IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

QUINZALE MASON,

Electronically Filed Jul 06 2015 04:23 p.m. No. 67830 Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

Appellant,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction in Case Number CR14-1830 The Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada Honorable Elliott A. Sattler, District Judge

JOINT APPENDIX VOLUME FOUR

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	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE	
7	HONORABLE ELLIOTT A. SATTLER, DISTRICT JUDGE	
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10	STATE OF NEVADA,	
11	Plaintiff,	00-1- No. 0014-1020
12	vs.	Case No. CR14-1830
13	QUINZALE MASON,	Dept. No. 10
14	Defendant.	
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RENO, NEVADA; WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2015; 9:00 A.M.

(Outside the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: Okay. We'll go on the record in

CR14-1830, the State of Nevada versus Quinzale Mason.

The record will reflect that we are meeting in the

courtroom outside the presence of the jury. Mr. Mason
is present with his attorney, Mr. Hylin. Mr. Young is
here on behalf of the State of Nevada. We are here to

finalize the jury instructions.

The Court has met with counsel this morning and tentatively established the order and number of jury instructions that will be given. We did that pursuant to NRS 175.161 and Washoe County Rule of Criminal Procedure 7. So now we are just going to put on the record and number the jury instructions.

Counsel, as we go through the instructions, if you have any objections, please make the objection as we get to the instruction and then we will create a record regarding that. Failure to make an objection at this point, I will assume, means that you're waiving any objection to the instruction.

So with that, Instruction No. 1 is ladies and gentlemen of the jury.

Instruction No. 2, if in these instructions.

Instruction No. 3, if during this trial.

Instruction No. 4 is 2 pages and it is the Amended Information instruction alleging just Count I and Count II.

Instruction No. 5 an, Amended Information.

Instruction No. 6, the penalty provided by law.

Instruction No. 7, there are two kinds of evidence, direct and circumstantial.

Instruction No. 8, nothing that counsel say.

Instruction No. 9, it is the duty of the attorneys.

Instruction No. 10, neither side is required.

Instruction No. 11, to the jury alone belongs the duty.

Instruction No. 12, the fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony.

MR. HYLIN: Your Honor, I'll be objecting to the -and requesting the removal of the second sentence in
that which states "The fact of such a conviction does
not necessarily destroy or impair the witness's
credibility."

I think that essentially says, okay, you can consider the -- you can consider the credibility of the witness if he's been convicted of a felony, but, ah, it

really doesn't matter anyway.

THE COURT: Mr. Young.

MR. HYLIN: That's what that second sentence says.

MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I would submit is a correct statement of the law. It doesn't make any statement that the jury must disregard it. It just simply says that they — taken in the totality they may consider and give whatever weight the jury chooses to a felony conviction. In conjunction with the balance of the instructions, it's an accurate statement of the law.

THE COURT: The Court finds that Instruction No. 12 as written is an accurate statement of the law.

Further, the Court finds that the sentence that follows the sentence Mr. Hylin is complaining about does clarify and provide additional context to what the jury should consider in weighing a felony conviction. And, therefore, the Court will give the instruction as written over Mr. Hylin's objection.

The next instruction is inconsistencies or discrepancies. And that will be number 13.

MR. HYLIN: And I will object to that.

THE COURT: And what's the objection to that one, Mr. Hylin?

MR. HYLIN: Well, it's already covered in a

previous instruction that states to the jury alone belongs the duty of weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses. I can read the whole thing if you'd like. It's Instruction No.

THE COURT: No, that's all right.

MR. HYLIN: — the one I'm referring to. And it gives a fairly thorough treatise there of what they're to be considering as far as the witnesses are concerned. And I realize that now they speak of inconsistencies on the proposed number 13. I assume you —

THE COURT: Right, that's number 13.

MR. HYLIN: Number 13 where it says inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness. Again, what that essentially does is it minimizes the -- and molds the way the jury is supposed to consider people. Well, that's why we have juries, is to use their common sense in conjunction with Instruction No. 11 to gauge the trustworthiness of the testimony of the jurors -- excuse me -- of the witnesses.

So this is, you know, a state-generated instruction that essentially says, "Look, if there's inconsistencies in the testimony, who cares. No big

deal. Don't pay any attention to it."

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Young, if you'd like to respond to that.

MR. YOUNG: I guess briefly. It's, again, an accurate statement of the law taken in conjunction with the balance of the instructions. It tells the jury that they are the deciders of the facts, that they can consider the credibility, including inconsistencies or discrepancies. And taking this specific instruction 13 as a whole, I think it doesn't mandate that they rule one way or the other, decide one way or another. It says you can consider it and give it whatever weight you feel is appropriate, particularly that last sentence.

THE COURT: The Court will give the instruction as noted over the objection of Mr. Hylin. Instruction No. 2 discusses the fact that juries are to consider all of the instructions as a whole and not to single out one sentence or phrase to the exclusion of others.

And so when the jury -- or if the jury were to consider possibly the testimony of witnesses and balance that against the reasonable doubt instruction that we know statutorily the Court must give, the Court believes that it's appropriate to give them some way to

balance or weigh the credibility of the witnesses. And it is important for the jury to know that just because there may be one inconsistency city or some inconsistencies, they need to weigh those things and not automatically and just come to some specific conclusion. Instruction No. 13 gives them the ability to weigh that.

Further, Instruction No. 13 does inform the jury that it's up to them to decide what weight to give inconsistencies or discrepancies. They may choose to discredit all of the testimony if that is what their final conclusion is. And so the Court will give Instruction No. 13 as written.

Instruction No. 14 is the testimony of one witness.

Instruction No. 15, a statement made by a defendant.

Number 16 is the expert witness instruction.
17, every person charged.

Instruction No. 18 is the defendant not testifying instruction. As I stated yesterday, NRS 175.181 -- and I think yesterday I said .185, but it's .181 -- directs that only the defendant can proffer this instruction.

Mr. Hylin, on behalf of Mr. Mason is it his desire to have this instruction given to the jury?

MR. HYLIN: That is accurate, Your Honor, and the language that exists in the instruction.

THE COURT: So Instruction No. 18 will read to the jury as written.

Instruction No. 19, in every crime.

Instruction 20 is the intent instruction.

- 21 is the statutory reasonable doubt instruction.
- 22, every count charges a separate and distinct offense.
 - 23 is the elements of Count No. I.
 - 24 is the elements of Count No. II 2.
 - 25 is the statutory definition of a deadly weapon.
- 26 is the instruction that the State is not require to have recovered the deadly weapon. Mr. Hylin, you had indicated you wanted to object to this instruction.
- MR. HYLIN: That is accurate, Your Honor. I'm objecting to this instruction which would be numbered number 26.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HYLIN: That is already covered by Instruction
No. 10 which states "Neither side is required to call
as witnesses all persons who may have been present at
any of the events disclosed by the evidence or who may
appear to have some knowledge of the events." And this

is the salient language, "or to produce all objects or documents mentioned or suggested by the evidence."

So, in other words, Instruction No. 26 really isn't needed. And I also think that it also relieves the State again of some of their burden of proof simply because they don't have a certain piece of evidence. As I mentioned before we were on the record, the State could probably offer a dozen instructions that kind of aid them in proving their case, for instance, you know, don't pay any attention to Detective Blas, because Detective Blas isn't required under the law to gather every little piece of evidence that is deemed appropriate by the defense or, you know, the State isn't required to swab the car, the State isn't required to do that.

And I think this is an old instruction that's been covered. I've looked up some of the case law on it, at least in California. And I don't -- you know, I know it's an instruction that's commonly given, but that doesn't mean just because through traditional that is correct.

So in my opinion, and I think under the tenets of due process and the requirements in the Constitution

that require the State to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt, adding instructions which relieve them of that burden or lightens the burden in any way are objectionable.

THE COURT: Mr. Young, what's the citation? I think it was to Harris or Harrison versus State.

MR. YOUNG: Harrison v. State, H-a-r-r-i-s-o-n, 96
Nevada 347. It's a 1980 case. The pinpoint page is
350 to 351.

MR. HYLIN: I am in receipt of that case. And actually the Supreme Court at that time gave the argument pretty short shrift as you can see from the opinion. They simply stated that the argument has no merit. You know, it might be nice to have some case law from this millennia. It might be appropriate.

THE COURT: Well, one moment. As a point of interest, I actually --

How about something from 2008, Mr. Hylin? In Newman versus State, N-e-w-m-a-n versus the State of Nevada, 124 Nevada 1496, 238 Pacific 3d, 842, the issue specifically was raised.

I'm looking for a page number. One moment. For some reason my computer is not providing me with page numbers. But I can tell you that the Nevada Supreme

Court actually did address this issue.

specifically in Newman versus State, it says,
quote, "Fifth, we reject Newman's contention that her
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
on appeal that the jury was improperly instructed. The
State was not required to have recovered a deadly
weapon or produced a deadly weapon in court in order to
prove the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a
crime. The State is not required to produce the actual
weapon at trial in order to enhance the defendant's
sentence for the use of a deadly weapon," close quote.

And it's -- then it has Footnote 17. Footnote 17 is a citation to Harrison versus State, 96 Nevada 347. So the Nevada Supreme Court in 2008 addressed this very issue.

The Court will give the instruction as indicated.

Instruction No. 27 is the term willfully. So it's the definition of willfully.

Instruction 28 is the motive instruction.

29 is the--

MR. HYLIN: I was going to object to the motive instruction also, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Instruction 28 then. We'll go back. Your objection, Mr. Hylin.

MR. HYLIN: Well, even though motive — well, here's my premise. Motive is not an element of the offense, so why are we instructing people, the jury, on where the motive fits in? First of all, it's a common sense concept with the jury. I don't think that the Court needs to be, you know, again, making a lighter burden on the State by saying, "Well, yeah, you know, you can consider motive."

And I know what some of the response is going to be. It also states in there that the absence of motive may tend to establish innocence. And I did read that in another California opinion. This is Cal J 2.51, if I recall. But nonetheless, you know, the motive is not an element of the offense. And I think in the jurors' minds it elevates motive to an element of the offense. And if there's evidence of motive, which the State is going to argue in this particular case, then they essentially say, "Okay. Here's your green light. We've proven our case, because this fellow has the motive to do it."

So I'm going to object on those due process grounds where it relieves the State of part of its burden of proof.

THE COURT: Prior to Mr. Young responding to the

argument, I would like to note that I did something that I advise attorneys not to do on a regular basis; that is, when I cited to Newman versus State, 124 Nevada 1496, the reason that there were no page numbers associated with it is that it's an unpublished disposition of the Nevada Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Rule 253 says that the parties shall not cite to unpublished opinions. And it is one of my personal pet peeves when attorneys do. And, therefore, I violated my own pet peeve by citing to that. It was inadvertent on my part, because I pulled it up on Westlaw and just clicked on the case and it took me directly to the page citation — or excuse me—directly to the citation of Harrison versus State. But then when I just went back and looked at it again, the reason that there were no page numbers associated with it is that it was an unpublished opinion.

The Court would note that it's not the only unpublished opinion that addressed that issue. Rather than citing to the other unpublished opinion regarding Harrison versus State, the Court will simply note that the Nevada Supreme Court in its recent unpublished decisions has not shown any indication that it intends on modifying or updating the law. And, therefore, the

Court's reasoning regarding that previous objection Mr. Hylin made will remain.

Regarding the motive instruction, Mr. Young.

MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, it's an accurate statement of the law. And the very first sentence instructs that motive is not an element. So there's no confusion there. Again, in conjunction with the balance of the instructions and this instruction in its entirety, particularly the last sentence, it advises the jury that they can give the presence or absence whatever weight they feel is entitled to be given to that evidence. And there was evidence of motive here.

So there's plenty of instructions in this packet that don't address the elements as Mr. Hylin cited. The majority of them in fact don't. It's a proper statement of the law and I would suggest should be given. It certainly does not reduce any burden upon the State.

THE COURT: The Court will give the instruction as noted. The purpose of the jury instructions is to advise laypeople on the law that they are to apply in coming to their decision. And so the Court does have to take into consideration the fact that they may not be aware of the fact that motive, that is, the why a

crime was committed, is not a specific element.

And so the Court believes that it is appropriate to give the instruction as noted and the Court will provide the jury instruction over objection. And it will be numbered 28.

One moment.

1.7

I had to go back and check. The Supreme Court rule that prohibits the citation of unpublished opinions is Rule No. 123, not 253. So I mistake there.

So we'll go back to numbering the instructions.

28, again, is the motive instruction. It will be given over objection.

29 is the transferred intent instruction.

Mr. Hylin.

MR. HYLIN: Yes, I've reviewed this, Your Honor.

Frankly, I looked high and low to find a defense instruction that throws a stick in Mr. Young's spokes, but Nevada is different than probably the majority of the jurisdictions. It has a very, very broad -- a very broad interpretation of this common law doctrine. So I don't have an objection or a countervailing--

THE COURT: No stick to throw in his spoke.

MR. HYLIN: No stick to put in the spoke.

THE COURT: Instruction No. 30, you are to consider

only the evidence.

31, it is your duty as jurors.

And 32 is the upon retiring.

And I will sign the district court judge line.

And then there will be verdict forms for Count I, not guilty and guilty, and Count II, not guilty and quilty.

The Court has been provided an additional instruction by the State. And the additional instruction by the State reads, "If you find the defendant attempted to suppress evidence against himself in any manner, such as by concealing evidence, such attempt may be considered by you as circumstances tending to show a consciousness of guilt; however, such conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your consideration.

Mr. Young, I indicated to you when we were informally settling the jury instructions that the Court would not be inclined to give the instruction.

MR. YOUNG: And I understand that, Your Honor. I offered this instruction and will still offer the instruction. It's Cal J 2.06. It related to the evidence of the gold four-door Hyundai vehicle that's

registered to Eboni Spurlock.

The State's basis is that there is both direct and circumstantial evidence showing and supporting that it was the defendant who drove the vehicle to the area based on witnesses placing him on the scene, leaving in the vehicle, Ms. Spurlock testifying that the vehicle was there in the morning but not there when she returned from work shortly before the shooting. And the defendant was located in a house just a few blocks away from the vehicle. So I would offer it and understand the Court's position.

THE COURT: As previously noted, the Court -- or excuse me -- as previously noted in the informal settlement of jury instructions, the Court is very concerned about the inference of consciousness of guilt regarding the location of the vehicle in this case. Certainly the instruction itself is an accurate statement of the law. However, the Court will not give the instruction.

The Court finds that while the argument that

Mr. Young makes may be appropriate in front of a jury,

the Court also doesn't -- the Court does not find that

it should be -- let me say it again. The Court does

not find that that argument should be buttressed by the

jury instruction. It would draw too large a conclusion in the Court's mind. Further, there has been no testimony, direct testimony, that Mr. Mason himself was the person who placed the vehicle there.

I'm trying to think of the name of the officer. It wasn't Officer Lancaster. Was it officer Kleidosty who was observing the vehicle, Mr. Young?

MR. YOUNG: Yes.

THE COURT: Officer Kleidosty did testify that he observed the vehicle. The Court would also note that the vehicle was in close proximity, a block or two away, from where the defendant was eventually seen immediately prior to being taken in custody, but there's absolutely no evidence that he, the defendant, was the person who placed the vehicle there. And, therefore, the Court will mark this jury instruction as refused pursuant to Local Rule of Criminal Practice 8E.

MR. YOUNG: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Young, do you have any additional jury instructions that you wish to offer?

MR. YOUNG: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any objection to the jury instructions 1 through 32 as numbered?

MR. YOUNG: None. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Hylin, do you have any additional jury instructions to proffer?

MR. HYLIN: No, I do not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And do you have any objections to the jury instructions 1 through 32 other than the objections that you have already made and the Court has ruled upon?

MR. HYLIN: Not other than the objections I've already placed on the record, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Then those objections have been preserved for the record and the Court will give the jury instructions as noted. And so I will go have my staff prepare packets of jury instructions for each --

Let me just do this before we do that.

Mr. Mason, you don't need to stand. But now that we are formally on the record, yesterday at the close of the court's day I did discuss with you the fact that you have a right to testify or not to testify and that you needed to discuss that with Mr. Hylin. It's my understanding that you have done that and it's your decision not to testify. Is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So, Mr. Hylin, will the defense be putting on a case this morning?

MR. HYLIN: No, Your Honor. When the jury convenes, I'll rest on the record.

IO

THE COURT: Well, I don't even know if you need to do that. It's up to you if when the jury comes in --

MR. HYLIN: Well, that's okay. If you don't think it's required, that's fine.

THE COURT: It's up to you. Sometimes I know that the counsel are uncomfortable drawing attention to the fact that you're not doing anything. I'm not suggesting you're not doing anything. You understand that's --

MR. HYLIN: No, I understand. I appreciate that, though.

THE COURT: If you don't want me to say anything about it, the State has rested, and so then the next thing that we'll do is when the jury comes in -- I have the jury instructions, one packet for each juror, on their chairs when they enter the room. Then I read the jury instructions and then I have all the jurors pass the jury instructions back down to the bailiff so they're not looking through the jury instructions while counsel is making closing argument. I want them to be able to focus solely on you and what you're talking about. And oftentimes if they have packets of paper,

then they're just kind of flipping through those.

back into the jury room and they'll have their copies when I'm reading them to them, but while you're making your argument, then they're not looking at them. So it's up to you to use the overhead if you'd like to and draw any attention to specific instructions you want.

MR. HYLIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Bailiff, where did Deputy Gray go?

THE BAILIFF: He's in dealing with the jury.

THE COURT: If you could let Deputy -- well, I understand that you probably need to be out here with Mr. Mason, but if you could let Deputy Gray know we're going to be photocopying the jury instructions and then we'll be ready to go.

Court's in recess.

(A recess was taken.)

(Within the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: We'll go back on the record in CR14-1830, the State of Nevada versus Quinzale Mason. Mr. Mason is present in court with his attorney, Mr. Hylin. Mr. Young is here on behalf of the State of Nevada.

Counsel, will you acknowledge the presence of the

jury?

MR. YOUNG: The State will, Your Honor.

MR. HYLIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The jury is all present,

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I need to offer you an apology. We are starting a little bit late this morning. It's not the fault of the attorneys. It's my fault. I had some other issues that I was attending to. So you were here waiting longer than I wanted you to be waiting, but I appreciate the fact you were all here on time. It was completely my fault that we didn't start promptly at 9:30 this morning. So I do offer you my apologies.

As we discussed yesterday -- I guess we didn't discuss it. As I told you yesterday, the attorneys and I had to get together and settle the jury instructions. That's the law that you use in deciding the facts in the case. If you remember, I told you you're the judges of the facts; I provide the law to you; and then with the facts and the law you come to a conclusion. We have done that. And each of you has a packet of jury instructions there on your chair with you.

It is required that I read the jury instructions to you. It's not because I don't think you know how to

read. It's because the courts want to make sure that all the jury instructions are thoroughly explained to you. But I wanted you to have a copy of them so you can review them as I go through them as well.

Now, at the conclusion of the jury instructions, at the conclusion of my reading the jury instructions to you, what I'll have you all do is pass them down to Deputy Gray so you're not looking at them while the attorneys are making their closing arguments.

I read the jury instructions to you and then the attorneys get to argue now the case to you. And then you go back and you take as much time as you need to come to whatever conclusion you come to in this case.

So with that, I will read the jury instructions to you.

(The jury instructions were read.)

THE COURT: And I have signed the jury packet. And then associated with it will be not guilty and guilty forms or Count No. I, battery with a deadly weapon, and not guilty and guilty forms for Count No. II, assault with a deadly weapon.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I would ask that you pass the packets down to your right and Deputy Gray will collect those.

On behalf of the State, Mr. Young, would you like to make your closing argument?

MR. YOUNG: Yes, please, Your Honor. Thank you. If I could use the podium again.

THE COURT: You may.

MR. YOUNG: Ladies and gentlemen, this case began with losing money. As simple and innocuous as that sounds, Quinzale Mason just couldn't let that go and so he grabbed a gun and he got into Eboni Spurlock his girlfriend or on-again/off-again girlfriend and cohabitant's vehicle and went looking for Anthony Holly. And when he found Mr. Holly in the front area of the parking lot of Delphine Martin's apartment unit, he pulled into the apartment complex, he got out of his vehicle, and he shot at least two times at Anthony Holly. And in doing that, he struck four-year-old Cecelia. That was August 9th of 2014.

And that leads us -- those actions, those completely irresponsible and driven-by-anger actions, lead us to this courtroom this week and ultimately today.

For his actions he was charged with battery with a deadly weapon for striking Cecelia and assault with a deadly weapon for the assault he committed on Anthony

Holly. And, ladies and gentlemen, the evidence you've heard the last two days and what we'll discuss a little bit this morning shows how the evidence is convincing, it's overwhelming, and it's clear that Mr. Mason committed those acts.

Now, there's a few jury instructions -- the judge just read you the entire packet. There's a handful of instructions I want to highlight right now. And rather them putting them up on the board since the screen is back there -- again, you'll have a copy of these in the room when you're deliberating.

But what jury instruction 17 says is "The defendant" -- and, again, this is something that everybody is used to hearing. In a criminal case, a defendant -- in this case, Mr. Mason -- is presumed innocent until and unless I establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. So that's a burden on me representing the State of Nevada.

I asked you in voir dire if you would hold me to that burden. I'm asking you again now. Hold me to my burden that the law requires for me to prove the charges against Mr. Mason beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now, Instruction No. 21 tells you -- it's a definition of what reasonable doubt means. And it's

important -- I want to talk about this very briefly, because it doesn't mean that I am required to prove the defendant's guilt beyond all doubt. It's beyond a reasonable doubt.

And jury instruction 21 tells you what that means. And what it says, among other things, on this paragraph is after you consider all the evidence, if you feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, or in this case charges, if you feel an abiding conviction of the truth of that charge, then I've satisfied my burden. That is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

So consider that, ladies and gentlemen, when you're deliberating in the jury room and considering and holding me to the burden that the law requires.

Now, the two offenses as charged in this case, battery with a deadly weapon -- again, Instruction No. 23 outlines the specific elements. And what instruction 23 does is say these are the three elements that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order for you to return a guilty verdict against Mr. Mason for battery with a deadly weapon.

And instruction 24 does the same thing for Count

II. Instruction 24 outlines -- I'm not going to go

over the specific elements. You'll have them in the

room. But 24 outlines the two elements, again, that I must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to rebut that initial presumption of innocence that is afforded to Mr. Mason.

One thing I want to discuss with respect to 24.

You will see on element one there's an A and a B

option, if you will. I would submit in this case both

A and B have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but
you only need to find one, in other words, the

defendant did either unlawfully attempt to use physical
force against Anthony Holly or the defendant did
intentionally place Anthony Holly in reasonable
apprehension of immediate bodily harm. Either A'or B

or, of course, both if you find satisfies element 1.

So they're alternative, if you will, to one another. I would suggest that both have been satisfied, but either one of those works.

Then obviously element 2 talks about the deadly weapon which I would submit, frankly, is not an issue in this case.

Now, I do want to take a moment with respect to instruction 29. That is what is referred to as the transferred intent instruction. And it's the two-paragraph instruction which starts "If an illegal

and unintended act results from the intent to commit a crime, " and it goes on.

And how it ends is -- at least that first

paragraph, "The doctrine applies in any case where

there is intent to commit a criminal act and the only

difference between the actual result and the

contemplated result is the nature of the personal

injury sustained."

What that effectively means, folks, is this. The State is — battery with a deadly weapon as charged is against Cecelia. This instruction tells you that the State is not required to prove that the defendant had any intent to strike Cecelia. The evidence certainly shows that Cecelia just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. I'm not required to prove that he had any intent against Cecelia.

If you find that the defendant had the intent against Mr. Holly, that intent transfers to Cecelia. So please don't misinterpret that it's my burden to prove that he had any intention to use force against Cecelia. That's what instruction 29 tells you.

And then the last instruction I briefly want to discuss is instruction 7 which talks about two kinds of evidence being direct and circumstantial. And it talks

about what direct evidence is, what circumstantial evidence is. And I like to use an analogy. And please understand this analogy has nothing to do with this case, but it will help you understand the difference between those two concepts.

Assume just for a moment that what I am trying to prove is that an individual crossed a snowy meadow. Again, nothing to do with the case. I'm not trying to minimize by using this -- the facts of the case. But in order to prove that an individual crossed the snowy meadow, direct evidence might be a witness saying, "I saw subject A start on the east side of the meadow,"

That would be direct evidence of somebody saying, if the jury were to believe that witness, direct evidence, that that subject crossed the snowy meadow.

Circumstantial is a little bit different. And, again, to prove that same premise of crossing a snowy meadow, you might have a witness say, "At 9 o'clock I saw the person on the east side of the meadow."

You might have another witness say, "15 minutes later I saw that same individual on the west side of the meadow."

And then the third person say, "Later when I went out there, there were some foot tracks across that meadow that weren't there before 9 o'clock."

Now, if the jury were to believe all of those components, that likewise would prove that the subject crossed the snowy meadow even though there's no one to come in and say, "I actually saw that."

And the reason I bring that up is because there's some evidence in this case that you heard, mainly from Mr. Stanley and Mr. Holly, as far as not actually seeing the gun being fired by the defendant, but circumstantially it's proveable. We'll talk about that. But, again, that's the difference between direct and circumstantial.

What this instruction tells you, number 7, is either or both direct and circumstantial evidence can be used by you. You're not limited to one or the other. You can consider all of the evidence in totality in reaching your verdict.

Okay. So August 9 -- let's get into what the evidence proves and shows in this case. During the morning Mr. Holly was playing craps, dice, on the street with a group of individuals, including the defendant. And Mr. Holly started winning money and he

started winning Mr. Mason's money and an argument ensued. And if you recall the testimony from Mr. Holly, someone said, "Hey, he has some physical issues."

Mr. Holly said, "That triggered with me, because my aunt had the same thing, so I stopped. I backed off.

I went to my place. I got out of there."

His testimony was he got a snack. He then went out in the parking lot and started playing with the dog.

It was over. It was not over, of course, to Mr. Mason.

Mr. Holly testified while he was in the grass area -- if you recall, Exhibit 2 -- if you recall, kind of there's this -- it's kind of covered by the trees, but there's this grass area to the front of the complex closest to Patton Drive. And this obviously is the apartment unit or the building that Delphine and Stanley Huey's apartments are in. And he's up here in this grass area playing with the dog. No issue. He's moved on. And he sees the defendant driving up the street in his gold car, what was registered to Eboni Spurlock.

He pulls into the parking lot. Mr. Holly testified that the defendant was the sole occupant of the car. Kind of through the window he sees something. He

hears, as he described, a click clack which he testified based on his background knows to be the cocking of a gun. He starts running away.

Now, this is some of the evidence going to support the assault with a deadly weapon charge. Reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. He's running away from an individual who's upset at him from that morning and driving up with a firearm.

He testifies that he kind of trips and falls near the stairway as it comes down. Shots are fired. And he peels and runs around the back of this unit hopping some fences. His testimony was he had some scratches on his chest. He runs out of his shoe. He testified he was scared for his life. He's getting shot at.

Again, factors that you can consider in support of Count -- I'm going in reverse order a little bit -- but Count II, the assault with a deadly weapon charge.

And you recall Eboni Spurlock's testimony. As he runs past her, what's he say? "Your baby daddy just shot a kid." Immediately. Immediately. He knows who was shooting at him. He didn't see the gun when it was being fired at him, but he knows.

He testified that after he got away he gets into his house, he gets some clothes, he runs into a friend

of an uncle or an uncle's friend, asks for a ride to Grand Sierra Resort where he felt there was safety where his wife was working.

Now, you heard testimony he is a three-time convicted felon. As the instructions tell you, you can certainly consider that in judging Mr. Holly's credibility. You can consider the fact he's a three-time felon. Let's weigh that in believing or disbelieving what he testifies to.

The State did not hide the fact that he's a three-time felon. But just because he's a three-time felon doesn't automatically mean that he is prohibited from being in fear for his life as he testified.

And we know he's in fear because of running, because of running out of his shoe, because of scraping himself up while jumping over fences, leaving the scene and getting away, which he later returns to speak with officers. That's how we know he's in fear.

He's a three-time felon. Yes, he is. But on August 9th he was put in fear by Mr. Mason pulling and shooting at him.

Now, also when considering his past, his criminal history, his three felonies that he testified to, consider his testimony. Don't consider it in isolation

but consider it in context with everything else. Is his testimony supported or rejected by the balance of the evidence?

And the reason I ask you to do that, aside from the law allowing you to do that, is because if he were to take the stand, "he" being Mr. Holly, and say something that was so farfetched and so off from all the other evidence, then those three felonies would carry a little more weight. But consider how his testimony is supported by the others that you heard.

Now, durning the shooting Cecelia was struck, as you heard by Dr. Cinelli, by metallic fragments which he opined being a ricocheted bullet. You recall his testimony. And there was some discussion about assumptions. His final opinion was a ricocheted bullet.

Now, how do we know that it was a ricocheted bullet? It's based on the same evidence that we heard throughout the course of the trial. It was a fresh injury; it was a penetrating wound injury. He testified that there was no rock or wood detected in the entry wound of her leg. The metallic fragment, he said — his words, not mine, metal inserted into her leg by a high-energy mechanism.

What could that be, folks? It's the bullet, the ricocheted bullet, while Mr. Mason was shooting at Mr. Holly. And, again, that transferred intent. The State doesn't need to prove that Mr. Mason intended to shoot Cecelia. It all comes back to the person who was taking Mr. Mason's money, that being Mr. Holly.

We have photos of the injuries. I'm not going to show them to you right now. You'll have them. But you'll recall that the penetrating wound photo, the x-ray.

Is there really any question of what that is that's in her leg? No. There's not.

Now, Delphine Martin, does she give a story that is completely off base from what Anthony Holly testified to or is it very similar to the accounting of Mr. Holly?

And when we go -- when I go through now Delphine's testimony and then a little bit of Huey Stanley's testimony, consider the timing of when they gave their statements and the places that they gave their statements. Were they all huddled up in the same room talking about, "Well, here's what we're going to say," and, "Let's get all of our statements the same," as the police showed up? No.

Anthony Holly, as soon as the shots ring out, he's gone. He doesn't give his statement, as you heard from Officer Kassebaum, until about three hours later when he returned.

Do Huey Stanley and Delphine Martin converse and talk about what their stories are going to be? No. Because we know Huey Stanley is on 911 immediately and we know that Delphine Martin is so hysterical on scene that they're not really able to have any substantial conversation with her. She's transported to the hospital.

So all three of these individuals who gave amazingly similar accounts of what happened give their statements at different times and different locations.

So Delphine Martin sees Holly in front of her apartment, which, again, going back to Exhibit 2 would put Mr. Holly up in this area, which, again -- now we're going to verge into Mr. Stanley. He said, "Yeah, I remember Mr. Holly being up here," consistent with that.

Now, Mr. Stanley, he's outside, there's nothing going on. So it's reasonable to believe that when he recalls the shooting happening when Mr. Holly is back here, he just didn't watch him walk up and back.

That's reasonable, but there's nothing going on at that time.

But Delphine Martin says the same thing that

Anthony Holly said. Walked my dog up to the grass

area; Mr. Mason pulls into the parking lot, same area;

gets out of the vehicle. And what does Delphine say?

She actually sees the defendant with a gun shooting at

Anthony Holly. Now, that, folks, is direct evidence

supporting the charges.

She says that Anthony Holly when the vehicle pulls in here by Mr. Mason is up near the car. Exactly what Anthony Holly told you.

She also said that the defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle. She also tells you that near the stairs Anthony Holly fell and he runs around and leaves the scene. Again, all -- I don't want to say identical, but very, very similar to Anthony Holly's testimony.

The last question that I asked her: "Is there any doubt that you saw the subject shooting?"

She said, "No."

"Is there any doubt that it was Quinzale Mason who was the shooter?"

And she said, "No."

And while she doesn't know Mr. Mason on a social level, she's seen him in the area. Mr. Holly has seen him in the area. Huey Stanley has seen the defendant in the area. They know who he is. So it's not a random person coming up who they've never seen and trying to figure out who this is. They know who the shooter was.

Delphine Martin had no issues with the defendant.

She had none. She's positive it was the defendant who was shooting.

Now, Huey Stanley, again, I don't need to go
through all of his testimony, but is it similar or is
it completely different than what you've already heard?
He recalls Anthony Holly being up — excuse me — up in
front of Delphine's residence, which we know happened,
the defendant pulling in in the gold four-door vehicle.
We know it happened. The evidence supports it.
Mr. Mason being the one to exit the car. He sees
something in his right hand, doesn't know what it is.
Again, this is now getting into circumstantial
evidence. He's not able to say it's a gun, but the
evidence is pretty clear what that something that he
had in his hand is.

He gets out of view and shots are fired. And then

Mr. Mason gets back in his car and drives southbound on Patton. And you heard the 911 call immediately. "I know who it is." He describes the car; he describes the direction of travel. You hear kind of the pandemonium going on in the background.

When Mr. Mason got out of his vehicle -- and I say "his vehicle." Technically Eboni Spurlock's registered vehicle. But when he gets out of that vehicle that both he and Eboni used, Mr. Stanley had an unobstructed view. He couldn't see the shooting, but he sees Mr. Mason get out with something in his right hand, comes out of view, immediately shots are fired, and Mr. Mason leaves.

Mr. Stanley immediately upon officers' arrival points out where the shooter lives. Right across the street, one unit down, the top unit closest to the street.

This is Exhibit 1. I apologize for walking up, but it's just easier than pulling the screen up.

This is the building that Delphine Martin and Huey Stanley live in. This one right above is the one that Anthony Holly lived in. Well, one building over and down, the top unit closest to the street is 2366 Patton. Huey Stanley pointed this out immediately to

officers. And we know from the evidence who lived in that unit, Eboni Spurlock and the defendant.

The testimony of those three individuals who all put the defendant on scene and either directly or circumstantially shooting that gun is supported by Steve Maes. Now, Mr. Maes, what's he doing on Patton Drive? He is helping somebody move in. Zero association with the area, zero association with anybody involved in this case, zero association with Mr. Mason. None whatsoever.

His testimony, exact same vehicle description.

He pulls into -- if you recall, he did it on the overhead -- this parking lot where Mr. Maes is working and the unit just to the south of 2366 helping his friend move in. He pulls in, circles around, stops just in front of, amazingly, 2366 Patton and yells out looking for someone.

He doesn't know who the driver is, but black male, beard, gold car, all consistent. And the evidence shows who that actually was, the sole occupant.

he drives northbound out of the parking lot, loses site, but his testimony, within 12 seconds, 12 seconds, of exiting that parking lot shots are fired and then that same vehicle leaving the scene southbound on

Patton.

So does he -- is he able to identify the driver?

Does he know the driver? No. But taken in collection with the balance of the evidence, it's clear who he saw. And again, recall what his connection to that area and this case is. There's none.

And what he also sees is the red hat that the driver is wearing, which, of course, launches us into the DNA evidence that you heard, because when the car is later searched, in the bag is a red 49ers hat.

Now, he said, "Well, Phillies or Reds," but the color scheme is the same.

And you heard evidence from Mr. Gresko that
Mr. Mason is the source, the source, of the dominant
DNA profile from the shirt as well as the hat. And to
acquire a source is 1 in 8 trillion, substantially
greater than the world population.

Now, I'm not asking you, ladies and gentlemen, to base your verdict and your decision on simply the red hat, just like I'm not asking you to base your decision simply on what Huey Stanley said in isolation or what Delphine Martin said in isolation or Anthony Holly said in isolation, but consider the information that Mr. Maes provided through his testimony in conjunction

with everything.

He sees this vehicle leaving that parking lot driving to the area of the shooting scene, shots fired and leaves, and then the red hat is located in the vehicle. And we're going to get to the vehicle here shortly. But you're able to consider that in conjunction with everything. It's one more layer connecting Mr. Mason to the car that was abandoned in Sun Valley after fleeing the shooting scene on Patton Drive.

So let's talk about the car. How do we know it was Eboni Spurlock's car at the shooting scene? Because as you heard from the testimony, nobody was able to obtain a license plate. Right? So how do we know it was the license plate 432LTY that was registered — that there's registration records and Eboni Spurlock said, "Yeah, that's my vehicle."

Well, three people, all of whom know -- again, not know personally, socially, but know who he is, identified Mr. Mason as the one getting out of that vehicle.

The vehicle had been seen at 2366 Patton Drive.

The vehicle matches -- or the description matches Eboni

Spurlock's car. It is supported by Steve Maes's

testimony. Recall Eboni Spurlock's testimony. When she left for work in the morning -- I think she says she works 4:00 to 11:00. If your memory is different than that, your memory controls. But somewhere in that range in the morning.

And when she left, her car wasn't working. That's why she got a ride from a coworker. So the car is on Patton. When she gets home, she says at 11:00 or 11:30, the car is no longer there. And who are the two people that drive her vehicle? Herself, one, and the defendant. Those are the two people that have access to her Hyundai.

Now, this gold vehicle which was there in the morning and is now gone immediately after the shooting, which matches the description of that vehicle and three witnesses say the defendant got out of, most importantly later on August 9th is located in Sun Valley. And you recall the testimony that it appeared abandoned, there was nobody there.

This is Exhibit 16 -- this is just so we all get our bearings -- the vehicle in question, Eboni Spurlock's vehicle. But you recall the testimony by Officer Kleidosty that the windows were down or partially down. Well, this is Exhibit 19. And you'll

get a closer look at this in the jury room. But if you look at the door once it's opened up for searching the car, you can actually see, yeah, the window is down, at least this front passenger window is down.

So this vehicle which is at Patton Drive on the morning of August 9th now appears to be abandoned in Sun Valley with the windows down, off of a dirt road access or a dirt access road, out of view of any paved street.

You recall the testimony that Fifth and Tornado, where that is, you can't see the vehicle because it's up this road that has an elevation and behind a fence.

Instruction 3 -- not instruction -- Exhibit 3 shows you the distance. The lower left area is Patton Drive. The upper right, the areas that's highlighted, is effectively where the vehicle was found.

What it's doing up there is that the defendant after the shooting fled the scene and ditched it in an area that he thought wouldn't be found. Now, amazingly -- this is Exhibit 4. You recall here's Fifth and Tornado, that intersection.

I hope everyone can see this. I apologize if I'm cutting anybody off.

Here's that dirt access road that comes -- kind of

parallels Trapper and Sun Mesa. And there's this fence line that runs there. The vehicle was parked just around this turn around this fence back in this area that has nothing to the east of it.

And where is the defendant located the next day within, what, 12 hours of the car being located when he's finally -- the surveillance from the airport?

He's located at 619 Lone Cedar Lane. So we're talking -- I'll let you do the math -- a handful of blocks from where this vehicle is apparently abandoned.

that's how we know that's the vehicle, all those factors. Again, I ask you respectfully, don't take one factor in isolation, consider them all in totality.

All of that conclusively shows that it was Eboni Spurlock's car leaving the scene of the shooting and it was Eboni Spurlock's car that was abandoned off of Fifth and Tornado close to the house that Mr. Mason was located in within 24 hours of the shooting.

Finally, you have evidence of statements by Mr. Mason that were made in the course of this investigation. Now, there's an instruction, a jury instruction, which talks to you about admission and confession testimony.

Wilma Gray and Officer Koger. Now, let me start

with Ms. Gray. She loves her grandson. It was uncomfortable for her to take the stand and testify to what happened. And, again, in judging credibility of what witnesses say, consider, as the instruction tells you, any bias and interest that she might have in the case.

Now, she did testify that in her conversations with Mr. Mason he admitted to her to possessing a gun. I believe her exact words is because he said, "I'm a little man and I need protection," or something along those lines.

so she does testify that he admitted to her he has a gun. And that corresponds certainly to the other evidence that he was seen shooting a gun. But the testimony that she provided as to her conversation with him is that she talked to Mr. Mason on the 8th, being her birthday, and then again on the 10th.

Now, we know that all the statements that I was asking her about and then ultimately Detective Jenkins testified to didn't happen on the 8th, because the alleged crime, the BBD, the ADB, didn't happen until the 9th. So we know that that conversation didn't occur on the 8th. But taking her testimony and Detective Jenkins' testimony in conjunction, she told,

according to Detective Jenkins, that Mr. Mason called her on the 9th sometime after noon which would be spot on consistent with the date and timing of the shooting itself, as police were dispatched at about 12:15 on the 9th.

7.4

When Officer -- or excuse me -- Detective Jenkins said, "Hey, we're looking for your grandson,

Quinzale" -- I understand she explains this away, being Ms. Gray, but what Detective Jenkins testified that she responded is "I know, because he shot a kid."

And when Detective Jenkins asked, "How do you know that?" she said, "Because Quinzale told me."

Now, Ms. Gray said she didn't even know that it had anything to do with a kid, she didn't have that information. And so that information had to come from somebody with knowledge. And that person would be, of course, the defendant.

Again, while she denied it when she testified,
Detective Jenkins testified that in speaking with
Quinzale Mason sometime on the afternoon of the 9th,
Mr. Mason said, "I'm looking for a way out of Reno."

And the one time that Detective Jenkins spoke with Ms. Gray was at 3 o'clock in the morning on August 10th. So, again, 15 hours or thereabout after

the shooting. You recall at one point Ms. Gray kind of slipped up a little bit and said, "Well, I told Officer Jenkins and I told Quinzale to turn himself in."

Well, if that's the case, then we know she had already talked to him which would put us on the 9th sometime in the afternoon. And she kind of corrected herself and said, "Well, it could have been the other officer," but we know from the timing of how this all played out.

Folks, Ms. Gray is the defendant's grandmother. I get it. But the evidence supports the timeline that she actually spoke to the defendant on August 9th in the afternoon and it was the defendant who said, "I shot a kid."

Now, Officer Koger, you heard that he didn't even have time to activate his recorder it happened so fast. Upon handcuffing the defendant, he says, "I was going to the station to turn myself in. This has been messing me up."

Well, what's he referring to? Of course he's referring to what happened the day before. He's messed up, to use his words, because he shot a four-year-old girl. That in itself further supports Officer Jenkins' timing of the call that Ms. Gray had with the defendant

rather than how Ms. Gray testified in court.

And in the backseat, of course, of Officer Koger's car he says, "Thank you for not shooting me."

And when the officer said, "Well, you know, we won't do that unless you give us a reason," what's his response?

"What I did was violent and so you may have thought I would be violent with you, too."

Again, I don't mean to be facetious, but what violence is the defendant speaking about? The shooting from less than 24 hours before.

so, folks, like I've mentioned a couple times, I ask that you -- respectfully I ask that you consider all the evidence in totality. We had two days of trial which is relatively quick. You did hear from a number of witnesses. But consider how all of the witnesses and all of the testimony they provided fits and how there's really nothing that was testified to that is so outlandish that you can just discard as being trivial or unsubstantiated.

If you consider everything, the three people who, again, don't have any issues with the defendant, know who he is, identify him as the shooter, either from directly seeing it, as Delphine did, or

circumstantially putting him there, immediately shots 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

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and leaving, if you consider that with Mr. Maes, if you consider that with the information about Eboni Spurlock's car, the location it was later located, and that location in relation to where the defendant was located, and the statements that he made, and everything else that we've discussed -- and, again, that presumption of innocence that the defendant is certainly entitled to is destroyed and the presumption of innocence has been rebutted and the State has proved -- I would submit respectfully to you has proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

Mr. Mason shot a handgun; it struck Cecelia -- a bullet struck Cecelia or at least a ricochet. The transferred intent shows that you can find him guilty of battery with a deadly weapon.

And in shooting at, towards, or brandishing a gun and discharging it when Mr. Holly is running away, you can find him guilty of Count II, assault with a deadly weapon as well.

I would ask that you consider all the evidence in sum. I would ask that you return guilty verdicts as to both Count I and Count II. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Young.

Mr. Hylin, your closing argument on behalf of Mr. Mason.

MR. HYLIN: Yes. Thank you.

Good morning. That's a nice neat little package, but there's a lot of flaws here in not only the testimony but inconsistencies in the facts themselves that create reasonable doubt in this case.

I don't know how many of you have seen the movie My Cousin Vinny where two cars virtually alike are involved in this case and the first car that's the subject of this movie is a green small Buick. It's an older movie. But the kids are charged with robbing this store. And they were in this green car and essentially the evidence all surrounds the appearance of this car.

And toward the end of the movie they figure out through evidence that's gathered by the sheriff that there is another green car exactly like it that was found in the possession of the people that had the gun that shot the clerk. It's not an impossible story.

So even though the District Attorney — the Deputy District Attorney, Mr. Young, would have you believe that these cars are the same, there's some very, very remarkable differences here. And I'll get into those

as we start to talk about the car. But there was testimony that's inconsistent amongst the people.

So let's start with Mr. Huey Stanley.

Mr. Holly and Delphine testified that he was standing by this brown car or gold car, however it's described, as it drove up into the parking lot. But Mr. Stanley said that Huey -- excuse me. Anthony was standing by his Blazer.

Now, this is a -- this is not perhaps in your mind initially going to be something that -- so two of the witnesses say Anthony Holly is here where I'm pointing with the tip of my pen where the car pulled up off of Patton Drive. Huey Stanley says his Blazer was parked over here on the other end of the building and Anthony Holly is standing over by the Blazer.

Now, this isn't remarkable testimony in and of itself, but it exemplifies how people see things and what witnesses do with the information that is lodged in their brain. Now, keep in mind this event was six months ago. And you'll hear me talk about the lapse of time in other contexts here, too.

I'm not saying that everybody has to have a perfect memory that goes under oath and testifies in a court of law, but if you're going consider the testimony

consistent and they're going to corroborate the State's case, you have to also consider these inconsistencies.

And that's one of them.

Mr. Huey said it was a brown car that pulled in there. And he later in his testimony, I'll concede -- "Well, it was gold. It was gold."

But here we have the passage of time again. And if these -- is it conceivable that these folks that live there in the neighborhood -- and Mr. Stanley is directly up above Delphine's apartment -- that they never talked about this incident ever again and they never said who did what and shared their stories about what was going on? Of course. It would be unnatural if they didn't ever speak about it again.

So when he said, "Well, it was a gold car, it was a gold car, you know, it wasn't brown," is he saying this because the other two said it was a gold car or somebody else said it was a gold car and that seems to be the thing that they should be talking about is a gold car because it fits the scenario that the State wants to present?

Well, let's talk about some other inconsistencies. Mr. Stanley is sitting by his apartment door up on the second floor here. And it doesn't show it here,

perhaps because this roof extends over it, but there's a walkway there that he described and that he oftentimes sits outside his door in his chair enjoying the out of doors mostly because of his -- I think he said COPD.

And he sees the car drive up. But this was an unremarkable event. There was nothing that caused him any alarm or any other predisposition to be concerned about this car driving up in the driveway in this first parking spot here.

So he said a fellow got out of the car and disappeared underneath the walkway so he couldn't see him anymore. But he said — here's what he said. And I brought this to his attention and, you know, he admitted he had said this at the preliminary hearing also. That when he got out of the car, the fellow got out of the car, he had one hand on the door and the other hand on the roof, but he never described what was in his hand on the roof or the hand that was touching the car. He said the hands were there. No gun.

And that's Mr. Stanley's version of what he observed when the car pulled in the parking lot and then the fellow disappeared underneath the walkway. He probably had a view of him for -- what? -- a second

perhaps. Not very much time to perceive somebody or anything for that matter.

And as you'll see, as time goes by, people have made different descriptions about the car, too. But one thing -- I will concede that one thing that they seem to be consistent on is they name Mr. Mason as the person who got out of that car. But let's talk about -- no witness there, whether it was Mr. Stanley, whether it was Anthony Holly or whether it was Delphine described him, the person that got out of the car, as having a hat on, let alone a red hat. None of them saw a hat.

Now, this is — I'll tie this together when we talk about Mr. Maes later on. But nobody talked about a red hat, nor did they describe the shirt. If you recall — I'll mention it now, because I'll talk a little more about Mr. Maes — Mr. Maes said the person that pulled in the lot up on the other side of the street where he was moving somebody in had a white shirt on and a red cap. Then he said that same — that same gold car went up the street.

Well, there's a couple other flaws in Mr. Maes's perception or testimony there that I'll discuss in a minute. But it's important to show that the three

people that testified that they saw Mr. Mason get out of that car and start shooting with a gun couldn't describe his clothes. And remember when he got out of the car, there wasn't — this wasn't anything where the adrenaline is rushing and your memory goes blank because you just can't seem to get it together to remember what it was because your mind is racing. Every human being has been through that same experience.

So there's no description of the clothes and there's no description of the hat, as Mr. Maes deliberately said this guy had a red cap on and a white shirt. So as we know from all the evidence that was gathered in this bag that they did the DNA test, there was no white shirt in there. It was a dark pullover shirt.

the car didn't pull in fast. It didn't come screeching around the corner and pull in there. The description by Huey Stanley was it just pulled in and parked right in that first spot. Nobody thought anything about it. And that's consistent with them not thinking that there's any big deal when this car pulls in the parking lot.

So at that point in time there's nothing unusual

that's been perceived by Huey Stanley. The fellow goes underneath the walk and then he hears "boom, boom," at least two and maybe even more than that. I think he described somewhere around four, was his testimony, rounds went off and what he thought was a gun.

Now, what did -- this is where the testimony gets convoluted. He says that Anthony ran around the back of his Blazer. He said he tried to go in front, but if you recall, Huey Stanley said there was a barbecue there and he couldn't go in front of Mr. Stanley's Blazer that was parked right in this area here where the tip of my pen is. He couldn't go in front of it because there was a barbecue there. Yet Delphine testified that Anthony ran in front of that and then went around the corner and he fell twice doing it.

Now, those differences in testimony become important when you see what their perception is. And I'll tell you why. Mr. Huey said as soon as he heard the "boom, boom, boom," he hit the deck. He was down on the deck and crawling back in his apartment. So he's going through his door and he can't see what's going on. And he certainly isn't seeing where the shooter is shooting, because he can't even see the shooter. He actually admitted that,

So without seeing where the gunman is aiming, he doesn't know what's really going on down there. He hears the sounds.

And listen, I'm not trying to make fun of what went on here and I'm not trying to humiliate Mr. Stanley, but these perceptions and the misperceptions you're hearing about need to be dealt with in your deliberations.

So we have Anthony Holly. You know, Mr. Young talked about his prior felonies. Felonies are introduced in our courts of law for the purposes of impeachment. And impeachment means that this is kind of a dishonest person, he's not really to be trusted. And the testimony that he gives here now isn't worthy of your trust.

He says he saw the defendant, but he was standing here and a car pulled in from right here. Okay. If Mr. -- if Anthony Holly is standing up here where I'm pointing -- in this area where I'm pointing my pen, what do you see here? What am I circling with my pen?

So this car comes in from Patton in an area like this and parks. And according to Anthony Holly and Delphine, he's standing here right near the car. Now, he doesn't say that he looks in the car. When the car

pulls up, he says the window was down and he heard a click that he associated with the rack of a pistol on a qun.

And he said he immediately, immediately took off running. Yeah, he took off running. And which direction did he run? He ran — according to Delphine he ran right in front of the building and then around the corner here. He fell a couple times. According to Huey Stanley he went around the Blazer, he was standing here to begin with, and then disappeared on this side of the property.

Well, if he's running in that direction, he can't be looking behind him. He's looking at where he's going as fast as he can. And, again, I'm not making fun of him, but I didn't see any eyes in the back of his head, and he couldn't see where that pistol was being aimed either. So far we have nobody that saw where this pistol is being aimed. I'll tie this together in a bit.

Well, let me mention it right now so I don't try to sound mysterious. Look, nobody -- Officer Kassebaum testified that he searched the area for impact, you know, bullet impact evidence. He found none, none in the wood structure, you know, none on the pavement.

And there was -- if you recall, I made a point of showing this retaining wall back up here. And if we look at -- this is Exhibit 7, by the way. The one I was just showing you -- I apologize -- was Exhibit 2. And these will be back in the jury room with you.

So this isn't a great picture, but it shows from the Patton Drive looking westbound through the parking lot. And if you recall, the building there is shown as the apartment building that they were in. And Delphine was down in this area sitting by her door with her child Cecelia. The car came in and parked right here. And Anthony Holly was running back toward the Blazer here in the background.

What's behind there? There's a big, tall, concrete block retaining wall. And what's on -- what's on the ground is pavement, albeit not in great condition. But Officer Kassebaum thought that, well, if there was -- you know, if the bullets were going to hit at a shallow angle, they would usually cause a linear scuff mark where they hit the pavement and bounced up. If bullets hit the concrete block back here, they're going to leave a mark. And you can all imagine this. When somebody is shooting, particularly with a moderately powered pistol like a 9 millimeter, it's going to leave

a mark somewhere.

There is no strike evidence anywhere shown here in this case, anywhere. The point is, where was that pistol pointed? Was the pistol pointed in the air? They couldn't find any strike marks anywhere, no ricochet marks, no nothing. So what is that particle in Cecelia's leg? The doctor didn't know. But I'll get there in a minute.

So we'll stay back on this particular photograph here. If Anthony Holly was running in the direction of this Blazer back here, you would think you would find a bullet hole in the Blazer, you would find a bullet hole in this retaining wall, you'd find a bullet hole or a ricochet off of these stairs, off of the building, but you don't.

Now, listen, Mr. Young wants you to ignore this mystery, that all of a sudden this particle ends up in Cecelia's leg, but it's important to understand -- and I'll tie this together with the instructions a little later on.

So Delphine, when she testified, no hat and she didn't describe any clothes either of whoever got out of that car and started shooting. Now, she said she didn't really pay any attention to what was going on

until Anthony started running.

Now, here's the peculiar thing. She stated that -- she said that she saw the person on the car and she says it's Mr. Mason, that the person shooting from the car was shooting at Anthony Holly. Now, I'll show you why you should seriously, seriously dispute this testimony in your deliberation.

If we go back to the State's Exhibit 2, Delphine is sitting by her door in this area right next to the wall, right next to her door. Anthony Holly, according to her testimony, is running from here in front of the building around this way. Or if you want to accept Huey Stanley's testimony, he is running this way and he goes around the Blazer and then down to the side of the building.

Delphine testifies that she saw Anthony Holly fall twice. Anthony Holly even testified that when he hit the stair, the stair rail, it caused him to fall. He actually fell twice according to Delphine. The bullet never struck him. If the shooter is shooting at Anthony Holly and he fell twice and he shot at him once on the ground, you certainly if he missed him would have seen a ricochet mark off of the asphalt. It's not there.

watching Anthony run this direction. If she's seeing Anthony run this direction and she's down here and she's seeing him go back here and she sees him fall, it's in this area where I'm making a little circle with my pen. I challenge you to watch him fall here, fall twice, by the way, and still have one eye cocked down here down the sidewalk to see where the shooter is shooting. It's virtually impossible. And she's not a chameleon where the eyes can diverge and look in all directions at the same time. Humans don't work that way. They can focus their eyes in parallel in one direction and that's it.

So Delphine either watched Anthony, which is the more trustworthy version, where she sees him fall and consistent with Anthony Holly's testimony that he fell first when he hit the stair rail, or she can see down toward Patton Drive. She can't be looking at the same time.

Now, consider this also. She said as soon as she heard the sound of the shots, she tried to cover her daughter who was sitting on the ground. That means she had to get on the ground and cover her daughter with her body. So how much could she actually see at that

point in time?

Why am I bringing this up? Do these people in this — that happened to experience this thing at 2397 Patton Drive, did they all get together and talk about what happened and, of course, their stories congeal? I'm not saying they're bad people. Everybody talks about important events in their lives, and particularly remarkable events like this, they'll talk about it and they'll talk about it, but over a six—month period what becomes fact and what becomes something that somebody said that stuck in your head and you think, "Yeah, maybe that's the way it was, I saw the guy shooting at Anthony" — but by her own testimony it's virtually impossible for her to see both.

As I mentioned, she's crouched over trying to protect Cecelia, but in fairness, it wasn't described exactly what she did, but she said she was bending over trying to protect Cecelia, but she certainly describes in fair detail the path that Anthony took.

Now, there's another thing that came over the 911 call that you heard for Huey Stanley. You'll have that in the evidence room. You can play it back there if you want. And this is something, if I recall, Mr. Maes stated too. He heard somebody screaming down there.

But over the 911 call they were saying, "They shot the baby."

Well, what's wrong in that? It's not "He shot the baby." It's "They shot the baby."

Maybe a small difference now, but when you add up all of the inconsistencies in this entire scenario, it makes a big difference, because you have to take all these little things that seem like a minor chip around the edge, you know, of the piece of pie, but by the time you put them all together, the pie gets consumed by the inconsistencies, because it just couldn't be that way.

So let's talk about the car. This is the car that the State actually wants you to believe was driven by Mr. Mason that came up there and parked in that spot at 2297 Patton. You recall what Mr. Maes said about the rear window? Oh, maybe he did, maybe he didn't, but I'll tell you what he said. He said the rear window was busted out. The rear window is not busted out on there.

So with Mr. Maes we have somebody in a white shirt and a red cap in -- I'm going to use the polite term -- an unloved car. He called it a ghetto car and described it with the rear window punched out or broken

out.

As you can see here, the rear window is fine on this car. This is the one that was found in Sun Valley. That nexus really hasn't occurred yet in this case, but nonetheless, they find this car and they want it to be the car that drove up in front of that — in front of that house, in front of the apartment building. So, therefore, that's what they expect you to believe, but it's not consistent with the testimony.

So if you -- Mr. Young emphasized that the car went around in the parking lot where Mr. Maes was, did a U-turn, headed up Patton Drive. And Mr. Maes actually, I think reluctantly, admitted that he couldn't actually see where it went because the trees were in the way, but he said maybe 10 or 12 seconds later he hears some qunshots.

So this is where you get into the instruction where you have circumstantial evidence. So they want you to believe that -- you know, that this is the same car that drove in, did the U-turn, but there's so many inconsistencies in it, you really can't consider this same gold car.

Mr. Maes didn't really give a make or mark of the car. This is a Hyundai Accent, you know, Eboni

Spurlock's car, the one that they want you to believe that was driven to the scene. So we have those inconsistencies there.

And let me show you -- again, this is Exhibit 14.

Do you remember what Delphine said about the left front? There was a big, huge, two-foot-in-diameter spot of black primer on that car that she said she saw. Now, this -- look, this is -- that's really significant as far as the identity of this car, because you can see from this photograph on Exhibit 17, there's no black primer, there's nothing wrong with the -- she said it was on the left front -- the driver's side -- by the driver's side front wheel is what her exact testimony was. There's no primer there. So she's describing a car that's probably different.

I don't have any statistics on how many gold cars inhabit the United States, or even Reno, but they're really common. You see gold cars just about everywhere. And small gold cars are probably a lot more popular than large gold cars. So that's what we have, here is another misdescription of this car.

And they want to tag Mr. Mason with this, so they picked this car because they think he was driving it up there and got out and started shooting. But here's the

lack of information that they have regarding the car.

Nobody on the scene got the license plate. Nobody on the scene described the make or model of that car.

They did describe some dark tinted windows. Some of them say the windows were rolled down. So how did they know? Another inconsis -- that's an inconsistency, within an inconsistency.

Detective Blas didn't do. Oh, by the way -- let me see if that photo is there. This is also very important. This is a feature of a car that would be easily describable by whoever perceived it to be there. And as this car pulled in -- as whatever car it was pulled in to the parking spot so that it could be perceived by Mr. Stanley and Delphine, nobody described the bumper this way. That's a very, very significant difference.

So what are all the flaws regarding the identity of this car? No license plate, you know, there's no make or model of the car that was described by Delphine or Mr. Stanley. They certainly would have noticed this bumper and been able to describe that, but that wasn't done. Nobody said anything about this bumper being that way.

The windows were supposedly rolled down. So how

did they know that they were dark tinted? As you can see, as the camera looks in this thing with the sun shining down on it, you can't even see in the vehicle, even from the front window. You can see part of the dash there where I'm pointing my pen and that's it. Even look at the surrounding vehicles. It would be very, very difficult to perceive anyone in the driver's seat of that car.

Then you couple on the other side where I showed you the other picture of this car. There's no primer there as described by Delphine. It's not the same car. They want you to think it's the same car, but it's not. So they go about their investigation assuming that this is the car. And it is an assumption.

And by the way, we don't convict people in America based on assumptions. It's not what it's about. It's proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

So let's talk a little bit about Detective Blas and how they used this car to establish some continuity in the case. So what I'm showing you here is Exhibit 19 now.

THE COURT: Mr. Hylin, on the larger screen to your left -- I'm sorry -- to your immediate left there's a little button in the lower right-hand corner that will

take the red arrow off of the screen there.

MR. HYLIN: I'm sorry. I didn't see it was on there. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, counsel, I don't mean to -- I'm not cutting your argument short.

We will be breaking for lunch in the next couple of minutes, ladies and gentlemen, just so you know.

MR. HYLIN: Do you want to do it now, Your Honor? That's fine.

THE COURT: It's certainly up to you, Mr. Hylin.

We started a little late. So, again, I'm not in any
way limiting the amount of time that you have to argue
your case. I just want to do it at a reasonable time
both for the convenience and comfort of the jury as
well as the parties. So maybe if we can — if you want
to break now, we can do that.

MR. HYLIN: That's fine with me, Your Honor. I will just be starting into Detective Blas's testimony, so this is a good spot to break.

THE COURT: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I think it might be a good idea then to break. The case has not been submitted to you yet. Argument has begun. But you are not to discuss the case, so I need to read you the admonition again.

You are instructed not to discuss the case among yourselves or with anyone else or to form any conclusions concerning the case until it is submitted to you. You're not to read, look at or listen to any news media accounts relating to this case should there be any. You're not to form any opinion about the case until it is finally submitted to you.

. Do not experiment or investigate. Do not visit the scene. Do not refer to any outside sources for instructions on the law. Rely only on the court for legal instruction.

Ladies and gentlemen, why don't we come back at approximately -- when I say "approximately," I immediately wish I hadn't said that. Why don't we back here at 1:15. That's going to give you a little bit of extra time for lunch, but I think that will give the appropriate amount of time both for you to go do the things you need to do and then we'll come back and conclude the closing arguments after the noon hour. So we'll be back, again, at 1:15 p.m.

Remember that admonition. You're not allowed to talk amongst yourself or with anyone else about the case because it is not submitted to you yet for consideration.

All rise for the jury.

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(Outside the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: Deputy Gray, did we order lunch already for the jurors?

DEPUTY GRAY: We have not.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we do that. We can order them lunch. I know that jury deliberations -- well, no, strike that. We're not going to do that, because they're going to be able to go out and do lunch on their own.

Be seated, everybody.

The nurse from the Washoe County Sheriff's Office is en route for Mr. Mason's medical needs, and so I did want to make sure that we took that break right around that period of time so Mr. Mason can get his insulin injection and also get his lunch and make sure that his physical needs are taken care of. And so we will be in recess until 1:15.

Deputy Gray, when the nurse comes, just have her assist Mr. Mason. I would request that Mr. Mason remain here in the courtroom at least briefly for the jurors to be able to clear the jury room if they need to so they do not see Mr. Mason being escorted in the company of the sheriff's office.

Anything else on behalf of the State, Mr. Young?

MR. YOUNG: No. Thank you.

THE COURT: On behalf of Mr. Mason, Mr. Hylin?

MR. HYLIN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Just so the parties also know, it is my practice to release the alternate juror when the jury begins their deliberations unless there's no reason to have -- in this case it a female -- to have her remain.

Mr. Young, do you have any objection to that?

MR. YOUNG: When you say "release," as far as let her leave the courtroom or the courthouse?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. YOUNG: I have no objection to that so long as she -- I know typically they at least provide a phone number in case she's needed to come back. But short of that, no, I have no objection.

THE COURT: If the parties have a strenuous objection, I can make the alternate remain here in the building. I don't have her remain here in this courtroom while her fellow jurors are deliberating, but she will remain in the building. But generally I like to let them go and I give them the admonition before they leave and then we also make sure that we've got a

cell phone number where we can reach that person. So if that is the framework, is that all right with the State? MR. YOUNG: For that I have no objection. THE COURT: Mr. Hylin? MR. HYLIN: That's fine with me, Your Honor. THE COURT: Then that will be the process that we will employ in this case. We'll be back on the record at 1:15. Court is in recess. (The lunch recess was taken.) --000--

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THE COURT: Will counsel stipulate to the presence of the jury? Mr. Young.

MR. HYLIN: The State will.

THE COURT: Mr. Hylin?

MR. HYLIN: Yes, I will.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we'll go back on the record in the State of Nevada versus Quinzale

Mason, CR14-1830. Mr. Hylin will continue now with his closing argument.

Go ahead, Mr. Hylin.

MR. HYLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Good afternoon.

when I left off I was about ready to start talking about Detective Blas and his phase of the investigation when he's gathering the items out of the car. And the photo that was at issue is here. If you recall, this is the -- I'm sorry. This is Exhibit 19, by the way. All these things will be in the jury room and you'll be able to inspect them themselves.

Now, I asked a lot of questions of Detective Blas and a lot of the procedural stuff, too. But when you distill all this down, he found some items in this car

here which has been well established that it's Eboni Spurlock's car. That's essentially undisputed. In the glove box there they found the registration. She confirmed it's her car. So why would it be a shock that Mr. Mason's items are sitting in that car?

But one of the important things that Steve Gresko told you with the DNA is it doesn't tell you the time any of these items were put in that car, it doesn't tell you what time anything happened, it doesn't say when month-wise, year-wise, day-wise. DNA essentially shows that there's DNA, say, on the hat and the shirt. And they're in a car that was essentially the family car. Eboni used it most of the time when she went to work, but it was also driven by Mr. Mason. So it's no shock.

What the State wants you to do now is relate this back and say, "Oh, that's got to be the car that pulled in at the scene." But because of the discrepancies that I showed you before, it couldn't be the car. There's no big two-foot primer mark as testified to by Delphine. Nobody described the bumper on this car. As I showed you in the other photograph, it's jobberywockey, it's been partially pried loose or at least loosened from its brackets. The back window

isn't out. The State wants you to just overlook all these inconsistencies in the car that pulled in that lot.

Well, you can't overlook the inconsistencies.

They're there. You know, they're the elephant in the parlor is the old legal term. And you have to get around that elephant in order to find that this is the car that was at that -- at 2397 Patton Drive. You can't do it.

So what they've done is gathered some of the items in here, did a DNA test on the hat particularly and said, "Bingo. This has got to be the car."

No, it doesn't have to be the car. It doesn't have the characteristics that were described by Mr. Maes or anybody there on the scene. You know, the only similarity is it was a small gold car. Small gold car. That's it. And that's why there's a huge discrepancy in the State's case.

So I'm not really making fun of Detective Blas, but they look for what they want to look for. And he found what he wanted to find. But when I started going over with him on some of the other items like, "Well, why didn't you swab the steering wheel? Why didn't you swab this?" and,

frankly, he came up with a bushel basketful of excuses. Mostly he said, "Well, it deteriorates in the weather."

Well, there wasn't any weather. Nobody testified to any rain. Nobody testified about going through a car wash. Nobody testified to any of that sort of stuff. The fact of the matter is they collected this car from where it was parked out at Sun Valley.

By the way, perhaps if you would have swabbed all that stuff it would have told us who drove it out there, because, if you recall, Steve Gresko testified that the last driver of the car, particularly on the steering wheel, would probably wipe out the DNA from all the previous drivers. But because he didn't do those tests and he didn't do, you know, a thorough investigation, we'll never know now. We can't know. So that really doesn't inure in the favor of the State.

If the State is not going to do a proper investigation so that you nail all these little details down, don't give them credit for it. You can't give them credit for it.

So at any rate, when -- all I can say, we would have found out who drove the car out there. Mr. Young wants you to believe that it was Mr. Mason, but I'm telling you, you have not heard one scintilla of

evidence of who parked that car there. Not one. So it's not even logical to conclude that that car was parked there by Mr. Mason. It's rank speculation.

And let's go back to what I had said about the A word, assumption. It's an assumption. We don't convict on assumptions in this country. That's not the way it's done. We convict on reasonable — if they have proved it beyond a reasonable doubt, which they have not.

Also, in this car they found no shell casing, they found no gun. I asked Detective Blas if he had -- you know, if he had done a gunshot residue test. It's called a GSR test in the investigative business. Well, he didn't even bother to think about it. But if somebody is shooting a gun near the car, near a human being, just like he said, "Well, I don't know. That gunshot residue can go quite a ways. It will get on somebody, you know, that's in the proximity."

Yeah, it will get on somebody in the proximity, but it will also get on the car and it will also get on Mr. Mason.

Did they do a gunshot residue of the clothes that they think that he was wearing that are in that little white bag that they collected? No, they did not. Is

it because -- did they intentionally not do a gunshot residue test on those clothes? That's a very, very serious question, very serious question, because that would have been a lot more conclusive if they would have come up with a gunshot residue on those clothes, but they didn't do a gunshot residue test.

They didn't do a gunshot residue test on the T-shirt, not on the hat. They didn't do it on the car. If you're shooting a gun over the top of the car or over the top of the hood, some of the gunshot residue and the gunshot powder will land on that car. Detective Blas even admitted that. But they didn't do that test. So now this is what we have.

We have the car that's in these exhibits that you've already seen that they want you to believe was the car that pulled up in front of that apartment. So either through investigative omission or investigative sleight of hand, this is what they're doing to you. They're trying to get you to believe that that car is this gold car when in the reality the gold car that was described by the people on the scene can't be this one. A very, very important fact.

Now, the airport trip. Detective Jenkins got an anonymous tip that mom was coming up. You know, this

is -- Valerie Stewart is Mr. Mason's mom. Got an anonymous tip. Well, anonymous tips I think are probably everywhere frowned upon. They're more akin to, you know, a cheesy rumor that goes around your place of employment, which are very dangerous items.

from Phoenix to whisk Mr. Mason away and take him somewhere where he wouldn't be found. Well, first of all, that's not particularly bright, taking him down to mom's place in Phoenix. Don't you think somebody could fly down there or the Phoenix Police Department could investigate or if they had a warrant out for him they go collect him at Valerie Stewart's house in Phoenix?

Second of all, Valerie Stewart flew up here. You know, they're not going to hitchhike home and they didn't have a car to get home. So this anonymous tip has a lot of incredulity attached to it to begin with.

Now, I'm not faulting Detective Jenkins for following up on it, but the State touts Detective Jenkins as the truth teller, as the person that is going to verify this story to make it look like there was this grand plot, but, you see, nobody else except this anonymous tipster and Detective Jenkins has anything to say about going back to Phoenix. All the

rest of the testimony that we heard is he was going to turn himself in.

I know the State wants you now to view that as some sort of admission of guilt. But, you know, that's what the -- you know, the State, being all government entities that suspect somebody of a crime, either put out a warrant or they go searching for somebody. And if that suspect knows that they're a suspect and they start to flee the jurisdiction, that in itself is evidence of flight or a crime. That didn't occur in this instance.

Everybody in that car told them that "We're going to turn him in." And that's the proper thing to do, for a suspect to do, is go confront the authorities and clear his name. Instead he got arrested and taken to the hospital. But notwithstanding that, that is not evidence of guilt when a suspect goes to turn himself in.

There's been thousands of cases that collectively that everybody in this room would have either read in the newspaper or heard about on TV news where somebody is suspected of doing something and they just go turn themselves in at the police station. Perhaps they're interviewed by the police, perhaps not. But that's the

proper thing to do.

So now the State wants you to imbue Mr. Mason with a cloak of guilt because he went to turn himself in.

Well, that's not proper. Now, they never got there, so I guess the State can argue, "Well, I don't know. They were going to run." But there's no evidence of that.

The only evidence is that he was going to turn himself in.

Now, let's take the veracity of Detective Jenkins. She took the notes on her hand. The reason there's a big pregnant pause here is if you're setting up on the telephone and you're going to interview a suspect, what detective makes notes on their hand?

I had a question, why did Detective Jenkins call at 3 o'clock a.m. Well, all right, fine. That may be her shift. I didn't check the roster and I didn't subpoena anything from the Reno Police Department to show that she was or was not on shift that night. All right. Fine. She choose 3 a.m., an unusual time to be calling somebody, but the reality is that if she set up the call at 3 a.m., she's intentionally calling. And a professional detective would either have a laptop there making notes or they would have a pad and paper there making notes. Instead she says she made notes on her

hand. Not particularly credible.

But the thing that really destroys her credibility is that Ms. Gray testified on the stand that Mr. Mason called her the day before on August 8th to wish her a happy birthday. That was her birthday.

Now, you got to ask yourself, why would he call on the 9th after this incident would have happened to talk to her and say he shot a kid, but he's calling her to wish her a happy birthday? This just doesn't add up. And it was clear from the stand after I cross-examined Detective Jenkins that she had misinterpreted the call on the 8th to have occurred on the 9th and used that in her report and her testimony to bolster the idea that Ms. Gray had talked to Mr. Mason before Detective Jenkins had called when Ms. Gray made it clear as a bell that what she actually did was tell Detective Jenkins that, "Yeah, I talked to him yesterday. He called to wish me a happy birthday."

And she got it conflated and thought, "Okay. So he called before and gave you this information," which really wasn't the case.

Now, that really doesn't go to the core of this particular case. And there's a lot of things that occur in the case here that are peripheral, that are

collateral matters almost. And the fact that he was going to turn himself in is essentially a collateral matter.

But let's go back to Dr. Cinelli now. And I'm going -- this is going to lead into where I start talking about some of the instructions. Dr. Cinelli, who is a medical man, by the way, and no doubt very respectable -- he has an incredible resume. And he has a very, very admirable job doing the trauma surgery that he does. I want it understood that I'm in no way demeaning him. But when he's called into a courtroom on a forensic basis like this, he's not in his operating room, he's not in the ER, he's in a courtroom. And he has a job to do here.

And he was essentially subpoenaed by the State to tell you that his analysis would be that this would be a ricochet. But how can he possibly say that? He admitted on the stand that they never extracted the metal in there, they never tested the metal, if indeed it is metal.

You know, he says it looks on the x-ray like it's metal, but he made a contrast showing you the gold ring that the x-ray tech or whoever it was was holding little Cecelia's leg and this gold ring showed up real

bright like there was a light in it. And he used that as an example of how metal shows up. And then he points to the fragment, which is clearly bright. I'm not disputing that. It's not -- you know, I'm not saying that he's way off base saying this. But the critical part is that they don't know the chemical composition of that metal.

And if you don't know the chemical composition of the metal or even the physical appearance of the metal, you can't say it's a bullet fragment. And Dr. Cinelli was very careful not to say that that wasn't a bullet. As a matter of fact, I went into it, you know, a direct hit. If you notice in the Amended Information for the charge dealing with Cecelia, they say that the defendant shot Cecelia.

No, he didn't shoot Cecelia. He wasn't pointing the gun at Cecelia. Whoever was doing the shooting there wasn't pointing the gun at Cecelia, because he testified — and he was familiar with firearms — that if it was — if it was a round that came out of that 9 millimeter, a metal round, it clearly would have gone through Cecelia's leg. And those bullets have enough force that it would even shear the bone and have gone through the bone if it would have hit the bone.

Now, he did characterize it as a higher velocity, but if you notice on those x-rays, you'll see that the fragment is stuck between the two bones and it may be touching them. It's a little bit difficult to tell from those x-rays. It may be touching those bones, but it could be a metal fragment from somewhere else.

Why is this important? Because it doesn't appear that this weapon from whomever was firing it was aimed. It certainly wasn't aimed at Cecelia. And it's really doubtful that it was aimed at Anthony Holly. There's no hits anywhere near where Anthony Holly was. There's no bullet strike, no bullets, you know.

So what's left to be concluded? That whoever was firing the firearm wasn't really pointing it where everybody assumes — again, an assumption — assumes that they're pointing that pistol. And that doesn't make any sense, because you can't find any evidence of the rounds hitting somewhere near it. It ranges from three to five shots being fired here. They found — they only found two casings, but they never found any bullets whatsoever.

So if the bullets did hit something, they didn't see any evidence of it. And the piece of metal in Cecelia's leg is now a mystery. It's still there and

it's a mystery.

All right. So what's the big deal here? Carl, why are you making such a big deal out of this?

Well, let me take you through the logic that these instructions do. And I'll show you each individual one as we go along. This is Instruction No. 19. And I'll see if I can't zoom in a little bit here.

This is the two things that make up a criminal event in American law. And this is virtually every jurisdiction in the United States, including the federal jurisdiction. This is basic criminal law that every law student learns in his first semester.

"In every crime there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent." In the law it's called an actus reus and the intent is called the mens rea. And the intent is the mental state that is required to exist before you can convict anybody of a crime in this country. There has to be that mental state, not just the act, not just the big "boom boom" that was testified to coming from the firearm, but there has to be -- you have to have beyond a reasonable doubt in your mind that whoever fired that pistol had the mental intent to commit the crime that's charged by the District Attorney's Office.

The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove both act and intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Well, there's not — the act is the "boom, boom, boom." I don't think any witness was incredible enough so that you would conclude that it didn't sound like a firearm was being fired. It may be blanks or something else, but it was fired. But the criminal intent here is the issue that we're dealing with.

So the crime of battery, which you relate this back — this is Instruction No. 23, by the way. "The crime of battery with a deadly weapon as set forth in Count I of the Amended Information" — you'll have the Information in there — "consists of the following elements: The defendant did willfully and unlawfully use force or violence upon the person of Cecelia M. with the use of a deadly weapon."

But, see, the use -- the use, force or violence upon the person of Cecelia M. is what they have to prove. They have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was the criminal intent to harm Cecelia with that deadly weapon.

Well, here's where the State -- well, let me put up Instruction No. 24 also which is the assault with a deadly weapon. This is in Count II. "The crime of

assault with a deadly weapon as set forth in Count II of the Amended Information consists of the following elements: That the defendant did, A, unlawfully attempt to use physical force against Anthony Holly or, B, intentionally place Anthony Holly in reasonable apprehension" --

B

Well, if you look in paragraph A, we still run into the same language, "unlawfully attempt to use physical force against Anthony Holly." The problem with that is if there was no aiming of the weapon at him, in other words, if there were shots in the air or shots somewhere elsewhere where they never find these rounds, they haven't established the criminal intent. And they can't establish it beyond a reasonable doubt because they don't have the evidence that those rounds were going where the State wants them to be to convict him of that crime delineated in A, in section A.

But that's not all there is to these. Not only have they not proved that intent, but what they want to do now, to get this back to Cecelia, is use the concept of transferred intent. I'm not going to read all this, but it's instruction 29 if you want to make a note of these and go through the analysis. It's instructions 19, 23, 24. And the transferred intent is instruction

29.

So transferred intent is a common law doctrine.

What do I mean by "common law"? Common law existed clear from hundreds and hundreds of years ago, perhaps even thousands of years ago. And this concept is as old as the hills. It's hundreds and hundreds of years old. It's not established necessarily by statute in all the jurisdictions. It's established in common law, however. And it has various breadth in the states, but in Nevada it's a very broad concept.

so what it does, as Mr. Young explained to you earlier -- and I know -- I'm not trying to bore you with specifics, but you're given the instructions and it's really important that you be able to analyze them according to how they tell you to do your analysis.

So this concept of transferred intent means that — and, you know, this is — I'm going to explain the weaknesses as we go along, that a piece of bullet — the State's theory is that a piece of bullet somehow got cleaved off and went into Cecelia's leg while the shooter was pointing the weapon and trying to hit Anthony. Okay. That's it in a nutshell. Shooter trying to hit Anthony; piece of bullet ends up in Cecelia. They are claiming that the crime is complete

at that point against Cecelia through this doctrine of transferred intent. In other words, they take the intent that the shooter is trying to hit Anthony Holly and transfer it over to Cecelia, because if we use a standard criminal analysis — this is why this doctrine exists — somebody could go shoot at a bunch of other people, miss them, hit somebody in the background, kill them, and they fall over dead, but you couldn't convict them of the crime of hitting the bystander without the doctrine of transferred intent. That's why it exists.

It's not unsensical to do this. But here's the way the analysis works here. The same intent that it takes to convict on Count I for Cecelia is the same intent that they want to transfer from Anthony Holly over to Cecelia. If the aim can't be established and they can't establish a path of bullets that prove beyond a reasonable doubt that anybody, be it Mr. Mason or anybody else who had that pistol in their hand and shooting, if they can't prove beyond a reasonable doubt that intent was there for Anthony Holly, they can't use it against Cecelia. Can't use it.

And since they can't prove beyond a reasonable doubt that that weapon was being fired at Anthony, because there's no path of the bullet that they can

establish -- I'll tell you what a crime scene would look like. They would have little cones on the ground where each impact was and they would have little stickers on the wall and be taking pictures of -- let's say that concrete block retaining wall on the west side of the property there, they would have had a big sticker, you know, on there with photos of where the chip came out and probably even perhaps pieces of the bullet. But they can't establish that. The bullets aren't anywhere and neither are the evidence of any bullets hitting anything around there.

And as for the piece of the particle in Cecelia's leg, they don't know that either. Now, it's a strange truth that Cecelia ends up with a particle in the leg, but that particle in the leg just with the gunshot is not enough to prove Count I beyond a reasonable doubt. They have to be able to prove that that shooter intended to hit Anthony, intended to batter Anthony, to transfer that intent to batter over to Cecelia. They have not done so.

If I could have just a moment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Certainly.

MR. HYLIN: You know, Officer Koger got up there who was taking Mr. Mason away from the scene where he

was stopped there by the overpass of 395 and stated that Mr. Mason said, "I'm glad you didn't shoot me." But I got to explain to you, that's not evidence of guilt. You know, if you got several police officers that are surrounding your car and you've got pistols, firearms pointed at you, and you're a suspect in a case, whether you're guilty or not, you're real glad they didn't open fire on you. And that's what that statement means. It's self-contained. It's not evidence of guilt. "Thank you for not shooting me."

Now, the other statement that Officer Koger exclaimed -- he says words to the effect -- and here I'm saying "to the effect" because that's basically what they were -- "I know what I did was violent and I didn't want you to shoot me."

Well, this is coming through Officer Koger how many hours after he wrote his report? And he didn't record it. Listen, I knew when I was asking those questions that Officer Koger wasn't just going to come up and say, "I'm a bad dog here. I didn't record it."

And what his explanation is is fairly simple. It's "Well, we're not required to have the recording device on."

Well, that may or may not be true. But if somebody

is saying some spontaneous statements, which started outside his car, by the way, outside the police unit, you know, he should have had that recording on. But it's not. So we have to take his word for it now.

And the State wants you to believe that Koger's rendition of what was said in that car is accurate, but all you have is that one person who didn't bother to record it and didn't bother to purify it by making sure that there was no doubt about -- or no doubts about his credibility. It could have been recorded and played for you. It was not.

I think I've covered just about everything else in my notes here. You know, I always close by saying this, but I really sincerely mean it. Sometimes lawyers are boring, sometimes they're obnoxious, sometimes they're arrogant, but most of all, they're out for their clients and what we do here is for our clients.

And I meant it when I started my voir dire. I explained that our system is always connected to our society through you folks. You're the ones that do this.

And our justice system, I can guarantee you, would

be far different, it would be far more like the things you find overseas in the continental system in Europe where those are closed systems and they thrive amongst themselves without input from the community.

And we really -- and I say "we." I mean we all have that same feelings that we thank you so very much for sitting here. But most importantly, my job is to make sure that the State -- to show you that the State did not prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt.

And I'm asking you to acquit my client, Mr. Mason.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hylin.

Mr. Young, would you like rebuttal argument?

MR. YOUNG: Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, I'll be relatively brief in relation to my initial argument. I do, of course, want to address some of the things that were stated by Mr. Hylin and ask that you -- again, as I stated in my initial close, rather than focusing on what one witness says and is there a way to explain that away and then look at the second witness and is there a way to explain that away, and the third and the fourth and so on, consider all of the testimony and all of the evidence together and ask yourself does it flow and

does it make sense.

And what I would submit is once you do that -- and you don't look at items of evidence in a vacuum or in isolation -- is that it all does make sense and it's all very clear what happened on August 9th.

Now, Mr. Hylin spent some time discussing inconsistencies. And primarily those inconsistencies were about Mr. Holly's location when the shots were fired and a description of the car and the red hat, whether Mr. Holly was wearing a red hat.

Well, Mr. Holly's location -- again, if you recall Mr. Stanley's testimony, he was ducking and dodging in front of his -- well, Delphine's unit. And if you recall Delphine Martin and Mr. Holly's testimony, he was up near the front and then as he ran back was ducking and dodging.

Okay. Ask yourself again how significant that is.

And in doing that, consider the jury instructions. 11 talks about how credibility is your determination alone. I can't tell you whether to believe or disbelieve someone. Nobody can except for yourself.

That's your job in this case as a juror. But it tells you how much credit should be given to somebody. You base that on a number of factors, and starting here

with character, conduct, manner upon the stand, fears, bias, impartiality, reasonableness or unreasonableness of their statements, strength or weakness of recollection, viewed in light of all the other facts in evidence. And that's all I'm asking you to do. Just consider it in conjunction with everything else.

Number 13 talks about specifically inconsistencies. This acknowledges what we all know, is that something might happen and people might see it a little bit differently. But that doesn't absolutely destroy what they say. And this tells you to look at is it an innocent misrecollection? Is it willful falsehood? Are they coming in and purposely testifying in a way falsely and, as this says, willfully falsely? Or is it just a vehicle pulls into the parking lot — all three individuals know who he is, know the car. It's innocuous. He's there for a handful of seconds and then he starts firing.

And Delphine Martin says, "I'm scared for my kid.

I've never been in this before. I see blood on my
hands. I start hyperventilating."

The officer confirms that and says she's in no condition to talk. Huey Stanley hits the ground.

Anthony Holly is running away.

So are these discrepancies, if you want to call them that? Are they the subject of innocent error or willful falsehood as the instruction asks you to consider?

The car description. Now, Mr. Hylin made a couple of times a statement that Mr. Maes said the back window was broken out. You as the triers of fact determine if that evidence was ever admitted in this case. I submit that the only evidence of a broken back window was the black VW bug that picked up Mr. Holly and left the scene. There was no evidence admitted by Mr. Maes or otherwise that the gold sedan had a broken-out back window, none at all.

The bumper up front that was broken. No one testified to that. True. And Ms. Martin said there was some primer on the driver's side and the picture doesn't show that. True. Willful falsehood? Innocent error? Shooting.

If you find that those minor discrepancies is enough to cause you reasonable doubt, that's your right to do. I would submit it's not when you take it in conjunction with everything else.

Now, I'm going to try my best not to bounce around too much and I apologize if I do.

But as far as the gold car and Mr. Hylin -- you know, small gold cars are common. I'm not going to disagree with that. And there was no license plate number obtained and there was no make or model and there's no description of, again, this damage to the bumper. All true. But you even heard Ms. Spurlock talk about the license plate. I'm not sure what my own license plate number is.

So ask yourself, does it make sense that initially somebody pulling in the parking lot who they all recognize and know and then a shooting immediately happens, are they going to get the make and model when they all said, "I don't really know vehicles"? Are they going to get the license plate? Are they going to pay much attention to the small minutia or are they going to focus on the shots being fired?

And as Delphine clearly said confidently, without doubt, it was the defendant shooting at Anthony Holly. And how many gold cars are there out there that resemble the description of the car in question, are registered to Eboni Spurlock, is at the residence that morning but is gone at the time of the shooting and is located after the shooting abandoned out of view of the public within a few blocks of where the defendant is

located?

Mr. Hylin pointed out, "Well, we know that it was the defendant that drove the car there"? No. That would be direct evidence. And you don't have that here. But recall the snowy meadow example. How do we know that vehicle that ended up in Sun Valley is the vehicle? From all those facts. That's circumstantial evidence that you may certainly consider in this case.

Now, there's no gun found. There was no GSR.

There was no swabs. Detective Blas explained why that wasn't done. There is a -- going on a 24-hour gap -- 23 hours between the shooting just around noon or noon 15 on the 9th and when the defendant is contacted later. Does it make sense to do GSR? Detective Blas said no. There's nothing rebut that. There's no evidence to rebut that assertion by Detective Blas.

Is there any reason to swab all the areas?

Detective Blas said no. And the same reason that

Mr. Hylin pointed out, that, well, you kind of expect
his clothes to be in there. You would also expect his

DNA to be in there. So would that tell us anything
when we know he drives that vehicle?

We heard that touch DNA is different than

biological. It's not guaranteed it's going to even leave anything anyway. And it's outside and the windows are -- a whole number of things.

So should it have been done? The testimony you heard was no, he didn't even second guess that. But even if it was, would it tell you anything different than what we already know?

Now, Mr. Hylin discussed the statements that the defendant made, "I was going to turn myself in," and that's not evidence of guilt. Okay. Again, you give that statement as much weight as you feel is appropriate. If you feel "I'm going to turn myself in" is consciously the defendant saying "I know what I did is wrong," fine. If you feel that a guy just turning himself in because he knows the police are looking for him, that's fine with me, too. But if Mr. Mason did not do anything wrong, if he was not involved in this shooting, he wouldn't make the additional statements that he did. He wouldn't say, "This has been messing me up." Would he?

He wouldn't say, "What I did was violent." And there's no recorder going because there was no intention to even speak with him. Contrary to what Mr. Hylin said, Officer Koger wasn't transporting him

anywhere. He just had him in the backseat of his car while REMSA was coming. And he makes these statements immediately.

So, again, if you want to fault Officer Koger for not initiating his recording device when he has no intention of even speaking with the defendant, that's your right to do. You can fault him if you'd like.

All I'm asking you to consider is he had no intention of speaking to him in the first place and he had no intention of asking him any questions. Is there any reason to activate a recorder?

Same with Detective Jenkins. Mr. Hylin said she was calling to interview a suspect. No, she wasn't. She was calling to try to find Quinzale Mason. And why was it 3 o'clock in the morning? Because what he had did just a few hours earlier was violent and they needed to find him and he was gone. And we know where he was. He was in a house in Sun Valley.

No. She's trying to find out where he is. She's not interviewing a suspect. She's not planning on a long dialogue that she needs to take notes. And then Ms. Gray starts making these comments. And, yeah, she wants to get him out of here.

Same as Mr. Koger. He initially said, "Well, words to the effect." If you recall, we stopped based on the objection. And I actually showed him his report to refresh his memory of the exact quotes he put in his report. The officers do reports to get accuracy of what was said. And that's what Detective Jenkins and Officer Koger did in this case.

Did she misinterpret what Ms. Gray said being the 8th? Of course not. Because on the 8th this crime had not even been committed yet. And on the 9th when he calls her, she's thinking, "Hey, he's calling me for my birthday." And they have a good relationship. You heard her testify, "I love my grandson." And she makes the comments that she would have not known other than him telling her.

Very briefly with Dr. Cinelli. And Mr. Hylin brought up, well, this is a courtroom, it's not his office. He was subpoenaed by the State to say ricochet bullets. Folks, if you feel that he said that on the State's behalf, again, that's you judging his credibility. But he is a person in the medical profession who treated Cecelia. And his opinion, his diagnosis per his testimony, was she suffered from a ricochet bullet. There is no evidence that was

introduced in this case to contradict that. There is none.

And when Mr. Hylin says, well, maybe it was blanks, well, that doesn't explain the metallic fragment in her leg. Dr. Cinelli was clear. His opinion: ricochet bullet. And we don't have bullet strikes. And it's, well, there's this concrete wall behind, which we saw in the picture, and there is asphalt and the like.

Well, you heard some explanation about that, but you also saw the dirt embankment behind there as well.

Again, what I ask you to do is don't consider all these pieces in isolation. We know Cecelia suffered a penetrating wound. The evidence is clear on that. The only evidence as to what that wound is is a ricochet bullet which just so happens to be consistent with Anthony Holly running in the direction of where she was sitting with her mom.

All right. Just a few more points, ladies and gentlemen. As Mr. Hylin said, I too appreciate your time and attention in this case. Now, I'm almost done. There's a few more things I want to highlight.

The suggestion was made in Mr. Hylin's closing argument that over the last five months or whatever it's been since August 9th that the three people who

all identified Anthony -- excuse me -- Quinzale Mason as the person who got out of the car and ended up doing the shooting have had -- his words, have had time to congeal and make up their stories.

Well, again, like I mentioned in my first closing, all three gave statements to the police. Mr. Stanley, as he told you, did a written statement and spoke with the dispatcher on 911 immediately. Mr. Holly was gone and came back and spoke with officers, specifically Officer Kassebaum. Delphine Martin after going to the hospital and able to calm down spoke with Officer Stockwell when he responded the hospital.

So they all made statements back at the time that this occurred. So it's not that everyone was silent for the last five months and has all this time to talk about it. And on top of that, Delphine, you heard her say, she moved. Mr. Holly didn't want to even get involved.

So does it make sense that they would all get together and come up with this master plan of what happened and to frame Mr. Mason and say it was him and say that, "Yeah, he was shooting at Anthony Holly versus in the air?" That's for you to decide. But it doesn't make any sense.

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And Mr. Hylin said, well, there's, you know -- if you recall this part of his argument, "Well, it was they, they, they," which means more than one person.

But where did we hear "they"? From the 911 call. And who said it? I'm going to play the call again for you, because it's important. But who said they drove up and shot the baby? That was Glorietta who Mr. Stanley said "wasn't outside with me because she had gone into the bathroom."

And even on the 911 call, you hear as she's passing the phone to Mr. Stanley who did see everything, or the majority of it at least, you even hear her say when she's transferring the phone to him, "Oh, I was coming out of the bathroom. I don't know what happened. I wasn't there."

When Mr. Stanley gets on the phone, immediately, this is as the shooting just finished and 911 is being called, before officers have even arrived, what does he say? "I know who it was. I know where he lives. He was the only person in the car. I saw the direction the car went."

Anything inconsistent from his testimony that he's had six months to manufacture in his head? No.

So let me play it for you. You listen to it. And,

again, listen to if even once Mr. Stanley uses the word "they," because he doesn't. Let me play it for you. 2 This is Exhibit 25. Again, I can't stress the timing 3 of this call, that shots were just fired. As you heard 4 from the testimony, Delphine is going into hysterics, 5 which makes sense, because her daughter was just shot. 6 And 911 is called immediately. And without any time to 7 figure out what to say, this is initially what 8 Glorietta says and candidly doesn't know much and uses 9 "they" and then it's passed over to Mr. Stanley. It's 10 consistent with what he testified to in this case. 11

(Exhibit 25 was played.)

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MR. YOUNG: That's what was said immediately after the shots. Only one person. "I've seen him around. He lives up here."

Then when Officer Lancaster pulls up, he points out the exact unit which matches, again, all the balance of the evidence which I'm not going to go through. Black male, beard. It all fits.

So, folks, I'm not -- I'm going to try not to take too much more of your time.

Again, the transferred intent with the battery. To be clear, the State does not need to show that Mr. Mason intended or wanted to strike Cecelia.

Willfully using force or violence. The term
"willfully" here is described in instruction 27. It
even says there, "does not require in its meaning,
among other things, any intent to injure another." All
it says is "implies a purpose or willingness to commit
the act."

So he willfully is discharging a firearm. There's evidence that he is shooting the firearm at Mr. Holly as he's running away. We know that from Delphine Martin and all the circumstantial evidence. And in the course of that, Cecelia is hit. The transferred intent, that's all that is required for Count I.

For Count II, the assault with a deadly weapon, did attempt to use force against Anthony Holly. The evidence supports that. Or alternatively that he did intentionally place Mr. Holly in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. Racking the gun, getting out of the car, shooting a firearm as Mr. Holly is running way, that's satisfied as well.

And then, of course, for both Counts I and II, it has to be done with the use of a deadly weapon which, again, isn't really much in dispute here.

So, folks, I'm going to finish with this. I appreciate your time. This is instruction 30. This

has not yet been discussed, but I'm going to close with this. Let me read it first and then discuss it.

The top paragraph reads, "Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences which you feel are justified by the evidence, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess."

So, folks, here's what this means. On Monday of this week all you came into court as prospective jurors. You were all selected to sit in this case as jurors. You check in and you come out of the jury room and you have stickers identifying yourself as jurors. Very shortly you're going to be released into the jury room to deliberate as jurors for this case. But what this instruction tells you, folks, is that prior to all of that, prior to this Monday when you began your jury service for this case, all of you have lived respectively your individual lives and all of you through the course of those lives have garnered common

sense as reasonable men and women.

And the law does not require you to shed that common sense. The law does not require you to ignore your common sense when you go into that jury room and deliberate.

So if you feel that I have failed to meet my burden of proof, then the defendant would be not guilty. But to do that, you have to disregard the three witnesses who all identified the defendant, you have to disregard all of the balance of the testimony of the vehicle not being on scene and being located in Sun Valley and being close to where the defendant was ultimately found and the statements that he made and everything else. But you would also have to disregard your common sense. Because when you look at the totality of the evidence, it's clear that it was the defendant who was the shooter. And it's clear that he was shooting at Anthony Holly. And it was clear in the course of that that Cecelia was struck by a — as the doctor said, a ricochet bullet.

Use your common sense. Use that in conjunction with the evidence. And if you do that, I would submit that the conclusion to be reached is that the defendant is guilty of both counts.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Young. Mr. Young, would you mind moving the TV screen and the monitor, please. Thank you.

Ms. Clerk, if you could swear in Deputy Gray and his fellow deputies to take custody of the jury.

(The oath was administered.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in a moment I am going to send you back into the jury room where you will begin your deliberations. And I won't read you the jury admonition, because you now get to talk about the case, you get to discuss the facts, you get to review the instructions and the evidence and come to the conclusion that you come to.

The one person who will not be doing that is the alternate. We always have an alternate in every case. Sometimes we have more than one. Just in case one of your fellow jurors is unable to complete deliberations, we have that alternate who can come in and we would begin deliberations anew.

Ms. Vasquez, you're actually the alternate in this case, and so you will not be deliberating with your fellow jurors, but what I can tell you is that I have spoken to both attorneys and they've agreed to release you from the courthouse. So you'll be free to go about

your business, but you'll be the only person I have to read the admonition to one more time.

You're not allowed to discuss the case until the case is concluded. So you need to follow that admonition again. Give Deputy Gray your cell phone number or some way we can get ahold of you. And that way, once the case is over with, he'll call you and he'll let you know that the case is finished and then you can discuss it with anybody you want to. But I do appreciate your service. I know you've been paying close attention to these proceedings and I appreciate the fact that you served your community. You get the same credit for jury service if you're the alternate or if you're not the alternate. So thank you again for being here.

Ms. Vasquez, you are instructed not to discuss the case among yourselves -- well, among yourself. I don't know how you discuss it with yourself. But don't go talking to yourself about it, Ms. Vasquez.

You're not to discuss the case with anyone else or to form any conclusions concerning the case until it is submitted to you. You're not to read, look at or listen to any news media accounts relating to the case should there be any. You're not to form any opinion

about the case until it is finally submitted to you.

Do not experience or investigate. Do not visit the scene. Do not refer to any outside sources for instructions on the law. Rely only on the court for legal instructions.

All rise for the alternate juror.

Okay. Everybody else can be seated.

Once Deputy Gray comes back, then I'll send you back into the jury room and you can begin your deliberations. So just one moment.

You will have, just so you know, the evidence and everything else go back there with you.

Mr. Young, did you get the CD out of the computer?

MR. YOUNG: No. I'll do that right now.

THE COURT: Deputy Gray, has Ms. Vasquez left?

DEPUTY GRAY: Not yet, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Just one moment then and then I'll excuse you for your deliberations.

All rise for the jury.

(Outside the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

The record will reflect that the jury has retired to the jury room. Informally prior to the resumption of the case after the lunch recess I discussed with

counsel the fact that Mr. Mason has dialysis scheduled this afternoon at approximately 3 o'clock. It is now 2:35, and so the jury will begin their deliberations, but it's reasonable to assume at some time in the near future that Mr. Mason will no longer be with us here in the courtroom.

The Court will allow the jury to continue their deliberations and we will wait on their call. However, we will not take the jury's verdict, assuming the jury comes to a conclusion, sometime after Mr. Mason leaves. The procedure that the Court will follow is that the jury will be brought back in, the verdicts will be taken by the clerk, and they will be kept locked by the court clerk until tomorrow morning when Mr. Mason will again join us.

Is that the process that the State agrees to, Mr. Young?

MR. YOUNG: I have no objection to that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Hylin?

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MR. HYLIN: Yes, that's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Assuming that that does occur, the jury then will be again given the admonition and they will be allowed to go home tonight. The Court does also

acknowledge that there may be the possibility that we have to go forward with Count III tomorrow. So we'll have the jury come back at 8:30 in the morning and we will take up whatever additional business we have to take up tomorrow.

Counsel, if you could please give Ms. White your cell phone number so we can get ahold of you. I like to keep people about no more than ten minutes away in case there are any questions for the jury. Thank you, counsel.

Court's in recess.

(A recess was taken.)

(Within the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: We'll go back on the record in CR14-1830, the State of Nevada versus Quinzale Mason. Mr. Mason is not present. His attorney, Mr. Hylin, is present. Mr. Young is here on behalf of the State of Nevada.

Mr. Young, do you stipulate to the presence of the jury less the alternate?

MR. YOUNG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Same for you, Mr. Hylin?

MR. HYLIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, who is your

foreperson?

JUROR CORNISH: I am.

THE COURT: Mr. Cornish. Have a seat, sir.

I want to let you know something that is going on.

As you can see, Mr. Mason is not with us. Mr. Mason
has some physical issues that needed attention, and so
he's not here today.

A defendant does have a right, a constitutional right, to be present when the verdict is returned in his case. It is approximately 10 minutes until 5:00. And so I won't be able to take your verdict today. But, Mr. Cornish, what I would like you to do is provide the packet of verdict forms to Deputy Gray. And he is going to provide them to me and I will place them in this envelope and then I will seal it. And we will not discuss the verdict until tomorrow.

I need you to come back at 8:30 a.m. tomorrow morning so we can return your verdict, whatever your verdict may have been.

So with that, I'll provide the jury instructions themselves to the clerk. And I apologize on behalf of Mr. -- well, I don't apologize on behalf of Mr. Mason. It's not his fault that he has some physical needs that need to be taken care of. But I want to thank you for

your attention to this issue. I know that I told you it was going to be four days at the most. So we will be back tomorrow morning at 8:30 a.m. so Mr. Mason can be here. At that point I will open the envelope and then we will publish your verdict.

Now, what's very important is that you are now not discharged from the admonition. So when you do home, the jury admonition still applies. Your service is not over yet. I'll let you know when you're allowed to talk to your friends and family and to talk to each other. So it's important also to keep in mind when you come back tomorrow morning — I know you've reached a decision on these charges, but you cannot discuss your decision with each other. All deliberations have to be conducted as a group. And so it would be inappropriate for one or two of you to come in tomorrow morning and start talking about your deliberations.

Does everybody understand that? I need to see everybody's head. Okay. So I've got positive nods from everybody.

One moment.

And I will tell you that this envelope tastes awful.

So the record will reflect that I have sealed the

envelope. I'll place my initials on the seal and date it. And I'll direct the clerk to maintain custody of the envelope. She'll lock it up so no one will have any access to it.

So, ladies and gentlemen, your work is almost finished. That's all I can tell you. I appreciate, again, the diligence that you've shown in these proceedings and I need you back here at 8:30 in the morning tomorrow. So when you go home, again, don't talk to anybody. Remember that.

You are instructed not to discuss this case among yourselves or with anyone else or to form any conclusions concerning the case until it is submitted to you. You are not to read, look at or listen to any new media accounts relating to this case should there be any. You're not to form any opinion about the case until it is finally submitted to you.

Do not experiment or investigate. Do not visit the scene. Do not refer to any outside sources for instructions on the law. Rely only on the court for legal instructions.

And remember, back here at 8:30 in the morning tomorrow and no discussion when you get together about what you did today. That portion of this case is not

over.

2,0

All rise for the jury.

(Outside the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

The record will reflect that the jury has returned to the jury room. Counsel, my judicial assistant is preparing the jury instructions for Count III in the event that we'll need those instructions.

I can tell you I didn't look at the verdict forms when I stuck them in the envelope, so I have to idea what the jury's decision is in this case.

So if we could just stand by, I can let know what I did was simply take out a number of them that were duplicative of instructions that had been given initially. It is my intention to number the additional instructions and then give them the entire packet back, because they use the same instructions for the ex-felon in possession of a firearm in the bifurcated portion of these proceedings, so they get the whole packet back. There's no reason to put in certain instructions. So just relax for a moment.

Mr. Hylin and Mr. Young.

MR. HYLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

This will be off the record momentarily.

possession of a firearm.

(A discussion was held off the record.)

THE COURT: Let's go back on the record. We'll go back on the record in CR14-1830. The record will reflect that we have remained in the courtroom since the jury has recessed and briefly discussed in an informal way the proposed jury instructions that will be given regarding being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm, or more accurately, being a felon in

The Court has four proposed jury instructions and verdict forms of not guilty and guilty for Count III of the Amended Information. The Court will number the instructions as follows: The instruction that begins "The Defendant Quinzale Mason" will be Instruction No. 33. "The elements of being a felon in possession of a firearm" will be 34. The instruction that says "you may consider all" is 35. And the instruction that says "both the defense and the State" will be 36.

The Court would note that in the informal meeting that we just had, the issue of a potential stipulation was discussed by the parties. Specifically there is the possibility that Mr. Mason will stipulate that he is a convicted felon. The Court would note that

Instruction No. 33 as it is currently numbered lists the offense that the defendant was convicted of as voluntary manslaughter with the use of a deadly weapon. However, the instruction that is numbered 36 discusses the contemplation of the parties that there may be a stipulation in the case, the stipulation being that Mr. Mason will simply stipulate to the jury that he is a convicted felon.

If Mr. Mason and the State enter into that stipulation, then the State will provide an alternate Instruction No. 33 that omits the language describing the nature of the offense in Clark County, Nevada. If, however, there is no stipulation, the Court will give Instruction No. 33 as it is currently written and the Court will remove Instruction No. 36. And so we will just wait on Mr. Mason's decision regarding that issue.

With that understanding, Mr. Young, do you have any additional instructions that you wish to offer regarding Count No. I?

MR. YOUNG: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And do you have any objection to the instructions that the Court has indicated that it will give?

MR. YOUNG: No. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Hylin, on behalf of Mr. Mason, do you have any additional instructions that you would like to give?

MR. HYLIN: No, I do not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And do you have any objections to the procedure that the Court just outlined regarding instructions 33 and 36?

MR. HYLIN: No. I concur, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then we will be in recess. The record will reflect that Mr. Mason was taken to the Washoe County Sheriff's Office at approximately -- I think it was about 3:15. Deputy, was it about 3:15?

THE BAILIFF: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- at approximately 3:15 in the afternoon while the jury was deliberating so he could receive his dialysis treatment. He will be back tomorrow morning at 8:30 a.m. at which point we'll unseal the jury's verdicts and then we will decide how we will proceed with these further issues.

Anything else, Mr. Hylin?

MR. HYLIN: Nothing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Young, anything else?

MR. YOUNG: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Then I will return the entire packet of

jury instructions to the clerk and simply request that she hold on to those until tomorrow at 8:30.

Court is in recess.

The record will reflect that the jury instructions will also be locked with the jury verdicts in the court's-- and time I say "lockbox.

MR. HYLIN: The magic box.

THE COURT: I think of Al Gore when I say "lockbox." But they will be in the court's lockbox. And the record will also reflect that the bailiff, Deputy Gray, has returned all of the exhibits to the court clerk.

Court is in recess.

(The proceedings were adjourned at 5:07 p.m.)

--000--

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I, LORI URMSTON, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby acknowledge:

That the foregoing proceedings were taken by me at the time and place therein set forth; that the proceedings were recorded stenographically by me and thereafter transcribed via computer under my supervision; that the foregoing is a true ROUGH DRAFT transcription of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge, skill and ability and has not been proofread, corrected or certified.

I further certify that I am not a relative nor an employee of any attorney or any of the parties, nor am I financially or otherwise interested in this action.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 6th day of May, 2015.

LORI URMSTON, CCR #51

LORI URMSTON, CCR #51

ROUGH DRAFT TRANSCRIPT

i.

1	CODE: 4185 PEGGY B. HOOGS, CCR #160					
2	HOOGS REPORTING GROUP 435 Marsh Avenue	UNCERTIFIED				
3	Reno, Nevada 89509 (775) 327-4460	DRAFT TRANSCRIPT				
4	Court Reporter	. 5.000 1 1100000000				
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6	SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT	COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA				
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE					
8	THE HONORABLE ELLIOTT	A. SATTLER, DISTRICT JUDGE				
9	-000-					
10		G N- GB14 1920				
11	STATE OF NEVADA,	Case No. CR14-1830				
12	Plaintiff,	Dept. No. 10				
13	VS.					
14	QUINZALE MASON,					
	Defendant.					
15						
16						
17						
18	ROUGH DR	AFT TRANSCRIPT				
19		TRIAL				
20		DAY 4				
21	FEBRUA	ARY 12, 2015				
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	Reported By: PEGGY B. HOO	GS, CCR #160, RDR, CRR				

CALIFORNIA CSR #5958

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1		-000- APPEARANCES -00	00-
2			
3	FOR	THE PLAINTIFF:	
4		ZACH YOUNG, ESQ.	
5		Deputy District Attorney I South Sierra Street	
6		Reno, Nevada 89501	
7	ECE	MUD DECEMBANA	
8	FOR	THE DEFENDANT:	
9		CARL HYLIN, ESQ. Deputy Public Defender	
9		350 South Center Street	
10		Reno, Nevada 89501	
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(The following proceedings were held outside
1
       the presence of the jury.)
 2
                  THE COURT: Let's go on the record in the
 3
      State of Nevada vs. Quinzale Mason, CR14-1830. Mr. Mason
       is present in court with his attorney, Mr. Hylin.
5
      Mr. Young is here on behalf of the State of Nevada.
6
       We're meeting outside of the presence of the jury.
7
                  Good morning to all of you.
8
                   Mr. Mason, last night after you were taken to
9
      have your dialysis treatment, we left the jury
 10
       deliberating, and so they continued to deliberate, and
 11
       they came back at approximately 4:45 yesterday with a
 12
       verdict. I have not looked at the verdict forms. I
 13
       actually took them from the jury and sealed them in an
 14
       envelope. I have the envelope here with me, and so I
 15
       know that you wanted to be present when the jury came
 16
       back and returned the verdict, so we have not heard from
 17
       the jury yet regarding what the outcome of your case is.
 18
                   There is a possibility that we will go
 19
       forward with Count 3 of the Amended Information.
 20
       Mr. Mason, Count 3, as you know, is charging you with
 21
       being a felon in possession of a firearm. One of the
 22
       elements of that offense is that you are a convicted
 23
```

felon. In order to prove that, what the State does is

- 1 they provide a certified copy of a prior criminal
 - 2 conviction that is provided to the jury.
 - 3 My understanding is that you have discussed
 - 4 with your attorney the concept of stipulating to the fact
- 5 that you are simply a convicted felon and, therefore,
- 6 waiving the requirement for the State to produce the
 - 7 certified copy of the prior criminal conviction.
- 8 You don't have an obligation to do that.
 - 9 It's completely up to you whether or not you enter into a
 - 10 stipulation with the State, but if you do stipulate,
 - 11 you're waiving an element -- one of the elements of that
 - 12 offense.
 - Do you understand that?
 - 14 THE DEFENDANT: Hold on.
 - THE COURT: Okay.
 - 16 (A discussion was held off the record.)
 - 17 THE COURT: Mr. Mason, did you have an
 - 18 opportunity to speak with Mr. Hylin and have any
 - 19 questions about what I just told you answered?
 - THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
 - 21 THE COURT: No, sir, or yes, sir?
 - 22 THE DEFENDANT: I mean yeah. I understand
 - it, yeah.
 - 24 THE COURT: You talked to Mr. Hylin, and he

- 1 was able to answer any questions you may have had about
 - 2 that stipulation?
 - 3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
- THE COURT: What you're doing by stipulating
- 5 is simply waiving that one element of the offense.
- 6 You're not waiving anything else. You're simply
 - 7 acknowledging that you are a convicted felon, and so in
- 8 doing that, you and the State have agreed that the State
- 9 won't tell the jury what the offense is. It's just that
 - 10 you're a convicted felon.
 - 11 Do you understand that?
 - 12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
 - 13 THE COURT: Is that what you want to do? I
 - 14 just want you to understand if you don't want to do
 - 15 that -- and, again, you have no obligation to do
 - 16 so -- what will happen is the State will mark a certified
 - 17 copy of the prior felony conviction and that will be
 - 18 admitted, assuming it's constitutional.
 - 19 Mr. Hylin has told me he has already reviewed
 - 20 it and it is constitutionally valid, and so that document
 - 21 will go to the jury, and they'll see your prior felony
 - 22 conviction for voluntary manslaughter with the use of a
 - 23 deadly weapon.
 - 24 So are you going to stipulate just that

- 1 you're a convicted weapon or do you want the State to
 - 2 produce the certified copy of the criminal conviction?
- THE DEFENDANT: I'll stipulate, Your Honor.
- 4 THE COURT: I appreciate that.
 - MR. HYLIN: We are offering that, the defense
- 6 is, Your Honor, and that's pursuant to Edwards vs. State,
- 7 122 Nev. 378, a 2006 case, which follows Old Chief vs.
- 8 United States, 519 U.S. 172.
 - g THE COURT: Then what the Court will do is
 - 10 withdraw the previously marked Jury Instruction No. 33
 - and instruct the clerk to mark "withdrawn" on that, and
 - 12 then this morning, Mr. Young provided a new Instruction
 - No. 33, and I will number that right now, and that will
 - 14 be read to the jury.
 - 15 It is my intention this morning to call the
 - 16 jury in to take their verdict, and then if the defendant
 - 17 was convicted of one or both of the felony offenses
 - 18 alleged in Count I and II of the Amended Information,
 - 19 what I will do then is inform the jury that they do have
- 20 one additional task that they need to address. I will
 - 21 read them the jury instructions, just the jury
 - 22 instructions that are new, 33 through 36, and I will send
 - 23 them back into the jury room to continue to deliberate,
 - 24 and then we will wait on their return. And, again,

- 1 that's assuming that the defendant is found guilty of one
- 2 or both of the offenses in the Amended Information.
 - 3 We will not have an opening statement, there
 - 4 will be no additional evidence presented based on the
 - 5 stipulation, and there will be, obviously, no closing
 - 6 arguments presented.
 - 7 Does anyone object to that procedure?
 - 8 Mr. Young?
 - 9 MR. YOUNG: I have no objection.
- 10 THE COURT: Mr. Hylin on behalf of Mr. Mason.
- MR. HYLIN: I have no objection, Your Honor,
- 12 considering that all the evidence concerning Count 3 has
- 13 already been placed before the jury as far as the firearm
- 14 is concerned.
- MR. YOUNG: Very briefly, it probably goes
- 16 without saying, but I am agreeing to the offer of the
- 17 stipulation for the --
- 18 THE COURT: I assumed as much based on our
- 19 conversations yesterday.
- MR. YOUNG: It probably did not need to be
- 21 said, but for the record.
 - 22 THE COURT: I like when it goes without
- 23 saying and then they say it anyway.
 - MR. YOUNG: I do that every now and then.

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1
                  THE COURT: All rise for the jury.
                 (The jury entered the courtroom.)
 2
                  (The following proceedings were held outside
 3
       the presence of the jury.)
                  THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and
 5
       gentlemen.
 6
                  Will counsel stipulate to the presence of the
 7
       jury less the alternate? Mr. Young?
8
                  MR. YOUNG: The State will, Your Honor.
9
                  THE COURT: Mr. Hylin?
 10
                   MR. HYLIN: Yes.
 11
                  THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, as we
 12
       discussed yesterday, Mr. Mason was not available when you
 13
       returned your verdict, and so, as you saw, I sealed your
 14
       verdicts in this envelope. Those of us who are old
 15
       enough to remember Johnny Carson, I feel like Karnick. I
 16
       have the envelope, and I can hold it up to my head and
 17
       tell you the answer.
 18
                   What I will do now is unseal the envelope and
 19
       provide your verdict forms to the clerk so they may be
 20
       published.
 21
                  Mr. Mason, generally I request the defendant
 22
       stand when the verdicts are read, but in your case I know
 23
       you have some problems with your legs, so you may remain
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- i seated.
- THE CLERK: "In the Second Judicial District
 - 3 Court in the State of Nevada in and for the County of
- 4 Washoe, the State of Nevada, plaintiff, vs. Quinzale
 - 5 Mason, defendant, Case No. CR14-1830, Department No. 10,
 - 6 Verdict: We, the jury in the above-entitled matter, find
 - 7 the defendant Quinzale Mason guilty of Count I, battery
- 8 with a deadly weapon, dated this 11th day of February,
- 9 2015, Foreperson;
 - "Verdict: We, the jury in the above-entitled
 - 11 matter, find the defendant Quinzale Mason guilty of
 - 12 Count II, assault with a deadly weapon, dated this 11th
 - 13 day of February, 2015, Foreperson."
 - 14 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
- is this your verdict, so say you one, so say you all?
- 16 (Collective affirmation by the jury.)
- 17 THE COURT: Does either party wish to have
- 18 the jury polled? Mr. Hylin?
- 19 MR. HYLIN: Yes, Your Honor:
- 20 THE COURT: Miss Clerk, please poll the jury.
- 21 THE CLERK: Juror No. 1, is this your verdict
- 22 as read?
- JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
- 24 THE CLERK: Juror No. 2, is this your verdict

```
1 as read?
                 JUROR NO. 2: Yes.
2
                 THE CLERK: Juror No. 3, is this your verdict
3
     as read?
4
5
                 JUROR NO. 3: Yes.
                 THE CLERK: Juror No. 4, is this your verdict
6
7
    as read?
                 JUROR NO. 4: Yes.
8
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 5, is this your verdict
9
10 as read?
                 JUROR NO. 5: Yes.
11
                 THE CLERK: Juror No. 6, is this your verdict
12
    as read?
13
                 JUROR NO. 6: Yes.
14
                 THE CLERK: Juror No. 7, is this your verdict
15
    as read?
16
                JUROR NO. 7: Yes.
17
                 THE CLERK: Juror No. 8, is this your verdict
18
     as read?
19
                 JUROR NO. 8: Yes.
20
                 THE CLERK: Juror No. 9, is this your verdict
21
22
     as read?
                 JUROR NO. 9: Yes.
23
                 THE CLERK: Juror No. 10, is this your
24
```

- 1 verdict as read?
- JUROR NO. 10: Yes.
 - 3 THE CLERK: Juror No. 11, is this your
 - 4 verdict as read?
 - JUROR NO. 11: Yes.
 - 6 THE CLERK: And Juror No. 12, is this your
 - 7 verdict as read?
 - JUROR NO. 12: Yes.
 - 9 THE COURT: The jury's verdicts will be
- 10 entered as part of the record in this case.
- 11 Ladies and gentlemen, I've been slightly
- 12 disingenuous with you about your responsibilities.
- 13 Yesterday when I told you you would come back and we
- 14 would simply read the verdict to the defendant, that was
- 15 not completely accurate. It depended on what your
- 16 verdict was.
- 17 There was one additional charge contained in
 - 18 the Amended Information. That charge was being a felon
 - in possession of a firearm. The Nevada Supreme Court, in
- 20 a case by the name of Brown vs. State requires that we
 - 21 bifurcate, which means we have two separate hearings or
 - 22 trials, regarding an allegation of certain felony
 - 23 offenses, and then if there's an additional offense of
 - 24 being a felon in possession of a firearm.

- So what the Supreme Court tells us we have to
 - 2 do, we have to hear that first offense first, and then
 - 3 you come back and make a decision on the offense of being
- 4 a felon in possession of a firearm.
 - 5 For that reason I have additional jury
- 6 instructions that I need to read you. There is one
 - 7 additional task that you have, and that is, you must
 - 8 determine if the defendant is quilty of being a felon in
- 9 possession of a firearm.
- 10 I'll read the jury instructions in a moment.
- 11 There are only four additional jury instructions, but
- 12 what I want to emphasize to you is, all of the other jury
- instructions still apply in this case, so I'm going to
- 14 give you back the packet of jury instructions numbered 1
- 15 through 32, and then there will be four additional
- 16 instructions, Instructions 33 through 36, attached to
- 17 them, and then there are two verdict forms, one guilty
- 18 and one not guilty, for being a felon in possession of a
- 19 firearm.
- 20 As I told you when I instructed you
- 21 yesterday, you're not obligated to find the defendant
- 22 guilty of this or any offense. It is just one additional
- 23 offense that the State has alleged. The State's burden
- 24 is exactly the same. They must prove beyond a reasonable

- doubt that the defendant committed the offense of being a
- 2 felon in possession of a firearm. All the other jury
- 3 instructions apply and you're allowed to consider all of
- 4 the evidence that you have listened to in coming to a
 - 5 conclusion whether or not the State has proven that
 - 6 offense.
 - 7 So what I'll do for you now is read you Jury
- 8 Instructions No. 33 through 36. I'm not going to give
- 9 you each a packet of these because it's very short.
- 10 (Jury instructions 33 through 36 were read to
- 11 the jury.)
- 12 THE COURT: So, ladies and gentlemen of the
- 13 jury, I will direct that the Court provide you -- strike
- 14 that -- the clerk provide you with all of the exhibits
- 15 again to aid in your deliberation should you need to
- 16 refer to any of them, I am providing you with a packet of
- 17 original jury instructions so you may refer to them, and
- 18 we will await your decision.
- 19 All rise for the jury.
- 20 Again, there's no admonition again. Go back
- 21 and discuss the case.
- 22 Court's in recess.
- 23 (A recess was taken.)
- 24 (The jury entered the courtroom.)

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THE COURT: Will counsel stipulate to the
1
2
       presence of the jury? Mr. Hylin?
                   MR. HYLIN: Yes, Your Honor.
  3
4
                  THE COURT: Mr. Young?
 5
                  MR. YOUNG: Yes.
                   THE COURT: Mr. Cornish, I've been informed
 6
 7
       you have an additional verdict; correct?
8
                   JURY FOREPERSON: Correct.
                   THE COURT: Would you provide that to Deputy
 9
10
       Gray.
                   The clerk will read the verdict regarding
 11
 12
       Count III.
                  THE CLERK: "Verdict: We, the jury in the
 13
       above-entitled matter, find the defendant Quinzale Mason
 14
       quilty of Count III, being a felon in possession of a
 15
       firearm, dated this 12th date of February, 2014."
 16
                   THE COURT: Is this your verdict, so say you
 17
      one, so say you all?
 18
                  (Collective affirmation by the jury.)
 19
                   THE COURT: Mr. Hylin, would you like the
20
      jury polled?
 21
 22
                   MR. HYLIN:
                              Yes, I would.
                   THE COURT: Why don't we poll the jury, then,
 23
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as to Count III.

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1
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 1, is this your verdict
2 as read?
                JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
3
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 2?
4
                JUROR NO. 2: Yes.
5
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 3?
                JUROR NO. 3: Yes.
7
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 4?
8
                JUROR NO. 4: Yes.
9
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 5?
10
                JUROR NO. 5: Yes.
11
12
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 6?
                JUROR NO. 6: Yes.
13
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 7?
 14
 15
                JUROR NO. 7: Yes.
16
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 8?
                JUROR NO. 8: Yes.
 17
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 9?
18
                JUROR NO. 9: Yes.
19
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 10?
 20
                JUROR NO. 10: Yes.
21
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 11?
 22
                JUROR NO. 11: Yes.
 23
                THE CLERK: Juror No. 12?
 24
```

- juror No. 12: Yes.
- 2 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
 - 3 now I'm not kidding. Your work here is finished. Thank
- 4 you very much for your service. I understand that it was
- 5 a little bit disjointed there the last couple of days,
- 6 yesterday and today, but it was just required based on
 - 7 the nature of the case.
- 8 There's only a couple of things that I ask of
- 9 you at this point. One of them is that at the end of
 - 10 every trial I have the jurors fill out a very brief
 - 11 questionnaire. You're not obligated to do so, so if you
 - 12 don't want to, you don't have to. I can guarantee you I
 - 13 review every single one of them.
 - 14 The reason I have the questionnaire done is I
 - 15 want to know what I can do to make jury service for the
 - 16 next 12 people sitting in the seats that you're sitting
 - 17 in better, so if you have suggestions in any way that I
 - 18 can make the process better, please let me know. Some
 - 19 people say we can give better coffee and we can make the
 - 20 facilities a little bit better. I think that eventually
 - 21 might have to be taken up with the county commission. We
 - 22 might need a new building at some point.
 - 23 So you as former jurors, if you have a strong
 - 24 feeling about the jury room, maybe at some point we can

- 1 take that up. I can't do anything about the facilities,
 - 2 but if there is something about them that made you
 - 3 uncomfortable, I need to know about it so we can address
- 4 that in the future.
- 5 The other thing I want to tell you is that
- 6 you are now completely free from the admonition. You can
 - 7 talk to anybody that you want to about your jury service.
- 8 I can tell you, based on my past experience as a trial
- 9 attorney, that oftentimes it's helpful for the attorneys
 - 10 to call the jurors and find out what it is that they did
 - 11 well or areas possibly they can work on to improve.
 - 12 There's nothing inappropriate about the attorneys or
 - 13 somebody from the attorneys' offices calling you and
 - 14 wanting to discuss the case with you, and so if that call
 - does come, it's up to you whether or not you want to talk
 - 16 to them or not. I'm not saying that you should or that
 - 17 you have to. I know, as I said before, Mr. Young and
 - 18 Mr. Hylin are both very courteous gentlemen, but if they
 - 19 call and you want to talk to them, feel free to do so.
 - 20 If you don't want to talk to them and you tell them that
 - 21 and they persist, then you call me and I'll take care of
 - 22 it for you, but I can't imagine that occurring.
 - The last thing I'll tell you is, I do make it
 - 24 a habit or a practice to meet with my fellow judges in my

- office after jury service. So Deputy Gray will let you
- 2 know, if you want to talk to me in my office about your
 - 3 jury service or I can answer possibly any questions that
- 4 you may have had about the process or the way that we do
 - 5 things, I'll be happy to meet with you once you've
 - 6 collected your belongings and you may come back.
 - 7 So just talk to Deputy Gray about that if
- 8 you'd like to do that. If I don't have the opportunity
- 9 to thank you in person under those circumstances, let me
 - 10 just one final time say thank you on behalf of your
 - 11 community for the service that you provided this week.
 - 12 Ladies and gentlemen, you will rise for the
- 13 jury.
- 14 (The jury exited the courtroom.)
- THE COURT: The record will reflect the jury
- 16 has retired to the jury room.
- Mr. Mason, we do need to prepare a
- 18 Presentence Investigation Report in your case, so,
- 19 Ms. Clerk, do we have a date for sentencing?
- MR. HYLIN: Your Honor, I was going to ask
- 21 that it be set in as close as possible. His medical
- 22 condition is deteriorating rapidly, and because of his
- 23 incarceration, they took him off of the donor list for a
- 24 transplant.

- 1 THE COURT: Okay.
- 2 MR. HYLIN: So, you know, it's become kind of
 - 3 critical as far as that is concerned, so I know -- I know
- 4 what the parameters are with the Division, but I think
- 5 they can probably squeeze out a PSI earlier than the
- 6 normal routine, so I would ask that we could set in as
- 7 soon as possible.
- 8 THE COURT: Mr. Young, the prior criminal
- 9 conviction out of Las Vegas, what year was that?
- 10 MR. YOUNG: 2006, I believe, Your Honor.
- 11 THE COURT: The only reason I ask is that we
- 12 can use a Presentence Investigation Report that's not
- 13 less than five years old, but if it was outside that
- 14 window, then we do need to do a new Presentence
- 15 Investigation Report.
- 16 MR. YOUNG: The first judgment and conviction
- 17 was December 18, '06, so going on nine years ago.
- THE COURT: So we can't use that old PSI.
- 19 Ms. Clerk, if we could set a date as soon as
- 20 possible for Mr. Mason.
- 21 Mr. Mason, we do have to do a Presentence
- 22 Investigation Report, and that usually takes about 45
- 23 days, but if we can set it maybe 30 days, then if the
- 24 Division can't do that, then I'll talk to them about it,

- 1 but I understand Mr. Mason's condition. I think
- 2 Mr. Hylin's request is a reasonable one.
- 3 MR. HYLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 4 THE CLERK: Mr. Hylin, would March
- 5 19th -- that's a Thursday -- that's a little bit over 30
- 6 days because February is a short month. Or March 17th?
- 7 MR. HYLIN: Either one is fine. The
- 8 Department 1 calendar is the same day, so what I'll have
- 9 to do is be in front of the calendar or trail it to the
- 10 end, but that should be fine.
- 11 THE COURT: We'll accommodate you one way or
- 12 the other, Mr. Hylin.
- 13 Which day do you prefer, Thursday the 19th or
- 14 Tuesday the 17th, Saint Patrick's Day or the 19th.
- MR. HYLIN: Let's do it the 19th.
- 16 THE COURT: We'll set this for sentencing on
- 17 Thursday, March 19th at 8:30 a.m., and Mr. Hylin will
- 18 contact my staff and let them know if you want to go
- 19 first or last. It will be completely up to you,
- 20 Mr. Hylin, but we'll accommodate you.
- MR. HYLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 22 THE COURT: Mr. Mason, I'm going to order you
- 23 cooperate with the Division of Parole & Probation in the
- 24 preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report. I'm

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1
     also ordering you bring in $25 on the day of your
      sentencing. That's an administrative assessment fee that
  3
      I'll order in addition to anything else I do on that
4
      date.
 5
                  Do you understand that?
                  THE DEFENDANT: Am I supposed to have, like,
 6
 7
      $25 on my books for that?
                  THE COURT: Yeah. If you have $25 on your
8
      books, that would be great. If you don't or you can't
9
10
      get it, I understand, but it is a requirement you pay a
      $25 administrative assessment fee.
11
12
                 Court's in recess.
13
                 (Proceedings concluded.)
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1	STATE OF NEVADA)) ss.
2	COUNTY OF WASHOE)
3	
4	I, PEGGY B. HOOGS, Certified Court Reporter
5	in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify:
6	That the foregoing proceedings were taken by
7	me at the time and place therein set forth; that the
8	proceedings were recorded stenographically by me and
9	thereafter transcribed via computer under my supervision;
10	that the foregoing is a ROUGH DRAFT transcription of the
11	proceedings and has not been proofread or certified.
12	I further certify that I am not a relative
13	nor an employee of any attorney or any of the parties,
14	nor am I financially or otherwise interested in this
15	action.
16	I declare under penalty of perjury under the
17	laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing statements
18	are true and correct.
19	Dated this 6th day of May, 2015.
20	
21	/s/ Peggy B. Hoogs
22	Peggy B. Hoogs, CCR #160, RDR
23	
24	

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that this document was filed electronically with
the Nevada Supreme Court on the 6th day of July 2015. Electronic
Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the
Master Service List as follows:

Terrence P. McCarthy, Chief Appellate Deputy, Washoe County District Attorney's Office

I further certify that I deposited a true and correct copy of the foregoing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to:

Mr. Quinzale Mason (#1135809) Northern Nevada Correctional Center P.O. Box 7000 Carson City, Nevada 89702

> John Reese Petty Washoe County Public Defender's Office