1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA	
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4	LINDSIE NEWMAN, Case No. 677 <b>5facie K. Lindem</b> Clerk of Supreme	n
5	Appellant, Case No. 67763 vs.	
6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
7	Respondent.	
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9	APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF	
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Docket 67756 Document 2015-38702

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## I.LEGAL ARGUMENT

The State argued in its Answering Brief that the district court did not err in
considering Appellant's pregnancy during sentencing because (1) the unborn child
exists in Appellant's body, similar to an organ (Answering Brief at 12:8-14)1; and
(2) the district court can consider any positive or negative effects of a particular
sentence. AB at12:15-13:13.

First, a fetus does not operate as a body organ. A fetus is more analogous to a tumor than an organ. Bourzal, K. *How a tumor is like an Embryo*, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/409004/how-a-tumor-is-like-an-embryo

Second, there is no case law to support the State's hypothetical that a court can sentence someone to protect their health, such as a sentence that protects a person with a heart issue that is an addict. Physical health would be a mitigating factor to decrease a sentence rather than to increase it. *See for example*, USSG § 5H1.4 (2008 ed.), (discussing downward departure justified in Federal sentencing based on physical impairment: "Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted. However, an extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to depart downward; *e.g.*, in the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment."). Appellant contends

Hereinafter "AB."

that sentencing someone based on strictly physical health reasons would be improper and unconstitutional.

Last, there is basic fallacy to the State's argument that a court should be able to consider Appellant's status as a pregnant addict during sentencing—this is not what Appellant argues or what the district judge did in this case. A mere consideration would have been expected, but here, the district judge based the harshness of Appellant's sentence entirely on the fact that Appellant was a pregnant addict.

There is no doubt that the district judge was frustrated by Appellant's inability to complete any of the programs that the court had previously granted. If the district court had sentenced her merely because of that, that would have been completely in the court's discretion. But the court expressly stated that the basis for its decision was to "make sure she stays in custody until that child is born."

AA at 40:9:2-5.

The State further argued that laws created to encourage women to seek prenatal care and medical treatment, such as Nevada's legislative preference to not criminalize pregnant addicts, do not create a get-out-of-jail-free card. AB at 14:9-15:4. Specifically, the State argued that there are several instances where pregnant women will not seek medical care, such as when they are victims of domestic violence. AB at 14:17-20.

Victims of domestic violence are not comparable to the pregnant addict.

Certainly the State would agree that it would be unconstitutional for a judge to sentence a domestic violence victim to prison to protect her. But more importantly, neither the district attorney's office or a district judge have the legal right to circumvent policies or laws that are created by the legislature. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 243 (1942).

Lastly, the State argued that there would have been very little difference in concurrent or consecutive sentences. AB at 18:4-19:10. There is a lengthy discussion in the transcripts on how the credits could be applied in this case and not one has the same conclusion as the State's argument in its brief. AA at 39:6:9-40:11:10. The district court had several options available, including running the sentences concurrently. The State argued that despite an order that the sentences run concurrent they would still effectively run consecutively. The district court obviously did not agree with this conclusion or it would not have struggled as it did in crafting a sentence that would guarantee that Appellant remained in prison until her child was born.

In fact, this struggle that the court demonstrated in constructing the sentence clearly proves that the judge would not have sentenced Appellant to consecutive

terms if she had not been a pregnant addict, as the State alleged in its brief. AA at 17:7-18:3. Any additional arguments are submitted on the briefs. 

## CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

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3	requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and
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1	3. Finally, I recognize that pursuant to NRAP 3C, I am responsible ///
2	for filing a timely reply brief I therefore certify that the information provided in
3	this reply brief is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and
4	belief.
5	DATED this 17th day of December, 2015.
6	/s/ SALLY DESOTO
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10	#1136265 - FMWCC 4370 SMILEY ROAD			
11	LAS VEGAS NV 89115			
12	DATED this 17th day of December, 2015.			
	SIGNED: /s/ Tosca M. Renner			
13	Employee of Nevada State Public Defender			
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