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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal brought by Appellant (hereafter "WESLEY") from post-divorce orders that, among other things, modified physical custody of the parties' minor child from joint physical custody to an award of primary physical custody to Respondent (hereafter "MARIA"). These orders also found WESLEY in contempt of court based upon his failure to comply with prior orders imposing financial obligations upon him and requiring him to take the minor child to tutoring classes. WESLEY's current child support obligation was increased to \$360.00 per month based upon his previously imputed gross monthly income and the modification of physical custody.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

- 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in modifying physical custody of the parties' minor child?
- 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in finding WESLEY in contempt of court?
- 3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in setting WESLEY's current child support obligation and in entering its orders relating to the minor child's participation in the Kumon tutoring classes?
- 4. Did the District Court display sufficient bias so as to taint the fairness

of the evidentiary hearing before it?

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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

WESLEY and MARIA are the parents of one minor child, to-wit: ISABELLA SARA LEWIS (hereafter "BELLA"), born August 10, 2006. The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree Of Divorce filed on July 15, 2011. (Record On Appeal [ROA] 81-96) The Decree awarded them joint legal and joint physical custody of BELLA, and imposed upon WESLEY a current child support obligation of \$440.00 per month less one-half of his monthly expense in maintaining health insurance to cover BELLA. (ROA 82)

On May 2, 2013 MARIA filed Plaintiff's Motion To Have Defendant Held In Contempt Of Court, To Enforce Decree Of Divorce, To Reduce Child Support Arrears To Judgment, And For Award Of Attorney Fees. (ROA 120-129) WESLEY, through counsel, responded with Defendant's Response And Countermotion For Attorney's Fees And Related Relief filed on May 28, 2013. (ROA 149-215) MARIA then filed Plaintiff's Reply To Defendant's Response And Countermotion For Attorney's Fee And Related Relief on May 31, 2013. (ROA 230 - 240)

At a hearing conducted on June 4, 2013 (ROA 926-927) the District Court scheduled an Evidentiary Hearing for August 29, 2013 on the issues raised by the parties. The Evidentiary Hearing was begun on August 29,

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2013 but then continued to October 8, 2013 to a courthouse power outage. (ROA 930-931). The Evidentiary Hearing was concluded on October 8, 2013, at which time the District Court took the matter under advisement. (ROA 932-933) On October 14, 2013 the District Court rendered its findings and orders in a detailed Minute Order. (ROA 934 - 939) and provided same to both counsel that day.

The findings and orders from the 2013 Evidentiary Hearing (in which WESLEY was represented throughout by counsel) were thereafter set forth in the Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order filed on December 27, 2013. (ROA 403-413). No appeal was taken therefrom.

The District Court at the conclusion of the 2013 Evidentiary Hearing determined that WESLEY's child support arrears from June 2011 through August 2013, exclusive of interest and penalties, were in the amount of \$9,012.38. (ROA 411) As for WESLEY's failure to obey the existing child support order, the District made the following orders (ROA 412):

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is held in contempt of court for his non-payment of child support as follows: In 2011, for June, July, August, September; In 2012, for January, May, June, July, September, October and November.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is sanctioned by the sum of \$500.00 for each of his eleven contempts set forth in the preceding paragraph for a total sanction of \$5,500.00. Said sum is reduced to judgment in favor of Plaintiff and may be collected by any and all lawful means. The Court is also

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imposing a 10 day jail sentence for each of the eleven contempts for a total sentence of 110 days. Said jail sentence is stayed, but will be imposed in the event that Defendant has any future missed payments to Plaintiff.

Based upon the evidence before it, including WESLEY's pay stubs, the District Court determined WESLEY to be wilfully underemployed and determined his imputed gross monthly income to be \$1,998.00 based upon a forty hour work week. (ROA 405) Based upon the joint physical custodial arrangement and MARIA's gross monthly income, WESLEY was ordered to pay \$91.00 per month as and for child support commencing October 2013, \$50.00 per month for his one-half of the monthly cost of MARIA maintaining health insurance for BELLA, and \$100.00 per month for child support arrears. (ROA 412)

The Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order, after finding that BELLA's continued tutoring with Kumon is in her best interest, ordered the parties to share equally in the cost of that tutoring and WESLEY was further ordered to take BELLA to her tutoring class on Mondays. (ROA 410) The District Court made the following further order regarding the tutoring:

... BELLA shall continue receive tutoring services until she is testing at or above grade level as tested by Kuman (or if Kuman does [sic] test, by the CRT's administered by the Clark County School District), or if Plaintiff and Defendant mutually decide to terminate the tutoring.

On March 19, 2014 MARIA filed her Motion To Modify Custody; To Enforce Order Of December 27, 2013 And An Award Of Attorney Fees. (ROA 532-631) In this motion MARIA sought a modification of custody so that she would be awarded primary physical custody of BELLA. In support of this request, MARIA alleged that WESLEY had failed to support efforts to improve BELLA's education; that WESLEY had failed to participate in BELLA's counseling despite her therapist's desire that he do so; that WESLEY had not properly tended to BELLA's health; and that WESLEY had failed and refused to co-parent with MARIA. (ROA 537-541)

MARIA's motion filed on March 19, 2014 also sought to enforce the financial obligations imposed upon WESLEY by the Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order filed December 27, 2013 through the District Court's contempt powers. The motion, and accompanying documentation, pointed out that WESLEY had not paid his one-half share of the cost of BELLA's tutoring, had not made timely child support payments, had not made the health insurance contribution payments, and had not made the mandated monthly payments on previously determined arrears. ROA 541-543)

Following the issuance of an Order To Show Cause filed on March 27, 2014 (ROA 633-634), WESLEY (although still with counsel of record) filed on April 24, 2014 a document entitled "Opposition To Motion To

Modify Custody; To Enforce Order Of December 27, 2013 And An Award Of Attorney's Fees And Countermotion For Fees; To Order Therapy For Plaintiff; To Hold Plaintiff In Contempt; And For Related Relief. (ROA 654-685)

A hearing was conducted on the motion calendar on May 1, 2014 with WESLEY represented in an unbundled capacity by his attorney of record who had represented in at during the 2013 proceedings. At that hearing the District Court scheduled an Evidentiary Hearing for July 29, 2014 and August 5, 2014 and made temporary custody modifications for the interim period. At the conclusion of the hearing, WESLEY's unbundled attorney of record was permitted to withdraw. (ROA 940-942). The District Court's temporary orders were thereafter set forth in an Order filed on June 16, 2014. (ROA 700-702)

The Evidentiary Hearing was in fact conducted on both July 29, 2014 and August 5, 2014, at the conclusion of which the District Court awarded MARIA primary physical custody of BELLA, modified the timeshare and entered orders relating thereto, modified WESLEY's current child support obligation based upon the new physical custody award, and found WESLEY in contempt of court. (ROA 943-947)

The District Court's orders were set forth in an Order filed on September 2, 2014 (ROA 889-893) and Supplemental Order filed on

September 4, 2014 (ROA 902-904). Following service of these orders, this appeal was commenced. (ROA 906)

ARGUMENT

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Modifying Physical Custody Of The Parties' Child

In Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 216 P.3d 213 (2009), this Court set forth the standard for reviewing custody orders as follows:

This court reviews the district court's decisions regarding custody, including visitation schedules, for an abuse of discretion. District courts have broad discretion in child custody matters, but substantial evidence must support the court's findings. Substantial evidence "is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment". (Citations omitted)

In the Replacement Opening Brief Of Appellant, WESLEY asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in modifying physical custody of BELLA by failing to apply the correct standard for such a custody modification and correspondingly failing to make the specific findings required by that standard. WESLEY argues on page 18 of his brief that, pursuant to *Ellis v. Carucci*, 123 Nev. 145, 161 P.3d 239 (2007), as follows:

A District Court may modify an order regarding primary physical custody "only when (1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification."

WESLEY argues that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to address any change in circumstances in support of its modification of physical custody. However, it is WESLEY not the District Court that is in error in terms of the proper standard to apply to a requested modification of physical custody in the case at bar.

This Court has distinguished cases in which a modification from a prior primary physical designation is being sought versus a modification from a prior joint physical custody designation is being sought. This was made clear by footnote 4 in *Rivero*, *supra*, where this Court stated as follows:

The court may modify *joint* physical custody if it is in the vest interest of the child. NRS 125.510(2); Potter v. Potter, 121 Nev. 613, 618, 119 P.3d 1246, 1249 (2005). However, to modify a primary physical custody arrangement, the court must find that it is in the best interest of the child and that there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 150, 161 P.3d at 242.

As noted earlier herein, the parties' 2011 Decree Of Divorce awarded them joint physical custody of BELLA. (ROA 82) MARIA's motion filed on March 19, 2014 sought a modification of that joint physical custody designation to an award to MARIA of primary physical custody. Accordingly, the District Court properly applied the "best interests" standard and WESLEY's argument to the contrary is without merit.

WESLEY also claims that the District Court's modification of physical custody was "based, in large part, upon Mr. Lewis' purported noncompliance with its orders." Had the District Court's award to MARIA of primary physical custody been based solely upon WESLEY's failure to comply with prior orders, clearly that would have been an abuse of discretion. Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 865 P.2d 328 (1993). However, a review of the record discloses that not to be the case.

WESLEY attempts to make much of the fact that the District Court's oral statement at the conclusion of the Evidentiary Hearing "twice" included references to WESLEY's disobedience of court orders. This is not surprising, nor does it taint the custody modification.

One of the issues before the District Court was the request that WESLEY be held in contempt of court for his failure to obey various provisions of the District Court's orders. Evidence was in fact propounded as to that issue, and WESLEY's failure to comply with those orders was proven. Therefore, in addressing the contempt of court issue it was entirely proper that the District Court make specific factual findings as to those failures.

In its oral statement setting forth its findings of fact supporting its modification of physical custody, the District Court addressed a number of instances of WESLEY's conduct that were contrary to BELLA's best

interest. WESLEY failed to permit or provide for communications between MARIA and BELLA when she was in WESLEY's care. (II. SUPP. APP. 363:9-21) WESLEY failed to consistently take BELLA to her tutoring, and indeed stopped doing so altogether in the Summer of 2014 because he did not want to drive so far. (II. SUPP. APP. 365:18 - 366:3) Despite being aware of BELLA's counseling and the therapist's desire that he become involved in same, WESLEY failed to participate in that counseling until he did so for appearance sake after the filing of MARIA's motion in March 2014. (II. SUPP. APP. 366: 21 - 367:5. WESLEY failed to attend to BELLA's medical needs when she was in his care. (II. SUPP. APP. 368:14 - 369:3).

The District Summarized the custodial findings (which in some instances also included violations of court orders) at II. SUPP. APP. 373:13 - 374:4 as follows:

You know, Mr. Lewis, in the space of ten months, you demonstrated to the Court by your own behavior in this – your own conduct, I should say, that it's in the best interest of the minor child that I change the custodial arrangement, from not paying your support to not taking her to Kumon, to ignoring her medical needs, to not making yourself available with a voicemail, to not following my Court orders, even so far as making sure your child's phone stay plugged in an charged so that Mom can have access to her, and to the tardies and the absentee record, especially the tardies and the absentee records. Those are

significant factors the Court looks at.

To the fact that you didn't participate in the child's mental health, that's significant to The Court, very, very significant. That you wait until March, and even then your dad is the one who calls and not you.

It is clear that WESLEY's argument that the District Court failed to use the proper standard for custody modification is without merit. The District Court's reciting of its factual findings as quoted immediately above similarly demonstrates WESLEY's arguments that the District Court based its change of circumstances on his violation of court orders and that the District failed to make specific findings necessary for a custody modification are similarly without merit. Accordingly, the modification of physical custody should be affirmed.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Finding Wesley In Contempt Of Court

In the Replacement Opening Brief Of Appellant, WESLEY argues that the District Court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt of court. This Court's jurisdiction to consider the contempt findings is not contested by MARIA since they are set forth in the custody orders appealed from by WESLEY. It should be noted, however, that WESLEY incorrectly adds that "the contempt Orders served as the basis of the attorney fee Order that is properly on appeal". The District Court did not award MARIA attorney fees in either of the two orders WESLEY is appealing from.

WESLEY seeks the vacating of the contempt orders on three separate grounds. He first asserts the Evidentiary Hearing was a criminal contempt proceeding rather than a civil contempt proceeding, and therefore his failure to have counsel violated his Sixth Amendment protections. WESLEY next argues that the contempt orders should be vacated because the District Court failed to determine his present ability to pay arrearages. Finally, it is argued that the order finding him in contempt for failing to take BELLA to her Kumon tutoring must be vacated because the order imposing such an obligation upon WESLEY "was too ambiguous". WESLEY's arguments will be addressed in the order in which they are presented.

WESLEY takes the position that since the District Court imposed a definite number of days sentence for each contempt (20 days, albeit stayed), each of these constitutes a "criminal contempt". Under that interpretation, WESLEY submits that his failure to have counsel during the Evidentiary Hearing was a violation of his Six Amendment rights.

It is respectfully submitted that the fact that a definite period of incarceration is imposed as a sentence for contempt does not necessarily constitute criminal contempt. Instead, it is the purpose of the sentence that is determinative. This was made clear by this Court in a case cited by WESLEY, *Warner v. Second Judicial District Court*, 111 Nev. 1379, 906 P.2d 707 (1995) by the following discussion:

The United States Supreme Court has further clarified the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, explaining that since a civil contempt sanction is designed to coerce the contemnor into complying with a court order, it must be conditional or indeterminate - that is, is must end if the contemnor complies. Hicks v. Fejock. 485 U.S. 624, 633, 108 S. Ct. 1423,1430, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988) In contract, a criminal contempt sanction is intended to punish the contemnor for disobeying a court order and, thus, must be determinate or unconditional. Such a sanction is not affected by any future action by the contemnor. Id, at 633-35, 108 S. Ct. at 1430-31.

In the case at bar, had each or even any of the 20 days sentences for contempt actually have been imposed and WESLEY incarcerated then this would clear have been a criminal contempt proceeding since the sanction would simply have been to punish him for disobeying a court order. However, in this instance all the sentences were stayed. Instead, the District Court advised WESLEY (II. SUPP. APP. 375:11-18) as follows:

For failing to bring the child to tutoring in Kumon – for failing to bring the child to tutoring on Mondays during your custodial time, I'm finding you in contempt and I'm sentencing you to twenty days, which is stayed.

For each of the missed payments, December, January, February, child support, I'm sentencing you to twenty days for each of those three missed payments, which are stayed, I'm not imposing them.

If there's any Court order in the future which you decide to ignore, and this comes back to me on an Order to Show Cause, I will impose jail on you. Do you understand that, Mr. Lewis?

By staying the imposition of the contempt sentences, it is clear that the District Court did not punish WESLEY. Instead, the stayed sentences

are intended to motivate or coerce WESLEY into complying with court orders in the future. For that reason, they constitute civil contempt sentences rather than criminal contempt sentences. WESLEY's decision not to have counsel at the Evidentiary Hearing did not violate his Six Amendment rights.

As indicated above, WESLEY also seeks to have the child support contempt findings vacated because "the District Court made no findings regarding an ability to pay". WESLEY's current child support obligation for the months that formed the basis of his contempt findings (December 2013, January 2014 and February 2014) was \$91.00 per month. (ROA 411). There was no suggestion that WESLEY lacked the ability to pay that child support.

Finally, WESLEY seeks to have the contempt finding related to his failure to take BELLA to Kumon tutoring vacated because the underlying order imposing such an obligation upon him was ambiguous since it directed him to "take BELLA to her Kuman [sic] Tutoring class on Mondays immediately after school." (ROA 410) WESLEY argues that he did not realize that the Kumon program was continuing during the summer months when school was not in session.

It is respectfully submitted that "immediately after school" simply referred to the time each Monday when BELLA was to be taken to her

tutoring class. This did not make the order ambiguous. Moreover, WESLEY's "summer months excuse" does not apply to the other instances in which he failed to take BELLA to her tutoring despite school being in session. (I. SUPP. APP. 153)

None of the three arguments WESLEY advances in an attempt to have one or all of the contempt findings vacated have merit. The uncontroverted evidence was that WESLEY in each instance violated a court order, and stayed sentences were imposed in an attempt to obtain compliance from him in the future.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Setting Wesley's Current Child Support Obligation Nor In Ordering Him To Pay On-Half Of Bella's Kumon Tutoring

The Replacement Opening Brief Of Appellant argues that the District Court abused its discretion in setting WESLEY's current child support obligation because ALLEGEDLY "no specific findings were made to justify the deviation from the statutory guidelines". This argument is faulty because the District Court's imposition of a current child support obligation of \$360.00 per month is not a deviation from the statutory guidelines.

In the Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order filed on December 27, 2013 following the 2013 Evidentiary Hearing, the District Court made a finding that WESLEY was wilfully underemployed.

Applying his hourly wage and commission percentage to a forty hour work

week, the District Court determined and made a finding that WESLEY's imputed gross monthly income for child support purposes is \$1,998.00. (ROA 403-413). Since there was no appeal from this order, this became the law of the case and no evidence was submitted at the 2014 Evidentiary Hearing to the contrary. With the award of primary physical custody to MARIA, applying the 18% multiple to this imputed income of \$1,998.00 yields a current child support obligation of \$360.00.

Alternatively, WESLEY argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to order him to continue to pay one-half of BELLA's Kumon tutoring cost because "the requirement that Mr. Lewis bring Bella to the Kumon programming and pay one half the cost of such programming, had already ended by the terms of the existing order."

The instances under which the Kumon tutoring would end are set forth within the Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order filed on December 27, 2013 (ROA 410: 8-14. None of these pre-conditions were were presented in the evidence as existing at the time of the Evidentiary Hearing. Therefore, this argument does not pass muster either.

The District Court Did Not Deprive Wesley Of A Fair Hearing

WESLEY argues that the record relating to this Evidentiary Hearing discloses such bias on the part of the District Court that he was deprived of a fair hearing. Such an argument ignores the fact that the District Court

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less than a year earlier had conducted an Evidentiary Hearing as to these parties in which it had found that WESLEY had failed to comply with his court ordered financial obligations, that he was wilfully underemployed, and that he had ignored many of his child's needs. The District Court had further made a finding that WESLEY had testified "on several issues where the Court found his credibility suspect, or that he was motivated to act in a manner that was contrary to the best interest of his minor child". (ROA 406)

Accordingly, when the 2014 Evidentiary Hearing commenced the District Court had a familiarity with the background facts and the parties. This does not, however, translate to improper bias and a tainting of the hearing. This Court is not unfamiliar with how trying an evidentiary hearing can be when a proper person litigant is involved, particularly one such as in this instance did not properly participate in pre-hearing discovery nor comply with the District Court's other pre-hearing orders.

WESLEY has pointed to instances in which the District Court was less than soothing in tone and ruled upon Objections that itself, in effect, had made. However, an examination of the Evidentiary Hearing transcript discloses the District Court at times taking the same approach with MARIA's counsel. Two points are most important. WESLEY is unable to point to any relevant evidence that he was not permitted to present.

WESLEY is unable to point to any finding that is not supported by evidence.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Respondent respectfully submits that the District Court orders appealed from by Appellant should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted on this / day of November, 2015, by:

The Fine & Price Law Group FRANCES-ANN FINE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 0025 Suite 5 8975 South Pecos Road Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 384-8900 Attorney for Respondent

MARIA DANIELA LEWIS

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Undersigned counsel hereby certifies that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word and a size 14 Times Regular font.

Undersigned counsel further certifies that this brief complies with the page or type-volume limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(c), it is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and contains 3,991 words.

Finally, undersigned counsel certifies that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, or the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity.

DATED this day of November, 2015.

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