.
25	MR. DIGIACOMO: Junior.
	KARReporting and Transcription Services 720-244-3978 4

1	THE COURT: I'm sorry. Junior and the third.
2	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: All right. And together you counseled,
4	encouraged, hired, commanded, or induced one or all of these
5	individuals to be and/or kill Timothy J. Hadland; is that correct?
6	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: And Deangelo Carroll actually procured Kenneth
8	Counts and/or Jayson Taoipu to actually shoot Timothy Hadland; is
9	that correct?
10	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: All right. And as a result of this conspiracy
12	and Mr. Deangelo Carroll procuring Mr. Counts and/or Jayson Taoipu,
13	Timothy Hadland was actually fatally shot in the head; is that
14	correct?
15	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
16	THE COURT: Is that acceptable with the State?
17	MR. DIGIACOMO: Yes, Judge.
18	THE COURT: All right. Ms. Espindola, the Court finds that
19	your plea of guilty has been freely and voluntarily given and hereby
20	accepts your plea of guilty.
21	Do we want a sentencing date in 60 days or what are we
22	doing?
23	MR. DIGIACOMO: Why don't you give us a status check in 60
24	days, Judge.
25	THE COURT: All right. So we won't refer it to P&P right
	KARReporting and Transcription Services

720**-**244-3978 5

1 now?

MR. DIGIACOMO: That's correct, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DIGIACOMO: We won't refer it over to P&P. And what I'd ask is that the guilty plea agreement be filed under seal with the exception that I'm allowed to provide it to the defense attorneys that are associated with the various people elicited in the amended information with the understanding that they're not supposed to pass it on. They certainly can discuss the contents, but they're not supposed to pass it on to their clients or any other witnesses in the case, Judge.

THE COURT: I'll see counsel at the bench.

MR. ORAM: Judge, also for the record, we waive any defect in any of the pleadings.

THE COURT: Oh, thank you. I thought I'd already said that, but I must have forgotten.

MR. ORAM: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: No, you're probably right.

(Off-record bench conference)

THE COURT: What we're going to do is we are going to file the guilty plea agreement and the third amended information. Those will be public records. The attachments will be temporarily sealed until further order of the Court in the interest of justice and the ongoing matters relating to the totality of the case.

MR. DIGIACOMO: Thank you, Judge.

KARReporting and Transcription Services 720-244-3978

1	THE COURT: All right. Thank you. We're going to set this
2	out for a status check.
3	THE CLERK: April 8th at 9:30.
4	MR. ORAM: Thank you, Your Honor.
5	MR. DIGIACOMO: Thank you, Judge.
6	MR. ORAM: Your Honor, could we go any day before or after
7	that?
8	THE COURT: Of course. We're flexible.
9	THE CLERK: April 15th
10	MR. ORAM: Thank you very much.
11	THE CLERK: or the 31st. Which one?
12	THE COURT: Tax day or April Fool's day.
13	MR. ORAM: Tax day is fine. Tax day is fine.
14	THE COURT: Which is it, Mr. Oram?
15	MR. ORAM: Tax day, Your Honor.
16	THE CLERK: April 15th at 9:30.
17	MR. ORAM: Thank you, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else relating to
19	Ms. Espindola's matter we need to do at this time?
20	MR. ORAM: No, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
22	(Proceedings concluded at 9:09 a.m.)
23	
24	
25	

\*\*\*\*

ATTEST: I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I HAVE TRULY AND CORRECTLY TRANSCRIBED THE AUDIO/VIDEO PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY.

MERLY LAWSON, TRANSCRIBER

KARReporting and Transcription Services

ļ	
1	VER
2	ORIGINAL FIFEB IN 8PEN COURT 5:40 PM
3	CHARLES J. SHORT
4	BY Lementers to
5	DISTRICT COURT DENISE HUSTED DEPUTY
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
8	Plaintiff, CASE NO: C212667
9	-vs- } DEPT NO: XXI
10	KENNETH JAY COUNTS,
11	Defendant.
12	)
13	<u>VERDICT</u>
14	
15	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant KENNETH JAY
16	COUNTS, as follows:
17	<u>COUNT 1</u> – CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER
18	(please check the appropriate box, select only one)
19	Guilty of Conspiracy To Commit Murder
20	☐ Not Guilty
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
i	

We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant KENNETH JAY COUNTS, as follows: **COUNT 2 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON** (please check the appropriate box, select only one)  $\square$  Guilty of First Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon Guilty of First Degree Murder Guilty of Second Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon Guilty of Second Degree Murder X Not Guilty DATED this day of February, 2008 EPERSON 

RECEIVED FEB 1 3 2008

**Volume 2 – 344** 

Defendant and/or his co-conspirators, did commit the acts as set forth in Count 2, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein; and/or by Anabel Espindola and/or Luis Hidalgo, III soliciting Deangelo Carroll to commit murder on or between May 23 and May 24, 2005.

### COUNT 2 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did, on or about May 19, 2005, then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, a human being, by shooting at and into the body and/or head of said TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, the Defendant being liable under one or more of the following theories of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly or indirectly committing the acts with premeditation and deliberation and/or lying in wait; and/or (2) by aiding and abetting the commission of the crime by, directly or indirectly, counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing or otherwise procuring another to by defendant along with LUIS HIDALGO, III procuring commit the crime, to-wit: DEANGELO CARROLL to beat and/or kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; thereafter, DEANGELO CARROLL procuring KENNETH COUNTS and/or JAYSON TAOIPU to shoot TIMOTHY HADLAND; thereafter, DEANGELO CARROLL and KENNETH COUNTS and JAYSON TAOIPU did drive to the location in the same vehicle; thereafter, DEANGELO CARROLL calling victim TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND to the scene; thereafter, by KENNETH COUNTS shooting TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; defendant paying \$5000.00 or \$6000.00 to DEANGELO CARROLL for the killing of TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; and/or (3) by conspiring to commit the crime of battery and/or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm and/or battery with use of a deadly weapon on the person of TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND whereby each and every co-conspirator is responsible for the //

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

26 //

27 | //

//

28 l

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

28

reasonably foreseeable general intent crimes of each and every co-conspirator during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy and/or (4) by conspiring to commit the crime of murder of TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND whereby each and every co-conspirator is responsible for the specific intent crime contemplated by the conspiracy.

DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781

BY

MARC DIGIACOMO Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955

ENDORSEMENT: A True Bill

Foreperson, Clark County Grand Jury

1	Names of witnesses testifying before the Grand Jury:
2	ZONE, RONTAE, C/O CCDA, 200 LEWIS AVENUE, LVN 89101
3	ESPINDOLA, ANABEL, C/O CCDA, 200 LEWIS AVENUE, LVN 89101
4	TELEGENHOFF, DR. GARY, CCME, 1704 PINTO LANE, LVN
5	MCGRATH, MICHAEL, LVMPD P#4575
6	WILDEMANN, MARTIN, LVMPD P#3516
7	Additional witnesses known to the District Attorney at the time of filing this Indictment:
8	KYGER, TERESA, LVMPD P#4191
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	07AGJ101X/08FB0018X/ts
27	LVMPD 0505193516 (TK 7)
28	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \

**TRAN** 1 ORIGINAL FILED 2 May 20 11 11 AM '08 3 4 5 DISTRICT COURT 6 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 CASE#: C212667 Plaintiff, 10 DEPT. XXI VS. 11 KENNETH JAY COUNTS II, 12 Defendant. 13 14 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE P. ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 15 THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 2008 16 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 17 SENTENCING 18 APPEARANCES: 19 For the State: GIANCARLO PESCI, ESQ. 20 MARC DIGIACOMO, ESQ. **Deputy District Attorneys** 21 For the Defendant: BRET O. WHIPPLE, ESQ. 22 KRISTINA M. WILDEVELD, ESQ. RECORDED BY: JANIE OLSEN, COURT RECORDER

## THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 2008 AT 10:42 A.M.

forget? Mr. Whipple. And for the record, Mr. Counts is on which page?

attorneys, Ms. Wildeveld and Mr. Whipple. And we have Mr. Pesci and Mr.

THE COURT CLERK: Twelve.

THE COURT: All right. You're here on Counts. I didn't see Mr. -- how could I

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Mr. Counts is present in custody with his

DiGiacomo representing the State. And this is the time set for rendition of sentence.

2

1

3

4

5

6 7

8

9

10

11

13

14 15

16

of Convictions.

17

18 19

20

22

21

23

24

25

Is everyone prepared to go forward? MR. DiGIACOMO: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. State, after seeing a jury verdict, you have a right to 12 arque. MR. DiGIACOMO: Thank you, Judge. I have in my hands certified copies of Judgments of Convictions for Mr. Counts from both California case BA133814 and

I also have a certified copy of the Department of Parole and Probation or Department of Probation in Los Angeles County, certified copies of all their records [indiscernible] his behavior on that probation over a period of 12 years now, Judge. I'd ask to approach and mark.

BA171370, as well the plea and sentencing transcript from both of those Judgments

THE COURT: And yes -- and just for the record, those would be the two convictions that are referenced in the PSI; is that correct?

MR. DiGIACOMO: That's correct. And, also, the two that are referenced in our Notice of Intent to Seek Habitual Criminal Treatment for Mr. Counts, Judge.

There are also the two convictions that the Defendant admitted during his testimony

to before this Court during the jury trial, Judge.

MR. WHIPPLE: Your Honor, those --

3

THE COURT: Yes; just on that.

4

MR. WHIPPLE: On that limited issue. They need to be certified. I haven't seen 'em. I'd like to confirm myself that they're in fact--

5

THE COURT: Your may approach --

6 7

MR. WHIPPLE: Thank you.

8

THE COURT: -- and look at the judgments and I believe Mr. DiGiacomo did

9

state that they were certified.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21 22

23

24 25

MR. DiGIACOMO: That's correct. And they've been previously provided to the defense as part of the discovery in the case. They're -- were also in the 15 Day Notice that was provided 15 days prior to trial, and so they have copies. I have additional certified copies back in my office if you needed certified copies. I know that they've seen those before, Judge.

THE COURT: I'll just let 'em look at 'em.

MR. DiGIACOMO: Thank you, Judge. Judge, based upon -- I'm not to argue the facts of this case considering how much time you spent looking at the facts of this case, Judge. What I'd like to discuss, basically, is this Defendant and why habitual criminal treatment applies to this particular Defendant.

This Defendant has been sentence -- under sentence of felony imprisonment for 12 years now. He received his first felony conviction in 1996. He fled the jurisdiction after receiving probation, picked up a second felony -- first he get arrested here for selling dope and a stolen gun in a car. That gets pled out to a gross so he can go back to California where he picks up a second felony sale of drug conviction. He then flees that jurisdiction again, gets transported back from our

jurisdiction to California, again, and is placed back on probation again; comes here and is now involved in the crimes in which he's convicted before this Court.

Any individual who is -- got qualifying felonies who can never get off probation who has been under sentence of imprisonments for 12 years straight, since 1996 to day, that warrant is still active out of California. I checked it yesterday to make sure that that's in fact true. He still has an active warrant on that underlying case, Judge, out of California from 1999.

I would submit to the Court he is eligible for habitual criminal treatment. I would submit to the Court that based upon the facts that you heard in this case, he's eligible for the maximum possible sentence of 96 to 240, which is the recommendation of the Department of Parole and Probation, and I'll submit it to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Counts, is there anything you would like to state to the Court before I pronounce sentence against you?

MR. WHIPPLE: Your Honor, with the Court's permission, could we speak first? Is that okay?

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. WHIPPLE: I want to address the issue of the habitual criminal filing. First of all, the State has several hurdles as this Court is aware. The first one is a Certification, which Ms. Wildeveld's looking at right now. The second is that they have to show that the felonies that occurred out of state would be felonies in this state. As the Court's aware, the second felony is for a marijuana charge. I'm not even sure if that would be a felony in this state. That's something they have to prove.

THE COURT: I believe it's marijuana for sale.

 MR. DiGIACOMO: One and two. It's the crime in which the state it was committed. If it's a felony conviction, it's a felony conviction.

THE COURT: Or it's a felony here if it's not a felony in the other state. So, it was a felony not only in that state, but would be a felony in this state as well, particularly since it occurred in 1999 before all of the recent changes in the drug laws.

So, had it he been convicted of that crime in 1999 in this state, it would -- possession, whether it was for sale or not, was still a felony back then.

MR. DiGIACOMO: Correct.

MR. WHIPPLE: So, we got two hurdles; the Certification. We got the fact whether that's felony in this State as well. Again, we're looking at those issues.

The third one, Your Honor, is there's a due process requirement for notice. And I don't know if this Court had an opportunity to look at the notice in this case but, in fact, the notice that we received only occurred after Mr. Counts' acquittal, on majority of counts, and a conviction on one count in a trial that lasted two weeks. And, in fact, if you look at that actual notice it says: In the event of conviction of some of all of the counts, they should have filed this ahead of time. We should have been put on notice from the beginning. In their own notice, it's inconsistent. Look at the date it was faxed to us, look what it says in the notice itself. It's facially defective. This notice should have been -- we should have known this ahead of time. They only did this was an after the fact issue they faxed to us after the conviction.

THE COURT: I don't know what Mr. DiGiacomo's going to say, but I anticipate that they're going to say that they were thinking he was going to get convicted of the murder and be sentenced to life with the possibility of parole with

 the death penalty, somewhere in that range, and that why then would you seek to adjudicate someone as a habitual criminal on the small habitual criminal which is less than what he would have gotten had he been convicted of first degree murder even if the jury had imposed the most lenient sentence possible.

MR. DiGIACOMO: Judge, in additional to that, the 15 Day Notice had both of these convictions in the judgment -- or in the 15 Day Notice. The statute requires one of two things: Either the filing of an Amended Information, which I rarely do in case because there's the possibility that there may be some error and then the jury winds up hearing 'cause, you know, you put that big: Do not Read, or the Legislature passed a notice requirement so long as it's 15 days prior to sentencing.

This notice is more than 15 days prior to sentencing and it certainly conforms to all the due process requirements. The suggestion from Mr. Whipple that he didn't even know about the felonies or that we would seek adjudication when the statute clearly indicates that you would is something I don't think is really going to fall on deaf ears at this Court, Judge, and I'll submit.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Whipple?

MR. WHIPPLE: Judge, if this Court's position is: Well, we thought he was going to get the death penalty so we didn't even take the time.

THE COURT: No; I didn't think he was going to get the death penalty. You spoke to why the State didn't file it previously and I'm suspecting that that's why. It wouldn't have been an issue had they gotten a conviction that they were seeking. That's all I was surmising.

MR. WHIPPLE: But I think the State agrees with that.

MR. DiGIACOMO: I don't know that I necessarily agree with that. But I would think that the Court would be less inclined to provide habitual criminal treatment on a

conspiracy count to the underlying murder and not run a concurrent to whatever the sentence the jury imposed for the case. So, likely it would not have had any legal moment whether or not we did it or did not do it.

MR. WHIPPLE: The fact remains if they anticipated, which I think they admitted after this Court's suggestion, if they're either get a life sentence or a -- potentially the death penalty, they failed to give us notice timely, Your Honor. This didn't come until February 11<sup>th</sup> and in their own notice itself, it starts talking about if he's convicted. I mean, we're going to -- I believe, under due process, we have a right to notice. And if they believe: Well, you know what? We don't even have to give them notice about a habitual criminal 'cause we're going to get the kid on the murder anyway. Well they do that at their own peril. And that's what happened in this case. They were so sure of their fact that they were going to get the murder conviction, they didn't follow through with the habitual criminal aspect of it and they did that at their peril. They had an option, they waived it, and then they realized they've missed it during the trial. So, then they -- this was after the fact.

THE COURT: Well that -- you've misconstrued what the Court suggested. I was just saying I think you were suggesting, maybe I misunderstood you, that they were somehow trying to pay hide the ball, and dump this on you at the last minute. And just in view of the history of this case, that does not appear to the Court to be at all what they were doing and whether that was their motivation or not, it makes rational sense to me as to why things progressed the way they did. That's all I'm saying.

MR. WHIPPLE: But it begs the question: Why didn't they file this timely? Why didn't they file it before it went to trial with the original Information like they do every other habitual criminal, at least that I've ever represented. It begs the

question: Why did it take 'em three years? I'm sorry. I just don't understand it.

MR. DiGIACOMO: I don't know why that would even be relevant, Judge. So --

MR. WHIPPLE: Well I mean --

MR. DiGIACOMO: Well there's simply no relevance to the argument. The statute allows for it to be filed within 15 days prior to sentencing. It was filed well before that 15 days. I don't know what the issue with the -- are they suggesting to the Court that they would have done something differently? And it is what it is.

THE COURT: Right. I know. It is what it is. I mean if you felt you needed more time, then you could ask for more time to do whatever it is you feel that you need to do. That would be the remedy here, not striking the notice or striking the convictions from the record. I mean, to me, that's your remedy if, in fact, the timely timeliness caused you some kind of prejudice. But I -- you're not suggesting that the defense needed to do anything else. They are certified copies. Obviously, if it turned out down the road that there was some fraud involved, you could raise that any time. So, you know, Ms. Wildeveld's looking them over and they've represented they're certified. There's no reason to believe that they're not certified. I don't know what else --

MR. WHIPPLE: Well I think that --

THE COURT: -- the defense feels they need to do. I mean, if there's something you feel you need to do, let me know.

MR. WHIPPLE: Yeah. I think the Notice of Habitual Criminal should be struck under due process violations. They had three years to file it. They didn't. After the conviction of one count of a multi-count Information, they then decide to file it. And it speaks for itself. We'll submit it on the record.

One last thing with regard to the Habitual Criminal Notice, Your Honor, and that is they do have to prove it would be a felony in this State. There's no facts from what we've seen; that would be the marijuana charge. The marijuana charge is eight years, nine years old. They have a requirement to prove that that marijuana charge would be a felony in this State. I believe, and I'm going to submit to the Court, from the information that they've provided to you, that they have not carried the burden on that issue.

THE COURT: Well I just pulled the statute. I read it yesterday but I'll read it again: Any felony who has previously been three times convicted, whether in this state or elsewhere, of any crime which under the laws of the situs of the crime or of this state, would amount to a felony. So, I — it was a felony in California and at the time, it would have been a felony and if it's marijuana for sale, it would still to my—to the best of my knowledge, be a felony. And so any three ways you cut it, it's a felony. And I think if it's within the clear language of 207.010, paragraph 1b, as I understand it. If I'm reading that incorrectly, then certainly you can raise that issue as an appellate issue if the Court's misinterpreting the statute. But to me, I think the language of the statute is pretty clear, and like I said, no matter how you slice it, it comes up, in my view, a felony.

MR. WHIPPLE: I understand, Your Honor. We preserved it. We made an issue --

THE COURT: I understand what you -- I mean I'm --

MR. WHIPPLE: -- we object to it. We'll submit it on the record on what exists at this point.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WHIPPLE: The next issue, of course, is -- and we've moved, Your

 Honor, you know, right past the actual recommendation, the original -- what should have been the recommendation of the Parole and Probation. They reported to this Court -- you know, they go out there to do a job. They're given a scale that they use with all these individuals, and they used the scale on Mr. Counts. And the sentencing recommendation selection scale came back and said: You know what? This individual deserves 26 months, a sentence of 26 to 10. All right. That's what their sentencing selection scale with one that they use with every other individual, what it comes back with Mr. Counts. And if that's what this Court's inclined is to follow the Parole and Probation recommendations on that issue, then we'll submit it. But its moved right past that issue to the habitual criminal issue. And if this Court wants me to address that, I'll be happy to address that as well.

THE COURT: Whatever you feel you need to address. Just so you know, I mean, these are a guideline. Obviously, you weren't present at the criminal judges meeting yesterday; Mr. Ponticello was. And pretty much the criminal judges indicated that they don't put a lot of stock in those numbers. It's a guideline. The PSI's are certainly useful but -- and you know what, the -- so that's my feeling about those numbers, and I think they're echoed by the majority of the criminal judges so --

MR. DiGIACOMO: And just to correct the record, the Division feels that the habitual treatment is appropriate and recommends same as the last line of that collusion.

MR. WHIPPLE: And that's what I want to address, Your Honor. Because the standard scale that they used for Mr. Counts, and every other person that's in his position, would have recommended 26 months. I think it's completely inappropriate for them -- there's no place that I see in the statute that allows them to make any

recommendation with regard to the habitual criminal. In fact, there has to be a weighing with this Court has nothing to do with the Parole and Probation recommends, and I ask that that portion of the PSI be stricken. There's no basis for them to be recommending a habitual criminal for this individual or any individual for that matter, because there's no statutory requirement. In fact, there's a statutory requirement that this Court take the considerations and not anybody but this Court. And I think it's completely inappropriate for them to be even making that -- bringing that up as an issue on the P and P report, and I ask that it be stricken.

MR. DiGIACOMO: I don't know if that's appropriate. It's a recommendation of the Department.

THE COURT: I don't care if it's stricken or not. I -- like I said. The Court -- I don't know how many sentences you've sat in here on but the Court makes its own determination whether it's a grand larceny or a conspiracy to commit murder. I am certainly not bound by what P and P says and, you know, I rely more on the crime and the background of the person than on any recommendation from some report writer that I don't even know so --

MR. WHIPPLE: Next I want to address the issue of how remote these felonies are, Your Honor. I'm sure this Court's already aware -- you know, Mr. DiGiacomo made great play of the fact: Oh my gosh, you know, he committed these felonies, 12 and nine years ago and he's still -- somehow this magic thing -- he still -- he's never resolved them. He's still under this threat or this [indiscernible] issue of imprisonment which is something we addressed during the trial. The fact of the matter is he's lived here in this State being a productive member; working, pulled over by officers numerous times and nobody else cared, Judge.

Look at -- you know what's amazing is this comments of how he's been

under this imprisonment and hasn't cleaned up his record in California and then you look at all the arrests. Look at all the arrests. How many times has he been arrested? And they never took him and transported him back to California. You know if Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department -- they don't care if he goes back to California and cleaned up. I don't understand why -- that's the whole theory of their case, why it should be used against him today because nobody else cared, in all those arrests, to take the time and arrest him and send him back.

THE COURT: Now Mr. Counts thought they cared if you believe his testimony because that's why he was hiding in the attic. He didn't care. He thought they were going to send him back to California if you accept what he testified to because his version of events was that's why he was hiding, and why they had to send a flare up, and why they had to send a dog up, and why they had to Taser him. So, maybe Las Vegas Metro wasn't concerned but Mr. Counts was clearly concerned.

MR. WHIPPPLE: Yes, Your Honor. It's his state of mind. But that's not what they're arguing. They're not arguing his state of mind. They're arguing the state of mind --

THE COURT: Well you just argued that nobody cared about these other convictions that's all I'm saying.

MR. WHIPPLE: Well let me clarify it then. Mr. Counts cared. Mr. Counts, obviously, as a father, as a coach to young children, he cared. Okay. But society didn't care. Society, at large, didn't care at all. And look at all the arrests that he's had here in Nevada with all this allegedly under imprisonment that stood out, that still stands today in California and none of them cared. All right. So, Mr. Counts cares and now Mr. DiGiacomo cares but it seems like they're the only in the State,

up to this point, that really cares.

You know, Your Honor, you have this saying and I've heard it several times, I think you call it the elephant in the room, the white elephant. I forget what it is. The only reason we're here --

THE COURT: I never mentioned the color of the elephant.

MR. WHIPPLE: Okay. The elephant [indiscernible].

MS. WILDEVELD: But it's not me anymore.

THE COURT: Now a pink elephant would indicate that some of us under the influence.

MR. WHIPPLE: The only reason we're here, the only reason we're here is because he acquitted on murder. He acquitted on a murder that was not just any murder. It's the murder that captured the attention of this community for the last couple years. And you know what? He should walk out of here just like any other person who is convicted of conspiracy. That's what the recommendation is, without taking into consideration all the hostility and all the emotion. The recommendation is 26 months, and that's what he should do, Your Honor. And what the white elephant, the pink elephant, or whatever that elephant is, that only reason that they filed this, the only reason we're here is because people think he got away with murder. Well, you know, that was a separate proceeding, Your Honor. And to hold him accountable for suspicions and suggestions and hopes and believes and maybes is incorrect, and it's unfair. And you know what? Those jurors know that. Those jurors knew that 'cause they looked at all the evidence. He took the stand and testified. His family took the stand and testified, and they -- you know what, they acquitted him.

And now for this Court to hold it -- to second guess them, I think's unfair

 and it's inappropriate. And I don't blame the State to doing that. You know what? I would do the same thing. I'd be damn pissed I let a murderer go free. Right? 'Cause that's what they think. But he's not, that's not. I would expect nothing less. But he's not. I expect more of the Court. I expect the Court to be like the jury and be fair and equitable and I think it should be 26 months and nothing more.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Counts, is there anything you would like to state to the Court before I pronounce sentence against you?

THE DEFENDANT: [Indiscernible] respected Your Honor.

another chance at my life and to restoration and reconciliation with my children and family and become a productive member of society once again. If anything, if not, Your Honor, let me off with a third suspended sentence or probation or intensive supervision, house arrest; anything like that just so I can -- I've been here three years. My oldest son has started and will be finishing middle school this year. I've missed all that time in his life. My second son is in his first year of middle school. My youngest, which is my daughter and my youngest son, they're in elementary; proceeding through. I want to be there for guidance and direction and be the good father that I am to them. And, also, I'd would just like to continue on with my life and my family's life who have supported me all through this trial and through my years of being in this incarceration.

I just ask for a -- mercy from the State and not sentence me [indiscernible].

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Well you know, I think he does qualify.

And he gets in trouble in 1996. He gets in trouble again in 1999, which is reduced to a misdemeanor; trouble again a month later in 1999, which takes a felony. You

know, I know we're going to say: Well, that's old. He doesn't get into trouble until 2005 but, you know, to me six years out of trouble really is not that long a time. Something happened in 2004 where his probation was modified and he gets jail time. So, there is some contact in 2004 and a lot of minor contacts along the way, as referenced on page number 5 of the PSI.

Therefore, accordingly, based upon the verdict of the jury, Mr. Counts, you are adjudged guilty of the felony crime of conspiracy to commit murder and you are adjudged a habitual criminal, pursuant to NRS 207.010.

In addition to the \$25 administrative assessment, the \$150 DNA analysis fee, and the fact that you have to submit to testing for genetic markers, you are sentenced to a minimum term of 96 months in the Nevada Department of Corrections, a maximum term of 240 months in the Nevada Department of Corrections. By statute, that would be imposed consecutively or I would impose it anyway consecutively to whatever time you have in California on that case. It looks like that may be over and closed out. I can't tell from the PSI. But Mr. DiGiacomo says there's an active warrant.

And you are entitled to your full credit of time served, which I am showing to be 1,029 days credit for time served.

MR. WHIPPLE: You Honor, may I inquire? There's two habitual criminals, there's the lower -- the small one and the larger one, is my understanding; right?

THE COURT: He's the small habitual criminal.

MR. WHIPPLE: That is the small; right?

THE COURT: Right. That's what I adjudged him as is the small.

MR. WHIPPLE: Okay.

MS. WILDEVELD: Your Honor, for bookkeeping purposes, may I just let the

14 15

13

16

17

18

20

21

19

22

23

24 25 Court know that on page 5, 4th -- one of the felonies is not -- one of those charges is not [indiscernible], ADW not firearm. That count does not belong to him nor does the grand theft count belong to him.

THE COURT: Yeah. And the point of that was just he had had at least a couple of other contacts just to say, you know, like I said a lot of times: Oh, 1999, he's been out of trouble. Well I don't think that's that long to be out of trouble, number one. And number two, you know, he's having negative contacts with law enforcement even though they don't result in adjudications of quilt. He, you know, is not living for six years as a totally upstanding member of our society. That's all the Court's comment was intended to reflect. All right. Thank you.

MR. DiGIACOMO: Can I collect the judgments and bring them back to the Clerk?

THE COURT: Oh, yes. Thank you.

MR. DiGIACOMO: And the Court admits these for purposes [indiscernible]. Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. We'll do Ms. Brooks matter.

MS. WILDEVELD: And, Your Honor, can we be appointed to Mr. Counts' appeal at this time?

MR. DiGIACOMO: I don't think both gets appointed, but one -- certainly one person needs to be appointed.

THE COURT: One can be appointed. Would you like to do that, Ms. Wildeveld? All right. Ms. Wildeveld is appointed.

MR. WHIPPLE: May I just --

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MS. WILDEVELD: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

[Proceedings concluded at 11:05 a.m.]

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video recording in the above-entitled case.

PATRICIA SLATTERY

Court Recorder/Transcriber

1

3

5

6

7 8

9

10

11 12

13

14 15

16

17

18

19 20

21 22

23

25

24

26 27

28

JOC

ORIGINAL MAR 31 9 19 AM '08

FILED

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff,

-VS-

KENNETH COUNTS aka KENNETH JAY COUNTS II #1525643

Defendant.

CASE NO. C212667

DEPT. NO. XXI

# JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (JURY TRIAL)

The Defendant previously entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of COUNT 1 -CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 199.480,200.020, 200.030, and COUNT 2 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.010, 200.030; and the matter having been tried before a jury and the Defendant having been found guilty of the crime of COUNT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 199.480, 200.010, 200.030 and NOT GUILTY to COUNT 2; thereafter, on the 20<sup>TH</sup> day of March, 2007, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with his counsel BRETEWEIPELE, ESQ., and good cause appearing,

MAR 3 1 2008

CLEMA OF THE WURT

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said crime under the SMALL HABITUAL Criminal Statute as set forth in the jury's verdict and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers, the Defendant is SENTENCED as follows: TO A MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of NINETY-SIX (96) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), with ONE THOUSAND TWENTY-NINE (1,029) DAYS credit for time served. SENTENCE to run CONSECUTIVE to Defendant's California time.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ day of March, 2007.

VALERIE ADAIR
DISTRICT JUDGE

# ORIGINAP

1 2 3 4 5	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		FILED  HAR 3; 9 23 AM '08  CLERK OF THE COURT
6		ICT COURT UNTY, NEVADA	- WORT
8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	)	
9 10 11 12	Plaintiff, -vs- JAYSON TAOIPU, #1970800	Case No: Dept No:	C212667 XXI
13 14 15	401	OF CONVICTION OF GUILTY)	

The Defendant previously appeared before the Court with counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the crime(s) of COUNT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER (Category B Felony) and COUNT 2 - VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony), in violation of NRS 199.480, 200.030, 200.040, 200.050, 200.080; thereafter, on the 25th day of March, 2008, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with his counsel, TERRANCE JACKSON, ESQ., and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offense(s) and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee and \$150 DNA Analysis Fee, the Defendant is SENTENCED on Count 1 to a MINIMUM of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections with a MAXIMUM term of ONE-HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS; Count 2 to a MINIMUM of SIXTEEN (16) MONTHS with a MAXIMUM term of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with an equal and consecutive term of

MAR 3 1 2008

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

P:\WPDOCS\UDG\OUTLYING\5B0\5B005401.doc

SIXTEEN (16) MONTH with a MAXIMUM term of SIXTY (60) MONTHS for the deadly				
weapons enhancement; Count 2 to RUN CONCURRENTLY with Count 1, SUSPENDED				
placed on PROBATION for an indeterminate period not to exceed FIVE (5) YEARS				
CONDITIONS:				
I. Obtain/maintain lawful full time employment unless Defendant is a full time student;				
2. Defendant placed on House Arrest for a period not to exceed one year;				
3. Submit to counseling evaluation and any counseling deemed necessary by the				
evaluator; submit to random urinalyses;				
4. Complete GED/high school diploma;				
5. Complete vocational training as deemed necessary by the Division of Parole and				
Probation.				
6. The Defendant shall submit to a test administered by the Division to determine				
genetic markers and pay a \$150 DNA Analysis Fee to the Clerk of the Court.				
DATED this _ day of March, 2008.				
DISPRICT JUDGE				

CLERK OF THE COURT

27

<del>~</del>28

111

P:\wPDOCS\motion\outlying\5B0\5B005205.doc

### **NOTICE OF HEARING**

YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing motion on for setting before the above entitled Court, Department XXI, thereof, on Thursday, the 10th day of July, 2008, at the hour of 9:30 o'clock A.M., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

DATED this 24 day of June, 2008.

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

BY

MARC DIGIACOMO

Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In May of 2005, Defendant Luis Hidalgo, III was arrested and charged with Conspiracy to Commit Murder, Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Solicitation to Commit Murder (Two Counts). After a preliminary hearing, he was held to answer and charged with the same crimes in C212667. In February of 2008, the State uncovered some additional evidence, and charged Luis Hidalgo, Jr. in the same Conspiracy to Commit Murder and Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon. Luis Hidalgo, Jr. was indicted on those charges in C241394. Notices of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty have been filed in both cases. The State now seeks to consolidate the cases for trial.

## STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Timothy Hadland's body was found at about 11:45 p.m. lying in the roadway at North Shore Road east of Lake Mead Boulevard. The victim's car was located near the body and it was still running. Homicide Detective McGrath found a cell phone inside the victim's car and also found flyers to the Palomino Strip Club near the victim's body. Detectives discovered that the last call that the victim received by the victim was placed at 11:27 p.m.

15

14

16 17

18 19

20 21

22 23

24 25

26

27 28

by Defendant Deangelo Carroll who worked at the Palomino. The cell phone was traced back to Simone's Auto Plaza which is owned by Luis Hidalgo, Jr. and run by Defendant Anabel Espindola. The bill to the phone was addressed to Anabel Espindola at 6770 Bermuda Road. A records check of Defendant Espindola revealed that she had a work card as the general manager at the Palomino.

Detectives made contact with Defendant Carroll at the Palomino and after Miranda warning obtained a statement from Defendant Carroll. Defendant Carroll worked at the Palomino for Mr. Hidalgo, Jr. hereinafter "Mr. H", where he did various jobs including handing out pamphlets and flyers to cab drivers and potential customers. Defendant Carroll explained that Rontae Zone and Jayson Taoipu helped him pass out flyers. On the night of the murder, Defendant Luis Hidalgo, III, also known as "Little Lou," called Defendant Carroll, telling him to come to the club and to bring baseball bats and garbage bags with him. When Defendant Carroll got to the Palomino he spoke to Mr. "H" who told him he wanted to hire someone to "take care of" Timothy Hadland who used to work at the club. Hadland was said to have been "bad mouthing" the Palomino, particularly with the contacts he knew among the cab drivers. As a result the Palomino was losing thousands of dollars in business so Mr. "H" said he would pay anyone who killed Hadland.

Defendant Carroll explained that on May 19, 2005 at about 11:00 p.m. he, Rontae Zone, and Jayson Taoipu picked Defendant Kenneth Counts (KC) in a white Chevy Astro van that was owned by the Palomino Club. Defendant Carroll told Defendant Counts that Mr. "H" wanted to pay someone to kill someone. Defendant Counts agreed to do it. Defendant Carroll called the victim and set up a meeting at Lake Mead. On the way to the meeting a discussion ensued regarding killing the victim. During the drive to the Lake, Defendant Espindola called Defendant Carroll and told him that Mr. "H" said, "If Hadland was alone, then go through with the plan." Defendant Espindola also told Defendant Carroll that if Hadland was not alone then Defendant Carroll was only to beat Hadland badly, or "go to plan B." When they arrived at the Lake, the victim got out of his car and approached Defendant Carroll, who was driving the van. When the victim approached, Defendant ÷

 Counts got out of the van and came around the front of the van and shot Timothy Hadland two times in the head. Defendant Counts then jumped back in the car and told Defendant Carroll to drive.

The group then drove back to the Palomino and Defendant Carroll and Defendant Counts went inside. Defendant Carroll went into Mr. "H's" office and spoke with Mr. "H" and Defendant Espindola. Defendant Carroll indicated that the job was done and that Defendant Counts wanted six thousand dollars. Mr. "H" told Defendant Espindola to get the money, which she did. Defendant Carroll then gave the money to Defendant Counts who left in a cab. Defendant Carroll told police that Mr. "H" and Defendant Espindola told him what he should tell police if he was questioned. Sometime later Mr. "H" contacted Defendant Carroll and told him that the police were looking for him.

Sometime on May 20th, Defendant Carroll was told to take the van used and get the tires changed. The co-conspirators were afraid that Defendant Carroll drove over either the body or some blood at the scene. Defendant Carroll took the van to Simone's Auto Plaza and changed the tires. The cut tires were thrown in a dumpster. Those tires have since been recovered.

On May 21, 2005, Detectives spoke with Rontae Zone. Rontae confirmed that he had accompanied Defendant Carroll, Taoipu, and Defendant Counts to Lake Mead. Rontae told police that he saw Defendant Counts shot the victim twice in the head with a .357 revolver. Since a revolver was used there were no casings found at the scene.

On May 21, 2005, Detectives also spoke with Jayson Taoipu. Jayson confirmed what the others did. Specifically, Jason indicated that he accompanied Defendant Carroll, Rontae, and Defendant Counts. Jayson told the police that killing the victim was discussed and that he saw Defendant Counts shoot the victim with a revolver two times. Defendant Counts was taken into custody on May 21, 2005 by members SWAT. At the time, Defendant Counts fled from police and hid in an attic in an effort to avoid the police.

On May 23, 2005, Defendant Carroll told police that he was contacted by Mr. Hidalgo III, "Little H", who told Defendant Carroll to pick up the Palomino shuttle bus and

13

11

14 15

16

17 18

19

2021

2223

2425

26

27

28

drive it to Simone's Auto Plaza. Defendant Carroll then met with police and prepared to set up a recorded conversation with Mr. "H", Defendant Hidalgo, and Defendant Espindola. When Defendant Carroll arrived Defendant Espindola met him and told him to go to "Little Lou's" office, which he did. In "Little Lou's" office, Defendant Hidalgo told Defendant Carroll that the phones and room was bugged so he whispered to Defendant Carroll. Defendant Espindola then came in the room and told Defendant Carroll to remove his clothing to make sure that he was not wearing a wire. Defendant Carroll took his clothes off and then Defendant Hidalgo and Defendant Espindola spoke to him in whispers.

Defendant Hidalgo had a large sword which was part of a wood cane that he was swinging during the conversation. Defendant Hidalgo told Defendant Carroll that if he told him what happened he would cut him up. Defendant Hidalgo further explained to Defendant Carroll that if he had to go to jail he, Defendant Hidalgo, would take care of Deangelo's wife. Defendant Espindola also told Defendant Carroll that Mr. "H" indicated that he would pay for an attorney for him. Defendant Carroll explained that Defendant Counts, Taoipu, and Zone wanted more money. Defendant Espindola then gave Defendant Carroll one thousand dollars to keep the other two quiet and gave Defendant Carroll four hundred more dollars. Defendant Hidalgo then gave Defendant Carroll a bottle of gin and Defendant Espindola and Defendant Hidalgo talked to Defendant Carroll about killing Zone and Taoipu. Specifically, they told Defendant Carroll to put rat poisoning in the gin and give it to Zone and Taoipu. Defendant Hidalgo then told Defendant Carroll to put more rat poisoning in a marijuana cigarette and have them smoke it in order to kill them. Defendant Espindola then told Defendant Carroll that he needed to resign from the Palomino but they would still pay him and after a few months he could come back to work when the investigation died down.

When the conversation ended, Defendant Carroll exited the Palomino and told the police what happened. The recording was analyzed and confirmed what Defendant Carroll said the other parties had said.

On May 24, 2005, Defendant Carroll once again entered Simone's Auto Plaza

ř

wearing a recording device. Like the day before, a meeting between Defendant Hidalgo, Defendant Espindola and Defendant Carroll occurred in room 6 of Simone's Auto Plaza which is a bedroom where Defendant Hidalgo resided. During this conversation, Defendant Espindola can be heard on the tape acknowledging that Mr. "H", Defendant Espindola and Defendant Hidalgo hired Defendant Carroll to harm Hadland. In addition, more money was given to Defendant Carroll to keep quite.

After this recording, contact was made with Defendant Hidalgo and Defendant Espindola. In a mirandized conversation, Defendant Hidalgo told the police to talk to his father, Mr. "H," and he would explain everything. Defendant Espindola acknowledged talking to Defendant Carroll on May 23rd and 24th at Simone's but terminated the interview before substantive information about the conversations were obtained.

While the interviews were taking place, search warrants were executed at both the Palomino Club and Simone's Auto Plaza. A number of incriminating items were recovered. One of those items was a note found in a recreation room with a pool table in near Defendant Hidalgo's bedroom. On the table was a bullet proof vest. Next to the table were bar stools. On one of the bar stools, a note which said, "MAYBE WE ARE BEING UNDERSERVAILLE, KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT!" The State previously sought handwriting samples and an order was filed as to Anabel Espindola, Deangelo Carroll and Luis Hidalgo, III. The note was not identified. As Luis Hidalgo Jr. was not charged, we did not take an exemplar from him. At the grand jury, Anabel Espindola indicated that she believed the handwriting was Mr. H's. Subsequent testing determined the note was written by Luis Hidalgo, Jr.

In addition, the State learned that the victim, Timothy Jay Hadland, had been fired from the club for allegedly stealing money that was related to promotions given to cab drivers who brought clients to the club. Earlier on the 19<sup>th</sup> of May, Defendant Carroll called Anabel at Simone's Auto Body to tell her that Mr. Hadland had been bad mouthing the club to cab drivers. When Ms. Espindola relayed what she heard in the presence of Luis Hidalgo, Jr. and Luis Hidalgo, III, a discussion occurred between the two men. During the discussion,

Luis Hidalgo, III, told his father that he would never make as much money as other strip club owners if he, Luis Hidalgo, Jr., did not do something to Mr. Hadland. Thereafter, Luis Hidalgo, III left Simone's. Phone records reflect that Luis Hidalgo, III called Deangelo Carroll's home after he left Simone's.

## POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

NRS 173.115 provides in part:

Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a single count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors, are ... based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

NRS 174.155 provides:

The Court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendant, if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.

Conversely, if the Court was considering the separation of various charges in one pleading document, the defendant would have to show that prejudice would result from a single trial or more than one count. Ex parte Groesbeck, 77 Nev. 412 (1961). Mere anticipatory conclusions are insufficient. White v. State, 83 Nev. 292 (1967); Anderson v. State, 81 Nev. 477 (1965). See also NRS 174.165.

It is important to not that NRS 174.165 uses the words may order. By use of the word "may" it is obvious that the legislature has intended to give the court broad discretion in applying the statute. Citing NRS 174.155, the Court in Lovell v. State, 92 Nev. 128 (1976), held that "joinder is within the discretion of the trial court and its action will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Moeller v. United States, 378 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1967). Where no prejudice will result from the joinder of two informations, no abuse of discretion is committed by a court who orders such a joinder. See Lovell v. State, supra.

The Nevada Statutes cited above are taken from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. NRS 174.155 is the same as Federal Rule 13 and NRS 173.135 is the same as

3.

Federal Rule 8(b). In considering whether to allow consolidation, the courts have looked at the conflicting policies of economy and efficiency in judicial administration by looking to control overcrowded court calendars and avoidance of multiple trials, and any resulting prejudice to a defendant which might arise from being prosecuted at trial by presentation of evidence of other crimes flowing from two or more interconnected transactions. Cantano v. United States, 167 F.2d 820 (Ca. 4th, 1948); United States v. Fencher, 195 F. Supp. 634 (D. Conn. 1960).

The interests of both justice and economy support the consolidation of these two cases. Moreover, consolidation of both cases would avoid the possibility of inconsistent verdicts. As an initial starting point, all of the evidence admissible against one co-defendant will also be admissible against the other. Through review of the case, there doesn't appear to be any cross-admissibility issues. It also does not appear that Defendants have antagonistic defenses. Both defendants have the same lawyer, something which would not be possible if there interests were adverse. Additionally, where two co-conspirators commit crimes together, the law favors consolidation.

The general rule favoring joinder has evolved for a specific reason – there is a substantial public interest in joint trials of persons charged together because of the judicial economy involved. <u>Jones v. State</u>, 111 Nev. at 853. Joint trials of persons charged with committing the same offense expedites the administration of justice, reduces the congestion of trial dockets, conserves judicial time, lessens the burden upon citizens to sacrifice time and money to serve on juries, and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses who would otherwise be called upon to testify only once. <u>Jones</u>, 111 Nev. at 853-854 (citations omitted). Consequently, the doctrine of severance is a very limited one.

In <u>Marshall v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 642, 56 P.3d 376 (2002), for example, codefendants Marshall and Currington were tried and convicted together of first degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. At trial, Marshall's defense strategy was to blame Currington; Currington's defense strategy was to blame Marshall. <u>Id</u>. at 644-645. Both were convicted.

On appeal, Marshall contended the district court erred in refusing to sever his trial from Currington's. <u>Id</u>. at 644. Marshall contended he and Currington had antagonistic

28

defenses in that each argued the other was responsible for the murder. <u>Id.</u> at 645. Marshall relied on the standard articulated in <u>Rowland v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 31, 39 P.3d 114 (2002), which stated that, "defenses must be antagonistic to the point that they are 'mutually exclusive' before they are to be considered prejudicial," requiring severance. <u>Marshall</u>, 118 Nev. at 646 (citation omitted). <u>Rowland</u> further stated that defenses are mutually exclusive when the core of the codefendant's defense is so irreconcilable with the core of the defendant's own defense that the acceptance of the codefendant's theory by the jury precludes acquittal of the defendant. <u>Marshall</u>, 118 Nev. at 646 (citations omitted).

The Court in <u>Marshall</u> was concerned that the language in <u>Rowland</u> was too broadly stated. Consequently, the Court clarified - - and limited - - the standard articulated in Rowland which requires severance.

"To the extent that this language suggests that prejudice requiring severance is presumed whenever acceptance of one defendant's defense theory logically compels rejection of another defendant's theory, it is too broadly stated. As we have explained elsewhere, while there are situations in which inconsistent defenses may support a motion for severance, the doctrine is a very limited one. A defendant seeking severance must show that the codefendants have conflicting and irreconcilable defenses and there is danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty. We take this opportunity to further clarify this issue.

Marshall, 118 Nev. at 646 (emphasis added). The Court then went on to explain the standard articulated in Rowland.

The decisive factor in any severance analysis remains prejudice to the defendant. NRS 174.165(1) provides in relevant part: 'If it appears that a defendant ... is prejudiced by a joinder ... of defendants ... for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.' Nevertheless, prejudice to the defendant is not the only relevant factor: a court must consider not only the possible prejudice to the defendant but also the possible prejudice to the State resulting from expensive, duplicative trials. Joinder promotes judicial economy and efficiency as well as consistent verdicts and is preferred as long as it does not compromise a defendant's right to a fair trial. Despite the concern for efficiency and consistency, the district court has a continuing duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice does appear. Joinder of defendants is within the discretion of the district court, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. To establish that joinder was prejudicial requires more than simply showing that severance made acquittal more likely; misjoinder requires reversal only if it has a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.

Most importantly, the Court stated that "antagonistic defenses are a relevant consideration but not, in themselves, sufficient grounds for concluding that joinder of defendants is prejudicial." 118 Nev. at 648 (emphasis added). In fact, the Court in Marshall ruled that the defenses were antagonistic; nevertheless, joinder was proper. The fact that codefendants at a joint trial offer mutually exclusive defenses, the Court recognized, is not, in itself, sufficient to establish that joinder was prejudicial. Id. at 648. Marshall failed to demonstrate that the joint trial compromised a specific trial right or prevented the jury from making a reliable judgment regarding guilt or innocence. Marshall, 118 Nev. at 648. Moreover, the State's case was not dependent on either defendant's testimony, and the prosecution presented evidence linking both to the murder. Id. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Marshall's conviction.

A similar analysis was offered by the highest court of the land in Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 113 S.Ct. 933 (1993). In that case, petitioners contended it is prejudicial whenever two defendants both claim they are innocent and each accuses the other of the crime. 506 U.S. at 538. The United States Supreme Court rejected their contention, holding that "mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial *per se.*" 506 U.S. at 538. A court should grant a severance *only* if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. 506 U.S. at 539. It is *not* prejudicial for a codefendant to introduce relevant, competent evidence that would be admissible against the defendant at a severed trial. Id. The Government offered sufficient evidence against all four petitioners, and the district court cured any possibility of prejudice by properly instructing the jury that it had to consider the case against each defendant separately. 506 U.S. at 540-541. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court held it was not an abuse of discretion to deny petitioners' motions to sever. Id. at 541.

#### CONCLUSION

The defendants are both charged with conspiring to kill Timothy Jay Hadland, as well as the killing itself. While Defendant Luis Hidalgo, III is also charged with solicitation to

kill the witnesses, the evidence demonstrates not only was Defendant Luis Hidalgo, Jr. being kept abreast of the subsequent meetings with Defendant Deangelo Carroll, but that he was in the same building while they were going on. Additionally, these conversations were part of the ongoing conspiracy to conceal the crime. As such, all of the evidence against both Defendants would be admissible in separate trials. Based on the foregoing, the State's Motion to Consolidate should be granted.

DATED this 2 day of June, 2008.

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

BY

MARC DIGIAÇÓMO

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #006955

## CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing, was made this day of June, 2008, by facsimile transmission to:

Dominic Gentile, Esq. 369-2666

/s/D.Daniels

Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

```
1
     0001
     DAVID ROGER
 2
     Clark County District Attorney
     Nevada Bar #002781
MARC DIGIACOMO
Chief Deputy District Attorney
 3
 4
     Nevada Bar #006955
     200 Lewis Avenue
     Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2211
(702) 671-2500
 5
 6
     Attorney for Plaintiff
 7
                                      DISTRICT COURT
                                 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
 8
 9
     THE STATE OF NEVADA,
10
                                                     Case No.
                                                                  C212667
                        Plaintiff,
11
                                                                  C241394
           -VS-
12
                                                                  XXI
                                                     Dept No.
13
     LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III,
     #1849634
     LUIS HIDALGO, JR.,
14
     #1579522
15
                        Defendant.
16
17
               NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASE NO.
18
                                   C241394 INTO C212667
19
                                 DATE OF HEARING: 7/10/08
20
                                TIME OF HEARING: 9:30 A.M.
21
           COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by DAVID ROOMED is rict Athres through
```

		<del></del>				
1	0001					
2	DAVID ROGER					
3	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 MARC DIGIACOMO					
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955					
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2211 (702) 671 2500					
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff					
7	DYGOTH COLUMN					
8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA					
9						
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA, )					
11	Plaintiff,	Case No.	C212667 C241394			
12	-vs- }	D	XXI			
13	LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III, #1849634	Dept No.	AAI			
14	LUIS HIDALGO, JR., #1579522					
15	}					
16	Defendant.					
17	,					
18	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASE NO.					
19	C241394 INTO C212667					
	DATE OF HEARING: 7/10/08					
20	TIME OF HEARING: 9:30 A.M.					
21	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by DAVID ROGER, Displet Atteres, through					
22	To the same of the					

Electronically Filed 10/20/2008 10:13:05 AM

1 2 3 4 5 6	NISD DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 MARC DIGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		CLERK OF THE COURT
7	DISTR	ICT COURT	
8		UNTY, NEVADA	
9			
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	)	
11	Plaintiff,	Case No.	C212667
12	-vs-	Dept No.	XXI
13	DEANGELO CARROLL, #1678381		
14	71070001	{	
15	Defendant.	_	

#### AMENDED NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK DEATH PENALTY

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, through DAVID ROGER, Clark County District Attorney, by and through MARC DIGIACOMO, Chief Deputy District Attorney, pursuant to NRS §175.552 and NRS §200.033, Nevada Supreme Court Rule 250, and Nevada Supreme Court Order 50576 declares its intention to seek the death penalty at a penalty hearing. Furthermore, the State of Nevada discloses that it will present evidence of the following aggravating circumstances:

1. The murder was committed by a person, for himself or another, to receive money or any other thing of monetary value, to-wit, by:

On or about May 19, 2005, the owner of the Palomino Club, Luis Hidalgo, Jr., located at 1848 North Las Vegas Boulevard, made it known to Deangelo Carroll, an employee of the Palomino Club, that he would pay someone to kill Timothy Jay Hadland, who was a former employee of the club. Luis Hidalgo, Jr., was angry with the victim, Timothy Jay Hadland,

because after his firing from the club, Timothy Jay Hadland was hurting the club's business

On the same date, after the initial conversation, Luis Hidalgo, III, a manager of the Palomino Club, called Deangelo Carroll and told him to come to the club and "bring baseball bats and garbage bags." When Defendant Carroll arrived at the Palomino Club, Defendant Luis Hidalgo, Jr., hired Deangelo Carroll to kill Timothy Jay Hadland. After conveying this information and procuring Deangelo Carroll, Deangelo Carroll went to 1676 "E" Street to the residence of Kenneth Counts and enlisted Defendant Kenneth Counts to kill Timothy Jay Hadland. Defendant Deangelo Carroll then drove Defendants Kenneth Counts and Jayson Taoipu, as well as witness Rontae Zone, out to the area of North Shore Road at Lake Mead, where Defendant Kenneth Counts shot and killed Timothy Jay Hadland.

After the killing, the group drove back to the Palomino Club and Defendant Deangelo Carroll entered the club with Defendant Kenneth Counts. Defendant Deangelo Carroll went into Luis Hidalgo Jr.'s office and met with him and Defendant Anabel Espindola. At that time Defendant Deangelo Carroll announced that, "it was done" and that Defendant Kenneth Counts wanted to be paid. Luis Hidalgo Jr., then told Defendant Anabel Espindola to get the money, which Defendant Anabel Espindola did and which she provided to Defendant Deangelo Carroll who then provided five thousand dollars (\$5,000) to Defendant Kenneth Counts. Defendant Deangelo Carroll also received some money for his involvement.

These facts support the aggravator because the murder was committed for the purpose

	-
	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
1	0
1	1
1	2
1	3
1	4
1	5
1	6
1	7
1	8
1	9
2	0
2	1
2	2
2	3

25

26

27

28

1

of improving the profits to the business and the employees of the Palomino Club. The owner of the club, Luis Hidalgo Jr., perceived that profits were being hurt by the victim, Timothy Jay Hadland "bad mouthing" him and the club. As such, Luis Hidalgo Jr., used employees, Defendants Anabel Espindola, Luis Hidalgo, III, and Deangelo Carroll to carry out his wishes. Defendant Deangelo Carroll also was directly paid for his role in the killing of Timothy Jay Hadland. In addition, these facts support murder for hire under the aggravator as Defendants Carroll enlisted the help of others, including Defendant Counts by offer of renumeration from the owners and managers of the Palomino Club.

The basis for this aggravator is the aggravated nature of the crime itself. The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony and exhibits introduced during the guilt or penalty phase of the trial, as well as the verdicts from the guilt phase.

In filing this NOTICE, the State incorporates all pleadings, witness lists, notices and other discovery materials already provided to Defendant by the Office of the District Attorney as part of its open-file policy as well as any future discovery received and provided to Defendant.

DATED this 20th day of October, 2008.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

BY /s/MARC DIGIACOMO
MARC DIGIACOMO
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #006955

### CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing, was made this 20th day of October, 2008, by facsimile transmission to:

DAYVID FIGLER, ESQ. FAX: 386-0344

/s/D.Daniels
Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

dd-mvu

		•	1 "
		FILE	D
1	TRAN	NOV 2 0 2	2009
2	00101111	DISTRICT COURT	0 04
3	ORIGINAL CLA	ARK COUNTY, NEVADA	VIRT
4			
5	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
6	Plaintiff,	) CASE NO. C212667	
7	vs.	) CASE NO. C241394 ) DEPT. XXI	
8	KENNETH COUNTS, LUIS ALC	,	
9	HIDALGO, aka LUIS ALONSO   HIDALGO, III, LUIS HIDALGO J	JR., aka )	
10	LUIS A. HIDALGO,	)	
11	Defendants.	<i>'</i>	
12			
13		LE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUI	OGE
14		DAY, JANUARY 16, 2009	
15	RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE: MOTIONS		
16			
17	APPEARANCES:		
18	FOR THE STATE:	MARC DIGIACOMO, ESQ.	
19		Chief Deputy District Attorney GIANCARLO PESCI, ESQ.	
20		Chief Deputy District Attorney	
21	FOR THE DEFENDANTS		
22		PAOLA M. ARMENI, ESQ. JOHN L. ARRASCADA, ESQ.	
23		CHRISTOPHER W. ADAMS, ESQ.	
24			
25	RECORDED BY: JANIE L. OLS	EN, COURT RECORDER/TRANSCRIBER	

### LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NV., FRI., JAN. 16, 2009

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. DI GIACOMO: Judge, it's my understanding after discussions with Mr. Gentile as well as Mr. Arrascada and Mr. Adams as well as my office that there has been an agreement reached as it relates to the conflict issue. And the agreement is as such:

The State of Nevada on the record here this morning is willing to withdraw its notice of intent to seek the death penalty against both defendants, whether they be original or amended notices. Both defendants have executed or are in the process of executing a waiver of a right to a jury trial as it relates to penalty should they be convicted.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DI GIACOMO: It is the State's understanding that -- the effect of that will essentially resolve any conflict issue. I've asked Mr. Arrascada and Mr. Adams to acknowledge that there is no, and they've acknowledged to me that they find no conflict issue as it relates to this case --

THE COURT: The guilt phase.

MR. DI GIACOMO: And based upon all those representations, it's my understanding that the Court is going to sign the order to consolidate, which I've also brought as well.

THE COURT: All right. And my understanding based on the last hearing was, Mr. Gentile and Mr. Arrascada, that that was both of your positions that there was no conflict in the guilt phase.

MR. GENTILE: There's no conflict in the guilt phase.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GENTILE: It's still our position, and we've been working every day.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ARRASCADA: Your Honor, just for the record, that's correct.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

MR. DI GIACOMO: Judge, may I approach?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. DI GIACOMO: There's one issue as it relates to consolidation as to what the charging document will be.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DI GIACOMO: I've had some discussions with Mr. Arrascada and Mr. Adams and Mr. Gentile this morning of what we've essentially agreed to do is we have a limited agreement as of right now. It's just to have it on for calendar call, and we'll work out whether we — I think Mr. Gentile's position is we just do two documents. Obviously, there needs to be an amended filed as to Little Lou because his is still the original information that has all the other codefendants in it.

I don't think there needs to be an amended filed as it relates to Mr. H. We are going to look legally whether or not there needs to be one document or two. I originally had an amended information, slash, indictment which is the way I've done it in the past. Mr. Gentile thought that there might be concerns about changing the nature of the charges and those types of things. And so to resolve that issue, I think we can probably work out a resolution.

THE COURT: Okay. And it may just be that there's two different charging documents, and we can just read one, this is the charging document pertaining to the first defendant, and this is, you know, obviously using their names.

MR. GENTILE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. So my --

MR. GENTILE: We have the original; it is signed. I'm handing it to -- this is the original of the waiver of rights.

MR. ARRASCADA: We've also executed that and provided it to Mr. DiGiacomo.

MR. DI GIACOMO: And I am just exec --

MR. ARRASCADA: That's the last time I say execute.

THE COURT: So we're planning on going to trial on January 26<sup>th</sup>; is that right?

MR. DI GIACOMO: What, the 26th?

MR. ARRASCADA: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And now that it's no longer a death case we don't need to do a questionnaire.

MR. GENTILE: We don't need a questionnaire.

THE COURT: What I would like -- I don't always request this -- but what I would like is if both sides could give me their proposed voir dire questions.

MR. GENTILE: We're going to get attorney voir dire in this case?

THE COURT: Yes. Basically the way I do it is I'll ask a few general questions. You know, I go through all of them, you know, what do you do for a living, are you married, children, that kind of thing, ever been a juror before. I may ask them, you know, arrested or charged, just a few of those sort of basic questions. And then typically I turn it over to the State and then the defense to follow up.

Because this is a non-death case, what I'd like to do if everyone's in agreement with this is I don't like the alternates to know that they're alternates until

right before they go to deliberate. And the way I do it is I don't have them in chairs 13 and 14 -- I think two alternates is sufficient -- I have them in chairs 6 and 7 so there's really nobody knows who the alternates are.

And basically the -- I kind of do it I've been told the old-fashioned way -the perempts are exercised publically. So once we qualify 14 in the box for cause,
the State would say, I'll thank and excuse Juror No. 2, and then the next in order
would take Chair No. 2, and then we all question, and then you exercise your
challenge. You'll obviously have nine challenges a side; one challenge is for the
alternates, but I don't care in which order you do it.

So if you do all nine, one and only one has to be on chair 6 or 7, which is your alternate.

MR. GENTILE: Okay. Great.

THE COURT: And then it's next in order. So there's some randomness in terms of who the alternates are, but you definitely know they're the two in chairs 6 and 7.

MR. DI GIACOMO: So, Judge, you have 14 up there, and then when you fill, you fill from the pool out here.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DI GIACOMO: So someone in 6 is always either be an alternate or be perempted. They're never going to move into your spot.

THE COURT: Right, they're never going to move up.

MR. ARRASCADA: Your Honor, one issue regarding voir dire. We filed a very extensive motion regarding voir dire from a death perspective, but there's several principles in there that we'd like the Court to look at regarding pretrial publicity, things of that nature, and ask the Court to give us the consideration of

having some extended voir dire with the potential jurors.

THE COURT: Yeah. What I normally do on the publicity issue is at the beginning, you know, when you go through anybody know the lawyers, anybody -- and then I'll say has anybody heard about the case, and obviously we don't want people discussing what they may have read or seen about the case in front of the rest of the panel.

So I may say, you know, in front of everybody, was that in the newspaper or on the news, and then anyone who thinks they know something about the case from the media or from, you know, talking to their neighbor or whatever, we bring them in and we do their questioning privately.

MR. ARRASCADA: That's exactly what I was --

THE COURT: Yeah, and that's the only -- typically, those are the only situations. So we'll kind of look at who's raised their hand. There may be a lot of people in this particular case. We'll bring in, like, the first ten, you know, excuse the rest of the jurors for a break and bring those people in individually till I think we have enough covered.

MR. GENTILE: When you ask about voir dire questions, I think there are many different ways that lawyers pick juries, and I have changed my ways --

THE COURT: I've seen you pick a jury years ago.

MR. GENTILE: Yeah, and I've changed my ways over the years.

THE COURT: 'Cause you used to do a lot of what books do you read and --

MR. GENTILE: Well, what I look for -- what I look for these days is what I anticipate being hot-button issues that might come up in a case that could cause someone to be prejudiced. In this particular instance, that's going to be strip clubs. And so there's no particular question, but it's an area of inquiry.

THE COURT: Right. So you might say, does anyone patronize strip clubs. Those questions I'll let you ask. I won't ask those.

MR. GENTILE: Okay. Good.

THE COURT: I kind of also like to see the questions because sometimes they're ones that I feel like I can ask with follow up from the lawyers. The reason I like to do it that way is it speeds up the process. Obviously, any question I ask, the lawyers are free to follow up on any answer that may have -- but I just kind of like to streamline the process.

MR. GENTILE: Okay.

THE COURT: Some questions I feel are not appropriate for the Court to be asking or I don't feel comfortable asking; obviously those questions I let the lawyers ask.

MR. GENTILE: Sure. No problem.

MR. DI GIACOMO: Judge, just one last issue. Apparently we have some motions set for Tuesday, some motions set for Thursday in this case. I know that Ms. Armeni had emailed me about moving it all to calendar call. I've talked to Mr. Arrascada and Adams, if we could put it all on the 22<sup>nd</sup>. I actually have to be in Henderson for the SWAT shooting prelim on Tuesday. So it would be easier for me certainly, if we could accommodate the Court to do it on calendar call.

THE COURT: Is that fine?

MR. GENTILE: That's fine. Just put it at the end of the calendar.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't we just say -- I don't know how long my calendar is. Let's say we'll just put everything on at 10:15.

Is that it for me?

MR. DI GIACOMO: Thank you, Judge.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

	<u> </u>
MR.	GENTILE: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR.	ARRASCADA: Thank you.
	-oOo-
ATTEST:	I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
	$\bigcirc$ $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{A}}$

JANIE L. OLSEN Recorder/Transcriber

## ORIGINAL

ļ	ORDR FILED IN CPEN COURT 9
1	ENWARD A. FRIEDLAND
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney
3	Nevada Bar #002781  MARC DIGIACOMO  DEPUTY
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff
7	
	DISTRICT COLUMN
8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
9	
0	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \end{bmatrix}$	Plaintiff,
2	-vs- Case No. C212667(C241394
3	LUIS HIDALGO, III, Dept No. XXI
4	and
5	LUIS HIDALGO, JR. () #1579522
6	Defendants.
7	ORDER GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE C241394 INTO
8	C212667
9	DATE OF HEARING: 1/16/2009
20	TIME OF HEARING: 9:30 A.M.
ŀ	THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the above entitled Court on the
21	16th day of January, 2009, the Defendants being present, represented by John Arrascada for
22	LUIS HIDALGO, III and Dominic Gentile for LUIS HIDALGO, JR., the Plaintiff being
23	represented by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through MARC DIGIACOMO, Chief
24	Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having heard the arguments of counsel and good
25	cause appearing therefor,
26	

H:\CASES OPEN\PALOMINO\ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION - HIDALGOS.doc

1	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the STATE'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
2	C241394 INTO C212667, shall be, and it is Granted.
3	DATED this <u>16th</u> day of January, 2009.
4	
5	Iklini adam.
6	DISTRICT JUDGE
7	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
8 9	DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781
10	1
11	W Jed
12	MARC DIGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955
13	Nevada Bar #006955
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

H-\Cases open\palomino\order of consolidation - hidalgos.doc  $^2 \begin{array}{c} Volume~2 - 395 \end{array}$ 

# ORIGINAL FILED IN OPEN COURT EDWARD A. FRIEDLAND

1	INFO	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney	JAN 26 2009
	Nevada Bar #002781	
3	MARC DIGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney	BY: Chuse Husko
4	Nevada Bar #006955	<b>DENISE HUSTED, DEPUTY</b>
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212	
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff	
7	DISTRICT CLARK COUNT	
8	CLARGE COOK	1, 142 771571
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
	į ( )	601066
10	Plaintiff,	Case No: C212667 Dept No: XXI
11	-vs-	Dept No. AAI
12	}	FOURTH AMENDED
13	LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III,	INFORMATION
	#1849634 Defendant.	
14	<u> </u>	
15	}	
16	STATE OF NEVADA )	
17	COUNTY OF CLARK ) ss.	
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	within and for the County of Clark, State of
18	•	•
19	Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the	ne State of Nevada, informs the Court:
20	That LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III,	the Defendant above named, having committed
21	the crimes of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT	MURDER (Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030,
22	193.165); MURDER WITH USE OF A D	EADLY WEAPON (Felony - NRS 200.010,

199.500), on or between May 19, 2005, and May 24, 2005, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and

200.030, 193.165), and SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER (Felony - NRS

provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, 26

27

23

24

25

28

\\SUPERMAN\DIGIACM\$\CASES OPEN\PALOMINO\5B005204.DOC

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III, along with co-conspirators KENNETH JAY COUNTS, ANABEL ESPINDOLA, DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL and JAYSON TAOIPU did, on or about May 19, 2005, then and there meet with each other and/or Luis Hildago, Jr. and between themselves, and each of them with the other, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire and agree to commit a crime, to-wit: the murder of TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, and in furtherance of said conspiracy, the Defendants and/or their co-conspirators, did commit the act as set forth in Count 2, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.

### COUNT 2 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Defendant LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III, along with co-conspirators KENNETH JAY COUNTS, ANABEL ESPINDOLA, DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL and JAYSON TAOIPU did, on or about May 19, 2005, then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, a human being, by shooting at and into the body and/or head of said TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, the Defendant being liable under one or more of the following theories of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by aiding and abetting the commission of the crime by, directly or indirectly, counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing or otherwise procuring each other to commit the crime, to-wit: by DEFENDANT Luis Hidalgo, III and/or Luis Hidalgo, Jr., procuring Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL to beat and/or kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; thereafter, Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL procuring KENNETH COUNTS and/or JAYSON TAOIPU to shoot TIMOTHY HADLAND; thereafter, Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL and KENNETH COUNTS and JAYSON TAOIPU did drive to the location in the same vehicle; thereafter, Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL calling victim TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND to the scene; thereafter, by KENNETH COUNTS shooting TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; and/or (2) by conspiring to commit the crime of battery and/or battery with use of a deadly weapon and/or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm and/or to kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND whereby each and every co-conspirator is responsible for not only the specific crime intended, but also for the natural and forseeable general intent crimes of each and every co-conspirator during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

COUNT 3 – SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER

Defendant LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III did, on or between May 23, 2005, and

Defendant LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III did, on or between May 23, 2005, and May 24, 2005, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously counsel, hire, command or other solicit another, to-wit: DEANGELO CARROLL, to commit the murder of JAYSON TAOIPU; the defendant being liable under one or more theories of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly or indirectly committing the acts constituting the offense; and/or (2) by aiding and abetting the commission of the crime by, directly or indirectly, counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing or otherwise procuring ANABEL ESPINDOLA to commit the crime.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

19 //

20 //

22 //

23 //

24 //

25 //

26 //

27 //

28 //

### **COUNT 4 – SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER**

Defendant LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III did, on or between May 23, 2005, and May 24, 2005, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously counsel, hire, command or other solicit another to-wit: DEANGELO CARROLL, to commit the murder of RONTAE ZONE; the defendant being liable under one or more theories of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by directly or indirectly committing the acts constituting the offense; and/or (2) by aiding and abetting the commission of the crime by, directly or indirectly, counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing or otherwise procuring ANABEL ESPINDOLA to commit the crime.

RY

MARC DIGIACOMØ

CHIEF DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Nevada Bar #006955

DA#05FB0052A/dd LVMPD EV#0505193516 CONSP MURDER;MWDW - F (TK7)

## ORIGINAL

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

) CASE NO: DEPT NO: (212667

vs.

LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, aka )
LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III, and ) Transcript of LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, JR., ) Proceedings

Defendants.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE P. ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JURY TRIAL - DAY 9

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2009

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE STATE: MARC DIGIACOMO, ESQ.

Chief Deputy District Attorney

GIANCARLO PESCI, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney

FOR LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, JR.: DOMINIC P. GENTILE, ESQ.

PAOLA M. ARMENI, ESQ.

FOR LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III: JOHN L. ARRASCADA, ESQ.

CHRISTOPHER ADAMS, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: JANIE OLSEN, COURT RECORDER

TRANSCRIBED BY: KARReporting and Transcription Services

KARReporting & Transcription Services

NOV 24 2009



### INDEX

### WITNESSES FOR THE STATE:

ANABEL ESPINDOLA

Direct Examination By Mr. Digiacomo 4

Cross-Examination By Mr. Gentile 167

#### EXHIBITS

STATE'S EXHIBITS ADMITTED: PAGE		
97 through 111	Photographs	51
230	Silverton Document	111
220 and 221	Card and Letter	160
DEFENDANT HIDALGO JR'S EXHIBITS ADMITTED:		
В	Blueprint of Simone's Auto Plaza	167

KARReporting & Transcription Services

## LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2009, 9:38 A.M. PROCEEDINGS

(In the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: All right. Court is now in session.

The record will reflect the presence of the State through the deputy district attorneys, the presence of the defendants and their counsel, the officers of the Court and the members of the jury.

Before we swear in the witness, ladies and gentlemen, I know some of you asked my marshal if we could work late tonight. I know there's frustration that we're not getting a lot done each day. We cannot stay past about 1:00 o'clock today. However, what I am doing is for Monday and Tuesday of next week, I'm trying to find another judge to hear my calendars so we can start at 9:00 a.m., and if everyone's available, we will work until 7:00 p.m. Monday and Tuesday.

So if anyone has conflict with that, you're directed to inform my marshal at the break. That's what I'm trying to do, because I understand for people who take off, if we only get three hours in, it's not a very productive day. So that's my plan and hopefully that will work out.

And having said that, the State has called as their next witness...

MR. DIGIACOMO: Anabel Espindola.

KARReporting & Transcription Services

1	THE COURT: All right. Ms. Espindola, I need you to		
2	stand up and face this lady right here who will be		
3	administering the oath to you.		
4	ANABEL ESPINDOLA, STATE'S WITNESS, SWORN		
5	THE CLERK: Please be seated and please state and		
6	spell your name.		
7	THE WITNESS: Anabel Espindola, A-n-a-b-e-l,		
8	E-s-p-i-n-d-o-l-a.		
9	THE CLERK: Thank you.		
10	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.		
11	DIRECT EXAMINATION		
12	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:		
13	Q Good morning, Ms. Espindola.		
14	A Good morning.		
15	Q What I need you to do is roll up right to that		
16	microphone because I know you have a soft voice and not		
17	everybody's going to hear you at all times, okay.		
18	A Yes, sir.		
19	Q I'm going to ask you to speak up when you're		
20	talking, okay?		
21	A Yes.		
22	Q All right. You said your name is Anabel		
23	Espindola, correct?		
24	A Correct.		
25	Q Okay. Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of		
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 4		

1	the jury where you've been living for the better part of the	
2	last four years.	
3	A Clark County Detention Center.	
4	Q And you're hear to testify about the events	
5	that put you in that place?	
6	A Correct.	
7	Q All right. I want to talk to you a little bit	
8	about your life before May 19th of 2005. Let's start with	
9	the when you turned 18, where were you living?	
10	A San Fran the bay area, California.	
11	Q Bay area, California?	
12	A Mm-hmm.	
13	Q Is that a yes?	
14	A Yes.	
15	Q Okay. And what were you doing for a living?	
16	Were you working?	
17	A Yes, I was.	
18	Q What were you doing?	
19	A I worked for Mr. Hidalgo.	
20	Q All right. How long prior to you turning 18	
21	did you start working for Mr. Hidalgo?	
22	A I was about six months after I turned 18.	
23	Q Okay. So about six months after you turned 18,	
24	you started working for Mr. Hidalgo?	
25	A Yes.	
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 5	

1		Q	And when we use the term Mr. Hidalgo, how did
2	you refer	to M	c. Hidalgo?
3		A	As Louie.
4		Q	Louie?
5		Α	Mm-hmm, yes.
6		Q	Is that a yes?
7		A	Yes.
8		Q	And is Louie here in court today?
9		Α	Yes, he is.
10		Q	Can you point to him and describe something
11	he's wear	ing?	
12		A	He's wearing a black jacket.
13		Q	So when you use the term Louie
14		MR.	GENTILE: May the record reflect that
15	Mr. Hidalgo stood for identification.		
16		THE (	COURT: It will. Thank you.
17		MR. (	GENTILE: Thank you.
18	BY MR. DI	GIACO	MO:
19		Q	And when you use the term Louie, you're
20	referring	to M	r. Hidalgo, I guess, Jr.?
21		Α	Yes.
22		Q	And had you ever heard other people refer to
23	him as so	methi	ng else?
24		A	Yes.
25		Q	What was that?
		KARR	eporting & Transcription Services 6

1	A	Mr. H.
2	Q	So he's Mr. H?
3	А	Yes.
4	Q	Okay. When you're working for Mr. H, what kind
5	of business wa	as it?
6	А	Auto shop, automotive repair.
7	Q	And what were you doing for him?
8	A	I was the secretary for him when I worked in
9	California.	
10	Q	And how long did you work for him in
11	California?	
12	A	Up until we moved to Las Vegas.
13	Q	And when was that approximately?
14	A	The beginning of 1999.
15	Q	The beginning of 1999?
16	А	Correct.
17	Q	And I apologize for asking you your age, but
18	how old were you in 1999?	
19	A	I was 19 no, I'm sorry. I was
20	Q	I guess I could do this easier
21	А	Like 27, I'm sorry.
22	Q	I apologize. So you're 36 today?
23	А	Correct.
24	Q	Okay. So you worked for Mr. H for eight years
25	approximately	while you're in California, some of that time?
	KARI	Reporting & Transcription Services 7

1	А	Yes.
2	Q	During that time period, were you solely an
3	employee of Mr	. H?
4	А	No.
5	Q	How long after you started working for Mr. H
6	did your relat	ionship with him change?
7	А	I it was immediate.
8	Q	Immediate?
9	А	Mm-hmm, yes.
10	Q	So you were with Mr. H from the time you were
11	18 kind of for	ward?
12	А	Yes.
13	Q	And how would you describe the relationship
14	that you had w	ith Mr. H?
15	A	I was his girlfriend.
16	Q	Did you know about what his family life
17	well, what	do you know what his marital status was at the
18	time?	
19	А	Yes.
20	Q	What was that?
21	А	He was married. He was currently married.
22	Q	Up until well, even after your arrest, but
23	at least up un	til your arrest in May of 2005, were you still
24	his girlfriend	?
25	A	Yes.
	KARR	eporting & Transcription Services 8

1		Q	At any point during that time period, did you
2	physically	y liv	e with Mr. H?
3		A	No.
4		Q	So you maintained your own residence and he
5	maintaine	d his	?
6		A	Yes.
7		Q	At some point in time did you learn about
8	Mr. H's c	hildr	en?
9		A	Yes.
10		Q	Okay. Let's talk about how many children
11	does Mr. 1	H hav	e?
12		A	Three.
13		Q	And let's can you name the oldest one for
14	me?		
15		A	Angelina Hidalgo.
16		Q	Angelina?
17		Α	Yes.
18		Q	Okay. And who's the second oldest?
19		A	Luis Hidalgo, III.
20		Q	And do you see Luis Hidalgo, III here in court
21	today?		
22		A	Yes, I do.
23		Q	Is he the guy standing up?
24		A	Yes.
25		MR.	DIGIACOMO: May the record reflect the
		KARR	eporting & Transcription Services 9

1	identification of Luis Hidalgo, III.		
2	THE COURT: It will.		
3	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:		
4	Q When you would refer to Luis Hidalgo, III, how		
5	would you refer to him?		
6	A As Luis or Little Luis.		
7	Q Luis or Little Luis?		
8	A Yes.		
9	Q Have other people used the term Little Lou		
10	before?		
11	A Yes.		
12	Q All right. What about is there a Spanish		
13	term that you would sometimes use for him?		
14	A Yes.		
15	Q What is that?		
16	A Luisito.		
17	Q Luisito?		
18	A Yes.		
19	Q And then after Little after Little Lou or		
20	Little Luis, who's the next child in Mr		
21	A Rosa Hidalgo.		
22	Q Rosa Hidalgo?		
23	A Yes.		
24	Q Can you tell me in maybe in relation to		
25	or maybe you know. Do you know the exact age of Little Lou?		
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 10		

1	A	I think 27.
2	Q	Okay. So he's younger than you?
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	Okay. You said that in 1999 you moved to Las
5	Vegas, correct	?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	And you indicated that Mr. H moved to Las
8	Vegas?	
9	А	Yes.
10	Q	Did Little Lou and the rest of the family come
11	as well?	
12	А	Yes.
13	Q	Okay. What what prompted the move to Las
14	Vegas?	
15	А	Louie wanted to we used to come and visit
16	quite often and	d he wanted to move.
17	Q	And what was the plans for when you moved here?
18	What was going	to happen?
19	А	To open up another body shop.
20	Q	How was the how was the body shop here
21	and that's Sim	one's we've heard testimony about?
22	А	Yes.
23	Q	How was that financed?
24	А	Through a friend of his, Dr. Simon Stertzer.
25	Q	Who is Dr. Simon Stertzer? Do you know him at
	KARR	eporting & Transcription Services

1	al1?	
2	А	Yes.
3	Q	Who is he?
4	А	He is a personal friend of Mr. Hidalgo's.
5	Q	Now, in the time that you were with
6	Mr. Hidalgo, d	id he ever talk to you about his history?
7	А	Yes.
8	Q	Okay. Let's talk a little bit about did you
9	have discussio	ns with him about the police and his involvement
10	with the polic	e?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	What did he tell you?
13	А	That he was a retired police officer from the
14	San Bruno Poli	ce Department. He went to work for the
15	sheriff's depa	rtment for a short period of time. His father
16	needed help at	the body shop so he retired from the police
17	force and went	to work at the body shop.
18	Q	And his father, what did you call what was
19	his father's n	ame?
20	А	Luis Hidalgo, Sr.
21	Q	And what did you call him?
22	А	Pops.
23	Q	Pops?
24	A	Yes.
25	Q	And has Pops passed on at this point?
	KARR	eporting & Transcription Services 12

1	A Yes.	
2	Q And approximately when did he pass away?	
3	A I believe it was two years ago.	
4	Q Two years it's 2009. So 2007, 2006,	
5	somewhere in that range?	
6	A Yes.	
7	Q Okay. Once you moved here let me ask you	
8	this: Did you know about the finances of Mr. Hidalgo when you	
9	moved when you moved here?	
10	A Yes.	
11	MR. ARRASCADA: Your Honor, I would just ask for	
12	clarity of the record that we perhaps Mr. Hidalgo, Jr.,	
13	Mr. Hidalgo, III, that we	
14	THE COURT: All right.	
15	MR. ARRASCADA: put some qualifiers because we do	
16	have the same names.	
17	MR. DIGIACOMO: I'll call him Mr. H. How's that?	
18	THE COURT: All right. And Mr. H refers to Hidalgo,	
19	Jr.,	
20	MR. DIGIACOMO: Correct.	
21	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:	
22	Q Mr. H were you aware well, let me ask you	
23	this: Mr Dr. Stertzer and do you know what? I never	
24	got you to answer that question. Who is Dr. Stertzer?	
25	A He's a doctor he's a heart surgeon. He	
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 13	

1	works at Stanford now or as far as I know.
2	Q And at some point, him and Mr. Hidalgo or Mr. H
3	got formed a relationship?
4	A Yes.
5	Q And when Mr. Hidalgo moved from San Bruno or
6	Mr. H moved from San Bruno to Las Vegas, you said something
7	about Mr. Stertzer financing Simone's.
8	A Correct.
9	Q How did that work?
10	MR. GENTILE: Foundation. Objection. Foundation.
11	THE COURT: All right. Lay a foundation.
12	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:
L3	Q Did Mr. H tell you how the financial
1.4	transaction related to Simone's worked?
15	A All I know is that
L6	MR. GENTILE: Objection.
L7	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:
L8	Q Let me ask you this
19	MR. GENTILE: Foundation.
20	THE COURT: Well
21	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:
22	Q did Mr. H ever describe to you how the
23	financial transaction for Simone's worked? Just answer yes or
24	no.
25	A No.
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 14

1	Q Okay. You never talked to him about it?
2	A No.
3	Q Okay. What capacity did you have at Simone's?
4	A I was the business administrator.
5	Q The business administrator?
6	A Yes.
7	Q Okay. And what does that mean you did at
8	Simone's?
9	A I ran the body shop. I took care of the
10	vehicles that were coming in, the paperwork, all billing. I
11	dealt with the customers, the insurance companies, the
12	employees.
13	Q When you left San or when there was a body
14	shop at San Bruno, did you have a similar job?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Okay. Were you involved or did you based
17	upon your financial involvement with the San Bruno shop, did
18	you know about how much money the San Bruno shop had or let
19	me rephrase this. Did they sell the San Bruno shop?
20	A Yes.
21	Q Okay. And ultimately their family moved here
22	and there was nothing left at San Bruno financially related to
23	the auto shop?
24	A Correct.
25	Q Okay. Were you aware of how much money the San
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 15

1	Bruno auto shop sold for?	
2	MR. GENTILE: Objection. Foundation.	
3	THE COURT: All right.	
4	THE WITNESS: I don't remember.	
5	MR. GENTILE: I'll withdraw the objection.	
6	THE COURT: She doesn't know anyway, so	
7	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:	
8	Q You don't remember?	
9	A No.	
10	Q Okay. When you got to Simone's well, let me	
11	ask you this: Was it a dirt lot?	
12	A No.	
13	Q Was there already a building there?	
14	A Yes.	
15	Q Okay. You move into the building, you're doing	
16	the billing, correct?	
17	A Yes.	
18	Q All right. Let's talk about the money coming	
19	into Simone's. Well, let me ask it this way: Was Simone's	
20	making money?	
21	A No.	
22	MR. GENTILE: Objection. Foundation.	
23	THE COURT: All right. Lay a foundation as to how	
24	she would know and then ask the question.	
25	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:	
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 16	

1	Q Okay. Did you not testify that you you were
2	doing the books for Simone's?
3	A I did the books for Simone's.
4	Q Okay. You did all the you took you paid
5	the bills out and you found out the money coming in, correct?
6	A Yes.
7	Q All right. Was Simone's making money?
8	A No.
9	MR. GENTILE: Again, objection. Simone's was in
10	business for six years.
11	THE COURT: All right. I think the basis of the
12	objection is during what period of time are you inquiring
13	about as to whether or not Simone's was making money.
14	Is that your objection, Mr. Gentile?
15	MR. GENTILE: That's the objection.
16	THE COURT: All right. Mr. DiGiacomo, if you will
L7	lay a foundation as to time frame, whether you're talking
18	about the entire six-year period or year by year or whatever.
19	Okay.
20	MR. DIGIACOMO: I could do it that way.
21	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:
22	Q Let's talk about it this way: When Simone's
23	first opened and it's the first couple of months, is Simone's
24	making any money?
25	A No.

KARReporting & Transcription Services 17

1	Q	At any point in time does it get to a point
2	where it's clea	aring a profit?
3	А	It progressively got better.
4	Q	Progressively got better?
5	А	Yes.
6	Q	At some point let's talk all the way up to
7	May of 2005	was it making enough money to sustain itself?
8	А	We were sustaining ourselves. We were paying
9	all our bills.	
10	Q	You were paying your bills?
11	А	Yes.
12	Q	Okay. Was there any how much money was
13	there left ove	r after paying all the bills?
14	A	None.
15	Q	Okay. Were you were you at all involved in
16	Mr. H's finances or was it just Simone's?	
17	А	I deposited his checks and wrote out all his
18	billing.	
19	Q	Okay. Did you have access to his bank .
20	accounts?	
21	А	Yes.
22	Q	Okay. And at some point in time did there come
23	a point in time	e in the years that you were living in Las Vegas
24	you learned abo	out something happening up at the Palomino Club?
25	A	Yes.
	KARRe	eporting & Transcription Services 18

1	Q	Okay. How did you initially find out that
2	something t	hat somehow Mr. H or somebody else was going to
3	be involved in	the Palomino Club?
4	А	Mr. H was looking to start another business.
5	Q	And who did what happened did he contact
6	anybody?	
7	А	He contacted Alex Gurde (phonetic) and they
8	were looking i	nto a different types of business.
9	Q	Okay. And who's Alex Gurde?
10	A	He's a realtor.
11	Q	What's is did Alex Gurde grow up an
12	American in	America?
13	А	Not as far as I know. He's Romanian.
14	Q	Did he have an accent?
15	А	Yes.
16	Q	Okay. You said he contacted Alex but for a
17	different type	of business. Did he ever wind up getting
18	involved in so	me other type of business?
19	A	Yes.
20	Q	What was it?
21	А	A strip club.
22	Q	And what strip club?
23	A	The Palomino Club.
24	Q	Okay. And who did he well, do you know who
25	he wound up ge	tting into the strip club business with?
	KARR	eporting & Transcription Services 19

1	MR. GENTILE: Objection. Foundation. Also, add a
2	time predicate. I mean
3	THE COURT: All right. Lay a bit of a foundation.
4	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:
5	Q What are we talking about? When does Mr. H
6	first get involved with the Palomino Club?
7	A 2000, 2001. I don't remember the exact year.
8	Q Okay. When Mr. H first gets involved in the
9	Palomino Club, is he the owner?
10	A No.
11	Q Okay. So at the point that Mr. H goes to the
12	Palomino Club, who's the owner?
13	A Dr. Stertzer.
14	Q Dr. Stertzer?
15	A Yes.
16	Q And did you learn through the conversations
17	through Mr. H about how Dr. Stertzer came into possession of
18	the club?
19	A Yes.
20	Q How was that?
21	A Dr. Stertzer purchased the club outright from
22	the Perrys.
23	Q Okay. And did you learn from Mr. H how much he
24	had paid for it?
25	A Yes.
:	KARReporting & Transcription Services 20

1	Q How much?
2	A 13 million.
3	Q \$13 million?
4	A Yes.
5	Q And then you said Mr. H became involved. What
6	was his position at the Palomino Club at that point?
7	A He was a general manager.
8	Q Okay. And did you have anything to do with the
9	Palomino Club at that point?
10	A Yes.
11	Q What was that?
12	A I did all the books for the Palomino.
13	Q You did the books for the Palomino Club?
14	A Yes.
15	Q Even when Dr. Stertzer owned it?
16	A Yes.
17	Q Okay. How much was Mr. H getting paid to be
18	the general manager? Do you recall?
19	A I believe it was 2,500 a week. I'm not quite
20	sure. I know it was between 2,000 to 2,500.
21	Q Okay. Somewhere between 2,000 and 2,500 a
22	week, so okay. At some point in time, is there discussions
23	that you've had with Mr. H related to him getting the title of
24	owner?
25	A Yes.
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 21

_ ՝	Q Can you describe that for the ladies and
2	gentlemen of the jury?
3	MR. GENTILE: Can we have a time predicate?
4	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:
5	Q All right. Approximately when is that?
6	A Maybe a year after, a year and a half after
7	Dr. Stertzer had owned it.
8	Q So a year, year and a half. And let me ask you
9	this let's go backwards a little bit. From the time that
10	you're arrested, how long had Mr. H been the owner of the
11	Palomino Club?
12	A Maybe a year
13	Q Okay.
14	A or so.
15	Q And what were what did Mr. H tell you about
16	the arrangements for the Palomino Club to pass from
17	Dr. Stertzer to Mr. Hidalgo or Mr. H?
18	MR. GENTILE: We have a Your Honor, again,
19	foundation. Was anybody present? That's appropriate
20	foundation. If he's going to talk about people talking about
21	things, there should be a time, place, and who was there.
22	THE COURT: Well, he
23	MR. DIGIACOMO: I was asking I'll rephrase.
24	THE COURT: I mean, he can do it that way or I
25	mean, if

KARReporting & Transcription Services 22

1	MR. DIGIACOMO: And he's free to ask on cross
2	every
3	THE COURT: I agree with you in terms of when the
4	conversation occurred, but I don't think Mr. DiGiacomo has to
5	find out everybody that was there as long as he indicates who
6	the speaker was and that she was the listener.
7	So go on, Mr. DiGiacomo.
8	MR. DIGIACOMO: Thank you, Judge.
9	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:
10	Q What did Mr. H tell you about the arrangement
11	between the passing of the club from Dr. Stertzer to Mr. H?
12	MR. GENTILE: Same objection. When?
13	THE COURT: All right. When did you have a
14	conversation with Mr. H about the passing of the Palominc Club
15	from Dr. Stertzer to Mr. H?
16	THE WITNESS: We spoke at the body shop. He
17	expressed that Dr. Stertzer no longer wanted the club.
18	THE COURT: And about when was this? When did he
19	start talking about that?
20	THE WITNESS: Like I said, maybe about a year after
21	Dr. Stertzer had owned it.
22	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
23	Mr. DiGiacomo.
24	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:
25	Q So he told you that Dr. Stertzer no longer
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 23

1	wanted to own the club?
2	A Correct.
3	Q Did he tell you why Dr. Stertzer didn't no
4	longer wanted to own the club?
5	A Yes.
6	MR. GENTILE: Double hearsay. Objection.
7	THE COURT: Overruled.
8	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:
9	Q And what did Mr. H tell you was the reason why
10	Dr. Stertzer didn't want to own the club?
11	A Publicity. Dr. Stertzer didn't want any.
12	Q Okay. And did Mr. H tell you what the
13	arrangement was going to be with him and Dr. Stertzer?
14	A Yes.
15	Q And describe that for the ladies and gentlemen
16	of the jury.
17	A Dr. Stertzer was going to go ahead and do the
18	note for 15 13 million, and on a weekly basis the club was
19	scheduled to pay the loan back.
20	Q On a weekly basis?
21	A On a weekly basis.
22	Q And what was the payment on a weekly basis?
23	A It was scheduled to be 10,000 a week.
24	Q So \$10,000 a week would be paid to Dr.
25	Stertzer?
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 24

ı	A Correct.
2	Q And how did this work? Did you do the books
3	for the Palomino?
4	A Yes.
5	Q Okay. So explain to the ladies and gentlemen
6	how, let's say, at the end of the week when you've got to make
7	the payment, explain to them how the finances would work.
8	A I would make the deposits to the bank. I would
9	deposit all the money into the Bermuda Sands account. From
10	there, I would transfer the money into the Palomino and I
11	would transfer \$10,000, or if the club wasn't doing as well,
12	whatever was available to Dr. Stertzer which would be the
13	Windrock account.
14	Q Okay.
15	A That was Dr. Stertzer's account.
16	Q Let's back up a little bit because you talked
۱7	about a bunch of things. You said Bermuda Sands. What's the
18	Bermuda Sands account?
19	A It was a holding account for the Palomino,
20	Satin Saddle and Lacy's.
21	Q All right. And so you said that the money that
22	was made from those properties would be placed into that
23	account?
24	A Correct.
25	Q Okay. Then you talked about some earnings
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 25

1	being transferred to other accounts, and I'm sorry, I missed
2	those.
3	A It was to another account which was Windrock
4	Enterprises.
5	Q What's Windrock Enterprises?
6	A It was Dr. Stertzer's account.
7	Q Okay. And so you take the money from one, move
8	it to the other
9	A Yes.
10	Q to pay Dr. Stertzer?
11	A Yes.
12	Q Now, you just mentioned the Satin Saddle and
13	Lacy's. What are you talking about?
14	A It was part of the purchase. They are two
15	other clubs.
16	Q And where are they located?
17	A Lacy's is within the Palomino Club.
18	Q Same building?
19	A Same building.
20	Q Okay.
21	A It's inside the same building.
22	Q And what's the Satin Saddle?
23	A Satin Saddle is a topless club and it's like
24	two doors down. Mm-hmm.
?5	Q Is that a yes?
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 26

1	A Yes.
2	Q And what about their addresses? Were they the
3	same or different addresses?
4	A Different addresses.
5	Q Okay. And did you know anything about the
6	property that those two clubs sat on?
7	A Yes.
8	Q Okay. How did you know about the property that
9	those two clubs sat on?
10	A It all when Dr. Stertzer had purchased the
11	club, the whole block went with it.
12	Q So the whole block was this area that has both
13	Satin Saddle, Lacy's and Palomino on it?
14	A Correct. It also has Easy Pawn and a loan
15	shop.
16	Q Okay. Now, the Easy Pawn and the loan shop,
17	were they run by Dr. Stertzer?
18	A No.
L9	. Q Okay. They were leased out?
20	A Yes.
21	Q And did you have anything to do with the money
22	that came out of those or what happened to the money that came
23	out to those?
24	A They would pay their monthly rent. It would
25	be the check would be made out to Windrock. It would be
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 27

1	made to Simone's. Simone's Autoplaza was the corporate office
2	for the Palomino Club, and I would make the deposits.
3	Q I guess my question is: The money that's
4	coming out of this pawnshop and the other business that's
5	there, is that part of the 10,000 that's got to be paid from
6	the Palomino and Lacy's and Satin Saddle?
7	A No.
8	Q You mentioned something to the effect of every
9	month the 10,000 wasn't getting put into Dr. Stertzer's
10	account or every week. Sorry.
11	MR. GENTILE: Objection. Is that a question?
12	MR. DIGIACOMO: I was just directing her back to it.
13	THE COURT: He was I think he was setting up a
14	question.
15	MR. DIGIACOMO: Thank you.
16	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:
17	Q Did you all right. I'll make it a question.
18	Did you mention that not every week \$10,000 was going into
19	Dr. Stertzer's account?
20	A Yes.
21	Q Okay. Well, describe that. What did you mean
22	by that?
23	A If the club was doing poorly that week, I had
24	already spoken to Dr. Stertzer and less money would be
25	deposited. When the club was doing better, I would make up
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 28

1	the differ	cence.
2		Q Okay. Let's talk about the time period gumming
3	up to May	of 2005. Was the club ever almost always able to
4	cover the	\$10,000 a week that was being paid out to
5	Dr. Stert:	zer?
6		A No.
7		Q Were you able to make up all of the money that
8	you were s	short for one week to cover Dr. Stertzer?
9		A No.
10		Q I didn't ask this, but other than the \$10,000 a
11	week that	was being put into Dr. Stertzer's account, was there
12	any other	monies paid for the Palomino Club?
13		A I don't understand the question.
14		Q Did Mr. H have to give Dr. Stertzer any
15	principle	or was he just paying the \$10,000 a week?
16		A Just the 10,000 a week.
17	!	Q And once he took over well, let me ask you
18	this: Is	it at what point does he become owner on the
19	documents	that the jury,'s now seen? What date does that
20	occur?	
21		MR. GENTILE: Objection. What documents?
22		THE COURT: All right. What exhibits are you
23	referring	to?
24		MR. DIGIACOMO: The phone list that says Mr. H,
25	owner.	

KARReporting & Transcription Services 29


1	THE COURT: Okay. So and that's exhibit number?
2	MR. DIGIACOMO: I don't know off the top of my head.
3	THE COURT: All right. You're talking about the
4	phone list that was highlighted and testified to by the
5	MR. DIGIACOMO: No. It was the phone list that was
6	hanging on the wall
7	THE COURT: All right.
8	MR. DIGIACOMO: in the Palomino.
9	THE COURT: That was recovered in the search warrant
10	by Sergeant McGrath. So we're clear what you're talking
11	about.
12	MR. GENTILE: I object to the form of the question.
13	I mean, ownership documents referred to
14	THE COURT: Right. That would refer to
15	MR. GENTILE: deeds and mortgages and
16	THE COURT: something filed with the business
17	licensing
18	MR. GENTILE: Right.
19	THE COURT: and whatnot. So if it's clear that
20	that's what you're referencing.
21	MR. DIGIACOMO: Okay.
22	THE COURT: And, Deniece, why don't you find that.
23	BY MR. DIGIACOMO:
24	Q Were you involved at all in records having to
25	be filed that Dr. Stertzer was no longer the owner and
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 30

ŀ	
1	somebody else was the owner?
2	A I took care of all the paperwork.
3	Q All of the paperwork?
4	A Yes. I would hand it to the accountant.
5	Q Okay. And does title pass from one company to
6	the another or do you know?
7	MR. GENTILE: Objection. Foundation.
8	MR. DIGIACOMO: She said she handled all the
9	paperwork. I'm asking her whether or not there was paperwork
10	filed passing title from the Windrock account to another

The remainder of this transcript has been omitted.

# ORIGINAL

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA



STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

) CASE NO: (C212667/C241394 DEPT NO:

vs.

LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, aka LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III, and ) Transcript of LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, JR., ) Proceedings

Defendants.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE P. ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

### JURY TRIAL - DAY 14 VERDICT

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2009

**APPEARANCES:** 

FOR THE STATE:

MARC DIGIACOMO, ESQ.

Chief Deputy District Attorney

GIANCARLO PESCI, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney

FOR LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, JR.: DOMINIC P. GENTILE, ESQ.

PAOLA M. ARMENI, ESQ.

FOR LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III: JOHN L. ARRASCADA, ESQ.

CHRISTOPHER ADAMS, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: JANIE OLSEN, COURT RECORDER

TRANSCRIBED BY: KARReporting and Transcription Services

RECEIVED

NOV 2 1 2009

KARReporting & Transcription Services

CLERK OF THE COURT

### 2 PROCEEDINGS 3 (Outside the presence of the jury.) 4 THE COURT: All right. Is everyone here? Are we 5 all ready? All right. You can go ahead and bring the jury in. 6 7 THE MARSHAL: The jury is entering. 8 THE COURT: All right. Everyone can be seated. 9 Court is now back in session. The record will reflect the 10 presence of the defendant, Mr. Hidalgo Jr., along with his 11 attorneys, Ms. Armeni and Mr. Gentile; the presence of the defendant, Mr. Hidalgo, III, along with his attorneys 12 13 Mr. Adams and Mr. Arrascada; the presence of the State through 14 the Deputy District Attorneys, Mr. DiGiacomo and Mr. Pesci; 15 the officers of the Court and the members of the jury. 16 Who's the foreperson of the jury? All right. 17 No. 10, Mr. Wallace, has the jury reach a verdict in this 18 case? 19 JUROR NO. 10: We have. 20 THE COURT: All right. Will you please hand the 21 forms of verdict to our bailiff. All right. The clerk will now read the verdict out 22 23 loud and inquire if this is the verdict of the jury. 24 THE CLERK: Yes, Your Honor. The State of Nevada, plaintiff, versus Luis Hidalgo, 25 KARReporting & Transcription Services

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2009, 3:03 P.M.

1	III, defendant. Case No. C212667, Department No. XXI.
2	Verdict.
3	We, the jury in the above-entitled case, find the
4	defendant Luis Hidalgo, III, as follows:
5	Count 1, conspiracy to commit murder. Guilty of
6	conspiracy to commit a battery with a deadly weapon or battery
7	resulting in substantial bodily harm.
8	Count 2, murder with use of a deadly weapon. Guilty
9	of second-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon.
10	Count 3, solicitation to commit murder. Guilty of
11	solicitation to commit murder.
12	Count 4, solicitation to commit murder. Guilty of
13	solicitation to commit murder.
14	Dated the 17th day of February 2009, juror,
15	foreperson.
16	The State of Nevada, plaintiff, versus Luis Hidalgo
17	Jr, defendant. Case No. C241394, Department XXI. Verdict.
18	We, the jury in the above-entitled case, find the
19	defendant Luis Hidalgo Jr. as follows: .
20	Count 1, conspiracy to commit murder. Guilty of
21	conspiracy to commit a battery with a deadly weapon or battery
22	resulting in substantial bodily harm.
23	Count 2, murder with use of a deadly weapon. Guilty
24	of second-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon.
25	Dated this 17th day of February 2009, juror,
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 3

1	foreperson.	
2	Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is this your	
3	verdict as read, so say you one, so say you all?	
4	(Jurors responded in the affirmative)	
5	THE COURT: All right. Before the verdicts are	
6	recorded in the minutes of the Court, does either side desire	
7	to have the jury polled?	
8	MR. GENTILE: Your Honor, we do.	
9	MR. ARRASCADA: Yes, Your Honor.	
10	THE COURT: All right. Ms. Husted.	
11	THE CLERK: Juror No. 1, is this your verdict as	
12	read?	
13	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.	
14	THE CLERK: No. 2, is this your verdict as read?	
15	JUROR NO. 2: Yes.	
1.6	THE CLERK: No. 3, is this your verdict as read?	
17	JUROR NO. 3: Yes.	
18	THE CLERK: No. 4, is this your verdict as read?	
19	JUROR NO. 4: Yes.	
20	THE CLERK: No. 5, is this your verdict as read?	
21	JUROR NO. 5: Yes.	
22	THE CLERK: No. 6, is this your verdict as read?	
23	JUROR NO. 6: Yes.	
24	THE CLERK: No. 7, is this your verdict as read?	
25	THE COURT: Seven was an alternate. It's now No. 8.	
	KARReporting & Transcription Services 4	

1	THE CLERK: That's right. I meant to say eight.
2	No. 8, is this your verdict as read?
3	JUROR NO. 8: Yes.
4	THE CLERK: No. 9, is this your verdict as read?
5	JUROR NO. 9: Yes.
6	THE CLERK: No. 10, is this your verdict as read?
7	JUROR NO. 10: Yes.
8	THE CLERK: No. 12, is this your verdict as read?
9	JUROR NO. 12: Yes?
10	THE CLERK: No. 13, is this your verdict as read?
11	JUROR NO. 13: Yes.
12	THE CLERK: And No. 14, is this your verdict as
13	read?
14	JUROR NO. 14: Yes.
15	THE CLERK: Thank you.
16	THE COURT: All right. The Court will now record
17	the verdicts in the minutes of the court.
18	Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes your service as
19	jurors. The prohibition on speaking about the case is now
20	lifted. You're free to speak about the case with each other
21	or anyone else you choose.
22	The attorneys often like to speak with members of
23	the jury to get your feedback and comments. If these
24	attorneys wish to speak with you and you're willing to speak
25	with them, that's fine. Obviously, if you don't wish to speak
	T

KARReporting & Transcription Services 5

with them, that -- they'll respect that as well. 1 2 I want to thank you for your service as jurors. 3 This was obviously a much longer trial than what had been 4 initially promised to you. I was very impressed, 5 notwithstanding that, with your attentiveness as evidenced by 6 the many questions throughout the course to have trial. 7 I want to thank you for your willingness to serve 8 and your attentiveness and participation. In a moment I'm 9 going to have our bailiff escort you back into the jury room, 10 and we will call down and make arrangements to make sure your 11 vouchers are available. 12 So take them through the back. 13 THE MARSHAL: Yes, ma'am. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 (Jury recessed at 3:09 p.m.) 16 THE COURT: All right. The matter's referred to the 17 Department of Parole and Probation for presentence investigation. 18 19 MR. DIGIACOMO: May we be heard as to Mr. Hidalgo, 20 Judge -- Jr. 21 THE COURT: Are you seeking remand? 22 MR. DIGIACOMO: I am, Judge. He's facing now 20 to

KARReporting & Transcription Services

23

24

25

life, and he has substantial assets, Judge. At this point we

ask for him to be remanded, as well as Luis Hidalgo, III, to

be remanded. I know that he has bail set, but I'd ask that he

be remanded without bail at this time.

MR. GENTILE: Your Honor, there's nothing about this man to indicate that he's going to flee. He's been here a long time.

THE COURT: I feel like based on the conviction I have to remand him today. So he is remanded, held without bond. Mr. Hidalgo, III, will also be held without bond, pending sentencing. And your sentencing date is. . .

THE CLERK: May 5th and May 30th.

THE COURT: If anyone would like -- of the lawyers would like to speak to the jury, typically our bailiff escorts them to the third floor for them to pick up their vouchers, so if you want to go down to the third floor, you'd be able to speak with them down there.

> MR. GENTILE: Thank you.

MR. DIGIACOMO: Thank you, Judge.

THE MARSHAL: Court is adjourned.

(Court adjourned at 3:10 p.m.)

20

ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

KIMBERLY LAWSON

**VER** 1 FILED IN OPEN COURT 2 EDWARD A. FRIEDLAND ORIGINAL CLERK OF THE COURT 3 FEB 17 2009 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA DENISE HUSTED, DEPUTY 6 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 7 CASE NO: Plaintiff, C212667 8 DEPT NO: XXI 9 -vs-LUIS HIDALGO, III, 10 Defendant. 11 12 **VERDICT** 13 We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant LUIS HIDALGO, III, as 14 follows: 15 **COUNT 1 – CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER** 16 (please check the appropriate box, select only one) 17 □ Guilty of Conspiracy To Commit Murder 18 Guilty of Conspiracy To Commit A Battery With A Deadly Weapon or 19 Battery Resulting In Substantial Bodily Harm 20 □ Guilty of Conspiracy To Commit A Battery 21 □ Not Guilty 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant LUIS HIDALGO, III, as
2	follows:
3	COUNT 2 – MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON
4	(please check the appropriate box, select only one)
5	☐ Guilty of First Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon
6	☐ Guilty of First Degree Murder
7	Guilty of Second Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon
8	☐ Guilty of Second Degree Murder
9	☐ Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter
10	□ Not Guilty
11	
12	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant LUIS HIDALGO, III, as
13	follows:
14	<u>COUNT 3</u> – SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER
15	(please check the appropriate box, select only one)
16	☐ Guilty of Solicitation To Commit Murder  ☐ Guilty of Solicitation To Commit Murder
17	□ Not Guilty
18	
19	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant LUIS HIDALGO, III, as
20	follows:
21	COUNT 4 – SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER
22	(please check the appropriate box, select only one)
23	çxGuilty of Solicitation To Commit Murder
24	□ Not Guilty
25	
26	DATED this // day of February, 2009
27	Dant Mall
28	FUREPERSON

### **ORIGINAL**

FILED

1 0001 2 CHR

3

4

5

6

ío

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19 20

21

CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM 520 South Fourth Street, Second Floor

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

TERK OF THE COURT

FEB 18 2009

CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, ESQ.

Nevada State Bar #004349

520 S. Fourth Street, 2nd Floor

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 384-5563

Attorney for Defendant ANABEL ESPINDOLA

1001 FEB 18 ₱ 5: 07

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

**CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 

CASE NO.

C212667

C241394

DEPT. NO.

XXI

DOCKET NO.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

ANABEL ESPINDOLA,

Defendant.

MOTION FOR OWN RECOGNIZANCE RELEASE, FOR HOUSE ARREST

COMES NOW the Defendant, ANABEL ESPINDOLA, by and through her attorney, CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, ESQ., and moves this Court for an Order releasing the Defendant on her own recognizance release for house arrest.

///

///

///

///

| ///

26

25

27

ৰ

1			
	This motion is made and based pleadings and papers on file herein, the affidavit of counsel		
	attached hereto, as well as any oral arguments of counsel adduced at the time of hearing.		
	DATED this day of February, 2009.		
	Respectfully submitted		
	Caller -		
	CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, ESQ. Nevada Bar #004349		
١	520 S. Fourth Street, 2nd Floor		
	Las Vegas, Nevada, 89101		
l	Attorney for Defendant		
	ANABEL ESPINDOLA		
	NOTICE OF MOTION		
	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the above and foregoing		
	on the 4 day of 4 , 2008, at 9 o'clock a.m. of said day, or as soon		
	thereafter as counsel can be heard in Department No V.		
	DATED this 15 day of February, 2009.		
	Respectfully submitted		
	CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, ESQ. Nevada Bar #004349 520 S. Fourth Street, 2nd Floor Las Vegas, Nevada, 89101 Attorney for Defendant ANABEL ESPINDOLA		

# CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM S20 South Fourth Street Second Floor

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

### POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Ms. Espindola testified for the State in the instant case. The State and Ms. Espindola have entered into an Agreement to Testify. The State agreed, "[A]fter Anabel Espindola has testified subject to cross-examination, the State agrees to request her release from custody in jail to house arrest for her own protection." The undersigned has spoken with both prosecutors and both have agreed to Ms. Espindola's release on house arrest. Therefore, the undersigned places this Motion on the Court's calendar for the release of Ms. Espindola on House Arrest.

# CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM 520 South Fourth Street, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

///

///

# AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PLACE ON CALENDAR

STATE OF NEVADA	)
	)ss:
COUNTY OF CLARK	)

CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, ESQ., having been duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. Your Affiant is an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada.
- 2. Ms. Espindola testified for the State in the instant case.
- 3. Ms. Espindola testified for the State in the instant case. The State and Ms.

Espindola have entered into an Agreement to Testify. The State agreed, "[A]fter Anabel Espindola has testified subject to cross-examination, the State agrees to request her release from custody in jail to house arrest for her own protection." The undersigned has spoken with both prosecutors and both have agreed to Ms. Espindola's release on house arrest. Therefore, the undersigned places this Motion on the Court's calendar for the release of Ms. Espindola on House Arrest.

4. That this motion is being made in good faith and not for purposes of delay.

520 South Fourth Street, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Further your affiant sayeth naught. 5.

DATED this 15 day of February, 2009.

CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, ESQ.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \( \) day of February, 2009.

County and State



NOTARY PUBLIC SIMONE MIYASATO

STATE OF NEVADA - COUNTY OF CLARK MY APPOINTMENT EXP. OCT. 28, 2008 No: 05-93902-1

1 TRAN 2 2009 JUL 13 P 3:3\$ 3 DISTRICT COURT ORIGINAL 4 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 5 6 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 7 CASE NO. C212667 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C241394 VS. 8 DEPT. XXI LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, aka LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III, LUIS HIDALGO) 10 JR., aka LUIS A. HIDALGO, 11 Defendants. 12 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE **TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 2009** 14 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE: 15 SENTENCING 16 17 APPEARANCES: 18 FOR THE STATE: MARC DIGIACOMO, ESQ. Chief Deputy District Attorney 19 GIANCARLO PESCI, ESQ. Chief Deputy District Attorney 20 21 FOR THE DEFENDANTS: DOMINIC P. GENTILE, ESQ. PAOLA M. ARMENI, ESQ. 22 JOHN L. ARRASCADA, ESQ. CHRISTOPHER ADAMS, ESQ. 23 24 25 RECORDED BY: JANIE L. OLSEN, COURT RECORDER/TRANSCRIBER RECEIVED JUL 13 2009

-1-

CLERK OF THE COURT

Volume 2 – 447

### LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NV., TUES., JUNE 23, 2009

• 7

 THE COURT: All right. This is the time for State of Nevada versus Luis

Hidalgo III and Luis Hidalgo Jr,, both of whom are present in custody with all of their

attorneys. This is the time set for the rendition of sentencing.

Is there any reason we cannot proceed with sentencing at this time?

And then I have some preliminary matters to address.

Before we do that, Mr. Adams, you had an issue with an order?

MR. ADAMS: Yes, ma'am, related to a matter which we'd previously addressed about U.S. savings bonds belonging to Mr. Hidalgo III were introduced into evidence. The parties have reached a stipulation to release those into the custody of Mr. Arrascada on behalf of Mr. Hidalgo III. We're making copies of the stipulation and our proposed order for the Court, and we will work on that. We'll substitute in either photocopies or actual photographs of the evidence, and we agree that nothing about the authenticity of the savings bonds is an issue related to our case.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DI GIACOMO: And Mr. Bunin has signed that on behalf of Mr. Figler -- on behalf of Mr. Carroll, which is the outstanding defendant set for trial.

THE COURT: All right. As soon as that's presented to the Court, the Court will sign that releasing the bonds.

Before we move into the sentencing, there are some outstanding matters that I just want to address on the record. This is not a substitute for the more detailed written decision which will be forthcoming and has not been filed yet with the clerk.

\* E

The defense raised some interesting and important issues with respect for the motion for judgment of acquittal and the motion for new trial which the Court has spent some time carefully considering. I want to address just on the record right now the most important points and the Court's reasoning, and again, this is not a substitute.

With respect to the purported juror misconduct with -- according to the defense -- misusing the jury instructions and the consideration of the words of Deangelo Carroll on the audiotape reconciling that with the, I believe it's the Meyer decision, which says, Misuse of the instructions is juror misconduct and then goes on in the same sentence, I believe, to say, But you can't consider the thoughts and deliberations.

I think that this case is distinguishable in that that case it was clear that they had considered punishment, and the Court said, Well, that could have impacted their deliberations. It did not require the individual jury members or the jury foreman to come in and to say how that had impacted their consideration of guilt.

The Court said, Well, it might have, and that was something that -- in terms of them having considered the punishment, that was something that was disclosed publicly.

This case, I think, goes to the very heart of how the jurors evaluated the evidence, what evidence they found to be important, and I think that goes to the essence of the deliberative process, and I think that that exactly is the kind of thing that our statute seeks to prevent.

Additionally, with respect to the purported misconduct in considering the statement of Deangelo Carroll, I would just note that that could even be considered an adoptive admission by Ms. Espindola and Mr. Hidalgo III in their response or lack

ī

of response to that comment made by Mr. Carroll. So to that extent it could be considered as the Court had previously ruled -- again, that's an issue for appeal rightly or wrongly -- that for purposes of the conversation of the cover-up the conspiracy was still ongoing and that there was a new conspiracy with respect to the solicitation for murder allegations relating to Kenneth Counts.

With respect to the verdict form where we separated battery and then battery with substantial bodily harm and/or battery with a deadly weapon, perhaps the better verdict form would have been battery with substantial bodily harm with a deadly weapon, battery with substantial bodily harm without a deadly weapon. That was not, according to my recollection, offered.

I think that if you consider the totality of the jury instructions with respect to the use of a deadly weapon, any potential problem in not separating those out I don't think is fatal to the verdict because again, there were other instructions relating to the use of a deadly weapon and what not, and I think that that takes care of it.

Again, no one gave a verdict form saying battery with substantial bodily harm with a deadly weapon, battery with substantial bodily harm without a deadly weapon. To just separate it out other than that wouldn't have made any sense because you could have found both obviously that they intended battery with substantial bodily harm and battery with a deadly weapon.

With respect to the interpretation of the evidence to support the verdict which was raised, obviously, by both, you know, defendants, I certainly think that there was enough evidence here to support, you know, at the end of the day I don't know whether or not they conspired to kill Timothy Hadland. I don't know whether or not they conspired to commit substantial bodily harm or not. That's me personally, but I think there certainly was sufficient evidence that the conspiracy went beyond a

ī

simple battery and that the conspiracy went to do significant harm to Mr. Hadland or to utilize a deadly weapon.

So, you know, the Court is not inclined to overturn the verdict or to sit as the thirteenth juror and say, no, there's not enough evidence. I don't think that this is the kind of case that cries out for the Court's intervention because, again, I think certainly a reasonable interpretation of the evidence while -- is that they wanted significant harm to come to Mr. Hadland.

With respect to the Jayson Taoipu prior testimony that the Court refused to admit, I stand by that decision because as we argued and as came out during the trial, the State did not really have an effective opportunity to -- they could have cross-examined him on that issue, the bats and bags and who said what, but it wasn't important at all in the Kenneth Counts case, and it would have made absolutely no sense for the State to have nitpicked on that point with Mr. Taoipu, And to me even though it was testimony, it's more like a statement he may have made to police that the Court would not have admitted.

And finally -- well, I think that covers the essential points.

MR. GENTILE: Your Honor, there's one other one that's a very important one, and that's the one where the Court instructed over our objection that the jury could use a slight evidence standard with respect to the hearsay that they weren't supposed to listen to in the first place, but nevertheless the slight evidence --

THE COURT: Well, again, you're disagreeing with the use of any of the hearsay on the tape, and again, that's obviously an appellate issue. As I indicated, the Court stands by its determination that the conspiracy was still ongoing with respect to Mr. Hidalgo III and Ms. Espindola in engaging in the cover-up.

I think that the instructions were clear that the slight evidence was only

to be used as to whether or not there was an existence of a conspiracy for evidentiary purposes. I don't find that it confused the jury. I don't think that there's reason to believe that it confused the jury or in any way reduced the State's burden of proof in this case. So I think those are the critical, I guess, issues that were raised.

All right. Anything else, Mr. DiGiacomo, before I move into sentencing?

MR. DI GIACOMO: The only thing is is that the Court -- I had sent an order over to P&P and then copied the Court on that order, and the Department of Parole and Probation attempted to do a supplemental PSI as to both defendants.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DI GIACOMO: They were successful as to Luis Hidalgo III. As to Luis Hidalgo Jr., there was a couple of words and in one phrase that they failed to correct despite the fact that it's in the order. And my suggestion to the Court is, one, that we attach a copy of the order itself to Luis Hidalgo Jr.'s PSI, and we can do any corrections by interlineation.

THE COURT: I was going to say we can interlineate both the Court's copy and we can interlineate the copy that goes to the prison to reflect --

MR. DI GIACOMO: The changes that should have been made that were not made.

THE COURT: And also in terms of the credit for time served, obviously the Court can independently calculate the correct credit for tiuniorme served.

MR. DI GIACOMO: And in fact, as to Mr. H. I calculated two more days than even Mr. Gentile did. I have it at 184 for Mr. Hidalgo Jr., and I think it's 1492 as it relates to Luis Hidalgo III.

THE COURT: Okay. And my understanding is as to Mr. Hidalgo III, there's

no dispute as to the credit for time served.

MR. ARRASCADA: At the 1492 that Mr. DiGiacomo --

THE COURT: Right, at the 1492.

MR. ARRASCADA: And, Your Honor, just one item. They must have missed this. They still have Ms. Armeni listed as their defense counsel on their revised presentence report, and it's Mr. Adams and myself.

THE COURT: All right. We can also correct that by way of interlineation.

MR. GENTILE: Am I to understand then that our objections to the supplemental presentence investigation report is basically being granted?

THE COURT: That is correct. It seems --

MR. GENTILE: We focused on the misspellings, the specific offense summary and the credit for time served.

THE COURT: Right. My understanding of what Mr. DiGiacomo is saying is he does not dispute those corrections and agrees to both attach this with the PSI as well as have the interlineation take place.

MR. DI GIACOMO: I actually have an order of the Court to sign that directs that those corrections were in the order. For whatever reason P&P just didn't get them into the PSI. So there's no dispute among the parties.

THE COURT: And I understand we have four family members that will be speaking today; is that correct?

MR. DI GIACOMO: We're currently at three, Judge, who actually want to speak. We may actually only be at two depending on what their choice is at the time of their turn to speak.

THE COURT: Okay. And I'm assuming the State would like them to speak last?

- 1	
1	MR. DI GIACOMO: That's correct, Judge.
2	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Adams.
3	MR. ADAMS: Judge, I do now have the hard copy of the stipulation of
4	proposed order. Would you like me to hold those to the end or to tender those now
5	THE COURT: Either way.
6	MR. ADAMS: I'll go ahead and get that done.
7	THE COURT: You can approach.
8	MR. GENTILE: Your Honor, there is one other thing I'd like to call to the
9	Court's attention before we start.
10	THE COURT: Yes.
11	MR. GENTILE: We filed a sentencing memorandum.
12	THE COURT: Yes, and I have reviewed that.
13	MR. GENTILE: All right. If you'd take a look at page 2, lines 18 through 21.
14	THE COURT: I'm sorry, which page?
15	MR. GENTILE: Page 2, lines 18 through 21.
16	THE COURT: Yes.
17	MR. GENTILE: I'd ask you to read it, not aloud, please.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	MR. GENTILE: We'd ask that those lines be sealed, that they either a
20	redacted copy of this be placed in the official file with a sealed copy if this
21	becomes you can appreciate why.
22	THE COURT: I understand why.
23	Any objection?
24	MR. DI GIACOMO: I don't, Judge, although it's already been filed as a public

record, so someone's going to have to notify the clerk's office to seal it.

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: That would be the clerk's -- my preference would be to redact those lines so that we have a copy that is publicly accessible and then to have a complete copy placed under as a, like a Court's exhibit or placed under seal.

MR. DI GIACOMO: I'm just saying that someone needs to withdraw it currently from the file.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Husted will do that.

MR. DI GIACOMO: 'Cause it's on Blackstone currently.

THE COURT: Do you understand the order, Ms. Husted?

THE CLERK: I do.

THE COURT: And just for the record it's lines --

THE CLERK: 18 through 21, page 2.

THE COURT: Yeah, 18 starting with Luis Jr., and 21 --

MR. DI GIACOMO: The whole line would be fine.

THE COURT: All right. The whole line.

Those housekeeping matters aside, is the State ready to proceed with their argument?

MR. DI GIACOMO: And I'm going to be somewhat brief. I have a few items to give to the Court; I've shown the defense counsel. The family has photos of Mr. Hadland in real life, and there is a letter from the family that we've provided to the defense related to their position of sentencing.

Obviously, the choice for the Court is really from the State's point of view whether or not you give him a life sentence or you give him a term of years.

I'd like to address Luis Hidalgo III first because there's an additional sentencing consideration for the Court. I'm not going to get lengthy into arguing for substantials, consecutive time from the solicitation to commit murder counts, but

9

13

12

15

14

16

17 18

19 20

21 22

23 24 25 those counts are wholly independent of the murder in this case, and the fact that the defendant committed those at a separate period of time is indicative that there are different victims, and while the Court may not see them as victims certainly he solicited an individual that he knows has already committed a murder to kill two more people and certainly consecutive time would be appropriate.

So that leads us to the murder count. I recognize that the legislature as to both defendants provides the Court the possibility of giving a term of years in a case that involves second degree murder, and as the Court knows, second degree murder is a broad range of activity, and that activity can be as minor as an inherently dangerous felony that never intended harm to an individual all the way up to intentional murder without premeditation and deliberation, and I heard the Court earlier say that these individuals intended to commit substantial harm to Timothy Hadland. I can't imagine the legislature thought that a term of years is appropriate for that type of behavior.

It's certainly the position of the State of Nevada that Timothy Hadland's life had more value than a term of years, and it's our position that they both deserve a life sentence.

As to their sentencing memorandum, there are two issues I'd like to correct to the Court. It has always been the State's position, and I don't think the Court would dispute this, had a jury determined that Kenneth Counts was the shooter, he would have not received a term of years.

In addition to that, they represent that the Court is going to give Anabel Espindola probation at some future point in time. It's my belief based upon the times that I've been in this courtroom that that statement is not an accurate probability of occurrence, and I do not think that it's appropriate to sentence these

two individuals based upon either the sentence of Ms. Espindola or the sentence of Mr. Counts. They are responsible and accountable for their actions they took in this case, and certainly Mr. Hadland and his family are entitled to a life sentence for the individuals for the actions that they took, and I'll submit it to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Who would like to speak -- well, would the attorneys like to address the Court first, or would you like to have your clients address the Court first?

MR. GENTILE: Your Honor, I'll address the Court first.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. GENTILE: It's almost four decades I've been doing this, and I can't remember another day that I've dreaded as much as I did this morning because candidly I didn't anticipate it in advance.

It is rare in my career that I would allow a person to testify in his own behalf at trial, but that happened here for two reasons. Number one, because from the very beginning, day one, when I flew back from San Diego and met with Mr. Hidalgo and Anabel Espindola and from what I was told by Mr. DePalma and Don Dibble about what occurred the day before I met with them, this account of what occurred never changed, not once.

The jury's acted. Nothing's going to change that now and certainly not in this courtroom, but I looked at two things here that just don't warrant a life sentence. One, the fact of the matter is even according to Anabel Espindola whose credibility not only did we assail, but I don't think anybody really believes that she told the truth in this courtroom, but even with all of her bias she conceded that she was the one who learned from Deangelo Carroll that Timothy Hadland had been talking badly about the Palomino Club and that she was the one who told Luis

Hidalgo Jr., about that.

His response to that and his testimony about his response to that has never been refuted. Nobody testified that there was some discussion that took place between him and anybody else wherein a murder or a serious beating was even discussed. The jury, of course, found not enough evidence for a conspiracy that an agreement was made to murder him. They did find that either one or the other of the objectives of the conspiracy ---

THE COURT: Or possibly both.

MR. GENTILE: Or possibly both, kind of hard to have both, I think, but maybe. You can maybe pistol whip somebody, I guess. That's what they came back with, and I look to Luis Hidalgo Jr.'s testimony in this case, which was never refuted. Anabel Espindola didn't come in and say, no, that didn't happen. And what did he say? He said that he told Deangelo Carroll to tell his friend to stop spreading shit, specifically talk badly about the club.

I have to tell you I doubt very much that there's a business person in any business who if confronted with such a communication, that being that someone's talking badly about the club, and if they knew that the person who was reporting it was a friend of that person as was the facts here, wouldn't tell that person, well, tell him to stop it, and from that coupled with Timothy Hadland's not saying no to making a trip to get drunk -- Timothy Hadland is dead today, that's a shame. We all feel that way. I think you're going to hear that from Mr. Hidalgo when he speaks to you, but it was not intended, and a life sentence really should be reserved for those situations where it was.

This is a second degree murder. The legislature has spoken to second degree murder in allowing a life sentence, but on the facts that are before you on

this case where there is no evidence, there is no evidence that there was a deliberate murder that took place here or that there was anything in the nature of something that was foreseeable that this man would die, and with the absence of those facts in this case, it seems to me that the proper and just sentence in this case should be a term of years of 10 to 25 years.

There has to be a consecutive sentence because of the enhancement with the weapon. We, of course, recognize that the Supreme Court has spoken to the starting date of the new statute and its application. Hopefully someday maybe some federal court, maybe a supreme court, if we are not successful on appeal, will see it differently. And so we are asking you, recognizing that as it stands right now you can't, but we are asking you to make his consecutive sentence also the minimum. This man is old and sick.

By the way, I don't know that you are going to do this so I'm going to ask you to do it. Would you please attach our sentencing memo to the presentence report so that it goes with him to the institution. The reason for that --

THE COURT: It indicates the prescriptions that he's taking and his --

MR. GENTILE: Exactly.

THE COURT: -- diagnosis.

MR. GENTILE: Exactly.

And so that having been said, I can honestly say, and it doesn't matter, and I couldn't say this to a jury 'cause ethics prohibit that, but I can say it to you, I believe in the innocence of my client, even today, even with the jury having said what they said.

Hopefully someday this verdict will be changed. It's not going to bring Timothy Hadland back. Nobody wanted him dead in the first place, most certainly

not Luis Hidalgo Jr., and we're asking essentially for the most lenient sentence that you can impose.

He would like to address the Court and the family at this time.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Hidalgo Jr., what if anything would you like to say?

THE DEFENDANT HIDALGO JR: Well, first of all, I would like to sympathize with the family, and I'm going to say I've been hearing a lot of things, you know, from the Court about evidence and so on and so forth. But I stand firm today like I did at the very beginning.

Mr. Hadland and I only came in contact three or four times. I never disliked the man simply enough because I never knew the man. All I ever did was to say hello. He greeted me well. It was fine with me. I did not know very much about him at all whatsoever, none. I had no reason at all whatsoever to go ahead and do any harm to this gentleman at all whatsoever. None.

I don't function that way. I'm not that kind of person. He was a good man. All I know is that what happened, what was offered to me was information that he was talking about the club which to me didn't mean a damn thing. It didn't bother me at all whatsoever. None. Absolutely not at all.

I sympathize with the fact that he died, definitely. I'm sorry about that, but I can definitely assure you that I had nothing to do with his death or beating suggestions and all whatsoever to do any harm at all to him at all whatsoever. And I know that there's conversations that talk about evidence this and evidence that.

What evidence?

Three years later I get arrested. I'm not the one that got caught on tape. I was never on tape. Ms. Espindola was. She definitely is deeper in this

situation than anybody else is. The way I look at it personally, a trophy needed to be obtained; the prosecution got it. There was nobody else more important in this case other than to go after me. If not, you would have gone ahead and done it way before that.

Ms. Espindola was facing a death penalty. She was facing two or three conspiracies. What happened? And then she gets to go home free because she turns State's evidence against me, and I'm the one that the least had anything to do with it. And I don't understand why it is, but I just sincerely hope, please, if you have to push the issue with somebody, find out who actually killed Mr. Hadland, because the other gentleman who was accused he got off. He got acquitted. The other two weren't even charged.

So I really don't understand, really, is this justice? No. The other two gentlemen were in the van when all this occurred. They weren't even charged. Everybody got probation or otherwise. My son and I are the ones that are getting the rap for it.

I stand firm again today telling you the same thing I would have, and I would have told the same story two days after this occurred when we sent, obviously, the first letter to the prosecution and tell them that I wanted to come down and tell them what I knew of the case. But here we are before you.

I understand that what I'm saying is not going to change your mind, Your Honor. I'm 58 years old. I'm sick. Okay. I ask for leniency for my son for being stupid, for thinking, obviously, the gentleman was his friend. They know it. They know that my son all he did was just converse, talk. Other than that, somebody else put this thing together, and it wasn't me.

And we have a gentleman, obviously, who keeps eluding everybody,

and his trial hasn't started, his trial which should have been the first one. Now it's into next year. What's going on? I don't know. But I can assure you I had nothing to do with it. I didn't suggest, direct it, anybody, and I was not a thump in the law.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Just to correct the record, Mr. Counts was sentenced to prison. The Court gave him the maximum sentence that I could give given the charge for which he was convicted by the jury, and as is clear on the record, he was adjudged a habitual criminal. The Court imposed the maximum prison sentence the Court could impose.

With respect to Mr. Carroll, the State has been trying and wanted Mr. Carroll to be the first trial out, and there's a separate record that has been made on the issue with why Mr. Carroll did not go to trial that I don't need to, I think, address here.

With respect to Ms. Espindola, she has not been sentenced. The negotiation that Ms. Espindola received is up to the State. The sentence will be up to me, and as Mr. DiGiacomo pointed out, I think the Court's opinion has already been made on that.

Now moving to Mr. Hidalgo III, would -- Mr. Arrascada, would you like to address the Court first or would you like your client?

MR. ARRASCADA: No, Your Honor, I'd like to address the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. ARRASCADA: Your Honor, regarding Luis Hidalgo III, what we'd like the Court to do regarding sentencing is focus on what is a just sentence as we did in our sentencing memorandum that we provided the Court. We're not going to argue facts or lack thereof. That's when we go up to the Supreme Court.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Hidalgo III on our advice is not going to be making a statement to the Court, but I can tell the Court that myself, Mr. Adams, Mr. Hidalgo III and throughout -- throughout our representation and throughout this entire trial have felt and expressed our sincerest condolences to the Hadland family --

THE COURT: And I just have to interrupt you. I was just going through everything to make sure I hadn't overlooked the sentencing memo. We did not receive a sentencing memo on behalf of Mr. Hidalgo III. We received the sentencing memo on behalf of Mr. Hidalgo Jr., and the objections on behalf of Mr. Hidalgo Jr., but that's all that we have. And like I said, I just went through my stack to make sure it wasn't my oversight, but we don't have anything.

MR. DI GIACOMO: Judge, I'll just give you my copy if you want to -- it's fairly short if the Court wants to read it.

MR. ARRASCADA: Your Honor, we'd ask that you review it before we continue.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you want us to take a break for the Court to review it?

MR. ARRASCADA: If you would, please.

THE COURT: All right. I'm now reading the letters that have been attached in support of Mr. Hidalgo III, just so you know why it's taking a few minutes. There are a number of letters that have been written in response of Mr. Hidalgo III, and I'm now reading those.

I've read all the letters as well as the memo.

MR. ARRASCADA: Your Honor, just for the record, it was filed with the court clerk downstairs. A courtesy copy was not provided to you for delay.

THE COURT: There's a delay, just so you know, between the time -- we are

 now paperless, so there is a delay between the time the documents are filed and they're actually scanned into the system and available for review by the Court, but there's no harm because I have taken the time to read the -- a lot of the things frankly I was aware of. Many of the things in the letters from people that grew up and have known Mr. Hidalgo III are consistent with the behavior the Court has observed during the trial and the numerous hearings. There's no prejudice. I have read everything and considered it.

MR. ARRASCADA: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, then I'd like to proceed with my sentencing argument on behalf of Mr. Hidalgo III.

Your Honor, I agree to a point with the recommendation from the division, but as you can see in our memorandum and the presentation I'm about to make that we do disagree regarding the sentence they recommend for the second degree murder with the weapon enhancement.

We believe based on the argument I'm about to present that Mr. Hidalgo III, should receive in his youth, and his ability to rehabilitate warrants the term of years of 10 to 25 years. We do believe the division is very correct and accurate when they recommend on Counts 3, 4, and 5 that that time run concurrent to the second degree murder conviction or Count 1, and we're going to urge the Court that you do so.

Your Honor, when I said we're not going to reargue facts today, it's as I said, that's an issue now for the Supreme Court, but what we'd like you to focus on is the four principles of sentencing which are rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence and incapacitation.

As the Court knows, Mr. Hidalgo has been incapacitated for over four years in this matter, and from what I understand, the time in the Clark County

 Detention Center it's like serving time in dog years. It -- there is no yard time. There is no programming. Mr. Hidalgo has not seen sunlight above his head in four years, but during all that time he has not had any major infractions. He has done his time. The goals of incapacitation and deterrence and even retribution have already been met regarding Luis Hidalgo III.

What I'd like the Court to focus on is rehabilitation, and that is a significant factor regarding any sentencing, and what we're asking you to do by imposing the term of years and running all of the other offences concurrent provides to Mr. Hidalgo a degree a hope. And when you're looking at rehabilitation, hope is significant, and a term of years indicates to Mr. Hidalgo as I believe the Court has just even stated, that you've noticed all of these tremendously good qualities and characteristics about Mr. Hidalgo III while he's been present through these numerous years in court.

THE COURT: I don't think that's what I said. I said some of the things regarding his behavior are consistent. I mean that he tries to be affable. He tried to be affable with court staff. He tried to be affable and was affable with the correction officers. You know, he tried to make jokes and things like that, and that was consistent with what I observed. He was a compliant prisoner. He was respectful to the correction officers, things like that, and I noticed that.

MR. ARRASCADA: And, Your Honor, that respect that you're noticing is an indication of through rehabilitation that Mr. Hidalgo III can be a functioning, productive member of our society. Because of that, Your Honor, we're going to ask that you impose the term of years -- he's 27 years old, and what does a term of years actually do? As I said, it gives hope of release, but regardless, if you follow the sentence we're recommending that you do, at a minimum, at a minimum Mr.

Hidalgo will serve 20 years in prison before he even gets to see the parole board, at a minimum.

And we need to look at his age, 27, the fact that he has no prior history whatsoever contacts with law enforcement and the fact of how will he -- who will he be and how will he do when he's reintegrated into society, and through the most trying of times the Court, as you put on the record, has noticed some characteristics or qualities, I'd like to call them, that are indicative of what he will do or how he will do when he is released.

And the term of years accomplishes all of the goals, Your Honor, of incapacitation, deterrence, retribution. It becomes a sentence that is equitable in light of all the other players involved, and it provides to Mr. Hidalgo the incentive to continue to program in the prison to do all the right things, to get a -- take college classes if available, to work his way towards being a model prisoner so that he's going through rehabilitation because he will have hope of someday not being incarcerated with the term of years if you impose it.

We're going to urge that you impose the term of years based on these reasons, and with that we submit, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Arrascada.

MR. GENTILE: Your Honor, there's one other thing.

And thank you, Mr. Pesci, for bringing it to our attention, and I mean that sincerely.

In the sentencing memorandum for Mr. Hidalgo Jr., a couple of the exhibits make reference to the same subject matter that we sealed, Exhibit 3, the first large paragraph, and Exhibit 9, the last paragraph.

THE COURT: All right. So you're --

MR. GENTILE: And so we're making this -- whoa, first and last paragraph, first full paragraph. It starts off with, Luis Hidalgo was --

THE COURT: So you want the first full paragraph as well as the last paragraph redacted?

MR. GENTILE: Right. Exactly.

THE COURT: And, Ms. Husted, did you get that?

The State has no objection to that?

MR. DI GIACOMO: That's correct, Judge.

THE COURT: And again, the redacted will be public record and the unredacted will be sealed and be part of the total record in the case, and that's for --

MR. GENTILE: Thank you.

MR. ARRASCADA: Your Honor, I'm sorry, one other issue I do want to bring up regarding the weapon enhancement. We do recognize the Nevada Supreme Court has spoken. Having been counsel in the Petrocelli case I don't see how it jibes with the ruling regarding the weapon enhancement. Notwithstanding that, Your Honor, we would ask that you impose the term of 4 to 10 years on the weapon enhancement, which would be under the new statute realizing the Supreme Court has spoken, and this may be an issue someday for a federal court.

THE COURT: Okay. And I would just put on the record that with respect to those areas that defense has sought to have redacted, the State has made no opposition to that. That is all information that has come out during the trial and during the various hearings of this case. So that information already is out there for purposes of the record in this case. That was all -- I think most of that came out in the trial, most if not all came out in the trial. So that information is public.

All right. We can hear from the speakers.

9

11

10

13

12

15

14

16 17

18

20

19

22

23

21

24

25

MR. DI GIACOMO: Yes.

THE COURT: Ma'am, please come on up here to the witness stand and just remain standing facing our court clerk who will administer the oath to you.

(Speaker sworn.)

THE CLERK: Please be seated and please state and spell your name.

THE WITNESS: Doris Emily Gibbs, G-i-b-b-s.

THE COURT: What would you like to say to me?

THE WITNESS: First I'd like to thank the Courts for their time and allowing me to speak today on behalf of my children and my extended Hadland family.

When the Hidalgo father-son team chose to do this crime, there were more victims than just Tim, also known as T.J. There are the family members that T.J. left behind. I'd like the Court to visualize a little four-year-old boy dressed in a yellow rain coat covered in soot with a little plastic red fireman hat watching and acting out the movies from Backdraft sceneries every day. And then last April this child fulfilled his dream and graduated third in his class from the fire academy.

On his way home that day, he called me up all excited because he was now a fireman. He said, I wish I could call dad and tell him. This entire great moment was tainted because his dad was not there to share this moment or to even share the memories of his childhood.

Then there's my daughter. I'd like you to imagine a young girl going through some major medical problems, no father to call or come and stay with you. Imagine that young girl going through a divorce, major medical and dealing with the murder of her father.

When she was born he had planted a tree in our backyard, an apple tree because she was the apple of his eye. She's in the military based far from

 either side of her family, going through and dealing with all this all on her own.

And then there's my oldest son. He worked with his dad pouring concrete out here in Vegas, and he also worked at Home Depot. He got a major promotion a few months ago, and he could not call his dad or share this great news. I could not even imagine being 21 years old and getting a call that your dad is at the morgue.

This was a good child, respected, hard-working kid with good morals, good citizenship who's had, I believe, one speeding ticket his entire life, and these men who thought they were above the law dealt him a life sentence.

My mother passed away 39 years ago, and last year I got married, and on that day I missed my mother terribly. She died of an aneurysm, something that is explainable.

My kids will still miss their father, and this will still make no sense to any of them in 40 years. They still will not be able to explain it to their family. They will not be able to explain it to their children because in Girl Scouts you learn sticks and stones may break your bones, but words will never harm you. But this makes no sense. My kids will never experience another joy, reason to celebrate or just need to speak with their dad ever again because of these men's actions.

When their children are born, when they get married, when they experience life's great moments and sad times, they will never be able to share these moments with their dad ever again. These men handed them a life sentence.

I had the privilege to sit in this courtroom during trial, and I watched the Hidalgos and the way that they acted during trial, but when the jury left the courtroom, I saw different Hidalgos. They were joking, laughing; they showed no respect for the families that was sitting in the room. They were arrogant. At one

I don't know who these men thought they are, but I do know that after what I witnessed in this courtroom that they have no remorse of their crimes. They might act like they are, but it's not for their crime; it's for themselves. They're remorseful because they were caught, tried and found guilty.

One prime example is that after Tim was murdered, they then began to plan the murder of two more people, young kids, and if they would have succeeded, they would have had two more families dealt life sentences.

I know Mr. H has some medical issues, and I'm sure his family will plead to this; however, please remember that when Mr. Hadland, my beloved father-in-law had a stroke last fall, his son could not be there to support his father or his mother, and when he passed away a few weeks ago, Tim wasn't there to console his mother or his grieving children, and I'm sure that Hidalgo III has family, brothers and sisters, but please remember their family, friends, and neighbors, whoever, can visit them in prison, and that's a whole lot more than Tim or Tim's family can do.

That night on that desert road they handed Tim a death sentence, and they handed his loved ones a life sentence. What was once fiction to my children is now a reality, something that they will have to live with and deal with for the rest of their lives.

I ask the Court today for -- after a long four years to hand these two men the same that they handed my children. Please remember they aren't remorseful for their actions, only that they were caught, tried and found guilty. Their family can still visit them in prison, which is a whole lot more than Tim's family can do.

I ask that you please give them the maximum sentence that this Court

is allowed to give, and I'd like to thank you for your time.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Please, to the witness stand just up those couple of stairs, and just remain standing facing that lady right there.

(Speaker sworn.)

THE CLERK: Please be seated. And please state and spell your name.

THE WITNESS: Allana, A-I-I-a-n-a, Hadland, H-a-d-I-a-n-d.

THE COURT: Thank you. What would you like to say to me?

THE WITNESS: My father was and still is the love of my life. He may not have been the most wonderful man in the world. He did do drugs and everything else, but he was the best father I could have ever asked for. He always told me that the happiest day of his life was the day that I was born, and as my mom stated, he planted me an apple tree, and I was his angel, and I have a tattoo on my back of an angel for him.

One of the proudest moments he had as a father was signing my preenlistment papers into the military. He had a sticker on the back of his truck that said, "My daughter's in the Air Force." He bragged about me being in the military all the time.

After I moved to Nebraska we talked every -- every day before I went to bed. Sometimes in the mornings when he would be on his way home from work at the Palomino Club I would be on my way to work, and we would talk for the drive. When I would iron my uniform we would talk and iron together. When I had a bad day, somehow he had ESP and knew, and even if it was just the sound of him singing to my voicemail, it made me feel better. It always helped.

On May 19, 2005, I talked to my dad for the last time before I went to

bed. He was excited about going camping, and we were making plans for him to come and see me that summer in Nebraska to see where I lived and what I did. I woke up about 12 — 2 o'clock in the morning Nebraska time, which would be 12 here, freezing cold and shaking. Mind you, the weather's the same here as it is there, just more humid there. So for me to be cold is not right, and I knew something was wrong.

I went to work the next day and at 11 o'clock I went to lunch, and the coroner's office called and told me that my father was found dead at the lake last night. I was 19, and I was the first person to know that my dad was dead, and I didn't know what to do or who to talk to. And then I went home and I called my uncle because I wasn't going to be the one to call my grandma and say, hey, guess what, we're living a movie.

I don't believe it. At the time I told them that they were crazy and playing a very dirty joke on me, and today I still don't believe it. I still sit by the phone on my birthday four years later waiting for my dad to call. I sit in my office at work waiting for flowers because he sent me flowers at work every year, at school or work.

After he died I couldn't make that drive to work anymore. I had to move because driving the route that I took to talk to him I couldn't take it. I didn't iron my uniform for almost a year because ironing was not an option for me. For the first couple of months I called voicemail, and I'd listen to his voice. It would help a little bit, and then his phone got turned off, and now I'll never hear the sound of my father's voice again. My father will never tell me that he loves me again. He'll never sing to my voicemail. He'll never answer the phone and say, Hey, baby.

He wasn't there with me when I got married; he didn't walk me down

the aisle. When I found out my husband had a girlfriend, he wasn't there to do what dad's usually do and have a talk with their son-in-laws. He wasn't there when I got divorced. I have reoccurring bone tumors in my arm, and I'm in extreme pain 24 hours a day, and my dad's not there to comfort me.

Because of the murder and the constant back and forth with courts, I have officially been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. I take antidepressants, antianxiety pills, sleep aids, probably more medication than any 23-year-old person should take just to keep myself from having a nervous breakdown. And every time I start getting better, somehow there's an appeal done, and court is delayed a few more months, and it sets me back. It brings back all the pain every time, and usually it's worse, and it's like all the victims become -- keep becoming victims and the defendants are just sitting back laughing because they're just hanging out, in my opinion.

I don't understand how someone's life can be valued at \$5,000. My father's life wasn't -- could not be valued in dollar amounts. To me it -- nothing will ever replace what was taken from me. I will always look at the picture that I have of my father and miss him. I'll always have to tell my children about my dad and how much all he wanted was for us to have kids, four of us each because he had four children so he wanted us to all have four kids so that he could have grandbabies out the wazoo.

To me a couple years in prison isn't -- doesn't justify what was done to my father. Nobody can play God but God, and to shoot somebody in the head, that's playing God. Nobody should have that right. The rest of my life I have to deal with the fact that I live in a movie because to me all this ever was was a movie and then only in movies do people get murdered, not in real life. And then on May 20<sup>th</sup>,

2005, I woke up and I was in a movie.

And that's all.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Just please remain standing facing our court clerk.

(Speaker sworn.)

THE CLERK: Please be seated, and please state and spell your name.

THE WITNESS: Jennifer Hadland, J-e-n-n-i-f-e-r, H-a-d-l-a-n-d.

THE COURT: Thank you. What would you like to say to me?

THE WITNESS: I was 14 years old when my dad was killed, and I graduated from high school two weeks ago on his birthday. I'm not going to say much because I'm going to start crying, but like my sister said, \$5,000 doesn't put a price on my dad's life, and I will never have him back.

When I get married, I won't have my father there. When my sister was married he wasn't there. He wasn't there to teach me how to drive. He won't be there when I have kids. I don't think it's right that they got to do what they did and get away with it, and just because they're in jail doesn't mean that they're getting away with it, but it doesn't mean that I'll have my father back 'cause they're in jail.

People can say whatever they want; it will never bring my dad back. I'll never be able to have him hug me. I'll never be able to see him. He'll never tell me that he loves me again.

They can still talk to their family. They can still see their family. They can live, they can breathe, they can eat. Yeah, it's from a jail cell, but it's better than nothing. The pain that they have brought to me and my family is more than anybody will ever have in this world. I've sat in here every single day for their trial, for the Kenneth Counts trial, and I'll do it again for Deangelo's trial, and I still don't believe.

I still wake up on my dad's birthday and want to call him. I still wake up on Father's Day and want to call him. I've actually woken up dialing his number. I woke up that day, and I saw it on the news. I saw his girlfriend's car, and I knew he had gone to the lake that night, and I went to school anyways. I got told by my mother and a counselor that I would never see my father again. I was supposed to go to this house that weekend. I was going to stay with him that summer, and I couldn't.

I'm the youngest of four children, and I love my brothers and my sister with all my heart, and they loved my father and we -- and I loved him too. He'll never be completely gone. He'll always be loved. He'll always be missed.

My entire family sits here, and we've all gone through these trials, and it's still unbelievable. I have nothing else to say. I'm going to break.

THE COURT: Thank you for coming and speaking to me.

MR. DI GIACOMO: That's it, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Hidalgo Jr., and Mr. Hidalgo III, if you'll please stand.

All right. Mr. Hidalgo Jr., pursuant to the jury's verdict in this case, you are hereby adjudged guilty of Count No. 1, Second degree murder with use of a deadly weapon and Count No. 2, Conspiracy to commit battery with a deadly weapon or Conspiracy to commit battery with substantial bodily harm, a gross misdemeanor.

In addition to the \$25 administrative assessment, the \$150 DNA analysis fee and the fact that you have to submit to a test for genetic markers on Count No. 1, you're sentenced to a minimum term of 120 months in the Nevada Department of Corrections and a maximum term of life and an equal and consecutive 120 months to life.

On Count No.2, the Conspiracy, you are sentenced to 12 months in the Clark County Detention Center. That is imposed concurrently with the time you received on Count No. 1. And you are entitled to --

What is the correct credit for time served?

MR. DI GIACOMO: It's 184, Judge, but it's actually -- Count 1 is the Conspiracy, Count 2 is the murder.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. It was wrong in the PSI.

MR. DI GIACOMO: Okay.

THE COURT: So it should be corrected to Count 1 being the Conspiracy and Count 2 being the Second degree murder with use of a deadly weapon which is imposed concurrently.

As to Mr. Hidalgo III --

So Count 1 is the conspiracy, Count 2 is the Second degree murder, and Counts 3 and 4 are the solicitation; is that right?

MR. DI GIACOMO: That's correct, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. That was also incorrect in the PSI.

Mr. Hidalgo III, by virtue of the jury's verdict, you are hereby adjudged guilty of Count No. 1, Conspiracy to commit battery with a deadly weapon or Conspiracy to commit battery with substantial bodily harm, a gross misdemeanor. Count No. 2, Second degree murder with use of a deadly weapon, Count No. 3, Solicitation to commit murder, and Count No. 4, Solicitation to commit murder.

In addition to the \$25 administrative assessment, the \$150 DNA analysis fee and the fact that you must submit to a test for genetic markers, on Count No. 1, Conspiracy, you're sentenced to 12 months in the Clark County Detention Center.

On Count No. 2, Second degree murder with use of a deadly weapon, you're sentenced to a minimum term of 120 months in the Nevada Department of Corrections and a maximum term of life with an equal and consecutive 120 to life. That is imposed concurrently with the time I gave you on Count No. 1.

On Count 3, Solicitation to commit murder, you're sentenced to a minimum term of 24 months in the Nevada Department of Corrections, a maximum term of 72 months in the Nevada Department of Corrections. That is imposed concurrent with the time I gave you on Counts No. 1 and 2.

On Count No. 4, Solicitation to commit murder you're sentenced to a minimum term of 24 months in the Nevada Department of Corrections, a maximum term of 72 months. That is also imposed concurrently with the time you were given on the other counts. And the correct credit for time served is 1,492 days.

MR. DI GIACOMO: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. GENTILE: Your Honor, I don't believe you read the credit for time served with respect to Mr. Hidalgo Jr.

THE COURT: Oh, I apologize.

MR. DI GIACOMO: 184

THE COURT: And the correct time is 184 days credit for time served.

MR. DI GIACOMO: Judge, one housekeeping matter. Do you want a short order on the motion for new trials, or do you want a written order drafted up on the findings here?

THE COURT: If you would do a draft that would be great.

MR. DI GIACOMO: Can I send an order down for the transcripts so I can have a transcript of it?

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. DI GIACOMO: Thank you, Judge.

-000-

ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

JANIE L. OLSEN Recorder/Transcriber JOC.

ORIGINAL

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA



THE STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff,

-vs-

LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III #1849634

Defendant.

CASE NO. C212667

DEPT. NO. XXI

## JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (JURY TRIAL)

The Defendant previously entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes of COUNT 1

- CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS

199.480, 200.010, 200.030, COUNT 2 – MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY

WEAPON (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165, COUNT

3 – SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS

199.500, COUNT 4 – SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 199.500; and the matter having been tried before a jury and the

Defendant having been found guilty of the crimes of COUNT 1 – CONSPIRACY TO

COMMIT A BATTERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON OR BATTERY RESULTING IN

SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM (Gross Misdemeanor) in violation of NRS 199.480,

200.481, COUNT 2 – SECOND DEGREE MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY

23

24

25

26

27

28

WEAPON (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165, COUNT 3 - SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 199.500, COUNT 4 - SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 199.500; thereafter, on the 23rd day of June, 2009, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with his counsel, JOHN ARRASCADA, ESQ., and CHRIS ADAMS, ESQ., and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offenses and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee and \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers, the Defendant is SENTENCED to the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) as follows: AS TO COUNT 1 - TO TWELVE (12) MONTHS in the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC); AS TO COUNT 2 - TO LIFE with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS, plus an EQUAL and CONSECUTIVE term of LIFE with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, COUNT 2: to run CONCURRENT with COUNT 1; AS TO COUNT 3 - TO A MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS, COUNT 3 to run CONCURRENT with COUNTS 1 & 2; AS TO COUNT 4 - TO A MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS, COUNT 4 to run CONCURRENT with COUNTS 1, 2 & 3; with ONE THOUSAND, FOUR HUNDRED, NINETY-TWO (1,492) DAYS credit for time served.

DATED this 25<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2009

DISTRICT JUDGE

Valenci Adair

(W)

JOC

2

3

7

8

11

12

13

DRICINAL

DISTRICT COURT

2009 AUG 18 A 9: 19

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

CASE NO. C241394

DEPT. NO. XXI

LUIS HIDALGO, JR. aka Luis A. Hidalgo

#1579522

Defendant.

14

15 16

17

18 19

20

22

21

24

25

23

26 27

## AMENDED JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (JURY TRIAL)

The Defendant previously entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes of COUNT 1 CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER (Category B Felony), in violation of NRS. 199.480, 200.010, 200.030, and COUNT 2 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony), NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165; and the matter having been tried before a jury and the Defendant having been found guilty of the crimes of COUNT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A BATTERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON (Gross Misdemeanor), in violation of NRS 199.480, 200.481, COUNT 2 - SECOND DEGREE MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony), NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165; thereafter, on the 23<sup>RD</sup> day of June, 2009, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with his counsel, DOMINIC GENTILE, ESQ., and PAOLO ARMENI, ESQ., and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT WAS ADJUDGED guilty of said offenses and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee and \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers, the Defendant was SENTENCED to the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) as follows: AS TO COUNT 1 - TO TWELVE (12) MONTHS in the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC); AS TO COUNT 2 - TO LIFE with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS, plus an EQUAL and CONSECUTIVE term of LIFE with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, COUNT 2 to run CONCURRENT with COUNT 1, with ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR (184) DAYS credit for time served.

THEREAFTER, on the 11<sup>th</sup> day of August, 2009, a Minute Order was prepared reflecting: It having been brought to the attention of the Court by Defense Counsel in this matter that the Judgment of Conviction, filed on July 10, 2009, contained an error as to the exact count the Defendant was found guilty of at time of trial, the Court does HEREBY ORDER that an AMENDED JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION be filed to reflect that the Defendant was found GUILTY of COUNT 1 – CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A BATTERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON OR BATTERY RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM, in place and stead of Conspiracy to Commit Battery with a Deadly Weapon.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_\_ day of August, 2009

VALERIE ADAIR DISTRICT JUDGE

S:\Forms\JOC-Jury 1 Ct/8/12/2009

Electronically Filed 04/19/2010 04:12:48 PM

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 MARC DIGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2211 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		CLERK OF THE COURT
	CT COURT JNTY, NEVADA	
Plaintiff,  -vs-  DEANGELO CARROLL,  #1678381	CASE NO: DEPT NO:	
Defendant.		

## SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF EVIDENCE IN AGGRAVATION

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada by Clark County District Attorney DAVID ROGER, through MARC DIGIACOMO, Chief Deputy District Attorney, pursuant to Rule 250(4)(f) of the Nevada Supreme Court, hereby gives notice of the existence of the following evidence in aggravation to be presented at the penalty phase of the trial:

1. The murder was committed by a person, for himself or another, to receive money or any other thing of monetary value, to-wit by:

On or about May 19, 2005, the owner of the Palomino Club, Luis Hidalgo, Jr., located at 1848 North Las Vegas Boulevard, made it known to Deangelo Carroll, an employee of the Palomino Club, that he would pay someone to kill Timothy Jay Hadland, who was a former employee of the club. Luis Hidalgo, Jr., was angry with the victim, Timothy Jay Hadland, because after his firing from the club, Timothy Jay Hadland was hurting the club's business by "bad mouthing" the club by spreading rumors about Luis Hidalgo Jr., and about the club. Timothy Jay Hadland had a lot of contact with cab drivers and was telling cabbies not to bring their fares to the club in retaliation for his firing. The Palomino Club is not located on

the Strip and its business relies heavily on customers being brought to the club by cabs. The club was losing money because of Timothy Jay Hadland's actions and as such Luis Hidalgo Jr., wanted him killed so that he, his business, and his employees would be better off financially by the increased flow of clients after Timothy Jay Hadland was silenced. Based upon this initial conversation, Deangelo Carroll procured the assistance of Jayson Taoipu to commit the murder.

On the same date, after the initial conversation, Luis Hidalgo, III, a manager of the Palomino Club, called Deangelo Carroll and told him to come to the club and "bring baseball bats and garbage bags." When Defendant Carroll arrived at the Palomino Club, Defendant Luis Hidalgo, Jr., hired Deangelo Carroll to kill Timothy Jay Hadland. After conveying this information and procuring Deangelo Carroll, Deangelo Carroll went to 1676 "E" Street to the residence of Kenneth Counts and enlisted Defendant Kenneth Counts to kill Timothy Jay Hadland. Defendant Deangelo Carroll then drove Defendants Kenneth Counts and Jayson Taoipu, as well as witness Rontae Zone, out to the area of North Shore Road at Lake Mead, where Defendant Kenneth Counts shot and killed Timothy Jay Hadland.

After the killing, the group drove back to the Palomino Club and Defendant Deangelo Carroll entered the club with Defendant Kenneth Counts. Defendant Deangelo Carroll went into Luis Hidalgo Jr.'s office and met with him and Defendant Anabel Espindola. At that time Defendant Deangelo Carroll announced that, "it was done" and that Defendant Kenneth Counts wanted to be paid. Luis Hidalgo Jr., then told Defendant Anabel Espindola to get the money, which Defendant Anabel Espindola did and which she provided to Defendant Deangelo Carroll who then provided the five thousand dollars (\$5,000) to Defendant Kenneth Counts. Defendant Deangelo Carroll also received some money for his involvement.

These facts support the aggravator because the murder was committed for the purpose of improving the profits to the business and the employees of the Palomino Club. The owner of the club, Luis Hidalgo Jr., perceived that profits were being hurt by the victim, Timothy Jay Hadland "bad mouthing" him and the club. As such, Luis Hidalgo Jr., used employees,

///

///

Defendants Anabel Espindola, Luis Hidalgo, III, and Deangelo Carroll to carry out his wishes. Defendant Deangelo Carroll also was directly paid for his role in the killing of Timothy Jay Hadland. In addition, these facts support murder for hire under the aggravator as Defendants Deangelo Carroll enlisted the help of others, including Defendant Counts by offer of renumberation from the owners and managers of the Palomino Club.

The basis for this aggravator is the aggravated nature of the crime itself. The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony and exhibits introduced during the guilt or penalty phase of the trial, as well as the verdicts from the guilt phase. [NRS 200.033(6)].

Regarding the establishment of aggravating circumstances under **Subsection 6 of NRS 200.033**, the State will rely upon the evidence to be adduced at the Guilt Phase of the Jury Trial. The State will file one or more witness lists in conformance with the Nevada Revised Statutes. The State has provided full discovery in this matter regarding said witnesses in this case. Rule 250(4)(f) requires the filing of this Notice to summarize the evidence which the State intends to introduce at the "Penalty Phase" of the trial. Therefore, regarding establishment of aggravating circumstances under **Subsection 6 of NRS 200.033**, said Notice need not and does not summarize any evidence in addition to that which has already been identified and disclosed to the defense, and/or to be introduced or disclosed during the Guilt Phase of the Jury Trial.

The Defense is hereby invited to re-examine the file of the Clark County District Attorney for any and all discoverable information and evidence.

In addition to the evidence to be offered to establish the statutory aggravating circumstances, the State hereby also gives notice of evidence of other relevant circumstances in the Penalty Phase of the Jury Trial. Below is a list of the names of the individuals that will give testifmony in support of the other circumstances and specifically what they will testify to:

C:\Program Files\Neevia.Com\Document Converter\temp\876190-995795.DOC

1.	ALAN HADLAND, the victim's son, may appear and testify pursuant to NRS
176.015.	Photographs of the victim and his family may be admitted during the testimony of
this witne	ess.

- 2. ALEX HADLAND, the victim's son, may appear and testify pursuant to NRS 176.015. Photographs of the victim and his family may be admitted during the testimony of this witness.
- 3. ELENA HADLAND, the victim's daughter, may appear and testify pursuant to NRS 176.015. Photographs of the victim and his family may be admitted during the testimony of this witness.
- 4. JENNIFER HADLAND, the victim's daughter, may appear and testify pursuant to NRS 176.015. Photographs of the victim and his family may be admitted during the testimony of this witness.
- 5. DORI LUKKER, the victim's former wife, may appear and testify to circumstances relative to the victim as provided in NRS 175.552. Photographs of the victim and his family/friends may be admitted during the testimony of this witness.
- 6. PAJIT KARSON, the victim's girlfriend at the time of his murder, may appear and testify to circumstances relative to the victim as provided in NRS 175.552. Photographs of the victim and his family/friends may be admitted during the testimony of this witness.
- 7. CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS CLARK COUNTY DETENTION CENTER May testify and admit disciplinary records of Defendant while at the Clark County Detention Center pending trial. Specifically, the records reflect a number of rules violations, including the harassment of a fellow prisoner and a statement of intent to assault and/or batter another inmate in December of 2005 (Updated records have been ordered). Additionally, jail phone calls involving Defendant Carroll may be offered.
- 8. CORRECTIONS OFFICER DENTON P# 8228 May testify to his involvement in the investigation of Defendant for rules violation including, but not limited to, his harassment of a fellow inmate and a statement of intent to assault and/or batter another inmate in December of 2005.

- 9. LVMPD OFFICER D. VERSHALL P#6350 and A. ECKEL P#6929 May testify to their investigation of a Conspiracy to Commit Robbery and Robbery under LVMPD event number 020518-0793 to which Defendant was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery in C184573. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD and/or the Clark County District Attorney's Office including a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in case number C184573 and/or records of the department of parole and probation including a copy of the pre-sentence investigation report.
- 10. STEPHEN BLODGETT Victim, may appear and testify regarding the Conspiracy to Commit Robbery and Robbery under LVMPD event number 020518-0793, to which Defendant was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery in C184573. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD and/or the Clark County District Attorney's Office including a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in case number C184573 and/or records of the department of parole and probation including a copy of the presentence investigation report.
- 11. CAVE CHRISTOPHER, RICHARD HARDMAN, JERRY FERGUSON, LELAND HEN and SHARICE LOUKISHA Witnesses, may appear and testify regarding the Conspiracy to Commit Robbery and Robbery under LVMPD event number 020518-0793, to which Defendant was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery in C184573. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD and/or the Clark County District Attorney's Office including a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in case number C184573 and/or records of the department of parole and probation including a copy of the pre-sentence investigation report.

- 12. LVMPD N. CHIO P#5109 and J. PANNULLO P#5455 May testify to their investigation of a Possession of Stolen Vehicle under LVMPD event number 000316-1323, in which Defendant was in possession of a stolen water truck, CA license CP59107. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD. This case was not proceeded upon by the Clark County District Attorney's Office.
- 13. LVMPD OFFICER HICKS P#6419 May testify to his investigation of a Possession of an Unregistered Firearm and Discharge of that Firearm under LVMPD event number 001119-2091, in which Defendant was in possession of an unregistered 9mm Parabellum, serial number R41512, which he discharged at 4817 Boulder Highway, Las Vegas Nevada, which Defendant claimed he purchased off the street. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD as well as records of the Clark County District Attorney's Office or the Las Vegas Justice Court in case number 00M25388X. On June 7, 2001, Defendant pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge of possession of an unregistered firearm in 00M25388X.
- 14. CITY OF LAS VEGAS MARSHALL'S OFFICERS D. MAJOR P#653, PEQUEEN P#215, and R. ADAMS P#603 May testify as to their investigation under event number 20020424-0003, in which Defendant was found to be in possession of marijuana, one bag of which Defendant claimed was his "personal stash," eight bags of individually wrapped marijuana, and a bag of twenty-four (24) pink pills, Defendant claimed were ecstasy. Officers may further testify that he responded to the Downtown Transportation Center in response to a call from BILL BETTS, claiming that a person was attempting to sell drugs at that location. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD and/or the Clark County District

//

Attorney's Office. This case was dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations in C184573.

- 15. BILL BETTS May testify as to his witnessing of Defendant attempting to sell street drugs at the Downtown Transportation Center on April 24, 2002, which resulted in the investigation under City of Las Vegas Marshall's event number 20020424-0003. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD and/or the Clark County District Attorney's Office. This case was dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations in C184573.
- 16. LVMPD OFFICER LEDBETTER P#4984 May testify to his investigation of a Conspiracy to Commit Robbery and Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon under event number 970125-0827 where Defendant, and two co-conspirators robbed JASON BRANDT and MICHAEL PARRISH with a small black handgun. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD and/or the Clark County District Attorney's Office. On May 20, 1997, Defendant was adjudicated a delinquent for Conspiracy to Commit Robbery With A Deadly Weapon and was committed to the Nevada Youth Training Center in Elko for one year. On May 20, 1998, Defendant was released on parole. In November of 1998, his parole was revoked. In November of 1999, he was released on parole again, and three months later, his parole was terminated.
- 17. JASON BRANDT and MICHAEL PARRISH Victims, and may testify to Defendant and two co-conspirators robbing them at gunpoint on January 25, 1997 which was documented under LVMPD event number 970125-0827. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD, the Clark County District Attorney's Office, and/or the Nevada Department of Parole and Probation.

- 18. LVMPD OFFICER CANNON P#6620 May testify to his investigation of Defendant for speeding, suspended driver's license and possession of marijuana under LVMPD event number 020516-2841. Said testimony will incorporate and admit all discovery and records regarding said case, including but not limited to all records, physical evidence, photographs, reports, or interviews in the possession of the LVMPD, the Clark County District Attorney's Office and/or the North Las Vegas Justice Court. Defendant pled guilty to speeding in case number 02MN0578X.
- 19. CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT: During the penalty phase, copies of records of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department may be admitted including any report, statement or physical evidence related to event numbers 970125-0827, 000316-1323, 001119-2091, 020516-2841 and 020518-0793.
- 20. CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF PAROLE AND PROBATION and/or NEVADA PAROLE AND PROBATION OFFICER BRENDA LEWIS P#560: During the penalty phase, it is anticipated that the pre-sentence investigation report from C184573 will be admitted.
- 21. CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS CITY OF LAS VEGAS MARSHALL'S OFFICE: During the penalty phase, copies of records of the City of Las Vegas Marshall's Office may be admitted including any report, statement or physical evidence related to event number 20020424-0003.
- 22. JEFF KENNETH BREMER May appear and testify to conversations he had with Deangelo Carroll about Defendant's involvement in the murder of Timothy Jay Hadland.
- 23. ANABEL ESPINDOLA May appear and testify to her knowledge of Defendant Deangelo Carroll not only in the charged crime, but other activities at the Palomino Club, including, but not limited to, one occasions where Defendant Luis Hidalgo Jr. had procured Defendant Carroll to harm the boyfriend of Defendant Hidalgo's daughter.
  - 24. JAYSON TAOIPU May appear and testify to his knowledge of Defendant

Deangelo Carroll including but not limited to the circumstances surrounding the crime.

All of the items referenced in this notice are part of the Clark County District Attorney's file. This notice hereby incorporates by reference all discovery in the case submitted to counsel. Defendant's counsel is invited to come to the Office of the District Attorney and review the file to ensure that they have all items listed in this notice.

DATED this 19th day of April, 2010.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

/s/MARC DIGIACOMO BYMARC DIGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006955

## CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing, was made this 19th day of April, 2010, by facsimile transmission to:

THOMAS ERICSSON, ESQ. FAX: 658-2502

/s/Deana Daniels
Secretary for the District Attorney's
Office

C:\Progr**10** Files\Neevia.Com\Document Converter\temp\876190-995795.DOC