1	OPPC	Alun S. Elmin	
2	BLACK & LOBELLO John D. Jones, Esq.	CLERK OF THE COURT	
3	Nevada State Bar No. 6699 10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300		
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135		
5	Telephone Number: 702-869-8801 Fax Number: 702-869-2669		
6	Email Address: jjones@blacklobello.com Attorneys for Plaintiff,		
7	KERSTAN HUBBS		
8			
9	DISTRICT COURT		
10	FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
11	KERSTAN MICONE,	CASE NO.: D-08-388334-D	
12		DEPT. NO.: J	
13	Plaintiff,		
14	VS.		
15	MICHAEL MICONE,		
16	Defendant.		
17	NOTICE: YOU ARE REQUIRED TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THIS MOTION WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND TO PROVIDE THE UNDERSIGNED WITH A COPY OF YOUR RESPONSE WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION. FAILURE TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS		
18			
19	OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION MAY RESULT IN THE REQUESTED RELIEF BEING GRANTED BY THE COURT WITHOUT HEARING PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED HEARING DATE.		
20	OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION AND COUNTERMOTION FOR		
21	DEFENDANT TO SHOW CAUSE AND FOR SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES		
22	COMES NOW, Plaintiff, KERSTAN M	IICONE, currently HUBBS, by and through her	
23	counsel of record, JOHN JONES, ESQ., with Black and LoBello Attorneys at Law, and brings		
24	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION AND HER COUNTERMOTION.		
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26	///		
<ul><li>26</li><li>27</li><li>28</li></ul>	///		
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Page 1 of 20

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This opposition and countermotion are based upon the Introduction, Points and 1 Authorities, any and all pleadings and papers on file in this matter, and any oral representation 2 that may take place at the hearing on November 4, 2015. 3 day of September, 2015. DATED this 4 Respectfully submitted: 5 6 BLACK & LOBELLO 7 8 9 Nevada Bar No. 006699 10 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 11 702-869-8801 Attorneys for Plaintiff 12 KERSTAN HUBBS 13 **NOTICE OF MOTION** 14 TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES: 15 YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned 16 will bring the above and foregoing Countermotion For Defendant To Show Cause And For 17 Sanctions And Attorney's Fees on for hearing before the entitled Court on the 4th day of 18 November, 2015, at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m., or as soon thereafter as may be heard 19 before the District Court, Family Division, Department J. 20 day of September, 2015. DATED this 21 **BLACK & LOBELLO** 22 23 24 Jones.Æs 25 Nevada Bar No. 006699 107 West/Twain Avenue, Suite 300 26

Page 2 of 20

Attorneys for Plaintiff KERSTAN HUBBS

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I.

# **INTRODUCTION & STATEMENT OF FACTS:**

The current motion is completely unnecessary and false as Plaintiff, KERSTAN HUBBS (hereinafter "KERSTAN") has repeatedly asked Defendant, MICHAEL MICONE (hereinafter "MIKE") and his attorney to propose a new visitation plan to her attorney that provides KERSTAN adequate notice and a consistent schedule because MIKE has failed to even remotely comply with the existing visitation plan under the parties' decree. See **Exhibit "Affidavit from Mark DiPentino"**. KERSTAN has always allowed her son to visit his father and family members, at times bending over backwards to make sure it happened. KERSTAN has simply requested assurance that should MIKE not return Michael, the parties' son, similar to how he did not return Isabella, the parties' daughter on July of this year or take other actions without her consent that there be an adequate remedy for her under law.

MIKE and KERSTAN have undergone over eight (8) years of on and off litigation in this Family Court. This motion for a change in custody of a perfectly happy and thriving 10.5 year old boy, is once again, to meet MIKE'S desire to abuse her and to teach KERSTAN "lessons" by utilizing her children as pawns for his own personal gain and retaliatory desires, and because he is angry and frustrated; largely due to his own actions. KERSTAN has endured years of verbal abuse and threats from MIKE that he will "not stop until [she] end[s] up paying for this...", that she is a "fucking horrible person", to "fuck her [herself] on her fucked up birthday", that she is a "piece of shit", that he will "see her in court", "drain her of every penny [he] can", "will break [her]", "will end it once and for all", "file a complaint" to the state bar so that she will "learn the hard way", and just recently on August 30th, that she will "get a felony charge" on her birthday. Exhibit 2 "Text messages". These message are only a small sample of the slanderous verbal abuse KERSTAN, and at times her husband, his relatives, and others experience at the hands' of MIKE, other disgusting comments include "you're a fat cow", "you are sick in the head", "she [KERSTAN] is a horrible fuck and person", "I will cut your tits out". KERSTAN does fear MIKE as he has assaulted her and her children by running into them with his car back in November of 2009 which culminated with MIKE being charged with four counts

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of assault with a deadly weapon. MIKE just recently called the police on his own parents on or about May30, 2015 in Reno, Nevada. His random verbal threats are often followed by actions. By repeatedly using the court and police powers of the state to purposefully scare and harm others is legal abuse.

Although the court recently awarded physical custody of the parties' daughter to MIKE'S parents, Chuck and Carol Burr, on or about March 31, 2015, this order is currently on appeal. It is important that the court understand the situation with Isabella as it relates now to Michael.

During Isabella's Junior year she became depressed. Exhibit 3 "Report from Dr. Pitts, PhD." Isabella told her parents, while in counseling with a jointly selected therapist, Diane Mercier, PhD, that she desired to move home with her Mother and brother, Michael, on or about April of 2015 with MIKE, KERSTAN, and Isabella present in Diane's office together. KERSTAN could not obtain input or consent from MIKE whether to enroll Isabella into her previous private high school, Bishop Manogue, and the last correspondence she had was that he would not pay for the school after Isabella's Junior year. Exhibit 4 "Text message from MIKE". KERSTAN told her daughter to complete her Junior year at Bishop Manogue and that she could return back to Las Vegas and complete her Senior year with her and Michael. MIKE and KERSTAN and Isabella's grandparents all were aware of and agreed to this change, so at the end of May, Isabella returned to Las Vegas where she was enrolled into her prior high school, Coronado High in Henderson, NV. Exhibit 5 "Email from KERSTAN and Text message from MIKE".

During the month of June, KERSTAN was approached by her attorney stating that an attorney for Chuck and Carol Burr, the children's paternal grandparents, Gary Silverman, Esq., had requested that Michael spend time with them over the summer during her time with Michael. Exhibit 6 "Email from Gary Silverman". MIKE'S mother and stepfather rarely see Michael because MIKE does not take Michael over to see his grandparents because MIKE despises them for reasons somewhat unknown to KERSTAN. KERSTAN was advised to allow Michael to see his grandparents. When MIKE found out that Michael was spending time with his parents he was clearly very upset as you can see from his statements in this motion. Normally KERSTAN

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does speak with MIKE openly about where the children will be at all times, however, two reputable attorneys, who practice in the area of family law, advised her to just remain neutral and say nothing to MIKE as he uses the Right of First Refusal (RFR) in the decree to withhold Michael from his parents and had recently in May, called the police on his own parents, even when they had a court order stating that Isabella could reside at their home. Michael was slated to see his grandparents and his cousins. Additionally, MIKE did see Michael when he was in Reno during this time. Chuck Burr, MIKE'S stepfather, made sure Michael visited with MIKE, whereas MIKE patently misstates this fact and says he never saw Michael in his motion. Exhibit 7 "Email from Chuck Burr with text message correspondence with MIKE".

Because MIKE was so angry with KERSTAN for allowing Michael to spend the week with his parents, MIKE decided to violate the parties' decree by dishonoring the parties' status as joint legal custodians of their daughter Isabella and unilaterally enrolled their daughter for school at Bishop Manogue, after the parties had jointly decided she would attend school in Las Vegas/Henderson. He then sent her to a therapist, Geri Goddard, without KERSTAN'S knowledge or consent, all while Isabella was "visiting" MIKE over the summer. Exhibit 8 "Email correspondence with Mike and Geri Goddard". KERSTAN, unsure of whether or not jurisdiction lies with this court has attempted to protect Michael, the parties' son from similar violations of the current decree and orders. Exhibit 9 "Court Minutes June 2, 2015 stating "...the District Court does not have jurisdiction to hear any further matters until authorized by the Supreme Court of Nevada". (Emphasis Added). KERSTAN was and is fearful that MIKE would keep Michael and enroll him in school too in Reno during the summer months and leave KERSTAN with no remedy in court while the appeal is underway. Exhibit 10 "Email from KERSTAN to MIKE." KERSTAN believes this threat is valid and real and in good faith is protecting Michael. Michael is a happy, loving, charismatic, smart little boy who is flourishing with his friends and family and residing with KERSTAN, Mark, and Michael's stepsister Graciana. Exhibit 11 "Michael's Letter and Award". Michael is not experiencing any material change in circumstance; his well-being and normalcy is merely being protected, as MIKE, recently does not appear to think joint legal custodianship pertains to him or means

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deciding important matters concerning the health, welfare and education of the children collectively and together with KERSTAN. MIKE, if allowed, would take Michael, and then turn around and say, "Cutting me out of [his] life and taking a passive approach is what I have learned from you. So thank you for teaching me..." which is exactly the statement made to KERSTAN after he did not return Isabella to Las Vegas as promised. Exhibit 12 "Text message between MIKE and KERSTAN".

KERSTAN has repeatedly requested a new visitation schedule be developed because the visitation as described in the parties' decree has <u>never</u> been followed by MIKE and if necessary KERSTAN can request Safe Key daily logs from the City of Henderson reflecting the time when the parties' son has been in the care of KERSTAN and his stepfather Mark. MIKE rarely visits when he is slated to see his son and has not been to Las Vegas since required to attend mediation in early August of 2015. Instead, MIKE requests that KERSTAN allow him to visit Michael at his pleasure with absolutely no notice and/ or to take Michael to the airport and fly him up to Reno after not returning Isabella as promised. Exhibit 13 "Text message between MIKE and KERSTAN. KERSTAN was not willing to do that until she had clarification after her daughter was NOT RETURNED as promised by MIKE. This request to obtain input on new visitation was sent to MIKE and to his counsel and her counsel multiple times prior to MIKE filing this frivolous motion, the latest request being September 1, 2015, one day before MIKE'S motion was filed, where you can clearly see parties' counsel copied and KERSTAN awaiting input from the professionals retained on this matter. KERSTAN states: "Once I have input and I know Michael is safe and will return as promised, I would be happy to have him see his father." See Exhibit 14 "Email titled Isabella to Vegas". KERSTAN believes nobody has responded because perhaps even the attorneys are unsure as to where jurisdiction lies on this matter. MIKE and his counsel do not want to work out visitation; they would rather file motions in court to waste time, money, and judicial resources and to harass, intimidate, and legally abuse KERSTAN. KERSTAN has freely allowed her children visitation with MIKE for eight (8) years until MIKE did not return one of them.

MIKE wanted physical custody of the parties' daughter as well, but the court wisely did

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not grant this motion as MIKE has several character issues that would not warrant having MIKE serve as physical custodian, the biggest issue being that he has been charged as perpetrator of domestic violence and child abuse among other things. MIKE'S premise was/is that his parents were/are horrible and that KERSTAN was/is horrible for various reasons, the majority of his claims largely untrue in nature. The court then granted physical custody to a third party. Instead of being upset about that decision, MIKE instead opposed KERSTAN when she attempted to have the court reconsider or set the order aside order. MIKE flipped script and opposed KERSTAN, even though custody has been provided to his parents, the same people he claimed were horrible and alienated him from Isabella, and the same people he just called the police on in May of this year. MIKE stated to KERSTAN that he wanted Isabella to reside with her so KERSTAN moved Isabella, her possessions, and car, and enrolled her in school and MIKE again flipped script and enrolled her in school in Reno and states that she will live with his parents without even speaking with KERSTAN or considering her input on the matter. KERSTAN is nervous about Isabella's latest evaluation and the therapists input regarding depression and Isabella's early signs of having a borderline personality disorder. This is the same type of personality disorder that MIKE was diagnosed with by Dr. Pagilini to this court after he assaulted KERSTAN and the parties' children.

The truth is, although not ideal, MIKE is okay with the current order because he is not required to pay child support so he opposes the reconsideration and request to set aside and the current appeal, even though it means Isabella will stay with his parents who he claims he despises. As a "punishment" to KERSTAN for sending his son to his own parent's home over the summer, as recommended by two highly regarded family law attorneys, he enrolled his daughter into a school in Reno, with full knowledge that she is enrolled in school in Las Vegas, without KERSTAN'S knowledge and consent and then has his counsel file this motion to have Michael, an innocent bystander, have his life uprooted to "teach" his mom "lessons" that MIKE believes KERSTAN should be taught. This motion is unnecessary as the parties' can work out visitation and what would transpire if MIKE does not return Michael, like he did not return Isabella. Divorced parties need to rely on the representations of the other, especially as it pertains

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to the return of the children to one another. KERSTAN clearly states: "...I can purchase their flight up. Can you confirm you will fly them home?" MIKE clearly states: "Yes". KERSTAN relying on his representation flew the children up. KERSTAN clearly states: "So you are confirming that she is not flying home after her visit?" Mike clearly states: "See you in court." He had no intention of returning Isabella and is not remorseful in the least for his actions. Exhibit 13 "Text message "KERSTAN and MIKE". Due to MIKE'S failure to return a child as promised, KERSTAN has been hesitant to allow Michael to leave her custody as she is fearful she does not have adequate protective measures to bring him home. To punish KERSTAN for waiting for sound direction from two retained attorneys who should be able to assist MIKE and KERSTAN is irrational and contrary to doing what is in the best interest of Michael.

This motion is unnecessary and frivolous in nature, brought to harass KERSTAN. MIKE and his counsel should show cause as to why MIKE unilaterally enrolled their daughter in a school and took her to a therapist surreptitiously and without KERSTAN'S knowledge and consent in violation of the court's decree that clearly states MIKE and KERSTAN have joint <u>legal custody</u>. If anyone should be held in contempt, it should be MIKE for not obtaining joint consent on two major matters concerning the education and health and welfare of the eldest child, Isabella and violating KERSTAN'S rights as legal custodian of Isabella and for never adhering to the court ordered visitation stated in the decree. MIKE should also be sanctioned for repeatedly perjuring himself in court. KERSTAN has brought the initial perjury to the court's attention concerning the car seat with her son Michael when he was a toddler (MIKE claiming he always used a car seat with Michael and Hal DeBecker a licensed PI having to show MIKE repeatedly putting a 3 year old boy in the front passenger side of the car unrestrained). Once again MIKE states that "...he did not see his son while Joseph (Michael's middle name) was visiting MICHAEL'S parent..." See Motion Page 4, ¶¶ 12-13. As you can plainly see from MIKE'S stepfather's correspondence, Michael visited with his father during that time. See Exhibit 7 Email from Chuck Burr.

Unfortunately KERSTAN had two choices: 1) send Michael to his father's home in Reno after he did not return the parties' eldest daughter and without knowing where jurisdiction might

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lie for relief if MIKE failed to send him home as promised or 2) keep her son safe and with her until counsel or the court established a new visitation arrangement that could be enforced and remedied in District Court if necessary.

II.

# **OPPOSITION POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

KERSTAN SHOULD NOT BE ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE AS TO WHY SHE Α. HAS NEVER FOLLOWED THE COURT ORDERED VISITATION SCHEDULE AND RECENTLY VIOLATED KERSTAN'S PARENTAL ROLE AS JOINT LEGAL CUSTONDIAN OF THE PARTIES' DAUGHTER.

MIKE seeks: 1) an order to show cause and 2) imprisonment of KERSTAN. Under NRS 22.010 the court has stated that "disobedience to any lawful writ order, rule or process issued by the court ..." constitutes contempts. Additionally, under NRS 22.110(1), a person may be imprisoned for such contempts. NRS 22.010(7) also finds contempts when a party is "abusing the process or proceedings of the court or falsely pretending to act under the authority of an order or process of the court." (Emphasis Added). In Hildahl v. Hildahl, 601 P.2d 58, 95 Nev. 657 (1979), the court held that a husband's unilateral modification of his performance under that order violated the decree and he was properly held in contempt. Lastly, this court has held that the order on which judgment of contempt is based must be clear and unambiguous, and must spell out details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms, so that person will readily know exactly what duties are imposed on him. Cunningham v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State of Nev., In and For Clark County, 1986, 729 P.2d 1328, 102 Nev. 551.

KERSTAN is not in contempt of court as she is awaiting a new visitation schedule and assurance that MIKE cannot take Michael under the guise of "visitation" and then not return him similar to what he just did on July 30th of this year when MIKE did not return the parties' eldest daughter after her visitation, but instead surreptitiously took her to "therapy" where it was decided Isabella did not want to return home and then enrolled her into school without KERSTAN's knowledge or consent. Isabella had a duffle bag in her possession and had fully planned on returning to Las Vegas prior to her visitation with her father. The parties are currently awaiting an appeal of a recent court order concerning their eldest daughter and the last

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court minutes state that "...the District Court does not have jurisdiction to hear any further matters until authorized to do so by the Supreme Court of Nevada."

MIKE did not return the parties' eldest daughter as promised. KERSTAN has properly requested that both parties' counsel assist MIKE and KERSTAN with a new visitation schedule as MIKE has never followed the current divorce decree and has recently behaved recklessly with the parties' eldest daughter. MIKE and his counsel were told one day before they filed this frivolous motion the following by KERSTAN:

> "Mike has asked to visit Michael, but I have not obtained input from John Jones or Donn Prokopius on what we would do if he [MIKE] did not return Michael. Once I have input and I know that Michael is safe and will return as promised, I would be happy to have him see his father." (Emphasis Added).

KERSTAN has freely allowed visitation with MIKE for eight (8) years. The only time periods when KERSTAN has been reluctant to allow the children to see their father was when he assaulted them with a deadly weapon and KERSTAN was waiting to get before this court for relief and just recently when MIKE violated the joint legal custodianship established by this court and did not return the parties' eldest child Isabella after a summer visit in Reno and then unilaterally enrolled her into high school and took her to secretive "therapy". The only party to this action, who is in contempt of court, is MIKE who similar to the husband in Hildahl, unilaterally modified his performance under the court order and violated the decree. KERSTAN was provided remedy form the court after being assaulted by MIKE, she is asking for the same relief at this time.

KERSTAN is unsure whether this court has jurisdiction and KERSTAN has properly appealed the recent order and is awaiting her day for the appeal to take place. Orders must be clear or unambiguous. The recent court minutes have led KERSTAN to believe there may be no relief in District Court should MIKE not return Michael similar to what he just did with Isabella. Furthermore, MIKE has unilaterally changed his visitation in the court ordered decree. He does not come to visit Michael as prescribed under the decree whereas KERSTAN should have the

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children every nine (9) days and then Mike should have them for five (5), more or less, but rather comes and see his son when he wants to and expects KERSTAN to drop everything she is doing, as well as, Michael, in order for visitation to take place. MIKE has unilaterally expected visitation on demand and strict compliance by Michael and KERSTAN, regardless of what they have had planned during that time.

CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' SON, MICHAEL, (NOT JOSEPH), SHOULD **B.** NOT BE MODIFIED AS MICHAEL'S BEST INTEREST IS SÉRVED BY RESIDING WITH HIS MOTHER AND THERE HAS NOT BEEN A MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE THAT IS DETRIMENTAL TO HIS WELFARE. FURTHERMORE THERE IS A PRESUMPTION THAT MICHAEL SHOULD RESIDE WITH HIS MOTHER BECAUSE HIS FATHER HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH DOMESTIC ABUSE.

In determining whether the facts warrant a custody modification, courts should not take the "changed circumstances" prong lightly. Ellis v. Carucci 123 Nev. 145 (2007). In Nevada, when a district court determines the custody of a minor child, "the sole consideration of the court is the best interest of the child, which is governed by NRS 125.480. Under Ellis, the court has held that a modification of primary physical custody is warranted only when the party seeking a modification proves there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child and the child's best interest is served by the modification.

Under NRS 125.480, in determining the best interest of the child, the court shall consider and set forth its specific findings concerning, among other things:

- (a) The wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to his or her custody.
- (b) Any nomination by a parent or a guardian for the child.
- (c) Which parent is more likely to allow the child to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with the noncustodial parent.
- (d) The level of conflict between the parents.
- (e) The ability of the parents to cooperate to meet the needs of the child.
- (f) The mental and physical health of the parents.
- (g) The physical, developmental and emotional needs of the child.
- (h) The nature of the relationship of the child with each parent.
- (i) The ability of the child to maintain a relationship with any sibling.
- (j) Any history of parental abuse or neglect of the child or a sibling of the child.
- (k) Whether either parent or any other person seeking custody has engaged in an act of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child.

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(1) Whether either parent or any other person seeking custody has committed any act of abduction against the child or any other child.

Michael is a happy, care-free, loving, smart boy who is excelling in the 5th grade and is obtaining love, support, care, time and attention of his family members and friends while residing with his mother. See Exhibit 11 "Michael's Writing and Awards". On the converse, Michael's father has alienated his son from his paternal grandparents (See Exhibit 6 "Email from Gary Silverman on behalf of Chuck and Carol Burr) and has currently attempted to alienate his daughter from her mother by keeping her up in Reno after he had promised to book her return flight after her visitation, violating the parties' joint legal custodianship by enrolling her in school and taking her to "therapy" without her mother's knowledge and consent. As you can see from Michael's letter, he loves spending time with his stepsister and family. He has a strong connection to all of them. Unfortunately, MIKE has been charged with the abuse of another young boy who was the son of his former girlfriend, Heather Velasquez Thomas. KERSTAN has provided proof of the arrest and charges to this court and if necessary can provide testimony as to how he BEAT THE BOY WITH A HANGER and upon information and belief, ABONDONED THE BOY WHILE BETWEEN THE AGES OF (6-10 YEARS OF AGE) AT LAKE TAHOE FOR ALLEGEDLY DAMAGING MIKE'S SPEEDBOAT with no food, water, phone while he drove the rest of the children back down to Reno, NV a few years back. His mother Heather was not at the lake and had to hear that her son was abandoned and had to immediately leave Reno to try and find and retrieve her son on the beach. This story was provided to KERSTAN by Isabella just this month, she had apparently kept this a secret in order to protect her father. Lastly, MIKE RAN HIS CAR INTO KERSTAN'S VEHICLE WHILE THREE (3) CHILDREN WERE INSIDE THE VEHICLE WITH HER. He was ultimately charged with four (4) counts of ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON.

Michael's custody should not be modified as he has not experienced a material change in circumstances and it is definitely not in his best interest to reside with his father who has neglected and abused another boy Michael's age, assaulted Michael while in a car with his mother, and alienated Michael from his own parents and is currently alienating the parties' eldest

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daughter Isabella from her mother by taking her to "therapy" sessions and enrolling her in school without her mother's knowledge or consent.

### MIKE SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THIS MOTION C. IS PATENTLY FRIVOLOUS AND FILED SIMPLY TO HARRASS KERSTAN.

MIKE'S attorney is seeking attorney's fees under NRS 18.010 and NRS 125.150(3). He claims that he is experienced, analyzed pertinent information, and expects to obtain a good result from filing this motion. What he doesn't say is that he has and had full knowledge that MIKE violated the parties' joint legal custodianship in July of 2015 and then turns around and files an unnecessary motion while a current appeal is underway.

MIKE'S attorney also has an ethical obligation under Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 which states that:

- (b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,--
- (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation ...;
- (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery...

MIKE'S own Exhibit A demonstrates that KERSTAN had concerns with allowing visitation due to the fact that MIKE recently violated the decree and did not return the parties' eldest child when promised and that the current minutes on file with this court state that, "...that the District Court does not have any jurisdiction to hear any matters until authorized by the Supreme Court of Nevada."

For these reasons above, attorney's fees should be denied.

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III.

# **COUNTERMOTION POINTS AND AUTHORIES**

KERSTAN has been repeatedly brought back to court for motions to change custody of both her children as a form of legal abuse. MIKE has been diagnosed as having BORDERLINE NARCISSITIC PERSONALITY DISORDER by a court-ordered, Nevada licensed psychologist. He abuses and controls financially, emotionally, psychologically, and through the court system as well.

MIKE does not comply with court orders. He has taken the children's education funds, insurance premiums, and used KERSTAN's credit line and damaged her credit by not paying off legal obligations when due. He has failed to pay child support, modified child support under false pretenses, failed to follow court ordered visitation, and just recently failed to comply with the parties' joint legal custodial rights. MIKE should be ordered to show cause for his non-compliance and MIKE and his attorney should be sanctioned for filing another frivolous motion while an appeal is pending.

A. MIKE SHOULD BE ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE AS TO WHY HE UNILATERALLY ENROLLED THEIR DAUGHTER ISABELLA INTO SCHOOL, TOOK HER TO "THERAPY" WITHOUT KERSTAN'S KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT AND FAILED TO RETURN HER ON JULY 30<sup>TH</sup> OF THIS YEAR AFTER HIS SCHEDULED VISITATION.

MIKE recently requested that KERSTAN fly both Michael and Isabella, the parties' children up to Reno to visit with him over summer. Isabella had recently returned to reside with her mother and Michael after she expressed a desire to do so in counseling after a bout of depression she experienced at the end of her Junior year. Isabella had been attending school in Reno, NV and while in school, would stay with her paternal grandparents, Chuck and Carol Burr. KERSTAN purchased the flights up to Reno and confirmed with MIKE that the children would return on July 30th. He confirmed that he would return the children, but then during the vacation with MIKE, he surreptitiously took Isabella to therapy with Gerri Goddard, MA in Reno. MIKE then went to Bishop Manogue, Isabella's prior high school and re-enrolled her into high school for her Senior year. All of this was done without KERSTAN'S knowledge and

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consent and in direct violation of the parties' joint legal custodianship specified in the decree.

Under NRS 22.010, the following acts or omissions shall be deemed contempts...:

- 3. Disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the court or judge at chambers....
- 7. Abusing the process or proceedings of the court or falsely pretending to act under the authority of an order or process of the court.

In Nevada, it has been found that a husband's unilateral modification of his performance under that order violated the decree and he was properly held in contempt. Hildahl v. Hildahl, 601 P.2d 58, 95 Nev. 657 (1979).

Here, MIKE simply states that Isabella has the right to do whatever she wants. That he did not need to have KERSTAN'S consent to take make decisions regarding Isabella's health and welfare, which would entail taking her to a therapist. MIKE also states that he does not need KERSTAN'S consent regarding the child's schooling, which would entail enrolling Isabella into high school. Both decisions are exactly what joint legal custodians should decide together.

The parties' divorce decree, (Decree pages 2-3), plainly states the following:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the parties share joint legal custody of the minor children, Isabella Caroline Micone, born March 26, 1998; and Michael Joseph Micone, born January 7, 2005:

The parents shall confer with each other on all important matters pertaining to the children's health, welfare, education, religious training and upbringing to arrive at a harmonious policy to promote the children's best interests, and not to promote the personal desires of either party.

The parents shall confer with each other on all matters regarding the children's healthcare, including but not limited to...psychological...inform the other parent of any health condition of the children...except in emergency situations...

The parent shall confer with each other regarding decisions pertaining to the education and school curriculum of the children...

KERSTAN was never contacted by MIKE while he was taking Isabella to counseling or enrolling her in high school. In fact the last harmonious decision reached pertaining to Isabella's therapy was to take her to Diane Mercier, PhD, where it became evident Isabella wanted to move

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home with her brother and mother. The last harmonious decision reached pertaining to Isabella's schooling was reached between MIKE and KERSTAN when they decided not to enroll her at Bishop Manogue, but rather to have Isabella enroll into high school in Henderson, NV.

MIKE abused the process or proceedings of the court and falsely pretended to act under the authority of an order or process of the court by stating that Isabella could do what she wanted, when in fact Isabella had two joint legal custodians and was not an emancipated adult. Additionally, he took Isabella to a counseling session unilaterally and enrolled her into high school unilaterally, similar to the husband in Hilbahl in violation of the decree and all recent orders. He used the current order regarding Isabella's physical custody while ignoring the parties' divorce decree pertaining to legal custodianship. MIKE violated both NRS 22.010 (3) and (7) and should be ordered to show cause as to why he should not be held in contempt of court. MIKE acted in bad faith by stating that he would return the children after their visitation July 22<sup>nd</sup> and then said, "See you in court" when he failed to put Isabella on a flight home. Isabella carried one duffle bag and left Las Vegas with full intention to return. Due to this unlawful act and due to the questions regarding current jurisdiction with the District Court, KERSTAN believes that MIKE may also keep Michael during his visitation and not return him as promised.

## KERSTAN'S ATTORNEY SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR B. HAVING TO OPPOSE THIS FRIVOLOUS MOTION WHILE A LEGITIMATE APPEAL IS UNDERWAY AND THE DISTRICT COURT HAS STATED THAT HEAR ANY FURTHER MATTERS UNTIL DIRECTED TO DO SO BY THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA.

MIKE has initiated this action in order to harass KERSTAN and comes to the court with unclean hands, having recently violated the parties' joint legal custodianship and not returning the eldest daughter on a recent visit to her father's home in Reno on July 22<sup>nd</sup>. disingenuously pretends to act under the authority of a court order and does not recognize the legal custody is strikingly different than physical custody. He states that since his parents, a 3<sup>rd</sup> party, were granted physical custody of their daughter that he has the right alone and unilaterally to take her to "therapy" sessions and then enroll her in a different high school then what was agreed upon between the parties.

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Furthermore, MIKE decides to violate the parties' decree while an appeal is pending and the District Court has stated that it will not hear any more matters until directed to do so from the Supreme Court of Nevada. MIKE should be required to pay KERSTAN's counsel for having to oppose this motion in order to protect Michael's current custody and well-being. Fees should be awarded and sanctions imposed under Rule 11.

The decision whether to award attorney fees is within sound discretion of trial court. Bergmann v. Boyce, 856 P.2d 560, 109 Nev. 670 (1993). Attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing party under NRS 18.010 when ...

- 2. In addition to the cases where an allowance is authorized by specific statute, the court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to a prevailing party:
- (a) When the prevailing party has not recovered more than \$20,000; or
- (b) Without regard to the recovery sought, when the court finds that the claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint or defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party. The court shall liberally construe the provisions of this paragraph in favor of awarding attorney's fees in all appropriate situations. It is the intent of the Legislature that the court award attorney's fees pursuant to this paragraph and impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in all appropriate situations to punish for and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses because such claims and defenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public.

Additionally under NRS 125.150(3), KERSTAN'S attorney may be awarded reasonable attorney's fees...if those fees are in issues under pleadings.

Pursuant to Brunzell v. Golden Gage Nat'l Bank, 85 NV 345 (1969), the court should take into consideration the following factors when determining an award of attorney's fees:

- The qualities of the advocate: (1)
- John Jones has practiced law in Nevada for over seventeen (17) years. Mr. Jones also has extensive trial experience in complex child custody issues. Mr. Jones is one of a small group of Board Certified Family Law Specialists in Nevada.
- The character and difficulty of the work performed: (2)

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The parties have a fast track appeal underway. The issues pertaining to this appeal and this collateral motion are difficult and require extensive time and understanding of procedure and law.

The work actually performed by the attorney: (3)

Mr. Jones has had to prepare this opposition and countermotion in a very contentious divorce to protect his client and to protect the stability of Michael's current custody. The opposition took substantial time in order to provide the court with evidence that the assertions made in MIKE'S motion are largely untrue.

The results obtained: (4)

Mr. Jones has advocated for KERSTAN since 2008 in a very heated and contentious divorce and post-decree matters including protection of KERSTAN and her children after MIKE assaulted them back in 2009, opposing a change in custody of the parties' eldest daughter in 2014-2015, and now opposing a change in custody of the parties' youngest son Michael in this current motion, which has been brought to harass KERSTAN and brought without reasonable grounds.

For these reasons above, the court should award KERSTAN'S attorneys fees and impute sanctions under NRS 18.010(2)(b) against both MIKE and his counsel.

IV.

# **CONCLUSION**

KERSTAN opposes MIKE's motion for an order to show cause, his request for change of custody of the parties' youngest child, Michael, for any modification of child support, and for attorney's fees. MIKE'S current motion is brought in bad faith and to harass KERSTAN while an appeal is underway concerning the parties' eldest daughter Isabella.

KERSTAN countermotions this court to issue an order to show cause as to why MIKE should not be held in contempt of the parties divorce decree after MIKE recently violated the parties' divorce decree and unilaterally enrolled their daughter into a school and taking their daughter to "therapy" without KERSTAN's knowledge or consent. MIKE did so under false pretense of complying with the order for physical custody that is currently on appeal. The parties had already agreed to enroll Isabella into school in Henderson, NV. KERSTAN believes MIKE violated decree because he was angry with KERSTAN for allowing their son, Michael to visit with his own parents for one week in Reno, a week that KERSTAN was slated to have the

children. He lies repeatedly stating that he never saw Michael during this time, when he obviously did and this was tracked by text message correspondence with his stepfather Chuck Burr. He also states that KERSTAN "refuses to have Michael see him" when this is largely untrue. KERSTAN has freely allowed visitation with Michael for eight (8) years, bending over backwards to allow it to happen at times. It is MIKE who has never adhered to the court ordered visitation schedule and expects KERSTAN to drop everything at a moment's notice to allow him time with his son when he wants visitation to take place. KERSTAN has repeatedly requested that his attorney provide a new schedule and assurance that there would be remedy for KERSTAN should MIKE not return the parties' son similar to what he just did with the parties' daughter Isabella, who flew up to Reno with a duffle bag and did not return after her "therapy" sessions with her father.

For these reasons KERSTAN asks this court to deny MIKE'S motion in its entirety, order him to show cause as to his willful violation of the parties' status as joint legal custodians, and to award sanctions and attorney's fees to John Jones for having oppose this frivolous motion.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of September, 2015.

Respectfully submitted,

BLACK & LOBELLO

John D. Jones, Esq.

Nevada State Bar No. 006699

107/77 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300

Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERSTAN HUBBS

# 10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 702-869-8801 FAX: 702-869-2669

# **DECLARATION OF KERSTAN MICONE IN SUPPORT OF HER OPPOSITION TO** CAUSE AND FOR SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

KERSTAN MICONE, under penalties of perjury, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing Opposition To Defendant's Motion And Countermotion For Defendant To Show Cause And For Sanctions And Attorney's Fees and know the contents thereof; that the same is true of my own knowledge except for those matters therein stated on information and belief and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. The allegations contained in the Motion are adopted as if fully set forth in this Declaration.

Signed under pains and penalties of perjury this 9th day of September, 2015.

Kustan Micone KERSTAN MICONE

# **BLACK & LOBELLO** 10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 (702) 869-8801 FAX: (702) 869-2669

# 

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Aday of September, 2015 I served a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Opposition To Defendant's Motion And Countermotion For Defendant To Show Cause And For Sanctions And Attorney's Fees, upon each of the parties by electronic service through Wiznet, the Eighth Judicial District Court's e-filing/e-service system, pursuant to N.E.F.C.R. 9; and by depositing a copy of the same in a sealed envelope in the United States Mail, Postage Pre-Paid, addressed as follows:

Donn W. Prokopius, Esq.
PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY
931 South Third Street
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Email for Service: general@pandblawyers.com
Attorneys for Defendant

an Employee BLACK & LOBELLO

2507-0001

MOFI

# DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

KERSTAN MICONE nka HUBBS,	Case No. D-08-388334-D			
Plaintiff/Petitioner	Case INO.			
v.	Dept. J			
V. MICHAEL MICONE,	MOTION/OPPOSITION			
Defendant/Respondent	FEE INFORMATION SHEET			
Notice: Motions and Oppositions filed after entry of a final order issued pursuant to NRS 125, 125B or 125C are subject to the reopen filing fee of \$25, unless specifically excluded by NRS 19.0312. Additionally, Motions and				
Oppositions filed in cases initiated by joint petition may be subject to an additional filing fee of \$129 or \$57 in				
accordance with Senate Bill 388 of the 2015 Legislative Session.				
Step 1. Select either the \$25 or \$0 filing fee in the box below.				
\$25 The Motion/Opposition being filed with this form is subject to the \$25 reopen fee.				
\$0 The Motion/Opposition being filed with this form is not subject to the \$25 reopen				
fee because:				
The Motion/Opposition is being filed before a Divorce/Custody Decree has been				
entered.				
The Motion/Opposition is being filed solely to adjust the amount of child support				
established in a final order.  The Motion/Opposition is for reconsideration or for a new trial, and is being filed.				
The Motion/Opposition is for reconsideration or for a new trial, and is being filed within 10 days after a final judgment or decree was entered. The final order was				
entered on .	tor decree was entered. The final order was			
Other Excluded Motion (must specif	ÿ)			
Step 2. Select the \$0, \$129 or \$57 filing fee in the box below.				
<b>▼ \$0</b> The Motion/Opposition being filed with this form is not subject to the \$129 or the				
\$57 fee because:				
The Motion/Opposition is being filed in a case that was not initiated by joint petition.				
☐ The party filing the Motion/Opposition previously paid a fee of \$129 or \$57OR-				
\$129 The Motion being filed with this form is subject to the \$129 fee because it is a motion				
to modify, adjust or enforce a final order.				
-OR-				
S57 The Motion/Opposition being filing with this form is subject to the \$57 fee because it is an opposition to a motion to modify, adjust or enforce a final order, or it is a motion				
and the opposing party has already pai	<del>-</del>			
Step 3. Add the filing fees from Step 1 and Step 2.				
The total filing fee for the motion/opposition I am filing with this form is:  □\$0 ★\$25 □\$57 □\$82 □\$129 □\$154				
Party filing Motion/Opposition: Kerstan Micone nka Hubbs Date 9/9/15				
Party filing Motion/Opposition: Kerstan Micone nka Hubbs Date 9/9/15				
$\alpha = \alpha =$				
Signature of Party or Preparer Check Beckal				

# Exhibit 1

# AFFIDAVIT OF MARK DIPENTINO

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STATE OF NEVADA ) ) ss COUNTY OF CLARK )

Mark DiPentino, being first duly sworn, deposes and attests the following, all of which is stated upon personal knowledge except for those matters stated upon information and belief, if any, and as for those matters, Affiant believes them to be true:

I am over the age eighteen (18) and competent to testify as to the matters stated herein.

My name is Mark DiPentino, Step-Father to Isabella and Michael Micone. During the hearing between the parties Michael A. Micone and Kerstan Hubbs on January 15<sup>th</sup> I was present in your court room and I observed Mike Micone's attorney make a gross misrepresentation to the court.

The attorney was either misinformed by his client or by a simple honest mistake gave testimony to the court that his client, Michael A Micone, had enjoyed regular visitation of Isabella and Michael every other week from the days of "...Tuesday through Sunday." This is a complete fallacy.

Since the day in which I met Isabella and Micheal Micone in December of 2008 and until the day in which she temporarily had gone to stay with her grandparents in Reno, Nevada to attend college preparatory school in August of 2013, I can testify that the Defendant, outside of the of yearly Summer and Christmas vacation, when the children traveled via airplane to see their Dad, has never taken Isabella and/or Michael J Micone

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Jovernight for a five day visit. In fact, what the Defendant has enjoyed on a regular basis has been to come into town numerous times a year and make cameo appearances at the children's events for a few short hours. When visiting Las Vegas, the Defendant rarely has or had the care, custody, and control of either child for more than any twenty-four hour period.

If the court would like to hear my testimony on this matter or the matter regarding the dismay of my wife, the Plaintiff, and the strife that it had caused her when she learned that the Defendant stole their children's college fund monies, intentionally harmed her credit, and the horror of ramming his rental car into hers with the children inside, which resulted the Defendant being arrested for four counts of assault with a deadly weapon, I will gladly tell you all that I know.

Further, your Affiant sayeth naught.

Mark DiPentino

Subscribed and sworn to before me <u>65</u> day of September, 2015.



Certificate No: 12-8953-1

# Exhibit 2

You're keeping me from my son! So fuck you!!! I will not stop until you end up paying for this. Fuck you! I will not stop!!!! You're a fucking horrible person and you will pay for all this

a fucking
horrible person
and you will
pay for all this
shit you do. So
fuck you on
you fucked up
birthday when
you disowned
your daughter.
What a piece
of shit you are.

See you in court.
All those times you drug me to court ... How does it feel. I will break you. I have the rest of my life to fight for my kids and I am sick of you controlling me. Your a controll Greek and I will end that once and for all. See you in court.

I will not stop. I will drain you of every penny I can. This is going to my redemption. You're a horrible person for keeping me from my rights with my daughter. I won't stop!!!

iMessage Yesterday 3:00 PM

complaint that you went through my personal property with out my permission and using it without permission. Filing it Monday. Next time ask and get permission but now you will learn the hard way.

Look up privacy laws. It's my phone and you need permission. That what the attorney just told me. Expect a complaint on your license soon. Have a great day

You don't scare me

Won't be funny when you get charged for a felony. Have a happy birthday
Oh any you will hear from more than John and Don

# Allican say is FELONY CHARGES COMING.

Sunday 11:38 AM

Delivered

for 2008. Don't fuck with me anymore. I will not stop if you keep fuckimg with me. I gave you property houses degrees paid off cars and the house. I will not pay you one cent more. I will make you pay. You fucked with the wrong person. See you in COURT.

To: Kerstan, Mike

how does it feel to be in second position. I turned her down because she is a horrible fuck and person. You

To: Kerstan, Mike

time. I hope
Kerstan
wakes up
and dumps
your ass.
Your a loser
and a fuck
sponge.
Don't call or

To: Kerstan, Mike

her. So wake up loser.
Your a filler and you will be dedication soon. And if I said yes to her you'd be living in your



## Report of Neuropsychological Assessment

Finally, Isabella presented with symptoms suggesting that her academic and interpersonal difficulties have culminated in Isabella experiencing significant and severe symptoms associated with depressed mood. To this end, individual and family psychotherapy to better assess and to address these mood related symptoms is strongly recommended. This therapy also would allow for further exploration and assistance in the areas of this teen's ego development, identity development and parent-child relationship problems.

Summary Diagnostic Impression:

American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V) criteria:

Cognitive Disorder, NOS (Executive Function Deficits)
Learning Disorder of Reading Accuracy
Dysthymic Disorder

It was a pleasure to work with Isabella and her family. Please feel free to contact me if I may be of further assistance. I can be reached by telephone at (775) 352-3898.

Maci B. Pitts, Ph.D.

Traci B. Pitts, Ph.D.

Child Clinical Psychologist

As long as I can't see Bella, I've made my last payment to Manogue. You have created this by prohibiting me from having Bella. I will not just write checks and have my rights as her father controlled. Please make arrangements to

pay for Manogue if you want her to still go there or she can move to

Vegas and I will get my kids schedule modified so I can get an apartment and have them stay with my every other Tues-Sunday and I will have my time one way or another.

Sat, May 23, 6:54 AM

Bella had dinner with us last night and she informed she is moving back to Vegas on the 30th. That was great news. I've always said that she better

off living with you or me. Although that wasn't how you felt. I know she wants to be with family and her brother. For me this is great bc now I can see her anytime she wants and I know vou will

I know you will help encourage that as you have with Michael. I want her happy and all of us to move on. Let me know if you want me to drive down with her.

## RE: Notice that Bishop Manogue Enrollment Due by April 24th

From: Kerstan Hubbs (khubbs@live.com)

Sent: Wed 4/29/15 9:11 AM

To: mikemicone@gmail.com (mikemicone@gmail.com)

Mike,

Isabella came down to see me this last weekend. She has agreed to enroll in Coronado High School her senior year. She actually is looking forward to it. I think it will be best if we are not all on board with her final year at Bishop Manogue. She said that she would like to spend her last year at home with me and Michael.

#### Kerstan

From: khubbs@live.com
To: mikemicone@gmail.com

Subject: Notice that Bishop Manogue Enrollment Due by April 24th

Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2015 14:54:34 -0700

Mke,

Good afternoon. A reminder that the enrollment for Isabella to attend Bishop Manogue for her Senior year is due by April 24th. Please confirm that you would like her to re-enroll in Bishop Manogue at this time. I spoke with Isabella today. She said that she wanted to attend Bishop Manogue for her Senior year.

Chuck has informed me that you have stated that you will only pay if Isabella has a 3.0 GPA. I think she is at a 2.67 (as of earlier this month). Please advise as to your commitment to payment for 2015-2016. I would like to confirm that statement.

I believe it is a \$25 penalty for late registration.

Sincerely, Kerstan

From: Gary Silverman [mailto:silverman@silverman-decaria.com]

Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2015 10:50 AM

To: John Jones

Cc: ckburr43@gmail.com

Subject: Burr/Hubbs: proposal to send child to grandparents; indemnity; RFR; time.

#### Dear John:

Chuck and Carol Burr want to visit with their grandson Michael during the summer for two weeks, when they would take him and his friend/cousin to Graeagle, Calif. As you may know or Kerstan will tell you, that place in the Sierras is as wholesome and cool (in both senses of the word) as a ten year-old or caring parents could want.

Apparently Mr. Micone will not agree to such an adventure with the Burrs and, further, he will invoke the "right to first refusal" provisions of the current custody order to prevent Kerstan from sending Michael to Graeagle on *her* time.

I do not have a copy of the Decree or Order which contains the RFR provisions so I am going on the routine wording we see. Respectfully, I submit the claim that an RFR provision bars Kerstan from sending Michael to his grandparents is absurd—the provision is inapplicable to a vacation…or at least not intended that way.

If such is the case with the routine RFR wording, in lieu of filing their own motion the Burr's ask that Kerstan send Michael to them for two weeks and let Mr. Micone bring such action as he sees fit and if he does for Kerstan to then file her own motion for leave to clarify the Order and permit her to send the boy north to his grandparents. Chuck and Carol will indemnify Kerstan for fees and costs. This seems much simpler than grandparents bringing their own motion.

Please send me a copy of the Order in effect and if the RFR provision is anywhere near what I have speculated, consider this course of action. I will call you after I have read the controlling order. The summer is here so time is of the essence.

## Mike/ communications last two days

From: Chuck  $\Box\Box$  Burr (ckburr43@gmail.com)

Sent: Wed 7/15/15 11:38 AM

To: Kerstan Hubbs (khubbs@live.com)

1 attachment

Test messages Mike and Chuck.docx (67.7 KB)

Chuck Burr ckburr43@gmail.com 775-846-7093 815 Arlington Ct Reno, NV 89509 Test messages Mike and Chuck

Chuck dropped off Michael at his dad's house at 2:30 on Tuesday the  $14^{\rm th}$  of July. Mike was hoping to have him come over Monday night so I had Michael talk to his dad and he told him "I just want to hang out with Hudson"

At 8:48 I texted to Mike "What time would you like me to pick up Michael?"

Then later I texted to Mike "Is Michael going to stay over? If so I can pick him up at 88am.

Mike responded "He's staying the night. No need to pick up MY son.

Chuck texted "Great, I'll check in the morning as to the airport. Have a great night."

In the morning about 7:45 Mike texted to see what time I was picking him up. He said he had eaten but did not have a change of clothes. (Michael said he did not want to take anything with him to his dad's)

Chuck tested back at 8:19 "Good, see you at 8:30"

Chuck picked up Michael at 8:33 am and he came to our house and changed then chilled out till time to go to the airport.

#### RE: Isabella Senior Year

From: Kerstan Hubbs (khubbs@live.com)

Sent: Tue 7/28/15 11:14 PM

To: Geri Goddard (gerigoddard@yahoo.com)

Geri,

I would like a copy of all of her records at this time. You may scan them or fax them to my attention. My fax number is 702-534-1697.

Sincerely, Kerstan

Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 22:32:42 +0000

From: gerigoddard@yahoo.com

To: khubbs@live.com

Subject: Re: Isabella Senior Year

Kerstan

Let me know if you'd like to speak by phone

Geri

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From: Kerstan Hubbs <khubbs@live.com>
To: Geri Goddard <gerigoddard@yahoo.com>

Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2015 3:18 PM Subject: RE: Isabella Senior Year

Geri,

A phone call prior to you seeing my daughter would have been best. It is difficult for me to really think this session or service provided is above board. Please attempt to place yourself in my situation. This is very unprofessional and questionable in every manner to me. I do not want you to provide any more therapy sessions to my daughter at this time. YOU DO NOT HAVE MY CONSENT AND SHE IS A MINOR. My ex-spouse and I should make these decisions "jointly" and this has not been the case. I realize that counseling is likely necessary

for Bella, this custody dispute has wreaked havoc on her and however, I don't really want a unilateral assessment of my daughter where you have head God knows what from her father. It is just not proper.

Thank You, Kerstan

Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 22:02:16 +0000

From: gerigoddard@yahoo.com

To: khubbs@live.com; mikemicone@gmail.com

CC: alex@pandblawyers.com; donn@pandblawyers.com

Subject: Re: Isabella Senior Year

#### Kerstan

Let me know when we can speak by telephone and a number that is good for contact. I would like to make sure you are included.

Geri

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From: Kerstan Hubbs <khubbs@live.com>

To: "mikemicone@gmail.com" <mikemicone@gmail.com>

Cc: "gerigoddard@yahoo.com" <gerigoddard@yahoo.com>; 'Alex Gomez' <alex@pandblawyers.com>; 'Donn

Prokopius' <donn@pandblawyers.com>
Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2015 12:10 PM

Subject: RE: Isabella Senior Year

Mike et al,

I just spoke with my daughter who informed me that the psychologist told her that she would contact me. I was never contacted and my daughter was unaware that this was necessary. When I took her to counseling in Reno, you were right there with me Mike. We both signed paperwork. Every psychologist in Reno informed me that we both needed to be on board with her counseling. Geri should know better and so should Donn.

Thank you, Kerstan From: mikemicone@gmail.com

To: khubbs@live.com

CC: gerigoddard@yahoo.com; Alex@PANDBLAWYERS.COM;

Donn@PANDBLAWYERS.COM Subject: RE: Isabella Senior Year

Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 12:01:49 -0700

Kerstan,

Bella is going to Manogue. She is enrolled and she wants to finish her last year here. Feel free to talk to your attorney but the best thing for Bella is to attend her last year of School in Reno at Manogue High School. I will keep Geri in the loop as your making threats to her now as well.

Thank,

Mike Micone

From: Kerstan Hubbs [mailto:khubbs@live.com]

Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2015 11:39 AM

To: mikemicone@gmail.com Subject: RE: Isabella Senior Year

Mike,

First, as joint legal guardians, you may not take her to a psychologist without my consent. What you did was wrong. Geri Goddard, MA should have requested dual consent understanding that Isabella is from a divorced family. She/He has their license on the line.

I will forward to my attorney. If the court believes that Bella should be allowed to live with you I will have to live with it, but I certainly don't support it. You ran into me and our children with a car. You hit Heather's boy with a hanger, and I recently found out that you abandoned Heather's boy at Lake Tahoe simply because you were mad at him.

What you have done to me personally is not of issue. It is what you have done to children. I am trying to keep Bella in a safe environment.

I just spoke to Bella and she said she was coming home after work camp. That is unless she is lying to me. I told her I am okay with her attending Manogue if she is with your parents.

Kerstan

From: mikemicone@gmail.com

To: khubbs@live.com

CC: <u>gerigoddard@yahoo.com</u>

Subject: Isabella Senior Year

Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 11:06:46 -0700

Kerstan,

Bella has decided to attend her last year at Manogue High School. As we know Bella had a hard decision to make but it was one that she is allowed to make according to the order from the judge. Bella went to see Geri Goddard, MA Psychologist for adolescents and Geri worked with Bella through this process and Bella made the decision that is best for her. Geri is going to contact you today regarding Bella's decision.

If you want to reach Geri yourself, her phone number is 775-826-1002 and she is cc'd on this email.

Bella is fully enrolled at Manogue and her registration is paid and payments have been scheduled. Bella has her class schedule set up and she is enrolled to play soccer as well. She is scheduled to take her Sr. photos on Monday at Johnson Photography.

I will email her class schedule to you or you can check her schedule on my backpack.

If you have any questions give me a call and we can work out the other logistics.

Thanks,

Mike

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Divorce - Complaint

**COURT MINUTES** 

June 02, 2015

D-08-388334-D

Kerstan D Micone, Plaintiff

VS.

Michael A Micone, Defendant.

June 02, 2015

12:00 AM

Minute Order

HEARD BY: Hughes, Rena G

COURTROOM: Courtroom 04

COURT CLERK: Tiffany Skaggs

PARTIES:

Isabella Micone, Subject Minor, not present

Kerstan Micone, Plaintiff, Counter Defendant,

John Jones, Attorney, not present

not present

Michael Micone, Defendant, Counter

Donn Prokopius, Attorney, not present

Claimant, not present

Michael Micone, Subject Minor, not present

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Per Judge Hughes

NRCP 1 and EDCR 1.10 state that the procedure in district courts shall be administered to secure efficient, speedy, and inexpensive determinations in every action. Pursuant to EDCR 2.23(c) and 5.11(e), this Court can consider a motion and issue a decision on the papers at anytime without a hearing. Further, pursuant to EDCR 2.20(c), this Court can grant the requested relief if there is no opposition timely filed.

A hearing is scheduled for June 4, 2015 on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order that was entered by the Court on March 31, 2015. Defendant has filed an Opposition and Countermotion and the Plaintiff has filed a Reply and Opposition to Defendant's countermotion.

Plaintiff has filed an appeal on the March 31, 2015 Order, which is pending with the Supreme Court of Nevada. In light of that appeal, the District Court does not have jurisdiction to hear any further matters until authorized by the Supreme Court of Nevada.

The June 4, 2015 hearing shall be taken off calendar.

## RE: Life Insurance Policy

From: Kerstan Hubbs (khubbs@live.com)

Sent: Fri 8/14/15 10:44 PM

To: mikemicone@gmail.com (mikemicone@gmail.com)
Cc: donn@pandblawyers.com (donn@pandblawyers.com)

Mike,

Please stop talking to me directly and work through Donn and John. I don't need your threats. Your visitation is not scheduled at this time and I don't feel comfortable with the current status of our order(s) or your recent actions with our daughter while she was up visiting with you. Call the police, I am doing nothing more than protecting my son. Please do not communicate with me again. I can wait to hear direction from John.

#### Kerstan

Subject: Re: Life Insurance Policy From: mikemicone@gmail.com

Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 21:38:57 -0700

CC: donn@pandblawyers.com

To: khubbs@live.com

#### Kerstan,

I booked the flight for Michael Sunday and I will have a police escort to pick up Michael with the decree and order. You can choose to refuse for me to have Michael and I'm sure their is a consequence for your decision.

I have set up tuition and I have set up payments. I'm sure your glad you don't have to pay anything. I have also made the payment on her car and insurance. Do you have an opinion about that as well. You usually do. See you Sunday.

Mike Micone CEO/President Micone Staffing Resources, Inc. 702-339-1113

On Aug 14, 2015, at 6:44 PM, Kerstan Hubbs < khubbs@live.com > wrote:

See below. Kerstan

ewor M me to me 0

AA 900462

what you've been doing to me. Cutting me out of her life and taking a passive approach is what I learned from you. So thank you for teaching me how to handle

Sun, Jun 14, 10:24 PM

# Can Bella and michael fly up this Wednesday night?

Mon, Jun 15, 8:24 AM

Yes. Are they both flying up. Bella didn't

Text Message Sat, Jul 18, 11:15 AM

Did you book there flights? Also what day to you want them back. Prefer on a day they can fly Allegiant.

Sat, Jul 18, 2:09 PM

Sent as Text Message

Sat, Jul 18, 3:38 PM

OK

Sun, Jul 19, 7:39 AM

Sat, Aug 1, 4:11 PM

We are having a great time on tahoe. Thanks for asking.

Bella decided to stay up there. She starts school Monday. I guess you still want to fight. That's who you

# And Bella?

She is with chuck and Nona's.

See you in court.

You ignored me Wineriasked for her flight. We are joint lega. custodians. You don't respect my rights. Do you know how many times our kios did noi want to fly up and see wat?

### Exhibit 14

### FW: Isabella to Vegas

From: Kerstan Hubbs (khubbs@live.com)

Sent: Tue 9/01/15 4:29 PM

To: graci dipentino (markdipentino@gmail.com)

2 attachments

Message from Bella.jpg (5.2 MB), Text message.png (117.2 KB)

See below. Call me when you can. Kerstan

From: khubbs@live.com

To: ckburr43@gmail.com; carolburr1963@gmail.com; mikemicone@gmail.com

CC: donn@pandblawyers.com; silverman@silverman-decaria.com; jjones@blacklobellolaw.com

Subject: Isabella to Vegas

Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2015 16:17:04 -0700

Chuck, Carol, and Mike,

Bella messaged me on Facebook and said she would like to come to Vegas for Labor Day. I told her to book her flight and I will pick her up. I am afraid to book travel because of what transpired after her visitation on July 30th where she did not return to Vegas. I will refund the money for her travel once she lands and she has more than enough money in her account that I fund at Wells Fargo bank. She uses her card, so I see that she has it. I am copying all parties as my last correspondence with her father was horribly abusive and unnecessary.

Mike has asked to visit with Michael, but I have not obtained input from John/Donn on what we would do if he did not return Michael. Once I have input and I know Michael is safe and will return as promised, I would be happy to have him see his father.

I just would like to see my daughter and not have anyone interfere.

Thank you, Kerstan TRANS

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CLERK OF COURT

COPY

## EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION

#### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

KERSTAN D. MICONE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MICHAEL A. MICONE,

Defendant.

CASE NO. D-08-388334-D

DEPT. J

DEPT. J

DEPT. J

DEPT. J

BEFORE THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES,

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

TRANSCRIPT RE: ALL PENDING MOTIONS

THURSDAY, JANUARY 15, 2015

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1	APPEARANCES:
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3	The Plaintiff: KERSTAN D. MICONE
4	For the Plaintiff: JOHN D. JONES, ESQ. Black & LoBello
5	10777 W. Twain Ave. #300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
6	(702) 869-8801
7	
8	The Defendant: MICHAEL A. MICONE For the Defendant: DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ.
9	931 S. Third St. Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
10	(702) 474-0500
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#### PROCEEDINGS

(THE PROCEEDING BEGAN AT 10:37:27.)

THE COURT: We're on the record in Case D388334.

Counsel, please state your appearances for the record.

MR. JONES: John Jones, Bar Number 6699, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, who is also present.

THE COURT: Very good.

MR. PROKOPIUS: Donn Prokopius, appearing on behalf of the defendant. Bar Number 6460.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good.

Do we have any stipulations or agreements?

MR. PROKOPIUS: Not at this time, Judge.

MR. JONES: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. Jones, when did you enter the case?

MR. JONES: Today.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. JONES: But -- but I'm certainly bundled. So you don't have to worry about --

THE COURT: You're bundled?

MR. JONES: I -- I'm -- I -- I've never been unbundled that I can recall.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, I -- I didn't have a counsel of

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MR. JONES: Actually, there wasn't one for either. I was surprised even though Donn's papers were filed under his firm name. The Marshal only had pro se for both parties.

MR. PROKOPIUS: It is odd. I did file the motion under my name and --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PROKOPIUS: -- and the reply and all of that, so.

THE COURT: Yeah. I -- I had your name on here, so.

MR. PROKOPIUS: Right.

THE COURT: That -- that's fine. Okay.

So, Mr. Prokopius.

MR. PROKOPIUS: Your Honor, I -- I think we outlined a lot of it in -- in the motions. And -- and it's very clear. But I just wanna -- I wanna just focus to you on -- on what is really ha -- the relevant period of time here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PROKOPIUS: Okay. And the relevant -- I mean, we -- we've got an opposition that throws out everything in the kitchen sink that's happened in this entire case from the beginning of time.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PROKOPIUS: Unfortunately, all -- most of that means nothing because of McMonigle.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PROKOPIUS: And basically -- before Bella left Las

Vegas, my client was enjoying -- and before he left Las Vegas,

my client was enjoying regular visitation with his -- his

child from Tuesday to Sunday every other week, so, extensive

unsupervised visitation prior to an entire change of situation

happening.

At the end of the 2011-2012 school year, Bella finished with, like, a 1.0 down here in Las Vegas; was hanging out with the wrong people. All of that was happening. So good parents, as they should do, came together and said, we've got to do something about this.

Now, you can say why any of this happened. You can say, oh, he refused to pay for private school here or whatever. The fact is, is they came to an agreement that said Bella was moving up to Reno. My client was living in Reno at that time.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PROKOPIUS: But yet was ext -- was still taking -- getting a lot of visitation, seeing his -- both of his children on a regular basis.

My client had a job at that time where he was moving around. He was traveling. So a -- the -- the idea was that the child wouldn't stay at the grandparents' or live at

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the grandparents' hou -- his grand -- his parents' house.

And my client was daily actively involved with Bella at that point and saw her grades in the 2012-2013 school year -- I think I have that right. Or maybe it was the '13-'14 school year. I may be off by a year. I apologize, Judge. But it's the last two years we're talking about.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PROKOPIUS: Come up to a 3.3, playing soccer, playing softball and everything. My client spends most of the summer with both his kids, this past -- this past summer.

And the plan was that Bella was gonna -- 'cause he then separated from his employment. He's starting his own business. He's on unemployment, but he's starting his own business.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PROKOPIUS: And it -- it -- he's now centralized to -- to Reno. He doesn't have to travel nearly as much and everything else.

So my client spends the last -- later part of the summer with -- with Bella and -- and -- and her -- his son up in Reno. And the school is gonna start. And what ends up happening is Bella's gonna move in with him and gonna continue to go to school. He's gonna have hands-on situation.

And plaintiff puts a complete stop to that. Says,

you're coming back to Las Vegas if you move in with -- with your father. So she's like, I -- I -- I can't do it, dad.

I'm not goin' back to Vegas. I want to stay here. So -- so all of the sudden, he doesn't -- she doesn't show back up at his -- his house. He calls and says, I'm at grandma and grandpa's because if I don't, I've got to go back to Vegas, according to my mom.

Now what we have is this. We have a situation in which grandma and grandpa, my client's parents, have aligned with who they perceive to be the shot caller. And that is plaintiff. For some reason, they believe, and she has them believing, that because she has this designation as the primary physical custodian, she calls the shots.

And -- and she's threatened - and you saw by e-mail - my client, saying, if you take the child to come live with you, I'm coming to get her; and she's coming back to Vegas.

Well, none of this really makes any sense. And -- and her opposition doesn't make any sense.

But before I get into that, now, during the first part of this school year, now I've got a client and a father who's now being excluded from his daughter's life for the most part because the grandparents are gatekeeping. The grandparents are saying, you can't come to the house anymore. And when he did come to the -- when -- when he was coming to the house,

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they would hover over him. They would tell him when he had to leave, et cetera, in front of his daughter.

so my client, basically, at that point, at the -and, of course, we filed a motion at the end of the summer,
too, or close to the end at that time. And all of this
started happening as we file a motion saying, the child's
supposed to come live with me; and -- and I'm gonna be the
father of this child; and -- and we're gonna move forward in a
father-daughter parent -- parental relationship. Now it's
gone completely the other direction.

Now he's basically being -- he doesn't get visitation with his child at all unless she sometimes comes with her friends to the house and things like that. But he can't go to the house anymore, to his own parents' house. So they control that. He doesn't have anything set with his daughter at this point. And -- and these parent -- grandparents think that they have complete control of the situation. And -- and that's really not what's supposed to happen. And we've watched her grades slip again.

And -- and the interesting thing is, is my client just informed me that -- that he's paying for the daughter's car. The --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PROKOPIUS: -- the Sequoia that she drives. And --

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and in that, he's put a GPS on his daughter's car; so she ——
he knows where she is. Well, he now knows, also, that the
daughter's lying to the grandparents about where she is
because she knows that he's —— he knows that she's with a
boyfriend up in Truckee, et cetera, not where she says she's
supposed to be. Okay.

So my client -- and -- and how there can be any argument to say there's no, say, change of circumstances under the -- under Ellis versus Carucci is perplexing to me because physical custody is physical, meaning the child is physically present with the -- with the plaintiff and lives in the plaintiff's house.

Isn't that what we de -- delineate where the child resides for what percentage of the time indicates what custody, physical custody, is.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PROKOPIUS: Okay. At this point, she basically has nothing more than visitation with the child, too, because she comes up once a month to see the child. So --

THE COURT: So Bella is --

MR. PROKOPIUS: -- he --

THE COURT: -- always with the grandparents?

MR. PROKOPIUS: Well, yeah --

THE COURT: Is residing?

D\_08\_38833A

MICONE 01/15/2015

TRANSCRIPT

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - FAMILY DIVISION - TRANSCRIPT VIDEO SERVICES 601 N. Pecos Road, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 455-4977

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MR. PROKOPIUS: -- unfortunately. That's because Bella was -- is now been put under the impression that if she goes to live with her father, she -- mom's gonna come yank her and take her back to Vegas.

THE COURT: And --

MR. PROKOPIUS: My client wants to do what's best for this child. And that is, there is a parental preference. The child should be living with my client in -- in -- in Reno. That's where they chose to put the child into school. That's where they chose to try to straighten this child up.

There was a -- a period of time in which the child moved in -- by agreement, she moved in with the grandparents because my client was traveling a lot. That now has changed. He has the fun -- the means and everything to -- to take care of this child.

And -- and he -- he is perplexed as to why he should be paying. And it's not -- listen, he wants what's best for his child. This -- but I can understand where he's coming from. Why, why do you send \$1,600 a month to a mother who is not physically present with the child? It doesn't make any sense whatsoever at this -- at this situation.

But, so, at -- at worst, you can -- you can say,

Judge, today -- I mean, I understand if we want to change

custody, there has to be an evidentiary hearing. I understand

that. We may have to go that route.

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But at least today you can say, look, if anybody should be getting support, it's the grandparents probably, not the mom. And -- and it doesn't -- just because the mom chooses to pay the grandparents, if she does, that's -- he still shouldn't have to pay her and hope that he -- she pays the grandparents.

THE COURT: And Bella's been with the grandparents since August 2013?

MR. PROKOPIUS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PROKOPIUS: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PROKOPIUS: So, Judge, there was a couple of other small issues in the -- in our motion. In the decree of divorce, she had two -- two years to refinance the HELOC. I know these are ancillary. But she's never done so.

MR. JONES: Wait, wait.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. JONES: Can you show me a paragraph? I don't like to interrupt. But I don't want to have to address something when I believe it's clearly a misrepresentation of what the decree says.

MR. PROKOPIUS: I thought that's what the decree said.

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MR. JONES: There's not a mention about a refinance of a single mortgage.

MR. PROKOPIUS: Okay.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PROKOPIUS: My client took -- got -- got that taken out of his name and -- and everything out of her name that -- that was his responsibility. She hasn't done anything to even try.

So, Judge, we're in a situation where due to the situation, my client's relationship with his daughter --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PROKOPIUS: -- is suffering because the -- the -- I guess you could call them -- I don't even know what the guar -- guardians or whatever they are; although, every time Bella has to go to the doctor, she has to send up a letter saying they're allowed to take her to the doctor.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PROKOPIUS: So they're not really guardians either. But they're gatekeeping because they're aligned with mom; whereas, my client lives in the same city with his child --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PROKOPIUS: -- and it -- it just doesn't make any sense.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you, counsel.

MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

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The one thing you didn't hear in any of that argument and the one thing you didn't read in any of the papers and pleadings filed by the defendant is how changing anything would be in the best interest of the child.

So let's assume that Ellis Carucci would allow for —— Ellis v Carucci would allow for you to consider the fact that dad moved from California back to Reno, has changed the circumstances affecting the child, which it isn't. It's not about a parent. It's about a child.

The change that occurred -- if he had -- if he had a motion to file, it was in 2013 after the end of the 2012 school year when she was doing terribly; and there would be a change of circumstances right along the lines of Ellis versus Carucci.

What's so amazing about this position is that a mom and a dad got together and they said, hey, our daughter is doing poorly. She's not behaving the way we want her to.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. JONES: She's not with the right people. And they make an agreement --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. JONES: -- as co-parents to, let's place the child with my parents, with dad's parents.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. JONES: Not with mom's parents or someone aligned with mom. This idea that dad's parents are now aligned with mom -- you know who dad's parents are aligned in -- with, the best interest of this little girl. I can't really call her a little girl at 16 and a half now.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. JONES: But you have a situation where they agreed.

And -- and here's the -- the multiple agreements that are involved in this case. The two parents agreed it was in the best interest of the child for mom to have primary custody.

Period. End of story.

Both shar -- parents agreed that it was in the best interest of the child to be placed for a year -- basically two-and-a-half years to finish high school with grandparents. Okay.

Dad doesn't like sending checks to mom. You saw the text messages attached. You know, I'm gonna break you financially. I'm going to destroy you. I mean, this is the type of guy dad is.

And it's interesting that he's making the argument that the child's grades have dipped recently. That would be truly unfortunate that -- and it would probably be the best evidence that this Court could rely on that dad is now back in

the picture and now trying to play a role and the child's grades are suffering.

Listen, no one's downplaying the fact that he's a parent. But as a parent, he reached this agreement. We're going to place the child with my parents. She's going to go to this school. And guess what? It worked. This is the perfect example of parents working together.

Let me ask you this, Judge. If they decided that this child needed to be in military school — let's go with this rather common sense example. So they go to X, Y, Z acad — she goes to X, Y, Z academy in Utah. She's staying there for nine months out of the year. The summer she's with mom primarily, which she was this past summer because mom is the primary custodial parent.

And, oh, by the way, mom's the primary custodial parent of their other child, Michael. So when he says, why should he be paying 1,600? Well, he should keep play — paying for Michael for sure because mom has primary custody of Michael; and there's no dispute on that.

So the issue, I guess, to dad is \$800 a month for the next year and a half of the child's life. That -- that's why we're here, which makes it absurd when a trial would obviously cost far more than that per side.

So what you're down to is no evidence of best

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interest, no evidence of a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child because you have to go to the point where the parties agreed that this was in the best interest of the child. This is what the parents decided, not what a Court decided, not what a third party decided.

So they can't meet either of the two prongs under Ellis versus Carucci. There wasn't even a mention of best interest. How could it be better to take a child from the environment that they were excelling in and place them elsewhere, when the only reason is, well, I'm the father?

How many times a week so far in the last three weeks have you had someone, a -- a dad typically, come in and say, well, I'm entitled to this custody because I'm a parent? You still have to meet best interest. And he doesn't even bother to allege it. He doesn't have any reason to be able to tell you.

Now let's go back to best interest. They didn't meet their burden. But I do want to talk to you about a few things. You have significant fitness issues. This is not a McMonigle issue. The decree was entered April of '09. In November of '09, he rams his car into mom's car because he's angry, while the kids are in the car.

MR. PROKOPIUS: What -- the -- we --

MR. JONES: Okay.

MR. PROKOPIUS: -- I -- I have to object because that did go to court. And a -- and an order was made from that, too.

MR. JONES: But --

MR. PROKOPIUS: So that, again, happened prior to court orders.

MR. JONES: Not a custodial order, Judge. We're talking about issues since the last custodial order. The only custodial order is the decree of divorce. So everything that happened, his drug charges, his domestic violence, all of that is relevant.

Now let's assume everybody lives in the same city.

And let's assume dad had none of the major fitness issues that should keep this Court awake at night, particularly the attitude he shows in his text messages. Let's assume they all lived in the same city, but they found it was better and more convenient for the child to sleep nights at grandma's house.

Now here's the other part. That -- that -- that's why if we assume fitness, we assume they're in the same city -- she's 16 and a half. She has a car. When do custodial orders basically become meaningless? When the child is a 16-and-a-half or 17-year-old, they're gonna drive and stay at whatever parent's house they want.

Now the concern, obviously, that mom has and the concern that grandma has because they know Mr. Micone -- I

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know Your Honor has not really been fully made -- you know, made to understand all of the issues that he's had. I think mom did a very nice job in proper person drafting pleadings that sort of gave you the history, the relevant history, of the fitness concerns.

But even if he did not have all these fitness concerns, he can't show you a basis for altering the current circumstance. And, yes, mom's response that, well, then, she's gonna be with me, goes back to the fact that the parties agreed it was best for the child to be --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. JONES: -- in the primary care and custody of mom. So there would be no reason for the child to be in the primary care and custody of dad, particularly because he can't give you either prong of Ellis versus Carucci.

And if you, you know -- it really stands for the basic principle. You gotta have more than just, well, I'm the father. I'm entitled.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. JONES: You have to have more, and you have to show best interest, even a prima facie showing. He can't do it.

So right now, leave the child in school for the next year and a half while staying with grandma. Maybe the parties can work out a visitation schedule that gives him additional

time, but that's the part that I was trying to point out. It doesn't make a lot of sense because a 16-and-a-half-year-old is gonna go and stay where she wants basically, whether it's with mom or with dad or with grandma.

And this issue that Bella wanted to live with dad, that Bella asked to live with dad, as much as my client does not want the child involved in litigation, I think you -- it will probably go miles to the issue of attorney's fees and potentially sanctions against dad if you have the child interview because Bella likes where she's living.

And, yes, a 16-and-a-half-year-old -- and this is the -- the slippery slope that mom's most concerned about. When you have a child who has had behavior issues before, placed in a household of someone who has historically not been the person he tries to present -- por -- portray himself to be, substance abuse issues, the text message from just this December from daughter to mom. Dad's drunk, driving and -- and texting while he drives with us in the car. I mean, hopefully you read that. It was in the most recently filed documents from mom. These are major issues.

And if you put a child, who has recovered and excelled, in a household with this type of fitness issues, she will fail. She will re -- you know, it will be recidivism all over with regard to the issue of her behavior, the issue of

her school performance. I've never seen somebody come into 1 2 court and argue that something that is not broken needed to be 3 fixed just because they're a parent. THE COURT: Uh-huh. 4 I now stand corrected that that has happened. 5 MR. JONES: On these other residual issues --6 7 THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. JONES: -- the district attorney has had a case 8 opened on child support now for years and years and years. 9 he has an issue with the amount of arrears that they have, 10 which I think at one point was over \$10,000 --11 Uh-huh. 12 THE COURT: -- he can address that with them. MR. JONES: 13 THE COURT: Yeah, I'm not reversing --14 That's not something you need to --MR. JONES: 15 THE COURT: -- any of the R case orders. 16 -- you don't need to --17 MR. JONES: 18 THE COURT: I would like you to touch on the other financial orders. I did not see a requirement in the decree 19 for the -- he would like to be re-fied. 20 21 MR. JONES: No, there isn't. I did not see a schedule by mom for medical 22 THE COURT:

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expenses.

MR. JONES: Correct.

I would need to see that. And the 529 account --

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THE COURT: -- I didn't see any proof of that issue.

MR. JONES: Well, she did attach the -- he -- he admits that he took the money. I mean, in his -- in his pa -- in his responsive papers, he says, yeah, I -- I was on hard times and I took the money. But we talked about that in court. Well, there was never an order made. And that money belongs to the children pursuant to the decree of divorce.

THE COURT: When was it taken?

MR. JONES: Some time between 2009 and 2013.

THE COURT: And dad was the custodian of the 529

MR. JONES: And the decree is very clear that they are to be maintained for the benefit of the children. That money's gone, and he admits that it's gone.

THE COURT: Do we --

MR. JONES: But by all means, give him --

THE COURT: -- do we have statements, bank statements from the accounts?

MR. JONES: I think that they were attached to -- I think they were attached to -- they were attached to one of your files.

MS. MICONE: The -- the -- he was the custodian and --

If you don't mind, is it okay if I talk to her?

MS. MICONE: It was on exhibit -- and these are the --

the insurance trusts that were taken.

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MR. JONES: Exhibit 10, I believe to the opposition, Your 1 2 Honor. THE COURT: 3 Okay. MS. MICONE: Yeah, Exhibit 10. 4 5 THE COURT: Thank you. MS. MICONE: So that was on April 2011, April  $25^{th}$ , 2011. 6 7 MR. JONES: So within two years of the decree being 8 entered. So the -- the financial issues, Judge, are not really that important to my client; although --9 THE COURT: Well --10 MR. PROKOPIUS: Well --11 12 MR. JONES: -- at some point --MR. PROKOPIUS: -- yeah --13 14 MR. JONES: -- he does have to pay back ---- they should be. 15 THE COURT: MR. PROKOPIUS: -- the reason -- well --16 17 MR. JONES: -- \$250,000. MR. PROKOPIUS: -- well, not really, Judge, because I can 18 show you the paper trail of a house that was given to him in 19 20 the decree of divorce --21 THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. PROKOPIUS: -- was then transferred to her in lieu of 22 paying back this money to the 529. So basically, he gave her 23 back a piece of his property to take care of that situation. 24

MR. JONES: There's a stip and order addressing that 1 2 transfer of property, Judge. THE COURT: Okay. 3 She assumed the mortgage and she paid it off. MR. JONES: 4 MR. PROKOPIUS: But it had -5 MR. JONES: It wasn't --6 MR. PROKOPIUS: -- \$250,000 worth of equity. 7 THE COURT: Wait, wait. One at a time. One at a 8 9 time. Mr. Pro --10 MR. PROKOPIUS: He had --11 THE COURT: -- Mr. Prokopius. MR. PROKOPIUS: -- a tremendous amount of equity in it. 12 THE COURT: Did you submit the paperwork to me? 13 MR. PROKOPIUS: I -- you know what? It came in -- in the 14 -- really, I -- I don't know that there was even a request, 15 really. It just said, oh, hey. If he has to pay child -- he 16 should have to pay this back. To whom? To whom does it have 17 18 to be paid back? 19 MR. JONES: The children. THE COURT: I -- I'm sorry. You said there was an 20 21 agreement. MR. PROKOPIUS: The children don't own anything. 22 23 THE COURT: There was an --MR. PROKOPIUS: They're a child. They're minors. 24

MR. JONES: Which means the parent with primary custody 1 2 MR. PROKOPIUS: Oh --3 MR. JONES: -- would get all of it. 4 5 MR. PROKOPIUS: -- okay. THE COURT: Wait, wait. There was an agreement 6 7 where he transferred property to her --8 MR. PROKOPIUS: Correct. THE COURT: -- in lieu of repaying the 529 --9 10 MR. PROKOPIUS: Correct. 11 THE COURT: -- account? And she's saying there was not, Judge. 12 MR. JONES: MS. MICONE: There was not. Your Honor, if you don't --13 14 if you don't mind --MR. PROKOPIUS: Did he transfer property that was his? 15 MS. MICONE: There was -- there was a piece of property 16 that Mike defaulted on. He was 90 days late. It was harming 17 18 my credit. So I told him that we needed to bring that mortgage current. It was for ten acres of raw land in 19 20 California. He said, I'm going to try to get a mortgage 21 modification. Just be quiet about it. And I said, no. I 22 can't have my credit ruined and I can't have creditors coming 23 24 after me because I'm joint and several on that mortgage.

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So I brought it up to date. And I continued to pay it for a year until I finally convinced him it was underwater land to at least to convey it to me because I paid -- I'm paying off the entire mortgage and it was -- it was his land. And my family kept saying, you're gonna end up paying off that mortgage and he's gonna sell it. And so he finally through stip and order, conveyed it to me.

MR. JONES: Not in exchange for liquidating the -- the college accounts. Why would you do a stip and order giving her the property that doesn't say, oh, it's in consideration for this? Particularly if the property was underwater. How can we say it had \$250,000 in equity?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PROKOPIUS: Well, I guess that's an issue of fact,

Judge --

MR. JONES: Well --

MR. PROKOPIUS: -- honestly.

MR. JONES: -- no, no, he admitted he liquidated the accounts.

MR. PROKOPIUS: And --

MR. JONES: He should be obligated to replenish them.

MR. PROKOPIUS: -- and he also said what the agreement was between the parties. He didn't just say, I liquidated the accounts, too bad.

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Is there anything in the record --

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MR. PROKOPIUS: 320.

Is there anything in the record? I'm just THE COURT: asking if there's anything in the record.

MR. JONES: And -- and I guess if we're talking about any time between 2009 and 2011, we know that the value of property probably plummeted about 100 percent.

THE COURT: That's why I'm asking --

MR. JONES: So --

MR. PROKOPIUS: Maybe.

THE COURT: -- the value at the time of the transfer.

-- if -- if he wants to try to prove --MR. JONES:

MR. PROKOPIUS: You don't know that.

MR. JONES: -- that it actually had some equity. But now you're hearing it was listed for sale for 320. And she had to pay off 190. It -- it's certainly not 250 anyway. But it's There's a stipulation that if she paid -also not agreed. think about it. She took over his payments to protect her own There's a value to that. And the total value of the credit. payments that she made -- I'd have to get the records, Judge. But --

MS. MICONE: It's over \$250,000.

MR. JONES: That you paid off.

MS. MICONE: Yes.

There you go. She paid off --MR. JONES:

1 THE COURT: Okay. -- \$250,000 to pay off this loan to protect 2 MR. JONES: her credit because he defaulted on his obligations under the 3 decree. 4 THE COURT: What I would like is -- is supplemental 5 6 briefing on the 529 account issue --7 MR. JONES: Okay. THE COURT: -- more evidence from both sides. 8 9 MR. JONES: Uh-huh. THE COURT: I want to see that. I'm going to take the 10 matter under submission. But it -- would two weeks be enough 11 time for you all to supplement your briefs with regard to the 12 529 issue? 13 MR. JONES: Sure. 14 THE COURT: Mr. Prokopius, is two weeks enough time for 15 16 you? 17 MR. PROKOPIUS: That's fine, Judge. THE COURT: Okay. So I'll review your briefs in two 18 weeks. I'm going to take --19 20 MR. JONES: Okay. THE COURT: -- everything under submission. I don't like 21 doing that, but I'm going to because I want to look into this 22 23

MR. JONES: And I -- and I appreciate you looking at her

-- her reply brief, Judge, because --1 2 THE COURT: Yes. MR. JONES: -- there -- there's a great deal in there 3 that sets the record straight because there are many, many 4 misrepresentations made by the defendant. 5 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 Anything else --MR. PROKOPIUS: Well, Judge --8 9 THE COURT: -- Mr. Prokopius? MR. PROKOPIUS: -- I mean, in response, as far as the 10 showing of the best interest, what -- what we've shown is now 11 that -- just quickly. The first year he was involved when she 12 was up there, on -- on a regular basis, involved with the 13 school, her schooling; involved with everything; 3.3 GPA. 14 he's been excluded. 15 16 THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. PROKOPIUS: And she's at a 2.0. He's not allowed in 17 18 the house anymore. 19 THE COURT: I don't have any current information on 20 grades. MR. PROKOPIUS: And I can supplement with it, Judge. 21 THE COURT: So you can include that if you want --22 23 MR. JONES: Be happy to.

THE COURT: -- if you want to do a little more analysis.

1 Your -- you in the case --MR. JONES: And I'll be -- actually, I'll also be able --2 be off -- be happy to offer you additional affidavits --3 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 4 MR. JONES: -- showing just how non-involved he was in 5 the 3.3. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. We'll -- we'll be happy to do that. 8 MR. JONES: 9 THE COURT: So I will allow both of you --MR. PROKOPIUS: From the people that are aligned with mom 10 11 and -- and have excluded my client. THE COURT: I understand. 12 MR. JONES: Yeah, because parents testify against their 13 14 children all the time, Judge. THE COURT: I understand. 15 MR. PROKOPIUS: It -- it happens. It's not that 16 17 uncommon. THE COURT: I would like both of you not only deal with 18 the -- I don't -- I don't need you to brief the HELOC issue. 19 I would like you to brief the 529 account. And if you have 20 21 additional evidence to submit regarding --MR. JONES: Grades and --22 THE COURT: -- no visitation, grades, things like that, I 23

will -- I'll give you an opportunity to include that.

Thank you, Judge. 1 MR. PROKOPIUS: THE COURT: And I'll take everything under submission. 2 3 And thank you very much for your arguments. Thank you so much, Judge. MR. JONES: 4 THE COURT: You're very thorough. 5 (THE PROCEEDING ENDED AT 11:06:08.) 6 7 8 I do hereby certify that I have truly and 9 correctly transcribed the digital proceedings in the aboveentitled case to the best of my ability. 10 11 SHERRY JUSTICE 12 Transcriber II 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

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#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

KERSTAN MICONE, N/K/A KERSTAN HUBBS,

Appellant,

VS.

MICHAEL MICONE,

Respondent;

Electronically Filed Oct 12 2015 12:24 p.m. Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

**S.C. DOCKET NO.: 67934** D.C. Case No. D-08-388334-D

#### APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

### Volume II of II

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# CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME II OF II

DESCRIPTION	DATE FILED	VOL./PAGE No.
Defendant's Supplemental Brief as Requested by the Court	01/29/2015	II/AA 000254 -AA 000275
Notice of Entry of Order from January 15, 2015 Hearing	03/31/2015	II/AA 000276 -AA 000289
Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order	04/13/2015	II/AA 000290 -AA 000302
Certificate of Service of Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order	04/14/2015	II/AA 000303
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order and Defendant's Countermotion for Sanctions and his Attorney's Fees, Costs and Related Matters	05/01/2015	II/AA 000304 -AA 000322
Plaintiff's Reply and Opposition to Defendant's Countermotion	06/01/2015	II/AA 000323 -AA 000349
Affidavit of Defendant, Michael A. Micone	09/02/2015	II/AA 000350 -AA 000367
Defendant's Motion for an Order to Show Cause to Find the Plaintiff in Contempt of Court and to Change Custody of the Parties' Child Joseph; to Review and Modify Child Support for Defendant's Attorney's Fees; and Related Matters	09/02/2015	II/AA 000368 -AA 000394

DESCRIPTION	DATE FILED	VOL./PAGE No.
Certificate of Service of Defendant's Motion for an Order to Show Cause to Find the Plaintiff in Contempt of Court and to Change Custody of the Parties' Child Joseph; to Review and Modify Child Support for Defendant's Attorney's Fees; and Related Matters	09/03/2015	II/AA 000395
Opposition to Defendant's Motion and Countermotion for Defendant to Show Cause and for Sanctions and Attorney's Fees	09/09/2015	II/AA 000396 -AA 000475
Transcript of January 15, 2015 Hearing	09/21/2015	II/AA 00476 – AA 000507

# ALPHABETICAL INDEX OF APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME II OF II

DESCRIPTION	DATE FILED	VOL./PAGE No.
Affidavit of Defendant, Michael A. Micone	09/02/2015	II/AA 000350 -AA 000367
Certificate of Service of Defendant's Motion for an Order to Show Cause to Find the Plaintiff in Contempt of Court and to Change Custody of the Parties' Child Joseph; to Review and Modify Child Support for Defendant's Attorney's Fees; and Related Matters	09/03/2015	II/AA 000395
Certificate of Service of Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order	04/14/2015	II/AA 000303
Defendant's Motion for an Order to Show Cause to Find the Plaintiff in Contempt of Court and to Change Custody of the Parties' Child Joseph; to Review and Modify Child Support for Defendant's Attorney's Fees; and Related Matters	09/02/2015	II/AA 000368 -AA 000394
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order and Defendant's Countermotion for Sanctions and his Attorney's Fees, Costs and Related Matters	05/01/2015	II/AA 000304 -AA 000322
Defendant's Supplemental Brief as Requested by the Court	01/29/2015	II/AA 000254 -AA 000275
Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order	04/13/2015	II/AA 000290 -AA 000302
Notice of Entry of Order from January 15, 2015 Hearing	03/31/2015	II/AA 000276 -AA 000289

DESCRIPTION	DATE FILED	VOL./PAGE No.
Opposition to Defendant's Motion and Countermotion for Defendant to Show Cause and for Sanctions and Attorney's Fees	09/09/2015	II/AA 000396 -AA 000475
Plaintiff's Reply and Opposition to Defendant's Countermotion	06/01/2015	II/AA 000323 -AA 000349
Transcript of January 15, 2015 Hearing	09/21/2015	II/AA 00476 – AA 000507

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**CLERK OF THE COURT** 

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### DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

KERSTAN D. MICONE,

CASE NO.:

DEPT. NO.:

D-08-388334-D

J

Plaintiff,

vs.

\* \*\*\*\*\*\* \* \*\*\*\* \*

MICHAEL A. MICONE,

Defendant,

DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF AS REQUESTED BY THE COURT

COMES NOW the Defendant, MICHAEL A. MICONE, by and through his attorney, DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ., and the following Brief:

Plaintiff, KERSTAN D. MICONE (hereinafter "KERSTAN") and Defendant, MICHAEL A. MICONE (hereinafter "MICHAEL") were divorced in Clark county, Nevada by a Decree of divorce that was entered on April 17, 2009. There are two minor children born to the parties as a result of the marriage, namely, Isabella Caroline Micone (Bella), born: March 26, 1998, age 16; and, MICHAEL J. Micone, born: January 7, 2005, age 8.

Pursuant to the Decree the parties share joint legal custody and shared physical custody of their minor children with KERSTAN been designated the children's primary custodian.

- 1. In her supplemental brief KERSTAN deal with the issues of the 529 tax savings, education plan for the parties that parties' minor child Isabella; the cash value of two life insurance policies maintain for the benefit of both children; and certain real estate located at 963 Smith Creek. In reading KERSTAN's supplemental brief she tries to give the impression that MICHAEL took the 529 account and the cash from the life insurance policies and use them for his own benefit without her knowledge and consent. Needless to say, KERSTAN is not being truthful about the circumstances surrounding the disposition of each of these items.
- 2. KERSTAN is correct that the 529 account was in existence at the time of the divorce in April of 2009 and had a ~\$70,000 balance. KERSTAN states that she learned in an email on May 8, 2012 that the account had been redeemed on April 25, 2011 and that because MICHAEL was the only one with the access to the account he must have done the redemption. The disposition of the 529 account is an issue that the Court has already heard and decided. KERSTAN filed a motion on March 12, 2013 in which she specifically told the Court that the 529 account had been redeemed and asked the Court for reimbursement. KERSTAN has never explained why she waited an entire year after learning that the 529 account had been redeemed before filing a motion to address the issue. The truth is KERSTAN was aware that MICHAEL needed the funds from the 529 account because he was struggling financially. Beginning in 2011 and throughout 2012 the parties went back and forth negotiating for MICHAEL to use the funds along with the cash value of the two life insurance policies. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is an email dated November 29, 2011 in which MICHAEL offered KERSTAN a 50% interest in the 963 Smith Creek property.

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KERSTAN was agreeable to the arrangement and even sent an e-mail dated February 20, 2012 to the Clark County DA to inform the DA that she and MICHAEL had settled the child support arrears issue. A copy of the email is attached hereto as **Exhibit B**. In her e-mail KERSTAN specifically states:

"Mike and I have agreed to exchange the outstanding child support payments for a property share in the Smith Lake Road property in Graeagle, CA."

In a stipulation and order that KERSTAN prepared and which she signed on December 11, 2012 after MICHAEL first sign the agreement on December 7, 2012. The stipulation and order was approved and adopted by the Court and filed on December 19, 2012. KERSTAN has included a copy of the executed stipulation and order as Exhibit 8 to her supplemental brief and therefore MICHAEL has not included a copy with his Brief. KERSTAN has failed to explain why after executing the stipulation and order she filed a motion on March 12, 2013 in which she raised the issues that she and MICHAEL had previously discussed and settled, namely, that KERSTAN would receive 100% of the Smith Creek property, not just 50%, in exchange for MICHAEL using the 529 funds and the two life insurance policies. KERSTAN's motion was heard on June 26, 2013. KERSTAN claims that the Court never specifically addressed the issue of the 529 account in its order from the June 26, 2013 hearing. The order from the hearing was entered on August 29, 2013 and the notice of entry of order was served on September 16, 2013. KERSTAN never filed a motion to rehear/reconsider the issue or a motion to set aside the order pursuant to NRCP 60(b). She has also never filed a motion to set aside the stipulation and order that was filed on December 19, 2012. A notice of entry of the stipulation and order was served by mail on December 24, 2012.

It is now too late to revisit these issues, even though KERSTAN has once again tried to get these issues before the court when in fact they are *res judicata* (see *Kramer v. Kramer*, 96 Nev. 759, 616 P.2d 395 (1980 Nev).

- KERSTAN'S argument that her receipt of the 963 Smith Creek property was not 3. meant to resolve the issue of the 529 account is untrue. Her argument overlooks what the parties actually did. KERSTAN received the entire 963 Smith Creek property, not just half. This came about because as MICHAEL's financial troubles continued he and KERSTAN agreed that he could use the 529 account funds along with the cash value of the two life insurance policies to meet his business expenses in exchange for which KERSTAN would receive 100% of the 963 Smith Creek property. MICHAEL summarized this arrangement in an e-mail to KERSTAN dated June 25, 2013, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C. MICHAEL subsequently transferred the 963 Smith Creek property to KERSTAN. He did so in reliance on their agreement. Indeed, there would be no reason for MICHAEL to transfer the entire ownership of 963 Smith Creek property to KERSTAN and not just 50% unless he had an agreement with her that giving her 100% of the property would resolve the issues of child support arrears, the 529 funds and the two life insurance policies. The value of the 963 Smith Creek property far exceeded the child support arrears that MICHAEL owed. He would never have given KERSTAN 100% of the land solely to pay the child support arrears.
- 4. KERSTAN now complains that her receipt of the land was not meant to compensate her for the child support arrears, the 529 funds and the life insurance. Instead she claims that the land was a liability that was harming her credit, she made \$81,273.02 of mortgage payments and then the refinance payoff of \$297,003.85 but the land has been on the market for a year at \$240,000 and has not sold.

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If so, she fails to explain how taking title to the property solved the problems that she now complains of. In fact, the net equity in the property was and is worth far more than KERSTAN suggests. Furthermore, KERSTAN was well aware of the financial circumstances surrounding the real estate, including MICHAEL'S inability to pay the mortgage, when she took title. Complaining now about how much she spent on the mortgage payments, the amount of the mortgage refinance and what KERSTAN claims is the current value of the property is irrelevant. She agreed to accept the real estate in exchange for waiving issues regarding the 529 account, the life insurance policies and the delinquent child support.

MICHAEL would submit that KERSTAN should be equitably estopped from 5. denying the existence of the parties' agreement. Equitable estoppel generally consists of the following four elements: (1) The party to be estopped must be apprised of the true facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting estoppel has the right to believe it was so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the true state of facts; (4) he must have relied to his detriment on the conduct of the party to be estopped. Mahban v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 100 Nev. 593, 691 P.2d 421(1984). The requirement of actual knowledge of the true facts on the part of the party to be estopped does not apply to a party whose affirmative conduct, consisting of either acts or representations, has misled another. Id 100 Nev. at 596, 691 P.2d 423. In this case, KERSTAN entered into a written agreement with MICHAEL but misled him into believing that she would accept the real estate in exchange for waiving issues regarding the 529 account, the life insurance policies and the delinquent child support. KERSTAN's duplicity can be seen and the fact that after getting MICHAEL to sign the stipulation and order entered on December 19, 2012 she subsequently filed a motion to address the same issues the parties had already settled.

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KERSTAN certainly intended MICHAEL to rely on the agreement and MICHAEL did in fact do so. MICHAEL was ignorant of the fact that KERSTAN intended to renege on her part of the bargain. MICHAEL certainly relied to his detriment because he no longer owns a valuable piece of California real estate and if KERSTAN has her way he will face paying her reimbursement of substantial sums of money.

- 6. KERSTAN'S delay raises the issue of whether her action should be barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. Laches is an equitable remedy that the Court may invoke when delay by one party works to the disadvantage of the other, causing a change of circumstances which would make the grant of relief to the delaying party inequitable. Erickson v. One Thirty Three, Inc., 104 Nev. 755, 766 P.2d 898 (1988). Laches is more than a party merely delaying the enforcement of his or her rights. The delay must work to the disadvantage to another. Nevada Gaming Commission v. Rosenthal, 107 Nev. 772, 819 P.2d 1296 (1991). In this case, KERSTAN waited two years before raising these issues and then she only did so in response to MICHAEL's motion. Her delay has severely disadvantaged MICHAEL and left him in an KERSTAN has no one but herself to blame for these impossible financial position. circumstances. KERSTAN delay has certainly worked to MICHAEL'S severe disadvantage. MICHAEL is therefore requesting that KERSTAN'S claim for reimbursement of the 529 account, the life insurance policies and child support arrears barred by laches and if necessary that the Court hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue.
- 7. MICHAEL submits that the stipulation and order and the agreement the parties made regarding the disposition of the 529 account and the 2 life insurance policies and the 963 Smith Creek property as evidenced by the emails included herewith constitutes an accord and satisfaction.

An accord is an agreement where one of the parties undertakes to give or perform, and others to accept, in satisfaction of a claim something other than or different from what he is, or considers himself, entitled to. *Walden v. Backus*, 81 Nev. 634, 408 P.2d 712 (1965). A finding of an accord and satisfaction requires a "meeting of the minds" of the parties on the terms of the agreement. *Pederson v. First Nat'l Bank of Nevada*, 93 Nev. 388, 392, 566 P.2d 89 (1977). Here, MICHAEL agreed to give KERSTAN the California real estate in exchange for KERSTAN waving certain terms originally ordered in the Decree. There was a clear meeting of the minds because the parties executed a written contract, namely, the stipulation and order filed on December 19, 2012 and the emails included herewith. MICHAEL fulfilled his part of the bargain by transferring the real estate to KERSTAN and KERSTAN accepted the property in satisfaction of money in the 529 account, the cash value of the life insurance policies and the child support arrears. MICHAEL respectfully submits that the 529 account, the life insurance policies and the child support arrears are all moot and KERSTAN'S attempt to have the Court review these issues yet again must be denied.

8. In her supplemental brief, KERSTAN ignored the Court's request for school information regarding Isabella. Presumably KERSTAN is not seriously disputing what MICHAEL said in his original motion, namely, the reason Isabella moved to Reno was due to her poor school performance. Attached hereto as **Exhibit D** are copies of Isabella's school records. Even a cursory review of these records reveals that Isabella's school performance after living with KERSTAN was dismal.

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They show that when Isabella began school in Reno and MICHAEL had the chance to work with her, Isabella's GPA went from 2.0 to 3.1. By contrast Bella had a 1.1 GPA when living with KERSTAN.

Dated this 29<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2015.

### PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY

/s/ Donn W. Prokopius
DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 006460
JEREMY R. BEASLEY, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 12176
931 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 474-0500 / Fax (702) 951-8022
general@pandblawyers.com
Attorney for Defendant,
MICHAEL A. MICONE

## **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

I hereby certify that I am an employee of the PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY, and on the 29<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2015, I duly deposited a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing **DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF AS REQUESTED BY THE COURT** for first class mailing in the U.S. Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, postage prepaid thereon, addressed to the following at the last known address as follows:

John D. Jones, Esq.
BLACK & LOBELLO
10777 West Twain Ave. Suite 300
Las Vegas, NV 89135
E-Mail for Electronic Service: jjones@blacklobellolaw.com
Attorney for Plaintiff,
KERSTAN D. MICONE

/s/ Alex Gomez
An employee of
PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY

# EXHIBITA

From: Kerstan Hubbs < khubbs@live.com>

Date: Tue, Nov 29, 2011 at 10:39 AM

Subject: FW: Smith Creek
To: mikemicone@gmail.com

Mike,

Please see my responses in bold. Let me know your thoughts soon. I would like to keep moving forward and not fight or try to get ahead. I am trying to be fair.

K

Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 07:19:55 -0800

Subject: RE: Smith Creek
From: mikemicone@gmail.com

To: khubbs@live.com

Kerstan, Thanks for working on this. Although you have paid money, at the time we did not have an agreement and we are working on an agreement.

I have always informed you this was not a gift. My attorney advised me to pay on our joint and several liabilities and then to seek relief in court. I am trying to work directly with you, if it breaks down or fails I will go to court. I believe that the court would simply give me the land as you were going to lose it and it was damaging our credit and leaving me open to a deficiency judgment. Other alternatives might be: 1) me pay for your land to save my credit, but you still owning the land, which would be unjust so I cannot imagine the court doing that, 2) the court granting me a constructive trust in the land for my contribution, or 3) you reimbursing me \$25K with an order to refinance so I am no longer harmed by you not performing on the note. It is important to note that we both were ordered to pay the mortgages that came with our property and the other was held harmless from this debt. The court will see the failure to do so as contempt of our decree.

I have decided to try a novel approach, which is I partner with you and save the land during this hardship, you retain a 50% interest, I obtain a 50% interest for paying your debt, we both save our credit and avoid a deficiency judgment, moving forward we will be partners similar to Mesquite. Outside of our finances, we have our kids and it is something we can do that is proactive and works in their best interest. This is my "making lemonade out of lemons" and if we are not greedy or prideful, I believe it is the best option for our family.

You are the father of my kids. I want good things for you, me, and them. I cannot let you take advantage of me financially though. I probably wouldn't do this for any other person besides my siblings. You are right, partnerships are not easy, but we managed to have a 12-year partnership that was successful. Financially we always worked well, emotionally and psychologically, not so well.:)

I have a few questions before I agree to a property transfer.

1) I can agree if you pay exactly what I have paid since our divorce as well as HOA, taxes and special assessments that I have paid since our divorce.

Mike, I would agree to a 50-50 partnership. I cannot keep paying the entire note. Once you are on your feet, I will partner with you and pay 1/2 of everything and work very diligently to obtain a modification or refinance the note. If you don't want to do this then I suppose you can reimburse me the money and you can attempt to refinance and take me off the note.

- 2) I think it will be smart if we have a buy out clause or agreement between us. Or something in our will should one of us die or becomes unable to pay their share. I agree, I can add this information to the Stipulation and Order or later in an operating agreement.
- a) If one party wants to sell then a first right is available determined by a current appraisal less 10% for no realtor or broker fee and with first right option. Sounds okay, but this will not include a short sale scenario, meaning we would have to sell for a profit or at a minimum enough for me to recoup the funds I have paid up to the date of the sale. I do not want to be strong-armed into purchasing land.
- b) Also each party needs to be in good standing and current on their fiduciary responsibility to pay their 50% of taxes and HOA and payments and any fees or assessments. This sounds good. What should be the consequence of the defaulting party?
- 3) This is for you to consider. If you want to consider a buy out of the property for 65k from me if you wanted to buy now.
- ~ This offer is Valid from Dec. 1, 2011 March 27th, 2012.
  - a) 10 ACRES at 936 Smith Creek. ~ \$485k was purchase price
- a) Current property valued at 485k and balance of loan is 330k. Approximate equity is 175k. Lets discuss so we can ensure clear understanding and continue in good faith. We have options and the property is not under water. The prices in Graeagle have maintained through this economy.

I am hoping we can come to a quick agreement and refinance the first of the year to be able to keep this in our family.

I am not interested in purchasing the property outright. I am involved because I was on the note. I am trying to make a bad situation good. I agree, I want to save something for our family. I am willing to make a long-term investment rather than lose the land, harm our credit, and possibly be subject to a deficiency judgment.

On Nov 29, 2011 6:10 AM, "Kerstan Hubbs" < khubbs@live.com > wrote: Mike,

I have created a Stipulation and Order, which will be signed by the judge and it essentially will change or amend our divorce decree. I will need to sign the order in front of a notary and then I will have it mailed to your address by a third party. *Please confirm in writing that you do not* 

have an attorney. Jim Jimmerson is still on record as your attorney. The Stip and Order will allow the land to be transferred back to me (50% interest) and you will keep a 50% interest. This order will allow us to convey/transfer without paying real property transfer tax because it will be a conveyance under court order (decree).

Once you recieve the Stip and Order in the mail, you will need to find a notary and have them sign the Acknowledgment Form stating that you freely signed the Stip and Order in front of them.

Do not date the Stip and Order, the judge will do that.

Once the Stip and Order is signed and the Acknowledgement Form notarized, you will send both documents back to me in the mail. I will make three copies and file them at the Family Court. The Stip will allow us to hold the property as Tenants in Common (similar to Mesquite) or we can keep it in the LLC you created and I can simply come on as Manager/Member with you and we can create an operating agreement of some sort.

I have paid \$25,484.03 to date on this land. A large part of the reason I have done this is because I don't want to lose the land to foreclosure and if we are smart I know we can save it over the long run. Any assets we preserve during this recession will be important to our kids later on after we are gone.

I noticed on 3/9/2011, Chase took \$6,281.60 of my payment of \$9,422.40 as "fees." This should have been applied to our interest and principal. I am filing a claim with their research dept. and disputing this issue. I will send you a copy of the dispute.

Kerstan

>

> Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 13:47:46 +0000

> Subject: Smith Creek

> From: mikemicone@gmail.com

> To: khubbs@live.com

> Send your resume.

> Also I have continued paying the HOA on Smith Creek. There was also a \$3k assessment that I have one payment remaining.

> Sent from my Droid Charge on Verizon 4GLTE

AA 000266

Mike Micone VP of Staffing Solutions 702-339-1113

No virus found in this message.

Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2015.0.5645 / Virus Database: 4273/9002 - Release Date: 01/26/15

# EXHIBIT B

From: Mike Micone < mikemicone@gmail.com >

Date: Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 2:12 PM

Subject: Fwd: Child Support Payments - Kerstan Hubbs

To: <a href="mailto:smg@jimmersonhansen.com">smg@jimmersonhansen.com</a>
Co: <a href="mailto:sh@jimmersonhansen.com">sh@jimmersonhansen.com</a>

This was an agreement for child support and for the 529 college plan money that I used to stay afloat. The property was appraised for \$380k and the loan was \$230 so then she took over payment and received a equity of \$150k which was to resolve any issues Kerstan had with me using the college funds.

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Kerstan Hubbs < khubbs@live.com > Date: Mon, Feb 20, 2012 at 1:20 PM

Subject: Child Support Payments - Kerstan Hubbs

To: <a href="mailto:carlsok@co.clark.nv.us">carlsok@co.clark.nv.us</a>
Co: <a href="mailto:mikemicone@gmail.com">mikemicone@gmail.com</a>

Ms. Carlson,

Good afternoon. I have tried to phone several times, but have been unsuccessful to date. Mike and I have agreed to exchange the outstanding child support payments for a property share in the Smith Lake Road property in Graeagle, CA. I have listed the APN for this parcel in the paperwork submitted to your attention. We have decided to do this so that he can become current on his child support payments, provide me with compensation for the outstanding balance, and allow him to move forward on time with payment to the state.

Please let me know if you need further information from me regarding this matter. I have been informed by Mike that he is having complications with liquid assets so he has proffered payment by way of a property interest to this land. I am working on our operating agreement and amendments to the LLC for the Secretary of State at this time. I can submit these signed documents for your files if necessary.

Please feel free to contact me directly at (702) 501-3442 if you should have any questions or concerns at this time.

Sincerely, Kerstan Hubbs

# EXHIBIT C

From: Mike Micone [mailto:mikemicone@gmail.com]

Sent: Tuesday, June 25, 2013 8:20 PM

To: Kerstan Hubbs

Subject: Re: Stip and Order

Kerstan,

This is what I know we had agreed to.

- 1) The Smith Creek property. For two years I paid over 25k until I could not pay for the property any further. We also agreed that we would be partners in the property. We agreed to convey the property over to you for protection from potential law suits from Lance. That is what we agreed to so lets discuss your option of completely converting this property to 100% yours. There is a value that you are gaining with me walking away.
- 2) You are asking for \$7,000 from the transfer from your accout to mine which I had no idea at the time until it was brought up to my attention. I have paid \$1,936 for 4 years while I was not earning any money. I also paid for your Mom's car which was \$17,000. I also had to pay \$40,000 in taxes during the time we were married.
- 3) The money that was in the 529 plan that I used to pay for child support and to pay on the Smith Creek property which will now be your in essense if conveyed to you will be an exchange in money as this asset will be 100% yours.
- 4) Also, you asked for me to get a life policy and you would take that in lew of all the above. So I have taken a \$200k policy and added Bella as the beneficiary should something happen to me.

You said this is what you would take in exchange for the 529 and the 7k. Which if you add up the 20k in taxes I paid and the 100k you get in asset in Smith Creek and the 200K in a life policy is 320k swing to your side and we can both walk away and again you will walk away with everything and I will have nothing.

Please call to discuss so we can finalize the agreement.

Kindly, Mike Micone

On Sun, Jun 23, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Kerstan Hubbs < khubbs@live.com> wrote:

> Mike,

> Here is the attached Stip and Order for you to review. Let me know

> what your schedule looks like for next week.

> Kerstan

Mike Micone Director of Professional Staffing Group ANI - Professional Services Group Sunnyvale, CA 94085 (408) 734-0403

# EXHIBITD



# Bishop Manegue Catholic High School

ા ducating through Faith, Leadership, Knowledge, and Compassion

Marking Period Grades and Comments

Mr. Michael Micone

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Course Name	Faculty	S1-P1	QTR1	QTR1C	S1	S1C
Academic Seminar	Doug Whitener				Α	Α
Academic Seminar	Doug Whitener					
Chemistry	Marcelino Ugalde	D =	C ?	A	¥C	A
Chemistry	Marcelino Ugalde		ennae assurantissus subjects et te			
English 11	Paul Richter	(C = 2	c 2	A	С	A
English 11	Paul Richter		ar American			
Geometry	Tren Nolan	/c - 2	C V	A	D	A
Geometry	Tren Nolan					
Religion 11	Janine Kearney	B = 3	ВЗ	Α	В	Α
Religion 11	Janine Kearney					
Spanish I	Will Monsey	D ~ [	c t	Α	D	Α
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United States History	Robin Peri	18-	Tell	•	В	Α
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GPA Name	Value	ł	184	7.2	= 4/	-()
Semester 1	2.29		, , ,	•	12	( 2 . (
Cumulative GPA	2.62				•	
Cumulative Weighted GPA	2.62					
Cumulative Core GPA	2.22					

Print Grades Only

Print Grades and Comments Marking Period: S1-Final Grade \*

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Junior Vear. For assistance with using this website, please email us at mbpsupport@bishopmanogue.org or call us at 775-336-6000.

\* Current GPA 1.8 1 st Semester

Junior yr.

2.0 Current Total GPA



## Bishop Manogue Catholic High School

Educating through Faith, Leadership, Knowledge, and Compassion

Grades and Comments History

Mr. Michael Micone

Academic Year: 2013-2					_	School	Građe: 10	
Course Name	Faculty	Si	52	Credits Earned	View Comments			
Academic Seminar	Tony Ghilleri		A	0.5	1	ě i		
Academic Seminar	Tony Ghilleri	Α		0.5		4		
Algebra I	Mandy Holback	В		0.5	and the second		·	
Algebra I	Mandy Holback		C	0.5	***************************************	7.5		
Drama I	Janet Beth Lazarus	В		0.5		~		
Drama II	Janet Beth Lazarus		В	0.5	The state of the s	3.0	)	
Earth Scl/Intro to Physics	Marcelino Ugalde	С		0.5	•		,	
Earth Sci/Intro to Physics	Marcelino Ugalde		В	0.5		2 5	<u>.</u>	
English 10	Montana Hill	С	£.141	0.5		2,5	٠	
English 10	Montana Hill		В	0.5			>	
Math Foundations	Mandy Holback	Α		0.5		ر. دی		
Math Foundations	Mandy Holback			0.5		3.€	)	
Soccer	40.00	CR		0.5				
World History	Don Johnson	В		0.5		3.5	<del></del> ·	
World History	Don Johnson	ģ	·····i	0.5			<del></del> -	
World Religions-Religion 10	Cynthia Cunningham	В		0.5	-	3 .5	<u></u>	

#### Printable Version

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1 > I was involved w/ her math and as you can SEE her grades were (Bt) in Algebra & (B) in Math foundations.

2 - A - in world History

Total GPA 3.1

RENA HUGHES DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. J LAS VEGAS, NV 89101-2408

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### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on the above file stamped date:

I have e-served pursuant to NEFCR 9 and/or placed a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER FROM JANUARY 15, 2015 HEARING in the appropriate attorney folder located in the Clerk of the Court's Office of:

John D. Jones, Esq Counsel for Plaintiff Donn W. Prokopious Counsel for Defendant

Jeanette Lacker

Judicial Executive Assistant, Department J

RENA HUGHES DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. J LAS VEGAS, NV 89101-2408

## DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

KERSTAN MICONE, nka KERSTAN HUBBS,

**DEPARTMENT J** 

CASE NO.: D-08-388334-D

Electronically Filed 03/31/2015 09:05:04 AM

CLERK OF THE COURT

MICHAEL MICONE,

VS.

Defendant.

Plaintiff,

### **ORDER FROM HEARING JANUARY 15, 2015**

This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Rena G. Hughes, Department J of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division. Plaintiff, Kerstan Micone (nka Kerstan Hubbs, "Kerstan") was present and was represented by her attorney, John D. Jones, Esq., of Black & LoBello, and the Defendant, Michael Micone ("Michael") was present and represented by his attorney, Donn W. Prokopius, Esq., of Prokopius & Beasley. The Court, having read and reviewed all the papers and pleadings on file, and having heard oral argument of counsel, makes the following Findings of Fact and Orders.

### FINDINGS OF FACT

The parties were divorced by Decree of Divorce dated April 17, 2009 in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada. The parties have two (2) minor children of the marriage, to wit: Isabella Micone, born March 26, 1998, and; Michael Micone, born January 7, 2005. The Decree of Divorce awarded Kerstan primary physical custody of the minor children, and the parties share joint legal custody.

**RENA KUGHES** DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. J LAS VEGAS, NV 89101-2408

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The issues before the Court on January 15, 2015 were Michael's Motion for a change in custody of Isabella, to modify child support, resolve child support arrears, to address an omitted debt (HELOC), for Kerstan to refinance the omitted debt, for a holiday visitation schedule of the minor child, Michael, and for attorneys' fees. Kerstan filed an Opposition to Michael's Motion, and a Countermotion for reimbursement of the children's 529 college account, the Penn Life Insurance cash value liquidated by Michael (together totaling \$248,593.33), and to maintain the status quo for Isabella while she is attending school in Reno, Nevada.

Some of the issues before the Court on January 15, 2015, were previously before the Court on June 26, 2013 at which time the parties stipulated to resolve the issues, and placed their agreements on the record<sup>1</sup>. The issues disposed of at the June 26, 2013 hearing included:

- 1. Michael's liquidation of the cash value of life insurance policies listed in the Decree of Divorce, pages 16-17;
- 2. Michael's liquidation of the 529 college account;
- 3. Michael's receipt of the Coverdell funds;

appeared, and placed certain stipulations on the record.

4. Michael's use of \$7,000.00 from the HELOC secured against the 1242 Sonatina Drive, Henderson, Nevada residence awarded to Kerstan in the Decree of Divorce; and

On March 12, 2013, Kerstan filed a "Motion to Stay Hearing of the Child Support Center of Southern Nevada and to Consolidate the Modification or Adjustment of Child Support with this Motion to Show Cause" seeking to stay a hearing in Case no. R-12-174206-R regarding Michael's request to modify his child support obligation, so the District Court Judge in Dept. J could hear the matter, along with alleged violations by Michael of the Decree of Divorce. Kerstan's Motion to Stay was set for hearing on April 25, 2013, but neither party appeared and the matter was taken off calendar. The hearing on Kerstan's Motion to Stay, and for an Order to Show Cause was then set for hearing on June 26, 2013. On that date, both parties

RENA HUGHES DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. J LAS VEGAS, NV 89101-2408 5. Child support arrearages owed by Michael.

Since the order resulting from the hearing on June 26, 2013 lacked specificity and detail, the Court reviewed all papers and pleadings pre-dating the hearing, as well as the video record of the hearing before Judge Pollock. The Court focused its attention on the chronology of events leading up to the stipulations of the parties on June 26, 2013 in discerning the scope of the parties' resolution at the hearing of that date.

- a. May 8, 2012 Kerstan and Kathy Bax, a registered investment advisor of Towerkeep, exchanged emails with a subject line: "529 and Coverdell."
  - 1. Kerstan emailed Kathy Bax to ask her if the Coverdell funds could be used to pay for Isabella's tutoring expenses.
  - 2. Kathy Bax emailed Kerstan that the "529 was completely redeemed 4/25/11" and that "...[t]here is \$2,722.77 in Coverdell. Coverdell cannot be used for college, but needs to be used for pre-college expenses." (such as the tutoring expenses)<sup>2</sup>.
  - 3. At 12:10 p.m., Kerstan received another email from Kathy Bax stating, "I just need to call and get a check. The account is owned by Isabel. The check will go to her."
- b. <u>December 19, 2012</u> the parties enter into a Stipulation and Order agreeing to transfer the 963 Smithcreek property (the Smithcreek or "raw land" was awarded to Michael in the Decree of Divorce) to Kerstan because "...Michael

The Coverdell and 529 American Fund accounts were not separately listed or awarded within the Decree of Divorce, but were apparently included in the paragraph at page 17 of the Decree of Divorce stating: "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all accounts, including prepaid tuition and 529 accounts, or life insurance policies in existence for the benefit of the children, or insuring their lives, shall be maintained for said children with both parties being named as custodians and requiring both signatures for any withdrawals."

can no longer make the mortgage, property tax, or HOA payments and Kerstan has been paying the mortgage for nearly two (2) years..." The Stipulation and Order made no mention of a transfer to Kerstan in exchange for reimbursement of funds withdrawn by Michael from the 529 or Coverdell accounts.

- c. March 12, 2013 Kerstan filed a "Motion to Stay Hearing of the Child Support Center of Southern Nevada and to Consolidate the Modification or Adjustment of Child Support with this Motion to Show Cause" but then did not appear for the April 25, 2013 hearing on the Motion.
- d. May 8, 2013 Kerstan filed a "Notice of Motion for Order to Show Cause" (presumably of the March 12, 2013 Motion for Order to Show Cause), which was set for hearing on June 26, 2013.
- e. <u>June 26, 2013</u> A hearing on Kerstan's March 12, 2013 Motion to Stay and Motion for Order to Show Cause took place. Michael did not file an Opposition to either Motion, but appeared at the hearing, and the parties discussed various issues with the Court on the record. The parties also entered into certain stipulations on the record, the extent and detail of which were largely omitted from the written order filed on August 29, 2013.
- f. June 26, 2013 agreements placed on the record included:
  - 1. There were (3) life insurance policies that were liquidated by Michael after the divorce. Michael agreed to replace them with a term policy for 10 years with AAA. Kerstan wanted to be a co-owner to ensure it stays in effect. Michael agreed to give her an authorization instead of

RENA KUGHES OISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. J LAS VEGAS, RV 89101-2408

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making her a co-owner. Discussions regarding adding Michael as a beneficiary by agreement of the parties.

With respect to the raw land (Smithcreek property) awarded to Michael in the Decree of Divorce, (VTS 10:15:06) in 2010 - 2011 he had a financial hardship and was falling behind on the mortgage. Smithcreek property is titled in the name of an LLC, but the LLC's status is "revoked." Michael paid (2) years of mortgage payments, and believes he should have some sort of equitable interest in the property. (VTS 10:16:14). Michael does not mind giving Kerstan the property to offset some other hardships he had, and monies he used while he was unemployed. (VTS 10:16:58). They have a verbal agreement they are still 50/50 owners. If Michael gives her the property, Kerstan wants him to pay the fees that it will require to transfer the title (VTS 10:17:43). If Michael signs the deed, he is satisfying his arrearages, and Kerstan is responsible for paying the cost to title it in her name. (VTS 10:18:31). Kerstan is not on the LLC, and is not authorized to reinstate the company. Kerstan questioned the Court whether the LLC had to be in good standing to convey title. Since it is a California property, the Court will only order Michael to execute transfer documents, and it is up to her to find out if California requires more. (VTS 10:19:30). The Court does not have authority to determine what California will need to record the deed.

RENA HUGHES DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. J LAS VEGAS, NV 88101-2408

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4.

3. HELOC – (VTS 10:21:00). Michael benefitted \$7,000.00 from the HELOC that went into his personal account to cover an overdraft because the HELOC was still associated with his account. Michael offered to pay \$100 per month to Kerstan until the \$7,000.00 is paid off, and she accepted. (VTS 10:22:10).

COVERDALE ACCOUNT FOR TUTORING - (VTS 10:22:43). Kerstan incurred \$5,000.00 in tutoring fees for Isabella. She contacted the financial representative to ask to the use the fund to reimburse her for the tutoring expenses, but when the check was cut, it went to Dad, and she is still paying on the tutoring bill. (VTS 10:23:28). Michael pointed out that the summer Isabella lived with him, he paid \$500.00 for her tutoring, so he used some of that money to pay for those expenses. (VTS 10:23:50). Rather than paying Kerstan the \$1,500.00 for reimbursement of that check, he wants to pay the next \$1,500.00 in tutoring expenses for Isabella. (VTS 10:26:02). Kerstan does not care if funds are used for current or future tutoring expenses, but just that they are used for tutoring expenses. (VTS 10:26:06). The parties both agreed to pay for Isabella's soccer camp, but Kerstan did not pay her ½ for the camp. (VTS 10:26:55). Kerstan agreed that as long as Michael pays her what they agreed for the 8th grade tutoring expenses, she will pay the rest. (VTS 10:29:18). The Court stated that it does not have a schedule of arrears for the tutoring expenses, so it cannot rule on the (VTS 10:29:55). Michael agreed to pay Kerstan the request.

\$7,000.00 for the HELOC and an additional \$1,000.00 for the tutoring expenses, for a total of \$8,000 and that will resolve the HELOC and the tutoring issue. (VTS 10:30:25). The Court asked the parties if those were all the issues, and the parties confirmed those were all the issues.

#### **ORDERS**

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court HEREBY ORDERS:

Res judicata attached to the following issues after the hearing of June 26, 2013, and they will not be reconsidered:

- 1. Michael's liquidation of the cash value of life insurance policies listed in the Decree of Divorce, pages 16-17;
  - 2. Michael's liquidation of the 529 college account;
  - 3. Michael's receipt of the Coverdell funds;
- 4. Michael's use of \$7,000.00 from the HELOC secured against the 1242 Sonatina Drive, Henderson, Nevada residence awarded to Kerstan in the Decree of Divorce; and
  - 5. Child support arrearages owed by Michael prior to June 26, 2013.

The issues remaining for the Court's consideration are:

- 1. Michael's request to modify custody of the minor child, Isabella (age 17) from primary with Kerstan, to primary with him;
  - Michael's request for modification of child support;
  - 3. Michael's request to determine child support arrearages after June 26, 2013;
  - 4. Prospective child support;

- Michael's contention that the HELOC was an "omitted debt" from the Decree
   of Divorce;
- 6. Michael's request for Kerstan to refinance the HELOC, and remove his name from the obligation;
- 7. Kerstan's request to maintain the status quo regarding custody of Isabella, and deny Michael's request for primary physical custody;
  - 8. Each party's request for attorney's fees.

#### PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF ISABELLA

There has been a material change in circumstances regarding the physical custody of the minor child, Isabella. Both parties admit that as of August 2013, Isabella has been residing with the paternal grandparents in Reno, Nevada. Isabella moved in with her grandparents to attend school in Reno, and both parents agreed to the move. Both parents also agree that Isabella is doing well in school, and her behavior and grades have improved over the status of the same while she was living primarily with Kerstan in Las Vegas.

The Court's primary focus in determining custody is the best interest of the child. Given Isabella's improved grades and behavior, it is this Court's opinion that Kerstan's best interest would be served by her continuing to reside with her paternal grandparents in Reno, Nevada. Since Isabella is, and has been, residing with her paternal grandparents since August 2013, neither parent has primary or shared physical custody of the child after that date. Rather, the parents have consented to the paternal grandparents having primary physical custody of Isabella. The Court orders that Isabella shall remain in the primary custody of the paternal grandparents, and that she may exercise teenage discretion in any visitation with either Michael or Kerstan, given her age of 17 years.

RENA HUGHES DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. J LAS VEGAS, NV 89101-2408

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#### **CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES**

Any child support arrearages that may have existed as of June 26, 2013 were resolved by the parties at the hearing of this date. It is questionable whether Michael owed any child support arrearages on June 26, 2013, and the Child Support Hearing Master, who summarily ordered a \$100.00 monthly payment toward "arrearages" did not hear any evidence of arrearages at the March 25, 2013 hearing in the R case.

Kerstan did not file a Schedule of Arrearages supporting alleged child support arrearages owed by Michael after June 26, 2013, and Michael has continued paying \$100.00 per month pursuant to the Child Support Order for unsubstantiated arrearages. Thus, Michael is entitled to a credit of \$1,700.00 for an overpayment (\$100.00 per month for 17 months). Rather than penalize the minor child, Michael, and issue an offset against his entitlement to current support from his father, the Court is ordering that the \$1,700.00 be offset against Michael's obligation to repay Kerstan the monies withdrawn from the HELOC account.

#### MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT

Pursuant to NRS 125B.040(3) "[a]n order of support of a child creates an obligation for the support of the child and follows the child to the person who has obtained lawful physical custody of the child." "Lawful physical custody" as defined in section (12) of the statute encompasses physical custody "[w]ith the consent of the person who has been awarded physical custody of the child pursuant to an order of a court." In this case, Kerstan was awarded primary physical custody of Isabella, and acquiesced to Isabella moving to Reno, Nevada to reside with her paternal grandparents. Thus, the paternal grandparents have "lawful physical custody" of Isabella under the statute. Given this fact, child support

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RENA HUGHES
CHSTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, CEPT. J LAS VEGAS, NV 89101-2408

follows the child, and the parental grandparents, not Kerstan, are entitled to receive the support obligation of the parents.

It also follows that once Kerstan ceased having primary physical custody of Isabella, she was no longer entitled to receive child support from Michael. Rather, Michael's child support obligation followed Isabella, who resides primarily with her paternal grandparents. However, since neither party, (nor the paternal grandparents) raised this issue until the instant motion, the Court will not revisit historical child support, nor order prospective child support for Isabella. Michael's child support obligation to Kerstan for Isabella shall cease immediately.

#### PROSPECTIVE CHILD SUPPORT

Since Kerstan maintains primary physical custody of the minor child, Michael (age 10), his father, Michael, shall continue to pay Kerstan \$714.00 per month as and for this minor child's support, and \$75.00 for medical support, beginning immediately.

Because the obligation of support follows the child, and neither Michael nor Kerstan are the custodial parent of Isabella, the Court finds they are EQUALLY obligated to the paternal grandparents for the support of Isabella. Once Kerstan ceased having primary physical custody of Isabella, her obligation to support Isabella was triggered under NRS 125B.070 et seq. However, the paternal grandparents have not requested child support for Isabella's benefit, so the Court is not ordering the same at this juncture.

#### HELOC AS OMITTED DEBT

Kerstan was awarded the residence located at 1242 Sonatina Drive, Henderson, Nevada, together with the "encumbrance" thereon. While the Decree uses the singular of this term at page 12, wherein Kerstan is awarded the property, at page 15, the parties

RENA HUGHES DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. J LAS VEGAS, NV 89101-2408 included a catch all provision whereby each party assumes responsibility for, indemnifies and holds the other harmless from "...the liabilities associated with the properties awarded to each of them herein." See, Decree of Divorce, filed April 17, 2009.

While the HELOC was not specifically designated as Kerstan's liability, it was "associated with the property" awarded to her, namely, the Sonatina residence, and she assumed responsibility for this obligation by paying the same subsequent to the Decree of Divorce in 2009. Kerstan only objected to paying the obligation when the sum of \$7,000.00 was withdrawn and applied to Michael's overdrafted account. This issue was also addressed at the June 26, 2013 hearing when the parties reached an agreement for Michael to pay Kerstan the \$7,000.00.

The parties are precluded from arguing there has been a mistake of fact 6 years later, when they have both conducted themselves consistent with a course of conduct whereby Kerstan has assumed responsibility for the debt, and Michael has assumed responsibility for his portion of an increase in the debt, to which Kerstan did not consent or acquiesce.

#### REFINANCE OF HELOC

The Decree of Divorce did not require either party to refinance any obligations associated with any property they received. Further, Michael is responsible for actually increasing the balance of the HELOC, thus this Court will not require Kerstan to refinance the HELOC.

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RENA KUOHES DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEFT. J LAS VEGAS, NV 89101-240B

#### ATTORNEY'S FEES

The Court finds that neither party is the prevailing party in this matter, and neither party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED this <u>SO</u> day of March, 2015.

RENA & HUGHES

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

REMA HUGHES DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. J LAS VEGAS, NV 89101-2408

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**MOT** 1 BLACK & LOBELLO 2 John D. Jones, Esq. Nevada State Bar No. 6699 3 10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 4 Telephone Number: (702) 869-8801 5 Fax Number: (702) 869-2669 Email Address: jjones@blacklobello.com 6 Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERSTAN HUBBS 7 8 9 KERSTAN MICONE, 10 11 Plaintiff, 12 VS. 13 MICHAEL MICONE, 14 Defendant. 15 16

Hum D. Elmin **CLERK OF THE COURT** 

**DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 

CASE NO.: D-08-388334-D

DEPT. NO.:

J

NOTICE: YOU ARE REQUIRED TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THIS MOTION WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND TO PROVIDE THE UNDERSIGNED WITH A COPY OF YOUR RESPONSE WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION. FAILURE TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION MAY RESULT IN THE REQUESTED RELIEF BEING GRANTED BY THE COURT WITHOUT HEARING PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED HEARING DATE.

### MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR SET ASIDE ORDER

Date of Hearing: 06/04/20159:00 A.M. Time of Hearing: Oral Argument Requested: Yes

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, KERSTAN MICONE, currently HUBBS ("KERSTAN"), by and through her counsel of record, JOHN JONES, ESQ., with Black and LoBello Attorneys at Law, and brings this motion to reconsider and/or in the alternative motion to set aside an order under NRCP 60 (a) and (b)1.

This motion is based upon the Introduction and Background, Points and Authorities, any and all pleadings and papers on file in this matter, and any oral representation that may take

place at the hearing of this motion.		
DATED this 13th day of April, 2015.		
Respectfully submitted:		
Black & LoBello		
Sabura M. Dryan #13/15		
John D. Jones, Esq.  Nevada Bar No. 006699		
10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300		
Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 (702) 869-8801		
Attorneys for Plaintiff		
KERSTAN HUBBS		
NOTICE OF MOTION		
TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES:		
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned		
will bring the above and foregoing Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order on for hearing		
before the entitled Court on the $\frac{4 \text{ th}}{}$ day of $\frac{\text{June}}{}$ , 2015, at the hour of $\frac{9:00}{}$		
o'clock a.m., or as soon thereafter as may be heard before the District Court, Family Division,		
Department J.		
DATED this 13th day of April, 2015.		
Black & LoBello		
Sabura W. Bryon #13105		
John D. Jones, Esq.		
Nevada Bar No. 006699 10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300		
Las Vegas, Nevada 89135		
(702) 869-8801 Attorneys for Plaintiff		
KERSTAN HUBBS		

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I

#### INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

- On March 31, 2015, this Court issued an ORDER FROM HEARING JANUARY 1. KERSTAN would like to provide the Court with the following corrections or arguments to the Court's statement of facts and order(s) as issued. KERSTAN requests that the Court to inquire more into Bella's needs at this time; independently and objectively in a manner the Court deems just.
- KERSTAN takes issue or objects to the following findings of fact entered without 2. an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate accurate information to the Court:
  - Child Support Arrears: KERSTAN properly transferred her rights to a. child support and enforcement of these rights to the Office of the District Attorney Family Support Division (the "DA") to manage, oversee, and enforce child support payment. KERSTAN does not manage the arrears of Defendant, MICHAEL MICONE ("MICHAEL") in regard to child support; the DA does. Schedule of Arrears should be provided to MICHAEL by the DA, not KERSTAN and she should not be penalized for actions outside of her direct control. Although MICHAEL's intention may have been to waive or remove his arrears; this was not agreed to by KERSTAN. MICHAEL's promises regarding the land on Smith Creek were not fulfilled and were a condition of any waiver of arrears owed to KERSTAN. The DA did not allow MICHAEL to contest arrears at his hearing to modify child support because KERSTAN was not provided proper legal notice of his intent to do so. KERSTAN would be able to provide this Court evidence that if MICHAEL had paid on the land as promised, she would have considered waiving arrears, but he did not materially perform and KERSTAN was left to pay all liability on the mortgage. Any arrearages that were "satisfied" by the transfer of land are contested by KERSTAN because the land was and still is underwater, there is no equity in the land to cover arrears and was not agreed upon between the parties or ordered by the

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Court. As such the finding of the Court is erroneous.

- Coverdell Account for Tutoring: Funds from this account were never b. sent to Isabella Micone. KERSTAN was informed that a check was sent to MICHAEL at his old address in a subsequent email by Kathy Bax. Michael has not fulfilled the order to repay KERSTAN to date. MICHAEL told KERSTAN that he used the funds; not Isabella. As such, the finding of the Court is erroneous.
- Motion to Stay Hearing of the Child Support Center et al.: Both c. parties did not appear before the Court on the day of the hearing because a stipulation and order to vacate or move the hearing was with clerk of the Court, but not filed on time and/or entered on calendar accordingly. MICHAEL had health issues and was not able to sign and send the stipulation expeditiously.
- KERSTAN takes issue or objects to the following ORDER(s)and was not 3. provided an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate accurate information to the Court:
  - Res Judicata: Overall, Michael did not file an objection to KERSTAN's a. MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE on June 26th as noted by this Court and he did not file a countermotion to argue arrears at all that day, but merely brought it up through his testimony or noted later on VTS. It was not agreed upon in the Stipulation and Order signed by the parties, thus Res Judicata as to this issue should not apply as it was not ordered by the judge after a hearing on the merits or agreed upon by the parties. KERSTAN would like to remind the Court that MICHAEL has perjured himself in Court before, a simple statement in Court should be backed up with evidence; this has not been.
  - Physical custody of Isabella (hereinafter "Bella"): KERSTAN has b. always held out that Bella resides at her Grandparent's home while attending private school; her home is with KERSTAN. KERSTAN agrees that Bella is performing well academically due to a change in schools; not a change in residence. KERSTAN and MICHAEL did not consent to a change in custody to a 3<sup>rd</sup> party at any time. Neither party filed a motion seeking such relief. No evidentiary hearing was held and Bella's grandparents are not parties to this action.

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- Child Support Arrearages: Whether or not MICHAEL owed arrears to c. KERSTAN has not been adequately reviewed. A finding without an evidentiary hearing is premature to determine that any due is "questionable" and should be addressed with proper evidence and testimony. KERSTAN was not required or ordered to file a schedule of arrears after June 26th and has provided all updated accounting from the DA in her objection to MICHAEL's Motion to Modify Custody et al. KERSTAN should be provided the opportunity to do so by this Court prior to ruling on the matter.
- Modification of Child Support: KERSTAN did not "acquiesce" to Bella d. moving to Reno to "reside" with her paternal Grandparents. KERSTAN and MICHAEL decided Bella needed a better educational environment during the school year and allowed Bella to live with MICHAEL's parents while in school. Bella has a diagnosed learning disorder(s) and needs specialized staff and resources. KERSTAN did not consent to a change in physical custody. KERSTAN has evidence to show that her intent was to remain the physical custodian and that Bella was simply away at school while school was in session. Bella's Grandparents and Bella were not party to the action to modify custody and were not provided an opportunity to testify or undergo an interview.
- Prospective Child Support: The calculations for support are not accurate e. as a change in physical custody was never agreed to between MICHAEL and KERSTAN and KERSTAN is not "detrimental" to Bella; in fact Bella wants KERSTAN to remain her physical custodian and would state the same if interviewed.

II

#### POINT AND AUTHORITIES

KERSTAN respectfully urges this Court to reconsider, or in the alternative, to set the Court's order dated March 31, 2015 aside, which provides in part that primary physical custody of her minor daughter Bella be given to her paternal Grandparents merely for residing at their home while attending high school outside of Clark County, NV. KERSTAN urges the Court to reconsider as the order is clearly erroneous and has been drafted in contravention of both NRS

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125.500 and binding precedent established in Ellis v. Carucci that speaks to a change in physical custody of a minor child. In the alternative, KERSTAN requests that the order be set aside due to errors arising from oversight or omission or errors arising from mistake inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.

#### Motion to Reconsider Α.

A district court may reconsider a previously decided issue if substantially different evidence is subsequently introduced or the decision is clearly erroneous. See Masonry & Tile Contractors Ass'n of S. Nevada v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, Ltd., 113 Nev. 737, 741, 941 P.2d 486, 489 (1997); (citing Little Earth of United Tribes v. Department of Housing, 807 F.2d 1433, 1441 (8th Cir.1986); see also Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 402, 405, 551 P.2d 244, 246 (1976)).

#### Motion to Set Aside Order B.

Under Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (NRCP): Rule 60 - "Relief from Judgement or Order" a party may motion the court to set aside an order for clerical mistakes. Under NRCP 60(a) it states:

> (a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.

Furthermore, if the mistake is not just clerical in nature, it may be set aside under section 60 (b) for mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud; or more. as follows:

> (b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a

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party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore intrinsic extrinsic), denominated or misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; or, (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that an injunction should have prospective application. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than 6 months after the proceeding was taken or the date that written notice of entry of the judgment or order was served. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

The prior order was ruled upon without an evidentiary hearing or a child interview; both requested by KERSTAN's counsel, especially prior to any change in custody. KERSTAN believes that issues of fact remain largely unknown to this court and that with proper presentation by way of a hearing, a different ruling would likely occur. Additionally, Bella's paternal grandparents did not have an opportunity to present their case and it remains unknown if Upon information and belief, they even want the responsibility of physical custodian. KERSTAN can demonstrate that a change in custody is not desired by the paternal Grandparents or Bella and that they would like physical custody to remain with KERSTAN. Below, KERSTAN will demonstrate that time away at school should be considered her custodial time.

In determining whether the facts warrant a custody modification, courts should not take the "changed circumstances" prong lightly. Ellis v. Carucci 123 Nev. 145 (2007). In Nevada, when a district court determines the custody of a minor child, "the sole consideration of the court

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is the best interest of the child, which is governed by NRS 125.480. Under Ellis, the court has held that a modification of primary physical custody is warranted only when the party seeking a modification proves there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child and the child's best interest is served by the modification.

Additionally, an award of custody in contravention of NRS 125.500 is invalid or unlawful. The statute states that "Before the court makes an order awarding custody to any person other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best interest of the child.

The parties to this action were Bella's father, MICHAEL, who was seeking primary physical custody of Bella and other matters and her mother who was seeking status quo or retaining primary physical custody while Bella was attending Bishop Manogue, a private Catholic school located in Washoe County, NV. There was not a party to the action seeking to change physical custody to the grandparents, and more importantly, the Grandparents and Bella would rather status quo continue (primary physical custody with KERSTAN) and be upheld. KERSTAN and MICHAEL did not consent to Bella's grandparents having physical custody of Bella. The court must make a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to Bella and that the award to a nonparent is required. Although the court states that KERSTAN "acquiesced" allowing Isabella to go to private school outside of Clark County, this should not be interpreted as KERSTAN's consent to give physical custody to a third party; that has never been the case and KERSTAN has substantial facts to demonstrate her understanding that physical custody would remain with her. Similar to parents around the world who decide to send their children away to boarding schools, study abroad programs, or military schools, KERSTAN, decided to send her daughter to a school that was outside of their county of residence because it was better for Bella academically.

By changing physical custody of Bella, it will change financial and legal matters pertaining to Bella's well-being. This may upset her current schooling as she has one more year until graduation, by pulling necessary support from her reach. The court must protect Isabella's

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custodial stability. As a change in circumstances is not to be taken lightly, the court should at a minimum speak with third parties to this action such as Bella's grandparents and Bella herself and allow them their due process rights and/or "day in court." KERSTAN's counsel did request that prior to this court making any change in custody, that an evidentiary hearing on the matter and child interview be conducted to examine both the changed circumstance prong and best interest of the child and this did not happen.

Although Bella is away at school throughout the school year, other jurisdictions have looked at similar fact patterns and have not made a change in custody due to these types of parenting decisions. In California, the courts have looked at disabled children who have been placed in a care home, children who spend time in daycare, and even children in boarding schools (emphasis added) and have held that it is proper to credit the custodial parent with the parenting time. See In re Marriage of Whealon, 53 Cal App. 4th 132; In re Marriage of DaSilva, 119 Cal. App. 4th 1030 (2004). These cases all led to the conclusion that just because your child does not live with you, it does not necessarily mean that a change of custody is mandated or that the parent should not receive child support. The court in California looks to "primary physical responsibility" not actual custody or presence. In re Marriage of Drake 53 Cal. App. 4th 1139, 1160 (1997). Overall, parents need to be able to have options for disabled children and children with educational needs who attend school away from home without risking the loss of custody. At times decisions to send children away to school are actually in the child's best interest and should be considered a factor in placing a child in custody of those who support their academic environment. This is the case with Bella, where her primary custodian KERSTAN, placed her in an academic setting that provides her more support for her diagnosed learning disability and that was agreed upon between the parents, her legal custodians. These legal custodians did not consent to a change in physical custody to a 3<sup>rd</sup> party at any time.

KERSTAN can assure the Court that she is not "detrimental to Bella." KERSTAN has done everything she can possibly do to provide the best academic resources, time, love and attention for both of her children and believes that with a proper evidentiary hearing on the matter, including a child interview that this will become apparent to the Court. Just recently,

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KERSTAN solely paid for Bella's re-evaluation with Dr. Tracy Pitts, PhD for her current 504 Plan in order for Bella to receive proper accommodations for college entrance exams and further accommodations in college should she decide to attend university at a later date. KERSTAN readily attends parent functions for Bella when needed, even when they require air travel and time away from her work and residence in Clark County. KERSTAN has an abundance of evidence that can demonstrate that she is a fit and loving parent and in no way is detrimental to her daughter's well-being; the strongest evidence being her daughter's own statement and family members who can attest to her character; including the paternal Grandparents. KERSTAN has amply provided objective evidence to this Court as to why Mike's fitness is not adequate and would likely be detrimental to Bella and again directs the Court to the domestic violence issues, arrests, prior substance abuse, and Dr. Paglini's report.

KERSTAN requests the Court to reconsider the current order, or in the alternative, for the order to be set aside under NRCP 60(a) or (b). KERSTAN believes a proper evidentiary hearing on the matter along with an interview with Bella herself will provide the Court with further information to order that physical custody of Bella Micone remain with her mother (status quo) until she is of majority age (18) and has graduated from high school.

#### III

#### **CONCLUSION**

KERSTAN is requesting that this Court reconsider its recent order and/or to set the order aside to allow a proper evidentiary hearing to be conducted on this matter. A change in custody is not warranted at this time as it has been done in contravention of statute and Court precedent. Both MICHAEL and KERSTAN took time to tour the school and speak with the teachers in the Integrated Learning Center before committing Bella to this change in school. Bella resides with her mother, but attends school elsewhere; this is similar to many families around the nation who send their children to boarding school. What the Court is inadvertently saying by this order is that by placing a child in a school away from home; a parent risks a losing custody and support. KERSTAN believes the intent behind NRS 125.500 is to protect the parent-child relationship. Changing Bella's education was not a whimsical decision in which KERSTAN "acquiesced" and

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simply allowed her daughter to reside with a third party. KERSTAN believes the order should be reconsidered because it is clearly erroneous and/or set aside due to clerical error or to mistake; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud; or more. KERSTAN has taken 17 years to raise Bella, six (6) years of which she has served as her primary physical custodian. She is a good parent and not a detriment to her child and asks that this Court interview Bella and allow her paternal Grandparents a voice on this matter as well.

13th day of April, 2015. DATED this

Respectfully submitted,

BLACK & LOBELLO

Mia W. Bolgon #13105 D. Jones, Esq. for John D. Jones, Esq.

Nevada State Bar No. 006699

10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300

Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERSTAN HUBBS

## BLACK & LOBELLO 10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 (702) 869-8801 FAX: (702) 869-2669

# DECLARATION OF KERSTAN MICONE IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR SET ASIDE ORDER

KERSTAN MICONE, under penalties of perjury, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR SET ASIDE ORDER and know the contents thereof; that the same is true of my own knowledge except for those matters therein stated on information and belief and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. The allegations contained in the Motion are adopted as if fully set forth in this Declaration.

Dated this 13th day of April, 2015.

Kerstan Micone, Hidus KERSTAN MICONE

Page 12 of 12

#### MOFI BLACK & LOBELLO

John D. Jones

Nevada State Bar No. 6699

10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300

Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone No.: 702-869-8801 Facsimile No.: 702-869-2669

Email: jjones@blacklobellolaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERSTAN HUBBS

DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

KERSTAN MICONE,

CASE NO.

D-08-388334-D

J

DEPT. NO.

Plaintiff,

VS.

MICHAEL MICONE,

FAMILY COURT MOTION/OPPOSITION FEE INFORMATION SHEET (NRS 19.0312)

Defendant.

Party Filing Motion/Opposition:	■ Plaintiff/Petitioner Defendant/Respondent			
MOTION FOR/OPPOSITION TO: Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order				
Motions and Oppositions to	Excluded Motions/Oppositions			
Motions filed after entry of a final Order pursuant to NRS	No Final Decree or Custody Order has been entered.	YES NO		
125, 125B or 125C are subject to the Re-open filing fee of	2. This document is filed solely to adjust the amount of support for a child. No other request is made.	YES • NO		
\$25.00, unless specifically excluded. (NRS 19.0312)  NOTICE: If it is determined that a motion or	3. This motion is made for <u>reconsideration</u> or a <u>new</u> <u>trial</u> and is filed within 10 days of the Judge=s			
opposition is filed without payment of the appropriate fee, the matter may be taken off the Court=s calendar or may remain undecided until	Order. If YES, provide file date of Order  If you answered YES to any of the questions above, you are not	YES NO  t subject to the \$25 fee.		
payment is made.  ■ Motion/Opposition IS subject to \$25.00 filing fee  □ Motion/Opposition IS NOT subject to filing fee				
Date: April 13, 2015 Cheryl Berdahl	CherylBer	0.00		
Print Name of Preparer	Signature of Preparer			

BLACK & LOBELLO

1	CSERV		
2	BLACK & LOBELLO John D. Jones, Esq.	Electronically Filed 04/14/2015 09:15:11 AM	
3	Nevada State Bar No. 6699 10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300	4 . 40	
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	Alun D. Chum	
5	Telephone Number: (702) 869-8801 Fax Number: (702) 869-2669	CLERK OF THE COURT	
6	Email Address: jjones@blacklobello.com Attorneys for Plaintiff,		
7	KERSTAN HUBBS f/k/a KERSTAN MICONE		
8	DISTRICT COURT		
9	FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
10	VEDSTANI MICONIE	CASE NO.: D-08-388334-D	
11	KERSTAN MICONE,		
12	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: J	
13	vs.		
14	MICHAEL MICONE,		
15	Defendant.		
16	CERTIFICAT	E OF SERVICE	

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the May of April, 2015 I served a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order, upon each of the parties by electronic service through Wiznet, the Eighth Judicial District Court's e-filing/e-service system, pursuant to N.E.F.C.R. 9; and by depositing a copy of the same in a sealed envelope in the United States Mail, Postage Pre-Paid, addressed as follows:

Donn W. Prokopius, Esq.
PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY
931 South Third Street
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Email for Service: general@pandblawyers.com
Attorneys for Defendant

an Employee of BLACK & LOBELLO

Electronically Filed 05/01/2015 09:28:30 AM

Alun D. Chum

**CLERK OF THE COURT** 

OPCM
PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY
DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 006460
JEREMY R. BEASLEY, ESQ.
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Attorney for Defendant,
MICHAEL A. MICONE

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### DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

KERSTAN D. MICONE,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

DATE OF HEARING: 6/4/2015
TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 A.M.

Defendant,

"NOTICE: YOU ARE REQUIRED TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THIS MOTION/COUNTERMOTION WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND TO PROVIDE THE UNDERSIGNED WITH A COPY OF YOUR RESPONSE WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION/COUNTERMOTION. FAILURE TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION/COUNTERMOTION MAY RESULT IN THE REQUESTED RELIEF BEING GRANTED BY THE COURT WITHOUT HEARING PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED HEARING DATE."

## <u>DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER</u> <u>AND/OR SET ASIDE ORDER</u>

#### <u>AND</u>

### <u>DEFENDANT'S COUNTER MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND HIS ATTORNEY'S</u> <u>FEES, COSTS AND RELATED MATTERS</u>

COMES NOW the Defendant, MICHAEL A. MICONE, by and through his attorney,

DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ., and moves this Honorable Court for the following relief:

- 1. Denying the relief sought by Plaintiff;
- 2. For sanctions and for Defendant's attorney's fees and costs incurred in this case;
- 3. For such other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate in the circumstances.

This opposition and counter motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file, and the attached affidavit of Defendant and is made in good faith and not to delay justice.

Dated this 1<sup>st</sup> day of May, 2015.

#### PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY

/s/ Donn W. Prokopius
DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 006460
JEREMY R. BEASLEY, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 12176
931 South Third Street
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general@pandblawyers.com
Attorney for Defendant,
MICHAEL A. MICONE

#### **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

#### I. RECENT CIRCUMSTANCES

Plaintiff, KERSTAN D. MICONE (hereinafter "KERSTAN") and Defendant, MICHAEL A. MICONE (hereinafter "MICHAEL") were divorced in Clark county, Nevada by a Decree of divorce that was entered on April 17, 2009. There are two minor children born to the parties as a result of the marriage, namely, Isabella Caroline Micone (Bella), born: March 26, 1998, age 16; and, MICHAEL J. Micone, born: January 7, 2005, age 8. Pursuant to the Decree the parties share joint legal custody and share physical custody of their minor children with KERSTAN been designated the children's primary custodian.

MICHAEL will respond to KERSTAN'S arguments in the order the appear in her motion:

#### a. Child Support Arrears

KERSTAN states that she "transferred her rights to child support and enforcement of these rights to the office of the District Attorney Family Support Division to manage, oversee, and enforce child-support payment." Apparently this comment is meant to absolve KERSTAN of any responsibility for monitoring and keeping track of the child support payments. The fact is neither MICHAEL nor his lawyer are aware of any rule, law, statute or case that provides that a litigant such as KERSTAN forfeits rights and responsibilities when she seeks the assistance of the DA to enforce a child support obligation. In fact, NRS125B.150(3) specifically provides that the District Attorney is *not* representing her and is not even acting on her behalf. Rather, the DA is rendering a public service as a representative of the state of Nevada. The statute reads as follows:

3. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 126.101, the district attorney and his deputies do not represent the parent, alleged parent, guardian or child in the performance of their duties pursuant to this chapter and chapter 31A, 126, 130 or 425 of NRS, but are rendering a public service as representatives of the State.

Thus, KERSTAN's reliance on the DA is misplaced. It is ultimately her responsibility to keep track of child support payments. KERSTAN admits that she may have agreed to waive child support arrears had MICHAEL fulfilled his promise regarding the land on Smith Creek. KERSTAN did agree to waive child support in consideration for which MICHAEL transferred the land on Smith's Creek to her. KERSTAN acknowledged this arrangement when she sent an email to the DA regarding the transfer of the land in exchange for child support arrears. Greedy to the last, KERSTAN's current complaint is that she claims she and MICHAEL should have been responsible to pay half the costs and certain expenses associated with the land. The parties

made no such agreement. Moreover, KERSTAN made this same argument at the January 15, 2015 hearing. The court had the issue before it and specifically found that no such arrangement existed for the parties' to share costs and also found that KERSTAN did in fact receive the land on Smith Creek as payment for any child support arrears and compensation for other funds MICHAEL received. KERSTAN also ignores the fact that MICHAEL hired a tutor for Bella and KERSTAN offered to pay half. However, when it came time to pay her share KERSTAN refused therefore MICHAEL used the Coverdale to pay for tutoring as well as helping pay for his children expenses while they were spending half the summer with him in Reno. MICHAEL also used the money to pay for travel because KERSTAN never paid for a single flight during this time post-divorce. MICHAEL spent over \$15,000 in travel over the 2 years post-divorce.

#### b. Coverdale Account for Tutoring:

KERSTAN once again alleges that MICHAEL took funds from a Coverdale Account for tutoring but alleges the funds were never sent to the parties' daughter Bella. The parties have already gone to court over these funds. This issue was specifically addressed at the June 26, 2013 hearing. KERSTAN tried to raise it again in opposition to MICHAEL's motion to change custody and this court specifically found at the January 15, 2015 hearing that the matter had already been heard and resolved nearly 2 years before. KERSTAN is now trying to raise the issue for a third time now claiming that the funds were never sent to the parties' daughter Bella. MICHAEL did not withdraw the money with the intention of turning it over to his daughter Bella. When MICHAEL withdrew the funds from the account he did so because he was struggling financially. KERSTAN specifically agreed to let MICHAEL have access to these funds in exchange for which MICHAEL agreed to KERSTAN receiving the land on Smith Creck. MICHAEL subsequently transferred the real estate to KERSTAN. It is disingenuous for

KERSTAN to now complain that MICHAEL did not use the funds for Bella. KERSTAN has always known what MICHAEL intended to do with the money from the account.

#### c. Motion to Stay Hearing of Child Support Center, et al

MICHAEL has absolutely no idea what KERSTAN's point may be in this paragraph and therefore neither he nor his lawyer have any idea what to say in response.

### 3. KERSTAN"S objections to certain of the court's orders issued following the January 15, 2015 hearing

#### a. Res Judicata

KERSTAN complains that at the June 26, 2013 hearing MICHAEL did not file a counter motion regarding the "arrears". Apparently this comment is meant to suggest that the issue was never actually litigated and therefore *res judicata* does not apply. MICHAEL is unclear what "arrears" KERSTAN is referring to however it does not matter. An issue such as this can be resolved by way of agreement as well as by way of a contested hearing.

In the case of *Five Star Capital Corp v. Ruby*, 194 P.3d 709 (2008) the Nevada Supreme Court clarified the doctrine of *res judicata* and reiterated that the goal of the doctrine is that final orders of a court, are indeed final. The Supreme Court noted:

"As stated in Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 19, comment a, the purposes of claim preclusion are "based largely on the ground that fairness to the defendant, and sound judicial administration, require that at some point litigation over the particular controversy come to an end" and that such reasoning may apply "even though the substantive issues have not been tried, especially if the plaintiff has failed to avail himself of opportunities to pursue his remedies in the first proceeding. . . ."

In *Five Star*, the Nevada Supreme Court was faced with the task of clarifying and differentiating between the concepts of "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" as they applied to the doctrine of *res judicata*.

Regarding "claim preclusion", the Nevada Supreme Court held that there is a three-part test for determining whether claim preclusion should apply: (1) the parties or their privies are the same; (2) the final judgment is valid; and (3) the subsequent action is based on the same claims or any part of them that were or could have been brought in the first case. This test maintains the well-established principle that claim preclusion applies to all grounds of recovery that were or could have been brought in the first case.

Regarding "issue preclusion", the Supreme Court held:

For application of the issue preclusion doctrine, we affirm the validity of the three factors outlined in *Tarkanian* [and applicable to claim preclusion], but we now add a fourth factor to that test to better clarify the distinction between claim and issue preclusion. Specifically, the fourth factor requires that the issue was actually and necessarily litigated. In both *Tarkanian* and *Executive Management*, this court recognized this requirement for issue preclusion but did not include it as a factor in the test for issue preclusion. Accordingly, the following factors are necessary for application of issue preclusion: "(1) the issue decided in the prior litigation must be identical to the issue presented in the current action; (2) the initial ruling must have been on the merits and have become final; . . . (3) the party against whom the judgment is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation"; and (4) the issue was actually and necessarily litigated.

Thus, while claim preclusion can apply to all claims that were or could have been raised in the initial case, issue preclusion only applies to issues that were actually and necessarily

litigated and on which there was a final decision on the merits. The reason for this distinction is because claim preclusion applies to preclude an entire second suit that is based on the same set of facts and circumstances as the first suit, while issue preclusion applies to prevent re-litigation of only a specific issue that was decided in a previous suit between the parties, even if the second suit is based on different causes of action and different circumstances

In this case, KERSTAN's argument regarding the "arrears" is clearly barred by issue preclusion. Claim preclusion does not apply to these circumstances because the current litigation is not an entirely new or second lawsuit. Rather, this instant motion derives from the original divorce case and the hearing of June 26, 2013. As to the issues, it is clear that the four pronged test of issue preclusion bars KERSTAN's attempt to modify either the original decree of divorce or the subsequent court order from the June 26, 2013 hearing.

- (1) The issue decided in the prior litigation must be identical to the issue presented in the current action. The issues in question, namely, MICHAEL's liquidation of the life insurance policies, MICHAEL's liquidation of the 529 account, MICHAEL's receipt of the Coverdale funds, MICHAEL's use of \$7000 from the HELOC and the child support arrears were before the Court at the June 26, 2013 hearing and have already been heard and decided in that prior litigation.
- (2) The initial ruling must have been on the merits and have become final. The prior rulings were on the merits and have become a final judgment. The Court took evidence and heard argument on these issues at the June 26, 2013 hearing. The Court adopted the stipulated agreement of the parties. KERSTAN prepared the order from the June 26, 2013 hearing and it was entered on August 19, 2013. KERSTAN then prepared and served a notice of entry of order on September 16, 2013. The Order is now a final judgment because KERSTAN's time

limits within which to either rehear/reconsider the order; move to set aside the order; and/or appeal the order have all expired. Indeed, the Nevada Supreme Court has specifically ruled that a property distribution becomes a final judgment six months after the entry of the order *Kramer v. Kramer*, 96 Nev. 759, 616 P.2d 395 (1980) (Absent specific authorization for continuing jurisdiction over property rights, NRCP 60(b) governs motions to modify property rights established by divorce decrees... a district court is without jurisdiction to modify a decree regarding the property distribution six months after the decree was entered).

- (3) The party against whom the judgment is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation". In this case the party against whom the judgment is asserted is KERSTAN. She was a party to the prior litigation and in fact has been a party throughout these entire proceedings.
- (4) The issue was actually and necessarily litigated. The issues in question were actually and necessarily litigated. KERSTAN is the one who raised these very same issues in the motion that she filed that resulted in the hearing of June 26, 2013. She is the one that brought them before the court and she is the one who agreed to a disposition of the issues as embodied in the stipulation the parties agreed to. The foregoing analysis establishes that the issues of MICHAEL's liquidation of the life insurance policies, MICHAEL's liquidation of the 529 account, MICHAEL's receipt of the Coverdale funds, MICHAEL's use of \$7000 from the HELOC and the child support arrears have already been heard and decided and are *res judicata*. It is too late for KERSTAN to revisit these issues a third time.

#### b. Physical Custody of Bella

This paragraph of KERSTAN's motion is by far the most bizarre. KERSTAN claims that although Bella lives with MICHAEL's parents in Reno the child's "home is with KERSTAN".

KERSTAN has not bothered to define what she means by the child's "home". Apparently she does not want to get bogged down in semantics. The Nevada Supreme Court has never adopted KERSTAN'S concept of "home". It held that in order for a parent to assert some measure of custody (i.e., joint, primary or sole) the child must reside with that parent. This is clear from the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion in *Rivero v. Rivero*, 216 P.3d 213 (2009), where the Nevada Supreme Court held

"The district court should calculate the time during which a party has physical custody of a child over one calendar year. Each parent must have physical custody of the child at least 40 percent of the time, which is 146 days per year. Calculating the timeshare over a one-year period allows the court to consider weekly arrangements as well as any deviations from those arrangements such as emergencies, holidays, and summer vacation. In calculating the time during which a party has physical custody of the child, the district court should look at the number of days during which a party provided supervision of the child, the child resided with the party, and during which the party made the day-to-day decisions regarding the child. The district court should not focus on, for example, the exact number of hours the child was in the care of the parent, whether the child was sleeping, or whether the child was in the care of a third-party caregiver or spent time with a friend or relative during the period of time in question. Id, (Emphasis added).

Obviously if KERSTAN is going to claim that she remains Bella's primary physical custodian is not enough to say that KERSTAN's house is the child's "home" or that KERSTAN never intended to relinquish custody. She must show that Bella lives with her and that she provides for the child's day to day care and supervision. Obviously, KERSTAN is doing none of this. Thus, this court correctly concluded that because Bella was no longer living with KERSTAN, she is no longer Bella's primary physical custodian.

KERSTAN claims that neither she nor MICHAEL consented to a change in custody to a third party at any time. The parties do not have to consent to a change in custody. The change in custody can come about by virtue of circumstances that create a de facto modification, which is exactly what occurred in this case. KERSTAN complains that no evidentiary hearing was held. None was necessary because KERSTAN failed to meet the standard of *Rooney v. Rooney*, 109

Nev. 540, 853 P.2d 123 (1993). She failed to demonstrate "adequate cause" for holding a hearing. Both parties acknowledged that Bella had been living with MICHAEL's parents in Reno for the past year. There would be no point in holding a hearing on an issue that was not in dispute. Yet, KERSTAN claims that MICHAEL's parents are not a party to this action. They don't have to be a party to this action. The court has jurisdiction to issue orders that are in the child's best interests (see NRS125.510(a). The court clearly found based on the circumstances that it would be in Bella's best interests to remain living with MICHAEL's parents. Subsequent circumstances have proven the Court's decision to be the right one. Bella is doing well and now sees MICHAEL far more than she used to now that the court has given her teenage discretion. Bella feels free to see MICHAEL more frequently and she likes the fact she is no longer in the middle of parental disputes. Bella for instance recently spent the entire weekend with MICHAEL when MICHAEL's son was with him for visitation. This was the first time in a year and Bella was able to do so because of the court's order giving her teenage discretion. Bella has also been able to spend time with KERSTAN's family as well.

#### c. Child Support Arrears.

KERSTAN claims that whether or not MICHAEL owes for child support arrears has not been adequately reviewed but she also complains that she was not required to file a schedule of arrears after June 26, 2013. She claims her updated accounting from the DA was sufficient. E.D.C.R. 5.33 requires KERSTAN to file a schedule of arrears, whether she likes it or not. The DA'S accounting cannot be relied upon because the DA was not continuously collecting child support via wage withholding. There were gaps in its collection of child support. Therefore it is anyone's guess how the DA arrived at the numbers contained in its accounting. MICHAEL specifically questioned the DA'S audit summary which supposedly showed he owed \$10,518 in

arrears because the audit was two years out of date. The Chase payment record KERSTAN included with her opposition to MICHAEL'S change custody motion revealed that MICHAEL has made consistent child support payments over the last several years and owed no arrears — a fact that now gets no mention in KERSTAN'S motion. MICHAEL did file an audit request with the DA to review his child support payment history and he has requested a hearing to resolve the issue. Moreover, as noted previously, the transfer of the Smith Creek property to KERSTAN was meant in part to pay any arrears that were owed. In these proceedings, there is only one way to resolve the arrears issue. If KERSTAN is going to claim she is owed child support arrears it is incumbent upon her to produce a sworn schedule of arrears as required by E.D.C.R. 5.33. Only then can MICHAEL compare his record of payments with the arrears KERSTAN claims she is owed. MICHAEL would note that he believes he owes no arrears whatsoever not only for the reasons previously discussed but in December of 2014 he was able to obtain a passport, which would have been denied to him if he owed child support arrears.

#### d. Modification of Child Support.

In support of this argument KERSTAN once again regurgitates the nonsense about Bella living with MICHAEL's parents in Reno but KERSTAN remaining the children's primary custodian. This argument is been previously addressed. The court correctly found that because Bella is not living with KERSTAN or MICHAEL neither party could claim child support from the other. Rather, if anyone is to be paying child support KERSTAN and MICHAEL should be paying it to MICHAEL's parents. It goes without saying that KERSTAN has never given MICHAEL's parents any financial assistance other that what MICHAEL paid to his parents in lieu of child support to KERSTAN. MICHAEL was paying \$870 a month to KERSTAN even though he was unemployed and waiting for the hearing on his motion but KERSTAN never

forwarded the full amount to MICHAEL'S parents. She was only sending \$300 at most but never the full amount. KERSTAN stated to MICHAEL that she needed the extra money to fly to Reno to see Bella. These circumstances however have not stopped KERSTAN from continuing to ask MICHAEL for money. MICHAEL has not responded because he alone has been the one paying child support during the time that Bella has been living in Reno. Fortunately for KERSTAN, MICHAEL's parents have never asked for any financial assistance from her however, MICHAEL submits it is time for the Court to order KERSTAN to begin paying her fair share.

#### e. Prospective Child Support

KERSTAN for the third time complains that she never agreed to a change in physical custody and that she remains the child's primary physical custodian and therefore she presumably wants child support. KERSTAN is not entitled to child support as long as Bella is not living with her.

#### **II. ARGUMENT**

### 1. KERSTAN'S REQUEST TO RECONSIDER OR SET ASIDE THE ORDER FROM THE JANARY 15, 2015 HEARING

#### a. Rehear/Reconsider the January 15, 2015 Hearing

#### EDCR 2.24 states:

#### Rehearing of motions.

- (a) No motion once heard and disposed of may be renewed in the same cause, nor may the same matters therein embraced be reheard, unless by leave of the Court granted upon motion therefor, after notice of such motion to the adverse parties.
- (b) A party seeking reconsideration of a ruling of the Court, other than an order which may be addressed by motion pursuant to NRCP 50(b), 52(b), 59 or 60, must file a motion of such relief within 10 days after service of written notice of the order or judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. A motion for rehearing or reconsideration must be served, noticed, filed and heard as is any other motion. A motion for rehearing does not toll the 30 day period for filing a notice of appeal from a final order or judgment.
- (c) If a motion for rehearing is granted, the Court may make a final disposition of the cause without re-argument or may restore it to the calendar for re-argument or resubmission or

may make such other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case. (Amended 12-5-86, eff. 2-3-87)

The case of *Masonry and Tile Contractors v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth*, 113 Nev. 737, 941 P.2d 487 (1997) sets forth the standard to be applied by the district Court in assessing a request to reconsider. In *Masonry and Tile* the Nevada Supreme Court held that a district Court may reconsider a previously decided issue if substantially different evidence is subsequently introduced or the decision is clearly erroneous.

The gist of KERSTAN's argument is her objection to the fact that the court allowed Bella to remain living with MICHAEL's parents in Reno and the court's finding that MICHAEL's parents were the child's actual physical custodian. KERSTAN has offered no new evidence in her motion that would indicate the court's decision should be altered. She simply objects to MICHAEL's parents being designated the child's custodian and argues that she never agreed to that arrangement. As noted previously, KERSTAN does not have to agree to a change in custody. KERSTAN did agree to Bella moving to Reno and living with MICHAEL's parents. She does not dispute this fact. KERSTAN also does not dispute that Bella has been doing well in school and that the change has proven beneficial for the child. Therefore, these events constitute a de facto change in circumstances that meet the two-pronged standard of Ellis v. Carucci, 167 P3rd 239 (Nev. 2007) and support the court's decision to modify custody. In support of her argument KERSTAN cites the case of In Re Marriage of Whealon, 53 Cal App. 4th 132 (1997). The facts of Whealon have absolutely no application to KERSTAN's argument. Whealon involved the case where the mother who had primary physical custody of the minor child sought to relocate for employment purposes and take the child with her. KERSTAN agreeing to send Bella to Reno to go to school and live with MICHAEL's parents is an entirely different situation. KERSTAN also cited the case of In Re Marriage of DaSilva, 199 Cal App. 4th 1030 (2004). This

28

case also has no relevance. *DaSilva* involved imputing a time share to the parents for the purpose of calculating child support under California's child support guidelines. KERSTAN also cites the case of *In Re Marriage of Drake* 53 Cal App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1139 (1997) which dealt with an issue similar to *DaSilva* regarding the imputation of timeshare for the purpose of calculating child support. All three cases are from California and are therefore not binding authority. The two latter cases deal with the interpretation and application of California's statutory child support scheme. They have no relevance or bearing on how this court chose to decide the custodial issue in the instant case. KERSTAN has offered no new evidence in support of her motion to reconsider and she has failed to show that this court's decision regarding the custody issue was clearly erroneous. Therefore her motion to reconsider the January 15, 2015 hearing must be denied.

# b. In The Alternative, Setting Aside The Order Entered March 31, 2015 RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER

NRCP60(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; or, (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that an injunction should have prospective application. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than 6 months after the proceeding was taken or the date that written notice of entry of the judgment or order was served. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a Court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the Court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

KERSTAN has requested in the alternative that the order entered March 31, 2015 be set aside. The case of *Leslie vs. Leslie*, 941 P.2 451 (Nev. 1997), provides that when the Court assesses a Rule 60(b) request, the Court must analyze whether the movant (1) promptly applied to remove the judgment; (2) lacked intent to delay the proceedings; (3) demonstrated good faith; (4) lacked knowledge of procedural requirements; and (5) tendered a meritorious defense. The Nevada Supreme Court later eliminated the requirement that a movant tender a meritorious defense. *Epstein v. Epstein*, 113 Nev. 1401, 950 P.2d 771 (1997).

KERSTAN has not even bothered to analyze the foregoing elements let alone demonstrate that they apply to her request. Throughout these proceedings KERSTAN has been represented by an attorney. She has had the opportunity to present her evidence and make her arguments to the court. She has made no showing whatsoever that her actions in these proceedings constitute mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, there is no basis to set aside the order entered March 31, 2015.

### 2. ATTORNEY'S FEES

### NRS 18.010 provides as follows:

- 2. In addition to the cases where an allowance is authorized by specific statute, the Court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to a prevailing party:
  - (a) When he has not recovered more than \$20,000.00; or
- (b) Without regard to the recovery sought, when the Court finds that the claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party complaint or defense of the opposing party was brought without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party.
- NRS 125.150(3). Except as otherwise provided in NRS 125.141, whether or not application for suit money has been made under the provisions of NRS 125.040, the Court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to either party to an action for divorce if those fees are in issue under the pleadings.

In a long line of cases, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that attorney's fees may be awarded in a post divorce action pursuant to NRS18.010 and NRS125.150(3). See Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 495 P.2d 618 1972); Leeming v. Leeming, 87 Nev. 530, 490 P.2d 342

(1971); Korbel v. Korbel, 101 Nev. 140, 696 P.2d 993 (1985); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 89 Nev 540, 516 P.2d 103 (1973); Halbrook v. Halbrook, 114 Nev. 1455, 971 P.2d 1262 (1998); and, Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 959 P.2d 523 (1998). In the case of Miller v. Wilfong, 119 P.3d 727 (2005) the Nevada Supreme Court held that it is within the trial Court's discretion to determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees under a statute or rule and that in exercising its discretion, the district Court must evaluate the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969), including the qualities of the advocate, the character and difficulty of the work performed, the work actually performed by the attorney, and the result obtained. In this case, MICHAEL'S counsel is an experienced attorney who has litigated numerous divorce, custody, paternity and post-divorce actions. The legal representation in this case involved the collection and analysis of the pertinent information, the preparation of legal documents and Court appearances. MICHAEL'S counsel expects to obtain a good result based on the facts of the case. MICHAEL is therefore requesting that he have an award of attorney's fees and sanctions in the sum of \$5,000.00

WHEREFORE, let and an order issue granting the relief requested by Defendant.

Dated this 1<sup>st</sup> day of May, 2014.

### PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY

/s/ Donn W. Prokopius
DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 006460
JEREMY R. BEASLEY, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 12176
931 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 474-0500 / Fax (702) 951-8022
general@pandblawyers.com
Attorney for Defendant,
MICHAEL A. MICONE

### **DECLARATION OF DEFENDANT, MICHAEL A. MICONE**

MICHAEL A. MICONE, first being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That Affiant is the Defendant in the above-entitled matter. That I have read the foregoing Opposition and Counter motion, including the points and authorities and any exhibits attached thereto, and the same are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
- 2. I respectfully request that this Honorable Court grant my foregoing Opposition and Counter motion.

/S/ Michael A. Micone
MICHAEL A. MICONE

### **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

I hereby certify that I am an employee of PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY, and on the 15
day of May 2015, I caused the DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO RECONSIDER AND/OR SET ASIDE ORDER AND DEFENDANT'S COUNTER
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND RELATED
MATTERS to be served as follows:

- [x] Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a) EDCR 8.05(f) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eight Judicial" by mandatory electronic service through the Eight Judicial District Court's electronic filing system;
- [x] by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada;
- [] Pursuant to EDCR 7.26 to be sent via facsimile or e-mail, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means;

To the Attorney's listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile number indicated below:

John D. Jones, Esq.
BLACK & LoBELLO
10777 West Twain Ave., Suite 300
Las Vegas, NV 89135
E-Mail: jjones@blacklobello.com
Attorney for Plaintiff,
KERSTAN HUBBS

/s/ Alex Gomez

An employee of PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY

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5	DISTRIC	CT COURT	
6	CLARK COL	INTY, NEVADA	
7	OLATIC COO	 	
8	KERSTAN D. MICONE,		
9	Plaintiff(s),	CASE NO. D-08-388334-D	
10	-VS-	DEPT. NO. J	
11		FAMILY COURT	
12	MICHAEL A. MICONE,	MOTION/OPPOSITION FEE INFORMATION SHEET	
13	Defendant(s).	(NRS 19.0312)	
14		f/Petitioner 🔀 Defendant/Respondent	
15	MOTION FOR OPPOSITION TO <u>DEFENDA</u>	ANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTI	ON TO
16	RECONSIDER AND/OR SET ASIDE ORDE	ER AND DEFENDANT'S COUNTER MOTION	I FOR
17	SANCTIONS AND HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES	S ET. AL.	
18	Motions and Oppositions to Motions filed after entry of a final order	Mark correct answer with an "X."  1. No final Decree or Custody Order has been	on .
19	pursuant to NRS 125, 125B or 125C are	entered. X YES NO	211
20	subject to the Re-open filing fee of \$25.00, unless specifically excluded.	2. This document is filed solely to adjust the	amount c
21	(NRS 19.0312)	support for a child. No other request is m YES NO	ade.
22	NOTICE:		
23	If it is determined that a motion or opposition is filed without payment of the appropriate fee, the matter may	<ol> <li>This motion is <u>made for reconsideration</u> of trial and is filed within 10 days of the Judg</li> </ol>	
24	be taken off the Court's calendar or may remain undecided until payment is made.	If YES, provide file date of Order:	
25			
26		If you answered YES to any of the questions you are <u>not</u> subject to the \$25 fee.	above,
	Motion/Opposition ☐IS ☒ IS NOT subject	t to \$25 filing fee	
28	Dated this 1 <sup>ST</sup> DAY of MAY,200 <u>15</u>		
	Printed Name of Preparer	Signature of Preparer	

Defendant.

BLACK & LOBELLO

		00/01/2015 06.23.42 P
	RPLY BLACK & LoBello John D. Jones, Esq.	Alm & Chin
	Nevada State Bar No. 6699 10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300	CLERK OF THE COURT
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
	Telephone Number: (702) 869-8801 Fax Number: (702) 869-2669	
	Email Address: jjones@blacklobello.com	
	Attorneys for Plaintiff,	
,	KERSTAN HUBBS	
	-	
	DISTRICT FAMILY I CLARK COUN	DIVISION
	KERSTAN MICONE,	CASE NO.: D-08-388334-D
	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: J
	vs.	
	MICHAEL MICONE,	

### PLAINTIFF'S REPLY AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S COUNTERMOTION

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, KERSTAN MICONE, currently HUBBS ("KERSTAN"), by and through her counsel of record, JOHN JONES, ESQ., with Black and LoBello Attorneys at Law, and brings PLAINTIFF'S REPLY AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S COUNTERMOTION.

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This response and this opposition are based upon the Introduction, Points and Authorities, any and all pleadings and papers on file in this matter, and any oral representation that may take place at the hearing on June 4, 2015.

DATED this day of June, 2015.

Respectfully submitted:

BLACK & LOBELLO

John D. Jones Esq. Nevada Bar No. 006699

107/77 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300

as Vegas, Nevada 89135

(702) 869-8801

Attorneys for Plaintiff KERSTAN HUBBS

I.

### **INTRODUCTION**

On September 14<sup>th</sup> of 2014, Defendant, MICHAEL MICONE ("MICHAEL"), filed a motion to modify custody concerning the parties' eldest daughter, BELLA. KERSTAN had physical custody of BELLA, but both parties had decided to enroll her in a private Catholic School in Reno, Nevada in order to further BELLA's academic learning environment. While attending school, BELLA stayed with her paternal grandparents: Charles and Carol Burr.

KERSTAN opposed MICHAEL's motion and countermotioned for status quo on October 1, 2014.

On March 31, 2015, this Honorable Court issued an order from the hearing on January 15, 2015. The most important ruling being that physical custody of the parties' eldest daughter BELLA be modified, with the Court granting physical custody to the paternal grandparents.

On April 13, 2014, KERSTAN timely motioned the Court to reconsider or in the alternative petitioned the court to set aside the order. KERSTAN requested an evidentiary hearing to obtain a decision on the merits with all factual information before the Court.

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On May 1, 2015, MICHAEL opposed KERSTAN's motion to reconsider et al. and countermotioned for sanctions and attorney's fees.

KERSTAN believes MICHAEL is filing this opposition and countermotion solely to keep the current orders in place, which do not order him to financially support BELLA by court order.

MICHAEL has not opposed the order in any manner, although it is contrary to his motion to modify custody because the original motion was never about obtaining custody of BELLA, but rather eliminating his requirement to pay child support for BELLA.

KERSTAN believes that MICHAEL does not want an evidentiary hearing as this may support her arguments and motion to reconsider or in the alternative her petition to set aside.

II.

### **POINT AND AUTHORITIES**

KERSTAN would like to briefly respond to various arguments and interpretations of Nevada law provided to the Court in MICHAEL's recent opposition and countermotion under Part One "Response to Opposition". In Part Two, KERSTAN will provide her opposition to MICHAEL's countermotion for sanctions, his attorney's fees, costs and related matters.

### PART ONE – RESPONSE TO OPPOSITION

A SCHEDULE OF ARREARS IS REQUIRED WHEN A MOVING PARTY **A.** ALLEGES THE OTHER PARTY IS IN AREARS IN PAYMENT OF PERIODIC CHILD SUPPORT.

EDCR 5.33 SPEAKS to a Schedule of Arrears during motions for judgment due to arrears in periodic payments of child support. It states that:

> "In any case where a party alleges the other party is in arrears in payment of periodic child support, ... and requests relief by motion, that party (emphasis added) shall file with the motion a schedule of arrears showing when each periodic payment was due and how much was paid, if any, on the due date..."

It goes on to state that the schedule should be on a court approved form.

KERSTAN did not request relief by motion; not back at the March 25th Child Support Hearing or at the June 26th hearing before Judge Pollock in 2013 or in the current opposition and

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countermotion before the Court. Rather, KERSTAN assigned her child support to the State of Nevada for enforcement once MICHAEL fell behind in payment as ordered under the parties' decree. It is important to note that MICHAEL has motioned the Court and challenged arrears; not KERSTAN.

The State of Nevada, by way of the District Attorney's office collects and disburses child support and reports THIS data or information under NRS 125B.160. The DA, by way of the Division of Welfare and Supportive Services of the Department of Health and Human Services, has provided MICHAEL a schedule of arrears and MICHAEL continuously does not explain to the Court why that is not sufficient, but rather turns and points a finger at KERSTAN. MICHAEL clearly states he is contesting the arrears with the DA's office. If MICHAEL's counsel is correct, that the DA does not "represent her", then why does KERSTAN need to answer MICHAEL when the DA furnishes a report to him, does KERSTAN speak for the DA? KERSTAN has never been ordered to produce a Schedule of Arrears and would be happy to do so, but does not believe she has been obligated to do so, especially when she has not requested relief by motion. If MICHAEL does not agree to the arrears MICHAEL can provide evidence that contradicts the DA's findings and challenge the report. MICHAEL is the moving party and must do some work on this matter himself.

MICHAEL argues that child support arrears were paid under the transfer of underwater real property. The property was a liability, draining additional funds from KERSTAN each month as she fulfilled MICHAEL's obligation of making a monthly mortgage payment on the Graeagle "Smith Creek" property. MICHAEL stubbornly refused to transfer the property and even said that he would "rather see it burn" then for KERSTAN to own the land.

All the Court has to do is follow the math and see the land did not have any equity and was not a form of consideration for the late arrears; the land was a liability. Prior to KERSTAN taking ownership of the land, MICHAEL did state that he would "help" her make the payment and he would pay ½ of the mortgage and that they would be partners, he pleaded with KERSTAN to inform the DA. However, MICHAEL never paid anything on the land and this "help" was a condition of any waiver on KERSTAN's part. KERSTAN represented to the DA

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that they were looking at options to the late arrears on real property. KERSTAN clearly represented to the DA that any such arrangement would result in the formal drafting of an operating agreement in writing, but this never took place because MICHAEL did not provide any support to KERSTAN or function as a partner in terms of sharing any of the liability.

Lastly, KERSTAN has included a Custodian Financial Audit from the DA's office. This audit reflects \$2,854.00 in arrears, \$1,306.71 in interest, and \$285.60 in penalties, totaling \$4,446.31. See Exhibit 1 – District Attorney Case No. UPI-249753200A. The Court will see that MICHAEL paid nearly \$10,005.83 during the month of November of 2014 (page 9 of 10). These funds were paid because the DA's office would not let MICHAEL have a new passport issued to visit an old acquaintance in Costa Rica. As the trip was important to MICHAEL, the funds were paid. The entire time MICHAEL had the funds, but chose not to pay the arrears until is hurt his travel plans. MICHAEL has deemed the payment of the arrears a "credit" to KERSTAN, even though the DA's office has reflected different figures on the audit. See Exhibit 2 – Email Correspondence from MICHAEL to KERSTAN 2/19/2015. MICHAEL and apparently MICHAEL's counsel attempt to stigmatize KERSTAN as "greedy to the last" apparently deferring child support owed to the children as some form of payment to KERSTAN. KERSTAN requests that the Court reflect on the purpose of child support and that these funds be interpreted correctly as support is for the parties' son MICHAEL and BELLA, this argument is not about alimony.

**B.** RES JUDICATA SHOULD NOT APPLY TO CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS UNDER CLAIM OR ISSUE PRECLUSION AS THERE WAS NO FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE MATTER, THE ISSUE ALTHOUGH MENTIONED BRIEFLY, WAS NEITHER DECIDED ON THE MERITS AND DID NOT BECOME FINAL, NOR WAS THE ISSUE ACTUALLY AND NECESSARILY LITIGATED.

MICHAEL and his counsel are correct that under Five Star Capital, Corporation v. Ruby, 124, Nev. 1048 (2008) the issue preclusion test should apply rather than the claim preclusion test as to child support arrears as there was clearly no final judgment on this matter issued by the Court, even the order lacked any mention of child support arrears. KERSTAN will not address all other matters mentioned by MICHAEL and his Counsel as these are not at issue in her motion

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for reconsideration, only that certain findings noted in the order were incorrect, specifically as it relates to the Coverdale Account. It is clear MICHAEL took \$248,593.33 in funds under accounts that were set aside for his children.

Concerning the child support arrears, under Five Star, the court has held that issue preclusion applies if: 1) the issue decided in prior litigation is identical to the issue presented in the current action; 2) the initial ruling had been on the merits and become final, 3) the party against whom the judgment is asserted had been a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation; and 4) the issue were actually and necessarily litigated. *Id* at 1055.

KERSTAN concedes that third prong is met; the current parties are the same as to the June 26<sup>th</sup> hearing. However all other prongs of Five Star are clearly not met. Under the first factor, the issue decided in the prior litigation must be identical to the issue presented in the current action; this is not the case here, we have no idea as to the amount of "arrears" briefly mentioned on record as compared to those at issue at this time as 24 months have passed since the June 2013 hearing. Under the second factor, the issue of arrears was clearly not decided on the merits. Judge Pollock did not even know the value of the property at issue, the amount due in arrears, and it was not even known if there was sufficient equity in the land to cover any arrears. This statement on record does not reflect a clear decision on the merits of child support arrears due. Under the fourth factor, the matter was not actually or necessarily litigated. In Nevada, an issue must be "actually litigated", not simply that a party had an opportunity to litigate the issue. In re Sandoval, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. 15, 232 P.3d 422, 425 (2010). KERSTAN and MICHAEL obviously did not actually litigate this issue. There was no evidence provided to the Court, the Court made no finding of fact, KERSTAN did not even have notice that MICHAEL would raise the issue of arrears as he had failed to file an opposition or countermotion. The issue of arrears came out of nowhere and was thrown into the record; this cannot be deemed a "matter actually litigated", even if KERSTAN was provided notice that this was going to be lumped into the hearing, under Nevada law, simply having the opportunity to litigate does not mean it was "actually litigated."

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C. MICHAEL AND HIS COUNSEL MISAPPLY ROONEY V. ROONEY AS THE HOLDING DOES NOT APPLY TO NON-MOVING PARTIES UNDER A MOTION TO MODIFY CUSTODY, THEREFORE KERSTAN WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE "ADEQUATE CAUSE" AND DENIAL OF THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS HARMFUL TO BELLA.

This is the second time MICHAEL's counsel misapplies a Nevada court holding to misconstrue the court. See Page 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's Brief Reply to Defendant' Reply to Opposition concerning the application of McMonigle v. McMonigle 110 Nev. 1407, 887 P.2d 742 (1994). MICHAEL's counsel states that Kerstan has not met the standard in Rooney v. Rooney, 109 Nev. 540 (1993) and that KERSTAN failed to demonstrate "adequate cause" for holding a hearing. However, the real holding states that the district court may "deny a motion to modify custody without holding a hearing unless the moving party demonstrates "adequate cause" for holding a hearing." KERSTAN was not the moving party asking for the Court to modify custody; the moving party was MICHAEL. Thus it was proper to deny MICHAEL's motion for lack of adequate cause. This holding does not apply to a non-moving party who simply wants to keep the same custody that is already in place, which was Kerstan maintaining primary custody. The Court has stated that "adequate cause" arises where the moving party presents a prima facie case for modification. To constitute a prima facie case it must be shown that: 1) the facts alleged in the affidavits are irrelevant to the grounds for modification; and 2) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching. Id. at 543. Rooney v. Rooney should not be used against a non-moving party who is not seeking modification.

D. THE HOLDING IN MASONRY AND TILE CONTRACTORS IS NOT LIMITED TO "DIFFERENT EVIDENCE", AS NEW ISSUES OF LAW AND CLEARLY ERRONEOUS DECISIONS ALSO CALL FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDERS ISSUED BY THE COURT AND KERSTAN HAS REQUESTED AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO PROVIDE "DIFFERENT EVIDENCE" NEEDED.

In response to MICHAEL's argument that the motion to reconsider should not be heard because KERSTAN has not offered any "new evidence" to indicate that the Court's decision should be altered. Notwithstanding the fact that a motion to reconsider is proper also when there are new issues of law presented to the Court, see Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 402, 405,

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551 P.2d 244, 246 (1976), a motion to reconsider is also proper to grant if it is clearly erroneous. KERSTAN has stated that the current order violates Nevada statute and court precedent and is requesting an evidentiary hearing so that proper evidence can be placed before the Court. Ironically, MICHAEL and his counsel fail to see that KERSTAN is requesting an evidentiary hearing so that the Court can review additional evidence that is contradictory to the Court's findings. The irony is that MICHAEL is arguing that under Rooney there was not adequate cause to have an evidentiary hearing and then turns around and argues that the lack of production of evidence from KERSTAN under *Moore* should be used against her to keep the Court from actually looking at material facts pertinent to change in custody and to other issues raised in KERSTAN's current motion.

### THE APPLICATION OF A 'DE FACTO' PHYSICAL CUSTODY CHANGE E. UNDER RIVERO LEADS TO AN ABSURD OUTCOME AND SHOULD NOT BE ROTELY APPLIED, ESPECIALLY WHEN OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE PERSUASIVE HOLDINGS FOR THE CURRENT FACT PATTERN AT ISSUE.

In response to MICHAEL and his counsel's argument of "de facto physical custody" under Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410 (2009), KERSTAN would like to demonstrate that the current fact pattern at issue (i.e. child staying with grandparents while away at school) is very different than the fact pattern in Rivero where the child was staying with mom and dad during the week. MICHAEL and his counsel are correct that KERSTAN has used California precedent to support her argument of custodial time allocation while a child is away at school. This is merely because Nevada does not have a case on point that speaks to this issue. It is important to note in *Rivero* the dissent by Justice Pickering concerning "the formulaic approach in *Rivero*." Court-mandated and developed formulas, similar to the formula in Rivero, "are difficult to change...and a bad rule of law can take a long time to return to the court..." The rote application of Rivero proposed by MICHAEL and his counsel leads to an absurd result: if you send your child away to attend school and this requires the child to stay overnight more than 146 days of the year away from home, then the custodial parent will lose physical custody to the person or institution which houses the child. In Nevada, a student can plan on attending school 180 days out of the year. See NRS 388.090. Therefore, parents who choose this option will lose

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physical custody of their children on a "de facto" basis. That presumption leads to a clearly absurd outcome.

### **PART TWO – OBJECTIONS**

A. MICHAEL SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AS A SANCTION AS HIS OPPOSITION TO KERSTAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ET AL. WAS NOT NECESSARY AND KERSTAN DID NOT BRING HER MOTION WITHOUT REASONABLE GROUNDS OR TO HARASS THE PREVAILING PARTY.

Under Nevada law, the district court may award attorney fees in a post-divorce action as part of its continuing jurisdiction. Halbrook v. Halbrook, 114 Nev. 1455, 971 P.2d 1262 (1998) (recognizing that a district court has the authority to award attorney fees in post-divorce proceedings involving child custody); see also NRS 125.150(3) (providing that the district court may award attorney fees in a divorce proceeding when fees are in issue in the pleadings). Moreover, under NRS 18.010(2)(b), a court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party if the court finds that the opposing party's claim was brought or maintained without reasonable grounds. Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 859-60, 138 P.3d 525, 532-33 (2006).

The district court may award attorney fees as a sanction under NRS 18.010(2)(b) as mentioned and also under NRCP 11 and EDCR 7.60(b) if it concludes that a party brought a frivolous claim. Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 441, 216 P.3d 213, 234 (2009). The district court must determine if there was any credible evidence or reasonable basis for the claim at the time of filing. Semenza v. Caughlin Crafted Homes, 111 Nev. 1089, 1095, 901 P.2d 684, 687-88 (1995) (discussing NRS 18.010(2)(b)). Although a district court has discretion to award attorney fees as a sanction, there must be evidence supporting the district court's finding that the claim or defense was unreasonable or brought to harass. Id.

What is plainly obvious is that there is not a "prevailing party" concerning the recent order issued by the Court. KERSTAN requests that that Court analyze why MICHAEL and his counsel may have filed an objection to KERSTAN's motion to reconsider when MICHAEL was not granted the relief he initially requested concerning his motion to modify custody, which was physical custody of BELLA? It is clearly obvious to everyone: family members, friends, and

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most likely all parties to this action, their counsel, and hopefully the Court, that all MICHAEL is concerned about is that KERSTAN not receive child support for BELLA; not that he actually have physical custody of BELLA. The current order provides the exact escape clause that MICHAEL is looking for, thus you see MICHAEL failing to fight for custody, but rather attempting to interfere with KERSTAN's request for reconsideration and petition to set aside as he is fearful that the judge may change her mind. If anyone should be receiving attorney's fees it should be KERSTAN for having to respond to MICHAEL's objections and oppose his countermotion on file that are disingenuous and simply about money.

KERSTAN did not bring or maintain her claim without reasonable grounds. mother would not ask a judge to reconsider a change of physical custody of her first born child? This is the most serious and adverse action that KERSTAN has encountered pertaining to the parties' entire divorce proceeding and all subsequent issues that have arisen in Court thereafter. Furthermore, MICHAEL has represented to KERSTAN throughout the pendency of these proceedings that he would prefer that BELLA reside with KERSTAN and that his real grief or issue is with the issue that BELLA is staying with his parents. See Exhibit 3 - Email correspondence from Mike to Kerstan. All of a sudden, MICHAEL is completely fine with BELLA staying at his parents' house, really?

For these reasons stated herein, MICHAEL's attorney should not be awarded attorney's fees as this opposition and countermotion are simply to prevent MICHAEL from paying child support and to harass KERSTAN.

DATED this day of June, 2015.

> Respectfully submitted, BLACK & LOBEILIO

Nevada State Bar No. 006699

107/17 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300

Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

KEŔSTAN HUBBS

# BLACK & LOBELLO

10777 West Twain Avenue, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 (702) 869-8801 FAX: (702) 869-2669

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of June, 2015 I served a true and correct copy of PLAINTIFF'S REPLY AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S COUNTERMOTION, upon each of the parties by electronic service through Wiznet, the Eighth Judicial District Court's e-filing/e-service system, pursuant to N.E.F.C.R. 9; and by depositing a copy of the same in a sealed envelope in the United States Mail, Postage Pre-Paid, addressed as follows:

> Donn W. Prokopius, Esq. PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY 931 South Third Street Las Vegas, NV 89101 Email for Service: general@pandblawyers.com Attorneys for Defendant

# Exhibit 1



# CLARK COUNTY OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Family Support Division - Enforcement I-Enforcement Team 3

### STEVEN B. WOLFSON

District Attorney

1900 E. Flamingo Rd., Suite 100 • Las Vegas, NV 89119 • 702-671-9200 • Fax: (702) 366-2328 • TDD: 702-385-7486

MARY-ANNE MILLER County Counsel

TERESA LOWRY
Assistant District Attorney

CHRISTOPHER LALLI
Assistant District Attorney

ROBERT DASKAS
Assistant District Attorney

April 24, 2015

KERSTAN DAWN HUBBS 1319 MINUET ST HENDERSON NV 89052

Re: KERSTAN HUBBS vs. Michael Micone

Our file no.: UPI-249753200A

Enclosed is an order or correspondence from the out of state office.
Please advise this office of any updates as to Respondent's whereabouts and/or employment.
Please complete the enclosed paperwork and return to our office as soon as possible.
Please advise this office of any direct payments you have received from the Respondent.
Enclosed is insurance information and/or claim forms required for the child(ren)'s coverage.
<ul> <li>Health insurance is not available through the Respondent's employer. If the Respondent's employment status should change, we will review this matter again.</li> <li>Is the child(ren) living with the Respondent? If so, from what date and for how long?</li> </ul>
A status request has been sent to the out of state office. Once a response is received, we will forward it to you.
Please provide the following documents to this office:
<ul> <li>Since we are no longer collecting current child support, this office will no longer be providing spousal support services. This meets federal case processing requirements.</li> <li>We are requesting permission to close our case for the following reason:</li> </ul>
The Non-custodial parent has been located.
Other: As per your request, please see enclosed audit for your family court case.
Sincerely,
Todd Bronson
Family Support Specialist

# Custodian Financial Audit (par 2 of 2)

Run Date: 04/24/2015

Run Time: 07:02 AM

NCP Name: Micone, Michael
CST Name: Hubbs, Kerstan

Case ID: 249753200A

Docket#: R-12-174206-R

Prepared By: BRONSOT
Last Updated By: WOODWAM

Office: 02

**Prepared By Date:** 04/24/2015 **Last Updated By Date:** 04/23/2015

Provision Type: Child Support

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Adjudicated	Penaity	Running	Balance	000		0.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.0	00.0	00.0	000	****		0.00	0.00	0.001	0.001	0.001	000			0.0018	0.00 19	0.00 20
Adjud	Pen		Amount	00.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.0	00.0	0.00	000	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.00	0.00	00.0	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Unadjudicated Danalty	arcy		balance	0.00	000	00.0	193.60	193.60	193.60	193.60	193.60	193.60	193.60	193 KN		387.20	387.20	580.80	580.80	580.80	580.80	580.80	00.00	280.80	580.80	580.80
		Adjust	AMOUNT	0.00	000	F	193.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.0	10	193.bU	0.00	193.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	00 0	20.0	00.0	0.00	0.00
Adjudicated Interest			מומונפ	0.00	0.00	000	00.0	0.00	90.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.0	00.0	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	000	00.0	0.00	0.00
Adjud Inte	:	Adjust	_	0.00	00.0	UU U	00.0	00.0	00.0	00.00	0.00	0.00	00.00	00.00	000		00.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	000	00 0	0.00	0.00
dicated (On AA)	c	Kunning Balance		0.00	0.00	0.00	UU U	00.0	00.00	0.00	00.00	0.00	00.00	00.00	0.00	000	00.0	00.0	000	0.00	0.00	00.0	0.00	00.0	200	0.00
Unadjudicat Interest (On	A	Adjust Amount		00.00	00.00	0.00	UU U	00.0	00.00	00.0	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.0	00.0	00.0	00.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.0	000	000
Interest (On UA)	Dunning	Balance	00.0	0.00	0.00	16.94	16.94	16.94	33.88	22.00	22.00	00.00	50.82	50.82	76.23	76.23	110 11	11.011		440.41	143.99	143.99	143.99	177.87	177 87	10.77
Interest	Admict	Amount	000	0.5	0.00	16.94	00.0	00.0	16 94	000	00.0	20.5	10.94	0.00	25.41	0.00	33.88	00.0	00.0	22.00	33.00	0.00	0.00	33.88	000	2
	Paid		000		0.00	0.00	0.00	1936.00	00.00	00.0	6		0.00		0.00	00.0	0.00	000	1936 00	000	00.0	0.00	1936.00	00.00	00.0	17
Event Current		oue	00'0	1626.00	1230.00	0.00	1936.00	00.0	0.00	1936.00	00.0	000	20.00	1930,00	0.00	1936.00	00.0	1936.00	00.0	00.0	00.0	1936.00	0.00	00.00	1936.00	0
Event	Type		~	C	>	Σ	0	a	M	0	c.	Σ		1	Σ	0	Σ	0	۵	Σ		5	۵	Σ	0	
Event	Date		11/01/2011	11/01/2011	7707777	11/30/2011	12/01/2011	12/27/2011	12/31/2011	01/01/2012	01/30/2012	01/31/2012	02/01/2012	02/00/2012	7107/67/70	03/01/2012	303/31/2012	04/01/2012	04/02/2012	34/30/2012	05/01/2012	77/07/2015	15/15/2012	)5/31/2012	06/01/2012	
			y{	2	,	7	4	2		7	Ø	5	Ē	7 7	Ī	12(	13(	14(	150	160				190	200	

4/24/2015

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	Event	Event	Current		Interest		Interest	t (On AA)	Adjua	Adjudicated	Unadju Pen	Unadjudicated Penalty	Adjud Pen	Adjudicated Penalty	
		) )	Due	ე დ ნ	Adjust Amount	Running	Adjust	Running	Adjust	Running	Adjust	2	Adjust		
2	21 06/04/2012	д.	00.00	1936,00	0.00	177.87	0.00		DO C	Dalance	Amo	Balan	Amount	Bala	
읬	)6/30/2012	Σ	00'0	00.00	33.88	211.75	00 0		00.0			08C	0.00		77
	7/01/2012	0	1936.00	0.00	00.00	1	0.00		00.0	0.00	o c	580	0.00		NAVAGORA AND A
유	7/11/2012	CL.	0.00	1936.00	00.0	1	000		00.0	0.00	) í	580.80	0.00	0.00	23
읁	7/31/2012	Σ	0.00	00.00		- 1	00.0		0.00	0.00	0	580	0.00	0.00	24
9	18/01/2012	0	1936.00	Ċ	00.00	245.63	00.0		0.00	0.00	0	580.	0.00	00'0	25
2	18/08/2012	С	00.0	1.936.00	0.00	245.63			00.0	0.00		580.80	00.00	0.00	26
<u>~</u>	18/31/2012	M	00.00	00.00	33.88	279.51			00.0	0.00	0.00	580.80	0.00	00.00	27
0	19/01/2012	0	1936.00		0.00	279.51	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	580.80	0.00	0.00	
2	9/27/2012	a	00.00	1936.00	0.00	279.51	0.00		00.0	0.00		580.80	0.00	0.00	
0	19/30/2012	×	0.00	00.00	33.88	313.39	000		00.0	0.00	0.00	580.80	0.00	0.00	
	0/01/2012	0	1936.00	00.00	0.00	313,39	00.0		00.0	0.00	• 1	580.80	0.00	0.00	
<del>-</del> 1	0/31/2012	M	0.00	00.00	42.35	355.74	0.00	00.0	0.00	00.0	o l	580.80	0.00	0.00	
	1/01/2012	0	1936.00	0.00	0.00	355.74	000	00.0	00.0	00.00	חי	7/4,40	0.00	0.00	33
	1/15/2012	습	0.00	1000.00	00.00	355.74	0.00	0.00	00.0	0.00	0.00	//4.40	0.00	0.00	
+	1/30/2012	Σ	0.00	0.00	46.44	402.18	00.0	0 0	00 0	00.0		7.74.40	0.00	0.00	
	2/01/2012	0	1936.00	0.00	0.00	402.18	00.0	0.00	00.0	0.00	93.bU	868.00	0.00	0.00	36
<del>-</del>	2/06/2012	Ъ	00.00	1300,00	0.00	402.18	000	00.0	80.0	00.0	0.00	868.00	0.00	0.00	37
7.	2/31/2012	Σ	00.00	00.0	49.23	451 41	00.0	00.0	00.0				0.00	0.00	38
Ö.	1/01/2013	0	1428.00	0.00	00.0	451.41	00.0	00.0	0.00		63.60		0.00	0.00	39
O	1/07/2013	a	00.0	800.00	00.0	451 41	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	40
O	1/22/2013	a.	00.0	1000.00	800	451 41	00.0	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	٠,	0.00	0.00	
O	1/31/2013	Σ	00.0	0.00	47.60	499.01	00.0	00.0		0.00	0.00		0.00		42
Ö	2/01/2013	0	1428.00	0.00	00.0	499.01	0.00	0.00	٠.		0.00	• •	00.00		43
Ö	2/01/2013	۵	0.00	900.006	0.00	499.01	00.0	00.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	٠.	0.00		44
Ö	2/07/2013	a	0.00	800.00	0.00	499.01	0.00	00.0		20.00	3.3	* 5	0.00		45
Ö	2/21/2013	۵	00.0	500.00	0.00	499.01	00.0	00.00	0.00		0.00		0.00		46
0	2/25/2013	۵	0.00	600.000	00.0	400 01	00.0	00.0	00.0	00.0 00.0	0.00		0.00	0.00	4.7
12	2/28/2013	Σ	0.00	0.00	41.60	540.61	00.0	00.0	00.0		0.00		0.00		48
0	3/01/2013	0	1428.00	0.00	00.0	540.61	00.0	00.00	0.00	0.00	' 1	- 1	0.00	00.00	49
10	3/06/2013	1	00.0	400.00	00.0	540 61	00.0	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00		50
18	3/18/2013	a.		700.00	00.00	540.61	00.0	00.0	0.00	0.00			0.00		51
03	1/25/2013	d	0.00	440.00	00.0	540 61	000	00.0	0.00	0.00	00.00	931.60	0.00		52
						70.015	00.0	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	0.00	53

Event Current	Current NCP	Current NCP	باعتبيت	Unadjue Interest	-	dicated (On UA)	Unadjudica Interest (On	idicated: (On AA)	Adjud Inte	Adjudicated Interest	Unadju Pen	Unadjudicated Penalty	Adjuc	Adjudicated Penalty	
Type	Type Due Paid Adjust	Due Paid Adjust	Adjust Amount		Runnir	<b>D</b> 0	Adjust	Rung	Adjust	Running	Adjust	Rumming	Adjust		
581	M 0.00 0.00 41.11 581	0.00 41.11 581	41.11 581	581	581,	72	00.00		0.00		Amount	Balance	Amount	Bala	
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P 0.00 1678.00 0.00 581	P 0.00 1678.00 0.00 581	1678.00 0.00 581	0.00 581	581	581.	.72	00.00	0.00	00.00	00.0	0.00		000		
P 0.00 501.37 0.00	P 0.00 501.37 0.00	501.37 0.00	0.00		581	.72	00.0	00'0	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00		
M 0.00 0.00 37.82	M 0.00 0.00 37.82	0.00 37.82	37.82		61		00.00	0.00	0.00	00'0	0.00	931.60	0.00		
0.00 0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00		[9]		0.00	0.00	0.00	00.0	0.00	931.60	0.00		
00.0 00.0 00.0 M	00.0 00.0 00.0 M	0.00 0.00 0.000	0.00		9	619.54	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	00.00	09
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00	28.00 0.00 0.00	07.50			56.050	0.00	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	00.00	00.00	61
0.00 0.00 0.000 d	0.00 0.00 0.000 d	0.00	0.00		0 2	26,959	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	00.00	00.00	62
M 0.00 0.00 36 05	M 0.00 0.00 36 05	00.00	36.05		2 0	26.000	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	00'0	63
0 1428.00 0.00 0.00	0 1428.00 0.00 0.00	428.00 0.00 0.00	0.00		0 09	693.87	00.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00		64
P 0.00 1490.00 0.00	P 0.00 1490.00 0.00	0.00 1490.00 0.00	490.00 0.00		69	693.87	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.0	0.00	931.60	0.00		
M 0.00 0.00 36.67	M 0.00 0.00 36.67	0.00 36.67	36,67		73	730.54	00 0	000		00.0	00.0	931.60	00.00		99
O 1428.00 0.00 0.00	O 1428.00 0.00 0.00	28.00 0.00 0.00	0.00		73	730.54	0.00	0.00	0.0	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00		67
P 0.00 1490.00 0.00	P 0.00 1490.00 0.00	1490.00 0.00	0.0.0		73(	730.54	0.00	00.00	00.0	00.0	0.00	931.60	0.00	00.0	ΩΩ Ω
M 0.00 0.00 36.40	M 0.00 0.00 36.40	0.00 0.00 36.40	36.40		76	766.94	00.00	0.00	0.00	00.0	0.00	931.60	00.0	00.0	3 5
0 1428.00 0.00 0.00	0 1428.00 0.00 0.00	428.00 0.00 0.00	0.00		76(	766.94	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.0	00.0	931.60	0.00	0.00	
V 0.00 1490.00 0.00	V 0.00 1490.00 0.00	1490.00 0.00	0.00		26	766.94	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	0.00	77
M 36.13	M 36.13	0.00 0.00 36.13	36.13		38	803.07	0.00	0.00	00.0	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	0.00	73
P 0.00 1400.00	P 0.00 1400.00	0.00 0.00 0.00	0.00		Σ   č	803.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	00.00	00.00	74
00.00 00.00 M	00.00 00.00 M	0.00	00.0		ğ 6	803.07	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	0.00	32
0 1428 00 0 00 0 0 0	0 1428 00 0 00 0 0 0	00.00	00.00		٥١٥	020.93	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	931.60	0.00	0.00	76
P 0.00 1490.00	P 0.00 1490.00	1490.00	000		oʻ lòx	838 03	00.0	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	77
M 0.00 0.00 35 50	M 0.00 0.00 35 50	0.00 35 50	35 50	ת הסי	0	27.7.2	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	e.09	931.60	00.00	0.00	78
0 1478 00	0 1428 00 0 00 0 000	28 00 0 00 0	00.00	000	0 0	4.34	0.00	000	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	0.00	79
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ά	4.52	0.00	00.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	00.00	0.00	80
W 0.00 1490.00 0.00	W 0.00 1490.00 0.00	1490.00 0.60	490.00 0.00		87	874.52	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	0.00	
M 0.00 0.00 35.32	M 0.00 0.00 35.32	0.00 0.00 35.32	35.32		8	909.84	00.0	0.00	00.00	0.00	00.00	931.60	00.0	0.00	
U 1428.00 0.00 0.00	U 1428.00 0.00 0.00	4z8.00 0.00 0.00	0.00		Q. I	909.84	0.00	00.00	0.00	0.00	00.0	931.60	00.0	0.00	83
M 0.00 0.00 3r.or	M 0.00 0.00 3r.or	1490.00 0.00	0.00		O) (	909.84	0.00	0.00	00.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	00.00	84
0.00 0.00 35.05	0.00 0.00 35.05	0.00 0.00 438 00 0.00	35.05		١ رد	944.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	0.00	85
0.00 0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00 0.00	428.00 0.00 0.00	0.00		ð	944.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.00	931.60	0.00	00.0	86

4/24/2015

	Tont	FYOR	Current		Unadjudicated	dicated	Unadjudicat	dicated		Adjudicated	Unadjı	Unadjudicated	Adjud	Adjudicated	
	Date	Type	₹	֓֞֝֞֝֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓		(On UA)	ا بي	(On AA)		Interest	Per	Penalty	Pen	Penalty	
_			Due	3	Aujust	Kunning Balance	Adjust Amount	Running Balance	Adjust Amount	Running	Adjust		Adjust	Running	
Ī	02/24/2014	۵.	0.00	1,490,00	0.00	944,89	00.0	,,			Junouir	balan	AHO	Balance	
$\overline{z}$	02/28/2014	M	0.00	00.00	34.78	979.67	00.0	00 0		00.0	0.00	931.		0.00	87
Ť	03/01/2014	0	1428.00	00.0	0.00			00.0		0.00	0.00	931	Ó	0.00	88
	03/17/2014	d	00.0	1490.00			00.0	00.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.	0.00	0.00	89
H	03/31/2014	Σ	0.00	00.00	8	· E	00.0	00.0	0.00	00.0	0.00		0.00	0.00	06
Ĭ	04/01/2014	0	1428.00	0.00	000	1014 17	00.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	0.00	91
	04/30/2014	Σ	0.00	00.0	20.00 A0.75	7 7 7 0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	931.60	0.00	0.00	92
╁	)5/01/2014		1478 00	00.0	000	7) C	0.00		0.00	0.00	142.80	1074.40	00'0	0.00	93
H	)5/02/2014		000	1490.00	0.00	- 1	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	1074,40	00.0	00.00	94
1	05/31/2014		000	00.07		1004.92	0.00	0.00	0.00	00'0	0.00	1074.40	00.0	0.00	95
1	)6/01/2014		1428.00		i lo		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1074.40	00.00	0.00	96
98	)6/09/2014		- i		00.0		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1074.40	00.00	0.00	76
10	)6/30/2014	-	<b></b>		30 77	2 V U	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1074.40	00.0	0.00	98
1000	7/01/2014	1	1428.00	00.0		1135.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.00	0.00	1074.40	00.0	0.00	66
10	17/01/2014		000	1590 00	00.0	~ <b>!</b> ~	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	1074.40	00.00	00.00	100
20	17/31/2014	1	000		20.00	3	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	1074.40	0.00	0.00	101
1030	08/01/2014	1	1478 00			۲	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	1074.40	0.00	00.0	102
1040	08/05/2014	d	000	( 8	00.0	j	0.00		0.00	0.00	00.00	1074.40	0.00	00:00	103
1050	08/22/2014	<u>a</u>	8 8	25	2000	4 7	00.0		0.0	0.00	0.00	1074.40	0.00	00:00	104
18	8/31/2014	Σ		ء اع	00.0	4/1	00.0		0.00	0.00	0.00	1074.40	0.00	00.00	105
1070	09/01/2014	; c	1428.00	00.0	51.02		0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	1074.40	0.00		106
1080	09/30/2014	Σ		00.0		405.	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	1074.40	0.00	0.00	107
1091	10/01/2014	C	1428 00	00.00	00.70	243.	0.00	• #	0.00	0.00	142.80	1217.20	0.00	00.00	108
		a		* *	00.0		00.0	• 1	0.00	0.00	00.00	1217.20	00'0	00.0	109
		c.	0.00	\$ 5	00.0	17.042.7	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	1217.20	0.00	0.00	1.10
	0/31/2014	Σ	00.0	00 0	00.00	1070 60	0.00		00.0	0.00	0.00	1217.20	0.00	0.00	11
一		0		00.0	0.7.30	1273 60	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	1217.20	0.00	0.00	112
4	1/17/2014	۵.	C	490	00.0	1373 60	0.00		0.00	0.00		1217.20	0.00	0.00	113
5	1/21/2014	С			00.0	1070 60	00.0		00.00	0.00		1217.20	0.00	0.00	114
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8 12/	2/31/2014	Σ	0.00		4.02	27.7	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	00.00	0.00	117
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4/24/2015

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			) 3 1		Amount	Balance	Amount	Ralance	Adjust	Kunning	Adjust	Amount Balance Amount Ralance Amount Balance	Adjust	Running	
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Total Unadjudicated Interest on UA: \$1306.71 Total Unadjudicated Interest on AA:

\$0.00

\$0.00 Total Interest: \$1306.71 Total Adjudicated Interest:

\$0.00 Total Unadjudicated Penalty: \$285.60 Total Adjudicated Penalty:

Total Penalty: \$285.60

**Total Arrears:** \$2854.00

Total Interest: \$1306.71 Total Penalty: \$285.60

4/24/2015

Custodian Financial Audit (part 1 of 2)

Run Date: 04/24/2015 Run Time: 07:02 AM

> NCP Name: Micone, Michael CST Name: Hubbs, Kerstan

Case ID: 249753200A

Docket#: R-12-174206-R

Prepared By: BRONSOT

Last Updated By: WOODWAM

Office: 02

Prepared By Date: 04/24/2015 Last Updated By Date: 04/23/2015

Provision Type: Child Support

	Event	Current	NCP	Unadjudicated Arrears	ed Arrears	Adjudicated	d Arrears	
	Туре	Due	Paid	Adjustment Amount	Running	Adjustment	Running	
11/01/2011		0.00	0,00	1936 00	1038 00		Dalance	
11/01/2011	0	1936 00	000	00000	00.00.00	000	0.00	
11/30/2011	Σ	0000		1330.00	38/2.00	0.00	00.00	N
٠, ١	Ξ (	0.00	00.00	00.0	3872.00	00.0	00.0	3
17/01/2011	2	1936.00	0.00	1936.00	5808.00	00.0	000	7
12/27/2011	d	0.00	1936.00	-1,936,00	3872.00	000	00.0	r L
12/31/2011	Σ	00.0	0.00	00.00	3872.00	00.0	0.00	
01/01/2012	0	1936.00	00:00	1936 00	5808 00	0.00	0.00	٦
01/30/2012	Ь	0.00	1936,00	-1936 00	3872.00	0.00	0.00	1
01/31/2012	Σ	00.0	0.00	00.0	3872.00	00.0	0.00	20
02/01/2012	0	1936.00	00 0	1936 00	2072.00	0.00	0.00	ما
02/29/2012	Σ	0.00	000	00.00	00.000	0.00	0.00	9
03/01/2012	0	1936.00	000	1036 00	3006.00	0.00	00.00	訂
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٦			0.00	00.0	//44.00	0.00	0.00	13
2102/10/04/0		1936.00	0.00	1936.00	9680.00	00.0	00.0	4
04/02/2012	۵	0.00	1936.00	-1936.00	7744.00	50.0	00.0	ű
04/30/2012	Σ	00.0	00.0	0.00	7744.00	000	00.0	7 4
05/01/2012	0	1936.00	0.00	1936.00	9680.00	000		
05/1.5/2012	ď	00.00	1936,00	-1936,00	7744 NN	00.0		13
05/31/2012	Σ	00.0	0.00	00.0	7744 00	00.0		2 5
06/01/2012	0	1936.00	00.00	1936.00	00 0890	0.00		2
06/04/2012	a	000	00.3601	00000	00.0000	0.00	0.00	70
	*	50.5	DD:0567	-1936.00	7744.00	0.00	00.0	21

- Apply	Amount	£				りるりましょう	
	Due	, Q	Adjustment Amount	Running	Adjustment	Running	
	0.00	0.00	0.00	7744 00		balance	
	1936.00	00.00	1936.00	9680.00		0.00	77 6
	0.00	1936.00	-1936.00	7744 OD		0.00	3 2
	0.00	00'0		7744.00		00.0	
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	00.0	1936.00	1936.00	7744,00		00.0	
	0.00	00.00	0.00	7744.00		00.0	
	1936.00	00.00	1936.00	9680.00	00.0	00.0	
	0.00	1936.00	-1936.00	7744.00	000	00.0	
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	0.00	00.0	0.00	9680.00	00.0	00.0	3 %
	1936.00	00.0	1936.00	11616.00	0.00	00.0	34
	0.00	1000.00	-1000.00	10616.00	00.00	0.00	35.
	0.00	0.00	00.0	10616.00	00.00	0.00	38
	1936.00	0.00	1936.00	12552.00	00.0	0.00	37
	0.00	1300.00	-1300.00	11252.00	00.0	0.00	38
	0.00	0.00	00:00	11252.00	00.00	0.00	39
	1428.00	0.00	1428.00	12680.00	00.00	0.00	40
	0.00	800.00	-800.00	11880.00	00.0	00.00	4.1
	0.00	1,000.00	-1000.00	10880.00	0.00	00.0	42
+	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.0880.00	00.0	0.00	43
	1428.00	0.00	1428.00	12308.00	00.0	0.00	44
	0.00	900.00	-900.00	11408.00	00.0		45
	0.00	800.00	-800.00	10608.00	00.00	0.00	46
+	0.00	500.00	-500.00	10108.00	00.00	00.00	4.7
	0.00	600.00	-600.00	9508.00	0.00	00.00	48
02/28/2013 M	0.00	00.0	0.00	9508.00	00.00		49
03/01/2013 0	1428.00	00.0	1428.00	10936.00	0.00		20
03/06/2013 P	0.00	400.00	-400.00	1.0536.00	0.00		25
	0.00	700.00	-700.00	9836.00	0.00		22
03/25/2013 P	0.00	440.00	-440.00	9396.00	0.00		53
-	0.00	00.00	00.0	9396.00	0.00	00.00	54
04/01/2013 0	1428.00	00.00	1428.00	10824.00	0.00	00.00	55

Event		ACP NCP	Unadjudicated	ed Arrears	Adjudicated	d Arrears	
Zype	Due	Paid	Adjustment Amount	Running	Adjustment	Running	1
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	00.00	1528.00	-1528.00		00.0	00.0	
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	1428.00	0.00	1428.00	9972.63	00.0	00.0	
	0.00	1528.00	-1528.00		00.0	00.0	
	0.00	0.00	0	8444.63	00.0	00.0	
	1428.00	0.00	1428.00	9872.63	00.0	00.00	0 t
	0,00	1,490.00	-1490.00	8382.63	00.0	00 0	
_	0.00	0.00	0.00	8382.63	0.00	00.0	
	1428.00	0.00	1428.00	9810.63	0.00	0.00	
_	0.00	1490.00	-1490.00	8320.63	00.0	00.0	
	0.00	0.00	0.00	8320.63	00.00	0.00	70
_	1428.00	0.00	1428.00	9748.63	00.00	00.00	71
-	0.00	1490.00	-1490.00	8258.63	0.00	00.00	72
	0.00	0.00	0.00	8258.63	00.00	00.0	73
_	1428.00	90.0			00.00	00.0	74
	0,00	1490.00	-1490,00	8196.63	00.00	00.0	75
-	0.00	0.00	00.00	8196.63	00.0	00.00	76
- -	1428.00	00.0	1428.00	9624.63	00.00	00.00	77
<b>-</b>  -	0.00	1490.00	-1490,00	8134,63	00.00	00.00	78
-	0.00	00.0	0.00	8134.63	00.00	0.00	79
_	1428.00	00.00	1428.00	9562.63	00.0	00.00	80
	0.00	1490.00	-1490,00	8072.63	00.00	00.00	83
_	0.00	00.00	0.00	8072.63	00.00	0.00	82
_	1428.00	0.00	1428.00	9500.63	00.00	0.00	83
_	00.00	1490.00	-1490.00	8010.63	00.00	0.00	88
_	0.00	0.00	0.00	8010.63	00.0	0.00	85
4	1428.00	0.00	1428.00	9438.63	00.00	0.00	86
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	0.00	0.00	0.00	7948.63	00.0	00.00	88
	1428.00	00.00	1428.00	9376.63	00.0	00.0	68

	Event	Event			Unadjudicated Arrears	ed Arrears	Adjudicate	ed Arreare	
	Date	Туре	Amount Due	Paid	Adjustment	Running	12	. i	
90	03/17/2014	U.	0.00	1490 00	1100 M	Dalance	Amount	Balance	
1	03/31/2014	Σ	00.0	00.00	1490.00	7886.63	0	0.00	90
35	04/01/2014	0	1428 00	00.0	0.00	/886.63	0	0.00	91
93	04/30/2014	Σ	000	00.0	1428.00	9314.63	0.00	0.00	92
94	05/01/2014	С	1428 00	0.00	00.0	9314.63	0.00	0.00	93
95	05/02/2014	) a	20.00	0.00	1428.00	10742.63	0.00	00.00	94
96	05/31/2014	. Σ	00.0	1490.00	-1490.00	9252.63	0.00	00.00	95
97	06/01/2014	: 0	1478 00	0.00	0.00	9252.63	0.00	0.00	96
96	06/09/2014	۵	0.00	1590.00	1428.00	10680.63	0.00	0.00	97
99	06/30/2014	W	00.0	00.00	1590.00	9090.63	0.00	0.00	98
100	07/01/2014	0	1428.00	0.00	0.00	9090.63	0.00	00.00	66
101	07/01/2014	) G.	00.0271	0.00	1428.00	10518.63	0.00	00.00	100
102	07/31/2014	Σ	00.0	3 0		8928.63	0.00	0.00	101
103	08/01/2014	0	1428.00	00.0	0.00	8928.63	0.00		102
1.04	08/05/201.4	G.	00.0	1400 000		10356.63	0.00		103
105	08/22/2014	. а.	00:0	00.0841	1,490,00	8866.63	0.00		104
106	08/31/2014	M	0.00	00.0		22.0777	0.00	0.00	105
107	09/01/2014	0	1428,00	00.0		1220.03	0.00	0.00	106
108	09/30/2014	Σ	0.00	00.0		8054.63	0.00		107
109	10/01/2014	0	1428.00	00.0	0.00	၁ [ ျ	0.00	0.00	108
110	10/15/2014	ď	00.0	1500 00	1428.00	•	0.00	0.00	109
111	10/23/2014	d	00.0	00.000.4	1290.00		0.00	0.00	110
112	10/31/2014	Σ	00.0	1040.00	-1540.00	* 5	0.00	00.0	111
113	11/01/2014	C	1478.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	112
114	11/17/2014	) <u>C</u> .	00.037.1	1400 000	1428.00	8280.63	0.00	0.00	113
115	11/21/2014	a.	00:0	7584.00	7490,00	6790.63	0.00	00.0	114
116	11/21/2014	۵.	000	031.00	20.307	0.00	00.0	0.00	115
117	12/01/2014	. 0	1428.00	22.T.03	.508.00	-508.00	0.00	0.00	116
118	12/31/2014	Σ	00.0	00.0	00.0241	920.00	0.00		117
119	01/01/2015	0	1428.00	0.00	1478 00	220.00	0.00		118
120	01/31/2015	Σ	0.00	00.0	000	2340.00	0.00		119
121	02/01/2015	0	1428.00	0.00	1428.00	3776.00	0.00		120
122	02/24/2015	۵.	0.00	2350.00	-2350.00	1476.00	0.00		21
123	02/28/2015	Σ	00.00	0.00	00 0	1476 00	0.00		777
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<del></del>	Event	Event	Current	2	Unadjudicated Arrears	ed Arrears	Adjudicated Arrears	d Arrears	
	Date	Туре	Amount	Paid	Adjustment Amount	Running	Adjustment	Running	
124		(							
ナマテ	02/01/2013	0	1478.00	0.00	1428,00	2854 DD	000	000	50
100		* *	( )		<u> </u>			0.00 124	174
127	- 1		0.00	0.00	00.0	2854.00	UU U	3C 1 00 0	7
	Totolo:						***************************************	00.0	14
	i otals.		\$65660.00	\$65959.20	\$0.00	\$2854.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	
								)	

Total Unadjudicated: \$2854.00

Total Adjudicated: \$0.00

Total Arrears: \$2854.00

## Exhibit 2

# RE: Michael Spring Break



Kerstan Hubbs 2/19/15

To: mikemicone@gmail.com Cc: donn@pandbla...

Mike,

That is not what the DA told me the other day on the phone. They told me you had \$2,500 in arrears and that they would revoke your license (notice had been sent) and contempt issues this month. I am simply the messenger. Those inconsistencies are telling.

Kerstan

From: mikemicone@gmail.com

To: khubbs@live.com

CC: donn@pandblawyers.com

Subject: Re: Michael Spring Break

Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2015 17:08:30 -0800

Kerstan,

As well, there is no custody issue with Michael. The issue pertains to Bella not being able to be with me I have requested my attorney, Donn to notify the DA of my child support. I actually have over 8k credit. Donn has sent the documentation to the judge. more in Reno.

## Exhibit 3

have the kids with me for Presidents Holiday and Spring Break in Odd numbered years. See Decree below. RE: Spring Break - I



Mike Micone 3/28/15

To: 'Kerstan Hubbs'

Kerstan,

I am taking Carol and Chuck out of the loop.

I will talk to Bella tonight and confirm her class and tell her we are going to Vegas. I think she does better when she gets to see you. I want her to we can get. It better that we take her and do something for her break vs letting her hang out in Reno with her spend as much time with us as grandparents.

Mike

Alun D. Chrim

: 1		
1	AFFT PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ.	
3	Nevada State Bar No. 006460	
4	JEREMY R. BEASLEY, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 12176	
5	931 South Third Street	
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 474-0500 / Fax (702) 951-8022	
6	general@pandblawyers.com	
7	Attorney for Defendant, MICHAEL A. MICONE	
8		
9	t I	STRICT COURT MILY DIVISION
10		COUNTY, NEVADA
11		
12	KERSTAN D. MICONE,	
13	Plaintiff,	CASE NO.: D-08-388334-D DEPT. NO.: J
14	vs.	DEFI. NO.
15	MICHAEL A. MICONE,	DATE OF HEARING:
16		TIME OF HEARING:
17	Defendant,	
18		THE NICHAEL A MICONE
19	AFFIDAVII OF DE	FENDANT, MICHAEL A. MICONE
20	STATE OF NEVADA )	
21	COUNTY OF WASHOE )	
22	MICHAEL A. MICONE, first b	eing duly sworn, deposes and says:
23	1 That Affiant is the Defe	endant in the above-entitled matter. That I have read the
24		
25	foregoing Motion, inclu	ding the points and authorities and any exhibits attached
26	thereto, and the same are	e true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
27	2. Plaintiff, KERSTAN 1	D. MICONE (hereinafter "KERSTAN") and I were
28	divorced in Clark Cour	nty, Nevada by a Decree of divorce that was entered on

April 17, 2009. There are two minor children born as a result of the marriage, namely, Isabella Caroline Micone (Bella), born: March 26, 1998; and, Michael Joseph Micone, born: January 7, 2005 (hereinafter "Joseph").

- The older child Isabella lives in Reno, Nevada with my parents and therefore neither party has custody of her. The younger child Joseph remains living with KERSTAN in Las Vegas. I am supposed to have visitation with Joseph. However, since KERSTAN and I tried mediation following the latest round of litigation, KERSTAN had refused to let me see my son at all.
- 4. KERSTAN had Joseph and Bella the first two weeks of July of 2015. In July of 2015 KERSTAN arranged without my consent for my parents to have Joseph on my visitation time. KERSTAN sent Joseph to Reno to visit my parents but did not tell me. Bella returned to Reno at the same time. I called KERSTAN in mid July of 2015 and told KERSTAN I had Joseph's flight booked for Joseph to come to Reno for visitation with me. It was only then that KERSTAN told me that Joseph was already in Reno with my parents. I did not see my son while Joseph was visiting my parents. Joseph went back to Las Vegas and I had to fly Joseph back to Reno and I had Joseph for the last 10 days of visitation with Joseph July of 2015. Joseph went back to Las Vegas on July 26, 2015.
- 5. On August 5, 2015 we attempted mediation but were unsuccessful. After the mediation meeting I emailed KERSTAN's and asked if I could take Joseph to lunch or dinner. KERSTAN sent an email stating "no". See email of her response attached hereto as Exhibit A. KERSTAN told me I could only see Joseph according to the Decree. Over the past 6 years, if I was in town and if

Joseph was available KERSTAN and I always worked it out and I was able to see my son. Now KERSTAN is refusing to let me see Joseph at all. In 6 years there was never a problem with scheduling time that is until our failure to reach a settlement in mediation.

- I scheduled a visit with Joseph from August 16th August 23rd which was my 6. scheduled time according to the decree. I booked the flight and emailed the flight times to KERSTAN (see itinerary attached hereto as Exhibit B). This visit was particularly special because I had purchased tickets for a 49er's football game for Joseph's 10th birthday. The day Joseph was supposed to fly up KERSTAN refused to let Joseph go. I could have sought the assistance of the police but chose to avoid the drama of having the police show up a KERSTAN'S residence and try and enforce the Decree. I had to cancel the flight at the last minute. I lost \$100 These circumstances are from the non-refundable unaccompanied minor fee. Another example is examples of the games KERSTAN insists on playing. KERSTAN threatening to inform the Court that I had failed to maintain a life insurance policy for the children as required in the Decree. Her allegation would have been a lie because I have indeed maintained the policy, proof of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
- 7. I have now scheduled another visitation for September 8 through September 13, 2015, which is my next scheduled time. I sent a text letting KERSTAN know that I had scheduled visitation time with Joseph but KERSTAN said she had not heard from my attorney or her lawyer so she is refusing to let me have my son yet again. It will be 6 weeks since KERSTAN has refused to let me talk or see Joseph.

# EXHIBITA

From: Mike Micone [mailto:mikemicone@gmail.com]

**Sent:** Friday, August 14, 2015 9:39 PM **To:** Kerstan Hubbs < <a href="mailto:khubbs@live.com">khubbs@live.com</a>>

Cc: donn@pandblawyers.com
Subject: Re: Life Insurance Policy

Kerstan,

I booked the flight for Michael Sunday and I will have a police escort to pick up Michael with the decree and order. You can choose to refuse for me to have Michael and I'm sure their is a consequence for your decision.

I have set up tuition and I have set up payments. I'm sure your glad you don't have to pay anything. I have also made the payment on her car and insurance. Do you have an opinion about that as well. You usually do. See you Sunday.

Mike Micone CEO/President Micone Staffing Resources, Inc. 702-339-1113

On Aug 14, 2015, at 6:44 PM, Kerstan Hubbs <a href="khubbs@live.com">khubbs@live.com</a> wrote:

See below. Kerstan

From: mikemicone@gmail.com

To: khubbs@live.com

CC: donn@pandblawyers.com; jjones@blacklobellolaw.com

Subject: RE: Life Insurance Policy Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 16:43:22 -0700

Kerstan,

I have booked the flight for Michael on Sunday and to return to Vegas on Sunday. I emailed you both his departure and return itinerary. I am reviewing our current visitation clause in the original divorce decree as we all agree it needs to be updated. I will use as much of the current order and make adjustments as we both live in separate cities.

Let me know if those flight times work for Michael. We can adjust the time as I emailed you the conformation codes for both departure and return flights. I figured since I was paying for the flights that I would schedule his trip from Sunday to Sunday and get him home at a decent hour Sunday.

Mike I have not been able to communicate with John today. I will not be putting Michael on a flight to Reno tomorrow. I advise you to make sure you keep your flight credits and/or refund the flight at this time.

\*I know Bella has asked for her clothes and you have avoided sending her clothes up with me and you have refused to send any thing up for her. She asked you to send a bag with Michael and you told her you knew nothing about Michaels trip to Reno. I showed her the email I sent you with Michael's Southwest Itinerary, so she knows I paid for Michael's flight and you have the opportunity to send a bag up with Michael. I have told her to go buy more clothes with the money I give her weekly but she is saving her money so she can go to college. I have set her up to try and save \$1,500 by the end of the year.

Bella has been told several times by me that I will be sending up her kakis and jeans. This has been coordinated. It is not my fault that you decided to keep her in Reno with only a duffle bag and enroll her in a private school that requires uniforms. You must have known that some expenditure on your part would be necessary. I paid for a U-haul to move all her clothing and room back to Vegas as she requested. This is not my fault. I did not consent to this last minute change. It was orchestrated by you and most likely her grandparents.

I told Isabella that I was not sure if Michael would be coming up to Reno, but told her that clothes were coming regardless. I provide for her monthly as well and take care of her major medical, car insurance, and phone.

\*Should you change her mind and want to send her clothes:

Carol Burr/Isabella Micone

815 Arlington Ct.

Reno, NV 89509

Thank you, I already have their address.

So I have paid for her tuition to Manague and I paid for all her books. I gave her money for clothes so I continue to take care of her needs. Her tuition was fully paid for by Chuck Burr, her grandparent. I was told that it was a gift. Sierra's is covered too. You may want to coordinate with your parents, a second payment of tuition may be redundant. Thank you, Mike Micone From: Kerstan Hubbs [mailto:khubbs@live.com] Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2015 8:23 AM To: mikemicone@gmail.com Cc: donn@pandblawyers.com; jjones@blacklobellolaw.com Subject: RE: Life Insurance Policy Dear Mike,

I would have liked to have spoken with my daughter during this very big time in her life. She has struggled with a few depressive episodes and I would have like to have been involved in all major decision-making; like her schooling or who a good therapist might be. This is a very important decision and one an active mother should be involved in. You made sure that did not happen. You ignored my request for her to come home and talk to me and so did your parents.

Thank you for not putting yourself first and expecting Michael to drop his planned time with me at a moments notice. I want to be happy and enjoy my time with him. You just had him for ten days. When it is your planned visitation, and I have reasonable notice, then you both can enjoy your lunch at Freddie's another day. We are leaving out of town on Friday so it does not work with my schedule. I also worry that you might just put him in your car and drive up to Reno and stop returning my phone calls and never fly him home. That would not be safe and I do not have the relief of going to District Court for enforcement at this time. I do not feel safe and will not have my son go with you until I know that I can get him back.

Kerstan

Subject: Re: Life Insurance Policy From: mikemicone@gmail.com

Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 07:23:06 -0700

CC: donn@pandblawyers.com; jjones@blacklobellolaw.com

To: khubbs@live.com

Dear All,

Every time I fly to Vegas I see a kids who's parents live in separate cities. Our situation is not that uncommon. Divorced parents have to coordinate all the time and we did great over the past 4 years being flexible and adaptable on both sides.

As we all know, I live and work outside of Vegas and over the past 6 years my visitation with my son was never an issue. I've always been respectful if he had other plans and I didn't want to interrupt his time with Kerstan or his friends. If he was available then we made it work. Michael loves to spend time with me and I with him. I'm sure he would like a hot dog from Freddie's and to see his Dad for an hour.

Yesterday I sent a text simply asking to take Michael to lunch or dinner. I am here through Friday so I thought a lunch would be ok. Today my request was denied. I was sent a text that I can't see him bc it's not my visitation time. We haven't used the visitation time in 4 years bc I don't live here.

If at all possible, and since Michael is not in school, I would like to take the little guy to lunch. He's 10 and shouldn't be used as a pawn. He didn't do anything wrong and his Dad wants to take him to his favorite place to have a hot dog at Freddie's. If he doesn't have anything serious going on today I am requesting request to take my son to lunch while I am here.

John, you asked for a visitation proposal and you'd look at it. I will work on that as I think it will be helpful moving forward. Give me some time to think through and look at what will work financially and something I can commit to and that fits around my work. I will keep it simple and use the current schedule as much as possible.

Any other suggestions I am open. I just want us all to get along for the sake of two kids who shouldn't be subject to our differences.

Thanks for the time and let me know how to proceed.

Thanks,

Mike Micone

702-339-1113

On Aug 6, 2015, at 6:27 AM, Kerstan Hubbs < khubbs@live.com > wrote:

Mike,

Good morning. I am making a request at this time that you provide the court ordered life
insurance policy. I would like to verify that you in fact did take out the policy, that it is active,
and other details for my files.

Sincerely,

Kerstan

# EXHIBIT B

From: Kerstan Hubbs [mailto:khubbs@live.com]

Sent: Friday, August 14, 2015 8:31 AM

To: mikemicone@gmail.com

Subject: RE: Flight reservation (H3HZBC) | 16AUG15 | LAS-RNO | Micone/Michael

Mike, I have forwarded the itinerary to John for review. I want to see what can be done if you do not send him home. Once he informs me that it will be okay, I will send him, if not, then I will not. Kerstan

From: mikemicone@gmail.com

Subject: Fwd: Flight reservation (H3HZBC) | 16AUG15 | LAS-RNO | Micone/Michael

Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 07:28:19 -0700

To: khubbs@live.com

Kerstan,

I booked Michael a flight for this Sunday and returning on the following Sunday. Below is the itinerary.

If you have any questions please email me back.

Thanks,

Mike Micone 702-339-1113

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Southwest Airlines" < SouthwestAirlines@luv.southwest.com>

Date: August 12, 2015 at 4:14:28 PM PDT

To: MIKEMICONE@GMAIL.COM

Subject: Flight reservation (H3HZBC) | 16AUG15 | LAS-RNO | Micone/Michael

Reply-To: "Southwest Airlines" <no-reply@luv.southwest.com>

a all set for your Impl

My Account | View My Itinerary Online
Check In Online Check Flight Status Change Flight Special Offers Hotel Offers Car Offers

ikeoff!

Thanks for choosing Southwest<sup>®</sup> for your trip! You'll find everything you need to know about your reservation below. Happy travels!

#### AIR Itinerary

R Confirmation: H3HZBC Confirmation Date: 08/12/2015

ssenger(s) Rapid Rewards # Ticket # Expiration Est. Points Earned

CONE/MICHAEL 366353573 5262134397473 Aug 11, 2016 2008

oid Rewards points earned are only estimates. Visit your (MySouthwest, <u>Southwest.com</u> or Rapid Rewards) ount for the most accurate totals - including A-List & A-List Preferred bonus points.

te	Flight	Departure/Arrival
n Aug 16	1965	Depart LAS VEGAS, NV (LAS) on Southwest Airlines at 11:00 AM Arrive in RENO/TAHOE, NV (RNO) at 12:20 PM Travel Time 1 hrs 20 mins Anytime

#### hat you need to know to travel:

- Don't forget to check in for your flight(s) 24 hours before your trip on <u>southwest.com</u> or your mobile device. This will secure your boarding position on your flights.
- Southwest Airlines does not have assigned seats, so you can choose your seat when you board
  the plane. You will be assigned a boarding position based on your checkin time. The earlier you
  check in, within 24 hours of your flight, the earlier you get to board.
- WiFi, TV, and related services and amenities may vary and are subject to change based on assigned aircraft. <u>Learn more.</u>

#### member to be in the gate area on time and ready to board:

- 30 minutes prior to scheduled departure time: We may begin boarding as early as 30 minutes prior to your flight's scheduled departure time. We encourage all passengers to plan to arrive in the gate area no later than this time.
- 10 minutes prior to scheduled departure time: All passengers must obtain their boarding passes
  and be in the gate area available for boarding at least 10 minutes prior to your flight's scheduled
  departure time. If not, Southwest may cancel your reserved space and you will not be eligible for
  denied boarding compensation.
- If you do not plan to travel on your flight: In accordance with Southwest's No Show Policy, you
  must notify Southwest at least 10 minutes prior to your flight's scheduled departure if you do not
  plan to travel on the flight. If not, Southwest will cancel your reservation and all funds will be
  forfeited.

Air Cost: 230.00

rryon Items: 1 Bag + small personal item are free. See full details. Checked Items: First and sond bags fly free. Weight and size limits apply.

re Rule(s): 5262134397473: NONTRANSFERABLE.

fid only on Southwest Airlines. All travel involving funds from this Confirmation Number must completed by the expiration date. Unused travel funds may only be applied toward the chase of future travel for the individual named on the ticket. Any changes to this itinerary may

ult in a fare increase.

S WN RNO200.84YLNEV 200.84 END ZPLAS XFLAS4.5 AY5,60\$LAS5.60

n About Our ding Process

Get EarlyBird Check-In® Details

### **ost and Payment Summary**

AIR - H3HZBC

se Fare	\$ 200.84	Payment Information
cise Taxes	\$ 15.06	Payment Type: Visa XXXXXXXXXXXXX0130
gment Fee	\$ 4.00	Date: Aug 12, 2015
ssenger Facility Charge	\$ 4.50	Payment Amount: \$230.00
ptember 11th Security Fee	\$ 5.60	
tal Air Cost	\$ 230.00	

#### **Useful Tools**

Check In Online
Early Bird Check-In
View/Share Itinerary
Change Air Reservation
Cancel Air Reservation
Check Flight Status
Flight Status Notification
Book a Car
Book a Hotel

#### Know Before You Go

In the Airport
Baggage Policies
Suggested Airport Arrival Times
Security Procedures
Customers of Size
In the Air
Purchasing and Refunds

#### **Special Travel Needs**

Traveling with Children
Traveling with Pets
Unaccompanied Minors
Baby on Board
Customers with Disabilities

#### Legal Policies & Helpful Information

Privacy Policy Notice of Incorporated Terms Customer Service Commitment

Contact Us

Book Air | Book Hotel | Book Car | Book Vacation Packages | See Special Offers | Manage My Account

<u>FAQs</u>

This is a post-only mailing from Southwest Aidines. Please do not attempt to respond to this message. Your privacy is important to us. Please read our <u>Privacy Policy</u>.

See Southwest Airlines Co. Notice of Incorporation

See Southwest Airlines Limit of Liability

Southwest Airlines P.O. Box 36647-1CR Dallas, TX 75235

Centact Us

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 $<sup>^4</sup>$  All travel involving funds from this Confirmation Number must be completed by the expiration data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Security Fee is the government-imposed September 11th Security Fee.

# EXHIBIT C

Policy Summary Page 1 of 1



# Policy 4022396107 - Policy Summary

OWNER'S NAME

Michael Micone

PREMIUM AMOUNT

\$49.99 (Monthly)

#### **BASE COVERAGE**

TYPE

AAA Annual Renewable Term Life

Insurance

**EFFECTIVE DATE** 

4/22/2013

COVERAGE AMOUNT

\$200,000

INSURED'S NAME

Michael Micone

#### **COVERAGE DETAILS**

POLICY EXPIRATION DATE

4/22/2049

Electronically Filed 09/02/2015 09:21:26 AM

MOSC
PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY
DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 006460

CLERK OF THE COURT

JEREMY R. BEASLEY, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 12176

931 South Third Street

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 474-0500 / Fax (702) 951-8022

general@pandblawyers.com

Attorney for Defendant, MICHAEL A. MICONE

> DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

KERSTAN D. MICONE,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

DATE OF HEARING: 11/4/15
TIME OF HEARING: 9:00am

MICHAEL A. MICONE,

Defendant,

"NOTICE: YOU ARE REQUIRED TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THIS MOTION/COUNTERMOTION WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND TO PROVIDE THE UNDERSIGNED WITH A COPY OF YOUR RESPONSE WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION/COUNTERMOTION. FAILURE TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION/COUNTERMOTION MAY RESULT IN THE REQUESTED RELIEF BEING GRANTED BY THE COURT WITHOUT HEARING PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED HEARING DATE."

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO FIND THE PLAINTIFF IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND TO CHANGE CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' CHILD JOSEPH; TO REVIEW AND MODIFY CHILD SUPPORTFOR DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY'S FEES; AND RELATED MATTERS

COMES NOW the Defendant, MICHAEL A. MICONE, by and through his attorney,

DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ., and moves this Honorable Court for the following relief:

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- 1. For an order to show cause to find the plaintiff in contempt of court for her refusal to allow defendant visitation with the parties' child Joseph;
- 2. Modifying physical custody and awarding the parties joint legal custody of their minor child Joseph, with the Defendant having primary physical custody, subject to the Plaintiff's right of visitation;
- 3. Ordering plaintiff to pay Defendant child support of 18% of her gross monthly income;
- 4. For Defendant's attorney's fees and costs incurred in this case;
- 5. For such other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate in the circumstances.

This motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file, and the attached affidavit of Defendant and is made in good faith and not to delay justice.

Dated this 1<sup>st</sup> day of August, 2015.

#### **PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY**

/s/ Donn W. Prokopius
DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 006460
JEREMY R. BEASLEY, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 12176
931 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 474-0500 / Fax (702) 951-8022
general@pandblawyers.com
Attorney for Defendant,
MICHAEL A. MICONE

#### NOTICE OF MOTION

# TO: KERSTAN D. MICONE THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED

Dated this 1<sup>st</sup> day of September, 2015.

#### PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY

DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 006460
JEREMY R. BEASLEY, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 12176
931 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 474-0500 / Fax (702) 951-8022
general@pandblawyers.com
Attorney for Defendant,
MICHAEL A. MICONE

### **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

## I. RECENT CIRCUMSTANCES

Plaintiff, KERSTAN D. MICONE (hereinafter "KERSTAN") and Defendant, MICHAEL A. MICONE (hereinafter "MICHAEL") were divorced in Clark county, Nevada by a Decree of divorce that was entered on April 17, 2009. There are two minor children born to the parties as a result of the marriage, namely, Isabella Caroline Micone (Bella), born: March 26, 1998; and, Michael Joseph Micone, born: January 7, 2005 (hereinafter "Joseph").

The older child Isabella lives in Reno, Nevada with MICHAEL'S parents and therefore neither party has custody of her. The younger child Joseph remains living with KERSTAN in

Las Vegas. MICHAEL is supposed to have visitation with Joseph. However, since the parties tried mediation earlier this year following the latest round of litigation, KERSTAN had refused to let MICHAEL see his son at all.

KERSTAN had Joseph and Bella the first two weeks of July of 2015. In July of 2015 KERSTAN arranged without MICHAEL'S consent for MICHAEL'S parents to have Joseph on MICHAEL'S visitation time. KERSTAN sent Joseph to Reno to visit MICHAEL'S parents but did not tell MICHAEL. Bella returned to Reno at the same time. MICHAEL called KERSTAN in mid July of 2015 and told KERSTAN he had Joseph's flight booked for Joseph to come to Reno for visitation with MICHAEL. It was only then that KERSTAN told MICHAEL that Joseph was already in Reno with MICHAEL'S parents. MICHAEL did not see his son while Joseph was visiting MICHAEL'S parents. Joseph went back to Las Vegas and MICHAEL had to fly Joseph back to Reno and MICHAEL had Joseph for the last 10 days of visitation with Joseph July of 2015. Joseph went back to Las Vegas on July 26, 2015.

On August 5, 2015 the parties attempted mediation but were unsuccessful. After the mediation meeting MICHAEL emailed KERSTAN's and asked if he could take Joseph to lunch or dinner. KERSTAN sent an email stating "no". See email of her response attached hereto as **Exhibit A**. KERSTAN told MICHAEL he could only see Joseph according to the Decree. Over the past 6 years, if MICHAEL was in town and if Joseph was available the parties always worked it out and MICHAEL was able to see his son. Now KERSTAN is refusing to let MICHAEL see him at all. In 6 years there was never a problem with scheduling time that is until the failure of the parties to reach a settlement in mediation.

MICHAEL scheduled a visit with Joseph from August 16th – August 23rd which was his scheduled time according to the decree. MICHAEL booked the flight and emailed the flight

times to KERSTAN (see itinerary attached hereto as Exhibit B). This visit was particularly special because MICHAEL had purchased tickets for a 49er's football game for Joseph's 10<sup>th</sup> birthday. The day Joseph was supposed to fly up KERSTAN refused to let Joseph go. MICHAEL could have sought the assistance of the police but chose to avoid the drama of having the police show up a KERSTAN'S residence and try and enforce the Decree. MICHAEL had to cancel the flight at the last minute. MICHAEL lost \$100 from the non-refundable unaccompanied minor fee. These circumstances are examples of the games KERSTAN insists on playing. Another example is KERSTAN threatening to inform the Court that MICHAEL had failed to maintain a life insurance policy for the children as required in the Decree. Her allegation would have been a lie because MICHAEL has indeed maintained the policy, proof of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

MICHAEL has now scheduled another visitation for September 8 through September 13, 2015, which is his next scheduled time. MICHAEL sent a text letting KERSTAN know that he scheduled visitation time with Joseph but KERSTAN said she had not heard from MICHAEL's attorney or her lawyer so she is refusing to let MICHAEL have his son yet again. It will be 6 weeks since KERSTAN has refused to let MICHAEL talk or see Joseph.

# **II. ARGUMENT**

# 1. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The following acts or omissions shall be deemed contempts:

3. Disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the court or judge at chambers.

# NRS 22.110 Imprisonment until performance if contempt is omission to perform an act;

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, when the contempt consists in the omission to perform an act which is yet in the power of the person to perform, he may be imprisoned until he performs it. The required act must be specified in the warrant of

commitment.

Pursuant to NRS22.010 contempt includes acts of disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the court. Any order meant to be the subject of a contempt proceeding must be clear, unambiguous, and set forth the details of compliance in clear, specific terms, so the parties will know what duties or obligations are imposed. Cunningham v. District Court, 102 Nev. 551, 729 P.2d 1328 (1986). The moving party carries the burden of demonstrating the other party had the ability to comply with the order, and the violation of the order was willful. Rodriguez v. District Court, 120 Nev. 789, 102 P.3d 41 (2004). The inability of a contemnor to obey the order (without fault on their part) is a complete defense and sufficient to purge them of the contempt charged. Mccormick v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 67 Nev. 318, 326; 218 P.2d 939 (1950). However, where the contemnors have voluntarily or contumaciously brought on themselves the disability to obey the order or Decree, such a defense is not available; and the burden of proving inability to comply is upon the contemnor. Id. The court must have the power to punish a transgressor for contempt in order to maintain respect, decency and dignity in the court's proceedings. Lamb v. Lamb, 83 Nev. 425, 433 P2d. 265 (1967).

In this case, KERSTAN has denied MICHAEL court ordered visitation with his son Joseph. There is no excuse whatsoever for KERSTAN'S refusal to comply with the Court's custody and visitation order. She is well aware that that MICHAEL is to have visitation with his son upon him providing the requisite prior notice. The only way to remedy this situation is to severely sanction KERSTAN to bring her into compliance with the Court's custody and visitation and to ensure that her contemptuous behavior does not occur again. MICHAEL is therefore respectfully requesting that KERSTAN be found in contempt of court and sanctioned,

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27 28 including incarceration, the payment of a fine for each offense and the payment of MICHAEL'S attorney's fees and costs.

MICHAEL is also requesting that KERSTAN be ordered to reimburse him for the \$100 fee that MICHAEL lost and that MICHAEL be allowed to deduct it from his child support payment.

# 2. MODIFICATION OF CHILD CUSTODY

# NRS 125.510. Orders: modification or termination; form; expiration.

- In determining custody of a minor child in an action brought under this chapter, the Court may:
- (a) During the pendency of the action, at the final hearing or at any time thereafter during the minority of any of the children of the marriage, make such an order for the custody, care, education, maintenance and support of the minor children as appears in their best interest;

#### Best interest of child; preferences; considerations of Court; NRS 125.480 presumption when Court determines that parent or person residing with child is perpetrator of domestic violence.

- 1. In determining custody of a minor child in an action brought under this chapter, the sole consideration of the Court is the best interest of the child. If it appears to the Court that joint custody would be in the best interest of the child, the Court may grant custody to the parties jointly.
- 2. Preference must not be given to either parent for the sole reason that the parent is the mother or the father of the child.
- 3. The Court shall award custody in the following order of preference unless in a particular case the best interest of the child requires otherwise:
- (a) To both parents jointly pursuant to NRS 125.490 or to either parent. If the Court does not enter an order awarding joint custody of a child after either parent has applied for joint custody, the Court shall state in its decision the reason for its denial of the parent's application.
- (b) To a person or persons in whose home the child has been living and where the child has had a wholesome and stable environment.
- (c) To any person related within the third degree of consanguinity to the child whom the Court finds suitable and able to provide proper care and guidance for the child, regardless of whether the relative resides within this State.
- (d) To any other person or persons whom the Court finds suitable and able to provide proper care and guidance for the child.
- 4. In determining the best interest of the child, the Court shall consider and set forth its specific findings concerning, among other things:
- (a) The wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to his custody.
  - (b) Any nomination by a parent or a guardian for the child.

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- (c) Which parent is more likely to allow the child to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with the noncustodial parent.
  - (d) The level of conflict between the parents.
  - (e) The ability of the parents to cooperate to meet the needs of the child.
  - (f) The mental and physical health of the parents.
  - (g) The physical, developmental and emotional needs of the child.
  - (h) The nature of the relationship of the child with each parent.
  - (i) The ability of the child to maintain a relationship with any sibling.
  - (j) Any history of parental abuse or neglect of the child or a sibling of the child.
- (k) Whether either parent or any other person seeking custody has engaged in an act of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child.
- 5. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 6 or NRS 125C.210, a determination by the Court after an evidentiary hearing and finding by clear and convincing evidence that either parent or any other person seeking custody has engaged in one or more acts of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child creates a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody of the child by the perpetrator of the domestic violence is not in the best interest of the child. Upon making such a determination, the Court shall set forth:
- (a) Findings of fact that support the determination that one or more acts of domestic violence occurred; and
- (b) Findings that the custody or visitation arrangement ordered by the Court adequately protects the child and the parent or other victim of domestic violence who resided with the child.
- 6. If after an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to subsection 5 the Court determines that each party has engaged in acts of domestic violence, it shall, if possible, then determine which person was the primary physical aggressor. In determining which party was the primary physical aggressor for the purposes of this section, the Court shall consider:
  - (a) All prior acts of domestic violence involving either party;
- (b) The relative severity of the injuries, if any, inflicted upon the persons involved in those prior acts of domestic violence;
  - (c) The likelihood of future injury;
  - (d) Whether, during the prior acts, one of the parties acted in self-defense; and
  - (e) Any other factors which the Court deems relevant to the determination.

In such a case, if it is not possible for the Court to determine which party is the primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 5 applies to both parties. If it is possible for the Court to determine which party is the primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 5 applies only to the party determined by the Court to be the primary physical aggressor.

7. As used in this section, "domestic violence" means the commission of any act described in NRS 33.018.

In seeking to change custody, MICHAEL must show (1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the modification serves the best interest of the child. *Ellis v. Carucci*, 167 P3rd 239 (Nev. 2007). The Nevada Supreme

Court has held that custodial parent's pervasive interference with the noncustodial parent's parental rights may form a basis to modify physical custody. *Martin v. Martin*, 90 P.3D 981 (2004). KERSTAN's behavior over the past several months certainly embodies what the Nevada Supreme Court had in mind in *Martin*. She has denied MICHAEL virtually all visitation with his son. Her actions are clearly a substantial change in circumstances affecting Joseph's welfare.

KERSTAN has done everything possible to obstruct MICHAEL'S contact with Joseph and deliberately interfere with MICHAEL'S relationship with his son. KERSTAN obviously has no intention of allowing MICHAEL to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with Joseph as contemplated by NRS125.480. In fact, KERSTAN'S conduct indicates that she is willing to whatever she can to obstruct and frustrate Joseph's relationship with his father. KERSTAN'S behavior can scarcely be said to be in Joseph's best interests.

MICHAEL respectfully submits that it is not in Joseph's best interests to let KERSTAN retain primary custody. MICHAEL is therefore requesting that the Court grant the parties joint legal custody of Joseph and that MICHAEL have primary physical custody, subject to KERSTAN'S right of supervised visitation.

# 3. CHILD SUPPORT

NRS 125B.145 Review and modification of order for support: Request for review; jurisdiction; notification of right to request review.

- 1. An order for the support of a child must, upon the filing of a request for review by:
- (a) The Welfare Division of the Department of Human Resources, its designated representative or the district attorney, if the Welfare Division or the district attorney has jurisdiction in the case; or
  - (b) A parent or legal guardian of the child,

shall be reviewed by the Court at least every 3 years pursuant to this section to determine whether the order should be modified or adjusted. Each review conducted pursuant to this section must be in response to a separate request.

- 2. If the Court:
- (a) Does not have jurisdiction to modify the order, the Court may forward the request to any Court with appropriate jurisdiction.

- (b) Has jurisdiction to modify the order and, taking into account the best interests of the child, determines that modification or adjustment of the order is appropriate, the Court shall enter an order modifying or adjusting the previous order for support in accordance with the requirements of NRS 125B.070 and 125B.080.
  - 3. The Court shall ensure that:
- (a) Each person who is subject to an order for the support of a child is notified, not less than once every 3 years, that he may request a review of the order pursuant to this section; or
- (b) An order for the support of a child includes notification that each person who is subject to the order may request a review of the order pursuant to this section.
- 4. An order for the support of a child may be reviewed at any time on the basis of changed circumstances. For the purposes of this subsection, a change of 20 percent or more in the gross monthly income of a person who is subject to an order for the support of a child shall be deemed to constitute changed circumstances requiring a review for modification of the order for the support of a child.
  - 5. As used in this section:
  - (a) "Gross monthly income" has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 125B.070.
- (b) "Order for the support of a child" means such an order that was issued or is being enforced by a Court of this State.

Pursuant to NRS125B.145, the district Court must review a support order every three years. The Court may also review a support order upon a showing of changed circumstances. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that because the term "may" is discretionary, the district Court has discretion to review a support order based on changed circumstances but is not required to do so. However, a change of 20 percent or more in the obligor parent's gross monthly income requires the Court to review the support order. Although these provisions indicate when the review of a support order is mandatory or discretionary, they do not require the Court to modify the order upon the basis of these mandatory or discretionary reviews. In summary, although a party need not show changed circumstances for the district Court to review a support order after three years, changed circumstances are still required for the district Court to modify the order and the district Court must also consider the best interests of the child and determine whether it is appropriate to modify the order. *Rivero v. Rivero*, 216 P.3d 213 (2009).

The modification of Joseph's custody is certainly grounds to review child support.

MICHAEL'S child support payment must be immediately terminated. KERSTAN must be

ordered to pay 18% of her gross monthly income, pursuant to NRS125B.070 as and for child support.

### 4. ATTORNEY'S FEES

# NRS 18.010 provides as follows:

- 2. In addition to the cases where an allowance is authorized by specific statute, the Court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to a prevailing party:
  - (a) When he has not recovered more than \$20,000.00; or
- (b) Without regard to the recovery sought, when the Court finds that the claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party complaint or defense of the opposing party was brought without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party.

NRS 125.150(3). Except as otherwise provided in NRS 125.141, whether or not application for suit money has been made under the provisions of NRS 125.040, the Court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to either party to an action for divorce if those fees are in issue under the pleadings.

In a long line of cases, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that attorney's fccs may be awarded in a post divorce action pursuant to NRS18.010 and NRS125.150(3). See Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 495 P.2d 618 1972); Leeming v. Leeming, 87 Nev. 530, 490 P.2d 342 (1971); Korbel v. Korbel, 101 Nev. 140, 696 P.2d 993 (1985); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 89 Nev 540, 516 P.2d 103 (1973); Halbrook v. Halbrook, 114 Nev. 1455, 971 P.2d 1262 (1998); and, Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 959 P.2d 523 (1998). In the case of Miller v. Wilfong, 119 P.3d 727 (2005) the Nevada Supreme Court held that it is within the trial Court's discretion to determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees under a statute or rule and that in exercising its discretion, the district Court must evaluate the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969), including the qualities of the advocate, the character and difficulty of the work performed, the work actually performed by the attorney, and the result obtained. In this case, MICHAEL'S counsel is an experienced attorney who has litigated numerous divorce, custody, paternity and post-divorce actions. The legal representation in this case involved the collection and analysis of the pertinent information, the preparation of legal

documents and Court appearances. MICHAEL'S counsel expects to obtain a good result based on the facts of the case. MICHAEL has incurred attorney's fees in filing this motion. He had to do so to compel KERSTAN'S compliance with the custody order. MICHAEL is therefore requesting that he have an award of attorney's fees, costs and sanctions in the sum of \$3,000.00

WHEREFORE, let and an order issue granting the relief requested by Defendant.

Dated this 1<sup>st</sup> day of September, 2015.

#### PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY

/s/ Donn W. Prokopius
DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 006460
JEREMY R. BEASLEY, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 12176
931 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 474-0500 / Fax (702) 951-8022
general@pandblawyers.com
Attorney for Defendant,
MICHAEL A. MICONE

# EXHIBITA

From: Mike Micone [mailto:mikemicone@gmail.com]

**Sent:** Friday, August 14, 2015 9:39 PM **To:** Kerstan Hubbs < <a href="mailto:khubbs@live.com">khubbs@live.com</a>>

Cc: donn@pandblawyers.com
Subject: Re: Life Insurance Policy

Kerstan,

I booked the flight for Michael Sunday and I will have a police escort to pick up Michael with the decree and order. You can choose to refuse for me to have Michael and I'm sure their is a consequence for your decision.

I have set up tuition and I have set up payments. I'm sure your glad you don't have to pay anything. I have also made the payment on her car and insurance. Do you have an opinion about that as well. You usually do. See you Sunday.

Mike Micone CEO/President Micone Staffing Resources, Inc. 702-339-1113

On Aug 14, 2015, at 6:44 PM, Kerstan Hubbs < khubbs@live.com > wrote:

See below. Kerstan

From: mikemicone@gmail.com

To: khubbs@live.com

CC: donn@pandblawyers.com; jjones@blacklobellolaw.com

Subject: RE: Life Insurance Policy Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 16:43:22 -0700

Kerstan,

I have booked the flight for Michael on Sunday and to return to Vegas on Sunday. I emailed you both his departure and return itinerary. I am reviewing our current visitation clause in the original divorce decree as we all agree it needs to be updated. I will use as much of the current order and make adjustments as we both live in separate cities.

Let me know if those flight times work for Michael. We can adjust the time as I emailed you the conformation codes for both departure and return flights. I figured since I was paying for the flights that I would schedule his trip from Sunday to Sunday and get him home at a decent hour Sunday.

Mike I have not been able to communicate with John today. I will not be putting Michael on a flight to Reno tomorrow. I advise you to make sure you keep your flight credits and/or refund the flight at this time.

\*I know Bella has asked for her clothes and you have avoided sending her clothes up with me and you have refused to send any thing up for her. She asked you to send a bag with Michael and you told her you knew nothing about Michaels trip to Reno. I showed her the email I sent you with Michael's Southwest Itinerary, so she knows I paid for Michael's flight and you have the opportunity to send a bag up with Michael. I have told her to go buy more clothes with the money I give her weekly but she is saving her money so she can go to college. I have set her up to try and save \$1,500 by the end of the year.

Bella has been told several times by me that I will be sending up her kakis and jeans. This has been coordinated. It is not my fault that you decided to keep her in Reno with only a duffle bag and enroll her in a private school that requires uniforms. You must have known that some expenditure on your part would be necessary. I paid for a U-haul to move all her clothing and room back to Vegas as she requested. This is not my fault. I did not consent to this last minute change. It was orchestrated by you and most likely her grandparents.

I told Isabella that I was not sure if Michael would be coming up to Reno, but told her that clothes were coming regardless. I provide for her monthly as well and take care of her major medical, car insurance, and phone.

\*Should you change her mind and want to send her clothes:

Carol Burr/Isabella Micone

815 Arlington Ct.

Reno, NV 89509

Thank you, I already have their address.

So I have paid for her tuition to Manague and I paid for all her books. I gave her money for clothes so I continue to take care of her needs. Her tuition was fully paid for by Chuck Burr, her grandparent. I was told that it was a gift. Sierra's is covered too. You may want to coordinate with your parents, a second payment of tuition may be redundant. Thank you, Mike Micone From: Kerstan Hubbs [mailto:khubbs@live.com] Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2015 8:23 AM To: mikemicone@gmail.com Cc: donn@pandblawyers.com; jjones@blacklobellolaw.com Subject: RE: Life Insurance Policy Dear Mike,

I would have liked to have spoken with my daughter during this very big time in her life. She has struggled with a few depressive episodes and I would have like to have been involved in all major decision-making; like her schooling or who a good therapist might be. This is a very important decision and one an active mother should be involved in. You made sure that did not happen. You ignored my request for her to come home and talk to me and so did your parents.

Thank you for not putting yourself first and expecting Michael to drop his planned time with me at a moments notice. I want to be happy and enjoy my time with him. You just had him for ten days. When it is your planned visitation, and I have reasonable notice, then you both can enjoy your lunch at Freddie's another day. We are leaving out of town on Friday so it does not work with my schedule. I also worry that you might just put him in your car and drive up to Reno and stop returning my phone calls and never fly him home. That would not be safe and I do not have the relief of going to District Court for enforcement at this time. I do not feel safe and will not have my son go with you until I know that I can get him back.

T	h	a	n	ks,
---	---	---	---	-----

Kerstan

Subject: Re: Life Insurance Policy From: <a href="mailto:mikemicone@gmail.com">mikemicone@gmail.com</a>

Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 07:23:06 -0700

CC: donn@pandblawyers.com; jjones@blacklobellolaw.com

To: khubbs@live.com

Dear All,

Every time I fly to Vegas I see a kids who's parents live in separate cities. Our situation is not that uncommon. Divorced parents have to coordinate all the time and we did great over the past 4 years being flexible and adaptable on both sides.

As we all know, I live and work outside of Vegas and over the past 6 years my visitation with my son was never an issue. I've always been respectful if he had other plans and i didn't want to interrupt his time with Kerstan or his friends. If he was available then we made it work. Michael loves to spend time with me and I with him. I'm sure he would like a hot dog from Freddie's and to see his Dad for an hour.

Yesterday I sent a text simply asking to take Michael to lunch or dinner. I am here through Friday so I thought a lunch would be ok. Today my request was denied. I was sent a text that I can't see him bc it's not my visitation time. We haven't used the visitation time in 4 years bc I don't live here.

If at all possible, and since Michael is not in school, I would like to take the little guy to lunch. He's 10 and shouldn't be used as a pawn. He didn't do anything wrong and his Dad wants to take him to his favorite place to have a hot dog at Freddie's. If he doesn't have anything serious going on today I am requesting request to take my son to lunch while I am here.

John, you asked for a visitation proposal and you'd look at it. I will work on that as I think it will be helpful moving forward. Give me some time to think through and look at what will work financially and something I can commit to and that fits around my work. I will keep it simple and use the current schedule as much as possible.

Any other suggestions I am open. I just want us all to get along for the sake of two kids who shouldn't be subject to our differences.

Thanks for the time and let me know how to proceed.

Thanks,

Mike Micone

702-339-1113

On Aug 6, 2015, at 6:27 AM, Kerstan Hubbs <khubbs@live.com> wrote:

Mike,

Good morning. I am making a request at this time that you provide the court ordered life
insurance policy. I would like to verify that you in fact did take out the policy, that it is active,
and other details for my files.

Sincerely,

Kerstan

.

# EXHIBIT B

From: Kerstan Hubbs [mailto:khubbs@live.com]

Sent: Friday, August 14, 2015 8:31 AM

To: mikemicone@gmail.com

Subject: RE: Flight reservation (H3HZBC) | 16AUG15 | LAS-RNO | Micone/Michael

Mike, I have forwarded the itinerary to John for review. I want to see what can be done if you do not send him home. Once he informs me that it will be okay, I will send him, if not, then I will not. Kerstan

From: mikemicone@gmail.com

Subject: Fwd: Flight reservation (H3HZBC) | 16AUG15 | LAS-RNO | Micone/Michael

Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 07:28:19 -0700

To: khubbs@live.com

Kerstan,

I booked Michael a flight for this Sunday and returning on the following Sunday. Below is the itinerary.

If you have any questions please email me back.

Thanks,

Mike Micone 702-339-1113

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Southwest Airlines" < SouthwestAirlines@luv.southwest.com >

Date: August 12, 2015 at 4:14:28 PM PDT

To: MIKEMICONE@GMAIL.COM

Subject: Flight reservation (H3HZBC) | 16AUG15 | LAS-RNO | Micone/Michael

Reply-To: "Southwest Airlines" < no-reply@luv.southwest.com>

a all set for your trip!

My Account ∫ View My Itinerary Online Check In Online Check Flight Status Change Flight Special Offers Hotel Offers Car Offers

ikeoff!

Thanks for choosing Southwest<sup>®</sup> for your trip! You'll find everything you need to know about your reservation below. Happy travels!

#### AIR Itinerary

#### R Confirmation: H3HZBC

Confirmation Date: 08/12/2015

ssenger(s) Rapid Rewards # Ticket # Expiration Est. Points Earned

CONE/MICHAEL 366353573 5262134397473 Aug 11, 2016 2008

pid Rewards points earned are only estimates. Visit your (MySouthwest, <u>Southwest.com</u> or Rapid Rewards) ount for the most accurate totals - including A-List & A-List Preferred bonus points.

n Aug 16 1965 Departure/Arrival

Depart LAS VEGAS, NV (LAS) on Southwest Airlines at 11:00 AM Arrive in RENO/TAHOE, NV (RNO) at 12:20 PM

Travel Time 1 hrs 20 mins

Anytime

#### hat you need to know to travel:

- Don't forget to check in for your flight(s) 24 hours before your trip on southwest.com or your mobile device. This will secure your boarding position on your flights.
- Southwest Airlines does not have assigned seats, so you can choose your seat when you board
  the plane. You will be assigned a boarding position based on your checkin time. The earlier you
  check in, within 24 hours of your flight, the earlier you get to board.
- WiFi, TV, and related services and amenities may vary and are subject to change based on assigned aircraft. <u>Learn more.</u>

#### member to be in the gate area on time and ready to board:

- 30 minutes prior to scheduled departure time: We may begin boarding as early as 30 minutes prior to your flight's scheduled departure time. We encourage all passengers to plan to arrive in the gate area no later than this time.
- 10 minutes prior to scheduled departure time: All passengers must obtain their boarding passes
  and be in the gate area available for boarding at least 10 minutes prior to your flight's scheduled
  departure time. If not, Southwest may cancel your reserved space and you will not be eligible for
  denied boarding compensation.
- If you do not plan to travel on your flight: In accordance with Southwest's No Show Policy, you
  must notify Southwest at least 10 minutes prior to your flight's scheduled departure if you do not
  plan to travel on the flight. If not, Southwest will cancel your reservation and all funds will be
  forfeited.

Air Cost: 230.00

rryon Items: 1 Bag + small personal item are free, See full details. Checked Items: First and bags fly free. Weight and size limits apply.

re Rule(s): 5262134397473: NONTRANSFERABLE.

lid only on Southwest Airlines. All travel involving funds from this Confirmation Number must completed by the expiration date. Unused travel funds may only be applied toward the chase of future travel for the individual named on the ticket. Any changes to this itinerary may

ult in a fare increase.

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n About Our ding Process

Get EarlyBird Check-In® Details

### ost and Payment Summary

AIR - H3HZBC

 se Fare
 \$ 200.84

 cise Taxes
 \$ 15.06

 gment Fee
 \$ 4.00

 ssenger Facility Charge
 \$ 4.50

 ptember 11th Security Fee
 \$ 5.60

 tal Air Cost
 \$ 230.00

**Payment Information** 

Payment Type: Visa XXXXXXXXXXXXX0130

Date: Aug 12, 2015

Payment Amount: \$230.00

#### **Useful Tools**

Check In Online
Early Bird Check-In
View/Share Itinerary
Change Air Reservation
Cancel Air Reservation
Check Flight Status
Flight Status Notification
Book a Car
Book a Hotel

#### Know Before You Go

In the Airport

Baggage Policies

Suggested Airport Arrival Times
Security Procedures
Customers of Size
In the Air
Purchasing and Refunds

#### **Special Travel Needs**

Traveling with Children
Traveling with Pets
Unaccompanied Minors
Baby on Board
Customers with Disabilities

### Legal Policies & Helpful Information

Privacy Policy

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<u>18 FAQs</u>

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Contact Us

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 $<sup>^{-1}</sup>$  All travel involving funds from this Confirmation Number must be completed by the expiration date.  $^{2}$  Security Fee is the government-imposed September 11th Security Fee.

# EXHIBIT C

Policy Summary Page 1 of 1



# Policy 4022396107 - Policy Summary

OWNER'S NAME

Michael Micone

PREMIUM AMOUNT

\$49.99 (Monthly)

### BASE COVERAGE

TYPE

AAA Annual Renewable Term Life

Insurance

EFFECTIVE DATE

4/22/2013

COVERAGE AMOUNT

\$200,000

INSURED'S NAME

Michael Micone

#### **COVERAGE DETAILS**

POLICY EXPIRATION DATE

4/22/2049

# DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

(, CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
KERSTAND. MICONE	Case No. 8-08-388334
Plaintiff/Petitioner	
v. Allerian A Manual	Dept.
TYTICHTEL TI TYTICTURE	MOTION/OPPOSITION
Defendant/Respondent	FEE INFORMATION SHEET
Notice: Motions and Oppositions filed after entry of a fi subject to the reopen filing fee of \$25, unless specifically Oppositions filed in cases initiated by joint petition may accordance with Senate Bill 388 of the 2015 Legislative 3	excluded by NRS 19.0312. Additionally, Motions and be subject to an additional filing fee of \$129 or \$57 in
Step 1. Select either the \$25 or \$0 filing fee in	the box below.
☐ \$25 The Motion/Opposition being filed with	
-OR- The Motion/Opposition being filed with	this form is not subject to the \$25 reopen
fee because:	i ans form is not subject to the \$25 teopen
The Motion/Opposition is being file entered.	d before a Divorce/Custody Decree has been
	solely to adjust the amount of child support
established in a final order.	
	ideration or for a new trial, and is being filed
entered on	t or decree was entered. The final order was
☐ Other Excluded Motion (must specify	y)
Step 2. Select the \$0, \$129 or \$57 filing fee in	the how helow
- 1 1 5 m	this form is not subject to the \$129 or the
\$57 fee because:	t this form is not subject to the \$129 of the
	d in a case that was not initiated by joint petition.
☐ The party filing the Motion/Opposit -OR-	ion previously paid a fee of \$129 or \$57.
$\square$ \$129 The Motion being filed with this form	is subject to the \$129 fee because it is a motion
to modify, adjust or enforce a final ord	der.
□ \$57 The Motion/Opposition being filing wi	th this form is subject to the \$57 fee because it is djust or enforce a final order, or it is a motion
Step 3. Add the filing fees from Step 1 and Step	.1 (1. 16.6; 1.11 a) (7.7).
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	2.
The total filing fee for the motion/opposition I a	2.
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Electronically Filed 09/03/2015 08:42:16 AM

Hom D. Lahre COM 1 PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 DONN W. PROKOPIUS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 6460 3 JEREMY R. BEASLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 12176 4 931 South Third Street 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 474-0500 / Fax (702) 951-8022 6 general@pandblawyers.com 7 Attorney for Plaintiff, MICHAEL A. MICONE 8 DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION 9 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 10 KERSTAN D. MICONE, CASE NO.: D-08-388334-D 11 DEPT. NO.: J 12 Plaintiff, 13 VS. DATE OF HEARING: 11/4/2015 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 A.M. 14 MICHAEL A. MICONE, 15 Defendant. 16 17 **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING** 18 I hereby certify that I am an employee of the PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY, and on the 3<sup>rc</sup> 19 day of September, 2015, I duly deposited a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO FIND THE 20 PLAINTIFF IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND TO CHANGE CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' CHILD JOSEPH; TO REVIEW AND MODIFY CHILD SUPPORT FOR 21 **DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY'S FEES AND RELATED RELIF** for mailing in the U.S. Mail 22 at Las Vegas, Nevada, postage prepaid thereon, addressed to the following at the last known address to: 23 John D. Jones, Esq. 24 **BLACK & LoBELLO** 25 10777 West Twain Ave., Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89135 26 Attorney for Plaintiff, KERSTAN HUBBS

An employee of PROKOPIUS & BEASLEY

/s/ Alex Gomez

27

28