1	IN THE SUPREME (COURT OF THE STATE	OF NEVADA	
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3	STEVE DELL MCNEILL,) No. 66697		
4	Appellant,)	Electronically Filed	
5	v.)	Electronically Filed Apr 30 2015 09:17 a.m Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Cour	
6)		
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)		
8	Respondent.)		
9	ADDELY ANTES ADD)	CIES 200 642	
10	APPELLANT'S APP	<u>PENDIX VOLUME III PA</u>	IGES 399-042	
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STEVE DELL McNEILL Case No. 66697

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1	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed 06/30/2014
2	Reporter's Transcript of Preliminary Hearing filed 06/06/2014
3	Return to Writ of Habeas Corpus filed 07/02/2014
4	Second Amended Information filed 07/09/2014
5	States' Exhibit 2 dated 07/08/14
6	State's Exhibit 3 dated 07/08/14612
7	State's Exhibit 4 dated 07/08/14
8	State's Exhibit 5 dated 07/08/14
9	State's Exhibit 6 dated 07/08/14
10	State's Exhibit 7 dated 07/08/14
11	State's Exhibit 8 dated 07/08/14
12	State's Exhibit 9 dated 07/08/14
13	State's Exhibit 10 dated 07/08/14
14	State's Exhibit 11 dated 07/09/14
15	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment Pursuant to NRS 176.525 or,
16	in the Alternative, Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [sic] Pursuant to NRS 176.323 of, 07/29/2014
17	State's Response to Defendant's Motion for Discovery filed 06/27/2014 102-110
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1	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing, Initial Arraignment
2	Date of Hrg; 05/07/2014
3	Reporter's Transcript, Calendar Call; Defendant's Motion for Discovery
4	Calendar Call; Defendant's Motion for Discovery Date of Hrg: 06/30/2014
5	Reporter's Transcript, Motion
6	Date of Hrg: 07/30/2014585-595
7	Reporter's Transcript, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
8	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Date of Hrg: 07/07/14
9	Reporter's Transcript, Sentencing
10	Date of Hrg: 09/10/2014596-608
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1	TRAN 12/22/2014 08:58:26 PM			
2	IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT			
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA CLERK OF THE COURT			
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5	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)			
6	Plaintiff,)			
7	vs.) CASE NO.			
8) C-14-297725-1 STEVE DELL McNEIL,)			
9) DEPT. NO. XXV Defendant.)			
10	}			
11				
12				
13	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS			
14	(ROUGH DRAFT)			
	JURY TRIAL			
15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN E. DELANEY			
16	WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 2014			
17				
18	APPEARANCES:			
19	For the State: JONATHAN COOPER,			
20	DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY			
21				
22	For the Defendants: NADIA HOJJAT, XIOMARA FERRERA-BONAVENTURE,			
23	DEPUTIES PUBLIC DEFENDER			
24				
25	REPORTED BY: DANA J. TAVAGLIONE, RPR, CCR NO. 841			

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1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 2014 2 3 4 THE COURT: Okay. First of all, let's get 5 appearances of counsel so that my court reporter has 6 all the names. 7 MR. COOPER: Jonathan Cooper on behalf of 8 the State. 9 MS. FERRERA: Xiomara Ferrera and Nadia 10 Hojjat for the defense. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Do you need any 12 spellings, or can you get those? 13 THE REPORTER: I've got everything, 14 Your Honor. Thank you. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Great. 16 All right. Sorry. Go ahead, Ms. Hojjat. 17 MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, when the 18 defense submitted proposed jury instructions last 19 night to Your Honor via e-mail, I did include a 20 bench memorandum in support of certain instructions. 21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 MS. HOJJAT: I do have a copy, a hardcopy 23 here today, that I wanted to file just so that the record is clear on precisely what it was the defense 24 25 has submitted to the Court to consider. The copy I

sent to the Court last night didn't have the filing 1 page on it. 2 3 It didn't have the caption, THE COURT: right. 4 5 MS. HOJJAT: It didn't have a caption or anything like that, but the text of the document is 6 the same. If I can approach the clerk and --7 8 THE COURT: That's fine. We'll go ahead and do it that way. As I said, I wasn't sure if you 9 10 wanted to do it that way or if you wanted to make 11 your memo a Court's exhibit because once we settle 12 instructions; but I think it is better to be filed. 13 And then of course, we'll have a filing of any 14 instructions that were proposed by either side that weren't given with their own caption. 15 16 But go ahead and approach. MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, if I can approach. 17 18 THE COURT: Give that to the clerk. 19 MS. HOJJAT: Thank you very much. 20 THE COURT: I also want to note, for the 21 record, that I do have now a file-stamped copy of 22 the Second Amended Information reflecting the 23 changes that we had approved, discussed, and I guess 24 mandated from our discussion yesterday. And that language will, of course, be reflected in the 25

instructions.

My intention is to complete the State's case, and what we may do is we may wait to -- we may break the jury then, and we may wait to come back to ask the Defense so we can canvass Mr. McNeil and ultimately ask if the Defense rests before we proceed, rather than doing it now because I won't have time.

I don't want to do the last witness, move the jury out, canvass Mr. McNeil, move the jury back in, then say we're resting for a couple of hours and then send them back out again. So if it works to do it that way, I think that's the best way to go. But so what we'll do is as soon as we --

THE COOPER: It's working.

THE COURT: As soon as the Defense rests, then we will move right into settling the jury instructions. And it is my intent right now because it's hard for me to predict how long we're going to have to argue, and then of course I need time to pull the final version together.

I'm intending to possibly to break the jury, depending on when we finish, until about 2:00 o'clock. So but we may go later to the lunch hour to finish what we need to do. So we might get

an hour to an hour and a half a lunch, but depending 1 2 on the time frame. But I just need that extra time. 3 MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, I think there 4 might be just --5 THE COURT: Well, I have one outstanding 6 issue too, but I wanted to see if anybody had any 7 questions about the schedule or anything like that. MR. COOPER: Not for the schedule, 9 Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: All right. I had the 11 outstanding of the issue of the mistrial request 12 that was made yesterday. 13 Is there anything else though before we address that? 14 MR. COOPER: There is, Your Honor. 15 I don't 16 know if you want them to go first or you want me to go first. 17 THE COURT: Things that you all have or 18 19 something related from yesterday? MR. COOPER: No, for the mistrial. 20 thought we were -- I'm sorry. 21 22 MS. HOJJAT: I thought we had already 23 submitted arguments, and the Court was -we did. 24 THE COURT: 25 MS. HOJJAT: Yeah.

1 No, I wasn't asking for THE COURT: 2 argument. I was just saying that's the issue that I 3 have outstanding to put in the record as my 4 determination. But I did indicate last night that, 5 you know, as the dust settled and as we all went 6 home and it was quite late, if anybody wanted to say 7 anything else, you would be welcome --8 MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor, 9 THE COURT: -- to do so. 10 MR. COOPER: And my understanding was I was 11 also able to look for cases, if anything was --12 THE COURT: I opened the door to either side if they wanted to add anything to the record. 13 14 MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, I would just 15 show that it was -- the actual case name is G-E-I-G-E-R -- so I just didn't want to butcher 16 17 it -- vs. State, 112 Nevada 3- -- 938. 18 And essentially, in this case, the 19 defendant was asking for a mistrial, and basically 20 the facts are important because he was 21 subsequently -- he was charged with a residential burglary in a case, and through an error of the 22 court clerk, they read to the jury that he had 23

previously been convicted of a burglary. And the

Supreme Court said that that was not enough for a

24

25

mistrial.

So in a case where somebody is convicted of a burglary, the jury finding out that they have previously been convicted -- I'm sorry. In a case where someone is charged with a burglary and the jury finding out that they have previously been convicted of a burglary, even that was not enough just to be a mistrial. The Court goes through the limiting instruction that they can give, and that was given in that case, and that was sufficient. And I think that's akin to this case but to a far more severe degree.

In this case, the jury would already know he's a sex offender; in this case, the jury already knew that he was on lifetime supervision; and quite candidly, the jury already knew that the parole board -- not probation, but the parole board, which only supervises people after they're released from prison -- was involved in this case.

So I mean, these issues that the jury had no idea what's going on and we can sanitize this any more than we already have, I think they're far left field, and I don't think they're appropriate. I think we have sanitized it. And at least in that case -- we've got far more than what's happening in

that case, and the error in that case was far more egregious than anything that happened in our case.

5

THE COURT: That case, it was not one of the ones that I looked, so I don't know if -- because several of the cases that I looked at certainly did have one of the reasons why the Court seemed to find harmlessness to the error was because it was a postconviction proceeding; they were able to look at the entire record and they were able to see that there was an overwhelming evidence of guilt in some of those cases.

I tend to, from my review, discount those types of cases and look more squarely at the types of cases where they were just addressing the Court's exercise of discretion. The cases that I all saw found other circumstances that I find to be more egregious than what we have in this case, also to not have warranted mistrial or at least the Supreme Court to confirm the District Court's denial of a mistrial.

One thing that you didn't answer though,
Mr. Cooper, and I'm not expecting a case
necessarily, but do you want to address part of the
argument yesterday from Ms. Hojjat was we're talking
about a cumulative effect now because we have, of

the State's two witnesses, each one saying something that should not have been said.

I don't interpret anything that was said by Officer Mangan as being intentional or a desire to inform the jury that Mr. McNeil had been previously incarcerated. It clearly came about as a result of a dispute about the documents and whether the documents would be allowed and a desire for additional foundation of the circumstances, a desire by the Court primarily, for additional foundation of why there would be several copies.

And we already knew going in that one of those copies was signed while he was incarcerated, and I found that her utterance of this was someone who was incarcerated was inadvertent, and of course that was immediately addressed with a curative instruction.

And the second then incident involved the final witness from the State of the day, and that was a general reference to the severity of the nature of a crime that would warrant lifetime supervision. And some additional dialogue that was a more extensive statement related to that, was not related directly to the defendant's case; but by the way of the conversation was being had, it would have

to be interpreted, since he is on lifetime supervision, that he falls into this category of the 23 worst, or however it was worded. So it's, in part, that standalone. But it's also, in part, to those two things taken together.

Did you want to address the potential for cumulative effect?

MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor. I still think the cumulative affect, I'm taking both of those as a -- together. I think when the Supreme Court, they look at these cases, they try to obviously see what was going on in the trial at the time, obviously, and that's hard to do based on the record.

So I mean, it's important to take into context how both those things happened. Neither one of those statements was a standalone. The witness looks over and says, "He was in prison" or "He's one of the 23 most worst." Both those statements happen in kind of a -- in kind of an already they were -- they were already speaking some other things, and that happened as well.

But when I actually heard that, I looked over to the jury, and I didn't see any of the jurors looking up in disbelief or they're extremely

shocked, like, "Oh, my God. I can't believe this happened" or "he's the worst of the worst." I mean, just the facts remain that we've sanitized this case as much as we possibly can, and the issue that comes is that -- I mean, there's nothing more we can do.

It's the fact that he is on lifetime supervision. It's the fact that he is one of the 23 worst. I mean, every sex offender is not put on lifetime supervision. And it's clear by the testimony, without anyone explicitly saying it, there are sex offenders that have lifetime supervision and there's sex offenders that don't have lifetime supervision, regardless of if it's 50 crimes or 100 crimes or whatever it is that actually requires lifetime supervision versus not lifetime supervision.

I mean, that's something that we can't sanitize against. It's going to be out there, and I don't think anything either witness said was obviously meant to the prejudice the defendant; nor do I think it did prejudice the defendant. And especially taken in a cumulative effect, it was nowhere near as egregious as saying, "This guy has been previously been convicted of a burglary" during a burglary trial.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Hojjat.

MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, I think I made most of my arguments yesterday to the Court.

I'll just briefly address the State's argument and the Court's inquiry.

when we say the "cumulative effect," what we're talking about is this is an issue that was decided before trial started. This was an issue that things that were going to come in were sex offender subject to lifetime supervision. At that point, the State has an obligation to admonish their witnesses.

when they know that all that is supposed to come in is sex offender on lifetime supervision. Yet two State's witnesses got up, one right after the other, and say things that they should have been admonished not to say. The State has the burden of controlling their witnesses, and that is in the case law.

The State has the burden of admonishing of them the things that could potentially come out that are not supposed to come out. Two witnesses in a row and both going to the same topic. Certainly after the first witness slipped up on it, the second witness should have been especially admonished on it. But no such admonishment occurred, and the second witness got up there and said the same thing.

So I would argue that this is not analogous to the situation where a clerk of the court accidentally read something. This is a situation where they should have been admonished ahead of time. When the first accident happened, there should have been special care taken care before the second witness got on the stand. And indeed, your Honor inquired of the district attorney, "Are you ready with the next witness? Do you need time to admonish."

So the situations are not analogous, and we are arguing there is a cumulative effect here. And it's not just two prejudicial facts. They are two prejudicial facts having to do with the same prejudicial overall thing that the Court has ruled the jury is not supposed to know about. They get to know he's a sex offender. They get to know he's on lifetime supervision.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

And some of the other cases that I looked at, and I don't have a case name to provide now, but there is some body of law from our Supreme Court

that also goes into its analysis in terms of determining whether when the Court, if the Court denies a mistrial request, whether the abuse of discretion exists.

And the Court will look at, you know, again, the specific circumstances surrounding what the incident was but also something that I kind of touched upon yesterday, which is that the nature of the charge in this case and the history of the individual. It's already understood -- and they'll look at what, you know, the jurors might have already had known to them or presupposed, that they were presupposing.

And in this particular case, again, we have a circumstance where we have an individual who was charged with a violation, violation of lifetime supervision by a convicted sex offender. We did note that the stipulation was too that there was -- that he is a convicted sex offender, a convicted felon, and on lifetime supervision.

we have sanitized, at this point, to remove what was the primary concern -- at that time, anyway -- of the prior, other underlying charge, attempt lewdness with a child under the age of 14, to avoid any of those potential biases that that

could engender with the jury.

But at the end of the day, this jury is aware that this is a convicted sex offender; the jury is aware that this individual is on lifetime supervision. It has to be, on some level, understood by the jury that there was incarceration, at some point in time and that it -- you don't get the designation of needing the lifetime supervision without it being somewhat serious.

But we have avoided any reference to the charge itself, which is again I think the primary concern. I do not find that there is a cumulative effect here that would so prejudice this jury or prejudice the potential outcome of this trial that, again, it would serve to be a manifest injustice for the defendant or to this case, and I'm going to deny the mistrial.

I am, however, going to give a curative instruction similar to the one that I gave yesterday. You don't wish us to do that?

MS. FERRERA: No, Your Honor. We don't wish any more attention to be brought to that statement. So we would not want the --

THE COURT: Well, I don't want to -- I
guess I'm going to respectfully disagree. I'm not

1 going to bring attention to the statement in any way 2 to say, you know, such and such said X and now 3 disregard X. I do, however, want to --And I should have been more clear. I 4 That the nature of the curative 5 apologize. 6 instruction that I want to give is to remind them 7 again that this case is about whether or not this defendant violated his -- you know, is guilty of the 8 9 violation of lifetime supervision by a convicted 10 sex offender and that nothing about how he became a sex offender on lifetime supervision is -- you know, 11 up to this point -- is relevant to those charges. 12 13 It's simply what is the quantum of proof; do they meet their burden beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 It's something along those lines. 15 16 MS. HOJJAT: Right. THE COURT: So I wasn't necessarily going 17 to intend to do it. But I thought it would behoove 18 19 us to remind them again that how we got here is not relevant to these charges. 20 21 MS. FERRERA: That would be great, 22 Thank you. Your Honor. 23 MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: That's something that was -- I 25 think we need to do.

MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I guess the only issue that State would have -- I know we're trying to get the jury in -- but my next witness was a counselor for this defendant, and I know she can't obviously go into any of the reason -- any of the, I guess, the legal opinions as to his likelihood to reoffend or anything like that.

But one of the concerns I had, and I wanted to bring it to the Court's attention before I put her on, because I don't want another mistrial argument, is that the defendant did make statements to her in open group that resulted in part of the reason why he was terminated.

obviously, she's able to talk about what statements he made to her. And I just want to make sure that I'm okay going down that road because they are statements from a defendant, and those statements were a basis of the reason he was terminated.

THE COURT: And can you be more specific as to what they are?

MR. COOPER: Your Honor, yes. So I guess, in generally, there's a group of sex offenders who are doing counseling. One sex offender says, "I was grooming my victim for two months." And then the

defendant yells out, "Well, you must not have did a 1 good job because she told." 2 THE DEFENDANT: That's all hearsay. 3 MR. COOPER: Your Honor --4 THE COURT: Your counsel is very capable, 5 Mr. McNeil. 6 MR. COOPER: Obviously, Your Honor, that 7 goes directly to the fact that he was showing no 8 progress. 9 THE COURT: And with all due respect, it's 10 the Court's determination what's hearsay and what 11 isn't. 12 MR. COOPER: That was going directly to the 13 fact that he had little to no progress; his attitude 14 at the time, and that's relevant. I mean, it comes 15 in obviously as defendant's statement. There's no 16 reason to keep it out. 17 I was just making sure the Court was aware 18 of that, because I know I'm going to get "object." 19 I know they're going to say, "Hey, I want a mistrial 20 now because they weren't supposed to say that." So 21 I just want to make sure the Court's -- I wanted the 22 Court's ruling before that came out. 23 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Cooper, do me a 24 favor. Let's try to change tactics today. 25

MR. COOPER: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Between both sides' counsels, you know, let's leave the editorializing out about what we think each counsel might do. Okay. Here's the deal: If they ask for a mistrial, they're going to ask for a mistrial because they think that somebody has said something that warrants it, and you have two witnesses that got up here and said something that they shouldn't have said.

MR. COOPER: I agree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I've already denied the mistrial, but let's save it that there's going to be, oh, another mistrial request, like somehow they're rationing this out because they're not. So what I want to make sure is your witness doesn't get up here and say anything that she's not supposed to say.

MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And what we're not going to do
to this jury what I've tried mightily to avoid is
turning this case into, you know, "We don't like
this gentleman because we don't like what he said;
we don't like what he did; we don't like that he's
on food stamps; we don't like that he's" -- you
know, I can't ultimately control what's in the minds

of the jury.

be --

But what I can do is remind them again that their job is to determine whether the State has met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he didn't comply with the conditions. All she has to testify to is that he was terminated from the treatment and the basis for that termination.

She doesn't have to go into the details of things that he said that are going to be considered to be potentially inflammatory. I do find that a statement like that, the substantial prejudice would outweigh any relevancy to the fact that he wasn't making progress and that he got terminated. So I am absolutely going to preclude that kind of thing.

maybe we need to have the doctor in here just to discuss and admonish in terms of what the scope --

MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- of the questioning should

MR. COOPER: And so I just want to make sure I understand. So are -- is it a blanket ruling that none of his previous statements come out, or --

THE COURT: I don't know what his previous statements are, but maybe, depending on if they're

going to be things like that.

MR. COOPER: And that's the problem,
Your Honor, because I can give you -- the only other
issue I know of or the only other statement would be
there was a situation where he became very
aggressive, and that is one of the reasons he was
terminated.

And the reason he was very aggressive was because it was a situation, again in group, where the counselor says, "You shouldn't be able -- you shouldn't date anyone with children"; and then he got really mad, saying that, "what do you mean? I can't have a normal life? What do you mean I can't be around children?" Blah-blah-blah, and I'm not going to ask her to go down the road of why he can't he be around children.

THE COURT: Mr. Cooper, here's the part that I think that we're losing the focus on. One of the underpinnings to his alleged violation of lifetime supervision was that he was -- he didn't complete his counseling and was terminated from counseling.

MR. COOPER: Terminated, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The exact wording was that he was terminated. The only testimony we need from

this doctor is that he was terminated from 1 counseling. 2 MR. COOPER: Yes. Your Honor, 3 THE COURT: And I have no problem with, and I think it is appropriate for her to give some basis 5 for why he was -- if she made the determination to 6 terminate him, why did she terminate it. But going 7 further into all of his behaviors at the time, I 8 mean, that's not relevant; and that is absolutely 9 maybe not intended, but it sounds like intended, but 10 certainly will inflame this jury to perhaps be 11 biased in terms of how they reach a verdict, and I 12 don't want that. 13 MR. COOPER: And I apologize, Your Honor. 14 It's definitely not intended. That's why I wanted 15 to bring it to the Court's attention first. 16 THE COURT: Well, I'm glad you did. 17 MR. COOPER: So I didn't want to do it and 18 then there be issues. 19 THE COURT: But I guess I'm trying to 20 understand why you would even want to have the 21 22 inquiry go into that level of detail of things that he said and did in groups just because they happen 23 24 to be some of the things that she weighed to terminate, when the relevant information is he 25

terminated, and he terminated for legitimate reasons.

1.

I mean, that's one of the reasons why I'm not just letting her get up there and say, "Here's my form and yes, I checked these boxes." I mean, she's able to say that he needed to be terminated and that it was legitimate. Because we already got an argument happening here that, you know, there was bias with the officer and that's why he, you know, he's -- things are happening.

There has to be able to be the ability for this witness to testify that she legitimately terminated him. But she doesn't have to go into the details of those circumstances.

MR. COOPER: That's fine with the State,

Your Honor. I just want to make sure I'm clear. Is

that -- is it okay if she just says, "Statements he

made showed he made little-to-no progress." It

doesn't talk about the statements, but she does need

to actually --

THE COURT: Generally, his behaviors and his statements and without her saying what they are, absolutely she's able to do that.

MR. COOPER: That's fine, Your Honor. I would just need to make sure I re-admonish my

witness. 1 THE COURT: No, I'm going to have her come 2 in here, and we're going to talk to her all 3 together. 4 MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor. 5 Let's have her come in now and THE COURT: 6 do that. 7 MR. COOPER: Do you want her --8 THE COURT: What do you anticipate your 9 examination time with this witness? 10 11 MR. COOPER: Ten. THE COURT: Fairly quick. 12 MR. COOPER: Ten minutes, yeah, I mean. 13 Just trying to gauge again in THE COURT: 14 terms of how long we might be into lunch hour to 15 settle the instructions. We do need to be as quick 16 as possible in settling instructions, folks, because 17 I need to get them done and I need to get the jury 18 back in here. So, you know, we just -- we'll figure 19 it out. We'll make it work. 20 what's the doctor -- what's her last name 21 again, "Lee"? 22 MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor. Marcia Lee. 23 THE COURT: Marcia Lee. And I'm sorry. 24 say "doctor" because I kind of tend to use that 25

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terminology for everybody. But is she a doctor?
1
              MR. COOPER: No. I think she's a licensed
2
     therapist.
3
              THE COURT: She's a licensed LCSW or an
4
     MFT?
5
              MR. COOPER: LFT -- MET.
6
              THE COURT: MFT, marriage and family
7
     therapist, okay.
8
              MS. FERRERA: So she's not a doctor.
9
              THE COURT: I don't think --
10
              MS. FERRERA: Okay.
11
              THE COURT: Most counselors are not
12
     doctors. But like I said, I tend to use that
13
     terminology. I don't want to slip and use that
14
     terminology.
15
              MS. FERRERA: And my only concern is that,
16
     at this point, Your Honor, if she is referred to as
17
     "doctor" --
18
              THE COURT: I Won't.
19
              MS. FERRERA: -- then she gets into expert
20
21
     testimony.
              THE COURT: Ms. Lee, come on up if you can,
22
     please. Just be easier to have you sit here, kind
23
     of get familiar with how all this works. When you
24
     come in later, you're going to kind of come up
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there, and we'll have you stand when you first come in, when the jury is present, raise your hand and get sworn. But you don't have to do that right now.

we're bringing you in in advance because there has been a lot of discussion amongst counsel and requests made to the Court for what the proper scope of your testimony will be, and I wanted to sort of give you some basic admonishments, for lack of a better word, of what is and is not appropriate to discuss.

As we know, the charges against Mr. McNeil are for violation of lifetime supervision by a convicted sex offender and prohibited acts by a sex offender, and your testimony, relevancy goes to that first charge because one of the bases upon which he's been charged with violation is that he was terminated from counseling.

So there has been some discussion about how much information can be given. Certainly the fact that he terminated, certainly the basis upon which he terminated, and the determination was made to terminate him is fine.

But what we cannot have happen with this jury is the kind of sort of details of what was said or what was done in the group setting or in the

individual settings that would cause the jury perhaps to become biased against him just because of that behavior. The determination needs to be made on whether or not he violated his conditions, which is the termination.

I have not told the counsel that he needs to limit his questioning of you or your answers to him to just "yes, he terminated" and "Yes, these are the boxes I checked on the form." But we have removed from the form any references to your belief of what his future propensities are or propensity to reoffend. That cannot be testified to. I believe you've probably already been admonished as to that.

But what we also want to avoid, even though you can explain that there were -- that he said things or did things in the treatment that caused you to believe that he was, as you checked the box, making little or no progress, however you're going to testify to that.

But what we cannot have and what we will not allow is the specifics of what he said or what he did in group or treatment to come into the testimony.

Is that clear enough to you to be able to answer the questions?

Did counsel -- obviously, I'm going to give 1 him some leeway to lead, if necessary. But, again, 2 we want the jury to make its determination on 3 whether this defendant is guilty based on the 4 elements and the underlying details. The Court has determined that those would 6 be substantially prejudicial and outweigh the 7 relevance of that testimony, so which is why we're 8 precluding the details of the statements made or the actions taken in group or individual. 10 MS. LEE: Which is why he was terminated, 11 part of why, a large part of why he was terminated. 12 THE COURT: understood. 13 MS. LEE: Okay. 14 THE COURT: But is it impossible for you to 15 say, "The defendant said things that caused me to 16 terminate him" versus "This is what the defendant 17 said." 18 Do you understand the difference? 19 MS. LEE: Yeah, I get the difference. 20 I appreciate it, and I THE COURT: 21 appreciate your desire perhaps to want to say more. 22 But what I'm going to do, as the gatekeeper of this 23 trial, is do my very best to ensure that when the 24 jury renders its verdict, it is rendering its

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verdict only on the information that is necessary to render its verdict on and not on other things that would tend to potentially cause them to render their verdict on something that is based on bias or other impermissible reasons.

I don't have a choice here. So I very much appreciate your job and what you do. But I also appreciate your understanding of that there are certain pieces of evidence that are relevant, and then there are certain pieces of evidence that, although they are relevant, are too prejudicial to the trial to be able to come in.

MS. LEE: Okay.

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THE COURT: Okay. I very much appreciate taking the time and having the opportunity to speak with you about that. As soon as we can have you re-exit, then we'll bring the jury in and call you back in. Okay?

MS. LEE: Okay.

MR. COOPER: And, your Honor, it might just be easier if she just goes in the witness room right there.

THE COURT: Yeah, of course. That's what I assumed she would do, or she can even have a seat.

Bring the jury in, so just if you would like to --

My PowerPoint is still on the 1 MR. COOPER: screen, so I think we should take that off before 2 the jury gets here. 4 THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. THE COURT: I don't control that. I'm not sure how to do this. THE REPORTER: 6 THE COURT: Jonathan will show you. Are you going to need to use the Elmo with 8 this witness? 9 10 MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, if you are, let's get it 11 all ready to go. And then, again, this is a 12 13 different reporter. So we're not perhaps as well versed in the moving back and forth, so. 14 MS. HOJJAT: Judge, I apologize. 15 I iust 16 want to make sure I don't open any doors during So can I just kind of make a proffer. 17 cross. THE REPORTER: I'm sorry, Your Honor. 18 19 THE COURT: Hold on a second. Yes, Susan -- I mean, Dana. Sorry. 20 THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. I couldn't do 21 both at the same time with the deputy -- I can't 22 23 report. 24 THE COURT: Understood. We're waiting. Thank you. 25 THE REPORTER:

MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, I just want to make sure I don't open any doors on cross-examination. So I just kind of wanted to make a proffer to the Court and make sure the Court was okay with a specific question I was going to ask in terms of not opening any doors.

THE COURT: Well, the witness is still in the courtroom. Are you sure you want to do it while she's sitting there? Can --

I'm sorry. Ms. Lee, can you step into the anteroom.

MS. HOJJAT: I apologize, Your Honor.

And it's directly testimony, an answer that she gave on direct in, at the preliminary hearing was he was terminated because he was disruptive; and when she was asked how he was disruptive, she said, "He'd argue with everybody and wouldn't accept feedback."

And so I kind of wanted to just cross her on that. I just want to make sure that going into that doesn't open the door to how else was he disruptive and us going down that path.

THE COURT: well, I mean, at the end of the day, as I've said, I think we can have testimony with regard to that he did things and said things

without exactly what those things were that he did 1 2 and exactly what those things were that he said. However, if you do ask questions that open 3 4 the door and she gives the answer, you know, I've already admonished her. I mean, basically, I 5 probably went too far in the admonishments, but I 6 did -- I wanted to make sure the witness was 7 understanding what I was trying to say. 8 9 But, you know, tread lightly here. It goes both ways. 10 11 MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. So we'll see. 12 THE COURT: 13 MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. 14 15 All right. Let's have the jury. 16 (The following proceedings were held in the 17 presence of the jury:) THE COURT: You can, of course, take your 18 seats as you reach them. Just a quick reminder to 19 20 make sure your cell phones are off or silenced, 21 please. 22 Go ahead. Everybody can have a seat as 23 well. Thank you, ladies and 24 All right. 25 gentlemen. Resuming the trial on the matter of the

State of Nevada vs. Steven Dell McNeil.

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I do have one matter that I have to address with the court -- or address with the jury before we get started. I just, I want to admonish or remind the jurors, based on the testimony that was given yesterday with both witnesses but additionally with the last witness of the day, to remind the jury that any information that goes to the history, shall we say, of this defendant in terms of how he became a convicted sex offender or the fact that he is in fact on lifetime supervision is not relevant to this trial.

what is relevant to this trial is that, in fact, those facts have been stipulated to; he is a convicted sex offender and he's on lifetime supervision. The issue is that what he's been charged with, violation of lifetime supervision and prohibited acts, and whether or not you find from the evidence and that the law, as we will instruct you later today, that he is in fact guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, to those charges. That is the only relevant information.

so I instruct you generally to disregard any information that may lead to discussion and certainly to direct you to not have and allow it to

enter into your deliberations or be part of your 1 deliberations in any way the underlying matters that 2 brought us to the point where these charges were 3 brought. 4 Okay. So with that general admonishment, I 5 think we can proceed, and I would ask now for the 6 State to call their next witness. 7 MR. COOPER: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 And, Your Honor, the State's next witness 9 is Marcia Lee. 10 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Lee. 11 Thank you, Ms. Lee. If you'll just come 12 all the way through up to the chair and remain 13 standing by the chair, then my clerk here to the 14 left will swear you in. 15 (witness sworn.) 16 THE WITNESS: I do. 17 THE CLERK: Please be seated. 18 THE COURT: Go ahead. 19 THE CLERK: Will you please state your name 20 and spell it, for the record. 21 Marcia Lee. Spelled THE WITNESS: 22 M-A-R-C-I-A L-E-E. 23 THE CLERK: Thank you. 24 Thank you, Ms. Lee. THE COURT: 25

Before Mr. Cooper gets started, I just 1 wanted to make sure is your monitor there on the 2 desk on, can you tell? 3 THE WITNESS: Yeah, appears to be. 4 think. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 6 Go ahead, Mr. Cooper. 7 MR. COOPER: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 9 10 Thereupon --11 MARCÍA LEE, having been first duly sworn to testify to the 12 truth, was examined and testified as follows: 13 14 DIRECT EXAMINATION 15 16 BY MR. COOPER: Ms. Lee, what's your current occupation? 17 0. I'm a licensed marriage and family 18 Α. therapist. 19 And based on that occupation, what are some 20 of the ordinary course of things you do on a daily 21 basis? 22 I see people for all kinds of issues, for 23 depression and adjustment disorders and that sort of 24 But I'm also a referral source for Parole 25 thing.

and Probation for working with adult sex offenders. 1 2 And do you recognize anyone in court here Q. today that you worked with as a sex offender? 3 I do. Α. Can you please point at that person and Q. 6 describe something he's wearing. It's Mr. McNeil, and he's sitting with a 7 8 tan shirt and a plaid tie. MR. COOPER: And may the record reflect the 9 witness has identified the defendant. 10 11 THE COURT: The record will so reflect. 12 Thank you. 13 BY MR. COOPER: 14 When was the first time you came in contact ο. with Mr. McNeil? 15 16 Α. He began treatment with me in March of 17 2008. 18 And, generally, what does sex offender Q. treatment entail? 19 well, it entails several parts. My program 20 addresses both objective and subjective measures, 21 22 which means we do some testing. We also do subjectively best in our clinical experience with 23 24 working with people who have sex offenses. 25 We also have -- we have three different

steps that we do. One is a psycho-ed portion, at 1 which point they take a sexual history, do a sexual 2 history; take a sexual history polygraph. They move 3 on from that to a group where they do some specific 4 homework, and then they do a maintenance group to 5 finish up. 6 Is the homework and the polygraph, is that 7 Q. the objective portion? 8 Yes. 9 Α. And was the defendant ever terminated in the 10 0. objective portion? 11 He was not. 12 Α. 13 Now, you said after that, you go on and you Q. do some group stuff as well? 14 We do, uh-huh. **1**5 Α. 16 Q. well, let me ask you this. How long have you been, I guess, a sex offender counselor? 17 I've been doing this for about 20 years. 18 Α. And at some point during the subjective part 19 Q. of the counseling, was the defendant subsequently 20 terminated? 21 22 Α. He was. And did you do something called a 23 Q. Termination Summary as a result of that? 24

I did.

Α.

25

1 MR. COOPER: Permission to approach the 2 witness, Your Honor. THE COURT: You may. 4 BY MR. COOPER: And I'm now showing you what's been 5 Q. previously marked as State's Proposed Exhibit 11. 6 Do you recognize that? I do. Α. And what is that? 9 Ο. 10 It is just a form that I use for a Α. 11. Termination Summary I send it to the Department of 12 Parole and Probation or to his probation, parole 13 officer. And is this a correct copy of that form that 14 Ο. you would have sent? 15 16 Yes. Α. MR. COOPER: At this point, Your Honor, the 17 State would move to admit State's Proposed 18 19 Exhibit 11. MS. HOJJAT: No objection, Your Honor. 20 State's Exhibit 11 is admitted. 21 THE COURT: 22 (whereupon State's Exhibit No. 11 was admitted into evidence.) 23 MR. COOPER: And permission to publish, 24 25 Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. 1 MR. COOPER: Thank you. 2 BY MR. COOPER: 3 And, Ms. Lee, if you look to your right Q. 4 there, I think this screen should show this document. 5 Α. Yes. 6 Okay. So it looks like on the left-hand 0. 7 side of this document, there's a couple of boxes that 8 are checked. 9 Yes. 10 Α. po you see those? 11 Q. I do. Α. 12 And one of them says "Client cannot make 13 Q. payments." What does that mean? 14 It means that he was behind in his fees to 15 Α. 16 therapy. Now, would being behind in fees alone, would Q. 17 that -- would you terminate somebody for that? 18 obviously not, no. 19 Α. what about the little or no progress in 20 Q. treatment, what do you mean when you check that box? 21 That was the subjective matters that I had 22 Α. noted in his behavior and his progress in group. 23 Okay. And when you terminated him, that was Q. 24 in December of 2012? 25

It was. 1 Α. And it looks like on the right, on the upper 2 Q. left right-hand portion of this, it says Officer Ron (sic) Paige. 4 Would that be your contact at P & P? 5 It was it's Officer Ryan Paige. 6 Α. Oh, I'm sorry. Ryan Paige. Q. Yeah. Α. 8 And at that time, that would have been the 9 Q. defendant's probation officer? 10 It was. 11 Α. And it looks like on the bottom here, it 12 Q. talks about treatment. It says that he was intaked 13 on March 8th, 2008? 14 Yes, he was. 15 Α. And the last date was December 14th, 2012? 16 Q. It was. 17 Α. was that the last session? 18 Q. That was the last session he attended. 19 Α. was he supposed to attend a session after 20 Q. 21 that? He was to have come in on the 21st, but he 22 called and canceled. 23 And was that the reason -- was that another 24 reason for the termination? 25

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1
                     Based on the conversation that had
          Α.
               Yes.
 2
      taken place in the previous session.
               And it says under Source B right here,
 3
 4
      "Therapist initiated"?
 5
          Α.
               Yes.
               And that's because you're the one that
 6
          Q.
 7
      initiated the termination?
 8
               Myself and the co-therapist in the group,
 9
     yes.
               MR. COOPER: Court's brief indulgence.
10
11
               THE COURT: Yes.
12
     BY MR. COOPER:
13
               And at any time after December 2012, did the
         Q.
     defendant come back to you for counseling?
14
15
         Α.
               NO.
16
               MR. COOPER: Your Honor --
17
     BY MR. COOPER:
18
              And your office is in Clark County, Nevada?
         Q.
19
               It is.
         Α.
20
              MR. COOPER: I'll pass the witness,
21
     Your Honor.
22
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
23
              Ms. Hojjat.
              MS. HOJJAT: Very briefly, Your Honor.
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1	CROSS-EXAMINATION
2	BY MS. HOJJAT:
3	Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Lee.
4	A. Good afternoon.
5	Q. How are you doing today?
6	A. Pretty good.
7	Q. I guess it's almost afternoon.
8	A. Sort of.
9	Q. You testified that he started treatment in
10	March of 2008?
11	A. I did.
12	Q. And he continued through December of 2012?
13	A. He did.
14	Q. So that's over four years?
15	A. It was.
16	Q. And he completed the homework?
17	A. He did a homework group. He was having
18	trouble doing the homework on his own. And so we
19	transferred him into a homework group where it was
20	done more one on one; although, there were three or
21	four in the group at the time, where it's done
22	verbally instead of having to read and write it,
23	where some people have problems with that.
24	Q. Okay. But he did
25	A. Which took about a year of time, yeah.

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But he did do the homework?
               Okay.
 1
         Q.
               не did do the homework.
 2
          Α.
 3
          Q.
               He completed that portion?
               Yes, he did.
 4
          Α.
               And he completed the second portion?
 5
         Q.
               The group portion?
 6
         Α.
               Yeah, the polygraph portion.
         0.
               The polygraph portion, he did.
 8
          Α.
               Okay. And in that four years, he wasn't
 9
         Q.
     terminated for constant failures to show up or
10
     anything?
11
12
         Α.
               No, he was not.
               Okay. He was showing up?
13
         Q.
               не did.
14
         Α.
15
         Q.
               Okay. And --
               Court's indulgence.
16
               THE COURT:
                           Yes.
                                  Excuse me.
17
               MS. HOJJAT: I'll pass the witness,
18
     Your Honor.
19
               THE COURT: Mr. Cooper, any redirect?
20
               MR COOPER: I just have one question,
21
22
     Your Honor.
     ///
23
24
     / / /
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     ////
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION 1 2 BY MR. COOPER: On average, how long is the sex offender 3 counseling? 4 Runs from a year to three years. depends a lot on the individual. The first part is 6 controlled, the first portion, which is the 7 psycho-ed portion, is pretty much controlled by the 8 therapist. 9 The second part, which is the group part 10 where they're doing the homework on their own is 11 controlled primarily by the client and how fast they 12 work through the homework and do the process in 13 14 group. And do you remember, off the top of your 15 head, how long the defendant was in that second part? 16 Judge, I'm going to object, 17 MS. HOJJAT: relevance and outside the scope. 18 THE COURT: Overruled. 19 20 You may answer. THE WITNESS: He was in group probably --21 and I'm guessing because I don't have the notes in 22 front of me -- about a year perhaps, when we 23 realized that he was really struggling with the 24

homework, and that's when we moved him to the

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homework group. And I believe he was in that group 1 for about a year. I did not do the homework with 2 him. Another therapist did, and then he came back 3 to the process group where I was. 4 MR. COOPER: No further questions, 5 Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Any further questions? MS. HOJJAT: No further questions, 8 Your Honor. 9 THE WITNESS: May I see by a show of hands 10 if any jurors have questions for this witness. 11 Seeing none then, Ms. Lee, then you are 12 excused. Thank you for your time today. 13 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 14 THE COURT: Does the State have any 15 additional witnesses to call? 16 MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, I've just 17 inquired of the clerk as to the status of my 18 19 exhibits. THE COURT: All -- the clerk indicates all 20 of the exhibits are admitted. 21 MR. COOPER: And with the admission of all 22 my exhibits, Your Honor, the State has no further 23 witnesses, and the State would rest this matter. 24 THE COURT: All right. The State has 25

rested now. It's about ten minutes to 12:00. We were not entirely sure how long the questioning of this witness would take. We do have some matters that we have to address, including finalizing the jury instructions for you. So what we are going to do is give you an extended lunch recess.

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we couldn't quite be sure if that was going to happen or not or how that would happen. So I apologize for the additional time that you will have. But the goal here has been to complete the trial. We will return and resume with the defense case, and then we will ultimately proceed with instructions and closings and deliver the trial to you today, as we indicated.

But I am going to give you a lunch recess that is going to be until 2:00 p.m. That is when you will return. We will expect to start promptly at 2:00 p.m. That, again, gives the Court the opportunity to complete its needs with the counsel and also for the counsel and staff to have a brief recess, lunch recess as well. So, again, I apologize for the additional time. But we will get back to business at 2:00 and deliver this case to you as soon as we can.

All right. Enjoy your lunch recess. By

the way, don't get up yet. I've got to admonish 1 you, because our Supreme Court will have a fit if 2 that's not in the record that I did so. 3 Not to talk or converse amongst yourselves 4 or with anyone else on any subject connected with 5 this trial; or read, watch, or listen to report of 6 or commentary of the trial or any person connected 7 with this trial by any medium of information, 8 including, without limitation, newspapers, 9 television, radio, internet, or social media or form 10 or express any opinion on any subject connected with 11 the trial until the case is finally submitted to 12 13 you. And we'll see you back here at 2:00 o'clock. 14 (Pause in the proceedings.) 15 (The following proceedings were held 16 outside the presence of the jury:) 17 THE COURT: All right. We'll get started 1.8 with the jury instructions. 19 Go ahead and have a seat. I did receive, 20 of course last night, the Defense Proposed Exhibits, 21 with and without cites, as well as the memorandum, 22 which has now been filed with its own caption 23 indicating, you know, summarizing the argument with 24 regard to what I think is sort of the gravamen of

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the dispute as to what the instructions should be, which is one of the components of lifetime supervision and whether or not these requirements set forth in the lifetime supervision agreement and the -- okay -- and what has been asserted as some or all of the bases for alleging violation of lifetime supervision are actually legal requirements that are mandated and can support the charge.

And, of course, the instructions then, we have the -- we have the proposal by the State for the instructions with regard to that. Now, there are some overlap obviously in the Defendant's Proposed, specifically the witness's -- the defendant's right to take the stand or not and some of the credibility. I don't know how we want to do them. It might be easier to kind of go through the defendant's.

My thought process coming into today, but I'm open to your suggestions, was to go through the Defendant's Proposed and allow that to be the argument. We'll obviously note where either are overlaps with what State has proposed or whatever are kind of typical stocks. I didn't necessarily see in the ones that you were putting in there that there was -- in the some of the stocks, that there

was a real differentiation. So I may have missed 1 something. But to go through those, and then of 2 3 course, when we get to the substantive ones, then we 4 can have that argument. 5 It seems to make more sense to do it that 6 way, and then we can obviously hear argument from the State; the Court will make its determination, 7 and then at the end of the day, we'll see if there's 9 any of the others the State has that are in 10 auestion. Does anybody want to do it a different way, 11 12 think there's a better way to do it? MS. HOJJAT: I have no objection to that, 13 14 Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Cooper. MR. COOPER: No objection, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: All right. So just for the 17 record, so that it's a little bit easier to do, and 18 I did appreciate that there were page numbers 19 associated with the Defendant's Proposed. 20 So the first one, which would be on 21 page 1 -- it's not actually numbered page 1 because 22 the page numbers don't actually begin until 23 page 2 -- but I honestly wasn't quite clear of the 24 basis for this proposal. 25

MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. And to clarify, there was clearly a conversation had in the office of Officer Zanna. It started in Officer Mangan's office -- and I'm sorry -- Sergeant Zanna, and eventually transpired in Sergeant Zanna's office. But clearly, there was some sort of incident and interaction, whatever occurred. There was testimony about it.

says just because the defendant is present at the scene of an incident, something occurring, some conversation happening, whatever it is, doesn't mean that that's it, now he's guilty because he was there. We're not disputing he was there, but we are saying him being there doesn't mean he's guilty. So I believe this instruction is on point because that's basically what it's telling the jury.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Cooper.

MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, I don't think there's any facts in evidence to support this instruction. I mean, mere presence at the scene is usually used in a robbery-type scenario when there was an actual crime committed at that particular specific moment and the defendant is like, "I was at

the scene, but I wasn't the one that committed the robbery."

I mean, this just doesn't go to the facts whatsoever. I mean, they're saying that he was in the office, but we're not saying that he did anything in the office? Well, I'm not -- I guess it just doesn't make sense factually. And it's hard for me to even, I guess, argue it.

MS. HOJJAT: If I can just briefly respond to that. What we're saying is he was in the office, but that doesn't mean he's guilty of a crime. The fact that they've proven he was in the office is not the burden that they need to meet. And this instruction is an accurate instruction of the law, and we believe it's on point in this case.

MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, it is an accurate instruction of the law. But as she said, it still needs to be on point, and the facts still need to support this instruction. I can't just put any instruction that has law behind it in any case.

THE COURT: The Court is not going to give the proposed instruction, and the basis for that is that, while it might be a correct statement of the law generally, I do not see it being a point in this case, and I see it potentially confusing to the

jury.

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It would be one thing if the instruction was written -- and I'm not suggesting this because I don't believe the instruction needs to be given, period -- but if it were written as the mere fact that certain dialogue was had in, you know, Sergeant zanna's office doesn't itself mean that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. But we just simply don't give instructions that go along those lines.

reason to believe would entirely confuse the jury as to why it is being given because there isn't an incident -- an incident attendant to what, again, was a circumstance of a crime is one thing. What we're talking about here is evidence that's been received of various supervisors or treater, treatment providers to the defendant and their testimony with regard to was his residency notified and established; was he terminated from treatment, that type of thing.

So I believe that this instruction would be misleading to the jury and is not applicable in the facts of the case. So I will not be giving it.

The next instruction, which again I would

consider to be a stock, "The defendant is presumed 1 innocent unless the contrary is proved. Presumption 2 placed upon the State, the burden." And this is the 3 4 reasonable doubt instruction. I didn't necessarily see where this differed. 5 So am I missing something? 6 MS. HOJJAT: No, Your Honor. It doesn't differ. 8 THE COURT: Okay. So it's -- and let me just get the page number that corresponds with the 10 11 State's Proposed. I had it a minute ago, and then I 12 lost it. I apologize. 13 MR. COOPER: Mine is page 6, Your Honor. THE COURT: Page 6. Thank you. 14 Yeah, I didn't see that difference. I just **1**5 16 wanted to make sure I didn't miss anything. So that instruction is going to be given. It's already part 17 included in the State's packet. But that 18 instruction will be given. But it's not, again, a 19 distinct instruction. So just to be clear on the 20 record in that. 21 22 Next instruction which appears, proposed instruction by Defense, is on page 3. That's of 23

course the constitutional right of the defendant not

to be compelled to testify. And we do need to

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complete that canvass obviously again before we 1 break or before we presume your case in chief. 2 But I already read this language, and this is the same as what the State is proposing. So this 4 instruction will also be given but is already 5 included in the State's packet. 6 Page 4, the credibility or believability of 7 a witness, this one, if I can find it. Yeah, this 8 one also matches to the State's. I couldn't 9 remember if something had been deleted from this 10 But it looks like this one is also in keeping 11 one. with the stock and what the State is proposing. 12 So is there anything that I've missed here? 13 No. Your Honor. MS. HOJJAT: 14 Okay. So page 4, Defendant's THE COURT: 15 proposed, which is the credibility, believability of 16 a witness instruction will also be given as matches 17 what's in the State's packet. 18 The page 5, the circumstantial evidence 19 clarification, for lack of a better way to put it. 20 I have not typically given this instruction, and I 21 wanted to have some discussion on why you believe 22 this instruction would be appropriate. 23 MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. 24 we don't have a circumstantial instruction 25

Unfortunately, there is no stock. 1 in Nevada. looked to California, which is the State that we 2 often look to here in Nevada; when we don't have our 3 own stocks, California is the stock that we most 4 typically go to. This is the California stock. 5 is an accurate statement of the law. This jury does 6 need --7 THE COURT: Accurate statement of 8 California law or accurate statement of Nevada law? 9 It's an accurate statement of MS. HOJJAT: 10 how circumstantial evidence should be taken into 11 account. Unless the Court found something 12 different, I haven't found anything in Nevada law 13 that says this is expressly incorrect. 14 THE COURT: I have not. 15 MS. HOJJAT: And so my understanding is 16 this has never been found to be -- nothing in here 17 contradicts Nevada law, that I'm aware of. 18 THE COURT: Okay. I don't have anything 19 that would disagree with that. 20 Maybe Mr. Cooper does, but --21 MR. COOPER: I do, Your Honor. It starts 22 off by saying, "Before you may rely on the 23 circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact 24 necessarily," and it goes down. I guess they're

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saying that you can't just rely on circumstantial evidence alone. But the law makes no distinction between the weight to be given between direct and circumstantial evidence.

so to say that you can't rely on circumstantial evidence alone is a mischaracterization of Nevada law.

11.

THE COURT: Well, you read it that way. I mean, I think what it's ultimately indicating and what the stock instruction would say, of course, is that it defines what circumstantial evidence is and talks about it being facts and circumstances which, you know, taken together are a fact which can prove another fact.

So I don't think it's a misstatement of the law, but I understand if you read it to indicate that somehow circumstantial evidence isn't to be given the same weight, then yes, that would be inaccurate. But I'm not sure that that's what that says.

MR. COOPER: And I'm sorry, Your Honor. It says, "Before you can rely on circumstance circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proven, you must be convinced that the State has

proven each fact essential to the conclusion beyond 1 a reasonable doubt." 2 So I guess I -- it's basically saying that 3 the State has to prove its case without 4 circumstantial evidence before you are able to 5 consider circumstantial evidence. That's my 6 interpretation of it. So I think --7 THE COURT: I understand your interpretation 8 of it. 9 MR. COOPER: Me having years legal -- and 10 I'm saying I'm no road scholar by my means, but I 11 have went to law school, and I think it's going to 12 be misinformed to the jury. The jury is going to be 13 14 mistaken as to the law because it either, A, needs to be worded differently; or, B, doesn't need to be 15 given at all. Because it is misleading, at least to 16 me, and individuals who do not have a legal degree, 17 I think they would also be confused as to what they 18 can do with circumstantial evidence. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Anything further. 20 Ms. Hojjat? 21 MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. 22 I would just respond I don't believe that 23 the State's reading is belied by the words. It's 24 saying that before you can rely on a fact to then go 25

to the step of circumstantial evidence, that fact has to be proven. The classic example that the Courts always give is the rainwater.

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If you're not actually present to see it rain, but when you're driving home, the ground is dry; you go into your house, you wake up the next morning, you come out, there's water on the lawn, there's water on the ground, there's water in the shudders; the idea is they do actually have to prove the ground was dry the day before and there's water on the lawn and water on the shutters.

It's not saying you can't rely on circumstantial evidence. You can't rely on the fact that there's water to reach the conclusion. It's not saying that. It's simply saying they do actually have to — they can't just say there was water without proving there was water. There needs to be the proof of that. And that's an accurate statement of the law of circumstantial evidence, Your Honor.

MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, just saying that there was water would not be circumstantial evidence. But the ground being wet, or something like that and you didn't see the rain or something like that, that would be circumstantial evidence.

But the law makes no distinction between direct 1 evidence and circumstantial evidence and the weight 2 to be given. 3 Now you're repeating yourself, THE COURT: 4 Mr. Cooper. 5 MR. COOPER: But it just -- that's 6 basically it's just -- that's basically what she's 7 saying is that, well, they have to actually prove by 8 direct evidence that the ground was wet at one point 9 before they can use the circumstantial evidence to 10 prove that it was raining. I mean, it's going back 11 and forth. 12 But essentially, they're saying that you've **1**3 got to do all this direct evidence stuff before I 14 can even get to the circumstantial evidence. And 15 that's not what the correct statement of the law is. 16 THE COURT: Anything else, for the record, 17 Ms. Hojjat? 18 MS. HOJJAT: I'll submit it, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Okay. And, you know, we'll see 20 timing wise, I am a little sensitive to the time. 21 It's not going to -- you're not going to win because 22 you're the last one who speaks. And this is the 23 whole point is just to make the record. I've 24 already pretty much got an idea of what I want to do 25

with these instructions. So I'm happy to hear some argument.

But let's just keep it to, like you said, this is the California version. You don't believe it's an incorrect statement. Mr. Cooper indicates he believes it is incorrect statement. The Court has indicated I believe it is a fair statement of what you the law is. However, the Court does -- it is my typical process to follow what the stock instructions are and only to change the stock instructions or add to the stock instructions if I feel that is necessary, because the stock instructions themselves are not complete and do not properly instruct on the law in Nevada.

I believe our stock instruction with regard to circumstantial evidence and what is proposed by the State, specifically on their page number 8, which then goes into further details in terms of how to weigh the evidence and what may be weighed and how to look at evidence is sufficient to instruct the jury. And I do not believe that this additional clarification on what is circumstantial evidence needs to be given at this time.

Although, I think your example was a good one, personally. But I do not believe this

instruction is necessary and that the instruction that we have, the State's Proposed, page number 8 is sufficient.

You have, and it was somewhat repeated.

Hold on a second. Let me just make my note. You had a second -- another instruction, I should say, on page 6, which incorporates some of the same information on which you had proposed on your page 5. But this is a specific statement with regard to evidence being susceptible to two interpretations, one pointed to guilt, one pointing to innocence.

I do, by the way, make all changes to instructions so we don't use the word "innocence." We use the words "defendant guilty" or "defendant not guilty." I did note that the State's Proposed does do that already, but I will always make any adjustments to remove that language. But that it is your duty to adopt the interpretation which points to defendant's not being guilty.

Again, we already have some instructions that touch upon this, but let's hear your argument for the basis for this.

MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, my argument is this is presumption of innocence instruction.

This goes to the heart of what presumption of innocence is, is the idea that you have to assume he's not guilty unless they prove beyond a reasonable doubt otherwise. And they need to actually prove beyond a reasonable doubt. You can't just guess him to guilt essentially.

If there's a fact that's in contention and you don't know one away or the other, the presumption of innocence trumps. The presumption of innocence must trump if the jury is unclear and going, "I don't know, it could be this, or it could be this." One points to guilt; one points to innocence.

So I think this instruction is very on point for the presumption of innocence. Nevada does not have a stock instruction for the presumption of innocence. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that this is an accurate statement of the law. They've held that multiple times.

And they have also said that -- I know it's not usually offered as a presumption of innocence instruction, which is why I included the "Crawford" cite, because we are proffering it as a presumption of innocence instruction. There is no presumption of innocence instruction currently proffered by the

State at all, and we believe we're entitled to a presumption of innocence instruction.

THE COURT: Mr. Cooper.

MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, I think it is somewhat duplicative. I thought there was an instruction I had that talks about that the defendant is presumed innocent unless he's proven guilty.

THE COURT: Well, we have the reasonable doubt instruction, and we have a few others that go to, I call it the "bad act instruction." But it's the one that says where if you, you know, received evidence that might indicate, you know, something else, you're not to determine that here.

And then of course we have the "You're here to determine if the defendant is guilty or not guilty from the evidence, not a verdict of guilt or innocence as to anyone else." So we've got two or three that sort of touch upon this, but I don't think we have any that would go squarely to presumption of innocence.

Again, that's not part of Nevada stock instructions. It would be an addition. We do have the reasonable doubt instruction though, which is on State's page 6, which is that the defendant is

presumed innocent unless the contrary is proved, and 1 that places the burden of proving beyond a 2 reasonable doubt every material element, but it does 3 not go into this discussion. 4 MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, I think that 5 is sufficient in order to let the jury know exactly 6 what the law is. But I mean, that's basically the 7 only argument I have. 8 MS. HOJJAT: And I'm sorry. If I could 9 just supplement just a little bit. 10 THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Hojjat. That's 11 fine. 12 MS. HOJJAT: I forgot to say something. 13 Essentially, the reason that it's our 14 position we're actually entitled an instruction on 15 presumption of innocence is the same reason we don't 16 just say the State has to prove beyond a reasonable 17 doubt, period, end of sentence, that's the 18 instruction. The State gets elaboration on what is 19 beyond a reasonable doubt. It's not a doubt that, 20 you know, is mere speculation. It's a doubt based 21 22 in reason. The idea, and what the Court says in 23 "Crawford," we don't expect jurors to be legal 24 scholars; we don't expect just a sentence to explain 25

to them what's going on; and when we don't expect that for the State has to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, we also shouldn't be expecting it on the defendant is presumed innocence.

The idea of the presumption of innocence is engrained in us because we do this every day. But for jurors, it doesn't necessarily connect that, "Oh, if I'm confused about a fact, I need to presume him innocence." That connection isn't made, and so we want an instruction to make that connection.

THE COURT: Well, at the risk of this potentially being something that would be irreversible error, I have not yet determined to give this instruction. I had some concerns about the way that it was worded, but my overall determination is that the presumption of innocence, as it's stated in the reasonable doubt instruction and the remainder of the reasonable doubt instruction is sufficient to meet the needs of the jury in understanding what their burden is.

we've already had any number of discussions, prior to the beginning of the trial, with the general instructions given then. But of course, these are the primary instructions that they are going to rely on. And I have gone back and

forth in my mind whether or not we needed to add and should add to the Court's, essentially to the Court's stock instructions, a presumption of innocence instruction.

And I have ultimately determined that the reasonable doubt instruction, as the stock is worded, is sufficient. But again, this is an area where I hope, at some point, we will have some change perhaps in the stocks, if that's what our Supreme Court or what is determined to be the case. But I am not going to give this instruction for those reasons stated.

Now we get into, I think -MS. HOJJAT: The defense special

instructions.

THE COURT: The defense specials. And, excuse me. And let's start with page 7, since we're keeping in the order, and I think that's makes the record cleaner that -- and we've had this discussion. Lifetime supervision begins after any period of probation or term of imprisonment has ended, and it gives specific years in which the defendant was on lifetime supervision, therefor, not on parole and probation.

There's a lot going on in this proposed

instruction, and I guess I was trying to get in your head to try to figure out what you were trying to achieve with it. I don't think it's necessarily a misstatement of the facts of this case. But I'm not quite sure what it does to aid and assist the jury as far as it being the law that they need to have. So maybe you could help me understand.

MS. HOJJAT: And I apologize, Your Honor.

I just saw a typo in it that I didn't see before.

The beginning "in," I would not have. So it would just be "The defendant in this case was on lifetime supervision in 2012 or 2013."

The reason for this specific instruction, it is an accurate statement of the law. Lifetime supervision is not probation and parole. I think that's been blurred a little bit for the jury, particularly when officer Mangan got up there. "Basically the same thing; it's basically the same thing." She said that several times. It's been a little bit blurred for the jury about whether this is probation and parole or whether this is lifetime supervision.

I'm going to have further instructions about lifetime supervision, and that's why I think this -- and I understand we're going in order, and

so it kind of --

THE COURT: It just seems to be more of

MS. HOJJAT: They're all kind of connected together, and it's really -- it's the other instructions are going to be -- if those are given, this one will clarify for the jury we're talking about lifetime supervision. We're not talking about probation and parole.

THE COURT: Yeah, and I think that, you know, we have to be clear; and I think they are, at this point, should be clear that we are talking about lifetime supervision. The first part of the instruction is, you know, how it -- when it begins and ends. Fair enough. But I guess if there was some argument that there was a time frame in which he wasn't under it, that he was being accused of violating it, then there would see the relevance to that instruction on the law.

And I don't typically instruct on facts, which I think the remainder of this instruction are simply facts. But I guess I'm still not clear on how it aids and assists the jury in what they need to do. But as you said, perhaps because of the way it ties into the others. I didn't get that, but

maybe we'll table this one for now and come back to 1 2 it. Mr. Cooper, did you have anything you 3 wanted to add to this? 4 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I mean, basically I was just going to say the same thing --6 THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. Counsel, could 7 8 you just slow down just a tad. Thank you. MR. COOPER: I don't understand how it 9 would benefit the jury with this instruction. I 10 11 mean, I don't think there was ever an issue that came into play where there was a question of whether 12 or not he was on parole or whether or not he was in 13 14 prison or on probation or on lifetime supervision. If that was the situation, then this instruction 15 would be an accurate statement of the law and would 16 be, I think, needed. But that didn't happen in this 17 18 case. THE COURT: Okay. Let's move on to the 19 remainder of the specials, and I don't know if this 20 is the appropriate time in which you want to sort of 21 22 make the argument that's set forth in your memo --23 MS. HOJJAT: Yes. THE COURT: -- about the, sort of the 24 remainder of these. 25

MS. HOJJAT: Yes. 1 And then we can sort of, I 2 THE COURT: think, go from there to see how we --3 MS. HOJJAT: And I filed the memo in part, 4 or I submitted the memo and filed it in part just 5 because I don't want to stand here and argue for 6 45 minutes --7 No. no. THE COURT: 8 MS. HOJJAT: -- to the Court. 9 I wish we had the time for me THE COURT: 10 to get everything done and do that. 11 MS. HOJJAT: I'm not going to be repeating 12 the arguments that I already said in here, but I am 13 going to expand just a little bit on the fact that 14 the Nevada Supreme Court has been very, very clear; 15 and the United States Supreme Court has been very 16 very clear: We look at the plain language of the 17 statute first. We don't start reading things into 1.8 it unless there's a problem with the plain language. 19 And by "problem," it's not, well, P & P 20 thinks they should have more rights or more control 21 and they don't have more control; it's on its face, 22 does this statute make sense if we just read it; 23 does it lay out what's a crime; does it lay out what 24

the punishment is? And is that it, are we concluded

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Is there vagueness; is there overbreadth? there? 1 If there's no vagueness and there's no 2 overbreadth and the statute clearly lays out what 3 the crime is, what the punishment is, we don't go 4 any further. That's the first definite step. 5 this case, that is met in NRS 213.1243. There is no 6 vagueness, and there is no overbreadth. There is no 7 question in NRS 213.1243. It says -- it lays out 8 precisely what violations of lifetime supervision 9 10 are. It even lays out: These are the 11 requirements that are mandatory, and these are the 12 requirements that were -- you know, they can choose 13

It even lays out: These are the requirements that are mandatory, and these are the requirements that were -- you know, they can choose to do electronic monitoring, if they want to. we're not making that one mandatory. We've got the permissive requirements; we've got the mandatory requirements. We have absolutely no catchall. There isn't any statement that says, "P & P may, at its -- the department may, at its discretion, add more requirements."

The department may --

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THE COURT: Did you look at the Nevada

Administrative Code that corresponds to this statute
to see if there's any catchall there?

MS. HOJJAT: I was not able to locate that.

pid the Court?

Q,

THE COURT: I did.

MS. HOJJAT: Okay.

THE COURT: And I do believe that there is language that pertains to the argument. It's -- and I can give you a copy, if you wish. But I just wanted to see if you were going to tie that into your argument at all. Let me -- when I was looking at the statute, because I really wanted to -- this is the first trial that I've had where this has been the charge.

I've certainly had these issues come up generally in other means and circumstances. But I went and I looked at the NRS, of course, 213.1243 under which the defendant is charged and then the reference indicating -- and I'm trying to put my hands on it now where I put my statute. It opens up, obviously, initially with, "The board shall establish by regulation a program of lifetime supervision."

And in seeing that reference, then it occurred to me that the Nevada Administrative Code, which is where any regulations that are established by any governmental entity would be included, would have something. And I found a Nevada Administrative

Code 213.290, and the title of that code provision is "Notification, Report, Hearing, Request to Modify Conditions," and then in parentheses, it has NRS 213.1243 as its corresponding reference.

And when you get down into Subsection -well, there's -- there's four subsections. But it
does reference that the, in Subsection 3, once the
notifications, which are what are determined and how
they're completed in Sections 1 and 2 when you have
someone who's coming off of probation or coming off
of parole who is subject to this special sentence of
lifetime supervision, it then directs the board to
make a determination. And it says specifically,
"Establish the conditions of lifetime supervision
for the sex offender."

And then it goes on to talk about how that determination would be made, and then it goes on further in Section 4 to say, "At least 30 days before the date on which the hearing is scheduled to make that determination, the division shall provide the board a report of the status of the sex offender who is the subject of the hearing. The report would include, without limitation, summary of progress. And then it will go on recommendations for condition of lifetime supervision."

I mean, there's numerous references in this Nevada Administrative Code. I wouldn't call it a catchall. I understand when you say "catchall," what you mean because, as you said, we have other statutes that are perhaps analogous where it kind of says, "Oh, and by the way, parole and probation can also add it, whatever it needs to add," and this doesn't include this.

However, in the Nevada Administrative Code, it does give the board, who ultimately is the one that signs off on these conditions of lifetime supervision, the authority to determine what those conditions should be based on who the offender is and what the offender's progress has been with regard to their -- and as it's specifically stated, "progress of the sex offender while on parole and probation or an institution or facility of the department, as applicable."

MS. HOJJAT: And if I can respond to that.

THE COURT: Please.

MS. HOJJAT: I may be misunderstanding the process at that point. But my understanding is the Nevada Administrative Code, that's the board is establishing that. That's not the legislature that's doing the Nevada Administrative Code.

I could be mistaken if the Court --

THE COURT: No. The legislature -- it's the legislature has committees that ultimately determine, and basically what happens is in odd-number years, you have the legislature meet to pass statutes; and in the even-numbered years, you have the legislature and these boards and commissions meet, and then it gets put into the code.

MS. HOJJAT: Right.

THE COURT: And so there's a lot of us in committees and whatnot, and it is ultimately a regulation that is adopted by the entity that's charged by the statute, but it's still the law.

It's not the legislature.

And I'm not going to interrupt you further to make your argument that the legislature has to set forth the law. What the legislature does is it empowers the agencies that are to carry out the law, to interpret the law in the way that they need to carry it out, and then the board or commissioner, whomever, then goes and does those regs; and those things taken together are, in fact, the law.

And what the legislature has empowered the board to do is to establish a program of lifetime

supervision. And what the board then has done, through the regulation, is has determined that it will set forth what those conditions of lifetime supervision are. So I believe that the fair reading of the statute and the regs together is that there are additional conditions allowed to be established for lifetime supervision by the board, pursuant to the legislature's grant of authority and that that is accomplished and that is what we see in the lifetime supervision agreement.

But that's -- I just kind of cut you at that point because I wanted to give you that insight in case that had not been taken into account in your memo, but I certainly want to allow you to complete your record as far as your memo.

MS. HOJJAT: No, and I appreciate the insight into where the Court's concerns lie. I'll try to address them. Essentially, I understand what the Court is saying it's, the legislature is essentially giving the board permission to establish program of lifetime supervision. We're not disagreeing that they're to set up the program.

But the idea of the statute, there's nothing in here -- again, I would submit to the Court, were the intention should be: Board, you can

set up a program and you can make whatever rules you want; they would have put in here, "And you can make whatever rules you want." They said you can set up a program, but essentially the board has given the board power is what we have in this situation.

That's great that the board decided to read NRS 213.1243 and say, "This means that we get to decide whatever the right for -- whatever rules we want for lifetime supervision," but that's not what the statute says. The statute only says, "We want you to be monitoring the program. You guys set up the program."

And the reason for that, it's logical is because P & P has the resources. They're the organization with the best resources for doing things like electronic monitoring, because that's what they're doing already is electronic monitoring, things like that. But, again, we've got a statute that, on its face, is not granting this power.

I would argue to the Court, if the Court is going to find that this power granting is occurring, now we've got a problem of a separation of powers, and we've got a problem with vagueness and overbreadth in the statute. And I'd move to strike the statute as being unconstitutional for those

reasons because it's inappropriate for the legislature to sit back and say, "You make the rules, you decide what's a crime. We're letting the executive branch do this now."

The board is definitely a member of the executive branch, and the separation of powers doctrine is very clear from the united States Constitution. While the legislature can say things like, "we're giving this organization the power to do these things," they certainly can't give the organization the power to set laws. That's a power granted only to the legislature, and the courts have been very clear on that issue. Boards don't get to set laws. Boards don't get to say something --

THE COURT: I just make sure that I understand your argument. So your argument is that unless, whatever the activity is is a violation of the statute and not anything outside of the statute, then it can't support the crime charged.

The Subsection 8 to NRS 213.1243 says obviously, "Except as otherwise provided in Subsection 7," which would not be applicable; that's the removal of the electronic monitoring device -- "a sex offender who commits a violation of a condition imposed upon him -- imposed on him or her

pursuant to the program of lifetime supervision is 1 guilty of a Category B felony." 2 Now, that language tracks right back up to 3 "The board shall establish, by Subsection 1: 4 regulation, a program of lifetime supervision." 5 Right. MS. HOJJAT: 6 so the statute, the legislature THE COURT: 7 has then seen fit --8 Right. MS. HOJJAT: 9 THE COURT: -- to authorize the board to 10 establish a program of lifetime supervision. And 11 down in Section 8, it says, "You violate the 12 condition imposed upon him from the program of 13 lifetime supervision," that's the guilty. But 14 you're still arguing that, unless it is literally 15 set forth in the four corners of NRS 213.1243, it 16 cannot constitute a violation of law. 17 Is that what you're arguing? 18 MS. HOJJAT: That is my argument. And the 19 reason for that argument, Your Honor, is yes, the 20 board has the ability to set up: We're going to 21 have an office; we're going to have P & P officers 22 specifically dedicated to lifetime supervision. 23 You're a sergeant; you're an officer. That's a 24

program of lifetime supervision. Conditions of

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lifetime supervision are different.

There's nothing in here that says the board has the authorization to establish the conditions of lifetime supervision, and it says specifically a violation of a condition of lifetime supervision is what creates the crime. And, again, my argument would be weaker if there wasn't a whole host of conditions laid out in this statute, but the statute has so many conditions that they've laid out themselves. There is a maxim of law that we presume that the legislature took into consideration and rejected what is not contained in the four corners of a -- of a document, of a statute.

And that's something that the Nevada
Supreme Court has spoken about, been cited to in
making their decisions. We don't assume, well, they
just forgot to put the catchall in there. We assume
they thought about it and rejected it. That is the
maxim of law, particularly in the State of Nevada
because the Nevada Supreme Court, and Justice
Douglas in particular, has cited to this in opinions
and oral arguments.

So we can't presume, well, they intended for the board to set the conditions, they just forgot to write it down here. They've given the board the jurisdiction to establish a program. But the word "program," we're talking about essentially an organization. They needed -- they have a unit. They have a sex offender unit; they have a sex offender lifetime supervision officer.

They have -- it's different than now you get to make the rules. They're not saying now you get to make the rules. They're saying now you get to set up the process, the program. And so my argument to the Court is, had they intended for the conditions to also be determined, they would have either put a catchall in here, or they would have put those conditions in here.

And I want to draw the Court's attention -I didn't include this in my memo -- but I'd like to
draw the Court's attention to NRS 213.1245 -- I'm
sorry. .1245 and .1255. I don't think I have -oh, I've got .1245 here, but not 1255, which
expressly outlines the conditions of parole for
sex offenders and does enumerate these conditions.

If the legislature's intention was just the board gets to decide everything, we've allowed them to set up a program, we don't enumerate conditions, then they wouldn't have enumerated the conditions in the other statute.

And if I can approach with that statute, 1 2 Your Honor. That's fine. THE COURT: 3 Thank you. And I have a copy MS, HOJJAT: 4 for the District Attorney as well. 5 MR. COOPER: I have it right now. 6 MS, HOJJAT: Okay. 7 THE COURT: Thank you. 8 MS. HOJJAT: So we don't have a situation 9 here where the legislature is just -- ah, we don't 10 put conditions in our statutes. We let P & P deal 11 with it. They expressly put conditions in this 12 statute because these are conditions for parole. 13 Arguably, the parole board has even greater leniency 14 in deciding parole conditions because, again, that 15 person is under a sentence of imprisonment. This is 16 just a benefit that's been granted. 17 The legislature feels that it's so 18 important to enumerate these conditions and the 19 parole statute, for us to say, "But you know what, 20 they just decided to leave it out of the lifetime 21 supervision statute." You've got one individual 22 who's under a sentence of imprisonment, been granted 23 a boon and is just being supervised on that boon. 24 You've got another individual who's maxed out their 25

sentence of imprisonment. Technically, they have their constitutional rights returned but for the rights that felons are denied.

so arguably, if either -- if one of these two statutes should be more specific in the conditions, it should be the statute that governs the people whose constitutional rights are being restored. To say that the legislature feels the need to enumerate in such detail the conditions of the person who's still under the sentence of imprisonment, but then just, ah, board can do whatever they want on the person whose constitutional rights are restored, it wouldn't be -- I mean, I would argue that these two statutes don't -- wouldn't make sense together when read together that way.

Additionally, to which, again, we don't assume that the legislature just forgot stuff. We assume they thought about it and put it aside, if it's in not in the plain language. It's not in the plain language here. And they really do impose conditions. Section 3, "Except as otherwise provided in Subsection 9, the board" --

THE REPORTER: I'm sorry, Counsel, please.

MS. HOJJAT: I apologize.

Section 3, "Except as otherwise provided in Subsection 9, the board shall require as a condition of lifetime supervision." They are laying out their conditions in the statute, Your Honor. When they're talking --

THE COURT: Well, it goes on specifically to talk about the location, the residence. I mean, that just goes to residence --

MS. HOJJAT: Right.

THE COURT: -- because then four has another aspect of a condition down to the seven which talks about electronic monitoring.

MS. HOJJAT: And that's my point is that when they're talking about Subsection 8, which your Honor mentioned earlier, "Except as otherwise provided, a sex offender who commits a violation of a condition imposed," they're talking about their own conditions. They've defined everything they've put down as a condition. They're saying you violate one of the things we've enumerated, you're guilty of a Category B felony, but they've enumerated their own conditions.

They've enumerated -- and not just we were enumerating mandatory conditions; they've numerated both mandatory and permissive conditions for P & P

to impose. For us to think that here, they intended for P & P to be able to add all this other stuff and just forgot to mention it, but here in 12.45, they specifically go into all of these requirements. These two statutes can't be read together with that interpretation. I would argue that it's -- they don't work together that way.

And as a followup argument, if the Court is not going to accept that, then I would move to strike NRS 213.1243 as being unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and a violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to, just for our record as complete, I'm going to deny the motion to find that the statute and the regulations are unconstitutional, but I'll have that in the record. There, I don't find that it is vague or overbroad. If they were rated on the bases upon which you just asserted, I apologize.

obviously, at some point in time, if there is to ultimately be that challenge, that may be something that would be addressed on appeal. That may be something that may be addressed by motion practice. But the Court, at this time -- I see the distinction that you are drawing between the two

statutes, but the basic tenet of statutory
construction and the basic allowance for the
legislature to authorize entities to do things and
then allow those entities to proceed by regs to
complete those processes, I don't find that what I
see here would violate that basic tenet of how our
laws are constructed.

I mean by analogy, maybe this works; maybe it doesn't. But you kind of -- you have good hypotheticals and good analogies. So let me try back at you. If you go to look at the statutes that talk about having a driver's license, it basically just says the DMV issues a driver's license. It doesn't go into any details about what has to be in that driver's license, how you put things in the driver's license, how you qualify for certain things.

I have some familiarity with this just because I've worked on some legislation involving those individuals who are transgender and they're changing of their gender marker and what's entailed with that and how that works. And all of that is dictated to by the DMV in their regulatory process because they've been empowered to issue driver's licenses. Everything else is in the regs and by

their own determination on how they see fit to carry out their duties.

I find this somewhat analogous. You have a situation where, you know, the statutes have determined that for parole, for probation, there are certain requirements; there are certain things, and then they give additional requirements that have been added obviously at some point more recently in history. If it's a sex offense, certain conditions for probation.

when it comes to the lifetime supervision special sentence, which comes into play after the completion of probation and parole, for the legislature to delegate to the board, you determine what that program is; here are certain things that we want, but you ultimately determine what that program is, and then the board to go on and determine what that program is.

And let me be perfectly clear. All of these 1 through 21 that you see on the lifetime agreement is not included in the NAC either. It's not in the Nevada Administrative Code either. There are some references to it. But ultimately the acknowledgment and the recognition and the receipt of the authorization to develop this program, I

believe is what is carried out here. And I do not 1 find that it is unconditionally vague or 2 unconstitutional in any way. 3 I just want to complete that record. 4 appreciate the opportunity to have this discussion 5 today and have this argument. I think that there 6 has been a lot of development of the law of lifetime 7 supervision, and I think it will probably continue 8 to develop. And I don't know, perhaps maybe that will be one of the ways in which it continues to 10 develop. I'm not making that call today. 11 MS. HOJJAT: And I apologize. If the 12 Court's ruling on all of them, the third thing that 13 I had raised was the separation of powers issue. 14 And just on that, just addressing the Court's 15 hypothetical --16 Right. THE COURT: 17 MS. HOJJAT: And I'm not trying to argue 18 with the Court. I'm just trying to complete my 19 I'm sorry. record. 20 No, I appreciate it. THE COURT: 21 again, on that basis as well, I did --22 MS. HOJJAT: Yeah, yeah. 23 THE COURT: -- on the vague, overbroad. 24 MS. HOJJAT: And --25

1 THE COURT: -- separation of powers.

THE REPORTER: Excuse me. I'm sorry. When the judge is talking ...

THE COURT: we're both talking over each other, and that's my fault too.

MS. HOJJAT: And on the separation of powers issue, the only distinction I draw with the DMV example was, to make my separation of powers record, would be that the DMV is not determining what's a crime, and that's where the separation of powers issue doesn't arise is that that is an administrative agency putting together a process, but it's not, at the end of it, they're not saying: All right, it's administrative agency. You get to put together whatever process you want and it's a crime if individuals don't follow it exactly the way you say. That's where the separation of powers issues comes in.

It's one thing to delegate to other agencies the power to take care of administrative things. It's another to delegate to them the power to make actions crimes. And so we'd argue that it's a separation of powers issue.

THE COURT: Okay. And your argument is noted, and it's a compelling argument. I'm not

going ultimately find it persuasive today, but I appreciate that. And so in light of that discussion, I don't know if you have more that you want to highlight from your memo again. We also have it in the record now.

MS. HOJJAT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In light of that discussion, it is the Court's intention to predominantly proceed with the jury instructions as proposed by the State. The reason I say "predominantly" though is because I mean, there are certainly some instructions that you have proposed that are not incorrect statements of the law.

But I think the way you have constructed them, and your intent behind them was to instruct the jury these are the only conditions, and therefor, only the violations of these conditions can sustain this charge and that only if they prove beyond a reasonable doubt those violations can they prevail.

I am not going to instruct in that fashion. However, you do have some instructions, sort of the reverse instruction to they have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, where you say if they haven't proven beyond reasonable doubt. I don't typically

give the reverse, but I want to hear the State's comment on that.

And then you also have some that go specifically to that notification aspect of the change of the address. The one that kind of stood out to me the most was that if -- page 18 of your proposed, "If the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant changed the location where he habitually slept, then he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty on Count 2."

And I do want to have a discussion about that.

MS. HOJJAT: I actually have a motion to make in regards to that, Your Honor, and I think that clarifies Instruction Number 19 and 20 because I am making a motion at this time. If the Court wants to do it now or --

THE COURT: Let's go ahead and do it now then.

MS. HOJJAT: Okay. We are moving for a directed verdict as to both counts in this case. Obviously, the directed verdict as to Count 1 was, in part, based upon the proposed instructions that I was suggesting, so you can understand if the Court would just --

I'll very briefly make that record in terms of saying, if our reading of the law is correct, then we would be moving for a directed verdict because the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, even in a light favorable to the State, that the violations have been made. I do understand the Court's not granting us our jury instruction. So that record is contingent upon our interpretation of the law being correct, essentially.

As to Count 2, Your Honor, we are moving for a directed verdict. We believe the State has failed to meet its burden that he was registered at an address and he wasn't living there. In fact, they've actually failed to meet their burden that he was registered at any address. They haven't entered any evidence that he was registered anywhere.

Officer Mangan repeatedly told us she couldn't tell us where he was registered because she's not that law enforcement agency.

The appropriate law enforcement agency for saying where somebody is registered is Metro. It's the local law enforcement agency. That's not P & P. P & P is they regulate people on parole, probation, lifetime supervision. They are not the law

enforcement agency. The law enforcement agency is the only one who can come in here and say he was registered at x address on X date. We've had absolutely no testimony or evidence from anybody about where he was registered at any given time.

They talked about the places that he was reporting to them. But not a single shred of evidence, not a certified document, nothing has been entered showing where he was registered. Therefore, the State has failed to meet its burden of, first, showing where he was registered to begin with. It's two prongs: One showing he was registered; two, showing he wasn't residing there. They haven't even shown where he was registered. So they can't possibly show that he wasn't residing there.

THE COURT: Well, as the charge, Count 2 prohibited acts is, at least listed in the information, it is listed as, "He failed to appear in person at the appropriate law enforcement agency before three business days past since he changed his address from his last registered address of Main and Wyoming."

So you're indicating that he has not shown that he was registered at Main and Wyoming and also that he -- it has not been proven that he changed

his address from that.

- 24

MS. HOJJAT: I mean, they haven't proven anything. Nobody has gotten up there to say, "He didn't show up and change." For all we know, he'd been changing once a day. Officer Mangan specifically said, "I can't tell you where he was registered at any given time. I can't tell you how many changes he made; I can't tell you anything; I have no information for you," and she made a point of saying that over and over again during cross-examination.

THE COURT: I thought she more -- what I gleaned was her confusion over the constant use of the word "registration" when he was -- when she was being asked about where he was reporting.

MS. HOJJAT: Right. And she kept saying that. She kept saying, "No, no, no. He reports to me; he doesn't register to me. No, no, no. You mean reporting. I don't do registration. I do reporting." I agree with the Court. She was clarifying the miscommunication. But the point that -- the clarification she was hammering home was that she's not the appropriate person to be testifying about registration at all.

She can't tell us where he was registered.

She can't tell us if he showed up and changed his address. The State -- our position is the State has failed to prove that he changed his address. They haven't established that by anything in this case.

THE COURT: Okay.

.17

MS. HOJJAT: They haven't shown that he wasn't residing at that location. And by Officer Mangan's own testimony, in a court period of six months, I believe it was, she did one visit to that location and couldn't find him there. And that was on February, in February of 2014.

Because the period that he supposedly changed and didn't change his registration, that he moved and didn't change his registration -- at least my understanding of the allegation is after August, after he absconded, they're claiming he moved and didn't change his registration.

They haven't shown he didn't change his registration. They haven't even shown that he moved. She only went out there once between August of 2013 and February of 2014, and he wasn't standing on the corner at that day when she went.

THE COURT: Let's let Mr. Cooper respond to the motion for directed verdict on the two counts.

And of course, then if you want to add anything to

the Court's determination not to give the instructions as designed by the defense, but perhaps we need to then address any adjustments we need to make to the instructions as you have provided them in light of some of the ones that they proposed.

11.

MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor. And,
Your Honor, I guess first on the directed verdict,
verdict issue, obviously the directed verdict on
Count 1 was based, my understanding was solely on
the argument that was previously given to the Court,
and that argument is, I guess, is not appropriate,
not for a jury instructions, first; and foremost, it
should be an argument that's made in a motion, in a
pretrial motion to dismiss or something of that
nature. Not jury instruction argument.

But with that aside, I think the statute is clear in terms of its ability to give the board the ability to regulate the program of lifetime supervision. The Court's already previously stated the regulation number or regulation cite that goes into details. And then just looking at the statute, it does give forward some conditions.

But obviously one of the conditions that isn't said in here is reporting. So it wouldn't make sense that he would have a probation officer

but he wouldn't have to report to him, but he would have to let them know of his address. None of those things could be I guess, put -- it just makes no sense.

with that said, Your Honor, I mean, I'm not going to belabor the point on Count 1. I think the record is made for the defense's standpoint, and then the State would just echo the same concerns that the Court had in terms of not only the procedural nature in which they're trying to bring this objection or motion and the actual substantive arguments that they made as well.

THE COURT: Count 2.

MR. COOPER: I'm sorry. I made notes. I just wanted to make sure I made my --

THE COURT: No, you're fine.

MR. COOPER: -- argument on Count 1. I'm sorry.

And, Your Honor, I mean, just reading off my notes, for the record, essentially the defense is saying that every lifetime supervision agreement ever put into place by the Department of Probation and Parole is invalid. It just makes no factual sense. But I guess that's for another day to decide.

he made crazy statements, "I'm not going to listen to anything you said," well, then you must have moved because we went out there once and you weren't there. And we went out there once between August and February.

But without that statement, all we have is an individual who went out there once between August and February. She went out there, I think two other times total.

I think a total of three times or four times? Three times total that ever went out --

MS. FERRERA: Four.

MS. HOJJAT: -- didn't see him. They just can't establish. They don't have -- they didn't call the right witness to establish he didn't change his registration. The correct witness would have been custodian of records from LVMPD. They didn't call the right witness.

THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Cooper?

MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, I was saying
I can proceed with my case any way I see fit. But
the facts still does remain that his statement did
come out -- and I'm sorry I didn't say that earlier.
His statement did come out that he was going to live
where he wanted to. He was going to move any time

he wanted to, and everything like that. 1 That statement combined with the fact that 2 she was unable to find him at what she knew to be 3 his registered address, at least at one point, is 4 sufficient to determine that he changed his address. 5 But I'll submit. 6 MS. HOJJAT: Her knowledge of his 7 registered address is not even -- that's not 8 evidence. It's not knowledge. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MS. HOJJAT: It's -- sorry. I apologize. 11 THE COURT: Like I said earlier, like I 12 said --13 MS. HOJJAT: I apologize. 14 THE COURT: -- you don't win because you're 15 the last person who speaks. It's just a matter of 16 let's get our record completed. 17 It is this Court's determination, at this 18 time, that the State has failed to provide evidence 19 to survive the motion for directed verdict on 20 Count 2, the prohibited acts by sex offender. There 21 is not evidence in the record regarding his change 22 of address from the last registered address. 23 There is sketchy evidence on the fact that 24 he even registered at any given time, as argued by 25

the defense. But there is certainly not evidence that is sufficient to go to the jury to make a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that he, in fact, changed his address and failed to notify the law enforcement agency.

I am going to grant the directed as to Count 2. I am not going to grant the directed verdict as to Count 1. There is ample evidence to go to jury to make a determination on whether there has been violation of lifetime supervision by convicted sex offender, and for all the reasons I've already stated. As far as how the statute and regulations are set up, I believe that it is appropriate to instruct and allow the jurors to decide whether he is guilty of that charge.

MR. COOPER: And I'm sorry. Your Honor, because this is my first directed verdict, so just procedurally am I supposed to change the verdict form, or how does that work?

THE COURT: It's my first one too,

Mr. Cooper. But I am going to change the verdict

form for us. Yes, the verdict form will only

reflect the one charge, and I will, when we instruct

the Court -- instruct the jurors, we will -- I'll

note that we are only instructing as to Count 1 of

the charge, and that is the only one that they are 1 to deliberate on. 2 MR. COOPER: Works for the State, 3 Your Honor. 4 okay. THE COURT: 5 MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Okay. So the instructions that 7 then go to that issue now are moot and will not need 8 to be given. So we really are just down to if the 9 defense has any arguments with regard to the 10 State's proposed instructions that the Court does 11 intend to give with regard to Count 1. 12 And, Your Honor, we did still MS. HOJJAT: 13 want -- I apologize. We did still want a couple of 14 those instructions just because they -- one of the 15 charges in Count 1 is that he failed to have his 16 residence approved, and so we think some of the 17 those instructions are a little bit overlapping in 18 terms of the location. 19 THE COURT: Which one is --20 MS. HOJJAT: In terms of the, you know, if 21 you're transient, it's the place that you habitually 22 sleep and things of that nature. Specifically, 23 Instruction Number 17. 24 THE COURT: And what else? 25

At this point, I'm going to have to pull 1 the plug and get in there and finish up the 2 instructions. 3 MS. HOJJAT: Sorry. So I need you to wrap up your THE COURT: arguments, and I will make a final completion, of 6 course, give you a set to review before we instruct. 7 MS. HOJJAT: I think 17 is the one. 8 THE COURT: okay. 9 MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, my 10 understanding that that refers to the count that 11 just was stricken. So there's no reason to have it. 12 MS. HOJJAT: It does refer specifically to 13 the count that was stricken, but we think the 14 arguments also go towards the Count 1, towards one 15 of the charges in Count 1. 16 THE COURT: Well, I'm looking at the, 17 again, the counts in Count 1. We have refusal to 18 submit to urinalysis, failure to report --19 MS. HOJJAT: Failing to have residence 20 21 approved. Failing to have his residence THE COURT: 22 approved. 23 MS. HOJJAT: And it's indicative --24 Failing to cooperate -- let me THE COURT: 25

If you keep talking over me, my reporter is finish. 1 going to have another fit. Okay? 2 MS. HOJJAT: I'm sorry, Your Honor. 3 Sorry. 4 THE COURT: Failing to cooperate --And rightfully so. 5 Failing to cooperate with his supervising 6 officer, failing to maintain lifetime -- full-time 7 employment. Sorry. Failing to abide by curfew 8 and/or terminated from the counseling. So you 9 believe that your 17 instruction, sex offender, no 10 fixed residence is still necessary to that? 11. MS, HOJJAT: Yes. I believe it's necessary 12 13 to the failing to have residence approved. Just the language of failing to have residence approved 14 seems, sounds like it makes it a crime to be 15 transient and that it has -- that you have to be at 16 one place every day. This instruction shows no, the 17 law does take into account people can be transient, 18 and it does take into account it's not the same 19 location every single night. It's the habitually 20 21 language. MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, we just went 22 over this long, I guess, discussion about the strict 23 reading of the statute, and the statute says that 24 they must have the residence approved. It doesn't 25

go anything about, well, it has to be within 30 days. The other statute may refer to that, 2 talking about where they register at and stuff like 3 that. 4 But having registered -- having their residence approved, it doesn't matter if you're 6 homeless; it doesn't matter where you live at, you 7 have to have your residence approved. 8 THE COURT: All right. Anything further 9 before I go and complete the instructions? 10 MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, I think we 11 just -- we held Defendant's Instruction 7 in 12 abevance, and I don't think you made a ruling on 13 that one. 14 THE COURT: The ruling now that has been 15 made with regard to -- you're right. I did hold it 16 in abeyance but because it was tied into the others, 17 and I've now determined obviously further arguments 18 that we've made that we are not going to give that 19 instruction. So our goal -- we didn't give the 20 other instruction, so we're not going to give 21 Number 7 either. 22 I will take under consideration number --23 page 17. 24 MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor. 25

And make a final version of the 1 THE COURT: instructions here as soon as we can take the break. 2 MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 4 the only --THE COURT: Go ahead. 5 MS. HOJJAT: I apologize. 6 THE COURT: You're fine. 7 MS. HOJJAT: We are asking that our denied 8 instructions be entered as a Court's exhibit. And 9 the only thing I'd ask is -- I apologize. I noticed 10 one more typo. In my Proposed Instruction Number 9, 11 which has been denied by the Court, it says, 12 "9 through 12" for defense proposed instructions, 13 but I actually meant "10 through 13." 14 THE COURT: Okay. So what I would ask you 15 to do, Counsel --16 MS. HOJJAT: Yes. 17 THE COURT: -- is because some of them 18 obviously were given --19 MS. HOJJAT: Yes. 20 THE COURT: -- rather than enter them as 21 Court's exhibits, what I prefer to do is have you 22 put a caption on them, with the caption being, with 23 the title being "Defendant's Proposed, not given" 24 and then just include the ones that were excluded so 25

that you have that complete set. File that with the 1 Court, and that will complete the record. 2 MS. HOJJAT: Perfect. Can I bring that 3 after lunch to file with the caption? 4 THE COURT: Oh, yeah. That can be filed 5 anytime. It doesn't have to be filed today. 6 MS. HOJJAT: Perfect. Thank you very much, 7 Your Honor. I appreciate it. 8 THE COURT: Last assignment that I think we 9 have to complete before we can break is to canvass 10 Mr. McNeil. So what I'd like to do first, and this 11 is of course regarding his intention whether or not 12 to invoke his rights or to testify. 13 I'd like to ask first of counsel, can you 14 please make representation, for the record, if you 15 have discussed with Mr. McNeil what his rights are 16 17 in this area. MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. We have -- I 18 have spoken with Mr. McNeil. I've discussed with 19 him his right to testify or his right not to 20 testify. I've informed him that if he chooses not 21 to testify, a jury instruction will be given telling 22 the jury that they cannot hold it against him that 23 he did not testify. 24 I've informed him that, if he does testify, 25

then the attempt lewdness with a minor conviction 1 could be used to impeach him and that the District 2 Attorney would have the opportunity to cross-examine 3 In speaking with him, it is my understanding 4 that, on the advice of counsel, he is choosing not 5 to testify. 6 THE DEFENDANT: That would be correct. 7 THE COURT: Well, I still have to canvass 8 you, Mr. McNeil. But I like to get the counsel's 9 representations first that they have, in fact, had 10 these discussions. So I have some set questions I 11 need to ask you. So I appreciate your patience 1.2 while we go through this. I need to read to you 13 some of your rights and then ask you if you 14 understand them. Okav. 15 You have the right under the Constitution 16 of the United States and the Constitution of the 17 State of Nevada not to be compelled to testify in 18 this case. 19 Do you understand that. 20 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 21 THE COURT: That means no one can make you 22 take the witness stand and make you answer any 23 questions. 24

Do you understand that.

25

I do. 1 THE DEFENDANT: THE COURT: You may, if you wish, give up 2 this right and you may take the witness stand and 3 If you do, you will be subject to 4 cross-examination by the District Attorney, as well 5 as your own attorney; and anything that you say, 6 whether it is in answers to questions put to you by your attorney or by the District Attorney, will be 8 the subject of fair comment when the District 9 Attorney speaks to the jury in final argument. 10 Do you understand that? 11 12 THE DEFENDANT: I do. THE COURT: If you choose not to testify, 13 14 the Court will not permit the District Attorney to 15 make any comments to the jury concerning the fact that you have not testified. 16 Do you understand that? 17 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 18 THE COURT: If you elect not to testify, 19 the Court will instruct the jury, only if your 20 attorney specifically requests, and obviously that 21 instruction has, in fact, been proposed by your 22 counsel. An instruction that reads as follows: 23 "It is a constitutional right of a 24 defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be 25

compelled to testify. Thus the decision as to 1 whether he should testify is left to the defendant 2 on the advice and counsel of his attorney. You must 3 not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that he does not testify; nor should this fact be - 5 discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in 6 any way." 7 I know that that was read obviously when we 8 were doing the jury selection, but --9 THE DEFENDANT: Couple of times, yes. 10 THE COURT: -- I wanted to make sure that 11 you understood that that is an instruction that will 12 given if you choose not to testify. 13 Are you aware of that? 14 THE DEFENDANT: I am. 15 THE COURT: Do you have any questions that 16 you would like to ask me about your constitutional 1.7 rights? 18 THE DEFENDANT: None that come to mind at 19 20 this time. THE COURT: Okay. Last little bit so that 21 you understand and can weigh when you give your 22 final decision, it's weighing all of these things 23 together. If you choose to testify and you have 24 been convicted of a felony within the past ten years 25

and you have been on Parole or Probation for a 1 felony within the past -- or you have been on Parole 2 and Probation for a felony within the past ten 3 years, the District Attorney may ask if you've been 4 convicted of the felony, what was the felony and 5 when it happened, but no details may be gone into 6 7 regarding any prior felony convictions. we've obviously had a lot of discussion 8 9 about that because of the nature of the charge in this case. But the only way he would be able to go 10 into any details or provide any kind of certified 11 copy of the conviction and get more information into 12 13 the record is if you were to deny the felony 14 conviction. So I know, I believe that you're already 15 16 aware of that. But are you aware of those rights? 17 THE DEFENDANT: I am. 18 THE COURT: Okay. In light of all of this 19 information, what is your determination as to 20 whether or not you wish to invoke your rights under the constitution to not be compelled to testify or 21 22 whether you wish to testify? 23 THE DEFENDANT: I wish not to testify. 24 THE COURT: You wish not to testify, okay. 25 Then I appreciate the opportunity to

canvass you on that. I think that that completes 1 everything. When we come back --2 MS, HOJJAT: I apologize. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Hojjat. 4 MS. HOJJAT: I need to lodge my objections 5 to four of their instructions that I'm objecting to. 6 THE COURT: Yeah, okay. I'm sorry. I 7 thought we completed the discussion of the 8 objections. 9 MS. HOJJAT: I'm sorry. I thought too, and 10 then I looked and realized I forgot to --11 THE COURT: Give me page numbers. 12 13 MS. HOJJAT: The first one is page number 12. Actually, no, I apologize. First one is 14 15 page number 7. THE COURT: Page 7. Okay. 16 мs. ноддат: This is not a relevant 17 instruction in this case; rather like the State made 18 about my mere presence instruction, it may be a 19 correct statement of the law, it's not applicable 20 here. There's nobody else here who may be innocent 21 or quilty of a crime. It's not applicable, and it 22 will confuse the jury. I'd ask --23 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, it's stock. If we 24 don't need it, I don't care. 25

I'll remove it. THE COURT: 1 MS. HOJJAT: Thank you. 2 That's State's page 7. THE COURT: 3 Go ahead. 4 MS. HOJJAT: State's page 11, that's the 5 bad acts instruction. I don't think it's 6 appropriate here. It's talking about the fact that 7 they can consider the fact that he's a sex offender 8 for the limited purpose of determining knowledge, 9 intent, motive, or absence of mistake or accident. 10 That's not an accurate statement of law here. 11 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I'm okay with 12 removing that one too. I actually did it for the 13 defendant's benefit because it did come out that he 14 was a sex offender. So I just wanted to make sure 15 they know that they can't use the fact that he's a 16 sex offender just against him. 17 THE COURT: Well, I've given that 18 admonishment significantly. 19 MR. COOPER: I understand. 20 I think this is, by the way, THE COURT: 21 Counsel an accurate Tavarez instruction. I've given 22 this instruction before. 23 MS. HOJJAT: Yes. 24 THE COURT: But I believe that there was 25

quite a bit of discussion about going into some of 1 the information and a lot of objections on the bench 2 about information coming from the witnesses that 3 might pertain to other bad acts. But if you don't wish to give this instruction, I won't force it. 5 MS. HOJJAT: Well, what I would propose to 6 the Court is if we were to cut it off, like the word "such," everything after the worth "such" because I 8 don't have a problem with the first sentence. 9 saying, telling them that they can use the fact that 10 he's a sex offender for anything that I'm objecting 11 I agree it's a correct Tavarez instruction. 12 I just don't believe that it's applicable 13 in this case because they're not supposed to use the 14 fact that he's a sex offender against him at all in 15 this case but for the fact that it satisfies an 16 element. So I'm okay with up through line 5. I 17 would just ask after the period, after the "crimes" 18 in line 5, everything after that be stricken. 19 THE COURT: I don't think the Tavarez 20 instruction is necessary in this case. 21 okay. MS. HOJJAT: 22 THE COURT: So I'm going to strike the or 23 take out State's page 11. 24 MS. HOJJAT: And then State's page 12, that 25

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objection just goes to the -- I'm objecting to it
 1
      officially, for the record, because I'm proposing my
 2
 3
      own.
 4
               THE COURT: You're proposing our own.
 5
               MS: HOJJAT: -- the ones that I proposed
 6
     that the State has denied -- or the Court has
 7
     denied.
 8
               THE COURT: Page 12 and page 13 both or
 9
     page -- yeah, page 12 and 12, 13 both?
10
              MS. HOJJAT: Yes.
11
                           Because you said you had two
              THE COURT:
12
     others.
              MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor -- well, no.
13
14
     There's also page 14 that I'm objecting to.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So 12 and 13 will be
16
     given.
             Your objection is noted but overruled.
17
              MS. HOJJAT:
                            Thank you.
18
              THE COURT: The page 14?
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              MS. HOJJAT: Page 14 is, I mean, we've
20
     already stipulated he's a sex offender. I'm not
21
            I mean, it's just confusing and redundant.
22
              MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, I guess my
     only argument is is that obviously the term "sex
23
     offender" has a distinct meaning in the law, and
24
25
     that term is actually used multiple times in the
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instructions. There's nothing that is prejudicial 1 2 to him by defining what the term "sex offender" is. So I don't understand how it --3 It's definitely an accurate statement of 4 That's directly what the definition is. 5 It's not prejudicial to him. It doesn't hurt him in 6 any way. So I don't understand why we wouldn't give it. But I mean, I would submit to the Court on it. 8 THE COURT: All right. I'll make a 9 determination on that as well and let you know what 10 11 the final set of instructions looks like, and I'll adjust the verdict form as we've discussed. 12 Is there anything else we need to address 13 before we take -- we still got about an hour lunch. 14 15 So that's not too bad. MS. HOJJAT: The only other thing we need 16 to address, I'm sorry, his ID number. We'd like his 17 ID number not to be on the -- what's given to the 18 19 jury. THE COURT: I don't put the ID number. 20 MS. HOJJAT: Perfect. Because it was on 21 the State's proposed, and I just want to --22 THE COURT: It's not going to look like the 23 State's proposed. I have a different version 24 entirely. 25

Thank you very much, 1 MS. HOJJAT: 2 Your Honor. 3 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I guess, just 4 procedurally -- again, this is my first directed verdict -- is the fact that this Court gave the 5 6 directed verdict on Count 2, is that appropriate argument for a defense counsel to make during closing? Because I honestly, I don't know. 8 THE COURT: No. The appropriate argument, 9 to this Court's opinion, is argument with regard to 10 11 whatever charge is remaining in this case and what 12 the evidence showed or didn't show as to that charge. The fact the Court has made a determination 13 that we're only going to proceed as to the one 14 15 charge will come out in the instructions, and that's 16 what the instructions will go to. But it is not subject of fair argument to 17 argue somehow and perhaps attempt to argue to the 18 19 jury that because the Court determined not to proceed on that charge, that somehow the other 20 21 charge is faulty. So I would appreciate the 22 opportunity to give that clarification. Thank you, Your Honor. 23 MR. COOPER: 24 THE COURT: That would not be appropriate 25 for argument.

Anything else? 1 okay. MR. COOPER: Thank you, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: All right. Enjoy your lunches, 3 and we will be back here a at 2:00 o'clock. 4 (Lunch recess.) 5 THE COURT: As soon as Mr. McNeil is ready, 6 we'll go back on the record and we'll have a brief 7 discussion about the final version of the 8 instructions and what I changed and why. I didn't 9 know if any of you would need a copy to refer to the 10 actual numbered instruction in your closings or not, 11 12 but ... MS. HOJJAT: We're ready whenever the Court 13 14 is. THE COURT: Oh, okay. I just wanted to let 15 Mr. McNeil finish and get in place. 16 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: No problem. 18 Okay. So a couple of changes in order in 19 which they appear in the final set of instructions. 20 You'll notice just my style, I like to only have the 21 first page say "Jury Instructions" but not actually 22 contain the first instruction. So we'll just go by 23 actual numbers of instructions now, since they are 24 in fact numbered, as opposed to the page number like 25

we were doing when we settled them. Okay?

So Instruction Number 3, I would note the State's version -- well, obviously, I've made a number of changes here because I've removed the reference to Count 2. I did make a change to the date. I think there was a date error contained in the State's Proposed. It had the 24th day of December, but the prior --

MR. COOPER: That must have been a typo.

That was my fault.

information I had the 14th. So I corrected that to the 14th day of December. I then removed, of course, again the Count 2. I also added the last sentence, which is standard in these instructions following the information or the indictment language regarding the duty of the jury. It was not contained in the State's Proposed, but I did add it in. So do you see that last sentence? It wasn't there before. But I did add it, so I just wanted to make sure everybody was aware.

I then moved the definitional sections and the sections pertaining to the actual crime charge up, after the information. So rather than having done all the kind of basic instructional how-to's

and then defining sex offender, et cetera, I brought those forward. I did leave in the definition of sex offender. I think it is necessary to complete the scope of the instructions in terms of what the charge is, as well as where it's used in the subsequent provisions.

I then -- the State's, what is now
Instruction Number 5 was proposed by the State, and
I don't believe I made any adjustments there. I
believe that is the way it was originally worded.

I did, however, change what is now
Instruction Number 6. The State was proposing, I
would say more general language, with regard to
reporting requirements. This is actually an
instruction that was proposed by the defense in
terms of the discussion with regard to what the
sex offender residency, dwelling, habitual, sleep,
knowledge, I thought -- the reason I took out the
State's and the reason I did include this is because
I wanted --

If you go back to Instruction Number 5, that is the sort of general instruction that if the sex offender, under the sentence of lifetime supervision who commits a violation of a condition imposed is guilty of the violation, one of the

underlying was this residency issue. But this -obviously, we don't have an instruction for each and
every one of the violations that could have
occurred. They're listed in the charging document,
but they're not listed in the instructions.

So I didn't have want to have one particular instruction that looked liked that's the only violation that's being considered. So I removed the State's version because I thought that's what that looked like. I hope this is making sense. If you have your version, I think it will make more sense. But what I did want to leave in was some clarification with regard to what the residency and registration requirement was. So that's why the defense's is in there and the State's is not.

Does anybody have any questions about that?

MR. COOPER: I don't have a question about

it, Your Honor. And I know there's -- do we object?

Do we object, or are we just settled or --

THE COURT: You're welcome to object, at this point, because I did make an additional change from when we settled it before. I'm not going to change it, but you're welcome to object; and if you would like and you think it's appropriate, you might want to do the same thing the defense will be doing,

which is to have a caption with "State's Proposed, not given" and then submitted in the record.

MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I don't think that's all necessary. My objection is just kind of just a wording is that he's only charged, in my understanding of the Complaint or the Information, is that he's only charged with not having his residence approved, not not registering his residence. That was Count 2.

My understanding is that this

Instruction 6 is referring to notifying local law
enforcement agency. Well, even if he does that,
that still does not necessarily mean that his
probation officer approved his residence. So I
don't believe this actually applies; but obviously,
if the Court's giving it, that's all I have.

THE COURT: Well, go ahead. Did you want to respond, either Ms. Hojjat or Ms. Bonaventure?

MS. BONAVENTURE: Well, Your Honor, if he has a problem with where it says, "At least every 30 days, shall notify the local law enforcement agency," we can do away with that language so that it reads that "A sex offender who has no fixed address shall" or -- basically to take that part out where it has that requirement for Count 2 but to

leave in the language where, if he doesn't have a fixed address, he can register at a corner.

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Or in absent of that, Your Honor, we can, if your preference is to get away with it -- or do away with it, then we will deal with that as well.

THE COURT: Well, like I said, what I took out was the -- again, following upon the general sort of if you have conditions imposed upon you and you don't comply with them, then that is a violation. That is Instruction Number 5. I thought it would be too confusing to have the very next instruction, and the only other instruction imposed by the State, to talk about sex offender is required to keep parole and probation officer assigned to him or her informed of the current address because that makes it looks like that's the only condition that we're talking about, and we're clearly not talking about that. So I took that out. That was a separate decision from including this one.

The then decision to include this one, I'm not trying to conflate -- and if I am inadvertently doing that, I apologize -- a registration or other requirement. But what you have in the charging document is any number of requirements, and I think the part where the jury needed -- any number of

requirements. Sorry. Let me finish my thought before I go forward.

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In terms of again, the U.A., the failing to report, failing to have the residence approved, failing to cooperate with the officer, I think all of these things, the testimony that's come into the trial has been about where was he; did he register? Did he -- I'm sorry. Did he report where he was; was he where he was supposed to be?

And I think at least some clarification on the requirements of advising of where he lives and changing addresses and how that ties into someone who is in fact homeless is necessary for this jury to fully understand what was applicable in Mr. McNeil's case. So that why I included it. I'm not, again, trying to conflate the two, and it is my preference to leave it in.

But I hear your potential concerns of, you know, how this might overlap with the other charge that was taken out. But, again, my goal here was that the jury understand this charging document. Here's how one may be guilty of that; and to the extent that you're dealing with understanding what alleged violations occurred and you have a question about what the requirements were for reporting of

where he is staying, this clarifies. So that's kind 1 of why that's the way it is. 2 THE DEFENDANT: Court's indulgence. 3 MS. HOJJAT: No, no, no. 5 THE DEFENDANT: Sorry. THE COURT: Anything further? 6 MS. BONAVENTURE: No. Your Honor. MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Let me just finish up. g MS. HOJJAT: Oh, sorry. 10 So I don't think I changed THE COURT: 11 anything else. I then picked up where the 12 instructions from the State, you know, continued 13 after the charging statement, which is with all of 14 the other sort of how-to's for the jury, and I 15 deleted those ones that we discussed that I would 16 delete. I don't believe I made any other 17 adjustments to the remainder of the instructions. 18 So I'm sorry. Go ahead, Ms. Hojjat. 19 MS. HOJJAT: And, Your Honor, the defense's 20 only concern is -- and I don't have a verdict form 21 here, so I'm not sure if Your Honor left Count 2 on 22 the verdict form. 23 THE COURT: No, I did not. 24 MS. HOJJAT: I think the defense, at this 25

point, needs to object to that just because we need a verdict from the jury on that count in order for any sort of jeopardy or anything like that to attach to that count.

THE COURT: The directed verdict doesn't suffice?

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, unfortunately, per statute, and there's case law on this unfortunately because the State has appealed directed verdicts before, and the Nevada Supreme Court has stated that they will consider the appeal if there's no verdict from a jury.

So if the State were to prefer to appeal it, if the jury has not rendered a verdict, Your Honor's verdict unfortunately would not allow jeopardy to attach. So basically the defendant would be prejudiced by not having the jury return a verdict on this.

THE COURT: I'm just not sure what that
looks like, Ms. Hojjat, because obviously, I'm going
to indicate in the instructions that the
instructions are inclusive only of Count 1 and
instructed on the law as to Count 1 because Count 2
has been determined by the Court that we will not be
proceeding. I don't know how to then in turn --

what am I supposed to tell the jury, just 1 2 check not guilty on the box? I mean --Yes, Your Honor. 3 MS. HOJJAT: 4 MR. COOPER: I don't think that's appropriate, Your Honor. 5 I've never had occasion to THE COURT: 6 understand that to be the process. 7 MR. COOPER: And in order to alleviate any 8 appellate issues, I can stipulate right now on the 9 record that the State is not going to be challenging 10 a directed verdict on Count 2. So that's not going 11 to be an issue going forward in the future. And 12 13 I'll stipulate to that right now that we're not going to challenge any issues regarding the Count 2 14 and the directed verdict. 15 THE COURT: Well, I mean, we have that in 16 the record. I have to look into this, Ms. Hojjat. 17 Right now, obviously the verdict form is not going 18 19 to go to the jurors until they deliberate. Right. 20 MS. HOJJAT: THE COURT: And once we instruct and once 21 22 you get started with your closings, I'll send a heads-up to my law clerk to see what she can find, 23 and I'll go and check it out and we'll see, and 24 ultimately the verdict form we provide to them will 25

be the one that we think we need to provide to them. 1 2 But we do have that stipulation, for the record, at this time, if we needed it. 3 I would ask for MS. HOJJAT: Thank you. 4 one further stipulation from the State then. In the 5 event that this case -- that we receive a not -- we 6 receive a quilty verdict as to Count 1, it goes up 7 on appeal, for some reason, if the case were to be 8 reversed and come back, we would also want a 9 stipulation that Count 2 will not, at that time, be 10 added if we somehow end up on in a retrial on this 11 12 case. THE COURT: I'm not sure how you'd be able 13 14 But I -- is the State willing to make that 15 stipulation? And, Your Honor, not on the --16 MR. COOPER: correct. The State will not proceed on Count 2, 17 again based on the same exact facts that we've 18 alleged in this count where the jeopardy would have 19 20 attached. 21 THE COURT: okay. 22 MS, HOJJAT: Thank you. I think we got that covered THE COURT: 23 24 then I think I appreciate. I still will look into

it, regardless. Like I said, my understanding of

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how we proceed would not include providing that to 1 2 the verdict form to the jury in that fashion and 3 directing them how to fill it out. But we'll look 4 into that. 5 Otherwise, are we ready for the jurors to 6 return? 7 MS. HOJJAT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Don't forget I'm going 8 to ask the defense whether or not they --9 MS. HOJJAT: Oh, yes, that we rest. Yes, 10 11 Your Honor. 12 (The following proceedings were held in the presence of the jury:) 13 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 Thank you. Go ahead and please do take your seats as you reach them. Please make sure that 16 17 your cell phones are off or silenced. 18 Resuming the trial in the matter of State of Nevada vs. Steve McNeil. 19 Don't worry, jurors, that podium will not 20 21 be remaining there for very long. Accept that it's 22 in your way. At this time, before we took the recess, 23 the State had rested. I ask, at this time now, if 24 25 the defense -- how the defense would like to

1 proceed. 2 MS. BONAVENTURE: Your Honor, the defense 3 would rest. Okay. Accepting that the 4 THE COURT: defense has also rested their case, I will now 5 proceed to instruct you on the law. 6 And actually, I'm going to ask you, 7 Mr. Cooper, if you don't mind, can you assist us by 8 9 moving that podium. MR. COOPER: No problem, Your Honor. 10 11 THE COURT: I was thinking that you would use it, obviously in your closings. But as I need 12 to instruct the jury first, let me do that without 13 14 it being in the way of us. So at this time, Ladies and Gentleman, the 15 State and the defense have both rested their case. 16 17 And as I told you at the beginning of this trial on Monday, the Court would need to instruct you on the 18 law to apply to the facts and the evidence as you 19 find it to be. What I'm going to do now is read you 20 21 these instructions. 22 You do not have a copy set at this time. But when you go to deliberate, you will, in fact, 23 have a copy set at that time, each and every one of 24

you, so that you can refer to it. I do want to

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remind you, however, that, again, it's not about necessarily -- and there's some instructions that go to this point -- singling out any one instruction or overemphasizing any one instruction but just having them available to you should you have any need for clarification. Okay?

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So at this time, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, it is now my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that applies to this case. It is your duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts as you find them from the evidence. You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated in these instructions.

Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in the instructions of the Court. If in these instructions, any rule, direction, or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none may be inferred by you.

For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to

consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in the light of all the others. The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

An Information is but a formal method of accusing a person of a crime and is not of itself any evidence of his guilt. In this case, it is charged in a Second Amended Information that, on or between the 14th day of December 2012 and the 10th day of March 2014, within the county of Clark, state of Nevada, Steven Dell McNeil, the defendant above named, committed the crimes of -- "crime," sorry -- a violation of lifetime supervision by convicted sex offender, Category B felony, NRS 213.1243-53481 as follows:

Count 1, violation of lifetime supervision by convicted sex offender. Did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly, and feloniously violate the conditions of a lifetime supervision agreement signed by the defendant in 2007 and/or November 2012. Pursuant to having, in 2004, had been convicted of a sex offense that requires lifetime supervision in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, to wit: By refusing to submit to a urinalysis, failing to report, failing

to have his residence approved, failing to cooperate with his supervising officer, failing to maintain full-time employment, failing to abide by a curfew, and/or was terminated from his sex offender counseling.

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It is the duty of the jury to apply the rules of law contained in these instructions to the facts of the case and determine whether or not the defendant is guilty of the offense charged.

I will note that the Count 2 has been removed from these instructions, and you will not be given instructions on the law as to Count 2 because you are not being asked, at this time, to return a verdict as to Count 2. The Court has determined that that count will not proceed further in this trial. So you're only directed to return a verdict as to Count 1, and these following instructions will be as to Count 1.

Sex offender is defined as a person who, after July 1, 1956, is or has been convicted of a statutorily categorized sexual offense. A sex offender under a sentence of lifetime supervision who commits a violation of a condition imposed on him pursuant to the program of lifetime supervision is guilty of violation of lifetime supervision by

convicted sex offender.

A sex offender who has no fixed residence shall at least every 30 days, notify the local law enforcement agency in whose jurisdiction the sex offender resides if there are any changes in the address of any dwelling that is providing the sex offender temporary shelter or any changes in location where the sex offender habitually sleeps.

To constitute the crime charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and an intent to do the act. The intent with which the act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. "Intent" refers only to the State of mind with which the act is done.

Motive is not an element of the crime charged, and the State is not required to prove a motive on the part of the defendant in order to convict; however, you may consider evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case. The intent of a person or the knowledge that a person possesses at any given time may not ordinarily be proved directly because there is no way of directly scrutinizing the workings of the

human mind.

In determining the issue of what a person knew or what a person intended at a particular time, you may consider any statements made or acts done by that person and all other facts and circumstances received in evidence which may aid in your determination of that person's knowledge or intent.

You may infer, but you are certainly not required to infer, that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done. It is entirely up to you, however, to decide what facts to find from the evidence received during this trial.

The defendant is presumed innocent unless the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, every material element of the crime charged and that the defendant is the person who committed the offense.

A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all of the evidence, are in such a condition that they can

say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt.

not mere possibility or speculation. If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

There are two types of evidence, direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime which has been charged, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a chain of facts and circumstances which tend to show whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.

The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict. Statements, arguments, and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case. However, if the attorneys

stipulate to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

You must not speculate to be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer. You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the Court and any evidence ordered stricken by the Court. Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his manner upon the stand, his relationship to the parties, his fears, motives, interests or feelings, his opportunity to have observed the matter to which he testified, the reasonableness of his statements, and the strength or weakness of his recollections.

If you believe that a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of his testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

It is a constitutional right of a defendant

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in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. Thus the decision as to whether he should testify is left to the defendant on the advice of counsel and counsel of his attorney. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that he does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way.

Although your verdict must be unanimous as to a charge, all 12 jurors do not have to agree on the theory of criminal liability under which guilt is established. Therefore, even if you cannot agree on the theory of criminal liability, as long as each of you believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, you should return a verdict of guilty as to that charge.

Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of your common, experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.

A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

In your deliberations, you may not discuss your consider the subject of punishment as that is a matter which lies solely with the Court. Your duty is confined to the determination of the guilt of whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. When you retire to consider your verdict, you must select one of your member to act as foreperson who will preside over your deliberation and will be your spokesperson here in court.

During your deliberation, you will have all the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions, and forms of verdict, which have been prepared for your convenience. Your verdict must be unanimous. As soon as you have agreed upon a verdict, have it signed and dated by your foreperson, and then return with it to this room.

If during your deliberation you should desire to be further informed on any point of law or hear again any portions of the testimony, you must

reduce your request to writing signed by the foreperson. The officer will then return you to court where the information sought will be given you in the presence of and after notice to the District Attorney and the defendant and his counsel.

Read-backs of testimony are time consuming and are not encouraged unless you deem it a necessity. Should you require a read-back, you must carefully describe the testimony to be read back so that the court reporter can arrange her notes.

Remember the Court is not at liberty to supplement the evidence.

Now you will listen to the arguments of counsel who will endeavor to aid you to reach a proper verdict by refreshing in your minds the evidence and by showing the application thereof to the law. But whatever counsel may say, you will bear in mind that it is your duty to be governed in your deliberation by the evidence, as you understand it to be and remember it to be, and by the law as given to you in these instructions with the sole, fixed, and steadfast purpose of doing equal and exact justice between the defendant and State of Nevada.

And the instructions have been signed by me

and dated by me today's date.

Again, you will each have a copy of these instructions to refer to as need.

And at this time, I will invite the State to make closing remarks.

MR. COOPER: Thank you, Your Honor.

STATE'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

MR. COOPER: Ladies and Gentlemen, this is not a difficult case. This is truly a case of the facts speak for themselves. The facts, the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits that have been admitted, those are the facts. It is my job during closing argument to help you apply the facts to the law. And I submit to you that once you apply the facts to the law, you will return with the only reasonable verdict, and that is a verdict of guilty on the charge of violation of lifetime supervision.

Every criminal prosecution, the State must prove two things: The State must prove that a crime was committed, and the State must prove that the defendant is the one that committed the crime. And Count -- Number 2 there is not really in question

here. I mean, the defendant is the one that was being supervised. You heard from Officer Mangan; you heard from Sergeant Zanna; you heard from the Marcia Lee, who was actually supervising him while he was on his sex offender counseling. That's not in question here. We know who committed the crime.

The State must prove these things beyond a reasonable doubt. Guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We've all heard it in TV or in the movies. What does that mean? It does not mean all doubt, merely reasonable. For a doubt to be reasonable, it must be actual, not based on just mere possibility or speculation.

The State must also prove that the defendant intended to act, and this is one of your jury instructions, and the judge has already read it for you. And it says, "To constitute the crimes charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and intent to do that act." When we're talking about intent, it's very narrow, only the defendant's state of mind when he acted.

He didn't just trip and fall and violate his lifetime supervision. That's what we're talking about. He knew what he was doing. He was acting on

purpose. The intent with which an act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. So what does that mean? It means you can use all the facts, all the exhibits, the testimony of the witnesses in order to determine if you think the defendant knew what he was doing or he just tripped and fell.

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Violation of lifetime supervision. Let's get down to it. This is one of your jury instructions, and the judge read it for you, and it's the law on what a violation is. And I'm not going to bore you because the jury -- the instruction has already been read to you. But I dowant to point out a couple key points.

In order to get a violation, you need to have a sex offender. The defendant is a sex offender. We need to have a violation of a condition, and we'll talk about that in a moment, but we have that here too, and we need to have a program of lifetime supervision, and the defendant is on lifetime supervision. We have those three things, guilty.

So let's talk about the violations, and I don't know if you can read those because they're a little blurry. So I'll read them a little bit.

These are just little tidbits of the agreements that you'll have when you go back to deliberate, and there's three of them, and I encourage you to look at them. And you'll see these instructions to the defendant as conditions of what he needs to do while on the lifetime supervision.

And the first is these reportings/relieves:
You're required to submit a monthly report. The
report will be a true and correct. In addition, you
shall report in person as directed by your
supervising officer, and some other things that
don't really apply in this case.

You heard from Officer Mangan. She didn't see the defendant for over seven months. From August of 2013 to March of 2014, while he was still on lifetime supervision, while he was still her lifetime supervisionee or offender, he didn't call. She went to go look for him. She couldn't find him. He didn't go to P & P to look for her, didn't say anything to her. She was unable to find him. He was an absconder, as she said. Got that one right there. He wasn't reporting.

The next one is residence. And it says,
"You shall reside at a location only if that has
been approved by your supervising officer. You

shall not change your place of residence without first obtaining permission from your supervising officer." Well, we have this one too. Again, he heard from Officer Mangan as she talked about she went to the area he said he was living.

She used the map that he gave her. She used the map to try to find him. She looked for over an hour on two separate occasions. Couldn't find him. wasn't there. She actually surveyed the area too. Never found him because he wasn't there. Got that one too.

Next it's titled "Controlled substance" but essentially says that you're not supposed to use controlled substance and you're supposed to submit to periodic testing to determine whether or not you are using controlled substances. Well, on this one, we heard from Officer Mangan again. We also heard from Sergeant Zanna.

And do you recall what Officer Mangan said? She tried to give him a urinalysis, a drug test, and he refused. It says right there that he has to submit to the testing, but he refused. He said, "I'm not going to do it." I mean, she can't make him. She can't physically force him. He didn't do it. Got that one easy.

The next one is: You're supposed to cooperate with your supervising officer, and your behavior should justify the opportunity granted to you by this lifetime supervision. Again, we heard from Officer Mangan as she went into detail about her interactions with the defendant and about -- and particularly one interaction that he had with her. She was calling him in June and trying to get him to come in for his July report.

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And do you recall what she said? She said she had to call him three different times because twice he hung up on her. That's not really being cooperative. He also, the final time when he actually picked up that phone, said F-U, hung up again. I don't know how that can be cooperative.

Curfew. Officer Mangan talked to you about how in March, she wanted to make sure that she was going to know where he was going to be at a certain time because she wanted to be able to check in on him and see what he was doing, and she gave him a 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. curfew. She talked about that. Defendant came back the next month and said, "Hey, it's kind of hot out here at 5:00 p.m."

Officer Mangan said, "You know, you're right, it is hot. I'll give it to you from

8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. so you don't have to actually be at the area you told me you were going to be until 8:00 p.m." She went out there after 8:00 p.m. I think she said about 9:45 or so when she went out there she and surveyed it for an hour. When she was driving around the alleys looking for this defendant, he was nowhere to be found, nowhere in that area.

That's violation of his curfew. Not only did when he go into Sergeant Zanna's office and they were talking about, you know, "You're not really compliant with this curfew." He said, "I'm not going to be on a curfew. I'm not going to do it.

I'm not going to be a dog on a leash." Exact words.

Counseling. You heard from Marcia Lee, and it's pretty clear he got terminated from counseling. He's supposed to do counseling and he was terminated from counseling. That is a violation of lifetime supervision. It's that easy. That's it. Just that alone is enough. You heard from Marcia Lee. She explained why she had to terminate him. She explained when he was terminated, how long he was in the program, what the program consisted of, and that he was making little to no progress and he was terminated. That alone is enough.

I'm not talking about everything on the screen, just one of those is enough. Then we have the employment violation, but I'm not really going to get into that. It's hard to find jobs. And easy to understand, all violations are "and/or." That means one violation is enough to be found guilty of violation of lifetime supervision.

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Just one. Counseling or curfew or not cooperating or not having the right residence or not submitting to the U.A., urinalysis; or not reporting, any one. And in your jury instructions, you'll see this instruction. The judge already read it to you. It talks about whether or not everyone has to agree on which theory in which he's guilty under.

So if six people think that, well, he's guilty because he got terminated from counseling and then six different people think that he's guilty because he wasn't reporting, that's it. He's done. He's guilty. All 12 of you don't have to all agree on counseling or all agree on reporting. You just have to agree that he did one of those. That's it.

And this is another portion of that form that the defendant signed, and you'll have it again when you go back to deliberate, and this is just one

of them. We went through a little bit. There's three different forms and three different dates, and you'll have them all. And I want to focus on that bold part, and it's bold for a reason. I didn't make it bold. That's how it looks it looks on the actual form.

And it says, "I fully understand the penalties involved should I, in any manner, violate the foregoing conditions." "I fully understand the penalties involved should I, in any manner, violate the foregoing conditions." Well, he did. He did violate them. He indicated he knew what was going to happen when he violated them. This is a piece of your verdict form. You'll have this, again, when you go back to deliberate. And I submit to you that the only reasonable verdict is a verdict of guilty.

This is, again, I know in your jury instructions, and it's what we refer to as the "Common-sense instruction," and the judge read it to you. So I'm not going to read the whole thing. But I do need you to understand that you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment of reasonable men and women. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light

of common experience. This just means don't leave 1 your common sense at the courthouse steps. 2 Based on the evidence, we know that the 3 defendant violated the terms of his lifetime 4 supervision agreement, and it's that simple. And, 5 again, this isn't a who-done-it. We know who did 6 what. 7 And finally, this is your duty as a juror, 8 and the judge read this. "It is the duty of the 9 jury to apply the law contained to the facts of the 10 case and determine whether or not the defendant is 11 quilty of the offenses charged." And I submit to 12 you that the defendant is guilty of violation of 13 lifetime supervision under one of seven different 14 theories, but you only have to pick one. 15 Thank you. 16 THE COURT: Ms. Bonaventure. 17 MS. BONAVENTURE: Thank you, Judge. 18 THE COURT: We didn't turn off the -- can 19 you take down your --20 MR. COOPER: Can I just turn the TV off. 21 THE COURT: That's fine. 22 MR. COOPER: It might make it easier. 23 THE COURT: Thank you. 24 please proceed. 25

DEFENSE CLOSING ARGUMENT

MS. BONAVENTURE: Sex offender, sex offender, sex offender. It sounds bad. I know it, you know it, the D.A. knows it; and we know the D.A. knows it because he spared absolutely no opportunity to throw it around to get it in your head, and the reason he's done that is because he wants you to hear that word. He wants you to hear it over and over again in your head so that when you leave here and you go back to deliberate that, if you've left here with just one thought in your head, it's sex offender, sex offender.

He wants you to convict Steve based on the fact that he's a convicted sex offender, but that conviction all of us already know. The judge has told us it's in the past. Nobody is to consider it because what we're here for today are violations. Because Steve is on lifetime supervision, he's assigned to follow rules, and you're here to decide whether or not he broke those rules, nothing else.

So just to be clear, because I don't want this nagging anybody in the back of their head when you go back there, nothing that's decided in this

trial -- whether you go back there and you say guilty, whether you go back there and you say not guilty -- I don't want you to be confused, whatever happens, whatever you decide, Steve is going to remain on lifetime supervision. That does not change.

1.2

Now, you've seen the State's case, and make no mistake that Officer Mangan, that's the State's star witness. All right. The State's asking you to find Steve guilty based on her testimony, Officer Mangan, who is inexperienced. She's overzealous; she's under prepared, and she is unreliable.

Now, I'm sure you've gotten the sense that Steve's not -- he doesn't have the easiest personality in the world. He's a little bit difficult, to say the least. You heard the testimony Officer Mangan had words with him at several times. In fact, when Supervisor Zanna took the stand, you heard that while they were in his office, they're shooting NRS statutes at each other: what's the law, who knows the law; who knows the law better. So suffice it to say Steve's not the easiest person to get along with.

Ms. Hojjat, my co-counsel, she told you this case is about a personality conflict, and it

is. The State wants you to focus on 2013, specifically five months. As Ms. Hojjat told you in opening, you have to take a step back from 2013. You have to get a good idea of the big picture here because Steve was in lifetime supervision starting in 2007. He was on lifetime supervision for over five years before he was supervised by Officer Mangan for five months. There's a huge discrepancy in that time period.

So we have to put those five months into context to get a better picture. So yep, Steve was placed on lifetime supervision in 2007, and over those five years before Officer Mangan became his lifetime supervision officer, he was getting it done. He was trudging along. He was reporting every month to P & P. He had never had one violation. He had never been brought up on charges before for violation of lifetime supervision.

In the years before Officer Mangan, we all know that Steve had various supervising officers. He had four, in fact. And now Officer Mangan did testify that officers get changed for various reasons, various administrative reasons, and that's not a reason to hold it against Steve. There's nothing to indicate that he did anything wrong to

get supervisors changed. Supervisors change, and that's just the course of their employment.

During those five years, you heard that at times, he was employed; at times, he was unemployed. During that period of time, he was submitting to urinary analysis tests. He'd been reporting monthly without fail. He'd been doing everything he was supposed to be doing. In fact, before Officer mangan became his supervising officer, he was even able to maintain a stable residence for about five years before becoming homeless.

The most important thing to remember about those five previous years is that, even with all that, he had never, never been charged with a violation of his lifetime supervision. So when we look at those five years, you see that there were a lot of people moving in and out of his lifetime supervision. But there was one constant, and that constant was Steve.

He's a little bit older. He's probably set in his ways, and Steve was the same difficult person that he is today. He has never had a major issue in the years before Officer Mangan. He was -- the same difficult person he is today, he was that same difficult person five years ago. He was that same

difficult person with supervising officer number 1, number 2, number 3, number 4, and never had an issue before up until Officer Mangan became his lifetime supervision officer.

1.6

So as I keep telling you, in March 2013, the only thing that changed with his lifetime supervision is that Officer Mangan became his lifetime supervision officer, and Officer Mangan is inexperienced. She is overzealous. She's under prepared, and she is unreliable. She is inexperienced. We all know that. It was obvious. She was a rookie. She almost still is a rookie.

She became his officer in March, 2013. She was fresh out of the academy. She had just completed her training. In fact, Steve, she even testified was one of her first cases. So suffice it to say, she didn't have very much experience. Officer Mangan is very overzealous as a new officer, that's to be expected. But from day 1, she saw steve as an absconder.

Steven is a man who had never been charged with a violation. He'd been consistently making his monthly reports for the whole five years before she became his probation officer. Officer Mangan made one call to Steve's cell phone that didn't go

through, and based on that one call that didn't go through, she marked him a potential absconder.

she began with this perception of him. She had already gone into this supervision thinking that there was going to be a problem. She didn't wait to see him, to talk to him, to meet with him. She didn't know him at all. But he was a problem. In fact, she testified that she was surprised that steve showed up for his first monthly report, which actually brings me to my next point that she's under prepared.

she actually testified that when she received Steve's file, she reviewed the prior case history notes and she reviewed what the other probation officers had said about Steve; yet she was surprised that he showed up for monthly visit in March 2013? A review of the case notes would have made it clear to her that here is a guy who has not missed his monthly reports for five years.

what would lead anybody who had read that before to think that he would not show up for his march 2013 monthly report. In fact, it's not surprising at all that Steve would show up. And the fact that she jumped to that conclusion, that's a direct result of her inexperience of the fact that

she's got an overzealous attitude and the fact that she is constantly unprepared. Had she been prepared, she would have known, but she didn't. So she jumped to a conclusion. And that is the exactly the reason why she is unreliable.

In fact, the D.A. couldn't even ignore the fact that she was unreliable. She admitted to you on the stand is that she testified one way at this trial and that she testified a different way at the preliminary hearing. At preliminary hearing, Officer Mangan testified under oath. She took the stand. She raised her right hand, and she said, "I promise to tell the truth."

She told you that the way she answered the questions the preliminary hearing, they were different than what you heard here. But the truth, the truth never changes. The truth doesn't change if I ask you a question two months ago or if I ask you yesterday. The truth remains the same. She told you it was the first time that she had testified. But what difference does that make? Absolutely none.

Every person who takes that oath is expected to testify accurately and truthfully, whether it's the first time they've taken that stand

or whether they've taken that stand 100 times. In fact, you saw yesterday answers like, "I don't recall," "I don't know," I don't -- "I'd have to look at my notes." They're all perfectly reasonable responses. If you don't know an answer, you're not expected to give one. You're not expected to create an answer or make an answer up.

she said that her testimony was different at the preliminary hearing because she didn't have her notes. Well, who had her notes? Why didn't she have her notes? She knew she was testifying. Why didn't she bring them with her to court? She is constantly unprepared, and that's obvious with the fact that she continuously was unable to answer direct questions.

In fact, several, several occasions during her testimony yesterday here, I had to show her notes, and it wasn't a big deal. I showed them to her when she didn't remember something to refresh her memory. When she wasn't certain, "I'm not certain." I gave her her notes. You all saw it. And even sometimes when she was just flat-out wrong and she wasn't testifying accurately, I went, I showed her her notes, and sure enough she was able to find the answer in her notes.

Now, just for some examples, at preliminary hearing, I had asked her, and you all already know this, "Did he ever draw you a map as to where he actually slept?" Her answer at preliminary hearing was, "No, he did not draw me a map." So imagine my shock when heading into trial, we have not just one map that Steve drew but two maps that he drew her on two separate occasions.

The fact remains that Officer Mangan's testimony is unreliable. Her testimony at the preliminary hearing was unreliable, and her testimony here at trial was unreliable. Now, I don't want to beat a dead horse here, and I don't want to go through every single inconsistency that we heard here in trial yesterday. But one prime example of just how unreliable her testimony is is that she had said that she waited seven months to file charges, the charges that led to this instant case.

She waited seven months. For what reason? To try to contact Steve. To try and to get him in, to try to, I guess figure something out, get him back on track. I don't know. I had asked her, "If you had made those attempts, if you had driven out there, if you had called him, would those

occurrences be noted in your case files?" She said, "Yes, they would be."

So I said, "If I showed you your case notes, would you be able to tell me how many calls you made and how many times you went out?" And she said yes. So I showed hem to her. She took her time; she reviewed her notes, and how many times did she call Steve in those seven months when she was purportedly trying to contact him? Zero. Zero times. She called him zero times.

In fact, she said she tried multiple times to go out and find him where he was reporting to be living on the corner. How many times did she actually go out? She went out once. She went out once in February 2014 to go look for him, two weeks before she filed the charges in the instant case. So she was just wrong. She was wrong, and her testimony is unreliable.

So for the sake of argument, maybe she didn't intentionally lie. Maybe she's not intentionally misrepresenting the facts in this case. I don't know exactly why Officer Mangan had so many issues with her testimony. That's actually for you to decide. What we all do know is that she is unexperienced; she is overzealous, under prepared

and unreliable. I am asking you to question her credibility, not only based on the discrepancies what I pointed out just now but based on the multiple discrepancies I'm sure you, as witnesses sitting in the box, saw for yourselves.

okay. I'm going to move on. Let's talk about the charge in the case at this point. He's being charged with violation of lifetime supervision. There are seven different reasons that the State is alleging that he violated his lifetime supervision, three of which were to have occurred on August 15th: That was refusing to take a urinary analysis test; refusing to abide by curfew, or refusing to have a curfew set; failing to cooperate with the supervising officer.

The act of saying no is not enough because, as I told you in this case, we have to put it in context. Because by this time, August 2013, the communications between these two had already deteriorated. They did not have a good working relationship, to say the very least. Officer Mangan, at that point, had only been his supervising officer for five months, and a lot had happened in those five months.

In fact in March, the first month that he

reported with her, she branded him a potential absconder. She assigned him a curfew. She knew he was homeless, but she assigned him a curfew to be at the corner where he is reporting to sleep from 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. That's a 12-hour block, which for a homeless person is unreasonable. Imagine how hot it is outside here in Las Vegas sometimes. What if he has to go to the bathroom; what if he gets hungry, what is he supposed to do?

In April she threatens him with criminal charges. She says, "If you don't get your act together, I'm going to arrest you." This is the second month she had supervised him. In May, she had him draw her a map because by that time, she had tried to go out one time to try to find him standing on the corner, and she couldn't find him.

In June -- in June, it was Officer white.

We remember, I'm sure, that Officer White, there was one month that she was not his probation -- or lifetime supervision officer. So we get to July. Prior to their July meeting, the D.A. already told you they had words over the phone. Steve called her a bad name, we all know that. He comes into the office, and she arrests him. She arrests him. She arrests him and charges him with violating his

lifetime supervision. This is the first time she's seen him since that.

This is the fourth month that she's been his supervising officer. And keep in mind, he has been reporting for over five years at this point in time. She has had him for four months, and she's already arresting him. Now, I know that all of you guys remember nothing came of those charges.

Nothing came of those charges. He was released to the street. Nothing happened.

But things had already started to escalate at this point in time, and things further escalated once the State decided not to file those charges. She was likely upset. He's more than likely upset because he's never had any problems with his lifetime supervision officer; and here, five months into having this Officer Mangan as his lifetime supervision officer, he's arrested after basically five-and-a-half years of reporting; and now he is being arrested by his P.O. who's only been his P.O. for five months.

Neither of them are getting what they want, at this point, which results in a clash at the next monthly reporting, which is August 15th. In August she came in here and she testified that Steve walked

in; she told him he had to take a U.A., the urinary analysis, that he refused, and she went and took him straight up to her supervisor's office, Officer zanna's office.

Now, they both testified that, oh, he just refused to take the U.A. and he didn't want to be on a curfew. But neither of them handed Steve a cup.

Neither of them attempted to put him under a curfew. The curfew was never set. In fact, there was already a curfew in place, she testified, and there was no testimony that he ever broke that curfew. So by all accounts, he'd been abiding by that curfew.

And, you know, Officer Mangan still wants to violate him and have him arrested. So that's all that happened on August 15th. And don't forget, even though they're alleging that he violated three of his conditions on August 15th, he walked out the door. They didn't arrest him. They didn't cite him. They did nothing. He walked out the door.

Now, another theory of their -- of the violations is that he failed to report. Now, you know that he has -- they have to prove that he intentionally and knowingly failed to report. However, in late August, you know all know that Officer Mangan and both -- and Officer Zanna, they

both testified that they were shown a Cease and Desist letter sent to their offices by Steve.

I know that Officer Zanna sat there, he testified that, "You know what, that means nothing to me. It didn't relieve Steve of any responsibility for his lifetime supervision. As far as I'm concerned, nothing changed; everything remained the same." However, Steve didn't know that. Steve was now in a bad situation with Officer Mangan, and after five years of complying with his lifetime supervision, everything was falling apart. And, again, the only difference was Officer Mangan.

He sent the Cease and Desist letter. And as we talked about in voir dire, in jury selection, legal issues are very difficult. It's very difficult for highly educated people to understand the law, nevermind Steve, who has very little access to things. He's a homeless man. He doesn't have access to money, and he doesn't have access to attorneys.

sent a Cease and Desist letter asking them, "You know what, just leave me alone. Don't bother me anymore; I don't want to deal with it." You're going to see in the exhibits that's going to be with

you in the deliberation room. You're going to see the attached a UCC filing letter saying that -- declaring himself as a corporation. Another legal document in there.

He thought that he had done something to comply to actually get P & P off his back. So when he didn't make those monthly reports anymore, that's because he thought he didn't have to. In fact, you already know that Officer Mangan didn't call him after August of 2013. Officer Mangan didn't go looking for him. By all accounts, Steve didn't think anyone was looking for him. He thought this had worked. So he continued not to report, but he didn't know that he had to continue to report. He didn't intentionally fail to report.

Failing to have his residence approved.

Steve is homeless. Steve does not have a residence. You're going to see in your jury instructions, the law says that if a sex offender does not have a fixed address, they have to register at a street corner closest to where they habitually sleep. Now, habitually, "habitually" means regularly. It means repeatedly. It does not mean always. It means the place where I go most the time. And there was actually no evidence proffered by the State that his

residence or the street corner he registered at was disapproved.

11.

Now, failing to maintain full-time employment. The D.A. himself recognizes that it's hard to find a job, especially in the current economic situation we have found ourselves in the last practically decade at this point in time. But what this shows you, it's another indication of the personal struggle between Officer Mangan and Steve. She's throwing everything in, everything and the kitchen sink including this because -- and he hadn't always been unemployed. He had moments of being unemployed with his previous lifetime supervision officers, and he didn't get a violation then.

terminated from counseling. He was terminated from counseling. He doesn't control that. You heard Marcia Lee testify this morning that he had been in counseling for four years. He had been doing weekly counseling for four years. He was not terminated for lack of participation. He was showing up; he was participating, and he had been doing that for four years. He doesn't have control over whether or not he gets terminated. So that's not a willing violation of one of his conditions.

So now I'm going to thank you for your time. You guys have been really patient. The State is going to get up here one more time. They get to have the last word, and that's because they have the burden of proof here, which is beyond a reasonable doubt, to prove that Steve violated his lifetime supervision. Just remember that they have to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when you go back there to deliberate.

The State at this case has hung their case on the testimony of Officer Mangan. It's your responsibility to measure Officer Mangan's credibility at this point and decide how much faith you really want to put in her testimony. Think about it like this: Picture your favorite food. I love hamburgers, so I'm going to picture a hamburger.

This hamburger represents Officer Mangan's testimony. Now, imagine that every inconsistency, every inaccuracy that she testified to is a dead cockroach, and ask yourself how many dead cockroaches am I willing to pick out of this hamburger and still eat it? How many inconsistencies in Officer Mangan's testimony do you need before you throw out her entire testimony? And you have the

1 ability to do that. If you don't believe her testimony, if you 2 don't find it credible, you get to throw it away. 3 You don't have to listen to it. And once you've done that, I am certain that you're going to see 5 that this entire case is built on her unreliable 6 testimony and that you're going to return a verdict 7 of not guilty because Steve is not guilty. 8 Thank you very much. 9 THE COURT: Thank you. Excuse me. Thank 10 you, Ms. Bonaventure. 11 Mr. Cooper. 12 13 MR. COOPER: Thank you, Your Honor. And could you associate the Elmo for me, 14 15 please. THE REPORTER: It should still be on. 16 MR. COOPER: The Elmo, not the --17 It's coming up. It just takes THE COURT: 18 19 a minute. 20 STATE'S FINAL CLOSING ARGUMENT 21 22 MR. COOPER: Ladies and Gentlemen, the 23 defense focused a lot on Officer Mangan, and they 24 wanted to talk about -- they wanted to talk about 25

her for about 20 minutes. So we're not going to 1 talk about her at all. We're not going to talk 2 about any of the violations that she observed or the 3 violations that Sergeant Zanna observed. 4 Let's focus on just one violation, and 5 6 you'll see this when you go back to deliberate. This is a Jury Instruction Number 3. 7 It's comes in full --8 THE COURT: It needs to focus. It will 9 take a second. Usually it does it on its own. 10 MR. COOPER: See if that works. I hate 11 12 technology. THE COURT: It usually auto-focuses, but it 13 doesn't seem to be doing that, Jonathan. I don't 14 know if you can assist us. 15 MR. COOPER: There we go. 16 THE COURT: All right. Looks like we got 17 it. Nevermind. 18 MR. COOPER: Yes. Let's just focus on one 19 there. Let's just focus on termination from his 20 sex offender counseling. You'll have the 21 Termination Summary when you go back to deliberate, 22 and you'll see on there that he was terminated in 23 December of 2012. Well, the Defense talked a lot 24 about Officer Mangan. Officer Mangan wasn't even 25

his officer in December of 2012. So how did this personality conflict create this whole issue?

Because he already wasn't doing what he was supposed to do in December of 2012. Before she was in the sex offender unit, he was already in violation. But he got a couple more chances, you know. She didn't just violate him for this. It wasn't just that. It wasn't just the failure to get his residence approved or the failure to go to a curfew or to take the urinalysis. It was the combination of everything.

But I need you to understand, Ladies and Gentlemen, that it only takes one. You'll have the jury instruction when you go back and deliberate. It only takes one. If you believe it's just the termination from sex offender counseling, guilty. If you believe it's just the reporting, guilty. Only takes one.

But for the sex offender counseling, it wasn't the defendant's fault; it was Marcia Lee's fault because with her 20 years of experience as a sex offense counselor and her doing groups and individual sessions, it was her fault that the defendant was not doing what he was supposed to do. It was her fault that he showed little or no

progress. That wasn't -- that wasn't on him.

Just like when he was being supervised by Officer Mangan, it wasn't on him either. It was on her. It was her fault because she's a new officer. It was her fault that he didn't do the curfew. Doesn't really seem right. But like I said when I started in the very beginning, this is not a difficult case. So I'm not going to take your time any further and go through all the other different things.

I would just say that the Defense was talking about the years before in 2007, when he was actually reporting, and 2008 when he was actually reporting and stuff like that. That doesn't matter. We're talking about 2012 through 2014. And it makes sense that he would report at first; right? He wanted to show that he could complete those requirements. But he got fed up. That's what it is.

He was tired of the requirements. He thought they were too stringent, didn't want to do them anymore; he was fed up and said, "Enough is enough, I'm not doing anything else, and you guys can't make me." That's why we're here.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cooper

I'm going to invite the officers of the court forward now to take charge of the jurors. The clerk will now swear the officers.

(Clerk administers oath to Court Officers.)

THE COURT: The reason we have two officers at this time to take charge of the jurors is because, as you know, we have 12 jurors who are going to deliberate and will proceed with Officer Crenshaw.

But we also have two jurors who are alternates. Now, you are not discharged from your duties at this time. You will only discharged upon notification of the Court that a verdict has been reached or the case has been resolved. But in the meantime, those alternate jurors will need to proceed with Ms. Springberg to get further instructions. And I can tell you, at this time, that the jurors that are the alternates who will proceed with Ms. Springberg are jurors Bonnie Schultz and Joey Hamilton. You'll proceed with Ms. Springberg.

Everyone else please take direction from Marshal Crenshaw, and we'll see you back when we're ready -- when you're ready.

(The following proceedings were held outside the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: I do have one thing for the record. They never shut the door. It makes me crazy. Go ahead and have a seat. They'll figure it out or somebody will get it.

Thank you, Ms. Bonaventure. I appreciate that.

I did take a moment -- well, I shouldn't say I did, my law clerk did -- take a moment to do some quick research on the issue that was raised in terms of the verdict form and the circumstances of how the verdict should be pursued when the Court had issued the directed verdict. And my interesting perhaps conclusion is going to be that the Defense is correct; however, I'm not going to do it differently than what we had already discussed doing it. I'll tell you why.

I found a couple of cases, or my law clerk provided me with a couple of case, one recently unpublished, "Battle vs. State of Nevada"; and one published back in 2000, "State of Nevada vs. Combs." And basically what these cases make clear -- they discuss a situation where the party asked for the Court to render a different verdict than guilty that

the jury had reached based on insufficiency of the evidence. And the Court determined that -- the supreme Court determined that the District Court would be in error in doing so, that that's something that has to be determined on appeal.

But these cases do speak to, and there is a specific statute, NRS 175.381, that speaks to if the Court does determine at the close of either side's case that there is insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction on one or more of the charges, that the Court is supposed to give an instruction to the jury regarding acquittal, which the jury is not required to follow, but that they should give that instruction rather than making that determination for the jury.

The reason I'm not going to change it, however, is that these cases -- and I specifically refer you back to "Combs" and "Battle" -- make it clear that regardless of what occurred, the double jeopardy does attach, that the State cannot pursue the charge again once the -- even if it's the Court's determination and even if the Court erred in how it instructed or failed to instruct the jury, that the double jeopardy, once the Court makes that determination of the insufficiency of the evidence,

the double jeopardy does attach.

So because it's not going to have a different outcome and because I did not instruct them with regard to that second count and then further instruct them that I would designate that my review of the evidence is that it's insufficient and recommend acquittal, I didn't want to further confuse them by trying to somehow put it back in or reinstruct or have it on the verdict form.

So because double jeopardy attaches regardless and because Mr. Cooper has already stipulated that the State does not intend to pursue it, I am going to sort of acknowledge my own error but ultimately determine that it doesn't warrant us changing the direction which we've proceeded, so

MR. COOPER: Your Honor, one just -- one issue. On my -- I don't know if my instructions were the same, but the wrong information was being used in Count 3. It was the information that talks about the agreement date and everything like that, and I'm not going to object to it. It is what it is, at this point. I just didn't know --

THE COURT: Hold on. I've got the original here.

MS. HOJJAT: Oh.

I made the change to the one THE COURT: 1 language, but I didn't --2 what else did we need to change? 3 MR. COOPER: Because I did file that 4 Second, that actually strikes that language about 5 the lifetime supervision, lifetime supervision dates 6 or lifetime supervision agreement dates that it was 7 signed on and stuff like that, that was stricken in 8 the Second Amended Information, but it is contained 9 in that document. But I mean I --10 THE COURT: I apologize. I think what 11 ended up happening was when you sent us the first 12 version and then you sent us the second version, 13 when I went back in and I made the adjustments, I 14 only adjusted --15 MR. COOPER: Yes. 16 THE COURT: -- a portion of it and not all 17 of it. 18 MR, COOPER: I don't -- I don't think it's 19 going to create an issue. 20 But it was a change that you THE COURT: 21 made; it wasn't necessarily one that you were 22 advocating for. Correct me if I'm wrong. So I 23 think in the long run, it's again a harmless --24 MR. COOPER: It is -- yeah, it is what it 25

is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- mistake more than an error, I think in anything. What I did was I changed the sex offense that requires lifetime supervision language, and I forgot about the discussion and didn't see the other changes. So appreciate you pointing that out.

Ms. Hojjat.

MS. HOJJAT: Your Honor, we'll submit it on what the Court said. My only inquiries to the Court would be, because we had submitted a proposed jury instruction about the directed verdict, I didn't end up putting that in my packet because I thought the jury was going to be instructed.

would the Court like me to file that? I didn't file it as of now. Whatever the Court's preference is.

THE COURT: I don't that we need it now that I have the record of the Court's determination of where it erred, but again, why we're not proceeding further --

MS. HOJJAT: Okay.

THE COURT: -- to make a different change and, again, further confuse the jury or bring anything else into the jury's purview. I think what

we have right now is what we should have ultimately, 1 which is the jury has instructions on the one charge 2 that's still, you know, really available to them 3 potentially for conviction and let them deliberate 4 and let them come to a conclusion on that, and we'll 5 But this was not without error, the handling 6 of the directed verdict, and I appreciate the 7 opportunity to clarify that, and we'll take care of 8 it from there. 9 But go ahead and give your cell numbers, or 10 however you want us to reach you, and we'll advise 11 you as soon as the jury has returned with a verdict. 12 MS. HOJJAT: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 Thank you. THE COURT: 14 (Jury deliberates.) 15 (The following proceedings were held in the 16 presence of the jury:) 1.7 THE COURT: Thank you, everybody. Please 18 have a seat. 19 Please let the record reflect the presence 20 of the defendant, his counsel, and the deputy 21 district attorney. 22 will the parties, at this time, please 23 stipulate, for the record, of the presence of the 24 25 jury.

1 Yes, Your Honor. MS. BONAVENTURE: 2 MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 3 Has the jury elected a foreperson, and if 4 that foreperson could please identify themselves by 5 6 juror number at this time. 7 JUROR NO. 1: Yes, Your Honor. Myself, 8 Jason Alper. 9 THE COURT: Juror No. 1. Thank you. Has the jury reached a verdict? 10 JUROR NO. 1: Yes, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Would you please provide the 12 13 verdict to the marshal so he can bring it forward for the Court's review. 14 15 will the defendant and his attorneys please stand, and the clerk will now read the verdict out 16 17 loud. District Court, Clark County, 18 THE CLERK: 19 Nevada, State of Nevada, Plaintiff vs. Steve Dell 20 McNeil, Defendant, Case No. C-14-297725-1, Department No. 25. Verdict. We, the jury in the 21 above-entitled case, find the Defendant, Steve 22 Dell McNeil, as follows: 23 Count 1, violation of lifetime supervision 24 by convicted sex offender, guilty. Dated 25

```
July 9th, 2014, signed by the foreperson,
1
     Juror No. 1.
2
              Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, is this
3
     your verdict as read? So say you one, so say
4
     vou all.
5
              THE COURT: You have to --
6
              THE JURY: Yes.
7
              THE COURT: -- say so.
8
              would either side wish to have the jury
9
     polled?
10
              MS. BONAVENTURE: Yes, Your Honor. Please.
11
              THE COURT: All right. Let me just clarify
12
     because sometimes this is confusing. That was your
13
     group statement that that was your verdict.
14
              At this time, the clerk will read off your
15
     juror number, one by one, and ask you if this is in
16
     fact your individual verdict to confirm whether that
17
     is the case.
18
              THE CLERK: Juror No. 1, is this your
19
     verdict as read?
20
              JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
21
              THE CLERK: Juror No. 2, is this your
22
     verdict as read?
23
              JUROR NO. 2: Yes.
24
               THE CLERK: Juror No. 3, is this your
25
```

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verdict as read?
1
              JUROR NO. 3: Yes.
2
              THE CLERK: Juror No. 4, is this your
3
     verdict as read?
4
              JUROR NO. 4: Yes.
5
              THE CLERK: Juror No. 5, is this your
6
     verdict as read?
7
              JUROR NO. 5: Yes.
8
              THE CLERK: Juror No. 6, is this your
9
     verdict as read?
10
              JUROR NO. 6: Yeah.
11
              THE CLERK: Juror No. 7, is this your
12
     verdict as read?
13
             JUROR NO. 7: Yes.
14
              THE CLERK: Juror No. 8, is this your
15
     verdict as read?
16
              JUROR NO. 8: Yes.
17
             THE CLERK: Juror No. 9, is this your
18
     verdict as read?
19
              JUROR NO. 9: Yes.
20
              THE CLERK: Juror No. 10, is this your
21
     verdict as read?
22
              JUROR NO. 10: Yes.
23
              THE CLERK: Juror No. 11, is this your
24
     verdict as read?
25
```

JUROR NO. 11: Yes.

. 14

THE CLERK: And, Juror No. 12, is this your verdict as read?

JUROR NO. 12: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you. You may have a seat while I discharge the jury.

I just want to let you know, at this time, first and foremost, of course how much the State, the Defense and the Court appreciates your service. Any case, no matter how long, is incredibly important, and your service is incredibly valuable to this community.

Of course, I've instructed you throughout the course of this trial that you are not to discuss the case with anyone, including yourselves, until you had a chance to deliberate and reach a verdict. Now that you have completed your duties, you are of course able to speak with anyone you wish to speak to about this trial, about your verdict, and the circumstances in the case.

sometimes counsel will like to speak to the jury to help better learn their skills and learn what worked and did not work, as the case may be in the trial. So you're certainly welcome to speak with counsel. There's no reason not to, but you're

certainly not required to either.

1.2

5

If anybody wishes to speak with you and you don't wish to speak with them, just let them know. If anybody persists, which I don't anticipate; but if that were to happen and you needed any assistance in that regard, just have the Court -- let the Court know, and we'll take care of it.

But, again, I just want to thank you for your service. I want to let you know, again, that you are welcome now to speak with anyone you see fit. And at this time, you are discharged, and the marshal will have any additional information you may need.

Thank you very much.

(The following proceedings were held outside the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: In case I didn't say it previously, of course the clerk needs to record the verdict in the minutes of the court, and that will be done, and the defendant will be returned to custody and remanded back to custody for a sentencing date in 60 days.

MR. COOPER: And, Your Honor, the State would just ask that he be held without bail at this point. Obviously, any issue in terms of whether or

```
not he was guilty has already been determined.
1
     I think that's the State's right pursuant to
2
     Nevada law.
              THE COURT: Counsel.
4
              MS. BONAVENTURE: Your Honor, I would ask
5
     for bail to remain the same.
6
              THE COURT: Okay. The Court will remand
     the defendant without bail. Any presumption of
8
     innocence is now resolved by the jury's verdict, and
9
     the Court will set the matter for sentencing on the
10
     date that would be the soonest we could get for
11
     anyone who remains in custody, which would be
12
13
     60 days.
              THE CLERK: September 10th, 9:00 a.m.
14
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you all very
15
     much. We'll see you then.
16
              MR. COOPER: Thank you very much,
17
     Your Honor.
18
              MS. BONAVENTURE: Thank you, Your Honor.
19
              MR. COOPER: Always a pleasure. It is what
20
21
     it is.
22
              (The proceedings concluded at 3:55 p.m.)
23
                              -000-
24
25
```

1	CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF NEVADA))SS:
4	COUNTY OF CLARK)
5	
6	I, Dana J. Tavaglione, RPR, CCR 841, do
7	hereby certify that I reported the foregoing
8	proceedings; that the same is true and correct as
9	reflected by my original machine shorthand notes
10	taken at said time and place before the
11	Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Court Judge,
12	presiding.
13	Dated at Las Vegas, Nevada, this 23rd day
14	of December 2014.
15	
16	/s/Dana J. Tavaglione
17	Dana J. Tavaglione, RPR, CCR NO. 841
18	Certified Court Reporter Las Vegas, Nevada
19	
20	
21	
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1	DISTRICT COURT
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
3	CLERK OF THE COURT
4	
5	
6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
7	Plaintiff,) Case No. C-14-297725-1
8	vs.) Dept No. XXV
9	STEVE DELL MCNEILL,
10	Defendant.)
11	.)
12	
13	
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE KATHLEEN DELANEY
15	JULY 30, 2014, 9:00 A.M.
16	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
17	OF PROCEEDINGS
18	
19	APPEARANCES:
20	For the Plaintiff: For the Defendant:
21	NICOLE CANNIZZARO, ESQ. XIOMARA BONAVENTURE, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney Deputy Public Defender
22	200 Lewis Avenue 309 S. Third Street, #226
23	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
24	
25	REPORTED BY: BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867
	1

LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 2014, 9:00 A.M.

PROCEEDINGS

-3

THE COURT: State of Nevada versus Steve McNeill.

I see Mr. McNeill present in custody.

I had asked for you earlier because I had matters on the calendar interestingly enough, and I just kind of want to give this background for you and for Mr. McNeill's edification. But there were four matters on the calendar this morning where an attorney had successfully applied to the court, my predecessor Judge Mosley, to have their client released from lifetime supervision -- certain conditions of lifetime supervision, let me be clear -- and the Court agreed to allow the release from those conditions.

I am not sure on what basis they did it, but here's what happened. The State then appealed to the supreme court that those certain conditions 1 through 23 be placed on the lifetime supervisor's Parole Board similar to those in this case. And they were then removed by Judge Mosley at the request of counsel.

It was done. The vehicle that was used to do that was a postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. And what happened was the supreme court said

that's the wrong vehicle, that unless the individual is still under a term of incarceration that the Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus isn't available to them and anybody who is under lifetime supervision is no longer under a term of incarceration.

grounds, the procedural grounds. But what was interesting to me is the supreme court mandated this court to reinstate those conditions. And there was a footnote where the supreme court speculated that to the extent because there was no findings of fact and conclusions of law, as all the reasons we don't know what the basis for the ruling was, that to the extent that there was any determination by the court made that 176.0931(3) would apply which is when you could apply to release from lifetime supervision conditions after a certain period of time and comply with a certain condition, that that was not applicable to any of these defendants either.

So the supreme court ---

THE DEFENDANT: Begging the Court's pardon. Just exactly how much time is that? What does the date start and what is the final date?

THE COURT: I believe it's ten years.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. From the date of

conviction?

THE COURT: Mr. McNeill, let me have that confirmation with the counsel. I don't want to misspeak. I'm not trying not to answer your question. My recollection is it is from the start of the lifetime supervision through to conclusion. After ten years you can apply. It is not an automatic. And there are certain conditions that have to be met.

THE DEFENDANT: Right. I had the conversation with counsel last time we met. They were not sure. I have no way to check.

THE COURT: It has changed. And there were times when that was suspended because of appeals that were happening.

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

THE COURT: And so there is a lot of confusion on that point, so that's not your counsel's fault. You can see I don't want to misspeak either.

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

THE COURT: But generally, my recollection of the cases that have come on the calendar if certain conditions have been met and a minimum is at least served on lifetime supervision without problems for at least ten years, then there is the possibility to apply. But that's kind of a side note.

So to finish my thoughts here, Ms. Bonaventure,

so what I thought was interesting was the supreme court wasn't just saying, you know, procedurally the Court did this wrong so reinstate the conditions. They clearly had thought it through and it seems to me that there would have been an opportunity there for them to say, you know, although this was an argument by a good counsel and maybe will be and maybe should be so that the supreme court can determine these particular arguments. But they didn't say, Oh, by the way, these conditions shouldn't be reinstated. They in fact did reinstate them.

So for interest sake, if you ever want to look and see, based on the calendar, how those cases went down, I found them kind of interesting.

But you have filed your postconviction motions, and to the extent the briefings, and I will of course absolutely let you make any representations or argument you want to make for the record. But to the extent that you were seeking the relief under NRS 176.525, it does appear that there is a time constraint on that which is seven days after determination of guilt.

The verdict, of course, is on the 9th. The judgment of conviction was subsequent to that. I do not have guidance on which date of those two is operative, but I would assume that perhaps it should be the judgment of conviction date, which would not make that untimely. But

if it is to be determined that it was to be the verdict date, because that was when the determination of guilt was made, then it would be untimely.

So I am just raising that there could potentially be a time constraint. So just out of an abundance of caution for these types of motions in the future, I don't know the answer to that. But it is not necessarily going to be the driving force on any decision today. I just wanted to point out but to the extent that there is a potential for the untimeliness of that particular motion aspect, the NRS 176.525, I am going to for today's purposes hear that motion basis as well as the other motion basis because I believe that it should be seven days from the judgment of conviction entry not from the verdict entry, but who knows.

So based on the fact that you have made two arguments for relief, is there anything you want to add for the record?

MS. BONAVENTURE: No, Your Honor. Everything is in the motion. I would just submit on the arguments in the motion.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Cannizzaro, the State's Opposition covered the ground that the Court had already covered during trial, and I certainly think it preserved these matters for the record. I have no qualms with this

matter being addressed in a postconviction motion so that it is in the record and thoroughly determined. But do you have anything you wish to add?

MS. CANNIZZARO: No, Your Honor. We would submit it on the State's Opposition.

THE COURT: All right. For the reasons stated in the State's Opposition which do conform with what the Court determined during the course of the trial, the Court is going to deny the motion, which again sought relief on bases; one, the Motion For Arrest of Judgment Pursuant to 176.525, Or in the Alternative, Motion For Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to NRS 175.381, the Court does believe that the legislature has properly conferred authority to the Board, and the Board then has properly carried out that authority to determine that lifetime supervision conditions can and are applicable and can provide the bases for charges of violation if they are not complied with.

I guess the only thing I would add for the record is in hindsight on the verdict form it probably would have been beneficial to have specific boxes as to each of the bases for the violation so that we would know which one or ones the jurors found to be the basis, but we didn't have that and it is not typical to have that. But in the civil world it certainly would have been required to have that

as a special verdict form because then on appeal when the court looks at this they will not necessarily know from the jury what the bases was and because some of the bases that were alleged, correct me if I'm wrong,

Ms. Bonaventure, some of the bases or at least one of the bases that was alleged would be from the statute. But the vast majority of them were from the Parole Board's added conditions, if you will.

So it might have been helpful to know. We won't know that. But we will at least know when the supreme court takes a look at this whether or not that authority is there or whether or not in order to have a violation of lifetime supervision charge it has to be just within the statute.

I am intrigued as anyone to see if the supreme court agrees with my analysis, but my analysis has already been made and I think the State set that out clearly. So I will ask the State to prepare the order denying the motion on those bases. And then obviously give you a chance to review it so we do have a clear record.

MS. BONAVENTURE: All right. Thank you so much.

THE COURT: Thank you.

(Proceedings were concluded.)

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF NEVADA)
4	COUNTY OF CLARK)
5	
6	I, BRENDA SCHROEDER, a certified court reporter
7	in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the
8	foregoing and attached pages 1-11 inclusive, comprise a
9	true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings reported
10	by me in the matter of THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff,
11	versus STEVE DELL MCNEILL, Defendant, Case No. C297725, on
12	July 30, 2014.
13	
14	
15	
16	Dated this 28th day of December, 2014.
17	
18	/s/ Brenda Schroeder BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867
19	
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1	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA CLERK OF THE COURT
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6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
7	Plaintiff,) Case No. C-14-297725-1
8	vs.) Dept No. XXV
9	STEVE DELL MCNEILL,)
10	Defendant.)
11	<u> </u>
12	
13	
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE KATHLEEN DELANEY
15	SEPTEMBER 10, 2014, 9:00 A.M.
16	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF
17	SENTENCING
18	
19	APPEARANCES:
20	For the Plaintiff: For the Defendant:
21	KRISTINA RHOADES, ESQ. XIOMARA BONAVENTURE, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney Deputy Public Defender
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23	
24	
25	REPORTED BY: BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867
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1 LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014, 9:00 A.M. 2 PROCEEDINGS 3 4 State of Nevada versus Steve 5 THE COURT: McNeill. Seeing Mr. McNeill present in custody. 6 7 This matter is on for sentencing today. Is there any legal cause or reason why we cannot proceed 8 with sentencing? 9 10 MS. BONAVENTURE: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. This of course was a 11 jury verdict so we need to hear from the State their 12 13 argument. MS. RHOADES: Yes, Your Honor. The Court sat 14 through the trial, knows the facts of the case. The 15 State is asking for the maximum sentence on this 16 defendant; 28 to 72 months in the Nevada Department of 17 Corrections. He has 158 days credit for time served. 18 I do realize that P and P recommends a minimum 19 20 front end 12 to 48. I am kind of surprised about that. I mean, his criminal history dates back to 1986, and it 21 is not small things that he is doing. These are very 22 scary crimes against children in different states. 23 So he starts off 1986, California, he has a 24 lewdness with a minor. He violates parole in that case. 25

1993 in Idaho, he is picked up for carrying a concealed weapon. 1995 he is in Texas and has picked up a misdemeanor assault charge with injury. He was convicted of that charge in Texas. In 2004 he comes to Nevada, he picks up more sexual assault charges against minors and is sentenced to prison in that case.

Now, we have him for a violation of lifetime supervision. He is not doing what he should, he is not reporting as he should. And, you know, I know that these charges are not as serious as the prior crimes that he has but his criminal history has shown that he is never going to change. He is never going to change. And we are asking for the 28 to 72 in this case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Bonaventure.

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MS. BONAVENTURE: Yes, Your Honor. Obviously,
Ms. Rhoades has not had the ability to watch the trial at
this point. First of all, Your Honor, I want to give you
an idea of the procedural history in this case because at
any particular point in time there was never the same
District Attorney standing in the District Attorney spot.

When we first started this case in arraignment there was -- it's actually really funny to me that the State is now asking for the maximum which there was an early offer relayed in court at his arraignment for the

defendant, which was actually never relayed to him because of the events that took place in justice court that morning.

However, that early offer was a misdemeanor and six months in the Clark County Detention Center. Like I said, that was never relayed to him. It was set for preliminary hearing. I was assigned as his attorney. I asked the DA to reextend that same offer, misdemeanor, six months. My client was willing to take that offer.

We show up for prelim -- and that was Alicia

Albritton -- she said absolutely not. She said at that

point in time she thought this case was worth a gross

misdemeanor and refused to extend the misdemeanor offer.

We left the preliminary hearing on and at preliminary hearing it was then Mr. Zadrowski, at which point he reextended the initial six months offer which Mr. McNeill said, Yes, I will take that six-month offer.

And right before the judge called the case, right before Judge Lippis called the case for prelim, in walks a camera crew, Officer Mangan and her supervisor who also testified at the trial, at which point the offer for the misdemeanor six months was rescinded. He was no longer able to take that offer and the preliminary hearing was forced forward for the cameras.

Later on that night I did see on the news -- it

was some story about how the State of Nevada goes too light or offer misdemeanors. So they used Mr. McNeill as a test case and used him to go forward and fulfill their political agenda at this point in time when this case should have never even made it to your courtroom, Your Honor, had that camera not come into court.

And then we're set for trial, at which point,
Mr. Zadrowski is on another case and Mr. Cooper picks up
the case. Mr. Cooper refuses to give a misdemeanor
offer. I tried to explain to him the procedure of the
entire case beforehand. He didn't care one way or the
other. His offer I believe was a felony minimum. Of
course my client is not willing to take that at this
time, so we proceed with trial.

And at trial, Your Honor, you saw what an awful witness their probation officer was. In fact, after preliminary hearing, Mr. Zadrowski said this case will absolutely deal, which is why I counted on that in order to talk to Mr. Cooper. Nobody cared. Nobody listened. That is why we did go forward with trial, Your Honor.

Like I was saying, Officer Mangan took the stand. She had so many inconsistent statements, Your Honor, that when we went to talk to the grand jury they had nothing good to say about her. They said the reason they convicted him was because prior to Officer Mangan

was the fact that he did get terminated from his sex offense counseling.

And so they hung their hat on that in order to convict him. Nothing that Officer Mangan had said even rang true with them. And that just goes to show how aggressive Officer Mangan was with Mr. McNeill.

Something that happened even prior to the fact that he was even in her supervisory capacity over him — his prior POs, two POs that he went through before he even got to him, didn't see fit to terminate him based on those grounds. Only when she became his officer. Only when she is trying to revoke and revoke and revoke him, and is unsuccessful, her charges are denied does she then take that one thing that was in the past and throw it in to the mix now.

I think the maximums are absolutely not appropriate in this, especially considering the fact the initial offer in this case was a misdemeanor, six months.

I am not going to stand here and ask for probation, Your Honor, but the State is saying that he is a terrible, terrible person. Yes, he has committed sexual offenses. That's why he is on lifetime supervision. But what he is being convicted of now, Your Honor, has nothing to do with -- it is nowhere in the ballpark of his priors, of his sex offenses. This is not

a new sex offense.

This is a situation where the PO didn't like him, they didn't get along, there was a personality conflict and so she wanted to get rid of him.

At this point, Your Honor, what I would ask for would be the minimums in this case, which is recommended by Parole and Probation. They ask for 12 to 48. I would ask for 12 to 36, Your Honor, because quite honestly I think that the case was just a mess from the beginning. He has been in custody for this long. To punish him further for the actions that were misrepresented by PO Mangan would just be injustice across the board.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Bonaventure.

Mr. McNeill, did you want to address the Court? We haven't had the chance before obviously, but this is your date for sentencing.

THE DEFENDANT: Only for the record and with all due respect, in recognition of your service to our community, I would like to accept your oath of office as a lawful binding contract between the two of us.

I would like to motion this court at this time to drop the charges in light that the State has failed to present a cause of action for which relief can be granted in that there is no victim so who would you grant relief to.

Furthermore, there is also the fact that, well, quite frankly, I would like to see some proof of jurisdiction, not just jurisdiction of me but over the subject matter and subject of course because I have heard Your Honor on several different cases say that this is a criminal court and I have been convicted of a contract violation. That's a civil matter.

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And then I would like to also see some proof that the prosecution actually obtained leave of court giving Your Honor jurisdiction to even hear their side of the case.

And then there was the fact that I was forced to take an attorney. I am told by the first judge or magistrate, whoever she was -- I never even get the chance to read her nameplate on the desk. I wasn't in the courtroom for more than 30 seconds before she forced an attorney on me.

And then when I vehemently objected for the record, she simply just bailed from the courtroom and had me dragged out.

THE COURT: Mr. McNeill, I gave the same instruction to another defendant earlier today, this is your time for sentencing. This is not to revisit anything that has happened before today. If you want to advocate for your sentencing and what your sentencing

should be, your attorney has already very passionately argued on your behalf for something lesser than what was recommended in the PSI.

I appreciate that you have questions and concerns about this Court's jurisdiction. I can say for the record that we have the jurisdiction. This is a criminal case. It has been tried in front of a jury that has reached a verdict. This is now the time for sentencing. So if you have anything relevant to sentencing, I am happy to hear it, if not, then we need to move on.

THE DEFENDANT: It says in Joyce versus US that there is no discretion to ignore the lack of jurisdiction. It also says in US versus Well that without jurisdiction you can't make a ruling against me of any kind or even pass sentence on me.

THE COURT: Mr. McNeill, as we have already established that there is jurisdiction in this case --

THE DEFENDANT: I haven't seen it established.

THE COURT: You don't need to see it,

Mr. McNeill, I stated it for the record. We are complete
now.

I am going to at this time adjudicate Mr. McNeill guilty of the violation of lifetime supervision --

THE DEFENDANT: So you don't have to follow the law?

THE COURT: Mr. McNeill, sit down if you are going to stay in the courtroom, otherwise I will have you removed. I have to complete the sentencing today. The law is what the law is. We have already had a trial. I have already told you I have jurisdiction. If you want to in a postconviction petition research and explore that issue you are welcome to do so. I am telling you there is jurisdiction.

So you are not speaking about sentencing, we do not have anything further to talk about.

You are adjudicated guilty of violation of
lifetime supervision by a convicted sex offender. I am
going to sentence you as requested by your attorney
because I do know the totality of the circumstances in
this case, to a minimum of 12, maximum of 36 months in
the Nevada Department of Corrections, and impose a \$25
administrative assessment fee, and I am going to give you
150 days credit for time served. Good luck, sir.

(Proceedings were concluded.)

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1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF NEVADA) ss.
4	COUNTY OF CLARK
5	
6	I, BRENDA SCHROEDER, a certified court reporter
7	in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that
8	the foregoing and attached pages 1-13, inclusive,
9	comprise a true, and accurate transcript of the
10	proceedings reported by me in the matter of THE STATE OF
11	NEVADA, Plaintiff, versus STEVE DELL MCNEILL, Defendant,
12	Case No. C297725, on September 10, 2014.
13	
14	
15	
16	Dated this 29th day of December, 2014.
17	
18	/s/ Brenda Schroeder BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867
19	DALINGUE DOLLAR DE LA CONTROL
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CASE NO. C297725	TRIAL DATE: July 7, 2014
DEPT, NO. XXV	JUDGE: KATHLEEN DELANEY
	CLERK: KRISTEN BROWN
STATE OF NEVADA	REPORTER: BRENDA SCHROEDER
PLAINTIFF,	J COOPER
vs.	COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
MCNEILL, STEVE DELL	
	X. BONAVENTURE / N. HOJJAT
DEFENDANT,	
	COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

Badge No.	Na	me of Jurats			State	Defendant
008	1.	HOSS, DARRELL			5	
. 003	2.	ALPER, JASON	1			
055	3.	MANDE, JACE			2	
060	4.	RIVERA, JOE	2			
166	5.	CARDOZA, GIANNI				3
001	6.	LAGOMARSINO, BRIAN	3			
679	7.	SWAIN, JEFFREY	4			
708	8.	SPOONER, JACOB	5			
883	9.	VILCHEZ, ISAAC	6			
885	10.	MOORE, JASON	7			
905	11.	RICE-WILSON, IDALIA	8			
907	12.	MORALES, JORGE	·			2
909	13.	WHISENANT, WINDELL				Ч
985	14.	WALKER, JUSTIN	9			
924	15.	TOWERS, SHIRLEY				5
927	16.	BENSON, RICHARD			<u> </u>	APAT, a colombia
930	17.	CANALES, GILBERT	10			
005	18.	POLLARD, GARY				1
987	19.	MANNING, STEVEN	()		•	
940	20.	BAKKEDAHL, JAMES	12			
000	21.	BURGESS, MARTIN		·	4_	A STATE OF THE STA
958	22.	SCHULTZ, BONNIE	13			
971	23.	HAMILTON, JOEY	14			The state of the s
006	24.	BURRIS, JOHN			1	

EXCUSED

CASE NO.	HEARING DATE:7/7/14
C297725	JUDGE:Judge Delaney
DEPT NO.	CLERK: Kristen Brown
XXV	RECORDER: _B. Schroeder
	Jonathan Cooper
PLAINTIFF_State of Nevada,	COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
VS	Xiomara Bonaventure
DEFENDANT_Steve Dell McNeill	COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

No.		Date Offered	Obj	Date Admitted
1	Cease and Desist Letter _ WITHDRAWN			
2	Lifetime Supervision Agreement dated 11-8-07	7/8	OBJ	7/8
3	Lifetime Supervision Agreement dated 12-4-07	7/8	OBJ	7/8
4	Lifetime Supervision Agreement dated 11-7-12	7/8	оВЈ	7/8
5	Probation and Parole monthly report dated 3-29-13	7/8	NO	7/8
6	Probation and Parole monthly report dated 4-12-13	7/8	NO	7/8
7	Probation and Parole monthly report dated 5-8-13	7/8	ろり	7/8
8	Probation and Parole monthly report dated 6-6-13	7/8	20	7/8
9	Probation and Parole monthly report dated 7-11-13	7/8	20	7/8
10	Probation and Parole monthly report dated 8-15-13	7/8	OBJ	7/8
11	TERMINATION SUMMARY	7/9	No	7/9
12				
<u> </u>				
·····				
·				

Board of Parole Commissioners LIFETIME SUPERVISION AGREEMENT

NDOC No: N/A File No.: L808-0537

CC No.: C204263 On the 10TH day of NOVEMBER, 2004, MCNEILL, STEVE was sentenced by JOHN S MCGFOARTY. District Index of the 8TH Judicial District Court in and for the County of CLARK. State of Nevada, to

System, for the orime of.

The sentencing court, in addition to your sentence, ordered

The tyou be placed on License supervision under the Ciner or the Division of Parcle and Probation. The Board of Parcle

Commissioners, by virtue of the authority vested in leby the laws of the State of Nevada, hereby assigns the conditions of Lifetime

Reporting/Release: You are required to submit a written report as directed by your supervising officer. The report will be true and correct in all respects. In addition, you shall report in person as directed by your supervising officer and submit a

Residence: You shall reside at a location only if it has been approved by your supervising officer. You shall not change your

Residence: You shall reside at a location only it it has been approved by your supervising officer. You shall not enable your place of residence without first obtaining permission from your supervising officer.

Intoxicants: You shall not drink or partake of any alcoholic beverages whatsnever. Upon request by the any Patole or Peace Officer, you shall submit to a medically recognized test for blood alcohol content. Failure to submit shall constitute a violation of your lifetime supervision. Test results of .08 blood alcohol or higher thall be sufficient proof of excess.

Constalled Substances. Vou shall not use purchase or propose any parcolic druce more any denominations druce, unless first

Controlled Substances: You shall not use, purchase or process any parcode drugs, nor any dangerous drugs, unless first prescribed by a licensed physician; you shall submit to periodic tests to determine whether you are using a controlled

Weapons: You shall not possess, own, carry, or have under your control, any type of firearm or illegal weapon.

Associates: You shall not associate with ex-folons or any person who is required loregister as a sex offender under Nevada law without permission from your supervising officer.

Cooperation: You shall, at all times, cooperate with your supervising officer and your behavior shall justify the opportunity granted to you by this Lifetime Supervision.

Laws and Conduct: You shall comply with all municipal, county, state and federal laws, and ordinances; and conduct yourself as a good citizen. You shall comply with all offender registration requirements.

Out-of-State Travel: You shall not leave the State without first obtaining written permission from your supervising officer. Employment Program: You shall seek and maintain employment, or maintain a program approved by the Division of Parole and Probation and not change such employment or program without first obtaining permission. You shall accept a position and trousenest and incoming a surface approved by your supervising officer.

11. Supervision Fees: Pay all applicable fees, fines and restitution on a schedule as determined by the Division of Parole and

- 12. Curfew: You shall abide by any curfew imposed by your supervising officer.

- 12. Company: You soan across on any expression of your supervising ouncer.

 13. Company and Participate in professional counseling if desired necessary by the Division of Parole and Probation.

 14. Polygraph Examination: You shall submit to periodic polygraph examination, as required by your supervising officer.

 15. No Contact: You shall not have contact or communicate with a victim of the offense who testified against you, or solicit another person to engage in such contact or communication on your behalf without permission from your supervising officer.
- 16. Alias Names: You shall not use aliases or frontious names without permission from your supervising officer.
- 17. Post Office Box: You shall not obtain a post office box unless you have obtained permission from your supervising officer. 18. No Contact With Persons Under 18 Years of Ager You shall not have contact with a person less than 18 years of age in
- a secluded environment unless another adult who has never been convicted of an offesse listed in NRS (79D.410 is present. 19. Presence: You shall not be in or near;
- - a) A playground, school or school grounds;
- b) A motion picture theater;
- c) A business that primarily has children as customers or conducts events that primarily children attend.
- 20. Search: You shall submit to a scarch of your person, property under your control, or place of residence, by a Parole Officer, at any time of the day or night without a warrant, upon reasonable cause of ascertained by the Parole Officer.

 21. Special Conditions of Your Lifetime Supervision: PENDING PAROLE BOARD ORDER

This Lifetime Supervision is granted to and accepted by you, subject to the conditions stated herein, and with the knowledge that the Board of Parole Commissioners has the power, at any time, to modify the conditions of supervision. Pursuant to MRS 213.1243(3), failure to comply with the conditions as set forth may result in felony charges being filed.

Cluef Parole Officer;

AGREEMENT BY OFFENDER

Ido hereby waive extradition to the State of Nevada from any state in the United States, and from any territory occountry outside the conditional United States, and also agree that I will not contest any effort to return me to the United States or the State of Nevada. I have read or had read to me, the conditions of my Lafotime Supervision, and I fully understand them and I agree to abide by and strictly follow them. I fully understand the penalties involved should I, in any manner, violate the foregoing

Witness: <u>CGS Crone</u>) Nov 8, 2007

ATION (IBIT

LIFETIME SUPERVISION AGREEMENT

NDOC No: N/A File No.: LS08-0537 CC No.: C204263

On the 10TH day of NOVEMBER, 2004, MCNEILL, STEVE was sentenced by JOHN S MCGROARTY, District Judge of the 8TH Judicial District Court in and for the County of CLARK. State of Nevada. to

System, for the crime of.

The sentencing court, in addition to your sentence, ordered that you be placed on Lifetime Supervision under the Chief of the Division of Parole and Probation. The Board of Parole Commissioners, by virtue of the authority vested in it by the laws of the State of Nevada, hereby assigns the conditions of Lifetime Supervision.

 Reporting/Release: You are required to submit a written report as directed by your supervising officer. The report will be true and correct in all respects. In addition, you shall report in person as directed by your supervising officer and submit a DNA sample as required.

Residence: You shall reside at a location only if it has been approved by your supervising officer. You shall not change your
place of residence without first obtaining permission from your supervising officer.

3. Intoxicants: You shall not drink or partake of any alcoholic beverages whatsoever. Upon request by the any Parole or Peace Officer, you shall submit to a medically recognized test for blood alcohol content. Failure to submit shall constitute a violation of your lifetime supervision. Test results of .08 blood alcohol or higher shall be sufficient proof of excess.

4. Controlled Substances: You shall not use, purchase or process any narcotic drugs, nor any dangerous drugs, unless first prescribed by a licensed physician; you shall submit to periodic tests to determine whether you are using a controlled substance, as required by your supervising officer.

5. Weapons: You shall not possess, own, carry, or have under your control, any type of firearm or illegal weapon.

6. Associates: You shall not associate with ex-felons or any person who is required to register as a sex offender under Nevada law without permission from your supervising officer.

Cooperation: You shall, at all times, cooperate with your supervising officer and your behavior shall justify the opportunity
granted to you by this Lifetime Supervision.

Laws and Conduct: You shall comply with all municipal, county, state and federal laws, and ordinances; and conduct
yourself as a good citizen. You shall comply with all offender registration requirements.

9. Out-of-State Travel: You shall not leave the State without first obtaining written permission from your supervising officer.

- 10. Employment/Program: You shall seek and maintain employment, or maintain a program approved by the Division of Parole and Probation and not change such employment or program without first obtaining permission. You shall accept a position of employment only if it has been approved by your supervising officer.
- 11. Supervision Fees: Pay all applicable fees, fines and restitution on a schedule as determined by the Division of Parole and Probation.

12. Curfew: You shall abide by any curfew imposed by your supervising officer.

- 13. Counseling: Participate in professional counseling if deemed necessary by the Division of Parole and Probation.
- 14. Polygraph Examination: You shall submit to periodic polygraph examination, as required by your supervising officer.
- 15. No Contact: You shall not have contact or communicate with a victim of the offense who testified against you, or solicit another person to engage in such contact or communication on your behalf without permission from your supervising officer.
- 16. Alias Names: You shall not use aliases or fictitious names without permission from your supervising officer.
- 17. Post Office Box: You shall not obtain a post office box unless you have obtained permission from your supervising officer.
- 18. No Contact With Persons Under 18 Years of Age: You shall not have contact with a person less than 18 years of age in a secluded environment unless another adult who has never been convicted of an offense listed in NRS 179D.410 is present.
- 19. Presence: You shall not be in or near:
 - a) A playground, school or school grounds;

b) A motion picture theater;

c) A business that primarily has children as customers or conducts events that primarily children attend,

20. Search: You shall submit to a search of your person, property under your control, or place of residence, by a Parole Officer, at any time of the day or night without a warrant, upon reasonable cause as ascertained by the Parole Officer.

21. Special Conditions of Your Lifetime Supervision: PENDING PAROLE BOARD ORDER

This Lifetime Supervision is granted to and accepted by you, subject to the conditions stated herein, and with the knowledge that the Board of Parole Commissioners has the power, at any time, to modify the conditions of supervision. Pursuant to NRS 213.1243(3), failure to comply with the conditions as set forth may result in felony charges being filed.

Chief Parole Officer:

Dated: 12-4-200

AGREEMENT BY OFFENDER

I do hereby waive extradition to the State of Nevada from any state in the United States, and from any territory or country outside the continental United States, and also agree that I will not contest any effort to return me to the United States or the State of Nevada. I have read or had read to me, the conditions of my Lifetime Supervision, and I fully understand them and I agree to abide by and strictly follow them. I fully understand the penalties involved should I, in any manner, violate the foregoing conditions.

Offender:

Dated: + /2-4-07

Witness

MARKEI STATE



LIFETEME SUPERVISION AGREEMENT

NDOC No: N/A File No.: LS08-0537 CC No.; C204263

On the 10TH day of NOVEMBER, 2004, MCNEILL, STEVE was sentenced by JOHN S MCGROARTY, District Judge of the 8TH Judicial District Court in and for the County of CLARK, State of Nevada, to i

The sentencing court, in addition to your sentence, ordered that you be placed on Lifetime Supervision under the Chief of the Division of Parole and Probation. The Board of Parole Commissioners, by virtue of the authority vested in it by the laws of the State of Nevada, hereby assigns the conditions of Lifetime Supervision.

1. Reporting/Release: You are required to submit a written report as directed by your supervising officer. The report will be true and correct in all respects. In addition, you shall report in person as directed by your supervising officer and submit a DNA sample as required.

2. Residence: You shall reside at a location only if it has been approved by your supervising officer. You shall not change your place of residence without first obtaining permission from your supervising officer.

- 3. Intoxicants: You shall not drink or partake of any alcoholic beverages whatsoever. Upon request by the any Parole or Peace Officer, you shall submit to a medically recognized test for blood alcohol content. Failure to submit shall constitute a violation of your lifetime supervision. Test results of .08 blood alcohol or higher shall be sufficient
- 4. Controlled Substances: You shall not use, purchase or process any narcotic drugs, nor any dangerous drugs, unless first prescribed by a licensed physician; you shall submit to periodic tests to determine whether you are using a controlled substance, as required by your supervising officer.
- 5. Weapons: You shall not possess, own, carry, or have under your control, any type of firearm or illegal weapon.
- 6. Associates: You shall not associate with ex-felons or any person who is required to register as a sex offender under Nevada law without permission from your supervising officer.
- 7. Cooperation: You shall, at all times, cooperate with your supervising officer and your behavior shall justify the opportunity granted to you by this Lifetime Supervision.
- 8. Laws and Conduct: You shall comply with all municipal, county, state and federal laws, and ordinances; and conduct yourself as a good citizen. You shall comply with all offender registration requirements.
- 9. Out-of-State Travel: You shall not leave the State without first obtaining written permission from your supervising
- 10. Employment/Program: You shall seek and maintain employment, or maintain a program approved by the Division of Parole and Probation and not change such employment or program without first obtaining permission. You shall accept a position of employment only if it has been approved by your supervising officer.
- 11. Supervision Fees: Pay all applicable fees, fines and restitution on a schedule as determined by the Division of
- 12. Curfew: You shall abide by any curfew imposed by your supervising officer.
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- 14. Polygraph Examination: You shall submit to periodic polygraph examination, as required by your supervising
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- 17. Post Office Box: You shall not obtain a post office box unless you have obtained permission from your supervising
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- 19. Presence: You shall not be in or near:
 - a) A playground, school or school grounds;
 - b) A motion picture theater;
 - c) A business that primarily has children as customers or conducts events that primarily children attend.
- 20. Search: You shall submit to a search of your person, property under your control, or place of residence, by a Parole Officer, at any time of the day or night without a warrant, upon reasonable cause as ascertained by the Parole
- 21. Special Conditions of Your Lifetime Supervision: EFFECTIVE 5/24/11: 1) Not to patronize a business which offers a sexually related form of entertainment and which is deemed inappropriate by the supervising officer; 2) Not possess any electronic device capable of accessing the Internet and not access the Internet through any such device of any other means, unless possession of a such a device or such access is approved by the supervising officer. An Internet monitoring service provider approved by the supervising officer will be the only means allowed for any and all Internet access device or service. 3) Abstain from consuming, possessing or having under your control any alcohol; 4) Not possess any sexually explicit material that is deemed inappropriate by the supervising officer; 5) Not possess any sexually explicit material that is deemed inappropriate by the supervising officer; 5) Comply with any protocol concerning the prescription medication prescribed by the treating physician, including, without limitation, any protocol concerning the use of psychotropic medication;

Board of Parole Commissioners has the power, at any time, to modify the conditions of supervision. Pursuant to NRS 213.1243(3), failure to comply with the conditions as set forth may result in felony charges being filed. Chief Parole Officer: Dated: AGREEMENT BY OFFENDER I do hereby waive extradition to the State of Nevada from any state in the United States, and from any territory or country outside the continental United States, and also agree that I will not contest any effort to return me to the United States or the State of Nevada. I have read or had read to me, the conditions of my Lifetime Supervision, and I fully understand them and I agree to abide by and strictly follow them. I fully understand the penalties involved should I, in any manner, violate the foregoing conditions. Witness:

This Lifetime Supervision is granted to and accepted by you, subject to the conditions stated herein, and with the knowledge that the

Yellow - LS Officer Pink - CPS Officer Gold CPS P&P HQ

STATE OF NEVADA CERTIFICATION OF BOARD OF PAROLE COMMISSIONERS ACTION

CONDITIONS OF LIFETIME SUPERVISION - NRS 213.1243

MCNEILL, STEVE	LS08-0537 NDOC#/Criminal Case #	Northern Perole Board	05/24/2011	
	A DOCUMENTAL CROSS &	, LK "n	Date of Action	

The board has excluded, amended or added the following information to the standard conditions of Metime supervision:

- 1 Not to paironize a business which offers a sexually related form of entainment and which is deemed inappropriate by the supervising officer.
- 2 Not possess any electronic device capable of accessing the internet and not access the internet through any such device or any other means, unless possession of such a device or such access is approved by the supervising officer. An internet monitoring service provider approved by the supervising officer will be the only means allowed for any and all internet access device or service.
- 3 Abatain from consuming, possessing or having under your control any alcohol.
- 4 Not possess any sexually explicit material that is deemed inappropriate by the supervising officer.
- 5 Comply with any protocol concerning the use of prescription medication prescribed by a treating physician, including, without limitation, any protocol concerning the use of psychotropic medication.

6 Do not enter a bar or lounge for any purpose expect for employment,

FOR THE NEVADA DOARD OF PAROLG COMPUSSIONERS

Recommendation of the panel:

Commissioner S. Jackson, GRANT

Commissioner T. Corde GRANT Commissioner A. Endal GRANT

The final action was ratified by the following parels commissioners:

Commissioner S. Jackson GRANT Commissioner T. Corda GRANT Commissioner A. Endel GRANT Chairman C. Bisbee GRANT

MARK STAT BIT



DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION MONTHLY REPORT

PAROLE/PROF	BATION MON	THLY SUPERVIS	ION REPORT F	OR: Month	Day: Z	7 Year: A3
MY PAROLE/P	ROBATION O	FFICER IS: A	te last on	= 4105 V	us Dike	
Check One:			Mauga	· -	-	
Did you move th	is mouth?	Yes No	o Did yo	ou change jobs this	month? Y	es No X
Your Name:	Stev	CD.MEN	leill	Phone #:		2-1333 (21)
Your Address:	May	+ Colorac	18	City/State/Zip:	LasVery	24, Mr. 89104
Mailing Address	: Novec			City/State/Zip:	<u> </u>	
Storage Unit/#:				City/State/Zip:		Adult Juvenile
I live with:	No on	L		Relationship:	Secondary	Adult Juvenile
I live with:			·	Relationship:		Adult Juvenile
I live with:				Relationship:	,	
I live with:				Relationship:		Adult Juvenile
Your Employer:	uner	nployed		Phone #		
Supervisor Name	e: Fur	1.5 y	ears	Work Schedule:		
Address:	2000	ista Pt	wysgns T	City/State/Zip:		
List all vehicle	es you own or d	rive: 5000	John Solz	L lest th	ne -	
Year	Make	Model	Color	License#	Owner	Insured by
, <u>.</u> ,,,,,		\-\	177	1 00	How to	
		Hasil	0000		1, 000	
		<u> </u>				
Counseling	Yes No	Provider:	Marc	ia lee	was to	the out
Counseling Schee	dule:					
			·			
Computer?	Yes No	Email Address(s):		<u> </u>		
Screen Name(s) / S	ervice					
Other (Social Networ	king?):					
Did you visit a do	octor this mont	h: Yes No Mo	edication prescri	bed: Free O	Linic offer	Sanara
Community serv	ice work hours	completed this mo	onth: O			
Restitution amou			s O	Owe	<u>s 300</u>	.00
Supervision fee a	mount naid thi	s month:		_ rues	1710.	00

13.K/16.7

Page 1 of 2 - Front

· I coateder

I will begin with obeying all institutional regulations and start planning for my future as a productive, law-abiding citizen;

I will fully accept responsibility for my actions;

I will understand the harm my actions have caused and acknowledge that I have done something wrong;

I will offer an apology to my victims and community;

I will repair the harm I have caused and will make restitution to my victims

Nevada law allows for an offender who has been convicted of a Felony or Gross Misdemeanor within the state of Nevada to shorten their term of probation by 20 days for every month they are employed and pay their financial obligations to the Court and to the Division of Parole and Probation.

No credit will be given to a probationer that are not employed and currently working or have complied with all Court ordered financial obligations and payment of Supervision Fees monthly to the Division. A payment of \$30 must be received by the Division each and every month in order to ensure you collect your credit.

Upon successful completion of specialty court, the probationer will receive any credits that would have been earned while in specialty court, retroactive to the date the probationer entered the program. This date will not be backdated any further than the date the supervising officer was notified of the completion of specialty court.

Those probationers that are removed from specialty court due to non-compliance will not be given any retroactive credit.

Financial Obligations:

Any excess monies paid will be applied to any other outstanding fees, fines and/or restitution, even if it is discovered after your discharge.

I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE; THE INFORMATION I HAVE SUBMITTED IN THIS REPORT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.

Report approved by:

Parole and Probation Employee

Page 2 of 2 - Back

IARKE STATE ON IT



DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION MONTHLY REPORT

PAROLE/PROI	BATION MONTE	ILY SUPERVISIO	ON REPORT F	OR: Month: 4	Day: / C	Year: 2013
MY PAROLE/P	ROBATION OF	FICER IS: 04	Ascer N	loucau		
Check One:	·					
Did you move th	is month?	Yes No	Did yo	u change jobs this n	nonth? Yes	No J
Your Name:	Star	e MENei	((Phone #:	702-462-	
Your Address:	Noue			City/State/Zip:	702-7	13.643B
Mailing Address	:			City/State/Zip:		3.0263
Storage Unit/#:				City/State/Zip:	748	- 3345 Adult Juvenile
I live with:	NA	·		Relationship:		Adult Juvenile
I live with:				Relationship:		Adult Juvenile
I live with:				Relationship:		Adult Juvenile
I live with:				Relationship:		Addit
Your Employer:	Noue			Phone#		
Supervisor Name				Work Schedule:		
Address:				City/State/Zip:	4 :	
List ali vehicle	es you own or dri	ve:				
Year	Make	Model	Color	License #	Оwner	Insured by
	Make	Model	Color	License #	Owner	Insured by
	Make	Model	Color	License #	Оwner	Insured by
	Make	Model	Color	License #	Оwner	Insured by
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Nou e Counseling	Yes No					
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Nou e Counseling Counseling Sched	Yes No					W CIEN QQ
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Page 1 of 2 - Front

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I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE; THE INFORMATION I HAVE SUBMITTED IN THIS REPORT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.

. 0
5 29 Mill
Your Signature
4-12-13
Today's Date

Page 2 of 2 - Back





DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION MONTHLY REPORT

PAROLE/PRO	BATION MONT	HLY SUPERVISIO	N REPORT I	OR: Month:	Day:	Year: /_	
MY PAROLE/E	PROBATION OF	FICER IS:					
Check One:				<u>,</u>			1
Did you move th	is month?	Yes No	Did ye	ou change jobs this :	month?	Yes No	
	TCLOU	y MENICO	(1/	Phone #:	702-4	62-1333 L. CCMU	
Your Name:	1/1/24	Wyoming, M	nc.in	City/State/Zip:	L.U.N	V. 89104	
Your Address:		oryoming) pe	<u> </u>	City/State/Zip:			
Mailing Address]			City/State/Zip:			
Storage Unit/#:				Relationship:		Adult J	ovenile
I live with:						Adult J	venile
I live with:		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Relationship:		Adult J	ivenile
I live with:				Relationship:		Adult Ji	venile
I live with:		<u></u>	<u> </u>	Relationship:			<u> </u>
Your Employer:				Phone #			
Supervisor Name	e:	<u> </u>		Work Schedule:			
Address:				City/State/Zip:			
List all vehicle	es you own or dr	ye:					
			1	j .		1	
Year	Make	Model	Color	License #	Owner	Insured b	<u>y</u>
Year	Make	1	Color	License #	Owner	Insured b	<u>у</u>
Year ///	Make	1	Color	License #	Owner	Insured b	<u>y</u>
Year	Make	1	Color	License #	Owner	Insured b	y
N/N		Model	Color	License #	Owner	Insured b	y
Counseling	Yes No.	1	Color	License #	Owner	Insured b	y
N/N	Yes No.	Model	Color	License #	Owner	Insured b	y
Counseling Counseling Schee	Yes No.	Model	Color	License #	Owner	Insured b	y
Counseling Counseling Schee	Yes No	Model Provider:	Color	License #	Owner	Insured b	y
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Page 1 of 2 - Front Nants apr curtain?

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Report approved by:	
	Sillally Q
	Your Signature
	5-8-13
Parole and Probation Employee	Today's Date

Gym > Dula gym Shower or French Novse Stands is sign LUBLUD: between circus way octernor and Cres Sia Cosmo on Foot bridge primok n

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DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION MONTHLY REPORT

PAROLE/PI	ROBAT	ION MON	THLY SUPERVI	SION REPOR	RT FOR: Month:	Day:	(Year:	13
			FFICER IS:	White	,			
Check On	le:							
Did you mov			Yes N		d you change jobs this	mouth?	Yes 🔲	No X
Your Name:		Stev	eMENICII 1 + Wyo	1	Phone #:	702-0	162-133	3
Your Address	s:	Meria	+ Win	M'NG	City/State/Zip:	L.U.	162-133 No. 841	Oti
Mailing Addr					City/State/Zip:			
Storage Unit/#			·		City/State/Zip:			
I live with:		No c	MC		Relationship:		Adult	Juvenile
I live with:					Relationship:		Adult	Juvenile
I live with:					Relationship:		Adult 🔲	Juvenile
I live with:					Relationship:		Adult	Juvenile
Your Employer	r:	 .			Phone #	,		
Supervisor Nan	ne:				Work Schedule:			
Address:		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			City/State/Zip:			
List all vehic	les you	own or dri	ve:		·			
Year	Make		Model	Color	License #	Owner	Insured	by
None	<u> </u>					-		
	┼							
	<u> </u>					<u> </u>		
Counseling	Yes	No	Provider:					
Counseling Sche	dule:							
	Yes	No	Email	<u> </u>	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·		
Computer?		No.	Address(s):					
icreen Name(s) / S	ervice	ļ						
ther (Social Networ	king?):	<u> </u>				·		
od you visit a do	ctor this	month:	Yes No Medic	ation prescri	bed:			
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estitution amour	nt paid t	his month:	·	8 0				
upervision fee an	nount pa	aid this mo	onth:	s O				

Page 1 of 2 - Front

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Report approved by:		Your Signature		
Parole and Probation Employee	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Today's Date		





DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION MONTHLY REPORT

	•				プ Day:)}	Year:
	BATION MONTH			FOR: Month:	Bay: 11	1000.
MY PAROLE/I	PROBATION OFF	ICER IS: /\ C	4/01			
Check One:			· · · · ·			
Did you move th	his month?	Yes No	Did	you change jobs this	month? Yo	es No
Your Name:	Steve	DMSN	e.11	Phone #:	702-462	
Your Address:	Mains	DMSN - Wyou	ine	City/State/Zip:	L.V., N	V
Mailing Address	'			City/State/Zip:		
Storage Unit/#:		<u></u>		City/State/Zip:		Adult Juvenile
I live with:	Noone			Relationship:		Adult Juvenile
I live with:				Relationship:	<u> </u>	Adult Juvenile
I live with:				Relationship:		Adult Juvenile
I live with:				Relationship:		
Your Employer:	None			Phone #		
Supervisor Nam				Work Schedule:		
Address:				City/State/Zip:		
List all vehicl	es you own or driv	/e:				
Year	Make	Model	Color	License #	Owner	Insured by
None			·			
1					<u> </u>	
						
Counseling	Yes No	Provider:				
Counseling Sche	dule:					
	Was No.	Email			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Computer?	Yes No X	Address(s):			70'	
Screen Name(s) / S	Service					
Other (Social Netwo	rking?):					
Did you visit a de	octor this mouth:	Yes No Me	dication presc	ribed:		
C		mnleted this mo	ath:)		
Community serv	ice work hours co	inprese -	J. Till	~		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	nce work hours count paid this mout		\$ 6	2		

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MELLILLE Report approved by: Today's Date Parole and Probation Employee

MARK STAT BIT





PAROLE/PROB.	ATION MONTH	LY SUPERVISIO	N REPORT	FOR: Month:	Day:	15 Year: 13
MY PAROLE/PH	ROBATION OFF	ICER IS: Ma	WG&11			
Check One:			<i>J</i> • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			,
Did you move thi	s month?	Yes No	Did y	ou change jobs this	month?	Yes No
		0/1/4/	<u>/</u>	1	787-CV	```
Your Name:	11 to i	11-118		Phone #:	1 1/1	L. CGIM
Your Address:	Main &	- Nomme	<u> </u>	City/State/Zip:	L-V. /	10. 8 1107
Mailing Address:				City/State/Zip:	<u> </u>	
Storage Unit/#:				City/State/Zip:		Adult Juven
I live with:				Relationship:		Adult Juven
I live with:				Relationship:		
I live with:				Relationship:		Adult Juven
I live with:				Relationship:		Adult Juven
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Phone #		
Your Employer:				Work Schedule:		
Supervisor Name	<u> </u>		-	City/State/Zip:		
Address:	s you own or driv	<i>1</i> 0•	,	1 010/10 1110 1110		
	Make	Model	Color	License #	Owner	Insured by
Year	Маке	IVIOUCI	COLOR	2200011		
1.11.4/						
Counseling	Yes No	Provider:				
Counseling Sched						
		Email				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Computer?	Yes No	Address(s):				
Screen Name(s) / Se	rvice /					·
Other (Social Network					·	
Did you visit a doo		Yes No Medi	cation prescr	ibed:		
Community service	ce work hours co	mpleted this mont	h: 6			
Restitution amour		•	\$ 0			
Supervision fee an	•		\$ 7	/		

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Report approved by:

8.15-13

Parole and Probation Employee

Today's Date

gt. Zana office

NO UR

= NO 1xweeky or

now registering every 30 days

MARCIA LEE, MS MFT 5852 S. Pecos Road H-2 Las Vegas, NV 89120 (702) 435 2212 FAX (702) 732 2227 marcialeemft@cox.net

Officer Ragan Juge

TERMINATION SUMMARY

Client: <u>STEVE</u> W			22-12
Signature of Therapist:	mar	ia Jusmer	
A. Reason for termination	on:		
[] Client refus Client could Little or no [] Client move [] Client chan	ged therapist	e in services	ed to:
B. Source of Termination	n decision:		,
[] Client initial	nitiated ecision		
C. Treatment:			
Date of Intake:	3/8/08	Date of last session:	12/14/12
Number of session	ns: Scheduled: Attended: Cancelled NCNS		12/14/12 OWES 1815,00
D. Kinds of services Reno [K] Individual ps [K] Group Thera [K] Other	ychotherapy	[] Couple/Family l [≽⊈ Psycho-education	
	-	MARK	иог

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS

CASE NO. <u>0297725</u>

		OFFERED	OBJ	ADMITTE
A.	CEASE AND DESIST LETTER	7/8	NO	ADMITTEI 7/8
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COURTESY NOTICE

VIA AFFIDAVIT FORMAT TO CEASE AND DESIST IN RESTRICTIONS AND HARRASSMENTS

NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT

"Indeed, no more than (affidavits) is necessary to make the prima facie case." <u>United States –vs- Kis.</u> 658 F2d 526, 536 (C.A. 7 (WIS) 1981): Cert. Denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 2169; S. Ct. March 22, 1982.

ALL NOTICES ARE SUBJECT TO LIABILITY, WAIVER OF IMMUNITY, THIS MAY INCLUDE JUDICIAL OFFICERS.

BE ADVISED: If any one desire to respond or rebut to this Courtesy Notice via Affidavit Format, the individual "MUST" do so in Affidavit Format, or anything else will be considered as a waste of limited and valuable resources of the respondent, it will be worthless. The Response/Rebuttal "MUST" be done within 30 days of receipt or this NOTICE will uphold in the Court in the event this will proceed to a Court Remedy and this will be used as Evidence for waiver of immunity.


SILENCE IS ACQUIESCENCE agreement, to the terms within. This is a SELF-EXECUTING CONTRACT.

I, Steve Dell McNeill© hereinafter "Affiant", a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood, sentient "real" human being Man, proclaimed and stated within N.R.S. 0.039 and 15 U.S.C. § 1127, being first duly bound in conscience by deeply held spiritual convictions to perform this Act Faithfully and Truthfully; corpore et animo, sealed by and under authority of the Affiant's own hand, having firsthand knowledge of the Facts contained herein and within, do DECLARE and ATTEST the following FACTS are TRUE, CORRECT, and COMPLETE, and NOT Meant to Mislead, to cause Embarrassment, Dis-Honor, and NOT to Defraud any one in any way shape or form to the Best of Affiant's Belief, Knowledge, and Conviction Herein and Within.

The Affiant is of legal Statute age of over 21 years old, is competent standing to state the matters contained herein, and has Declared and Attested that in the Affiant's knowledge and conviction, the statements made within are True, Correct, Complete, and NOT Meant to Mislead, cause Embarrassment, Defraud, or Dis-Honor on/to any one in any way shape or form.

The Affiant agrees to perform to the contracted limited liberty of movement, pursuit of happiness, job entitlement, Defamation of Character, harassment from authorities stated within the statutes of limitations to what Affiant is contracted with, and comply with the authority (ies) requests, etc., "PREDICATED" upon Proofs of Claim of substantial conclusive evidence, that supersedes the established, filed papers of the Affiant, that is stated.

Affiant believes the so-called Authority (ies) Third-Party Intervenor(s) do NOT have legal and lawful papers/documents that supersede Affiant's papers/documents, and there is NO Evidence to the "CONTRARY." This will be considered and taken as substantial conclusive evidence of the so-called Authority subjecting themselves to Misconduct, and committing: Dishonor in Commerce, Fraud upon the Affiant and Public, Conspiracy, Traitorous Acts on the People, and Affiant, and violating the R.I.C.O. act.



/ OF 3

TO SUPPERIORS AND MANAGING PERSONNEL:

BE ADVISED, You are being Noticed in writing to **Cease and Desist to Contact and/or attempt to contract with. Steve Dell McNeill in anyway shape or form**, unless the authority had seen or there is a signed Affidavit with two or more countable witnesses (that are NOT part of the authority for it will be a conflict of interest) that He had physically cause an injury. He will NOT register with the authority as he has been doing, so now, Steve Dell McNeill will be living as a free man, as he was before he was enslaved without Full Disclosure, without Clean Hands, Good Faith, and Fair Business Dealings of what he will encounter of submission to the authorities of the Artificial Corporation Entity as stated within N.R.S. 205.4611 in which the State Representatives have subverted Steve Dell McNeill into without His knowledge.

The attached document is a UCC Financing Statement, filed with the Secretary of State, of California, in which is Zone One and THE STATE OF NEVADA is covered, Registered in Zone One. The UCC Financing Statement is recorded and as a matter of public record, with the CLARK COUNTY RECORDER'S office of Nevada. I'm now forwarding this document to you with this Courtesy Notice, and to inform you of a few things you may not know. As per N.R.S. 104.9402, I am now referred to as a secured party/creditor, [no longer the corporate entity; as defined by N.R.S. 205.4611]. Attached are:

Corporate Ownership document/title

Power of attorney (unlimited)

Hold harmless and indemnity agreement

Legal Notice and Demand

The Affiant is calling special attention to Legal Notice and Demand because if in the course of future events the Affiant should be molested, accosted or otherwise Dis-Honored in any way shape or form by one or more of your agents, and/or representatives, Your office and the individual in his/her official capacity, and THE STATE OF NEVADA will be receiving an invoice for the listed fines & fees THIS IS NOT A THREAT! I am only putting you on NOTICE, and serving you with the Substantial Conclusive Evidence of Fact that You need to understand and be aware that I am no longer under your jurisdiction.

COMMERCIAL AFFIDAVIT OATH AND VERIFICATION

State of Nevada		Commercial Oath and Verific	on
County of Clark	}		

I, Steve Dell McNeill©, having first-hand knowledge of the Facts Contained herein are True, Correct, Complete and NOT to be Misleading, under penalty of commercial law.

EXPRESS SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS OF RIGHTS

The Affiant Steve Dell McNeill©, reserve all my Natural Rights as an American under Contract Law of the Divine Creator without prejudice and without recourse to me. I do NOT consent to any compelled performance under Contract that I did NOT enter Knowingly, Voluntarily, Intelligently. I do NOT accept the liability of the benefits or privileges of any unrevealed contract or commercial agreement.

Submitted by;

Steve Dell McNe

JURAT

State of Nevada } ss.
County of Clark }

The above named Affiant Steve Dell McNeill©, appeared before me, a Notary, subscribed, sworn to the truth of this Courtesy Notice in Affidavit.

Under Oath this 19 day of August, 2013.

Notary Signature

SEAL:



UCC FINANCI FOLLOW INSTRUCT A NAME & PHONE O B. SEND ACKNOWLE STEVEN 1130 SO. LAS VEC	06/29 S0S 33715	33715230002 ucc 1 Filing THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY			
	FULL LEGAL NAME-insert only one debtor name (12 or 1b)	- do not abbreviane or combine names			······································
1s. ORGANIZATIONS					
STEVE DELL MONEILL OR IL NOVIDUAL SLASTNAME		FIRST NAME	MDDLE	MIDDLE NAME	
		GTY	STATE	POSTAL CODE	COUNTRY
c. MAILING ADDRESS	 -	1		1	1
130 SO.CASIN	O CENTER #7 ADDI INFO RE 11. TYPE OF CRIGANIZATION	LAS VEGAS	NV	89104 ANIZATIÓNAL ID#, if any	USA
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, ADDITIONAL DEBT	HAME			200	
			MIDDLE	Masur	louenv
26. INDIVIDUAL'S LAS	ST NAME	FIRST NAME	MILLE	NAME	SUFFIX
		CITY	STATE	POSTAL CODE	COUNTRY
MAILING ADDRESS		GIT			
	ADDILINFO RE 2s. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION	21. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION	2g. ORG.	ANIZATIONAL ID#, if any	,l
SEPINSTRUCTIONS	IORGANIZATION	1	1		Пиом
	DEBTOR 'S NAME (aNAME & TOTAL ASSIGNEE & ABSIGNOR S/P)	inent only one section of party name (3s os 3b)	1. 20. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.		
PERHOEN DARTY	S NAME (4) NAME (4) TOTAL ASSIGNEE BY ASSIGNOTOF)	- Steat I'm Jane			·
SECURED TAINING					
3a. ORGANIZATION'S		FIRST NAME	WOOLE	NAME	SUFFEX
3a. ORGANIZATION'S	ST NAME		Traff.	Dell	
3a. ORGANIZATIONS	ST NAME	Steven			
3a. ORGANIZATION'S	ST NAME	GIY	STATE	POSTAL CODE	COUNTRY
39. ORGANIZATIONS R 36. HYDRADUAL'S LAS				POSTAL CODE 89104	COUNTRY USB

ALL PROPERTY BELONGING TO DEBTOR BELONGS TO SECURED PARTY DEBTOR IS A TRANSMITTING UTILITY

DEBTOR IS A TRUST

DESCRIPTION MADDICANAL LESSEELESSOR	CONSIGNEE/CONSIGNOR BAILE	E/BAILOR SELLER/BUYER	AG, LIEN NON-UCCFILING
5. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNATION (# applicable): LESSEEALESSOR 6. This FRANCING STATEMENT is to be filed (for record) (or record)		URCH REPORT(S) on Dibitor(e)	Debtor 1 / Debtor 2
TESTATE RECORDS ATRIST AMERICAN	If spoicable! [ACCATIONAL FEE]	C 1 200	- 11 ME
B. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA	n/////////////////////////////////////	-DU 1111	
SECURED PARTY	My how		
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Inst #: 201207120001959

Fees: \$54.00 N/C Fee: \$25.00

07/12/2012 02:58:12 PM Receipt #: 1231834

Requestor:

STEVEN MCNEILL

Recorded By: OSA Pgs: 38

DEBBIE CONWAY

CLARK COUNTY RECORDER

AFFIDAVIT OF POLITICAL STATUS

I declare this is an Affidavit of Political Status and this includes all attached documents.

EVEN DELL MENERLY GRANTOR: STEVEN DELL MCNEILL

Steven Dell McNeill Grantee:

Steven Dell McNeill

Secured Party Creditor

RETURN TO

NAME Steven Dell McNeill

ADDRESS 1130 So Casino Center #7

CITY STATE/ZIP Las Vegas Nevada 89164

1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA				
2					
3	STEVE DELL MCNEILL,) No. 66697				
4	Appellant,				
5	v.)				
6 7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,				
8	Respondent.				
9	APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME III PAGES 399-642				
10					
11	PHILIP J. KOHN Clark County Public Defender STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney				
12	PHILIP J. KOHN Clark County Public Defender 309 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2610 S1EVEND. Wolf Street Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3 rd Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89155				
13	Address for Appellant ADAM LAXALT				
14	Attorney General 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717				
15	(702) 687-3538				
16 17	Counsel for Respondent CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE				
18	I hereby certify that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada				
19	Supreme Court on the 29th day of, 2015. Electronic Service of the				
20	foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:				
21	CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO STEVENS OWENS STEVENS OWENS STEVENS OWENS SHARON G. DICKINSON HOWARD S. BROOKS				
22	STEVEN S. OWENS I further certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing a true and				
23	correct copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to:				
24	STEVE DELL MCNEILL				
25	NDOC # 84046 c/o HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON				
26	P.O. Box 650 INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 890\8				
27					
28	BYEmployee, Clark County Public Defender's Office				