IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

2			
3	MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE,) Case No.: 65390	
4	MATTHEW LEON MOOLIKIE,	Case No.: 03390	Electronically Filed Sep 22 2014 09:55 a.m.
5	Appellant,		Tracie K. Lindeman
6	vs.	{	Clerk of Supreme Court
7		{	
8	STATE OF NEVADA,	{	
9	Respondent.	{	
10			

APPELLANT MATTHEW LEON MOULTRIE'S REPLY TO FAST TRACK RESPONSE

- 1. Name of party filing this fast track statement: Matthew Leon Moultrie, appellant/defendant.
- 2. Name, law firm, address, and telephone number of attorney submitting this fast track statement: CHRIS ARABIA, Law Offices of Chris Arabia, PC, 601 S. 10th St., Suite 107, Las Vegas, NV 89101, (702) 701-4391.
- 3. Name, law firm address, and telephone number of appellate counsel if different from trial counsel: N/A.
- 4. Pending and prior proceedings in this court. List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently or previously pending before this court which are related to this appeal (e.g., separate appeals by codefendants, appeal after post-conviction proceedings): none known.
 - 5. Legal argument, including authorities:

I. THE STATE CONCEDED THAT THE ALLEGED THIRD-PARTY CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS INVALID BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO BRIEF OR OTHERWISE RESPOND TO THE ISSUE; THUS, THE ALLEGED FRUITS OF THE SEARCH WERE PROPERLY DISALLOWED BY THE JUSTICE COURT AND THE DISCHARGE WAS PROPER

A respondent's failure to address an issue raised on appeal can be considered a confession of error. Polk v. State, 233 P.3d 357, 359-60 (Nev. 2010). An appellant's assertion of "significant constitutional issues ... compels a response" from the state. Id.

In the instant case, Moultrie asserted that the alleged third-party consent to search was invalid as applied to Moultrie's backpack because the police knew the backpack belonged to Moultrie, Moultrie indisputably never consented, and there was no evidence of apparent or actual authority of the third-party to consent. (Fast Track Statement, p. 13 lines 4-8, p. 13 line 4 through p. 15 line 25).

The state failed to address this issue in its response.

Based on <u>Polk</u>, the failure to respond to important constitutional arguments should be regarded as a confession of error, i.e. confession of a constitutional violation and concession that the Justice Court properly disallowed the fruits of the search stemming from the invalid third-party consent. *Therefore*, *the discharge at the preliminary hearing was proper and absolutely not an egregious error*.

II. THE DISCHARGE WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE STATE CHARGED 2ND OFFENSE POSSESSION WITH INTENT BUT OFFERED ZERO EVIDENCE OF A 1ST OFFENSE; THE STATE'S RESPONSE 1) FAILED TO MENTION THAT IT MADE NO EFFORT TO AMEND UNTIL AFTER CLOSING ARGUMENTS AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, AND 2) REPEATEDLY CITED THE LAW PERTAINING TO THE AMENDMENT OF INFORMATIONS, EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO INFORMATION IN EXISTENCE WHILE THE CASE WAS IN THE JUSTICE COURT

Regarding the punishment for the offense of Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Sell, NRS 453.337(2)(b) provides that a second offense shall be punished as a category C felony. The sole count of the criminal complaint alleged "Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Sell ... a category C felony" (i.e. a 2nd Offense). (AA 1). The Nevada Supreme Court has held with respect to the requirements at preliminary hearing in the non-status enhancement/priors context, "the State must substantiate the existence of the offenses at the preliminary hearing." Parsons v. State, 116 Nev. 928, 936, 10 P.3d 836, 841 (2000), cited in Hobbs v. State, 251 P.3d 177, 182 (2011).

Despite the law as elucidated in <u>Hobbs</u> and <u>Parsons</u>, the state offered nothing to substantiate the existence of the alleged prior offense at the preliminary hearing. Given that failure, the Justice Court properly declined to bind the case over based on the lack of even slight or marginal evidence of the necessary prior offense. *Under the circumstances of the instant case, the assertion of egregious error is preposterous*.

The state asserts that during the preliminary hearing, the state "moved to amend the complaint" to 1st Offense Possession with Intent to Sell "to conform to the evidence." (Fast Track Response, last sentence on page 2, AA 56). This seemingly innocuous assertion is misleading because it implies that this was a simple case of the state amending before submission and argument.

 During the preliminary hearing in the instant matter, the state rested its case with the statement, "the State has no further witnesses." (AA 52). Moultrie declined to put on a case, at which point the state declared its readiness to make a closing statement and then made the statement. (AA 52).

After the state completed its closing statement, Moultrie's counsel began his closing argument by stating, "All right. I'm going to ask for a discharge." (AA 54). Moultrie's counsel argued at length that the state's failure to introduce evidence of a 1st offense possession with intent to sell "would preclude a bindover" on a charge of 2nd offense possession with intent. (AA 55). [Emphasis added.]

At that point, the state had rested, the state had made its closing argument, and Moultrie had argued in his closing that the complete lack of substantiation of a 1st offense precluded a bindover on a 2nd offense. It was only then, after closing arguments, that the state sought to amend the complaint to a 1st offense and admitted, "I don't have any evidence of any priors." (AA 56). [Emphasis added.] The Justice Court then discharged Moultrie. (AA 56).

Both the state and the District Court rely on the inapplicable law governing the amendment of an information to buttress their arguments that the Justice Court should have permitted the amendment of the complaint after the closing arguments at the preliminary hearing. (Pages 7 and 8 of fast track response, AA 85-86).

The state and District Court have alleged that the Justice Court did something it could not possibly have done with respect to a document that could not possibly have existed – the information does not yet exist while the case is in the Justice Court.

The Justice Court's task in the instant case was to assess whether the state demonstrated that there was probable cause to believe that Moultrie committed the <u>charged</u> offense. NRS 171.206. The state failed to meet its burden, so the Justice Court discharged. (AA 56). <u>That is not an error</u>.

III. THE STATE INCORRECTLY ASSERTS THAT JUSTICE COURT EGREGIOUSLY ERRED BY EXCLUDING AS HEARSAY A PURPORTED STATEMENT OF CONSENT FOR THE POLICE OFFICER TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE; THE JUSTICE COURT ALLOWED THE OFFICER TO TESTIFY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED PERMISSION TO SEARCH

When Deputy Kirkland attempted to testify as to what the driver said in response to Kirkland's request to search the vehicle, Moultrie objected and the Court sustained. (AA 24). The State rephrased and Kirkland testified, "I asked Brandy's permission." (AA 25). [Emphasis added.]

Moultrie again objected and the Court ruled, "I'll allow that answer." (AA 25). [Emphasis added.] The state then asked Kirkland, "Did you in fact search the vehicle?" and Kirkland replied, "Yes, I did." (AA 25). Some additional argument about the propriety of the search ensued, and the Court indicated that it

had allowed the search of the vehicle but not necessarily the backpack of Moultrie's inside the vehicle:

MR. BRADSHAW: I've asked this witness whether he had permission to search the vehicle. That is not a hearsay issue because he's not quoting anybody. I'm simply asking him whether he obtained permission or had permission to search.

THE COURT: The vehicle.

MR. BRADSHAW: The vehicle.

THE COURT: **Now we're talking about a backpack.** (AA 28). [Emphasis added.]

Another subsequent exchange further suggests that the Justice Court's issue was not with the permission to search the vehicle but with whether there was permission to search the backpack:

MR. BRADSHAW: I'm not asking him to testify as to what somebody quoted that's not available for cross examination in the court today. I'm simply asking him about his actions, did he or did he not obtain or have permission to search the vehicle.

The propriety of the backpack search is discussed at pp. 13-15 of the Fast Track Statement; the state did not address the issue in its Response (**See** Part I of the instant Reply Brief from p. 1 ln. 21 through p. 2 ln. 23 for discussion of the state's confession of error through failure to address).

THE COURT: The vehicle only. We're now moved on to the backpack. Did he ask — it's your question but he needed permission to get in the backpack. That's not the vehicle so if you can get on to that, you can go forward.

(AA 30). [Emphasis added.]

The state never attempted to establish that the police had permission to search the backpack.

When the state asked Deputy Kirkland about what he found in the backpack, Moultrie's counsel stated, "I just want to make sure that my objection to all this is noted." (AA 31).

The Justice Court did <u>not</u> exclude as hearsay the state's testimony about permission to search the vehicle and in fact seems to have allowed it. (AA 25, 28, 30). Thus, there is no basis for the state's claim of egregious error stemming from a hearsay error by the Justice Court.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, in addition to the reasons elucidated in the fast track statement, this Honorable Court should reverse the District Court's granting of the motion for leave to file an information by affidavit.

VERIFICATION

I recognize that pursuant to N.R.A.P.3C I am responsible for filing a timely fast track appeal and/or reply and that the Supreme Court of Nevada may sanction an attorney for failing to file a timely fast tract appeal and/or reply, or failing to raise material issues or arguments in the fast track appeal and/or reply, or failing to cooperate fully with appellate counsel during the course of an appeal. I therefore certify that the information provided in this fast track reply is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

DATED this 19th day of September, 2014.

/s/

CHRIS ARABIA,Esq. Nevada Bar #9749 Law Offices of Chris Arabia, PC 601 S. 10th St., Suite 107 (702) 701-4391 Attorney for Appellant Moultrie

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

3	1. I hereby certify that this brief and/or reply complies with the formatting		
4	requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5), and		
5	the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because:		
6	[x] This brief had been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using		
7	Times New Roman font in14-point; or		
8	[] This brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using Corel		
10	WordPerfect X4 with 10 characters per inch, Courier New 12-point font.		
11	2. I further certify that this brief complies with the page- or type-volume		
12	limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted		
13	by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is either:		
14	[] Proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and contains		
15	words; or		
16	[] Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch, and contains		
17	words or lines of text; or		
18	[x] Does not exceed 5 pages, or has been submitted in conjunction with a		
19	motion for leave to file a reply in excess of 5 pages.		
20	3. Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the		
21	best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for		
22	any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable		
23	Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which		
25	requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be		
26	supported by appropriate references to the page and volume number, if any, of		
27			
28			

the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DATED this 19th day of September, 2014.

/s/ CHRIS ARABIA, Esq. Nevada Bar #9749

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA A F F I R M A T I O N – NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document, APPELLANT'S FAST TRACK STATEMENT filed in case number 65390 does **NOT** contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 19th day of September, 2014

/s/ CHRIS ARABIA, Esq. Nevada Bar #9749

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on September 19th, 2014. Electronic service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

Robert Glennen, District Attorney, Esmeralda County

I further certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing a true and correct copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to:

Esmeralda County DA P.O. 339 Goldfield, NV 89013

Matthew Moultrie 1701 Oak Tree Dr. Elko, NV

> /s/CHRIS ARABIA, Esq.