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1	IN THE SUPREME CO	URT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
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3	JOSHUA C. SHUE,) No. 67428
4	Appellant,) Electronically Filed
5	v.	Jul 20 2015 04:59 p.m.
6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Cour
7)
8	Respondent.)
10	APPELLANT'S APPE	NDIX VOLUME II PAGES 241-456
11		
12	PHILIP J. KOHN Clark County Public Defender 309 South Third Street	STEVE WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney
13	309 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2610	Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3 rd Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
14	Attorney for Appellant	ADAM LAXALT
15	·	Attorney General 100 North Carson Street
16		Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (702) 687-3538
17		Counsel for Respondent
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CLERK OF THE COURT

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EXMT

Nevada Bar #12556 200 Lewis Avenue

Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500

Attorney for Plaintiff

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STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 LEAH BEVERLY Deputy District Attorney

> DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff.

-VS-

JOSHUA C. SHUE, aka, Joshua Caleb Shue, #1550230

Defendant.

CASE NO.

C-13-288172-1

DEPT NO.

XXI

EX PARTE MOTION FOR RELEASE OF MEDICAL RECORDS

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through LEAH BEVERLY, Deputy District Attorney, and moves this Honorable Court for an Order Releasing evidence which includes protected health information being held by Spring Mountain Treatment Center consisting of any and all medical records for patient: HAZEL IRAL, DOB: 02/04/95, concerning diagnosis, prognosis and/or treatment given or provided on or about March 19, 2014, to be released to a representative of the DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE for the purpose of prosecuting the above referenced case charging the crime of CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (Category B Felony - NRS 200.508), USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION (Category A Felony - NRS 200.710), POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD (Category B Felony - NRS 200,700, 200,730) and OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS (Gross Misdemeanor - NRS 201.210),

Pursuant to 45 CFR 164.512(f), Movant represents that the information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry; that the request is specific and limited in scope to the extent reasonably practicable in light of the purpose for which the information is sought; and that de-identified information could not reasonably be used.

DATED this 1nd day of Warch, 2014.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY

LEAH C. BEVERLY / Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #12556

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ORDR 1 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney CLERK OF THE COURT 2 Nevada Bar #001565 LEAH C. BEVERLY 3 Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #12556 4 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff 6 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff. 11 -VS-CASE NO. C-13-288172-1 12 13 DEPT NO. JOSHUA C. SHUE, aka, Joshua Caleb Shue, XXI #1550230 14 Defendant. 15 ORDER RELEASING MEDICAL RECORDS 16 Upon the ex parte application and representation of STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark 17 County District Attorney, by and through LEAH BEVERLY, Deputy District Attorney, that 18 certain records containing protected health information are necessary for the prosecution of 19 the above-captioned criminal case are being held in the custody of Spring Valley Hospital; 20 that said information is relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry; that the 21 application was specific and limited in scope to the extent reasonably practicable in light of 22 the purpose for which the information is sought; and that de-identified information could not 23 reasonably be used; 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27

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1	NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to 45 CFR 164.512(f), and GOOD CAUSE
2	APPEARING, Spring Valley Hospital, shall release to a representative of the DISTRICT
3	ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, any and all medical records concerning diagnosis, prognosis, and/or
4	treatment of HAZEL IRAL, whose date of birth is 02/04/95, for the time period March 19,
5	2014.
6	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED.
7	DATED this 3 day of March, 2014.
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9	DISTRICT JUDGE ST
10	Pistaci jobos
11	·
12	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney
13	NEVADA BAR #001565
14	BY AM LUCE
15	LEAH BEVERLY
16	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #12556
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EXMT CLERK OF THE COURT STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 LEAH BEVERLY Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #12556 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 5 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff. C-13-288172-1 CASE NO. 11 -VS-12 JOSHUA C. SHUE, aka, Joshua Caleb Shue, DEPT NO. $\mathbf{X}\mathbf{X}\mathbf{I}$ #1550230 13 Defendant. 14

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EX PARTE MOTION FOR RELEASE OF MEDICAL RECORDS

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through LEAH BEVERLY, Deputy District Attorney, and moves this Honorable Court for an Order Releasing evidence which includes protected health information being held by Spring Valley Hospital consisting of any and all medical records for patient: HAZEL IRAL, DOB: 02/04/95, concerning diagnosis, prognosis and/or treatment given or provided on or about March 19, 2014, to be released to a representative of the DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE for the purpose of prosecuting the above referenced case charging the crime of CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (Category B Felony - NRS 200.508), USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION (Category A Felony - NRS 200.710), POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD (Category B Felony - NRS 200.700, 200.730) and OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS (Gross Misdemeanor - NRS 201.210),

Pursuant to 45 CFR 164.512(f), Movant represents that the information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry; that the request is specific and limited in scope to the extent reasonably practicable in light of the purpose for which the information is sought; and that de-identified information could not reasonably be used.

DATED this Wa day of March, 2014.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY

LEAH C. BEVERLY Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #12556

12F13527X/cmj/L-3

ORDR 1 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney CLERK OF THE COURT Nevada Bar #001565 LEAH C. BEVERLY 3 Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #12556 4 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 5 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 10 Plaintiff, 11 CASE NO. C-13-288172-1 -VS-12 DEPT NO. XXIJOSHUA C. SHUE, aka, Joshua Caleb Shue, 13 #1550230 14 Defendant. 15 ORDER RELEASING MEDICAL RECORDS 16 Upon the ex parte application and representation of STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark 17 County District Attorney, by and through LEAH BEVERLY, Deputy District Attorney, that 18 certain records containing protected health information are necessary for the prosecution of 19 the above-captioned criminal case are being held in the custody of Spring Mountain Treatment 20 Center; that said information is relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry; 21 that the application was specific and limited in scope to the extent reasonably practicable in 22 light of the purpose for which the information is sought; and that de-identified information 23 could not reasonably be used; 24 NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to 45 CFR 164.512(f), and GOOD CAUSE 25 APPEARING, Spring Mountain Treatment Center, shall release to a representative of the 26 /// 27

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1	DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, any and all medical records concerning diagnosis,
2	prognosis, and/or treatment of HAZEL IRAL, whose date of birth is 02/04/95, for the time
3	period March 19, 2014.
4	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED.
5	DATED this day of April, 2014.
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7	Valeu (Idani
8	DISTRICT JUDGE
9	
10	STEVEN B. WOLFSON
11	Clark County District Attorney NEVADA/BAR #001565
12	DV HIM V MI
13	LEAH BEVERLY
14	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #12556
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1 **OML** TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQUIRE Nevada Bar No. #0854 CLERK OF THE COURT 2 Law Office of Terrence M. Jackson 624 South Ninth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702)386-0001 4 (702)386-0085 FAX 5 Counsel for Joshua C. Shue 6 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 Case No: C-13-288172-1 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Dept. No.: XXI 10 Plaintiff. -VS-11 OPPOSITION TO STATE'S 12 JOSHUA C. SHUE, #1550230 13 Defendant. 14 COMES NOW the Defendant, JOSHUA SHUE, by and through his counsel, TERRENCE 15 M. JACKSON, ESQ., and opposes the State's Motion in Limine to restrict the defense from proper 16 cross examination at trial. 17 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 18 I. The Credibility of a Witness is Always at Issue in a Criminal Case and the State's 19 Attempt to Limit Cross Examination is Contrary to Law. 20 The State has previously opposed the Defendant's Motion to have a psychological 21 examination of the alleged victim. The State now seeks to prevent the Defendant from uncovering 22 the truth concerning the victim's mental status concerning the truth about any duress or coercion that 23 she has been placed upon her to testify in this case. 24 This attempt by the State to limit cross examination is flagrantly unconstitutional. The facts 25 of this case are compelling. Defendant submits that the pressure put upon Hazel Iral by the State of 26

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Nevada has actually led her to attempt suicide. The State however does not want the Defendant to be able to question Hazel Iral about her "mental health" status, past or present. The mental health of a witness is always directly relevant to credibility as it goes to the bias

perception and competency of a witness. The government tries to suggest there exist no issues of fact concerning Hazel Iral's testimony. Defendant respectfully disagrees as her knowledge, consent, or direct or indirect participation in the creation of the purported physical evidence of child pornography can only be determined through her testimony on direct <u>and</u> cross examination.

Any facts that her testimony has been manipulated or tampered with, or any evidence that she is not a competent witness is extremely relevant at trial. Hazel Iral has never been cross examined by the defense. The admission of her Grand Jury testimony at trial would violate the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause.

Nothing is more fundamental in the criminal justice system than allowing an accused to present a defense to the charges against him. The United States Constitution and the Nevada Constitution allow a criminal defendant to present testimony and confront and cross examine witnesses. U.S. Const. Amend. V, VI, XIV; Nev. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 8. See also, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1984); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 614 P.2d 532 (1980).

The importance of the right to cross examination was cogently explained in *Kittelson v. Dretke*, 426 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2005) where the court recognized that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and compulsory process clause or confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to present his case:

Kittelson argues that the trial court limited both his right to challenge the testimony of the State's witnesses and his right fairly to present the testimony of his own witnesses. "Whether rooted directly in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 329 n. 16, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense encompasses a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause to rebut the State's evidence through cross examination. See, Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (per cuirum); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) ("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.") (internal citations and quotations

omitted). The State does not context that either the broad Sixth Amendment right to put on a full defense or the Confrontation Clause right to rebut the State's evidence are clearly established through longstanding Supreme Court precedent.

Although the right to cross examination is not absolute, it is effectively denied when a defendant is prohibited from "expos[ing] to the jury the facts from which jurors as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witnesses." Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105; see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). The absence of proper confrontation at trial "calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process." Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038. "The right to cross examination includes the opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51-53, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). "[A] denial of cross examination without waiver ... would be constitutional error of the first magnitude." Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). Id. 318 (emphasis added)

The mere fact that Hazel Iral, the alleged victim, was a child or juvenile does not give her special procreation from cross examination. The mere fact a witness was a child of tender years has been held not to be a sufficient reason for the court to be extraordinarily protective or solicitous of the witness. In the case of *Davis v. Alaska*, 415 U.S. 309, 39 L.Ed.2d 341, the Supreme Court held that the accused's constitutional right will override exclusionary rules of evidence designed to protect a juvenile. The Court in that case analyzed the conflict between an accused's constitutional right and an Alaskan statute making juvenile proceedings confidential. The Supreme Court there recognized that while the statute and rule served an important public policy of rehabilitating juvenile offenders, the Court nevertheless struck the balance in favor of an accused's right to elicit facts about the credibility of key prosecution witnesses. The Court must do the same in this case.

CONCLUSION

The State makes an assumption that the cross examination of Hazel Iral about her mental health issues should be limited because under NRS 48.035 the probative value of such evidence would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, or confusion of the issues. Their self-serving assumption is false. What the State fears is that the jury will disregard the testimony of their mentally ill and uncredible witness, Hazel Iral. The probative value of evidence obtained by a thorough cross examination of Hazel Iral is vastly more important than any prejudicial effect of such evidence. The Motion in Limine should therefore be denied.

DATED this 15th day of April, 2014. TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQUIRE Counsel for Defendant, Joshua C. Shue CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I am assistant to Terrence M. Jackson, Esq. And that I am a person competent to serve papers, not a party to the above-entitled action and on the 15th day of April, 2014, I served a copy of the foregoing Opposition to State's Motion in Limine via efiling at the Clark County Courts WizNet to the attention of Deputy District Attorney Leah Beverly. PDMotions@ccdanv.com /s/ Ila C. Wills By: _ An employee of T.M. Jackson, Esq.

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Alter A. Chum

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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VS

STATE OF NEVADA

JOSHUA SHUE

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Valarie Adair DISTRICRT JUDGE Department 21 AS VEGAS, NV 89155 CASE NO.: C-13-288172-1

DEPARTMENT 21

NOTICE OF HEARING

Please be advised that the above-entitled matter has been scheduled for Evidentiary Hearing, to be heard by the Honorable VALERIE ADAIR, at the Regional Justice Center, 200 Lewis Ave, Las Vegas, Nevada 89155, on the 19th day of May, 2014, at the hour of 9:30 AM, in RJC Courtroom 11C, Department 21.

HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR

By: Shorry Drascarelle

Sharry Frascarelli Judicial Executive Assistant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on or about the date e-filed, I served a copy of the foregoing document

X by placing a copy in the attorney's folder located in the Regional Justice Center to:

Leah Beverly, Esq. (Deputy District Attorney) Terrence Michael Jackson, Esq.

Sharry Das carelli
Sharry Frascafelli

Judicial Executive Assistant

Department 21

Electronically Filed 08/06/2014 11:33:49 AM

1	MOTN
^	TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ.
2	I
_	Law Office of Terrence M. Jackson
3	624 South Ninth Street
	Las Vegas, NV 89101
4	T: 702-386-0001 / F: 702-386-0085
	Counsel for Defendant, Joshua C. Shue

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CLERK OF THE COURT

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,)	CASE NO.:	C-13-288172-1
v.	Plaintiff,	<u> </u>	DEPT. NO.:	
JOSHUA C. SHUE,		{		
# 1550230	Defendant.	{		

Motion to Dismiss Indictment Because of Violation Based on Inadequate Notice

COMES NOW the DEFENDANT, Joshua C. Shue, by and through counsel and moves this Honorable Court to enter an Order the indictment be dismissed because it did not provide sufficient notice of the actual time/times the alleged crimes took place.

The indictment drafted by the State of Nevada after the Grand Jury hearing March 13, 2013, is impossibly vague and defective and in violation of due process because it does not state any time or times of the crime(s) alleged in the indictment.

Instead, the indictment which alleges a total of 41 counts including child abuse and neglect, use of child in production of pornography, possessions of visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a child, and open or gross lewdness states these crimes occurred sometime during a nearly 32 month period, from January 1, 2010, until August 23, 2012. Not one specific date or time is mentioned for any count. It is respectfully submitted such purported notice stating the crime(s) occurred sometime in the previous 32 months is defective as it is the equivalent of no actual notice.

The case of Wilson v. State, 121 Nev. 345, 114 P.3d 285 (2003), found there was no defect in the indictment when the indictment stated that the crimes were committed on or about the 10th

day of November, 2001 and the 18th day of November, 2001. The court, relying on NRS 173.075(1) which requires an indictment contain 'a plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged' stated:

... 'this court has noted that there is no requirement that the State allege exact dates unless the situation is one in which time is an element of the crime charged. Instead, the State may provide approximate dates on which it believed the crime occurred. Id. 368, 369

In **this** case, the age of the victim is a critical element of most of the charges and failure to plead the dates with precision prevents the possibility of a defense. The indictment in *Wilson* was also completely distinguishable from the indictment in the instant case as a mere eight day gap in time provides reasonable notice to a defendant, while a more than two and one half year gap is totally inadequate notice and a violation of due process.

In Cunningham v. State, 100 Nev. 396, 683 P2d 500 (1984), the Supreme Court noted that while the State is not absolutely required to allege the exact date of the offenses charged, the state should, whenever possible, allege the exact date on which it believes a crime was committed, or as closely thereto as possible. Id. 400 (Emphasis added)

The State in this case made no effort whatsoever to allege any of the actual dates of the alleged crimes. For that reason this indictment is defective as written because it denies Defendant important statutory and Constitutional rights. In this case, the lack of notice in the indictment severely prejudices Defendant. Defendant, while attempting to develop a simple time line based defense strategy, has found it absolutely impossible to proceed because of the vagueness of the indictment. Because the State is not bound by the indictment as written to any particular dates, Defendant cannot raise many potential viable defenses.

Wherefore, the indictment should be dismissed for due process grounds, or alternatively the State should be compelled to rewrite the indictment to provide appropriate notice to the Defendant of the actual dates each count occurred or as closely thereto as possible.

DATED this 6th day of August, 2014

/s/ Terrence M. Jackson
Terrence M. Jackson, Esquire
Counsel for Defendant, Joshua C. Shue

-2-

1	NOTICE OF MOTION
2	TO: Clark County District Attorney:
3	Please take notice that Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT BECAUSE OF
4	VIOLATION BASED ON INADEQUATE NOTICE in the above-captioned case will be heard on
5	$\frac{19}{19}$ day of $\frac{\text{Aug}}{19}$, 2014, at the hour of $\frac{9:30}{19}$ a.m./p.m. in the Eighth Judicial District Court,
6	Department 21.
7 8 9	/s/ <u>Terrence M. Jackson</u> Terrence M. Jackson, Esquire Counsel for Defendant, Joshua Shue
10	
11	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
12	I hereby certify that I am an assistant to Terrence M. Jackson, Esquire, I am competent to
13	serve papers and not a party to the above-entitled action and that on the 6th day of August, 2014, I
14	served a copy of the foregoing: Defendant, Joshua C. Shue's MOTION TO DISMISS
15	INDICTMENT BECAUSE OF VIOLATION BASED ON INADEQUATE NOTICE:
16	
17	[X] Via Electronic Service to the Eighth Judicial District Court, Wiz-Net E-file Service as
18	follows:
19	
20	STEVEN B. WOLFSON, ESQ.
21	Clark County District Attorney
22	PDMotions@ccdanv.com
23	
24	By: /s/ Ila C. Wills
25	An employee of Terrence M. Jackson
26	••• ·
27	

1	TB
1	TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ.
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CLERK OF THE COURT

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE	OF NEVADA, Plaintiff,		CASE NO.: DEPT. NO.:	C-13-288172-1 XXI
JOSHUA C. SHUE,		{		
# 1550230	Defendant.	{		

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF

I. FACTUAL STATEMENT

Defendant was arrested on August 23, 2012. The Grand Jury returned a <u>41</u> count indictment against Joshua Shue on March 12, 2013. Shue had originally been charged by criminal complaint on August 24, 2012, with a gross misdemeanor; CAPTURING THE IMAGE OF PRIVATE AREA OF ANOTHER, NRS 206.601. An amended criminal complaint charging multiplicitous counts involving the same acts was later filed. These additional counts all were either child pornography or related charges apparently arising from a single video camera.

A preliminary hearing was set for March 18, 2013. On March 15, 2013 however, the Grand Jury met and heard testimony of two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Officers: Officer Ryan Jaeger, LVMPD #5587 and Officer Vincente Ramirez, LVMPD #4916, and the alleged victim, Hazel Iral and her mother, Anita Iral.

Detective Jaeger informed the Grand Jury that he began his investigation as a sexual assault complaint. (GJT p. 10) He testified that when he questioned Shue concerning an incident which occurred August 27, 2012, Shue admitted he had taken pictures of Hazel Iral on a blue camera under her skirt. (GJT p. 14) Based upon these admissions, Jaeger sought search warrants to discover any other improper or illegal photos. (GJT p. 15, 16) Pursuant to warrant a search was done and a

forensic evaluation was then completed by Officer Vincente Ramirez who made copies of what he believed were relevant photos which were then introduced to the Grand Jury. (GJT p. 26)

At the Grand Jury hearing, Hazel Iral identified various exhibits, photos or video of her taken while she was showering or undressing in the bathroom. She also identified several other photos of her younger brother, Curt Iral, in a state of undress in the bathroom. (GJT p. 41, 44, 46) None of the photos Hazel identified depicted sexual conduct as defined in NRS 200.700(3). Hazel Iral stated she believed her age on each of the photos was 16 or approximately 16 years of age. (GJT pgs. 39, 41, 43, 44, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58) Finally, Anita Iral, the mother of Hazel Iral, testified that she had been threatened by Detective Jaeger and a representative of CPS (Children's Protective Services). (GJT p. 65-67) She testified that the representative of CPS told her she wouldn't get her children back if she didn't testify as CPS demanded. (GJT p. 68)

In pretrial proceedings Defendant has tried to raise the issue of Hazel Iral's bias. Defendant has noted her reluctance to testify in this case through various pretrial motions, filing requests for discovery, filing a Writ of Habeas Corpus, filing a Motion for Psychiatric Examination and a Motion to Dismiss, as well as Points and Authorities challenging the State's Motion in Limine.

The mental status of Hazel Iral came into sharp focus when she recently attempted suicide on or about March 19, 2014. Whether she was biased by continuous payments to her by the Clark County District Attorney for many months is another issue that has arisen during pretrial proceedings. This has been a matter that has provoked recent substantial media attention in other cases especially as it has called into question the policy of the District Attorney in these types of cases. Because of the actions of the District Attorney's office and the State of Nevada in the handling of this case, Defendant respectfully submits wide latitude during cross-examination of key state witnesses should be granted.

II. ISSUES

A. Whether the Photographic Images Seized Actually are Child Pornography. What Standards the Jury Must Use in Deciding That Issue?

B. Whether the Court Can Unreasonably Limit Cross Examination of Hazel Iral on

Matter of Credibility Including Bias, Mental Status, and Payments From the Government.

- C. Whether the Defendant is Entitled to His Theory of the Case Instructions and Other Necessary Legal Instructions.
- A. THE JURY, NOT THE PROSECUTOR, MUST DETERMINE WHETHER THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING THE CASE ACTUALLY MEETS THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF PORNOGRAPHY.

One of the elements of the many charges, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is that the Defendant produced or possessed material that was actually <u>child pornography</u> as defined in NRS 200.710. The jury alone must determine whether the exhibits meet the legal definition of pornography. Interpreting the facts and law in a criminal case requires the jury to decide if the state has proved the elements of pornography. The jurors must use their common sense and apply reason to this decision. The jury, in exercising this decision must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements have been proved. *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)

Defendant submits that the jury be instructed that mere nudity is not pornography. (See, Defense Proposed Instruction A) Otherwise, the statute, NRS 200.710, is too broad and in violation of due process. A reasonable person can only guess at what is, or is not, pornography and is punishable under the law as criminal behavior.

The facts are clear in this case that the pictures and video introduced in evidence at the Grand Jury hearing, and to be introduced at trial, show no sexual action whatever but merely show Hazel Iral in various states of undress and also her brother in the bathroom using the toilet. See, GJT p. 58:

- Q. "And Hazel, am I correct in saying that all the videos we saw today are generally the same thing of you or your brother going into the bathroom, getting undressed, taking a shower, getting out of the bathroom and doing other bathroom things; is that correct?"
- A. "Yes."

It is respectfully submitted all of the evidence shown in the photos or videos is not sufficient to qualify under the statutes, NRS 200.710 or NRS 200.730, as pornography. Pornography entails graphic depiction of sexual activity with intent to arouse. The Defendant submits proposed instruction A and H define what pornography is and what the State's evidence is, in this case, is **not** pornography and the jury properly instructed will so find.

B. THE CREDIBILITY OF HAZEL IRAL MUST BE TESTED BY FAIR CROSS EXAMINATION TO ADEQUATELY DETERMINE HER CREDIBILITY.

The credibility of Hazel Iral is at issue. For tactical reasons the State wishes to wrap a cocoon around Hazel Iral that insulates her from cross examination. The State insists that her mental status and her psychiatric history, or even her veracity, or potential bias, is irrelevant to the facts of this case. (See, State's Motion in Limine) This argument is absurd for the following reasons:

(1.) Without Hazel Iral's testimony, the State of Nevada cannot lay a proper foundation for most of the exhibits the State wishes to introduce into evidence. Establishing a proper foundation for an exhibit is essential and admission of evidence without the necessary foundation is error. Hazel's testimony is especially critical to establish her age in the photographs as well as to establish the photos were taken by someone other than herself.

The case of *U.S. v. Rembert*, 863 F.2d 1023 (1988) required that admission of photographic evidence meet the foundational requirement of Federal Rules of Evidence 901(a). The question then arises, are the photos self-authenticating or not therefore in need of any foundation?

The pictures in this case standing alone do not establish when they were taken, or how old Hazel was at the time the pictures were taken, or who the pictures were taken by, or how the pictures may have been scanned and/or downloaded to any computers or discs. The State's argument that the pictures speak for themselves is therefore defective because the images alone provide an incomplete picture and mean nothing without foundation or context.

(2.) Hazel Iral has knowledge that can exculpate the Defendant, Joshua Shue. If she chooses not to provide this knowledge, or to misrepresent the facts during her testimony, it may lead to a wrongful conviction.

Defendant submits if Hazel Iral testifies truthfully she will accept responsibility for herself producing some of the so called "pornographic" pictures and will therefore exculpate Joshua Shue from the alleged charges in the indictment. Whether she tells the truth to the jury is critical to the defense. Her recent actions reflecting her mental instability including her suicide attempt are extremely relevant evidence for the jury's credibility determination. Also relevant for the credibility of Hazel Iral is her bias caused by the coercive and manipulative tactics employed by the police and governmental authorities in this case. Relevant to the jury's determination of credibility are the prior threats made to her and her mother, along with the ongoing cash payments and other subtle, and not so subtle, manipulation which have biased her as a witness and have caused her to testify to facts that she knows are exaggerated or untrue.

Nothing is more fundamental in the criminal justice system than allowing an accused to present a complete defense to the charges against him. The United States Constitution and the Nevada Constitution allow a criminal defendant to present testimony and confront and cross-examine witnesses. U.S. Const. Amend. V, VI, XIV: Nev. Const. Art. 1, Sect. 8. See also, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1984); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967), Vipperman v. State, 96 Nev. 592, 614 P.2d 532 (1980) (The due process clause of the federal and state constitutions "assure an accused the right to introduce into evidence any testimony or documentation which would tend to prove the defendant's theory of the case") citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) and State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 514, 221 P.2d 404, 409 (1950).

In Kittelson v. Dretke, 426 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2005), the court recognized that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and compulsory process clause or confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to present his case:

Kittelson argues that the trial court limited both his right to challenge the testimony of the State's witnesses and his right fairly to present the testimony of his own witnesses. "Whether rooted directly in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 329 n. 16, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense encompasses a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause to rebut the State's evidence

through cross-examination. See, Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (per cuirum); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) ("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." (internal citations and quotations omitted) The State does not contest that either the broad Sixth Amendment right to put on a full defense or the Confrontation Clause right to rebut the State's evidence are clearly established through longstanding Supreme Court precedent.

Although the right to cross-examination is not absolute, it is effectively denied when a defendant is prohibited from "expos[ing] to the jury facts from which jurors as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105; see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d. 297 (1973). The absence of proper confrontation at trial "calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process." Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038. "The right to cross-examination includes the process." Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038. "The right to cross-examination includes the

opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable." *Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 39, 51-53, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). "[A] denial of cross-examination without waiver ... would be constitutional error of the first magnitude." *Smith v. Illinois*, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). <u>Id</u>. 318, 319

In Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1992), the court relying on U.S. v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 680 (1986) stated:

"Whether a trial court has abused its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of a witness for bias depends on 'whether the jury had sufficient other information before, it, without the excluded evidence, to make a discriminating appraisal of the possible biases and motivation of the witnesses." Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Tracey, 675 F.2d 433, 437 (1st Cir. 1982)) See also, United States v. Lucian-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1153 (1st Cir. 1995) (adopting the "discriminating appraisal" formulation); United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 131 (2nd Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Ward, 211 F.3d 356, 363 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Turner, 198 F.3d 425, 429 (4th Cir. 1999) (To prohibit the cross-examination of a prosecution witness "on relevant evidence of bias and motive may violate the Confrontation Clause, if the jury is precluded from hearing evidence from which it could appropriately draw adverse inferences on the witness's credibility.") (Emphasis added).

Without a thorough cross-examination of Hazel Iral, the jury will not be able to determine the credibility or biases of Hazel Iral. This will seriously prejudice the Defendant and deny him fundamental Fifth and Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

C. THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HIS THEORY OF THE CASE

INSTRUCTIONS. DEFENDANT REQUESTS DEFENSE PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS (A - I) BE GIVEN.

Defendant submits the instructions he proposes are justified by the facts and law. Nevada law is clear that if even slight or marginal evidence supports a criminal defendant's theory of the case, he is entitled to appropriate theory of the case instructions. The facts of this case raise several important issues that require detailed jury instruction. Among the most important instructions Defendant submits are those concerning the legal definition of pornography and the credibility of witnesses, as well as the instructions concerning lesser included offenses.

Defendant may argue all appropriate instructions if they are supported by any evidence or law even weak and insubstantial evidence, and to propose theory of the case instructions that support his defense if he can establish any reasonable basis for the instruction. Boykins v. State, 116 Nev. 171, 995 P.2d 474 (2000). Rosas v. State, 122 Nev. 1258, 147 P.3d 1101 (2008) held a defendant also has a right to have instructions on lesser included offenses given to the jury when appropriate and failure to give such instructions will result in reversible error.

The defendant is not even required to admit culpability in order to be entitled to instruction on lesser included offenses. As the Supreme Court concluded in *Rosas, supra*:

"The governing principle is that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on his or her theory of the case as <u>long</u> as there is some evidence to support it, regardless of who introduces the evidence and regardless of what other theories may be advanced. <u>Id</u>. 1269 (Emphasis added)

Defendant submits his list of proposed jury instructions is a partial list of defense instructions deemed necessary for his defense and he requests the right to supplement these as necessary. It is well settled that the trial court has the duty to give a <u>correct and complete</u> charge of the law applicable to the facts of the case. *State v. Teel*, 793 S.W.2d 236 (1990).

Respectfully submitted this 12th day of August, 2014

/s/ Terrence M. Jackson
Terrence M. Jackson, Esquire
Counsel for Defendant Shue
PROPOSED LIST OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

-7-

1		
2	A.	PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGES OF 'MERE NUDITY' IS NOT IN ITSELF
3		PORNOGRAPHY
4	B.	DUTY TO FIND LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
5	C.	LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE (NRS 200.730)
6		'Knowing Possession' Depicting Person Under 16 as Subject Sexual Portrayl
7	D.	LESSER INCLUDED
8		Capturing Private Image of Another (NRS 200.604)
9	E.	CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION REGARDING PAYMENT TO WITNESSES
10	F.	CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION REGARDING MENTAL HEALTH OF
11		WITNESS
12	G.	LACK OF KNOWLEDGE
13	H.	POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
14	I.	CREDIBILITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
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00		DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 'A'

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'Mere Nudity'

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Photographic depiction of nudity alone is not pornography.

In order to establish the crime of child pornography, photos must show something more obscene than 'mere nudity.' In evaluating whether the photos admitted in evidence constitute pornography, the jury should consider in totality the following factors:

- (1) whether the genitals or pubic area are the focal point of the image;
- (2) whether the setting of the image is sexually suggestive (i.e., a location generally associated with sexual activity);
- (3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose or inappropriate attire considering her age;
- (4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude;
- (5) whether the image suggests sexual coyness or willingness to engage in sexual activity; and
- (6) whether the image is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.

U.S. v. Amirault, 173 F.3d at 31

DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 'B'

'Lesser Included Offense'

The crime of use of child in production includes the lesser crimes of capturing the private image of another. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty and all of you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the lesser crime of capturing the private image of another (NRS 200.604), you may find the defendant guilty of capturing the private image of another. (NRS 200.604).

In order for the defendant to be found guilty of the lesser crime of capturing the private image of another, NRS 200.604, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

- 1. The Defendant knowingly captured the image of another's private areas;
- 2. He did this without consent of the party.

DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 'C'

-10-

A person who knowingly and willfully has in his possession for any purpose any film, photograph or other visual presentation depicting a person under the age of 16 as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in or simulating, or assisting others to engage in or simulate sexual conduct is guilty of the lesser charge of possession of visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a child.

NRS 200.710, NRS 200.730

DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 'D'

-11-

'Capturing the Private Image of Another Person'

It is unlawful to capture the private image of another person without their consent when such persons had a reasonable expectation of privacy. If you find the Defendant did not commit the crime of use of a child in production of pornography or possession of visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a child, you may find him guilty of the lesser included offense of capturing the private image of another person without their consent.

NRS 200.604

DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 'E'

-12-

'There is evidence a principle witness for the State has received cash payments from the State of Nevada'

to the witness may have had on the witness's bias in favor of the State. You should also consider

whether under the totality of circumstances, including the total amount of the payments in deciding

whether the payments the witness received were justified. Even if the payment may be justified by

some reason of policy, you may still consider whether the payments may have in some way

improperly influenced the testimony of the witness.

In evaluating the credibility of this witness, you may consider the effect the cash payment

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DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 'F'

-13-

'The Mental Health of a Witness is Always a Relevant Factor in Determining a Witness's Credibility'

along with all other factors to ascertain whether the witness is worthy of belief. You may also

consider evidence that a witness has engaged in acts of self harm such as cutting in determining

whether they are worthy of belief. The mental status of a witness is always relevant in determining

the credibility of a witness and you should evaluate carefully any evidence of mental instability of

a witness in assessing the credibility of that witness.

Evidence a witness has made a recent attempt to commit suicide is a factor you may consider

DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 'G'

-14-

'Lack of knowledge is a complete defense to the crime of possession of child pornography.'

In order to be found guilty of Possession of Child Pornography, the Defendant must possess such pornography knowingly, that is with full knowledge of pornographic content of the material alleged to be pornography.

If you find the Defendant was not aware of the content of the computer discs which contained illegal or contraband material, you must find him not guilty.

DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 'H'

'Possession of Child Pornography'

In order to find the Defendant guilty of possession of child pornography, the government must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the defendant knowingly possessed pictures or video that the defendant knew contained visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct;

Second, the defendant knew each of the visual depictions contained in the pictures or video showed a minor[s] that the defendant knew contained [a] visual depiction[s] of [a] minor[s] engaged in sexually explicit conduct;

Third, the defendant knew that production of such [a] visual depiction[s] involved use of a minor in sexually explicit conduct; and

"Visual depiction" includes undeveloped film and video tape, and data that has been stored on computer disk or data that has been stored by electronic means and that is capable of conversion into a visual image.

A "minor" is any person under the age of 18 years.

"Sexually explicit conduct" means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.

"Producing" means producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or advertising.

9th Circuit Federal Jury Instructions 8.185

DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 'I'

-16-

Credibility of Witnesses - Law Enforcement Officer

You have heard the testimony of law enforcement officer(s). The fact that a witness is employed as a law enforcement officer does not mean that (his)(her) testimony necessarily deserves more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that of any other witness.

You must decide, after reviewing all the evidence, whether you believe the testimony of the law enforcement witness and how much weight, if any, it deserves.

-17-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

By:

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

The undersigned hereby certifies she is an employee of Terrence M. Jackson, Esquire, and is a person of such age and discretion as to be competent to serve papers, and that on the 12th day of August, 2014, she served the Defendant, JOSHUA C. SHUE'S, TRIAL BRIEF, by electronic service through the court approved *wiznet* service provider, and by hand or U.S. Postal Service delivery to Honorable Judge Adair in Eighth Judicial District Court Dept. 21on the 11th floor of the Regional Justice Center as **set forth below**:

Steven B. Wolfson, Esquire Clark County District Attorney PDMotions@ccdanv.com

/s/ Ila C. Wills

An employee of T. M. Jackson, Esq.

-18-

1	OPPM	Street to Coloren	
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney	CLERK OF THE COURT	
3	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 LEAH C. BEVERLY		
4	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #0012556		
	200 Lewis Avenue		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500		
6	Attorney for Plaintiff		
7	DISTRICT COURT		
8	CLARK COUI	NTY, NEVADA	
9			
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
11	Plaintiff,	CASE NO: C288172	
12	-VS-	DEPT NO: XXI	
13	JOSHUA SHUE, #1550230		
4	Defendant.		
15			
۱6	STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDAN	T'S MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT	
ر 7		RING: 8/19/2014	
18	TIME OF HEA	RING: 9:30 AM	
19	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada	, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County	
20	District Attorney, through LEAH C. BEVERLY, Deputy District Attorney, and hereby		
21	submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss		
22	Indictment.		
23	This Opposition is made and based upo	n all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the	
24	attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if		
25	deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.		
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES STATEMENT OF THE CASE

An Indictment was filed on March 13, 2013 charging Joshua Shue (hereinafter "Defendant") with one count of Child Abuse and Neglect, 29 counts of Use of Child in Production, 10 counts of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child, and one count of Open and Gross Lewdness. Defendant plead not guilty on March 28, 2013. The instant Motion to Dismiss was filed on August 6, 2014. The trial in this matter is currently set for August 25, 2014. The State's Response follows:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

During the late night hours of August 22, 2012, victim Hazel Iral returned home to the apartment she shared with her mother, two brothers and her mother's boyfriend Joshua Shue ("Defendant"). Grand Jury Transcript, ("GJT"), 36. Upon returning home, Hazel and Defendant began to talk about Hazel's outing that evening. Id. At some point that evening, Defendant used his camera to take a picture underneath Hazel's skirt. Id. After offering Hazel a Shirley temple drink that "tasted different", Defendant began kissing Hazel on her mouth despite the fact that Hazel had no sexual attraction to Defendant and did not want to kiss him. GJT, 36-37.

The following day, Hazel reported this incident to the police causing Detective Ryan Jaeger to interview Defendant on August 23, 2012. GJT, 11. During this interview, Defendant admitted to taking a picture with a blue camera under Hazel's skirt. GJT, 12. Following this interview, Detective Jaeger obtained a search warrant for the apartment where Defendant lived with Hazel which authorized him to seize all digital equipment located in the apartment. GJT, 15. Detective Jaeger then obtained a second search warrant to actually search the electronic items. GJT 16. Of particular relevance to this case was Defendant's Sony Vio laptop.

Upon conducting a forensic analysis on the computer, Detective Vince Ramirez uncovered that the computer was registered to Defendant. GJT, 25. In addition, Ramirez found over 140 video files as well as regular photographs in folders labeled "Yummm" and "Hmmm" depicting children engaging in bathroom activities and children engaging in sexual activities.

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GJT, 25, 28.

Hazel Iral later identified herself and her brother Curt Iral as the subject of all of the video files listed in the Indictment. <u>GJT</u>, 38-57. In all of the videos, Defendant is seen setting up a video camera in the bathroom of the apartment and either Hazel or Curt are recorded in the bathroom showering, using the restroom, putting on lotion and conducting other bathroom routines. <u>Id</u>. All of the videos show full frontal nudity of the children's genitals. <u>Id</u>. Hazel specifically testified that each of the videos were recorded on a different day because she and her brother only showered once a day. <u>Id</u>. Hazel also testified that both she and her brother were under 18 at the time these videos were created. <u>Id</u>.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. THE INDICTMENT IS NOT DEFECTIVE AND PROVIDES PROPER NOTICE.

Defendant claims in the instant motion that the Indictment is defective and should be dismissed because it is vague and does not give sufficient notice of when the crimes occurred. This claim is without merit and should be denied.

The Indictment in this case states that the crimes occurred on or between January 1, 2010 and August 23, 2012. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that date ranges are permissible in an Information or Indictment. NRS 173.075 states in relevant part, "The indictment or the information must be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."

In <u>Wilson v. State</u>, defendant Wilson was charged with multiple counts of use of minor in producing pornography or as the subject or a sexual portrayal in performance and multiple counts of possession of visual presentations depicting sexual conduct of a person under the age of 16- the same charges as in the instant case. <u>Wilson v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 345, 114 P.3d 285 (2005). In <u>Wilson</u>, the State alleged that the crimes occurred within an eight day range. <u>Id</u>. The Court set forth the law regarding date ranges in charging documents. The Court held:

Wilson's final contention is that defects in the indictment violated his due process rights by failing to provide him with adequate notice and that the defects prejudiced him to such an extent that he was unable to mount a proper defense. Wilson points to the language of the indictment wherein the State accused him of crimes "committed at and within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, on or 10th day of November, 2001, [sic] and **301 the 18th day of November 2001." (Emphasis added.) 21 Nevada law requires that an indictment must contain "a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."51 However, this court has noted that there is no requirement that the State allege exact dates unless the situation is one in which time is an element of the crime charged.⁵² Instead, *369 the State may provide approximate dates on which it is believed that the crime occurred. 53 In Cunningham v. State, this court held that it is permissible for the State to give a time frame for an offense instead of a specific date, provided that the dates listed are sufficient to place the defendant on notice of the charges.⁵⁴ "Otherwise, convictions for criminal misfeasance would only be valid when the State correctly guesses the [exact] date of an offense."55 This court has made it clear, however, that the State may not fail to allege any date whatsoever in an indictment or information, for such a failure would deprive the defendant of adequate notice of the crime charged such that he would be incapable of preparing an adequate defense, which is the intended purpose behind the notice requirement

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Wilson v. State, 121 Nev. 345, 368-69, 114 P.3d 285, 300-01 (2005). The Court held that Wilson was not deprived of adequate notice of the charges against him or prejudiced to the extent that he was unable to adequately defend against the State's charges. <u>Id</u>. Of importance is that the Court never held that time is an element of the charges such that exact dates were required. As such, contrary to Defendant's claim in the instant motion, time is not an element of the charges and specific dates are not necessary.

In <u>Cunningham v. State</u>, the Court held that a two year time frame did not make the information defective. <u>Cunningham v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 396, 683 P.2d 500 (1984). The Court held:

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Appellant next contends that the information which was filed against him in this matter was deficient since it did not allege the exact date of the commission of the present offenses, *400 but instead simply alleged that one of the acts of which he was convicted occurred "on or about the calendar year of 1981," and that the other two acts occurred "on or about the calendar years of 1981 and 1982, but prior to November 15, 1982." We disagree.

23 Unless time is an essential element of the offense charged, there is no absolute requirement that the state allege the exact date, and the state may instead give the approximate date on which it believes the crime occurred. See Brown v. State, 81 Nev. 397, 404 P.2d 428 (1965); Martinez v. State, 77 Nev. 184, 360 P.2d 836 (1961); see generally 41 Am.Jur.2d Indictments and Informations § 115 (1968). Time is clearly not an element of the offenses charged in the present case. See Martinez v. State, supra (time is not an element of the offense of rape); see also People v. Wrigley, 69 Cal.2d 149, 70 Cal.Rptr. 116, 443 P.2d 580 (1968) (time is not an essential element of the crime of committing lewd and lascivious acts upon a minor). As such, the state was not absolutely required to allege the exact date of the commission of the present offenses.

4 This does not mean, however, that the state may fail to allege any date whatsoever in the information or the indictment, since such a failure would clearly deprive the defendant of adequate notice of the charge against him. See Grant v. Sheriff, 95 Nev. 211, 591 P.2d 1145 (1979); see generally Simpson v. District Court, 88 Nev. 654, 503 P.2d 1225 (1972). Moreover, the state should, whenever possible, allege the exact date on which it believes a crime was committed, or as closely thereto as possible. Cases such as the present one, however, pose special problems for the state in attempting to allege the exact date of the commission of the crime. Generally speaking, in a case involving a child victim, the child is often unable to indicate to the state with any precision the exact time of the commission of the offense. This problem is compounded in cases involving sexual abuse, since there are usually no witnesses to the offense other than the child. Additionally, in cases such as the present one which involve the sexual abuse of children by members of their own family, the children are often understandably reluctant to tell anyone of such occurrences, and often do not tell anyone until quite some time later. By that time, as here, the child is often unable to remember more than the general period in which

the offense took place. Faced with such problems, it *401 clearly cannot be said that the state had an absolute obligation to draft an 1 information with any more particularity than was done here. As 2 noted by the Idaho Supreme Court: It would be a very weak rule of law that would permit a man to 3 ravish a fifteen year old girl ... and then say in effect: "You cannot convict me of this crime, as you did not guess the right 5 date." See State v. Rogers, 48 Idaho 567, 283 P. 44, 45 (1929). 6 We have considered appellant's remaining contention and have found it to be without merit. 8 Cunningham v. State, 100 Nev. 396, 399-01, 683 P.2d 500, 502 (1984). As the use of date 9 ranges provides sufficient notice to a Defendant, Defendant's claims in the instant motion 10 11 are without merit. 12 CONCLUSION 13 As all of Defendant's claims in the instant Motion are without merit, the State 14 respectfully requests that Defendant's Motion be DENIED. 15 16 DATED this 10 ay of August, 2014. 17 Respectfully submitted, 18 STEVEN B. WOLFSON 19 Clark County District Attorney 20 Nevada Bar # 001565 21 BY22 23 Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #12556 24 25 26 27 28

CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that service of STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT, was made this day of August, 2014, by facsimile transmission to: TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ. 702-386-0085 BYSecretary for the District Attorney's Office 12F13527X/LB/cmj/L-5

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1	NWEW & Chum		
2	TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 00854 CLERK OF THE COURT		
3	Law Office of Terrence M. Jackson 624 South Ninth Street		
4	Las Vegas, NV 89101 T: 702-386-0001 / F: 702-386-0085		
5	Counsel for Joshua C. Shue		
6	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO.: C-13-288172-1		
8	Plaintiff, DEPT. NO.: XXX		
9	V.		
10	JOSHUA C. SHUE,) aka Joshua Caleb Shue)		
11	Defendant.		
12	NOTICE OF WITNESSES		
13	[NRS 174.234(1)(a)]		
14	TO: STATE OF NEVADA, PLAINTIFF; and		
15	TO: Maria Lavell, Chief Deputy D.ACriminal, Counsel of Record:		
16	YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Counsel for the		
17	Defendant submits this list of potential witnesses:		
18	NAME ADDRESS		
19	FRANCES CARREON 3000 Roseville Way, Las Vegas, NV 89102		
20	ANITA IRAL 3000 Roseville Way, Las Vegas, NV 89102		
21	CURT IRAL 3000 Roseville Way, Las Vegas, NV 89102		
22	FRANZKE IRAL 3000 Roseville Way, Las Vegas, NV 89102		
23			
24	None of these witnesses are expert witnesses or alibi witnesses and their testimony will be		
25	mostly limited to impeachment testimony of Hazel Iral. The potential exculpatory evidence of		
26	Frances Carreon and Franzke Iral was recently discovered during interviews on August 20, 2014.		
27	All of the potential witnesses except possibly Frances Carreon have been subpoenaed by the		
28	State or were known to the State.		

Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of August, 2014. /s/ Terrence M. Jackson
Counsel for Defendant Joshua Shue CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies she is an employee of Terrecne M. Jackson, Esquire, and is a person of such age and discretion as to be competent to serve papers, and that on the 22nd day of August, 2014, she served Defendant, JOSHUA C. SHUE'S, NOTICE OF WITNESSES, by electronic service through the court approved wiznet service provider, as set forth below: Steven B. Wolfson, Esquire Clark County District Attorney PDMotions@ccdanv.com Ila C. Wills By: An employee of T. M. Jackson, Esq. /// /// /// -2-

1	INST ORIGINAL FILED IN OPEN COURT				
2	STEVEN D. GRIERSON				
3	AUG 29 2014 5: 40 pm				
4	() · d/tod				
5	D1,				
6	DISTRICT COURT DENISE HUSTED, DEPUTY CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
7					
8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)				
9	Plaintiff, CASE NO: C288172				
10	-vs- \ DEPT NO: XXI				
11	JOSHUA SHUE				
12	Defendant.				
13	INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY (INSTRUCTION NO. I)				
14	MEMBERS OF THE JURY:				
15	It is now my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that applies to this case. It is				
16	your duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts as				
17	you find them from the evidence.				
18	You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated in these				
19	instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it				
20	would be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that				
21	given in the instructions of the Court.				
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INSTRUCTION NO.

If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in the light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

An Indictment is but a formal method of accusing a person of a crime and is not of itself any evidence of his guilt.

In this case, it is charged in an Indictment on or between January 1, 2010 and August 23, 2012, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada,

COUNT 1 - CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT

did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly neglect, cause, or permit a child under the age of 18 years, to-wit: HAZEL IRAL, being approximately 17 years of age, to suffer unjustifiable physical pain, or mental suffering, or by permitting the said HAZEL IRAL to be placed in a situation where she might have suffered unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, by the Defendant taking pictures of the said HAZEL IRAL's genital area and/or by taking off her clothing and/or by inappropriately kissing the said HAZEL IRAL on the mouth and/or videotaping HAZEL IRAL in the nude while she showered and engaged in other bathroom activities.

COUNT 2 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: lewd exhibition of genitals, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by using a camera to take a photograph of the said HAZEL IRAL's genital area.

COUNT 3 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0058, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other

private bathroom routines.

COUNT 4 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit CURT IRAL, a minor under the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0058, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of said CURT IRAL as he showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 5 - POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD

did then and there feloniously, knowingly and willfully, have in his possession, a film, photograph, or other visual presentation depicting a child under the age of sixteen years as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in, or stimulating, or assisting others to engage in or stimulate sexual conduct, to wit: a computer video file named PICT0058, depicting a fully naked CURT IRAL standing nude in the bathroom, said video displaying full frontal nudity.

COUNT 6 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0031, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 7 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit CURT IRAL, a minor under the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0031, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to

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wit: by filming the genital areas of said CURT IRAL as he showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 8 - POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD

did then and there feloniously, knowingly and willfully, have in his possession, a film, photograph, or other visual presentation depicting a child under the age of sixteen years old as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in, or stimulating, or assisting others to engage in or stimulate sexual conduct, to wit: a computer video file named PICT0031, depicting a fully naked CURT IRAL standing nude in the bathroom, said video displaying full frontal nudity.

COUNT 9 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0005, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 10 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit CURT IRAL, a minor under the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0005, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of said CURT IRAL as he showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 11 - POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD

did then and there feloniously, knowingly and willfully, have in his possession, a film, photograph, or other visual presentation depicting a child under the age of sixteen years old as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in, or stimulating, or assisting others to engage in or stimulate sexual conduct, to wit: a computer video file named PICT0005, depicting a fully naked CURT IRAL standing nude in the bathroom, said video displaying full frontal nudity.

COUNT 12 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0007, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 13 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit CURT IRAL, a minor under the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0007, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of said CURT IRAL as he showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

<u>COUNT 14</u> - POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD

did then and there feloniously, knowingly and willfully, have in his possession, a film, photograph, or other visual presentation depicting a child under the age of sixteen years old as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in, or stimulating, or assisting others to engage in or stimulate sexual conduct, to wit: a computer video file named PICT0007, depicting a fully naked CURT IRAL standing nude in the bathroom, said video displaying full frontal nudity.

COUNT 15 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage,

entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0006, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 16 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit CURT IRAL, a minor under the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0006, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of said CURT IRAL as he showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 17 - POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD

did then and there feloniously, knowingly and willfully, have in his possession, a film, photograph, or other visual presentation depicting a child under the age of sixteen years old as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in, or stimulating, or assisting others to engage in or stimulate sexual conduct, to wit: a computer video file named PICT0006, depicting a fully naked CURT IRAL standing nude in the bathroom, said video displaying full frontal nudity.

COUNT 18 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0057, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 19 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

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did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit CURT IRAL, a minor under the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0057, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of said CURT IRAL as he showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 20 - POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD

did then and there feloniously, knowingly and willfully, have in his possession, a film, photograph, or other visual presentation depicting a child under the age of sixteen years old as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in, or stimulating, or assisting others to engage in or stimulate sexual conduct, to wit: a computer video file named PICT0057, depicting a fully naked CURT IRAL standing nude in the bathroom, said video displaying full frontal nudity.

COUNT 21 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0089, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 22 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit CURT IRAL, a minor under the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0089, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of said CURT IRAL as he showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 23 - POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD

did then and there feloniously, knowingly and willfully, have in his possession, a film, photograph, or other visual presentation depicting a child under the age of sixteen years old as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in, or stimulating, or assisting others to engage in or stimulate sexual conduct, to wit: a computer video file named PICT0089, depicting a fully naked CURT IRAL standing nude in the bathroom, said video displaying full frontal nudity.

COUNT 24 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0124, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 25 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit CURT IRAL, a minor under the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT00124, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of said CURT IRAL as he showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 26 - POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD

did then and there feloniously, knowingly and willfully, have in his possession, a film, photograph, or other visual presentation depicting a child under the age of sixteen years old as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in, or stimulating, or assisting others to engage in or stimulate sexual conduct, to wit: a computer video file named PICT0124,

depicting a fully naked CURT IRAL standing nude in the bathroom, said video displaying full frontal nudity.

COUNT 27 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0073, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 28 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0075, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 29 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0002, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 30 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0002[214-847], for the purpose of producing a pornographic

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performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 31 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0011[214-856], for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 32 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0013[214-858], for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 33 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0015[214-860], for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 34 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0016, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to

wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 35 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0025[214-870], for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 36 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0026 and PICT0027[214-872], for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 37 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0030[214-875], for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 38 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION

did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly use, encourage, entice, coerce or permit HAZEL IRAL, a minor over the age of fourteen years old to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance, to wit: full frontal display of genitals in a video file named PICT0044, for the purpose of producing a pornographic performance, to

wit: by filming the genital areas of HAZEL IRAL as she showered and performed other private bathroom routines.

COUNT 39 - OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS

did then and there wilfully and unlawfully commit an act of open or gross lewdness by inappropriately kissing said HAZEL IRAL on the mouth.

COUNT 40 - POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD

did then and there feloniously, knowingly and willfully, have in his possession, a film, photograph, or other visual presentation depicting a child under the age of sixteen years old as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in, or stimulating, or assisting others to engage in or stimulate sexual conduct, to wit: a computer video file named {4ADE06C5-E63D-4364-B21E-540546F93E9E}-99e2250e821a640148cb04ae0bde9813.jpg, depicting an unidentified boy receiving oral sex from another male.

COUNT 41 - POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD

did then and there feloniously, knowingly and willfully, have in his possession, a film, photograph, or other visual presentation depicting a child under the age of sixteen years old as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in, or stimulating, or assisting others to engage in or stimulate sexual conduct, to wit: various pictures depicting a fully naked unidentified boy standing nude in the bathroom and bedroom, said pictures displaying full frontal nudity.

It is the duty of the jury to apply the rules of law contained in these instructions to the facts of the case and determine whether or not the Defendant is guilty of one or more of the offenses charged.

INSTRUCTION NO. 4

The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

There are two types of evidence; direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime which has been charged, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a chain of facts and circumstances which tend to show whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict. Statements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case. However, if the attorneys stipulate to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

You must not speculate to be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the court and any evidence ordered stricken by the court.

Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

INSTRUCTION NO. 5

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To constitute the crime charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and an intent to do the act.

The intent with which an act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done.

Motive is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to prove a motive on the part of the Defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case.

unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect or to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the result of abuse or neglect is guilty of Child Abuse, Neglect or Endangerment.

A person who willfully causes a child who is less than 18 years of age to suffer

INSTRUCTION X

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"Abuse or Neglect" means physical or mental injury of a non-accidental nature, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child under 18 years under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm.

9.

"Sexual abuse" includes acts upon a child constituting:

- 1. Incest under NRS 201.180;
- 2. Lewdness with a child under NRS 201.230;
- 3. Sado-masochistic abuse under NRS 201.262;
- 4. Sexual assault under NRS 200.366;
- 5. Statutory sexual seduction under NRS 200.368;
- 6. Open or gross lewdness under NRS 201.210;

26.

"Sexual exploitation" includes forcing, allowing or encouraging a child:

- 1. To solicit for or engage in prostitution;
- 2. To view a pornographic film or literature; and
- 3. To engage in:
- (a) Filming, photographing or recording on videotape; or
- (b) Posing, modeling, depiction or a live performance before an audience, which involves the exhibition of a child's genitals or any sexual conduct with a child, as defined in NRS 200.700.

Mental Injury means an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity or the emotional condition of a child as evidenced by an observable and impairment of his or her ability to function within his or her normal range of performance or behavior.

- -

The word "willfully", when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, as used in the child abuse instruction, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or to make the omission in question. The word does not require in its meaning any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.

INSTRUCTION NO. 12

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A person who knowingly uses, encourages, entices, coerces or permits a minor to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance is guilty of the crime of Use of Minor in Production regardless of whether the minor is aware that the sexual portrayal is part of a performance.

Minor means any person under the age of 18.

INSTRUCTION NO. 14

"Performance" means an	y play, film, photograph, computer-generated image
electronic representation, dance	or other visual presentation.

"Sexual portrayal" means the depiction of a person in a manner which appeals to the prurient interest in sex and which does not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.

A person who knowingly and willfully has in his or her possession for any purpose any film, photograph or other visual presentation depicting a person under the age of 16 years as the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in or simulating, or assisting others to engage in or simulate, sexual conduct is guilty of the crime of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Person Under 16 Years of Age.

Consent of a minor is not a defense for the crime of Use of Minor in Production or the crime of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child.

In order to be found guilty of Possession of Child Pornography, the Defendant must possess such pornography knowingly, that is with full knowledge of pornographic content of the material alleged to be pornography.

If you find the Defendant was not aware of the content of the computer discs which contained illegal or contraband material, you must find him not guilty.

Any person who commits any act of open and gross lewdness is guilty of the crime of Open and Gross Lewdness.

You are instructed that the word "open" is used to modify the term lewdness. As such, it includes acts which are committed in a private place, but which are nevertheless committed in an "open" as opposed to "secret" manner. You are further instructed that it includes an act done in an "open" fashion clearly intending that the act be offensive to the victim.

The term "gross" is defined as being indecent, obscene or vulgar.

The term "lewdness" is defined as an act of a sexual nature which the actor knows is likely to be observed by the victim who would be affronted by the act.

In your deliberation you may not discuss or consider the subject of punishment, as that is a matter which lies solely with the court. Your duty is confined to the determination of whether the State has proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his manner upon the stand, his relationship to the parties, his fears, motives, interests or feelings, his opportunity to have observed the matter to which he testified, the reasonableness of his statements and the strength or weakness of his recollections.

If you believe that a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of his testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

The Defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged and that the Defendant is the person who committed the offense.

A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the Defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.

It is a constitutional right of a defendant during questioning that he may invoke his right to counsel. You must not draw any inference of guilt from this, not should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberation in any way.

Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of common experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.

A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.



When you retire to consider your verdict, you must select one of your number to act as foreperson who will preside over your deliberation and will be your spokesperson here in court.

During your deliberation, you will have all the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions and forms of verdict which have been prepared for your convenience.

Your verdict must be unanimous. As soon as you have agreed upon a verdict, have it signed and dated by your foreperson and then return with it to this room.

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If, during your deliberation, you should desire to be further informed on any point of law or hear again portions of the testimony, you must reduce your request to writing signed by the foreperson. The officer will then return you to court where the information sought will be given you in the presence of, and after notice to, the district attorney and the Defendant and his counsel.

Play backs of testimony are time-consuming and are not encouraged unless you deem it a necessity. Should you require a play back, you must carefully describe the testimony to be played back so that the court recorder can arrange her notes. Remember, the court is not at liberty to supplement the evidence.

Now you will listen to the arguments of counsel who will endeavor to aid you to reach a proper verdict by refreshing in your minds the evidence and by showing the application thereof to the law; but, whatever counsel may say, you will bear in mind that it is your duty to be governed in your deliberation by the evidence as you understand it and remember it to be and by the law as given to you in these instructions, with the sole, fixed

of Nevada.

GIVEN: Jaline (1)

and steadfast purpose of doing equal and exact justice between the Defendant and the State

1	VER] ORIG	INAL '	STEVEN D. GR	IERSON
2	VAL			AUG 29	2014 5:40 pm
3		DISTRIC	CT COURT		1 4
4	CI	LARK COU	NTY, NEVAD & Y. I	ENISE HUSTED	DEPUTY
5	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)		,
6	Plaintiff,		CASE NO:	C288172	
7	-VS-		DEPT NO:	XXI	
8	JOSHUA SHUE,	•	{		
9	Defendant.				•
10		•			
11		VER	DICT		
12	We, the jury in the above e	entitled case,	find the Defendant	, as follows:	
13					
14	COUNT 1 – CHILD ABUSE, NE		R ENDANGERME	NT	
15	(Please check the appropr	iate boxes)			
16	☑ Guilty of Child Abı	use, Neglect	or Endangerment		
17	☐ Not Guilty				
18	COUNT 2 – USE OF CHILD IN	PRODUCT	ION		
19	(Please check the appropr	iate boxes)			
20	☐ Guilty of Use of Ch	nild in Produ	ction		
21	☐ Not Guilty		+		
22					
23	COUNT 3 – USE OF CHILD IN	PRODUCT	ION		
24	(Please check the appropri	iate boxes)			
25	Guilty of Use of Ch	aild in Produ	ction		
26	☐ Not Guilty				
27					
28			•		

1	COUNT 4 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION		
2	(Please check the appropriate boxes)		
3	Guilty of Use of Child in Production		
4	☐ Not Guilty		
5	COUNT 5 - POSSESSON OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL		
6	CONDUCT OF A CHILD		
7	(Please check the appropriate boxes)		
8 9	Guilty of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child		
10	☐ Not Guilty		
11	COUNT 6 – USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION		
12	(Please check the appropriate boxes)		
13	Guilty of Use of Child in Production		
14	☐ Not Guilty		
15	COUNTY USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION		
16	COUNT 7 – USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION (Please check the appropriate boxes)		
17	— arr coldition		
18 19	Guilty of Use of Child in Production Not Guilty		
20			
21	COUNT 8 - POSSESSON OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL		
22	CONDUCT OF A CHILD		
23	(Please check the appropriate boxes)		
24	Guilty of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child		
25	☐ Not Guilty		
26			
27			
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	COUNT 9	USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
2	(Pleas	e check the appropriate boxes)
	\boxtimes	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
		Not Guilty
	<u>COUNT 10</u> -	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
	(Pleas	e check the appropriate boxes)
	×	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
		Not Guilty
	COUNT 11	- POSSESSON OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL
	CONDUCT	OF A CHILD
	(Pleas	e check the appropriate boxes)
	Ø	Guilty of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child
		Not Guilty
	<u>COUNT 12</u> -	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
(Please check the appropriate boxes)		
	Ø	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
		Not Guilty
	COUNT 13	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
i	(Pleas	e check the appropriate boxes)
	×	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
		Not Guilty
	COUNT 14	- POSSESSON OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL
	CONDUCT	OF A CHILD
	(Pleas	e check the appropriate boxes)
	×	Guilty of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child
		Not Guilty

1	COUNT 15 – USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION	
2	(Please check the appropriate boxes)	
3	Guilty of Use of Child in Production	
4	☐ Not Guilty	
5	COUNT 16 – USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION	
6	(Please check the appropriate boxes)	
7	Guilty of Use of Child in Production	
8	☐ Not Guilty	
9	COUNT 17 - POSSESSON OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL	
10	CONDUCT OF A CHILD	
11	(Please check the appropriate boxes)	
12 13	Guilty of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child	
14	☐ Not Guilty	
15	COUNT 18 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION	
16	(Please check the appropriate boxes)	
17	Guilty of Use of Child in Production	
18	☐ Not Guilty	
19	COUNT 19 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION	
20	(Please check the appropriate boxes)	
21	Guilty of Use of Child in Production	
22	☐ Not Guilty	
23	COUNT 20 - POSSESSON OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL	
24	CONDUCT OF A CHILD	
25	(Please check the appropriate boxes)	
26	Guilty of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child	
27	☐ Not Guilty	
28		
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	<u>COUNT 21</u> –	USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
	(Please	check the appropriate boxes)
	X	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
		Not Guilty
	COUNT 22 –	USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
		check the appropriate boxes)
		Guilty of Use of Child in Production
		Not Guilty
	COUNT 23	- POSSESSON OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL
	CONDUCT C	OF A CHILD
	(Please	check the appropriate boxes)
	×	Guilty of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child
		Not Guilty
	<u>COUNT 24</u> -	USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
	(Please	e check the appropriate boxes)
	×	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
		Not Guilty
ĺ	<u>COUNT 25</u> -	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
	(Pleas	e check the appropriate boxes)
	×	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
		Not Guilty
	COUNT 26	- POSSESSON OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL
	CONDUCT	
	(Pleas	e check the appropriate boxes)
		Guilty of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child
		Not Guilty
þ	1 .	

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1	COUNT 27	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
2	(Pleas	se check the appropriate boxes)
3	×	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
4		Not Guilty
5	COUNT 28	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
6	(Pleas	se check the appropriate boxes)
7	×	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
8		Not Guilty
9	COUNT 29	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
10	(Pleas	se check the appropriate boxes)
11	×	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
12		Not Guilty
13	COUNT 30	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
14	(Plea:	se check the appropriate boxes)
15		Guilty of Use of Child in Production
16		Not Guilty
17		- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
18	(Plea	se check the appropriate boxes)
19	×	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
20		Not Guilty
21		- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
22	(Plea	se check the appropriate boxes)
23	M	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
24		Not Guilty
25		– USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
26	(Plea	se check the appropriate boxes)
27	M	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
28		Not Guilty
	1	

1	COUNT 34	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
2	(Pleas	e check the appropriate boxes)
3	×	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
4		Not Guilty
5	COUNT 35	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
6	(Pleas	e check the appropriate boxes)
7	×	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
8		Not Guilty
9	COUNT 36	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
10	(Pleas	e check the appropriate boxes)
11	X	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
12		Not Guilty
13	COUNT 37	- USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
14	(Pleas	se check the appropriate boxes)
15	×	Guilty of Use of Child in Production
16		Not Guilty
17	COUNT 38	– USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION
18	(Pleas	se check the appropriate boxes)
19		Guilty of Use of Child in Production
20		Not Guilty
21	COUNT 39	- OPEN AND GROSS LEWDNESS
22	(Plea	se check the appropriate boxes)
23		Guilty of Open and Gross Lewdness
24		Not Guilty
25		
26		
27		
26		

1	COUNT 40	– POSSESSON OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL	
2	CONDUCT OF A CHILD		
3	(Pleas	se check the appropriate boxes)	
4	×	Guilty of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child	
5			
6		Not Guilty	
7	COUNT 41	- POSSESSON OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL	
8	CONDUCT	OF A CHILD	
9	(Pleas	se check the appropriate boxes)	
10	×	Guilty of Possession of Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child	
11			
12		Not Guilty	
13			
14	 Date	ED this 29th day of August, 2014.	
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CLERK OF THE COURT

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE	OF NEVADA,)	
Plaintiff,		CASE NO.:	C-13-288172-1
v.	r lamum,	DEPT. NO.:	XXI
JOSHUA C. SHUE,			
# 1550230	Defendant.	\	
		J	

EX PARTE ORDER

This matter having come before the court and there appearing good cause therefore, based upon Counsel representation that defendant, JOSHUA SHUE, who is in custody, is now indigent.

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Dr. John Paglini be appointed for the purpose of completing a psychological evaluation of the defendant pursuant to N.R.S. 176A.110.

DATED this / day of November, 2014.

JUDGE VALERIE ADAIR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Prepared by Terrence M. Jackson, Esq.

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CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

JOSHUA C. SHUE aka Joshua Caleb Shue #1550230

Defendant.

CASE NO. C288172-1

DEPT. NO. XXI

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (JURY TRIAL)

The Defendant previously entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes of COUNT 1 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.508; COUNTS 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.710; COUNTS 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 40 and 41 -POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.700, 200.730; and COUNT 39 -OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS (Gross Misdemeanor) in violation of NRS 201.210; and the matter having been tried before a jury and the Defendant having been found guilty

of the crimes of COUNT 1 — CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.508; COUNTS 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 — USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.710; COUNTS 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 40 and 41 — POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.700, 200.730; and COUNT 39 — OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS (Gross Misdemeanor) in violation of NRS 201.210; thereafter, on the 15th day of January, 2015, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with counsel TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ., and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offense(s) and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers, \$3,540.39 Fine (Count 1) and \$28,000.00 Fine (\$1,000.00 each as to COUNTS, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38), the Defendant is SENTENCED to the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) as follows: COUNT 1 - a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS; COUNT 2 – LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 1; COUNT 3 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENT with COUNT 2; COUNT 4 – LIFE with the possibility of parole after TEN (10) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENT with COUNT 3; COUNT 5 – a MAXIMUM of THIRTY-SIX (36) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWELVE (12)

MONTHS, CONCURRENT with COUNT 4; COUNT 6 - LIFE with the possibility of
parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENT with COUNT 3;
COUNT 7 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after TEN (10) YEARS have been served,
CONCURRENT with COUNT 6; COUNT 8 - a MAXIMUM of THIRTY-SIX (36)
MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWELVE (12) MONTHS,
CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 9 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5)
YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 10 - LIFE with the possibility of
parole after TEN (10) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 11 – a
MAXIMUM of THIRTY-SIX (36) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWELVE
(12) MONTHS, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 12 – LIFE with the possibility of parole
after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 13 - LIFE with
the possibility of parole after TEN (10) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY;
COUNT 14 – a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole
Eligibility of TWELVE (12) MONTHS, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 15 – LIFE with the
possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY;
COUNT 16 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after TEN (10) YEARS have been
served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 17 – a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72)
MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWELVE (12) MONTHS,
CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 18 – LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5)
YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 19 - LIFE with the possibility of
parole after TEN (10) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 20 – a
MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of
TWELVE (12) MONTHS, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 21 – LIFE with the

possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 22 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after TEN (10) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 23 – a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWELVE (12) MONTHS, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 24 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 25 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after TEN (10) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 26 - a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-THREE (23) MONTHS, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 27 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 28 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 29 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 30 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 31 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 32 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 33 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 34 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 35 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 36 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 37 - LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been

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served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 38 – LIFE with the possibility of parole after FIVE (5) YEARS have been served, CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 39 – THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR (364) DAYS in the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC), CONCURRENTLY; COUNT 40 – a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWELVE (12) MONTHS, CONCURRENTLY; and COUNT 41 – a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWELVE (12) MONTHS, CONCURRENTLY; with ONE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE (141) DAYS credit for time served.

DATED this 20 day of January, 2015

VALERIE P. ADAIR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

	MAPA Delim to Lemma
1	TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ.
2	Nevada Bar No.: 00854 Law Office of Terrence M. Jackson
3	624 South Ninth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101
4	T: 702-386-0001 / F: 702-386-0085 Counsel for Defendant, JOSHUA C. SHUE
5	
6 7	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,) CASE NO.: C-13-288172-1
10	Plaintiff, DEPT. NO.: XXI
11	JOSHUA C. SHUE,
12	# 1550230 Defendant.
13	
14	TO THE PROPERTY OF A TRODNEY FOR A DDF AT
15	MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEY FOR APPEAL
16	COMES NOW the DEFENDANT, Joshua C. Shue, by and through counsel
17	TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ., and moves this Honorable Court to enter an Order to appoint
18	an attorney for represent defendant referenced-above for his direct appeal.
19	As grounds for this motion defendant states:
20	1. That although he retained counsel Terrence M. Jackson for trial he is now indigent and
21	unable to pay the cost of an appeal.
22	2. Defendant will state under penalty of perjury he has no assets and he has no income, he is
23	currently incarcerated.
24	3. Defendant cannot pay either reasonable attorneys fees or the cost of transcripts and other fees
25	associated with a complex criminal appeal.
26	4. Defendant is facing multiple life sentences pursuant to judgment of conviction issued January
27 28	21, 2015 with the Clerk of the Court.

DATED this 23d day of January, 2015. 1 /s/ Terrence M. Jackson Terrence M. Jackson, Esquire 2 Law Office of Terrence M. Jackson 3 624 South Ninth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101 Counsel for Defendant, Joshua C. Shue 5 6 NOTICE OF MOTION 7 8 Clark County District Attorney: TO: 9 Please take notice that Defendant's MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL FOR APPEAL in 10 the above-captioned case will be heard on 05 day of Feb., 2015, at the hour of 9:30 am 11 a.m./p.m. in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Department 21. 12 13 /s/ Terrence M. Jackson Terrence M. Jackson, Esquire 14 Counsel for Defendant, Joshua Shue 15 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 16 I hereby certify that I am an assistant to Terrence M. Jackson, Esquire, I am competent to 17 serve papers and not a party to the above-entitled action and that on the 23d day of January, 2015, 18 I served a copy of the foregoing: Defendant, Joshua C. Shue's, MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 19 20 ATTORNEY FOR APPEAL: Via Electronic Service to the Eighth Judicial District Court, Wiz-Net E-file Service as 21 |X|22 follows: 24

23

STEVEN B. WOLFSON, ESO. Clark County District Attorney PDMotions@ccdanv.com

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By: /s/ Beverly Jackson An employee of Terrence M. Jackson

02/12/2015 11:30:44 AM NOAS 1 PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR No. 0556 **CLERK OF THE COURT** 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 3 (702) 455-4685 Attorney for Defendant 5 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 CASE NO. C-13-288172-1 Plaintiff, 11 DEPT. NO. XXI ν. 12 JOSHUA C. SHUE, 13 Defendant. NOTICE OF APPEAL 14 THE STATE OF NEVADA 15 TÓ: · 16 DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CLARK COUNTY, STEVEN B. WOLFSON, NEVADA and DEPARTMENT NO. XXI OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE 17 COUNTY OF CLARK. 18 NOTICE is hereby given that Defendant, Joshua C. Shue, 19 presently incarcerated in the Nevada State Prison, appeals to the 20 Supreme Court of the State of Nevada from the judgment entered 21 against said Defendant on the 21st day of January, 2015 whereby he 22 was convicted of Ct. 1 - Child Abuse & Neglect, Cts. 2, 3, 4, 6, 23 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 24 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 - Use of Child In Production; 25 Cts. 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 40 and 41 - Possession of 26 Visual Presentation Depicting Sexual Conduct of a Child; Ct. 39 -27 Open or Gross Lewdness and sentenced to \$25 Admin. fee; \$150 DNA

analysis fee; genetic testing; \$3,540.39 fine (Ct. 1) and \$28,000

fine (\$1,000 each as to Cts. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38); Ct. 1 - 24-72 months in prison; Ct. 2 - 5 years to Life served consecutive to Ct. 1 - Ct. 3 - 5 years to Life Concurrent with Ct. 2 - Ct. 4 - 10 years to Life concurrent with Ct. 3 - Ct. 5 - 12-36 months in prison concurrent with Ct. 4; Ct. 6 - 5 years to Life in prison concurrent with Ct. 3; Ct. 7 - 10 years to Life concurrent with Ct. 6; Ct. 8 - 12-36 months in prison concurrently; Ct. 9 - 5 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 10 - 10 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 11 - 12-36 months in prison, concurrently; Ct. 12 - 5 years to Life in prison concurrently; Ct. 12 - 5 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 13 - 10 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 14 - 12-72 months in prison, concurrently; Ct. 15 - 5 years to Life in prison concurrently; Ct. 16 - 10 years to Life concurrently; Ct. 17 - 12-72 months concurrently; Ct. 18 - 5 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 19 - 10 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 20 - 12-72 months in prison concurrent; Ct. 21 - 5 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 22 - 10 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 23 - 12-72 months in prison; Ct. 24 - 5 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 25 - 10 years to Life in concurrently; Ct. 26 - 23-72 months in prison, concurrently; Ct. 27 - 5 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 28 - 5 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 29 - 5 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 30 - 5 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 31 - 5 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Cts, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 - 5 years to Life in prison, concurrently; Ct. 39 - 364 days in CCDC, concurrently; Ct.

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40 - 12-72 months in prison, concurrently; Ct. 41 - 12-72 months in prison concurrently - 141 days CTS. DATED this 12th day of February, 2015. PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER /s/ William M. Waters_ By: WILLIAM M. WATERS, #9456 Deputy Public Defender 309 S. Third Street, Ste. 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4685

1	DECLARATION OF MAILING
2	Carrie Connolly, an employee with the Clark County
3	Public Defender's Office, hereby declares that she is, and was
4	when the herein described mailing took place, a citizen of the
5	United States, over 21 years of age, and not a party to, nor
6	interested in, the within action; that on the $12^{ m th}$ day of
7	February, 2015, declarant deposited in the United States mail at
8	Las Vegas, Nevada, a copy of the Notice of Appeal in the case of
9	the State of Nevada v. Joshua C. Shue, Case No. C-13-288172-1,
10	enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was
11	fully prepaid, addressed to Joshua C. Shue, c/o High Desert State
12	Prison, P.O. Box 650, Indian Springs, NV 89018. That there is a
13	regular communication by mail between the place of mailing and the
14	place so addressed.
15	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
16	true and correct.
17	EXECUTED on the 12 th day of February, 2015.

.19

/s/ Carrie M. Connolly
An employee of the Clark County
Public Defender's Office

1	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
2	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing
3	was made this 12 th day of February, 2015 by Electronic Filing to:
4	District Attorneys Office
5	E-Mail Address:
6	PDMotions@clarkcountyda.com
7	Jennifer.Garcia@clarkcountyda.com
8	Eileen.Davis@clarkcountyda.com
9	
10	/s/ Carrie M. Connolly
11	Secretary for the Public Defender's Office

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

March 13, 2013

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

March 13, 2013

11:45 AM

Grand Jury Indictment

HEARD BY:

Bell, Linda Marie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 03F

COURT CLERK: Shelly Landwehr

RECORDER:

Renee Vincent

REPORTER:

PARTIES

Beverly, Leah C.

Attorney

PRESENT:

Laurent, Christopher J.

Attorney

State of Nevada

Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Chris Pace, Grand Jury Foreperson, stated to the Court that at least twelve members had concurred in the return of the true bill during deliberation, but had been excused for presentation to the Court. State presented Grand Jury Case Number 12AGJ131X to the Court. COURT ORDERED, the Indictment may be filed and is assigned Case Number C-13-288172-1, Department 21. Ms. Beverly requested a warrant and argued bail. COURT ORDERED, WARRANT WILL ISSUE \$75,000.00 TOTAL BAIL. FURTHER, case 12F13527X DISMISSED. Exhibit(s) 1-8 lodged with Clerk of District Court.

B.W.

PRINT DATE:

03/19/2013

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

March 13, 2013

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

March 28, 2013

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

March 28, 2013

9:30 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY:

Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Dulce Romea; Keri Cromer/kc; Dania Batiste; Sharon Coffman

RECORDER:

Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Shue, Joshua C State of Nevada District Attorney

Attorney

Defendant Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RESET BAIL AS PREVIOUSLY SET BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE OR GRANT A BAIL LESS THAN \$75,000.00...INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN

Mr. Jackson advised he has not received a copy of State's opposition. Matter trailed for Mr. Jackson to read opposition. Matter recalled. Argument by Mr. Jackson. Colloquy regarding what constitutes pornography. Court requested State provide pictures for review in order to make a determination on severity. Court noted Mr. Jackson can provide case law to determine the definition of pornography. COURT ORDERED, Deft.'s motion continued pending review. DEFT. SHUE ARRAIGNED, PLED NOT GUILTY, and WAIVED the 60-DAY RULE. COURT ORDERED, matter set for trial.

CUSTODY

4/25/13 9:30AM MOTION TO RESET BAIL

10/3/13 9:30AM CALENDAR CALL

PRINT DATE:

03/29/2013

Page 1 of 2

Minutes Date:

March 28, 2013

C-13-288172-1

10/7/13 9:30AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 03/29/2013

Page 2 of 2

Minutes Date:

March 28, 2013

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

April 25, 2013

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

 $\mathbf{v}\mathbf{s}$

Joshua Shue

April 25, 2013

9:30 AM

Motion

HEARD BY:

Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted; Katrina Hernandez/kh

RECORDER:

Janie Olsen

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Shue, Joshua C State of Nevada District Attorney

Attorney for Defendant

Defendant Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Arguments by Mr. Jackson contending the bail currently set is excessive given the non-violent nature of the charges. Ms. Beverly argued the bail is appropriate. COURT FINDS, the bail amount is not excessive, and advised the issue can be revisited after matter is heard on May 5th, and ORDERED, Motion DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; Bail STANDS.

CUSTODY

PRINT DATE:

04/29/2013

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

April 25, 2013

May 02, 2013 **COURT MINUTES** Felony/Gross Misdemeanor State of Nevada C-13-288172-1 Joshua Shue

May 02, 2013

9:30 AM

Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus

HEARD BY:

Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted; Katrina Hernandez/kh

RECORDER:

Ianie Olsen

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

District Attorney

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Attorney for Defendant

Scow, Richard H.

District Attorney

Shue, Joshua C

Defendant

State of Nevada

Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Arguments by Mr. Jackson contending the Defendant was prejudiced during the Preliminary Hearing and argued the number of counts are excessive. Colloquy regarding legal definition of pornography. Further Arguments by Mr. Jackson asserting it does not meet the statute. Arguments by Mr. Scow that Defendant was properly charged. COURT ORDERED, matter UNDER ADVISEMENT. A decision will be issued from Chambers in the form of a Minute Order.

CUSTODY

PRINT DATE:

05/03/2013

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

May 02, 2013

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 19, 2013

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

August 19, 2013

3:00 PM

Decision

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK:

RECORDER: Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- COURT ORDERED, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

PRINT DATE:

08/20/2013

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

August 19, 2013

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

September 26, 2013

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

September 26, 2013

9:30 AM

Motion in Limine

HEARD BY:

Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER:

Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Lavell, Maria

State of Nevada

Attorney for the Deft

Attorney for the State

Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFT NOT PRESENT. Ms. Lavell informed the Court the State has basic opposition with a caveat that this is a sex based crime but the State doesn't want to precluded from discussing the sexual implications, but the State doesn't intend on suggesting there was a sexual assault. Mr. Jackson has concerns that the Detective testified with the Grand Jury there was a sexual assault, which was not the case, therefore, Mr. Jackson argued he doesn't want the Detective to state this was a sexual assault crime because that would be prejudicial. Court concurred. COURT ORDERED, MOTION GRANTED. DEFT'S PRESENCE WAIVED.

NIC

10-03-13 9:30 AM CALENDAR CALL (DEPT. XXI)

10-07-13 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. XXI)

PRINT DATE:

09/27/2013

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

September 26, 2013

October 03, 2013 COURT MINUTES Felony/Gross Misdemeanor State of Nevada C-13-288172-1 $\mathbf{v}\mathbf{s}$ **Toshua Shue**

October 03, 2013

9:30 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY:

Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER: Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Attorney for the Defendant

Monje, Ofelia L.

Attorney for the State

Shue, Joshua C State of Nevada Defendant Plaintiff

IOURNAL ENTRIES

- CALENDAR CALL...DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE OF JURORS BY COUNSEL TO PROTECT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL...DEFT'S MOTION TO VACATE AND RESET TRIAL DATE

There being no opposition by the State, COURT ORDERED, trial date VACATED and RESET. The Court explained its policy regarding Defendant Motion for Individual Voir Dire of Jurors by Counsel to Protect Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial and ORDERED, motion DENIED. However, if an issue arises, the Court will reconsider and question the juror individually on limited questioning.

BOND

5/29/14 9:30 AM CALENDAR CALL

6/2/14 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE:

10/14/2013

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

October 03, 2013

October 08, 2013 **COURT MINUTES** Felony/Gross Misdemeanor State of Nevada C-13-288172-1 vs Joshua Shue

October 08, 2013

9:30 AM

Motion

HEARD BY:

Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER:

Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Graham, Elana L.

Jackson, Terrence Michael

State of Nevada

Attorney for the State

Attorney for the De4ft

Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFT NOT PRESENT. Mr. Jackson informed the Court the State has filed an opposition to the Motion, therefore, he requested to file a Reply and a evidentiary hearing be set. The State has a opposition to a evidentiary hearing. COURT ORDERED, DEFT'S PRESENCE WAIVED, Mr. Jackson's Reply is due by 10/29/13. HEARING SET.

BOND

11-07-13 9:30 AM HEARING (DEPT. XXI)

PRINT DATE:

10/09/2013

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

October 08, 2013

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

November 07, 2013

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue vs

November 07, 2013

9:30 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY:

Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Dania Batiste

RECORDER:

Ianie Olsen

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Deputy District Attorney

Attorney for Defendant

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- HEARING......DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF ALLEGED VICTIM

Defendant not present. Mr. Jackson advised he attempted to subpoena the documents from the District Attorney's office, however, he was told the information would not be produced; and the alleged victim's credibility is an issue. Additionally, Mr. Jackson claimed the State is providing the alleged victim with money and gifts.

Ms. Beverly argued against Mr. Jackson's allegations, stating that bribing the alleged victim with monies and/or gifts is criminal, and Mr. Jackson's claims are false. Ms. Beverly also argued that defense counsel has not met the requirements that would necessitate a psychiatric evaluation.

Court NOTED it is not believable that the State would do such an act, and there is no evidence to corroborate Mr. Jackson's claims; however, he may file any Motions he wishes. Further arguments by counsel.

COURT ORDERED, Defendant's Motion is DENIED, noting there is no basis for an examination, and this is not the type of case for such evaluation. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, State to provide documentation if the witness was paid or compensated; Defendant's presence WAIVED.

5/29/2014 9:30 AM CALENDAR CALL

6/2/2014 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE:

11/08/2013

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

November 07, 2013

December 17, 2013 COURT MINUTES Felony/Gross Misdemeanor State of Nevada C-13-288172-1 Ioshua Shue

December 17, 2013

9:30 AM

Motion for Discovery

HEARD BY:

Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER:

Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

State of Nevada

Attorney for the State

Attorney for the Defendant

Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Defendant's presence WAIVED. Ms. Beverly stated that she provided the discovery to Mr. Jackson that she had; what was not provided did not exist. Mr. Jackson argued that the victim is receiving funds from the Attorney General's office which shows they are showing undo influences over one of the witnesses. The Court instructed Mr. Jackson that he needs more back up regarding his allegations; hearsay is not enough. Mr. Jackson stated that that they provided funds to help this individual move. The Court reiterated that someone telling Mr. Jackson something is still not enough; affidavits need to be done. Additionally, Ms. Beverly already informed counsel that they did not do what is being alleged. Further arguments by Mr. Jackson. The Court advised that it will not make a special order compelling the victim to speak to the investigator; if she wishes to speak to the investigator, it is up to her. Following further arguments, COURT ORDERED, CPS records are to be provided to the Court in-camera and matter SET for a status check.

BOND

2/4/14 9:30 AM STATUS CHECK: CPS RECORDS

PRINT DATE:

12/30/2013

Page 1 of 2

Minutes Date:

December 17, 2013

PRINT DATE: 12/30/2013

Page 2 of 2

Minutes Date:

December 17, 2013

February 04, 2014 Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES State of Nevada C-13-288172-1 vs Joshua Shue

February 04, 2014

9:30 AM

Status Check

HEARD BY:

Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER:

Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

State of Nevada

Attorney for the State

Attorney for the Defendant

Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- The Court stated that the CPS records were not received, therefore not reviewed. Ms. Beverly informed the Court that the records would be provided. She also stated she requested reciprocal discovery from Mr. Jackson and that it wasn't provided. Mr. Jackson stated he will contact Ms. Beverly. COURT ORDERED, a strict stay from the victim and the project where she lives is ORDERED; matter CONTINUED.

CONTINUED TO: 2/20/14 9:30 AM

PRINT DATE:

02/10/2014

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

February 04, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

February 20, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

February 20, 2014

9:30 AM

Status Check: CPS Records

HEARD BY:

Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Tia Everett

RECORDER:

Patti Slattery

PARTIES

Ofelia Monje, Deputy District Attorney, present on behalf of the State.

PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Ofelia Monje, Deputy District Attorney, present on behalf of the State.

Court noted Defendant and counsel Mr. Jackson are not present this morning; however, this matter is on calendar regarding CPS records to which the Court has reviewed the CPS records and Metro disciplinary records and has determined they will be provided to parties as they go toward veracity. Further, Court stated copies will be made and parties shall be contacted when the records are ready to be picked up.

BOND

PRINT DATE:

02/20/2014

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

February 20, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES April 08, 2014

C-13-288172-1 State of Nevada
vs
Joshua Shue

April 08, 2014

9:30 AM

Defendant's Motion to Vacate Trial Date and Reset

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Andrea Natali

RECORDER: Janie Olsen

PARTIES

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Attorney for Deft.

PRESENT:

Lavell, Maria

Attorney for State

State of Nevada

Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Deft. not present. Mr. Jackson requested Deft.'s presence be waived. COURT SO NOTED. Mr. lackson stated he had received several phone calls from the victim's mother indicating the victim was being pressured; therefore, requested counsel to be appointed for the victim. Further, Mr. Jackson stated a hearing may need to be set for testimony related to the evidence he anticipates presenting at the time trial. In addition, Mr. Jackson requested two weeks to respond to the State's Motion in Limine as he was just served with the motion on Thursday. Opposition by Ms. Lavell regarding the allegations of the victim being pressured and to appoint counsel; however, advised there was no objection to setting a hearing for the victim to testify. Further statement by Mr. Lavell regarding service of the State's Motion in Limine. COURT NOTED, victims are not normally appointed counsel and the statements relayed to Mr. Jackson may not be true; therefore, ORDERED, request to appoint counsel for the victim DENIED; evidentiary hearing TO BE SET for the Court to question the victim, mother, and any other witnesses regarding the concerns raised today. Colloquy regarding whether the aforementioned evidentiary hearing should be sealed and whether the exclusion of witnesses would be invoked. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, request to seal the evidentiary hearing DENIED. COURT ADVISED, counsel not to prepare briefs or coach the witnesses. As to the State's Motion in Limine, COURT ORDERED, matter VACATED and RESET; Defense reply due 4/23/14.

As to the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Trial Date and Reset, COURT ORDERED, Trial Date STANDS. Argument by Mr. Jackson regarding a scheduling conflict with trial date. COURT SO NOTED.

PRINT DATE:

04/09/2014

Page 1 of 2

Minutes Date:

April 08, 2014

C-13-288172-1

COURT ADVISED, counsel will receive a letter from chambers indicating the date and time set for the evidentiary hearing.

BOND

5/29/14 9:30 AM - STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE...CALENDAR CALL

6/2/14 9:30 AM - JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 04/09/2014

Page 2 of 2

Minutes Date:

April 08, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

May 19, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

May 19, 2014

9:30 AM

Evidentiary Hearing

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER:

Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Shue, Joshua C State of Nevada Attorney for the State

Attorney for the Defendant

Defendant Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Mr. Jackson stated that the defendant is in need of a Tagalog interpreter. The Court advised that the defendant spoke to Mr. Jackson in English. A member of the Court's staff checked with the interpreter s office and an interpreter was not ordered in advance. Colloquy regarding witnesses. Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Jackson said the defendant testified to the Grand Jury in English and works in a casino. The Court stated that the matter will proceed today and parties can do what they can.

Anita Iral SWORN AND TESTIFIED, HAZEL IRAL SWORN AND TESTIFIED. The Court noted that this is one of these situations where everyone is telling the truth, but what does it mean. Plaintiff received money because of being in the foster system, which has nothing to do with the testimony in this case. There is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct as the police did not force her to testify and there was no improper coaching. COURT FINDS, there was nothing improper done to influence the victim's testimony; will copy the CPS records for the State and defense. FURTHER, motion to continue trial is DENIED as Hazel Iral seems to have worked through the issues and is poised, therefore there is no reason to continue the trial. Mr. Jackson stated he wants an individual

PRINT DATE:

08/06/2014

Page 1 of 2

Minutes Date:

May 19, 2014

C-13-288172-1

psychological evaluation due to the attempted suicide. COURT FINDS, suicide attempt does not make testimony no credible and there is nothing to suggest she wasn't being truthful about the reason for the attempt; here credibility as a witness in intact. COURT ORDERED, motion DENIED.

PRINT DATE: 08/06/2014

Page 2 of 2

Minutes Date:

May 19, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

May 29, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

May 29, 2014

9:30 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY:

Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER:

Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Attorney

Jones, Tierra D.

Attorney for the State

Shue, Joshua C

Defendant for the Defendant

State of Nevada

Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- CALENDAR CALL, .. STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE

Mr. Jackson stated he is ready for trial. Ms. Jones advised that the State is not ready. COURT ORDERED, trial date VACATED and RESET.

Colloquy regarding State's Motion in Limine. COURT ORDERED, the motion will be decided at the time of trial.

BOND

8/21/14 9:30 AM CALENDAR CALL

8/25/14 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE:

05/30/2014

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

May 29, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 19, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

VS.

Joshua Shue

August 19, 2014

9:30 AM

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment Because of

Violation Based on Inadequate Notice

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Dania Batiste

RECORDER: Debbie Winn

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Deputy District Attorney

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Attorney for Defendant

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Mr. Jackson argued in support of the Motion, citing the "Cunningham" case, and stated pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court, the State is not required to allege the exact date of an offense charged; however, whenever possible, should do so as closely thereto as possible. Mr. Jackson further argued that the issue of age will be critical, and the State needs to give notice when those alleged incidents occurred; and moved to dismiss for violating Defendant's due process rights.

Opposition by Ms. Beverly, citing the "Wilson" case, and argued that the State is not attempting to hide any information; further, the date in the Indictment is when Defendant was residing with the Iral family, and the end date is when the police became involved. Further arguments by counsel.

Court stated its findings, NOTING that although the State could have pled this case more specifically, Defendant's due process rights are not violated, and adequate notice was provided; additionally, the State will have to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, including the age of the witness(es).

COURT ORDERED, Motion to Dismiss is DENIED; calendar call and trial dates STAND.

BOND

8/21/2014

9:30 am

Calendar Call

8/25/2014

9:30 am

Jury Trial

PRINT DATE:

08/19/2014

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date:

August 19, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 21, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

August 21, 2014

9:30 AM .

Calendar Call

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Ianie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Shue, Joshua C State of Nevada Attorney for the State

Attorney for the Deft

Defendant Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- The State announced ready for trial. Parties discussed scheduling conflicts. COURT ORDERED, TRIAL VACATED, MATTER REFERRED TO OVERFLOW. 5 Days, State - 6 Witnesses, Defense - 4 Witnesses.

BOND

8-22-14 8:45 AM OVERFLOW (DEPT. XVII)

PRINT DATE:

08/22/2014

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Minutes Date:

August 21, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 22, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

August 22, 2014

8:45 AM

Overflow

HEARD BY: Villani, Michael

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11A

COURT CLERK: Carol Donahoo

RECORDER:

Patti Slattery

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Maria Lavell, Chf Dep DA, present on behalf of the State and Terrence Jackson, Esq., present on behalf of Deft. Shue, who is also present.

State and Defense announced ready; the trial is expected to take five (5) days. COURT ORDERED, matter REFERRED to Department XXX for Jury Trial. Court instructed both counsel to provide their proposed Jury Instructions to Chambers on the first day of trial. Any special instructions should include case citations.

BOND

08/25/14 10:30 AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE:

09/02/2014

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Minutes Date:

August 22, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 25, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Ioshua Shue

August 25, 2014

9:30 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER:

Ianie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Lavell, Maria

Shue, Joshua C State of Nevada Attorney for the State

Attorney for the Defendant

Attorney for the State

Defendant Plaintiff

IOURNAL ENTRIES

 OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Colloquy regarding jury selection. Ms. Beverly stated that as to the Motion in Limine, some issues have already been decided and some will be discussed as the trial proceeds. The Court informed counsel that there is no good faith reason to ask the question regarding rent being paid through the Foster Program. Opposition by Mr. Jackson. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Introductions by the Court and counsel. CONFERENCE AT BENCH. Jury selection proceeded. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. The Court stated that Mr. Jackson approached the bench regarding a challenge of one of the potential jurors. Then Mr. Jackson stated that he wanted the Court to recuse itself and then continued saying this out loud in front of the jurors. The Court further stated that Mr. Jackson was told at the bench that he was putting the cart before the horse and that this Court has nothing against Mr. Jackson nor his client, but does disagree with his conduct. Upon Court's inquiry, Ms. Leah and Ms. Lavelle stated that this comported with their recollection. Mr. Jackson stated that he feels that the Court is biased against him. The Court informed Mr. Jackson that the fact that he disagrees with the Court's rulings is not a basis for recusal. Ms. Beverly objected to Mr. Jackson's motion for recusal; the potential juror has done her job for

PRINT DATE:

08/26/2014

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Minutes Date:

August 25, 2014

C-13-288172-1

thirteen years and said she could be fair. QUESTIONING OF JUROR OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE OTHER JURORS. COURT ORDERED, for cause challenge is DENIED. FURTHER, Mr. Jackson's renewed motion to recuse is DENIED as well. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Jury selection. CONFERENCE AT BENCH. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Colloquy regarding jury selection. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Jury SELECTED AND SWORN. Indictment read by the clerk. Evening recess. MATTER CONTINUED.

PRINT DATE: 08/26/2014

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Minutes Date:

August 25, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 26, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

August 26, 2014

10:30 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RIC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER:

Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Lavell, Maria

Shue, Joshua C State of Nevada Attorney for the State

Attorney for the Defendant

Attorney for the State

Defendant Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Opening statements by Leah Beverly. Mr. Jackson reserved the right to opening statements at this time. EXCLUSIONARY FULE INVOKED. Testimony and exhibits presented per worksheet. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OFTHE JURY. The Court instructed Ms. Leah to show any evidence to Mr. Jackson prior to showing it to the jury. Mr. Jackson requested that the bench conferences be recorded. The Court explained to him that this Courtroom is not equipped to comply with his request. The Court reminded counsel not to make speaking objections, but to object properly. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Testimony and exhibits presented per worksheet. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. The Court informed counsel that it may be possible to record the bench conferences, however Ms. Olsen contacted IT and they cannot come to the Courtroom right away; it may take some time due to their scheduling. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Testimony and exhibits presented per worksheet. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. The Court discussed the fact that the State's witness divulged that the Defendant requested counsel. Mr. Jackson MOVED for a mistrial. The Court informed counsel that it can't cure a negative inference. It may be able to be cured by asking about the right to counsel. COURT ORDERED, motion for

PRINT DATE:

09/08/2014

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Minutes Date:

August 26, 2014

C-13-288172-1

MISTRIAL is DENIED. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Mr. Jackson MOVED or a mistrial and wanted the record to show his continuing request for a mistrial. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Testimony and exhibits presented per worksheet. CONFERENCE AT BENCH. Testimony and exhibits per worksheet. Evening recess. MATTER CONTINUED.

PRINT DATE: 09/08/2014

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Minutes Date:

August 26, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 27, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

August 27, 2014

10:30 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER: Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Lavell, Maria

Shue, Joshua C State of Nevada

Attorney for the State

Attorney for the Defendant

Attorney for the State

Defendant

Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. The Court informed counsel that the technology for recording bench conferences will not be ready today. Colloquy regard issue of detective's testimony from the previous day. Pursuant to constance interruptions to the Court by Mr. Jackson, the Court admonished him as to his constant interrupting, rudeness, belligerence. The Court informed him that if it does not cease, Mr. Jackson will be subject to sanctions.

The Court stated its recollection that Ms. Leah stopped questioning the detective after his response; Mr. Jackson is trying to cause his own mistrial. COURT ORDERED, motion for mistrial is DENIED for the reasons already stated. Further arguments by Mr. Jackson. The Court again stated that there are no grounds for a mistrial. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY, CONFERENCE AT BENCH, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Testimony and exhibits per worksheet. Mr. Jackson said he intended to ask about the payments received by the victim for CPS. COURT ORDERED, that is DENIED; issue has been gone through many times. Arguments by Mr. Jackson that he wants to check into the defendant's mental status. COURT ORDERED, DENIED. COURT FINDS, there is no reason to

PRINT DATE:

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Minutes Date:

C-13-288172-1

discuss her mental status. Mr. Jackson stated he has a right to ask if she was taking drugs. The Court informed him that this is not a case that is not clear. Frankly, the Court informed Mr. Jackson is preposterous because parties watch her video for two hours. The fact that she was hospitalized for a suicide attempt and was depressed after she was taken from her home is not a surprise. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Testimony and exhibits presented per worksheet. The State RESTED. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. The Stated objected to Mr. Jackson's first witness as he did not provide a five day notice; she requested an offer of proof of the relevance of calling this witness. Mr. Jackson advised this witness is going to testify as to Hazel's voracity. The Court recognized that the notice was untimely, but will allow her testimony.

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Minutes Date:

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 27, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

August 27, 2014

10:30 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER:

Ianie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Lavell, Maria

Shue, Joshua C State of Nevada Attorney for the State

Attorney for the Defendant

Attorney for the State

Defendant Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

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Minutes Date:

C-13-288172-1

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Minutes Date:

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 28, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

August 28, 2014

10:30 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER:

Patti Slattery

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Lavell, Maria

Shue, Joshua C

State of Nevada

Attorney for the State

Attorney for the Defendant

Attorney for the State

Defendant Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. The Court informed parties that while at lunch, there she recognized a juror, but he wasn't wearing his badge so it could be seen. She doesn't recall discussing the case, but out of an abundance of caution the juror was brought in without the other jurors present. The juror said he did see the Judge at lunch, but was unable to hear her conversation.. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Testimony and exhibits presented per worksheet. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. The Court instructed counsel to return at 9:00 AM on Friday to discuss jury instructions; the jury will come back at 10:00 AM. Evening recess. MATTER CONTINUED.

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Minutes Date:

August 28, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 29, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

August 29, 2014

9:30 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER:

Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Beverly, Leah C

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Lavell, Maria

Shue, Joshua C

State of Nevada

Attorney for the State

Attorney for the Defendant

Attorney for the State

Defendant Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Settling of jury instructions. Parties stipulated that the Court not read the Indictment as it was read on 8/25/14 by the clerk. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. CONFERENCE AT THE BENCH. Testimony and exhibits present per worksheet. Defense rested. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. Mr. Jackson MOVED for a directed verdict as the State has not met their burden of proof. Opposition by Ms. Beverly. COURT FINDS, there is enough evidence for the jury and ORDERED, Motion for a Directed Verdict is DENIED. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. The Court instructed jurors on the law of the case. Closing arguments by Ms. Beverly. Closing arguments by Ms. Lavelle. Rebuttal arguments by Ms. Lavell.

At the hour of 1:05 PM the jury retired to deliberate.

At the hour of 5:40 PM the jury returned with the following verdict:

COUNT 1 - CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (F) - GUILTY;

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Minutes Date:

August 29, 2014

COUNTS 2-4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27-38 - USE OF CHILD IN PRODUCTION (F) - GUILTY;

COUNTS 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 40, 41 - POSSESSION OF VISUAL PRESENTATION DEPICTING SEXUAL CONDUCT OF A CHILD (F) - GUILTY;

COUNT 39 - OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS (GM) - GUILTY.

Jurors polled at the request of Mr. Jackson. The Court thanks and excused the jurors from service.

Ms. Lavelle requested that the defendant be remanded. Opposition by Mr. Jackson. COURT FINDS, based on the seriousness of the charges and that only \$75,000.00 has been posted, COURT ORDERED, defendant REMANDED AND HELD WITHOUT BOND. Further, matter referred to the Division of Parole and Probation for a presentence investigation report and SET for sentencing. BOND, EXONERATED.

CUSTODY (CCDC)

12/9/14 9:30 AM SENTENCING

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

December 09, 2014

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

December 09, 2014

9:30 AM

Sentencing

HEARD BY: Adair, Valerie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER:

Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Jones, Tierra D.

Shue, Joshua C State of Nevada Attorney for the Defendant

Attorney for the State

Defendant Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- COURT ORDERED, CONTINUED at the request of Mr. Jackson; physician preparing report needs time to complete the report. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED.

CUSTODY

CONTINUED TO: 1/15/15 9:30 AM

PRINT DATE:

12/09/2014

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date: December 09, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

February 05, 2015

C-13-288172-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Shue

February 05, 2015

9:30 AM

Motion for Appointment

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Denise Husted

RECORDER:

Janie Olsen

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Bateman, Caroline

Jackson, Terrence Michael

Shue, Joshua C State of Nevada Attorney for the State

Attorney for the Defendant

Defendant Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- The Court noted that it spoke with Drew Christensen; Mr. Jackson is WITHDRAWN as counsel of record. Mr. Christensen apprised the Court that the Public Defender's office will CONFIRM Mr. Jackson stated that the Notice of Appeal needs to be filed before 2/19/15 and he will provide the documents in a timely manner.

CUSTODY

PRINT DATE:

02/10/2015

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date: February 05, 2015

TRAN CLERK OF THE COURT 2 3 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 5 6 STATE OF NEVADA, 7 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C288172-1 DEPT. XXI 8 VS. 9 JOSHUA C. SHUE, AKA JOSHUA CALEB SHUE, 10 Defendant. 11 12 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 THURSDAY, MARCH 28, 2013 15 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RESET BAIL AS PREVIOUSLY SET BY 16 MAGISTRATE JUDGE OR GRANT A BAIL LESS THAN \$75,000.00 INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN 17 18 APPEARANCES: 19 FOR THE STATE: LEAH C. BEVERLY, ESQ. 20 **Deputy District Attorney** 21 FOR THE DEFENDANT: TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ. 22 23 24 25 RECORDED BY: JANIE L. OLSEN, COURT RECORDER/TRANSCRIBER

morning?

MR. JACKSON: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Anything you'd like to add to what's already been provided to the Court?

MR. JACKSON: Well, just very briefly. The defendant was initially charged with a gross misdemeanor in this matter. The State decided to file additional charges by way of a criminal complaint about six or seven months later after getting his computer. I had asked for months to get discovery, and we set a preliminary hearing. At the State's request I continued it. The State went in and argued in front of the magistrate, and I provided Your Honor a copy of the transcript before the magistrate, to raise the bail.

The magistrate after lengthy argument said, no, we're not going to raise the bail. He's made all his court appearances. He's lived here his whole life, and, you know, we're going to have a prelim. But the State chose to go in front of the Grand Jury.

Now, they put their side of it in front of the Grand Jury. They put their side of it in their motion. I can tell the Court I've looked at the pictures that they've recovered, and whether or not it is or is not what they claim -- it would be for a jury to decide -- I'm also going to be filing a motion --

THE COURT: Well, why doesn't someone give me a copy of the pictures, and I can look at them, and I can make a determination as to the likelihood of, in my opinion, conviction and the strength of the State's evidence based on the pictures, and also I can make a determination as to how dangerous I think he is to the community.

MR. JACKSON: That's fine.

THE COURT: I'm happy to do that.

gross prosecutorial overcharging.

MR. JACKSON: I have no objection to that. All right. In fact, I think that -- and I'd also like to provide the Court with some case law as to what is and what is not pornography because I have done research --

THE COURT: Isn't that one of those you know it when you see it?

MR. JACKSON: That's what Justice Stewart said, and full frontal nudity is not enough to make pornography. The multiple counts they've charged in this case is

The initial charge which was taking an image, a gross misdemeanor was a fair charge, and the prosecution has gone way overboard here. The magistrate had it right when the magistrate said, we're going to leave the bail at 2.000.

THE COURT: Let's do this, Mr. Jackson. First of all, you know, it depends on the purpose for which the picture was taken. I mean, full frontal nudity if it's taken, you know, as part of a medical thing or some other thing like that, of course it's not. It depends on the purpose for which it's taken.

So here is what I would say. Why don't we have either you or the State provide me with the pictures. Right now I'm not inclined to lower the bail. You can provide me with the case law; obviously also provide it to the State, and we'll revisit this issue once I've had an opportunity to look at the pictures, and then when you say, well, the pictures aren't offensive or the pictures aren't pornographic, I have something in front of me and I can say, no, yes, I agree it is or it isn't in my assessment. If I look at the pictures and I don't find them offensive, then, you know, it will be my judgment that I should lower the bail.

If conversely I look at the pictures and I say, while in a vacuum these pictures could be innocuous, given the circumstances that have been alleged by the

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State they are not innocuous, then I'm disinclined to order the bail. So why don't we do it that way.

MS. BEVERLY: Your Honor, can I just make some representations quickly?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. BEVERLY: Leah Beverly for the State.

Mr. Jackson in my opinion is misinterpreting what's going on here because these are not just pictures. These are hundreds of videos. We've only charged --

THE COURT: Right, they're video -- according to your allegations in the opposition, they're -- the defendant was videotaping in the bathroom, correct?

MS. BEVERLY: Exactly, that's correct. And not only --

THE COURT: And there's been pictures, still pictures up underneath the dresses.

MS. BEVERLY: Yes. Your Honor, there's also pictures of another victim who is not related to these particular children in the video --

THE COURT: Counsel, here's the bottom line. I'm not doing anything today to lower the bail. The bail stands today. We can both argue here, you know, on and on and on, back and forth. I'm not lowering the bail today. Provide the pictures. We'll set it over for a continued hearing.

As of right now, based on the allegations and the history of the case and what he's been indicted on and the evidence as I understand it, I'm not inclined to lower the bail.

However, Mr. Jackson, I'm happy to review more information and continue the hearing, and if after I've reviewed more information I'm inclined to agree with you or agree partially with you, then perhaps I'll lower the bail. As of

today, I'm not going to lower the bail.

So it's a waste of time for the State to keep arguing, and it's a waste of time for you to keep arguing because I'll say it again, I'm not going to do anything today until I've seen the pictures. You say they're not pornographic; she says they are. I'm going to look at them. I'm going to tell you, wait a minute, you know, there's no good rhyme or reason this guy was taking these pictures except for, you know, an aberrant sexual interest. If that's what I think, then you're looking at the \$75,000 bail, which in that case I might think it's a little bit low.

But, you know, Mr. Jackson, would you like to volunteer to provide the pictures or maybe it's easier for the State.

MR. JACKSON: Maybe the State should because they --

THE COURT: It's easier for the State.

So, State, provide me with the pictures, and we'll set this over for -- here's your new date.

Any supplemental briefing or case law that you want to provide, either side provide that to the Court and then obviously to opposing counsel.

Clerk, please give the date. I'll give the date --

THE CLERK: April 25th at 9:30.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, should we -- we can wait till that date to enter a formal plea.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry, he hasn't been arraigned yet?

MR. JACKSON: He hasn't been arraigned.

THE COURT: Why don't we just arraign him today unless you'd rather not arraign him today?

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MR. JACKSON: No, let's arraign him today.

THE COURT: Okay. And I apologize. It wasn't calendared for initial arraignment.

All right. Mr. Shue, you have received a copy, have you, of the Indictment charging you in Count No. 1 with child abuse and neglect, numerous counts of use of child in production of pornography, three counts of possession of visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a child and one count of open and gross lewdness.

Have you received a copy of that Indictment?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And what is your true name?

THE DEFENDANT: Joshua Caleb Shue.

THE COURT: All right. And does your true name appear on that Indictment?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if that is not your true name you must declare your true name to me at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. And how old are you, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: 38.

THE COURT: How far did you go in school?

THE DEFENDANT: I completed high school and some college.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you read, write and understand the English language?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you waive the formal reading of the Indictment and

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the list of witnesses, meaning -- okay. The clerk can read the whole thing out loud here in open court this morning, if you'd like, or you can waive that and she won't read the whole thing out loud because you and your lawyer have already read it.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

THE COURT: Which would you like to do?

THE DEFENDANT: We can waive it then. If my attorney has it then I don't need it.

THE COURT: All right. And you've seen it as well?

THE DEFENDANT: I've seen it, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand the nature of the charges contained against you in the Indictment?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. And have you had an opportunity to discuss these charges with your attorney Mr. Jackson?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. As to the charges set forth in the Indictment, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Not guilty.

THE COURT: All right. Now, you understand that you have the right to have a trial within 60 days. Do you wish to invoke your right to a trial within 60 days, or do you wish to waive and give up this right?

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, because we may be filing a writ, I believe by statute, we should waive the right to a trial within 60 days. So that's compelled by statute.

THE COURT: Okay. Unless you want to invoke it and then if you file the writ

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then obviously that would waive it.

So based on talking with your lawyer, he intends to file a writ, and you want to waive your right to a trial within 60 days to enable Mr. Jackson, your lawyer, to file a writ based on things that occurred before the Grand Jury? I don't know what the basis will be, but there are various things he can raise by way of a writ.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right then, we'll go ahead and the clerk will give you a trial setting.

THE JEA: Jury trial on October 7th, calendar call on October 3rd at 9:30.

THE COURT: And does that give both sides adequate time to prepare in this matter?

MS. BEVERLY: Absolutely.

THE COURT: Mr. Jackson, does that give you adequate time to prepare?

MR. JACKSON: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. We'll see you back here regarding the bail motion.

MS. BEVERLY: Thank you.

MR. JACKSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

-000-

I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video ATTEST: proceedings in the above-entitled case.

Recorder/Transcriber

1 **TRAN CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 3 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 5 6 STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. C288172-1 7 Plaintiff, DEPT. XXI 8 VS. 9 JOSHUA C. SHUE, AKA JOSHUA CALEB SHUE, 10 Defendant. 11 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 13 THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2013 14 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: 15 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RESET BAIL 16 17 APPEARANCES: 18 LEAH C. BEVERLY, ESQ. FOR THE STATE: **Deputy District Attorney** 19 TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT: 20 21 22 23 24 25 RECORDED BY: JANIE L. OLSEN, COURT RECORDER/TRANSCRIBER

THE COURT: State versus Joshua Shue who is present in custody. This is the continuation of the defendant's motion to reset bail. We received the evidence and have looked it over.

Mr. Jackson, anything else you want to state?

MR. JACKSON: Well, I'd emphasize that I don't think anything has changed since the charges were originally filed. The -- and when it went before the magistrate, the magistrate refused to increase the bail at the district attorney's request, and then the district attorney while we were waiting for a prelim went to the Grand Jury, and the Grand Jury, of course, not even being aware of that set bail at 75,000.

Now, I've filed -- in filing points and authorities have filed points and authorities saying the Grand Jury may have been wrong. That will be for the Court to decide at a later time, next week, I believe, but, you know, the issue is this person has lived in town his whole life. His father is here; his family's here. He's not charged with sexual assault or a crime of violence. He's charged at most with having pictures. Pictures. They want him to have a \$75,000 bail, which is impossible for him or his family to make.

Whether he did something else or whatever, they haven't charged him. They've managed to stack a whole bunch of charges, and the Grand Jury, I would argue, the unwitting tool of the prosecutor said, yes, okay, we've got, you know, some 40 some counts or whatever. Each count we'll set a bail of 2,000 or whatever it comes up to \$75,000.

This I think is an excessive amount of bail. Your Honor has looked at

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the pictures. Whether they're so horrible they deserve that kind of bail is questionable, but I would say the original bail of \$2,000 which the defendant posted out of his money is sufficient.

If the Court's going to hold him for trial, it's going to make it almost impossible for me to defend him. He can't work. I'm going to ask the Court to appoint me to represent him. I'm going to ask for a number of other things I'm going to have to file motions on, but it presents tremendous Sixth Amendment rights for him. He's locked up.

He does not, to my knowledge, have any record aside from this. Now, I think the prosecution has gone overboard here, and I'm not disputing that they have filed serious charges, but I think that the initial bail is sufficient to assure his presence, and I don't think that there's any reason to believe he will be afraid or be a danger to society.

I think that you can craft conditions so that he will not be a danger to anyone. He can stay away from any of those people the prosecution wants him to stay away from. That's what the magistrate did. I'll submit it with that.

THE COURT: State.

MS. BEVERLY: Yes, Your Honor. Leah Beverly for the State.

Now that the -- Mr. Jackson isn't exactly correct. When Judge Sullivan decided not to increase the bail, she had not seen anything in this case. Now the Grand Jury has seen this case. Now Your Honor has seen the videos in this case. These are not just pictures. These are videos, over and over and over again, and I only charged 41 counts. I could have charged a lot more counts but for purposes of trial I chose not to.

The fact is, Your Honor, Mr. Jackson is saying he doesn't have a

criminal record, and he's not a danger to society. He is a danger to society. The reason that he doesn't have an on-the-record criminal history is because he's never been caught. These videos are over a --

MR. JACKSON: I believe that's an improper argument. Your Honor, for all due respect I'm going to object to saying the reason he doesn't have a record is he hasn't been caught --

MS. BEVERLY: That's the truth.

MR. JACKSON: -- that's totally improper, and I ask the Court to sanction the prosecutor.

THE COURT: No, I'm not going to sanction --

MR. JACKSON: You can't make an argument like that.

THE COURT: Mr. Jackson, I'm not going to sanction her. The Court will accept he's never had any negative contacts with law enforcement. How long and how old the pictures are is part of the charges in this case.

So I agree with you she can't say, well, the only reason he hasn't been in trouble before is because he hasn't been caught. What she can say is, well, we know he's possessed these images for some time, or the images are old or something like that to suggest that this was an ongoing offense. That's certainly appropriate argument; although I agree with you she can't say well, the reason he hasn't racked up felonies in the past is because nobody ever caught him. What she can say is this wasn't, you know, he didn't just possess it on this one particular day. He had it for some time prior.

So I'm considering oral argument only in that narrow context, okay.

MS. BEVERLY: I do apologize, Your Honor. My point in saying that is to say that these are not videos that occurred on one day. These are videos that occurred

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now that Your Honor has seen these videos, these are just continuous streams of --I don't want to say it in open court, but we know what the videos are, and the fact is that he is a danger to not only the older victim but also the younger victim as being on the streets. These are Category A and B felonies. \$75,000 is extremely reasonable

over and over again. And now that the Grand Jury has seen these videos,

considering the amount of charges and the seriousness of these allegations.

THE COURT: Okay. Here's what I'm going to do. You know, with respect to the flight risk, I mean, he had serious felonies hanging over his head before; he has serious felonies hanging over his head now, although more. You know, he is obviously aware that there's additional evidence, which makes the case more compelling perhaps than it was before.

I think you have to look at the totality. If you isolate, you know, each of the images, the subsequent images that he took, yes, you know, one image alone without the context could be considered more innocuous than the way we're looking at them, but you have to look at them in the context.

So I think that the \$75,000 bail is not excessive, but we're going to be back here on May 2nd looking at the petition, and depending on how -- you know, I haven't read everything for that -- depending on how that goes, then obviously if that petition is granted in whole or in part then the Court will revisit the bail issue at that time.

So for purposes of today, bail stands. Again, we'll look at the issues raised in the petition, and at that point in time depending on the Court's ruling we'll revisit the bail issue.

MS. BEVERLY: All right, Your Honor.

1	MR. JACKSON: Thank you, Your Honor.		
2	THE COURT: Thank you.		
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4	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case.		
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1 **TRAN CLERK OF THE COURT** DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 6 STATE OF NEVADA. CASE NO. C288172-1 7 Plaintiff, DEPT. XXI 8 VS. JOSHUA C. SHUE, AKA JOSHUA CALEB SHUE, 10 Defendant. 11 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 13 TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2013 14 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: 15 DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 16 17 APPEARANCES: 18 RICHARD H. SCOW, ESQ. FOR THE STATE: Chief Deputy District Attorney 19 LEAH C. BEVERLY, ESQ. **Deputy District Attorney** 20 21 TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT: 22 23 24 25 RECORDED BY: JANIE L. OLSEN, COURT RECORDER/TRANSCRIBER

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LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NV., TUES., MAY 2, 2013

THE COURT: State versus Joshua Shue who is present in custody.

And this is the defendant's habeas petition which I've reviewed everything.

Mr. Jackson, would you like to add anything to what has already been provided to the Court?

MR. JACKSON: Well, I've got a few words to say.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. JACKSON: I just received the government's response yesterday. I'd just like to make a few comments if the Court would please.

THE COURT: Well, we can -- you can either respond orally today --

MR. JACKSON: I can respond orally.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. You can respond orally.

MR. JACKSON: Number one, the first issue I don't think the government responded to adequately, that was whether or not the defendant was prejudiced by the detective bringing out inadmissible evidence before the Grand Jury.

THE COURT: The double hearsay of the --

MR. JACKSON: Well, I think the Grand Jury was -- well, it wasn't hearsay; it was -- it was evidence of other crimes. I think the Grand Jury was poisoned by the detective with the prosecutor's I don't know if it was connivance or with their leading through it bringing up questioning about the fact they brought in --

THE COURT: You're talking about that the detective stated that the mother of the girl told him that the girl had told the mother that she thought she had been drugged and --

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 MR. JACKSON: And sexually assaulted.

THE COURT: -- that that's why -- and assaulted, and that's why she was taken to UMC?

MR. JACKSON: Yeah. Now, this — the prosecution attempts to suggest that, well, we've charged him with the crime of battery, gross misdemeanor. There's a whole big difference between a battery, gross misdemeanor and a sexual assault. They never charged him with the sexual assault or any drugging, battery or anything like that, yet the detective brought that before the Grand Jury. So immediately they are looking at these pictures they later showed in a whole different tone, a whole different point of view.

They didn't need to bring that out. That was totally improper, and it totally poisoned the Grand Jury. If it came out at a trial, I'd be jumping up saying mistrial, mistrial. This is improper under 48.035, and I think the courts would grant it; if not the appellate court would grant it because this is a kind of improper evidence that should not come before a jury, and by law also it shouldn't come before a Grand Jury.

Now, they'll say no harm no foul, but I don't think we can say that because we look at the other issues here. The other issue is they charge him with 40-some counts. He's got more charges than the Boston Marathon bombers, and what we have is one instance of he allegedly turns on a camera in a bathroom, and the camera runs for maybe a couple weeks. Takes -- maybe it took 10,000 pictures. They could have charged him with 10,000 counts if they wished.

But it's one incident involving one or two victims at most, but where do we draw the line. Do we say each day is a different event? Do we say each time she goes into the shower is a different event?

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The evidence reflects the camera was running continuously. There was no indication the camera was viewed more than once. There's no indication that what was taken off the camera was distributed to anyone or anything else.

The case law I've cited suggests that when you have one continuous incident like this, when you have one act, it should be considered one charge. Now, how they divided it up when it's a continuous transaction like this, coming up with 40 different counts, it's multiplicitous, the 29 counts were multiplicitous, and also they merge.

It certainly makes it convenient for the government to go to trial when someone's facing 40 counts in front of a jury. Well, he's got 40 counts of this. He's looking at all these counts. He must be guilty of something. At most he should be facing one or two counts if he's guilty of anything.

The third issue is even more important. If you look at the statute, and you look at the pictures, what was on the pictures wasn't a crime. The government tries to say, this is the second part of the statute. I looked at the definition, and it requires there be sexual acts. You've got to read the statute together.

What is pornography? If it's not void for vagueness, it requires the doing of sexual acts.

THE COURT: Well, I think it could be erotic depiction under certain circumstance -- well, an erotic depiction of, you know, a minor. It can be pornography whether or not the minor is engaging in sexual acts or not. So, you know, like I said, I think we discussed this before. You know, a clinical depiction of a nude person clearly that wouldn't be pornography. But I think that, you know, it's you know it when you see it. There's a little bit of a judgment call, and you look at -you have to look at the circumstances of it, you know, what's the point of

photographing someone, you know. Is this a picture for the National Geographic of, you know, tribal people in their, you know, who maybe are unclothed, or, you know, is this a surreptitious recording of people for apparently no other purpose.

It's not for a medical purpose. It's not for a diagnostic purpose. It's not for an archeological or, you know, anthropological purpose. I don't know. Historical, I mean, I don't see, you know, what -- I mean, I think you have to look at the situation, and you're allowed to look at the situation and the totality of everything. To say, well, what is this, you know. Like I said, of course nudity is not always pornography, and we discussed that before, but it can be.

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, but the cases I cited are directly on point. I'll cite for the Court the case out of Kansas, State versus Leibow (phonetic). It's a -- and this was a case almost identical. It says if the defendant -- if the defendant himself made and possessed videotapes which showed a nude 16-year-old girl to satisfy his own sexual desires, that was still not sufficient to classify the harmless videos as pornography. The Court noted, While we can assume under the facts of the case that Leibow made and possessed the videotapes with the intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires or appeal to his prurient interests, the nudity depicted on the videotape is that of a child in a harmless moment.

Clearly a 16-year-old girl unaware that she is being videotaped in the nude while in the bathroom cannot be said to be engaging in sexually explicit conduct or an exhibition of nudity.

Now, that's exactly what happened here. There were pictures taken while she was in the bathroom showering, getting in and out of the bathroom, exactly the same. Whether the defendant did it for his own sexual gratification or not doesn't make it pornography. What's pornography is if you're engaged in the

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24 25 specific acts delineated by the Nevada Revised Statute, and that wasn't happening. There wasn't sexual penetration. There wasn't bestiality. There wasn't any of those things --

THE COURT: No, there was -- it's bathroom behavior, I mean, showering, maybe using the --

MR. JACKSON: Well, all right, but --

THE COURT: That's what I'm saying, it's normal --

MR. JACKSON: But that's not --

THE COURT: I know, we're in agreement on that point. It's not, you know, it's normal behavior that would occur by somebody who thought that they were using the bathroom in the privacy of their own home. I mean, I think we're all in agreement. The State thinks that. I think that, and you think that. I don't see a dispute there.

MR. JACKSON: But they charged him with felony charges and this -- there is a gross misdemeanor statute that the defendant was originally charged with before this prosecutor took over, which is taking an image of another. That's what he may be guilty of. That's what he was originally charged with.

Now, why they decided to charge, you know, 40 felonies or whatever is beyond me. It's an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, and they went before the Grand Jury while we were waiting for a prelim, and then they asked to raise the bail to \$75,000, which is outrageous in the facts of this case because all the case law is against them.

This person has never been arrested. They don't have the -- they didn't file any sexual assault charges, but they're charging harmless videos against him and making it like his multiple sexual counts of misbehavior. They're pictures on a

video taken from a camera that don't show anything pornographic yet they want him to go to trial facing life sentences or 5 to life or whatever. It's absurd.

I've cited another case for the Court, which is in my brief, and I'd like the Court to look at those cases carefully because the cases delineate this kind of -- these kind of actions are not -- are not the kinds of things that was meant to be considered as child pornography or pornography that is production of pornography or whatever.

There is a crime, and that's the gross misdemeanor charge, and that's all he should be held to answer on.

There's a Florida case, Lockwood. In Lockwood the Court said, The record reflects the tape does not show a presentation of sexual conduct as defined by the statute. That's almost the identical statute to Nevada. The presentation shows rather the innocent, normal everyday occurrence of a female child undressing, showering, performing acts of female hygiene and donning her clothes. None of which meets any of the detailed sexual acts contained in the statute. It thus appears the motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted.

The statute in Lockwood read, Sexual conduct means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviant sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation or sadomasochist, I could go on but it's almost identical --

THE COURT: No, you don't -- I mean, we can both read. You don't need -- MR. JACKSON: It's almost identical to the Nevada statute. None of that happened in this case. You've got a young woman getting in and out of the shower. You've got a young boy sitting on a toilet. That's what the cameras said. Obviously if the pictures were taken for sexual gratification, that may show that there's some voyeuristic intent.

THE COURT: Well, okay, let's be real here. Why the heck else would they have been taken? You're saying that doesn't matter, and the real issue is what conduct is depicted on the images --

MR. JACKSON: Yes.

THE COURT: -- that is essentially your argument. So your argument is basically it's irrelevant as to what his intent or the purpose of the photos were --

MR. JACKSON: That's what the case law says.

THE COURT: Right, but let's be real here. There's no other, in my view, conceivable explanation as to why he's doing this.

MR. JACKSON: I agree there may be voyeuristic intent, but that doesn't make it pornography.

THE COURT: I mean, I understand you're saying it's what's depicted in the image. It's, you know, is there some kind of sexual behavior, if you will, depicted in the image and that that's what puts it over the threshold as to being pornography or not, and simply a picture of the nude form regardless if it's taken surreptitiously, regardless if it's for the sole purpose of some kind of sexual gratification on the part of the taker, the photo taker or the image maker that therefore it is irrelevant; that's essentially your argument, correct?

MR. JACKSON: My argument is the law is clear --

THE COURT: And that the nudity in and of itself is sort of by definition without some other kind of behavior, gesticulation, you know, even facial gesture is just nudity and that the intent of the taker or the maker, as I said, is irrelevant. Is that essentially -- that's what you're saying, right?

MR. JACKSON: My argument is it doesn't meet the statute unless it's pornography, and pornography has to be carefully defined otherwise it's void for

 vagueness. It is carefully defined in NRS 200.710 where it defines the acts that make pornography up, and that wasn't what occurred here, and at the Grand Jury they didn't establish that, and they never even instructed the Grand Jury what pornography was.

Also, the Grand Jury was tainted by the -- by the prosecutor's actions and the detective's actions. I mean, you've got to -- you know, you've got to look at that. This was a totally improper poisoned Grand Jury. They didn't know the law, and they were tainted by the actions of the prosecutor.

THE COURT: Does the State wish to respond beyond what you've already done?

MR. SCOW: I think the brief lays it out pretty well, and if there's anything that you would like me to address specifically, I will. Otherwise, it's just really briefly --

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. SCOW: It's clear that we can charge one of two ways in this use of minor. Under Subsection 1, it's sexual conduct which all the law is based on and all his arguments are based on, but he ignores Subsection 2, which is a sexual portrayal, which is the depiction of a person in a manner which appeals to the prurient interests in sex and which does not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, which are the examples that Your Honor was given.

If there's video of children in a park playing, you're recording your kids, that's harmless. But when you take it in the bathroom surreptitiously record their nude bodies, then you're within, clearly within these statutes, and he's properly charged.

THE COURT: All right. Here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to review everything more fully, and I'll issue a decision from chambers, and obviously you

don't need to come back for that. That will be on Monday. So look for a minute order sometime Monday. Feel free to call the department if you don't see it and ask about it.

MR. JACKSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

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ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case.

JAMIE L. OLSEN Recorder/Transcriber

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TRAN CLERK OF THE COURT 3 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 6 STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO. C288172-1 DEPT. XXI 7 Plaintiff, 8 VS. JOSHUA C. SHUE, AKA JOSHUA 9 CALEB SHUE, 10 Defendant. 11 12 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 16 17 APPEARANCES: 18 MARIA LAVELL, ESQ. FOR THE STATE: Chief Deputy District Attorney 19 TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ. 20 FOR THE DEFENDANT: 21 22 23 24 25 RECORDED BY: JANIE L. OLSEN, COURT RECORDER/TRANSCRIBER

THE COURT: Mr. Jackson, have you ever -- well, you'll be given ample

opportunity to respond. I mean, she didn't file a written opposition --

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MR. JACKSON: I realize that.

THE COURT: -- so I thought that she was going to say that she had no opposition.

It sounds like the State has no basic opposition with a caveat. So let's hear what the caveat is, and then if we can't -- meaning you -- agree with that, then you can respond. But if she's basically not opposing it, there's nothing for everybody to fight about except for the one issue that she's going to focus on.

So, Ms. Lavell, go ahead.

MS. LAVELL: And kind of jumping to the end. If it becomes a huge issue, they can just say they responded, but the bottom line is these were — they responded in regards to basically kiddie porn, and that's sex based, and there's no way of getting around that. That's obviously going to come out during trial. So the State doesn't want to be limited in regards to discussing the sexual aspect of the defendant's crimes; however, we certainly aren't suggesting that there was a sexual assault.

We're not suggesting that there was any sexual conduct. Probably the most close in line was when the individual allegedly photographed his step-daughter under her dress while she was in it. And so, you know, obviously this is sex based. So we don't want to be precluded from discussing the sexual implications, but we certainly aren't intending to nor do we have any reason or basis to suggest that there was a sexual assault.

THE COURT: Right. Well, the term sexual complaint, which Mr. Jackson seems to be complaining about, if he says it that way, that suggests that there's a victim who was complaining.

Is that what you're concerned about, Mr. Jackson?

 MR. JACKSON: Well, you know, the facts as it came out, the way the detective testified in front of the Grand Jury is that there was a potential sexual assault, and that simply didn't happen. There's never been any sexual assault charges made.

The mother in this is -- panicked and thought possibly her daughter may have been a victim. It turned out that wasn't the case. Inadvertently, other -- one thing led to another, and some objects which the State claims are pornography, which we don't concede, were found as a result of that investigation.

Now, how the State gets to that in the trial I don't know, but we don't want the police officer saying, we went there to investigate a sexual assault because that's prejudicial --

THE COURT: Right, I agree with you that is prejudicial. He won't say it. He won't say anything that suggests that there was a complaint that this other unrelated person could have been a victim.

MR. JACKSON: Thank you.

MS. LAVELL: And I have to --

THE COURT: Of a sexual assault.

MS. LAVELL: A victim of a sexual assault because clearly she was a victim.

THE COURT: Right. But not of --

MS. LAVELL: Not of a sexual assault, and we don't plan on suggesting that, using that terminology or --

THE COURT: Or anybody else that's been charged was the victim of a sexual --

MS. LAVELL: Absolutely not. This is all about kiddie porn.

THE COURT: All right. Then keep it focused that way.

MS. LAVELL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Jackson, if they, you know, ask a question that, you know, suggests something, or we can bring the detective in beforehand or something like that to give him an admonishment if that would make you more comfortable.

MR. JACKSON: I think that might be appropriate before we impanel a jury. I have -- I'll probably be filing other motions. I haven't stopped working on motions, Your Honor, and we have one next week regarding -- set at calendar call regarding how we question the jury in picking the jury. I have a couple others in the works.

THE COURT: That's fine. Okay. So we can, you know, admonish the detective, you know, whether it's before jury selection, I don't know that we need to do it then, certainly before he testifies.

MR. JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

MS. LAVELL: Judge, if I could just make a record. All of the discovery has been provided to Mr. Jackson including additional copies of all the videos and photos.

MR. JACKSON: Well, that was one of the things I was going to raise at calendar call because I've got -- might as well deal with that now.

I got a list of additional witnesses, but I've got no discovery concerning those witnesses. Now, this is what, you know, they give me a list of a bunch of names, and I've got nothing connecting those names to anything. They're just names floating out there.

One of them I got a name and I don't have an address or anything, and I got nothing in my discovery concerning this one person. So I'll probably be filing a motion to strike him from the Information. I've got no discovery, no address. I've

just got a name. I mean, that's wonderful, but it doesn't --

THE COURT: Do you know what he's talking about, Ms. Lavell?

MS. LAVELL: Your Honor, this isn't my case, although I think I am going to be second chair, but I am not familiar with it.

THE COURT: All right. Since you're not that familiar with who these names, you know, whose names these are and whether there's discovery relating to them or whether they're actually going to be called or anything like that, let's go ahead and table this issue until we come back at the calendar call.

MR. JACKSON: Yes.

THE COURT: At that time, Ms. Lavell, I expect somebody to be here who is familiar with all of these issues, and maybe some of these witnesses aren't even going to be called; in which case, you know, the State can just stand up and say we're not calling that person. Then we don't need to spend 15 minutes discussing whether or not the notice was appropriate.

MS. LAVELL: And does he have any other issues that we're going to need to address so we can prepare for that and not kind of be blindsided at calendar call?

MR. JACKSON: Well, you're not going to be blindsided, because anything I file I file timely unless it's --

After I complete my investigation, I will advise the State if there's any other issues. There are some issues regarding witness intimidation, which I intend to raise. So I don't want to be blindsided about that.

THE COURT: Mr. Jackson, you're always welcome to file any motions that are filed in a timely fashion, and we'll certainly deal with those, and we'll expect the State to also respond in a timely fashion.

MR. JACKSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

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ATTEST:

I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case.

JANIE L. OLSEN

Recorder/Transcriber

TRAN CLERK OF THE COURT 3 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 5 STATE OF NEVADA, 6 7 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C288172-1 DEPT. XXI 8 VS. 9 JOSHUA C. SHUE, AKA JOSHUA CALEB SHUE, 10 Defendant. 11 12 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 THURSDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2013 15 CALENDAR CALL DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE OF JURORS BY 16 COUNSEL TO PROTECT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 17 APPEARANCES: 18 FOR THE STATE: MARIA LAVELL, ESQ. 19 Chief Deputy District Attorney 20 FOR THE DEFENDANT: TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ. 21 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: JANIE L. OLSEN, COURT RECORDER/TRANSCRIBER 25

 MR. JACKSON: My client is present. This matter I filed a motion to vacate, and the district attorney is not opposing it, is my understanding. Leah Beverly does not oppose my motion to vacate the trial date and reset it if the Court would please.

THE COURT: All right. There's no opposition. What are -- when are you looking for?

MR. JACKSON: Sometime after the first of the year would, I think, would fit my schedule. I don't know about the State and the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. Sometime after the first of the year and that will give you adequate time?

MR. JACKSON: Uh-huh.

THE JEA: How about March 17th.

MR. JACKSON: Thank you. Your Honor.

THE JEA: Jury trial, March 17th, calendar call March 13th, both at 9:30.

MR. JACKSON: All right. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Do you want me to rule on the motion for individual voir dire at this time?

MR. JACKSON: You know, I don't know if the -- I'd like to argue it. I don't know if Ms. Beverly isn't here --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's go ahead and pass it then. It doesn't really -we don't need to deal with it. I'll just tell you typically what I do in these cases,
question everyone as a group, and if they look like they're uncomfortable or they say
they're uncomfortable, or they say something which could taint the rest of the jury,
then we might take a break or table that juror till we take a break and then question

them individually.

MR. JACKSON: All right. Well --

THE COURT: Typically I don't do individual voir dire. The only time I've done it was on the Desai case because of the extraordinary pretrial publicity. But other than that, it's not -- it's not something I do, but like I said, if the need arises based on a response or something like that, then I'm happy to question -- for example, typically, you know, when we deal with the issue of pretrial publicity, we question the jurors individually just asking that -- just when they've indicated they've read, seen or heard something then of course we question them privately.

MR. JACKSON: My only concern is in these cases involving sexual matters, sometimes I've had four or five jurors raise their hand that they've either been the victim of a sexual matter when they were a child or whatever, and they're reluctant to discuss that in front of other jurors. And I think it also taints the jury panel.

Because of that, I think that it creates -- it creates a dynamic that in these particular kind of cases can lead to a skewed jury. It can lead to prejudicing the other jurors even the ones that haven't themselves been victims, and, you know, if it looks like there's no problem, you know, I can see maybe no need for it, but if it develops --

THE COURT: Right. If it looks like, like I said, if it looks like there's people—somebody's uncomfortable or maybe they're withholding something, certainly we can question that juror privately just like we would a juror who maybe had a situation with a, you know, somebody, the district attorney's office where that could taint the whole panel or something like that. So, you know, if the need arises we can question on just limited areas jurors individually. But we're not going to do the whole questioning individually, and we're not going to make a blanket rule. We're going to

see how it goes. It's kind of a fluid process, and then if we feel like we need to do it, but certainly can make whatever records you need to make and whatnot.

So let's table this issue. That's my preliminary ruling on that, and I'm sure you'll have other motions and whatnot to file in this case.

MR. JACKSON: There's another motion that's pending and I just filed, motion for psychological examination of the victim. That was filed just this week. That's mainly one of the reasons for the continuance. The State hasn't responded to that. That will probably be set in a couple weeks. I don't know. So the case is proceeding along, and I may be filing other motions as the case progresses.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. We'll see you back here then probably in a few weeks.

(Case recalled.)

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, could we recall the Shue case. Ms. Beverly came up to me in the hall and said that date that we set wasn't a good date for her.

THE COURT: All right. That's fine. Where's Ms. Beverly now.

MS. LAVELL: Your Honor, Maria Lavell for the State. I was in another courtroom. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: That's fine. We gave a March date. What date does the State want?

MS. LAVELL: We're asking for any week in June if possible.

MR. JACKSON: I wouldn't object to that.

THE COURT. Okay. We'll give you a new date.

THE JEA: June 2nd for the jury trial, May 29th for calendar call, both at 9:30.

MR. JACKSON: 5, 29. All right. I won't get a written acknowledgment from my client. He's already left the building. I went down looking for him, but when I

saw Ms. Beverly, she said, no, no, I can't do that date. So that's fine. I'm sure that date will be fine with my client. If there's a problem I'll put it back on.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LAVELL: And, Your Honor, I'm sorry. I missed the first part of the show, so I didn't know what happened with the various motions that were on calendar, did you set those --

THE COURT: Basically, you can probably get the notes from the deputy, but I said I'm going to follow my standard procedure on jury selection. If there's something, you know, that somebody has trouble talking or they are uncomfortable or we think that they maybe are being deceptive or something like that, we can do individual voir dire solely on that issue with those jurors that appear to need it.

And Mr. Jackson is free to make whatever records he needs to make and motions throughout the proceeding.

-oOo-

ATTEST:

I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case.

JANIE L. OLSEN

Recorder/Transcriber

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2	KIKAN	CLERK OF THE COURT
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5	NISTRICT	T COURT
6	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
7	CLARR COOK	III, NEVADA
	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)	
9	Plaintiff,	CASE#: C288172
	vs.	DEPT. XXI
	JOSHUA C. SHUE, aka) JOSHUA CALEB SHUE)	
12	Defendant.	
13		D ADAID DISTRICT COLIDT HINGE
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE P. ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2013	
15	RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF	
16		
17		
18	APPEARANCES:	
19	For the State:	ELANA L. GRAHAM, ESQ.
20		Deputy District Attorney
21	For the Defendant:	TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ.
22		
23		
24		
25	RECORDED BY: JANIE OLSEN, COURT RECORDER	
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9:54 A.M.

1	TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2013 AT 9:54 A.M.
2	
3	THE COURT: All right. State versus Joshua Shue.
4	MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, the State filed a response to this motion
5	yesterday. I'd like time to respond. Also, I'd like an evidentiary hearing on it. The
6	government alleged in their motion that I was alleging certain facts that weren't true.
7	have two witnesses that will support the facts I allege, who are the government's
8	witnesses, I'd like
9	THE COURT: Why don't we do this.
10	MR. JACKSON: I'd like to call as witnesses.
11	THE COURT: Let's address the issue of whether or not you should have an
12	evidentiary hearing
13	MR. JACKSON: Okay.
14	THE COURT: in your reply brief. And we'll give you how long do you
15	need?
16	MR. JACKSON: You know, I'd like a couple weeks to respond. You know, I
17	I'll get a statement from my investigator of what the witnesses I have said.
18	THE COURT: Yeah, you can do it by way of affidavit initially.
19	MR. JACKSON: Okay.
20	THE COURT: And then if we if the Court decides, well, you know, we need
21	to flesh this out

MR. JACKSON: All right.

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THE COURT: -- then we'll have an evidentiary hearing.

MR. JACKSON: That's fine.

THE COURT: Obviously, if the affidavits say something such as, you know,

THE COURT: That's -- that's fine. I'm just saying if for some reason there

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was something in here concerning -- the reason I said that, is there something here concerning that there's been incentives given and things like that.

MR. JACKSON: Yeah.

THE COURT: So, you know --

MR. JACKSON: Right.

THE COURT: -- if that's -- if -- you know, there -- that hasn't been done then they can address that by way of affidavit, depending on what your affidavit says. Again, they're going to look at the affidavit that you file. If there's certain factual assertions relating to employees of the District Attorney's Office and they dispute those, they may also do that by way of affidavit, and then the Court will make a determination if an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. The point of me saying --

MR. JACKSON: I think that's appropriate.

THE COURT: -- what I just said is that I believe if factual assertions are made relating to an employee of the District Attorney's Office that they have a right to make their own factual assertions and make them part of the record, whereas normally, as you know, they would not be allowed to file any kind of responsive pleading or any response to your brief.

So, the court clerk will give you -- two weeks, is that sufficient for your reply?

MR. JACKSON: What date is that? I know I'm going to be out of town early November --

THE COURT CLERK: It's October 22nd.

MR. JACKSON: -- in the Ninth Circuit. Can we make it the week after? I'm going to be preparing on some things. If you make it the 29th.

THE COURT CLERK: The 29th?

MR. JACKSON: Yeah. 1 THE COURT: That's fine. 2 MS. GRAHAM: Your Honor, I have a question. For our objection to the 3 evidentiary hearing, if Mr. Jackson doesn't raise anything specifically to State -people in our office, would you still like that addressed through a motion or just 5 6 argument? THE COURT: Just argument. 7 MS. GRAHAM: Okay. 8 THE COURT: And then a hearing date thereafter. THE COURT CLERK: Hearing date will be November 5th at 9:30 a.m. 10 MR. JACKSON: Could we make it -- I will be in San Francisco on November 11 the 4th and probably coming back the 5th. Can we make it --12 THE COURT CLERK: How about the 12th? 13 MR. JACKSON: -- two days after? 14 THE COURT: How about the 7th? 15 THE COURT CLERK: The 12th or the --16 MR. JACKSON: The 7th is fine. 17 THE COURT: November 7th. 18 THE COURT CLERK: The 7th? 19 MR. JACKSON: The 7th is fine. 20 THE COURT CLERK: November 7th at 9:30 a.m. 21 THE COURT: All right. And you're asking us to waive your client's 22 23 appearance for today. MR. JACKSON: Yes. 24

THE COURT: That's fine.

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MR. JACKSON: He's working.

[Proceedings concluded at 9:58 a.m.]

* * * * * * * *

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

SANDRA PRUCHNIC

Court Transcriber

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RTRAN CLERK OF THE COURT 2 3 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE#: C288172 9 Plaintiff, VS. DEPT. XXI 10 JOSHUA C. SHUE, aka 11 JOSHUA CALEB SHUE 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE P. ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2013 15 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 16 HEARING; DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF **ALLEGED VICTIM** 17 18 APPEARANCES: 19 LEAH C. BEVERLY, ESQ. For the State: **Deputy District Attorney** 20 TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ. For the Defendant: 21 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: JANIE OLSEN, COURT RECORDER 25

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2013 AT 9:30 A.M.

THE COURT: Are you asking that we waive his appearance for today?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: State versus Joshua Shue.

And where is Mr. Shue? He's out on bond.

THE COURT: All right. We'll go ahead and waive his appearance.

And this is your motion for a psychiatric examination. We did receive an opposition and I think reply. And do you have anything you'd like to add, Mr. Jackson, to --

MR. JACKSON: You --

MR. JACKSON: Yes.

THE COURT: -- what has already been provided to the Court?

MR. JACKSON: You received my -- the affidavits --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JACKSON: -- from my investigator, Mr. Abbott?

Well, the thing that I'd like to add is that we're concerned and I haven't had a chance to prepare my discovery motion. I did attempt to subpoena documents from the District Attorney's Office since the last court appearance. And I got letters from both the district attorney and a CPA that they wouldn't release the information I requested. So I will be -- I'm working on preparing a discovery motion. But the information that I sought, which I think is relevant, is -- concerns directly whether or not the alleged child victim is receiving benefits from the District Attorney's Office. That was represented by the witnesses we spoke to. They believe that she was getting certain funds or --

THE COURT: Like for counseling or something --

MR. JACKSON: No.

THE COURT: -- is that what you're talking about?

MR. JACKSON: Like for money to buy TV sets. Like for money to spend for various things. Now this is important because in a recent case it was developed that the same unit of the District Attorney's Office had destroyed the records on this and --

THE COURT: Are you talking about the case that was in front of Judge Cadish recently?

MR. JACKSON: Yes.

THE COURT: Is that the case you're talking about?

MR. JACKSON: And there is concerns, and especially since based on the information we received from the witness, specifically --

THE COURT: Well, let me cut you off.

MR. JACKSON: All right.

THE COURT: First of all, it seems unlikely that they're buying TV sets for the victims; however, if that's true then certainly you need to be notified about that.

MR. JACKSON: And I --

THE COURT: I would agree with you. Just like, you know, they should disclose to you what witness fees are being paid or if they're providing counseling services, not directly of course, but through -- you know, I know sometimes there's a fund for that. I would be surprised, to put it mildly, if they were buying electronics and TVs and things of that nature, but certainly if that were occurring you would be entitled to know about it.

MR. JACKSON: I will file a motion and specifically asking for the records of

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the District Attorney's Office and what they have provided to this witness. Also, I will file a motion -- I've been told by CPS they won't provide information based on a Nevada statute. I think this Court has the inherent authority --

THE COURT: Typically what happens is if you make a motion and I grant it I sign an order.

MR. JACKSON: Right.

THE COURT: The records from CPS come to me for in-camera review and then I make a finding as to whether they're relevant or not relevant. If they're relevant then I of course make copies and distribute a copy to the defense, a copy to the State. If they're not relevant the records go into a sealed packet.

MR. JACKSON: For appeal.

THE COURT: They become a Court's exhibit and they're available for review by the Supreme Court if requested.

MR. JACKSON: 1 --

THE COURT: So that's what we do here. And I think --

MR. JACKSON: I'll go through that procedure.

THE COURT: -- that's pretty uniform.

MR. JACKSON: Now, the -- you know -- to just very briefly sum up my motion. I think this is a classic case for the Court ordering a psychiatric evaluation. The witness is going to be a critical witness for the State. She is going to testify to what happened and we want to ask her significant questions. I think her credibility is an issue. I think she has serious psychological problems. I think we can demonstrate that -- them and I think we have a right to this information and I would submit it with that.

THE COURT: All right.

State, do you want to respond?

MS. BEVERLY: Yes, Your Honor.

And I would like to make a record. First, I did file a sur-reply yesterday.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. BEVERLY: I'm sure --

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MS. BEVERLY: Before I talk about the actual motion, I need to make a record about the things that I'm being accused of because what Mr. Jackson is accusing me of is essentially a crime; it is bribing a witness. Saying that I am providing -- and he specifically uses my name, so that's why I filed the motion from my -- for myself. He is accusing me of bribing a witness by providing televisions, computers, cameras, cell phones. Number one, that is a complete violation of my oath as an attorney. Number two, it's a criminal offense and I can be prosecuted by my own office if I were doing that. So I would like this Court to make a finding that that is simply not true. The information that he provides in his motion is that, well, the mom said she got the gifts so I must have provided them. So I -- I would really ask this Court to make a finding based on my affidavit and knowing I'm the one prosecuting this case that that's simply false.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. JACKSON: Well --

THE COURT: At this point, you know, we got two affidavits. I will say this, that -- you know, like I said already, it's not believable to me that the district attorney is doing these things. Now if the District Attorney's Office said, okay, you can borrow this, you know, television to look at the video, even that would be unusual. But there's no evidence that that happened in this case because typically you'd have

the witness come in to your office, sit there, show them the video, or the photos, or the tape or whatever it is you wanted to watch. You know, I don't know where the mother's getting this information but, you know, she thinks this happened. You know, I just don't see anything credible, but certainly, Mr. Jackson, you can -- you've indicated an intent to file a motion. You're welcome to file whatever motion you want to file --

MR. JACKSON: I will.

THE COURT: -- so feel free to do that.

MR. JACKSON: Well --

THE COURT: I don't know what else -- what else to say.

MR. JACKSON: It's a question of credibility. I think maybe we should have an evidentiary hearing and bring all the parties in --

THE COURT: All right. At this point --

MR. JACKSON: -- and we can question them under oath.

THE COURT: -- Mr. Jackson, we are not going to set an evidentiary hearing until I get a better foundation --

MR. JACKSON: Okay.

THE COURT: -- for where this information is coming from so that we can -- I can determine whether there's a need to assess credibility, which is what you do, as you know, in an evidentiary hearing. If I find that there's not sufficient evidence that calls for me to have a hearing where I have to assess the credibility of the various witnesses then I don't see a need for an evidentiary hearing. So at this point I don't see a need, but you've indicated a desire to file a motion. You're certainly, as I just said, always welcome to file whatever motion you feel that you need to file; so go ahead and file that.

I certainly think, you know, generally you're entitled to a record of whatever payments were made to a witness. Now, that's probably the witness fee possibly for coming in. You know, \$25 witness fee or, you know, maybe parking. I don't know; whatever. If there's a record of that then certainly they should provide that to you.

Secondly, like I said, there used to be a fund that could be used for counseling and other things. If this victim has availed herself or her family has availed herself of any funds though the auspices of the district attorney then I believe you're certainly entitled to those things and anything else. So even if there hasn't been anything illegal done or bribery or anything like that, certainly legitimate payments Mr. Jackson's allowed to inquire as to those. Mr. Jackson's allowed to receive a record of those. That was kind of the issue I think in the case before Judge Cadish. Those records were destroyed. So certainly -- you know, even if there's no TV sets, which again, I think is highly unlikely, you still, Mr. Jackson, should get a record of if it's a \$25 witness fee, or parking, or the mother was paid to bring her in also \$25, whatever may have occurred, Mr. Jackson, you ought to get a record of that. I agree with you there. Okay?

MS. BEVERLY: And, Your Honor, for the record, attached to my sur-reply I did attach the two payments -- vouchers that the victim was paid for coming to testify at the grand jury. So that --

THE COURT: And that's it?

MS. BEVERLY: -- has been provided.

MR. JACKSON: I have not received --

THE COURT: And it's the State's --

MR. JACKSON: -- a reply.

THE COURT: -- position that's it. There were no other fees for other conferences with the District Attorney's Office, or parking reimbursement or anything like that?

MS. BEVERLY: That is correct. I had my victim witness person look from the start of this case until today. Those were the only two vouchers that were paid, and those for -- for preparation of the grand jury, as well as testimony at the grand jury.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACKSON: I'd like to get a copy of her reply. I've been out of the office for two days. There's been a death in my family. But if counsel would be graciously -- provide me a copy of that reply.

MS. BEVERLY: It's on Odyssey.

MR. JACKSON: I will get it.

MS. BEVERLY: It's on Odyssey.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? Anything else relating to the motion we have today?

MS. BEVERLY: Yes. Absolutely, Your Honor.

In terms of the actual motion itself asking for a psychological examination, this is not a sex assault case. He has to meet -- even if this were a sex assault case, which it isn't, but if it were, he has to meet the requirements of the -- what the case law says is required before you can order a psychological examination. He hasn't met any of those requirements. We're not calling an expert. This is a child pornography case. It's on video. The only thing she's going to be testifying to is that's me in the video and -- or that's my brother in the video. So he hasn't met any of those requirements. But before we even get to that, it's not a sex assault case. So with that, Your Honor, I will submit --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. BEVERLY: -- on the rest of my opposition.

THE COURT: I don't see really at this point, Mr. Jackson, a basis -- as you know, it's the exception where these psychiatric examinations are ordered. It's not customary by any means. Certainly this is not the type of case, in my view, that calls out for one because her testimony really is relating to the pictures, which speak for them -- in my view, speak for themselves. And so, you know, some cases where it's just the testimony of a child, you know, uncorroborated, I think those cases might call out for it in certain circumstances where there's other information far more than in a case like this. So for that reason the motion is denied.

MR. JACKSON: Can I respond just briefly to that for the record?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. JACKSON: Number one, I have a fundamental Sixth Amendment Right to confrontation. Number two, she's 17 years old, not four years old or five years old, so she can answer questions. The prosecutor may just want to get her in and off the stand and say are these -- this you? That's fine. I may have some questions going to my theory of the case, which I don't know if the Court wants me to reveal now.

THE COURT: Well, not right now, but certainly --

MR. JACKSON: But I do have questions for her regarding how the pictures were taken, where they were taken, who took them --

THE COURT: And that's all fair --

MR. JACKSON: -- and -- and --

THE COURT: -- game, Mr. Jackson. I mean --

MR. JACKSON: If she's -- if she's lying, or if she makes up things, or if she is

not telling the truth that is relevant. And if she has psychological --

THE COURT: Well, that's relevant in every single case whether it's a sex case, or a robbery case, or whatever it is. I mean, and you can always have a -- I mean, let's face it, a lot of the witnesses have psychiatric problems, and drugs problems, and emotional problems, and cognitive problems, and recall problems and other things regardless of the type of crime because that's the nature I think of people who often witness criminal activity or are involved in people who are committing criminal activity. We don't psych them all. Have them all have -- submit to psychiatric examinations because they may not be truthful because they may have cognitive impairments because they may have, you know, memory lapses and other things.

Certainly -- I mean, there's two issues here. There's your right of confrontation that nobody is trying to limit in any way. You can confront her. You can cross-examine her. You can ask her about these things, but that doesn't mean that we're going to subject her to an examination at this point. I simply don't see that there's enough here that warrants it in this case. That's what I'm saying. Now you can complete your record to the extent it's not -- it's already not a part of the papers that you have filed in this matter. If it's part of the paperwork then obviously, as we all know, it's the record. It is the record.

But if you need to say anything else -- I mean, don't try to change my mind because at this point that's my ruling. Now if something else comes up in the future and you want to renew your motion, as I said, you're welcome to file whatever motion you deem appropriate if there's new information, but at this point in time I just don't see a justification. That's my opinion.

MR. JACKSON: Would it be appropriate to resolve this matter now than

before trial and bring up all these issues in front of a jury. We're going to have to litigate this again. We have this 17 year old, her psychological issues, I think it should be resolved.

THE COURT: Resolved how?

MR. JACKSON: Well --

THE COURT: I mean, even if you get an opinion --

MR. JACKSON: Are you going to advise me I can't --

THE COURT: -- that shows that she has some emotional issues, which frankly, wouldn't be surprising. What, you're then going to ask me that she not be allowed to testify. Either way, I mean, they're then going to have an opinion that she is competent to testify. So she's still probably going to be testifying, you know, unless she's -- you know, and no one's suggesting that she's delusional to the point where she can't give -- she's not competent to testify.

MR. JACKSON: Well, we don't know that.

THE COURT: What you're talking about is her credibility, as I understand it, not her competency as a witness. So even if you find something that, you know, suggests that she's not that credible she still is going to be able to testify, so we still would be crossing this bridge in front of the jury. Ultimately it's still going to be the jury's call.

MR. JACKSON: We don't know that she's not delusional. I'd like to show the Court pictures of what a cutter does to herself.

THE COURT: Have you shown the State?

MS. BEVERLY: This is not --

MR. JACKSON: I'm showing the State's now.

MS. BEVERLY: This is not even a picture --

1	THE COURT: I mean, that should've been
2	MS. BEVERLY: of the victim.
3	MR. JACKSON: I just got these
4	MS. BEVERLY: It's not even a picture of our victim.
5	MR. JACKSON: I got these yesterday. This is what this is not your
6	victim, but this
7	THE COURT: Was she a cut
8	MS. BEVERLY: She's not our victim.
9	MR. JACKSON: I haven't been able to get pictures
10	THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry.
11	MR. JACKSON: because they haven't given me the medical records.
12	MS. BEVERLY: What medical
13	MR. JACKSON: But this what a cutter does.
14	MS. BEVERLY: what medical records?
15	THE COURT: Who are these pictures of?
16	MR. JACKSON: They're a picture of a cutter and this is what they do to
17	themselves.
18	THE COURT: I'm okay. I know what a cutter does. I've you know,
19	familiar with
20	MR. JACKSON: Okay. Well, that's why we need a psych of this girl.
21	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jackson
22	MR. JACKSON: I'd like to get the medical records. I'd like they're not
23	they're stonewalling me and not giving me anything.
24	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jackson, there are three different issues here. Your
25	right of confrontation. No one's trying to minimize that. You can cross-examine her,

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for a single motion. MR. JACKSON: Okay.

THE COURT: We're not going to this morning -- without the Court having the benefit of reviewing any written pleadings relating to these other matters, we're not going to address every conceivable issue that may come up in the trial at this point in time.

you know, just like you would any other witness. The psychiatric examination. Your

request is denied at this point in time. Discovery issues. I've told you already, file

your motion. I've told you what you're entitled to; any payments. If there are other

discovery issues then you need to raise that by way of a motion. This is on calendar

This was calendared for a single motion. We've addressed the motion; we've addressed some discovery issues. You know -- I mean, basically, State, you know, if you paid her something, if you paid the family something, anybody relating to her Mr. Jackson needs to know about it and you need to provide the proof, the voucher, whatever you might have in your records; okay. That's the ruling.

Now, if Mr. Jackson says I want something showing the payment of a TV set and nobody bought her a TV set, then I expect an affidavit from somebody or from the custodian of records to say we've reviewed our records and there's no payment of a TV set. That should address that issue, you know, there and then. I mean -- like I said, I don't believe it occurred but, you know, it's very simple. They can note the absence of a voucher in their records as well as the presence of a voucher. So that's what I expect for the State.

So I think we've addressed everything that's before the State this morning. And as I said, Mr. Jackson, if they're ongoing discovery issues, these other matters, please file your motion and we'll deal with it at that time.

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1	RTRAN	CLERK OF THE COURT
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5	·	T COURT
6	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
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8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
9	 Plaintiff,	CASE#: C288172
10	vs.	DEPT. XXI
11	JOSHUA C. SHUE, aka	
12	JOSHUA CALEB SHUE	
13	Defendant.	
14	t t	E P. ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
15	TUESDAY, DEC	EMBER 17, 2013
16	RECORDER'S TRANSC	CRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS ION FOR DISCOVERY
17	DEFENDANTS MOT	
18	APPEARANCES:	
19		LEAH C. BEVERLY, ESQ.
20	For the State:	Deputy District Attorney
21	For the Defendant:	TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ.
22	1 of the Bolondana	
23		
24	RECORDED BY: JANIE OLSEN, COUR	T RECORDER
25		

1	TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 2013 AT 9:29 A.M.
2	
3	THE COURT: State
4	MS. LAVELL: Your Honor, if we could I believe that Leah Beverly is going
5	to come down for this.
6	THE COURT: All right. I'm sorry, Mr. Jackson, we have to trail this for Ms.
7	Beverly.
8	MR. JACKSON: All right. I'm ready whenever she is. I'll hang around.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MR. JACKSON: I'll watch the proceedings with happiness.
11	THE COURT: Well, enjoy yourself.
12	MR. JACKSON: All right.
13	[Proceedings trailed at 9:30 a.m.]
14	[Proceedings resumed at 9:32 a.m.]
15	THE COURT: State versus Joshua Shue.
16	And are you asking that we waive Mr. Shue's
17	MR. JACKSON: Yeah.
18	THE COURT: presence for today? That's fine.
19	All right. This is your discovery motion. And do you want me to just g
20	through everything or, Mr. Jackson, do you want to highlight the ones
21	MR. JACKSON: Well
22	THE COURT: where you feel there still is some kind of dispute and you
23	need
04	MAD LACKSON: It's kind of like I didn't

MR. JACKSON: It's kind of like I didfit -

THE COURT: -- the Court's intervention?

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MR. JACKSON: I didn't discover much with my discovery motion in that the State claims that there wasn't much to be discovered. And all the things I asked for they claimed I either already had them -- and some of the things I don't believe I have and -- or they say they don't exist, which is convenient, but --

THE COURT: Well, it may -- it may be convenient or it may be true.

MR. JACKSON: Well, --

THE COURT: Or it may --

MR. JACKSON: -- it may be true.

THE COURT: -- be both.

MR. JACKSON: The -- I have some contrary information on some of the things and I just point out the things I have contrary information on --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACKSON: -- just to make a record.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

MR. JACKSON: And if I'm wrong then later if somewhere down the road it might come out that I was right, or at least I was partially right, and it can be resolved later sometime down the road.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. JACKSON: What I have information on is that the victim, you know, has been getting some funds from the District Attorney's Office. And I got that from her mother. That's what --

THE COURT: Isn't that the same thing we --

MR. JACKSON: -- her mother believes.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt you. Isn't that the same thing we talked about last time where allegedly Ms. Beverly gotten her a TV set or

MR. JACKSON: Right.

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THE COURT: Aren't we kind of back to --

MR. JACKSON: All I want is the records that they have. And they -- and they're saying well they got no records. Now -- you know, if they got records, they got records. I went to subpoena them; they said well I -- not following procedures. I think they should have some procedures. They say they -- you know, what brought this up -- why I decided to file the writ of motion is Mr. Figler had the same issue in a case of his and it turned out that lo and behold the same unit of the Clark County District Attorney's Office had not complied completely and --

THE COURT: Are you talking about the case in front of Judge Cadish that was ultimately dismissed?

MR. JACKSON: He actually got an acquittal on many counts because Judge Cadish --

THE COURT: Oh, she gave an instruction.

MR. JACKSON: -- gave an instruction.

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. JACKSON: And I just want --

THE COURT: She gave an instruction --

MR. JACKSON: -- to make sure --

THE COURT: -- to the jury and that -- as I -- I know what I read in the paper.

MR. JACKSON: It was a --

THE COURT: Okay. So I haven't studied --

MR. JACKSON: -- spoliation instruction.

THE COURT: Right. But it pertained to the witness fees and that there was

no record, correct, of the witness fees that had been paid by the State. I don't recall from what I read, and I certainly haven't reviewed the Court's file, so I don't know anything about a TV set or gifts or anything like that. I thought it just concerned that they hadn't kept records of the witness fees that had been paid.

MR. JACKSON: Well, I -- I'm always -- now, I -- there is also an issue that came up in this case whether or not a certain detective, Mr. Jaeger, has undue influence on one of the witnesses. And that is other information I have received from investigation that he may have either through threats or through excessive persuasion maybe. And, you know, maybe that's just his interpretation --

THE COURT: All right. Let's back --

MR. JACKSON: -- of his job.

THE COURT: -- let's back up here for a minute. First of all, what you're saying to me is, well, somebody told you this that somebody got that. I mean, if you want this to be made part of the record then I think you need some kind of an affidavit --

MR. JACKSON: All right.

THE COURT: -- or something from this mother saying I believe my child was given a TV set. And the reason I believe that is because one day Investigator Bob from the DA's Office showed up carrying a TV set or whatever information she may have. Because right now all you're telling me --

MR. JACKSON: Right.

THE COURT: -- is this mother has told you something and -- I mean, how do they give you -- if there's no record -- if they didn't buy the TV set, which, as I said last time, in my view would be highly unusual. If they didn't buy the TV set what record are they going to have? A record that says we didn't buy this person a TV

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set. We never buy a TV set. There is no record. There's not going to be a record. So -- I mean, if it's true -- and like I said, it would seem very unlikely to me that all of a sudden they're in the business of giving expensive electronic gifts --

MR. JACKSON: My understanding -

THE COURT: -- to witnesses.

MR. JACKSON: -- is what they're doing is supporting the individual with cash payments so she could move out. And this is -- you know, whether they have a cash fund for this or providing support --

THE COURT: Okay. Here's -- we're back --

MR. JACKSON: -- so she could move away from her mother.

THE COURT: -- we keep -- Mr. Jackson, I don't mean to keep interrupting you, but we keep going back to square one, which is where we were at our last hearing and I said, basically you telling me what somebody told you is not credible evidence before this Court. If you want to make a better record then you need to come up with an affidavit or something from this victim's mother or family members and why they believe that the District Attorney's Office has given money to the victim, or a TV set to the victim, or any other gifts to the victim beyond the ordinary victim witness fee of the \$25 --

MR. JACKSON: Right.

THE COURT: -- or whatever it is nowadays.

MR. JACKSON: I'll do that.

THE COURT: It used to be \$25. And then if I think, or they think, that there's reason, Ms. -- not Ms. Beverly who's not -- she can do her own affidavit saying she's not responsible, she didn't give any gifts, she didn't authorize the payment of any gifts. And then if need be the financial person for the District Attorney's Office can

do an affidavit saying that the District Attorney's Office has not made any payments over and beyond the witness fees. That's how we put credible -- or evidence to be considered before the Court; not you saying somebody told you and therefore it must be true.

MR. JACKSON: I didn't say it must be true.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. JACKSON: I said that --

THE COURT: I mean, you're making inquiry --

MR. JACKSON: -- I said that there was --

THE COURT: -- and Ms. Beverly has already said that that didn't happen in this case. So I don't really know where you want to go from here. What are you asking the Court to do at this point?

MR. JACKSON: I'm asking for the -- the State has responded. They have a duty under *Kyles versus Whitley*, under *Giglio* to provide me with exculpatory evidence. They're saying --

THE COURT: But if it doesn't exist --

MR. JACKSON: -- they don't have it.

THE COURT: -- what are they going to provide you with.

MR. JACKSON: Okay.

THE COURT: They can't provide you with a record that doesn't exist. I mean, you're -- there would be --

MR. JACKSON: All right.

THE COURT: -- no record.

MR. JACKSON: Now, if I present -- you're saying if I present affidavits contrary to what they say that you -- will you order an evidentiary hearing under

those circumstances?

THE COURT: Not necessarily. But Ms. Beverly certainly can do an affidavit, as well as the financial people at the District Attorney's Office who would be responsible for making such a payment.

MR. JACKSON: Now the one thing I did ask for, which I believe I should be entitled to, is the criminal records and the -- of the victim and her -- and I used to be able to get this as a public defender; as private counsel I can't get them. They cited federal statutes. I'm not sure why I wouldn't be entitled to that. It would allow me to impeach them.

THE COURT: Okay. Basically, I'll tell you my blanket rule on this is this.

They can't -- they're not allowed to turn over NCIC -- the actual printouts. If they -the victim, any other witness. If they uncover information that there's a conviction
that can be used for impeachment purposes they must disclose that to you. They
must disclose the nature of the offense, the date of the conviction, the jurisdiction in
which the person was convicted, and then you can obtain a certified judgment of
conviction. That's what I require. So if there is such information then Ms. Beverly
must turn that over. But, no, they don't give you NCIC and, you know, any minor
ticketing or, you know, anything like that that couldn't be used for impeachment.
That's basically the blanket rule that I have. And that will be the order in this case
as well, as it is in every other case, when defense counsel asks for that information.
So I don't know where to go from there.

MR. JACKSON: Will they give me the disciplinary records of the officers involved here, especially whether they have had any problems in the past regarding intimidation of witnesses or similar actions.

THE COURT: All right. Here's what the State has said. If -- they're going to

 look and see if there's any disciplinary -- if there's ever been an incidence of discipline. They're going to disclose that to you. Then I may order an in-camera review of what the disciplinary history was. You know, let's just say it was speeding. I don't know that that's really --

MR. JACKSON: I'm not interested in that.

THE COURT: No, that's what I'm saying. Let's say they were disciplined for running a stoplight in a patrol car or for speeding in a patrol car. They may have been disciplined for something like that. That isn't relevant to this. So if that's what the discipline is I'm not going to make them disclose those records. We're going to see what they are if, in fact, there is a history of discipline. That's all I'm saying. And you right now have conceded that there are things conceivably law enforcement officers can be disciplined for, which should be wholly irrelevant to this case, so you don't get all that; if, in fact, there even is anything. I don't know.

So -- I mean, I think probably --

MR. JACKSON: Well --

THE COURT: -- on most of this going forward -- Ms. Beverly.

MS. BEVERLY: If I could just respond briefly, Your Honor.

In terms of the discipline, of course, if there is something I will disclose that. My concern is with this -- we keep going in circles with this affidavit. He already filed an affidavit saying that this is what the mother told him. I then already filed an affidavit saying that, you know, from --

THE COURT: Well, I don't want his affidavit, Ms. Beverly. What I'm saying is we're back to square one. You call it going it circles. I call it going back to square one, which is, I don't want his affidavit. I don't want him saying I was told this. If you think you have credible evidence from somebody who would know of improper

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payments from the District Attorney's Office then you need to put that out there, Mr. Jackson. You just can't stand here saying, oh, somebody told me this and that and ask this Court to believe that the State is making improper payments. You need to come forward with something more. That's what I'm telling you. MR. JACKSON: All right. I'd like an opp --

THE COURT: Your affidavit -- your hearsay affidavit isn't sufficient.

MR. JACKSON: I'd like --

THE COURT: I believe you that you were told this but, you know --

MR. JACKSON: One of the things I'd like is an opportunity to have my investigator talk to the alleged victim, but I think the pressure has been put on her by the State. I know she doesn't have to speak to us, but I think she could clear up a lot of things. And that's one of the things that I have concern -- and I may be filing a motion to dismiss because she has been pressured not to speak to my investigators.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jackson, as you yourself have conceded just now, she doesn't have to speak to you.

MR. JACKSON: That's correct.

THE COURT: You haven't spoken to her, so we don't know if she's been pressured or not pressured. It sounds to me like you're conjecturing --

MR. JACKSON: Well --

THE COURT: -- she's been pressured, or maybe the mother told you she's been pressured --

MR. JACKSON: That's correct.

THE COURT: -- or whatever. You know, I'm sure Ms. Beverly's going to say no she wasn't pressured and, you know, I don't know what --

MR. JACKSON: Would Ms. Beverly give me her current address right now?

THE COURT: All right. I don't see -- first of all --

MR. JACKSON: She can send it to me by email. She doesn't have to give it in the courtroom.

THE COURT: She can disclose the address, but --

MR. JACKSON: Okay.

THE COURT: -- again, if the victim has indicated she doesn't want to speak with you or your investigator -- specifically your investigator --

MR. JACKSON: That's fine.

THE COURT: -- then she doesn't have to do that. And getting another address, if he's already gone out there and been told she doesn't want to speak to him, this does not invite him going out anew and bothering her. I mean, basically it's not unusual, as you well know, for a victim not to want to speak to the defense's investigator. The rules are she doesn't have to. I mean, I don't -- I don't know what you're asking me to do.

MR. JACKSON: Well, she could be asked whether anyone has put pressure on her not to. That's perfectly --

THE COURT: Well, no -- I mean --

MR. JACKSON: -- a proper question.

THE COURT: Basically, Mr. Jackson, we're not going to make this case any different from any other case where the victim doesn't want to speak with the defense attorney's investigator. I mean, the rule is they don't have to.

MR. JACKSON: They don't have to and that's correct, but if the government has told them that they should not then that is grounds to dismiss under due process, *United States versus Gregory*. And so I just want to determine if that's the

situation.

THE COURT: All right. Now we're going around in circles.

MR. JACKSON: No, we're going straight forward.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jackson, here's the deal. I'm not going to make a special order that -- essentially what you're asking me to do is to make a special order that compels the victim to answer a single question from your investigator, which is, has the District Attorney's Office told you not to speak or not to cooperate with the defense. That's essentially what you're asking for; correct?

MR. JACKSON: Well, that is one question --

THE COURT: Or you want me to --

MR. JACKSON: -- that I will have my investigator --

THE COURT: -- schedule a separate --

MR. JACKSON: -- try to find out.

THE COURT: -- evidentiary hearing and call her in and -- certainly, you know, if there are other third party witnesses he can talk to those people, but I'm not willing to make an exception here to say she has to answer a single question, or a series of questions, or come in for an evidentiary hearing and that seems to me what you're asking me to do.

MR. JACKSON: Well, I'll file appropriate paperwork and we'll -- you know, but the government, you know, cannot dictate the way they shield their witnesses in a case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACKSON: That's not the way --

THE COURT: Ms. Beverly, would you like to place on the record what, if anything, you told the victim, or if it's the victim's mother, the victim's guardian, the

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victim doesn't have either, is older now, what exactly was stated regarding their obligations, if any, to speak with the defense?

MR. JACKSON: I'm not saying it was Ms. Beverly. I believe it was Detective Jaeger.

MS. BEVERLY: Yes, I would, Your Honor. Thank you.

And just for the record, this victim no longer lives at home. She is over the age of 18. She is no longer in foster care. She is no longer a ward of the State. She is living on her own at this point.

And for the record, I've had several conversations with the victim in this case. I have told her numerous times that she is allowed to speak to whoever she would like to speak to in this case. If she has any questions she is more than able to call me, but she is allowed to speak to anyone that she wishes in this case, and she's allowed not to speak to anyone in this case if she chooses not to. That's the only thing I've ever told her.

MR. JACKSON: And for the record, I've never suggested Leah Beverly told her not to speak to me or my representatives.

THE COURT: All right. Looking at your request for discovery, the only two sort of outstanding things where there may be information that hasn't been disclosed are number 7, the mental health records of Hazel Iral, and the disciplinary records of Detective Jaeger. Ms. Beverly has already stated if she becomes aware of any disciplinary records she will disclose that and then the Court will order an in-camera review to determine relevancy. Okay? That's where we are on number 8.

On number 7, the mental health records of Ms. Iral in the possession of CPS or the District Attorney's Office. Ms. Beverly has stated that the District Attorney's Office does not have any mental health records nor are you aware of any;

is that correct?

MS. BEVERLY: Correct. And I don't know what really he means by mental health records. I don't know if he means CPS records that exist or if he means like --

THE COURT: Counseling or --

MS. BEVERLY: I don't know what he means, but I don't have any.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, do you have anything that could be construed as a mental health record?

MS. BEVERLY: Not -- not that I -- nothing from any hospitals. If he wants CPS records then I would ask that the Court --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. BEVERLY: -- review those in-camera, but --

THE COURT: Here's what we're going to order on the CPS records. Go ahead and do an order. It will be -- come to me for in-camera review. If I see anything that may be relevant it will be disclosed to both sides. If not, the records become a Court exhibit for potential appellate review and are in a sealed condition with the clerk of the court. All right?

MS. BEVERLY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And so I don't know that we need to do anything else on what was scheduled for today. I mean, we could set it over for a status check on the issue of the CPS records and the issue of Detective Jaeger and the discipline.

Why don't we go out six weeks -- six to eight weeks.

1	THE COURT CLERK: February 4 th at 9:30.
2	MS. BEVERLY: Thank you.
3	[Proceedings concluded at 9:50 a.m.]
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21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
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23	Sandra A Pruchmic SANDRA PRUCHNIC
24	SANDRA PRUCHNIC
25	Court Transcriber

1	RTRAN	Hun to Comme
2	2	CLERK OF THE COURT
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5	Dk	STRICT COURT
6	CLARK	COUNTY, NEVADA
7		
8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
9	Plaintiff,) CASE#: C288172
10	vs.) DEPT. XXI
11	JOSHUA C. SHUE, aka JOSHUA CALEB SHUE	}
12		
13	Defendant.	}
14		LERIE P. ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
15		7, FEBRUARY 4, 2014
16	RECURDER'S THA STATUS CH	INSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS IECK: CPS RECORDS
17		
18	APPEARANCES:	
19 20	For the State:	LEAH C. BEVERLY, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney
21	For the Defendant:	
22		TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ.
23		
24		
25	RECORDED BY: JANIE OLSEN, CO	OURT RECORDER
		. 1

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2014 AT 9:44 A.M.

THE COURT: State versus Joshua Shue.

Where's Mr. Shue?

MR. JACKSON: He's present.

THE COURT: All right. He can stand next to Mr. Jackson.

This is on just for a status check regarding the CPS records. We have not received any CPS records.

MS. BEVERLY: Judge, I did provide them back on the 18th to your JEA, as well as the records for -- the discipline records for the police officers --

THE COURT: Okay. I apologize --

MS. BEVERLY: -- that Your Honor had asked me for.

THE COURT: -- because somehow they didn't make it back to me.

MS. BEVERLY: I can make another copy.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BEVERLY: I did want to make -- just while we're here and while the Defendant is here, I just did want to make a couple of -- a record on a couple of different issues.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BEVERLY: The first one being that when Mr. Jackson filed his discovery motion, in my reply I did ask for reciprocal discovery. It's my understanding that he's interviewed various people in this case. I've receive no discovery for him. I would like, based on the reciprocal discovery rules, any transcripts or audio of any witnesses he's interviewed in this case. And maybe we could set that also for a status check the same day as the status check for the CPS records so he can

provide me with whatever information he has or that he plans to use.

MR. JACKSON: I'm going to give her an affidavit today I have from one of the witnesses. That's Ms. Anita Iral, which I received from her last night.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACKSON: It's a short affidavit. I have some investigative reports which I think are probably work product, but I will review them and give those parts of them that I think are discoverable to her. I'm waiting, of course, for the CPS records.

Once the Court has the chance to redact them or review them --

THE COURT: And I apologize for that confusion.

MR. JACKSON: Yeah, I understand. We're -- you know, I'm going off to California in a few days to the Ninth Circuit; I won't be back till the middle of next week. When I get back I have a whole bunch of things waiting for me, but this is one of the cases I will be focusing on along with some others. And I will contact Ms. Beverly and I'll contact the Court about getting discovery that's available after the Court has -- had her JEA review what is appropriate to release me --

THE COURT: Well, I'll be reviewing it.

MR. JACKSON: -- from CPS.

THE COURT: I don't know what the --

MR. JACKSON: I understand.

THE COURT: -- between me and the JEA where it went. I will say this.

Basically, if I review it and determine that it's discoverable then we'll just make the copies and contact --

MR. JACKSON: Qkay.

THE COURT: -- both counsel and give you that, and then the original becomes a Court's exhibit for appellate purposes so it's clear what's been turned

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MR. JACKSON: And if it's not, you know I'll -- you know I'll accept the Court's ruling at least until appellate time and we'll go from there.

THE COURT: All right. So, Mr. Jackson, going forward you're going to turn over that affidavit to Ms. Beverly today.

MR. JACKSON: Yes.

THE COURT: You're going to agree to go through whatever investigative reports have been generated in connection with your investigation and turn over any information that's discoverable. Is that correct?

MR. JACKSON: Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BEVERLY: Judge, I also wanted to make a couple other motions. Well, I also wanted to say that I have turned over everything other than the CPS records that we're talking about. But otherwise --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BEVERLY: -- I have turned over all of -- all other discovery. I do not anticipate any other discovery coming in, and with that we would be ready for trial in June -- our June 3rd date.

Also, I wanted to make a record that while there were some preliminary discussions between Mr. Jackson and I, I've never made an offer in this case. There's not an offer in this case. We're just simply, based on our discussions, way too far apart for me to even make an offer. So I did want to make a record of that based on that Supreme Court case.

And I'm a little concerned because when -- this case has been going on for a while and the Defendant is out of custody, and I have received some possible

information that he might still be visiting the home with the two boys and where the mom lives. I just wanted to remind him that he has a very strict stay-away order from that apartment where the mother lives, as well as where the two boys live, and I just want to make sure there's no issues with him visiting or anything like that.

THE COURT: I'm assuming, Mr. Shue, you're going to deny that you visited

THE COURT: I'm assuming, Mr. Shue, you're going to deny that you visited the apartment.

THE DEFENDANT: I don't go to the apartment.

THE COURT: Unless -- let me just give you sort of some advice.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Unless you live in that apartment complex there's really no reason for you to even be there.

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

THE COURT: So I would just stay -- you know, I'm not saying you were there, but stay away from that whole complex. I don't know how big it is or whatever, but that way nobody can say they saw you there or anything like that, and you'll be able to stay out of trouble and you'll be able to, you know, stay at liberty until we go forward with your trial. So that would just be my advice to you.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

MS. BEVERLY: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. So, basically, do we need to set this for another status check then or do we just want to, you know, have the Court disseminate anything, you know, it finds discoverable?

Mr. Jackson, you will give Ms. Beverly what you have. And then if there's a problem we can put it on calendar.

MS. BEVERLY: Sure. And I'll make -- recopy that again today and bring

1	them up to chambers.
2	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Beverly.
3	MS. BEVERLY: Thank you.
4	THE COURT: Is that acceptable with you, Mr. Jackson?
5	MR. JACKSON: Yeah. I'd like once I once I see if there's something
6	once I get from CPS, if there's something else I need I'll file appropriate motions.
, 7	THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.
8	MS. BEVERLY: Thank you.
9	[Proceedings concluded at 9:49 a.m.]
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21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
22	audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
23	101
24	Sandra A Pruchnic SANDRA PRUCHNIC
25	Court Transcriber

RTRAN CLERK OF THE COURT 2 3 5 DISTRICT COURT 6 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 CASE#: C288172 Plaintiff, VS. 10 DEPT. XXI 11 JOSHUA C. SHUE, aka JOSHUA CALEB SHUE 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE P. ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2014 15 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 16 STATUS CHECK: CPS RECORDS 17 18 APPEARANCES: 19 OFELIA MONJE, ESQ. For the State: **Deputy District Attorney** 20 No Appearance 21 For the Defendant: 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: PATRICIA SLATTERY, COURT RECORDER 25

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2014 AT 10:59 A.M.

THE COURT: Mr. Jackson never showed up and Ms. Beverly never showed up.

MS. MONJE: Your Honor, I have the file from Ms. Beverly.

THE COURT: Okay. Here's the deal on State versus Joshua Shue. We were going to release the CPS records and Metro discipline record because it goes to veracity. So what we're going to do is photocopy that and when it's ready call both sides to pick it up from the box or chambers. Okay?

MS. MONJE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I don't really need Mr. Jackson for that.

[Proceedings concluded at 10:59 a.m.]

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

Court Transcriber

1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA	
2		
3	JOSHUA C. SHUE,) No. 67428	
4	Appellant,)	
5	v.)	
6)	
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
8	Respondent.)	
9	APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME II PAGES 241-456	
10		
11	PHILIP J. KOHN Clark County Public Defender Clark County District Attorney Clark County District Attorney Clark County District Attorney	
12	Clark County Public Defender 309 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2610 Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3 rd Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89155	
13 14	Attorney for Appellant ADAM LAXALT Attorney General	
15	Attorney General 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (702) 687-3538	
16 17	Counsel for Respondent CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
18	I hereby certify that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada	
19	Supreme Court on the day of day, 2015. Electronic Service of the	
20	foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:	
21	CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO HOWARD S. BROOKS	
22	STEVEN S. OWENS I further certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing a true and	
23	correct copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to:	
24	JOSHUA C. SHUE	
25	NDOC # 1133873 c/o HIGH DESERT STATE PR IS QN	
26	PO Box 650	
27	Indian Springs, NV 89070	
28	BY	