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Electronically Filed
Aug 25 2016 01:27 p.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JOHN AND MELISSA FRITZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant(s),

Vs.

CASE No. 67660

WASHOE COUNTY,

Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

COMES NOW Appellant(s), JOHN AND MELISSA FRITZ, a married couple (hereinafter "the Fritzes") by and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby file the following Answer to Petition for Rehearing in response to Respondent WASHOE COUNTY's

1 August 22, 2016 Petition for Rehearing (hereinafter “Petition”), filed
2
3 pursuant to Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure (“NRAP”) 40 seeking
4 rehearing of the Court’s August 4, 2016 Opinion (hereinafter
5 “Opinion”) in this case.
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8 As shown below, for each issue raised in the Petition, there is
9 nothing new that is presented to this Court. Washoe County is simply
10 attempting to reargue the issues already raised. *Ducksworth v. State*, 114
11 Nev. 951, at 953 (1998).
12

13
14 **There is no error in this Court’s statement of California law from**
15 ***Ullery* – Washoe County misreads *Gutierrez***
16

17 Washoe County argues that the Court adopted an incorrect
18 statement of California law as to when a government entity is liable in
19 inverse-condemnation (Petition at 1). Washoe County also argues that
20 accepting dedications falls far short of an affirmative act directed
21 towards the Fritzes’ property under *Gutierrez v. County of San Bernardino*,
22 198 Cal. App. 4th 831 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2011) and cannot be a basis
23 for concluding the County was substantially involved in private
24 development (Petition at 5).
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1 The *Gutierrez* decision was discussed in the Opening Brief at 22, in
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3 Washoe County’s Answering Brief at 13-15, and in the Reply Brief at 8.

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5 Washoe County’s argument that *Gutierrez* “corrected” the finding
6 in *Ullery v. County of Contra Costa*, 202 Cal. App. 3d 562 (Cal. App. 1st
7 Dist. 1988) relied upon by this Court is erroneous. The *Gutierrez* Court
8 analyzed the language in *Ullery* that could be read to support the
9 assertion that mere ownership of property is sufficient to support the
10 finding that such ownership is a “public improvement.” *Gutierrez* at Fn.
11 5. The issue in *Gutierrez* was whether unimproved raw land that has
12 not been deliberately acted upon by the County was a “public
13 improvement” for purposes of inverse condemnation. *Id.* at 841.
14 Clearly, this case does not involve unimproved raw land. It involves
15 public improvements, i.e. streets and storm drainage systems in Lancer
16 Estates and Monte Rosa.
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23 In adopting the rule in *Ullery*, this Court concluded that without a
24 local government acceptance of a dedication, subdivision map approval
25 alone is not enough to give rise to establish inverse condemnation
26 liability. (Opinion at 8-9) This rule from *Ullery* was never “corrected”
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28

1 by *Gutierrez*. To the contrary, the *Gutierrez* Court found that even in the
2
3 absence of acceptance of dedications, inverse condemnation liability
4
5 can be shown where a local government does something less than
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7 accepting dedications, i.e. where the local government exercises
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9 “dominion and control” over a public improvement. *Gutierrez* at Fn. 5.
10
11 This ruling is consistent with the well-established rule in California that
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13 inverse condemnation liability is imposed on a public entity which has
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15 approved and accepted, for a public purpose, work performed by a
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17 subdivider or private owner of property. *Yox v. City of Whittier*, 182 Cal.
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19 App. 3d 347, 353 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1986) citing *Sheffet v. County of Los*
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21 *Angeles*, 3 Cal.App.3d 720 (1970).

22
23 Washoe County seeks to have this Court read the ruling in *Gutierrez*
24
25 to mean that a local government can accept dedication of a public
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27 improvement without exercising “dominion or control” over that
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public improvement, despite the fact that title to property dedicated or
accepted for streets and easements passes when the final map is
recorded. *See* NRS 278.390. This conclusion is unreasonable and is a
result of misreading of *Gutierrez*.

1 **This Court did not overlook any requirement in Nevada law as to**
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3 **when the taking occurred – it correctly ruled that the District**
4 **Court never addressed the issue**

5
6 Washoe County argues that this Court overlooked the requirement
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8 in Nevada law that an inverse condemnation claimant must own the
9 condemned property at the time when the government action
10 engendering inverse condemnation occurred (Petition at 1). Washoe
11
12 County also argues that the Court misapprehended the threshold issue
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14 of standing to challenge government action that occurred before the
15 ownership because the Fritzes did not have a valid interest in the
16 property affected by the government action before they bought the
17 property in 2001 (Petition at 5).
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20 The issue of when the taking occurred was discussed in Washoe
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22 County's Answering Brief at 19, and in the Reply Brief at 11.

23 This Court's Opinion specifically found that the District Court
24
25 made no findings with regard to when the taking occurred. (Opinion at
26
27 4). Washoe County points out that the District Court did state that it
28 considered Washoe County's arguments and found them meritorious.

1 Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the District Court
2 was required to set forth the undisputed material facts and legal
3 determinations on which the Court granted summary judgment, which
4 it did not do on this issue.
5

6
7 Further, Washoe County argues that the alleged government action
8 that gives rise to this Court's remand for factual findings is primarily
9 the 1996 NDOT letter (Appx. Vol. 3 at 456) (Petition at 6). This Court
10 never used the word "primarily" to describe the 1996 NDOT letter, but
11 specifically noted in the Opinion that it is "one such document"
12 presented by the Fritzes (Opinion at 3). The 1996 NDOT letter was
13 part of a long series of events and actions by Washoe County that
14 resulted in the flooding of the Fritzes property, the taking of which
15 "vested" when the flooding began to occur on the Fritzes property as a
16 result of the developments. *Argier v. Nevada Power Co.*, 114 Nev. 137,
17 142 (Nev. 1998). As argued in the Fritzes Opening Brief at page 12 line
18 27, and as described in detail in the Channel Study by the Fritzes'
19 expert (Appx. Vol. 1 at 131), many of the actions of Washoe County
20 complained of by the Fritzes occurred after they purchased the
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1 Property in 2001 and John Fritz has observed flooding since 2002
2 (Appx. Vol. 1 at 123).

3
4 **This Court did not misapprehend the meaning of the 1996 NDOT**
5 **Letter**

6
7 Washoe County argues that this Court misapprehended the 1996
8 NDOT letter showing that Washoe County directed the developers of
9 Lancer Estates to divert water across the Frites property (Petition at 2).
10 Nowhere in the Court's Opinion does it state that the 1996 NDOT
11 letter was the sole basis upon which the Court concluded that that
12 genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Washoe County's
13 actions constituted substantial involvement (Opinion at 9). Washoe
14 County's argument is based on the false premise that the scope of
15 Washoe County's involvement in the development of Lancer Estates
16 and Monte Rosa was limited to the 1996 NDOT letter.

17
18 The 1996 NDOT letter was discussed in the Opening Brief at 11,
19 in Washoe County's Answering Brief at 9, and in the Reply Brief at 6.

20
21 Washoe County also argues that this Court mischaracterizes the
22 1996 NDOT letter because the letter is "mere planning" (Petition at 8).

1 The letter by its terms is not mere planning because it directed the
2 diversion of water that would have gone around the Fritzes property
3 through the Fritzes property, not the evaluation of plans submitted by
4 the developer. The 1996 NDOT letter is just one piece of the puzzle
5 of evidence in this case that shows that Washoe County's involvement
6 in the developments was substantial, despite its claims to the contrary.
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11 Washoe County's Petition also states that, "the Fritzes purchased
12 the property in question in 2001; five years after the 1996 NDOT letter
13 was written and seventeen years before this lawsuit was filed." (Petition
14 at 6) As shown in (Appx. Vol. 1 at 1), the first complaint in this case
15 was filed on April 4, 2013, which is approximately twelve years after the
16 Fritzes purchased the property in 2001 (See 2001 Deed to Fritz at
17 Appx. Vol 1 at 18). Assumedly, Washoe County meant that the lawsuit
18 was filed seventeen years after the 1996 NDOT letter.
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
23 CONCLUSION

24 Washoe County states that the Court's decision is that "mere
25 planning" might suffice for inverse condemnation liability. (Petition at
26 10). This is despite the fact that this Court's Opinion specifically states
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1 that claims based on mere planning are outside the scope of the
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3 substantial involvement required to impose liability for inverse
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5 condemnation, citing *Sproul Homes of Nev. v. State, Dep't of Highways*, 96
6 Nev. 441, 443, 611 P.2d 620, 621 (1980) (Opinion at 7). Washoe
7
8 County's caution to this Court in its conclusion is unfounded because
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10 Washoe County simply misreads what this Court concluded in its
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12 Opinion, i.e. that genuine issues of material fact exist in this case as to
13 whether Washoe County's actions constituted substantial involvement.

14 WHEREFORE, the Fritzes pray that this Court deny Washoe
15
16 County's Petition for Rehearing.

17 Respectfully submitted this Thursday, August 25, 2016
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19

20 By: 

21 Luke Busby, Esq.
22 Nevada Bar No. 10319
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NRAP 28.2 ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that this Answer complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirement of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally-spaced typeface using Garamond in 16-point font using Google Docs. I further certify that this Answer complies with the page or type volume limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(c), it is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and contains 1706 words.

Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this Answer, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this Answer complies with all applicable NRAP, in particular NRAP 28(e), which requires every assertion in the Answer regarding matters in the record to be supported by appropriate references to the page and volume number, if any, of the record on appeal. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying Answer is not in conformity with the requirements of the NRAP.

Respectfully submitted this Thursday, August 25, 2016

By: Luke A. Busby

Luke Busby, Esq.


Nevada Bar No. 10319

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3 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

4 I hereby certify that I have on this day served the foregoing
5 document upon the following parties by U.S. Mail and/or Electronic
6 Service and/or hand delivery to:
7

8 Washoe County DA's Office
9 Attn: Stephan Hollandsworth
10 Washoe County District Attorney Civil Div.
11 P.O. Box 11130
12 Reno, NV 89520

13 Respectfully submitted this Thursday, August 25, 2016
14

15 By: 
16 Luke Busby, Esq.
17 Nevada Bar No. 10319
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