Further, Defendant American Vantage Brownstone LLC (AVB) signed the Term Sheet (see Exhibit 1 to the Complaint). The signature block for AVB is signed by Defendant Tassinari as its chairman.

Defendants managed, lead, acted on behalf of and owned the Brownstone Plaintiffs and therefore, for purposes of privity, their interests and motivations were and are perfectly aligned. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive a way in which they were *not* privies to the Brownstone Plaintiffs. After all, Tassinari signed the contract or Term Sheet in his capacity as chairman of AVB and on behalf of AVB the owner of Brownstone Gold Town, LLC. See *Bloom v Claimetrics Management*, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis. 75841 (Nev. 2011) (Since defendants in second case were managing agents, members and owners of defendant limited liability company in first case, they were privies for purposes of claim preclusion.)

b. The Order of Dismissal With Prejudice in the First Case is Valid.

As to the second factor, there can be no question that the Order of Dismissal of Action with Prejudice (the "Order of Dismissal") filed in the First Case is valid. The Order of Dismissal was submitted by and signed by counsel for Robert Mendenhall and Sunridge Corporation, the Defendants in the First Case and the Plaintiffs in the instant case, the Order of Dismissal was signed by District Court Judge Ronald J. Israel and filed in the First Case, and the Order of Dismissal specifically provides in part that: "...the above entitled action **BE AND**IS HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, FULLY DISCHARGED AND RELEASED, with respect to any and all claims as alleged, or that could have been alleged in this action by ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION..." (Emphasis in original).

Plaintiff's Opposition does not dispute the validity of the Order of Dismissal.

REPLY RE MOTION TO DISMISS - 8

c. Plaintiff's Claims Herein, or Any Part of Them, Were or Could Have

Been Brought in the First Case.

Claim preclusion applies to prevent a second suit based *on all grounds of recovery* that were or *could have been brought* in the first suit. *Five Star Capital v Ruby*, 108 Nev. 149.

Mendenhall's Motion to Amend in the First Case seeking to assert the same claims now brought in the case at bar, clearly demonstrates that the claims in this case could have been brought in the First Case.

Plaintiff's Opposition incorrectly argues that there is some requirement that the second suit arise from the "same cause of action" as the first suit in order for claim preclusion to apply.

The same argument was presented to the Court in *Five Star Capital* and rejected. The Nevada Supreme Court in *Five Star Capital* explained in part as follows:

"Next, **Five Star's** argument that claim preclusion cannot apply because the second suit included <u>an additional claim for breach of contract</u> damages is erroneous. As explained above, claim preclusion applies to prevent a second suit based on <u>all grounds of recovery that were or could have been brought in the first suit</u>." (Emphasis Supplied)

Despite the undisputed fact the Plaintiffs actually attempted to bring the same claims asserted in this Second Case in the First Case by filing Mendenhall's Motion to Amend in the First Case, Plaintiffs now claim they could not have brought their claims in the First Case because Plaintiffs' argue that Mendenhall could not have been aware that Mr. Tassinari signed the Undisputed Term Sheet in the Other Investor(s) signature block. However, Plaintiff's argument is not supported by Mendenhall's own admissions (See above).

Contrary to the assertions in Plaintiff's Opposition, Mendenhall admits: a) that Mendenhall signed the Term Sheet first when no other signatures were present; and b) that on December 5, 2007 Mendenhall had possession the Undisputed Term Sheet. The Undisputed Term Sheet plainly shows that Ronald Tassinari signed the Undisputed Term Sheet both on behalf of American Vantage Brownstone, LLC and for Other Investor(s).

Mendenhall's admission that he was in possession of the Undisputed Term Sheet since December 5, 2007 irrefutably demonstrates that Plaintiffs discovered, or should have discovered, that Mr. Tassinari signed the Undisputed Term Sheet in the Other Investor(s) signature block.

There is no question that claims Plaintiff are asserting in this action could have been brought in the First Case.

Plaintiff incorrectly argues that claim preclusion only applies to compulsory counterclaims under NRCP 13(a). However, there simply is no such requirement under Nevada law as set out by the Nevada Supreme Court in *Five Star Capital Corp v Ruby*, 124 Nev. 1048, 194 P3d 709, 713 (2008).

Plaintiff's argument that Plaintiff was somehow precluded by NRCP 11 from asserting in current claims in the First Case is without merit. Plaintiff did in fact attempt to assert the same claims in the First Case through the Motion to Amend.

Finally, Plaintiff incorrectly argues that there is an equitable prong to the standard for claim preclusion set out in *Five Star Capital*. There simply is no such prong in the *Five Star Capital* standard. In fact the Court in *Five Star Capital* specifically rejected an equitable public policy argument.

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Further, the Order of Dismissal by its express terms extends to claims which could have been alleged by Plaintiffs herein in pertinent part as follows:

"...the above entitled action BE AND IS HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, FULLY DISCHARGED AND RELEASED, with respect to any and all claims as alleged, or that could have been alleged in this action by ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION, BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN, LLC and BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN CV, LLC, including but not limited to, those asserted in the Complaint, as well as any related or potential claims that could be asserted in this action against one another,..."

(Emphasis Supplied).

The August 29, 2014 Order of Dismissal specifically dismissed with prejudice any and all claims that could have been alleged in the First Case, including any related or potential claims that could be asserted. The Order of Dismissal was entered well after the Motion to Amend filed by Mendenhall on July 21, 2014. Plaintiff's claims in this action, which Plaintiff attempted to assert through the Motion to Amend is absolutely barred by the express terms of the Order of Dismissal.


Since all three requirements for claim preclusion are met, this action must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

The Defendants in this case were officers and managing agents and members of the Plaintiffs in the First Case, Brownstone Gold Town, LLC and Brownstone Gold Town CV, LLC. The Defendants herein were and are privies of the Brownstone Plaintiffs in the First Action. The Order of Dismissal of Action with Prejudice filed in the First Case is valid. The claims in this case could have been brought in the First Case. Therefore this action is barred and must be dismissed.

DATED this 1075 day of March, 2015.

HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, CHARTERED



HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar no. 1252 400 South Fourth Street, Third Floor

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Tel. No.: (702) 382-6700 Fax No.: (702) 384-0715 Email: harry@marquislaw.net

Attorney for Defendants

In Association with:

JAMES J. LEE, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 01909 Legal Offices of James J Lee 2620 Regatta Drive, Suite 102 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Telephone (702) 664-6545 Email: james@leelawonline.com

Attorney for Defendants

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on the 10th day of March, 2015, I served a true copy of the above and foregoing Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss herein electronically via the Court's ECF system upon all parties listed on the electronic service list, as follows: Gwen Rutar Mullins, Esq. Wade B. Gochnour, Esq. HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Telephone: (702) 257-1483 Facsimile: (702) 567-1568 Email: grm@h2law.com Email: wbg@h2law.com Attorneys for Defendants An employee of HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, CHTD REPLY RE MOTION TO DISMISS - 13

Exhibit "F"

AMERICAN VANTAGE BROWNSTONE, LLC A SUBSIDILARY OF AMERICAN VANTAGE COMPANIES

Phone: (702) 227-9800 — Fex: (702) 227-8525 P.O. Box 61920, Les Vegas, NV 59180

CARSON VALLEY CASINO PROJECT TERM SHEET

Transaction:

This term short shall serve as an outline of the basic business terms and conditions upon which Brownstone GoldTown, LLC ("Brownstone GoldTown"), a subsidiary of American Vantage Brownstone, LLC ("AVB"), Robert L. Mendenhall, Fh.D. or an earlity wholly-award by Mr. Mendenhall ("Mendenhall"), and other potential equity investor(s) (the "Other Investor(s)"), will acquire membership interests in the Novada limited liability sempany, Brownstone GoldTown CV, LLC (the "Company") for the primary purpose of constructing, owning and operating a hotel casino to be located in Carson Valley, Donglas County, Nevada (the "Project").

Project Description

GaldTown Hotel and Casino Resort, to be constructed on 45 acres, with approximately 300 hotel rooms and suites, 92,000+ square feet of casino space, three fall service restaurants, 8,000 square feet of convention space and multiple retail outlets. The project site is located within a row miles of Carson City and Lake Tahoe, Nevade and rorty-five minutes from Reno, Nevada.

The Project also includes the exclusive option to purchase an adjoining 300-acre, 7,000 yard, par 72, championship golf course ("Sunridge Golf Chib") with pro allop. The option to purchase Sunridge Golf Chib expires on January 11, 2008.

Ownership of the Company:

The Project membership interests (the "Membership Interests") will be allocated based on the following:

For contribution of the 46-acre project site, valued at \$15,000,000,000,000, Mendenhall will receive a 27.0% Membership Interest. The acreage will be contributed in full on or before the option expiration date of December 27, 2007 or as mutually agreed between Brownstone GuldTown and Mendenhall.

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Erownstone GoldTown, LLC Carson Valley Casino Project Term Sheet Page Two

- It is expected that the Other Investor(s) will contribute \$7,000,000.00
 U.S. dollars for a 12.6% Membership Interest.
- Brownstone GoldTown will contribute \$1,500,000.00 U.S. dollars for a 2.7% Membership Interest
- The option to purchase Sunridge Golf Club provides that, at the discretion of Brownstone Gold Town:
 - The total Purchase Price of \$2,500,000.00 U.S. dollars;
 or,
 - A Furthese Price of \$1,000,000.00 U.S. plus assumption of the golf oart loan, in an amount not to exceed \$150,000.00, and an equity percentage share of the Company in the same manner and terms as the other equity investors of the Company. The equity percentage share is currently equal to a 2.7% Membership Interest.

If Brownstone GoldTown elects to purchase the Suntidge Golf Course for the total Purchase Price of \$2,500,000.00, the related 2.7% Membership Interest will be allocated on a pro-rata basis to Mandenhall, the Office Investor(s) and Brownstone GoldTown.

- The above contributions are collectively defined as the "Project Contributions."
- Brownstone GoldTown will retain the remaining Membership Interest as its foundar.

The total Membership Interests may be impacted if there is an increase in the current investment banking equity requirement of \$25,000,000.00.

Allocation of Casino And Retail Business Cash Flores:

The Operating Agreement will provide for quarterly distribution, if and when available, of the Company's Casine cash flow, after payment of operating expenses (including a development fee of 3.0% of the total development costs and an annual management fee of \$1,000,000.00), senior debt coverants and any required reserves, in the following manner:

Fifty-percent (50%) to the pro ests repayment of the Project Contributions until together with the distributions from the Retail Business each flow (see below), the full value of the Project Contributions is repaid. Distributions from the Company's Casino

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Brownsione GoldTown, LLC Careon Valley Casino Project Tarm Sheet Page Three

> cash flow will first satisfy the pro rate repayment of the Project Contributions, with repayment interest terms based on the higher of 90-Day LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) at the date of the contribution or an annual rate of 6%.

Remaining 50% to be allocated based upon the percentage of Membership Interests held by each member in the Company.

The Operating Agreement will also provide for monthly distributions of the Company's Retail Business cash flow, if and when available, after payment of operating expenses (including development and management fees), senior debt covenants and any required reserves, in the following manuer:

- Seventy-percent (70%) to the pro rata repayment of the Project Communicate until, together with the distributions from the Company's Casino each flow (as discussed above), the full value of the Project Contributions is repedit. Distributions from the Company's Retail Business cash flow will first satisfy the pro rata repayment of the Project Contributions, with repayment interest terms based on the higher of 90-Day LIBOR (London interbank Offered Rate) at the date of the contribution or an annual rate of 6%.
- Remaining 30% to be allocated based upon the percentage of Membership Interests field by each member in the Company.

The Operating Agreement shall provide that, upon the repayment of the fail! value of the Remaining Memberchip Interests, the Company's Cusino and Retail Business each Tows will be distributed according to the percentage of Memberchip Interests held by each member in the Company.

Refinencing

In the event a refinancing of the Project is approved by the Company, after payment of the senior debt, any excess capital realized from the refinancing shall be applied, collectively determined on a pro rata basis from emited centributions, in the following manner to: (i) the Other Investor(s), Mendenhull, Brownstone GoldTown, end as applicable, the Sunridge Golf Club seller, to the extent that the Project Contributions have not been repaid from the digitibutions of Casino cash flow and Readil Business each flow; and (ii) distributed according to the percentage of Membership Interests held by each member in the Company.

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Brownstone GoldTown, LLC Carson Valley Casino Project Term Sheet Page Four

Licensing

The Project owners will be required to satisfactorily obtain a Nevada gaming license. Costs associated with obtaining a Nevada gaming license for a director, employee or consultant directly associated with the dsvelopment or management of the Project are the only licensing costs that will be borne by the Project.

Exclusivity:

Non-exclusive arrangement.

Termination of

Agreement

The Term Sheet may be terminated if not executed by the parties on or before

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Brownstone GoldTown, LLC Carson Valley Cesire Project Term Sheet Page Five

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have agreed upon the above terms and conditions of this Term Sheet. This Term Shoet consent may be executed by one or more of the signers hereto in any number of separate counterparts, and all such counterparts taken together shall be decared to constitute one and the same instrument. Execution of this Term Sheet and delivery thereof by facsimile or email transmission shall be sufficient for all purposes and shall be binding upon any party who so executes.

Dated: 12/4 200

American Vanlage Brownstone, LLC

Name: Rouglet/1: Tessicari Title: Choirmen

Brownstone Gold Fown, LLC

Name: Robert F. Gross
Title: Chief Executive Officer

Robert L. Mendenhall, Ph.D. or Other:

Name: Title:

Спиркцу Маше:

Other Investor(s):

Name:

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Exhibit "G"

AMERICAN VANTAGE BROWNSTONE, LLC A SUBSIDILAR OF AMERICAN VANTAGE COMPANIES

Phone: (702) 227-9800 — Fex: (702) 227-8525 P.O. Box 61920, Les Vegas, NV 89180

CARSON VALLEY CASINO PROJECT TERM SHEET

Transaction:

This term sheet shall serve as an outline of the basic business terms and canditions upon which Brownstone GoldTown, LLC ("Brownsone GoldTown'), a subsidiary of American Vantage Brownstone, LLC ("AVE"), Robert L. Mendachall, Ph.D. or an entity wholly-owned by Mr. Mendenhall ("Mendenhall"), and other potential equity investor(s) (the "Other Investor(s)"), will acquire membership interests in the Navada limited Hability company, Brownstone GoldTown CV, LLC (the "Company") for the primary purpose of constructing, owning and operating a hotel casino to be located in Carson Valley, Dougias County, Nevaria (the "Project").

Project Description:

GoldTown Hotel and Casino Resort, to be constructed on 45 acres, with approximately 300 hotel rooms and suites, 93,000+ square feet of casino space, three full service restaurants, 8,000 square feet of convention spaces and multiple retail outlets. The project site is located within a few miles of Carson City and Lake Tahoo, Novade and forty-five minutes from Reno, Novada.

The Project also includes the exclusive option to purchase an adjoining 300-asre, 7,000 yard, par 72, championship golf course ("Sunridge Golf Chib") with pro shop. The option to purchase Sunridge Golf Chib expires on January 11, 2008.

Ownership of the

The Project membership interests (the "Membership Interests") will be allocated based on the following:

For contribution of the 46-acre project site, valued at \$15,000,000.00, Membership interest. The acreage will be contributed in full on or before the option expiration date of December 27, 2007 or as mutually agreed between Brownstone GoldTown and Mendenhall.

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Brownstone GoldTown, LLC Carson Valley Casino Project Term Sheet Page Two

- It is expected that the Other Investor(s) will contribute \$7,000,000.00
 U.S. dollars for a 12.6% Membership Interest.
- Brownstone GoldTown will contribute \$1,500,000.00 U.S. dollars for a 2.7% Membership Interest.
- The option to purchase Sunridge Golf Club provides that, at the discretion of Brownstone Gold Town;
 - o The total Purchase Price of \$2,500,000.00 U.S. dollars; or.
 - o A Purchase Price of \$1,000,000.00 U.S. pius assumption of the golf cart loan, in an amount not to exceed \$150,000.00, and an equity percentage share of the Company in the same manner and terms as the other equity investors of the Company. The equity percentage share is currently equal to a 2.7% Membership interest.

If Brownstone GoldTown elects to purchase the Subridge Golf Course for the total Purchase Price of \$2,500,000,00, the related 2.7% Membership Interest will be allocated on a pro rata basis to Membership interest investor(s) and Brownstone GoldTown.

- The above contributions are collectively defined as the "Project Contributions."
- Brownstone GoldTown will retain the remaining Membership Interest as its founder.

The total Membership Interests may be impacted if there is an increase in the current investment banking equity requirement of \$25,000,000.00.

Allocation of Casino And Retail Business Cash Flows:

The Operating Agreement will provide for quarterly distribution, if and when available, of the Company's Casine each flow, after payment of operating expenses (including a development fee of 3.0% of the total development costs and an annual management fee of \$1,000,000.00), serior debt covenants and my required reserves, in the following reserves.

Fifty-percent (50%) to the pro rata repayment of the Project Contributions until together with the distributions from the Retail Business cash flow (see below), the full value of the Project Contributions is repaid. Distributions from the Company's Casino

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Brownstone GoldTown, LLC Cirron Valley Casino Project Term Sheet Page Tures

> cash flow will first satisfy the pro rate repayment of the Project Contributions, with repayment interest terms based on the higher of 90-Day LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) at the date of the contribution or an annual rate of 6%.

 Remaining 50% to be allocated based upon the percentage of Membership Interests held by each member in the Company.

The Operating Agreement will also provide for monthly distributions of the Company's Retail Business cash flow, if and when available, after payment of operating expenses (including development and management fees), senior debt covenants and any required reserves, in the following manner:

- Seventy-percent (70%) to the pro rata repayment of the Project Contributions until, together with the distributions from the Company's Casino cash flow (as discussed above), the first value of the Project Contributions is repaid. Distributions from the Company's Renail Business cash flow will first satisfy the pro rata repayment of the Project Contributions, with repayment interest terms based on the higher of 90-Day LIBOR (London interbank Offered Rate) at the date of the contribution or an annual rate of 6%.
- Remaining 30% to be allocated based upon the percentage of Membership Interests held by each member in the Company.

The Operating Agreement shall provide that, upon the repayment of the full value of the Ramaining Membership Interests, the Company's Casino and Retail Business cash flows will be distributed according to the percentage of Mambership Interests held by each member in the Company.

Refirmance

In the event a refinencing of the Project is approved by the Company, after payment of the senior debt, any excess capital realized from the refinancing shall be applied, collectively determined on a pro man basis from capital cantributions, in the following manner to: (i) the Other Investor(s), Mendenhall, Brownstone GoldTown, and as applicable, the Sunridge Golf Club seller, to the extent that the Project Contributions have not been repaid from the distributions of Casino cash flow and Rerail Business cash flow; and (ii) distributed according to the percentage of Membership Interests held by each member in the Company.

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FROM : RFG GAMING & HOSPITALITY, LLC PHONE NO. : 7023466442

Dec. 05 2007 09:5184 P2

Brownstone GoldTown, LLC Carson Valley Casino Project Term Sheet Page Four

Licensing

The Project owners will be required to satisfactorily obtain a Nevada gaming license. Costs associated with obtaining a Nevada gaming license for a director, employee or consultant directly associated with the development or management of the Project are the only licensing costs that will be borne by the Project.

<u>Pxclusivity</u>:

Non-exclusive arrangement.

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Errownstone GoldTown, LLC Carson Valley Casino Project Term Sheet Page Five

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have agreed upon the above terms and conditions of this Term Sheet. This Term Sheet consent may be executed by one or more of the signers hereto in any number of separate commerciants, and all such counterparts taken together shall be deemed to constitute one and the same instrument. Execution of this Term Sheet and dilivery thereof by facsimile or email transmission shall be sufficient for all purposes and shall be binding upon any party who so executes.

Dated: /Z/4/ 2007

American Vantage Brownstone, LLC

Name: Royald J. Taxsinari Title: Cheirmen

Brownsione Gold Fown, LLC

Name: Robert F. Gross
Title: Chief Executive Officer

Robert L. Mendothall, Ph.D. or Other:

Name: Trile:

Сстряку Маше:

Other Investor(s):

Titles

By: Necres:

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Innovators in Recycling Asphalt Pavements

REGISTER OF ACTIONS CASE NO. A-14-708281-C

Robert Mendenhall, Plaintiff(s) vs. Ronald Tassinari, Defendant

(s)

\$ Case Type: Other Tort
 \$ Date Filed: 10/08/2014
 \$ Location: Department 32
 \$ Cross-Reference Case
 \$ Number:

Supreme Court No.: 68053

PARTY INFORMATION

§

Lead Attorneys

Location : District Court Civil/Criminal Help

Defendant Tassinari, Ronald James John Lee

Retained 702-382-4044(W)

Plaintiff Mendenhall, Robert L Gwen Rutar Mullins

Retained 702-257-1483(W)

Plaintiff Sunridge Corporation Gwen Rutar Mullins

Retained 702-257-1483(W)

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

03/17/2015 Motion to Dismiss (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Bare, Rob)

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Minutes

02/24/2015 9:00 AM

03/17/2015 9:00 AM

Court presented an overview and procedural history of the case, noting the Five Star Capital case regarding claim preclusion. Colloquy regarding a previous case with like claims before Judge Israel that was dismissed. Arguments by Mr. Marquis in support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, stating the claims in this case could have been brought in the previous case before Judge Israel. Opposition argued by Mr. Young alleging different circumstances in this case, noting the offer of judgment timeline in the previous case. Following further arguments by counsel distinguishing the two cases, COURT ORDERED, matter taken UNDER ADVISEMENT; written Order TO ISSUE.

<u>Parties Present</u> <u>Return to Register of Actions</u>

Electronically Filed 03/08/2016 09:54:25 AM

1 TRAN DISTRICT COURT **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 4 5 6 7 ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, SUNRIDGE) CORPORATION, CASE NO. A-14-7082818 9 Plaintiffs, DEPT. NO. XXXII 10 VS. 11 RONALD TASSINARI, AMERICAN Transcript of Proceedings 12 VANTAGE BROWNSTONE, LLC, 13 Defendants. 14 BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROB BARE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 15 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 16 TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2015 17 APPEARANCES: 18 For the Plaintiffs: JAY YOUNG, ESQ. 19 GWEN RUTAR MULLINS, ESQ. 20 For the Defendants: HARRY P. MARQUIS, ESQ. 21 22 CARRIE HANSEN, DISTRICT COURT RECORDED BY: TRANSCRIBED BY: KRISTEN LUNKWITZ 23 24 Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript 25 produced by transcription service. Page 1

1 TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2015 AT 9:17 A.M. 2 THE LAW CLERK: Case number A708281. 3 THE COURT: What about this one? 4 5 [Colloquy between the Law Clerk and the Court] 6 THE COURT: I apologize for this, but I'm going to 7 call you guys next because I --8 MR. MARQUIS: Oh, okay. THE COURT: He -- my law clerk didn't know that 9 but it's going to take -- yours is going to take a little 10 11 longer. 12 MR. MARQUIS: All right. Thank you. 13 THE COURT: And so the other one is going to be a little quicker. Sorry about that. Let's go ahead and call 14 15 this one. [Case trailed at 9:18 a.m.] 16 17 [Proceeding resumed at 9:24 a.m.] THE LAW CLERK: Case number A708281. 18 19 MR. MARQUIS: Good morning, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Good morning. 21 MS. RUTAR MULLINS: Good morning, Your Honor. 22 MR. YOUNG: Good morning. Jay Young and Gwen 23 Rutar Mullins on behalf of the plaintiff. 24 MR. MARQUIS: Harry Marquis on behalf of the 25 defendants and I have Mr. Tassinari with me as well.

THE COURT: All right. Welcome, have a seat and relax everyone. Now, you heard that I typically like to go over the factual predicate and sometimes also let everybody know what I think the most relevant legal analysis might just be going into these hearings. If I were to do that in this case, to a level of specificity that you all know, it would take quite a while because there's a pretty storied procedural history here. So, rather than going through it all and just know I've read it and outlined it, I'm going to give a more summary version. You're welcome to argue or tell me things from the factual scenario that I don't mention now. But just know I have it all here, outlined, pretty much everything from the year 2006 on, having to do with the underlying factual predicate.

So, there's that. But in any event, the case that we have in our court in -- as a theory, involves a fraud claim. Of course, what we have is that Judge Ron Israel had a case that it's alleged, basically, would now act as a preclusive case, a claim preclusion under the Five Star Capital case where I think that's really where the Nevada Supreme Court took the opportunity to change Nevada jurisprudence from what it used to be in the past. You know, a few of us don't have hair in the room and it used to be a thing called res judicata when we did have hair. And the Court took an opportunity in our lifetimes to say:

Wait a second, there's claim preclusion, there's issue preclusion. And they laid it all out.

The mainline case, of course, is this Five Star case. It talks about whether the parties or their privies are the same. The privy issues, I think, becomes relevant in our case, whether the final judgment's valid. I don't think we have a dispute as to the Israel judgment being a valid one. And whether the subsequent actions based upon the same claims or any part of them that could have been brought in the first case and I think that's a big issue in the argument today as to whether all that -- you know, all the claims could have been brought.

But again, without getting into the whole storied factual predicate, it seemed like what happened was -because I've got to look at what happened in the Ron Israel case and compare it to what I now have here to the best of my ability. In other words, what I'm saying to you all, the note I made reading through all this is: Is our -maybe a better way to say it is -- and if I'm wrong about this just tell me, but this is how I conceptualize the thing so you guys can argue. Is our case, if you look at the four corners of it, is it a compulsory or permissive counterclaim that could have been brought, really, in the Israel case? Because the claim preclusion area of law does not bar a party from suing independently if it maybe were a

permissive counterclaim. That's from the Executive

Management Limited Ticor Title case, Nevada Supreme Court

from '98. Gives me some guidance on that. It -- also,

Rule 13 talks about the idea that:

A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim

which at the time of serving the pleading or the

pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises

matter of the opposing party's claim.

Essentially, I have to look at, again, what we have here and ask: Could it or should it have been brought in the Judge Israel case or was it even fairly encompassed in the case, which is another sort of thought because if you look at the court procedure, and correct me if I'm wrong, but there was a -- essentially, a settlement. It was a settlement in the Israel case. Right?

out of the transaction or occurrence as the subject

MR. MARQUIS: Correct.

THE COURT: And then after all that --

MS. RUTAR MULLINS: It was an offer of judgment.

THE COURT: Pardon me?

MS. RUTAR MULLINS: Acceptance of offer of

||judgment, so --

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THE COURT: Yeah. I said this was an offer of judgment.

MS. RUTAR MULLINS: Right.

THE COURT: And so the question became, it seemed like that the plaintiffs which were known in the Israel case say as the Brownstone plaintiffs, they filed Motion to Clarify Enforced Terms of Mendenhall's Offer of Judgment. And in his wisdom, Judge Israel, in August of 2014 as I understand it, heard that Motion to Amend, part of a Motion to Amend, I guess, and said that he wouldn't prohibit them from filing another lawsuit and right after that, within about 10 days, Judge Israel entered an Order of Dismissal of Action with Prejudice and, in that, indicated the standard language but specific language that:

The above action be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice fully discharged and released with respect to any and all claims as alleged.

And then it says: Or that could have been alleged, consistent with this idea of probably a compulsory counterclaim. It could have been alleged in this action by Robert Mendenhall, Sunrise Corporation, blah, blah, blah.

And so I know that Mr. Marquis, in part, your argument is: Well, that language from the Judge Israel Order in conjunction with the facts here should lead a Court to conclude that the instant fraud allegations could have been alleged by Mendenhall in the other action. I don't know if you're also going as far as to say: Hey look, in any event, it was encompassed in the acceptance of

the offer of judgment anyway.

And that gets us to the last part, maybe the only part of the factual predicate that seems most relevant. I know that the idea was: Well, there was this deposition that occurred and it was, at that time, plaintiffs say that Mr. Tassinari --

MR. MARQUIS: Tassinari, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Tassinari. Okay. They -- plaintiffs say that as far as Mr. Tassinari's alleged fraudulent acts, they didn't know that until his deposition. And I think that's the main part of an argument that: Well, wait a second, the current cause of action for fraud could not have been fairly encompassed or really brought up in the Israel case.

And, so, it might be helpful to me if you both kind of talked about the time element of when this deposition occurred as compared to everything that happened in Israel case and that sort of thing. I think that might be the -- at least something to talk about.

And the last part of it, I share stuff with people. Not -- doesn't mean I'm right in this stage of a hearing, but I share stuff. It just -- it did seem to me and I'm not -- I don't mean this with any disrespect to the plaintiffs' side, but I looked at the Offer of Judgment. I looked at the term sheet that I have outlined here.

Anyway, it's at least questionable in my mind what was going on here. In other words, again no disrespect, but an argument, sort of a thought came to mind, not even an argument, that: Okay, Mendenhall makes an Offer of Judgment. It's used in another District Court department to consummate sort of a finalization of a case and is it that Mendenhall is really just trying to get out of it is a question? I mean, is what I have to, at least in fairness, bring up.

So, in any event, it's a defense motion. Mr. Marquis.

MR. MARQUIS: Thank you, Your Honor. You're right, this case is determined by the Five Star Capital case and in the factual scenario that you laid out, I'd ask you to also be aware that they did file a Motion to Amend, that they did file a Motion to Amend and that I attached that motion and their Proposed Amended Complaint.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARQUIS: And it contained all these claims. So, when they say that that could not possibly have been brought in that case, well, not only could it have been brought in the case, but they tried to bring it in the case.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARQUIS: Now that motion wasn't ruled upon

because the case was settled before that, but let me go 1 2 through the factors. Okay. Were these two parties, 3 American Vantage Brownstone, LLC, and Ronald Tassinari, were they privies of the plaintiffs in the first case? 4 5 Well I submit obviously they are, Your Honor. Both signed 6 the term sheet. And if you look at the term sheet, the --7 it's Exhibit F to my -- our Reply and specifically on page -- there's Mendenhall bates number 00674. 8 9 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. MARQUIS: You can see the signatures. You can 10 11 see the two signatures. You can see the --12 THE COURT: Yeah. I know. We do have that 13 outlined here. 14 MR. MARQUIS: Yeah. 15 THE COURT: I mean, I usually use a green 16 highlighter, he uses a yellow one, but we've got it. 17 MR. MARQUIS: All right. Okay. So, American 18 Vantage Brownstone, --19 THE COURT: Yeah. 20 MR. MARQUIS: -- they signed this contract. 21 Tassinari signed as other investor. His name's identified, 22 printed out on the American Vantage one, not printed out on 23 the other one. 24 THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MARQUIS: But it's the same signature.

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It's

not even close. It's a distinctive signature. It's not like it's some kind of, you know, line with an X in it or something.

THE COURT: So, in your view, that establishes the privy part of the analysis?

MR. MARQUIS: That -- certainly the fact that American Vantage is the parent corporation --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARQUIS: -- of the other two plaintiffs. And Mr. Tassinari is the chairman of American Vantage and he actually signed on behalf of American Vantage and he also signed himself. So, it clearly -- there's privy in this case. I don't think it's a close call. The second prong -- and in the term sheet itself it even says, it identifies the Brownstone GoldTown, LLC, is a subsidiary of American Vantage Brownstone. It's right in the terms of the agreement.

The second prong in the Five Star Capital case is:

Is the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice valid? I don't

think there's any question that it is.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MARQUIS: It was signed by the attorneys for everybody. It was acceptance of an Offer of judgment. We argued about the terms before Judge Israel. There's no question that that's a valid, legal, and binding Order.

1 Finally: Could the claims have been brought in 2 this case -- in the first case? Obviously, Your Honor --3 THE COURT: They tried to. 4 MR. MARQUIS: They tried to. 5 THE COURT: Yeah. 6 MR. MARQUIS: They tried to bring them. 7 tried to bring them and the defendants in this -- that they're trying to sue in this case, after we litigated for 8 9 years and finally settled this case, and Mr. Tassinari was 10 deposed in that case. Mr. Tassinari signed the term sheet. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. MARQUIS: Twice. And American Vantage signed 13 the term sheet. For them to say that they could not have 14 brought these claims on this term sheet in the first case 15 is incorrect, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you --17 MR. MARQUIS: And they certainly could have 18 brought them. 19 THE COURT: Let me ask you a couple questions. 20 MR. MARQUIS: Yeah. Certainly could have brought 21 those in this case and there's very little question about it. Now, they've argued that well --22 23 THE COURT: Okay. Let me interrupt you and ask 24 you a question.

MR. MARQUIS: Sure.

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THE COURT: You're familiar with the Judge Ron 1 2 Israel events that happened? MR. MARQUIS: Oh yeah. Yeah. No. I was part of 3 4 the --5 THE COURT: Yeah I know you were part of it and 6 you were there. 7 MR. MARQUIS: Yeah. Yeah. 8 THE COURT: So, I have a couple questions having 9 to do with that. 10 MR. MARQUIS: Sure. 11 THE COURT: As I understand it, there is this 12 Motion to Amend --13 MR. MARQUIS: Right. 14 THE COURT: -- that you've mentioned. It was 15 withdrawn, as I understand it. MR. MARQUIS: Just never ruled on because it was 16 17 settled first. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. MARQUIS: It was not withdrawn. There was 20 never a hearing. There was never an Opposition filed --21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. MARQUIS: -- because, in the meantime, this 23 Offer of Judgment had been served and accepted. THE COURT: All right. That clears that up a 24 25 little bit up for me.

Let me ask you this, and I'm just asking you what you think. I mean, -
MR. MARQUIS: Sure.

THE COURT: -- You might not know the answer to this because you're not Judge Israel, but why did he make this comment or have this allowance to bring another lawsuit? In other words, why do you think the judge, in hearing this Motion to Clarify, because that's what he's dealing with then. Right?

MR. MARQUIS: Right.

THE COURT: This Motion to Clarify and enforce what is the Offer of Judgment end result. Right? That's what he's doing.

MR. MARQUIS: Right.

THE COURT: Why did he basically say: Well, you can bring another lawsuit -- and he didn't really do anything affirmative to, as I understand it, to actually clarify or enforce anything.

MR. MARQUIS: Yes. He -- my understanding of what he said from the bench, because I was there, --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MARQUIS: Okay. Was that no question that the Offer of Judgment was going to be accepted. No question that the terms of the Offer in Judgment were going to be incorporated into his Order.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARQUIS: And they were. And they were. And they were -- and they're very specific. It's dismissed with prejudice:

Fully discharged and released with respect to any and all claims as alleged or that could have been alleged in this action.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARQUIS: And then: Including, but not limited to, those asserted in the Complaint as well as any related or potential claims that could be asserted as action against one another.

So, it was very broad but what he stated from the bench was that what was before him was the resolution of this case. Whether or not they would file another case, which, you know, of course they were saying then: Well, we wouldn't do that. Right? But didn't take them long to do it. So -- but they -- if that case was filed, that was going to be assigned to a different judge and that wasn't before him at this time. And that --

THE COURT: What type of case, though, you think it was envisioned in that? It just seemed, I'm just saying, I'm not criticizing Judge Israel. I'm not. That's not the point of this. But if a judge says: Well, you can go file some other lawsuit, what was -- what kind of

1 lawsuit was envisioned in this potential future filing? 2 MR. MARQUIS: I envisioned, Your Honor, that they 3 would file exactly what they filed, which was their amended 4 -- their counterclaim that they sought to assert by filing 5 their Motion to Amend. I envisioned that they would file 6 that exact claim against American Vantage Brownstone and 7 Mr. Tassinari. That's exactly what we envisioned and that's what we exactly told Judge Israel we were afraid 8 9 that they would do. THE COURT: So, I take it maybe the judge was of a 10 11 mindset: Well, let somebody else handle that. I'm done 12 with it here. I mean that --13 MR. MARQUIS: That's exactly what he said.

THE COURT: And not as an indication that it had validity but rather under --

MR. MARQUIS: No. And as a matter of fact, he doubted -- he said he didn't think it would survive a motion but it wasn't before him and he wasn't going to make that ruling. Somebody else was going to have to decide that.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. MARQUIS: So, now we're before Your Honor.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. MARQUIS: Okay.

THE COURT: All right.

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1 MR. MARQUIS: So, and --2 THE COURT: Because I -- the reason I mentioned 3 that, too, is that --4 MR. MARQUIS: Yeah. 5 THE COURT: -- I've had it happen where, you know, 6 a settlement happens or an Offer of Judgment is accepted 7 and people come in and they ask for some kind of clarification, or some kind of enforcement, or something 8 9 from a, you know, a judge. And if it is my case I'll do 10 I typically just do it. 11 MR. MARQUIS: Yeah. 12 THE COURT: But, I mean, I'm not criticizing Judge 13 Israel but I mean I'm just trying to figure out what happened because it's -- I think it would be a little 14 15 inconsistent with the way I do stuff but that's okay. He's 16 been around longer than me and maybe his way is better. I don't know. But I'm just saying that's my thought. 17 18 MR. MARQUIS: I don't know. I mean, had he 19 granted our motion at that time then we wouldn't be here 20 today but he didn't, so they --21 THE COURT: Got it. 22 MR. MARQUIS: -- immediately refiled the same 23 claim --24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. MARQUIS: -- they asserted in their amended

1 pleading that they sought to assert. 2 THE COURT: All right. 3 MR. MARQUIS: And the final thing I'd like to point out to Your Honor is the fact, the undisputed fact, 4 5 based on Mr. Mendenhall's affidavits filed in the other case and in this case, that Mr. Mendenhall had this page, 6 7 this Exhibit F, with these signatures. He had this and admits he had that --8 9 THE COURT: Okay. MR. MARQUIS: -- in December of 2007. For them to 10 11 say now, oh, you know, we didn't have this or we didn't see 12 it, well, it's -- they produced it. They had it. 13 THE COURT: Right. 14 MR. MARQUIS: The one we had wasn't as good a copy 15 and that's the next exhibit, Exhibit G. That's not a great 16 That's the one we had but they had the good copy 17 with the clear signatures. It's not what they showed the 18 people in the depositions but they had it. It had been 19 produced in the case before the depositions --20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. MARQUIS: -- by them. 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 MR. MARQUIS: And them to -- for Mr. Mendenhall to

say, he didn't know who signed it, I couldn't tell what

those signatures were, there's no question he signed it

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1 first. Nobody signed it before Mr. Mendenhall. He signed 2 it first. He faxed it back. The signatures were -- the other signatures were made and then sent back to Mr. 3 4 Mendenhall and he admits he got it the next day. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. MARQUIS: And he had this document. 7 THE COURT: Yeah. I noted that. 8 MR. MARQUIS: So for him to say that they couldn't 9 have brought these claims because didn't know where those -10 - those signatures were on there. It just does not ring true, Your Honor. 11 12 THE COURT: Right. I have that fact down here, 13 since you mentioned it. December 2007, Tassinari and 14 Mendenhall reach an agreement. That's the term sheet 15 agreement. 16 MR. MAROUIS: Correct. 17 THE COURT: That set forth that Mendenhall would 18 transfer property to Brownstone plaintiffs in exchange for 19 an interest in the Brownstone plaintiffs -- they would 20 contribute initial development costs. And it goes on from 21 there. 22 MR. MARQUIS: That's right, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Right. 24 MR. MARQUIS: And that's what the other case was

The other case was that Mr. Mendenhall never

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about.

transferred the property.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARQUIS: So, the casino was never built.

THE COURT: Right. Got it. Okay. Understand.

MR. MARQUIS: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. YOUNG: Thank you, Your Honor. As the Court is well aware, res judicata and its modern branches are equitable doctrines designed to present -- prevent a plaintiff from suing a defendant over, and over, and over. That's certainly not the case here. That's what was envisioned and talked about in the Five Star case. What we have here are defendants who are admitted fraud feasors and they are now coming to this Court seeking equity. Equity does not allow a fraud feasor to use this Court as an arrow in its quiver to avoid a \$7,000,000 fraud compounded with an additional \$1.2 million fraud on the case and we believe that's why Judge Israel indicated that he would be fine with another case being brought, another lawsuit.

The facts that you haven't mentioned here today that are salient, that must be accepted to be true regarding the development of this casino, was that Sunridge had the property. Brownstone was going to develop the property and Sunridge was going to exchange the property for an interest and Brownstone was going to bring in this investor group out of Canada. And that investor group was

going to infuse \$7,000,000 in cash.

Now, what you have when you look at the term sheet are the signatures of Mr. Tassinari on behalf of AVB. Then you -- we have testimony in the underlying in the first action from Anna Morrison and Robert Gross, who were a part of Brownstone, and they, looking at the signature of who they want you to believe is their boss, could not tell that it was his signature, that it was the same signature as he signed under AVB. In fact, both of them testified that they believed that that was some Canadian fellow who was signing on behalf of a Canadian consortium that was going to infuse \$7,000,000 into this project.

It wasn't until Mr. Tavinari's [sic] deposition that we learned that that wasn't the case. Nobody was in the room with Mr. Tassinari when he signed that. Mr. Mendenhall was not in the same room there. As you heard, there was a faxing that went back and forth. Mr. Mendenhall affixes his signature, then as signatures were affixed by the other parties, and then faxed back.

What Mr. Tassinari admitted to in his deposition was that he signed on behalf of the other investors and then he admitted to a stunning fraud, that when he signed that document he had no intention, on behalf of himself or any consortium or any other fictional group that he was representing when he affixed his signature there, of

infusing \$7,000,000 in cash. But yet, at the same time, he still wanted to hold Mr. Mendenhall liable for deposit on the property.

Now, as the Court has mentioned, timing on this is very important, that the Court understands that timing. The parties were up against a discovery deadline. It was a hard deadline. They had taken the depositions of Gross and Morrison. Both Gross and Morrison, who were testifying on behalf of the Brownstone entities, said that this signature for the other investors, some signature they didn't recognize. They assumed it was the Canadian fellow. Shortly thereafter, on July 10th, 2014, Mr. Mendenhall and Sunridge served a \$1.2 million Offer of Judgment.

Now, the 10 days after that, the 10 judicial days after that come into very important play here, Your Honor, because as this Court is aware, an Offer of Judgment, once made, cannot be withdrawn under any circumstances, even the recognition of fraud on the other side, within that first 10 days. And that's the rule that caught everybody here.

Four days after the Offer of Judgment was served, Mr. Tassinari's deposition was taken. Not before, as was insinuated a moment ago. Four days after the Offer of Judgment was served, his deposition was taken. And it was then and only then that the plaintiffs -- or the defendants in the action learned of Mr. Tassinari's stunning fraud.

On the 21st, a week later, the defendants filed their Motion for Leave to Amend. That was never heard. It was never heard for a good reason, because before the 10 days was up, the Offer of Judgment was accepted. Remember, we had no ability to withdraw that offer of judgment. We had to play that out. It was accepted. The case was dead. The judge did not hear the motion. Leave was not granted to file the new claim. No claim was served. There was no jeopardy attached, if you want to borrow a claim from criminal law. That — those claims simply were not part of that case. The only claims that were part of that case that were served and for which due process started were the claims that were filed by the plaintiffs in that case against the defendants, my clients.

Now, addressing the Five Star elements. First, the Five Star case, and most of the cases looking at the Five Star case, deal with plaintiffs who are filing serial lawsuits. That's not the circumstance here. We were the defendants in the last action. We're now the plaintiffs in this action so it's not the case where the Court is trying to keep a plaintiff from continually filing suit, after suit, after suit until it gets what they want from a Court. That's not the case here.

The initial action was a fraud action. This is -- excuse me, a breach of contract action. This one,

obviously, is a fraud action. The question of privity, if we were talking about if we had brought an action for breach of contract or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounding either in tort or in contract action and we were standing here in front of you on that, I would agree with Mr. Marquis that there would be an argument for privity there. We're not standing before you on those causes of action. We're not standing before you on a breach action. We're standing before you on a fraud action that wasn't discovered until after the Offer of Judgment was made in the action and it was too late for us to withdraw that.

Corporate agents and their -- and individuals are separately liable for their fraudulent actions and, in this case, Mr. Tassinari not only duped Mr. Mendenhall but he duped his own employees in the subsidiary companies, Morrison and Gross. Both of those subsidiaries thought that that signature belonged to the Canadian fellow as well. That's how they testified at their deposition.

THE COURT: What was the sum and substance of the Motion to Clarify and Enforce that Judge Israel basically didn't rule on with specificity?

MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, that was to do with the nature of the Order itself. And if we look at the Order itself, Your Honor, it does bear some --

1 THE COURT: In other words, you're telling me it 2 didn't have anything to do with this fraud thought? 3 MR. YOUNG: Come again? 4 THE COURT: It didn't have anything to do with a 5 fraud that you're now alleging? 6 MR. YOUNG: No, Your Honor, because that didn't 7 appear until after the Offer of Judgment. He was looking at the language of the Offer of Judgment and how that 8 9 language was going to affect the dismissal language. 10 THE COURT: Why wouldn't you say to Judge Israel 11 though, something along the lines of what you're saying to 12 me, having to do with the factual chronology? In other words, the idea that on July 10th the Offer of Judgment is 13 served and on July 14th Tassinari's deposition is taken. 14 15 You now think there's fraud or you've discovered fraud 16 based upon, as you say, some -- I forget how you said it 17 but some surprisingly --18 MR. YOUNG: Stunning fraud. 19 THE COURT: Stunning fraud. Right. Whatever. 20 makes an admission that he never intended to pay the 21 7,000,000 bucks or whatever. Right? 22 MR. YOUNG: Right. 23 THE COURT: It's a stunning admission. 24 MR. YOUNG: It is. 25 THE COURT: Okay. That's what you said. But in

any event, why wouldn't you do that with Judge Israel while he has the case if that's really what you're --

MR. YOUNG: That was done, Your Honor. And what Judge Israel said was: You're stuck with it. The 10 days are the 10 days. You don't get to -- you don't get to lift that for any reason whatsoever. You're stuck with it. I'm stuck with it. I don't like it. Go file your suit somewhere else. So, we're stuck with this result just because of language in the Offer of Judgment statute.

THE COURT: Because it's interesting. I mean, it's six in one, half a dozen in the other, I guess. But if you did perfect with Judge Israel a legal attempt to have the Judge Israel case address this alleged fraud and he denied that, wouldn't that -- wouldn't the procedural avenue be something -- some kind of an activity with the Nevada Supreme Court on that issue?

MR. YOUNG: He didn't deny it. Our attempt to get in front of him was the Motion for Leave, which is proper. That was never heard because the case died as soon as the Offer of Judgment was accepted. And so the judge never heard the Motion for Leave.

THE COURT: So, I'm -- what I'm trying to figure out, Mr. Young, is this: In your view, did you or did you not perfect, in the record of the Israel case, your attempt to bring the fraud claim that you now have in our court in

the Israel case? Is it perfected in that record or not?

MR. YOUNG: I don't think it's perfected because
we never had an opportunity to be heard on the Motion for
Leave to Amend.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. YOUNG: Judge certainly knew it was out there and told us we were stuck with it and to file our action in another court. So, here we are.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. YOUNG: And I think the Court really hit the nail on the head when talking about whether this was a compulsory or permissive counterclaim in the first case because a decision could swing on that fact here as well. If we go to the second element --

THE COURT: That's a good point, Mr. Young, because what I'm getting at -- that's really where I'm going in my mind having to do with this little discussion about did you perfect with Judge Israel --

MR. YOUNG: Right.

THE COURT: -- the idea of: Hey, we want to bring a fraud claim here because we had a deposition four days after the Offer of Judgment and that changed things.

Because if you did sort of have that in there, that's more along the lines of, I think, a compulsory counterclaim sort of a theory. I mean, the whole philosophy would be that

it's more appropriate to bring right then and there in the Israel case.

MR. YOUNG: Right. And nobody here has argued, to my knowledge, that it was a compulsory counterclaim. First of all, it wasn't a counterclaim, it was a third party claim.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. YOUNG: Right.

THE COURT: I know. It's the same philosophy is what I'm saying.

MR. YOUNG: Exactly.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. YOUNG: Exactly.

And I want to touch very briefly on the second element of the Five Star case, whether the facts that were essential are the same. The facts that were essential to the breach of contract were whether Mr. Mendenhall submitted the property to the venture as he was required to under the term sheet. That has nothing to do with whether Mr. Tassinari signed a document pledging \$7,000,000 knowing full well that he had no intention of actually giving the \$7,000,000.

THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. Let me ask you this question and I hope you think it's a fair one. When Mendenhall serves the Offer of Judgment and -- on July $10^{\rm th}$.

Right?

MR. YOUNG: Yes.

THE COURT: What am I supposed to do about that with this thought process? I mean, you control whether you sign off on an Offer of Judgment. There's a whole bunch of statutes that are real clear that there's penalties and exposure, there's legal exposure, a lot of it. You know, when the Legislature came out with that whole Offer of Judgment statutory scheme and then a bunch of case law that comes after that, I think it would be pretty clear to anybody involved with an Offer of Judgment decision that if we do this, I mean, it's serious. There's serious consequences, legally. I mean, if you go to trial and, you know, you beat an Offer of Judgment then you get a lot of stuff for that.

MR. YOUNG: Right.

THE COURT: You get attorney's fees, costs, and you get a lot for that. So, there's a lot of significance to these Offers of Judgment. And, so, what I'm really getting to is, on July 10th when a \$1.2 million Offer of Judgment is sent out, is it that you sort of -- I'm not saying it's a complete waiver, but it seems to me that at least an argument can be made that if you're going to do that with a deposition that you know you're going to be involved with in four days, it's almost as though you're

saying: You know what? We don't really care about the deposition as much as -- to Affect the timing of our Offer of Judgment. I mean, why did you do the Offer of Judgment after the deposition four days later?

MR. YOUNG: Well, Your Honor, I suppose that would be the case if we were standing here suing Brownstone again. That's not this case. Yeah, there is some risk to filing an Offer of Judgment and it's a risk that everybody assumes. I mean, this property was worth, at the time, about \$15,000,000. So, you know, knowing that they uncovered their own fraud, they accept the Offer of Judgment so that -- instead of the 15,000,000 that they were hoping for. That, you know, but again, we were stuck with that result not knowing --

THE COURT: But you had the term sheet since December of 2007.

MR. YOUNG: And yet their own people said that that wasn't Mr. Tavinari's [sic] signature. I don't think that fact can be stressed enough. They know him. Mr. Mendenhall doesn't know his signature. It's enough dissimilar that they thought it was this Canadian consortium. You have that testimony in front of you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But fair to say, on July 10th, 2014, when Mendenhall puts the \$1.2 million Offer of Judgment

down, the term sheet has been available and known for five years?

MR. YOUNG: It has. But let's look at the language of that Offer of Judgment. That Offer of Judgment only covers, what Mr. Marquis conveniently left off at the end of his quotation there, in this action against one another. Those six words have not been spoken by Mr. Marquis for a reason because we're not here suing the same people that we were suing before. The Offer of Judgment was to those people, on those claims. The only claims that were alive were the claims that were made by the plaintiffs in that action, not these new claims. They were not ever allowed to be alive. Leave was not even considered, much less granted.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. YOUNG: And that's the language that's then after reflected in the order of dismissal. If we look at that, the order of dismissal:

All claims as alleged -- and then going down to the end of that paragraph:

In this action against one another.

Now, Mr. Marquis wants to stand up and say:

That's everything. Anything that could have been alleged in that action. But it's not against one another.

Now, let's not forget that these are third party

actions and the case law suggests that we have to look at Rule 13(g) in conjunction with the preclusion rules.

That's the Executive Management case that you referred to before. When dealing with subsequent litigation between former codefendants, which again is not a perfect analogy here but closer than what we have argued by Mr. Marquis, you must consider the rules regarding cross claims in conjunction with the rules of preclusion. Rule 13(g) provides a permissive may:

A party may file actions against a co-party.

So, we could have, instead of filing that Motion for Leave to Amend, walked down to the courthouse and filed in another action and there's nothing that they could have done about it at that time.

THE COURT: Yeah, but 13(a) talks about compulsory counterclaims and the idea that if it arises out of the same transaction of occurrence --

MR. YOUNG: Right. But these facts, the facts that we rely on here today, have nothing to do with the facts that they relied on in that action. There is -- the circumstances are that they happened at the same time when both parties are signing the term sheet.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. YOUNG: But one is whether Mr. Mendenhall refused to submit the property. The other one is whether

someone committed a fraud at that time and then later developed that fraud during the deposition. So, yeah there is an interplay between 13(a) and 13(g), but 13(a) is only if we're talking about the same parties on the same sets of facts. That's not the case here. We have --

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Young, what do you make of Mr. Marquis' argument that there's evidence in the record? I mean, because the analysis for me, and it's never any fun to have to figure out what some other judge did and why.

MR. YOUNG: Right.

THE COURT: But, I mean, that's clearly part of the analysis here is what happened in the Israel case and is it distinguishable someway meaningfully in this whole claim preclusion area, as compared to our case. Of course. That's the whole -- that's the analysis. But how do you then reconcile, again, Mr. Marquis' argument that: Well, we have evidence. It's a piece of paper. Probably more than one sheet. Your Motion to Amend that was brought, how do you reconcile that because that -- it's a good argument, I think, that Mr. Marquis makes. In other words, he says: Look, Judge, to me, he says there's evidence. You know, it's sort of the smoking gun evidence that -- of a sort of a compulsory claim or counterclaim, or at least philosophy, and it's evidenced by your own Motion to Amend which is

mirroring the claim you have here now. How do you reconcile that?

MR. YOUNG: Well, that might be a smoking gun if his own clients hadn't testified at their depositions that they didn't recognize that signature as being Mr.

Tavinari's [sic]. How is that a smoking gun if his own

people don't recognize it for what he claims it to be and what he ultimately told us it was during his deposition?

THE COURT: Well, I think the answer to that, and Mr. Marquis could argue it, but, I mean, what he might say to me is that Motion to Amend is evidence that you knew everything that you needed to know in order to bring it in the Israel case.

MR. YOUNG: Well, he did know, as of the 14th. And if we look at Rule 13(e), Your Honor, 13(e) allows for the filing, even -- even considering 13(a), 13(e) is a trump of 13(a) and it says if you have something that matures after the action files, then you can file even in a non-permissive fashion under 13(a). You could under 13(e).

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. YOUNG: So, I don't think you're completely lost. Again, what we're talking about here is fundamental fairness. Right? That's what these rules are trying to get toward and that's what rule preclusion, claim preclusion, issue preclusion is trying to get at.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. YOUNG: And here is a party that has admitted to be a fraud feasor. And he's seeking equity in front of you. How can the Court do anything other than deny that?

THE COURT: But you, I mean -- this is a bit of a devil's advocate sort of statement and I'll try to make it into a question, but I mean, I'll just tell you what's running through my mind in part, in part. I mean, clear to say, and correct me if I'm wrong, that as of July 14th, it's clear from your perspective, in any event, in the light most favorable to you, that Mr. Tassinari here committed fraud. Right?

MR. YOUNG: Yes.

THE COURT: You still have at least a month before Judge Israel is doing something to dispose of the case.

MR. YOUNG: That's not true.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. YOUNG: What we have is 10 days from the 10th until it's disposed of because it's disposed of once the offer is accepted. And before the offer is accepted --

THE COURT: But as far as the District Court itself, the Judge Israel department, I don't know what number it is. I've never been good with that. But as far as him actually doing something to close the case, that doesn't happen for another month or so after the 14th. Fair

1 enough? 2 MR. YOUNG: Fair enough. And --3 So, why not, again, do something with THE COURT: that judge to get him to do what you're asking me to do now 4 5 in this lawsuit? Safe to say --6 MR. YOUNG: We attempted. We asked for the Motion 7 for Leave to be heard on an order shortening time. 8 THE COURT: But you withdrew -- you withdrew it. 9 MR. YOUNG: What's wrong? 10 MS. RUTAR MULLINS: No. It was just removed. 11 was just removed once the settlement was done. 12 I believe so. MR. YOUNG: 13 THE COURT: What happened to not have it heard? 14 MR. YOUNG: The case was dead once the offer was 15 accepted. MS. RUTAR MULLINS: They accepted the Offer of 16 17 Judgment. 18 THE COURT: Okay. But it wasn't heard, in other 19 words? 20 MS. RUTAR MULLINS: Right. It was never heard. 21 MR. YOUNG: Right. Never heard. 22 MS. RUTAR MULLINS: There was no Opposition. The 23 time to file an Opposition hasn't even run by the time they 24 accepted the offer. 25 MR. YOUNG: It was --

1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. YOUNG: They accepted the offer three days 3 after the motion was filed. THE COURT: 4 Yeah. 5 MR. YOUNG: So, everything stopped. 6 THE COURT: So, isn't it true that as a law of the 7 case that this idea of amending to include fraud is encompassed then in everything that happened with Israel? 8 9 MR. YOUNG: No. THE COURT: Seems like it is to me. 10 11 MR. YOUNG: How could you say that, Your Honor, 12 when leave wasn't even considered, much less granted? 13 THE COURT: It was a pleading in the case. 14 mean, you could -- I'm just saying, I told you this was 15 going to be a bit of a devil's advocate position. But if 16 you believe in the fraud so much that you're filing a 17 Motion to Amend and if you see a judge take any action to 18 finalize and dismiss the case, why wouldn't you say: 19 Judge, before you do that, you know, this is what we need to tell you. We know about this fraud from July 14th. We 20 21 have a Motion to Amend. Here it is. Give us our day on 22 this. 23 MR. YOUNG: And that's what Judge Israel was 24 addressing when he was talking about what language was

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going to go in the Order, was -- the language in the Order

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1 says: Between these parties. As to this other thing that 2 you want to do, go ahead and file that elsewhere. 3 THE COURT: Yeah. 4 MR. YOUNG: And I would suggest, Your Honor, if 5 what you're suggesting is true, then the Court is a party 6 to Mr. Tassinari's fraud. And that's not a result that any 7 Court should want. I'll --THE COURT: Which Court? Israel? 8 9 MR. YOUNG: This courthouse. I mean, if you're 10 saying that we're now foreclosed from bringing this action 11 because we were not allowed to seek leave in the prior action because of the timing of the Offer of Judgment and 12 13 now we come here and we can't -- couldn't hear it here, the 14 court system itself would be a party to Mr. Tassinari's 15 fraud, in my view. 16 THE COURT: Well, that's not a good argument. 17 MR. YOUNG: Well, it --18 THE COURT: I mean, that's not a good argument. 19 MR. YOUNG: We're here seeking equity, Your Honor. 20 They're seeking equity. 21 THE COURT: Yeah. But that's not a good argument. 22 The Court has to handle the legal aspect of what's been 23 brought. That doesn't mean the Court then gets complicit

Page 37

The point is probably overblown,

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in a fraud.

MR. YOUNG: No.

1 Your Honor, but the point is that we have to seek equity at 2 every turn. 3 THE COURT: I understand. MR. YOUNG: And there's no equity --4 5 THE COURT: Understood. But the Court doesn't 6 become a party in a fraud by doing its best to handle the 7 legal aspects of claim preclusion or, you know, what -- and that's my perspective on it from what I'm doing here. 8 9 mean, just to let you know. MR. YOUNG: No. I understand that. 10 11 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else you 12 want to add? 13 MR. YOUNG: No, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: It's your motion. You get the last 15 word. 16 MR. MARQUIS: Thank you, Your Honor. A couple of 17 things, Your Honor. First, they argue under Rule 13 that 18 this isn't arising out of the same transaction. I don't 19 think there's any question it is. It's the same contract. 20 It's parties to the same contract. 21 THE COURT: Yeah. 22 MR. MARQUIS: Everybody that they've sued in this 23 case also signed, was a party to that same contract. For

them to say it's not the same transaction in occurrence,

it's -- it just doesn't hold water, Your Honor. Absolutely

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it was. Okay.

For them to say: Oh, it's a different claim because this is a fraud claim. That was a breach of contract claim. Maybe if we sued them for breach of contract maybe they'd be right. Well, that doesn't work either. In the Five Star case itself, they argue that:

Claim preclusion shouldn't apply because a second suit included an additional claim for breach of contract.

And this Five Star Court ruled that claim was erroneous. It's:

A claim preclude applies to prevent a second suit based on all grounds of recovery that were or could have been brought in the first suit.

They could have sued our clients back, the Brownstone plaintiffs in the first case, they could have sued them for breach of contract. They could have sued them for fraud. They could have sued American Vantage, who signed the contract, for breach of contract or fraud. They could have signed Mr. Tassinari who signed the contract for breach of contract or fraud. They could have sued all those. It's absolutely the same transaction in occurrence.

THE COURT: That --

MR. MARQUIS: The fact that it's another theory, that doesn't matter for --

THE COURT: Okay. Conceivably, I get that.

MR. MARQUIS: Yeah.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question though.

MR. MARQUIS: Sure.

THE COURT: Do you agree with Mr. Young's comments about the full force and effect of the deposition of your client on July $14^{\rm th}$?

MR. MARQUIS: No. No. That's -- that was, you know, he's taking bits and pieces out of the deposition. He wasn't there. It's just bits of the transcript. The fact was -- and what he's not telling, Your Honor, is there was never a question that there was a Canadian investor. The Canadian investor had already invested substantial amounts of money, millions of dollars in the form of loans, into this transaction and that was all -- all those documents were produced in that case. It wasn't like some mystery. He had already put in millions of dollars in the form of loans and was prepared to put in additional funds and we never got to the point of taking his deposition but he was absolutely ready to go.

The only reason he didn't put any more money in was because what did he need for the thing to go forward? He needed the dirt. He wanted to see Mr. Mendenhall and Sunridge put in the land and then he put in some more money.

So, yeah. Their whole spin that this is some stunning fraud, I mean, you know, I understand. You've got to argue and you're doing what you're going to do, but no. We don't accept or agree with that at all.

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And the whole -- their entire case, their entire theory that this was some fraud and some trick all boils down to these contracts, Your Honor. And when they argue that at the depositions of Mr. Gross and Ms. Morrison, they couldn't identify the signatures, remember the signatures that they presented in front of them were the signatures on Brownstone 00271 which are very unclear copies. Yeah. If you look at those, I don't know if anybody can identify those signatures. Maybe Mr. Tassinari can because they're his, but they are very fuzzy signatures. These are the ones they elected to stick in front of those witnesses at the deposition, but they had the clean signatures the whole time. Since December 2007, Mr. Mendenhall had this and for them to say that this was a fraud because I didn't -- I looked at their bad copy of it instead of the one that I admit that I had that clearly shows his signature because their whole fraud claim boils down to: We didn't -- not recognize those two signatures. But they had the document since 2007, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me tell you all that typically, I mean statistically really, probably 95

percent of the time I like to tell people what the decision is when they come to court. However, in this situation I do want to look a little bit more at what Judge Israel did and so I'm going to do that. That means I'm going to give you a written opinion.

MR. MARQUIS: Very good. Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. RUTAR MULLINS: Thank you.

PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 10:14 A.M.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the audio-visual recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

AFFIRMATION

I affirm that this transcript does not contain the social security or tax identification number of any person or entity.

KRISTEN LUNKWITZ

INDEPENDENT TRANSCRIBER

Page 43

REGISTER OF ACTIONS CASE NO. A-14-708281-C

Robert Mendenhall, Plaintiff(s) vs. Ronald Tassinari, Defendant

(s)

Case Type: Other Tort
Date Filed: 10/08/2014
Location: Department 32
Cross-Reference Case
Number:
Supreme Court No.: 68053

PARTY INFORMATION

8

§

§

Lead Attorneys

Location : District Court Civil/Criminal Help

Defendant Tassinari, Ronald James John Lee

Retained 702-382-4044(W)

Plaintiff Mendenhall, Robert L Gwen Rutar Mullins

Retained 702-257-1483(W)

Plaintiff Sunridge Corporation Gwen Rutar Mullins

Retained 702-257-1483(W)

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

03/30/2015 Minute Order (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Bare, Rob)

Minutes

03/30/2015 3:00 AM

- DECISION: Motion to Dismiss This matter came before the Court on March 17, 2015 for hearing on Defendants Motion to Dismiss Re: Doctrine of Claim Preclusion. Counsel presented their case and Court took matter under advisement. After carefully considering the papers submitted and hearing arguments, Court issued its Decision this 30th day of March, 2015. COURT ORDERED, Motion to Dismiss GRANTED. Counsel for Tassinari and American Vantage Brownstone, LLC is directed to submit a proposed Order consistent with the foregoing which sets forth the underpinnings of the same in accordance herewith and with counsel s briefing and argument and submit to opposing counsel for review and signification of approval/disapproval. CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this Minute Order to be placed in the attorney folder(s) of: Harry P. Marquis, Esq., and Gwen P. Mullins (Howard & Howard).

Return to Register of Actions

Electronically Filed

		05/08/2015 11:45:54 AM	
1	NEO	Alun A. Lluin	
2	JAMES J. LEE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 01909		
	Legal Offices of James J Lee 2620 Regatta Drive, Suite 102	CLERK OF THE COURT	
3	Las Vegas, Nevada 89128		
4	Telephone (702) 664-6545 Email: <u>james@leelawonline.com</u>		
5			
6	HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 001252		
7	HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, CHTD. 400 South Fourth Street, Third Floor		
8	Las Vegas, Nevada, 89101		
	Telephone (702) 382-6700 Email: harry@marquislaw.net		
9	Attorneys for Defendants Ronald Tassinari		
10	And American Vantage Brownstone, LLC		
11	DISTRICT COURT		
12	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
13			
14	ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an individual, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION, a Nevada) Case no.: A-14-708281-C	
15	Corporation,) Dept. no.: XXXII	
16)	
	Plaintiffs,)	
17	v.) NOTICE OF ENTRY OF) FINDINGS OF FACT,	
18	RONALD TASSINARI, an individual,) CONCLUSIONS OF	
19	AMERICAN VANTAGE BROWNSTONE,) LAW, AND ORDER GRANTING) DEFENDANTS' MOTION	
20	LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, DOES 1 through 5, inclusive and ROE) TO DISMISS	
21	CORPORATIONS 1 through 5, inclusive,)	
22	Defendants.) 	
23	·		
	TO: GWEN RUTAR MULLINS, ESQ.	., HOWARD & HOWARD, PLLC, attorney for	
24	Plaintiffs.	, ,,,,,	
25	1 faiitii 15.		
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YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 7TH day of May, 2015, the above-entitled Court entered a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the above-entitled action. A true copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is attached hereto as Exhibit "1" and incorporated herein by this reference.

DATED this day of May, 2015.

Respectfully submitted,

HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, CHTD.



HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 1252
400 South Fourth Street, Third Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephone (702) 382-6700
Attorneys for Defendants Ronald Tassinari
And American Vantage Brownstone, LLC

In Association with:

JAMES J. LEE, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 01909 Legal Offices of James J Lee 2620 Regatta Drive, Suite 102 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Telephone (702) 664-6545 Email: james@leelawonline.com Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 I certify that on the day of May, 2015, I served a true copy of the above and 2 foregoing Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting 3 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss herein electronically via the Court's ECF system upon all parties 4 listed on the electronic service list, as follows: 5 6 Gwen Rutar Mullins, Esq. Wade B. Gochnour, Esq. HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000 8 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Telephone: (702) 257-1483 9 Facsimile: (702) 567-1568 Email: grm@h2law.com 10 Email: wbg@h2law.com 11 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 12 An employee of 13 HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, CHTD. 14 **15** 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Exhibit "1"

Electronically Filed

•		05/07/2015 04:23:36 PM
1	ORDR	Alun D. Lehum
2	JAMES J. LEE, ESQ.	CLERK OF THE COURT
3	Nevada Bar No. 01909 Legal Offices of James J Lee	
-	2620 Regatta Drive, Suite 102	
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Telephone (702) 664-6545	
5	Email: james@leelawonline.com	
6	HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, ESQ.	
7	Nevada Bar No. 001252	
8	HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, CHTD. 400 South Fourth Street, Third Floor	
9	Las Vegas, Nevada, 89101	
10	Telephone (702) 382-6700 Email: harry@marquislaw.net	
	Attorneys for Defendants Ronald Tassinari	
11	And American Vantage Brownstone, LLC	
12	DISTRICT COURT	
13	CLARK COUN	TTY, NEVADA
14		•
15	ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an individual,) Case no.: A-14-708281-C
16	SUNRIDGE CORPORATION, a Nevada Corporation,) Dept. no.: XXXII
17) FINDINGS OF FACT,
	Plaintiffs,) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER GRANTING
18	Tiumilio,) DEFENDANTS' MOTION
19	v.) TO DISMISS
20	RONALD TASSINARI, an individual,)
21	AMERICAN VANTAGE BROWNSTONE,)
22	LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, DOES 1 through 5, inclusive and ROE)
23	CORPORATIONS 1 through 5, inclusive,)
24	Defendants.))
25	The Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf	of Defendants Ronald Tassinari and American
26		
27	Vantage Brownstone, LLC, having come on fo	r nearing on March 17, 2015; with Harry Pau
28	Marquis, Esq., of Harry Paul Marquis, Charter ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 1	ed, appearing on behalf of Defendants Ronald

Tassinari and American Vantage Brownstone, LLC; with Gwen Rutar Mullins, Esq. and Jay Young, Esq., of Howard & Howard Attorneys, PLLC, appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs, Robert L. Mendenhall ("Mendenhall") and Sunridge Corporation ("Sunridge"); the Court, having considered the Motion, the Opposition and Reply thereto, and oral arguments by counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court rules as follows:

- 1. THE COURT HEREBY FINDS AND CONCLUDES that Defendants have satisfied the three-part test for determining whether claim preclusion applies which the Nevada Supreme Court established in *Five Star Capital Corp v Ruby*, 124 Nev. 1048, 194 P3d 709, 713 (2008);
- 2. THE COURT HEREBY FINDS AND CONCLUDES that Defendant American Vantage Brownstone LLC is the owner of both Brownstone Gold Town, LLC, and Brownstone Gold Town CV, LLC, (collectively the "First Case Plaintiffs") the Plaintiffs in *Brownstone Gold Town LLC v. Robert Mendenhall et al*, A-11-653822-C (the "First Case") and that Defendant American Vantage Brownstone LLC signed the Term Sheet which was attached as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint herein (the "Term Sheet");
- 3. THE COURT HEREBY FINDS AND CONCLUDES that Defendant Ronald Tassinari signed the Term Sheet in his capacity as chairman of Defendant American Vantage Brownstone LLC;
- 4. THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that Defendant Ronald Tassinari managed, led, and acted on behalf of the Brownstone Plaintiffs and the interests and motivations of Defendant Ronald Tassinari and the Brownstone Plaintiffs have sufficient commonality and alignment that privity exists;

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

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28 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 3

- 5. THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that Defendant American Vantage Brownstone LLC managed, led, owned, and acted on behalf of the Brownstone Plaintiffs and the interests and motivations of Defendant American Vantage Brownstone LLC and the Brownstone Plaintiffs have sufficient commonality and alignment that privity exists;
- 6. THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that Defendants Ronald Tassinari and American Vantage Brownstone, LLC are both privies with Brownstone Gold Town, LLC and Brownstone Gold Town CV, LLC, the Plaintiffs in the First Case;
- THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that the first 7. part of the Five Star Capital Corp v Ruby, Supra, test that the parties or their privies are the same has been satisfied;
- THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that the Order 8. of Dismissal of Action with Prejudice (the "Order of Dismissal") filed in the First Case on August 29, 2014 is a final valid judgment;
- THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that the 9. second part of the Five Star Capital Corp v Ruby, Supra, test that the final judgment is valid has been satisfied;
- THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that on July 10. 21, 2014, the Plaintiffs herein, Mendenhall and Sunridge, filed a Motion for Leave to Amend in the First Case seeking to assert a counterclaim and a third-party complaint against Defendants Ronald Tassinari and American Vantage Brownstone, LLC containing virtually the same allegations as those set forth in the current Complaint filed herein on October 8, 2014;

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- 11. THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that claims asserted in this action through the Complaint filed herein on October 8, 2014 are based on the same claims or any part of them that were or could have been brought in the First Case;
- 12. THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that the third and final part of the *Five Star Capital Corp v Ruby*, *Supra*, test that the subsequent action is based on the same claims or any part of them that were or could have been brought in the first case has been satisfied;
- 13. THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS AND CONCLUDES that Plaintiffs claims herein are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion;
- 14. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED in its entirety;
- 15. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this action is hereby dismissed, with prejudice as to all parties and all claims.

DATED this 28 day of April, 2015.

Respectfully Submitted By:

HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, CHARTERED

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JUDGE, DISTRICT COURT, DEPARTMENT 32
Approved as to Form Only:

HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS

HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 1252

400 South Fourth Street, Third Floor

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Tel. No.: (702) 382-6700

Fax No.: (702) 384-0715

Email: harry@marquislaw.net

Attorney for Defendants

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 4

GWEN RUTAR MULLINS ESO.

Nevada Bar No. 003146

/Jay A. Young, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 005562

3800 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Suite 1400

Las Vegas, Nevada 89169

Tel. No.:(702) 257-1483

Attorney for Plaintiffs

1	In Association with:
2	JAMES J. LEE, ESQ.
3	Nevada Bar No. 01909 Legal Offices of James J Lee
4	2620 Regatta Drive, Suite 102 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
5	Telephone (702) 664-6545
6	Email: james@leelawonline.com Attorney for Defendants
7	
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10	4846-9299-6643, v. 4
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28	ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 5
J	OLDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 3

28

NOAS Gwen Rutar Mullins, Esq. **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 Nevada Bar No. 3146 Wade B. Gochnour, Esq. 3 Nevada Bar No. 6314 **HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC** 4 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 5 Phone: 702.257.1483 Fax: 702.567.1568 6 E-Mail: grm@h2law.com, wbg@h2law.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs Robert L. Mendenhall 7 and Sunridge Corporation 8 **DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** Case No. A-14-708281-C ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an individual, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION, a Nevada Dept. No. XXXII corporation, Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL v.

Defendants.

RONALD TASSINARI, an individual,

AMERICAN VANTAGE BROWNSTONE,

LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, DOES 1 through 5, inclusive and ROE

CORPORATIONS 1 through 5, inclusive,

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs, ROBERT L. MENDENHALL and SUNRIDGE CORPORATION, by and through their counsel of record, the law firm of Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC, hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed and entered on May 7, 2015. 111 /// ///

Page 1 of 2

4846-1138-0003v2

1 This Appeal is taken on all matters of law and fact relating to the aforementioned 2 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 3 DATED this 19th day of May 2015. 4 HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC 5 6 /s/ Gwen Rutar Mullins GWEN RUTAR MULLINS, ESQ. 7 Nevada Bar No. 3146 WADE B. GOCHNOUR, ESQ. 8 Nevada Bar No. 6314 9 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Ste. 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 10 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Robert L. Mendenhall and Sunridge Corporation 11 12 **CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE** 13 I do hereby certify that on the 19th day of May 2015, I served a copy of the 14 PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL on all parties listed in the Master Service List in 15 accordance with the Electronic Filing Order entered in this matter on the following: 16 17 James J. Lee, Esq. – james@leelawonline.com Harry Marquis, Esq. - harry@marquislaw.net 18 and by depositing a true and correct copy of the same for mailing at Las Vegas, Nevada, first-19 class postage fully prepaid, addressed to: 20 Harry Paul Marquis, Esq. James J. Lee, Esq. 21 HARRY PAUL MARQUIS CHARTERED LAW OFFICE OF JAMES J. LEE 22 400 South Fourth Street, Third Floor 2620 Regatta Drive, Ste. 102 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 23 Attorneys for Defendants Ronald Tassinari Attorneys for Defendants Ronald Tassinari and American Vantage Brownstone, LLC and American Vantage Brownstone, LLC 24 25 26 /s/ Kellie Piet 27 An employee of Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC 28 Page 2 of 2

4846-1138-0003v2

ASTA Gwen Rutar Mullins, Esq. **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 Nevada Bar No. 3146 Wade B. Gochnour, Esq. 3 Nevada Bar No. 6314 **HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC** 4 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 5 Phone: 702.257.1483 Fax: 702.567.1568 E-Mail: grm@h2law.com, wbg@h2law.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs Robert L. Mendenhall and Sunridge Corporation **DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 10 Case No. A-14-708281-C ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an individual, 11 SUNRIDGE CORPORATION, a Nevada Dept. No. XXXII corporation, 12 13 Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS' CASE APPEAL **STATEMENT** 14 RONALD TASSINARI, an individual, 15 AMERICAN VANTAGE BROWNSTONE, 16 LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, DOES 1 through 5, inclusive and ROE 17 CORPORATIONS 1 through 5, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 1. Name of appellants filing this case appeal statement: 20 Robert L. Mendenhall, Sunridge Corporation 21 2. Identify the judge issuing the decision, judgment or order appeal from: Eighth Judicial District Court Judge Rob Bare. 22 23 3. Identify each appellant and the name and address of counsel for each appellant: Appellants: Robert L. Mendenhall, Sunridge Corporation 24 25 26 27 28

Page 1 of 3

4847-7485-1876.v2

Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC 3800 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Suite 1000 Las Vegas, NV 89169

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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3

Counsel for Appellants:

Gwen Rutar Mullins, Esq. Wade B. Gochnour, Esq. Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 702-257-1483

4. Identify each respondent and the name and address of appeal counsel, if known, for each respondent:

Respondents: Ronald Tassinari, American Vantage Brownstone, LLC

Counsel for Respondent:

Harry Paul Marquis, Esq. Harry Paul Marquis Chartered 400 South Fourth Street, Third Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

James J. Lee, Esq. LAW OFFICE OF JAMES J. LEE 2620 Regatta Drive, Ste. 102 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128

- 5. All counsel identified are licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada.
- 6. Appellants were represented by retained counsel in the District Court.
- 7. Appellants will be represented by retained counsel in this Appeal.
- 8. Appellants have not been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
- 9. Date this matter commenced in the District Court: October 8, 2014.
- 10. Provide a brief description of the nature of the action and result in the district court, including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the district court:

This appeal results from the District Court's grant of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss Appellants' Complaint for fraud in the inducement; fraud; negligent misrepresentation; and fraudulent omission. Respondents, who were not parties to a prior suit, claimed, and the district court agreed by the granting of the Motion to Dismiss, that the tort claims asserted in this action were barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion.

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4847-7485-1876.v2

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11.	This appeal h	nas not	previously	been	the	subject	of	an	appeal	to	original	wri
	proceeding in	the Sur	oreme Court	t.								

- 12. This appeal does not involve child custody or visitation.
- 13. Appellant is unsure at this time whether this appeal involves the possibility of settlement.

DATED this 19th day of May 2015.

HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC

/s/ Gwen Rutar Mullins
GWEN RUTAR MULLINS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 3146
WADE B. GOCHNOUR, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 6314
3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Ste. 1000
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on the 19th day of May 2015, I served a copy of the **PLAINTIFFS' CASE APPEAL STATEMENT** on all parties listed in the Master Service List in accordance with the Electronic Filing Order entered in this matter on the following:

James J. Lee, Esq. – james@leelawonline.com Harry Marquis, Esq. - harry@marquislaw.net

and by depositing a true and correct copy of the same for mailing at Las Vegas, Nevada, firstclass postage fully prepaid, addressed to:

Harry Paul Marquis, Esq.

HARRY PAUL MARQUIS CHARTERED

400 South Fourth Street, Third Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Defendants Ronald Tassinari and American Vantage Brownstone, LLC

James J. Lee, Esq.

LAW OFFICE OF JAMES J. LEE

2620 Regatta Drive, Ste. 102

Las Vegas, Nevada 89128

Attorneys for Defendants Ronald Tassinari and American Vantage Brownstone, LLC

/s/ Kellie Piet

An employee of Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC

Page 3 of 3

4847-7485-1876.v2

REGISTER OF ACTIONS

CASE No. A-14-708281-C

Robert Mendenhall, Plaintiff(s) vs. Ronald Tassinari, Defendant(s)

Case Type: Other Tort Ş Date Filed: 10/08/2014 Location: Department 32 § Cross-Reference Case Number: A708281 § Supreme Court No.: 68053 §

Ş PARTY INFORMATION

Lead Attorneys

Defendant Tassinari, Ronald James John Lee

Retained 702-382-4044(W)

Plaintiff Mendenhall, Robert L **Gwen Rutar Mullins**

Retained 702-257-1483(W)

Plaintiff **Gwen Rutar Mullins** Sunridge Corporation

Retained 702-257-1483(W)

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

DISPOSITIONS

05/07/2015 Order of Dismissal With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Bare, Rob)
Debtors: Robert L Mendenhall (Plaintiff), Sunridge Corporation (Plaintiff)
Creditors: Ronald Tassinari (Defendant), American Vantage Brownstone LLC (Defendant)

Judgment: 05/07/2015, Docketed: 05/14/2015

OTHER EVENTS AND HEARINGS

10/08/2014 Case Opened

10/08/2014 Complaint Complaint

12/02/2014 Affidavit of Due Diligence

Affidavit of Due Diligence re: American Vantage Brownstone, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company

12/02/2014 Affidavit of Due Diligence

Affidavit of Due Diligence re: Ronald Tassinari

Ex Parte Application 12/03/2014

Ex Parte Application for an Order to Allow Service by Publication of Summons as to Defendant Ronald Tassinari

12/10/2014 Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service

12/10/2014

Order for Publication
Order for Publication of Summons as to Defendant Ronald Tassinari Notice of Entry of Order

12/11/2014

Notice of Entry of Order for Publication of Summons as to Defendant Ronald Tassinari 01/13/2015 Affidavit of Publication

Affidavit of Publication

Motion to Dismiss

01/23/2015 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure 01/23/2015

Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure

02/10/2015 Stipulation and Order

Stipulation and Order To Continue Hearing on Motion to Dismiss

02/12/2015 Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order

Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order to Continue Hearing on Motion to Dismiss Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 02/24/2015

Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Reply in Support

03/10/2015

Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Motion to Dismiss (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Bare, Rob) 03/17/2015

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Parties Present

02/24/2015 Reset by Court to 03/17/2015

Result: Granted

03/30/2015 Minute Order (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Bare, Rob)

	Result: Minute Order - No Hearing Held
05/07/2015	Order
	Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
05/08/2015	Notice of Entry
	Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
05/19/2015	Case Appeal Statement
	Plaintiffs' Case Appeal Statement
05/19/2015	Notice of Appeal
	Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal
05/19/2015	Notice of Posting of Cost Bond
	Plaintiffs' Notice of Posting Bond for Costs on Appeal
02/11/2016	Notice of Appearance
	Notice of Appearance
02/11/2016	Request
	Request for Transcript of Proceedings
03/08/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing
	Transcript of Proceedings: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 3-17-15

		FINANCIAI	L INFORMATION	
	Defendant American Van Total Financial Assessme Total Payments and Cred Balance Due as of 03/15	nt tits		30.00 30.00 0.00
01/23/2015 01/23/2015		Receipt # 2015-07700-CCCLK	American Vantage Brownstone LL	30.00 (30.00)
	Defendant Tassinari, Ror Total Financial Assessme Total Payments and Cred Balance Due as of 03/15	nt its		223.00 223.00 0.00
01/23/2015 01/23/2015	Transaction Assessment Wiznet	Receipt # 2015-07699-CCCLK	Tassinari, Ronald	223.00 (223.00)
	Plaintiff Mendenhall, Rob Total Financial Assessme Total Payments and Cred Balance Due as of 03/15	nt its		301.00 301.00 0.00
10/08/2014 10/08/2014 05/20/2015 05/20/2015 02/11/2016 02/11/2016 02/11/2016 02/11/2016	Transaction Assessment Wiznet Transaction Assessment Wiznet Transaction Assessment	Receipt # 2014-115159-CCCLK Receipt # 2015-52872-CCCLK Receipt # 2016-14350-CCCLK Receipt # 2016-14492-CCCLK	Mendenhall, Robert L Mendenhall, Robert L Mendenhall, Robert L Mendenhall, Robert L	270.00 (270.00) 24.00 (24.00) 3.550 (3.50) 3.50 (3.50)
10/09/2014	Plaintiff Sunridge Corpor Total Financial Assessme Total Payments and Cred Balance Due as of 03/15	nt its		30.00 30.00 0.00
10/08/2014 10/08/2014	Transaction Assessment Wiznet	Receipt # 2014-115160-CCCLK	Sunridge Corporation	30.00 (30.00)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND SUNRIDGE CORPORATION, A NEVADA CORPORATION,

Appellants,

VS.

RONALD TASSINARI. AN INDIVIDUAL: AND AMERICAN VANTAGE BROWNSTONE, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,

Respondents.

680 Flectronically Filed 02:47 p.m. Case No.: Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Rob **Bare Presiding**

JOINT APPENDIX (Volume 2, Bates Nos. 111–254)

Marquis Aurbach Coffing

Avece M. Higbee, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 3739 Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8437 Adele V. Karoum, Eq. Nevada Bar No. 11172 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 382-0711 Facsimile: (702) 382-5816 ahigbee@maclaw.com mechols@maclaw.com

akaroum@maclaw.com

Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC

Nevada Bar No. 3146 Wade B. Gochnour, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6314 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway **Suite 1000** Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Telephone: (702) 257-1483 Facsimile: (702) 567-1568 grm@h2law.com wbg@h2law.com

Gwen Rutar Mullins, Esq.

Attorneys for Appellants, Robert L. Mendenhall and Sunridge Corporation

INDEX TO JOINT APPENDIX (Alphabetical)

]	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	LOCATION	
Complaint (fil	Volume 1, Bates Nos. 1–10		
Exhibits to C	omplaint		
Exhibit No.	Document Description		
1	Carson Valley Casino Term Sheet	Volume 1, Bates Nos. 11–16	
	Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure	Volume 1, Bates Nos. 17–18	
Defendants' M	Motion to Dismiss (filed 01/23/15)	Volume 1, Bates Nos. 19–29	
Exhibits to De	efendants' Motion to Dismiss		
Exhibit No.	Document Description		
A	Complaint in Case No. A653822 (filed 12/27/11)	Volume 1, Bates Nos. 30–36	
В	Defendants' Offer of Judgment in Case No. A653822 (dated 07/10/14)	Volume 1, Bates Nos. 37–40	
С	Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend [Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint] with Exhibits in Case No. A653822 (filed 07/22/14)	·	
D	Notice of Plaintiffs' Acceptance of Offer of Judgment in Case No. A653822 (dated 07/24/14)		
E	Notice of Entry of Order of Dismissal of Action with Prejudice with Order in Case No. A653822 (filed 09/03/14)	Volume 1, Bates Nos. 105–110	
Docket of Dist	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 253–254		
Minute Order	Volume 2, Bates No. 238		
Minutes of March 17, 2015 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss Volume 2, Bates No. 194			

I	LOCATION	
Notice of Entrand Order Gr Findings of Fa Defendants' M	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 239–247	
Plaintiffs' Cas	e Appeal Statement (filed 05/19/15)	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 250–252
Plaintiffs' Not	ice of Appeal (filed 05/19/15)	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 248–249
Plaintiffs' Op (filed 02/24/15	position to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 111–126
Exhibits to Pl to Dismiss	aintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion	
Exhibit No.	Document Description	
F	Mendenhall Affidavit (dated 02/24/15)	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 127–130
G	Gochnour Affidavit	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 131–167
Reply in Supp 03/10/15)	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 168–180	
Exhibits to R Dismiss		
Exhibit No.	Document Description	
Н	"Undisputed" Carson Valley Casino Project Term Sheet	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 181–186
I	"Deposition" Carson Valley Casino Project Term Sheet	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 187–193
Transcript of Dismiss (filed	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 195–237	

INDEX TO JOINT APPENDIX (Chronological)

I	LOCATION	
Complaint (file	Volume 1, Bates Nos. 1–10	
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D	Notice of Plaintiffs' Acceptance of Offer of Judgment in Case No. A653822 (dated 07/24/14)	
Е	Notice of Entry of Order of Dismissal of Action with Prejudice with Order in Case No. A653822 (filed 09/03/14)	· ·
Plaintiffs' Op (filed 02/24/15	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 111–126	
Exhibits to Pl to Dismiss		
Exhibit No.	Document Description	
F	Mendenhall Affidavit (dated 02/24/15)	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 127–130

]	LOCATION	
Exhibits to Pl to Dismiss (co		
Exhibit No.	Document Description	
G	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 131–167	
Reply in Supp 03/10/15)	port of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (filed	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 168–180
Exhibits to R Dismiss	eply in Support of Defendants' Motion to	
Exhibit No.	Document Description	
Н	"Undisputed" Carson Valley Casino Project Term Sheet	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 181–186
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Minutes of Ma	Volume 2, Bates No. 194	
Transcript of Dismiss (filed	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 195–237	
Minute Order	Volume 2, Bates No. 238	
Notice of Ent and Order Gr Findings of Fa Defendants' M	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 239–247	
Plaintiffs' Not	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 248–249	
Plaintiffs' Cas	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 250–252	
Docket of Dis	Volume 2, Bates Nos. 253–254	

v.

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CLERK OF THE COURT

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Gwen Rutar Mullins, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 3146 Wade B. Gochnour, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6314

HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC

4 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000

Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 5 Phone: 702.257.1483 Fax: 702.567.1568

E-Mail: grm@h2law.com, wbg@h2law.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs Robert L. Mendenhall and Sunridge Corporation

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an individual, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation,

Case No. A-14-708281-C Dept. No. XXXII

Plaintiffs,

RONALD TASSINARI, an individual, AMERICAN VANTAGE BROWNSTONE, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, DOES 1 through 5, inclusive and ROE CORPORATIONS 1 through 5, inclusive,

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO **DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS**

Hearing Date: March 17, 2015 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

Defendants.

ROBERT L. MENDENHALL and SUNRIDGE CORPORATION Plaintiffs, (collectively, the "Sunridge Parties"), by and through their counsel of record, the law firm of Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC, hereby file their Opposition to Defendants, Ronald Tassinari's ("Tassinari") and American Vantage Brownstone, LLC's ("AVB") (collectively, the "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss.

This Opposition is based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Affidavits of Robert L. Mendenhall ("Mendenhall 111

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Affidavit") and Wade B. Gochnour ("Gochnour Affidavit") submitted in support hereof, and any argument the Court may hear.

DATED this 24th day of February, 2015.

HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC

/s/ Gwen Rutar Mullins
GWEN RUTAR MULLINS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 3146
WADE B. GOCHNOUR, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 6314
3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Ste. 1000
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Robert L. Mendenhall
and Sunridge Corporation

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants seek dismissal of the Sunridge Parties' Complaint based upon the doctrine of claim preclusion. Defendants claim that the Sunridge Parties' claims against the Defendants in this matter could have been, and should have been, asserted in a prior lawsuit in which the Sunridge Parties were sued by Brownstone Gold Town, LLC and Brownstone Gold Town, CV, LLC (collectively, "Brownstone Plaintiffs") for breach of an alleged contract. Defendants, who were not parties in the prior suit, now claim that because the current tort claims were not raised in the prior breach of contract suit, they are now barred.

The claims at issue in the instant action were never part of the prior action, and could not have been asserted in the prior action. In fact, the Sunridge Parties were not aware of the Defendants' fraudulent acts until Tassinari's deposition, which occurred long after the Sunridge Parties served their Answer in the First Action, and while the Sunridge Parties' Offer of Judgment to the Brownstone Plaintiffs was already pending, and could not be withdrawn. The Offer of Judgment was made to resolve the claims asserted or could have been asserted by the Page 2 of 16

Brownstone Plaintiffs and the Sunridge Parties, against one another. The Brownstone Plaintiffs accepted the Sunridge Parties' Offer of Judgment, resolving the claims between the Sunridge Parties and the Brownstone Plaintiffs, and thereby preventing the Sunridge Parties from asserting their fraud claims against Defendants in the First Action.

It is undisputed that the Sunridge Parties could not have asserted the claims made in this action in the First Action as the case concluded before the Sunridge Parties were legally and procedurally able to bring the claims. Because the Sunridge Parties' claims were not, and could not have been litigated in the First Action, they are not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, and Defendants' Motion should be denied.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about December 27, 2011, the Brownstone Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the Sunridge Parties in the District Court, Clark County, Nevada, Case No. A-11-653822-C (the "First Action"). The Brownstone Plaintiffs alleged causes of action against the Sunridge Parties for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3); Unjust Enrichment and (4) Declaratory Relief, arising out of the Brownstone Plaintiffs' attempt to treat the December 4, 2007 Carson Valley Casino Project Term Sheet (the "Term Sheet") as a binding contract rather than an outline of the terms to be put into a later binding agreement. *See* Exhibit A attached to Defendants' Motion. The Sunridge Parties filed an Answer to the Complaint. At the time of the filing of their Answer, the Sunridge Parties were not aware of the fraudulent actions of Defendants that are the subject to this action. Defendants were not parties in the First Action.

On July 10, 2014, in an effort to resolve the First Action, the Sunridge Parties served an Offer of Judgment on the Brownstone Plaintiffs. *See* Exhibit B attached to Defendants' Motion. Specifically, the Offer of Judgment provided:

Defendants ROBERT L. MENDENHALL and SUNRIDGE CORPORATION hereby offer to allow judgment to be entered in favor of Plaintiffs BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN, LLC and BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN CV, LLC and against

Page 3 of 16

Las Vegas, NV 89169

Defendants ROBERT L. MENDENHALL and SUNRIDGE CORPORATION in the lump sum of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS (\$1,200,000.00) in settlement of all claims between and among ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION, BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN, LLC and BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN CV, LLC or those asserted or that could have been asserted on behalf of each of them against one another, inclusive of all accrued costs and legal fees.

Acceptance of this Offer of Judgment would fully discharge and release any and all claims as alleged, or that could have been alleged, in this action by ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION, BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN, LLC, and BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN CV, LLC, including, but not limited to, those asserted in the Complaint as well as any related to potential claims that could be asserted in this action against one another. This offer will expire 10 days after the date of its service.

Id.

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On July 14, 2014, the Sunridge Parties deposed Tassinari in the First Action. See Gochnour Affidavit. During Tassinari's deposition, Tassinari testified: (1) that he had signed the Term Sheet that was the basis for the contract claims in the First Action, signing on behalf of the "Other Investor(s)" and on behalf of AVB; and (2) that he had no expectation to invest \$7,000,000 as set out in the Term Sheet. Id.; see also the excerpts from the Deposition Transcript of Ronald Tassinari at 37:17-38:17, attached to the Gochnour Affidavit as Exhibit 1.

Prior to Tassinari's deposition, the Sunridge Parties were unaware that Tassinari had signed the Term Sheet as the "Other Investor(s)." See Mendenhall Affidavit. In fact, during the depositions of Anna M. Morrison on July 6, 2014 and the deposition of Robert F. Gross on July 11, 2014, both representatives of the Brownstone Plaintiffs, both witnesses testified that they believed that the signature for "Other Investor(s) was that of a Canadian investor who was also looking to invest in Brownstone Gold Town CV, LLC. See excerpts of the deposition of Anna M. Morrison, attached to the Gochnour Affidavit as Exhibit 2. See also excerpts of the deposition of Robert F. Gross, attached to the Gochnour Affidavit as Exhibit 3. So, prior to

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Tassinari's deposition on July 14, 2014, both the Sunridge Parties and the other representatives of the Brownstone Plaintiffs believed the Term Sheet had been signed by an investment group from Canada. Only Tassinari knew the truth, which was not discovered until the July 14, 2014 deposition.

The Sunridge Parties relied on the fact that another investor, i.e. a Canadian investor, was committing to invest \$7,000.000 before agreeing to sign the Term Sheet. Prior to Tassinari's deposition, the Sunridge Parties were not aware of the fraudulent actions and omissions that were perpetrated against them as alleged in the Complaint in this action. The deception was not discovered until July 14, 2014, which was only 4 days prior to the July 18, 2014 discovery cut-off in the First Action, and only 56 days before the matter was set for trial.

On July 22, 2014, after learning of Defendants' and the Brownstone Plaintiffs' fraudulent conduct, the Sunridge Parties filed a Motion to Amend Answer to add the Defendants as parties to the First Action, and to assert claims against the Brownstone Plaintiffs and the Defendants for: (1) fraud in the inducement; (2) fraud; (3) negligent misrepresentation; and (4) fraudulent omission. See Exhibit C attached to Defendants' Motion. The Motion was scheduled to be heard on August 7, 2014. Id. Moreover, the Sunridge Parties attempted to withdraw the Offer of Judgment made to the Brownstone Plaintiffs but were unable to do so as pursuant to NRCP 68, the Offer of Judgment may not be withdrawn within the initial ten days of its service.

On July 24, 2014, before any opposition to the Sunridge Parties' Motion to Amend was due from the Brownstone Plaintiffs, and before Sunridge Parties' Motion to Amend was heard by the Court, the Brownstone Plaintiffs accepted the Offer of Judgment. See Exhibit D attached to Defendants' Motion.

On September 3, 2014, a Notice of Entry of Order of Dismissal of Action with Prejudice was filed in the First Action. See Exhibit E attached to Defendants' Motion.

On October 8, 2014, the Sunridge Parties filed their Complaint in the instant matter against Defendants, alleging causes of action for: (1) fraud in the inducement; (2) fraud; (3) negligent misrepresentation; and (4) fraudulent omission (the "Second Action"). Understanding Page 5 of 16

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the intent and scope of the Offer of Judgment in the First Action, the Sunridge Parties did not include The Brownstone Plaintiffs as a party to the Second Action. Because the Sunridge Parties never had an opportunity to pursue, and could not have pursued, their claims against the Defendants in the First Action, the claims are not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.

ARGUMENT

A. The Sunridge Parties' Claims Are Not Barred By The Doctrine Of Claim Preclusion.

The doctrine of claim preclusion, only bars a subsequent action if the following elements are satisfied: (1) the parties or their privies are the same; (2) the final judgment is valid; and (3) the subsequent action is based on the same claims or any part of them that were or could have been brought in the first case. Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1054, 194 P.3d 709, 713 (2008). In order for claim preclusion to apply under Nevada law, the two claims must be based on the same "cause of action." Executive Mgmt., Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 114 Nev. 823, 963 P.2d 465, 473 (1998) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Here, the claims asserted by the Sunridge Parties in the Second Action are not based on the same claims alleged by the Brownstone Plaintiffs in the First Action. Additionally, the Sunridge Parties' claims against Defendants could not have been brought in the First Action. Accordingly, the Sunridge Parties' claims are not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.

1. The Defendants Are Not Privies As It Relates To Their Own Fraudulent Actions.

In order to meet the first element of the claim preclusion test, Defendants must establish that "the parties or their privies are the same." Five Star Capital Corp, supra, 124 Nev. at 1054, 194 P.3d at 713 (2008). While the Brownstone Plaintiffs and the Defendants may have been privies with regard to a breach of contract action, they are not with regard to the fraud actions asserted in this action. Corporate agents and individuals are separately liable for their own fraudulent actions. See e.g. Semenza v. Caughlin Crafted Homes, 111 Nev. 1089, 1098, 901 P.2d 684, 689 (1995) ("An officer of a corporation may be individually liable for any tort which

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he commits, and, if the tort is committed within the scope of employment, the corporation may be vicariously or secondarily liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior."); see also Nev-Tex Oil and Gas v. Precision Rolled Products, 105 Nev. 685 (1989) ("An agent who fraudulently makes representations is liable in tort to the injured person although the fraud occurs in a transaction on behalf of the principal.").

The claims against the Defendants are based upon each Defendant's separate and individual liability for the fraudulent acts as set forth in the Complaint. Further, the individual liability under the tort theories has no connection with the Brownstone Plaintiffs' claims that there was a contract between them and the Sunridge Parties.

2. The Facts Essential To Maintain The First Action Are Significantly Different From The Facts Essential To Maintain The Second Action.

"[I]n order for a subsequent suit to be barred under claim preclusion, the subsequent suit and the first suit must arise from the same cause of action. The Nevada test for identical causes of action is whether the sets of facts essential to maintain the two suits are the same." Taylor v. Merscorp, Inc., 2012 WL 4361026, *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 21, 2012) (citing Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)); see also Matter of Firsching's Estate, 94 Nev. 252, 254, 578 P.2d 321, 322 (1978) (citation omitted).

More specifically, the Nevada Supreme Court has explained the "same cause of action" test:

> "The true test of identity of 'causes of action,' as that term is used in connection with the plea of former adjudication, is the identity of the facts essential to their maintenance. . . . The authorities agree that when the same evidence supports both the present and the former cause of action, the two causes of action are identical. . . ." Silverman v. Silverman, 52 Nev. 152, 169-70, 283 P. 593, 598 (1930) (Coleman, J., concurring). Thus, if appellant's claim is based upon evidence of new and independent delinquencies, there can be no such identity. Where claims arise at different times out of the same transaction, a judgment as to one or more of such claims is no bar to a subsequent action on the claims arising thereafter. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 54 N.M. 165, 216 P.2d 698 (1950).

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Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. B-Neva, Inc., 96 Nev. 181, 606 P.2d 176, 178 (1980). Identity of claims under Nevada law has also been described as "one right" and "one wrong": "The test of a cause of action for res judicata purposes is the identity of facts essential to maintain the two suits; if the facts show only one right of the plaintiff and one wrong by the defendant involving that right there is only one cause of action." In re Estate of Firsching, 94 Nev. 252, 578 P.2d 321, 322 (1978) (quoting Bissell v. Coll. Dev. Co., 89 Nev. 558, 517 P.2d 185, 187 (1973)).

Here, the facts essential to maintain and support the claims asserted by the Sunridge Parties in the Second Action against Defendants are significantly different than the facts that the Brownstone Plaintiffs relied upon for the claims that the Brownstone Plaintiffs asserted against the Sunridge Parties in the First Action. The First Action was a breach of contract lawsuit filed by the Brownstone Plaintiffs against the Sunridge Parties. To maintain a cause of action for breach of contract, a party must establish: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) a breach by the defendant; and (3) damage as a result of the breach. Brown v. Kinross Gold U.S.A., Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d 1234, 1240 (D. Nev. 2008) (citation omitted). Meanwhile, the Second Action is a fraud lawsuit filed by the Sunridge Parties against the Defendants. To maintain a claim for fraud, a party must establish: (1) defendant made a false representation; (2) defendant knew or believed that the representation was false at the time that it was made; (3) defendant intended to induce plaintiff to act or refrain from acting based upon the misrepresentation; (4) plaintiff justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation; and (5) plaintiff sustained damages. Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114 Nev. 441, 446, 956 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1998).

Given the difference in the elements that must be proven to succeed on a breach of contract claim compared to the elements that must be satisfied to succeed on a fraud claim, the set of facts necessary to maintain the two suits differs greatly. This is especially true here, where the First Action was filed against the Sunridge Parties, and the Second Action was filed by the Sunridge Parties against the Defendants, who were not parties to the First Action, for fraudulent actions Defendants committed in their individual capacity. Because the set of facts

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essential to maintaining the two actions are not the same, the Sunridge Parties' claims are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist., supra.

3. The Claims Asserted By The Sunridge Parties In The Second Action Could Not Have Been Asserted In The First Action.

The third element for claim preclusion is that the subsequent action must be based on the same claims or any part of them that were or could have been brought in the first case. Five Star, 124 Nev. at 1054, 194 P.3d at 713. In support of their assertion that the Sunridge Parties' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, Defendants maintain that the claims asserted by the Sunridge Parties in the Second Action could have been brought in the First Action. Specifically, Defendants' Motion states that "Mendenhall's Motion to Amend in the First Case seeking to assert the same claims now brought in the case at bar, clearly demonstrates that the claims in this case could have been brought in the First Case." See Defendants' Motion at p. 9.

Despite Defendants' claims to the contrary, the Sunridge Parties could not have asserted their claims against the Defendants in the First Action. In an effort to resolve the First Action, the Sunridge Parties served an Offer of Judgment on the Brownstone Plaintiffs on July 10, 2014 based upon the Sunridge Parties' knowledge and understanding of the facts at that time. Pursuant to NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115, after service, an offer of judgment is irrevocable for a period of ten (10) days. In other words, after the Sunridge Parties served The Brownstone Plaintiffs with the Offer of Judgment, the acceptance period for the Offer of Judgment remained open until July 24, 2014, and the Sunridge Parties could not withdraw the offer made to Brownstone Plaintiffs.

On July 14, 2014, while the acceptance period for the Offer of Judgment remained open, the Sunridge Parties deposed Tassinari. It was during Tassinari's deposition that the Sunridge Parties learned for the first time of Defendants' and the Brownstone Plaintiffs' fraudulent acts. Accordingly, on July 22, 2014, the Sunridge Parties filed a Motion for Leave to Amend to add Defendants as parties to the First Action and to assert claims against The Brownstone Plaintiffs and Defendants for: (1) fraud in the inducement; (2) fraud; (3) negligent misrepresentation; and (4) fraudulent omission. However, before the Motion to Amend could be heard by the Court, Page 9 of 16

the Brownstone Plaintiffs accepted the Sunridge Parties' Offer of Judgment, and the First Action was dismissed. Due to the timing of the service of the Offer of Judgment and the nature of the testimony elicited at the Tassinari deposition, the Sunridge Parties could not have asserted the causes of action raised in the Second Action in the First Action. In order to be able to assert those claims in the First Action, the Sunridge Parties would have had to obtain leave of the court, and due to acceptance of the Offer of Judgment, the Court never considered the Motion to Amend.

4. The Sunridge Parties' Claims Against The Defendants Were Not Compulsory Counterclaims.

In arguing that the Sunridge Parties' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the Defendants are essentially claiming that the Sunridge Parties' claims were compulsory counterclaims. NRCP 13(a) governs compulsory counterclaims and provides:

A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. (Emphasis added).

The purpose of NRCP 13(a) is "to encourage swift adjudication of claims against the same parties in one action." *United Factory Furnishings Corp. v. Alterwitz*, 2012 WL 2138115, *2 (D. Nev. June 13, 2012) (citing *Great W. Land & Cattle Corp. v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court*, 86 Nev. 282, 285, 467 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1970). "The general rule is that a claim must have matured before it will be subject to the compulsory counterclaim rule." *Id.* (quoting *Bennett v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland*, 98 Nev. 449, 453, 652 P.2d 1178, 1181 (1982)). "A counterclaim that would have been based in an action but occurred after the serving of the defendant's answer is not a compulsory counterclaim." *Id.* (citing *Madsen Const. Corp. v. Riverside County Mortg. & Loan Co.*, 71 Nev. 356, 358, 291 P.2d 1056, 1057 (1955). Pursuant to FRCP 13(a), a claim is "mature" when it has accrued for statute of limitations purposes. *Id.* at *3 (citing *Cabrera v. Courtesy Auto, Inc.*, 192 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1015 (D. Nebr. 2002).

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Other jurisdictions take a similar view of the compulsory counterclaim rules. See Allan Block Corp. v. County Materials Corp., 239 F.R.D. 523, 529 (W.D. Wisc. 2006) (citation omitted) ("[E]ven when a counterclaim meets the same "transaction or occurrence" test a party "need not assert it as a counterclaim if it has not matured when the party serves [its] answer."); Allen v. Martin, 203 P.3d 546 (Colo. App. 2008), cert. denied, 2009 WL 501890 (Colo. 2009)(A party need not assert a compulsory counterclaim unless it has matured at the time of the responsive pleading, even if it arises from the same transaction or occurrence described in the complaint.). "Implicit within this requirement, however, is the knowledge that one has a claim against the opposing party. Certainly Rule 13(a) cannot be construed to require a party to file as a compulsory counterclaim a claim which it does not know it has." Sho-Me Motor Lodges, Inc. v. Jehle-Slauson Const. Co., 466 So.2d 83, 90 (1985); Stines v. Satterwhite, 294 S.E.2d 324, 328 (N.C. App. 1982) (citation omitted) ("Where a cause of action, arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, matures or is acquired by a pleader after he has served his pleading, the pleader is not required thereafter to supplement his pleading with a counterclaim.").

As set forth above, the Sunridge Parties did not learn of the Brownstone Plaintiffs' and Defendants' fraudulent acts until Tassinari's deposition on July 14, 2014, which was long after the Sunridge Parties served their Answer in the First Action. As such, the Sunridge Parties could not have brought the claims that they are asserting in this action at the time of filing their Answer in the First Action. See NRS 11.190 (the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue upon the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.)

The Sunridge Parties were not aware of Defendants' fraudulent actions at the time of the filing of their Answer in the First Action. In fact, the Sunridge Parties only became aware of Defendants' fraudulent actions on July 14, 2014, the date of Tassinari's deposition. Thus, the claims asserted in the Second Action had not accrued until such time. Id. Because the Sunridge Parties' claims against the Defendants had not arisen at the time of serving their Answer in the First Action, the claims are not considered compulsory counterclaims. Stines, supra (Trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's action for failure to assert claim Page 11 of 16

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for construction defects as a compulsory counterclaim in prior related actions between the parties, where the construction defects had been discovered subsequent to the time plaintiff's answer was filed in the related matters.)

Moreover, NRCP 13(e) addresses situations like the present action, where a counterclaim matures after the filing of a pleading. Specifically, NRCP 13(e) provides:

> A claim which either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving a pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading. (Emphasis added).

In other words, where a cause of action arises after a party has plead in a matter, the party may seek to amend to add the newly-matured claim, but is not required to do so. And, if an existing party to a lawsuit can file a subsequent lawsuit against the same party to address the newlyacquired cause of action, then surely a new lawsuit can be initiated to assert a newly-acquired cause of action against someone that is not a party to the current lawsuit. Thus, Defendants' attempt to expand the doctrine of res judicata beyond its intended purpose and to bar claims that could not have even been asserted in the First Action is directly contrary to the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, and cannot be permitted.

> 5. NRCP 11 Prevented The Sunridge Parties From Asserting Their Claims Against Defendants And The Brownstone Plaintiffs In The First Action.

In order to allege a cause of action, a party must have a good faith basis for doing so. NRCP 11. Specifically, NRCP 11(b) provides, in pertinent part:

> By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, -

> (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;

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(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery

As set forth above, the Sunridge Parties were not aware of the Defendants' fraudulent acts until Tassinari's deposition on July 14, 2014, i.e. after their Offer of Judgment had been served. Upon learning of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, the Sunridge Parties promptly moved to add the Defendants as parties to the First Action and to allege fraud claims against the Brownstone Plaintiffs and Defendants. Before the Court could hear the Sunridge Parties' Motion to Amend, however, the Brownstone Plaintiffs accepted the Offer of Judgment, preventing the Sunridge Parties from being able to pursue the fraud-based claims in the First Action.

The Sunridge Parties, however, could not have asserted fraud claims against the Defendants prior to the Tassinari deposition because they did not have a good faith basis for doing so, and would have been in violation of NRCP 11. Accordingly, the Sunridge Parties' claims should not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Moreover, if the Court finds that the Sunridge Parties' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, this will only encourage parties to plead all possible claims, in fear of losing the opportunity to pursue a cause of action, regardless of whether a good faith basis for raising the claim exists. Such conduct, however, would be in direct contravention of NRPC 11.

В. Equity Requires That The Sunridge Parties Be Allowed To Pursue Their Fraud Claims Against Defendants.

Res judicata is an equitable doctrine that is designed to prevent a multiplicity of lawsuits between the same parties where the facts and issues are the same. Murneigh v. Gainer, 685 N.E.2d 1357, 1363 (Ill. 1997). "Res judicata promotes judicial economy by preventing repetitive litigation and [additionally] protects parties from being forced to bear the unjust burden of relitigating essentially the same case." Arvia v. Madigan, 809 N.E.2d 88, 97 (Ill. 2004). The doctrine of res judicata is not meant to become the tool of inequitable or unjust results. See e.g., Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Commission 905 P.2d 1248 (Cal. 1995); City

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of Sacramento v. State of California, 785 P.2d 522 (Cal. 1990). Equity dictates that the doctrine of res judicata will not be technically applied if to do so would create inequitable and unjust results. City of Chicago v. Midland Smelting Co., 896 N.E.2d 364 (III. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2008); Best Coin—Op, Inc. v. Paul F. Ilg Supply Co., 545 N.E.2d 481, 489 (1989). Res judicata should not be applied by this court where it would be fundamentally unfair to do so. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 757 N.E.2d 471, 477 (III. 2001). The doctrine should only be applied as fairness and justice require. Best Coin—Op, 545 N.E.2d at 489.

As set forth above, at the time that the Sunridge Parties learned of Defendants' and the Brownstone Plaintiffs' fraudulent acts, an Offer of Judgment was pending. Despite their wishes, the Sunridge Parties could not withdraw the Offer of Judgment. The Brownstone Plaintiffs accepted the Offer of Judgment before the Court heard or decided the Sunridge Parties' Motion to Amend¹, thereby preventing the Sunridge Parties from being able to pursue their fraud claims against Defendants. Due to the timing of service of the Offer of Judgment and the Sunridge Parties learning of the Defendants' fraudulent conduct, equity requires that the Sunridge Parties be allowed to pursue their fraud claims against the Defendants in the Second Action. The Second Action is against parties that were not parties in the First Action, and only for their independent fraudulent actions perpetrated against the Sunridge Parties. *Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc.* 796 F.Supp.2d 1005 (D. Ariz. 2011) (Claim preclusion doctrine did not apply to bar claims asserted against seatbelt manufacturer in products liability action arising out of single-vehicle rollover accident, since manufacturer was different party than seat belt manufacturer named in first suit arising out of accident, and first suit produced no final judgment on merits with respect to claims asserted against manufacturer.)

Moreover, "[t]he purpose of the doctrine [res judicata] is to 'relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple law suits [sic], conserve judicial resources and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication." *Taylor*, 2012 WL 4361026 at *3 (quoting *Allen v. McCurry*, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411 (1980) (internal citation omitted)).

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¹ The Offer of Judgment was accepted before any Opposition to the Motion to Amend was due. Undoubtedly, Brownstone would have vehemently opposed the Motion to Amend had Brownstone not accepted the Offer of Judgment or had an Offer of Judgment not been pending at that time.

Howard & Howard, Attorneys PLLC 3800 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Suite 1000 Las Vegas, NV 89169

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Any judgment obtained by the Sunridge Parties against Defendants in this action will not result in inconsistent decision obtained in the First Action. In fact, the judgment in this action will have no bearing whatsoever on any decisions made in the First Action.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, this Court should deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in its entirety, as the claims alleged by Sunridge Parties in the Second Action are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

DATED this 24th day of February 2015.

HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC

/s/ Gwen Rutar Mullins GWEN RUTAR MULLINS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 3146 WADE B. GOCHNOUR, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6314 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Ste. 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Robert L. Mendenhall and Sunridge Corporation

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Howard & Howard, Attorneys PLLC 3800 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Suite 1000 Las Vegas, NV 89169 (702) 257-1483

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on the 24th day of February 2015, I served a copy of the **PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS** on all parties listed in the Master Service List in accordance with the Electronic Filing Order entered in this matter.

James J. Lee, Esq. – james@leelawonline.com Harry Marquis, Esq. - harry@marquislaw.net

/s/ Kellie Piet

An employee of Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC

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MENDENHALL AFFIDAVIT

MENDENHALL AFFIDAVIT

HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS FLLC 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway Wells Fargo Tower, Suite 1000

Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 257-1483

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. MENDENHALL

STATE OF NEVADA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF CLARK)

Ą

I, ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, being first duly sworn, depose and state:

- 1. I am over 18 years of age, a resident of the State of Nevada, and competent to testify to the matters contained in this Affidavit, which are based upon my personal knowledge, except as to those matters that are based upon my information and belief. As to those matters, I believe them to be true.
- 2. This Affidavit is given in support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
- 3. On either December 4 or December 5, 2007, a Carson Valley Casino Project
 Term Sheet (the "Term Sheet") was executed by American Vantage Brownstone, LLC
 ("AVB"), Brownstone Gold Town, LLC, "Other Investor(s)" and me.
 - 4. The Term Sheet provides in pertinent part:

This term sheet shall serve as an outline of the basic business terms and conditions upon which Brownstone GoldTown, LLC ("Brownstone GoldTown"), a subsidiary of American Vantage Brownstone, LLC ("AVB"), Robert L. Mendenhall, Ph.D. or an entity wholly-owned by Mr. Mendenhall ("Mendenhall"), and other potential equity investor(s) (the "Other Investors"), will acquire membership interests in the Nevada limited liability company, Brownstone GoldTown CV, LLC (the "Company") for the primary purpose of constructing, owning and operating a hotel casino to be located in Carson Valley, Douglas County, Nevada (the "Project").

5. The Term sheet further provides in relevant part:

The Project membership interests (the "Membership Interests" will be allocated based on the following:

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- For contribution of the 46-acre project site, value at \$15,000,000, Mendenhall will receive a 27% Membership Interest. The acreage will be contributed in full on or before the option expiration date of December 27, 2007 or as mutually agreed between Brownstone GoldTown and Mendenhall.
- It is expected that the Other Investor(s) will contribute \$7,000,000.00 U.S. Dollars for a 12.6% Membership Interest.
- Brownstone GoldTown will contribute \$1,500,000.00 U.S. dollars for a 2.7% Membership Interest.
- б. I was told by Ronald Tassinari ("Tassinari") and Robert Gross that they had a Canadian group of equity investors that would be committing to contribute \$7,000,000.00 to acquire a 12.6% Membership Interest in Brownstone GoldTown CV, LLC, and that the Canadian group would also be signing the Term Sheet.
- In reliance on these representations, I signed the Term Sheet, and returned the 7. Term Sheet to Tassinari and Mr. Gross on December 5, 2007.
- 8. That same day, December 5, 2007, a fully executed copy of the Term Sheet was faxed back to me, with all of the signature lines completed.
 - 9. I was never told that the Canadian group did not sign the Term Sheet.
- 10. I was never told that Tassinari signed the Term Sheet as the "Other Investor(s)," rather than the third party Canadian group that I had been told would be the "Other Investor(s)."
- I was also never told that despite signing the Term Sheet as the "Other 11. Investor(s)" that Tassinari had no expectations or intent of contributing \$7,000,000.00.
- 12. It was my understanding that it was the Canadian group that had signed as the "Other Investor(s)."

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13. In signing the Term Sheet I relied on those representations and would not have signed the Term Sheet had I known that those representations were false and untrue and that there was no third party investor group who would be committing to contribute \$7,000,000.00. I was misled to believe that the Canadian group had signed the Term Sheet and would be committing to contribute the \$7,000,000 to this project.

- 14. Prior to Tassinari's deposition, I was not aware that Tassinari signed the Term Sheet as the "Other Investor(s)."
- 15. Additionally, prior to Tassinari's deposition, I was not aware of the fraudulent actions and omissions that were perpetrated against myself and Sunridge Corporation by the Defendants, as alleged in the Complaint in this action.

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this 24th day of February, 2015.

KOBERT L. MENDENHALL

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this <u>Outh</u>day of February, 2015.

NOTARY PUBLIC in shid for said County and State.

4816-4568-7585, v. 2



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4816-4568-7585y2

GOCHNOUR AFFIDAVIT

GOCHNOUR AFFIDAVIT

3800 Howard Hughes Parkway Wells Fargo Tower, Suite 1000

Las Vegas, Nevada 89169

702) 257-1483 14

AFFIDAVIT OF WADE B. GOCHNOUR

STATE OF NEVADA) ss. COUNTY OF CLARK)

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I, WADE B. GOCHNOUR, being first duly sworn, depose and state:

- 1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada and I am one of the counsel of record for Plaintiffs, Sunridge Corporation and Robert L. Mendenhall (collectively, the "Sunridge Parties").
- 2. This Affidavit is given in support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
- At the time of filing of their Answer in Case No. A-11-653822-C (the "First 3. Action"), the Sunridge Parties were not aware of the fraudulent actions of Defendants that are the subject to this action. Defendants were not parties in the First Action.
- 4. On July 14, 2014, the deposition of Ronald Tassinari ("Tassinari") was conducted. During Tassinari's deposition, Tassinari testified: (1) that he had signed the Term Sheet that was the basis for the contract claims in the First Action, signing on behalf of the "Other Investor(s)" and on behalf of AVB; and (2) that he had no expectation to invest \$7,000,000 as set out in the Term Sheet. See excerpts of Tassinari's Deposition Transcript attached as Exhibit 1.
- 5. Prior to Tassinari's deposition, the Sunridge Parties were unaware that Tassinari had signed the Term Sheet as the "Other Investor(s)."
- Prior to Tassinari's deposition the Sunridge Parties believed that the signature 6. contained for the "Other Investor(s) was that of the Canadian Investor.

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 257-1483

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7.	During the depositions of Anna M. Morrison on July 6, 2014, and the deposition
of Robert F.	Gross on July 11, 2014, both representatives of the Brownstone Plaintiffs, both
witnesses tes	tified that they believed that the signature for "Other Investor(s)" was that of a
Canadian inv	estor who was also looking into investing in Brownstone Gold Town CV, LLC
See excerpts	of the deposition of Anna M. Morrison, attached as Exhibit 2. See also excerpts of
the deposition	n of Robert F. Gross, attached as Exhibit 3.

- 8. Once Tassinari testified that he had signed the allegedly binding Term Sheet on behalf of the "Other Investor(s)," Tassinari was asked if he expected to contribute \$7,000,000.00 to the deal as stated in the Term Sheet. Tassinari testified that he did not expect to contribute \$7,000,000.00 as stated in the Term Sheet. See Exhibit 1.
- Prior to Tassinari's deposition, the Sunridge Parties were not aware of the 9. fraudulent actions and omissions that were perpetrated against them as alleged in the Complaint, and therefore no affirmative claims were asserted against Brownstone or Tassinari and AVB when the Sunridge Parties filed their Answer to the Complaint in the First Action.

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this 20th day of February 2015.

WADE B. GOCHNOUR

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO

before me this and day of February, 2015.

ARY PUBLIC in and for

said County and State.

County of Clark KELLIE PIET Appt. No. 02-74699-1 Appt. Expires January 21, 2018

Notary Public - State of Nevada

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4835-2539-1137v1

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

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DISTRICT COURT
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                        CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
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     BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN, LLC, a
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     Nevada limited liability company,)
     BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN CV, LLC, a )
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     Nevada limited liability company,)
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             Plaintiffs,
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                                          Case No. A-11-653822-C
        vs:
10
     ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an
     individual, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION,
11
     A Nevada corporation, and DOES 1 )
      through 10, inclusive,
12
             Defendants.
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            VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF RONALD J. TASSINARI
16
                          Las Vegas, Nevada
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                        Monday, July 14, 2014
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                               Volume I
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      Reported by:
      BARBARA R. JUSTL
      CSR No. 878
23
      Job No. 1884789
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      PAGES 1 - 266
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Veritext National Deposition & Litigation Services 877-955-3855

1	DISTRICT COURT
1 2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
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)
6	BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN, LLC, a)
	Nevada limited liability company,)
7	BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN CV, LLC, a)
	Nevada limited liability company,)
8)
**********	Plaintiffs,
9)
	vs.) Case No. A-11-653822-C
10)
	ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an)
11	individual, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION,)
	A Nevada corporation, and DOES 1)
12	through 10, inclusive,
***************************************)
13	Defendants.
)
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17	Videotaped Deposition of RONALD J. TASSINARI,
18	Volume I, taken on behalf of Defendants, at 3800 Howard
19	Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000, Las Vegas, Nevada, beginning
20	at 9:11 a.m. and ending at 5:28 p.m. on Monday, July 14,
21	2014, before BARBARA R. JUSTL, Certified Shorthand
22	Reporter No. 878.
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9	Page 2

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    Also present:
       James M. Barker, Esq.
19
       General Counsel
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       Las Vegas Paving Corp.
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    Videographer:
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        MARK STATES, VERITEXT
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1	A	Yes.	
2	Q	Okay. Any other contracts that you feel have been	
3	breache	ed, or any other claims that you think you're	
4	making	in this lawsuit?	
5		MR. MARQUIS: Object to the form of the question.	
6		THE WITNESS: To me, it's a simple breach of 10:01	
7	contra	ct.	
8	BY MR.	GOCHNOUR:	
9	Q	Okay. And I just want to be sure that this is	
10	A	Yes.	
11	Q	"this" being Exhibit 1, is the contract that	
12	we're	talking about.	
13	A	Yes, sir.	
14	Q	That you guys the Brownstone entities are	
15	claimi	ng that there was a breach of, correct?	
16	A	Correct.	
17	Q	Okay. And if I could have you turn back to page	
18	5, ple	ase, the fifth page of the exhibit, the signature 10:01	
19	page.		
20		And there's a signature for American Vantage	
21	Browns	tone LLC.	
22	Α	Yes.	
23	Q	Is that your signature?	
24	A	Yes.	
25	Q	Are you familiar with Mr. Gross's signature?	
		Page 37	

1	A	Looks like his.	
2	Q	And was Mr. Gross the chief executive officer of	
3	Browns	tone Gold Town, LLC?	
4	A	He was.	
5	Q	I'm sorry, in December of 2007?	0:02
6	A	Yes.	
7	Q	And then there's the other investor. Can you tell	
8	me who	se signature that is?	
9	А	Looks like mine.	
10	Q	Looks like yours. Why would you have been the	1
11	other	investor in this agreement?	
12	A	You know, I don't remember, but that is definitely	
13	my sig	nature.	
14	Q	Well, were you committing to put \$7 million into	10:02
15	this p	project as of December 4, 2007?	
16	A	I did not make a commitment to put \$7 million into	
17	this p	project on December 4, 2007.	v
18	Q	Can you please tell me why you signed on behalf of	10:02
19	other	investors?	
20	A	I can't tell you today. I don't remember.	
21	Q	Did you think signing on behalf of other investors	
22	had ar	ny legal consequences to you?	
23	A	Never really thought about it.	
24	Q	So you didn't think signing as an other investor	
25	in an	agreement that you're claiming is a binding	
		Page 3	38

1. I, the undersigned, a Certified Court Reporter of 2 3 the State of Nevada, do hereby certify: That the foregoing proceedings were taken before 4 5 me at the time and place herein set forth; that any 6 witnesses in the foregoing proceedings, prior to 7 testifying, were duly sworn; that a record of the proceedings was made by me using machine shorthand which 8 9 was thereafter transcribed under my direction; that the 1.0 foregoing transcript is a true record of the testimony 11 given. 12 Further, that before completion of the proceedings, review of the transcript [] was [XX] was 1.3 not requested. 14 15 I further certify I am neither financially interested in the action nor a relative or employee of 16 17 any attorney or party to this action. 18 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have this date 19 subscribed my name. 20 Dated: July 26, 2014 21 22 23 24 JUSTIA CCR No. 878 25 Page 266

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

```
DISTRICT COURT
1
                        CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
2
3
4
5
     BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN, LLC, a
6
     Nevada limited liability company,)
     BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN CV, LLC, a )
 7
     Nevada limited liability company,)
 8
             Plaintiffs,
 9
                                        ) Case No. A-11-653822-C
         vs.
10
     ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an
     individual, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION,)
11
     A Nevada corporation, and DOES 1 )
12
     through 10, inclusive,
             Defendants.
13
14
15
              VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF ANNA M. MORRISON
16
                           Las Vegas, Nevada
17
                        Thursday, July 3, 2014
18
                               Volume I
19
20
21
      Reported by:
22
      BARBARA R. JUSTL
      CSR No. 878
23
      Job No. 1884749
24
      PAGES 1 - 239
25
                                                          Page 1
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CLARK COUNTY, 1	NEVADA
)
BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN, LLC, a)
Nevada limited liability company	·,)
BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN CV, LLC, a)
Nevada limited liability company	
)
Plaintíffs,)
	· }
Vs,) Case No. A-11-653822-C
· w ?)
ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an	, }
individual, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION	, I)
A Nevada corporation, and DOES 1	
through 10, inclusive,	· /
emtough to, inclusive,	\ \
Defendants.	\ \
Detendants,	\ \
	/
Idaniana Panasiti	NO AF ANNA M MODDICON
•	on of ANNA M. MORRISON,
Volume I, taken on behalf of Def	
Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000, Las	
at 9:00 a.m. and ending at 4:28	
2014, before BARBARA R. JUSTL, C	ertified Shorthand
Reporter No. 878.	
	Page 2

Veritext National Deposition & Litigation Services 877-955-3855

1	APPEARANCES:
2	For Plaintiffs:
3	HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, CHTD.
4	By: HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, Attorney at Law
5	400 South 4th Street, Third Floor
б	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
7	(702) 382-6700
8	harry@marquislaw.net
9	**and**
10	CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM
11	By: SEAN K. CLAGGETT, Attorney at Law
12	8751 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite 200
13	(702) 655-2346
14	sclaggett@claggettlaw.com
15	
16	For Defendants:
17	HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS, PLLC
18	By: WADE B. GOCHNOUR, Attorney at Law
19	3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000
20	Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
21	(702) 257-1483
22	wbg@h2law.com
23	
24	Videographer:
25	TOM BURTNEY, VERITEXT
	Page 3

1,2		
1	lawsuit that was filed by Brownstone Gold Town and	
2	Brownstone Gold Town CV. Do you understand that?	09:14
3	A Yes.	
4	Q Do you know what the claims of Brownstone Gold	:
5	Town and Brownstone Gold Town CV are making in this	
6	action?	
7	A My understanding is both from the litigation	
8	and from information while I was there that Mendenhall	
9	breached the agreement between the parties.	09:15
10	Q And that's your understanding. That's your	
11	understanding of the claims that Brownstone are asserting	
12	against Mr. Mendenhall and Sunridge?	
13	A Yes.	
1.4	Q Okay. Do you know of any other claims as you sit	
15	here today?	
16	A I'd have to see the specific document to refresh	
1.7	my memory.	
18	Q And when you say that your understanding is that	
19	Mendenhall breached the agreement, what agreement are you	
20	talking about?	
21	A There was a binding agreement that was reached in	09:15
22	approximately the end of 2007 that was signed between	
23	Mendenhall, Brownstone and a Canadian investor.	
24	Q Do you recall the title of that agreement?	09:16
25	A I'd have to see the document to get the specific	
	Page	25

Veritext National Deposition & Litigation Services 877-955-3855

1	BY MR.	GOCHNOUR:	
2	0	Ms. Morrison, I'm showing you what's titled the	- The second sec
3		r Valley Casino Project Term Sheet." If you'd jus	t:
4		second to look through and then tell me if you	
5		ize this document.	09:18
6	a dougar.	MR. MARQUIS: What's the exhibit number?	02,10
7		MR. GOCHNOUR: 1.	09:18
			03:10
8		THE WITNESS: (Witness complies.) Yes,	
9	BY MR.	GOCHNOUR;	
10	Q	So this is the agreement that you were talking	09:19
11	about?		
12	A	Yes, it does appear to be, yes.	
13	Q	You're back on the signature page right now,	
14	right?		
15	A	Yes.	
16	Q	And that is it has a little mark down at the	
17	bottom	that says BROW00271?	
18	А	Yes	
19	õ	And it seems that it's signed by American Vantage	: : :
20	Browns	tone, LLC?	
21	А	Correct of	
22	, Q	And Brownstone Gold Town, LLC?	
23	A	Correct,	
24	Q	And Mr. Mendenhall's signature line has a	09:20
25	signat	ure on it?	
	~		~~ 0 T
		Fa	ge 27

Veritext National Deposition & Litigation Services 877-955-3855

1	A Correct,
2	Q And then it says "Other investor." Do you know
3	who that other investor is?
4.	A It's hard to read, isn't it. I don't know.
5	Q Do you know who any other potential investors were
6	about December 4th of 2007?
7	A At that time, we were talking with a Canadian
8	group.
9	Q Do you have any was there a particular was
10	it a group? Was it an individual?
11	A They had a contact person. His name was Robert 09:20
12	Sim.
13	Q Now, I know it's been a long time since you've
14	probably seen this, but what language in this agreement 09:21
15	makes you believe that this is a binding agreement?
16	A If you look at the signature page
17	Q Sure.
18	A ~- on the paragraph at the top of the page, the
19	last sentence, "shall be binding upon any party who so
20	executes, 9 09:21
21	Q Let me ask you, during your time at American
22	Vantage and/or in dealing with Brownstone, was this a
23	typical contract form that you entered into in order to
24	tie down investors to projects, a term sheet like this? 09:21
25	A We would have had letters of intent which would
	Page 28

Veritext National Deposition & Litigation Services 877-955-3855

ı	MR. GOCHNOUR: Can we mark the next two in order.
2	(Deposition Exhibit 6 marked.) 10:12
3	(Deposition Exhibit 7 marked.)
4	BY MR. GOCHNOUR:
5	Q Ms. Morrison, I'm showing you two they're
6	unsigned, but they're two separate Carson Valley Casino
7	project term sheets, and I hope you can look those over
8	and tell me whether they look familiar to you or not.
9	A Well, they would have they are likely to have
10	been prepared internally at American Vantage Companies.
11	Q Would this do you know if these were prepared 10:12
12	before, after, contemporaneously with Exhibit 1?
13	A Well, this one has a date of January 20, '07.
14	Q I'm sorry to stop you, but when you say "this
15	one," just so we can figure out which exhibit
16	A Exhibit 7. 10:13
17	Q Okay.
18	A Has a date on it of it's blank, but January
19	blank, 2007. That would appear to precede the term
20	sheet. The other one has no date, so I can't I don't
21	know when it was drafted.
22	Q On Exhibit 7, down at the last page, down in the
23	signature blocks, it says "Investor Group," Robert Sims 10:13
24	and Richard Coglon. Do you know who Robert Sims is?
25	A Robert Sim was I referred to him earlier as
	Page 63

1	being in charge or leading the Canadian investor group.
2	Richard Coglon I don't remember. I feel like I
3	should know that name, but I just don't remember
4	specifically who he is. I'm sure I'll remember it about 10:14
5	2 o'clock this morning.
6	Q And during 2007, do you know, were there term
7	sheets being provided to other investors, potential
8	investors in the Gold Town project?
9	A '07. I would have to actually see the documents 10:14
10	to be able to tell you for sure, but I would have thought
1.1	that at least discussions. I don't know if I don't
12	remember if they got to the level of a term sheet.
13	Q Now, the Canadian investors, were they the other
14	investors that signed the term sheet that's Exhibit 1?
15	A As I mentioned, I don't recognize that signature
16	that's there.
17	Q Okay.
18	A So I can't assert that that's definitely who it 10:15
19	was or who signed it.
20	Q But you don't have any recollection of discussions
21	about who the other investor was?
22	A The other investor that there were discussions
23	with was the Canadian group.
24	Q I'm sorry, could I have you look back at
25	Exhibit 1?
	Page 64

1.	A Oh, 1?	
2	Q Yes.	
3	A Uh-huh.	
4	Q Second page, top item says, "It is expected the 10	:15
5	Other Investors will contribute \$7 million U.S. for a	
6	12.6 percent Membership Interest."	
7	Does that refresh your recollection as to whether	
8	the other investor was the Canadian group you're talking	
9	about?	
10	A Yes.	
11	Q It does refresh your recollection?	
12	A I do believe the other investor was the Canadian	
13	group.	
14	Q Okay.	
1.5	A I just don't know who the signer was.	
16	Q Okay. And is it your belief that the term 1	:16
17	sheet was binding on all the parties that signed it,	
1.8	right?	
19	A Correct.	
20	Q Including Mr. Mendenhall?	
21	A Yes.	
22	Q Including Brownstone?	
23	A Yes.	
24	Q And American Vantage?	
25	A Yes.	
	Page 65	
	1	

ý		
1	Q	And the other investor?
2	A	Correct. I do want to clarify, American Vantage
3	Compani	es did not sign this term sheet, American Vantage
4	Brownst	one did 10:16
5	Q	Okay.
6	A	which was a subsidiary, wholly owned.
7	Q	Not the same thing?
8	A	Not the same thing, just to clarify.
9	Q	No, I appreciate that. Thank you.
10		Other than the Canadian group and Mr. Mendenhall,
11	do you	recall any other potential investors that
12	Mr. Gro	ss or Mr. Tassinari were talking to in 2007 about
13	the Gol	d Town project?
1.4	Ą	You'd have to address that question to them. 10:17
15	Q	I'm just asking, you don't recall any?
16	A	No.
17	Q	Now the Canadian group, did they end up investing
18	in Gold	l Town?
19	A	How so?
20	Ç	Did they invest any money in Gold Town?
21	А	They we entered into yes, the answer is
22	yes,	
23	Q	What did they invest into the Gold Town group 10:18
24	into th	ne Gold Town project, excuse me?
25	А	There were three promissory notes,
		Page 66

Veritext National Deposition & Litigation Services 877-955-3855

1 I, the undersigned, a Certified Court Reporter of 2 the State of Nevada, do hereby certify: 3 That the foregoing proceedings were taken before 4 me at the time and place herein set forth; that any 5 witnesses in the foregoing proceedings, prior to 6 7 testifying, were duly sworn; that a record of the proceedings was made by me using machine shorthand which 8 was thereafter transcribed under my direction; that the 9 foregoing transcript is a true record of the testimony 10 11 given. Further, that before completion of the 12 proceedings, review of the transcript [] was [XX] was 13 not requested. 14 I further certify I am neither financially 15 interested in the action nor a relative or employee of 16 any attorney or party to this action. 17 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have this date 18 subscribed my name. 19 20 Dated: July 17, 2014 21 22 Mary K. Mate 23 BARBARA R. JUSTL, RPR CCR No. 878 24 25

> Veritext National Deposition & Litigation Services 877-955-3855

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EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 3

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DISTRICT COURT
1
                        CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
2
3
4
5
     BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN, LLC, a
6
     Nevada limited liability company,}
     BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN CV, LLC, a )
7
     Nevada limited liability company,)
8
             Plaintiffs,
 9
                                        ) Case No. A-11-653822-C
        vs.
10
     ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an
     individual, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION,)
11
     A Nevada corporation, and DOES 1 )
     through 10, inclusive,
12
             Defendants.
13
14
15
              VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF ROBERT F. GROSS
16
                           Las Vegas, Nevada
17
                         Friday, July 11, 2014
18
                               Volume I
19
20
21
     Reported by:
22
      BARBARA R. JUSTL
23
     CSR No. 878
      Job No. 1884784
24
      PAGES 1 - 261
25
                                                          Page 1
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Veritext National Deposition & Litigation Services 877-955-3855

1	DISTRICT COURT
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
3	
4	
5	
)
6	BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN, LLC, a)
	Nevada limited liability company,)
7	BROWNSTONE GOLD TOWN CV, LLC, a)
	Nevada limited liability company,)
8	·
	Plaintiffs,)
9)
	vs.) Case No. A-11-653822-C
10)
	ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an)
11	individual, SUNRIDGE CORPORATION,)
	A Nevada corporation, and DOES 1)
12	through 10, inclusive,)
)
13	Defendants.
	}
14	
15	
16	
17	Videotaped Deposition of ROBERT F. GROSS,
18	Volume I, taken on behalf of Defendants, at 3800 Howard
19	Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000, Las Vegas, Nevada, beginning
20	at 9:18 a.m. and ending at 6:20 p.m. on Friday, July 11,
21	2014, before BARBARA R. JUSTL, Certified Shorthand
22	Reporter No. 878.
23	
24	
25	
	Page 2

Veritext National Deposition & Litigation Services 877-955-3855

```
APPEARANCES:
1
    For Plaintiffs:
2
       HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, CHTD.
3
           HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, Attorney at Law
4
       By:
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5
       Las Vegas, Nevada
                            89101
6
       (702) 382 - 6700
7
       harry@marquislaw.net
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9
10
    For Defendants:
       HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS, PLLC
11
       By: WADE B. GOCHNOUR, Attorney at Law
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       3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000
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       Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
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       (702) 257-1483
15
16
       wbq@h2law.com
17
18
    Also present:
        James M. Barker, Esq.
19
        General Counsel
20
        Las Vegas Paving Corp.
21
22
    Videographer:
23
        KENNETH LAURSEN, VERITEXT
24
25
                                             Page 3
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1	facsimile or email trans	mission"
2	THE REPORTER: I'	m sorry?
3	MR. GOCHNOUR: Sp	eak up and slow down. I'm sorry,
4	sir.	
5	THE WITNESS:	"shall be significant (sic) for
6	all purposes and shall b	e binding upon any party who so 10:17
7	executes."	
8	BY MR. GOCHNOUR:	
9	Q And so that sente	nce is what you believe makes
10	this a binding contract?	
11	A Correct.	
12	Q And you're on the	signature page still, correct?
13	A Yes.	
14	Q Who is the other	investor who signed this?
15	A I can't see the	signature here. The investor $_{70}$ I 10:18
16	believe that is America	Nantage or signed by American
17	Vantage.	
18	Q You're still on	the signature page, correct?
19	A Uh-huh, yes, cor	rect.
20	Q The top signature	e is American Vantage Brownstone,
21	LLC?	
22	A Uh-huh.	
23	Q Yes?	
24	A Yes.	
25	Q And you think th	at the bottom one that says "Other
		Page 38

Veritext National Deposition & Litigation Services 877-955-3855

		,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
1	Investor(s)," is also American Vantage?	10:18
2	A To the best of my knowledge, yes. It looks like	
3	the same signature. I can't read this copy that well,	
4	but	
5	Q Okay. Well, let me ask you, as of December 4th,	
6	2007, what other investors did the Brownstone entities	
7	have signed on for this project for the Gold Town Casino	10:19
8	project?	
9	A Other investors would be Bob Sim from Canada.	
10	Other investors would be would be entities through Bob	10:19
11	Sim, whether it's Level 10 or whatever entity he would	
12	come in with who agreed to participate.	
13	Q Was there a separate term sheet or other document	
14	signed between the Brownstone entities and Bob Sim or one	
15	of his entities?	
16	A We had loan documents through Level 10 for	
17	approximately a million dollars towards the project. We	10:20
18	had a term sheet for Bob Sim, but right now I can't are I	
19	just don't remember. I'd have to look in my documents.	
20	Q Well, you looked in your documents to prepare as a	
21	30(b)(6) representative today, correct?	
22	A Correct.	
23	Q And do you recall seeing a term sheet that was	
24	ever signed by Bob Sim or one of his entities?	10:20
25	A No.	
	Page	39

100	<i>,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,</i>
1	Q And can I have you turn to the second page of the
2	term sheet, please. Let me ask you let me back up a
3	second first.
4	With regard to that other investor signature, if 10:21
5	you don't recognize who that is, would there be somebody
6	else who would have more knowledge than you as to who
7	that might be?
8	A I don't know. I would have to get a better copy
9	than this and corporate maybe.
10	Q When you say corporate, who would that be?
11	A Mr. Tassinari or who was in the corporate
12	office.
13	Q We're going to take just a second to adjust your 10:21
14	microphone so the videographer can hear what you're
1.5	saying.
16	And are you aware of any other signed term sheets
17	other than Exhibit 1?
18	A No.
19	Q And just so we're clear, when I say any other, I 10:22
20	mean between Brownstone entities and any other potential
21	investor, not just another one with Mr. Mendenhall or
22	Sunridge or anything like that. Just are there any other
23	signed term sheets that you're aware of relating to the
24	Gold Town Casino project?
25	A As far as Brownstone entity that I was in charge
	Page 40

1	of, no.
2	Q Is there a term sheet you're aware of that relates
3	to a non-Brownstone entity that you're in charge of?
4	A Not to my recollection. 10:22
5	Q Okay. I just want to be sure because you seemed
6	to make a differentiation.
7	A Well, there is a difference, because I ran
8	Brownstone. I was not in corporate. So American
9	Vantage, I don't know.
10	Q On page 2, the first bullet on the top of that
11	page
12	A Uh-huh.
13	Q it says, "It is expected that the other
1.4	investors will contribute \$7 million U.S. dollars for a
15	12.6 percent membership interest." 10:23
16	Does that help you recall who the other investors
17	were?
1.8	A The other investor would be Bob Sim.
19	Q Because Bob Sim was signed on to contribute
20	\$7 million to the Gold Town Casino project?
21	A Bob Sim committed 7 million or more.
22	Q And just so I'm clear, does that tell you that Bob
23	Sim is the other investor rather than American Vantage,
24	or you're not sure?
25	A I'm not sure on the signature.
	Page 41

1	Q Bi	ut you recall that Bob Sim had committed	10:23
2	\$7 millio	on to the project?	
3	A Co	orrect.	
4	Q WI	hat was that \$7 million to be used for?	
5	A As	s equity into the project.	
6	Q Bı	ut it wasn't just going to sit in a bank account	
7	as equity	y, it was actually going to be used for	10:24
8	something	g, correct?	
9	A Co	orrect. That was the portion of equity we needed	ì
10	to move	the project.	
11	Q M)	hat was that portion of the equity to move the	
12	project	going to be used for?	
13	A D	evelopment of the project.	
14	Q L	ike pre-development, actual construction, what?	
15	A C	Construction. Pre-development and construction.	
16	All of t	he above.	
17	Q A	and as of December 4th, 2007, were there any	10:25
18	business	terms that still had to be worked out between	
19	the Brow	mstone entities, Mr. Mendenhall, and the other	
20	investor	in order to make this project go?	
21	A B	Business terms?	10:25
22	Q Y	es.	
23	A T	There needed to be an operating agreement	
24	finalize	ed,	
25	Ω 0	okay. Anything else you can think that needed to	
		Pag	ge 42
	s and the second		وووجه والمحاج والمجرورة مجرورة للتالية للتاليان التالي ويروري

Veritext National Deposition & Litigation Services 877-955-3855

1	little conflict here, I thought you testified during the
2	period of August 1, 2007, to September 27, 2007, you 13:35
3	didn't present any term sheets to Mr. Mendenhall. But
4	now you're saying that he insisted on this binding
5	language which is in this agreement
6	A Uh-huh.
7	Q in this draft that was drafted between August
8	1, 2007, and August 27, 2007. So you're saying he asked
9	for that, even though you weren't giving him term sheets
10	at that time. Is that what you're testifying?
11	MR. MARQUIS: I'm going to object to the form of
12	the question. That mischaracterizes his testimony.
13	BY MR. GOCHNOUR:
14	Q If I've mischaracterized your testimony, please, 13:35
15	I'm trying to correct it so I know what you're saying.
16	A I'm trying to get the dates correct. All I can
17	remember is we had binding binding the term sheet
18	was binding, and we put it in for the Canadians. We also
19	put it in and Mr. Mendenhall wanted binding agreement.
20	That's all I can say. I mean, I can't remember any more.
21	I mean
22	Q The binding the Canadians were the other
23	investors in the Exhibit 1 term sheet, right?
24	A Yes.
25	Q Okay. And it was binding that term sheet was 13:36
	Page 110

1.	binding on them as well, right?	
2	A Of course.	13:36
3	Q Okay. Can I have you turn to the part of Exhibit	
4	89 that is BROW-9968. Can you tell me when this term	13:38
5	sheet was drafted?	13:38
6	A I am looking at the dates below, but they don't	
7	correspond with the term sheet.	***************************************
8	Q Okay.	
9	A This term sheet was probably automatically updated	
10	each time we used it and corrected it, so I don't know	
11	whoever did the term sheet, how their computer changes	13:39
12	the dates on it.	
13	Q But on page 1, which is BROW-9968, the bullet	
14	point at the very bottom says, "For each \$1 million of	
15	Contributed Capital, Investor will receive a 1.8	
16	Membership Interest."	
17	Now, that occurred because that was a term that	
18	Mr. Mendenhall demanded somewhere in your negotiations,	
19	right?	
20	A Correct.	
21	Q And you then presented it to other potential	
22	investors on that basis?	13:39
23	A After we were in agreeance (sic) with Mendenhall,	
24	yes.	
25	Q Turning to the next page, the top bullet point, it	
	Page	111

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1	A He probably I don't know what percentage he
2	owned of it, but he had invested some money in Level 10,
3	and he said that, you know, look for them for the
4	million-and-a-half, but look for me for the 7 to
5	25 million.
6	Q Okay. So was Bob Sim, again, the other investor
7	that's listed in the term sheet who was
8	A Yeah.
9	Q going to contribute \$7 million?
10	A That's who was in mind when we did the term sheet,
11	absolutely. 15:44
12	Q And again, I don't understand how it came that
13	Level 10 is talking about \$7 million. This isn't an
1.4	additional 7 million, this is in place of that 7 million,
15	right?
16	A No. No. Well, it would be in place of it, but
17	they would look and do it themselves. You know, you've
18	got to remember Bob was only an investor in Level 10.
19	Ralph was a little greedy CPA that would borrow from Bob,
20	and Ralph wanted to do it himself, but he just didn't 15:44
21	have the capacity. So we really didn't look to him for
22	the 7 million. It was always Bob Sim, always.
23	Q Then why are you writing a note, whether it
24	actually got sent or just to yourself, that says that "We
25	do understand that you may need some time on the
	Page 174

		,
1	have Bob. Bob was like I said, he was the staple	
2	because he lived here, he already had a gaming license,	
3	he had the land value. We didn't have to do anything if	
4	we kept Bob in as a partner.	17:22
5	But the fact he didn't contribute the land, we	
6	lost a lot of smaller investors. Bob Sim is the one that	
7	stuck with us for awhile. He stayed committed.	
8	Q On the term sheet, there was Bob Mendenhall.	
9	A Uh-huh.	
10	Q There was Brownstone. There was the possibility	
11	of the Sunridge Golf Course, and there was the other	
12	investor, which I thought we've established was Bob Sim	
13	for \$7 million.	17:22
14	A Bob Sim was the other investor.	:
15	Q Yes.	
16	A We only needed the 7 million.	
17	Q Okay. So why were we still talking to other	
18	potential Canadians about additional money being	
19	invested?	
20	A If we wanted to do the whole job, we needed more	
21	equity.	
22	Q But you had decided to cap out the equity at	
23	25 million.	
24	A Correct. But you always have backups. You know,	
25	any project you have a backup. And depending on the	17:22
	Page 2	227

1	Q And who were the other investors who were
2	concerned?
3	A The Canadians.
4	Q Which Canadians are we talking about?
5	A Bob Sim and his group.
6	Q And they were concerned? 17:43
7	A Yes.
8	Q Were they still committed to investing the
9	25 million to buy the property if Mr. Mendenhall wasn't
10	in in that period?
11	A Oh, in that period?
12	Q In the December 4, 2007, to April 8, 2008 period.
13	A Well, he was in, so there wasn't a need for the
1.4	25 million, so the discussion was a moot issue.
15	Q Okay. After you received Mr. Mendenhall's letter, 17:43
16	did you go back to Mr. Sim and say, "Are you still
17	willing to invest the 25 million?"
18	A Yes.
19	Q And what was his response?
20	A He was still he was still interested in
21	investing himself He said he would have to get back
22	with the Germans and see if they were, so, you know
23	and that went on for months and months. So we looked for
24	different investment, different equity.
25	Q Mr. Sim never came in with \$25 million, correct? 17:44
	Page 235

1 I, the undersigned, a Certified Court Reporter of 2 the State of Nevada, do hereby certify: 3 That the foregoing proceedings were taken before 4 me at the time and place herein set forth; that any 5 witnesses in the foregoing proceedings, prior to 6 testifying, were duly sworn; that a record of the 7 proceedings was made by me using machine shorthand which 8 was thereafter transcribed under my direction; that the 9 foregoing transcript is a true record of the testimony 1.0 11 given. Further, that before completion of the 12 proceedings, review of the transcript [] was [XX] was 13 not requested. 14 I further certify I am neither financially 15 interested in the action nor a relative or employee of 16 17 any attorney or party to this action. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have this date 18 subscribed my name. 1.9 20 Dated: July 22, 2014 21 22 war K. Nisi 23 BARBARA R. JUSTL, RPR CCR No. 878 24 25 Page 260

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1	RIS		
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11	Attorneys for Defendants Ronald Tassinari		
	And American Vantage Brownstone, LLC		
12	DISTRICT COURT		
13	CLARK COUNT	ΓY, NEVADA	
14			
15	ROBERT L. MENDENHALL, an individual,) Case no.: A-14-708281-C	
	SUNRIDGE CORPORATION, a Nevada) Dept. no.: XXXII	
16	Corporation,)	
17	Plaintiffs,) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF	
18) DEFENDANT'S MOTION	
19	v.) TO DISMISS	
	, ·) Date of Hearing: March 17, 2015	
20	RONALD TASSINARI, an individual,) Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.	
21	AMERICAN VANTAGE BROWNSTONE, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,)	
22	DOES 1 through 5, inclusive and ROE)	
23	CORPORATIONS 1 through 5, inclusive,)	
	Defendants.)	
24	D OTOTICALITIO.		
25	COMPONON D.C. 1. 1.1	to de l'acceptation de l'Arriver de la Company de l'Arriver de l'Arriv	
26	COMES NOW, Defendants by and through	gh their counsel James J. Lee, Esq. and Harry	
27	Paul Marquis, Esq. and submit their Reply in	Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss	
28	REPLY RE MOTION TO DISMISS - 1		
	TELET TE MOTION TO DISMISS - I		
- 1	I		

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pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(6) and/or NRCP 56 on grounds that this action is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.

Defendant's Reply is made and based on the following points and authorities, all pleadings and papers on file herein and any and all arguments the court may entertain upon hearing.

DATED this 10724 day of March, 2015.

HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, CHARTERED

HARRY PAUL MARQUIS, ESQ. Nevada Bar no. 1252

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Attorney for Defendants

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. Introduction

This action is an attempt by Plaintiffs, Robert Mendenhall and Sunridge Corporation, (hereinafter both referred to as "Mendenhall") to revive a case that was dismissed with prejudice in August of 2014. That case was styled *Brownstone Gold Town LLC v. Robert*

REPLY RE MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

Mendenhall et al, A-11-653822-C ("First Case"). In the First Case, Brownstone Gold Town, LLC and Brownstone Gold Town CV, LLC ("Brownstone Plaintiffs"), sued Mendenhall for breach of contract and unjust enrichment in connection with the contract—referred to as a "term sheet"—which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint on file herein. After years of litigation, Mendenhall made an offer of judgment and the Brownstone Plaintiffs timely accepted it. Consequently, the District Court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice, fully discharging and releasing the parties with respect to any and all claims alleged as well as any related or potential claims that *could have* been alleged.

Now, Mendenhall has singled out Ronald Tassinari ("Tassinari") an officer and managing agent of American Vantage Brownstone LLC (AVB), the owner of the Brownstone Plaintiffs, as well as AVB itself, to assert claims grounded in the same transactions that gave rise to the First Case and which indeed he tried to assert in that case before it was settled and dismissed with prejudice.

As a matter of law, a dismissal with prejudice *is just that*, it permanently bars all claims that were brought, *or that could have been brought*, in the dismissed action. Since Mendenhall's claims in this case are based on the same core transactions which gave rise to the First Case and could *have been brought* in that case, and since Tassinari and AVB were and are *privies to* the Brownstone Plaintiffs in the First Case, this action is barred.

B. Admissions of Mendenhall in Plaintiff's Opposition

In their Opposition, Plaintiff's Robert L. Mendenhall ("Mendenhall") and Sunridge Corporation ("Sunridge") (collectively the "Mendenhall Parties") admit that: 1) Mendenhall was the first to sign the Term Sheet; 2) Mendenhall signed the Term Sheet containing no other signatures; 3) that Mendenhall returned the Term Sheet signed only by Mendenhall to the REPLY RE MOTION TO DISMISS - 3

Brownstone Plaintiffs; and 4) that Mendenhall subsequently received a copy of the Term Sheet with all signatures. Mendenhall's affidavit attached to Plaintiff's Opposition states in pertinent part as follows:

- "... I signed the Term Sheet, and returned the Term Sheet to Tassinari and Mr. Gross on December 5, 2007.
- 8. That same day, December 5, 2007, a fully executed copy of the Term Sheet was faxed back to me, with all of the signature lines completed."

There is no question that Mendenhall did not sign the Term Sheet in reliance upon any existing signatures on the Term Sheet because <u>it is undisputed that Mendenhall signed the</u>

<u>Term Sheet first.</u>

Mendenhall's affidavit attached to Defendant's Motion to Amend in the First Case contains verbatim the same language quoted above from Mendenhall's affidavit attached to Plaintiff's Opposition. Mendenhall's affidavit attached to Defendant's Motion to Amend in the First Case also specifically identifies the Term Sheet he signed and returned as Exhibit 1 to said Motion to Amend. A copy of Exhibit 1 to the Motion to Amend is attached hereto as Exhibit "F" and contains bates numbers from the First Case of MEN00670-MEN00674 identifying the document as being produced by the Mendenhall Parties (the "Undisputed Term Sheet").

Defendants respectfully ask the Court to closely examine the signature page of the Undisputed Term Sheet (MEN00674) particularly in regard to the signatures of American Vantage Brownstone, LLC, which was signed by Ronald Tassinari, Chairman, and the signature for Other Investor(s). The signature of Ronald Tassinari for American Vantage Brownstone, LLC is extremely distinctive and is the same signature for Other Investor(s). *The affidavits of*

REPLY RE MOTION TO DISMISS - 4

Mendenhall admit that Mendenhall had possession of the Undisputed Term Sheet (Ex. F) on December 5, 2007.

Plaintiffs argue that they could not have brought the claims they attempted to assert in the First Case through their Motion to Amend, and which they have asserted in this case, because the claims did not accrue until Plaintiffs' "discovery" of the fact that Mr. Tassinari signed the Undisputed Term Sheet in the Other Investor(s) signature block. However, what Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge, and what Plaintiffs cannot escape, is that *Mendenhall admits* that Mendenhall had possession of the Undisputed Term Sheet (Ex. F) on December 5, 2007. Mendenhall's admission that he was in possession of the Undisputed Term Sheet since December 5, 2007 irrefutably demonstrates that Plaintiffs discovered, or should have discovered, that Mr. Tassinari signed the Undisputed Term Sheet in the Other Investor(s) signature block.

In their Opposition, Plaintiff's argue that at their depositions in the First Case both Robert F. Gross and Anna M. Morrison were unable to identify the signature in the Other Investor(s) signature block of the Term Sheet. However, Plaintiffs fail to disclose to the Court that the Term Sheet presented to Mr. Gross and Ms. Morrison at their respective depositions was not the Undisputed Term Sheet, but was a much less clear copy of the Term Sheet which was marked as "Exhibit 1" to both depositions and which contained bates numbers from the First Case of BROW00267-BROW00272 (the "Deposition Term Sheet"). A copy of the Deposition Term Sheet is attached hereto as Exhibit "G". It is undisputed and admitted by Mendenhall that Plaintiffs had possession of the clear and distinct Undisputed Term Sheet since December 5, 2007, that Plaintiffs produced the Undisputed Term Sheet as MEN00670-MEN00674 in the First Case, and that Plaintiffs had possession of the clear and distinct REPLY RE MOTION TO DISMISS - 5

Undisputed Term Sheet at the time of the depositions of Mr. Gross and Ms. Morrison in the First Case.

Contrary to the assertions in Plaintiff's Opposition, Mendenhall admits that Mendenhall signed the Term Sheet first when no other signatures were present and that on December 5, 2007 Mendenhall had possession the Undisputed Term Sheet which plainly shows that Ronald Tassinari signed the Undisputed Term Sheet both on behalf of American Vantage Brownstone, LLC and for Other Investor(s).

ARGUMENT

1. This Case is Barred by the Doctrine of Claim Preclusion.

The doctrine of claim preclusion provides that a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action or operative facts. Five Star Capital Corp v Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 194 P3d 709, 713 (2008). The Nevada Supreme Court has established a three-part test for determining whether claim preclusion applies: "(1) The parties <u>or their privies</u> are the same; (2) the final judgment is valid; and (3) the subsequent action is based on the same claims <u>or any part of them</u> that <u>were or could have been brought in the first case</u>." (Emphasis Supplied) *Id* at 710.

a. Defendants Ronald Tassinari and American Vantage Brownstone LLC are Privies of the Plaintiffs in the First Case.

Defendants Ronald Tassinari and American Vantage Brownstone LLC were and are privies to the Brownstone Plaintiffs in the First Case. Privity exists when a person is identified and shares a commonality of interest with another. See *Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 399 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.2005). The focus of the inquiry regarding privity is whether the party in the later action was "sufficiently close" to the party in the first action so as to justify REPLY RE MOTION TO DISMISS - 6

applying preclusion principles. Clemmer v Hartford Insurance Co. 22 Cal .3d 865, 151 Cal Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d 1098, 1102 (Cal.1978).

Plaintiff's argument in their Opposition that the fact corporate officers or agents could be liable for torts committed within the course and scope of theirs duties does not mean privity does not exist for purposes of claim preclusion pursuant to *Five Star Capital Corp.* See *Bloom v Claimetrics Management*, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis. 75841 (Nev. 2011) (Since defendants in second case were managing agents, members and owners of defendant limited liability company in first case, they were privies for purposes of claim preclusion.)

Here, Defendant American Vantage Brownstone LLC (AVB) is the owner of both Brownstone Plaintiffs, Brownstone Gold Town, LLC, and Brownstone Gold Town CV, LLC. In fact the Term Sheet, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint herein, specifically identifies Brownstone Gold Town, LLC as a subsidiary of AVB as follows:

"This term sheet shall serve as an outline of the basic business terms and conditions upon which <u>Brownstone GoldTown</u>, <u>LLC ("Brownstone GoldTown")</u>, a <u>subsidiary of American Vantage Brownstone</u>, <u>LLC ("AVB")</u>, Robert L. Mendenhall, Ph.D. or an entity wholly-owned by Mr. Mendenhall ("Mendenhall"), and other potential equity investor(s) (the "Other Investor(s)), will acquire membership interests in the Nevada limited liability company, Brownstone GoldTown CV, LLC (the "Company") for the primary purpose of constructing, owning and operating a hotel casino to be located in Carson Valley, Douglas County, Nevada (the "Project")." (Emphasis Supplied)

REPLY RE MOTION TO DISMISS - 7