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## EXHIBIT M Death Certificate of MARJORIE T. CONNELL

Page 39

Docket 66231 Document 2015-35653

## STATE OF NEVADA — DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION OF HEALTH — VITAL STATISTICS

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Lawrence K. Sands, D.O., M.P.H.

Registrar of Vital Statistics

By:

Date Issued:

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EXHIBIT N
Transcript of January 14, 2014 Motions Hearing

RTRAN

**CLERK OF THE COURT** 

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

MATTER OF THE TRUST OF W.N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST DATED 5/18/72

CASE NO. P-066425

DEPT. XXVI

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLORIA J. STURMAN, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 2014

> RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT MOTIONS HEARING

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: Michael D. Lum, Esq.

John R. Mugan, Esq. JEFFREY BURR, LTD.

For the Respondent: Joseph J. Powell, Esq.

THE RUSHFORTH FIRM, PLLC

RECORDED BY: KERRY ESPARZA, COURT RECORDER

TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 2014 AT 9:02 A.M.

THE COURT: Peter 9066425.

MR. POWELL: Good morning, Your Honor. Joey Powell appearing on behalf of Jacqueline Montoya.

MR. MUGAN: Good morning, Your Honor. John Mugan on behalf of Eleanor Ahern.

MR. LUM: Good morning, Your Honor. Michael Lum bar number 12997 on behalf of Eleanor Ahern.

THE COURT: Okay. We have two motions. The first one is a motion to dismiss the debt for relief action and the second one is a hearing to compel distributions. So we'll take the motion to dismiss first.

MR. MUGAN: If it pleases the Court, I presume that you've had an opportunity to review the motion. Basically claim preclusion and there's three things that are required. The parties or their privies are the same. The final judgment in the first action is valid. And most importantly the subsequent action is based on the same claims or any part of them that were or could have been brought in the first case.

It's undisputed there's two cases involved. A 2009 case, which involved the trust, specifically trust number two, reformation construction action. Basically construed the document, said who the residuary beneficiaries are when my client died. And there's no question that the privies and parties are the same as in this action. There's no question

that the judgment is valid. There's an order entered. Notice of entry back in 2009. Appeal time et cetera is long past.


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three, that the claims could have been brought in the first case. Opposing counsel cited the <a href="Tarkanian">Tarkanian</a> (phonetic) case as saying that the same claims have to be included in both actions. The <a href="Tarkanian">Tarkanian</a> case was back in '94. <a href="Five Star">Five Star</a> <a href="Capital Crop">Capital Crop</a> which we cited a 2008 case changed that. And basically said that it's broadened to include all claims which could have been brought in the first action.

And there's no question that the claims -- I mean, we're dealing with the same thing. Trust number -- the trust, trust number two, the rights thereunder. Also I don't think there's any question that we're dealing with the same oil rights. If you look at the pleading in 2009 it refers to the oil assets in trust number two and says that there's an appraisal being done. And it estimates the value at 700,000.

As we set out in our pleading Jackie, the Petitioner, did in fact have an appraisal done. It came back at \$716,000 and it was for all of the oil assets not just 35 percent of them.

And so arguably not only do we have claim preclusion we also have issue preclusion because we're basically dealing with the exact same thing. The rights of the parties under trust number two.



And so our belief is that claim preclusion is applicable. And accordingly this action needs to be dismissed. In the alternative we even think issue preclusion is applicable because of what I stated.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. POWELL: Your Honor, as we discussed the last time the 2009 petition is a reformation petition. It dealt with basically in essence a couple of basically two major issues. That was the succession of who the residuary beneficiaries were of trust number two and then also as well who was going to be the successor trustee of that.

If you've read the petition in 2009 and the order that was in 2009, that's the substantive part of what is going on. In fact, the petition even states these issues didn't come up with trust number three, they're only related to trust number two, but we can see what was done in trust number three in terms of final distribution, who would be the trustees. We didn't have that same matching language in trust two. So we need to solve that issue.

Arguably was it critical that the 2009 petition was brought? I would say probably not just because you could glean from trust number three what the intent was. It was more of a clarification petition just so there weren't issues down the road. That's what the 2009 petition did.

THE COURT: So the fact that at the same time that trust three was being litigated that your clients didn't seek to also litigate the issue with respect to trust number two doesn't preclude them from now doing so?

MR. POWELL: Well, correct, exactly. And there were no issues with trust number three. Trust number three was basically what we refer to as the survivor's trust. But because of the timeframe in which it was done it also included essentially marital trust as well. So it was a marital trust along with a survivor's trust. In which Mrs. Connell as the surviving trustor had the ability to freely amend that trust. She also had the ability to do a -- exercise a power of appointment, which she did.

And so at the time there was -- the relevance of trust number three was not in question. That had already been in exercise of power of appointment to her individual trust that she setup the MTC living trust.

So this petition, this reformation petition was not a declaration of rights in terms of current rights. What it was, was to have clarification at the time that Ms. Ahern passed was the issue here, so that there wasn't any confusion. Her children, my client and her sister were deemed to be the residuary beneficiaries and also as well the successor trustees.

So that was the extent of what that petition did.

Again, if you look at what the prayer was in that petition, if
you look what the accompanying order said, that's what it did.

And in their petition and in subsequent petitions as well in their arguments they essentially said that -- really that my client and her sister were behind that petition. Even though Ms. Ahern had her own counsel. Even though the petition was discussed with her own counsel, somehow my clients were behind that.

So which again, begs the logical question -THE COURT: So you're contesting that the issue that it
seems Mr. Mugan is focused on is the same issues were could
have been filed, but it's your position that there -- it
wasn't necessarily the same parties, it wasn't necessarily a
final judgment as to the issues that are at issue here?

MR. POWELL: Correct, correct. It wasn't even an issue at that point because there was a 65/35 split of this income. And again, it continued for nearly four years after the order was entered. Which again begs the question is, if that was the point of what the order was, was this declaration of rights, why exactly is the status quo being followed for an additional four years after that fact?

The fact of the matter is it wasn't a declaration of rights as to Ms. Ahern. It wasn't a declaration of rights as to the issue that's now present which is the 65/35 split. It was a clarification as to what would happen at Ms. Ahern's

death. And what it was, was that my client and her sister were to be the residuary beneficiaries as basically was gleaned from and was consistent with the way that trust three read. Trust three ultimately wound up being different because it -- exercise the power of appointment so.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

MR. POWELL: Yeah.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Mugan?

MR. MUGAN: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. We're not arguing issue preclusion. Issue preclusion, the claims have to be identical. We're arguing claim preclusion.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MUGAN: Which is much, much broader and much more expansive. There doesn't have to be a final judgment on the specific issue in the first case under Nevada law claim preclusion. You don't need a final judgment. Alls [sic] you need is that the claims, or any part of them in the first case — in the second case, excuse me, could have been brought in the first case. And there's no question it could have been brought in the first case. And this argument about trust number three and trust number two.

I believe it's very, very important when you look at the pleadings in the first case they refer to the oil assets.

And again, I repeat myself and I apologize. They reference an appraisal being done. And it's in the approximate amount of

\$700,000.

by his client in 2009 that included all of the oil rights; not 35 percent. So all of the oil rights were included in trust number two. And that's what we were talking about in the first case. And even if we weren't you don't need a final judgment on the issue. Under claim preclusion it's just a claim that could have been brought in the first action. It's very, very broad and expansive the Nevada position under <u>Five</u> Star.

And it's undisputed that there was an appraisal done

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not understanding that there shouldn't -- there doesn't have to be a valid final judgment. I think that is an essential issue. Sit back down, Mr. Powell. You don't get to talk again.

MR. POWELL: Sorry.

THE COURT: The same parties or their privies are involved in both cases. A valid final judgment has been entered and the subsequent action is based on the same claims or any part of them could have been brought in the first case. That's to me, I don't see that it meets any of those elements. I don't think it's the same parties. We have a judgment on something that's entirely different than what's involved here.

I guess you could have litigated at the same time, but it -- not to the extent that I feel that they're precluded

from litigating it now. I mean, it was an entirely different and I think somewhat I guess a previous issue that was reasonably litigated when it was litigated. But there's nothing to indicate that you would need to litigate this issue because nobody knew that four years in the future the trustee was going to change how she's making distributions. I mean, nobody could have anticipated that. So how would you litigate it?

To me it just doesn't seem that it's an issue that should be precluded from being litigated at this time. So I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss the declaratory relief petition.

Then we have the second issue which is the -- this is now your turn, Mr. Powell.

MR. POWELL: Okay.

THE COURT: Which is the issue of whether distributions should be made.

MR. POWELL: Your Honor, as is pointed out, we have a 33 year, we're now in year 34, status quo distribution of 65/35. That is going back to the way that the trust was initially allocated between trust two and trust three in approximately 1980. That the -- Mr. Connell died I think in December of '79. So returns were done in '80.

From '80 on we had a situation where Mrs. Connell as the surviving trustor received 65 percent of this oil gas

1	mineral income. And Ms. Ahern received 35 percent. Also in
2	1980 as well Ms. Ahern became a co-trustee of the trust as
3	well, which is a significant fact. So it was Ms. Ahern and
4	Ms. Connell as trustees. These returns were done. And for 34
5	or 29
6	THE COURT: Okay.
7	MR. POWELL: Yes?
8	THE COURT: But didn't we already litigate or argue the
9	whole issue of whether there we should maintain the status
10	quo, or they should be reinstated? And didn't we already rule
11	on that? And isn't that what we're having the trial for in a
12	month or so?
13	MR. POWELL: I
14	THE COURT: What's the change? In other words
15	MR. POWELL: Well
16	THE COURT: why would we change six weeks before
17	the trial
18	MR. POWELL: Sure, I understand.
19	THE COURT: why would we change and say no. Now we've
20	got too many distributions here?
21	MR. POWELL: Well
22	THE COURT: What's the change, or why would I change that
23	previous status quo that you've established?
24	MR. POWELL: Well, one, the issue previous was that we
25	had not petitioned for relief to reinstate that status quo

until such time as a final determination was made. So that's one issue. Secondary issue was it was argued that the -- we hadn't made the argument supposedly about laches. We feel like the hearing in six weeks does not need to occur. That the doctrine of laches must apply here.

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We also have as well, we have a clear declaration from Ms. Ahern that she was aware at the time that supposedly she had these rights but she claims she consulted with an attorney who told her that she had these rights. She then decided that I guess apparently on the advice of the attorney she may not want to actually enforce these rights because she might be better off simply waiting for -- she might be better not upsetting Ms. Connell for fear that she might get disinherited from Ms. Connell's estate plan.

In fact, the language that's actually used in her response is that she acquiesced. We believe the doctrine of laches applies here and makes all of this case irrelevant in terms of needing to proceed forward. The doctrine of laches is supposed to prevent somebody from sleeping on their rights. And then in this case 33 years down the road arguing that they have rights, they have enforceable rights and they have justification for doing what they did.

THE COURT: So you're not just seeking to have the distributions reinstated in anticipation of the outcome of the ultimate hearing. You're saying there's no need to have that

hearing?

MR. POWELL: There's no need to have that hearing because the doctrine of laches is applicable here. The <u>Kuni</u> case as — at which seems to be the landmark case for doctrine of laches, that was a 22 year period of sleeping on one's rights. This is again, we're in year 34 now. This is the first time again that there's been this assertion that no. I always had this hundred percent right to the income, not the 35 percent income that I was taking for 29 years of Ms. Connell's life and then four years subsequent to that.

So we believe as we've outlined the doctrine of laches is applicable here and needs to be enforced.

Now we don't need to even -- just like a statute of limitations issue, we don't need to get into the substantive arguments because the doctrine of laches has to apply. Even assuming arguendo that she does have this right. She slept on it for 33, 34 year snow. And this is not behavior that should be rewarded. Especially in this court, a court of equity.

And again, like I said, we have the <u>Kuni</u> case that spells out. And I'm assuming you've seen the quotes that are in there. They're pretty clear. That when you have an issue like we have here where Ms. Connell's already deceased. So we have a -- we can't also locate the 706 because the IRS hasn't retained a copy. The preparer of the 706 hasn't retained a copy. We have spoliation of evidence.

So we are at a severe disadvantage for being able to rebut the assertions that Ms. Ahern is making other than what we've already provided, which is --

THE COURT: If there's spoliation of evidence it wouldn't have been by Ms. Ahern. I mean, it's just a lapse of time.

It's not something that she --

MR. POWELL: Well, Miss -- if -- well, my point is if Ms. Ahern had brought this in a timely manner, and specifically if she had brought this when Ms. Connell had the ability to rebut --

THE COURT: Doesn't that get back to this whole point of claim preclusion then? Why didn't we litigate this four years ago?

MR. POWELL: Exactly. Why did no -- it wasn't raised four years ago. There was still 65/35 four years ago.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. POWELL: There was 65/35 up until June. Then the plug is pulled by Ms. Ahern who says, I've always been entitled to a hundred percent of it. I just never told any of you apparently that I felt this way and had these rights.

I mean, this is analogous to again, a homeowner who says, you're encroaching on my property by 30 feet. I've known for 30 years but I'm telling you now. Well, too late.

THE COURT: You're about to talk me into reconsidering my
-- Mr. Mugan's motion. Because what you're saying basically

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1	is that we should have known this and it should have all been
2	litigated when Ms. Connell was still alive. And you know, Ms.
3	Ahern didn't tell us and so, you know, it should have been
4	litigated four years ago. You know
5	MR. POWELL: But I'm not sure how that would be on my
6	client's burden when Ms. Ahern is the trustee and Ms. Ahern is
7	still doing a 65/35 split that whole time.
8	THE COURT: Okay. So it's her fault that it didn't
9	MR. POWELL: How can my client anticipate
10	THE COURT: we didn't get litigate this didn't get
11	litigated nine years ago when maybe I don't know if Ms.
12	Connell was competent to I don't know what condition she
13	was in at the end of her life.
14	MR. POWELL: Oh, well, she was still but my point
15	being is if you're going to make an argument of saying, you're
16	not entitled to the 65 percent; I was always entitled to it.
17	Why was this not done during Mrs. Connell's lifetime so Ms.
18	Connell could have responded to it? Ms. Connell was a trustee
19	as well.
20	THE COURT: Right.
21	MR. POWELL: Not just a beneficiary. Again, they were
22	since 1980 they were both co-trustees.
23	THE COURT: Uh-huh.
24	MR. POWELL: So again, Ms. Ahern's point is since day one

25 | I was always entitled to a hundred percent of the income.

Ms.

Connell was never entitled to a red cent. And then following her passing Jacqueline and her sister were never entitled to that.

So again, we have a situation where somebody is raising an argument that nobody's aware of existed until June essentially when the --

THE COURT: And so she should now be foreclosed from raising it just because while her step -- her I guess adopted mother, step-mother was living she let her have the 65 percent.

MR. POWELL: Uh-huh, supposedly.

THE COURT: Now she should be precluded --

MR. POWELL: From arguing that -- right, exactly.

THE COURT: -- that she was in fact entitled to that 65 percent?

MR. POWELL: Exactly, exactly. We have -- again, we have 33 years of a 65/35. Only recently do we have the assertion, no. I was always entitled to a hundred percent. The only evidence we have left is a Texas estate tax return which shows a 65/35 allocation.

THE COURT: Uh-huh, okay.

MR. POWELL: So we -- the spoliation is the fact that we can't offer any testimony from Mrs. Connell, the other cotrustee to say no. This was all done properly. They're trying to basically assert that as was done on the Texas

1	return, which again is the only evidence we have left because
2	the 706 can't be found, that somehow
3	THE COURT: Well, spoliation really just raises a
4	rebuttal presumption. So it doesn't necessarily mean that
5	judgment would be granted.
6	MR. POWELL: Sure.
7	THE COURT: It just means that at trial
8	MR. POWELL: Sure.
9	THE COURT: you know, if you raise that there's been
10	spoliation that somehow I guess would be attributable
11	MR. POWELL: Well, and
12	THE COURT: to Ms. Ahern.
13	MR. POWELL: Yeah.
14	THE COURT: And which I'm kind of not seeing that, but
15	you know, it could be. I mean
16	MR. POWELL: Well
17	THE COURT: it wasn't really briefed. So okay.
18	MR. POWELL: Well, the <u>Kuni</u> case basically says is that a
19	critical factor in determining whether laches should apply is
20	whether there's a disadvantage of basically the injured
21	party
22	THE COURT: Right.
23	MR. POWELL: which would be my client.
24	THE COURT: Sure.
25	MR. POWELL: And we can't offer any rebutting evidence

from Mrs. Connell as to what the realities of the situation were. And that's a huge factor in <u>Kuni</u> and also many of the other laches cases that said that if a key witness cannot present their testimony that's a huge factor that has to be considered by the Court --

THE COURT: Okay, got it.

MR. POWELL: -- because that's the damage so.

THE COURT: Mr. Mugan.

MR. MUGAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Talk about the injunction. I'll just respectfully remind you that we were here in November. We went through this. You basically issued an order saying that my client as trustee, there was no dispute that she was entitled to 35 percent; she could have that. The 65 percent as trustee she had to hold until this matter was --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MUGAN: -- going to be heard in a couple months. And nothing can be more fair than that. You're treating both sides equally. When the final judgment is rendered the money's going to be there whoever wins. And nobody has the use or enjoyment in the interim.

Like we said in our objection, it's like trying to argue again the merits of the case and we're not there yet.

You found that we have to have an evidentiary hearing. And if you look at the requirements for an injunction they have to

prove irreparable harm, compensatory damages are not adequate 1 remedy. And a showing of reasonable probability of success. They haven't shown any of those. 3 And they have to show all three. If they fail on 4 any of them then they're not entitled to an injunction. 5 Basically you've already issued an injunction regarding the 65 6 percent. There's no proof of irreparable harm. We're talking about dollars here. THE COURT: Right. 9 That's adequate compensation. We're not 10 MR. MUGAN: talking about blowing up a building that can't be replaced, or 11 the sale of real estate that's irreplaceable. We're talking 12 That's adequate compensation. 13 about dollars. And since it's not even like an asset that 14 THE COURT: would fluctuate like in the stock market. It's oil lease 15 money. It's --16 17 MR. MUGAN: Yeah, it's oil. It's revenue from oil leases. 18 THE COURT: Right. 19 MR. MUGAN: 20 THE COURT: It's cash coming in. MR. MUGAN: And the last thing is the reasonable 21 probability of success. We don't think they've shown that. 22 23 And we went into great detail as to why. Laches, let's talk about laches. Laches work both 24

ways. If you recall Marjorie died in 2009.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

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MR. MUGAN: And they're claiming that Marjorie in her last will and testament exercises general power of appointment as to the 65 percent. And it went to a separate and distinct trust called the MTC Living Trust.

And they cite 163.385 about not having to, you know, deed it out, not having to divide it. Well, if you look at 163.383 that's applicable when you're talking about a trust or trusts created by a single instrument. Once she died we're talking about two separate trusts, two separate documents.

One created way back in '72. And now a separate and distinct trust in 2009.

So you know, they should have deeded out that at that point, the 65 percent. And it was never done. Also they make in their pleadings they talk in detail about the oil -- apache oil and gas leases in 2012 and how Jacqueline was intimately involved in blah, blah, blah. And how she had professionals helping her. And how they had Eleanor, my client as trustee sign all the new leases as the sole lessor as trustee.

Well, if they had 65 percent, if MTC Living Trust had 65 percent interest they would -- Jackie as trustee of that trust would have been legally required to sign those leases. And they never did. They only had Eleanor. And that speaks volumes of not only Jackie's belief, but also the

professionals that she employed.

one of the two primary beneficiaries.

The division orders. You go back years and years.

All of the division orders from Apache and the other oil companies, they don't use the employer ID number, the federal ID number for trust number three. They use trust number two. And again, in 2009 at the latest that should have been changed. And Jackie was intimately involved. And she's the trustee, the sole trustee of MTC Living Trust. And she's also

And so when you talk about laches it works both ways. And Marjorie really is the only one who can say what the deal was. And Marjorie is dead. And it's just as much to our detriment if not more than to theirs.

And when you talk about laches and detrimental reliance you have to talk about first offer and acceptance. And there really has been no proof of any offer and acceptance. What detrimental reliance and laches is, is really a substitute for consideration. And we kind of skip over those first two elements and alls we talk about is consideration.

Well, even if it's a substitute for consideration we're talking about oil and gas rights and an undivided interest in real estate that cannot be performed within one year.

So under the statute of frauds it would have had to

be in writing. You're dealing with real estate. And you're dealing with a situation that cannot be performed with one year.

So laches works both ways. And you already decided last time that we needed an evidentiary hearing in this matter.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. MUGAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Powell, briefly.

MR. POWELL: Your Honor, I -- the crux of this, we're acting again as though somehow this -- that Eleanor just out of the blue decided to give the 65/35. I would point to again, on the Texas estate tax return the only evidence we still have left because of this huge passage of time, is schedule B2. It says specifically the language coming up with the 65/35 split on this return. Marital bequest.

As pointed out trust number three was a survivor's trust but it also had the marital trust as well. Back when this trust was created and back when Mr. Connell died there was no thing as -- there was no such thing as the Q Tip trust.

So -- and the trust itself says, I want to max out the marital deduction --

THE COURT: Okay. When I started out -- when you started
Mr. Powell --

MR. POWELL: Yeah.

	1	THE COURT: the question was what's changed; didn't we
	2	already argue all of this? And you said well
n ya wa wada ga wa da	3	MR. POWELL: Here's
	4	THE COURT: the release issues hadn't been addressed.
	5	And to me they all sound like they really were more in support
	6	of Mr. Mugan's motion on claim preclusion. That she shouldn't
	7	have changed this. Why wasn't it litigated previously? To me-
	8	this is the whole point why we have to have this evidentiary
;	9	hearing is because we don't have any other way. I don't
:	10	understand how we could possibly do this short of an
	11	evidentiary hearing. Because as you said, some of the
8 • •	12	evidence is gone, the written documentary evidence would be
; -	13	gone.
	14	Through nobody I'm not saying it's anybody's
:	15:	fault, but it just this goes back to '72. This is like 40
	16	years old.
	17	MR. POWELL: Which and that again went to our point of
; ;	18	why we think again laches should be applicable here because of
	19	the fact that this and if I could read you just real
	20	quickly
	21	THE COURT: Sure.
	22	MR. POWELL: the passage directly from Ms. Ahern's
	23	response. Which did you have the opportunity to read our
	24	THE COURT: Yeah.
	25	MR. POWELL: response to their

MR. POWELL: -- response to their --

evidentiary hearing that's coming up in a month. I just didn't see what the change was in circumstances.

MR. POWELL: Okay.

THE COURT: Now that I understand that you're just -this is an issue you want -- you would have liked me to grant
today, but it's just an issue to get as part of the ultimate
case it's one of the claims is that she's barred by the
doctrine of laches.

And now I understand -- that's how I understand it.

MR. POWELL: Okay.

THE COURT: That's how I view it. And I think it's something that has to be determined at the same time we determine the other issues --

MR. POWELL: Understood.

THE COURT: -- in the pending evidentiary hearing in February.

MR. POWELL: Okay, understood.

THE COURT: So denying both petitions. It's without prejudice because if for some reason something develops through the evidentiary hearing that one of the other claims has merit, either that this is precluded or that there's laches then, you know, we can rule on it at that time, but that's when I think it all has to be part of the evidentiary hearing.

MR. POWELL: Understood. Thank you, Your Honor.



1 MR. POWELL: The laches issue, okay. -- it's any different from any of the other 2 THE COURT: issues that are going to be --3 4 MR. POWELL: Okay. 5 THE COURT: -- determined at the hearing. It's --6 MR. POWELL: Okay. 7 THE COURT: It's just one of the claims that goes to, is she barred from making this change --8 MR. POWELL: Okay. -- by the doctrine of laches. 10 THE COURT: 11 MR. POWELL: Okay. 12 THE COURT: I mean, it's now --13 MR. POWELL: I understand. THE COURT: -- I think it's something that's part of our 14 15 February trial. 16 MR. POWELL: Okay, okay. 17 THE COURT: 18 MR. POWELL: Understood. 19 -- when I say I'm not going to grant it today THE COURT: it's not that I'm saying you --20 21 MR. POWELL: Sure. 22 THE COURT: -- aren't entitled to pursue it --23 MR. POWELL: Sure. -- as a claim. It's just that I can't grant 24 THE COURT: 25 preliminary relief. To me this is part of the whole

Her evidence is she's got this Texas estate tax 1 return showing 65/35. 2 THE COURT: Okay. But they can all come in and testify, 3 Mr. Powell. 4 5 MR. POWELL: Okay. That's -- I think that's what we said back in THE COURT: 6 November is that this is a factual dispute. It's going to 7 require taking the testimony. And in the meantime money's 8 being held. It's just cash. It's not some sort of an estate, 9 or something -- it's being just held. If it's theirs they get 10 If it's not theirs Ms. Ahern gets the money. 11 the money. 12 MR. POWELL: Okay. I'm just not understanding why we can't do 13 THE COURT: this in February when -- as was planned originally. 14 MR. POWELL: It was planned originally --15 What has changed? 16 THE COURT: 17 MR. POWELL: -- but it was also left that we could petition for any other relief because it was deemed -- it was 18 deemed essentially -- and Mr. Mugan argued that we didn't 19 plead enough of the issues. That we only pled for a 20 21 declaratory judgment. 22 THE COURT: Right. Well, I just think that at this point 23 in time this is one of the issues that would be appropriately determined at the hearing. And I don't think it's any 24

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different --

THE COURT: Oh, yeah. I've got it right here.

2 MR. POWELL: okay.

3 THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. POWELL: This is the assertion in their words. "When W.N. Connell passed away Marjorie T. Connell as a surviving trustor and trustee of the trust began paying herself 65 percent of the Upton County Texas oil right income.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. POWELL: Eleanor consulted an attorney and was advised that although Eleanor was entitled to all of the Upton County Texas Oil right income, if she asserted her rights to all the income against Marjorie at the time it would in all likelihood result in Marjorie disinheriting Eleanor when Marjorie died.

The advice essentially was to take less now so you could inherit all of Marjorie's estate later. Although Eleanor knew that she, Eleanor, was entitled to a hundred percent of the Upton County Texas Oil income. She consented to Marjorie receiving the 65 percent. The advice of the attorney and Eleanor's love and respect for and appreciation of Marjorie T. Connell as her mother led to her acquiescence.

How is this not laches if you sleep on your rights, you don't assert anything different? And I'm not sure how my client could have expected anything different than the status quo to remain in effect. How did she know?

MR. MUGAN: I'm not trying to be a smart aleck, Your 1 Honor. But I'm just asking if the Court wishes to reconsider 2 its ruling in light of what he said regarding the claim 3 preclusion. THE COURT: I appreciate that, Mr. Mugan. And as I said, 5 you know, he almost talked me into reconsidering it. But now 6 that I understand that he's just raising this issue as a 7 potential claim or theory for determination at the time of trial then I think that's where we'll leave it. We'll consider all these issues at the trial. 10 MR. MUGAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 Okay, thanks. 12 THE COURT: [Proceedings Concluded at 9:36 a.m.] 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video recording in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

Matthew Smith

Certified Transcriber

Hun J. Colum

**CLERK OF THE COURT** 

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## DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, Dated May 18, 1972,

CASE NO. P-09-066425 DEPT NO. XXVI (26)

Date of Hearing: January 14, 2015 Time of Hearing: 10:00a.m.

An Inter Vivos Irrevocable Trust.

OPPOSITION TO ELEANOR C. AHERN'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED; AND,

COUNTERMOTION OF KATHRYN A. BOUVIER AND JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, FOR DAMAGES AND ASSESSMENT OF PENALTIES, AND FOR OTHER RELIEF

Kathryn A. Bouvier ("Kathryn") and Jacqueline M. Montoya ("Jacqueline") hereby oppose the MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING LIMITED INTEREST OF TRUST ASSETS PURSUANT TO NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), AND NRS 164.033(1)(A) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED PER NRCP 12(b)(5)

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("Eleanor's Motion"), filed herein on October 9, 2014, by Eleanor C. Ahern ("Eleanor"); and, they further hereby submit their COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, FOR DAMAGES AND ASSESSMENT OF PENALTIES, AND FOR OTHER RELIEF, stating as follows:

It is respectfully submitted that once the Court understands the pertinent facts in this case and applies the law thereto it will be obvious that Eleanor's Motion is frivolous and a waste of time and expense to the Court and the parties in this case. On the other hand, it is further respectfully submitted that the Countermotion of Jacqueline and Kathryn set forth hereafter has merit and should be granted.

## PERTINENT BACKGROUND FACTS

- This Trust Case was actually commenced by Eleanor in 2009 with an 1. unopposed Trust Petition (hereinafter referred to as the "2009 Petition") to obtain a Court order clarifying to whom subtrust benefits would be paid upon her death. A copy of Eleanor's 2009 Petition is attached as Exhibit "D" to Eleanor's Motion. The Trust involved was THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Trust No. 1"). The subtrust involved in the 2009 Petition was Trust No. 2, created under the provisions of Trust No. 1.
- 2. The Trust No. 1 provisions created two sub-trusts upon the death of original grantor, W. N. Connell, in 1979 (referred to as Trusts Nos. 2 and 3). Income allocated to Trust No. 2 was payable to Eleanor during her lifetime. Income and assets of Trust No. 3 belonged to Marjorie T. Connell (hereinafter "Marjorie"), one of the original trustors creating the Trusts. However, the Trust No. 2 provisions were not clear as to the designation of the successor beneficiaries entitled to the benefits under Trust No. 2 upon the death of Eleanor. On the other hand, the provisions for the designation of successor beneficiaries to the income and assets of Trust No. 3, after the death of Marjorie, were perfectly clear.

- 3. Therefore, Eleanor, following Marjorie's death, was advised by her former attorneys handling this Trust matter, **and she herself elected**, to petition the Court to make clear that her two daughters, Jacqueline and Kathryn, would inherit her benefits and the assets under Trust No. 2 upon her death. As the 2009 Petition proceedings will clearly demonstrate, the 2009 Petition and court action was a totally uncontested matter dealing only with Trust No. 2. Eleanor was the Petitioner and no other persons intervened in the proceedings.
- 4. On September 4, 2009, pursuant to Eleanor's 2009 Petition, the District Court took jurisdiction over Trust No. 1 (and the sub-trusts created thereunder), approved Eleanor's request for clarification, and ordered that Trust No. 1 and Trust No. 2 be reformed and clarified to provide that upon the death of Eleanor, the income rights which she had under Trust No. 2 and the assets therein, would pass to her two daughters, Jacqueline and Kathryn. This was obviously the intent of the original grantors of Trust No. 1, W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell, as had been asserted in Eleanor's 2009 Petition.
- 5. Pursuant to the provisions of Trust No. 1, Trust No. 2, and Trust No. 3, up to the time, and at the time, of Eleanor's initial 2009 Petition in this Trust Case, and the September 4, 2009 Order entered by the Court clarifying entitlement after Eleanor's death, approximately 35% of the income earned by Trust 1, from Texas oil and mineral properties it owned, was being paid to Eleanor as the beneficiary under Trust No. 2. The remaining approximate 65% of the income earned by Trust 1 had been paid to Marjorie as the beneficiary of Trust No. 3 until her death in 2009.
- 6. After Marjorie's death and the entry of the Court's September 4, 2009 Order clarifying to whom the income and assets of Trust No. 2 would devolve after Eleanor's death, and for the next four years thereafter, the income of Trust No. 1 was continued to be paid in the same proportions, with approximately 35% going to Eleanor as the income beneficiary under Trust No. 2, and the remaining approximate 65% portion going to Jacqueline and Kathryn as beneficiaries under Trust No. 3. (Marjorie

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designated Jacqueline and Kathryn as the beneficiaries by naming them as the beneficiaries under her MTC Living Trust, which Trust Marjorie also designated, by a power of appointment granted her under Trust No. 1, as the beneficiary of her interests under Trust No. 3.)

- This consistent allocation of the income continued until approximately 7. June, 2013, when Eleanor suddenly decided that she should receive all of the income from Trust No. 1, and she discontinued any payments to Jacqueline and Kathryn.
- 8. Thus, to reiterate, the division and distribution of income earned by Trust No. 1 (i.e., 35% to the beneficiary of Trust No. 2 and 65% to the beneficiary of Trust No. 3) was recognized, approved, and followed by the Trustees of the Trust and all beneficiaries from the death of original Trustor, W. N. Connell, in 1979, until the summer of 2013, when Eleanor, as Trustee of Trust No. 1, then decided that while she was alive, all of the Trust No. 1 income (the shares payable to both Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3) should be paid to her. Therefore, she abruptly ceased distributing any of the Trust No. 1 income to Jacqueline and Kathryn beginning in June, 2013.
- 9. Eleanor, as Trustee of Trust No. 1, abruptly ceased paying any income from Trust No. 1 to Jacqueline and Kathryn, as beneficiaries under Trust No. 3, via the MTC Living Trust, in June, 2013, without filing any petition with the Court for instructions to clarify whether her position was correct or not. Neither did she discuss the reasoning or legal basis of her decision with Jacqueline or Kathryn. In suddenly stopping payments to Jacqueline and Kathryn, she went counter to 34 years of history and precedent in how the income of Trust No. 1 was allocated (i.e. 35% to Trust No. 2, and 65% to Trust No. 3). Eleanor's conduct left Jacqueline and Kathryn then, in 2013, with no other alternative but to seek Court assistance themselves in restoring to them their beneficial income rights under Trust No. 3, via their beneficial interests in the MTC Living Trust.
- 10. As the Court had already taken jurisdiction over Trust No. 1 with the filing of Eleanor's 2009 Petition in this Trust Case, Jacqueline, as Trustee of Marjorie

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Connell's MTC Living Trust, and on her and Kathryn's behalf as beneficiaries, filed herein on September 27, 2013, the PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING LIMITED INTEREST OF TRUST ASSETS PURSUANT TO NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), AND NRS 164.033(1)(A) (hereinafter "current Trust Petition"). The purpose of this current Trust Petition, which is now pending before the Court, was to resolve Eleanor's abrupt cessation of payments of income to Jacqueline and Kathryn from Trust No. 1 in June, 2013, and restore to them the income they are entitled to as beneficiaries under Trust No. 3. Jacqueline and Kathryn further believe that Eleanor's actions constitute a breach of her fiduciary duties as Trustee of the Trust, requiring her removal as Trustee and awarding to them the damages they have suffered, as well as damages for her wrongful conduct. Further, they submit that her belated claim to all of the Trust income is contrary to the Trust provisions and triggers the right to have the "no-contest clause" in the Trust applied to cause Eleanor to forfeit all rights to benefits under the Trust. Lastly, they submit that Eleanor's wrongful conduct and the litigation expenses it has caused to Jacqueline and Kathryn also justify the Court awarding them judgment against Eleanor for the attorney's fees and costs they have incurred.

- 11. The purpose of Eleanor's initial uncontested 2009 Petition in these proceedings was simply to have the Court interpret and reform the subtrust (i.e. Trust No. 2) to clarify to whom the income and assets of Trust No. 2 would be distributed after Eleanor's death. At the time of that 2009 Petition, at the time the Order on that Petition was granted in 2009, and for four years thereafter, there was no dispute between Eleanor and Jacqueline and Kathryn as to Trust No. 3's entitlement to 65% of the income from Trust No. 1. In fact, there had never before then been a dispute as to this distribution of income (35%/65%) between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3 from the date of W. N. Connell's death in 1979, until Eleanor's abrupt cessation of payments to Jacqueline and Kathryn in June, 2013.
  - In addition to the proceedings commenced with the current Trust Petition, 12.

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and approximately 6 months after the filing of the current Trust Petition to establish that Jacqueline and Kathryn have the right to 65% of the trust income from Trust No. 1, Eleanor, in 2014, filed a Will Contest in Case No. P-14-080595-E. purpose in filing the Will Contest is to try to prove that Marjorie's 2008 Will is invalid. If she accomplished that purpose, then it would be her position that the power of appointment that Marjorie exercised in her Will, appointing to her MTC Living Trust (and in turn to Jacqueline and Kathryn as beneficiaries under that Trust) all rights and interests under Trust No. 3 upon her death, is null and void, in which event the benefits under Trust No. 3 passed to her upon Marjorie's death.

- Thus, Eleanor, in her quest to now claim the right to the income from Trust 13. No. 3, has made two separate claims. Her first claim asserted in July, 2013 (by stopping payments to Jacqueline and Kathryn), is under the provisions of Trust No. 1 (and subtrusts thereunder) where she asserts that the trust terms in question require that she should be paid the income allocated to Trust No. 3, challenging and seeking to reverse 34 years of trust administration precedent. Her second claim and approach to claim all the income is with her Will Contest. By invalidating Marjorie's Will, she believes Marjorie would then not have successfully exercised her power of appointment granted to her under Trust No. 3, leaving the devolution of Trust No. 3 benefits to her upon Marjorie's death, instead of to Marjorie's MTC Living Trust (and Jacqueline and Kathryn as beneficiaries under that Trust).
- Now, Eleanor has filed Eleanor's Motion asserting that Jacqueline's and 14. Kathryn's current Trust Petition should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. More specifically, she asserts that the current Trust Petition is precluded under the legal theory of "claim preclusion". Eleanor asserts that when she filed her 2009 initial Petition in this Trust Case to clarify to whom benefits under Trust No. 2 would devolve upon her death, Jacqueline and Kathryn had a duty, under the legal theory of claim preclusion to assert their claim to income under Trust No. 3. By failing to do so in 2009 when Eleanor filed her initial 2009 Petition, Eleanor claims that they have

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forfeited the right to now file an action claiming their right to the income under Trust No. 3, and challenging Eleanor's efforts in 2013 to cut off their income rights. Eleanor's Motion and assertions therein are preposterous!

- 15. Obviously, when Eleanor filed her initial uncontested 2009 Petition to clarify beneficial rights to Trust No. 2 upon her death, Jacqueline and Kathryn had no "claim" or cause of action to assert with respect to their right to receive the income under Trust No. 3. They had no "claim" because their right to receive the income was recognized, and had been recognized by all persons concerned, including Eleanor, since the death of W. N. Connell in 1979. This right was provided to them under the terms of Trust No. 1 and Trust No. 3, and Marjorie's MTC Living Trust. So, it would not have been possible, when Eleanor filed her initial 2009 Petition, for Jacqueline and Kathryn to have been aware that four years later, in 2013, Eleanor would suddenly do an about face and make a claim to the income under Trust No. 3, ignoring the said Trusts' terms and 34 years of precedent following such terms.
- 16. Prior to Eleanor's abrupt cessation of payments to Jacqueline and Kathryn in 2013, Jacqueline and Kathryn had no reason to suspect or predict that Eleanor would take the highly illogical and unsupportable position that she has the right to the income from Trust No. 3. Eleanor had not made any such claim to the income for 34 years, while not only receiving 35% of the income benefits under Trust No. 2, but also while serving as the Co-Trustee and successor sole Trustee of Trust No. 1, Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3, tasked with properly administering and distributing the income thereunder. Eleanor's position, in now claiming all of the income, is tantamount to an admission on her part that she did not exercise her fiduciary duties properly as Trustee of the Trusts for 34 years. She is contradicting her own decisions and actions over that 34 year period in her current claim to the income allocated to Trust No. 3. importantly, it cannot be disputed that Eleanor's sudden change in making her claim to the income in 2013, was not known or predictable by Jacqueline and Kathryn four years earlier in 2009, so as to create in them a duty to make a claim then to the income,

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or be precluded therefrom under the legal theory of claim preclusion, as illogically asserted in Eleanor's Motion.

- 17. Jacqueline's and Kathryn's claim under their current Trust Petition simply is a claim that did not exist in 2009 (since there was no dispute creating a claim at that Their claim, or more appropriately their cause of action, only came into existence in the summer of 2013, when Eleanor "out of the clear blue" decided to claim all of the income under Trust No. 3 and cut off their income stream, breaching her duties as Trustee of the Trust. Thus, it is utterly impossible for Jacqueline's and Kathryn's claim to the income under Trust No. 3, as asserted in their current Trust Petition, to be barred under the theory of claim preclusion as asserted in Eleanor's Motion.
- 18. On the other hand, Eleanor has now asserted and admitted, since the filing of the current Trust Petition, that she has believed that she was entitled to all of the income paid from Trust No. 1 to Trust No. 3 since the death of W. N. Connell in 1979. She has asserted that an attorney (who is now deceased) so advised her at that time, but she never took any action or made anyone else involved aware of her belief. Her excuse for not taking action or revealing her belief regarding her claim to all of this income prior to June, 2013, is that she allegedly did not want to alienate her mother, Marjorie, and have her otherwise disinherit her. She has also asserted in these proceedings (inconsistently) that she wanted to gift the income to Marjorie as a good will gesture. (This last excuse of course does not explain why she also "gifted" under this reasoning the income from Trust No. 3 to Jacqueline and Kathryn for four years after Marjorie's death until July, 2013.) Nonetheless, the fact Eleanor admits allegedly recognizing that she was purportedly entitled to all of the income for the last 34 years, but just did not want to "rock the boat", raises the issue of whether she, herself, is precluded from now claiming the right to all of the income from Trust No. 3 under the legal theory of claim preclusion, providing a legal basis to grant Jacqueline's and Kathryn's Countermotion for Summary Judgment on the claims asserted in their current

Trust Petition.

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- 19. Eleanor, though now claiming that she has allegedly known she purportedly had the right to all of the income for the last 34 years, has not acted consistently with this alleged belief. First, as a beneficiary and second as a Co-Trustee or sole Trustee of Trust No. 1 and its subtrusts, she has approved and allowed 65% of Trust No. 1 income to be paid to the beneficiary of Trust No. 3. This inconsistent behavior, relied upon by Jacqueline and Kathryn, would also preclude Eleanor from making a claim to the income from Trust No. 3 under the legal theory of "waiver".
- 20. Jacqueline's and Kathryn's defenses to Eleanor's efforts to now claim the income from Trust No. 3 are further supported by the fact that when Marjorie died in 2009, Eleanor was provided with a copy of Marjorie's Will wherein Marjorie had appointed her interests under Trust No. 3 to her MTC Living Trust (and in turn thereunder to Jacqueline and Kathryn). Eleanor never raised any objection or challenge to this Will at that time, or to Marjorie's said Trust. Rather, Eleanor accepted a \$300,000.00 bequest under the Trust from Marjorie. Further, in her initial 2009 Petition in these Trust proceedings, she indicated her recognition and approval of Marjorie's Will and Trust. This conduct further supports granting Jacqueline's and Kathryn's Countermotion for Summary Judgment, based on the assertion of the defenses of laches and waiver against Eleanor in these proceedings.
- 21. In now asserting a right to all of the income from Trust No. 3, and in her Will Contest challenge, Eleanor has waited until key witnesses who could give clear and convincing evidence relating to the claims have died. First, obviously, she has waited until four years after the death of Marjorie before making her claims. The testimony of Marjorie, one of the original grantors of the Trust, would be very persuasive in clarifying what she and W. N. Connell intended under the Trust as to the right to income during the balance of Marjorie's life.
- 22. While we have lost Marjorie's testimony due to her death in 2009, it would be highly illogical for Marjorie to have agreed to a Trust agreement wherein all

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the income earned by the Trust No. 1, both that allocated to Trust No. 2 and that allocated to Trust No. 3, was payable to Eleanor, her and W.N. Connell's daughter, with Marjorie receiving no benefit. The Trust Marjorie and W. N. Connell created, was a typical AB Trust, wherein a portion of the Trust assets went to Marjorie as the survivor, upon W. N. Connell's death, distributed under Trust No. 3, and a portion (income only) would be payable to Eleanor, distributed to her under Trust No. 2. This fact is admitted by Eleanor in her 2009 verified Petition. Nonetheless, not having Marjorie's testimony in these proceedings is highly prejudicial to Jacqueline and Kathryn, because she would have explained: 1) that she was entitled to receive and had received the income under Trust No. 3 from and after the death of her husband, W. N. Connell, 2) that her receipt thereof was exactly what she and W.N. Connell intended, 3) that it was due to the proper allocation of assets and interpretation of the provisions of Trust No. 1, Trust No. 2, and Trust No. 3, upon her husband's death and in the filing of his Federal and Texas Estate Tax Returns, and 4) that such allocation was made by the attorneys and accountants assisting the Trustee of the Trusts in fulfilling her duties thereunder.

- 23. Second, the attorneys, accountants and other persons who were intimately involved, following W. N. Connell's death in 1979, in the allocation of assets between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3 under the provisions of Trust No. 1, are now also deceased. These professionals were tasked with assisting the Trustee of the Trusts in the proper filing of W. N. Connell's Federal Estate Tax Return and his Texas Estate Tax Return, wherein the allocations of property between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3 were made, in accordance with the provisions of Trust No. 1, Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3. These allocations determined the right to income for the beneficiaries of Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3. The testimony of these percipient witnesses would be vitally crucial in the present dispute between Eleanor and Jacqueline and Kathryn. But, Eleanor again has waited until they are all deceased before making her claim.
  - In addition to witness testimony, documents pertinent to the filing of W. 24.

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N. Connell's Estate Tax Returns cannot now be located, including the controlling Federal Estate Tax Return. Eleanor's delay in making her claim (first asserted in 2013) has permitted this valuable document to now be misplaced or destroyed. (Eleanor as Trustee of Trust No. 1 and its subtrusts should have kept a copy of the Return, but now alleges she has none.) Fortunately, a signed copy of the Texas Estate Tax Return, and a copy of the closing letter for the Federal Estate Tax Return are still in existence, corroborating Jacqueline's and Kathryn's right to the income under Trust No. 3, and proving that Eleanor is not entitled to such income. See respective Exhibits "A" (Texas Estate Tax Return) and "B" (IRS closing letter) attached hereto, which are incorporated herein by this reference. But, having a copy of the Federal Estate Tax Return would be very material evidence, which has now been lost over the years while Eleanor sat on her claim to the income, waiting for all this evidence to be lost.

- 25. Based upon the foregoing facts, Jacqueline and Kathryn submit:
- A. That Eleanor's Motion should be denied. The legal theory of claim preclusion is not relevant with respect to their claims under their current Trust Petition, first arising in 2013 when Eleanor cut off their income from Trust No. 3. This is blatantly obvious, and Eleanor's Motion is frivolous and has caused them unnecessary legal expense and harassment in this Case.
- Further, if any claim in this current Trust proceeding is subject to denial В. under the legal theory of claim preclusion, it is Eleanor's claim (belatedly asserted in 2013) to all of the income under Trust No. 3. She has admitted that she allegedly knew she had the claim, that a mistake was allegedly made in the allocations between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3 in the filing of W. N. Connell's Estate Tax Returns, but she declined to assert it with her initial 2009 Petition in this Trust proceeding.
- C. Eleanor's claim to all of the Trust income, first asserted in or around June, 2013, is pathetically late. It is inconsistent with her conduct during the prior 34 year period. It is asserted after key witnesses and material documentary evidence are no longer alive or available, thus severely prejudicing and inhibiting Jacqueline and

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Kathryn in their defense of her claim. Therefore, Eleanor's claim and position in these proceedings should be denied under the Statute of Limitations, and/or under the doctrines of laches and waiver as requested hereafter in Jacqueline's and Kathryn's Countermotion for Summary Judgment.

- Further, Jacqueline and Kathryn have repeatedly requested Eleanor to provide them with an accounting of each of the Trusts, as required under Nevada law, but none has been forthcoming. Eleanor should be penalized for this default and be required to pay the fees and costs incurred by Jacqueline and Kathryn in having to seek the Court's assistance to obtain information regarding the Trust that they are legally entitled to. Further, given the acrimonious dispute between the parties as to the entitlement to income, some restraints and safeguards need to be placed to insure that Jacqueline and Kathryn receive the income in the event they prevail in this matter. Placing all income withheld from them during the last year and one-half, together with all accruing income from the Trust (not otherwise paid to them as herein requested) in a neutral bank account, with no withdrawal allowed without the Court's order, would be a proper step to protect Jacqueline and Kathryn's rights and interests in these proceedings. Jacqueline and Kathryn also believe Eleanor has breached her Trustee duties, not only in withholding the Trust income from them without proper cause, but also in misappropriating their Trust income which she should have been holding pending the Court's decision as to entitlement in these proceedings. Eleanor should be removed as the Trustee of the Trusts due to her improper conduct and obvious conflict of interest with Jacqueline and Kathryn.
- For over one year now, Eleanor has been filing a multitude of frivolous petitions and motions, a frivolous Will Contest, a frivolous appeal to the Nevada Supreme, extensive but unnecessary discovery efforts, and other churning actions in these proceedings and in the Will Contest Case. Her purpose in doing so is obviously to harass and put financial pressure on Jacqueline and Kathryn to settle this case on Eleanor's ridiculously unfair terms. Eleanor has continued to receive income under

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Trust No. 2 during this period. However, Eleanor has withheld the payment of any income (over \$1,500,000.00) owed to Jacqueline and Kathryn, greatly inhibiting them in not only funding their fees and costs in this litigation, but in meeting their basic living expenses. While the Court recognized this unfairness and ordered in the May 13, 2014 hearing that Jacqueline and Kathryn could start receiving the Trust No. 3 income, the Court required that they post a bond first as a condition to receiving the income. Bonds are practically impossible to obtain nowadays, even with a willingness to pay a large premium. Thus, Jacqueline and Kathryn have not benefitted from the Court's decision from the May 13, 2014 hearing. A resolution of this unfair situation needs to be made.

Jacqueline and Kathryn request the Court to review again the issue of ordering the resumption of Trust income payments to them. While they have been deprived of over \$1,500,000.00 during the last year, Eleanor has been receiving for her use and benefit her 35% share of the Trust income. If Jacqueline and Kathryn's position in this litigation prevails, Eleanor will likely owe them considerable damages, including not only attorneys fees and damages suffered due to Eleanor's breach of her fiduciary duties, but also the disgorgement by Eleanor of the \$300,000.00 bequest she received under Marjorie's MTC Living Trust. Further, under the "no-contest" clause in Trust No. 1, Eleanor is subject to forfeiture of any further benefits under Trust No. 2 due to her wrongfully challenging the provisions for distribution.

In addition, it appears that the income allocated to Trust No. 3, which Eleanor is required to hold and safeguard pending the Court's decision herein as to entitlement, has already been wrongfully depleted by Eleanor, based upon the recent account statement received and information acquired from Eleanor and her counsel. Thus, not only could she have forfeited her right to further income benefits from the Trust, but she also appears to have wrongfully spent monies she was required to hold in the Trust's account pending the outcome of these proceedings. Based on these facts, she would not have the ability to repay Jacqueline and Kathryn all that she would owe

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There is no security posted by Eleanor to pay these potential damages to Jacqueline and Kathryn in these proceedings should they prevail. Thus, Jacqueline and Kathryn are not being treated fairly in the withholding of income from them, while Eleanor continues to receive income to fund her litigation tactics in these proceedings.

Accordingly, Jacqueline and Kathryn request that either income payments of their 65% share of trust income resume to them, without their having to post a bond, or that Eleanor's 35% share be withheld from her also, pending the Court's decision in this Case. Eleanor is the wrongdoer in this Case. She, as a trustee with a fiduciary duty, in a most cavalier manner, stopped paying Jacqueline and Kathryn their income shares, without first consulting with them, and most importantly without getting direction from and approval of the Court. A trustee who wishes to reverse 34 years of trust administration practice and decisions, and who wants to make a self-serving claim to all benefits under the Trust, thereby severely damaging other trust beneficiaries, should be punished for acting without first seeking proper court approval and allowing the other beneficiaries due process to protect their interests. This malicious and inexcusable conduct of Eleanor alone justifies allowing a resumption of Trust payments to Jacqueline and Kathryn, and reimbursement of past payments withheld, pending the Court's decision in these proceedings.

### **LEGAL POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

### CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION Α.

The Nevada Supreme Court in Five Star Capital Corporation v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 194 P.3d 709 (2008), enunciated the elements and test required to establish the defenses of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. As the Court noted, much confusion has existed regarding these legal theories, and claim preclusion has often been referred to as "res judicata", and issue preclusion as "collateral estoppel". Eleanor's Motion seeks to have Jacqueline's and Kathryn's current Petition dismissed under the legal theory of claim preclusion.

In Five Star Capital Corporation v. Ruby, the Court held that to establish claim

preclusion it must be shown that:

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- 1. The parties or their privies are the same;
- The final judgment is valid; and 2.
- 3. The subsequent action is based on the same claims or any part of them that were or could have been brought in the first case. Id. at 713.

Applying this test to Eleanor's Motion assertions clearly establishes that Jacqueline's and Kathryn's claim under their current Petition to 65% of the Trust income, first arising in 2013, is not barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion.

First, the 2009 initial Petition filed by Eleanor did not involve any other parties disputing the relief she was seeking. There was no contest involved. While Jacqueline and Kathryn benefitted from the Petition, they could only possibly be considered "privies" with Eleanor in the matter. There were no privies with a disputing party, as there was none. Thus, it is questionable that the first element of claim preclusion exists in applying that theory to the claim of Jacqueline and Kathryn against Eleanor four years later.

The second element necessary to establish claim preclusion, that of a final judgment, may appear to be present, but in actuality it is probably not even relevant to the claim made by Jacqueline and Kathryn in 2013. The only final decision in 2009 said, in essence, that Jacqueline and Kathryn would receive Eleanor's income rights and all assets of Trust No. 2 upon the death of Eleanor. That decision did not touch on or effect Trust No. 3 income rights. A reading of the initial verified Petition filed by Eleanor, attached as Exhibit "D" to Eleanor's Motion, shows throughout the Petition that all that was at issue, was the devolution rights to Trust No. 2 upon Eleanor's death. Further, while no issues were raised with regard to Trust No. 3 in the Petition, consistently throughout the Petition, Eleanor as the Petitioner states and confirms her recognition that Marjorie was the beneficiary of income rights under Trust No. 3, and that Jacqueline and Kathryn succeeded to Marjorie's rights as beneficiaries of Trust No. 3 upon Marjorie's death. Thus, in 2009 there was no dispute regarding Jacqueline's and

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Kathryn's claim to the income from Trust No. 3, which they were forced to assert in 2013, after Eleanor cut off their income rights. The only final decision rendered with the 2009 Petition was that Jacqueline and Kathryn would also be the beneficiaries of Eleanor's income and the assets of Trust No. 2 upon Eleanor's death. Jacqueline's and Kathryn's claim to the income from Trust No. 3 is not at all inconsistent with Eleanor's Petition and the Court's decision in 2009, designating them also as the beneficiaries of the income and assets under Trust No. 2, upon Eleanor's death.

The third element is the clear and decisive determinant that Eleanor's Motion and assertion of claim preclusion against Jacqueline and Kathryn is frivolous. This element requires that "the subsequent action is based on the same claims or any part of them that were or could have been brought in the first case". Five Star Capital Corporation v. Ruby, supra, at 713. Obviously, the 2013 claim of Jacqueline and Kathryn, to have restored to them the income payable to Trust No. 3, from which Eleanor had cut them off, was not a claim relating to the issues and matters addressed in Eleanor's 2009 Petition. Eleanor's 2009 Petition dealt only with the request to the Court that Trust No. 1 and Trust No. 2 be reformed and clarified to provide that the benefits of Trust No. 2 devolve to Jacqueline and Kathryn upon Eleanor's death. There was no issue at that time with respect to entitlement to income as the beneficiary of Trust No. 3.

In addition, it is patently obvious that Jacqueline and Kathryn "could not have brought" in 2009, with the filing of Eleanor's Petition, the claim they asserted in 2013 to have income restored to them. Their 2013 claim did not exist in 2009. Eleanor had not made her belated claim to all of the income from Trust No. 3 until 2013. It would be utterly imbecilic to assert that Jacqueline and Kathryn had some duty to know or predict in 2009 that Eleanor would contradict her own conduct as Trustee of Trust No. 1 and its subtrusts and the distribution allocations which had been in place and honored for 34 years, by claiming a right to all of the income in 2013. In her 2009 Petition, Eleanor, herself, makes it clear that she did not claim a right to the income from Trust

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No. 3., but recognized that such income belonged to Marjorie while alive, and then to Jacqueline and Kathryn. It is mind-boggling for Eleanor to now assert that Jacqueline and Kathryn had any duty to ask the Court in 2009 to confirm the recognized practice of distributing Trust No. 3 income to them, when Eleanor, based upon her 2009 Petition, and conduct as the Trustee of Trust No. 1, Trust No. 2, and Trust No. 3 for the prior 30 years, had always displayed agreement with the income distribution allocation to and under Trust No. 3.

The Court in Five Star Capital Corporation v. Ruby explained why claim preclusion is not a viable defense for Eleanor in the current Petition and Trust Case. The Court noted at page 715 as follows:

"As stated in <u>Restatement (Second)</u> of <u>Judgments section 19</u>, comment a, the purposes of claim preclusion are 'based largely on the ground that **fairness to the defendant**, and sound judicial administration, require that at some point litigation over the particular controversy come to an end' and that such reasoning may apply 'even though the substantive issues have not been tried, especially if the plaintiff has failed to avail himself of the opportunities to pursue his remedies in the first proceeding . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Clearly, it would be extremely unjust and unfair to expect Jacqueline and Kathryn, in 2009, to have had a "crystal ball" with which they could see in the future that Eleanor would take the action she took in 2013 to cut off their income from the Trust, so as to require them to have asserted a claim in 2009 to the income (even though there was no reason then to assert such claim as no one had opposed or challenged their right to the income for the previous 30 years).

On the other hand, Eleanor may be guilty of conduct requiring the application of claim preclusion to defeat her claim to all of the Trust income in 2013, and right to cut off Jacqueline's and Kathryn's right to the income. Since Eleanor has readily admitted she thought she had the claim to all of the income for the last 34 years, she alone was aware of this percolating (in her mind only) issue, and she alone could have brought the issue to the Court's, Jacqueline's and Kathryn's attention in 2009, rather than waiting until 2013. While the issues addressed in her 2009 Petition are quite different than the issues now pertinent in the current Petition and Trust proceeding, at

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least Eleanor was aware of her claim and could have asserted it with her 2009 Petition, if that was necessary to avoid claim preclusion. This is why Jacqueline and Kathryn raised this issue previously in these proceedings.

In the recent case of Williams v. Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, 2014 WL 3732892 (Table) (Nev.), the Nevada Supreme Court rejected the petitioners assertion of claim preclusion to defeat the subject claim. In that case it was alleged that Williams' first action related to a violation of a settlement agreement. Since the second case involved further alleged violations of the settlement agreement, the petitioners asserted Williams should have included his second claim in his first case, and failing to due so was then barred under the theory of claim preclusion. The Court, however, noted:

"... the claims at issue here are distinct from those in the previous case and could not have been brought in that matter, rendering petitioners' preclusion-based argument without merit (citing their decision in *Five Star Capital Corporation v. Ruby*)"

The claims in the Williams case related to the same settlement agreement. However, the claim in the second case was for a violation of the settlement agreement that occurred after the time of the first case. Obviously, therefore, the second claim could not have been brought with the first claim. This situation is comparable to the claims in the current Petition and Trust case involving Eleanor and Jacqueline and Kathryn. There was no way that Jacqueline and Kathryn could have known to raise a claim regarding entitlement to income from Trust No. 3 in 2009 when Eleanor filed her initial Petition to clarify entitlement to the benefits of Trust No. 2 upon her death. As in the Williams case, Jacqueline's and Katherine's claim did not arise until 2013, four years after the issues in Eleanor's 2009 Petition had been resolved and finalized.

In summary of this point, Jacqueline and Kathryn submit that Eleanor's Motion to Dismiss their claim to income under Trust No. 3 based upon the theory of claim preclusion should be denied. Further, since Eleanor's claim is frivolous and only asserted to harass Jacqueline and Kathryn and cause them additional unnecessary legal expense, they should receive an award of attorneys fees and costs against Eleanor

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pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b).

### B. COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT **BASED** STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS LACHES, WAIVER, AND **CLAIM PRECLUSION**

In considering the granting of a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought, and disputed but unresolved factual allegations of that party must be presumed correct unless clearly proven otherwise. The burden is on the movant to demonstrate that grounds for summary judgment exist. Pacific Pools Constr. Co. v. McClain's Concrete, Inc., 101 Nev. 557, 706 P.2d 849 (1985). However, in opposing the motion, the party against whom it is sought must present specific facts rather than general allegations and conclusions to defeat the motion. Bird v. Casa Royale W., 97 Nev. 67, 624 P.2d 17 (1981). Further, the purpose for NRCP Rule 56 should be effectuated, when the motion shows no genuine issues of fact remain. The party filing the motion, as clearly stated in the Rule, should be granted the judgment, so as not to be required to continue to waste time and expense litigating where the opposing party's position lacks merit. Elizabeth E. V. ADT, 108 Nev. 889, 839 P. 2d 1308 (1992).

Jacqueline and Kathryn respectfully submit that their current Petition should be summarily granted in that there are no material disputed facts relating to their defenses and rights under the Statute of Limitations, laches, waiver, and claim preclusion against Eleanor for wrongfully cutting off their income and beneficial rights under Trust No. 3. Eleanor's derelictions and belated behavior in asserting a claim to the income under Trust No. 3, in light of her inconsistent conduct during the prior 34 years, and the loss of material evidence due to the passage of time, which causes severe prejudice to Jacqueline and Kathryn, clearly support the granting of summary judgment to them at this time.

It should be noted that Eleanor has admitted that she was allegedly informed by

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an attorney after the death of W. N. Connell, over 34 years ago, that she was entitled to the income payable to the beneficiary of Trust No. 3. This attorney is no longer practicing in Nevada and is now deceased. The point is that Eleanor admits she was aware that a mistake had allegedly been made in W.N. Connell's Federal Estate Tax Return and the allocation of Trust asset rights between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3 in 1979, over 34 years ago. Yet, she did not take any action to make a claim and assert her purported right to the income payable to Trust No. 3 until 2013. This would apparently mean that her claim should be barred by the Statute of Limitations, NRS 11.190(3)(d), which bars actions for relief on the ground of mistake unless asserted within 3 years from "discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake". If, however, Eleanor's 2013 claim to the income payable to Trust No. 3 is not barred by the Statute of Limitations, it certainly should be barred under the equitable theories of laches, waiver and claim preclusion.

1. Laches- Applying the legal principles of laches to the facts, as stated above, presents a compelling case for granting summary judgment to Jacqueline and Kathryn under their current Petition. The Nevada Supreme Court in the landmark case of Cooney v. Pedroli, 49 Nev. 55, 235 P. 637 (1925), enunciated when it is appropriate to apply the doctrine of laches to defeat a claim. The plaintiff in Cooney sought an interest in real property 22 years after the defendant claimed the property, delaying taking any action for that long period of time, notwithstanding the defendant's claims to the property were all open and notorious and consistent with absolute ownership. Also, during the delay, a material witness died preventing the defendant from having the witness's testimony to support his case. The Court in considering the defense of laches held:

"(I) fit appears that (the adverse party) ha(s) been deprived of any advantage they might have had if the claim had been seasonably insisted on, or if they be subjected to any hardship that might have been avoided by reasonably prompt proceedings, a court of equity will not interfere to give relief, but will remain passive (i.e., will apply the doctrine of laches to defeat the claim).

It is a very material circumstance to be considered in connection with the lapse of time that death of those who could have explained the transaction has

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### intervened before the claim is made." *Id.* at 640. (Emphasis added.)

More recently, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Cooney v. Pedroli in the case of Public Service Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Company, 103 Nev. 187, 734 P.2d 1245. In this more recent case, the Court noted that Sierra Pacific knowingly failed to assert its claims for six and one-half years. Having failed to do so, the Court determined its claims were lost under the doctrine of laches. The Court stated at page 1251 as follows:

"Laches will be invoked when an actual or presumable change of circumstances makes it inequitable to grant relief. (Citation) In Cooney v. Pedroli, 49 Nev. 55, 62-63, 235 P. 637, 640 (1925), we declared that '[w]henever the passage of time has brought in its train anything that works to the disadvantage of a party and makes it doubtful if equity can be done, relief will be denied.'

If Sierra had proceeded with diligence to challenge the Commission's interpretation of the statute or, at the least, had recognized and acted upon the Commission's relaxed approach to its earlier pronouncement, we are confident that much of the delay and prejudice could have been avoided or minimized." (Emphasis is the Court's.)

Applying the test enunciated in Cooney v. Pedroli and reaffirmed in Public Service Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Company to the present litigation, it is clear that Eleanor's blatantly belated claim (made by cutting off income distributions to Jacqueline and Kathryn), first asserted in 2013, must be dismissed under the doctrine of laches. Eleanor admits believing she was entitled to all of the income from Trust No. 3 following the death of W. N. Connell in 1979. She admits she was advised over 30 years ago, by an attorney, that a mistake was purportedly made in the allocation of the income between the subtrusts. She asserts in her pleadings filed herein that she refrained from making a claim for two inconsistent reasons. On one hand, she has stated that she did not make a claim because she was afraid it would upset her mother, Marjorie, and would cause Marjorie to disinherit her to some extent in Marjorie's estate planning. On the other hand, but inconsistently, she asserts she was just being generous and wanted Marjorie to have 65% of the income during her life as a gift from Eleanor. In either case, she admits full awareness for over 34 years of her alleged right to all of the income, and a decision on her part to not reveal her awareness of or assert

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her purported claim with those interested in and benefitted by the Trust. Thus, the first element for a finding of laches is present, that is, an awareness of a purported right to a claim which the claimant delays making for an inordinate period of time.

The allocation of income from Trust No. 1 between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3, was made according to the terms of Trust No. 1. It involved the filing in 1979, following W. N. Connell's death, of Federal and Texas State Inheritance Tax Returns wherein the maximum marital deduction was claimed through allocating an approximate 65% of the Texas oil properties to Marjorie. This fact is confirmed in Eleanor's own initial verified Petition filed in 2009, attached as Exhibit "D" to her Motion, as noted in Paragraph 15, on pages 3 and 4 thereof. This allocation was made pursuant to the terms of Trust No. 1, as noted in said Petition. This then set the basis and pattern for dividing thereafter the income received by Trust No. 1 between the two sub-trusts as required by Trust No. 1. All of the attorneys and accountants who could give testimony as to their calculations in making the allocation between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3 are now deceased. Further, no copy of the Federal Estate Tax Return can now be located. And, lastly, and of most importance, Marjorie, one of the two grantors establishing Trust No. 1 and its provisions for allocating its assets, is now deceased. The loss of all this documentary evidence and witness testimony greatly prejudices Jacqueline and Kathryn and inhibits the Court in now adjudicating the issues. Thus, the second and final element for a finding of laches is established, that is, prejudice to those opposing the claim.

While the history and precedent set for nearly 34 years, where the income has been allocated between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3, provides compelling proof that Eleanor's claim to all of the income is invalid, and the Texas Estate Tax Return and IRS Closing Letter provide further compelling proof thereof, Eleanor's delay in making her claim to all of the income until 2013, after all the percipient witnesses are deceased, and the Federal Estate Tax Return cannot be located, causes severe prejudice to Jacqueline and Kathryn in conclusively establishing their continuing right to 65% of

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Trust No. 1 income. For all of these reasons, Jacqueline and Kathryn submit valid grounds exist under the doctrine of laches to deny and dismiss Eleanor's opposition to their current Petition and grant them summary judgment thereunder, determining that they are entitled to the all of the 65% share of Trust No. 1 income payable to Trust No. 3. It is hard to imagine or conceive of a more appropriate situation for applying the doctrine of laches, precluding Eleanor from now challenging their right to the income.

Waiver- The doctrine of waiver is similar in some respects to the doctrine 2. of laches. If Eleanor's late action in challenging Jacqueline's and Kathryn's right to the 65% share of Trust No. 1 income paid to Trust No. 3 is not defeated under the doctrine of laches, it should nonetheless fail under the doctrine of waiver. "Waiver requires 'an existing right, a knowledge of its existence, and an actual intention to relinquish it, or conduct so inconsistent with the intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that is has been relinquished." McKeeman v. General American Life Insurance Company, 111 Nev. 1042, 899 P.2d 1124, 1128 (1995). Certainly, Eleanor's conduct in delaying her challenge to the alleged income right under Trust No. 3 and her other inconsistent actions over the years, show a waiver of her rights to challenge Jacqueline's and Kathryn's right to the income at this time.

It must be remembered that Eleanor was not a passive, uninvolved party in the administration of Trust No. 1, Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3 during the last 34+ years. She has not only been a beneficiary of Trust income under Trust No. 2, she has also served as the Trustee of these Trusts during this period of time and to the present day. In 2009, when Eleanor was preparing to file her initial 2009 Petition in these proceedings, Jacqueline had full time employment earning \$120,000.00 a year. Because of her receipt of the bequest from Marjorie's MTC Living Trust granting to her a portion of the income from Trust No. 3, Jacqueline was then considering resigning from her employment to be a stay-at-home mother for the benefit of her children. She discussed her considerations with Eleanor, asking if Eleanor thought that the income Jacqueline would receive from Trust No. 3 would thereafter be adequate

and secure enough for her to give-up her employment. Eleanor assured Jacqueline that it would and, influenced by Eleanor's assurances, Jacqueline decided to leave her lucrative employment position. See Affidavit of Jacqueline Montoya, attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by this reference, confirming these facts. Thus, Eleanor's sudden about face in claiming the income she said would be payable to Jacqueline causes Jacqueline severe prejudice, threatening her and her family's financial well-being. Kathryn too has made financial decisions based upon reliance of her right to income under Trust No. 3. The loss of such income would obviously also affect her and her family's well-being. See Affidavit of Kathryn Bouvier attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by this reference.

It should further be noted that Eleanor was provided with a copy of Marjorie's Will immediately after Marjorie's death in 2009. She was notified of Marjorie's exercise of her Power of Appointment under the Will, leaving Marjorie's rights and benefits under Trust No. 3 to Marjorie's MTC Living Trust, and in turn to Jacqueline and Kathryn as beneficiaries under the MTC Living Trust. See Affidavit of David Straus, Esq. executed on April 9, 2014, which is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated by this reference. Further, in filing her initial 2009 Petition in this Trust Case, Eleanor admitted in a footnote on page 4 the following:

"MARJORIE exercised this power of appointment prior to her death as indicated in Article Four of the Last Will and Testament of MARJORIE, dated January 7, 2008. A copy of MARJORIE's Last Will and Testament is attached hereto as Exhibit "5." The beneficiary of the exercise of the power of appointment was the MTC Living Trust, which contains provisions for the benefit of the Petitioner's issue." (Emphasis added.) Notwithstanding she was fully aware of these facts, Eleanor declined to challenge Marjorie's Will and Trust and readily accepted, herself, a substantial bequest from the MTC Living Trust of \$300,000.00.

To reiterate, shortly following Marjorie's death in 2009, Eleanor was aware of her Will, and aware of its effect in exercising a Power of Appointment giving, in essence, Marjorie's interest in Trust No. 3 to Jacqueline and Kathryn. Further, Eleanor accepted a \$300,000 bequest which relied upon the effectiveness of documents

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Marjorie executed on September 7, 2008, including her Will and the Amendment to her MTC Living Trust, which gave Jacqueline and Kathryn the right to the benefits under Trust No. 3. And lastly, in 2009, when Eleanor filed her initial Petition, Eleanor, under oath, asserted that she recognized that she did not have the right to any of the income from Trust No. 3.

All of these facts show clearly that Eleanor was fully aware that Jacqueline and Kathryn were entitled to the 65% share of Trust No. 1 income payable to Trust No. 3, and all of Eleanor's conduct and actions prior to July, 2013 were consistent with this income distribution. Thus, under the elements for a finding of waiver, as quoted above in McKeeman v. General American Life Insurance Company, Eleanor clearly waived her right to assert in 2013 any claim to the income from Trust No. 3. All of this history, conduct of Eleanor, and prejudice caused to Jacqueline and Kathryn by Eleanor's inconsistent and abrupt change of position in 2013, claiming then the income from Trust No. 3 after never having asserted such a claim for over 34 years, provides a clear legal basis to deny Eleanor's claim and grant Jacqueline's and Kathryn's Countermotion for Summary Judgment.

If this Trust Case were to proceed to trial, Jacqueline and Kathryn are very confident that the Court would rule in their favor on the merits of the dispute. While no copy of the Federal Estate Tax Return can be found evidencing the proper allocation of income earned by Trust No. 1 between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3, a copy of the Texas Estate Tax Return filed for the Estate of W.N. Connell has been located. The Texas Return states that it relied upon the division of assets and income set forth in the Federal Estate Tax Return. Specifically, page 4 of the Texas Return, titled as "Schedule C", reflects that a Form 706, the Federal Estate Tax Return, was previously filed and there is a statement on the form which provides as follows:

The following information should be furnished from Form 706, U.S. Estate Tax Return, filed or to be filed on behalf of this estate with the Internal Revenue Service.

We also have the IRS Closing Letter for the Federal Estate Tax Return providing

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information corroborating the Texas Estate Tax Return allocations with the Federal Estate Tax Return. See Exhibit "A" (Texas Estate Tax Return) and Exhibit "B" (IRS Closing Letter) which are attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. One can thus clearly understand and recognize that the allocation of assets between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3 upon the death of W. N. Connell, resulting in the income rights of Eleanor and Marjorie from Trust No. 1 thereafter, was properly made.

The allocation of benefits between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3, relied upon the obtaining of the maximum marital deduction for W. N. Connell's taxable estate. The expert witness Jacqueline and Kathryn have engaged to review the matter, Daniel T. Gerety, CPA, has explained with extensive detail and thorough explanation how the calculations were made in 1980 and has concluded that the allocations between the two sub-trusts were properly arrived at after the death of W.N. Connell. See copy of the Expert Report of Daniel T. Gerety, CPA, dated September 27, 2014, which is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and hereby incorporated by this reference. Thus, all family members thereafter, up until Eleanor's unexplainable abrupt change of course in the summer of 2013, recognized the 35%-65% asset and income allocation required under the Trust.

However, the cost of this litigation is very damaging to Jacqueline and Kathryn. Where legal grounds exist to now resolve the litigation without the expense of a trial, relief should be granted. Eleanor's belated claim now to 100% of the income earned by Trust No. 1 should be denied, even without considering the possible merits of her claim, on the legal theories of laches and waiver. Jacqueline and Kathryn have previously indicated to the District Court that they feel Eleanor's claims and position in this case should be denied based upon laches and waiver. However, the District Court determined that before it would rule on this issue, and other Motions filed in the Trust Case proceedings, it would be time and cost efficient to first resolve the parties' claims in Case No. P-14-080595-E, the Will-Contest Case, also pending before the Court. Eleanor requested that the District Court postpone any further decisions in the

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Trust Case, pending its decision in the subsequently filed Will-Contest Case. Nonetheless, now that Eleanor has chosen to bring the merits of the current Petition and Trust Case back on before the Court, it would be proper and fair to Jacqueline and Kathryn, that the Court hear and resolve their Countermotion for Summary Judgment.

Right to Accounting and Verification of Funds- NRS 165.141 requires a Trustee to provide an accounting to a beneficiary upon demand within 60 days thereafter. Jacqueline and Kathryn, through their counsel, have repeatedly requested an accounting from Eleanor during the last six months. None has been received. This is particularly troublesome in that Eleanor should be holding back over \$1,500,000.00 in Trust income belonging to Jacqueline and Kathryn. Further, Eleanor has been acting unstable for over one year in disappearing, moving around, and being under the influence of others, whom Jacqueline and Kathryn believe have improper motives in influencing Eleanor's conduct. While patiently waiting to receive an accounting, Jacqueline and Kathryn have also asked simply for bank statements verifying the amount of funds in the Trust's account under Eleanor's control, and the receipts and distributions from the account.

Finally, at the Supreme Court Mediation-Settlement Conference held on October 14, 2014, Jacqueline and Kathryn were presented with a letter from an accountant verifying what funds were allegedly in the Trust account. However, this verification is very troubling in that it appears several hundred thousand dollars are missing from the funds (income allocated to Trust No. 3) which Eleanor should be holding secure for them in the account. In addition, this alleged verification still does not meet the legal obligations Eleanor has defaulted on in providing an accounting.

NRS 165.200 provides:

"When a trustee fails to perform any of the duties imposed upon the trustee by this chapter the trustee may be removed, the trustee's compensation may be reduced or forfeited, or other civil penalty inflicted, in the discretion of the court."

Jacqueline and Kathryn submit that an appropriate penalty for Eleanor's failure to provide the accounting is to require her to pay and reimburse to Jacqueline and Kathryn A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

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\$5,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs incurred in seeking the accounting, in this Countermotion, and as a penalty for Eleanor's wrongful conduct. Further, Eleanor's accounting dereliction adds to the grounds already existing due to her breach of duty to distribute Trust funds, and she should be removed as the Trustee of Trust No. 1, Trust No. 2, and Trust No. 3.

### **COUNTERMOTION FOR DAMAGES AND ASSESSMENT OF PENALTIES** AND OTHER RELIEF AGAINST ELEANOR

Trust No. 1 contains a "no contest" clause which requires that a beneficiary forfeit his or her entitlements if he or she violates the clause by wrongfully litigating the Trust distribution provisions and rights thereunder. The "no contest" clause found in Article Tenth of the Trust provides for the following:

NON-CONTEST PROVISION. The Grantors specifically desire that these trusts created herein be administered and distributed without litigation or dispute of any kind. If any beneficiary of these trusts or any other person, whether stranger, rélatives or heirs, or any legatees or devisees under the Last Will and Testament of the Grantors or the successors in interest of any such persons, including any person who may be entitled to receive any portion of the Grantors' estates under the intestate laws of the State of Nevada, seek or establish to assert any claim to the assets of these trusts established herein, or attack, oppose or seek to set aside the administration and distribution of the said trusts, or to have the same declared null and void or diminished, or to defeat or change any part of the provisions of the trust established herein, then in any and all of the above mentioned cases and events, such person or persons shall receive One Dollar (\$1.00) and no more in lieu of any interest in the assets of the trusts.

A similar "no contest" clause is found in Marjorie's Will and her MTC Living Trust.

By her actions in wrongfully stopping payments to Jacqueline and Kathryn from Trust No. 1, and claiming all the income for herself, Eleanor has violated the "no contest" clause in Trust No. 1, and the penalty for such violation should be assessed by terminating Eleanor's right to any further income as the beneficiary of Trust No. 2. Pursuant to NRS 163.00195(1), the enforcement of the "no contest" clause found in Trust No. 1 is mandatory.

By contesting Jacqueline's and Kathryn's right to the income payable to Trust No. 3, as beneficiaries under Marjorie's Will and her MTC Living Trust, Eleanor has violated the "no contest" clauses found in those documents. The penalty for such

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violations is forfeiture of any benefits otherwise paid or payable to Eleanor under these estate planning documents. As stated above, pursuant to NRS 163.00195(1), the enforcement of the "no contest" clauses found in Marjorie's Will and the MTC Living Trust are mandatory. Eleanor received a \$300,000.00 bequest under the MTC Living Trust provisions and, in the event her Will Contest challenge is denied, she should be required to disgorge this amount and repay it to the MTC Living Trust.

In addition, as noted above, Eleanor has breached her duties as the Trustee of Trust No. 1, Trust No. 2, and Trust No. 3, in wrongfully depriving Kathryn and Jacqueline of the income benefits they are entitled to receive. This breach of her duties should not only cause her dismissal as the Trustee, but she should also be required to pay to Kathryn and Jacqueline damages caused by her wrongful conduct. **NRS** 153.031(3)(b) provides for the following:

If the court grants any relief to the petitioner, the court may, in its discretion, order any or all of the following additional relief if the court determines that such additional relief is appropriate to redress or avoid an injustice:

(b) Order the trustee to pay to the petitioner or any other party all réasonable costs incurred by the party to adjudicate the affairs of the trust pursuant to this section, including, without limitation, reasonable attorney's fees. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 165.139, the trustee may not be held personally liable for the payment of such costs unless the court determines that the trustee was negligent in the performance of or breached his or her fiduciary duties.

Lastly, Eleanor has wrongfully caused Kathryn and Jacqueline to incur substantial attorney's fees and costs in the Trust and Will Contest litigation in these proceedings. Her conduct has been frivolous and intended to harass Kathryn and Jacqueline, and justifies the award of fees and costs to Kathryn and Jacqueline and against Eleanor under NRS 18.010(b). Further, under NRS 153.031(3)(b), as noted above, and NRS 137.020(3), Jacqueline and Kathryn, as the parties successful in the Trust and Will Contest litigation, are entitled to an award of fees and costs against Eleanor

### **SUMMARY**

Jacqueline and Kathryn request the following relief from the Court at this time:

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That Eleanor's Motion be denied, and that they receive an award of attorney's Α. fees and costs against Eleanor, pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b) for having filed her frivolous and harassing Motion.

- That their Countermotion for Summary Judgment be granted for the reasons В. submitted above, namely that Eleanor's claim to a right of the income under Trust No. 3, first asserted by her in 2013 in stopping income payments to Jacqueline and Kathryn, is barred, by the Statute of Limitations, the doctrine of laches, the doctrine of waiver, and/or the doctrine of Claim Preclusion. Under NRCP Rule 56, where no material facts are subject to dispute and the law applied shows the movant is entitled to judgment, summary judgment should be granted to avoid further waste of time and expense to the moving party and the Court. Clearly, this is an appropriate case to grant summary judgment.
- That Eleanor be sanctioned for having failed to provide them with a proper accounting of the Trust, including awarding fees and costs incurred to them, and further penalizing Eleanor. It should be ordered all accruing income received by Trust No. 1 for distribution between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3, and that presently being held by Eleanor, other than that which the Court allows to be distributed as requested above, be placed in a neutral bank account to not be further released without further Court order. Further, Eleanor should be removed as Trustee of Trust No. 1, Trust No. 2, and Trust No. 3, as she is not capable or fit to handle this important fiduciary duty.
- That the Court reconsider its decision from the May 14, 2014 hearing, and allow D. Jacqueline and Kathryn to receive the income payable to Trust No. 3 during these proceedings without posting a bond, should these proceedings not be resolved within the next month, just as Eleanor has been entitled to continue receiving her share of the income. In the alternative. Eleanor should be required to post a bond to cover the potential damages, fees and costs she would suffer and owe to Jacqueline and Kathryn, should she not prevail in this case, to secure the payment thereof.
- E. That it be determined that Eleanor has forfeited her rights and benefits under

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Trust No. 1 and Trust No. 2, by wrongfully claiming all income earned by Trust No. 1 and attempting to deprive Kathryn and Jacqueline of their right to income under Trust No. 3.

In the event that Marjorie's Will Contest challenge is denied, that it be determined that Eleanor has forfeited her rights and benefits under Marjorie's Will and her MTC Living Trust, and that she be required to disgorge and pay back to the Trust the \$300,000.00 bequest she accepted from the Trust, as a result of her wrongfully claiming that the Will is invalid.

Dated this 23rd day of December, 2014.

## ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRIGHT

/s/ Whitney Warnick

By:

WHITNEY B. WARNICK, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 001573 801 S. Rancho Drive, Suite D-4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89016 Attorneys for Kathryn Bouvier

### THE RUSHFORTH FIRM

By


Nevada Bar No. 008875 9505 Hillwood Drive, #100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorneys for Jacqueline M. Montoya

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I am an employee of THE RUSHFORTH FIRM, LTD. and that on the 33day of December, 2014, I placed a true and correct copy of the foregoing OPPOSITION TO ELEANOR C. AHERN'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED; COUNTERMOTION OF KATHRYN A. BOUVIER AND JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PETITION **FOR** 

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, FOR DAMAGES AND ASSESSMENT OF PENALTIES, AND FOR OTHER RELIEF, in the United States Mail, at Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope with first class postage thereon fully prepaid, and addressed to the following: Liane K. Wakayama, Esq. Candice E. Renka, Esq. Marquis Aurbach Coffing 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (On the same date, I also served a true and correct copy of each of the foregoing documents upon all counsel of record by electronically serving the same using the Court's electronic filing system.) An Employee of The Rushforth Firm, Ltd.

EXHIBIT "A"



### BOB BULLOCK Rev. 9-78) COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS STATE OF TEXAS BOB BULLOCK

Do not write in above space

			Date Received (Da	not write in this space)			
INHERITANCE TAX RETURN - NON-RESI	DENT	[ '	- a	у лич от втом франциј			
Decedent's Name (First, Middle, Maiden, Last)		Date of Death		T CODE 5 90100			
William M. Connell		November	24, 1979	DEPOSIT CODE 11 110			
Residence (Domicile) at Time of Death (City and State)		Year in which c	Iomicile was				
Boulder City, Nevada		established.	1936				
Married Divorced	Single	Logalfy	Separated [	Widow/Widower			
If Married, Date of Marriage: June 2, 1942	Number of Chile	dren: one	Number of Child	ren Surviving: One			
transfer of property within Texas in which any death,	ne decedent, within, mak≥ any transfe equate and full co	er of property wit	thin Texas without	If "YES", please furnish complete information.			
	letters tostamental ad for this estate?  YES	ry or of administ	ration	Date Granted			
To whom granted? (Designate "Executor," "Executrix," "Administra							
	SIGNATION		RESS (Street & No.	., City, State, Zip Code)			
Name of Court	Location of	Court					
				•			
Have anciliary probate proceedings been applied for and granted?  YES NO	County in 7	ounty in Texas					
Name of ancillary administrator or executor							
Address				V-1-FVV			
INHERITANCE TAX DUE							
PART I		PART II					
Basic inheritance tax (From Schedule B)		Federal cred	x (From Schedule C)				
\$ -00-			\$ 515.00				
TAX DUE (PART I OR F	PART II, WHICHE	VER IS GREAT	ER)	**************************************			
and the same of th	515.00						
I declare that this return and any accompanying statements are true, subject to the fraudulent report provisions of TEX. TAXGEN, ANN.	art. 1.12 (1959).						
Name of Preparer Darrel Knight Assoc., IncPC   915 695-23			inistrator, Heir at La 11, Executri				
Address (Street & No., City. State, Zip Code) 301 S. Pioneer, #102, Abilene, TX 79605	Address	(Street & No., C	ity, State, Zip Code	)			
sign Propaget! Date here 12-16-	sign						
PLEASE NOTE: RETURN FILES SIGN PREPARING RETURN.	VED BY PERSON	AL REPRESAN	TATIVE OF ESTA	TE AND PURSON			
MUST BE ATTACHED			AND STALL SALES IN WAY	II WE BEIDGHIL			
For assistance call Area Code 512 475-3603 or	MAIL						
TOLL FREE from anywhere in Texas		INHERI	ROLLER OF PUBLI TANCE TAX DIVIS				
1-800-252-5555, Ext. 119, 120 or 121			L STATION TEXAS 78774	TRF_000001			

### SCHEDULE A

Ciry y

### PROPERTY SUBJECT TO TEXAS INHERITANCE TAX

Did the decedent at the time of death own an interest in real estate or minerals located within the State of Texas?  Solves    No If "Yes," list below.							
Did the decedent at the time of death own an interest in any tangible personal property such as livestock, farm and ranching equipment, grain in storage, growing crops, all equipment used in connection with the drilling and producing of subsurface crude oil, gas or other minerals and any other tangible property having an actual situs in the State of Texas?   Yes  No If "Yes," list below.							
All assets listed below must be clearly described and identified. If valuations are based upon appraisals, copies of such appraisals should accompany the return. If a formal appraisal of oil and gas leases and royalties is not made, a five-year payout based on the last twelve months prior to death will be used in determining the value of such mineral interest.							

### **ALTERNATE VALUATION**

An election to have the gross estate of the decedent valued as of the alternate date or dates is made by entering a check mark in the box set forth below:

The executor elects to have the gross estate of the decedent valued in accordance with values as of a date or dates subsequent to the decedent's death as authorized under TEX. TAX.-GEN: ANN. art. 14.11 (Supp. 1976).

NO.	DESCRIPTION	SUBSEQUENT VALUATION DATE	ALTERNATE VALUE	. VALUE AT DATE OF DEATH
	2,301 acres, pasture land, out of Block 39, T-5-S, Sections 38,47,48, W237, Upton County, Texas. Separate property of decedent.		<b>\$</b>	<b>\$</b> 80,535.
	Mineral rights, Upton County, Texas, & interest in Dora Connell Estate. Separate property of decedent. Valued on a 5-year payout based on payments received 12 months prior to date of death.			20 677
				32,677.
	·			
	•	·		
<del></del>	TOTAL (Also enter under Scher	\$	\$ <sup>113</sup> ,212.	

Page 2

[If more space is needed, insert additional sheets of same size)

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SCHEDULE B

Form 2Q30-1.02 Page 3

# COMPUTATION OF BASIC INHERITANCE TAX

Value of share of these of the services are services of the se	List all beneficiaries under the will of the decedent (including charitable bequests)  or under the laws of intestacy who take any share of the estate.  Attach a copy of the last will and testament or an affidavit of heirship if the decedent died intestate.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
60 69,704 -0- 197.04 -00- 41 12,528 -00- 125.28 -00- 43 -00000-	Relationship of Beneficiary to Decedent
60 69,704 -0- 197.04 -00- 41 12,528 -00- 125.28 -0000000000	1
-000000-	wife daughter
	son-in-law

(if more space is needed, insert additional sheets of seme size)

# COMPUTATION OF PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF FEDERAL CREDIT FOR STATE DEATH TAX

The following information should be furnished from Form 706, U.S. Estate Tax Return, filed or to Internal Revenue Service.  IF FORM 706 WAS NOT FILED, COMPLETE LINES 1 THROUGH 5 AND LINE 12	o be filed on behalf of this esta	ite with the
1. Value of property subject to Texas Inheritance Tax.	1. \$ 113,212	
2. Total value of all other property.	180,023	
3. Total gross estate (lines 1 plus 2)-(Same as recapitulation p. 3, U.S. Estate Tax Return)		3. 293,235
4. Funeral, administration expenses, debts of decedent, mortgage and liens (Schedules J & K, U.S. Estate Tax Return)	10,936	. v
5. Total value of net estate wherever located.		282,299
6. Other deductions (Total of Schedules L, M, N and O, U.S. Estate Tax Return)	6. 76,688	
7. Total allowable deductions (Line 4 plus line 6) (Same as Recapitulation, page 3, U.S. Estate Tax Return)		7. 87,624
8. Taxable estate for Federal Estate Tax purposes. (Line 3 minus line 7) (Same as page one U.S. Estate Tax Return, line 3)		8. 205,611
9. Adjustment to compute State Death Tax.	9.	
10. Federal adjusted taxable estate (line 8 minus line 9).		10. 145,611
11. a) Excess of gross estate tax over unified credit.  (from line 12, page 1, form 706)	11a 18,596	
b) Maximum Federal Credit for State Death Tax. (Computed on Table C, Form 706)	1,335	
c) Allowable Federal Credit for State Death Tax. (line 11a or 11b, whichever is smaller)		11c 1,335
2. Percentage of Texas gross estate to total gross estate. (line 1 divided by line 3)	38.61%	-
13. Portion of Federal Credit for State Death Tax allocated to the State of Texas. (line 11c multiplied by line 12).  TO BE CARRIED FORWARD TO PAGE 1, PART II		<b>13.</b> 515

### SCHEDULE B-1

# William M. Connell Estate Distribution of Net Estate Wherever Located Supporting Schedule B-3

Net Taxable Estate Wherever Located		\$282,299
Distribution to Marjorie Connell:		•
Las Vegas rental property (Sch. A, Item 3, Form 706) Stock and bonds (Sch. B, Form 706) Cash and First Trust Deeds (Sch. C, Form 706) Insurance proceeds (Sch. D, Form 706) Mobil home, furniture and automobiles (Sch. F, Items 3, 4, 5 and 6, Form 706) Marital bequest, 64.493% of 2,301 acres Upton Co., Texas land (Sch. A, Item 1, Form 706)	\$37,500 52,218 74,660 1,358 11,250	•
Marital bequest, 64.493% of mineral rights, Upton Co., Texas (Sch. A, Item 2, Form 706) Distributive share of allowable deductions	51,940 21,074 (10,936)	(239,064)
Distribution to Eleanor M. Connell Hartman:		
Diamond Shrine Riva (Sch. F, Item 1, Form 706) 35.507% of 2,301 acres, Upton Co., Texas land	2,750	
(Sch. A, Item 1, Form 706) 35.507% of mineral rights, Upton Co., Texas	28,595	
(Sch. A, Item 2, Form 706)	11,603	(42,948)
Distribution to Robert Hartman:		
Gold Diamond Glycene wristwatch		(287)
		\$ -0-

### SCHEDULE B-2

# William M. Connell Estate Distribution of Texas Estate Supporting Schedule B-3

Net Texas Estate		\$113,212
Distribution to Marjorie Connell:		•
Marital bequest, 64.493% of 2,301 acres		
Upton County land (Sch. A, Item 1)	\$51,940	
Marital bequest, 64.493% of mineral rights,		•
Upton County, Texas (Sch. A, Item 2)	21,074	(73,014)
Distribution to Eleanor M. Connell Hartman:		·
35.507% of 2,301 acres, Upton County land		
(Sch. A, Item 1)	28,595	
35.507% of mineral rights, Upton County,	·	
Texas (Sch. A, Item 2)	11,603	(40, 198)
		. 6 0

SCHEDULE B-3

William M. Connell Estate Determination of Value of Taxable Share Supporting Schedule B, Columns 4 & 5

(e)	Value of taxable share	\$ 69.704	12,528	101	\$ 82,232		(e)	Value of	taxable share	Ĭ	o C	o •0•	i O I
(P)	Pro rata share of exemption (b) x (c)	\$169,360	30,420	25,000			(P)	Pro rata share	of exemption (b) x (c)	\$128,980	71,020	10-	\$200,000
(σ)	Exemption	\$200,000	200,000	200,000			(°)		Exemption	\$200,000	.000,000	0-	
(b) % of share	total of all	84.68%	15.21%	.11%	100.00%	•	(b) % of share	received to	Class A shares	267.79	35.51%	-0-	100.00%
(a) Value of share of entire net	estate wherever	\$239,064	45,948	287	\$282,299		( <b>&amp;</b> )	Value of share		\$ 73,014	40,198	-0-	\$113,212
•	Beneficiary	Marjorie Connell	Eleanor C. Hartman	Robert Hartman	Totals				Beneficiary	Marjorie Connell	Eleanor C. Hartman	Robert Hartman	Totals

EXHIBIT "B"

# Internal Revenue Service District Director

jt
Department of the Treasury

Date: UCT 3 0 1981

•

WILLIA: & CONNELL ESTATE
MARUPRIC COMMELL
1535 CIADY AVE
BUULDIR CITY. NV 89005

Number:
, 530-05-6631

Date of Death:
November 24, 1979

Person to Contact:
L. Peterson

William M. Connell

Decedent's Social Security

Estate of:

Contact Telephone Number: 784-5262

Estate Tax Closing letter (This is not a bill for tax due)

Our computation of the Federal Tax liability for the above estate is shown below. It does not include any interest that may be charged. You should keep a copy of this letter as a permanent record because your attorney may need it to close the probate proceedings for the estate. This letter is evidence that the Federal tax return for the estate has either been accepted as filed, or has been accepted after an adjustment that you agreed to.

This is not a formal closing agreement under section 7121 of the Internal Revenue Code. We will not reopen this case, however, unless Revenue Procedure 74-5 reproduced on the back of this letter, applies.

If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown above. Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

12.7. Swenson

District Director

(over)

P.O. Box 4100, Reno, Nevada 89505 cc: Robert T. Ashworth, P/A

Letter 627(DO) (Rev. 2-78)

EXHIBIT "C"

# AFFIDAVIT OF JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STATE OF NEVADA	)
	)ss.
COUNTY OF CLARK	)

JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, being first duly sworn testifies as follows:

- 1. I am an adult, I have personal knowledge of the matters herein stated, and I am competent to testify to them in a Court of law.
- 2. I am a daughter of Eleanor Connell Hartman Ahern.
- 3. I have read the factual assertions made in the foregoing Opposition and Countermotion for Summary Judgment and I state that they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and information.
- 4. In 2009, after the death of my Grandmother, Marjorie T. Connell, I was advised that under her Will and MTC Living Trust, I and my sister, Kathryn A. Bouvier, would be the equal beneficiaries of approximately 65% of the income received by the W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust, Dated May 18, 1972.
- 5. At the time I was fully employed working for a prominent employer in Las Vegas, Nevada, Wynn Las Vegas, as the executive director of weddings, and earning a base salary of \$92,000 which together with commissions resulted in total yearly compensation of approximately \$120,000.00.
- 6. At the time, I was also the mother of two minor children, twin boys, and our family relied upon my employment income and that of my husband for our living needs.
- 7. With the bequest made to me from the said Trusts, the MTC Living Trust and my contingent interest in Trust No. 2 of the W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust following

- my mother's passing, I considered resigning from my employment to be able to tend my boys as a full-time mother.
- 8. Before making a decision to resign my employment, I wanted to make sure that the income derived from the Texas oil rights would be stable and continuing so as not to jeopardize my family's financial needs.
- 9. I therefore discussed these concerns with my mother, Eleanor. In December of 2009, while sitting at a table in my home, my mother readily confirmed to me that I had nothing to worry about regarding the stability and continuation of the income from the Trust as it was being paid to me. Eleanor looked at me while smiling and said that I should absolutely resign from my employment and that I should stay home to raise my boys.
- 10. In reliance upon my mother's assurances regarding the Trust income, I discussed the matter with my husband and we agreed it would be a prudent and beneficial step benefitting our family and children for me to resign my employment and be able to spend more time with our children and having more time to spend with them. April 30, 2010 was my last day of employment with Wynn Las Vegas and I have not been employed since such date.
- 11. The cutting off of my Trust income by my mother in approximately June, 2013 has greatly harmed my family's financial welfare and made the decision to terminate my employment one I would most certainly not have made had I known she would attempt to challenge my right to the income as she did beginning in approximately June, 2013. In addition to the decision to terminate my employment, I have made decisions regarding the purchase of assets, the investment of assets, and the payments of debt obligations, which I would certainly not have made had I known that my mother would attempt to challenge my right to the income as she did beginning in approximately June, 2013.

12.	This damage to my fam	ly's financial welfare	has caused me	e a tremendous	amount of
	emotional stress.				

Dated this 22 day of December, 2014.

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing statements are true.

| Caeque leve (M.11 fartae) |
| ACQUELINE M. MONTOYA |

EXHIBIT "D"

# AFFIDAVIT OF KATHRYN A. BOUVIER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STATE OF TEXAS	)
	)ss.
COUNTY OF GALVESTO	N)

KATHRYN A. BOUVIER, being first duly sworn testifies as follows:

- 1. I am an adult, I have personal knowledge of the matters herein stated, and I am competent to testify to them in a Court of law.
- 2. I am a daughter of Eleanor Connell Hartman Ahern.
- 3. I have read the factual assertions made in the foregoing Opposition and Countermotion for Summary Judgment and I state that they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and information.
- 4. In 2009, after the death of my Grandmother, Marjorie T. Connell, I was advised that under her Will and MTC Living Trust, I and my sister, Jacqueline M. Montoya, would be the equal beneficiaries of approximately 65% of the income received by the W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust, Dated May 18, 1972.
- 5. In the four years following my receipt of the bequest and share of the income from the Trusts,

  I and my husband have made financial decisions based upon the assurances from my mother,

  Eleanor, that the Trust income was secure, stable and would be continuing for us well into
  the future.
- 6. In reliance upon my mother's assurances regarding the Trust income, I have made decisions regarding the purchase of assets, business affairs, and other matters, which I would certainly not have made had I known she would attempt to challenge my right to the income as she did beginning in approximately June, 2013.

7. The cutting off of my Trust income by my mother in approximately June, 2013, has greatly harmed my family's financial welfare, in addition to causing a tremendous amount of emotional stress relating to such financial harm.

Dated this <u>22</u> day of December, 2014.

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing statements are true.

AA 1805

EXHIBIT "E"

### 1 AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID A. STRAUS 2 I, DAVID A. STRAUS, ESQ., being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 3 I am an attorney licensed in the State of Nevada, the State of California, and the State of 1. 4 Colorado. I am in good standing in each of these states. 5 I have been licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada since 1991. 2. 6 I reside in Clark County, Nevada. 3. 7 I am employed by and am the sole member of the Law Offices of David A. Straus, LLC. 8 Marjorie T. Connell ("Marjorie") was a long time estate planning client of mine. 5. I prepared the MTC Living Trust for Marjorie, dated December 6, 1995, and the restatement 10 6. 11 to the MTC Living Trust, dated January 7, 2008. 12 As Marjorie's attorney, I spoke with Marjorie on multiple occasions about the real property 7. 13 located in Upton County, Texas and the oil, gas, and mineral rights related to such property 14 ("Texas Property"), all of which was previously deeded to "The W.N. Connell and Marjorie" 15 T. Connell Living Trust" ("Connell Family Trust") by Mr. Connell, Marjorie's husband. 16 Marjorie always represented to me that a portion of the Texas Property had been allocated 8. 17 to the Survivor's subtrust under the Connell Family Trust, which was known as Trust No. 18 3, for which she had been granted a power of appointment over the disposition of. 19 A reason Marjorie wanted to exercise a new Last Will and Testament in 2008 was her desire 9. 20 21 to exercise her power of appointment over Trust No. 3 to ensure that all of the assets that 22 belonged to Trust No. 3, specifically the interest in the Texas Property, would belong, 23 following her death, to the MTC Living Trust, which Marjorie decided to restate in its 24 entirety in 2008. 25 Following Marjorie's passing in 2009, I sent a letter dated May 21, 2009, via certified mail, 10. 26 to Eleanor C. Ahern, in her capacity as Trustee of the Connell Family Trust, to advise her of 27 the fact that Marjorie had exercised her power of appointment over Trust No. 3 in favor of 28

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID A. STRAUS, ESQ.— Page 1

of the MTC Living Trust. The exercise of the power of appointment over Trust No. 3 was done in Marjorie's Will dated January 7, 2008 and as such I provided Eleanor with a certified copy of the Will.

- 11. As to the Texas Property, I had multiple conversations with Jacqueline Montoya ("Jacqueline"), in her capacity as the Trustee of the MTC Living Trust, and in her capacity as a beneficiary of such Trust, together with Kathryn Bouvier ("Kathryn"), in her capacity as a beneficiary of the MTC Living Trust, regarding the need, based on Marjorie's exercise of the power of appointment over Trust No. 3 in favor of the MTC Living Trust, to effect a formal change in title to the Texas Property to the MTC Living Trust.
- Based upon my recollection, I believe that Eleanor C. Ahern ("Eleanor") participated in at least one of these conferences regarding the need to change title to the Texas Property from the Connell Family Trust to the MTC Living Trust, as to the portion that had been allocated to Trust No. 3.
- 13. I do not recall during any of these conversations was there any objection by any of those present that Trust No. 3 had not been allocated a portion of the Texas Property when the estate tax return for Mr. Connell had been prepared following his death.
- 14. Although I would not have prepared the documents to legally change title of the share of the Texas Property from the Connell Family Trust to the MTC Living Trust, not being licensed in the state of Texas, I had offered my services to assist in finding and working with a Texas attorney who could accomplish this task.
- 15. My offer to assist with the transfer of the Texas Property was respectfully declined by Jacqueline, Kathryn, and Eleanor. I was informed that they were concerned with the fees and costs to effectuate the formal transfer of the proportional interest in the Texas Property to the MTC Living Trust and that their plan was to take care of the transfer in the future as they did not yet want to spend the legal fees necessary to accomplish this task.

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID A. STRAUS, ESQ.— Page 2

1	16.	From those meetings in which the Texas Property interest belonging to the MTC Living		
2		Trust was discussed, I was confident that I had adequately done my job of explaining to		
3		them the need to cleanly separate the Texas Property in accordance with the exercise of		
4		Marjorie's power of appointment and in turn for each of the Connell Family Trust and the		
5		MTC Living Trust to each legally hold title to its proportional interest in the Texas Property.		
6	17.	In my discussions with Eleanor, she did not indicate to me that she felt that the MTC Living		
7				
8	10	Trust did not have a legal interest in the Texas Property.		
9	18.	At the conclusion of these meetings, in collective sense, it was my impression and		
10		understanding that Jacqueline, Kathryn, and Eleanor had decided that they would forego		
11		the expense of making the legal transfer of the Texas Property and instead were choosing		
12		to divide the income in the same proportional interests belonging to the MTC Living Trust		
13		and Eleanor's interest in the Connell Family Trust.		
14	19.	It was my hope that they would take my advice, for both legal and tax purposes, and		
15 16		effectuate the legal transfer of the Texas Property with a Texas attorney.		
17	20.	I am willing and able to testify to all of the statements made herein.		
18	:	I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.		
19				
20		DAVID A. STRAUS, ESQ.		
21		CRIBED AND SWORN TO OR		
22	AFFIR	EMED by me on Ughel 9,2014.		
23	1	JOSEFINA C. JONES Notary Public State of Nevada		
24	NOT	No. 06-107459-1 My Appt. Exp. June 26, 2014		
25	XOIA	RYPUBLIC		
26				
27				
28				

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID A. STRAUS, ESQ.— Page 3

EXHIBIT "F"



6817 S. Eastern Avenue, Suite 101 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119-4684 Phone: 702-933-2213 Fax: 702-933-2214

Website: www.geretycpa.com

September 27, 2014

Joseph Powell The Rushforth Firm, Ltd. 9505 Hillwood Drive, Suite 100 Las Vegas, NV 89134-0514

Re: W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust

Dear Mr. Powell:

You have asked that I provide my professional opinion regarding the allocation of assets of the W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust ("Trust") after the death of William M. Connell ("William") and then the death of Marjorie Connell ("Marjorie").

A copy of my credentials is attached as Exhibit 1. Our fees are based on the time required to review the facts, write this letter and respond to any questions. Kirstin Lambrecht has assisted me with the preparation of this letter and the analysis contained herein. Kirstin Lambrecht's billing rate is \$335 an hour and my billing rate is \$480 per hour.

This report is based on the facts and information I am aware of today. I reserve the right to modify this report should other information become available to me.

### **Summary of Opinion**

The Texas Inheritance Tax Return ("Texas Return") I reviewed reconciles and agrees with the IRS closing letter I reviewed. I recomputed the maximum marital deduction to be \$76,691 based on the assets reported on the Texas Return. The Texas Return, Schedule C, Line 6 reported \$76,688 as other deductions which represented the marital deduction. The difference of \$3 between my calculation of the maximum marital deduction and what was taken on the Texas Return is assumed to be rounding.

Per Article Third of the Trust Document, the Trustee was required to fund Trust No. 3 with a fractional interest in William's Separate Property with a value equal to the maximum marital deduction allowed under Federal law at the time of William's death.

The only assets identified as William's separate property on Schedule A of the Trust Document was Texas real estate and Texas mineral rights. In calculating the maximum marital deduction I assumed all other property was community property because William and Marjorie lived in a community property State for most of their lives and all property transferred to the Trust per Schedule A of the Trust Document was community property other than the Texas property. In order for the Trustee to arrive at the same marital deduction as I computed, she must have reported all property as community property on the estate tax return, other than the Texas property; otherwise the estate tax return would have reported a different marital deduction than what I computed.

Article Third of the Trust Document states, "In making the computations and allocations of the said property to Trust No. 3 as herein required, the determination of the character and ownership of the said property and the value thereof shall be as finally established for federal estate tax purposes. Based on the assets held by the estate, it would be mathematically impossible to arrive at the tax due

on the Federal Estate Tax Closing letter without treating all property, except for the Texas Property, as community property and the Texas property as separate property. Thus, all property, other than the Texas property, was characterized as community property as finally established for federal estate tax purposes. Therefore, other than assets which passed outside of the Trust, the only assets that could be used to fund the \$76,688 marital deduction were the Texas property. Also, the marital deduction required to be funded under the Trust Document is \$76,688, as finally established for federal estate tax purposes.

The Trustee's funding of the marital deduction with \$73,014 of Texas property or a 64.493% fractional interest of the Texas property to Trust No. 3 was the only option the Trustee had at the time of funding based on the facts presented to me. There was no other way to fund the marital deduction based on the terms of the Trust.

# Documents Reviewed in Order to Come to My Opinion

In order to prepare this report I was given the following information to review:

- The W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust Document (Exhibit 4)
- December 2, 1980 letter from Darrel Knight Associates, Inc. P.C. which provided a valuation of land and royalties
- Internal Revenue Service Estate Tax Closing Letter for the William M. Connell Estate dated October 30, 1981 (Exhibit 5)
- Inheritance Tax Receipt from the Comptroller of Public Accounts State of Texas dated March 30, 1982 for the Estate of William M. Connell
- Texas Inheritance Tax Return Non-Resident for William M. Connell signed by Marjorie Connell on December 16, 1980 (Exhibit 6)
- Letter to Daniel T. Gerety dated January 27, 2014 from The Rushforth Firm, Ltd. explaining the facts of the case

## **Analysis of Facts and Basis for Expert Opinion**

I have been informed that there is a dispute as to the proper allocation of Texas land, oil, gas and mineral rights ("Texas property") that are titled in the Trust's name. The Trust was formed on May 18, 1972 by William and Marjorie ("Grantors") per the Trust Document. Grantors were Nevada residents at the time the Trust was established per the Trust Document. The Texas property, which was William's separate property, was transferred to the Trust in 1972 (Schedule A of Trust Document). The Texas property received by the Trust remained William's separate property during the Grantors' joint lives per the Trust Document. While both Grantors were living, the Trust was called Trust No. 1.

William died November 24, 1979 per the Texas Inheritance Tax Return and the IRS Estate Tax Closing Letter. Per Article Second C. of the Trust Document, upon William's death Trust No. 1 was to be divided into two separate trusts, Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3. Trust No. 2 was designed as a "credit shelter trust" and Trust No. 3 was designed as a "marital trust".

Per Article Second C. 2. and 3. and Article Third, Trust No. 3 was to be funded with (a) Marjorie's separate property, (b) Marjorie's one-half (1/2) interest of the community property, (c) Marjorie's community property interest in any life insurance on William payable to the Trust, and (d) enough of a fractional share of William's separate property to equal the maximum marital deduction allowed for federal estate tax purposes, reduced by the total of any other amounts allowed under the IRS Code, as a marital deduction, which are not a part of the Trust estate.

Per Article Second C. 4., the remaining portion of the Trust not allocated to Trust No. 3 was to be allocated to Trust No. 2. Per Article Fourth B., all income received by Trust No. 2 from the separate property of William shall be paid to the Residual Beneficiary. Should any real property located in Upton County, Texas, as listed on the original Schedule A, form a part of the corpus of Trust No. 2, the Residual Beneficiary shall be paid an additional payment from the income received from the Decedent's half of the community property which forms a part of the corpus of Trust No. 2, equal to all of the income received by Trust No. 2 from the real property located in Upton County, Texas. This additional payment will be noncumulative. All other income received by Trust No. 2 will be paid to Marjorie. Per Article First Eleanor Marguerite Connell Hartman ("Ellie") is the Residual Beneficiary referred to above.

Per Article Fifth A., the income of Trust No. 3 should be paid to Marjorie. Per Article Fifth B., Marjorie had a "General Power of Appointment" of the Principal of Trust No. 3, which gave her the power to appoint the Principal of Trust No. 3 to anyone she saw fit during her lifetime or at death. I have been told Marjorie, via her Will, exercised her power of appointment over Trust No. 3 and allocated it entirely to the MTC Living Trust. I have been told that Marjorie died in 2009 and that Jacqueline Montoya ("Jacqueline") and her sister Kathy are the beneficiaries of MTC Living Trust.

I have been told that a copy of William's Federal Estate Tax Return, Form 706 was unobtainable. However, I reviewed a copy of the IRS Estate Tax Closing Letter for the estate which shows that the tentative federal estate tax was \$56,596, the unified credit was \$38,000, the credit for State death taxes of \$515 and the net federal estate tax was \$18,081. I reviewed a Texas inheritance tax receipt for \$515 which agrees to the State death tax credit reflected on the IRS Estate Tax Closing Letter. I also reviewed a signed copy of the Texas Inheritance Tax Return which reconciles to the IRS Estate Tax Closing Letter and lists all of the assets of the estate.

The Texas return lists the assets includable in William's taxable estate and the values of each asset. Per Schedule A of the Trust Document, William's only separate property was located in Texas. All other property transferred to the Trust listed on Schedule A of the Trust Document was shown as community property. I was told that the Grantors were married for a long period of time and had lived in a community property State for most of their marriage. Therefore, it is my understanding as a CPA and estate planning professional that there would be a presumption that all property would be community property, unless specifically titled otherwise. Under federal tax law, the taxable property listed on William's Texas Inheritance Tax Return should include his one-half of the community property interest and his interest in his separate property. The only Texas property (separate property) listed on the Texas Inheritance Tax Return was 2,301 acres of Texas pasture land valued at \$80,535 and Texas mineral rights valued at \$32,677. The total of William's separate property was \$113,212. All other property listed would be presumed to be William's one-half of the community property.

Per the Trust Document, Article Second C. 3. and Article Third, as summarized previously, only William's separate property may be used to fund Trust No. 3 in order for William's estate to maximize the estate tax marital deduction. Article Third specifically states, "the Trustee shall allocate to Trust No. 3 from the Decedent's separate property the fractional share of said assets which is equal to the maximum marital deduction allowed for federal estate tax purposes, reduced by the total of any other amounts allowed under the Internal Revenue Code as a marital deduction which are not a part of this Trust estate. In making the computations and allocations of said property to Trust No. 3 as herein required, the determination and the character and ownership of said property and the value thereof shall be as finally established for federal estate tax purposes."

It appears the Trustee followed the terms of the Trust exactly as written when it allocated 64.493% of the Texas property to Trust No. 3. See Exhibit 2 which shows how the Trust assets should have been allocated between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3. Based on my calculations, the maximum marital deduction for William's estate was \$76,691 or 67.741% of the separate property (76,691 / 113,212). Per the Texas return the estate took a \$76,688 marital deduction. This is only a \$3 variance from my calculations which is probably rounding. Per the Texas return, only \$73,014 (51,940 + 21,074) or 64.493% of the Texas separate property was used to fund the marital deduction. Because the marital deduction taken on the return agrees with my calculations, the only explanation for the difference in the amount of separate property used to fund the marital deduction is that \$3,674 (76,688 – 73,014) of assets passed to Marjorie outside of Trust No. 1. This may have been the life insurance of \$1,358 plus possibly a bank account that Marjorie had right of survivorship on.

William's separate property would have been required to be transferred to Trust No. 3 in order to fully fund the allowable marital deduction. The maximum allowable marital deduction under Code Sec. 2056(c) in 1979 was the greater of \$250,000 or 50% of the taxable estate before the marital deduction ("Adjusted Gross Estate"). If the estate consisted of community property, the \$250,000 amount was reduced by the amount of community property net expenses, debt and losses includable in the Adjusted Gross Estate. Expenses, debt and losses are required to be allocated pro-rata between community and non-community property. Thus, the \$250,000 limitation was reduced to \$76,691 (250,000 – 173,309) see Exhibit 2. When calculating the 50% limitation the Adjusted Gross Estate had to be reduced by the net community property includable in the estate. Thus, the Adjusted Gross Estate of \$282,299 was reduced to \$108,990 (282,299 – 173,309). Therefore, the 50% limitation for William's estate was \$54,495. The greater two limitations, \$76,691 and \$54,495, is \$76,691, which is the maximum marital deduction William's estate was allowed to take. Exhibit 3 is a copy of Code Sec. 2056(c) prior to the amendment of Code Sec. 2056 in 1981 by P.L. 97-34, Sec. 403(a)(1)(A) and (B) , which was effective for estates of decedents dying after 12/31/81.

Sincerely,

Gerety & Associates, CPAs

Daniel T. Gerety, CPA

dans

President

**Attachments** 

# DANIEL T. GERETY, CPA GERETY & ASSOCIATES, CPAS

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89119-4684
Telephone (702) 933-2213
Fax (702) 933-2214
dgerety@geretycpa.com
www.geretycpa.com

Daniel T. Gerety is the Owner and President of Gerety & Associates, CPAs. Dan specializes in estate and income tax planning for individuals and businesses including structuring large transactions such as the sale and purchase of a business. Throughout his career he has worked with many closely held businesses in many industries providing tax and business planning for them.

Dan started his accounting career with McGladrey & Pullen, LLP in 1982 and became a tax partner with that firm before he left in 2004 to start his own firm. He was a lead specialist for McGladrey & Pullen, LLP and RSM McGladrey, Inc. in gift and estate tax matters along with income taxation of trusts.

A native of Davenport, Iowa, Dan attended St. Ambrose College in Davenport where he obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree in Accounting and Business Administration. Among his current professional affiliations, he is a member of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Nevada Society of Certified Public Accountants. He is a past President of the Southern Nevada Estate Planning Council and the Central Illinois Estate Planning Council. He is a past member of the Nevada Society of Certified Public Accountants Taxation Committee. He currently sits on the board of the Las Vegas Chapter of the Nevada CPA Society, the Nevada State College Foundation, where he is chairman of the Planned Giving Committee, and the Grant a Gift Autism Foundation. As a CPA, Dan is allowed to practice before the IRS.

Dan is a consultant to a number of other CPA firms and law firms regarding estate and gift taxation matters, including supporting a number of attorneys as an expert witness in litigation matters regarding trust accounting issues, executive compensation, investment and business matters, and divorce work.

The most recent cases Dan has been an expert in are as follows:

- Mashelle Begovich and Mary Sophia Smith v. Mark S. Chase, Trustee of the Milos Sharkey Begovich Trust. Engaged to review investment and loan activities of Trustee for reasonableness and conslotation regarding malpractice claim.
- Susan Toma vs James Hansen, Dennis Toma Trust, Estate of Dennis Toma et al, Case No. A-13-681931-B. Consultation regarding malpractice claim.
- Crivello Loving Trust, Engaged to prepare a trust accounting.

- W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust. Engaged on February 4, 2014 as expert to provide opinion on the allocation and funding of sub-trusts.
- Lawrence A. Lapenta Family Trust. Prepared a trust accounting for the period January 6, 2006 through June 30, 2013, prepared letter of opinion, dated September 19, 2013, regarding reasonable trustee fees for this period and prepared letter of opinion, dated November 23, 2013, regarding reasonable amount to charge for trustee fees going forward.
- Grand Canal Shops II, LLC vs. Riccardo Iavarone. On October 10, 2012 I prepared an expert opinion report to rebut the expert opinion report of Michael L. Rosten dated September 27, 2012 regarding whether Riccardo Iavarone's actions made him the alter ego of Lanciani of Las Vegas, Inc. Deposition was taken March 26, 2013.
- In the Matter of Estate of Harvey Putter and the Harvey Putter Living Trust dated January 16, 2001. Prepared a Trust Accounting for the Period July 2, 2010 through April 30, 2012.
- Aimee Lynn Alterwitz vs. Daryl Alterwitz, et.al. Prepared report to rebut the Expert Report of George C. Swarts, CPA regarding actions taken by management of various closely held real estate developments including the refinancing, mergers, spin-offs and amendments made to various operating agreements of each of the closely held entities. Observed testimony of Mr. Swarts during his deposition and during arbitration. Case settled prior to arbitration ruling.
- Testamentary Trust of George A. Steiner Trust, Case No. P41337 consolidated with P42062. On June 14, 2012 prepared report analyzing the Twenty Third Accounting for the trust for the year ended December 31, 2011. On August 4, 2011, prepared expert report to rebut information contained in Objection to Twenty Second Accounting filed on behalf of Russell Steiner. Report contained analysis of how trustees' decisions affected the income beneficiaries financially, an analysis of what was principal vs. income, and whether the accounting provided to the court was in accordance with the Nevada Revised Statutes. On September 15, 2011 responded to rebuttal of my report. On November 1, 2011 wrote expert report on analysis of how corporate dividends of closely held consolidated group of corporations were classified on a partnership return. On June 14, 2012 wrote expert report of my analysis of the Twenty Third Accounting of the G. A. Steiner Trust. On September 26, 2012 wrote a rebuttal report to the Expert Opinions of Chris Wilcox, Peter K. Ellison and Curtis D. Trader. On October 27, 2013 wrote report regarding the 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> Annual Accountings. On January 15, 2014 wrote rebuttal report to the Expert Opinions of Chris Wilcox, Curtis Trader, David Denis, Ronald Gilson, Craig Aronoff, and D. Gordon Smith.
- Steven L Dahl vs. Ronald Henry, Trustee of the Lloyd L. Dahl Testamentary Trust. On September 19, 2011 I prepared draft of expert witness report computing damages incurred by beneficiary from the Trustee's management of trust assets.
- Emil Frei, III vs. Daniel V Goodsell. Clark County District Court. Work entailed calculation of damages pertaining to a malpractice suit on estate planning matters. Deposition taken January 28, 2011 and Testimony given in District Court February 22, 2011
- Trail Gate, LLC and Nikko Capital Corp vs. Lloyd Manning, Kevin Hooks, Trail Gate Lenders, LLC, Catalyst RX, Bormann Development, Inc, DOES 1-10 and Roe

- Corporations 1-X, Inclusive. Clark County District Court. Work entailed a rebuttal of other expert and calculation of monies due under development, construction, management and lease contracts. Deposition taken December 7, 2010.
- Reta Leseberg and Mark Leseberg vs. R. Glen Woods, Esq., and Woods Erickson Whitaker Miles & Mauruice. Clark County District Court. Dan's work was to rebut another experts report regarding damages in a conflict of interest suit. His deposition was taken September 22, 2010 and he assisted attorney in deposition of the other expert. Testimony given in District Court December 23, 2010.
- Eric Nelson v. Lynita Nelson divorce case. Clark County Family Court. Meeting with attorneys to help with negotiation of property settlement. Dan testified on October 20, 2010 regarding business and tax risks and values of various ongoing businesses and investments and whether tax attributes could be transferred in an divorce. Prepared expert report on March 21, 2011 regarding tax issues of ownership of LLC holding a Mississippi Casino which rebutted other CPAs report. Prepared expert report on July 5, 2012 regarding the accounting and separate identity of the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust. Report was used to counter alter-ego claim. Testified in Family Court on July 18th, July 19th, July 23rd, and August 20, 2012.
- Christian Buck and Anne Buck-Fenn, Christian & Anne Buck LLC v. John Hoffman and Leonard C. Buck. Second Judicial District Court of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe. This case went to trial. Dan's report and testimony in court involved determination of damages due to improper funding and management by the trustee.
- HSK Trust v. Jason Hecker. Clark County Probate Court. Gerety & Associates, CPAs prepared the trust accounting and Dan testified regarding the mismanagement of trust assets by the trustee.
- Christopher W. Chingros and Arthur S. Chingros v. Carolyn A. Chingros. Clark County District Court. Dan wrote a report regarding valuation of a limited partnership distributed and the underfunding of a trust upon death of grantor. Deposition taken June 30, 2010.
- Thomas A. Hantges, USACM Liquidating Trust v. Lucius Blanchard; Lucius Blanchard Children's Irrevocable Trust and Palomino Partners Limited Partnership. Michael W. Carmel, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Thomas A. Hantges v. Thomas A. Hantges and Trustees of the Hantges Children's Education Trust. USACM liquidating Trust v. Eagle Ranch, LLC; Eagle Ranch Residential, LLC; Willowbrook Residential, LLC, etc. United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Nevada. Expert report covered and reviewed all cash transactions and loans with USA Commercial Mortgage, accounting of loans and payback of loans between related entities, analyzed the set up of the Trust, reasonableness of the Trust's earnings, investment, profits, cash flow and amortization from loans with USA Commercial Mortgage and rebuttal of other expert witness' report.
- Rowell v. Frontier Logistics, LP. Dan helped determine the value of minority partner buyout of several LPs and S-Corps. He consulted with Frontier and attorneys to help arrive at a fair value to offer to buy out a disgruntled partner. He also reviewed many of the filings to give input on case. Case settled through Arbitration by American Arbitration Association in Houston, TX.

- Valeria Saint Clair v. Michael Foresta; dealing with trust and partnership accounting. Case was settled out of court.
- Thomas G. Wiley Trust. Clark County District Court. Dealt with dispute between co-trustees and preparation of proper trust accounting to determine personal vs. trust expenses. The accounting Dan prepared was accepted as part of the settlement agreement.
- Mark Brandenburg, as trustee of the Ghelfi Family Residual Trust v. Daniel E. Rubin, entailed the taxation of the share of profits in a partnership agreement and the allocations and taxation of these interests. Dan testified in the arbitration. Dan's testimony was accepted over the other experts in this case.
- Other cases have included two executive compensation suits. Michael Starr v. MGM Mirage, United States District Court, District of Nevada. Provided declaration of lost benefits. Klem Belt v. Health South, had deposition taken in Albuquerque, NM regarding lost benefits of terminating deferred compensation plan and split-dollar life insurance agreement. There have been a number of estate and trust accounting matters and one divorce case in which the attorneys on both sides relied on Dan's advice to tell them what the tax consequences would be, based on drafts of the property settlement agreements. Another case that went to arbitration was a lawsuit against Bank of America. Dan was Bank of America's expert witness. The case involved trustee matters and the taxation of life insurance.

Dan has been a Special Master to the Court twice. At one time, he was Co-Special Master to the Court with Governor Bob Miller and retired Judge Richardson on the William Perry case in Clark County District Court. He wrote the report that advised the Judge on what should be done with the money that was confiscated until it could be determined who the creditors were. The other case dealt with the valuation of a business and the split up of an estate between its heirs and was held in Clark County Probate Court. Dan evaluated the business valuations that were prepared, and the opinion of another accounting firm that was an expert on the case, and then advised the Judge on how to proceed.

Dan has spoken to numerous groups over the years including twice for the Illinois CPA Society's Real Estate Conference regarding asset protection and how real estate investments should be held. He has also spoken to the Southern Nevada CPA Society regarding estate tax planning. Dan has not authored any articles. Lorman Educational Services may have published one of the presentations that he co-wrote and presented titled Estate Planning in Nevada. Dan wrote the section titled Estate, Gift and GST Tax After the 2001 Tax Act. This talk was presented on February 19, 2002. His most recent presentations have been as follows:

- May 30, 2013, Presented Obama Care Changes Affecting Individuals and Business to clients and centers of influence.
- February 13, 2013, Presented Top Estate Planning Techniques for the National Business Institute.
- October 17, 2012, Federal Estate Tax Return, presented to Northern Nevada Estate Planning Council

- September 13, 2012, Tax Planning for Trust and Estates for the National Business Institute with Serena Baig, Robert L. Bolick, and Heidi C. Freeman.
- March 28, 2012, Part of panel of professionals leading discussion for Collaborative Succession Planning Workshop for Financial Planning Association of Nevada.
- November 8, 2011, Succession Planning for Law Firms, presented to the Las Vegas Association of Legal Administrators.
- June 6, 2011, Trust Administration: Preventing and Litigating Fiduciary Liability, Compliant Trust Taxation and Reporting, presented for NBI: National Business Institute.
- April 21, 2011, appeared on KLAV Radio Family Law & Order Show. Spoke on income tax issues for families and domestic partners.
- February 22, 2011, IRS Guidance on Filing Requirements for Domestic Partners, presented for the Gay & Lesbian Community Center of Southern Nevada.
- November 10, 2009, Choice of Entity, Presented to the Las Vegas Association of Legal Administrators.
- January 22, 2009, Deductibility of Fees Paid to Las Ventanas as Medical Expenses, presented for Las Ventanas, Las Vegas, NV
- October 22, 2008, Accounting for Estates And Trusts in Nevada, Presented for Lorman Educational Service. I covered Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates and Types of Trusts and Estates.
- February 6, 2008, Tax Update including Cover your Assets and Estate Planning Issues affecting Domestic Partners, presented for Because We aRe Different, Las Vegas, NV
- June 12, 2007, Choice of Entity, presented to Las Vegas Association of Legal Administrators.
- December 1, 2005, Cover Your Assets, Las Vegas, NV
- October 27, 2005 Current Year Tax Update, Las Vegas, NV
- July 30, 2004, Advanced Estate Planning and Creditor protection Strategies in Nevada, Presented for Lorman Educational Services with Richard and Steven Oshins, Las Vegas, NV. I presented on To Disclose or Not to Disclose a Sale to a Defective Trust on A Gift Tax Return and Postmortem Planning.
- June 15, 2004 Income Taxation for Trusts and Estates, Presented for RSM McGladrey, Inc Annual Tax Conference, Kansas City, MO
- February 26, 2004, Choice of Entity, Presented to the Society of Financial Service Professionals, Las Vegas, NV
- July 30, 2003, Estate Planning and Creditor protection Strategies in Nevada for Lorman Educational Services with Jeffrey Burr, Richard Oshins and Steven Oshins, Las Vegas, NV. I presented the Charitable Planning section of this seminar.
- July 11, 2002, Cover Your Assets, presented to the CFO Group, Las Vegas, NV
- May 22, 2002, Covering Your Assets, presented for Illinois CPA Society & Foundation 2002 Taxation on Real Estate Workshop, Chicago, IL
- May 05, 2002, Covering Your Assets, presented to Radiology Associates of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV

- February 19, 2002 Estate Planning In Nevada, presented for Lorman Educational Services with Stephen Nicolatus and Scott Swain, Las Vegas, NV
- October 16, 2001, Cover Your Assets, presented for the 28<sup>th</sup> Annual Illinois CPA Society & Foundation 2001 Real Estate Conference, Chicago, IL
- March 22, 2001, Cover Your Assets, presented to the Green Valley Rotary, Henderson, NV
- February 12, 2001, Cover Your Assets, presented to the Construction Financial Management Association, Las Vegas, NV
- January 30, 2001, Cover Your Assets, presented to the Las Vegas 100, Las Vegas,
   NV
- September 21, 2000, The Beneficiary controlled Dynasty Trust: Leveraging it with Installment Sales, GRAT Remainder Sales and Opportunity Shifting Strategies, Presented to the Nevada Society of CPA's Las Vegas Chapter with Steven Oshins, Las Vegas, NV
- I may have missed some above and I have presented many more times prior to 2000.

# Exhibit 2 William Connell Jr Estate November 24, 1979 Taxable Estate and Funding of Trust

	Assets Rep	orted on Texas Re	eturn	Plus		Funding Alloc	ation
	50% of	Decedent's	Taxable	Survivor's 50%	Total	Total	Total
	Community Prop.	Separate Prop.	Estate	of Community	Assets	Trust 3	Trust 2
Las Vegas rental	37,500		37,500	37,500	75,000	37,500	37,500
Stocks and bonds	52,218		52,218	52,218	104,436	52,218	52,218
Cash	74,660		74,660	74,660	149,320	74,660	74,660
Insurance Mobile home etc.	1,358		1,358	1,358	2,716	1,358	1,358
2301 Acres Upton Co	11,250	80,535	11,250	11,250	22,500	11,250	11,250
Mineral rights Upton		32,677	80,535 32,677	0 0	80,535 32,677	54,553	25,982 10,543
Diamond shrine riva	2,750	32,077	2,750	2,750	5,500	22,135 2,750	10,542 2,750
Gold wristwatch	2,730		2,730 287	2,730	5,500 574	2,730	2,730 287
Total	180,023	113,212	293,235	180,023	473,258	256,711	216,547
Allocation of expenses	(6,714)	(4,222)	(10,936)	100,023	473,230	0	(10,936)
Taxable estate before marital	173,309	108,990	282,299		-	256,711	205,611
Marital ded. for TX sep. prop.			(73,014)			200,711	203,011
Marital ded. non-trust assets			(3,674)				
Taxable estate		-	205,611				
		=					
Estate tax on above			56,596				
Unified credit			(38,000)				
State tax credit / Texas Tax due			(515)				(515)
Balance federal estate tax due		_	18,081				(18,081)
		=	<del></del>			-	187,015
Computation of Marital Deduction							
Taxable estate before marital			282,299				
Exemption amount			(147,000)				
Marital deduction needed to zero o	out tax	-	135,299				
Maximum marital deduction allowe	ed under Sec. 2056		250,000				
Less community property included	in Estate		(173,309)				
Adjusted maximum marital deducti	on under Sec. 2056	_	76,691				
Total marital deduction taken on Te	exas return	_	(76,688)				
Variance		<u>-</u>	3				
Bill died 11/24/1979							
Exemption in 1979	147,000	18%	70%				
4070 / 13							
1979 table	Over	rate					
	0	18%	4 555 55				
	10,000	20%	1,800.00				
	20,000	22%	3,800.00				
	40,000	24%	8,200.00				
	60,000 80,000	26%	13,000.00				
	100,000	28% 30%	18,200.00 23,800.00				
	150,000	30%	23,800.00 38,800.00				
	250,000	34%	70,800.00				
	500,000	37%	155,800.00				
	750,000	39%	248,300.00				
	1,000,000	41%	345,800.00				
	1,250,000	43%	448,300.00				
	1,500,000	45%	555,800.00				
	2,000,000	49%	780,800.00				
	2,500,000	53%	1,025,800.00				
	3,000,000	57%	1,290,800.00				
	3,500,000	61%	1,575,800.00				
	4,000,000	65%	1,880,800.00				
	4,500,000	69%	2,205,800.00				
	5,000,000	70%	2,550,800.00				

# Exhibit 3 Code Sec. 2056(c) in 1979

Prior to its deletion in 1981, by P.L. 97-34, Sec. 403(a)(1)(A), Code Sec. 2056(c) read as follows:

- "(c) Limitation on aggregate of deductions.
- "(1) Limitation.
- "(A) In general. The aggregate amount of the deductions allowed under this section (computed without regard to this subsection) shall not exceed the greater of—
- "(i) \$250,000, or
- "(ii) 50 percent of the value of the adjusted gross estate (as defined in paragraph (2)).
- "(B) Adjustment for certain gifts to spouse. If a deduction is allowed to the decedent under section 2523 with respect to any gift made to his spouse after December 31, 1976, the limitation provided by subparagraph (A) (determined without regard to this subparagraph) shall be reduced (but not below zero) by the excess (if any) of—
- "(i) the aggregate of the deductions allowed to the decedent under section 2523 with respect to gifts made after December 31, 1976, over
- "(ii) the aggregate of the deductions which would have been allowable under section 2523 with respect to gifts made after December 31, 1976, if the amount deductible under such section with respect to any gift required to be included in a gift tax return were 50 percent of its value.

For purposes of this subparagraph, a gift which is includible in the gross estate of the donor by reason of section 2035 shall not be taken into account.

- "(C) Community property adjustment. The \$250,000 amount set forth in subparagraph (A)(i) shall be reduced by the excess (if any) of—
- "(i) the amount of the subtraction determined under clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) of paragraph (2)(B), over
- "(ii) the excess of the aggregate of the deductions allowed under sections 2053 and 2054 over the amount taken into account with respect to such deductions under clause (iv) of paragraph (2)(B).
- "(2) Computation of adjusted gross estate.
- "(A) General rule. Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, the adjusted gross estate shall, for purposes of subsection (c)(1), be computed by subtracting from the entire value of the gross estate the aggregate amount of the deductions allowed by sections 2053 and 2054.

- "(B) Special rule in cases involving community property. If the decedent and his surviving spouse at any time, held property as community property under the law of any State, or possession of the United States, or of any foreign country, then the adjusted gross estate shall, for purposes of subsection (c)(1), be determined by subtracting from the entire value of the gross estate the sum of—
- "(i) the value of property which is at the time of the death of the decedent held as such community property; and
- "(ii) the value of property transferred by the decedent during his life, if at the time of such transfer the property was held as such community property; and
- "(iii) the amount receivable as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent, to the extent purchased with premiums or other consideration paid out of property held as such community property; and
- "(iv) an amount which bears the same ratio to the aggregate of the deductions allowed under sections 2053 and 2054 which the value of the property included in the gross estate, diminished by the amount subtracted under clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) of this subparagraph, bears to the entire value of the gross estate.

For purposes of clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), community property (except property which is considered as community property solely by reason of the provisions of subparagraph (C) of this paragraph) shall be considered as not 'held as such community property' as of any moment of time, if, in case of the death of the decedent at such moment, such property (and not merely one-half thereof) would be or would have been includible in determining the value of his gross estate without regard to the provisions of section 402(b) of the Revenue Act of 1942. The amount to be subtracted under clauses (i), (ii), or (iii) shall not exceed the value of the interest in the property described therein which is included in determining the value of the gross estate.

- "(C) Community property conversion into separate property.
- "(i) After December 31, 1941. If after December 31, 1941, property held as such community property (unless considered by reason of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph as not so held) was by the decedent and the surviving spouse converted, by one transaction or a series of transactions, into separate property of the decedent and his spouse (including any form of coownership by them), the separate property so acquired by the decedent and any property acquired at any time by the decedent in exchange therefor (by one exchange or a series of exchanges) shall, for the purposes of clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) of subparagraph (B), be considered as 'held as such community property.'
- "(ii) Limitation. Where the value (at the time of such conversion) of the separate property so acquired by the decedent exceeded the value (at such time) of the separate property so acquired by the decedent's spouse, the rule in clause (i) shall be applied only with respect to the same portion of such separate property of the decedent as the portion which the value (as of such time) of such separate property so acquired by the decedent's spouse is of the value (as of such time) of the separate property so acquired by the decedent."

# Exhibit 4

### TRUST AGREEMENT

("The W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust")

THIS TRUST AGREEMENT, made this stay of the principal properties thereof),

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Grantors", when reference is made to them in their capacity as creators of this Trust and the transferrors of the principal properties thereof), and W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL, of Las Vegas, Nevada, (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Trustee" when reference is made to them in their capacity as the Trustee or fiduciary hereunder), and by this instrument revoke the previous revocable living trust made by us on the 1st day of Dec., 1971:

#### WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the Grantors desire by this Trust Agreement to establish a revocable trust for the uses and purposes hereinafter set forth, to make provision for the care and management of certain of their present properties and for the ultimate disposition of the trust properties;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Grantors hereby give, grant, transfer, set over and deliver as the original trust estate, IN TRUST, unto the Trustee, who hereby declare that they have received from the Grantors all of the property listed on Schedule "A" (which schedule is attached hereto and made a part of this Trust Agreement), TO HAVE AND TO HOLD THE SAME IN TRUST, and to manage, invest and reinvest the same and any additions that may from time to time be made thereto, subject to the hereinafter provided trusts and the terms and conditions, powers and agreements, relating thereto.

Additional property may be added to the trust estate, at any time and from time to time, by the Grantors, or either of them, or by any person or persons, by inter vivos act or testamentary transfer, or by insurance contract or trust designation.

The property comprising the original trust estate during the joint lives of the Grantors shall retain its character as their community property or separate property, as designated on the attached Schedule "A". Property subsequently received by the Trustee during the joint lives of the Grantors shall be listed on an appropriate schedule annexed hereto and shall have the separate or community character ascribed thereto on such schedule.

FIRST: NAME AND BENEFICIARIES OF TRUST. The trusts created hereby shall be for the use and benefit of the Grantors and for ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN, the daughter of W. N. CONNELL by a prior marriage, and for her issue as hereinafter provided.

ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN shall hereinafter be designated as the "Residual Beneficiary".

This trust shall be known and identified as the "W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust", and, for purposes of convenience, shall hereinafter be referred to as Trust No. 1.

SECOND: TRUST NO. 1. The Trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the trust estate and shall collect the income thereof and dispose of the net income and principal as follows:

- A. Income. The Trustee shall pay equally to the Grantors, during their joint lives, all community net income of the trust estate and shall pay to each Grantor all separate net income from his or her respective share of the trust estate. Such income shall be paid to the Grantors unless the Trustee receives written notice from the Grantors that all income shall not be distributed but shall be accumulated by the Trustee and invested and reinvested as herein provided.
- B. <u>Principal</u>. During the joint lives of the Grantors, the Trustee shall pay over and distribute to a Grantor such part or all of the principal of his or her separate property and his or her share of the community property placed in this initial trust by that Grantor as he or she shall demand in a writing directed to the Trustee.
- C. Death of Either Grantor. Upon the death of the Grantor whose death shall first occur, the Trustee shall divide the trust estate, including all property received as a result of the decedent's death, as follows:

- 1. The trust estate and all property received as a result of the decedent's death shall be divided into two parts, each part to be administered as a separate trust to be known respectively as "Trust No. 2" and "Trust No. 3". Reference hereafter to the "Decedent" shall refer to either of the Grantors whose death shall first occur and reference to the "Survivor" shall refer to the other Grantor.
- 2. The Trustee shall allocate to Trust No. 3
  (a) the Survivor's separate property interest in the trust estate; (b) the Survivor's one-half (1/2) interest in the community property of the trust estate, less a proportionate part of all amounts properly chargeable against all community property; and (c) the Survivor's community property interest in any policy of insurance on the life of the Decedent owned by the Grantors as community property and made payable to Trust No. 1.
- 3. The Trustee shall allocate to Trust No. 3. from the Decedent's separate property an amount as determined in Article THIRD hereof.
- 4. The Trustee shall allocate to Trust No. 2, all the remaining protion of the trust estate not allocated to Trust No. 3, including, but not limited to, the Decedent's community property interest, if any, in any life insurance policy on the life of the Decedent payable to Trust No. 1.
- 5. In the event that property is received by the Trustee, by inter vivos or testamentary transfer and directions are contained in the instrument of transfer, for allocation to or between Trust No. 2 or Trust No. 3, then the Trustee shall make allocation in accordance with such directions, anything to the contrary herein, notwithstanding.
- 6. It is the intention of the parties, that ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN shall be a Cotrustee of the Decedent's separate property in trust in this Trust to the extent the term "Trustee", as hereinafter used, shall apply to her.

THIRD: MARITAL DEDUCTION. The Trustee shall allocate to.

Trust No. 3 from the Decedent's separate property the fractional share of the said assets which is equal to the maximum marital deduction allowed for federal estate tax purposes, reduced by the total of any other amounts allowed under the Internal Revenue Code as a Marital Deduction which are not a part of this trust estate. In making the computations and allocations of the said; property to Trust No. 3 as herein required, the determination of the character and ownership of the said property and the value thereof shall be as finally established for federal estate tax

purposes. This distribution is being made without regard to death taxes payable by reason of the Decedent's death, which taxes shall be paid from Trust No. 2 only.

FOURTH: TRUST NO. 2. The Trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the estate of Trust No. 2 and shall collect the income thereof and dispose of the net income and principal as follows:

- A. Death of Decedent. Upon the death of the Decedent, the Trustee shall pay from the income or principal of this trust, the death taxes, probate and legal expenses, and the expenses of the last illness and funeral of the Decedent, provided, however, that no funds received by the Trustee as proceeds from a retirement plan qualified under the Internal Revenue Code shall be available for these purposes unless there are no other assets in the Survivor's estate, in which event funds from a qualified plan can be used, but only to the extent of these actual expenses.
- Income. All income received by this Trust from the separate property of the Decedent shall be paid to the Residual Beneficiary. In the event any of the real property located in Upton County, Texas, as listed on the original Schedule "A" attached hereto, forms a part of the corpus of this Trust, the Residual Beneficiary shall be paid an additional payment from the income received from the Decedent's half of the community property, which forms a part of the corpus of this Trust, equal to all of the income received by this Trust from the real property located in Upton County, Texas. However, the provisions relating to the additional payment, shall be noncumulative, and in any calendar year in which the income received from the said community property is not sufficient to make full payment hereunder, the Trustee is directed to pay only the income which has been received by this Trust during that year, and not to carry forward any deficiency in payment to the next calendar year's income.

In the event the Residual Beneficiary predeceases the Survivor, the Residual Beneficiary's rights to receive income hereunder shall be paid to or for the benefit of her living children and the issue of any deceased : child by right of representation; or in the event she dies without living issue, her income rights hereunder shall become those of the Survivor.

All other income received by this Trust shall be distributed to the Survivor.

All payments as provided in this Section shall be made at frequent intervals, but at least semi-annually.

C. Principal. The Trustee shall pay over and distribute the principal of the estate of Trust No. 2 as follows:

- 1. Power to make gifts. The Survivor shall have the discretionary power during his or her lifetime to direct the Trustee to pay over and distribute trust principal of the separate property in trust from the Decedent's Trust to or for the benefit of the Residual Beneficiary or any of her living issue; such power may be exercised by delivering to the Trustee a writing duly executed and acknowledged, wherein he or she specifies the amount of principal that should be paid over and distributed to the particular issue and in what proportions such principal shall be paid over and distributed. It is the Grantors' intent hereby to convey upon the Survivor a sprinkling power; said power is limited, however, to appointments made to and among the Residual Beneficiary or her living issue.
- 2. Power of invasion. If, in the opinion of the Trustee, the income from all sources of which the Trustee has knowledge shall not be sufficient to support, maintain, educate and provide for the Survivor or Residual Beneficiary or any issue of the Residual Beneficiary in their accustomed manner of living, or in the event of any emergency befalling these said parties, such as illness, accident or other distress, the Trustee is authorized to use and expend such part of the trust principal of Decedent's separate property in trust, as the Trustee may deem necessary or desirable to meet such needs or emergencies. The decision of the Trustee as to what shall constitute an emergency or the necessity or desirability of encroachment upon principal shall be conclusive upon all parties and the Trustee shall be relieved and exonerated hereunder if the Trustee acts in good faith in making such determination.
- 3. Sale of real property from Decedent's separate property. The Survivor is directed that in the event any additional money is needed for payment of funeral, last illness or other costs to settle any claims made against Decedent's estate, or in the event that the sale of Decedent's separate property is contemplated at any time, only the separate property of Decedent situated in Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, shall be sold to satisfy this obligation.
- 4. Sale of real property. In the event that any real property which is listed on Schedule "A" attached hereto as the Decedent's separate property, and, is a part of the corpus of Trust No. 2 is sold, the Grantors direct the Trustee to distribute the net proceeds from such sale, less any applicable income tax due because of such sale, to the Residual Beneficiary, free of trust. In the event the Residual Beneficiary is not living at the time of the said sale, the proceeds therefrom shall remain in this Trust, and shall be subject to all of the provisions as herein contained.

D. <u>Definition of real property</u>. The term "real property" as used in this Article FOURTH shall not include the mineral, oil and gas interests in Upton County, Texas, if the same are separately listed on Schedule "A" hereto.

FIFTH: TRUST NO. 3. The Trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the estate of Trust No. 3 and shall collect the income thereof and dispose of the net income and principal as follows:

A. Income. The Trustee shall pay to the Survivor during his or her lifetime all of the net income of the Survivor's trust estate in convenient, regular installments, but not less frequently than quarter-annually.

## B. Powers of appointment over income and principal.

- 1. During his or her lifetime, the Survivor shall have the power to appoint all or any part of the principal and undistributed income, if any, of the estate of Trust No. 3 to himself or herself, or to any person or persons. Such power of appointment shall be exercisable in all events, but only by the Survivor's submitting to the Trustee written instructions expressly exercising such power.
- 2. Upon the death of the Survivor, he or she shall have the absolute power to appoint the entire principal and the undistributed income, if any, of the estate of Trust No. 3, or any part thereof, to his or her estate or to any person or persons. Such power of appointment shall be exercised only by a provision in the Last Will of the Survivor expressly exercising such power. Unless within ninety (90) days after the death of the Survivor the Trustee has actual notice of the existence of a Will exercising such power, it shall be deemed for all purposes hereunder that such power was not exercised.
- C. Revocation and Amendments. The Survivor shall have the power to revoke, amend or terminate Trust No. 3 herein provided by delivering such amendments or revocation in writing to the Trustee provided that the Trustee's duties and liabilities cannot be increased without the Trustee's consent.
- D. Death of Survivor. Upon the death of the Survivor, the Trustee shall distribute the trust estate in accordance with and to the extent provided by the Survivor's exercise of his or her power of appointment.

If and to the extent that the Survivor shall fail to effectively exercise the foregoing power of appointment, the principal and undistributed income of Trust No. 3 shall, upon his or her death, be distributed to the Residual Beneficiary, or to the heirs of her body if she is not then living.

...

SIXTH: SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION. Each and every beneficiary under the Living Trust and the various estates created hereunder is hereby restrained from and shall be without right, power or authority to sell, transfer, assign, pledge, mortgage, hypothecate, alienate, anticipate, bequeath or devise, or in any manner affect or impair his, her or their beneficial right, title, interest, claim and estate in and to either the income or principal of any claim created hereunder, or to any part thereof, during the entire term of said trusts; nor shall the right, title, interest, or estate of any beneficiary be subject to any right, claim, demand, lien or judgment of any creditor of any such beneficiary, nor be subject nor liable to any process of law or equity, but all of the income and principal, except as otherwise provided in this Trust Agreement shall by the Trustee be payable and deliverable to or for the benefit of only the before named and designated beneficiaries, at the times hereinbefore set out, and receipt by such beneficiaries shall relieve the Trustee from responsibility for such good faith distributions.

SEVENTH: POWERS OF TRUSTEE. To carry out the purposes of any trust created under this instrument and subject to any limitations stated elsewhere in this Trust Agreement, the Trustee is vested with the following powers with respect to the trust estate and any part of it, in addition to those powers now or hereafter conferred by law:

- A. To continue to hold any property, including any shares of the Trustee's own stock and to operate at the risk of the trust estate any business that the Trustee receives or acquires under the trust as long as the Trustee deems advisable.
- B. To manage, control, grant options on, sell, (for cash or on deferred payments), convey, exchange, partition, divide, improve and repair trust property.
- C. To lease trust property for terms within or beyond the term of the trust and for any purpose, including

exploration for and removal of gas, oil and other minerals; and to enter into community oil leases, pooling and unitization agreements.

- D. To borrow money and to encumber or hypothecate trust property by mortgage, deed of trust, pledge, or otherwise; to borrow money on behalf of one trust from any other trust created hereunder to guarantee any loan made during the lifetime of the Grantors.
- E. To carry, at the expense of the trust, insurance of such kinds and in such amounts as the Trustee deems advisable to protect the trust estate and the Trustee against any hazard.
- F. To commence or defend such litigation with respect to the trust or any property of the trust estate as the Trustee may deem advisable at the expense of the trust.
- G. To compromise or otherwise adjust any claims or litigation against or in favor of the trust.
- H. To invest and reinvest the trust estate in every kind of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of investment, specifically including, but not by way of limitation, corporate obligations of every kind, stocks, preferred or common, shares of investment trusts, investment companies, and mutual funds and mortgage participations, which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence acquire for their own account, and to invest in any common trust fund administered by the Trustee and to lend money of one trust to any other trust created hereunder.
- I. With respect to securities held in the trust, to have all the rights, powers and privileges of an owner, including, but not by way of limitation, the power to vote, give proxies and pay assessments; to participate in voting trusts, pooling agreements, foreclosures, reorganizations, consolidations, mergers, liquidations, sales and leases and incident to such participation to deposit securities with and transfer title to any protective or other committee on such terms as the Trustee may deem advisable; and to exercise or sell stock subscriptions or conversion rights.
- J. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this instrument, the determination of all matters with respect to what is principal and income of the trust estate and the apportionment and allocation of receipts and expenses thereon shall be governed by the provisions of the Nevada Principal and Income Law and shall be determined by the Trustee in the Trustee's discretion; provided, however, that all capital gain distributions from mutual funds should be allocated to principal.
- K. All of the trust powers set forth in Nevada Revised Statutes 163.265 to 163.410 inclusive, are hereby incorporated into this Trust Agreement.

# EIGHTH: SPECIAL PROVISIONS.

A. Use of Home. The Trustee shall allow the Survivor to occupy and use until his or her death the home (or any interest therein) used by either or both Grantors as a principal residence at the time of the Decedent's death. The Trustee shall, at the discretion of the Survivor, sell such home, and if the Survivor so directs, purchase and/or build another comparable residence to be used as a home for the Survivor, and so on from time to time. The Survivor shall not be required to pay any rent for the use of such home.

## B. Revocation and Amendment.

- 1. (Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this clause):
  - (a) This Trust Agreement, and the trusts evidenced thereby, may be revoked at any time during the joint lives of the Grantors by either of the Grantors delivering written notice of revocation to the Trustee and to the other Grantor.
  - (b) This Trust Agreement, and the trusts evidenced thereby, may be amended at any time and from time to time during the joint lives of the Grantors by the joint action of both Grantors delivering such amendment or amendments in writing to the Trustee provided that the Trustee's duties and liabilities cannot be increased without the Trustee's consent.
  - (c) From and after the death of the Decedent, this Trust Agreement may not be revoked, altered or amended, except as provided in relation to Trust No. 3.
  - (d) Upon any revocation of this Trust Agreement, during the Grantors' joint lives, the Trustee shall return to each Grantor his or her half of the community assets and to each Grantor his or her separate property, as indicated on Schedule "A".
- 2. In the event that any insurance on the life of either Grantor, owned by the other Grantor as his or her separate property, is payable to the Trustee or Trustees of any trust hereunder, then this Trust Agreement and the trusts evidenced thereby may be amended or revoked, insofar as they relate to such insurance, only by the Grantor who is owner of such insurance. The insured Grantor shall have no right to revoke or amend to that extent. This paragraph shall be construed as limiting the rights of the insured-Grantor and not as expanding the rights of the owner-Grantor.

C. Simultaneous Death. If there be no sufficient evidence that the Grantors died otherwise than simultaneously, then for purposes of this Trust Agreement, it shall be conclusively presumed for all purposes of administration and tax effect of this Trust Agreement that the Decedent shall be the Husband and the Survivor shall be the Wife.

- D. Limitation of Trust Powers. Administrative control and all other powers relating to the various trust estates created hereunder, shall be exercised by the Trustee in a fiduciary capacity and solely for the benefit of the Survivor and the other beneficiaries as herein provided. Neither the Trustee, the Grantors, nor any other person, shall be permitted to purchase, exchange, reacquire or otherwise deal with or dispose of the principal of any of the various trust estates or the income therefrom, for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth; nor shall any person borrow the principal or income of the trust estates, directly or indirectly, without adequate interest in any case or without adequate security therefor.
- E. Compensation of Trustee. The Trustee or successor Trustee, as herein provided, shall receive reasonable compensation for ordinary services performed hereunder. Reasonable compensation shall be based upon the then prevailing rates charged for similar services in the locality where the same are performed by other fiduciaries engaged in the trust business or acting as trustees.
- F. Applicable Law. This Trust Agreement is executed under the laws of the State of Nevada and shall in all respects be governed by the laws of the State of Nevada; provided, however, the Trustee shall have the discretion, exercisable at any later time and from time to time, to administer Trust No. 1 pursuant to the laws of any jurisdiction in which the Trustee may be domiciled, by executing and acknowledging a written instrument to that effect and attaching the same to this Trust Agreement, and, if the Trustee so exercises the Trustee's discretion, as above provided, the various trust estates shall be governed by the laws of the other state or jurisdiction in which Trust No. 1 is then being administered.
- G. Invalid Provisions. In the event any clause, provision or provisions of this Trust Agreement and the Living Trust created hereunder prove to be or be adjudged invalid or void for any reason, then such invalid or void clause, provision or provisions, shall not affect the whole of this instrument, but the balance of the provisions hereof shall remain operative and shall be carried into effect insofar as legally possible. If any provision contained in this Trust Agreement shall otherwise violate the rules against perpetuities now or hereafter in effect in the State of Nevada or in any state by which this Living Trust may subsequently be governed, that portion of the Trust so effected shall be administered as herein provided until the termination of the maximum period authorized by law, at which time and forthwith, such part of the said trust estate so

affected shall be distributed in fee simple to the beneficiary or beneficiaries in the proportions in which they are then entitled to enjoy the benefits so terminated.

- H. Incompetency of Beneficiary. During any period in which any beneficiary under this Trust Agreement is judicially declared incompetent, or in the opinion of the Trustee is unable to care for himself, the Trustee shall pay over or use for the benefit of said incompetent beneficiary any part or all of the net income or principal from his or her share of the trust estate, in such manner as the Trustee shall deem necessary or desirable for said beneficiary's support, maintenance and medical care.
- I. Claimants. The Grantors have, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Trust Agreement, intentionally and with full knowledge declined to provide for any and all of their heirs or other persons who may claim an interest in their respective estates or in these trusts.
- J. <u>Headings</u>. The various clause headings used herein are for convenience of reference only and constitute no part of this Trust Agreement.
- K. <u>Copies</u>. This Trust Agreement may be executed in any number of copies and each shall constitute an original of one and the same instrument.
- L. <u>Construction</u>. Whenever it shall be necessary to interpret this trust, the masculine, feminine and neuter personal pronouns may be construed interchangeably, and the singular shall include the plural and the plural the singular.

NINTH: LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES. With respect to any policies of life insurance under which the Trustee is designated as beneficiary, the Trustee shall deal with such policies as required by the following trust provisions, in addition to the general trust provisions hereinbefore and hereinafter set forth:

- A. Custody of Insurance Policies. The Trustee shall have the custody of any policy of life insurance under which the Trustee is designated as beneficiary. However, the owner shall have the right to possession of said policy or policies upon written request to the Trustee.
- B. Payment of Premiums. The Trustee shall be under no obligation to pay the premium of any policy or policies of insurance, nor to make certain that such premiums are paid by the Grantors or others, nor to notify any persons of the non-payment of such premiums; and, the Trustee shall be under no responsibility or liability of any kind in case such premiums are not paid.

C. Collection of Policy Proceeds. Upon the death of the insured under such policy or policies, the Trustee shall collect all proceeds due thereon and the Trustee shall make all reasonable efforts to carry out the provisions of this Trust Agreement, including the maintenance of or defense of any action or suit; provided, however, the Trustee shall be under no duty to maintain or enter into any litigation unless the expenses thereof, including counsel fees and costs, have been advanced or guaranteed in an amount and in a manner which is reasonably satisfactory. The Trustee may repay any advances made by the Trustee or reimburse itself for any such fees and costs expended in reasonable attempts for collection of such proceeds out of the principal or income of the trust.

D. <u>Purchase of Assets</u>. The Trustee is hereby authorized and empowered to apply any part or the whole amount of any insurance proceeds collected hereunder to purchase assets from the insured's estate which may be offered for sale by the legal representative of the insured's estate at a price equal to the value of such assets as fixed by competent authority for purposes of determining the liability of the insured's estate for death taxes or at such other price as may be agreed upon by the personal representative of the insured's estate.

TENTH: NON-CONTEST PROVISION. The Grantors specifically desire that these trusts created herein be administered and distributed without litigation or dispute of any kind. If any beneficiary of these trusts or any other person, whether stranger, relatives or heirs, or any legatees or devisees under the Last Will and Testament of the Grantors or the successors in interest of any such persons, including any person who may be entitled to receive any portion of the Grantors' estates under the intestate laws of the State of Nevada, seek or establish to assert any claim to the assets of these trusts established herein, or attack, oppose or seek to set aside the administration and distribution of the said trusts, or to have the same declared null and void or diminished, or to defeat or change any part of the provisions of the trust established herein, then in any and all of the above mentioned cases and events, such person or persons shall receive One Dollar (\$1.00) and no more in lieu

of any interest in the assets of the trusts.

ELEVENTH: DEATH OF ALL BENEFICIARIES. In the event the Residual Beneficiary shall predecease the Grantors without living issue or children of any deceased child, then the Grantors direct that all of the income and principal of any trusts created hereunder shall be distributed to the Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children upon the death of the Survivor.

TWELFTH: SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE. In the event of the death or incapacity of either Grantor, the Survivor shall continue to serve as the sole Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder. Upon the death or incapacity of the Survivor, the Grantors then nominate and appoint ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN as the Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder, or in the event that she is unable or unwilling to serve in the said capacity, then the Grantors nominate and appoint the FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF NEVADA to serve in the said capacity. No successor trustee shall have any responsibility for the acts or omissions of any prior trustee and no duty to audit or investigate the accounts or administration of any such trustee, nor, unless in writing requested so to do by a person having a present or future beneficial interest under a trust created hereunder, any duty to take action or obtain redress for breach of trust.

THIRTEENTH: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, REPORTS, INSPECTION OF RECORDS.

The Trustee hereby acknowledges receipt of and accepts the property and the estate of Trust No. 1 created hereunder on the terms and conditions stated and agrees to care for, manage and control the same in accordance with the directions herein specified, and to furnish to each beneficiary having income paid, distributed, credited or accumulated for his or her benefit, annually and more often if requested so to do, a statement showing

the condition of the trust property, the character and amounts of the investments and liabilities, and the receipts, expenses and disbursements since the last previous statement. The books of account of the Trustee in connection with the investments shall at all times be open to the reasonable inspection of the living beneficiaries or their duly qualified representatives, and such person or persons as they may designate for that purpose.

THIS TRUST AGREEMENT is accepted and executed by the Grantors and Trustee in the State of Nevada on the day and year first above written.

GRANTORS:

JUM CONNECTE

MARJORIE T. CONNELL

TRUSTEE:

Marjarie J. Connell
MARJORJE T. CONNELL

STATE OF NEVADA) COUNTY OF CLARK)

a Notary Public, W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL, who declared to me that they executed the foregoing Trust Agreement.

Notary Public in and for said County and State

CLARN COUNTY JUNE A GAVIN My Commission Expires May 9, 49/8

### SCHEDULE "A"

("The W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust")

All of the Grantors' rights, title and interest in the following assets are hereby transferred to the Trustee as part of this trust estate and will be administered and distributed in accordance with the terms of the foregoing Trust Agreement.

The following real property interests constitute the community property of the Grantors:

- 1. Lots One (1) and Two (2) in Block Sixteen (16) of South Addition to the City of Las Vegas, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 1 of Plats, page 51, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.
- 2. Lot Three (3), Block Six (6), Biltmore Addition to the City of Las Vegas, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 2 of Plats, Page 33, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.
- 3. Lots Fifteen (15) and Sixteen (16) in Block Fifteen (15) in the South Addition to the City of Las Vegas as shown by map thereof on file in Book 1 of Plats, Page 14, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.
- 4. Lots Twenty-Two (22) and Twenty-Three (23) in Block Eleven (11) of South Addition to the City of Las Vegas as shown by map thereof on file in Book 1 of Plats, Page 51, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.
- 5. Lots Twenty-four (24) and Twenty-five (25) in Block Eleven (11) of South Addition to the City of Las Vegas, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 1 of Plats, page 51, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.

The following assets constitute the separate property of

## W. N. CONNELL:

- 1. Real Property:
  - (a) That portion of the North Half (N 1/2) of the South Half (S 1/2) of the Southwest Quarter (SW 1/4) of Section 28, Township 20 South, Range 61 East, M.D.B.&M., described as follows:

Beginning at the point of intersection of the East Line of the Northwest Quarter (NW 1/4) of

the Southeast Quarter (SE 1/4) of the Southwest Quarter (SW 1/4) of said Section 28, said Township and Range, (hereinafter called Line 1) with the South boundary of Clark Avenue produced Westerly as the same is now established (hereinafter called Line 2); thence South along said Line 1 a distance of 378 feet; thence North 89° 36' West and parallel to said Line 2 a distance of 100 feet; thence North along a line parallel to said Line 1 a distance of 378 feet to said Line 2; thence East along said Line 2, 100 feet to the point of beginning-

Together with an undivided 1/30th interest of, in and to all water flowing or otherwise produced from that certain artesian well located in the North Half of the South Half of the Southeast Quarter of Section 29, Township 20 South, Range 61 East, M.D.B.&M, known as the New Russell Well. Together with an undivided 1/30th interest in and to that certain pipe line connected to and running from said well Easterly to a point 100 feet West from said Line 1 above described; together with an easement for said pipe line in common with all the other owners of said pipe line along a strip of ground three feet in width, the center line of which is located approximately 150 feet South of and running parallel with said Line 2, and which strip extends from said well to a point 100 feet West from said Line 1; together with the right to enter thereon for the purpose of repairing, replacing and renewing said pipe line.

Reference: Deed # 180405, Book 35, pages 159 and 160.

- (b) The West 1/2 of Section 37, all of Sections 38, 47 and 48 in Block 39, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey in Upton County, Texas.
- 2. Oil, gas and mineral rights on and under the following described real property in Upton County, Texas.
  - (a) Sections 31 and 42 of Block 38, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey.
  - (b) Sections 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47 and 48 of Block 39, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey.
  - (c) Sections 36 and 37 of Block 40, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey.
- 3. The oil, gas and mineral leases on the following described real property in Upton County, Texas.
  - (a) Sections 31 and 42 of Block 38, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey.
  - (b) Sections 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47 and 48 of Block 39, Township 5 South, T. & P. R. R. Co. Survey.

(c) Sections 36 and 37 of Block 40, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey.

The undersigned Grantors named in the foregoing Trust Agreement hereby certify that they have read said Trust Agreement and that it fully and accurately sets out the terms, trusts and conditions under which the trust estate therein described is to be held, managed and disposed of by the Trustee therein named; and, that they hereby approve, ratify and confirm the said Trust Agreement.


M. N. CONNELL

MARJORIE T. CONNELL

STATE OF NEVADA) COUNTY OF CLARK)

On May 18th, 1972, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public, W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL, who acknowledged to me that they executed the foregoing Trust Agreement.

County and State



# Internal Revenue Service District Director

Date: UCT 3 0 1981

WILLIA: A CONTELL ESTATE MARUPATA CONTELL
1535 CI DY AVE
BOULDER CITY.

NV 89005

Estate of:
William M. Connell
Decedent's Social Security
Number:
530-05-6631
Date of Death:
November 24, 1979
Person to Contact:
L. Peterson
Contact Telephone Number:
784-5262

# Estate Tax Closing letter (This is not a bill for tax due)

Our computation of the Federal Tax liability for the above estate is shown below. It does not include any interest that may be charged. You should keep a copy of this letter as a permanent record because your attorney may need it to close the probate proceedings for the estate. This letter is evidence that the Federal tax return for the estate has either been accepted as filed, or has been accepted after an adjustment that you agreed to.

This is not a formal closing agreement under section 7121 of the Internal Revenue Code. We will not reopen this case, however, unless Revenue Procedure 74-5 reproduced on the back of this letter, applies.

If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown above. Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

12.7. Swanson

District Director

(over)

P.O. Box 4100, Reno, Nevada 89505 cc: Robert T. Ashworth, P/A

Letter 627(DO) (Rev. 2-78)



# Samptration Form 2030-1.02

# Exhibit 6 BOB BULLOCK COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS STATE OF TEXAS

Copy

Do not write in above space

INHERITANCE TAX RETURN - NON	-RESIDE	NT	ĺ	Date Received (Do	not write in this space)
Decedent's Name (First, Middle, Maiden, Last)			Date of Deat	h	T CODE 5 90100 DEPOSIT CODE 5 110
William M. Connell			Novembe	AMOUNT	
Residence (Domicile) at Time of Death (City and State)	·····		Year in which	h domicile was	Amount
Boulder City, Nevada	···········		estabilistiad.	1936	
Married Divorce	d [	] Single	Loga!	ly Separated	☐ Widow/Widower
If Married, Date of Marriage: June 2, 1942	No	umber of Child	iren: one	Number of Child	iren Surviving: One
Did the decedent, at any time during life, make any transfer of property within Texas in which any beneficial interest was retained?   YES  NO	death, ma		r of property i	mmediately prior to within Texas without YES XX NO	If "YES", please furnish complete information.
Did the decedent die testate? YES NO If "YES" attach copy of will.  If "NO" attach an affidavit of heirship,	L	rs testamentar or this estate?	y or of admini		Date Granted
To whom granted? (Designate "Executor," "Executrix," "/	Administrator,				
NAME		NATION		DDRESS (Street & No	., City, State, Zip Code)
Name of Court		Location of	Court		
	į	Courton	·		•
Have ancillary probate proceedings been applied for and granted?		County in T	exas		
☐ YES 🔯 NO					
Name of ancillary administrator or executor		<u> </u>			
Address					
INHERITANCE TAX DUE					
PART I  Basic inheritance tax (From Schedule B)			Cadasul as	PARTII	45 01 1 1 2
<b>s</b> -00-			rederat cr	edit for state death ta	x (From Schedule C)
				\$ 515.00	
TAX DUE (PAI	RT LOR PAR	T II, WHICHE	VER IS GREA	ATER)	
	\$ 515	.00			
I declare that this return and any accompanying statements	are true corre	ect and comple	ote in the base	of my knowledge 4	and a state of the second
sobject to the tradedient report provisions of TEX. TAXGE	N. ANN. art.	7.12 (7969).		ministrator, Heir at L	
Darrel Knight Assoc., IncPC 915	695-2370			ell, Executri	
Address (Street & No., City, State, Zip Code) 301 S. Pioneer, #102, Abilene, TX 7	9605	1		City, State, Zip Code	
sign Proparet! Date here 12	sign	PO Box 710, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101  sign, Executor, etc. here X Marina Capmall y 12 - 16-80			
PELASE MOTE / RETURNATION	GE SIGNED	BY PERSON	AL III PRESE	NTATIVE OF ESTA	TE AND PURSON
MUST BE ATTA		OFT OF D	CCCUENT'S	WILL ON AFFIDAV	TIT OF HEIRSHIP
For assistance call Area Code 512 475-366	03 or	MAIL		ULLOCK	
TOLL FREE from anywhere in Texas		-		TROLLER OF PUBLISTANCE TAX DIVIS	
1-800-252-5555, Ext. 119, 120 or 121		CAPIT	OL STATION N. TEXAS 78774		

# STATE OF TEXAS

Caply

APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE INHERITANCE TAX RETURN AND/OR PAY INHERITANCE TAX
(Articles 14.14(C) and/or 14.16(A) and (B) of Title 122A, Chapter 14, Revised Civil Statutes, 1925)

Name and Maifing Address of Application Preparer		sheritance Tax Return Du	e Date
Denne I Wadata da da mara		ugust 24, 1980	
Darrel Knight Associates, Inc P.C 301 South Pioneer, Suite 102		ecedent's County of Resid Lark County	dence - or County of Probate Proceedings
Abilene, Texas 79605	L	ecadent's Social Security	Number
	5	30-05-6631	
Decedent's First Name and Middle Initial	Decedent'	s Last Name	Date of Death
William N.	Connel	l, Jr.	Nov. 24, 1979
PART II – EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE (Art. 14.14(C))			Extension Data Requested Feb. 24, 1981
Reasons (state in detail):  The federal estate return is being pall the information he needs to complete the Texas return until I receive form 7	e form 706	at this time.	
PART III - EXTENSION OF TIME TO PAY (Art. 14.16 (A) and (	(B))		Extension Date Requested
Reasons (state in detail):		**************************************	
			,
·			
Amount of estimated Inheritance Tax Due			-0-
Amount of Cash Shortage Claimed			
BALANCE DUE (Pay with this Application)			_0-
PART IV - SIGNATURE AND VERIFICATION			
(Signature of executor, administrator or person in possession of pro	operty)	(Title)	(Date)
		,	,,
			•
If prepared by Someone Other Than Executor, Administrator or I Penal Code, I declare that to the best of my knowledge and beli- executor, administrator or person in possession of property to pre-	ief, the statement	ts made herein are true ai	
A member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of		tion)	\$*B*###################################
A certified public accountant duly qualified to practice in (sp. A personal representative (as defined in Article 14.00A(e), T.	•	State of Te	жаs
	akation-General,	revised Civil Statutes of I	exast other than above.
(Signature of preparer Other than executor, administrator or person	,CPA		8-22-30
والمناولة والمنا			(Date)
PART V - NOTICE TO APPLICANT - TO BE COMPLETED BY I	INHERITANCE T	AX DIVISION	
1. The Application For Extension of Time to File (Part II) is:    Approved While Footual U. 24, 1981   Not approved because	********	>>\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	***************************************
	=q4q.==+4+4+4+4+4+4+	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	b
2. The Application For Extension of Time to Pay (Part III) is:	-4+101+1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1		
[ ] Approved			
Not approved because			
**************************************			
YE are VV It VPA 1 1 ACT (1)		\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	

# SCHEDULE A

Car My

# PROPERTY SUBJECT TO TEXAS INHERITANCE TAX

Did the decedent at the time of death own an interest in real estate or minerals located within the State of Texas?  © Yes   No If "Yes," list below.
Did the decedent at the time of death own an interest in any tangible personal property such as livestock, farm and ranching equipment, grain in storage, growing crops, all equipment used in connection with the drilling and producing of subsurface crude oil, gas or other minerals and any other tangible property having an actual situs in the State of Texas?   Yes  No If "Yes," list below.
All assets listed below must be clearly described and identified. If valuations are based upon appraisals, copies of such appraisals should accompany the return. If a formal appraisal of oil and gas leases and royalties is not made, a five-year payout based on the last twelve months prior to death will be used in determining the value of such mineral interest.

# ALTERNATE VALUATION

An election to have the gross estate of the decedent valued as of the alternate date or dates is made by entering a check mark in the box set forth below:

The executor elects to have the gross estate of the decedent valued in accordance with values as of a date or dates subsequent to the decedent's death as authorized under TEX. TAX.-GEN: ANN, art. 14.11 (Supp. 1976).

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	SUBSEQUENT VALUATION DATE	ALTERNATE VALUE	. VALUE AT DATE OF DEATH
2	2,301 acres, pasture land, out of Block 39, T-5-S, Sections 38,47,48, W\(\frac{1}{2}\)37, Upton County, Texas. Separate property of decedent.  Mineral rights, Upton County, Texas, \(\frac{1}{2}\) interest in Dora Connell Estate. Separate property of decedent. Valued on a 5-year payout based on payments received 12 months prior to date of death.	DATE	\$	\$ 80,535.
	TOTAL (Also enter under Sche	dule C, Page 4)	\$	\$ <sup>113,212</sup> .

Page 2

(If more space is needed, insert additional sheets of same size)

Form 2Q30-1.02 Page 3

# COMPUTATION OF BASIC INHERITANCE TAX

ion	nt's		т •	(Z)						Į.
of the distribution	fied in decede.	(8)	Texas Inheritance Tax	(6) multiplied by (7)	S	ò	0-	0-		•
	are not as specif		Ratio of share of Texas net estate to share of entire net	(5)divided by(4)		-0-	-0-	0-		
sre the estate equally, attach a nounts distributed to each benef	ne distribution schedule eased, disclaimed, etc.),	(9)	Tax at Texas rates on share of entire net estate (4). (See Tax Rate Schedule)		49	197.04	125.28	-0-		
• If beneficiaries do not share the estate equally, attach a copy indicating the items and amounts distributed to each beneficiary	<ul> <li>If beneficiaries listed on the distribution schedule are not as specified in decedent's will, please explain (predeceased, disclaimed, etc.).</li> </ul>	(5)	Value of share of net Texas estate	(See Sch.B-3)	v	0-	. 0	-0-		
•	heirship if the • If be will,	(4)	Value of share of entire not estate wherever focated	(See Sch.B-3)	45	69,704	12,528	. 0		
uding charitate.	of	Ê	Age of Beneficiary at date of Geath of	Decedent		09	14	43		
he decedent (incl any share of the	and testament or an aff	(2)	Relationship of Beneficiary to Decedent			wife	daughter	son-in-law		
• List all beneficiaries under the will of the decedent (including charitable bequests) or under the laws of intestacy who take any share of the estate.	<ul> <li>Attach a copy of the last will and test decedent died intestate.</li> </ul>	(1)	Name and Address of Beneficiary			Marjorie Connell P. O. Box 710 Boulder City, Nevada 89101	Eleanor M. Connell Hartman P. O. Box 710 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	Robert Hartman P. O. Box 710 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	•	

Page 3

69

TOTAL TEXAS INHERITANCE TAX-Col. 8 (TO BE CARRIED FORWARD TO PAGE 1, PART 1)

(if more space is needed, insert additional shoots of seme size)

# COMPUTATION OF PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF FEDERAL CREDIT FOR STATE DEATH TAX

The following information should be furnished from Form 706, U.S. Estate Tax Return, filed or t Internal Revenue Service.  IF FORM 706 WAS NOT FILED, COMPLETE LINES 1 THROUGH 5 AND LINE 12	to be filed on behalf of this esta	ete with the
1. Value of property subject to Texas Inheritance Tax.	1. \$ 113,212	
2. Total value of all other property.	180,023	•
3. Total gross estate (lines 1 plus 2)-(Same as recepitulation p. 3, U.S. Estate Tax Return)		3. 293,235
4. Funeral, administration expenses, debts of decedent, mortgage and liens (Schedules J & K, U.S. Estate Tax Return)	10,936	
5. Total value of net estate wherever located.		282,299
6. Other deductions (Total of Schedules L, M, N and O, U.S. Estate Tax Return)	6. 76,688	
7. Total allowable deductions (Line 4 plus line 6) (Same as Recapitulation, page 3, U.S. Estate Tax Return)		7. 87,624
8. Taxable estate for Federal Estate Tax purposes. (Line 3 minus line 7) (Same as page one U.S. Estate Tax Return, line 3)		8. 205,611
9. Adjustment to compute State Death Tax.	9.	
10. Federal adjusted taxable estate (line 8 minus line 9).		10.
11. a) Excess of gross estate tax over unified credit.  (from line 12, page 1, form 706)	112	
b) Maximum Federal Credit for State Death Tax. (Computed on Table C, Form 706)	11b 1,335	
c) Allowable Federal Credit for State Death Tax. (line 11a or 11b, whichever is smaller)		11c 1,335
12. Percentage of Texas gross estate to total gross estate.  (line 1 divided by line 3)	38.61%	
13. Portion of Federal Credit for State Death Tax allocated to the State of Texas. (line 11c multiplied by line 12).  TO BE CARRIED FORWARD TO PAGE 1, PART II		13. 515

# SCHEDULE B-1

# William M. Connell Estate Distribution of Net Estate Wherever Located Supporting Schedule B-3

Net Taxable Estate Wherever Located		\$282,299
Distribution to Marjorie Connell:		
Las Vegas rental property (Sch. A, Item 3, Form 706)	\$37,500	
Stock and bonds (Sch. B, Form 706)	52,218	
Cash and First Trust Deeds (Sch. C, Form 706)	74,660	•
Insurance proceeds (Sch. D, Form 706)	1,358	•
Mobil home, furniture and automobiles (Sch. F,		
Items 3, 4, 5 and 6, Form 706)	11,250	<u>.</u>
Marital bequest, 64.493% of 2,301 acres Upton Co.,	•	·
Texas land (Sch. A, Item 1, Form 706)	51,940	
Marital bequest, 64.493% of mineral rights, Upton		
Co., Texas (Sch. A, Item 2, Form 706)	21,074	
Distributive share of allowable deductions	(10,936)	(239,064)
Distribution to Eleanor M. Connell Hartman:		
Diamond Shrine Riva (Sch. F, Item 1, Form 706) 35.507% of 2,301 acres, Upton Co., Texas land	2,750	
(Sch. A, Item 1, Form 706)	<b>28,</b> 595	
35.507% of mineral rights, Upton Co., Texas	20,575	
(Sch. A, Item 2, Form 706)	11,603	(42,948)
Distribution to Robert Hartman:		
Gold Diamond Glycene wristwatch		(287)
		\$ -0-

# SCHEDULE B-2

# William M. Connell Estate Distribution of Texas Estate Supporting Schedule B-3

Net Texas Estate	•	\$113,212
Distribution to Marjorie Connell:		·
Marital bequest, 64.493% of 2,301 acres		
Upton County land (Sch. A, Item 1)	\$51,940	
Marital bequest, 64.493% of mineral rights,		•
Upton County, Texas (Sch. A, Item 2)	21,074	(73,014)
Distribution to Eleanor M. Connell Hartman:		
35.507% of 2,301 acres, Upton County land		
(Sch. A, Item 1)	28,595	
35.507% of mineral rights, Upton County,	20,575	
Texas (Sch. A, Item 2)	11,603	(40, 198)
		. 6 0
		\$ -0-

SCHEDULE B-3

William M. Connell Estate Determination of Value of Taxable Share Supporting Schedule B, Columns 4 & 5

(e)	Value of taxable share (a) - (d)	\$ 69,704	12,528	-0-	\$ 82,232	(9)	Value of taxable share		- 0-	-0-	-0-
(9)	Pro rata share of exemption (b) x (c)	\$169,360	30,420	25,000		(P)	Pro rata share of exemption (b) x (c)	\$128,980	71,020	-0-	\$200,000
(°)	Exemption	\$200,000	200,000	200,000		(e)	Exemption	\$200,000	200,000	-0-	1
(b) 7 of share	received to total of all Class A shares	84.68%	15.21%	.117	100.00%	(a)	<pre>/ or share received to total of all Class A shares</pre>	267.79	35.51%	-0-	100.001
(a) Value of share	of entire net estate wherever located	\$239,064	45,948	287	\$282,299	(a)	Value of share of Texas net estate	\$ 73,014	40,198	-0-	\$113,212
•	Beneficiary	Marjorie Connell	Eleanor C. Hartman	Robert Hartman	Totals		Beneficiary	Marjorie Connell	Eleanor C. Hartman	Robert Hartman	Totals

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

\* \* \*

IN THE MATTER OF: THE W.N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, DATED MAY 18, 1972,

ELEANOR C. AHERN A/K/A ELEANOR CONNELL HARTMAN AHERN.

Appellant,

VS.

JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA; AND KATHRYN A. BOUVIER,

Respondents.

Supreme Court No.: 6 Electronically Filed No.: 6 20 2015 04:12 p.m.

<u>Tracie K. Lindeman</u>

Consolidated with: 67187k 6809 Supreme Court

District Court Case No.: P-09-066425-T

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court, The Honorable Gloria Sturman Presiding

# APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

**(VOLUME 8 OF 17)** 

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KIRK B. LENHARD, ESQ., Nevada Bar No. 001437 TAMMY BEATTY PETERSON, ESQ., Nevada Bar No. 005218 BENJAMIN K. REITZ, ESQ., Nevada Bar No. 13233 BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP 100 North City Parkway, Suite 1600

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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ELEANOR CONNELL HARTMAN AHERN

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### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

\* \* \*

IN THE MATTER OF: THE W.N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, DATED MAY 18, 1972,

ELEANOR C. AHERN A/K/A ELEANOR CONNELL HARTMAN AHERN,

Appellant,

VS.

JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA; AND KATHRYN A. BOUVIER,

Respondents.

Supreme Court No.: 66231

Consolidated with: 67782, 68046

District Court Case No.:

P-09-066425-T

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court, The Honorable Gloria Sturman Presiding

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, and pursuant to NRAP 25(c) and (d), I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing **APPELLANT'S APPENDIX (Volume 8 of 17) (Pages AA 1617-1849)** by using the Court's Electronic Filing System on November 20, 2015, upon the following:

WHITNEY B. WARNICK, ESQ. ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRIGHT 801 South Rancho Drive, Suite D-4 Las Vegas, NV 89106 Attorneys for Kathryn A. Bouvier

JOSEPH J. POWELL, ESQ. THE RUSHFORTH FIRM, LTD. P.O. Box 371655 Las Vegas, NV 89137-1655 Attorneys for Jacqueline M. Montoya and Kathryn A. Bouvier I hereby certify that on November 20, 2015, I served a copy of this document by mailing a true and correct copy, postage prepaid, via U.S. Mail, addressed to the following:

MICHAEL K. WALL, ESQ. HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, LLC 10080 West Alta Drive, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89145 Attorneys for Fredrick P. Waid, Courtappointed Trustee

/s/ Erin Parcells
an employee of Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP

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CLERK OF THE COURT

**MOT**JOHN R. MUGAN, ESQUIRE

Nevada Bar No. 10690

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john@jeffreyburr.com

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Attorneys for Trustee ELEANOR CONNELL HARTMAN AHERN

DISTRICT COURT

# **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

In the Matter of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, Dated May 18, 1972

Case No. P-09-066425-T

Dept. No. XXVI (26)

Date of Hearing: November 26, 2014 Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m.

An Inter Vivos Irrevocable Trust.

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MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING LIMITED INTEREST OF TRUST ASSETS PURSUANT TO NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), AND NRS 164.033(1)(A) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED PER NRCP 12(b)(5)

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COMES NOW ELEANOR C. AHERN, a/k/a ELEANOR CONNELL HARTMAN AHERN, as Trustee of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST dated May 18, 1972, by and through her counsel of record, JOHN R. MUGAN, ESQ., and MICHAEL D. LUM, ESQ., of the law firm of JEFFREY BURR, LTD., and hereby submits this Motion To Dismiss Petition For Declaratory Judgment Regarding Limited Interest Of Trust Assets Pursuant To NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), And NRS 164.033(1) For Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). This motion is based upon the pleadings and papers filed before this Honorable Court, the following memorandum of points and

authorities, and any oral argument which may be taken at the time of hearing of this matter.

# **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

# A. STATEMENT OF FACTS

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W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL were married in approximately 1942. At the time of their marriage, W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL were residents of the state of Nevada, a community property state, and W. N. CONNELL had sole and separate property consisting in part of surface real estate located in Upton County, Texas, and the oil, gas and mineral interests on and under such real estate and severed oil, gas and mineral interests in other acreage in Upton County, Texas (the "Upton County, Texas, Oil rights"). Texas was at the time of the marriage, and still is, a community property state also. At the time of the marriage, W. N. CONNELL had one child from a previous marriage, namely ELEANOR C. AHERN, also known as ELEANOR CONNELL HARTMAN AHERN ("ELEANOR"). ELEANOR was born on May 13, 1938, and was approximately four (4) years of age at the time of her father's remarriage. During her years of minority, physical custody of ELEANOR was shared between her father, W. N. CONNELL, and ELEANOR's natural mother, who married Joe Gallowich when ELEANOR was approximately six (6) years of age. Such custody arrangement involved ELEANOR living part of each week with W. N. CONNELL and her stepmother, MARJORIE T. CONNELL, and living part of each week with ELEANOR's natural mother (and stepfather after the remarriage of ELEANOR's natural mother). W. N. CONNELL had no other children, and MARJORIE T. CONNELL had no children. MARJORIE T. CONNELL would eventually adopt ELEANOR after ELEANOR reached majority age. A copy of the Decree Of Adoption is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference incorporated herein.

W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL as grantors and initial trustees established the W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST dated May 18, 1972 (the "TRUST"). A copy of the TRUST agreement including Schedule "A" thereto is attached hereto as

Exhibit "B" and by this reference incorporated herein. The sole and separate Upton County, Texas, Oil rights of W. N. CONNELL were conveyed by W. N. CONNELL to himself and MARJORIE T. CONNELL as Trustee (sic) of the TRUST via two Quitclaim Deeds dated June 5, 1972 and recorded June 13, 1972 as Instrument No. 61969 in Volume 409, Page 329 and as Instrument No. 61970 in Volume 414, Page 9 of the Deed Records of the County Clerk of Upton County, Texas. Copies of such Deeds are attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and by this reference incorporated herein.

W. N. CONNELL died on November 24, 1979 and was survived by his spouse, MARJORIE T. CONNELL. ELEANOR was and is the only surviving child of W. N. CONNELL. ELEANOR has two children, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER.

The TRUST agreement provides in part that upon the death of the Grantor whose death shall first occur [W. N. CONNELL], the Trustee shall divide the trust estate into two parts, each part to be administered as a separate trust to be known respectively as "Trust No. 2" and "Trust No. 3". In particular, Article SECOND, *TRUST NO. 1*, Paragraph C, *Death of Either Grantor*, of the TRUST agreement (Exhibit B) in relevant part states:

"Upon the death of the Grantor whose death shall first occur, the Trustee shall divide the trust estates, including all property received as a result of the decedent's death, as follows:

1. The trust estate and all property received as a result of the decedent's death shall be divided into two parts, each part to be administered as a separate trust to be known respectively as 'Trust No. 2' and 'Trust No. 3'."

Subparagraph 4 of said Paragraph C of the TRUST agreement (Exhibit B) describes how Trust No. 2 is to be funded, and states as follows:

"The Trustee shall allocate to Trust No. 2 all the remaining protion (sic) of the trust estate not allocated to Trust No. 3, including but not limited to, the Decedent's [W. N. CONNELL] community property interest, if any, in any life insurance policy on the life of the Decedent [W. N. CONNELL] payable to Trust No. 1."

Article FOURTH, TRUST NO. 2, Paragraph B, Income, of the TRUST agreement (Exhibit B) sets forth how the income of Trust No. 2 was to be paid, and in relevant part states:

"All income received by this Trust from the separate property of the Decedent [W. N. CONNELL] shall be paid to the Residual Beneficiary [ELEANOR]. In the event any of the real property located in Upton County, Texas, as listed on the original Schedule "A" attached hereto, forms a part of the corpus of this Trust, the Residual Beneficiary [ELEANOR] shall be paid an additional payment from the income received from the Decedent's [W. N. CONNELL] half of the community property, which forms a part of the corpus of this Trust, equal to all of the income received by this Trust from the real property located in Upton County, Texas."

Schedule "A" attached to the TRUST agreement sets out the detailed legal descriptions of the Upton County, Texas, real property as the "... separate property of W. N. CONNELL." See Schedule "A" of the TRUST agreement, Exhibit B. It is obvious that the intent of Decedent W. N. CONNELL was that his only child, ELEANOR, should have the right to receive an amount equal to all of income generated from the Upton County, Texas, Oil rights as long as ELEANOR lived. This makes perfect sense from an estate-planning point of view in that the Upton County, Texas, Oil rights were the sole and separate property of W. N. CONNELL that he brought into his second marriage with MARJORIE T. CONNELL, ELEANOR was his only child, and ELEANOR was his child from a previous marriage.

MARJORIE T. CONNELL died on May 1, 2009. She had no surviving spouse, but was survived by her only child, ELEANOR. ELEANOR was adopted by MARJORIE T. CONNELL as noted above-*see* Exhibit A.

# B. <u>PROCEDURAL HISTORY</u>

Subsequent to the death of MARJORIE T. CONNELL, a Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe And Reform Trust (the "PETITION") was filed by MARK A. SOLOMON, Esquire, and BRIAN K. STEADMAN, Esquire, as purported attorneys for ELEANOR as Petitioner. A copy of such PETITION without exhibits is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and by this reference incorporated herein. This is the first case dealing with the TRUST, Trust No. 2, its assets, the income therefrom, the remainder interest, and the construction and reformation of the TRUST agreement. The PETITION was filed with this Court on August 17, 2009. To the

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best of her recollection, all of ELEANOR's meetings and dealings regarding the PETITION were with DAVID A. STRAUS, Esquire, and his client, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA; all meetings regarding the PETITION were at the law office of Mr. STRAUS; the PETITION was executed by ELEANOR at the law office of Mr. STRAUS, and ELEANOR never met with Mr. SOLOMON or Mr. STEADMAN, the attorneys listed as her attorney on the PETITION. In essence, the action was initiated and driven by JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and her attorney, and primarily was for the benefit of JACQUELINE M MONTOYA and her sister, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER. Further evidence of the fact that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA initiated the 2009 case for her and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER's benefit are the August 4, 2009 letters and enclosed Consents to Reformation sent to them by Mr. STEADMAN, purported attorney for ELEANOR, which are attached hereto as Exhibits "E" and "F", respectively and incorporated herein by this reference. Mr. STEADMAN sent the August 4, 2009 letters to JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER prior to filing the PETITION and stated therein that, "As you are aware, we are in the process of reforming the W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust (the 'Trust')." (Emphasis added.) Enclosed with the letters were Consents to Reformation prepared by the law office of Solomon, Dwiggins, & Freer, Ltd., which as Mr. STEADMAN conveyed to JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER in said letter were prepared for the purpose of "outlin[ing] the estate tax implications that may arise in reforming the Trust." (Emphasis added.) Why would Mr. STEADMAN be referencing "we" in these letters and giving legal advice (the estate tax implications of reformation) to JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER if they were not his clients? The answer is he would not.

Paragraphs 18-20, inclusive, of the PETITION provide in relevant part as follows:

"18. As of the death of MARJORIE, <u>Trust No. 2 owned land and oil and gas shares in reserves and income located in Upton County, Texas (the 'Oil Assets')</u>. The Oil Assets have not been valued for some time, but are estimated to be worth approximately \$700,000." (Emphasis added.)

- "19. Pursuant to Article Fourth, which Article governs the administration of Trust No. 2, all income from the Oil Assets is to be paid to the Petitioner [ELEANOR] as the 'Residual Beneficiary' during her lifetime." (Emphasis added.)
- "20. Section B of Article Fourth, governing Trust No. 2, provides as follows:
- B. Income.... In the Event that the [Petitioner] (ELEANOR) predeceases [MARJORIE], the [Petitioner's] right to receive income hereunder shall be paid to or for the benefit of her living children and the issue of any deceased child by right of representation; or in the event she dies without leaving issue, her income rights hereunder shall become those of [MARJORIE]."

Attached as Exhibit 6 to the PETITION is the Consent To Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe And Reform Trust And Waiver Of Notice of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA dated August 8, 2009. A copy of such Consent is attached hereto as Exhibit "G" and by this reference incorporated herein. Paragraphs 1-3, inclusive, of the Consent provide in relevant part as follows:

- "1. I am a <u>contingent income beneficiary</u> of the W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972 (the 'Trust')." (Emphasis added.)
- "2. <u>I have read the Petition</u> To Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe And Reform Trust (the 'Petition') and <u>believe it to be true and correct</u> to the best of my knowledge." (Emphasis added.)
- "3. I hereby <u>consent to the Petition</u> and request that the Court enter an Order approving the Petition <u>in its entirety</u>." (Emphasis added.)

KATHRYN A. BOUVIER signed an identical Consent, and a copy of such Consent is attached hereto as Exhibit "H" and by this reference incorporated herein.

A hearing on the PETITION was scheduled before the Probate Commissioner on September 4, 2009 at 9:30 a.m. Notice of the date, time and place of hearing and a copy of the PETITION were mailed to ELEANOR, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER on August 17, 2009. Copies of the Notice Of Hearing On Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe And Reform Trust and of the Certificate Of Mailing are attached

hereto as Exhibit "I" and by this reference incorporated herein. The PETITION came on for hearing before the Probate Commissioner on September 4, 2009, and an Order Assuming Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And For Construction Of And Reform Of Trust Instrument (the "ORDER") was entered and filed herein on said date. The ORDER in part construed and reformed the TRUST to provide that upon the death of ELEANOR, Trust No. 2 and its assets, including the Upton County, Texas, Oil rights, shall pass equally to her children, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER, each of whom shall also have a power of appointment as to their share of the residue if they would predecease ELEANOR, to-wit:

"IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the dispositive provisions of Trust No. 2 created under THE W. N. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, are hereby reformed and construed to provide that upon the death of ELEANOR C. AHERN, the residue of Trust No. 2 created under THE W. N. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, shall be distributed to the heirs of ELEANOR C. AHERN."

"IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that it is approved and granted that Sections "E," "F," "G," and "H" to Article Fourth of THE W.N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST dated May 18, 1972, is hereby reformed as follows:

- E. <u>Distribution Upon Death of both the Survivor [MARJORIE T. CONNELL] and the Residual Beneficiary [ELEANOR]</u>. Upon the death of both the Survivor [MARJORIE T. CONNELL] and the Residual Beneficiary [ELEANOR], the Trustee shall divide the balance of Trust No. 2 into two equal shares, as follows:
  - 1. One (1) equal share shall be distributed, outright and free of trust, to the Residual Beneficiary's daughter, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, if she is then living. Subject to Section (F) below if, as the date of the Residual Beneficiary's death, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA is not then living, then said equal share shall be distributed to JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA's then living issue, by right of representation. Each share created pursuant to this Section E(1) of Article Fourth for the benefit of the issue of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA shall be held as a separate trust ("Beneficiary's Share" for the benefit of such issue ("Beneficiary") to be held by the Trustee, administered and further distributed pursuant to Section G of this Article Fourth.
  - 2. One (1) equal share shall be distributed, outright and free of trust, to the Residual Beneficiary's daughter, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER, if she is then living. Subject to Section (F) below if, as the date of the Residual Beneficiary's death, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER is not then living, then said equal share shall be distributed to KATHRYN A. BOUVIER's then living issue, by right of representation. Each share created pursuant to this Section E(2) of Article Fourth for the benefit of the

issue of KATHRYN A. BOUVIER shall be held as a separate trust ("Beneficiary's Share" for the benefit of such issue ("Beneficiary") to be held by the Trustee, administered and further distributed pursuant to Section G of this Article Fourth.

- 3. In the event that both JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER predecease the Grantors, leaving no issue, and having failed to exercise the testamentary power of appointment pursuant to Section (F) below, then the balance shall be distributed in accordance with Article Eleventh herein.
- F. <u>Power of Appointment</u>. In the event that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA or KATHRYN A. BOUVIER predeceases the Residual Beneficiary, upon the death of the Residual Beneficiary, the Trustee shall distributed such beneficiary's equal share to or in trust for such one or more persons or organizations and in such manner and proportions as such beneficiary may appoint by her will or revocable trust making specific reference to this general power of appointment.

A copy of such ORDER is attached hereto as Exhibit "J" and by this reference incorporated herein.

On September 8, 2009, a Notice Of Entry Of Order and Certificate Of Mailing were filed herein attesting to the mailing of the Notice Of Entry Of Order and Certificate Of Mailing and a copy of the Order Assuming Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And For Construction Of And Reform Of Trust Instrument to ELEANOR, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and to KATHRYN A. BOUVIER at their last known mailing addresses per Nevada law. A copy of such Notice Of Entry Of Order and Certificate Of Mailing is attached hereto as Exhibit "K" and by this reference incorporated herein.

A search of the Register of Actions and pleadings herein shows no objection to, motion for relief from, request for reconsideration of, or appeal of the ORDER being filed.

On September 27, 2013, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA filed her Petition For Declaratory Judgment Regarding Limited Interest Of Trust Assets Pursuant To NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), And NRS 164.033(1)(A) herein (the "DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION") with this Court. This is the second case dealing with the TRUST, Trust No. 2, its assets, the income therefrom, the remainder interest, and the construction and reformation of the TRUST agreement.

The DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION seeks in part a determination that her mother, ELEANOR, both individually and as Trustee of the TRUST, "... is only entitled to a 35% proportion of all real property located in Upton County, Texas, including the income generated from gas, oil, and mineral leases relating to such Upton County, Texas real property..." The DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION further seeks in part a determination that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER or Trusts that they are beneficiaries of are entitled to Sixty-Five Percent (65%) proportion of all real property located in Upton County, Texas, including the income generated from gas, oil, and mineral leases relating to such Upton County, Texas real property.

On November 12, 2013, ELEANOR filed an initial Motion To Dismiss Petition For Declaratory Judgment Regarding Limited Interest Of Trust Assets Pursuant To NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), And NRS 164.033(1) For Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted Pursuant To NRCP 12(b)(5). Hearing thereon was held on January 14, 2014, and the Court denied the Motion To Dismiss without prejudice and stated that the potential claim or theory was for determination at time of trial. Subsequent to the hearing, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER has retained legal counsel, WHITNEY B. WARNICK, Esquire, and joined in the 2013 PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.

# C. <u>LEGAL STANDARD</u>

Nevada law provides for dismissal of a claim for relief for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *See* NRCP 12(b)(5). Specifically, this rule provides the following:

(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for

relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject, matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the present (2)

subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) insufficiency of process, (4) insufficiency of service of process, (5)

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (6) failure to join a party under Rule 19. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (5) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. (Emphasis added.)

In *Edgar v. Wagner*, 101 Nev. 226, 699 P.2d 110 (1985), the Nevada Supreme Court discussed implementation of the Motion to Dismiss standard under NRCP 12(b)(5) in practice, as follows:

On review of a motion to dismiss, our task is to determine whether or not the challenged pleading sets forth allegations sufficient to make out the elements of a right to relief. *Crucil v. Carson City*, 95 Nev. 583, 600 P.2d 216 (1979); cf. *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349, 354, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1103, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). In making this determination, the allegations in the complaint must be taken at "face value," *California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*, 404 U.S. 508, 515, 92 S.Ct. 609, 614, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972), and must be construed favorably in the plaintiff's behalf. The complaint cannot be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts which, if accepted by the trier of fact, would entitle him to relief. *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss, if a district court considers evidence outside the pleadings, the district court must normally convert the 12(b)(5) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and must give the non-moving party an opportunity to respond. *See* NRCP 12(b). However, the court may consider certain materials without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. *See United States v. Ritchie*, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th

Cir. 2003) (citing *Van Buskirk v. CNN*, 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2000)); *Barron v. Reich*, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994); and 2 James Wm. Moore et al., *Moore's Federal Practice* § 12.34[2] (3d ed.1999). Apart from the pleading itself (the DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION), such materials include documents attached to the DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION, documents incorporated by reference into the DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION, or matters of judicial notice and matters to which there is no dispute as to authenticity. *See id*.

Further, as matters of public record, there is no dispute as to the authenticity of the prior pleadings filed with this Court in the 2009 case and the fact that the Court may take judicial notice of the same.

# D. <u>ARGUMENT</u>

# **CLAIM PRECLUSION**

The legal theory of issue preclusion, sometimes referred to as "collateral estoppel," and the legal theory of claim preclusion, are often confused. Although somewhat similar, they are substantially different. Claim preclusion, under which a valid and final judgment on a claim precludes a second action on that claim or any part of it, embraces all grounds of recovery that were asserted in a suit, as well as those that could have been asserted, and thus has a broader reach than issue preclusion. Five Star Capital Corporation v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 194 P.3d 709 (2008). While claim preclusion can apply to all claims that were or could have been raised in the initial case, issue preclusion only applies to issues that were actually and necessarily litigated and on which there was a final decision on the merits. See Id. The modern view is that claim preclusion embraces all grounds of recovery that were asserted in a suit, as well as those that could have been asserted in a suit, and thus has a broader reach than collateral estoppel. University Of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 110 Nev. 581, 879 P.2d 1180, 97 Ed. Law Rep. 927 (1994); Betterman v. Wells Fargo Ag. Credit Corp., 802 P.2d 1112 (Colo.Ct.App. 1990); Matter of Herbert M. Dowsett Trust, 7

Haw.App. 640, 791 P.2d 398 (Ct. 1990); *Madsen v. Borthick*, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah, 1998). Claim preclusion applies to all grounds of recovery that were or could have been brought in the first case. *Five Star Capital Corporation*, supra. Claim preclusion should apply if: (1) the parties or their privies are the same; (2) the final judgment is valid; and (3) the subsequent action is based on the same claims or any part of them that were or could have been brought in the first case. These three factors, in varying language, are used by the majority of state and federal courts and the test maintains the well-established principle that claim preclusion applies to all grounds of recovery that were or could have been brought in the first case. *See Id*.

Claim preclusion is clearly applicable as a bar to the 2013 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION filed by JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, the second case dealing with the TRUST, Trust No. 2, its assets, the income therefrom, the remainder interest, and the construction and reformation of the TRUST agreement. As noted above, the first case dealing with the TRUST, Trust No. 2, its assets, the income therefrom, the remainder interest, and the construction and reformation of the TRUST agreement was a Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe And Reform Trust that was filed on August 17, 2009.

The first required factor for claim preclusion to be applicable is that the parties or their privies are the same in both cases. The parties in the 2009 case and in this case are the same. In the 2009 case, the Petitioner was ELEANOR and JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER were necessary parties who participated in the same. As noted above, in reality the action was initiated and driven by JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and her attorney, and primarily was for the benefit of JACQUELINE M MONTOYA and her sister, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER. ELEANOR was confirmed as Trustee of the TRUST in the first case. Not only did JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA receive a copy of the 2009 PETITION and a notice of the hearing thereon, she actively participate in the case by signing a Consent to the PETITION in which she stated that she had read the PETITION, believes it to be true and correct to the best of her knowledge, consents to

the PETITION, and requests that the Court enter an Order approving the PETITION in its entirety. JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA is the Petitioner in the current 2013 declaratory judgment action, the second case dealing with the TRUST, Trust No. 2, its assets, the income therefrom, the remainder interest, and the construction and reformation of the TRUST agreement, against ELEANOR, individually and as Trustee of the TRUST.

KATHRYN A. BOUVIER was also a necessary party to the 2009 PETITION, the first case dealing with the TRUST, Trust No. 2, its assets, the income therefrom, the remainder interest, and the construction and reformation of the TRUST agreement. She not only received a copy of the 2009 PETITION and a notice of the hearing thereon, she also actively participated in the first case by signing a Consent to the PETITION in which she stated that she had read the PETITION, believes it to be true and correct to the best of her knowledge, consents to the PETITION, and requests that the Court enter an Order approving the PETITION in its entirety. KATHRYN A. BOUVIER is also a necessary party in the 2013 declaratory judgment action, the second case dealing with the TRUST, Trust No. 2, its assets, the income therefrom, the remainder interest, and the construction and reformation of the TRUST agreement, and a copy of the 2013 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION and a Notice of the Hearing thereon were mailed to KATHRYN A. BOUVIER by Petitioner JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA. A copy of the Certificate Of Mailing is attached hereto as Exhibit "L" and by this reference incorporated herein.

Further, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER has now retained legal counsel and joined in the 2013 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION as a party.

That JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER were parties to the 2009 case and the PETITION filed therein is further supported by the August 4, 2009 letter and enclosed Consents to Reformation (attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and "F") sent by Mr. STEADMAN, ELEANOR's purported attorney, to JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER. As mentioned above, Mr. STEADMAN states in those letters, "As you

are aware, we are in the process of reforming the W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust (the 'Trust'). (Emphasis added.) By saying "[a]s you are aware," Mr. STEADMAN indicates that he or his firm had previously advised JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER of the fact that a petition to reform the TRUST was going to be filed. The introductory phrase "[a]s you are aware" combined with the next word "we" implies that after being advised by Mr. STEADMAN with regard to the PETITION and agreeing that the same should be filed, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER, and ELEANOR ("we") agreed to proceed with filing the PETITION. Additionally, by enclosing Consents to Reformation with the August 4, 2009 letter, which "outlin[e] the estate tax implications that may arise in reforming the Trust," Mr. STEADMAN was giving legal advice to JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER – something an attorney would do only for his clients.

In light of the foregoing, it is difficult for JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER to argue that they were not in fact parties to the 2009 case and the PETITION filed therein.

At the January 14, 2014 hearing on ELEANOR's first Motion To Dismiss Petition For Declaratory Judgment Regarding Limited Interest Of Trust Assets Pursuant To NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), And NRS 164.033(1) For Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted Pursuant To NRCP 12(b)(5), this Court said, "I don't think it's the same parties." Hrg. Transcr. 8:22 (January 14, 2014). (Emphasis added.) If notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, which show strong support for JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER being parties to both the instant case at the 2009 case, this Court continues to be of the opinion that the parties are not the same in both cases, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER, and ELEANOR are certainly in privity with each other.

Pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 41, which was adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court in *Alcantara ex rel. Alcantara v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 321 P.3d 912, 917 (Nev.

2014), a person who was represented by (in privity with) a party to an action is bound by a judgment in that action even if such person was not an actual party. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 41 states in relevant part:

- (1) A person who is not a party to an action but who is represented by a party is bound by and entitled to the benefits of a judgment as though he were a party. A person is represented by a party who is:
- (a) The trustee of an estate or interest of which the person is a beneficiary; or

5) The executor, administrator guardian conservator or similar fiduciony managen

(b) The executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or <u>similar fiduciary manager of an interest of which the person is a beneficiary</u>;

(2) A person represented by a party to an action is bound by the judgment even though the person himself does not have notice of the action, is not served with process, or is not subject to service of process. (Emphasis added.)

Again, although JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER were the drivers of the 2009 case, ELEANOR was shown on the PETITION as the Petitioner and thus was a party. Again, if this Court does not accept the idea that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER were parties to the 2009 case, it should find that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER were in privity with ELEANOR – the Petitioner in the 2009 proceeding. There is no argument that ELEANOR was not a party to that case as Trustee of the TRUST, which TRUST again was the subject of the 2009 case and PETITION. JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER were made beneficiaries of the TRUST via the 2009 case and PETITION and were represented by ELEANOR via the PETITION in that regard. Therefore, § 41 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments is directly applicable to this case in that ELEANOR, as Trustee of the TRUST, represented JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER, as beneficiaries of the TRUST, in the 2009 case. Consequently, as provided by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 41, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and

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KATHRYN A. BOUVIER are "bound by the judgment" in the 2009 case.

The first factor for claim preclusion to apply is satisfied as the parties or their privies are the same in the 2009 case and the current 2013 case, namely ELEANOR, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER.

The second required factor for claim preclusion to be applicable is that the final judgment in the first case is valid. There is no question of the validity of the judgment in the first case, the 2009 case. As noted above, the 2009 Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe And Reform Trust was filed on August 17, 2009; a true and correct copy of the PETITION and Notice Of Hearing thereon was mailed to ELEANOR, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER at their last known mailing addresses per Nevada law as evidenced by a Certificate Of Mailing and Notice Of Hearing attesting to such mailing filed; on the hearing date of September 4, 2009, an Order Assuming Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And For Construction Of And Reform Of Trust Instrument was filed; a Notice Of Entry Of Order and Certificate Of Mailing were filed attesting to the mailing of the Notice Of Entry Of Order and Certificate Of Mailing and a copy of the Order Assuming Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And For Construction Of And Reform Of Trust Instrument to ELEANOR, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER at their last known mailing addresses per Nevada law; and a search of the Register of Actions and pleadings in the first case shows no objection to, motion for relief from, reconsider or appeal of such Order being filed. The time to object to, file a motion for relief from, reconsider or appeal the Order has long past. Accordingly, the second factor for claim preclusion to apply is satisfied as the Order entered in the first case in 2009 is valid.

The third and final required factor for claim preclusion to be applicable is that the subsequent action is based on the same claims or any part of them that were or <u>could have been</u> brought in the first case. The first case involved the TRUST, Trust No. 2, its assets, the income therefrom, the remainder interest, and the construction and reformation of the TRUST agreement.

In particular, the Court assumed jurisdiction of the TRUST, the Court confirmed the Trustee thereof, and the Court construed and reformed the TRUST agreement in part by declaring that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER were beneficiaries of Trust No. 2 upon the death of their mother, ELEANOR. The second case of 2013 also involves the TRUST, Trust No. 2, its assets, the income therefrom, the remainder interest, and the construction and reformation of the TRUST agreement. There is no question that the claims in the second case could have been brought in the first case.

Further, the allegations in the 2009 PETITION in the first case were directly on point regarding the dispute contained in the second case. Although this is not necessary for claim preclusion to apply, one can argue that not only could the claim in the 2013 case have been brought in the 2009 case, in fact the dispute raised in the 2013 case, ownership of the Oil assets and the corresponding entitlement to the income therefrom, was addressed in the 2009 PETITION and Consents. The 2009 PETITION specifically states that that: (1) as of the death of MARJORIE, Trust No. 2 owned land and oil and gas shares in reserves and income located in Upton County, Texas (the "Oil Assets"); and (2) pursuant to Article Fourth, which Article governs the administration of Trust No. 2, all income from the Oil Assets is to be paid to ELEANOR as the "Residual Beneficiary" during her lifetime. The Consents of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA (and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER) filed in the 2009 case specifically state: (1) **JACQUELINE M.** MONTOYA has read the Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe And Reform Trust and believes it to be true and correct to the best of her knowledge; and (2) JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA consents to the Petition and requests that the Court enter an Order approving the Petition in its entirety. Furthermore and most noteworthy, the Consents contain an affirmative representation by JACQULINE M. MONTOYA and by KATHRYN A. BOUVIER that she is only a contingent income beneficiary of the TRUST. Now the 2013 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION seeks in part a determination that ELEANOR, both

individually and as Trustee of the TRUST, "... is only entitled to a 35% proportion of all real property located in Upton County, Texas, including the income generated from gas, oil, and mineral leases relating to such Upton County, Texas real property..." The DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION further seeks in part a determination that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER or Trusts that they are beneficiaries of are entitled to 65% proportion of all real property located in Upton County, Texas, including the income generated from gas, oil, and mineral leases relating to such Upton County, Texas real property. This is completely contrary to and contradictory of the statements and representations contained in the PETITION and the Consents of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER noted above. For example, how could JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER each only be a contingent income beneficiary and ELEANOR be entitled to all of the income for her life as JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER consented to and affirmatively asserted in the 2009 case, but now both claim ELEANOR is only entitled to Thirty-Five Percent (35%) of the income? It is important to note that the claim of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER in the 2013 case, that ELEANOR is only entitled to Thirty-Five Percent (35%) of the income and JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER (or a trust of which they are beneficiaries thereof) are entitled to the Sixty-Five Percent (65%) interest in the Oil Assets, is based on their allegation that such right of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER (or a trust of which they are beneficiaries thereof) is the result of a power of appointment exercised in the Last Will and Testament of MARJORIE T. CONNELL. The date of death of MARJORIE T. CONNELL was May 1, 2009. A copy of the Death Certificate of MARJORIE T. CONNELL is attached hereto as Exhibit "M" and by this reference incorporated herein. The first case was not filed until August 17, 2009, subsequent to the death of MARJORIE T. CONNELL. JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA became the successor trustee of THE MTC LIVING TRUST immediately upon the death of MARJORIE T. CONNELL.

Therefore, this claim of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, individually and as Trustee of THE MTC LIVING TRUST, and of KATHRYN A. BOUVIER as set forth in the 2013 case was fully vested and in existence at the time of the 2009 case.

The third factor for claim preclusion to apply is satisfied as the subsequent 2013 action is based on the same claims that could have been brought in the first case of 2009. Further, not only could the claim in the second case of 2013 have been brought in the first case of 2009, arguably the claim in the 2013 case was brought and addressed in the 2009 case in that the allegations and representations contained in the PETITION and Consents filed in the first case of 2009 directly address the claim to Sixty-Five Percent (65%) of the assets and income of the Trust No. 2 now raised in the 2013 case. Accordingly, the third factor for claim preclusion to apply is satisfied both possible ways.

Further, at the Motions Hearing on January 14, 2014, counsel for Petitioner JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, namely MR. POWELL, specifically argued that ELEANOR should have brought her current questions and disputes regarding the TRUST income in the 2009 case. Counsel for Petitioner JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA stated that ELEANOR therefore should now be precluded from asserting any claims in this 2013 case. In doing so, counsel for Petitioner JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA admitted on the record that claim preclusion is applicable. Accordingly, any questions, issues or disputes JAQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN M. BOUVIER had about the TRUST also should have been brought in the 2009 case. Counsel for Petitioner JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA cannot on the one hand argue that claim preclusion is not applicable to his client (and KATHRYN M. BOUVIER) regarding a dispute as to who is entitled to the TRUST income under his 2013 case in his resistance to ELEANOR's Motion To Dismiss, and then at the very same hearing argue that claim preclusion, under the guise of "laches", is applicable to ELEANOR regarding her claim as to the TRUST income in the 2013 case. Counsel for Petitioner JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA is correct that claim preclusion is applicable herein;

however, counsel cannot choose which party claim preclusion is applicable to and which party it is not applicable to. Claim preclusion bars the 2013 case, period.

The Court acknowledged the claim preclusion argument, that counsel for Petitioner JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA seemed to be arguing in favor of ELEANOR's Motion To Dismiss on the grounds of claim preclusion, and asked why indeed these disputes and questions were not raised in the 2009 case. When confronted by this by the Court, counsel for Petitioner JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA attempted to distinguish his argument as one of laches, not claim preclusion. The Transcript of the January 14, 2014 Motions hearing contains the following dialogue:

"MR. POWELL: Well, Miss – if – well, my point is *if Ms. Ahern had brought this in a timely manner*, and specifically if she had brought this when Ms. Connell had the ability to rebut –

THE COURT: Doesn't that get back to this whole point of claim preclusion then? Why didn't we litigate this four years ago?

MR. POWELL: *Exactly*. Why did no -it wasn't raised four years ago. There was still 65/35 four years ago.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. POWELL: There was a 65/35 up until June. Then the plug is pulled by Ms. Ahern who says, I've always been entitled to a hundred percent of it. I just never told any of you apparently that I felt this way and had these rights. I mean, this is analogous to again, a homeowner who says, you're encroaching on my property by 30 feet. I've known for 30 years but I'm telling you now. *Well, too late*.

THE COURT: You're about to talk me into reconsidering my – Mr. Mugan's motion. Because what you're saying basically is that we should have known this and it should have all been litigated when Ms. Connell was still alive. And you know, Ms. Ahern didn't tell us and so, you know, it should have been litigated four years ago. You know –

MR. POWELL: But I'm not sure how that would be on my client's burden when Ms. Ahern is the trustee and Ms. Ahern is still doing a 65/35 split that whole time.

THE COURT: Okay. So it's her fault that it didn't -

MR. POWELL: How can my client anticipate –

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THE COURT: - we didn't get litigate – this didn't get litigated nine years ago when maybe I don't know if Ms. Connell was competent to – I don't know what condition she was in at the end of her life.

MR. POWELL: Oh, well, she was still – but my point being is if you're going to make an argument of saying, you're not entitled to the 65 percent; I was always entitled to it. Why

was this not done during Mrs. Connell's lifetime so Ms. Connell could have responded to

THE COURT: Right.

it? Ms. Connell was a trustee as well.

٠..

THE COURT: Okay. When I started out – when you started Mr. Powell –

MR. POWELL: Yeah.

THE COURT: - the question was what's changed; didn't we already argue all of this? And you said well –

MR. POWELL: Here's -

THE COURT: - the release issues hadn't been addressed. And to me they all sound like they really were more in support of Mr. Mugan's motion on claim preclusion. That she shouldn't have changed this. Why wasn't it litigated previously? To me this is the whole point why we have to have the evidentiary hearing is because we don't have any other way. I don't understand how we could possibly do this short of an evidentiary hearing. Because as you said, some of the evidence is gone, the written documentary evidence would be gone. Through nobody — I'm not saying it's anybody's fault, but it just — this goes back to '72. This is like 40 years old. (emphasis added)

...

THE COURT: So denying both petitions. It's without prejudice because if for some reason something develops through the evidentiary hearing that one of the other claims has merit, that this is precluded or that there's laches then, you know, we can rule on it at that time, but that's when I think it all has to be part of the evidentiary hearing.

A copy of this Transcript is attached as Exhibit "N" and incorporated herein by this reference. See Motions HearingTranscr. 13:7 – 14:20; 21:23 – 22:16; 26:18 - 26.24 (January 14, 2014).

Regardless of what you call it, laches and/or claim preclusion, as shown by the foregoing

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discussion at the Motions Hearing, both the Court and counsel for Petitioner JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA acknowledged that the claims brought in this second case of the 2013 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION could have been brought in the 2009 case, which 2009 case involved the TRUST, Trust No. 2, its assets, the income therefrom, the remainder interest, and the construction and reformation of the TRUST agreement. As noted above, claim preclusion applies to all grounds of recovery that were or **could have been brought in the first case**. Therefore, claim preclusion applies, the 2013 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PETITION is barred, and no evidentiary hearing is needed.

# D. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

The Petition For Declaratory Judgment Regarding Limited Interest Of Trust Assets pursuant to NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), AND NRS 164.033(1)(A) should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) on the grounds of claim preclusion.

WHEREFORE, ELEANOR C. AHERN, a/k/a ELEANOR CONNELL HARTMAN AHERN, as Trustee of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST dated May 18, 1972, respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter an Order granting her Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5).

DATED: October 9, 2014.

JEFFREY/BURR.LTD

By: JOHN R. MUGAN, ESQUIRE

Nevada Bar No. 10690

MICHAEL D. LUM, ESQUIRE

Nevada Bar No. 12997

2600 Paseo Verde Pkwy., Suite 200

Henderson, Nevada 89074

Attorneys for Trustee ELEANOR CONNELL

HARTMAN AHERN

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1-5		<b>VERIFICATION</b>
STATE OF ///	)	***************************************
COUNTY OF LCC	): ss )	

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me

day of October, 2014.

ELEANOR CONNELL HARTMAN AHERN, as Trustee of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST dated May 18, 1972, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That I am the Movant herein; that I have read the above and foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING LIMITED INTEREST OF TRUST ASSETS PURSUANT TO NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), AND NRS 164.033(1)(A) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED PER NRCP 12(b)(5); that the same is true of my own knowledge, except for matters therein stated on information and belief, and as for those matters, I believe it to be true.

1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF MAILING</u>
2	I hereby certify that on the <u>q</u> day of October, 2014, I did email to JOSEPH.
3	POWELL, Esquire, as indicated below, and I did email and deposit in the U.S. Post Office at La
4	Vegas, Nevada, postage prepaid, a copy of the above and foregoing MOTION TO DISMIS
5	PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING LIMITED INTEREST O
6	TRUST ASSETS PURSUANT TO NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), AND NRS 164.033(1)(A
7	FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED PER NRC
8 9	12(b)(5), to each person as indicated below, addressed as follows:
0 1 2	Joseph J. Powell The Rushforth Firm. Ltd. P.O. Box 371655 Las Vegas, NV 89137-1655 probate@rushforthfirm.com
3 4 5	Whitney B. Warnick Albright, Stoddard, Warnick & Albright 801 South Rancho Drive, Suite D-4 Las Vegas, NV 89106 wbw@alrightstoddard.com
6	
8	Michael
9	An employee of JEFFREY BURR, LTD.
20	

# **INDEX OF EXHIBITS**

27		dated May 18, 1972 in the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, Case No. P-09-066425-T	
25 26		Trustee; And For Construction of And To Reform Of Trust Instrument in the matter of the W. N. Connell And Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust	51
24	K	in the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, Case No. P-09-066425-T  Notice of Entry Of Order Assuming Jurisdiction Over Trust Confirm	37
23		Construction of And To Reform Of Trust Instrument in the matter of the W. N. Connell And Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust dated May 18, 1972 in the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, Case No. P-09-066425-T.	
22	J	Order Assuming Jurisdiction Over Trust Confirm Trustee; And For	36
20 21		Living Trust dated May 18, 1972 in the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, Case No. P-09-066425-T	
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9	E	August 4, 2009 Letter From Mr. Brian Steadman, Esq.	31
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6	C	Quitclaim Deeds of Grantor W. N. Connell-Upton County, Texas	29
5	В	W. N. Connell And Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust dated May 18, 1972	28
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EXHIBIT A
Decree of Adoption

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FILED

CASE NO. 8044

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IN THE RIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

in the Matter of the Adoption of ELEANOR C. HARTMAN.

un Adult

DECREE OF ADOPTION

MARJORIE T. CONKELL and ELEANOR C. HARTMAN having presented their polition for approval of their adoption declaring that ELEANOR C. HARTMAN, an adult, is the child of Politicaer MARJORIE T. CONNELL; and said matter coming on requierly to be heard before the above-entitled Court, there appeared before the Gourt the Politicaers who were mamined by the Court, from which examination it is found that MARJORIE T. CONNELL is the stepmether and is more than twenty years older than ELEANOR C. HARTMAN; that both Politicaers are residents of the County of Clark, State of Newada; that both Politicaers are married; that the respective spouses of Politicaers have given their consents to the adoption of ELEANOR C. HARTMAN by MARJORIE T., CONNELL;

The Court being satisfied that the best interests of the Petitioners will be promoted by the proposed adoption, hereby grants the Petition and it is therefore

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the said adoption agreement is approved and that said ELEANOR C. HARTMAN, an adult, bo, and she hereby is, declared adopted by Patitioner MARJORIE T. CONNELL, and shell henceforth be regarded and treated in all respects as her child and have all the rights and be

LAW OPPICES
TOT R. GREGORY, Jr.
RESECUTION OFFICERING
LESS R. CELESCON SAITS.
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LION GIVICES TOY B. GERMORY, Ja. THE E. CHESLESTON MAN. LAS VIERAS. WY 03101

subject to all the duties of that relation. PATED MI 24 dry of November, 1971.

> JOSENI S. PAVUKOWSKI DISTRICT JUDGE

TOY BLEREGORY, JR., A Professional Corporation

By YOV R. GESSIONY, JR.
Attorney for Patitioners
1828 East Charteston Boulevard
Les Vegas, Nevedie

AA 1645

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AA 1646

### TRUST AGREEMENT

THIS TRUST AGREEMENT, made this Aday of May,

1972, by W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL, husband and wife,

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Grantors", when

reference is made to them in their capacity as creators of this

Trust and the transferrors of the principal properties thereof),

and W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL, of Las Vegas, Nevada,

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Trustee" when reference

is made to them in their capacity as the Trustee or fiduciary

hereunder), and by this instrument revoke the previous revocable

living trust made by us on the 1st day of Dec., 1971:

# WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the Grantors desire by this Trust Agreement to establish a revocable trust for the uses and purposes hereinafter set forth, to make provision for the care and management of certain of their present properties and for the ultimate disposition of the trust properties;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Grantors hereby give, grant, transfer, set over and deliver as the original trust estate. IN TRUST, unto the Trustee, who hereby declare that they have received from the Grantors all of the property listed on Schedule "A" (which schedule is attached hereto and made a part of this Trust Agreement), TO HAVE AND TO HOLD THE SAME IN TRUST, and to manage, invest and reinvest the same and any additions that may from time to time be made thereto, subject to the hereinafter provided trusts and the terms and conditions, powers and agreements, relating thereto.

any time and from time to time, by the Grantors, or either of them, or by any person or persons, by inter vivos act or testamentary transfer, or by insurance contract or trust designation.

The property comprising the original trust estate during the joint lives of the Grantors shall retain its character as their community property or separate property, as designated on the attached Schedule "A". Property subsequently received by the Trustee during the joint lives of the Grantors shall be listed on an appropriate schedule annexed hereto and shall have the separate or community character ascribed thereto on such schedule.

hereby shall be for the use and benefit of the Grantors and for ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN, the daughter of W. N. CONNELL by a prior marriage, and for her issue as hereinafter provided.

ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN shall hereinafter be designated as the "Residual Beneficiary".

This trust shall be known and identified as the "W. W. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust", and, for purposes of convenience, shall hereinafter be referred to as Trust No. 1.

SECOND: TRUST NO. 1. The Trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the trust estate and shall collect the income thereof and dispose of the net income and principal as follows:

- A. Income. The Trustee shall pay equally to the Grantors, during their joint lives, all community net income of the trust estate and shall pay to each Grantor all separate net income from his or her respective share of the trust estate. Such income shall be paid to the Grantors unless the Trustee receives written notice from the Grantors that all income shall not be distributed but shall be that all income shall not be distributed and reinvested as accumulated by the Trustee and invested and reinvested as herein provided.
- B. Principal. During the joint lives of the Grantors, the Trustee shall pay over and distribute to a Grantor such part or all of the principal of his or her separate property and his or her share of the community property placed in this initial trust by that Grantor as he or she shall demand in a writing directed to the Trustee.
- C. Death of Either Granter. Upon the death of the Granter whose death shall first occur, the Trustee shall divide the trust estate, including all property received as a result of the decedent's death, as follows:

- as a result of the decedent's death shall be divided into two parts, each part to be administered as a into two parts, each part to be administered as a separate trust to be known respectively as "Trust No. 2" and "Trust No. 3". Reference hereafter to the "Decedent" shall refer to either of the Grantors whose death shall first occur and reference to the "Survivor" shall refer to the other Grantor.
- 2. The Trustee shall allocate to Trust No. 3

  (a) the Survivor's separate property interest in the trust estate; (b) the Survivor's one-half (1/2) trust estate; (b) the Survivor's one-half (1/2) interest in the community property of the trust estate, less a proportionate part of all amounts properly chargeable against all community property; and (c) the Survivor's community property interest in any the Survivor's community property interest in any policy of insurance on the life of the Decedent owned by the Grantors as community property and made payable to Trust No. 1.
- 3. The Trustee shall allocate to Trust No. 3. from the Decedent's separate property an amount as determined in Article THIRD hereof.
- 4. The Trustee shall allocate to Trust No. 2, all the remaining protion of the trust estate not allocated to Trust No. 3, including, but not limited to, the Decedent's community property interest, if any, in any life insurance policy on the life of the Decedent payable to Trust No. 1.
- 5. In the event that property is received by the Trustee, by inter vivos or testamentary transfer and directions are contained in the instrument of transfer. for allocation to or between Trust No. 2 or Trust No. 3, then the Trustee shall make allocation in accordance with such directions, anything to the contrary herein, notwithstanding.
- 6. It is the intention of the parties, that ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN shall be a Co-'t trustee of the Decedent's separate property in trust in this Trust to the extent the term "Trustee", as hereinafter used, shall apply to her.

THIRD: MARITAL DEDUCTION. The Trustee shall allocate to.

Trust No. 3 from the Decedent's separate property the fractional share of the said assets which is equal to the maximum marital deduction allowed for federal estate tax purposes, reduced by the total of any other amounts allowed under the Internal Revenue Code as a Marital Deduction which are not a part of this trust estate. In making the computations and allocations of the said, property to Trust No. 3 as herein required, the determination of the character and ownership of the said property and the value thereof shall be as finally established for federal estate tax

purposes. This distribution is being made without regard to death taxes payable by reason of the Decedent's death, which taxes shall be paid from Trust No. 2 only.

FOURTH: TRUST NO. 2. The Trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the estate of Trust No. 2 and shall collect the income thereof and dispose of the net income and principal as follows:

- A. Death of Decedent. Upon the death of the Decedent, the Trustee shall pay from the income or principal of this trust, the death taxes, probate and legal expenses, and the expenses of the last illness and funeral of the Decedent, provided, however, that no funds received by the Trustee as proceeds from a retirement plan qualified under the Internal Revenue Code shall be available for these purposes unless there are no other assets in the Survivor's estate, in which event funds from a qualified plan can be used, but only to the extent of these actual expenses.
- B. Income. All income received by this Trust from the separate property of the Decedent shall be paid to the Residual Beneficiary. In the event any of the real property located in Upton County, Texas, as listed on the original Schedule "A" attached hereto, forms a part of the corpus of this Trust, the Residual Beneficiary shall be paid an additional payment from the income received from the Decedent's half of the community property, which forms a part of the corpus of this Trust, equal to all of the income received by this Trust from the real property located in Upton County, Texas. However, the provisions relating to the additional payment, shall be noncumulative, and in any calendar year in which the income received from the said community property is not sufficient to make full payment hereunder, the Trustee is directed to pay only the income which has been received by this Trust during that year, and not to carry forward any deficiency in payment to the next calendar year's income.

In the event the Residual Beneficiary predeceases the Survivor, the Residual Beneficiary's rights to receive income hereunder shall be paid to or for the benefit of her living children and the issue of any deceased: child by right of representation; or in the event she dies without living issue, her income rights hereunder shall become those of the Survivor.

All other income received by this Trust shall be 'distributed to the Survivor.

All payments as provided in this Section shall be made at frequent intervals, but at least semi-annually.

C. <u>Principal</u>. The Trustee shall pay over and distribute the principal of the estate of Trust No. 2 as follows:

- 1. Power to make gifts. The Survivor shall have the discretionary power during his or her lifetime to direct the Trustee to pay over and distribute trust principal of the separate property in trust from the Decedent's Trust to or for the benefit of the Residual Beneficiary or any of her living issue; such power may be exercised by delivering to the Trustee a writing duly executed and acknowledged, wherein he or she specifies the amount of principal that should be paid over and distributed to the particular issue and in what proportions such principal shall be paid over and distributed. It is the Grantors' intent hereby to convey upon the Survivor a sprinkling power; said power is limited, however, to appointments made to and among the Residual Beneficiary or her living issue.
- 2. Power of invasion. If, in the opinion of the Trustee, the income from all sources of which the Trustee has knowledge shall not be sufficient to support, maintain, educate and provide for the Survivor or Residual Beneficiary or any issue of the Residual Beneficiary in their accustomed manner of living, or in the event of any emergency befalling these said parties, such as illness, accident or other distress, the Trustee is authorized to use and expend such part of the trust principal of Decedent's separate property in trust, as the Trustee may deem necessary or desirable to meet such needs or emergencies. The decision of the Trustee as to what shall constitute an emergency or the necessity or desirability of encroachment upon principal shall be conclusive upon all parties and the Trustee shall be relieved and exonerated hereunder if the Trustee acts in good faith in making such determination.
- J. Sale of real property from Decedent's separate property. The Survivor is directed that in the event any additional money is needed for payment of funeral, last illness or other costs to settle any claims made against Decedent's estate, or in the event that the sale of Decedent's separate property is contemplated at any time, only the separate property of Decedent situated in Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, shall be sold to satisfy this obligation.
- 4. Sale of real property. In the event that any real property which is listed on Schedule "A" attached hereto as the Decedent's separate property, and, is a part of the corpus of Trust No. 2 is sold, the Grantors direct the Trustee to distribute the net proceeds from such sale, less any applicable income tax due because of such sale, to the Residual Beneficiary, free of trust. In the event the Residual Beneficiary is not living at the time of the said sale, the proceeds therefrom shall remain in this Trust, and shall be subject to all of the provisions as herein contained.

D. <u>Definition of real property</u>. The term "real property" as used in this Article FOURTH shall not include the mineral, oil and gas interests in Upton County, Texas, if the same are separately listed on Schedule "A" hereto.

FIFTH: TRUST NO. 3. The Trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the estate of Trust No. 3 and shall collect the income thereof and dispose of the net income and principal as follows:

A: Income. The Trustee shall pay to the Survivor during his or her lifetime all of the net income of the Survivor's trust estate in convenient, regular installments, but not less frequently than quarter-annually.

# B. Powers of appointment over income and principal.

- 1. During his or her lifetime, the Survivor shall have the power to appoint all or any part of the principal and undistributed income, if any, of the estate of Trust No. 3 to himself or herself, or to any person or persons. Such power of appointment shall be exercisable in all events, but only by the Survivor's submitting to the Trustee written instructions expressly exercising such power.
- 2. Upon the death of the Survivor, he or she shall have the absolute power to appoint the entire principal and the undistributed income, if any, of the estate of Trust No. 3, or any part thereof, to his or her estate or to any person or persons. Such power of appointment shall be exercised only by a provision in the Last Will of the Survivor expressly exercising such power. Unless within ninety (90) days after the death of the Survivor the Trustee has actual notice of the existence of a Will exercising such power, it shall be deemed for all purposes hereunder that such power was not exercised.
- C. Revocation and Amendments. The Survivor shall have the power to revoke, amend or terminate Trust No. 3 herein provided by delivering such amendments or revocation in writing to the Trustee provided that the Trustee's duties and liabilities cannot be increased without the Trustee's consent.
- D. Death of Survivor. Upon the death of the Survivor, the Trustee shall distribute the trust estate in accordance with and to the extent provided by the Survivor's exercise of his or her power of appointment.

If and to the extent that the Survivor shall fail to effectively exercise the foregoing power of appointment, the principal and undistributed income of Trust No. 3 shall, upon his or her death, be distributed to the Residual Beneficiary, or to the heirs of her body if she is not then living.

SIXTH: SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION. Each and every beneficiary under the Living Trust and the various estates created hereunder is hereby restrained from and shall be without right, power or authority to sell, transfer, assign, pledge, mortgage, hypothecate, alienate, anticipate, bequeath or devise, or in any manner affect or impair his, her or their beneficial right, title, interest, claim and estate in and to either the income or principal of any claim created hereunder, or to any part thereof, during the entire term of said trusts; nor shall the right, title, interest, or estate of any beneficiary be subject to any right, claim, demand, lien or judgment of any creditor of any such beneficiary, nor be subject nor liable to any process of law or equity, but all of the income and principal, except as otherwise provided in this Trust Agreement shall by the Trustee be payable and deliverable to or for the benefit of only the before named and designated beneficiaries, at the times hereinbefore set out, and receipt by such beneficiaries shall relieve the Trustee from responsibility for such good faith distributions.

SEVENTH: POWERS OF TRUSTEE. To carry out the purposes of any trust created under this instrument and subject to any limitations stated elsewhere in this Trust Agreement, the Trustee is vested with the following powers with respect to the trust estate and any part of it, in addition to those powers now or hereafter conferred by law:

- A. To continue to hold any property, including any shares of the Trustee's own stock and to operate at the risk of the trust estate any business that the Trustee receives or acquires under the trust as long as the Trustee deems advisable.
- B. To manage, control, grant options on, sell, (for cash or on deferred payments), convey, exchange, partition, divide, improve and repair trust property.
- C. To lease trust property for terms within or beyond the term of the trust and for any purpose, including

exploration for and removal of gas, oil and other minerals; and to enter into community oil leases, pooling and unitization agreements.

- D. To borrow money and to encumber or hypothecate trust property by mortgage, deed of trust, pledge, or otherwise; to borrow money on behalf of one trust from any other trust created hereunder to guarantee any loan made during the lifetime of the Grantors.
- E. To carry, at the expense of the trust, insurance of such kinds and in such amounts as the Trustee deems advisable to protect the trust estate and the Trustee against any hazard.
- F. To commence or defend such litigation with respect to the trust or any property of the trust estate as the Trustee may deem advisable at the expense of the trust.
- G. To compromise or otherwise adjust any claims or litigation against or in favor of the trust.
- H. To invest and reinvest the trust estate in every kind of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of investment, specifically including, but not by way of limitation, corporate obligations of every kind, stocks, preferred or common, shares of investment trusts, stocks, preferred or common, shares of investment trusts, investment companies, and mutual funds and mortgage participations, which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence acquire for their own account, and to invest in any common acquire for their own account, and to invest in any common trust fund administered by the Trustee and to lend money of one trust to any other trust created hereunder.
- I. With respect to securities held in the trust, to have all the rights, powers and privileges of an owner, including, but not by way of limitation, the power to vote, give proxies and pay assessments; to participate in voting trusts, pooling agreements, foreclosures, reorganizations, consolidations, mergers, liquidations, sales and leases and incident to such participation to deposit securities with and transfer title to any protective or other committee on such terms as the Trustee may deem advisable; and to exercise or sell stock subscriptions or conversion rights.
- J. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this instrument, the determination of all matters with respect to what is principal and income of the trust estate and the apportionment and allocation of receipts and expenses thereon shall be governed by the provisions of the Nevada Principal and Income Law and shall be determined by the Trustee in the Trustee's discretion; provided, however, that all capital gain distributions from mutual funds should be allocated to principal.
- K. All of the trust powers set forth in Nevada Revised Statutes 163.265 to 163.410 inclusive, are hereby incorporated into this Trust Agreement.

## EIGHTH: SPECIAL PROVISIONS.

A. Use of Home. The Trustee shall allow the Survivor to occupy and use until his or her death the home (or any interest therein) used by either or both Grantors as a principal residence at the time of the Decedent's death. The Trustee shall, at the discretion of the Survivor, sell such home, and if the Survivor so directs, purchase and/or build another comparable residence to be used as a home for the Survivor, and so on from time to time. The Survivor shall not be required to pay any rent for the use of such home.

# B. Revocation and Amendment.

- 1. (Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this clause):
  - (a) This Trust Agreement, and the trusts evidenced thereby, may be revoked at any time during the joint lives of the Grantors by either of the Grantors delivering written notice of revocation to the Trustee and to the other Grantor.
  - (b) This Trust Agreement, and the trusts evidenced thereby, may be amended at any time and from time to time during the joint lives of the Grantors by the joint action of both Grantors delivering such amendment or amendments in writing to the Trustee provided that the Trustee's duties and liabilities cannot be increased without the Trustee's consent.
  - (c) From and after the death of the Decedent, this Trust Agreement may not be revoked, altered or amended, except as provided in relation to Trust No. 3.
  - (d) Upon any revocation of this Trust Agreement, during the Grantors' joint lives, the Trustee shall return to each Grantor his or her half of the community assets and to each Grantor his or her separate property, as indicated on Schedule "A".
- 2. In the event that any insurance on the life of either Grantor, owned by the other Grantor as his or her separate property, is payable to the Trustee or Trustees of any trust hereunder, then this Trust Agreement and the trusts evidenced thereby may be amended or revoked, insofar as they relate to such insurance, only by the Grantor who is owner of such insurance. The insured Grantor shall have no right to revoke or amend to that extent. This paragraph shall be construed as limiting the rights of the insured-Grantor and not as expanding the rights of the owner-Grantor.

- C. Simultaneous Death. If there be no sufficient evidence that the Grantors died otherwise than simultaneously, then for purposes of this Trust Agreement, it shall be conclusively presumed for all purposes of administration and tax effect of this Trust Agreement that the Decedent shall be the Husband and the Survivor shall be the Wife.
- D. Limitation of Trust Powers. Administrative control and all other powers relating to the various trust estates created hereunder, shall be exercised by the Trustee in a fiduciary capacity and solely for the benefit of the Survivor and the other beneficiaries as herein provided. Neither the Trustee, the Grantors, nor any other person, shall be permitted to purchase, exchange, reacquire or otherwise deal with or dispose of the principal of any of the various trust estates or the income therefrom, for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth; nor shall any person borrow the principal or income of the trust estates, directly or indirectly, without adequate interest in any case or without adequate security therefor.
- Trustee, as herein provided, shall receive reasonable compensation for ordinary services performed hereunder. Reasonable compensation shall be based upon the then prevailing rates charged for similar services in the locality where the same are performed by other fiduciaries engaged in the trust business or acting as trustees.
- respects be governed by the laws of the State of Nevada and shall in all respects be governed by the laws of the State of Nevada; provided, however, the Trustee shall have the discretion, exercisable at any later time and from time to time, to administer Trust No. 1 pursuant to the laws of any jurisdiction in which the Trustee may be domiciled, by executing and acknowledging a written instrument to that effect and attaching the same to this Trust Agreement, and, if the Trustee so exercises the Trustee's discretion, as above provided, the various trust estates shall be governed by the laws of the other state or jurisdiction in which Trust No. 1 is then being administered.
- G. Invalid Provisions. In the event any clause, provision or provisions of this Trust Agreement and the Living Trust created hereunder prove to be or be adjudged invalid or void for any reason, then such invalid or void clause, provision or provisions, shall not affect the whole of this instrument, but the balance of the provisions hereof shall remain operative and shall be carried into effect insofar as legally possible. If any provision contained in this Trust Agreement shall otherwise violate the rules against perpetuities now or hereafter in effect in the State of Nevada or in any state by which this Living Trust may subsequently be governed, that portion of the Trust so effected shall be administered as herein provided until the termination of the maximum period authorized by law, at which time and forthwith, such part of the said trust estate so

affected shall be distributed in fee simple to the beneficiary or beneficiaries in the proportions in which they are then entitled to enjoy the benefits so terminated.

- H. Incompetency of Beneficiary. During any period in which any beneficiary under this Trust Agreement is judicially declared incompetent, or in the opinion of the Trustee is unable to care for himself, the Trustee shall pay over or use for the benefit of said incompetent beneficiary any part or all of the net income or principal from his or her share of the trust estate, in such manner as the Trustee shall deem necessary or desirable for said beneficiary's support, maintenance and medical care.
- I. Claimants. The Grantors have, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Trust Agreement, intentionally and with full knowledge declined to provide for any and all of their heirs or other persons who may claim an interest in their respective estates or in these trusts.
- J. Headings. The various clause headings used herein are for convenience of reference only and constitute no part of this Trust Agreement.
  - K. Copies. This Trust Agreement may be executed in any number of copies and each shall constitute an original of one and the same instrument.
  - L. Construction. Whenever it shall be necessary to interpret this trust, the masculine, feminine and neuter personal pronouns may be construed interchangeably, and the singular shall include the plural and the plural the singular.

NINTH: LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES. With respect to any policies of life insurance under which the Trustee is designated as beneficiary, the Trustee shall deal with such policies as required by the following trust provisions, in addition to the general trust provisions hereinbefore and hereinafter set forth:

- A. <u>Custody of Insurance Policies</u>. The Trustee shall have the custody of any policy of life insurance under which the Trustee is designated as beneficiary. However, the owner shall have the right to possession of said policy or policies upon written request to the Trustee.
- B. <u>Payment of Premiums</u>. The Trustee shall be under no obligation to pay the premium of any policy or policies of insurance, nor to make certain that such premiums are paid by the Grantors or others, nor to notify any persons of the non-payment of such premiums; and, the Trustee shall be under no responsibility or liability of any kind in case such premiums are not paid.

C. Collection of Policy Proceeds. Upon the death of the insured under such policy or policies, the Trustee shall collect all proceeds due thereon and the Trustee shall make all reasonable efforts to carry out the provisions of this Trust Agreement, including the maintenance of or defense of any action or suit; provided, however, the Trustee shall be under no duty to maintain or enter into any litigation unless the expenses thereof, including counsel fees and costs, have been advanced or guaranteed in an amount and in a manner which is reasonably satisfactory. The Trustee may repay any advances made by the Trustee or reimburse itself for any such fees and costs expended in reasonable attempts for collection of such proceeds out of the principal or income of the trust.

D. Purchase of Assets. The Trustee is hereby authorized and empowered to apply any part or the whole amount of any insurance proceeds collected hereunder to purchase assets from the insured's estate which may be offered for sale by the legal representative of the insured's estate at a price equal to the value of such assets as fixed by competent authority for purposes of determining the liability of the insured's estate for death taxes or at such other price as may be agreed upon by the personal representative of the insured's estate.

TENTH: NON-CONTEST PROVISION. The Grantors specifically desire that these trusts created herein be administered and distributed without litigation or dispute of any kind. If any beneficiary of these trusts or any other person, whether stranger, relatives or heirs, or any legatees or devisees under the Last Will and Testament of the Grantors or the successors in interest of any such persons, including any person who may be entitled to receive any portion of the Grantors' estates under the intestate laws of the State of Nevada, seek or establish to assert any claim to the assets of these trusts established herein, or attack, oppose or seek to set aside the administration and distribution of the said trusts, or to have the same declared null and void or diminished, or to defeat or change any part of the provisions of the trust established herein, then in any ## www.comesta.com is the second of the control of and all of the above mentioned cases and events, such person or persons shall receive One Dollar (\$1.00) and no more in lieu

of any interest in the assets of the trusts.

Residual Beneficiary shall predecease the Grantors without living issue or children of any deceased child, then the Grantors direct that all of the income and principal of any trusts created hereunder shall be distributed to the Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children upon the death of the Survivor.

In the event of the death or incapacity of either Grantor, the Survivor shall continue to serve as the sole Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder. Upon the death or incapacity of the Survivor, the Grantors then nominate and appoint ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN as the Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder, or in the event that she is unable or unwilling to serve in the said capacity, then the Grantors nominate and appoint the FIRST NATIONAL BANK. OF NEVADA to serve in the said capacity. No successor trustee shall have any responsibility for the acts or omissions of any prior trustee and no duty to audit or investigate the accounts or administration of any such trustee, nor, unless in writing requested so to do by a person having a present or future beneficial interest under a trust created hereunder, any duty to take action or obtain redress for breach of trust.

THIRTEENTH: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, REPORTS, INSPECTION OF RECORDS.

The Trustee hereby acknowledges receipt of and accepts the property and the estate of Trust No. 1 created hereunder on the terms and conditions stated and agrees to care for, manage and control the same in accordance with the directions herein specified, and to furnish to each beneficiary having income paid, distributed, credited or accumulated for his or her benefit, annually and more often if requested so to do, a statement showing

the condition of the trust property, the character and amounts of the investments and liabilities, and the receipts, expenses and disbursements since the last previous statement. The books of account of the Trustee in connection with the investments shall at all times be open to the reasonable inspection of the living beneficiaries or their duly qualified representatives, and such person or persons as they may designate for that purpose.

THIS TRUST AGREEMENT is accepted and executed by the Grantors and Trustee in the State of Nevada on the day and year first above written.

GRANTORS:

W. N. CONNELL

MARJORIE T. CONNELL

TRUSTEE:

Marjain J. Connell

MARJORJE T. CONNELL

STATE OF NEVADA)

COUNTY OF CLARK)

On \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, 1972, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public, W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL, who declared to me that they executed the foregoing Trust Agreement.

County and State

CLARK COURTY JUNE A. GAVIN My Commission expires May 1, 1970 SCHEDULE "A"

("The W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust")

All of the Grantors' rights, title and interest in the following assets are hereby transferred to the Trustee as part of this trust estate and will be administered and distributed in accordance with the terms of the foregoing Trust Agreement.

The following real property interests constitute the community property of the Grantors:

- 1. Lots One (1) and Two (2) in Block Sixteen (16) of South Addition to the City of Las Vegas, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 1 of Plats, page 51, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.
- 2. Lot Three (3), Block Six (6), Biltmore Addition to the City of Las Vegas, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 2 of Plats, Page 33, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.
- 3. Lots Fifteen (15) and Sixteen (16) in Block Fifteen (15) in the South Addition to the City of Las Vegas as shown by map thereof on file in Book 1 of Plats. Page 14, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.
- 4. Lots Twenty-Two (22) and Twenty-Three (23) in Block Eleven (11) of South Addition to the City of Las Vegas as shown by map thereof on file in Book 1 of Plats, Page 51, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.
- 5. Lots Twenty-four (24) and Twenty-five (25) in Block Eleven (11) of South Addition to the City of Las Vegas, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 1 of Plats, page 51, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.

The following assets constitute the separate property of W. N. CONNELL:

- 1. Real Property:
  - (a) That portion of the North Half (N 1/2) of the South Half (S 1/2) of the Southwest Quarter (SW 1/4) of Section 28. Township 20 South, Range 61 East, M.D.B.&M., described as follows:

Beginning at the point of intersection of the East Line of the Northwest Quarter (NW 1/4) of

the Southeast Quarter (SE 1/4) of the Southwest Quarter (SW 1/4) of said Section 28, said Township and Range, (hereinafter called Line 1) with the South boundary of Clark Avenue produced Westerly as the same is now established (hereinafter called Line 2); thence South along said Line 1 a distance of 378 feet; thence North 89° 36' West and parallel to said Line 2 a distance of 100 feet; thence North along a line parallel to said Line 1 a distance of 378 feet to said Line 2; thence East along said Line 2, 100 feet to the point of beginning-

Together with an undivided 1/30th interest of, in and to all water flowing or otherwise produced from that certain artesian well located in the North Half of the South Half of the Southeast Quarter of Section 29, Township 20 South, Range 61 East, M.D.B.&M, known as the New Russell Well. Together with an undivided 1/30th interest in and to that certain pipe line connected to and running from said well Easterly to a point 100 feet West from said Line 1 above described; together with an easement for said pipe line in common with all the other owners of said pipe line along a strip of ground three feet in width, the center line of which is located approximately 150 feet South of and running parallel with said Line 2, and which strip extends from said well to a point 100 feet West from said Line 1; together with the right to enter thereon for the purpose of repairing, replacing and renewing said pipe line.

Reference: Deed # 180405, Book 35, pages 159 and 160.

- (b) The West 1/2 of Section 37, all of Sections 38, 47 and 48 in Block 39, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey in Upton County, Texas.
- 2. Oil, gas and mineral rights on and under the following described real property in Upton County, Texas.
  - (a) Sections 31 and 42 of Block 38, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey.
  - (b) Sections 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47 and 48 of Block 39, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey.
  - (c) Sections 36 and 37 of Block 40, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey.
- 3. The oil, gas and mineral leases on the following described real property in Upton County, Texas.
  - (a) Sections 31 and 42 of Block 38, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey.
  - (b) Sections 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47 and 48 of Block 39, Township 5 South, T. & P. R. R. Co. Survey.

(c) Sections 36 and 37 of Block 40, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey.

The undersigned Grantors named in the foregoing Trust Agreement hereby certify that they have read said Trust Agreement and that it fully and accurately sets out the terms, trusts and conditions under which the trust estate therein described is to be held, managed and disposed of by the Trustee therein named; and, that they hereby approve, ratify and confirm the said Trust Agreement.


M. N. CONNELL

MARJORIE T. CONNELL

STATE OF NEVADA)
) SS
COUNTY OF CLARK)

on hand, who acknowledged to me that they executed the foregoing Trust Agreement.

Notary Public in and for said County and State



# EXHIBIT C

Quitclaim Deeds of Grantor W. N. Connell-Upton County, Texas

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	<u>.</u>



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SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE

61969

### QUITCLAIM DEED

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COMPUTED ON FULL VALUE OF PROPERTY CONVEYED,
OR COMPUTED ON FULL VALUE LESS LIENS AND
ENCOMBRANCES RÉMAINING AT TIME OF SALE.
Whi amuel.
Signature of Declarant or Agent determining tax. Firm Name

FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged

WILLIAM N. CONNELL, also known as W. N. CONNELL

o hereby

TIP

REMISE RELEASE AND FOREVER QUITCLAIM to W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL, as TRUSTEE All of his rights and title to the Oil, Gas and Minerals interest on and under the following described property

the real enterty in the State of TEXAS.

STATEMENTS TO.

NAME

County of UPTON!

SUBJECT TO: "The W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE W. CONNELL LIVING TRUST"
dated May 18, 1972.

- (a) Sections 31 and 42 of Block 38, Township 5 South, T. P. RR. Co. Survey
- (b) Sections 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47 and 48 of Block 39, Township 5 South, T. & P. R.R. Co. Survey.
- (c) Sections 36 and 37 of Block 40, Township 5 South, T. & P. RR. Co. Survey

alod: Gune 5, 1972 :	Syclian h Connell
V	William N. Connell
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itate of Galifornia;	•
County of Clark 3	
on June 5, 1922	_, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State,
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personally appeared W/LL/A M	
known to me to be the person whose namesubscribe	hed to the within instrument and acknowledged that
Witness my hand and official seal.	•
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ELSIE M. BELLONI	(Seal) Com M. Colore Metery Public in and for said State.
NOTARY PUBLIC - NEVADA	
CLARK COUNTY My Commission Expires Jan. 19, 1976	•
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DEED-OUITCLAIM-WOLCOTTS FORM 790

This standard form covers most usual problems in the field indicated. Before you sign, read 2. Ill in all blaists, said make changes proper to your transaction. Controll a lawyer if you doubt the form's fibers for your purpose.

FILED FOR RECORD ON THE Listipay OF June A.D., 19 72 AT 10:04 O'CLOCK A. M. DULY RECORDED THIS THE Listipay OF June A.D., 19 72 AT 1:00 O'CLOCK P. M. INSTRUMENT NO. 61969.

VOL. 409 PAGE 329 LOCAL RECORDS

BUENA R. COFFEE, COUNTY CLERK

ADDRESS

Hense Street Address City & State	W. N. Connell 727 So. 3nd Street Las Ulyan. Neveda 891	7
ă tată	and algorithm to me	٢

SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE-

61970

### QUITCLAIM DEED

INSTRUMENT NO. 61970

DOCUMENTARY TRANSFER TAX & MORE
COMPUTED ON FULL VALUE OF PROPERTY CONVEYED,
ENCUMBRANCES REMAINING AT TIME OF SALE.
Signature of Declarant or Agent determining tax. Firm Name

FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged

WILLIAM N. CONNELL, also known as W. N. CONNELL

does heroby

REMISE, RELEASE AND FOREVER QUITCLAIM to W. W. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL, as TRUSTEE. SUBJECT TO: "The W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust" dated! May 18, 1972 with complete powers of disposition of the real estate herein described the real property in the x3/miant Schlinnia described ax: County of Upton State of Texas

The West 1/2 of Section 37, all of Sections 38, 47, and 48 in Block 39, Township 5 South, T. & F. R.R. Co. Survey in Upton County: Texas.

Dated: June 5. 1972	Twilliam h Como	el"
·	William N. Connell ::	
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State of California.  County of Cland.		•
on June 5, 1972	before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for sa	Id State,
known to me to be the person whose name subscribe executed the same.	and to the within instrument and acknowledged that	2
Witness my hand and official seal.		
ELSIE M. BELLONI  NOTARY PUBLIC - NEVADA	(Seal) Rotary Public in and for seld State.	24
CLARK COUNTY My Commission Expires Jan. 19, 1976		
Title Order Ko.	Escrow or Loan Ro	
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STATEMENTS TO		
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DEED-QUITCLAIM-WOLCOTTS FORM 780 Dis nandard form coren most ergel problems by the field believed, Before you clear read it, all in all bleate,

## EXHIBIT D

Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe And Reform Trust of Eleanor Ahern in the matter of the W. N. Connell And Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust dated May 18, 1972 in the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, Case No. P-09-066425-T



1-924990-60-9

Aug 17 12 21 Mi '09 AUG 17 2009

MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 00418 BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 10771 SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Telephone: 702.853.5483 Facsimile: 702.853.5485

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Attorneys for ELEANOR C. AHERN, Petitioner

#### DISTRICT COURT

### **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Case No. P.00 P. 09-066425 PC1 In the Matter of the THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. ) CONNELL LIVING TRUST, Dated May 18, 1972

An Intervivos Irrevocable Trust.

Date of Hearing: September 4, 2009 Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m.

## PETITION TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER TRUST; CONFIRM TRUSTEE; AND CONSTRUE AND REFORM TRUST

Petitioner, ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN ("Petitioner"), as successor Trustee of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972 (the "Trust"), by and through counsel Mark A. Solomon, Esq., of the law firm of SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD., hereby respectfully petitions this Court to assume jurisdiction over the Trust, to confirm the Petitioner as Trustee of the Trust and any and all sub-trusts created under the Trust, to construe the Trust, and for an order reforming the distributions to the beneficiaries after the death of the Petitioner and the provisions appointing the successor Trustee. Pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes ("NRS") 153.031(b), (e), and (n), 155.140, 164.050, 164.010, and

Page 1 of 18

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164.015, Petitioner alleges as follows:

#### I.

# PETITION TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER TRUST AND CONFIRM THE APPOINTMENT OF PETITIONER AS TRUSTEE

- 1. W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL ("MARJORIE"), husband and wife, as the grantors ("Grantors") and initial trustees, established the Trust on May 18, 1972, a copy of which is attached to this Petition as Exhibit "1."
- 2. W. N. CONNELL died on November 24, 1979, and was survived by his wife, MARJORIE.

  A copy of W. N. CONNELL's death certificate is attached hereto as Exhibit "2."
- 3. The Petitioner is W. N. CONNELL's only surviving child. MARJORIE had no children during her lifetime, but formally adopted the Petitioner.
- 4. Pursuant to Article Twelfth, upon W. N. CONNELL's death, MARJORIE was named as the successor Trustee. See, Trust, Ex. 1, at pg. 13.
- 5. Pursuant to Section C of Article Second and Article Third, upon W. N. CONNELL's death, the Trust was divided between Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3. MARJORIE served as successor Trustee of the Trust, including Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3, until her death.
- 6. On May 6, 1980, the Petitioner was named as Co-Trustee of the Trust, as is indicated in the Substitution of Trustee, attached hereto as Exhibit "3." The Petitioner served as Co-Trustee until the death of MARJORIE.
  - 7. MARJORIE died on May 1, 2009. A copy of MARJORIE's death certificate<sup>2</sup> is attached hereto as Exhibit "4."
    - 8. Pursuant to Article Twelfth, upon the death or incapacity of both W. N. CONNELL and

The social security number has been redacted.

The social security number has been redacted.

MARJORIE, the Petitioner is to serve as successor Trustee. See, Trust, Ex. 1, at pg. 13. The Petitioner is currently serving as sole Trustee of the Trust, including Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3. 2 The Petitioner is currently residing in Clark County, Nevada. The Trust is currently being 9. administered in Clark County, Nevada. Section F of Article Eighth states as follows: 10. Applicable Law. This Trust Agreement is executed under the F. laws of the State of Nevada and shall in all respects be governed by the laws of the State of Nevada. 8 9 NRS 164.010(1) and (2) provides in pertinent part as follows: 11. 101 Upon the petition of any person appointed as trustee of an express 1. trust by any instrument other than a will . . . the district court of the county in 11 which the trustee resides or conducts business, or in which the trust has been domiciled, shall consider the application to confirm the appointment of the 12 trustee and specify the manner in which the trustee must qualify. Thereafter the 13 court has jurisdiction of the trust as a proceeding in rem. 14 If the court grants the petition, it may consider at the same time any petition for instructions filed with the petition for confirmation. 15 16 It is appropriate for this Court to confirm Petitioner as Trustee since the Trust designates her 12. 17 to serve as successor Trustee upon the death of both W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE death. 18 Further, in rem jurisdiction over the Trust is proper since the Trust is domiciled and being 13. 19 administered in Nevada. Therefore, this Court should confirm the appointment of the Petitioner as Trustee of the Trust 21 14. and exercise in rem jurisdiction over the Trust. 23 II. PETITION TO CONSTRUE AND REFORM TRUST 24 Pursuant to Section C of Article Second and Article Third, upon W. N. CONNELL's death, 25 15. 26 MARJORIE, as the Trustee, allocated to Trust No. 3: (1) MARJORIE's separate interest in the trust 27 estate; (2) MARJORIE's one-half (1/2) interest in the community property of the trust estate; and (3) an 28 Page 3 of 18

amount of property which qualified for the maximum marital deduction allowed for federal estate tax purposes, reduced by the total of any other amounts allowed under the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") as federal estate tax credits. MARJORIE allocated to Trust No. 2 the balance of the Trust assets. See, Trust, Ex. 1, at pgs. 2 and 3.

- 16. The division of the Trust into Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3 is similar to a type of trust commonly known as an "AB" trust, where upon the death of the first settlor, an amount equal to the federal estate tax exemption is allocated to a credit shelter type trust with the remaining assets allocated to a trust for the surviving spouse. In a standard AB trust, the assets allocated to the credit shelter trust are for the benefit of the deceased spouse's beneficiaries while the remaining assets are for the benefit of the surviving spouse.
- 17. Indeed, Trust No. 2 was drafted in such a manner as to benefit both the Petitioner and MARJORIE, who would typically be W. N. CONNELL's beneficiaries. Additionally, Trust No. 3 was for MARJORIE's benefit during her lifetime, and, more importantly, MARJORIE retained the testamentary power to appoint the balance of Trust No. 3 to her estate or to any person or persons. See, Trust, Ex. 1, at pg. 6.3
- 18. As of the death of MARJORIE, Trust No. 2 owned land and oil and gas shares in reserves and income located in Upton County, Texas (the "Oil Assets"). The Oil Assets have not been valued for some time, but are estimated to be worth approximately \$700,000.
- 19. Pursuant to Article Fourth, which Article governs the administration of Trust No. 2, all income from the Oil Assets is to be paid to the Petitioner as the "Residual Beneficiary" during her

MARJORIE exercised this power of appointment prior to her death as indicated in Article Four of the Last Will and Testament of MARJORIE, dated January 7, 2008. A copy of MARJORIE's Last Will and Testament is attached hereto as Exhibit "5." The beneficiary of the exercise of the power of appointment was the MTC Living Trust, which contains provisions for the benefit of the Petitioner's issue.

lifetime.<sup>4</sup> Such income has been paid to the Petitioner since the creation of Trust No. 2 after W. N. CONNELL's death. Section B of Article Fourth, governing Trust No. 2, provides as follows: 20. Income. . . . In the event that the [Petitioner] predeceases B. [MARJORIE], the [Petitioner's] right to receive income hereunder shall be paid to or for the benefit of her living children and the issue of any deceased child by right of representation; or in the event she dies without leaving issue, her income rights hereunder shall become those of [MARJORIE]. See, Trust, Ex. 1, at pg. 4. Although Trust No. 2 provides for a contingent distribution of the income from Trust No. 2 21. 10 in the event that the Petitioner predeceased MARJORIE, no provision is made as to the final distribution 11 of Trust No. 2 after the death of the Petitioner, in the event that MARJORIE predeceased the Petitioner. 12 Upon assuming jurisdiction of a trust, this Court "has exclusive jurisdiction" over 22. 13 proceedings to construe the terms of the trust and declare the rights of the parties, including "any appropriate relief provided for with regards to a testamentary trust in NRS 153.031." See, NRS 15 16 164.015(1). NRS 153.031 provides, in pertinent part: 17 A trustee or beneficiary may petition the court regarding any aspect of the affairs of the trust, including: 18 19 Determining the construction of the trust instrument; (b) 20 Ascertaining beneficiaries and determining to whom property is 21 to pass or be delivered upon final or partial termination of the trust, to the extent 22 not provided in the trust instrument; 23 24 Section B of Article Fourth also states that all income received by Trust No. 2, other 25 than that received from the Oil Assets, is to be paid to MARJORIE. However, as the sole asset of Trust No. 2 consists of the Oil Assets, this provision is inapplicable. Additionally, Trust No. 2 26 granted to MARJORIE the power to appoint and/or invade the principal of Trust No. 2 during her 27 lifetime. See, Trust, Ex. 1, at pg. 5. Petitioner is informed and believes that MARJORIE did not exercise her power of appointment nor was the principal invaded for her benefit during her lifetime. 28

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- (n) Approving or directing the modification or termination of the trust[.]
- 23. A trust instrument may be reformed to conform with the settlor's intent, which may be ascertained from the trust instrument as a whole. See, Sheinkopf v. Bornstein, 823 N.E.2d 372 (Mass. 2005); see also, Dassori v. Patterson, 440 Mass. 1039, 802 N.E.2d 553 (2004) (A trust instrument may be reformed to conform with the settlor's intent.) The equitable power of the court to modify or reform a trust extends to situations where trust instrument contains some expression of trustor's intention, but drafting error renders that expression ambiguous. See, Ike v. Doolittle, 61 Cal. App. 4th 51, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 887 (4th Dist. 1998) (Recognizing the common law equitable power and the statutory authority of the court to alter administrative or distributive provisions of trust where necessary to accomplish purpose of trust).
- On the application of the trustee or one or more beneficiaries, the court possesses and frequently exercises the power to modify the terms of the trust in order to effectuate the accomplishment of the purposes of the settlor. See generally, *Bogert on Trusts and Trustees*, §994; Restatement, Third, Trusts, §62. The court has equitable power to order reformation of a trust; and, once the court acquires jurisdiction, it is authorized to administer full, complete, and final relief. *See*, *Schroeder v. Gebhart*, 825 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2002), review denied, 845 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2003).
- 25. If, due to a mistake, the trust does not contain the terms that were intended by the settlor, the settlor or other interested party may maintain a suit in equity to have the instrument reformed so that it will contain the terms that were actually agreed upon or that reflect the settlor's actual intent. See, Restatement, Second, Trusts, §333. See also, Restatement, Third, Trusts, §62.
- 26. The Petitioner is informed and believes that the failure to provide for distribution upon Petitioner's death is an omission due to scrivener error. Indeed, the Trust as a whole appears to be an

"AB" type trust whereby each spouse designates the beneficiaries they intend to receive such spouse's share, but, in the case of the Trust, the final dispositive provisions of Trust No. 2 were omitted. 2 Indeed, Article Fourth of the Trust, governing Trust No. 2 makes adequate provision for 27. numerous other contingencies for the disposition of Trust No. 2, but appears to omit a provision for alternate disposition in the current situation - where MARJORIE predeceased the Petitioner. See, Trust, Ex. 1, at pgs. 4 and 5. The Grantors' intent as to the final disposition of Trust No. 2 after the death of the Petitioner 28. can be derived from the contingent dispositions of Trust No. 2 and the dispositve terms of Trust No. 3. 10 Section B of Article Fourth, governing Trust No. 2, provides that the income from Trust No. 29. 11 2 is to be distributed to the Petitioner's issue if the Petitioner predeceased MARJORIE. Additionally, 12 Trust No. 2 provides that, if the Petitioner predeceased MARJORIE leaving no issue, that MARJORIE 13 be entitled to the income from the Oil Asset. These provisions show the Grantors had an overall 14 dispositive model for Trust No. 2 in mind, which included not only the Petitioner, but the Petitioner's 15 16 issue. 17 As outlined in Section D of Article Fifth, governing Trust No. 3, adequate provisions are 30. 18 made in for Trust No. 3 for the contingency of MARJORIE predeceasing the Petitioner, as follows: Death of Survivor. Upon the death of the Survivor, the Trustee 20 shall distribute the trust estate in accordance with and to the extent provided by the Survivor's exercise of his or her power of appointment. 21 22 If, and to the extent that the Survivor shall fail to effectively exercise the foregoing power of appointment, the principal and undistributed income of Trust 23 No. 3 shall, upon his or her death, be distributed to the Residual Beneficiary, or to the heirs of her body if she is not then living. 24 See, Trust, Ex. 1, at pg. 6. 26 Moreover, Section D of Article Fifth, governing Trust No. 3, provides that, upon the death 31. 27 of both W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE, the balance of Trust No. 3, if not otherwise appointed, is to

be distributed to the Petitioner or, if she is not living, then to her heirs. This provision clearly shows the Grantors' overall intent that the assets be vested in remainder beneficiaries, in particular the Petitioner and her heirs.

- 32. Bringing together the dispositive provisions of Trust No. 2 and Trust No. 3, the Grantors' intentions can be derived as follows: that, upon the death of the Petitioner, the balance of Trust No. 2 is to vest in the Petitioner's heirs.
- 33. Based on the terms of the Trust, the Petitioner requests that this Court: (1) construe the Trust to provide that it is the intent of W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL, as Grantors, to distribute the residue of Trust No. 2 to ELEANOR C. AHERN's heirs upon her death;<sup>5</sup> and (2) reform Trust No. 2 in accordance with such intention by adding new Sections "E," "F," "G," and "H" to Article Fourth as follows:
  - E. <u>Distribution Upon Death of both the Survivor and the Residual Beneficiary</u>. Upon the death of both the Survivor and the Residual Beneficiary, the Trustee shall divide the balance of Trust No. 2 into two equal shares, as follows:
  - 1. One (1) equal share shall be distributed, outright and free of trust, to the Residual Beneficiary's daughter, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, if she is then living. Subject to Section (F) below, if, as of the date of the Residual Beneficiary's death, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA is not then living, then said equal share shall be distributed to JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA's then living issue, by right of representation. Each share created pursuant to this Section E(1) of Article Fourth for the benefit of the issue of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA shall be held as a separate trust ("Beneficiary's Share") for the benefit of such issue ("Beneficiary") to be held by the Trustee, administered and further distributed pursuant to Section G of this Article Fourth.
  - 2. One (1) equal share shall be distributed, outright and free of trust, to the Residual Beneficiary's daughter, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER, if she is then living. Subject to Section (F) below, if, as of the date of the Residual Beneficiary's death, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER is not then living, then said equal

The Petitioner's heirs as of the date of this Petition are her two (2) daughters, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER.

share shall be distributed to KATHRYN A. BOUVIER's then living issue, by right of representation. Each share created pursuant to this Section E(2) of Article Fourth for the benefit of the issue of KATHRYN A. BOUVIER shall be held as a separate trust ("Beneficiary's Share") for the benefit of such issue ("Beneficiary") to be held by the Trustee, administered and further distributed pursuant to Section G of this Article Fourth.

- 3. In the event that both JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER predecease the Grantors, leaving no issue, and having failed to exercise the testamentary power of appointment pursuant to Section (F) below, then the balance shall be distributed in accordance with Article Eleventh herein.
- F. <u>Power of Appointment</u>. In the event that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA or KATHRYN A. BOUVIER predeceases the Residual Beneficiary, upon the death of the Residual Beneficiary, the Trustee shall distribute such beneficiary's equal share to or in trust for such one or more persons or organizations and in such manner and proportions as such beneficiary may appoint by her will or revocable trust making specific reference to this general power of appointment.
- G. <u>Management of Beneficiary's Shares</u>. Until a Beneficiary has attained the age of twenty-one (21) years, the Trustee may distribute to or apply for the benefit of such Beneficiary so much of the income or principal from such Beneficiary's Share as the Trustee determines, in the Trustee's sole discretion, is necessary to provide for his or her health, education, maintenance, and support. In addition, the Trustee may make the following discretionary distributions:
- 1. <u>Investment in Business</u>. The Trustee may, in the Trustee's sole discretion, apply the principal or income of such Beneficiary's Share for the purpose of investing in a business or profession operated by, or to be operated by, such Beneficiary and to be owned by the Beneficiary's Share.
- discretion, apply the income and principal of such Beneficiary's Share for the purpose of purchasing one or more residences to be owned by the Beneficiary's Share and used and occupied by such Beneficiary and his or her family, including a primary residence, seasonal residence or otherwise. In the case of any residence owned by the Beneficiary's Share, and in the Trustee's sole discretion, such Beneficiary may occupy and use such residence without rent or any other financial obligation for the payment of the taxes, insurance payments, maintenance costs and other expenses required in order to keep such residences in proper repair and free of liens.
- 3. <u>Use of Tangible Trust Assets</u>. The Trustee, in the Trustee's sole discretion, may grant such Beneficiary the right to the use, possession and

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- 4. <u>Distribution of Beneficiary's Share</u>. Upon a Beneficiary attaining the age of twenty-one (21), the Trustee shall distribute to him or her, outright and free of trust, the remaining principal and accumulated income of that Beneficiary's Share. If the Beneficiary has already reached the age of twenty-one (21) at the time of the creation of the Beneficiary's Share, then the Trustee shall, upon making the division, distribute, outright and free of trust, to the Beneficiary the balance of such Beneficiary's Share.
- Distribution Upon Death of Beneficiary. If any Beneficiary shall · 5. die prior to the complete distribution of such Beneficiary's Share, then all of the remaining assets in such Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed to or in trust for such one or more persons or organizations and in such manner and proportions as such Beneficiary may appoint by his or her will or revocable trust making specific reference to this general power of appointment. To the extent that the Beneficiary does not exercise this general power of appointment, the remainder of such Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed to the issue of such Beneficiary in equal shares by right of representation and each such share shall be held, managed and further distributed by the Trustee as a Beneficiary's Share under Section G of Article Fourth. If the Beneficiary shall die failing to exercise this general power of appointment without leaving issue, then the Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed pro rata to the other Beneficiary's Shares then being administered by the Trustee hereunder, and if none, then to the Beneficiary's heirs at law under the intestacy laws of the State of Nevada.
- Distributions to or for the Benefit of Minors or Persons Under Disability. Whenever the Trustee is given the power or discretion to make distributions to or for the benefit of a minor or other beneficiary under a disability, the Trustee, in the Trustee's sole discretion, may make distributions to a minor or other person under disability by making distributions to the guardian or conservator of his or her estate and/or person, as the Trustee shall determine, or to any suitable person with whom he or she resides, or the Trustee may apply distributions directly for such beneficiary's benefit, or the Trustee may make distributions to any duly established custodian for any minor beneficiary under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or Uniform Transfers to Minors Act of any State. Any custodian acting on behalf of a minor beneficiary shall have the power to bind the beneficiary with respect to all matters concerning the Trust. The Trustee, in its sole discretion, may also make distributions directly to a minor if, in the Trustee's judgment, such minor is of sufficient age and maturity to receive such distribution and spend the money The previous language of this paragraph 6 notwithstanding, if a properly. beneficiary is, or would be eligible for need-based government benefits, the Trustee shall hold the funds for such beneficiary in a "special needs trust" as that term is understood for need-based government planning. By "special needs

trust" is meant that the Trustee shall have the sole and absolute discretion to make distributions for the benefit of such beneficiary in a manner that improves the qualify of life for the beneficiary but will not make the beneficiary ineligible for need-based government benefits. The provisions of the Paragraph 6 are intended to supplant need-based government benefits, but not to replace them and all terms of this Paragraph 6 shall be so interpreted for all purposes.

- Maximum Term for Trusts. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Trust, unless terminated earlier under other provisions of this agreement, each trust created under this agreement shall terminate upon the expiration of the longest period that property may be held in trust under this agreement without violating the applicable rule against perpetuities, or similar applicable rule. At that time, the remaining trust property shall vest in and be distributed to the persons entitled to receive distributions of income hereunder.
- Article Twelfth of the Trust states, in pertinent part, as follows:

Successor Trustee. In the event of the death or incapacity of either Grantor, the Survivor shall continue to serve as the sole Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder. Upon the death or incapacity of the Survivor. the Grantors then nominate and appoint [the Petitioner] as the Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder, or in the event that she is unable or unwilling to serve in the said capacity, then the Grantors nominate and appoint the FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF NEVADA to serve in the said capacity.

- In 2008, the FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF NEVADA failed, and is no longer in existence. As outlined in Article Twelfth, W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE entrusted the beneficiaries (first being MARJORIE and, upon MARJORIE's death, the Petitioner) of the Trust to act as Trustees.
- The Petitioner requests that, due to the failure of the successor Trustee named by the Grantors, this Court: (1) construe the Trust to provide that the intent of W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE is to appoint the beneficiaries of the Trust to serve as Trustees thereof; and (2) to reform the Trust in accordance with such intention by modifying Article Twelfth as follows:

Successor Trustee. In the event of the death or incapacity of either Grantor, the Survivor shall continue to serve as the sole Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder. Upon the death or incapacity of the Survivor, the Grantors then nominate and appoint ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN, as the Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder, or in the event that she is unable or unwilling to serve in the said capacity, then the Grantors nominate and appoint JACQUELINE M.

MONTOYA to serve in the said capacity. In the event that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA is unable or unwilling to act as successor Trustee, then KATHRYN A. BOUVIER shall act as successor Trustee. No successor Trustee shall have any responsibility for the acts or omissions of any prior trustees and no duty to audit or investigate the accounts or administration of any such trustee, nor, unless in writing requested so to do by a person having a present or future beneficial interest under a trust created hereunder, any duty to take action or obtain redress for breach of trust.

In the event that none of the trustees named in this Article Twelfth are able or willing to serve, then the majority of adult income beneficiaries of the Trust shall select a successor Trustee.

- 37. The reformation of the Trust, pursuant to this Petition, will not change the substantive rights of the Petitioner during her lifetime. The sole purposes of the reformation are: (1) to clarify the dispositive provisions of Trust No. 2 after the death of the Petitioner; and (2) to forestall the requirement of petitioning the Court upon the death of the Petitioner to determine the successor Trustee.
- 38. The names, ages, residences, and relationships of the persons interested in the Trust, so far as known to Petitioner, are as follows:

NAME	AGE	RELATIONSHIP	<u>ADDRESS</u>
ELEANOR C. AHERN	Adult	Residual Beneficiary	6105 Elton Ave Las Vegas, NV 89107
JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA	Adult	Daughter of ELEANOR C. AHERN	3385 Maverick Street Las Vegas, NV 89108
KATHRYN A. BOUVIER	Adult	Daughter of ELEANOR C. AHERN	8461 Purple Sage Road Middleton, ID 83644
SHRINERS HOSPITALS FOR CHILDREN	N/A		Attn: Legal Department P.O. Box 31356 Tampa, FL 33631-3356

39. JACQUELINE M .MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER have consented in writing to the proposed reformation, as outlined in herein, and to this Court entering an order to assume jurisdiction over the Trust, the appointment of the Petitioner as the Trustee, and the reformation of the Trust as provided in this Petition. Said consents are attached hereto as Exhibits "6" and "7,"

40. The interests of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER and their respective issue in Trust No. 2 are substantially identical, and JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER are able to adequately represent the interests of their respective issue, including any minor and unborn issue without the necessity of the appointment of a guardian ad litem. See, NRS 155.140 and 164.005.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that this Petition be set for hearing, and that after hearing the matters of this Petition, this Court find that notice of the time and place of such hearing has been given in the manner required by law, and that this Court make and enter its Orders and Decrees pursuant to NRS 153.031 (e) and (n), 164.010 and 164.015:

- 1. That this Court assume jurisdiction over THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, and any and all sub-trusts created thereunder, as a proceeding *in rem*;
- 2. That ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN be confirmed as the Trustee of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, and any and all sub-trusts created thereunder, with the exception of any trust in which the assets of Trust No. 3 of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972 were appointed by MARJORIE T. CONNELL;
- That this Court enter an order: (1) construing THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, to provide that it was the intent of W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL, as Grantors, to distribute the residue of Trust No. 2 created thereunder to ELEANOR C. AHERN's heirs upon her death; and (2) that the Trust is to be reformed in accordance with such intent;

4. That this Court order the Trust to be reformed to add new Sections "E," "F," "G," and "H" to Article Fourth of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, as follows:

- E. <u>Distribution Upon Death of both the Survivor and the Residual Beneficiary</u>. Upon the death of both the Survivor and the Residual Beneficiary, the Trustee shall divide the balance of Trust No. 2 into two equal shares, as follows:
- 1. One (1) equal share shall be distributed, outright and free of trust, to the Residual Beneficiary's daughter, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, if she is then living. Subject to Section (F) below, if, as of the date of the Residual Beneficiary's death, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA is not then living, then said equal share shall be distributed to JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA's then living issue, by right of representation. Each share created pursuant to this Section E(1) of Article Fourth for the benefit of the issue of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA shall be held as a separate trust ("Beneficiary's Share") for the benefit of such issue ("Beneficiary") to be held by the Trustee, administered and further distributed pursuant to Section G of this Article Fourth.
- 2. One (1) equal share shall be distributed, outright and free of trust, to the Residual Beneficiary's daughter, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER, if she is then living. Subject to Section (F) below, if, as of the date of the Residual Beneficiary's death, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER is not then living, then said equal share shall be distributed to KATHRYN A. BOUVIER's then living issue, by right of representation. Each share created pursuant to this Section E(2) of Article Fourth for the benefit of the issue of KATHRYN A. BOUVIER shall be held as a separate trust ("Beneficiary's Share") for the benefit of such issue ("Beneficiary") to be held by the Trustee, administered and further distributed pursuant to Section G of this Article Fourth.
- 3. In the event that both JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER predecease the Grantors, leaving no issue, and having failed to exercise the testamentary power of appointment pursuant to Section (F) below, then the balance shall be distributed in accordance with Article Eleventh herein.
- F. <u>Power of Appointment</u>. In the event that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA or KATHRYN A. BOUVIER predeceases the Residual Beneficiary, upon the death of the Residual Beneficiary, the Trustee shall distribute such beneficiary's equal share to or in trust for such one or more persons or organizations and in such manner and proportions as such beneficiary may appoint by her will or revocable trust making specific reference to this general power of appointment.

G. <u>Management of Beneficiary's Shares</u>. Until a Beneficiary has attained the age of twenty-one (21) years, the Trustee may distribute to or apply for the benefit of such Beneficiary so much of the income or principal from such Beneficiary's Share as the Trustee determines, in the Trustee's sole discretion, is necessary to provide for his or her health, education, maintenance, and support. In addition, the Trustee may make the following discretionary distributions:

- 1. <u>Investment in Business</u>. The Trustee may, in the Trustee's sole discretion, apply the principal or income of such Beneficiary's Share for the purpose of investing in a business or profession operated by, or to be operated by, such Beneficiary and to be owned by the Beneficiary's Share.
- discretion, apply the income and principal of such Beneficiary's Share for the purpose of purchasing one or more residences to be owned by the Beneficiary's Share and used and occupied by such Beneficiary and his or her family, including a primary residence, seasonal residence or otherwise. In the case of any residence owned by the Beneficiary's Share, and in the Trustee's sole discretion, such Beneficiary may occupy and use such residence without rent or any other financial obligation for the payment of the taxes, insurance payments, maintenance costs and other expenses required in order to keep such residences in proper repair and free of liens.
- 3. <u>Use of Tangible Trust Assets</u>. The Trustee, in the Trustee's sole discretion, may grant such Beneficiary the right to the use, possession and enjoyment of all of the tangible personal property held by such Beneficiary's Share, without financial obligation for the use of such property.
- 4. <u>Distribution of Beneficiary's Share</u>. Upon a Beneficiary attaining the age of twenty-one (21), the Trustee shall distribute to him or her, outright and free of trust, the remaining principal and accumulated income of that Beneficiary's Share. If the Beneficiary has already reached the age of twenty-one (21) at the time of the creation of the Beneficiary's Share, then the Trustee shall, upon making the division, distribute, outright and free of trust, to the Beneficiary the balance of such Beneficiary's Share.
- die prior to the complete distribution of such Beneficiary. If any Beneficiary shall die prior to the complete distribution of such Beneficiary's Share, then all of the remaining assets in such Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed to or in trust for such one or more persons or organizations and in such manner and proportions as such Beneficiary may appoint by his or her will or revocable trust making specific reference to this general power of appointment. To the extent that the Beneficiary does not exercise this general power of appointment, the remainder of such Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed to the issue of such Beneficiary in equal shares by right of representation and each such share

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shall be held, managed and further distributed by the Trustee as a Beneficiary's Share under Section G of Article Fourth. If the Beneficiary shall die failing to exercise this general power of appointment without leaving issue, then the Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed pro rata to the other Beneficiary's Shares then being administered by the Trustee hereunder, and if none, then to the Beneficiary's heirs at law under the intestacy laws of the State of Nevada.

Distributions to or for the Benefit of Minors or Persons Under 6. Disability. Whenever the Trustee is given the power or discretion to make distributions to or for the benefit of a minor or other beneficiary under a disability, the Trustee, in the Trustee's sole discretion, may make distributions to a minor or other person under disability by making distributions to the guardian or conservator of his or her estate and/or person, as the Trustee shall determine, or to any suitable person with whom he or she resides, or the Trustee may apply distributions directly for such beneficiary's benefit, or the Trustee may make distributions to any duly established custodian for any minor beneficiary under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or Uniform Transfers to Minors Act of any State. Any custodian acting on behalf of a minor beneficiary shall have the power to bind the beneficiary with respect to all matters concerning the Trust. The Trustee, in its sole discretion, may also make distributions directly to a minor if, in the Trustee's judgment, such minor is of sufficient age and maturity to receive such distribution and spend the money properly. The previous language of this paragraph 6 notwithstanding, if a beneficiary is, or would be eligible for need-based government benefits, the Trustee shall hold the funds for such beneficiary in a "special needs trust" as that term is understood for need-based government planning. By "special needs trust" is meant that the Trustee shall have the sole and absolute discretion to make distributions for the benefit of such beneficiary in a manner that improves the qualify of life for the beneficiary but will not make the beneficiary ineligible for need-based government benefits. The provisions of the Paragraph 6 are intended to supplant need-based government benefits, but not to replace them and all terms of this Paragraph 6 shall be so interpreted for all purposes.

H. <u>Maximum Term for Trusts</u>. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Trust, unless terminated earlier under other provisions of this agreement, each trust created under this agreement shall terminate upon the expiration of the longest period that property may be held in trust under this agreement without violating the applicable rule against perpetuities, or similar applicable rule. At that time, the remaining trust property shall vest in and be distributed to the persons entitled to receive distributions of income hereunder.

5. That this Court enter an order: (1) construing THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, to provide that the intent of W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL was to appoint the beneficiaries of the Trust to serve as Trustees thereof; and

(2) that the Trust is to be reformed in accordance with such intent; That this Court order the Trust to be reformed by modifying Article Twelfth of THE W. N. 6. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, to read as follows: Successor Trustee. In the event of the death or incapacity of Twelfth: either Grantor, the Survivor shall continue to serve as the sole Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder. Upon the death or incapacity of the Survivor, the Grantors then nominate and appoint ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN, as the Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder, or in the event that she is unable or unwilling to serve in the said capacity, then the Grantors nominate and appoint JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA to serve in the said capacity. In the event that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA is unable or unwilling to act as successor Trustee, then KATHRYN A. BOUVIER shall act as successor Trustee. No successor Trustee shall have 10 any responsibility for the acts or omissions of any prior trustees and no duty to audit or investigate the accounts or administration of any such trustee, nor, 11 unless in writing requested so to do by a person having a present or future 12 beneficial interest under a trust created hereunder, any duty to take action or obtain redress for breach of trust. 13 In the event that none of the trustees named in this Article Twelfth are 14 able or willing to serve, then the majority of adult income beneficiaries of the 15 Trust shall select a successor Trustee. 16 For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 7. 17 DATED this 14 day of August, 2009. 18 Respectfully submitted, SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LAD. 19 20 ARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ. 21 Nevada State Bar No. 00418 22 BRIAN K. STEADMAN Nevada State Bar No. 10//1 23 9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 24 Telephone: 702.853.5483 25 Attorneys for Eleanor C. Ahern, Petitioner 26 27

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### **VERIFICATION**

ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN, whose address is 6105 Elton Ave, Las Vegas, NV 89107, declares under penalties of perjury of the State of Nevada:

That she is the Petitioner who makes the foregoing Petition to Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; and Construe and Reform Trust; that she has read said petition and know the contents thereof, and that the same is true of her own knowledge except for those matters stated on information and belief, and that as to such matters she believes it to be true.

DATED this 3<sup>rd</sup> day of August, 2009.

ELEANOR C. AHERN f/k/a ELE

ELEANOR C. AHERN f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN

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Brian P. Eagan Catherine M. Mazzeo Brian K, Steadman Robert D. Simpson Jeffrey P. Luszeck Ross E. Evans

August 4, 2009

# PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL

Jacqueline M. Montoya 3385 Maverick Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89108

Re: W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust

Dear Jackie:

As you are aware, we are in the process of reforming the W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust (the "Trust"). As part of this process, enclosed for your review is the Petition to Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; and Construe and Reform Trust (the "Petition") which has been reviewed and signed by your mother, Eleanor Ahern.

Also enclosed for your review are two additional documents, as follows: (1) Consent to Petition to Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe and Reform Trust and Waiver of Notice (the "Consent and Waiver"); and (2) Consent to Reformation. The Consent and Waiver simply states that you have read the Petition and consent to the court entering an order approving the same. The Consent to Reformation outlines the estate tax implications that may arise in reforming the Trust. After your review of the Petition, Consent and Waiver, and Consent to Reformation, if everything appears in order, please sign the Consent and Waiver and Consent to Reformation and return the originals to our office.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me directly at (702) 589-3510.

Sincerely,

Brian K. Steadma

BKS:dld

Enclosures

## SOLC. NON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

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Brian P. Eagan Catherine M. Mazzeo Brian K. Steadman Robert D. Simpson Jeffrey P. Luszeck Ross E. Evans

August 4, 2009

# PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL

Kathryn A. Bouvier 8461 Purple Sage Road Middleton, Idaho 83644

Re: W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust

Dear Kathryn:

As you are aware, we are in the process of reforming the W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust (the "Trust"). As part of this process, enclosed for your review is the Petition to Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; and Construe and Reform Trust (the "Petition") which has been reviewed and signed by your mother, Eleanor Ahern.

Also enclosed for your review are two additional documents, as follows: (1) Consent to Petition to Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe and Reform Trust and Waiver of Notice (the "Consent and Waiver"); and (2) Consent to Reformation. The Consent and Waiver simply states that you have read the Petition and consent to the court entering an order approving the same. The Consent to Reformation outlines the estate tax implications that may arise in reforming the Trust. After your review of the Petition, Consent and Waiver, and Consent to Reformation, if everything appears in order, please sign the Consent and Waiver and Consent to Reformation and return the originals to our office.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me directly at (702) 589-3510.

1//

Sincerely

Brian K. Steadman

BKS:dld

**Enclosures** 

EXHIBIT F
Consents to Reformation

## CONSENT TO REFORMATION

TO.

JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA

FROM:

SOLOMON, DWIGGINS, & FREER, LTD.

RE:

THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST

DATE:

August 4, 2009

This Consent to Reformation has been prepared to outline the potential tax implications on some of the changes to the W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust (the "Trust") in the event the Petition for Reformation of the Trust is approved of by the Nevada Court.

## Purpose of the Reformation

As you know, the Trust omits directions as to the final disposition of Trust No. 2 after Eleanor C. Ahern's death. The Petition for Reformation fixes this omission by providing that one-half (1/2) of the remaining assets are to be distributed outright to you upon Eleanor's death. The Petition for Reformation also gives you an additional power, commonly known as a "testamentary general power of appointment." This power is discussed in more detail below.

# Estate and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes Upon Eleanor C. Ahern's Death

We have reviewed the Trust and applicable law, and have concluded that under applicable law: (1) upon Eleanor C. Ahern's death, the assets in Trust No. 2 will not be included in Eleanor's estate for federal estate tax purposes; and (2) that no generation-skipping transfer taxes will be due on the assets that pass to you after her death.

## Estate Taxes Upon Your Death

The Petition for Reformation gives you two rights that will cause your share of Trust No. 2 to be included in your estate for federal estate tax purposes. Those rights are: (1) outright distribution to you of your share of the assets upon Eleanor's death; and (2) a testamentary general power of appointment giving you the right, effective on your death, to appoint the assets to whomever you choose. These rights may also carry with them state estate and inheritance tax consequences that should be discussed with your estate planning attorney.

## Right to Outright Distribution

The reason the Petition for Reformation includes an outright distribution is to give you full control over your share of Trust No. 2 after Eleanor's death (as opposed to limiting your control by keeping your share in the Trust for your lifetime). If Eleanor dies before you, the right to outright distribution of your share will cause your share of Trust No. 2 to be included in your estate for federal estate tax purposes upon your death.

Because the asset will be included in your federal estate upon your death, in the event your total federal estate exceeds the federal estate tax credit (currently \$3.5 million, but is subject to

change), your heirs may be required to pay federal estate taxes. If you have made lifetime gifts using what is commonly known as your "unified credit," the amount of the federal estate tax credit available to you at your death may also be affected. If your total federal estate does not exceed the federal estate tax credit in effect upon your death, and you have not made any lifetime gifts, then no tax will be levied against your estate.

## **Testamentary General Power of Appointment**

In addition to receiving your share of the remainder of Trust No. 2 outright upon Eleanor's death, the Petition for Reformation grants you a "testamentary general power of appointment" over your share of the remaining assets. The purpose of this power is to allow you to direct where you want your share of the remainder of Trust No. 2 to pass if you die before Eleanor. Of course, Eleanor will still be receive all the income from Trust No. 2 until her death, but, after her death, your share will pass to whomever you have directed.

You can exercise this testamentary power of appointment by indicating your intentions in your Will, your revocable trust, or a separate written document signed by you. You should contact the attorney preparing your estate plan to discuss this power, and its implications, in more detail.

In the event that you were to pass away before Eleanor, the testamentary general power of appointment will cause the value of your "remainder interest" (i.e. the present value of a future expectancy) to be included in your estate for federal estate tax purposes. The amount included in your federal estate will not be the full value of your share of Trust No. 2 (since your heirs will not receive your share until Eleanor also passes away) but will be valued at a lower amount.

Because your share of the "remainder interest" in Trust No. 2 will be included in your federal estate upon your death, in the event your total federal estate exceeds the federal estate tax credit (currently \$3.5 million, but is subject to change), then your heirs may be required to pay federal estate taxes. If you have made lifetime gifts using what is commonly known as your "unified credit" the amount of the federal estate tax credit available to you may also be affected. If your total federal estate does not exceed the federal estate tax credit in effect upon your death, and you have not made any lifetime gifts, then no tax will be levied against your estate.

### Alternative

An alternative to granting you these rights is to hold your share of the remaining assets after Eleanor's death in the Trust for your benefit, during your lifetime, and then for your children thereafter. The benefit for this alternative is that, under current applicable law, the assets would pass to your children free of federal estate taxes and generation-skipping transfer taxes. The downside, however, is that the assets would have to remain in the Trust, and you would be limited on how much of the assets you could access and control.

We recommend that you review these issues with your estate planning attorney to determine how the rights granted to you in the Petition for Reformation may affect your estate. However, if you have any questions regarding this letter, please feel free to contact me directly.

By signing below, you hereby acknowledge that you have been informed and understand there may be federal and state tax consequences from the rights granted to you under the Petition for Reformation of the Trust as described herein, you hereby acknowledge that you have had the opportunity to discuss these issues with your counsel, and you hereby consent to the filing of the Petition for Reformation containing the rights granted to you, as outlined herein.

Date:

ACOUEINE M. MONTOYA

## CONSENT TO REFORMATION

TO:

KATHRYN A. BOUVIER

FROM:

SOLOMON, DWIGGINS, & FREER, LTD.

RE:

THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST

DATE:

August 4, 2009

This Consent to Reformation has been prepared to outline the potential tax implications on some of the changes to the W. N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust (the "Trust") in the event the Petition for Reformation of the Trust is approved of by the Nevada Court.

## Purpose of the Reformation

As you know, the Trust omits directions as to the final disposition of Trust No. 2 after Eleanor C. Ahern's death. The Petition for Reformation fixes this omission by providing that one-half (1/2) of the remaining assets are to be distributed outright to you upon Eleanor's death. The Petition for Reformation also gives you an additional power, commonly known as a "testamentary general power of appointment." This power is discussed in more detail below.

## Estate and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes Upon Eleanor C. Ahern's Death

We have reviewed the Trust and applicable law, and have concluded that under applicable law: (1) upon Eleanor C. Ahern's death, the assets in Trust No. 2 will not be included in Eleanor's estate for federal estate tax purposes; and (2) that no generation-skipping transfer taxes will be due on the assets that pass to you after her death.

## Estate Taxes Upon Your Death

The Petition for Reformation gives you two rights that will cause your share of Trust No. 2 to be included in your estate for federal estate tax purposes. Those rights are: (1) outright distribution to you of your share of the assets upon Eleanor's death; and (2) a testamentary general power of appointment giving you the right, effective on your death, to appoint the assets to whomever you choose. These rights may also carry with them state estate and inheritance tax consequences that should be discussed with your estate planning attorney.

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The reason the Petition for Reformation includes an outright distribution is to give you full control over your share of Trust No. 2 after Eleanor's death (as opposed to limiting your control by keeping your share in the Trust for your lifetime). If Eleanor dies before you, the right to outright distribution of your share will cause your share of Trust No. 2 to be included in your estate for federal estate tax purposes upon your death.

Because the asset will be included in your federal estate upon your death, in the event your total federal estate exceeds the federal estate tax credit (currently \$3.5 million, but is subject to

change), your heirs may be required to pay federal estate taxes. If you have made lifetime gifts using what is commonly known as your "unified credit," the amount of the federal estate tax credit available to you at your death may also be affected. If your total federal estate does not exceed the federal estate tax credit in effect upon your death, and you have not made any lifetime gifts, then no tax will be levied against your estate.

## **Testamentary General Power of Appointment**

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You can exercise this testamentary power of appointment by indicating your intentions in your Will, your revocable trust, or a separate written document signed by you. You should contact the attorney preparing your estate plan to discuss this power, and its implications, in more detail.

In the event that you were to pass away before Eleanor, the testamentary general power of appointment will cause the value of your "remainder interest" (i.e. the present value of a future expectancy) to be included in your estate for federal estate tax purposes. The amount included in your federal estate will not be the full value of your share of Trust No. 2 (since your heirs will not receive your share until Eleanor also passes away) but will be valued at a lower amount.

Because your share of the "remainder interest" in Trust No. 2 will be included in your federal estate upon your death, in the event your total federal estate exceeds the federal estate tax credit (currently \$3.5 million, but is subject to change), then your heirs may be required to pay federal estate taxes. If you have made lifetime gifts using what is commonly known as your "unified credit" the amount of the federal estate tax credit available to you may also be affected. If your total federal estate does not exceed the federal estate tax credit in effect upon your death, and you have not made any lifetime gifts, then no tax will be levied against your estate.

#### Alternative

An alternative to granting you these rights is to hold your share of the remaining assets after Eleanor's death in the Trust for your benefit, during your lifetime, and then for your children thereafter. The benefit for this alternative is that, under current applicable law, the assets would pass to your children free of federal estate taxes and generation-skipping transfer taxes. The downside, however, is that the assets would have to remain in the Trust, and you would be limited on how much of the assets you could access and control.

We recommend that you review these issues with your estate planning attorney to determine how the rights granted to you in the Petition for Reformation may affect your estate. However, if you have any questions regarding this letter, please feel free to contact me directly.

By signing below, you hereby acknowledge that you have been informed and understand there may be federal and state tax consequences from the rights granted to you under the Petition for Reformation of the Trust as described herein, you hereby acknowledge that you have had the opportunity to discuss these issues with your counsel, and you hereby consent to the filing of the Petition for Reformation containing the rights granted to you, as outlined herein.

Date: 8/9/09

AA 1695

# EXHIBIT G Consent and Waiver of Notice of Jacqueline M. Montoya to Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe And Reform Trust in the matter of the W. N. Connell And Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust dated May 18, 1972 in the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, Case No. P-09-066425-T

1	CONS SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.					
2	MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ.					
3	Nevada State Bar No. 00418 BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ.					
ا د	Nevada State Bar No. 10771					
4	9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129					
5	Telephone: (702) 853-5483 Facsimile: (702) 853-5485					
6	E-mail: msolomon@sdfnvlaw.com					
7	Email: <u>bsteadman@sdfnvlaw.com</u>					
	Attorneys for Eleanor C. Ahern, Petitioner					
8	DISTRICT COURT					
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA					
10	In the Matter of the ) Case No.					
11	) Department No.  THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE )					
12	T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, )					
13	Dated May 18, 1972 ) Date of Hearing:					
14	An Intervivos Irrevocable Trust. ) Time of Hearing:					
ł	<u> </u>					
15	CONSENT TO PETITION TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER TRUST: CONFIRM TRUSTEE; AND					
16	CONSTRUE AND REFORM TRUST AND WAIVER OF NOTICE					
17	JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, an interested party in the above-named Trust matter, states					
18	as follows:					
19	1. I am a contingent income beneficiary of the W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T.					
20	CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972 (the "Trust").					
21	2. I have read the Petition to Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee, and					
22	Construe and Reform Trust (the "Petition") and believe it to be true and correct to the best of my					
23	knowledge.					
24	3. I hereby consent to the Petition and request that the Court enter an Order approving					
25	the Petition in its entirety.					
26	4. I hereby waive notice of notice of the hearing on the Petition pursuant to Nevada					
27						
28	Page 1 of 2					

Revise Statutes 155.010(4). Dated this <u>\$\mathbb{g}\$</u> day of August, 2009. SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 00418
BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 10771
9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue
Las Vegas, NV 89129 Attorneys for Eleanor C. Ahern, Petitioner 

Page 2 of 2

### **EXHIBIT H** Consent and Waiver of Notice of Kathryn A. Bouvier to Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe And Reform Trust in the matter of the W. N. Connell And Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust dated May 18, 1972 in the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, Case No. P-09-066425-T

1	CONS SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREFR LTD				
2	SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ.				
3	Nevada State Bar No. 00418 BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ.				
3	Nevada State Bar No. 10771				
4	9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129				
5	Telephone: (702) 853-5483				
6	Facsimile: (702) 853-5485 E-mail: msolomon@sdfnvlaw.com				
	Email: <u>bsteadman@sdfnvlaw.com</u>				
7	Attorneys for Eleanor C. Ahern, Petitioner				
8	DISTRICT COURT				
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
10	In the Matter of the ) Case No.				
11	) Department No.				
12	THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE ) T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, )				
•	Dated May 18, 1972  Date of Hearing:				
13	An Intervivos Irrevocable Trust. Time of Hearing:				
14					
15	CONSENT TO PETITION TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER TRUST; CONFIRM TRUSTEE; AND				
16	CONSENT TO PETITION TO ASSUME FORM TRUST AND WAIVER OF NOTICE				
17	This matter states as				
18	follows:				
19	1. I am a contingent income beneficiary of the W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T.				
20	CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972 (the "Trust").				
21	2. I have read the Petition to Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee, and				
22	Construe and Reform Trust (the "Petition") and believe it to be true and correct to the best of my				
23	knowledge.				
24	3. I hereby consent to the Petition and request that the Court enter an Order approving				
25	the Petition in its entirety.				
26	4. I hereby waive notice of notice of the hearing on the Petition pursuant to Nevada				
27					
28	Page 1 of 2				

Revise Statutes 155.010(4). Dated this \_\_\_\_ day of August, 2009. SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. By; MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00418 BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10771 9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89129 Attorneys for Eleanor C. Ahern, Petitioner Page 2 of 2 

### EXHIBIT I

Notice Of Hearing on Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over Trust; Confirm Trustee; And Construe And Reform Trust and Certificate Of Mailing in the matter of the W. N. Connell And Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust dated May 18, 1972 in the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, Case No. P-09-066425-T



9-09-066425-T

NOTC

MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ.

Nevada State Bar No. 00418

BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ.

Nevada State Bar No. 10771

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

Telephone: 702.853.5483 Facsimile: 702.853.5485

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Attorneys for ELEANOR C. AHERN, Petitioner

FILED

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CLERK OF THE COURT

#### DISTRICT COURT

### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the

Case No. , P-09-066425-T

PC1

H

THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIET. )

CONNELL LIVING TRUST,

Dated May 18, 1972

Date of Hearing: September 4, 2009

An Intervivos Irrevocable Trust. ) Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m.

### NOTICE OF HEARING ON PETITION TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER TRUST; CONFIRM TRUSTEE; AND CONSTRUE AND REFORM TRUST

ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER TRUST; CONFIRM TRUSTEE; AND CONSTRUE AND REFORM TRUST for the above-referenced Trust; that a hearing on the Petition has been set for Friday, the 4th day of September. 2009, at the hour of 9:30 A.M., in Department PC1, Family Court, Courtroom 9, of the above-entitled Court which is located in the Clark County Courthouse, Family Division, 601 North Pecos, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101, at which time all persons interested in THE W.N. CONNELL AND MAJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST dated May 18, 1972, may appear and show cause, if any they have, why said Petition should not be granted.

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Further details concerning this Petition can be obtained by reviewing the Court file at the Clark
County Clerk, Clark County Courthouse, Family Division, or by contacting the Petitioner or the attorney
for the Petitioner whose name, address and telephone number is:
SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.
MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ. BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ.
9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89129
Telephone No. 702.853.5483
DATED this 14 day of August, 2009.
SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.
MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 000418
BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ.
9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue
Telephone: (702) 853-5483
Facsimile: (702) 853-5485
Attorneys for Petitioner, ELEANOR C. AHERN
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7
8

Page 2 of 2

# ORIGINAL

2 3	COM MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 00418 BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 10771 SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Telephone: 702.853.5483 Facsimile: 702.853.5485  Attorneys for ELEANOR C. AHERN, Petitioner	AUG 17 12 30 AH '09  CLERK OF THE COURT
8		T COURT
9		_
10	CLARK COUN	P-09-066425-T
11	I HI HIE Matter of the	Case No. P-09
12	11	PC1 H
13	CONNELL LIVING TRUST,	
	Dated May 18, 1972	Date of Hearing: September 4, 2009
14	An Intervivos Irrevocable Trust. )	Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m.
15		
16	CERTIFICALI	E OF MAILING
17	Thereby certify that on the day of Augu	ist, 2009, I caused to be served a true and correct copy
18		TRUST; CONFIRM TRUSTEE; AND CONSTRUE AND
19		
20	REFORM TRUST and NOTICE OF HEARING for sa	aid Petition, by mail using the United States Postal
21	Service, certified mail, return receipt requested, I	postage prepaid thereon in a sealed envelope to the
22		
23	following individuals:	
24	Kathryn A. Bouvier	Jacqueline M. Montoya
	8461 Purple Sage Road	3385 Maverick Street Las Vegas, NV 89108
25		•
26		
27		
28		
	II Down	1 of 2

Shriners Hospitals for Children Attn: Legal Department P.O. Box 31356 Tampa, FL 33631-3356

An Employee of Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd.

### **EXHIBIT J**

Order Assuming Jurisdiction Over Trust Confirm Trustee; And For Construction of And To Reform Of Trust Instrument in the matter of the W. N. Connell And Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust dated May 18, 1972 in the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, Case No. P-09-066425-T

### ORIGINAL

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FILED **ORDR** MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 00418 3 BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 10771 SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Telephone: 702.853.5483 Facsimile: 702.853.5485 Attorneys for ELEANOR C. AHERN, Petitioner DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 Case No. P-09-066425-T In the Matter of the PC1 12 THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. ) CONNELL LIVING TRUST, Dated May 18, 1972 Date of Hearing: September 4, 2009 14 Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m. An Intervivos Irrevocable Trust. 15 ORDER ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER TRUST; CONFIRM TRUSTEE; AND 16 FOR CONSTRUCTION OF AND REFORM OF TRUST INSTRUMENT 17 The verified Petition of ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL 18 HARTMAN to assume jurisdiction over THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL 19 20 LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972 (the "Trust"), and any and all sub-trusts created thereunder, to 21 confirm ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN as the 22 Successor Trustee of said trust; and for construction and reform of trust instrument, having come on regularly for hearing the 4th day of September, 2009; BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ., of the law firm 24 SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. appeared as counsel for the Petitioner; the Court finds that 25 due and legal notice of the time and place of hearing of said Petition has been given in the manner 26 required by law; and good cause appearing therefor,

CLE IC OF THE COURT

Page 1 of 6



IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court hereby assumes jurisdiction over THE W. N. CONNELLAND MARJORIET. CONNELLLIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, and any and all subtrusts created thereunder, as a proceeding *in rem*;

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN be, and hereby is, confirmed and appointed as Successor Trustee of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, and any and all sub-trusts created thereunder, with the exception of any trust in which the assets of Trust No. 3 of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972 were appointed by MARJORIE T. CONNELL; and

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the dispositive provisions of Trust No. 2 created under THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, are hereby reformed and construed to provide that upon the death of ELEANOR C. AHERN the residue of Trust No. 2 created under THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, shall be distributed to the heirs of ELEANOR C. AHERN;

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that it is approved and granted that Sections "E," "F," "G," and "H" to Article Fourth of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, is hereby reformed as follows:

- E. <u>Distribution Upon Death of both the Survivor and the Residual Beneficiary</u>. Upon the death of both the Survivor and the Residual Beneficiary, the Trustee shall divide the balance of Trust No. 2 into two equal shares, as follows:
  - 1. One (1) equal share shall be distributed, outright and free of trust, to the Residual Beneficiary's daughter, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, if she is then living. Subject to Section (F) below, if, as of the date of the Residual Beneficiary's death, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA is not then living, then said equal share shall be distributed to JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA's then living issue, by right of representation. Each share created pursuant to this Section E(1) of Article Fourth for the benefit of the issue of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA shall be held as a separate trust ("Beneficiary's Share") for the

benefit of such issue ("Beneficiary") to be held by the Trustee, administered and further distributed pursuant to Section G of this Article Fourth.

- 2. One (1) equal share shall be distributed, outright and free of trust, to the Residual Beneficiary's daughter, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER, if she is then living. Subject to Section (F) below, if, as of the date of the Residual Beneficiary's death, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER is not then living, then said equal share shall be distributed to KATHRYN A. BOUVIER's then living issue, by right of representation. Each share created pursuant to this Section E(2) of Article Fourth for the benefit of the issue of KATHRYN A. BOUVIER shall be held as a separate trust ("Beneficiary's Share") for the benefit of such issue ("Beneficiary") to be held by the Trustee, administered and further distributed pursuant to Section G of this Article Fourth.
- 3. In the event that both JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYN A. BOUVIER predecease the Grantors, leaving no issue, and having failed to exercise the testamentary power of appointment pursuant to Section (F) below, then the balance shall be distributed in accordance with Article Eleventh herein.
- F. Power of Appointment. In the event that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA or KATHRYN A. BOUVIER predeceases the Residual Beneficiary, upon the death of the Residual Beneficiary, the Trustee shall distribute such beneficiary's equal share to or in trust for such one or more persons or organizations and in such manner and proportions as such beneficiary may appoint by her will or revocable trust making specific reference to this general power of appointment.
- G. <u>Management of Beneficiary's Shares</u>. Until a Beneficiary has attained the age of twenty-one (21) years, the Trustee may distribute to or apply for the benefit of such Beneficiary so much of the income or principal from such Beneficiary's Share as the Trustee determines, in the Trustee's sole discretion, is necessary to provide for his or her health, education, maintenance, and support. In addition, the Trustee may make the following discretionary distributions:
- 1. <u>Investment in Business</u>. The Trustee may, in the Trustee's sole discretion, apply the principal or income of such Beneficiary's Share for the purpose of investing in a business or profession operated by, or to be operated by, such Beneficiary and to be owned by the Beneficiary's Share.
- 2. Acquisition of Residences. The Trustee may, in the Trustee's sole discretion, apply the income and principal of such Beneficiary's Share for the purpose of purchasing one or more residences to be owned by the Beneficiary's Share and used and occupied by such Beneficiary and his or her family, including a primary residence, seasonal residence or otherwise. In the case of any residence owned by the Beneficiary's Share, and in the Trustee's sole

discretion, such Beneficiary may occupy and use such residence without rent or any other financial obligation for the payment of the taxes, insurance payments, maintenance costs and other expenses required in order to keep such residences in proper repair and free of liens.

- 3. <u>Use of Tangible Trust Assets</u>. The Trustee, in the Trustee's sole discretion, may grant such Beneficiary the right to the use, possession and enjoyment of all of the tangible personal property held by such Beneficiary's Share, without financial obligation for the use of such property.
- 4. <u>Distribution of Beneficiary's Share</u>. Upon a Beneficiary attaining the age of twenty-one (21), the Trustee shall distribute to him or her, outright and free of trust, the remaining principal and accumulated income of that Beneficiary's Share. If the Beneficiary has already reached the age of twenty-one (21) at the time of the creation of the Beneficiary's Share, then the Trustee shall, upon making the division, distribute, outright and free of trust, to the Beneficiary the balance of such Beneficiary's Share.
- die prior to the complete distribution of such Beneficiary. If any Beneficiary shall die prior to the complete distribution of such Beneficiary's Share, then all of the remaining assets in such Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed to or in trust for such one or more persons or organizations and in such manner and proportions as such Beneficiary may appoint by his or her will or revocable trust making specific reference to this general power of appointment. To the extent that the Beneficiary does not exercise this general power of appointment, the remainder of such Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed to the issue of such Beneficiary in equal shares by right of representation and each such share shall be held, managed and further distributed by the Trustee as a Beneficiary's Share under Section G of Article Fourth. If the Beneficiary shall die failing to exercise this general power of appointment without leaving issue, then the Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed pro rata to the other Beneficiary's Shares then being administered by the Trustee hereunder, and if none, then to the Beneficiary's heirs at law under the intestacy laws of the State of Nevada.
- Disability. Whenever the Trustee is given the power or discretion to make distributions to or for the benefit of a minor or other beneficiary under a disability, the Trustee, in the Trustee's sole discretion, may make distributions to a minor or other person under disability by making distributions to the guardian or conservator of his or her estate and/or person, as the Trustee shall determine, or to any suitable person with whom he or she resides, or the Trustee may apply distributions directly for such beneficiary's benefit, or the Trustee may make distributions to any duly established custodian for any minor beneficiary under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or Uniform Transfers to Minors Act of any State. Any custodian acting on behalf of a minor beneficiary shall have the power to bind the beneficiary with respect to all matters

concerning the Trust. The Trustee, in its sole discretion, may also make distributions directly to a minor if, in the Trustee's judgment, such minor is of sufficient age and maturity to receive such distribution and spend the money properly. The previous language of this paragraph 6 notwithstanding, if a beneficiary is, or would be eligible for need-based government benefits, the Trustee shall hold the funds for such beneficiary in a "special needs trust" as that term is understood for need-based government planning. By "special needs trust" is meant that the Trustee shall have the sole and absolute discretion to make distributions for the benefit of such beneficiary in a manner that improves the qualify of life for the beneficiary but will not make the beneficiary ineligible for need-based government benefits. The provisions of the Paragraph 6 are intended to supplant need-based government benefits, but not to replace them and all terms of this Paragraph 6 shall be so interpreted for all purposes.

H. <u>Maximum Term for Trusts</u>. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Trust, unless terminated earlier under other provisions of this agreement, each trust created under this agreement shall terminate upon the expiration of the longest period that property may be held in trust under this agreement without violating the applicable rule against perpetuities, or similar applicable rule. At that time, the remaining trust property shall vest in and be distributed to the persons entitled to receive distributions of income hereunder.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, is hereby reformed and construed to provide that the beneficiaries of the Trust shall serve as Successor Trustees upon the death, incapacity, or resignation of ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN; and

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that it is approved and granted that Article Twelfth of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, is

hereby reformed as follows:

Twelfth: Successor Trustee. In the event of the death or incapacity of either Grantor, the Survivor shall continue to serve as the sole Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder. Upon the death or incapacity of the Survivor, the Grantors then nominate and appoint ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN, as the Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder, or in the event that she is unable or unwilling to serve in the said capacity, then the Grantors nominate and appoint JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA to serve in the said capacity. In the event that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA is unable or unwilling to act as successor Trustee, then KATHRYN A. BOUVIER shall act as successor Trustee. No successor Trustee shall have

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any responsibility for the acts or omissions of any prior trustees and no duty to audit or investigate the accounts or administration of any such trustee, nor, unless in writing requested so to do by a person having a present or future beneficial interest under a trust created hereunder, any duty to take action or obtain redress for breach of trust.

In the event that none of the trustees named in this Article Twelfth are able or willing to serve, then the majority of adult income beneficiaries of the Trust shall select a successor Trustee.

DATED this 4th day of September, 2009.



DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GE,

Respectfully submitted,

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ.

Nevada State Bar No. 00418 BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ.

Nevada State Bar No. 10771

9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue


Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

Attorneys for Eleanor C. Ahern, Trustee

#### EXHIBIT K

Notice of Entry Of Order Assuming Jurisdiction Over Trust Confirm Trustee; And For Construction of And To Reform Of Trust Instrument in the matter of the W. N. Connell And Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust dated May 18, 1972 in the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, Case No. P-09-066425-T

### ORIGINAL



Page 1 of 2

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#### **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

I hereby certify that on the 8th day of September, 2009, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER, by mail using the United States Postal Service, by first class mail, postage prepaid thereon in a sealed envelope to the following individuals:

Kathryn A. Bouvier 8461 Purple Sage Road Middleton, ID 83644 Jacqueline M. Montoya 3385 Maverick Street Las Vegas, NV 89108

Eleanor C. Ahern 6105 Elton Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89107 Shriners Hospitals for Children Attn: Legal Department P.O. Box 31356 Tampa, FL 33631-3356

via Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested

An Employee of Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd.

**ORDR** MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 00418 BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ. 1 2009 SEP -4 P 4: 50 Nevada State Bar No. 10771 SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Telephone: 702.853.5483 Facsimile: 702.853.5485 Attorneys for ELEANOR C. AHERN, Petitioner DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 Case No. P-09-066425-T 11 In the Matter of the PC1 12 THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. ) CONNELL LIVING TRUST, 13 Dated May 18, 1972 Date of Hearing: September 4, 2009 14 Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m. An Intervivos Irrevocable Trust. 15 16 ORDER ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER TRUST; CONFIRM TRUSTEE; AND FOR CONSTRUCTION OF AND REFORM OF TRUST INSTRUMENT 17 The verified Petition of ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL 18 19 HARTMAN to assume jurisdiction over THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL 20 LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972 (the "Trust"), and any and all sub-trusts created thereunder, to 21 confirm ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN as the 23 Successor Trustee of said trust; and for construction and reform of trust instrument, having come on regularly for hearing the 4th day of September, 2009; BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ., of the law firm SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. appeared as counsel for the Petitioner; the Court finds that 25 26 due and legal notice of the time and place of hearing of said Petition has been given in the manner 27 required by law; and good cause appearing therefor,

Page 1 of 6

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court hereby assumes jurisdiction over THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIET. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, and any and all subtrusts created thereunder, as a proceeding *in rem*;

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN be, and hereby is, confirmed and appointed as Successor Trustee of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, and any and all sub-trusts created thereunder, with the exception of any trust in which the assets of Trust No. 3 of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972 were appointed by MARJORIE T. CONNELL; and

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the dispositive provisions of Trust No. 2 created under THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, are hereby reformed and construed to provide that upon the death of ELEANOR C. AHERN the residue of Trust No. 2 created under THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, shall be distributed to the heirs of ELEANOR C. AHERN;

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that it is approved and granted that Sections "E," "F," "G," and "H" to Article Fourth of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, is hereby reformed as follows:

- E. <u>Distribution Upon Death of both the Survivor and the Residual Beneficiary</u>. Upon the death of both the Survivor and the Residual Beneficiary, the Trustee shall divide the balance of Trust No. 2 into two equal shares, as follows:
  - I. One (1) equal share shall be distributed, outright and free of trust, to the Residual Beneficiary's daughter, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA, if she is then living. Subject to Section (F) below, if, as of the date of the Residual Beneficiary's death, JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA is not then living, then said equal share shall be distributed to JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA's then living issue, by right of representation. Each share created pursuant to this Section E(1) of Article Fourth for the benefit of the issue of JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA shall be held as a separate trust ("Beneficiary's Share") for the

benefit of such issue ("Beneficiary") to be held by the Trustee, administered and further distributed pursuant to Section G of this Article Fourth.

- 2. One (1) equal share shall be distributed, outright and free of trust, to the Residual Beneficiary's daughter, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER, if she is then living. Subject to Section (F) below, if, as of the date of the Residual Beneficiary's death, KATHRYN A. BOUVIER is not then living, then said equal share shall be distributed to KATHRYN A. BOUVIER's then living issue, by right of representation. Each share created pursuant to this Section E(2) of Article Fourth for the benefit of the issue of KATHRYN A. BOUVIER shall be held as a separate trust ("Beneficiary's Share") for the benefit of such issue ("Beneficiary") to be held by the Trustee, administered and further distributed pursuant to Section G of this Article Fourth.
- 3. In the event that both JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA and KATHRYNA. BOUVIER predecease the Grantors, leaving no issue, and having failed to exercise the testamentary power of appointment pursuant to Section (F) below, then the balance shall be distributed in accordance with Article Eleventh herein.
- F. <u>Power of Appointment</u>. In the event that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA or KATHRYN A. BOUVIER predeceases the Residual Beneficiary, upon the death of the Residual Beneficiary, the Trustee shall distribute such beneficiary's equal share to or in trust for such one or more persons or organizations and in such manner and proportions as such beneficiary may appoint by her will or revocable trust making specific reference to this general power of appointment.
- G. <u>Management of Beneficiary's Shares</u>. Until a Beneficiary has attained the age of twenty-one (21) years, the Trustee may distribute to or apply for the benefit of such Beneficiary so much of the income or principal from such Beneficiary's Share as the Trustee determines, in the Trustee's sole discretion, is necessary to provide for his or her health, education, maintenance, and support. In addition, the Trustee may make the following discretionary distributions:
- 1. <u>Investment in Business</u>. The Trustee may, in the Trustee's sole discretion, apply the principal or income of such Beneficiary's Share for the purpose of investing in a business or profession operated by, or to be operated by, such Beneficiary and to be owned by the Beneficiary's Share.
- 2. Acquisition of Residences. The Trustee may, in the Trustee's sole discretion, apply the income and principal of such Beneficiary's Share for the purpose of purchasing one or more residences to be owned by the Beneficiary's Share and used and occupied by such Beneficiary and his or her family, including a primary residence, seasonal residence or otherwise. In the case of any residence owned by the Beneficiary's Share, and in the Trustee's sole

discretion, such Beneficiary may occupy and use such residence without rent or any other financial obligation for the payment of the taxes, insurance payments, maintenance costs and other expenses required in order to keep such residences in proper repair and free of liens.

- 3. <u>Use of Tangible Trust Assets</u>. The Trustee, in the Trustee's sole discretion, may grant such Beneficiary the right to the use, possession and enjoyment of all of the tangible personal property held by such Beneficiary's Share, without financial obligation for the use of such property.
- 4. <u>Distribution of Beneficiary's Share</u>. Upon a Beneficiary attaining the age of twenty-one (21), the Trustee shall distribute to him or her, outright and free of trust, the remaining principal and accumulated income of that Beneficiary's Share. If the Beneficiary has already reached the age of twenty-one (21) at the time of the creation of the Beneficiary's Share, then the Trustee shall, upon making the division, distribute, outright and free of trust, to the Beneficiary the balance of such Beneficiary's Share.
- Distribution Upon Death of Beneficiary. If any Beneficiary shall 5. die prior to the complete distribution of such Beneficiary's Share, then all of the remaining assets in such Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed to or in trust for such one or more persons or organizations and in such manner and proportions as such Beneficiary may appoint by his or her will or revocable trust making specific reference to this general power of appointment. To the extent that the Beneficiary does not exercise this general power of appointment, the remainder of such Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed to the issue of such Beneficiary in equal shares by right of representation and each such share shall be held, managed and further distributed by the Trustee as a Beneficiary's Share under Section G of Article Fourth. If the Beneficiary shall die failing to exercise this general power of appointment without leaving issue, then the Beneficiary's Share shall be distributed pro rata to the other Beneficiary's Shares then being administered by the Trustee hereunder, and if none, then to the Beneficiary's heirs at law under the intestacy laws of the State of Nevada.
- Disability. Whenever the Trustee is given the power or discretion to make distributions to or for the benefit of a minor or other beneficiary under a disability, the Trustee, in the Trustee's sole discretion, may make distributions to a minor or other person under disability by making distributions to the guardian or conservator of his or her estate and/or person, as the Trustee shall determine, or to any suitable person with whom he or she resides, or the Trustee may apply distributions directly for such beneficiary's benefit, or the Trustee may make distributions to any duly established custodian for any minor beneficiary under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or Uniform Transfers to Minors Act of any State. Any custodian acting on behalf of a minor beneficiary shall have the power to bind the beneficiary with respect to all matters

concerning the Trust. The Trustee, in its sole discretion, may also make distributions directly to a minor if, in the Trustee's judgment, such minor is of sufficient age and maturity to receive such distribution and spend the money properly. The previous language of this paragraph 6 notwithstanding, if a beneficiary is, or would be eligible for need-based government benefits, the Trustee shall hold the funds for such beneficiary in a "special needs trust" as that term is understood for need-based government planning. By "special needs trust" is meant that the Trustee shall have the sole and absolute discretion to make distributions for the benefit of such beneficiary in a manner that improves the qualify of life for the beneficiary but will not make the beneficiary ineligible for need-based government benefits. The provisions of the Paragraph 6 are intended to supplant need-based government benefits, but not to replace them and all terms of this Paragraph 6 shall be so interpreted for all purposes.

H. <u>Maximum Term for Trusts</u>. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Trust, unless terminated earlier under other provisions of this agreement, each trust created under this agreement shall terminate upon the expiration of the longest period that property may be held in trust under this agreement without violating the applicable rule against perpetuities, or similar applicable rule. At that time, the remaining trust property shall vest in and be distributed to the persons entitled to receive distributions of income hereunder.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, is hereby reformed and construed to provide that the beneficiaries of the Trust shall serve as Successor Trustees upon the death, incapacity, or resignation of ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN; and

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that it is approved and granted that Article Twelfth of THE W. N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972, is hereby reformed as follows:

Twelfth: Successor Trustee. In the event of the death or incapacity of either Grantor, the Survivor shall continue to serve as the sole Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder. Upon the death or incapacity of the Survivor, the Grantors then nominate and appoint ELEANOR C. AHERN, f/k/a ELEANOR MARGUERITE CONNELL HARTMAN, as the Trustee of all of the trusts created hereunder, or in the event that she is unable or unwilling to serve in the said capacity, then the Grantors nominate and appoint JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA to serve in the said capacity. In the event that JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA is unable or unwilling to act as successor Trustee, then KATHRYN A. BOUVIER shall act as successor Trustee. No successor Trustee shall have

any responsibility for the acts or omissions of any prior trustees and no duty to audit or investigate the accounts or administration of any such trustee, nor, unless in writing requested so to do by a person having a present or future beneficial interest under a trust created hereunder, any duty to take action or obtain redress for breach of trust.

In the event that none of the trustees named in this Article Twelfth are able or willing to serve, then the majority of adult income beneficiaries of the Trust shall select a successor Trustee.

DATED this 4th day of September, 2009.

### T.ARTRE BETTALT

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Respectfully submitted,

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

SOZOMON, ESQ.

Nevada State Bar No. 00418

BRIAN K. STEADMAN, ESQ.

Nevada State Bar No. 10771

9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue

Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

Attorneys for Eleanor C. Ahern, Trustee

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EXHIBIT L Certificate of Mailing of Petition For Declaratory Judgment Regarding Limited Interest Of Trust Assets pursuant to NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), AND NRS 164.033(1)(A) 

	CERT S. Chrim
1	JOSEPH J. POWELL CLERK OF THE COURT
2	State Bar No. 8875
3	THE RUSHFORTH FIRM, LTD. P. O. Box 371655
4	Las Vegas, NV 89137-1655 Telephone: (702) 255-4552
5	fax: (702) 255-4677 e-mail: probate@rushforthfirm.com
6	Attorneys for Jacqueline M. Montoya
7	DISTRICT COURT
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
9	
10	In the Matter of the Estate
11	
12	of
13	THE W. N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated
14	May 18, 1972, Case No. P-09-066425-T  Department: 26 (Probate)
15	A non-testamentary trust.
16	
17	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
18	Date of Hearing: October 11, 2013 Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m.
19	
20	I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on September 27, 2013, I sent a copy of the "Petition
21	for Declaratory Judgment Regarding Limited Interest of Trust Assets Pursuant to NRS 30.040,
22	NRS 153.031(1)(E), and NRS 164.033(1)(A)" that has been filed in this proceeding, together with
23	a copy of the Notice of Hearing related that petition, to each person named below by first-class mail,
24	addressed as follows:
25	
26	
27	
28	

Certificate of Mailing

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Eleanor C. Ahern c/o Jeff Johnston, Esq. Stanley Crawford, Esq. Johnston & Associates, P.C. 400 West Illinois, Suite 1600 Midland, TX 79701
Eleanor C. Ahern, aka Eleanor M. Hartman Ahern 8635 West Sahara, Suite #549 Las Vegas, NV 89117
Jacqueline M. Montoya 3385 Maverick Street Las Vegas, NV 89108

Eleanor C. Ahern c/o Shauna S. Brennan, Esq. Brennan Legal Counsel Group, PLLC 9480 S. Eastern Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89123

Kathryn A. Bouvier 4221 A Surf Drive Galveston, TX 77554

Diane L. DeWalt, an employee of The Rushforth Firm, Ltd.

Certificate of Mailing