IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE) Case No. : 65	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	Electronically File Jul 01 2014 02:47 Fracie K. Lindem Clerk of Supreme	7 p.m. an
9	Respondent.			
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12	APPELLANT'S APPENDIX			
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CASE NO 12-2201	
The undersigned hereby affirms this document does not contain a social security number, pursuan to NRS 230R 030.	t

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ESMERALDA TOWNSHIP JUSTICE COURT FILED GOLDFIELD, NEVADA

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IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF ESMERALDA TOWNSHIP, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ESMERALDA, STATE OF NEVADA

6	in and for the country of Esmeralda, State of Nevada
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
9	Plaintiff,
10	vs. CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
11	MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE,
12	Defendant.
13	
14	STATE OF NEVADA)
15	:ss COUNTY OF ESMERALDA)
16	
17	ANTHONY PHILIPS, Sergeant with the Esmeralda County Sheriff's Office, State of Nevada,
18	being first duly sworn, personally appeared before me and complained and deposed that
19	MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE, the above-named defendants, on or about December 11, 2011,
20	at or near US Hwy 95, Esmeralda Mile Marker 32, County of Esmeralda, State of Nevada, did
21	commit the crimes of:
22	
23	COUNT I: POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO SELL, in violation of NRS 453.337, a category "C" felony, it is unlawful for a person to possess for
24	the purpose of sale flunitrazepan, gamma-hydroxybutyrate, any substance for which flunitrazepam or gamma-hydroxybutyrate is an immediate precursor or any controlled substance
25	classified in schedule I or II, to wit; said defendant did possess METHAMPHETAMINE, a
26	schedule I controlled substance with the intent to sell.
27	

All of which is contrary to the form of Statute and/or Ordinance in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada. Said complainant therefore respectfully requests that a warrant be issued for the arrest of said defendant, if not already arrested, so that he may be dealt with according to law.

ANTHONY PHILIPS

Signed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me on <u>Jan 11-2011</u> by ANTHONY PHILIPS.

Justice of the Peace Notary Public

FILED

Case No. CR-12-832 Department 2

The undersigned affirms that this document does not contain the social security number of any person.

MAY 23 2012 Salinda Elgan ESMERALDA COUNTY CI FRK

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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ESMERALDA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

v.

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE INFORMATION BY AFFIDAVIT

MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE,

Defendant.

MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE, Defendant

AND TO: Christopher Arabia, Esq., Attorney for Defendant,

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned will bring on the above Motion for hearing before the above-entitled Court in the courtroom of the Esmeralda County Courthouse, Goldfield, Nevada, ON June 19th 2012, AT 10:00 A.M., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

DATED this 9th day of May, 2012.

ARTHUR WEHRMEISTER

ESMERALDA COUNTY DISTRICT, ATTORNEY

ROBERT E. GLENNEN III Deputy District Attorney

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 20, 2012, a Preliminary Hearing was held in the Esmeralda Justice Court for the defendant. (Exhibit 1, hereinafter PHT). At conclusion of that hearing, Defendant was not bound over on any charges. (PHT 40).

The State requests this honorable court and, based upon the following argument set forth herein below, respectfully asks this court to grant its Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended Information by Affidavit to include the discharged Count POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO SELL.

2. FACTS

On March 21, 2012, a Preliminary hearing was held in the Justice Court of Esmeralda Township County of Esmeralda, State of Nevada for the defendant Matthew Leon Moultrie, hereinafter referred to as "Moultrie."

The defendant was discharged on Count I, possession of controlled substance with intent to sell, for unlawfully possessing METHAMPHETAMINE, a schedule I controlled substance with intent to sell (PHT 40).

On December 11, 2011, Deputy Matthew Kirkland, hereinafter referred to as Kirkland, while on patrol at approximately Esmeralda County Mile Marker 33, stopped a white SUV bearing Nevada registration 420 XKS, for no headlights (PHT 7).

Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw): Could you tell us how that contact occurred?

MATTHEW KIRKLAND: After I spoke with Brandy, I went back up to

the vehicle, after I ran her, and I spoke with Brandy and asked 1 her if I could look in her vehicle. She said she -2 MR. ARABIA: Objection. Hearsay. 3 THE COURT: Sustained. 4 Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw) Did you in fact search the vehicle? 5 6 A. Yes, I did 7 Q. And why did you search it? Did you have permission to 8 search? 9 A. Yes, I -MR. ARABIA: Objection. Hearsay. It's just trying to get around 10 the previous objection. 11 12 THE COURT: Sustained Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw) What did you do to actually search the 13 14 vehicle? MR. ARABIA: What was that? I didn't hear. 15 MR. BRADSHAW: I asked the question, what did you do to actually 16 17 search the vehicle. 18 MR. KIRKLAND: I asked Brandy's permission. MR. ARABIA: And I have the same objection. 19 MR. BRADSHAW: He is not actually quoting Brandy at this time with 20 21 that question. THE COURT: I'll allow that answer. 22 BRADSHAW: Did you in fact search the vehicle? 23 24 KIRKLAND: Yes, I did. (PHT 8 - 9) Methamphetamine was found in a backpack, which Mr. Moultrie admitted belonged to him, and which tested positive for 26 methamphetamine after a NIK test by a trained officer. (PHT 27,

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27

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30).

The defendant then admitted that the methamphetamine and some money that was found with it belonged to him and that he was selling methamphetamine for a person named Mike that lived in the area. (PHT 27, 30).

3. STANDARD FOR INFORMATION BY AFFIDAVIT

According to NRS 173.035(2), the prosecuting attorney may file an Information by Affidavit, if, after preliminary hearing, the accused has been discharged. This is to correct egregious error by the lower court, and the Information must be supported by affidavits of competent witnesses. Here, the Justice Court committed egregious error by failing to allow testimony that the driver of the vehicle gave permission for the search of the vehicle while right next to Defendant, and by failing to bind Defendant over for trial despite evidence on each element of the crime being presented.

Nevada State law requires a justice court judge to forthwith hold a defendant to answer in the district court if it appears from the evidence produced at the preliminary examination "That there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed and the defendant has committed it." Beasley v. Lamb, 79 Nev. 78, 378 P.2d 524 (1963). Marcum v. Sheriff, Clark County, 85 Nev. 175, 178 (Nev. 1969).

NRS 171.206 states in pertinent part:

If from the evidence it appears to the magistrate that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall forthwith hold the defendant to answer in the district court... (emphasis added).

A preliminary hearing is not a trial. State v. Holt, 47 Nev. 233, 219 P. 557 (1923); Overton v. State, 78 Nev. 198, 370

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P.2d 677 (1962). The issue of innocence or guilt is not before the magistrate. Marcum v. Sheriff, Clark County, 85 Nev. 175, 178-179 (Nev. 1969). That function is constitutionally placed elsewhere. Id. The full and complete exploration of all facets of the case is reserved for trial and is not the function of a preliminary examination. Id.

The evidence need not be sufficient to support a conviction. Maskaly v. State, 85 Nev. 111, 450 P.2d 790 (1969). Nor must the State produce the quantum of proof required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Robertson v. <u>Sheriff</u>, 85 Nev. 681, 462 P.2d 528 (1969). The State is not required to negate all inferences which might explain the defendant's conduct. <u>Johnson v. State</u>, 82 Nev. 338, 418 P.2d 495 (1966); <u>Beasley v. Lamb</u>, 79 Nev. 78, 378 P.2d 524 (1963).

It is firmly established that the finding of probable cause may be based on slight, even marginal, evidence. State v. <u>Boueri</u>, 99 Nev. 790, 795 (Nev. 1983). The State is merely required to present enough evidence to support a reasonable inference that the accused committed the offense. Kinsey v. <u>Sheriff</u>, 87 Nev. 361, 487 P.2d 340 (1971); <u>Morgan v. Sheriff</u>, 86 Nev. 23, 467 P.2d 600 (1970). The justice court should not concern itself if the evidence might, by itself, be insufficient to convict the defendant of the charged offense. McDonald v. <u>Sheriff</u>, 89 Nev. 326, 512 P.2d 774 (1973).

Identification by one witness may be sufficient enough to establish probable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense. Sheriff, Clark County v. Badillo, 95 Nev. 593, 594-595 (Nev. 1979). The fact that this testimony is in direct conflict with that of another witness is of no import at this stage of the proceedings. Id. The ultimate question of the credibility of the witnesses is for the Trier of fact at trial. Wrenn v.

Sheriff, 87 Nev. 85, 482 P.2d 289 (1971). A justice court does not consider defenses or pass on the sufficiency of the evidence to justify conviction, but only decides if there is enough evidence to bind over the defendant to the district court for trial. Woerner v. Justice Court, 116 Nev. 518, 1 P.3d 377 (2000), Parsons v. State, 116 Nev. 528, 10 P.3d 836 (2000), State v. Justice Court, 112 Nev. 803, 919 P.2d 401 (1996).

Under NRS 48.025, "all relevant evidence is admissible" at preliminary hearing. This is subject only to certain Constitutional or prejudicial exceptions. West v. State, 119 Nev. 410, 75 P.3d 808 (2003); Williams v. State, 118 Nev. 536, 50 P.3d 1116 (2002).

4. THE JUSTICE COURT'S EGREGIOUS ERRORS

The lower court committed egregious error by not binding the defendant over on the charge of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO SELL based upon the evidence presented, and further by preventing testimony that the driver of the car in which Defendant was seated consented to the search right in front of Defendant. The justice court was presented sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to establish probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed and that the defendant committed the offense. However the justice court failed to hold the defendants to forthwith answer in the district court. The Criminal Complaint alleged POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO SELL, in violation of NRS 453.337.

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- offered to rebut an express or implied charge against influence or motive;
- (c) One of identification of a person made soon after perceiving the person; or
- (d) A transcript of testimony given under oath at a trial or hearing or before a grand jury; or
- The statement is offered against a party and is:
- (a) The party's own statement, in either the party's individual or a representative capacity;
- (b) A statement of which the party has manifested adoption or belief in its truth;
- (c) A statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject;

- (d) A statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the party's agency or employment, made before the termination of the relationship; or
- (e) A statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Here, the statement ruled hearsay was by the defendant's driver, to the question may I search, answered 'yes' in defendant's presence. First, that statement is not offered for the truth of the matter, so is not hearsay. The 'yes' is offered only for the fact it was said, and the effect on the hearer: "I have consent to search". See Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554, 576, 577, 119 P.3d 107 (2005).

Second, any statements by the driver are party admissions. Failure to dissent to implicating statements by another is ruled an adoptive admission. Maginnis v. State, 93 Nev. 173, 561 P.2d 922 (1977); McKenna v. State, 101 Nev. 338, at 345, 705 P.2d 614 (1985). Therefore, the consent by the driver was an admission by the driver adopted by the Defendant sitting next to her, and is not hearsay and should have been admitted. Finally, the driver's consent to search is a statement against her interest, and a hearsay exception. Soebbing v. Carpet Barn, Inc., 109 Nev. 78, 847 P.2d 731 (1993). Therefore, ruling that consent inadmissible is not only legal error, but egregiously so.

After considering all of the evidence presented in its totality, the justice court committed egregious error by not finding slight, or even marginal evidence, existed when it ruled, "Defendant is discharged. No probable cause shown." (PHT 40).

The Criminal Complaint alleged POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO SELL, in violation of NRS 453.337. This

requires proof that: 1) On December 11, 2011; 2) in Esmeralda County; 3) Defendant; 4) possessed; 5) Methamphetamine; 6) intending to sell it. The evidence shows all of those elements. The crime was committed December 11, 2011 in Esmeralda County, (PHT 6), by Defendant (PHT 10), and a valid search was done of the vehicle which turned up methamphetamine (PHT 8,9), which tested positive for methamphetamine, (PHT 27), which belonged to Defendant, (PHT 27), that he weighed and packaged, (PHT 27), and which Defendant intended to sell. (PHT 30).

5. CONCLUSION

This Honorable Court should allow the State leave to file an Information by Affidavit. The "Proposed Information" is attached herein as Exhibit 2. In addition, this Court should find that the Amended Information by Affidavit is proper to correct egregious error in this case, namely, discharge of the defendant on the Criminal Complaint.

The State's motion should be GRANTED. DATED this day of 9th May, 2012.

ARTHUR WEHRMEISTER

ESMERALDA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Вy

ROBÉRT E. GLENNEN III Deputy District Attorney

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6	AFFIDAVIT
7	STATE OF NEVADA) ss:
8	COUNTY OF LYON)
9	Deputy District Attorney Les Bradshaw, being first duly sworn,
10	deposes and says that:
11	1. I am the Deputy District Attorney prosecuting this case;
12	2. I was present at the preliminary hearing conducted on March
13	21, 2012;
14	3. The statements of fact made herein are true and correct to the
15	best of my knowledge and belief;
16	4. I declare under penalties of perjury under the laws of the State
17	of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct?
18	Les Badde
19	SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO ME
20	Dudre A Chare DEDRE A CHARLES
21	Notary Public, State of Mayada
22	NOTARY PUBLIC Appointment No. 96-1375-5 My Appt. Expires Apr 10, 2018
23	
24	
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AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF NEVADA)
COUNTY OF ESMERALDA)

- I, Deputy Matthew Kirkland, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that:
- 1. I worked as a Deputy Sheriff on January 11th, 2012;
- 2. I was present at the preliminary hearing conducted on March 21, 2012;
- 3. The statements of fact made therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief;
- 4. When I stopped the vehicle Defendant was riding in on December 11, 2011, I asked the driver if I could search the car, and the driver, Brandy, said 'yes'. This was the testimony I was prepared to give at preliminary hearing when the court sustained an objection and I was unable to testify to that.
- 5. I declare under penalties of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO ME THIS 23, DAY OF MAY, 2012.

Sandra S. Johnson
DTARY PUBLIC



1 AFFIDAVIT 2 STATE OF NEVADA ss: 3 COUNTY OF ESMERALDA I, Deputy Matthew Kirkland, being first duly sworn, deposes 4 5 and says that: I worked as a Deputy Sheriff on January 11th, 2012; 6 7 I was present at the preliminary hearing conducted on March 21, 2012; 8 The statements of fact made therein are true and correct to 9 3. 10 the best of my knowledge and belief; I declare under penalties of perjury under the laws of the 11 State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct. 12 13 Sergeant Anthony Philips 14 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO ME THIS 22 nd DAY OF MAY, 2012. 15 Notary Public - State of Neve COUNTY OF ESMERALDA SANDRA S. JOHNSON 16 1.7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), and NEFR 9, I certify that I am an employee of the Esmeralda County District Attorney's Office, that I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within action. I am familiar with the practice of the Esmeralda County District Attorney's Office, for the service of documents via facsimile, U.S. Postal Service and electronic mail and that, in accordance with standard practice, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE AMENDED INFORMATION BY AFFIDAVIT for District Court Case No. CR-12-832, State of Nevada vs. Matthew Leon Moultrie to be served on the parties below via the following method(s):

_____ Via Hand Delivery

_____ Via Facsimile -

_____ Via Overnight Delivery

_____ Via Email -

Placing the foregoing document(s) in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid in the United States Postal Service, at Goldfield, Nevada, addressed as follows:

DATED: May 23, 2012.

Danielle Johnson

Christopher Arabia, Esq. 601 S. 10th Street, Suite 107 Las Vegas, NV 89101

27 Secretary to the Esmeralda County District Attorney

ESMERALDA TOWNSHIP GOLDFIELD. NEVADA 1 CASE NO. 12-2201 2 2012 APR -9 P 3: 36 3 4 5 6 IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF ESMERALDA TOWNSHIP 7 COUNTY OF ESMERALDA, STATE OF NEVADA 8 9 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Transcript of: • 11 Plaintiff, PRELIMINARY HEARING 12 -vs-13 14 MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 19 The above-entitled cause of action came on regularly 20 for hearing before the Honorable Judge Juanita Colvin at 21 Goldfield, Nevada on March 21, 2012. 22 23 DanRa Boscovich, Reporter 24 Certified Court Reporter License No. 218 25

1	APPEARANCES
2	
3	For the Plaintiff: LES BRADSHAW
4	
5	
6	For the Defendant: CHRISTOPHER ARABIA
7	Attorney at Law PO Box 35945
8	Las Vegas, Nevada 89133
9	* * * *
10	
11	
12	WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2012, 3:15 O'CLOCK P.M.
13	JOHN T.M.
14	
15	PROCEEDINGS
16	
17	THE COURT: Justice Court of Esmeralda
18	Township is in session.
19	This is the time and place set for the
20	preliminary examination in Case Number 12-2201. The
21	complaint was filed January 11th, 2012, in the Justice
22	Court of Esmeralda Township, wherein the State of Nevada
23	is plaintiff versus Matthew Leon Moultrie, defendant.
24	The defendant is charged with, Count 1,
25	possession of controlled substance with intent to sell,

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a violation of Nevada Revised Statute 453.337, a Category C felony.

Let the record show that the defendant was arraigned March 5th, 2012, and is present in court today represented by Christopher R. Arabia, Esquire, Public Defender for Esmeralda County. The State of Nevada is represented by Les Bradshaw, Deputy District Attorney for Esmeralda County.

Are the parties ready to proceed at this

MR. ARABIA: We are.

MR. BRADSHAW: Yes.

MR. ARABIA: Your Honor, there's one quick thing I want to put on the record before we go any further. There's a person by the name of Nicholas Stone who I represented on a probation hearing some time ago --I think it was -- I think it was back in late 2010 -- and his name does come up in passing in this case. I looked at it pretty closely and I don't see a conflict. could potentially be one down the road which -- a case that I was appointed in this court to Nick Stone on.

I'm ready to go forward with the prelim but I wanted to make sure that was on the record because, as I said, I've looked at this and I don't think that there's a conflict at this time. If one came up later,

	I may not be able to represent Nick Stone or something.
;	Obviously we can deal with that then but
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Ę	Ready to proceed?
6	MR. BRADSHAW: Yes. The State invokes
7	the exclusionary rule and I have two witnesses before the
	state today and I would request that all other witnesses
. 8	be excluded except the one that's testifying.
9	THE COURT: All right.
10	Do you have any witnesses?
11	MR. ARABIA: No.
12	THE COURT: If you'll stand and raise
13	your right hand please?
14	
15	(Whereupon +b.
16	(Whereupon the witnesses were sworn by the Court.)
17	
18	THE COURT -
19	THE COURT: First witness?
20	MR. BRADSHAW: Matthew Kirkland.
21	THE COURT: You're going to wait out
22	there and not discuss your testimony. Correct?
	MR. PHILIPS: Yes, ma'am.
23	THE COURT: All right.
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MATTHEW RICHARD KIRKLAND,
called as a witness on behalf of the State, being first
duly sworn, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BRADSHAW:
Q. Thank you. State your name for the record and
spell your last name.
A. Matthew Richard Kirkland, K-i-r-k-l-a-n-d.
Q. And what is your employment?
A. Work for Esmeralda County Sheriff's Office.
Q. And how long have you been so employed?
A. A little over two years.
Q. And what are your duties at the sheriff's office?
A. Deputy out on the road.
Q. And what special training or classes have you
had to qualify you for your job?
A. I went to my CAT-1 Academy up in Carson City,
Nevada.
Q. Have you had any special training in recognizing
drugs?
A. Yes. While we were at the academy, we went
through a drug recognition class.
Q. And what did that training consist of in

-	specific?
2	A. Showing us the drugs and informing us what they
3	do.
4	Q. And how many traffic stops have you made during
5	your law enforcement career just approximately, not down
6	to the very number but is it more than two hundred?
7	
8	
9	Q. Okay. Drawing your attention to the events
10	that bring us together today, on December 11th of 2012,
11	do you remember working that day?
12	A. Yes, I do.
13	Q. And what were your duties that day?
14	A. I was running traffic on Highway 95.
15	Q. And where were you working within Esmeralda
16	County?
17	A. Between Goldfield and Tonopah.
18	Q. Do you remember where you were working
19	specifically around two-thirty or fourteen-twenty-three
20	hours that day?
21	A. Approximately Mile Marker 33.
22	Q. And is that in Esmeralda County?
23	A. Yes, it is.
24	Q. And did you have occasion to make a traffic
25	stop around two-thirty that day?

•	A. Yes, I did.
2	Q. Do you remember that event?
3	A. Yes. I stopped a white TrailBlazer traveling
4	north on Ninety-Five with no headlights on.
5	
6	
7	A. We have a headlight section law in Nevada,
8	daytime headlights.
9	Q. And was that law applicable to that section of
10	the highway where you made this stop?
11	
12	Q. Had you made stops in this area before based on
13	that
14	A. Yes, I do.
15	Q that law?
16	A. Yes, I did.
17	Q. And did you in fact effect the traffic stop?
18	A. Yes, I did.
19	Q. And did you have contact with the people in the
20	vehicle?
21	A. Yes, I did.
22	Q. Can you tell us what that contact was?
23	A. I went up to the driver's door and a female
24	driver, Brandy, was driving the vehicle and I asked her
25	for a license and registration and insurance.
,	

1	Q. And then what happened?
2	A. At that point in time I went back to my vehicle
. 3	and ran Brandy with dispatch. She came back no warrants
4	and her license was valid.
5	Q. And her insurance?
6	A. Her insurance was valid.
7	Q. And was there did you say there was a
8	passenger in the car?
9	A. There was a passenger.
10	Q. And did you make contact with the passenger?
11	A. Yes, I did.
12	Q. Could you tell us how that contact occurred?
13	A. After I spoke with Brandy, I went back up to
14	the vehicle, after I ran her, and I spoke with Brandy
15	and asked her if I could look in her vehicle. She said
16	she
17	MR. ARABIA: Objection. Hearsay.
18	THE COURT: Sustained.
19	Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw) Did you in fact search the
20	vehicle?
21	A. Yes, I did.
22	Q. And why did you search it? Did you have
23	permission to search?
24	A. Yes, I
25	MR. ARABIA: Objection. Hearsay. It's

-	.]
	just trying to get around the previous objection.
2	THE COURT: Sustained.
3	Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw) What did you do to actually
4	search the vehicle?
5	MR. ARABIA: What was that? I didn't
6	hear.
7	MR. BRADSHAW: I asked the question,
8	what did you do to actually search the vehicle.
9	MR. KIRKLAND: I asked Brandy's
10	permission.
11	MR. ARABIA: And I have the same
12	Objection.
13	MR. BRADSHAW: He is not actually quoting
14	Brandy at this time with that question.
15	THE COURT: I'll allow that answer.
16	Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw) Did you in fact search the
17	vehicle?
18	A. Yes, I did.
19	Q. And what about the passenger? Where was he
20	during the search?
21	
22	has in the passenger seat and I asked him
23	to step out and I recognized him from a stop about three
24	weeks prior to this stop.
25	Q. So you had prior contact with the passenger?
	A. Yes, I did.
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1	Q. And did you ascertain the passenger's name?
2	A. I knew his name as Matthew.
3	
4	
5	Q. Is Matthew, the passenger, here in the court
6	today?
7	A. Yes. He's sitting right there.
8	MR. BRADSHAW: And will the record
9	reflect that the witness has identified the defendant in
10	this matter
11	THE COURT: The record will reflect.
12	MR. BRADSHAW: Matthew Leon Moultrie?
13	Thank you.
14	Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw) Then so where was
15	Mr where was the passenger when you were searching
16	the vehicle?
17	A. He was standing on the shoulder with Brandy.
18	Q. Was that in front or in back of the vehicle?
19	A. In front of the vehicle.
20	Q. Can you describe the results of your search of
21	the vehicle?
22	A. In the backpack, I found a
23	MR. ARABIA: Your Honor, at this point
24	I'm going to object to the search just because I haven't
25	heard anything that would provide legal justification for

it, before we get too far into what may or may not have been recovered. What I'm inferring here is that they're claiming it was a consent search. There's no evidence that there was consent provided.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. BRADSHAW: I did ask -- sorry.

May I speak?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. BRADSHAW: I did ask the witness if he had permission to search. That would not be hearsay because he's not quoting anybody.

MR. ARABIA: Well, no, it is.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ BRADSHAW: I'm asking him whether he felt he that had permission.

THE COURT: That's not what you asked him. There was nothing about what he felt.

Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw) Did you have permission to search the vehicle?

MR. ARABIA: Again, I object because it's one thing to use that answer to move forward but at the point where we're going to start bringing the evidence in, there's no evidence that there was consent and so it's one thing, like I said, to say that, you know, he had permission for the purposes of moving forward in this hearing, but at the point where they're trying to

1 introduce the evidence, they either have to have consent 2 or reasonable suspicion and that's what we're missing at 3 this point. 4 THE COURT: Actually we're talking about 5 the backpack. Was there permission to search the backpack 6 is where we're at. Correct? 7 MR. ARABIA: Well, whose permission are 8 we talking about? 9 Here's the overall problem though. 10 The whole search portion of this started with they're 11 claiming that there was consent. They don't have any 12 evidence that there was and anything that follows from that is fruit of the poisonous tree, so I'm objecting 13 14 to all of that at this point. 15 MR. BRADSHAW: I've asked this witness whether he had permission to search the vehicle. 16 17 is not a hearsay issue because he's not quoting anybody. I'm simply asking him whether he obtained permission or 18 19 had permission to search. 20 THE COURT: The vehicle. 21 MR. BRADSHAW: The vehicle. 22 THE COURT: Now we're talking about a 23 backpack. 24 MR. BRADSHAW: Yes, but I believe that

the objection is about the legality of the officer's

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search of the vehicle, so I guess I'm going back to that. I want to establish that this officer had permission from the owner of the vehicle to search the vehicle.

MR. ARABIA: And that's --

MR. BRADSHAW: If that's not an issue now, then I'll move forward.

MR. ARABIA: Well, it is an issue. saying that he had permission. There was hearsay offered which is inadmissible and I haven't heard anything else and, again, using that word as a mask for the fact they don't actually have it is not sufficient.

MR. BRADSHAW: I believe that the officer can testify whether he had permission or did not have permission to search the vehicle. That's not -- in my view, it's not a hearsay issue because he's not quoting anybody. He's simply stating his belief as to whether he had permission or didn't have permission.

MR. ARABIA: Well, he was testifying that he got the permission by asking a question of someone and then quoting their response, which is hearsay, and repackaging that as permission doesn't really get around the fact that what they're basically doing is they're saying they had permission in the form of a hearsay statement but it's not hearsay, so it's not an admissible statement no matter how you describe it.

MR. BRADSHAW: I've not asked this witness to quote anyone. I'm simply asking --

MR. ARABIA: The permission itself was a statement which is inadmissible so it's not admissible so it doesn't matter what he felt or whatever.

MR. BRADSHAW: I'm not asking him to testify as to what somebody quoted that's not available for cross examination in the court today. I'm simply asking him about his actions, did he or did he not obtain or have permission to search the vehicle.

THE COURT: The vehicle only. We're now moved on to the backpack. Did he ask -- it's your question but he needed permission to get in the backpack. That's not the vehicle so if you can get on to that, you can go forward.

MR. BRADSHAW: Okay.

May I consult with the witness? Can we take a two-minute break and let me consult --

MR. ARABIA: I'm going to object to that. I think we should move forward with the questioning.

MR. BRADSHAW: I just want to ask the witness about this document that I may or may not be able to introduce.

THE COURT: I'll allow you two minutes. We'll recess and you have two minutes.

1	(Recess.)
2	
3	THE COURT: Okay. We're back on the
4	record.
5	MR. BRADSHAW: Thank you.
6	THE COURT: Mr. Bradshaw?
7	MR. BRADSHAW: Thank you.
8	Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw) When you were searching the
9	vehicle, inside the vehicle what did you find?
10	A. Found a backpack.
11	Q. And did you search the backpack?
12	A. Yes, I did.
13	Q. What did you find in the backpack?
14	A. In the side compartment in the backpack was a
15	small black bag.
16	MR. ARABIA: Your Honor, I just want to
17	make sure that my objection to all this is noted.
18	THE COURT: So noted.
19	MR. ARABIA: Thank you.
20	Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw) What was in the small black
21	bag?
22	A. In the small black bag, there was a blue and
23	white plastic case. On the outside of the case was a
24	hair tie with a plastic bag with a crystal substance on
25	it. Inside the bag was fifty dollars plus a glass pipe.

1	Q. And where was the glass pipe?
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4	you first encountered it?
5	A. It was on the outside pocket of the backpack.
6	Q. Then what happened?
7	A. I looked inside and I found the blue and white
8	case with white substance, crystal substance, on the
9	outside. At that point in time I placed Matthew in
10	handcuffs until I could figure out exactly what I was
11	dealing with.
12	Q. And why did you place him in handcuffs
13	specifically?
14	A. The backpack had was sitting right behind
15	him, where he was sitting and actually I think it was
16	on the floor board but I'd have to look at the notes
17	again to find out exactly where the backpack was sitting.
18	Q. Did you speak with Matthew about the backpack?
19	A. Yes, I did.
20	Q. And that would be the defendant in this matter,
21	Matthew Leon Moultrie?
22	A. Yes, I did.
23	Q. And what did Matthew say about the backpack?
24	A. He said the contents he didn't know that that
25	container was on it or in the backpack. He informed

Ī	me that that was Nick Stone's.
2	Q. Do you know who Nick Stone is?
3	
4	Q. Who is he?
5	A. He's a gentleman that lives in Tonopah, Nevada,
6	and we three weeks prior, I was with NHP and I was on
7	that stop with them.
8	Q. Was Nick Stone involved in that other stop?
9	A. Yes, he was.
10	Q. Okay. Can you summarize for the Court the
11	articles that you believe that you found in the
12	backpack or the small case that was in the backpack?
13	Can you summarize that evidence that you found?
14	A. There was fifty dollars cash; there was a
15	glass pipe; there was a straw inside the blue and white
16	case. There was four small plastic bags of crystal
17	substance inside and one small bag on the outside of
18	the blue and white case held on by a hair tie.
19	Q. Do you have an opinion as to what the white
20	crystal substance was or is?
21	A. Yeah. At that point in time I had the opinion
22	that it was crystal meth.
23	Q. And what is that opinion based on?
24	A. On my training.
25	Q. And do you know how much, by weight of the

	crystal substance, there was?
2	A. No, I do not.
3	Q. At some point did you make a definite
4	identification of the fellow that you knew as Matthew,
5	the passenger in the car?
6	A. Yes, by his ID card.
7	Q. What sort of ID card was that?
8	1
9	Q. Did any other officers arrive on the scene to
10	assist you with this situation?
11	A. Deputy Philips.
12	Q. And when did Deputy Philips arrive in relation
13	to your interaction with Matthew?
14	A. I don't know exact time.
15	Q. Did Deputy Philips arrive before or after you
16	finished searching the interior of the car?
17	A. While I was in the process of still searching
18	it. I already found the meth or the crystal substance
19	at that point before Deputy Philips arrived.
20	Q. Okay.
21	MR. ARABIA: I just want to object to
22	the characterization of it as meth and ask that that be
23	stricken and that the white crystal description remain.
24	THE COURT: I will strike that reference
25	to crystal meth until it's established.

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- (By Mr. Bradshaw) Did you at any time conduct any kind of tests or do any further research to determine -- you, yourself -- what the crystal
- Okay. And What did you do then with Mr.
- I brought him in to Esmeralda County Sheriff's
- Did you find any other evidence that you took into custody at that time when you were searching, other than the white crystal substance that you described and the money and those items that you described already? Anything in addition?
 - Α. No, I did not.
- What happened to the vehicle after you took Mr. Moultrie into custody?
- I released it to Brandy, the owner of the Α. vehicle, so she could get to work.
 - Thank you. Q.
- MR. BRADSHAW: Nothing further of this witness.
 - THE COURT: You may step down.
 - Oh, I'm sorry. You may cross examine

1	this witness.
2	
3	CROSS EXAMINATION
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5	BY MR. ARABIA:
6	Q. Do you have a video camera system in your car?
7	A. Yes, I do.
8	Q. Okay. Did it capture this incident?
9	A. I am ninety-nine percent sure it did.
10	Q. Where is Mile Marker 32? What county?
11	A. Esmeralda County.
12	Q. You alerted to an incident where Matthew was
13	a passenger in a car that was stopped.
14	A. Yes, sir.
15	Q. Okay. Isn't it true that you searched him and
16	his things and didn't find anything at that incident?
17	A. That is correct.
18	Q. So, similar to Brandy, he wasn't doing anything
19	wrong in that incident?
20	I'll rephrase that. That's a bad
21	question.
22	You testified that you did a search
23	of him, of Matthew and his belongings, and didn't turn
24	anything up.
25	A. On the Nick Stone stone

A. On the Nick Stone stop?

-	Q. Yes.
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. Okay. And that was approximately three weeks
4	before the incident here?
5	A. Yeah, approximately three weeks.
6	
7	MR. ARABIA: Court's indulgence for a
8	brief moment.
9	THE COURT: All right.
10	Q. (By Mr. Arabia) In your report, you wrote that
11	there was a backpack located in the rear seat behind the
12	passenger seat. Was it on the seat or on the floor? Do
13	you recall?
14	A. I do not recall.
15	Q. But it was in the back of the vehicle?
16	A. Uh-huh.
17	MR. ARABIA: All right. Nothing further.
18	Thank you.
19	THE COURT: Redirect?
20	MR. BRADSHAW: Nothing. Subject to
21	recall, however.
22	I call Officer Philips.
23	THE COURT: Don't discuss your testimony
24	please while you're waiting.
25	MR. KIRKLAND: Yes.

:	THE COURT: I'll remind you that you
	were previously sworn. Please be seated.
3	
4	ANTHONY PHILIPS,
5	
6	duly sworn, testified as follows:
7	
8	DIRECT EXAMINATION
9	
10	BI M. BRADSHAW:
11	Q. State your name for the record and please
12	spell your last name.
13	A. Anthony Philips, P-h-i-l-i-p-s.
14	Q. And state your occupation.
15	A. Sergeant with Esmeralda County Sheriff's Office.
16	Q. And how long have you been so employed?
17	A. With Esmeralda, since 2005.
18	Q. And before that, did you have any prior law
19	enforcement experience?
20	A. Since 1984.
21	Q. You've been a police officer?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. In December of 2011, what was the I'm sorry.
24	Withdraw that question.
25	What training or experience have you had

I guess that's the way it reads, 12/11/2011.

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Q.

	A. Yeah.
2	Q. Do you remember arriving at that traffic stop?
3	A. Yes.
4	Q. What did you observe when you first arrived?
5	A. A white SUV stopped. Deputy Kirkland searched
6	the vehicle. I asked him what he had going on and he
7	told me.
8	Q. Do you remember at this stop, was it within
9	Esmeralda County?
10	A. les, by Mile Marker 33, right around there
11	somewhere, on US 95.
12	Q. US 95?
13	A. Uh-huh.
14	Q. Thank you. Now what was your did you have
15	contact with any of the people that were inside the car
16	that was stopped?
17	A. Yeah. I talked to Brandy Bodily.
18	Q. Had you known her previously?
19	A. Yes.
20	Q. Was there any other people in the car besides
21	Brandy, the car that was stopped?
22	A. Mr. Moultrie.
23	Q. Do you recognize Mr. Moultrie here today?
24	A. Yes, I do.
25	Q. Could you point him out?

	A. He's sitting right there at the end of the
2	table in the green shirt.
3	MR. BRADSHAW: The record will reflect
4	this officer has identified the defendant in this matter
5	Matthew Leon Moultrie?
6	THE COURT: The record will so reflect.
7	Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw) Did you have any further
8	contact with Mr. Moultrie after you assisted Deputy
9	Kirkland with the traffic stop?
10	A. Yes. Back at the sheriff's office, I did.
11	Q. Who transported Mr. Moultrie back to the
12	sheriff's office?
13	A. That would have been Deputy Kirkland.
14	Q. So what happened at the sheriff's office that
15	you had contact with Mr. Moultrie?
16	A. I advised Mr. Moultrie that I wanted to speak
17	to him.
18	Q. Was Mr. Moultrie in custody at this time?
19	A. Yes.
20	Q. Did he agree to speak with you?
21	A. Yes.
22	Q. Did you read him his Miranda rights?
23	A. Yes, I did.
24	Q. Did he understand them to your in your
25	A. Yes. As I read Miranda rights, I just don't go

:	right through them. I do each line at a time and have
,	them initial each line that they understand.
3	Q. Did that happen?
4	
5	Q. Did you feel Mr. Moultrie understood the Miranda
6	rights warning?
7	A. Uh-huh.
8	Q. Did you indeed speak with Mr. Moultrie after you
9	gave the Miranda warning?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. Now what was the nature of that interaction with
12	Mr. Moultrie?
13	A. It was about the substance that Deputy Kirkland
14	found, how it was packaged, whose it was.
15	Q. What did Mr. Moultrie say about what kind of
16	substance it was?
17	A. At first he said it belonged to a different
18	individual.
19	Q. Who was that?
20	A. Nick Stone.
21	Q. When you said at first, then did that story
22	change?
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. How did it change or
25	A. I explained to Mr. Moultrie that I find it hard

to believe that somebody would leave their meth and money laying around. Knowing those people, they protect that stuff more than anything else, and then he admitted it was his.

- Q. So what in fact did he admit exactly?
- A. That it was his and that -- he said it was for personal use at first and then I explained to him it wasn't my first day on the job and the way it was packaged -- he knew how much every package weighed. In fact he weighed it and separated it himself. They don't do that for personal use.
- Q. Mr. Moultrie explained that he had weighed it and packaged it?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. What did you believe the substance was that was weighed and packaged?
 - A. Methamphetamine.
- Q. And why do you think that? Why did you think that at the time?
- A. Just from the look of it and the consistency of it. Then I tested it.
 - Q. And what kind of a test did you run on it?
 - A. A NIK, narcotics identification kit.
 - Q. And what was the results of that test?
 - A. Positive for amphetamine.

1	Q. Did you in the sequence of events in your
2	interaction with Mr. Moultrie, when did you run that test?
3	A. That was the last thing I did.
4	
5	•
6	Q. So during the interview well, let me withdraw
7	that question.
8	Did you have occasion to personally
9	observe the what you believed was methamphetamine
10	andthe money that was associated with it that had been
11	taken
12	A. Yes.
13	Q by Deputy Kirkland?
14	A. Yes.
15	Q. Could you describe that in some detail as to
16	what exactly how it was packaged and how much money
17	there was?
18	A. Not looking at my report but I knew it was a
19	blue and white plastic box and when he found it, there
20	was actually one of the little packages was on the
21	outside with a I don't think it was a rubber band
22	MR. ARABIA: Wait. I'm going to object
23	to that. I think he's testifying as to what someone else
24	found. I think he should stick to what he found or saw.
25	MR. PHILIPS: I am testifying to what

	1 I saw.
	MR. ARABIA: I thought you said it was
	Matt. In that case I would withdraw the objection.
	Q. (By Mr. Bradshaw) Continue on.
!	A. There was a blue and white package and it had
(a one of the packages of the substance was on the
7	outside of it with I don't think it was a rubber
8	band. I think it was like a pony tail or hair tie or
9	something anyway, holding it on the outside. Inside
10	was more packages and there was fifty dollars in there.
11	That's when we got into what it weighed.
12	Q. Did you weigh it?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. You weighed the so-called methamphetamine?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. Do you recall, without looking at your report,
17	how much it weighed?
18	A. No, I don't recall.
19	Q. Okay. And how much money was there in total?
20	A. Fifty dollars.
21	Q. And what did Mr. Moultrie say about the money
22	and the what you believed was methamphetamine at the
23	time?
24	A. When he first said it, there was he had
25	weighed them out and packaged them in twenty-three

	grams I believe it was, I can't remember and those
2	would sell for fifty dollars.
3	Q. Did Mr. Moultrie admit that he was selling
4	methamphetamine?
5	A. Finally he did, yes.
6	Q. What did he say exactly?
7	A. He was selling for a guy named Mike out of
8	Silver Peak and he would be giving that money the
9	money was belonged to Mike.
10	Q. The money that had been confiscated, the fifty
11	dollars?
12	A. Yes. And any extra he could make off it, he
13	kept.
14	Q. Did Mr. Moultrie say how many sales he had made
15	or anything like that?
16	A. No, sir.
17	Q. What else did you talk to Mr. Moultrie about?
18	A. About setting up a deal with Mike in Silver Peak.
19	Q. Did that happen?
20	A. Kind of.
21	Q. Let me withdraw that question.
22	Did you try to set up something with
23	Mr. Moultrie and Mike?
24	A. Yes.
25	Q. And the purpose of that was what?

	A. To get the supplier.
	Q. And that would be Mr. Moultrie's supplier?
	A. Yes.
	Q. What did Mr. Moultrie say about whether he would
	or could do that?
	A. He said he would. He said that he would have to
•	text him, that they didn't call each other.
8	Q. And did that happen?
9	
10	Q. Did Mr. Moultrie use his own phone or someone
11	else's phone?
12	A. I believe it was Brandy's phone, if I recall
13	correctly.
14	Q. Did Mr. Moultrie have that phone on his person
15	at the time you were talking with him?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. And you had not confiscated that at the time?
18	A. No.
19	Q. Okay. And in fact was there some kind of setup
20	arranged or how did that turn out?
21	A. Yes, there was.
22	Q. What happened?
23	A. That vehicle was stopped.
24	Q. When you say that vehicle, whose vehicle was
25	stopped?

-	A. It was actually Nichole White and Mike.
2	Q. And this is the same Mike that you referred to
3	that Mr. Moultrie said he was selling for?
4	
5	J HCAULIN.
6	MR. BRADSHAW: Yes.
7	
8	A. The person he said he got his meth from that he
9	was selling it for.
10	Q. And the woman's name that you mentioned?
11	A. Nichole White.
12	Q. Do you know anything about her?
13	A. No.
14	Q. You said that the vehicle that those two people
15	were in was stopped?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. Who stopped it?
18	A. Deputy Kirkland.
19	Q. Okay. Do you have any personal knowledge of what
20	the result of that stop was?
21	A. Yes. I was on that stop.
22	Q. And what happened?
23	A. We found nothing. He said he was coming to
24	get
25	MR. ARABIA: Objection. Hearsay.

	1 Q. (By Mr. Bradeham) W.
	Yes, Without quoting them
:	did you have occasion to find contraband or not? A. Nope.
Ę	enose two people detained in any way?
6	- Joseph Short time.
7	ode on the highway?
8	A. res. They actually agreed to come to the office
9	Q. So they did come to the office?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. And you interviewed them there?
12	
13	Q. And were there any further efforts made to effect
14	a buy from Mike using Mr. Moultrie?
15	A. He agreed to that but never heard from him.
16	Q. So it didn't happen?
17	A. Didn't happen.
18	Q. How much time did you give Mr. Moultrie to make
19	that happen?
20	A. I cannot remember without referring to my report.
21	I think it's in there.
22	Q. Were there any further tests done on the
23	methamphetamine that you tested with a NIK test that
24	was found in the vehicle that Mr. Moultrie was a passenger
25	in? Were there any further tests done to further identify

	the substance, the white substance?
	A. I don't believe it's been sent to Metro yet
	until it goes up to court.
	Q. Okay. Just to be clear, did or did not Mr.
	Moultrie admit that the methamphetamine that you
(ultimately tested with a NIK test belonged to him?
-	MR. ARABIA: Objection. Asked and
8	answered.
9	THE COURT: Well, it has been asked and
10	answered so I will sustain.
11	MR. BRADSHAW: Thank you. Nothing
12	1 2 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13	THE COURT: Thank you.
14	Mr. Arabia?
15	MR. ARABIA: Thanks.
16	
17	CROSS EXAMINATION
18	
19	BY MR. ARABIA:
20	Q. Good afternoon.
21	A. How are you?
22	Q. All right.
23	On the I want to make sure I
24	understand. You, I think, said that Matthew had
25	Brandy's phone on him?

	A. You know, I'm not clear on that or he said he
	needed to use Brandy's because he was out of minutes.
	Somehow we ended up using her phone.
	Q. He was in custody at that time though?
:	A. Yes.
(Q. Would someone in custody normally have a phone
-	on their person or how did that what was the mechanics
8	of that?
9	MR. BRADSHAW: Objection, Your Honor.
10	Calls for speculation. If he could just be asked whether
11	he had the phone on his person or not.
12	MR. ARABIA: Yeah, that's fine.
13	Q. (By Mr. Arabia) Did he have the phone
14	Brandy's phone on his person?
15	A. I don't remember.
16	Q. Okay. And then the interview, was any of that
17	recorded?
18	A. I can't remember that either. I think it was.
19	Q. All right.
20	MR. ARABIA: Nothing further. Thank you.
21	THE COURT: Any redirect?
22	MR. BRADSHAW: No.
23	THE COURT: Subject to recall?
24	MR. BRADSHAW: Subject to recall. Well,
25	yeah. Yes.

1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. BRADSHAW: Keep him handy. 3 And the State has no further witnesses. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Arabia? 5 MR. ARABIA: Your Honor, I just want to 6 state for the record that I've discussed with Mr. Moultrie 7 the fact that at this preliminary hearing, he does have 8 the right to introduce evidence and witnesses and whatnot 9 and to testify. We've discussed all of those issues. We're not going to present witnesses and he's not going 10 11 to testify today. 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 Are you ready to make a closing statement 14 or --15 MR. BRADSHAW: Yes, I'm ready. 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MR. BRADSHAW: Thank you. 18 We're charging this person with 19 possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. 20 We described that there was a highway stop based upon no 21 headlights in an area that the law requires headlights 22 to be on in; that it was in a certain portion of Esmeralda 23 County. 24 The vehicle was pulled over. The officer 25 had permission to search the car from the driver and the

owner of the car and Mr. Moultrie was the passenger in the car.

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Contraband was found in a backpack, which contraband ultimately was admitted by Mr. Moultrie belonged to him, that he was selling -- well, the contraband was described and tested for methamphetamine with a NIK test, and we heard testimony from the officer that he had been trained in administering the NIK test and that the NIK test returned a result of methamphetamine or methamphetamine derivatives -- I can't remember exactly what he said -- and that this defendant then admitted that the methamphetamine and some money that was found with it belonged to him and that he was selling methamphetamine for a person named Mike that lives -- lived in the area; that the officers tried to get Mr. Moultrie to set up a situation with Mike where they could make an arrest of Mr. Moultrie's dealer, who was alleged to be Mike. didn't happen.

So we believe that we've met the elements of the crime, that is, that this defendant in fact possessed methamphetamine and money, packaged in a way that, in the officers' judgment and professional experience and their opinions, was packaged for sale; that this defendant admitted that he was selling methamphetamine; that this happened in Esmeralda County.

And we believe that we have met the elements of the crime that we've alleged and we ask the Court to bind over as charged.

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. Arabia?

MR. ARABIA: All right. I'm going to ask for a discharge. I've got five reasons. I think two of them are more evidentiary in nature and then three of them are legal, so I'll start with the evidence first.

I don't think there was any evidence introduced that there was any justification for the search, no consent, no reasonable suspicion. He made allusions to an incident where Matthew was actually, much like Brandy in this case who wasn't charged, wasn't doing anything wrong. There was no evidence of consent so there would have been no justification for the search and everything that followed would be fruits of the poisonous tree.

The second issue with the evidence is I don't think anything was admitted. I don't think there was items admitted into evidence or anything ID'd as such. There were references to things but I was waiting to object to evidence being admitted. If there was any, and I don't think that there was, which means that there wouldn't be anything to support the bindover.

The third thing is this case was charged as a C-felony and I'm going to -- I have a copy of the statute for Your Honor and for the State.

It's very clear in Section (2)(b) of the statute that for it to be a Category C felony as it's charged -- well, first of all, the way it's charged, there's supposed to be -- they're basically charging it as a second offence. There's nothing in the complaint alleging that there was ever a first offense, so there's that problem.

The second problem is there was no evidence introduced of a prior that would allow a bindover on a second offense. The way the statute reads is you would need to have a first offense, a Category D felony. They haven't introduced anything like that and he doesn't actually have any felony convictions, so that, right there, also would preclude a bindover, even if they introduced something, which they did not.

So based on the consent issue -- and if your ruling was definitive on that, I wasn't clear on that, that's why I brought that up. I wouldn't, you know, argue that in front of you but I do think that that issue, by itself, would justify it.

I don't recall them introducing exhibits and having them admitted by the Court. That's failure

number two.

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Number three, the complaint is not drafted in a way that gives us any notice that they were going for the second offense. They didn't introduce a prior which would be, you know, some evidence that the prior felony -- and they couldn't actually do that because there isn't one.

And so for all of those reasons, a discharge is warranted here. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BRADSHAW: First of all, I probably agree with the Category C-D issue and I move to amend the complaint to conform with the evidence to charge --

MR. ARABIA: That can't be done now.

MR. BRADSHAW: -- a Category D felony.

That's all I can do at this point. I don't have any evidence of any priors.

THE COURT: All right.

I do find that the State has not met its burden of proof in this matter for the various reasons that Mr. Arabia has stated on the record and the complaint is effective and cannot be amended at this time, so I am not binding the defendant over and he's been discharged from custody and any pretrial release obligations.

Court is adjourned.

CERTIFICATE

I, DanRa Boscovich, certify that I am a Certified Court Reporter in the State of Nevada; that I attended the above-entitled hearing and reported the proceedings; and that the foregoing constitutes a full, true and correct transcript of the same to the best of my knowledge, skill and ability.

Dated: April 4, 2012.

Danka Boscovich, CCR 218

Case No. CR-12-832 Dept 2

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The undersigned hereby affirms this document does not contain a social security number, pursuant

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ESMERALDA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

٧.

INFORMATION

MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE,

Defendant.

ROBERT GLENNEN III, Esq, Esmeralda County Deputy District Attorney, informs the Court that, on or about the 11th day of December, 2011, and before the filing of this information, in Esmeralda County, State of Nevada, the defendant did then and there commit the following offense(s), to-wit:

> **COUNT 1: POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT** TO SELL, in violation of NRS 453.337, a category "D" felony, it is unlawful for a person to possess for the purpose of sale flunitrazepan, gammahydroxybutyrate, any substance for which flunitrazepam or gammahydroxybutyrate is an immediate precursor or any controlled substance classified in schedule I or II, to wit; said defendant did possess METHAMPHETAMINE, a schedule I controlled substance with the intent to sell.

All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada

The names and addresses of the witnesses known to the District Attorney at the time

Sergeant Anthony Philips Esmeralda County Sheriff's Office Goldfield NV 89013

Case No. 12-832

FILED

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ESMERALDA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

12 Plaintiff,

13 VS.

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14 MATTHEW MOULTRIE,

15 Defendant. OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE INFORMATION BY AFFIDAVIT; DEFENSE MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART

COMES NOW Defendant MATTHEW MOULTRIE, by and through his attorney CHRISTOPHER R. ARABIA, Esq., who submits this opposition to Plaintiff's motion for leave of court to file an information by affidavit. This Opposition is based upon the attached points and authorities, the pleadings and papers on file herein, and the evidence, testimony, and argument to be adduced at hearing.

DATED this 4th day of June, 2012.

CHRISTOPHER R. ARABIA, Esq.

Nevada Bar #9749 601 S. 10th St.

Las Vegas, NV 89101

702.281.4093

Attorney for Defendant Moultrie

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DECLARATION OF CHRIS ARABIA, Esq. IN LIEU OF AFFIDAVIT AS CONTEMPLATED BY NRS 53.045

I, Chris Arabia, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge:

Declarant is a duly licensed attorney in the State of Nevada and is the attorney for defendant Moultrie.

Declarant hereby incorporates the entirety of this motion into this declaration, as if fully set forth herein.

Declarant received in pre-trial discovery a copy of a purported prior conviction of defendant Moultrie for a Nevada gross misdemeanor offense. Declarant took no action from the time of discharge to the time the state's motion was filed (63 days). As far as declarant is aware, Moultrie does not reside in the Fifth Judicial District.

EXECUTED this 4th day of June



POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

The defendant Matthew Moultrie ("Moultrie") was charged by criminal complaint with "Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Sell, in violation of NRS 453.337, a category "C" felony...."1 [Italics added, bold original.]

¹ The State has submitted a proposed information for an alleged category "D" felony violation of NRS 453.337 even though the complaint charged an alleged category "C" felony violation of NRS 453.337 (i.e. second offense). This was no accident, and it is no accident that the State's motion repeatedly refers to Possession with Intent without specifying the section of 453.337 or the category of felony involved. It is offensive that the State has tried to hoodwink this court and violate Moultrie's Due Process rights with a stealth move to a whole new charge.

NRS 453.337(2) provides in pertinent part:

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- 2. Unless a greater penalty is provided in NRS 453.3385, 453.339 or 453.3395, a person who violates this section shall be punished:
- (a) For the first offense, for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.
- (b) For a second offense, or if, in the case of a first conviction of violating this section, the offender has previously been convicted of a felony under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act or of an offense under the laws of the United States or any state, territory or district which, if committed in this State, would amount to a felony under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, for a category C felony as provided in NRS 193.130.

Additionally, NRS 453.337(2)(c) provides for punishment as a category "B" felony for some violations of 453.337.

The sole count of the complaint alleged:

COUNT I: POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO SELL, in violation of NRS 453.337, <u>a category "C" felony</u>, it is unlawful for a person to possess for the purpose of sale flunitrazepan, gamma-hydroxybutyrate, any substance for which flunitrazepan or gammahydroxybutyrate is an immediate precursor or any controlled substance classified schedule I or II, to wit; said defendant did METHAMPHETAMINE, a schedule controlled substance with the intent to sell. [Italics and underline added, bold original.] (Defense Exhibit A).

At the beginning of the preliminary hearing on <u>March 21, 2012</u>, the Justice Court read the charge in the criminal complaint filed by the state: "The defendant is charged with, Count 1, possession of controlled substance with intent to sell, a violation of Nevada Revised Statute 453.337, a Category C felony." (PHT 1-3). [Both emphases added.] The State made no comment in response.

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As part of pre-trial discovery, the State provided a copy of a purported prior gross misdemeanor offense committed by Moultrie. (Defense Exhibit B).

ARGUMENT

I.

THE COURT SHOULD DENY THE STATE'S MOTION BECAUSE THE PROPOSED INFORMATION IS EXTREMELY UNTIMELY (FILED 63 DAYS AFTER THE PRELIMINARY HEARING AND NOT THE 15 DAYS OUTLINED IN THE STATUTE), THE STATE HAS SHOWN NO GOOD CAUSE FOR THE DELAY, AND THE DELAY HAS GREATLY PREJUDICED MOULTRIE

NRS 173.035 mandates that the information "shall be filed within 15 days after the holding or waiver of the preliminary hearing." [Emphasis added.]

NRS 178.556(1) provides that the District Court may dismiss an information that is not filed within 15 days after the preliminary examination.

The Nevada Supreme Court has ruled that minor violations of the 15-day rule do not require dismissal if the defendant is unable to show prejudice. <u>Berry v. Sheriff</u>, 93 Nev. 557, 559 (1977) (4day delay deemed insufficient to compel dismissal where no prejudice shown); Thompson v. State, 84 Nev. 682, 683 (1970) (9-day delay held insufficient where no prejudice shown).

Analyzing NRS 178.556(2), the section of the statute dealing with the 60-day speedy trial right, the High Court has held that dismissal is mandatory if the State fails to show good cause for violating the 60-day trial rule. Anderson v. State, 86 Nev. 829, 834 (1970). The logic of Anderson is appropriate to apply to the other half of NRS 178.556, the section containing the 15-day rule.

In the instant case, 63 days passed from the time of the preliminary hearing to the time of the state's filing of its motion and proposed information. This is nothing like the trivial delays in <u>Berry</u> and <u>Thompson</u>; the 48-day violation in the instant case is more than 3.5 times greater than the <u>Berry</u> and <u>Thompson</u> delays combined.

Furthermore, the state's delay has substantially prejudiced Moultrie. The Justice Court discharged him, he had reason to believe that the case was almost certainly finished once the 15 days passed (especially given the rarity of grand juries in the Fifth District), he has been living since late March/early April in a world without this case hanging over him, he had reason to forget about the case and his defense, he had reason not to confer with his attorney to optimize his trial defense, the defense has done nothing on this case and thereby permanently diminished the potential effectiveness of a defense, and Moultrie does not live in the Fifth Judicial District. (See Declaration of Chris Arabia at page 2 of this Opposition).

Additionally, the state has made \underline{no} showing of anything resembling good cause for its delay.

The state's long, causeless delay contravenes the spirit of NRS 178.556 and requires this Court to deny the state's motion.

II.

THE JUSTICE COURT DID NOT COMMIT EGREGIOUS ERROR AS CONTEMPLATED
BY NRS 173.035(2) AND THE STATE IS CLEARLY ABUSING THE STATUTE
FOR AN IMPROPER SECOND CHANCE AT PROSECUTING MOULTRIE;
THUS, THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE STATE'S MOTION

The Nevada Supreme Court has articulated a clear standard for the types cases that justify the State's use of NRS 173.035(2) to circumvent a discharge by the Justice Court: "That statute contemplates a safeguard against **egregious error** by a magistrate in determining probable cause, not a device to be used by prosecutor to satisfy deficiencies in evidence at a preliminary examination, through affidavit." Cranford v. Smart, 92 Nev. 89, 91, 545 P.2d 1162 (1976). To avoid instances of prosecutors unfairly relying on NRS 173.035(2), the Cranford Court expressly adopted a more exacting standard than the previous "arbitrary or mistaken decision" standard described a mere four years earlier in Ryan v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 88 Nev. 638, 640, 503 P.2d 842 Subsequent (1972). Supreme Court interpretations NRS 173.035(2) evidently do not define "egregious." According to the Legal Dictionary, egregious means "extremely and conspicuously bad." The World English Dictionary ("outstandingly bad; flagrant") and <u>Dictionary.com</u> ("extraordinary in some bad way; glaring; flagrant") contain similar definitions connoting high-octane awfulness.

Regardless, the magnitude of error necessary for proper resort to NRS 173.035(2) is indisputably great; remarkably, the State has resorted to 173.035(2) even though the Justice Court clearly did not err in discharging Moultrie (had the Justice Court erred in the instant case, everyday errors, minor errors, and arguable errors of a magistrate would simply not suffice).

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The state charged Moultrie with second offense, "C" felony Possession with Intent to Sell but offered no testimony or evidence that the instant case constituted a second offense as contemplated by NRS 453.337; under such circumstances, a discharge by the Justice Court was absolutely proper.

Alleged violations of NRS 453.337 can be charged as category "B," "C," or "D" felonies depending on the defendant's prior record, with the category "C" felony expressly available for certain second offenses. NRS 453.337(2).

In the instant case, the state charged Moultrie with a category "C" felony (See Defense Exhibit A), provided a copy of a purported prior offense to Moultrie as part of discovery (See Defense Exhibit B), 2 and offered no correction or amendment when the Justice Court read the complaint's allegation of a category "C" felony. (PHT 2-3).

During the preliminary hearing, the state failed to present any evidence of any purported prior offense. The state also never amended the complaint to a category "D" felony, an offense which does not require a prior transgression under NRS 453.337.

It was only after the state had presented and submitted its case, made its closing statement, and listened to Moultrie's closing statement that the state made an untimely motion to amend the complaint after conceding that it had not made the case for the offense charged. (PHT 40).

² The purported prior was for a gross misdemeanor in Nevada, which actually would not have satisfied the requirements of NRS 453.337(2)(b).

Rather than address this issue in its motion for leave of court to file an information by affidavit and proposed information, the state embarked on the much less taxing (and totally lawless) path of no resistance: the state simply changed the offense from the category "C" felony alleged in the complaint to a category "D" felony in the proposed information. (See state's Exhibit 2 and Defense Exhibit A). The state's concurrent omission throughout its motion of the section and felony of 453.337 hardly seems coincidental.

The state's omission of the prior offense from its laundry list of required elements also hardly seems coincidental. (State's motion, p. 9).

The state presented <u>absolutely no evidence</u> of an element of the offense charged. Therefore, the Justice Court quite properly discharged Moultrie and the state's assertion of "egregious error" is spurious, preposterous - outrageous.

В.

The Justice Court did not commit error in ruling a hearsay statement to be hearsay and even if a different court might have ruled differently, the Justice Court absolutely did not commit egregious error; the state's argument on the hearsay issue makes factual assertions not supported by citations to the record, and Moultrie moves to strike those assertions

At the preliminary hearing, Deputy Kirkland ("Kirkland") attempted to testify that during the traffic stop at the center of

the instant case, a woman named Brandy said that Kirkland could search the vehicle, i.e. that Brandy gave consent. The Justice Court sustained Moultrie's objection based on hearsay. (PHT 8).

The state has claimed that Kirkland obtained permission and/or consent to search the vehicle. (See e.g. PHT 8-9, 11-13, 36). Thus, the statement attributed to Brandy was offered for its truth, i.e. to establish that Kirkland had consent. Citing NRS 51.035, the state contends that the statement was not hearsay because it was only offered for its effect on Kirkland. (State's motion, p. 8). This assertion is belied by the state's repeated reliance on the statement's truth-in other words, that Deputy Kirkland had permission-to justify the search.

The state next alleges that Brandy's statement was an implicating statement and that Moultrie adopted it as an admission by failing to dissent. (State's motion, p. 8). There is nothing in the record to establish that the alleged consent of Brandy was an implicating statement (and the police let her and her vehicle go, PHT 19, which suggests that the police felt that Brandy had neither engaged in nor was aware of any conduct for which she could implicate herself or anyone else).

There is also no evidence that Moultrie adopted or heard Brandy's alleged statement; there is only the state's assertion without citation that Moultrie was sitting next to Brandy (which should be stricken along with all similar assertions, so the defense moves to strike the following from the state's motion: lines 21-22 on page 6, lines 6-7 on page 7, and lines 7 and 16-17 on page 8). (State's motion, p. 8).

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Finally, the state asserts that Brandy's alleged statement was a statement against interest and therefore a hearsay exception. (State's motion, p. 8). Given that the police themselves did not seem to think that Brandy had done or was aware of anything preventing them from letting her drive away from the Moultrie stop unfettered, there is nothing to support the state's assertion that Brandy's alleged statement was against interest.

It is important to note that the only one of the hearsay arguments in the state's motion that the state offered at the preliminary hearing was the argument that the statement was offered for its effect on Kirkland. However, the state undercut its own argument on this issue by repeatedly stressing that Kirkland had consent to search - in other words, that the statement was offered for its truth.

The record in the instant case demonstrates that the stronger argument supports the ruling that the statement was hearsay. Especially because the state invented new justifications for admitting the statement that it did not offer at the preliminary hearing, the record is clear that the Justice Court did not commit egregious error.

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III.

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CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons presented above, this Court must deny the state's motion and deny leave to file an information by affidavit.

DATED this 4th day of June, 2012.

CHRISTOPHER R. ARABIA, Esq.

Nevada Bar #9749 601 S. 10th St.

Las Vegas, NV 89101

702.281.4093

Attorney for Dfdt. Moultrie

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee or agent of CHRISTOPHER R. ARABIA, Attorney at Law, and that on the 4th day of June, 2012, I served the foregoing **DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION** by hand-delivering and/or emailing and/or faxing and/or mailing first-class postage prepaid, copies to the following parties(s) at the following address(es): Esmeralda DA's Office, Courthouse, Goldfield, NV 89013

an employee or agent of CHRISTOPHER R. ARABIA

EXHIBIT A

CASE NO 12-2201

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The undersigned hereby stirms the document does not contain a social elegative banker, pursuant to the 2200 0300

ESMERALDA TOWNSHIP JUSTICE COURT FILED GOLDFIELD.NEVADA

2017 JAN | 1 P 1: 30

IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF ESMERALDA TOWNSHIP.

6	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ESMERALDA, STATE OF NEVADA		
7 8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
9	Plaintiff,		
0	vs.	CRIMINAL COMPLAINT	
1	MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE,		
2	Defendant.		
4 5 6	STATE OF NEVADA) :ss COUNTY OF ESMERALDA)		
7	ANTHONY PHILIPS, Sergeant with the Esmeralda County Sheriff's Office, State of Nevada,		
8	being first duly sworn, personally appeared before me and complained and deposed that		
9	MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE, the above-r	named defendants, on or about December 11, 2011,	
21	at or near US Hwy 95, Esmeralda Mile Marke	r 32, County of Esmeralda, State of Nevada, did	
23 24 25 26 27	COUNT I: POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO SELL, in violation of NRS 453.337, a category "C" felony, it is unlawful for a person to possess for the purpose of sale flunitrazepan, gamma-hydroxybutyrate, any substance for which flunitrazepam or gamma-hydroxybutyrate is an immediate precursor or any controlled substance classified in schedule I or II, to wit; said defendant did possess METHAMPHETAMINE, a schedule I controlled substance with the intent to sell.		
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Arthur Wehrmeister, Esq., Esmeralda County District Attorney
1st floor of County Courthouse at comer of Euclid & US 95, P.O. Box 339, Goldfield, NV 89013

All of which is contrary to the form of Statute and/or Ordinance in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada. Said complainant therefore respectfully requests that a warrant be issued for the arrest of said defendant, if not already arrested, so that he may be dealt with according to law.

ANTHONY PHILIPS

Signed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me on <u>Jan 11-2011</u> by ANTHONY PHILIPS.

Justice of the Peace/Notary Public

Arthur Wehrmeister, Esq., Esmeralda County District Attorney 1st floor of County Courthouse at corner of Euclid & US 95, P.O. Box 339, Goldfield, NV 89013

Phone:775-485-6352 Fax: 775-485-6356

FILED

Case No. 12-832

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11 | THE STATE OF NEVADA,

12 | Plaintiff,

13 | vs.

4 | MATTHEW MOULTRIE,

Defendant.

SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENSE OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE INFORMATION BY AFFIDAVIT; DEFENSE MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART

COMES NOW Defendant MATTHEW MOULTRIE, by and through his attorney CHRISTOPHER R. ARABIA, Esq., who submits this supplement to defendant's opposition to Plaintiff's motion for leave of court to file an information by affidavit. This supplement contains Defense Exhibit B, which was accidentally not included in the filing the of the opposition.

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ESMERALDA

DATED this 11th day of June, 2012.

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CHRISTOPHER R. ARABIA, Esq. Nevada Bar #9749 601 S. 10th St. Las Vegas, NV 89101 702.281.4093 Attorney for Dfdt. Moultrie

EXHIBIT B

CASE NO. CR-FP-09-638

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2010 AUG -9 P 3: 53

ELKO CO DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT OF

CONVICTION

MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE,

(Probation /Guilty)

Defendant.

On the 22nd day of February, 2010, the above-named Defendant, MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE, (date of birth: 03/17/1990 (age: 20), place of birth: Tucson, Arizona) entered a plea of guilty to the crime of COUNT 1:ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A SCHEDULE I OR SCHEDULE II CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SALE, A GROSS MISDEMEANOR AS DEFINED BY NRS 453.337 AND 193.330, which crime occurred on or about the 28th day of October, 2008 and the 4th day of December, 2008.

At the time said Defendant entered his plea of guilty, this Court informed him of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to a speedy trial, his right to a trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. At said time Defendant was also advised of the maximum penalty for the crime to which he would plead guilty and the elements of that crime. After being so advised, the Defendant stated that he understood these rights and that he still desired this Court to accept his plea of guilty.

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As a result of the foregoing, this Court on July 12, 2010, finds the above-named Defendant guilty of the crime of COUNT 1: ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A SCHEDULE I OR SCHEDULE II CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SALE, A GROSS MISDEMEANOR AS DEFINED BY NRS 453.337 AND 193.330, for which he was found guilty and hereby sentences said Defendant on this 12th day of July, 2010 as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant shall submit to testing to determine his genetic markers in accordance with the provisions of NRS 176.0913, and shall pay the One Hundred Fifty Dollar (\$150.00) genetic testing fee in accordance with the provisions of NRS 176.0915.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in accordance with the provisions of NRS 453.575, the Defendant shall pay the Sixty Dollar (\$60.00) forensic fee.

For Count 1, the Defendant is hereby sentenced to serve 12 months in the Elko County Jail. The Defendant shall receive credit for 2 days heretofore served as of July 12, 2010.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence for Count 1 is hereby suspended and the Defendant placed on a term of probation of twenty four (24) months. While on probation, the Defendant shall comply with the standard rules of probation, including the following special conditions:

- That the Defendant obtain a substance abuse evaluation at his own expense and, if deemed necessary, that he enter and successfully complete a treatment program as approved by the Division of Parole and Probation;
- That the Defendant shall attend NA/AA meetings twice a week, and shall provide proof of attendance to his probation officer for the entire length of his probationary term.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED in accordance with the provisions of NRS 176.062, that the Defendant shall forthwith pay to the Elko County Clerk, the sum of Twenty-five Dollars (\$25.00), as an administrative assessment fee, and judgment therefore is hereby entered against the Defendant.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Bail Bond posted in the amount of \$20,000.00, is hereby exonerated.

-3.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Andrew J. Puccinelli, District Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court, Department 2, and that on this ______ day of August, 2010, I served by hand delivery by placing a copy of said document in the agency box located in the Elko County Clerk's Office, a true copy of the foregoing document to: Elko County District Attorney (2) Roger H. Stewart, Esq.

State of Nevada, Division of Parole & Probation

Elko County Sheriff

Elko Bail Bonds

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee or agent of CHRISTOPHER R. ARABIA, Attorney at Law, and that on the day of June, 2012, I served the foregoing **DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENT** by hand-delivering and/or emailing and/or faxing and/or mailing first-class postage prepaid, copies to the following parties(s) at the following address(es): Esmeralda DA's Office, Courthouse, Goldfield, NV 89013

an employee or agent of CHRISTOPHER R. ARABIA



CR 12-832

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Dept. No. 2

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR ESMERALDA COUNTY

THE STATE OF NEVADA

Plaintiff,

٧.

MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE

Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING THE STATE LEAVE TO FILE AN INFORMATION BY AFFIDAVIT

The Court has received the State's request to file an information by affidavit in this case; which request has been timely opposed by the Defendant. Because the Court finds that there was sufficient evidence presented during the preliminary hearing to support a finding of probable cause, that the Justice Court erred in discharging the Defendant, and that the arguments presented by the Defendant are insufficient to warrant denial, the Court now GRANTS the State's request.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case originates in a traffic stop performed by the Esmeralda County Sheriff's Office on December 11, 2011. During the stop, a deputy requested permission to search the vehicle and allegedly discovered methamphetamine belonging to the Defendant, a passenger in the vehicle. The Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, with an enhancement for a second offense. A preliminary hearing was held on the charge; during the preliminary hearing

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the Justice of the Peace upheld a hearsay objection to prevent the deputy from testifying about whether he received consent to search the vehicle the Defendant was riding in.

Additionally, although the State filed the charge as a second offense, it was unable to provide evidence of a prior conviction at the preliminary hearing.

On the basis of the hearsay objection and the State's failure to prove a prior conviction, the Justice of the Peace discharged the Defendant and dismissed the charge. The State filed its request to file an information by affidavit 63 days after the discharge by the Justice Court. The Defendant opposed the State's request on the grounds that: 1) it was untimely, being filed outside the statutory fifteen day window; 2) the information filed by the State alleges a Class D Felony first offense rather than a Class C Felony second offense (which was originally charged); and 3) the Justice of the Peace did not commit egregious error when the hearsay object was upheld.

DISCUSSION

1. THE HEARSAY ERROR IN THE JUSTICE COURT WAS SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT THE STATE TO FILE AN INFORMATION BY AFFIDAVIT

The primary procedure for trying a defendant in District Court for felonies and gross misdemeanors is through preliminary hearing and bindover in the Justice Court. However, if a Defendant is discharged in the preliminary hearing, or if he waives his preliminary hearing, the State may file an information by affidavit in the District Court if that Court grants permission to do so. NRS 173.035(2) (2009). The statute governing the filing of informations by affidavit in the District Court does not specify a basis for a Court to allow the state to proceed by affidavits. *Id.* The Nevada Supreme Court has, however, held that the State should only be permitted to proceed on an information filed by affidavit to correct egregious error committed by the Justice Court; not to overcome

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deficiencies in the presentation of evidence at a preliminary hearing. State v. District Court, 114 Nev. 739, 741-42, 964 P.2d 48, 49 (1998). Thus, where the State fails to demonstrate probable cause as to one of the elements of the charged offense and a defendant is discharged, it may not attempt to recharge the defendant in the District Court. Cranford v. Smart, 92 Nev. 89, 89, 545 P.2d 1162, 1163 (1976).

Unfortunately, "egregious" error has not been identified or explained by the Nevada Supreme Court, nor are there any examples of what is egregious error in Nevada case law. Other jurisdictions have equated egregious error with plain error, which is generally defined as an error so significant that it affects the substantial rights of the parties. Ex parte Taylor, 666 So.2d 73, 84 (Ala. 1995). Actions to correct plain or egregious error should only be employed when a miscarriage of justice would likely occur otherwise. Id.; see also Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008).

Having defined as well as possible the parameters for permitting the State to file an information by affidavit, the Court turns now to the facts and law specific to this case. The first error the State complains of is the Justice Court's decision to uphold a hearsay objection raised by the Defendant when the State attempted to establish that the vehicle the Defendant's drugs were allegedly found in was searched subject to the driver's consent. It is well established law that a statement of consent to search given to police is not hearsay if offered for the purpose of explaining why an officer believed he had consent to search the vehicle. See NRS 51.035 (defining hearsay as a statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted); see also e.g. State v. Hodges, 672 S.E.2d 724, 731 (NC Ct. App. 2009) ("...[the statement of consent] was used to explain why [the Officer]

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believed he could conduct the search of the vehicle and proceeded to search the vehicle...[and] was not hearsay as it was admitted to explain his subsequent conduct.")

The Justice of the Peace erred when it upheld the hearsay objection to the Officer's statements about why he chose to search the vehicle in this case. The Defendant's statement of consent was admissible to explain the officer's subsequent conduct and to establish simply that the statement was made. See Id. As such the statement of consent was not hearsay and should have been admitted. An erroneous ruling on the rules of evidence is not normally significant enough to rise to the level of plain error; however, in this case the error prevented the Justice of the Peace from considering admissible evidence in making her determination of probable cause. Thus, the State's right to proceed in a criminal matter was substantially affected and the filing of an information by affidavit is the appropriate remedy.

THE JUSTICE COURT ALSO ERRED BY DENYING THE STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND THE INFORMATION

An information may be amended at any time prior to a verdict at trial so long as no additional or different offenses are alleged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not affected. NRS 173.095(1) (1995). Amendment to conform charges to the evidence is allowed if it does not change the theory of prosecution or negate the method of defense. State v. District Court, 116 Nev. 374, 377, 997 P.2d 126, 129 (2000); Green v. State, 94 Nev. 176, 177, 576 P.2d 1123, 1123 (1978).

In this case, the State sought to amend its information to remove the repeat offender element of the charges after it failed to provide any proof of the Defendant's prior conviction (if indeed there is a prior conviction) for possession during the preliminary hearing. Since the Defendant was not even in a trial and there was no verdict

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to be given, the State should have been permitted to amend the information. The Justice of the Peace denied the motion to amend and then discharged the Defendant because, among other things, the State had not proven that the Defendant was a repeat offender. This was an error, and warrants an order permitting the State to proceed by affidavit. The State presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause as to all the elements of a first offense possession with intent to sell charge and it should have been permitted to proceed on that charge.

3. THE STATE'S DELAY IN FILING IN THE DISTRICT COURT, ALTHOUGH SIGNIFICANT, HAS NOT PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT

Under NRS 173.035, a request from the State to file an information by affidavit must be filed within fifteen days after a defendant is discharged by the Justice Court. However, if the State misses the fifteen day deadline, denial of the motion to proceed by affidavit is not mandatory; rather, the Court has the discretion to deny and should do so if the Defendant is prejudiced by the delay. Berry v. Sheriff of Clark County, 93 Nev. 557, 558, 571 P.2d 109, 110 (1977). To warrant denial of the State's motion, the Defendant's showing of prejudice must be actual and will not be satisfied by speculation about what could have happened if the State had not delayed. Mello v. State, 93 Nev. 662, 664, 572 P.2d 533, 534 (1977).

The Defendant's first allegation of prejudice is that he has not been active in defending his case during the State's period of delay because he thought the case was finished. Crucially, however, the Defendant does not explain to the Court exactly what he could have been doing during the 63 day delay that he is unable to do now. The prejudice complained of is speculative and does not warrant denial of the State's motion. The Defendant also alleges that he is prejudiced by the delay since he is not a resident of

Esmeralda County; however, it is unclear how this makes the State's delay prejudicial. Whether the Defendant was charged 63 days ago or today he still will have to travel to Esmeralda County and be subject to any attendant inconveniences. The Defendant's last allegation of prejudice is that he has not been able to consult with counsel during the delay because he did not know he was going to be re-charged; however, the Court is sure that the Defendant will have adequate time to consult with his counsel prior to trial.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court now GRANTS the State's motion to file an information by affidavit in this case.

By the Court this and day of June, 2012,

Hon! Robert W. Lane District Court Judge



CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 16th day of June, 2012, he mailed copies of the foregoing Court Orden to the following:

Robert Glennen (Courthouse Mailbox)

Christopher Arabia (Courthouse Mailbox)

Law Clerk for the Court

AFFIRMATION

The undersigned hereby affirms that the document Court Oche does not contain the social security number of any person.

Law Clerk for the Court

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FILED

JUL 05 2012

The undersigned hereby affirms this document does not contain a social security number, pursuant

Case No. CR-12-832

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Dept 2

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ESMERALDA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

٧.

INFORMATION

MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE,

Defendant.

ROBERT GLENNEN III, Esq, Esmeralda County Deputy District Attorney, informs the Court that, on or about the 11th day of December, 2011, and before the filing of this information, in Esmeralda County, State of Nevada, the defendant did then and there commit the following offense(s), to-wit:

> **COUNT 1:** POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO SELL, in violation of NRS 453.337, a category "D" felony, it is unlawful for a person to possess for the purpose of sale flunitrazepan, gammahydroxybutyrate, any substance for which flunitrazepam or gammahydroxybutyrate is an immediate precursor or any controlled substance classified in schedule I or II, to wit; said defendant did possess METHAMPHETAMINE, a schedule I controlled substance with the intent to sell.

Sergeant Anthony Philips Esmeralda County Sheriff's Office Goldfield NV 89013

Case No. CR-12-832 Dept 1

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The undersigned hereby affirms this document does not contain a social security number, pursuant to NRS 239B.030.


IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ESMERALDA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,)	
Plaintiff,)	
vs.)	
MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE,		
Defendant.)	
)	

CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT

I hereby agree to enter a conditional plea of guilty to the offense of POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO SELL, a category "D" felony, in violation of NRS 453.337, as more fully alleged in the Information on file herein and/or in the charging document attached hereto as Exhibit A.

My conditional guilty plea is based upon the plea agreement in this case which, is as follows: 1) the state consents to my preservation of the right to appeal, under NRS 174.035(3); 2) the state agrees that it will dismiss and/or not pursue any additional charges relating to this matter; and 3) the state agrees that it will not pursue the habitual offender enhancement in this case.



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This guilty plea is conditional. NRS 174.035(3) specifies:

3. With the consent of the court and the district attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal must be allowed to withdraw the plea.

As contemplated by NRS 174.035(3), I expressly and in writing reserve my right to appeal for the purpose of obtaining a review of the District Court's adverse determination of my obtaining a review of the District Court's adverse determination of the state's motion for leave to file an information by affidavit (i.e. a review of District Court's decision to grant the state's motion for leave to file an information by affidavit); I also expressly and in writing reserve my right to withdraw my guilty plea.

I also understand that my attorney will not file this plea agreement unless the District Court consents on the record during the plea hearing to my reservation of the right to appeal, as required by NRS 174.035(3).

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA

I understand that by pleading guilty I admit the facts which support all the elements of the offense(s) to which I now plead as set forth in Exhibit 1.

I understand that as a consequence of my plea of guilty I may be imprisoned for a period of not less than one (1) year or more than FOUR (4) years in the state prison and that I may be further fined up to FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS (\$5,000.00). I

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understand that I may receive probation for this offense. I also understand that the law requires me to pay an administrative assessment fee.

I understand that, if appropriate, I will be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense(s) to which I am pleading guilty and to the victim of any related offense which is being dismissed or not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement. I will also be ordered to reimburse the State of Nevada for expenses related to my extradition, if any.

I understand that my sentence is in the discretion of the sentencing judge.

I understand that if more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed and I am eligible to serve the sentences concurrently, the sentencing judge has the discretion to order the sentences served concurrently or consecutively.

I understand that information regarding charges not filed, dismissed charges or charges to be dismissed pursuant to this agreement may be considered by the judge at sentencing.

I have not been promised or guaranteed any particular sentence by anyone. I know that my sentence is to be determined by the court within the limits prescribed by statute. I understand that if my attorney or the State of Nevada or both recommend any specific punishment to the court, the court is not obligated to accept the recommendation.

I understand that the division of parole and probation of the department of motor vehicles and public safety will prepare a report for the sentencing judge before

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sentencing. This report will include matters relevant to the issue of sentencing, including my criminal history. I understand that this report may contain hearsay information regarding my background and criminal history. My attorney and I will each have the opportunity to comment on the information contained in the report at the time of sentencing.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

By entering my plea of guilty, I understand that I have waived the following rights and privileges:

- 1. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, including the right to refuse to testify at trial, in which event the prosecution would not be allowed to comment to the jury about my refusal to testify.
- 2. The constitutional right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, free of excessive pretrial publicity prejudicial to the defense, at which trial I would be entitled to the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained. At trial, the state would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense charged.
- 3. The constitutional right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who would testify against me.
- 4. The constitutional right to subpoena witnesses to testify on my behalf.
- 5. The constitutional right to testify in my own defense.

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
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6. The right to appeal the conviction, with the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained, unless the appeal is based upon reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings and except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 of NRS 174.035.

VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

I have discussed the elements of all the original charges against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of these charges against me. I have decided to enter my guilty plea herein after a review of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) and Tiger v. State, 98 Nev. 555, 654 P.2d 1031 (1982). I understand that an "Alford plea is a guilty plea accompanied by a denial of the facts constituting the offense. In Alford, the Supreme Court held that such a plea is constitutionally sound if it is knowingly entered for a valid reason, for instance, to avoid the possibility of a harsher penalty. However, the district judge, in accepting the plea, must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea, and he must further inquire into and seek to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence. The court's inquiry should be addressed to the defendant personally, and not simply to his counsel. Moreover, the district judge, as in accepting other guilty pleas, must also determine that the accused understands the elements of the offense with which he is charged." Tiger, 98 Nev. at 558.

I understand that the state would have to prove each element of the charge(s) against me at trial.



I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses and circumstances which might be in my favor. My attorney has thoroughly investigated my case and has acted exclusively in my best interest.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest.

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency, except for those set forth in this agreement.

I am not now under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this agreement or the proceedings surrounding my entry of this plea.

My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this guilty plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

Agreed to on this *22va* day of

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District Attorney

Defendant

Defendant's Initials
Attorney's Initials

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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

- I, the undersigned, as the attorney for the defendant named herein and as an officer of the court hereby certify that:
 - 1. I have fully explained to the defendant the allegations contained in the charges to which GUILTY pleas are being entered.
 - 2. I have advised the defendant of the penalties for each charge and the restitution that the defendant may be order to pay.
 - 3. All pleas of guilty or guilty but mentally ill offered by the defendant pursuant to this agreement are consistent with all the facts known to me and are made with my advice to the defendant and are in the best interest of the defendant.
 - 4. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the defendant:
 - (a) Is competent and understands the charges and the consequences of pleading GUILTY as provided in this agreement.
 - (b) Executed this agreement and will enter a GUILTY pursuant hereto voluntarily.
 - (c) Was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug at the time of the execution of this agreement.

1 day of the month of Nov of the year 2013 Dated: This

Attorney for Defendant

1	CASE NO. CR-12-832 FILED	
2	DEPT NO. 2 APR - 2 2014	
3	ESMERALDA COUNTY CLERK	
4	IN AND FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT	
5	COUNTY OF ESMERALDA, STATE OF NEVADA	
6		
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
8	Plaintiff,)TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS	
9	vs.) SENTENCING HEARING	
10	MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE,)	
11	Defendant.)	
12		
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT W. LANE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE	
14	230 CROOK STREET, GOLDFIELD, NEVADA 89013	
15	ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, W014	
16	AT 10:13 A.M.	
17		
18	APPEARANCES:	
19	For the State: Robert Glennen, Esq.	
20	Esmeralda County District Attorney	
21		
22	For the Defendant: Christopher R. Arabia, Esq.	
23	Esmeralda County Public Defender	
24		
25	Reported by: Deborah Ann Hines, CCR #473, RPR	
	<u> </u>	

TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, W014

---00----

THE COURT: Moultrie, 12-832, time and place set for sentencing. We have a PSI dated

December 30th in which the division recommends

probation, 19 to 48 months underlying, five years

probation, all the standard costs and fees.

Mr. Moultrie is present represented by Mr. Arabia. We're going to hear from Chris and then from Mr. Moultrie and then from Mr. Glennen.

MR. ARABIA: All right. Well, your Honor, what I would ask is that you follow the recommendation of probation. Mr. Moultrie has had some issues. He's on probation and he's in drug court in Elko. He's moved into phase two. I didn't a hundred percent recognize him at first. He looks good. I think he's doing his best.

And as for this case, I think he put it well in his statement, I committed my crimes because I was being an idiot. And he at least recognizes that, so I think that would be appropriate that you put him on probation; and it would also be consistent with the plea deal we have on this case, which is a conditional plea pending appeal. So that's what I would ask.

Thank you, sir. THE COURT: 1 Mr. Moultrie, anything you'd like to say? 2 THE DEFENDANT: No, other than I'm doing 3 great, working full time. Just glad, not this Monday 4 but last Monday, I was phased into phase two of drug 5 court. 6 THE COURT: How long have you been clean 7 8 now? THE DEFENDANT: I've been clean almost eight 9 months now. 10 THE COURT: All right. Anything else you'd 11 12 like to say? THE DEFENDANT: No. 13 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Glennen? 14 MR. GLENNEN: Your Honor, the presentence 15 report is well considered, and we would request that 16 your Honor follow it. I believe parole and probation 17 is requesting \$500 on legal services in this case. 18 THE COURT: That's correct. 19 Anything else from the division? 20 OFFICER GODFREY: No, your Honor. We'd just 21 ask that it's consecutive to the Elko County case. 22 THE COURT: All right. We'll go ahead and 23 follow the recommendations of the division and make 24 it consecutive with all the standard fines and fees 25

and the 19 to 48 months suspended for five years, put 1 you on probation with all the terms that they're 2 3 recommending. What we normally do is we'll have the 4 division do an analysis of you and say, Does this guy 5 have an anger management problem or gambling problem 6 or whatever, and whatever they recommend to me that 7 you need, I'll go ahead and sign off on. 8 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 9 THE COURT: And we'll put you on probation 10 for the five years. Hopefully you'll stay clean from 11 drugs and stay out of trouble. If you mess up, we'll 12 see you soon and we'll give you that 19 months. 13 Any questions for me about what's going on? 14 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 15 THE COURT: Good luck to you. 16 Thank you. THE DEFENDANT: 17 (Thereupon the proceedings 18 were concluded at 10:16 a.m.) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
2	STATE OF NEVADA)
3	SS:
4	COUNTY OF NYE)
5	I, Deborah Ann Hines, certified court
6	reporter, do hereby certify that I took down in
7	shorthand (Stenotype) all of the proceedings had in
8	the before-entitled matter at the time and place
9	indicated; and that thereafter said shorthand notes
10	were transcribed into typewriting at and under my
11	direction and supervision and the foregoing
12	transcript constitutes a full, true and accurate
13	record of the proceedings had.
14	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed
15	my hand this 18th day of February, 2014.
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18	Dutsich am Hein
19	Deborah Ann Hines, CCR #473, RPR
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ILED

CASE NO. CR-12-832 DEPT. 2

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ESMERALDA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
Plaintiff,))
vs.	<i>)</i>)
MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE,	<i>)</i>)
Defendant.)) \
	,

JUDGMENT

On the 19th day of November, 2013, the Defendant above-named appeared before the Court with his counsel Christopher R. Arabia, Esquire, and having been found guilty of the crime of, COUNT 1: POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO SELL, in violation of NRS 453.337, a category D felony.

On the 21st day of January, 2014, the Defendant appeared before the Court for sentencing with his counsel, Christopher R. Arabia, Esq., and the State was represented by Robert E. Glennen III, Esmeralda County District Attorney. No sufficient legal cause was shown by the Defendant as to why judgment should not be pronounced against him.

The Court adjudged the Defendant guilty of the crimes of,

COUNT 1: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO SELL, in violation of NRS 453.337, a category D felony.

Defendant sentenced to 19 months to 48 months in the Nevada State Prison, suspended. Defendant be placed on probation for a term of five (5) years.

Defendant shall receive twenty (20) days credit for presentence incarceration.

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Defendant shall pay to the Clerk of the Court a twenty five dollars and no cents (\$25.00) assessment fee.

Defendant shall pay a sixty dollar (\$60.00) Forensic Fee.

Defendant shall pay a three dollar (\$3.00) DNA Administrative Assessment.

Defendant shall pay the Clerk of the Court a five hundred dollar (\$500.00) fee for his Attorney.

Defendant's sentence shall run consecutive to Elko County case CRFO-13-0640.

Defendant shall remain in and successfully complete the Fourth Judicial District Court Adult Drug Court Program.

Defendant shall completely abstain from the use, possession or consumption of any alcoholic beverages. Further, the Defendant completely abstain from being present in any cocktail lounge, bar or similar establishment operated for the primary purpose of serving alcoholic beverages, unless required to be so present during actual employment purposes. Defendant shall completely abstain from gambling, or from being present in a gambling establishment except for employment purposes.

Defendant shall maintain steady and gainful employment as approved by Nevada Parole and Probation, and if not employed full time, participate in employment/vocational training.

Defendant resolve all outstanding warrants within 30 days of probation grant.

The immediately after sentencing, the Defendant shall report to the Esmeralda County Sheriff's Office to be formally booked on the charges of the instant offense.

DATED this March, 2014.

DISTRICT JUDGE