

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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*Supreme Court Case No.*

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WYNN RESORTS, LIMITED,

*Petitioner,*

v.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF  
NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK, AND THE  
HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT JUDGE, DEPT. XI,

*Respondent,*

and

KAZUO OKADA; UNIVERSAL ENTERTAINMENT CORP.  
AND ARUZE USA, INC.,

*Real Parties in Interest.*

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**PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR  
ALTERNATIVELY, MANDAMUS**

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James J. Pisanelli, Esq., #4027  
[jjp@pisanellibice.com](mailto:jjp@pisanellibice.com)  
Todd L. Bice, Esq., #4534  
[tlb@pisanellibice.com](mailto:tlb@pisanellibice.com)  
Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., #9695  
[dls@pisanellibice.com](mailto:dls@pisanellibice.com)  
PISANELLI BICE PLLC  
400 South 7th Street, Suite 300  
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101  
702.214-2100

Paul K. Rowe, Esq.  
*pro hac vice admitted*  
[pkrowe@wlrk.com](mailto:pkrowe@wlrk.com)  
Bradley R. Wilson, Esq.  
*pro hac vice admitted*  
[brwilson@wlrk.com](mailto:brwilson@wlrk.com)  
WACHTELL, LIPTON,  
ROSEN & KATZ  
51 West 52nd Street  
New York, NY 10019  
212.403.1000

Robert L. Shapiro, Esq.  
*pro hac vice admitted*  
[rs@glaserweil.com](mailto:rs@glaserweil.com)  
GLASER WEIL FINK  
HOWARD AVCHEN  
& SHAPIRO, LLP  
10250 Constellation Blvd  
19th Floor  
Los Angeles, CA 90067  
310.553.3000

Attorneys for Petitioner Wynn Resorts, Limited

**RULE 26.1 DISCLOSURE**

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the foregoing are persons or entities as described in NRAP 26.1(a), and must be disclosed. These representations are made in order that the judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

Petitioner Wynn Resorts, Limited is a publicly-traded Nevada corporation, headquartered in Las Vegas, Nevada.

DATED this 17th day of July, 2015.

PISANELLI BICE PLLC

By: /s/ Todd L. Bice  
James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027  
Todd L. Bice, Esq., Bar No. 4534  
Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695  
400 South 7th Street, Suite 300  
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Petitioner Wynn Resorts, Limited

**ROUTING STATEMENT**

The Nevada Supreme Court should retain this writ proceeding because it stems from a case "originating in Business Court." NRAP 17(a)(10); NRAP 17(e). Additionally, this Court should retain this matter because another writ proceeding involving the same case is presently pending before it: Case No. 68310.

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**I. OVERVIEW AND RELIEF SOUGHT**

Wynn Resorts, Limited ("Wynn Resorts" or the "Company") petitions this Court under NRAP 21 and NRS Chapter 34 for a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, mandamus against the District Court's June 22, 2015 order (the "Order") for the very reasons this Court holds that writ relief is available to restrain overbroad discovery orders: The Order compels Wynn Resorts, under the threat of future sanction, to produce "any and all" documents for 78 distinct and sweeping document requests, untethered to any concept of relevancy to the matters at hand. It is the definition of a naked blanket discovery order.

As if that were not enough, the District Court's Order further transcends this Court's precedents by compelling the production of documents that both the gaming laws of Nevada and Macau declare to be confidential. Not only does the District Court's Order trample these explicit policy directives – of both Nevada and of a foreign sovereign – it does so without the slightest of findings or rationale. Indeed, there is no indication that the district court gave any heed to these policy directives. Respectfully, the judicial branch's control over discovery in litigation notwithstanding, courts should not run roughshod over explicit public policy and regulatory restrictions, particularly absent any evidentiary showing of relevancy or need.

The essence of the District Court's approach here – that these are large, well-heeled litigants with ample resources to comply with unbounded discovery – ignores this Court's teachings and only undermines the legitimate interest of litigants and the judicial process. No litigant should be held to have committed itself to unbounded and irrelevant discovery for the sake of having exercised its constitutional right to seek redress in Nevada's courts. Because that is what the District Court's blanket Order does here, Wynn Resorts seeks a writ to set aside that Order.

1 **II. ISSUE PRESENTED**

2 Does a district court's order compelling broad discovery without regard to  
3 relevancy or proportionality and compelling the production of documents deemed  
4 protected by law warrant this Court's review by writ of prohibition or, alternatively,  
5 mandamus?

6 **III. FACTS RELEVANT TO UNDERSTANDING THIS PETITION**

7 **A. Wynn Resorts' Articles of Incorporation Provide for Redemption**  
8 **of Shares.**

9 The geneses of the underlying litigation derive from provisions of Wynn  
10 Resorts' Articles of Incorporation ("Articles" or "Articles of Incorporation") known  
11 and agreed to by all stockholders, particularly Real Parties in Interest  
12 Aruze USA, Inc. ("Aruze"), its principal, Kazuo Okada ("Okada"), and parent,  
13 Universal Entertainment Corp. (collectively the "Okada Parties"). (Vol. IV PA  
14 752-63.) Pursuant to those Articles, the Wynn Resorts Board of Directors, on  
15 February 18, 2012, redeemed all of the outstanding shares then held by Aruze.  
16 (Vol. III PA 700, Vol. IV PA 752-63.) The Board did so because it learned of  
17 serious misconduct by Okada and entities he controls, including Aruze, involving  
18 improper payments to Philippine gaming officials with regulatory authority over an  
19 Okada-sponsored casino development project in that country. (Vol. III PA 697-  
20 701, 704-750.)

21 As authorized by Article VII of the Articles, the Board redeemed Aruze's  
22 shares in exchange for a promissory note. (Vol. III PA 700-01, Vol. IV PA 752-63,  
23 765-68.) Article VII empowers the Wynn Resorts Board to redeem the shares of  
24 any stockholder who the Board deems, in its sole discretion, to be an "Unsuitable  
25 Person" as the Articles define, most relevantly where the Board determines that  
26 continued ownership would jeopardize Wynn Resorts' existing gaming licenses or  
27 opportunities for additional licenses. (Vol. III PA 700, Vol. IV 758-62.)  
28



1       Upon Wynn Resorts' formation, stockholders – including the Okada Parties –  
2 agreed that the Company's Board shall have the power to redeem any shares held by  
3 any "Unsuitable Person" or its affiliates. (Vol. IV PA 760.) Each of the shares held  
4 by Aruze was emblazoned with a notice of Wynn Resorts' redemption rights upon  
5 their initial issuance. (Vol. IV PA 782, 950-51.) And as Section 2 of Article VII  
6 provides, in relevant part:

7               Finding of Unsuitability. (a) The Securities Owned or  
8               Controlled by an Unsuitable Person or an Affiliate of an  
9               Unsuitable Person shall be subject to redemption by the  
10              Corporation, out of funds legally available therefor, by  
11              action of the board of directors, to the extent required by  
12              the Gaming Authority making the determination of  
13              unsuitability or to the extent deemed necessary or  
14              advisable by the board of directors . . . .

15 (Vol. IV PA 759.) "Unsuitable Person" is further defined as:

16              [A] Person who (i) is determined by a Gaming Authority  
17              to be unsuitable to Own or Control any Securities or  
18              unsuitable to be connected or affiliated with a Person  
19              engaged in Gaming Activities in a Gaming Jurisdiction,  
20              or (ii) causes the Corporation or any Affiliated Company  
21              to lose or to be threatened with the loss of any Gaming  
22              License, or (iii) in the sole discretion of the board of  
23              directors of the Corporation, is deemed likely to  
24              jeopardize the Corporation's or any Affiliated Company's  
25              application for, receipt of approval for, right to the use of,  
26              or entitlement to, any Gaming License.

27 (Vol. IV PA 760.)<sup>1</sup> Thus, any stockholder who in the Board's "sole discretion" is  
28 "deemed likely to jeopardize" the Company's existing gaming licenses or the  
Company's ability to secure additional licenses in the future qualifies as an  
"Unsuitable Person." (*Id.*)

Wynn Resorts' Articles of Incorporation not only empower the Board to  
redeem the shares but also authorize the Board to determine the "Redemption Price"

<sup>1</sup> The Articles of Incorporation define the term "Gaming Licenses" to include  
"all licenses, permits, approvals, authorizations, registrations, findings of suitability,  
franchises, concessions and entitlements issued by a Gaming Authority necessary  
for or relating to the conduct of Gaming Activities." (Vol. IV PA 758.)

1 to be paid. (Vol. IV PA 759, Vol. II PA 701.) Article VII provides that unless a  
2 gaming regulator mandates a particular price be paid, the price should be an  
3 "amount determined by the board of directors to be the fair value of the Securities  
4 to be redeemed." (Vol. IV PA 759.) In paying this "Redemption Price," the Wynn  
5 Resorts Board has the discretion to compensate the unsuitable stockholder with  
6 either cash or a ten-year promissory note with a prescribed interest rate of 2% per  
7 year (or some combination of the two). (*Id.*)

8 Simply put, Wynn Resorts' Articles of Incorporation reflect Nevada's  
9 fundamental and paramount public interest in gaming: The "probity" of gaming  
10 licensees and their associates. (Vol. III PA 547-49.) And, *all* Wynn Resorts  
11 stockholders – no matter the size of their holdings or perceived self-importance –  
12 are subject to these requirements.

13 **B. Wynn Resorts Uncovers Improprieties by the Okada Parties.**

14 Since sometime in 2007 or 2008, Okada has been engaged in promoting and  
15 financing a projected casino resort in the Philippines. (Vol. III PA 695.) At a  
16 meeting of the Wynn Resorts Board held on November 1, 2011, former Nevada  
17 Governor Robert Miller, the Chairman of Wynn Resorts' Compliance Committee,  
18 discussed the results of two independent investigations into Okada's activities in the  
19 Philippines. (Vol. III PA 697.) These investigations stemmed from concerns about  
20 the general compliance environment in the Philippines, a country where corruption  
21 is perceived to be widespread, and the risk that Okada's entities' activities there  
22 would create compliance-related problems for Wynn Resorts. (Vol. III PA 695-97.)

23 Governor Miller reported to the Wynn Resorts Board that the evidence  
24 uncovered prior to November 1, 2011 raised questions about Okada's suitability.  
25 (Vol. III PA 697.) Governor Miller advised the Board that, in light of the  
26 then-existing findings, the Compliance Committee intended to retain former  
27 federal judge and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Louis Freeh  
28 ("Director Freeh") of Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP, to investigate Okada's

1 activities. (*Id.*) Following Governor Miller's presentation, the Wynn Resorts Board  
2 ratified the Compliance Committee's decision to retain Director Freeh. (Vol. III  
3 PA 697-98.)

4 The investigation spanned the next three and a half months. (Vol. III  
5 PA 698.) Initially, Okada refused to even be interviewed, but ultimately relented  
6 and made himself available for a day, on February 15, 2012, as Director Freeh's  
7 investigation was concluding. (*Id.*) Shortly thereafter, Director Freeh presented  
8 the investigation's conclusions at a special meeting of the Wynn Resorts Board,  
9 along with a 47-page written report detailing the findings (the "Freeh Report").  
10 (Vol. III PA 698, 704-50.)

11 Director Freeh first described the scope of his investigation, reported on  
12 impressions of the personal interview of Okada, and answered questions from the  
13 directors. (Vol. III PA 698-699.) As reflected in the Freeh Report, he advised the  
14 Board that Okada had not presented any exculpatory evidence – that is, evidence  
15 that would tend to contradict the findings – and that Okada's broad denials of any  
16 personal involvement were not credible in light of the evidence uncovered.  
17 (Vol. III PA 698, 750.)

18 Following the presentation, the Board adjourned for two hours to give the  
19 directors an opportunity to analyze the Freeh Report. (Vol. III PA 699.) The Freeh  
20 Report detailed findings that were incompatible with any legitimate business  
21 operator, much less for a Nevada gaming licensee:

- 22 • "Mr. Okada, his associates and companies appear to have engaged in a  
23 longstanding practice of making payments and gifts to his two (2) chief  
24 gaming regulators at the Philippines Amusement and Gaming  
25 Corporation," as well as their families and associates, in substantial  
26 amounts. (Vol. III PA 704.)
- 27 • "In one such instance in September 2010, Mr. Okada . . . paid the  
28 expenses for a luxury stay at [the] Wynn Macau by [PAGCOR]  
Chairman Naguiat," his family, and "other senior PAGCOR officials . .  
. . . Mr. Okada and his staff intentionally attempted to disguise this  
particular visit by Chairman Naguiat by keeping his identity 'Incognito'  
and attempting to get Wynn Resorts to pay for the excessive costs of  
the chief regulator's stay, fearing an investigation." (Vol. III PA 705.)

- 1 • "[D]espite being advised by fellow Wynn Resorts Board members and  
2 Wynn Resorts counsel that payments and gifts to foreign government  
3 officials are strictly prohibited" – including under the Wynn Resorts  
4 Code of Business Conduct and Ethics – "Mr. Okada has insisted that  
5 there is nothing wrong with this practice in Asian countries." (Vol. III  
6 PA 713.)
- "Mr. Okada has stated his personal rejection of Wynn Resorts  
7 anti-bribery rules and regulations, as well as legal prohibitions against  
8 making such payments to government officials, to fellow  
9 Wynn Resorts Board members." (*Id.*)
- Mr. Okada has "refus[ed] to receive Wynn Resorts requisite FCPA  
10 training provided to other Directors" and "fail[ed] to sign an  
11 acknowledgement of understanding of Wynn Resorts Code of  
12 Conduct." (Vol. III PA 705.)

13 The Board engaged in an extensive discussion of Director Freeh's  
14 presentation and the Freeh Report. (Vol. III PA 700.) During the course of its  
15 deliberations, the Board also considered advice from two highly-experienced  
16 attorneys in the applicable Nevada gaming statutes and regulations, Jeffrey Silver  
17 and David Arrajj. (*Id.*) At the conclusion of these discussions, and in light of the  
18 findings in the Freeh Report, Director Freeh's presentation, and the advice of expert  
19 gaming counsel, the Wynn Resorts Board (excluding Okada) unanimously  
20 determined – pursuant to the Company's Articles – that the Okada Parties were  
21 "Unsuitable Persons" whose continued affiliation with Wynn Resorts was "likely to  
22 jeopardize" the Company's existing and potential future gaming licenses. (Vol. III  
23 PA 700, 770.) Thus, the Board redeemed Aruze's shares.

24 Again, under the terms of Article VII, the redemption price could be paid  
25 wholly in cash, or with a ten-year promissory note bearing an annual interest rate of  
26 two percent, or by some combination of these two options. (Vol. III PA 700,  
27 Vol. IV PA 759.) The Board discussed with the Company's then-chief financial  
28 officer the effect on the Company's financial condition and flexibility under each of  
the alternatives. (Vol. III PA 700-01.) The Wynn Resorts Board also considered its  
duties to the Company's remaining stockholders in determining the method of  
payment. (Vol. III PA 701.) Based on all of these considerations, the Wynn

1 Resorts Board (other than Okada) unanimously determined to pay the full amount  
2 of the redemption price by issuing a promissory note. (Vol. III PA 700-01, Vol. IV  
3 PA 765-68.)<sup>2</sup>

4 **C. Wynn Resorts Reports the Unsuitability Determination and Sues**  
5 **to Enforce its Legal Rights.**

6 That same day, Wynn Resorts informed the Nevada State Gaming Control  
7 Board as to its finding that Okada, Aruze, and Universal were "Unsuitable Persons"  
8 and that it had redeemed Aruze's shares pursuant to Article VII of the Articles of  
9 Incorporation. (Vol. III PA 701.) Wynn Resorts also informed the Gaming  
10 Control Board as to the issuance of the promissory note for the redeemed shares.<sup>3</sup>  
11 Wynn Resorts also acted promptly in pursuing legal relief against the Okada  
12 Parties, filing this action on February 19, 2012, and asserting claims for declaratory  
13 relief, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty.  
14 (Vol. I PA 1-21.)

15 In response, the Okada Parties sought to delay this matter with procedural  
16 maneuvering in the form of an improper removal to federal court that resulted in a  
17 remand and a sanctions award against the Okada Parties. (Vol. I PA 70-76,  
18 192-95.) The Okada Parties also sought to distract from the unsuitability  
19 determination and redemption, and filed a 107-page answer and counterclaim,  
20

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21 <sup>2</sup> Article VII required the Wynn Resorts Board to determine the "fair value" of  
22 Aruze's shares in setting the redemption price. (Vol. III PA 700, Vol. IV PA 759.)  
23 The Board received advice from an outside financial advisor, Moelis & Company,  
24 which presented the Board with a written report containing an analysis of a fair  
25 valuation range for Aruze's shares, taking into consideration provisions in a  
26 stockholders agreement that prohibited Aruze from transferring its shares without  
the consent of Mr. Wynn and Ms. Wynn, as well as the overall size of Aruze's block  
of shares. (Vol. III PA 700-01.) Following its review of the Moelis analysis, the  
Board (other than Okada) unanimously determined to apply a blended 30%  
discount to the public trading price of the Company's shares. (*Id.*)

27 <sup>3</sup> At no point has the Gaming Control Board disputed the Wynn Resorts  
28 Board's authority to redeem the shares of any stockholder the Board deems  
unsuitable, or the manner of payment for the redemption. (Vol. III PA 701.)

1 asserting the proverbial kitchen sink affirmative defenses, and twenty claims against  
2 the Company, its-then directors, as well as the Company's General Counsel. (Vol. I  
3 PA 77-191.)

4 The Okada Parties also sought a preliminary injunction from the District  
5 Court, asking it to, among other things, reverse the share redemption. (Vols. I-III  
6 PA 196-511.) The District Court denied the Okada Parties' request, finding that the  
7 business judgment rule applied to the Board's decision and concluding that Wynn  
8 Resorts had the reasonable likelihood of success. (Vol. V PA 1083-88.)

9 The case was also delayed when the United States Department of Justice  
10 intervened and asked the District Court for a stay due to its pending criminal  
11 investigation of the Okada Parties. (Vol. VI PA 1401-11.) That stay lasted  
12 approximately twelve months, and was ultimately lifted by the District Court  
13 despite the United States' request for a further extension as its investigation is  
14 ongoing. (Vol. VI-VII PA 1496-1504, Vol. IV PA 1505-13.)

15 Ever since, the Okada Parties' approach in discovery and to this litigation in  
16 general has become transparent and predictable: Needing to distract from the  
17 dispositive point – the Board's exercise of its business judgment in determining that  
18 the facts presented to it about the Okada Parties' activities (and Okada's refusal to  
19 provide any exculpatory evidence) jeopardized existing and future licensing – the  
20 Okada Parties seek to focus on anything and everything else, beginning with events  
21 preceding the 2002 creation of Wynn Resorts, and continuing through nearly every  
22 transaction and business relationship, and every contemplated transaction and  
23 business relationship since. (Vol. V PA 1089-1124 (1st), Vol. II PA 1514-59 (2d),  
24 Vol. XVII PA 1560-86 (3d), VIII PA 1893-1907 (4th).)

25 **D. The District Court Orders Wynn Resorts to Respond to Every**  
26 **Discovery Request at Issue, Despite the Lack of Any Relevance.**

27 The Okada Parties give new meaning to the phrase "scorched earth" tactics.  
28 To date, they have served over 900 different requests for production of documents

1 to either Wynn Resorts or its individual Board members. Some 326 of these  
2 requests have been directed to the Company alone.<sup>4</sup> (Vol. V PA 1089-1124 (1st),  
3 Vol. II PA 1514-59 (2d), Vol. XVII PA 1560-86 (3d), VIII PA 1893-1907 (4th).)  
4 Consistent with its obligations and recognizing that the rules of discovery are broad,  
5 Wynn Resorts has agreed and is committed to responding to 192 of those requests  
6 in rolling productions as approved by the District Court. (Vol. VI PA 1277-1374  
7 (1st), Vols. VII-VIII PA 1628-1796 (2d), Vol. XI 1797-1872 (3d).)<sup>5</sup>

8 But 78 of those requests – the subject of the District Court's Order – are  
9 breathtaking in their overbreadth and irrelevance. Indeed, these are just *some* of the  
10 matters swept up by the Okada Parties' unbounded requests at issue:

- 11 (1) Any and "all documents" related to the non-party Wynn Resorts  
12 (Macau) S.A.'s ("WRM") acquisition of a Macau gaming license in  
13 2002;
- 14 (2) Any and "all documents" related to Wynn Resorts' efforts to obtain a  
15 land concession in Cotai (a subsidiary's second Macau location);
- 16 (3) Any and "all documents" related to Wynn Resorts' sale of the Macau  
17 gaming sub-concession to a third party more than nine years ago;
- 18 (4) Any and "all documents" related to government investigations with  
19 respect to Wynn Resorts and non-party Wynn Macau, Limited's  
20 activities<sup>6</sup>;

21  
22 <sup>4</sup> The other 500-plus requests are directed to each of the director defendants.  
23 Vol. VIII PA 2698-2731 (Chen), Vol. VIII PA 2732-2765 (Goldsmith), Vol. VIII  
24 PA 2766-99 (Irani), Vol. VIII PA 2800-33 (Miller), Vol. VIII-IX PA 2834-2867  
25 (Moran), Vol. IX PA 2868-2901 (Schorr), Vol. IX PA 2902-35 (Shoemaker), Vol.  
26 IX PA 2936-70 (Sinatra), Vol. IX PA 2971-3004 (Wayson), Vol. IX PA 3005-38  
27 (Zeman). This number does not even include the 117 requests propounded by the  
28 Okada Parties on Mr. Wynn, who is separately represented. (Vol. IX PA 3039-93.)

<sup>5</sup> The stipulated deadline to respond to the Fourth Set of Requests is  
forthcoming.

<sup>6</sup> Wynn Macau, Limited ("Wynn Macau") is a publicly traded company, listed

- 1 (5) Any and "all documents" related to government investigations into the
- 2 Okada Parties' activities;
- 3 (6) Any and "all documents" related to suitability and licensing issues at
- 4 Wynn Resorts, regardless of any connection to Okada, as well as
- 5 documents concerning investigations and regulatory findings;
- 6 (7) Any and "all documents" related to the Wynn Resorts Board and
- 7 committee meetings, including all Board materials and minutes, from
- 8 2002 to the present, regardless of time or topic;<sup>7</sup>
- 9 (8) Any and "all documents" related to the relationship between Okada
- 10 and Stephen A. Wynn dating back to before 2002; and
- 11 (9) Any and "all documents" related to any of Mr. Wynn's past business
- 12 relationships (potential, contemplated, successful, or unsuccessful)
- 13 regardless of with whom or when.

14 (Vol. II PA 1514-59 (2d), Vol. XVII PA 1560-86 (3d).)

15 Yet it is not just the facial overbreadth of the individual requests that  
16 confirms their impropriety: the requests are also patently irrelevant. In challenging  
17 Wynn Resorts' objections, the Okada Parties admitted it was not until Wynn Resorts  
18 began looking into Okada's activities that he self-servingly developed his purported  
19 "suspicions" of Wynn Resorts' conduct arose. (*E.g.*, Vol. XVII PA 3846.)

20 The best justification the Okada Parties could muster in support of their  
21 limitless requests was the fantastical assertion that there "could" have been some  
22 improprieties by Wynn Resorts on any of these far-ranging subjects. (*E.g.*, Vol. XI

23  
24 on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Okada was a board member of Wynn Macau  
25 from the time of its listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in Fall 2009 until  
26 his February 24, 2012 removal.

27 <sup>7</sup> Prior to filing their underlying motion to compel, the Okada Parties  
28 withdrew their request for all "notes" related to all Board meetings from 2002 to  
the present, subject to renewing their request in the future. (Vol. XI PA 1927  
n.22.) Needless to say, this minor modification did not address Wynn Resorts'  
concerns or objections.



1 PA 1920, Vol. XVII PA 3846.) They make that claim despite the fact that Okada  
2 was a board member of both Wynn Resorts and Wynn Macau throughout this entire  
3 time period and never many any such assertions. Now, however, the Okada Parties  
4 contend it is sufficient to speculate – because they are desperate for a diversion –  
5 that it "may be" that individual directors would want to keep secret any purported  
6 past improprieties such that years later they engaged in a "pretext" to get rid of the  
7 Okada Parties to prevent them from "blowing the whistle" on the same. (Vol. XI  
8 PA 1916-17.)

9 This is beyond nonsense. The forced redemption of Aruze's shares would  
10 certainly not discourage him from making specious allegations. It would only  
11 encourage him to make specious allegations to distract from his own misconduct,  
12 which (not coincidentally) is precisely what he has done. Besides, a right to  
13 discovery is not triggered by merely proffering wildly self-serving speculation that  
14 "maybe" there is something somewhere on any topic that would prompt the Board  
15 of Directors to unanimously deem the Okada Parties unsuitable *other than* the facts  
16 uncovered by Director Freeh.

17 But what is even more astonishing is that this guess-work argument actually  
18 prevailed. The District Court summarily ordered Wynn Resorts to respond to all  
19 78 requests to which it had objected, without any distinction, analysis, or restraint.  
20 (Vol. X PA 3949-59). By definition, the District Court issued a blanket discovery  
21 directive without regard to how the actual requests relate to the subject matter of the  
22 action, if they even do, and importantly, without any factual showing that there is a  
23 basis for the inquiry in the first place. Thus, Wynn Resorts petitions this Court.

#### 24 **IV. REASONS WHY THE REQUESTED WRIT SHOULD ISSUE**

##### 25 **A. The District Court's Blanket Discovery Order Warrants** 26 **Extraordinary Writ Relief.**

27 Wynn Resorts does not dispute the proper scope of discovery and that it is  
28 rightly broad. Discovery is proper for information that is "*reasonably calculated* to

1 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." NRCP 26(B)(1) (emphasis added);  
2 *Harrison v. Falcon Prods., Inc.*, 103 Nev. 558, 560, 746 P.2d 642, 642 (1987). But  
3 the requirement that discovery requests be reasonable and calculated must have  
4 meaning. Discovery is not without limits. *Schlatter v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*,  
5 93 Nev. 189, 192, 561 P.2d 1342, 1343 (1977). And that is why this Court has  
6 recognized and exercised its discretionary authority for the issuance of  
7 extraordinary writs to review and limit discovery orders that transcend what the law  
8 permits. E.g., *Valley Health Sys., LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 127 Nev. Adv.  
9 Op. 15, 252 P.3d 676, 678–79 (2011) (citing *Wardleigh v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct.*,  
10 111 Nev. 345, 350–51, 891 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1995)).

11 As this Court has said in the context of discovery rulings, if "the District  
12 Court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction, a writ of prohibition may issue to  
13 curb the extra jurisdictional act." *Las Vegas Sands v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*,  
14 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 13, 319 P.3d 618, 621 (2014); see also *Schlatter*, 93 Nev. at  
15 192, 561 P.2d at 1343 (issuing writ on discovery order); *Vanguard Piping v. Eighth*  
16 *Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 63, 309 P.3d 1017, 1019 (2013).

17 This Court has emphasized its discretion to act when a district court's  
18 discovery order: (1) requires the disclosure of privileged information; or  
19 (2) constitutes a "blanket discovery order[] without regard to relevance." *Las Vegas*  
20 *Sands*, 319 P.3d at 621; *Vanguard Piping*, 309 P.3d 1017 (citing *Valley Health Sys.*,  
21 252 P.3d at 678-79). In such instances, there is no "just, speedy and adequate  
22 remedy in the ordinary course of the law," and thus, without writ review, "the order  
23 could result in irreparable prejudice." NRS. 34.170; *Vanguard*, 309 P.3d at 1019.  
24 For a blanket discovery order, writ relief is appropriate because "the disclosure of  
25 irrelevant matter is irretrievable once made, [thus the petitioner] would effectively  
26 be deprived of any remedy from [the District Court's] erroneous ruling if she was  
27 required to disclose the information and then contest the validity of the order on  
28 direct appeal." *Schlatter*, 93 Nev. at 193, 561 P.2d at 1344.

1       When writ review reveals that a discovery order exceeds the jurisdiction of  
2 the district court, a writ of prohibition is the "appropriate" remedy to "prevent" the  
3 "improper discovery." *Rock Bay, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 129 Nev. Adv.  
4 Op. 21, 298 P.3d 441, 444 (2013); *Valley Health Sys.*, 252 P.3d at 678 n.5;  
5 *Wardleigh*, 111 Nev. at 350, 891 P.2d at 1183; *see also Vanguard*, 309 P.3d at 1019  
6 (holding prohibition is the better choice over mandamus). *See generally*  
7 NRS 34.320 ("[Writs of prohibition] arrest[ ] the proceedings of any tribunal,  
8 corporation, board or person exercising judicial functions, when such proceedings  
9 are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or  
10 person.").

11       Additionally, a writ petition raising a discovery issue is appropriate when "an  
12 important issue of law needs clarification and public policy is served by this court's  
13 invocation of its original jurisdiction." *Aspen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Eighth Jud.*  
14 *Dist. Ct.*, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 93, 313 P.3d 875, 878 (2013). This includes, but is  
15 not limited to, an "opportunity to define the precise parameters of [a] privilege . . .  
16 ." or some other protection from disclosure. *Id.*; *Diaz v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*,  
17 116 Nev. 88, 93, 993 P.2d 50, 54 (2000) (considering writ petition for a discovery  
18 issue that "implicate[d] a matter of public importance:" whether a journalist waives  
19 the news shield statute protections with respect to the contents of a published  
20 article).

21       **B. The District Court's Blanket Discovery Order Gives No Regard to**  
22       **Relevance.**

23       The 78 boundless requests are the very definition of blanket discovery; they  
24 are not reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable information concerning claims  
25 and defenses at issue. Indeed, all this Court needs to do is take the Okada Parties at  
26 their own word. They concede that they have no actual facts upon which to base  
27 these requests. (*E.g.*, Vol. XI PA 1920 ("could have raised questions"), 1921 ("may  
28

1 have feared").) Thus, they proffer rank speculation as their only means of  
2 rationalization.

3 Unremarkably, this Court and others recognize that wishful thinking does not  
4 satisfy the requirement that discovery be "reasonably calculated." *See, e.g., Matter*  
5 *of Halverson*, 123 Nev. 493, 517, 169 P.3d 1161, 1177 (2007) (recognizing that  
6 even in the criminal context, this Court has "refused to authorize so-called 'fishing  
7 expeditions.'"); *see also E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.*,  
8 24 F.R.D. 416, 423 (D. Del. 1959) ("I can see nothing to support this part of the  
9 request *except a hope that the defendant might find something* which will help its  
10 case. . . . I realize that 'fishing expedition' is no longer a ground of objection to  
11 discovery. But, on the other hand, unless the Court requires the moving party to  
12 show that there is *something more than a mere possibility* that relevant evidence  
13 exists, the only appropriate order would be one requiring the party to turn over  
14 every scrap of paper in its files as well as the contents of its waste baskets.")  
15 (emphasis added).

16 Nor is conjuncture sufficient. *See Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co.*,  
17 894 F.2d 1318, 1326, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[R]equested information is not  
18 relevant to 'subject matter involved' in the pending action if the inquiry is based on  
19 the party's mere suspicion or speculation. Micro Motion here is unmoored and  
20 trolling . . . . A litigant may not engage in merely speculative inquiries in the guise  
21 of relevant discovery.")<sup>8</sup>; *Bristol v. Trudon*, No. 3:13-CV 911 JBA, 2014  
22 WL 1390808, at \*4 (D. Conn. Apr. 9, 2014) ("The law is well-established that  
23  
24

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25 <sup>8</sup> To the District Court, the Okada Parties cited *Micro Motion* for the  
26 proposition that "discovery is allowed to flesh out a pattern of acts *already known*  
27 *to a party* relating to an issue *necessarily* in the case." (Vol. XVII PA 3841.)  
28 Since the Okada Parties' requests are admittedly based on "suspicion" alone  
(Vol. XVII PA 3840), they fail to meet the standard even they recite.

1 discovery requests that are based on pure speculation and conjecture are not  
2 permissible . . . .") (internal quotations omitted).

3 Salacious speculation is all the Okada Parties can muster. Indeed, they are  
4 careful never to represent that, as a Board member, Okada *actually* raised concerns  
5 about any of the transactions about which he now seeks "all documents." Coyly  
6 avoiding representations where Okada would be exposed, the best the Okada Parties  
7 do is hypothesize that perhaps he "*could have* raised questions" (Vol. XI PA 1920.)  
8 Of course, as a Board member of both Wynn Resorts and non-party Wynn Macau,  
9 Okada had a fiduciary duty to pose any questions *at the time* if he had a legitimate  
10 point. But now that his own misconduct has been exposed, Okada is determined to  
11 smear the very Board members with whom he voted and to impose an incalculable  
12 burden on Wynn Resorts through a multitude of foundationless discovery requests  
13 that wishfully "*may*" reveal some hypothetical wrongdoing, while never articulating  
14 what.

15 The Okada Parties truly outdo themselves when they bluster that  
16 Wynn Resorts was out to prevent Okada "from blowing the whistle on the  
17 Wynn Parties' potentially corrupt activities in Macau." (Vol. XI PA 1916-17.) But  
18 of course, they never identify what these purported activities are or how Wynn  
19 Resorts was somehow concerned about what manufactured whistle Okada would  
20 blow. Indeed, the only thing the Okada Parties are blowing is smoke. Their  
21 argument is circular. Nonsensically, they suggest that the Wynn Resorts Board  
22 members were concerned about Okada "blowing the whistle" on some supposed  
23 wrongdoing that even Okada presently says he cannot identify.

24 That Okada is desperate to distract from his conduct in the Philippines is  
25 more than apparent. And, contrary to the Okada Parties' hopes and wants, wild  
26 hyperbole is not a "factual predicate" to support any "suspicion" much less his  
27  
28

1 desired fishing expedition into matters that have nothing to do with this business  
2 judgment case. *Matter of Halverson*, 123 Nev. at 517, 169 P.3d at 1177.<sup>9</sup>

3 The Tenth Circuit addressed similarly reckless rhetoric in *Koch v. Koch*  
4 *Industries, Inc.*, 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2000). There, the plaintiffs argued that  
5 their "extraordinarily expansive discovery requests" related to "two broad,  
6 non-specific allegations contained in their Second Amended Complaint." *Id.* at  
7 1238. The Tenth Circuit aptly held that "[w]hen a plaintiff first pleads its  
8 allegations in entirely indefinite terms, without in fact knowing of any specific  
9 wrongdoing by the defendant, and then bases massive discovery requests upon  
10 those nebulous allegations, in the hope of finding particular evidence of  
11 wrongdoing, that plaintiff abuses the judicial process." *Id.* The appellate court  
12 applauded the district court for "appropriately recogniz[ing] that the likely benefit  
13 of this attempted fishing expedition was speculative at best." *Id.* (noting also that  
14 the "massive amount of documents requested, first weeding out privileged and  
15 confidential records, would impose a serious burden and expense . . . [that] far  
16 outweighed their likely benefit").

17 As the Eighth Circuit has likewise noted: "[w]hile the standard of relevance  
18 in the context of discovery is broader than in the context of admissibility . . . , this  
19 often intoned legal tenet should not be misapplied so as to allow fishing expeditions  
20 in discovery. Some threshold showing of relevance must be made before parties are  
21 required to open wide the doors of discovery and to produce a variety of  
22 information which does not reasonably bear upon the issues in the case." *Hofer v.*  
23 *Mack Trucks, Inc.*, 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992). This well-stated principle is  
24  
25

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26 <sup>9</sup> It is charitable to even characterize the Okada Parties' position as speculation  
27 as even they do not actually assert this conclusion. Rather, they launch the  
28 discovery campaign on the concept of "what if" there are bad acts that support their  
naked theory of pretext.

1 on all fours with this Court's requirement as to the necessity for a factual predicate  
2 as held in *Matter of Halverson*, 123 Nev. at 517, 169 P.3d at 1177.

3 The requests' lack of legitimacy is underscored by the District Court's failure  
4 to identify the purported relevancy for any of the disputed requests. *See Clark v.*  
5 *Second Jud. Dist. Court*, 101 Nev. 58, 64, 692 P.2d 512, 516 (1985)  
6 ("The district court exceeded its jurisdiction under our ruling in *Schlatter* in  
7 ordering the production of the decedent's entire tax returns *without specifying the*  
8 *items requested and the relevancy thereof.*") (emphasis added). Blanket discovery  
9 orders without addressing the relevancy of the actual request (especially such  
10 overly broad requests that essentially seek all of the records of two different  
11 publicly traded gaming companies – one of which is not even a party to this case) or  
12 detailing how the request can lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,  
13 constitutes error. *Id.*

14 In short, the Okada Parties failed to establish any factual predicate remotely  
15 establishing their burden of demonstrating the purported relevance for any of the 78  
16 requests to the claims at issue. And, while "[m]uch of discovery is a fishing  
17 expedition of sorts, [the rules of civil procedure] allow the Courts to determine the  
18 pond, the type of lure, and how long the parties can leave their lines in the water."  
19 *Myers v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.*, 581 F. Supp. 2d 904, 913 (E.D. Tenn. 2008).  
20 Here, the District Court's blanket discovery order disregards these obligations.  
21 It instead allows for carte blanche discovery of "all documents" sought for each and  
22 all of the 78 requests despite the Okada Parties' inability to articulate a factual  
23 predicate for a single one of them. This is an improper discovery order under any  
24 standard.

25 **C. This Blanket Discovery Order Also Disregards Serious Policy and**  
26 **Privacy Concerns as it Relates to Nevada Gaming Licensees.**

27 The impropriety of such a blanket discovery order is particularly acute here,  
28 considering that the ordered production includes sweeping categories of documents

1 that companies like Wynn Resorts are required to maintain and share with  
2 government regulators, solely due to their status as a gaming licensee.

3 As the Nevada Legislature makes clear, "[t]he gaming industry is vitally  
4 important to the economy of the State and the general welfare of its inhabitants."  
5 NRS 463.0129(a). And, a gaming license in Nevada is not a right; but rather a  
6 privilege. NRS 463.0129(d). With that privilege comes heightened responsibilities  
7 owed to the public and to the State of Nevada. Indeed, Nevada gaming licensees  
8 are "strictly regulated" to, among other things, "ensure that gaming is free from  
9 criminal and corruptive elements" and to maintain "[p]ublic confidence and trust."  
10 NRS 463.0129(b)-(c). Like other licensees, Wynn Resorts is charged by law to  
11 strictly comply with the gaming regulations to which it is subject. This includes,  
12 among other things, an open door relationship with state regulators, creating and  
13 implementing a self-policing policy, and taking any and all other steps necessary to  
14 be compliant with the gaming regulations.

15 The Nevada Legislature enacted NRS 463.140, which outlines the broad  
16 power and duties of the Gaming Control Board and the Nevada Gaming  
17 Commission. Stated bluntly, the state gaming regulators are afforded  
18 unprecedented access to the licensee's business, records, and information.  
19 Regulators can inspect all gaming premises, "summarily seize and remove. . .  
20 documents or records," and "demand access to and inspect, examine, photocopy and  
21 audit all papers, books and records" of any licensee. NRS 463.140(2)(a), (c), (d),  
22 (e). Of course, the regulators also can issue subpoenas or compel the attendance  
23 and testimony of witnesses. NRS 463.140(5). Because the licensee must do as  
24 asked or instructed by the regulators, the more common scenario is that the  
25 regulators ask, and the licensee provides any and all requested information.



1                   **1.    *The District Court's blanket discovery order ignores the***  
2                   ***statutory presumption of confidentiality.***

3                   Because of the aforementioned open door and the "can't say no" policy  
4                   between the regulators and licensees, the Nevada Legislature afforded statutory  
5                   protections to licensees, in NRS 463.120, among others. The main statutory  
6                   provision provides:

7                               4.    Except as otherwise provided in this section,  
8                               all information and data:

9                               a) ***Required by the Board or Commission to be***  
10                              ***furnished to it*** under chapters 462 to 466,  
11                              inclusive, of NRS or any regulations adopted  
                              pursuant thereto or which may be otherwise  
                              obtained relative to the finances, earnings or  
                              revenue of any applicant or licensee;

12                              (b) ***Pertaining to an applicant's or natural***  
13                              ***person's criminal record, antecedents and***  
14                              ***background*** which have been furnished to or  
                              obtained by the Board or Commission from any  
                              source;

15                              (c) ***Provided to the members, agents or employees***  
16                              ***of the Board or Commission by a governmental***  
17                              ***agency or an informer or on the assurance that***  
                              ***the information will be held in confidence and***  
                              ***treated as confidential;***

18                              (d) ***Obtained by the Board from*** a manufacturer,  
19                              distributor or ***operator***, or from an operator of an  
20                              inter-casino linked system, relating to the  
                              manufacturing of gaming devices or the operation  
                              of an inter-casino linked system; or

21                              (e) Prepared or ***obtained by an agent*** or employee  
22                              of the Board or Commission ***pursuant to an audit,***  
                              ***investigation, determination or hearing,***

23                              are ***confidential*** and may be revealed in whole or  
24                              in part only in the course of the necessary administration  
25                              of this chapter or upon the lawful order of a court of  
26                              competent jurisdiction. . . . Notwithstanding any other  
                              provision of state law, such information may not be  
                              otherwise revealed without specific authorization by the  
                              Board or Commission.

27                              5. Notwithstanding any other provision of state  
28                              law, any and ***all information and data*** prepared or  
                              ***obtained by an agent*** or employee of the Board or

Commission relating to an application for *a license, a finding of suitability or any approval* that is required pursuant to the provisions of chapters 462 to 466, inclusive, of NRS or any regulations adopted pursuant thereto, are *confidential and absolutely privileged* and may be revealed in whole or in part only in the course of the necessary administration of such provisions and with specific authorization and waiver of the privilege by the Board or Commission . . . . .

NRS 463.120 (emphasis added).

These confidentiality and privilege protections go hand in glove with the open relationship between the regulators and gaming licensees, and recognize Nevada's strong interest in maintaining confidential investigations related to its licensees. *See, e.g., In re Smith*, 397 B.R. 124, 126 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2008). But the District Court's blanket discovery order below tramples these regulatory concerns.

And, the Okada Parties make no secret of their desire to circumvent these regulatory requirements so as to learn what the gaming authorities know about them. They propounded broad requests seeking, among other things, "All Documents" between Wynn Resorts and the Nevada Gaming Control Board (as well as other governmental entities) about Okada, Universal, Aruze, or "their affiliates":

**REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 215:**

All Documents concerning Communications between WRL and the NGCB, the FBI, DOJ, and/or the Philippine Department of Justice concerning Mr. Okada, Universal, and/or Aruze USA and their affiliates.

(Vol. VIII PA 1767.)

Wynn Resorts objected to Request No. 215, citing NRS 463.120, among other things. (*Id.*) Of course, Wynn Resorts does not dispute that these "confidential" documents by and between Wynn Resorts and Gaming may be compelled "upon the lawful order of a court of competent jurisdiction." NRS 463.120(4). But, the law obviously requires the "court of competent

1 jurisdiction" to do more than issue a blanket discovery granting the motion, as the  
2 District Court did here.<sup>10</sup>

3 "Where a court of competent jurisdiction is authorized to order discovery of  
4 confidential records, the court must balance the public interest in avoiding harm  
5 from disclosure against the benefits of providing relevant evidence in civil  
6 litigation . . . ." *In re Smith*, 397 B.R. at 129 (discussing compelling documents that  
7 are "confidential" pursuant to NRS 463.120) (quoting *Laxalt v. McClatchy*,  
8 109 F.R.D. 632, 635 (D. Nev.1986) (*Laxalt I*) (discussing compelling confidential  
9 records in general)). In considering NRS 463.120 and the necessary analysis to  
10 compel "presumptively confidential records," the Nevada federal bankruptcy court  
11 in *In re Smith* looked to a Nevada federal district court decision and to the  
12 Ninth Circuit's four-part test:

13 Initially, the relevance of the evidence must be taken into  
14 account. Further, the availability of other evidence and  
15 the government's role in the litigation must be  
16 considered. Finally, the court noted that the extent to  
which disclosure would hinder frank and independent  
discussion regarding the agencies contemplated decisions  
and policies would factor into the court's decision.

17 *In re Smith*, 397 B.R. at 130 (citing *Laxalt v. McClatchy*, 116 F.R.D. 455, 459  
18 (D. Nev. 1986) (*Laxalt II*) (citing *Fed. Trade Com'n v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc.*,  
19 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984)). Nevada's federal district court expressly  
20 noted that sister courts with similar review processes "believe when a claim of  
21

22 <sup>10</sup> While Wynn Resorts recognizes that the District Court Order compels Wynn  
23 Resorts and not the Gaming authorities to produce these confidential records,  
24 the confidentiality and the purposes for the statutory protection are not eliminated.  
25 Nevertheless, it bears noting that the Nevada Legislature expressly stated that "[t]he  
26 Commission and the Board may refuse to reveal, in any court or administrative  
27 proceeding except a proceeding brought by the State of Nevada, the identity of an  
28 informant, or the information obtained from the informant, or both the identity and  
the information." NRS 463.144. While the Okada Parties seek to circumvent the  
Gaming Control Board by issuing a Rule 34 request in the instant litigation, the  
gaming authorities should still be able to invoke their separate statutory right to  
refuse to reveal any information that they may have received from Wynn Resorts.

1 privilege, confidentiality or irrelevance is raised the court has a duty to conduct an  
2 *in camera* inspection to separate and permit discovery of only the relevant  
3 documents, thereby protecting against unnecessary and damaging disclosure of  
4 irrelevant confidential material." *Id.* (quoting *Berst v. Chipman*, 653 P.2d 107, 113  
5 (Kan. 1982).)

6 Yet, the District Court here gave no consideration to these policies either at  
7 the hearing or in the Order. (Vol. X PA 3949-59, Vols. IX-X PA 3861-3948.)  
8 Indeed, the purpose of the statutory protections afforded gaming licensees, the  
9 powers and duties of the gaming authorities, and, most generally, the overall policy  
10 behind the statutory framework designed to regulate the gaming industry – while  
11 also balancing the public policy that recognizes its unmatched contribution to  
12 Nevada – are not addressed or even mentioned by the District Court's blanket  
13 discovery order. (*Id.*)

14 **2. *The District Court's blanket discovery Order ignores that***  
15 ***Macau gaming licensees are statutorily mandated to keep their***  
***tender and concession-related records confidential.***

16 Similarly, the government of Macau has enacted a statutory framework that  
17 regulates its gaming concessionaires and their affiliates. Macanese law also  
18 provides for confidentiality of documents and data related to the regulatory entities'  
19 role, duties, and authority. Specifically, Macanese Law 16/2001 establishes the  
20 legal framework for the operation of games of chance in casinos. Article 16 of Law  
21 16/2001 (unofficially) translates as follows:

22 The bidding processes, the documents and data included  
23 therein, as well as all documents and data relating to the  
24 tender, are confidential and access to or consultation of  
25 such documents by third parties is prohibited, and for this  
26 purpose the provisions of article 63 to 67 and 93 to 98 of  
the *Codigo de Procedimento Administrativo* ("Code of  
Administrative Proceedings"), approved by Decree-Law  
no. 57/99/M of October 11 are not applicable.

27 Macau Law 16/2001, Art. 16.  
28

1 Pursuant to this law, documents related to the bidding process, tender, and  
2 concession are confidential, and third parties are prohibited from access to or  
3 consultation of those documents. This law is buttressed by the language of the  
4 concession agreement itself. Clause 92 of the concession agreement provides  
5 additional confidentiality protections to concessionaires beyond the bidding and  
6 tender process. The clause breaks down into three parts, which (unofficially)  
7 translate as follows:

- 8 1. The documents produced by the Government or by the concessionaire,  
9 in keeping with the conditions of law or the present concession  
10 contract, have a confidential character, and can only be made available  
11 to third parties with the authorization of the other Party.
- 12 2. The Government and the concessionaire take all the necessary steps to  
13 ensure that, respectively, the workers of the Public Administration of  
14 the Macau Special Administrative Region, and the workers of the  
15 concessionaire are bound by the duty of secrecy.
- 16 3. The Government and the concessionaire undertake to enforce the duty  
17 of secrecy on other persons who have had or who might have access to  
18 confidential documents, namely through consulting services and other  
19 contracts.

20 (Vol. XVI PA 3526-27.)

21 Similar to the Nevada Legislature empowering the Nevada gaming regulatory  
22 authorities to enact gaming regulations, the Macanese gaming regulatory arm, the  
23 Direcção de Inspeção e Coordenação de Jogos ("DICJ"), enacted what it calls  
24 instructions. Article 8 of DICJ's Instruction 1/2014 provides for the confidentiality  
25 of personal information gathered by gaming concessionaires and  
26 sub-concessionaires.<sup>11</sup> Article 8 of DICJ Instruction 1/2014 (unofficially) translates  
27 as follows:

28 Without prejudice to the legal framework for the  
protection of personal data set forth in Law 8/2005, the

---

<sup>11</sup> This instruction is specific to the Macau gaming concessionaires and sub-concessionaires, and is distinct from the Macau Personal Data Privacy Act which this Court addressed in *Las Vegas Sands v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 61, 331, P.3d 876 (2014).

1 personal data collected by the gaming concessionaires  
2 and sub-concessionaires is subject to the confidentiality  
3 regimen set out in the legal framework governing the  
4 concession of the exploration of games of chance in a  
5 casino which includes law 16/2001, Administrative  
6 Regulation 6/2002 as revised and re-published by  
Administrative Regulation 27/2009, Law 5/2004, and  
Law 10/2012, as well as the respective gaming  
concession and sub-concession agreements, with any  
transfer of personal data being prohibited without the  
prior authorization of the competent public entities.

DICJ Instruction 1/2014, Article 8.

7  
8 But again, the District Court gave no consideration of these restrictions. The  
9 point Wynn Resorts makes here is that the District Court failed to consider gaming  
10 policy and the duties of a licensee (or concessionaire under Macau law) when it  
11 issued its blanket discovery Order that compels a licensee/concessionaire to  
12 produce statutorily protected documents without any relevancy analysis to the  
13 issues in dispute.

14 Specifically, the Okada Parties propounded six requests seeking documents  
15 related to Wynn Resorts' affiliate, non-party WRM's, bidding and tender process.  
16 (Vol. VII 1641 (Req. No. 89), 1665 (Req. No. 114), 1676 (Req. No. 123), 1677  
17 (Req. No. 124), 1679-80 (Req. No. 126), Vol. XI PA 1805 (Req. No. 249).)  
18 Of course, if non-party WRM violates Law 16/2001, it will be subject to sanctions  
19 in Macau. Law 16/2001 was passed by the legislative council of Macau and signed  
20 into effect by the Chief Executive. The regime for handling infractions is set out in  
21 Article 43 of Law 16/2001 and contemplates both administrative proceedings  
22 (fines) and possible criminal proceedings (sub-section (3)). The Okada Parties  
23 failed to assert any factual basis to connect WRM's bidding and tender process to  
24 this case, and failed to provide a factual predicate for any purported wrongdoing by  
25 this non-party. Yet, the blanket discovery Order sweeps this third party into the  
26 mix, compels the production of records that are statutorily protected by a foreign  
27 sovereign and which may result in sanctions against foreign, non-party WRM,  
28 without providing any analysis or discussion.

1 In addition, the Okada Parties propounded **52 individual requests** desperately  
2 seeking to gather documents related to Wynn Resorts' efforts to obtain a concession  
3 for land (akin to a lease) in the part of Macau called the Cotai Strip. (Vol. VII  
4 PA 1665 (Req. No. 114), 1669 (Req. No. 118), 1672 (Req. No. 120), 1674  
5 (Req. No. 122), 1678 (Req. No. 125), 1650-1709 (Req. Nos. 127-149), 1711  
6 (Req. No. 152), 1726 (Req. No. 166), 1727 (Req. No. 167), Vol. XVIII PA 1759  
7 205, 1760 206, Vol. XV PA 1805 (Req. No. 249), 1806-07 (Req. No. 250), 1817-26  
8 (Req. Nos. 259-266), 1829-39 (Req. Nos. 269-277).) The Okada Parties would like  
9 to argue that Wynn Resorts did something wrong or improper in the process to  
10 obtain that land concession for a new casino development. But, there is no factual  
11 predicate to connect the land concession to the subject matter at issue in this action.  
12 And, there is no factual predicate to support the notion that there was any  
13 wrongdoing in the first instance. The process by which Wynn Resorts obtained the  
14 land concession commenced in 2005, took place over several years, and was fully  
15 disclosed in multiple Wynn Resorts public SEC filings, (E.g., Vol. XVI PA 3573-  
16 75, 3576-78, 3579, 3606-07), and from the time it listed on the Hong Kong Stock  
17 Exchange in 2009, multiple Wynn Macau public Hong Kong Stock Exchange  
18 filings. (E.g., Vol. XVI PA 3583-84, 3606-07.) Moreover, Okada was a Wynn  
19 Resorts and Wynn Macau director when WRM and an affiliate accepted the land  
20 concession in September 2011, and there was no argument or evidence offered that  
21 he ever questioned the transaction at any step during the process. (See Vol. XVII  
22 PA 3831-34.)

23 Similarly, the Okada Parties now want to scrutinize Wynn Resorts' 2006 sale  
24 of its Macau gaming sub-concession to a third party, Publishing &  
25 Broadcasting, Ltd., propounding **seven more requests** demanding records related to  
26 the sub-concession and the sale process. (Vol. VII PA 1665 (Req. No. 114), 1669  
27 (Req. No. 118), 1671 (Req. No. 119), 1672 (Req. No. 120), 1674 (Req. No. 122),  
28 1678 (Req. No. 125), Vol. XI PA 1839 Req. No. 278).) The Okada Parties argue

1 that they want to know why and how Wynn Resorts was able to get a third party to  
2 pay \$900 Million for the sub-concession, which is one of only six licenses to legally  
3 operate gaming establishments in Macau. (E.g., Vol. XVI PA 3583.) The inquiry  
4 is silly, and the answer can be provided by basic microeconomics. However, for the  
5 instant debate about the impropriety of the blanket discovery Order, the sale of the  
6 sub-concession relates to no issue in this litigation. (Vol. VI PA 1375-1400, 1401-  
7 1412-95.)

8 And, there is no factual predicate upon which to base an argument of  
9 wrongdoing through the sale of the valuable sub-concession. Of course, the  
10 sub-concession process was disclosed in the Company's public filings. And, once  
11 again, Okada was a director of Wynn Resorts during the relevant time period and  
12 never inquired into or questioned the transaction (a transaction that benefitted the  
13 Wynn Resorts stockholders, including Aruze, and which the Okada Parties have  
14 never disputed, much less offered any evidence to the contrary). (Vol. XIV  
15 PA 3104.)

16 None of these requests were considered individually, nor were the gaming  
17 related policies, laws, and obligations that are expressly implicated by the requests.  
18 Instead, they were swept up into the District Court's blanket discovery Order. The  
19 District Court exceeded its jurisdiction by entering the improper blanket order  
20 without regard to any of the above-stated issues, most importantly, whether any of  
21 them are relevant to this case or whether there is a factual predicate for the Okada  
22 Parties' speculative arguments made in support thereof.

23 **3. *The District Court's blanket discovery Order ignores that***  
24 ***Nevada gaming licensees are statutorily mandated to create***  
25 ***and implement a compliance program, and report its results to***  
***the gaming regulators.***

26 Such a blanket discovery order is particularly problematic vis-à-vis  
27 Nevada's highly regulated gaming industry, since gaming regulators require  
28 licensees to maintain extensive records on transactions and people with whom the



1 licensee does business. Tellingly, the Okada Parties do not seek discovery as to  
2 Wynn Resorts' knowledge about transactions or matters involving the Okada  
3 Parties. No, as the Okada Parties themselves described their requests, they seek  
4 (i) all "documents regarding *any* suitability investigations conducted by the  
5 Compliance Committee [of the Wynn Resorts board], or suitability concerns raised  
6 by regulatory authorities," (Vol. XI PA 1926 n.19 (identifying Request Nos. 230-  
7 234, 240-242, and 289)), and (ii) all documents regarding "specific persons who  
8 should have raised suitability concerns," (*id.* at n.20 (identifying Request Nos.  
9 230-234, 289) (emphasis added).)

10 While some of these requests impinge upon the same confidentiality  
11 provisions discussed above, some also seek the same type of documents related to  
12 this Nevada gaming licensee's licensing process in other jurisdictions (which would  
13 have similar if not the same purpose as the Nevada policy discussed above).  
14 Examples are:

15 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 230:**

16 All Documents concerning the loss or potential  
17 loss or revocation of gaming licenses held by WRL or  
any Counterdefendant from any state or local gaming  
regulatory body in the United States.

18 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 231:**

19 All Documents concerning any determination of  
20 unsuitability of WRL or any Counterdefendant by any  
gaming regulatory body not located in the United States.

21 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 232:**

22 All Documents concerning any potential or  
23 threatened determination of unsuitability of WRL or any  
Counterdefendant by any gaming regulatory body not  
located in the United States.

24 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 233:**

25 All Documents concerning the loss or revocation  
26 of gaming licenses held by WRL or any  
Counterdefendant from any gaming regulatory body not  
located in the United States.

27 (Vol. VIII PA 1783-86.)  
28

**REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 240:**

All Documents concerning any Investigation conducted by WRL's Gaming Compliance Committee pursuant to the requirement (referred to in Paragraph 14 of the Second Amended Complaint) that it "investigate senior officers, directors, and key employees to protect WRL from becoming associated from [sic] any unsuitable persons."

**REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 241:**

Documents sufficient to identify all subjects of Investigations conducted by WRL's Gaming Compliance Committee related to the Committee's requirement (referred to in paragraph 14 of the Second Amended Complaint) that it "investigate senior officers, directors, and key employees to protect WRL from becoming associated from [sic] any unsuitable persons."

**REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 242:**

All Documents concerning any Investigation conducted by WRL's Gaming Compliance Committee concerning the potential determination of Stephen A. Wynn as an unsuitable party by any gaming regulatory body.

(Vol. VIII PA 1792-95.)

**REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 289:**

All Documents Concerning any consideration or decision whether or not to seek a finding from any Gaming Authority of the suitability of any of the following: Stephen A. Wynn, any member of the WRL Board (except Mr. Okada), any counterdefendant, or WRL.

(Vol. XI PA 1849-50.) Trying to rationalize these requests, the Okada Parties resort to claiming that Wynn Resorts' commitment to compliance and the protection of its gaming licenses "is a sham because WRL routinely associated with potentially unsuitable persons without any investigation by the Compliance Committee." (Vol. XI PA 1926.)<sup>12</sup>

But of course, Okada made no such noise when he served on the Board. His current hyperbole is as specious as it is desperate. All Nevada gaming licensees,

<sup>12</sup> Wynn Resorts agreed from the time of its original objections and responses to produce some documents in response to the requests in this category – namely, documents that relate to the compliance fallout from the Okada Parties' misconduct and therefore documents that relate to the subject matter of this action. (Vol. VIII PA 1782-87 (Responses to Req. Nos. 230-34).)

1 including Wynn Resorts, are obligated to police themselves through a  
2 statutorily-mandated compliance committee and compliance program. The Okada  
3 Parties present no evidence of any supposed "sham" regarding Wynn Resorts'  
4 compliance obligations. Rather, the actions the Wynn Resorts Board took *were*  
5 *required* to fulfill the Company's obligations under Nevada's gaming regulations.

6 As previously explained to the District Court, Nevada law affirmatively  
7 requires licensees and registrants to take independent and proactive steps toward  
8 ridding themselves of unsuitable persons before gaming regulators have to do it for  
9 them. Indeed, for this reason, other public companies have "unsuitable person" and  
10 redemption provisions in their organizational documents that are essentially  
11 identical to the provisions in Article VII of the Wynn Resorts Articles of  
12 Incorporation. (Vol. III PA 549-50.)

13 In addition, the Gaming Commission and Gaming Control Board, exercising  
14 authority under Gaming Commission Regulation 5.045, requires Wynn Resorts to  
15 maintain and follow a "Compliance Program" that is reviewed and approved by the  
16 Commission and the Control Board. (Vol. III PA 547-49.) That program  
17 specifically states that its purpose is to mitigate the "dangers of unsuitable  
18 associations and compliance with regulatory requirements," and it defines an  
19 "Unsuitable Person" as anyone "that the Company determines is unqualified as a  
20 business associate of the Company or its Affiliates based on, without limitation, that  
21 Person's antecedents, associations, financial practices, financial condition, or  
22 business probity." (Vol. III PA 585, 588.)

23 The Compliance Program affirmatively requires the Company's Compliance  
24 Committee to *investigate* all senior executives, directors, and key employees, "in  
25 order to protect the Company from becoming associated with an Unsuitable  
26 Person." (Vol. III PA 592.) The program also requires the Company to report to  
27 Nevada gaming authorities to keep them "advised of the Company's compliance  
28 efforts in Nevada and other jurisdictions." (Vol. III PA 585.) In particular, the

1 Compliance Program requires that "any known acts of wrongdoing" by any  
2 executive or director that are reported to the Wynn Resorts Board must also be  
3 reported to the Chairman of the Nevada State Gaming Control Board within ten  
4 business days of the report to the Board. (Vol. III PA 595.)

5 Thus, under the Nevada gaming regulations, Wynn Resorts has an affirmative  
6 obligation to self-police. The documents it is required to generate and provide to  
7 the Gaming authorities in this respect are highly confidential, highly sensitive, and  
8 – most notably – have absolutely nothing to do with the Okada Parties' claims.  
9 Again, the Okada Parties have not provided a single factual predicate for this  
10 invasive fishing expedition. The fact that there may exist thousands of documents  
11 as a result of Wynn Resorts' compliance with Nevada law – to maintain the  
12 privilege of being a gaming licensee – does not, without a factual predicate, grant  
13 its litigation adversaries access to those documents. The District Court erred in  
14 entering a blanket ruling that would compel the production of confidential and  
15 sensitive documents that a gaming licensee is required to prepare and maintain  
16 about those with whom a licensee does business.

17 **4. *The District Court's Blanket Discovery Order ignores the lack***  
18 ***of relevancy of the financial information in the compelled***  
***documents.***

19 Likewise, the information gathered for applications, investigations, suitability  
20 inquiries, and compliance programs is highly sensitive, personal and financial  
21 information. The District Court's blanket discovery Order compels the production  
22 of personal financial information of Wynn Resorts' Board members, as well as any  
23 other third party who may be swept up in the net of the Compliance Committee's  
24 procedures and investigations. (*Compare* Vol. X PA 3949-59, *with* Vols. VII-VIII  
25 PA 1628-1796, *and* Vol. XI PA 1797-1872.) There is no basis to allow the Okada  
26 Parties access to the financial records of these Board members and third parties, yet  
27 the blanket discovery order does just that. On this point alone, the District Court's  
28 Order constitutes error pursuant to this Court's decision in *Schlatter* and its progeny.

1 In *Schlatter*, this Court recognized that when a litigant puts her income at  
2 issue, and there is a showing that the financial information is not otherwise  
3 obtainable, then "a court may require disclosure of matter contained in tax records  
4 which is relevant to this issue." 93 Nev. at 192, 561 P.2d at 1343. However,  
5 respecting the privacy of the party whose financial records were ordered produced  
6 (rather than just third parties), this Court was quick to note that the District Court's  
7 "order went beyond this and permitted carte blanche discovery of all information  
8 contained in these materials without regard to relevancy." *Id.*, 561 P.2d at 1343-44.  
9 Noting that the "discovery rules provide no basis for such an invasion," this Court  
10 issued a writ, holding that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering  
11 disclosure of information neither relevant to the tendered issues nor leading to  
12 discovery of admissible evidence." *Id.*, 561 P.2d at 1344.

13 Here, the effect of the District Court's blanket discovery order is to compel  
14 Wynn Resorts to produce, among many, many other things, personal financial  
15 information of the Board member defendants (whose business judgment as a  
16 director is their only act at issue) as well as hundreds or thousands of individuals  
17 who have been swept into the Company's self-policing compliance investigations  
18 and procedures required of a gaming licensee. This blanket Order, of course, was  
19 entered without regard to subject matter much less to whether the information in the  
20 materials sought would be relevant to the subject matter at issue. It is not.

21 **D. The District Court's Blanket Discovery Order Allows Unfettered**  
22 **Discovery to a Competitor.**

23 The District Court's blanket discovery Order further ignores the unfettered  
24 discovery allowed to a competitor, who already has shown a disregard for the  
25 protective order in place in this action.<sup>13</sup> Where a competitor seeks broad access to

26  
27 <sup>13</sup> Specifically, and despite Wynn Resorts' best efforts, the Okada Parties have  
28 given documents deemed confidential under the Protective Order to third parties,

1 a company's records, a writ of mandamus properly issues where a "protective order  
2 does not adequately safeguard the confidentiality of the" records. *Ex parte Miltope*  
3 *Corp.*, 823 So.2d 640, 645 (Ala. 2001).

4 In *Miltope*, the defendant, who worked for Miltope's competitor, demanded  
5 discovery of "all documents which relate, refer to or reflect meetings of Miltope's  
6 Board of Directors, division reviews or the equivalent between October 28, 1998  
7 and the present, including, but not limited to all meeting minutes, notes and  
8 materials presented during such meetings[.]" *Id.* at 642. The trial court ordered  
9 Miltope to produce the documents but entered a protective order limiting the uses  
10 and dissemination of the documents. *Id.* The Alabama Supreme Court determined  
11 that the minutes of the board constituted a trade secret as they were used in  
12 business; embodied in a compilation not publicly known; could not be readily  
13 ascertained from public knowledge; were secreted from the public; and had  
14 economic value. *Id.* at 644. Thus, even with the protective order in place, the court  
15 concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling Miltope to produce  
16 the minutes of its board of directors. *Id.* at 645.

17 Similarly here, the Okada Parties asked for and the District Court ordered  
18 production of "all documents, presentations, reports, notes, and minutes Concerning  
19 each meeting of the WRL Board from 2002 to the present" with oft-repeated  
20 assurances that there would be no public dissemination given the protective order in  
21

22  
23 and the information has appeared in news articles, among other things. (Vol. VIII  
24 PA 1884 n.7; Vol. VII PA 1599-1600; *see also* Vol. V PA 1126-1127.) The Okada  
25 Parties' assurances regarding protecting highly confidential or sensitive  
26 information are near meaningless under these circumstances, especially when  
27 given to an adversary who has publicly stated his desire and intent to "beat" Wynn  
28 Resorts. (Vol. V PA 1130.)

1 place. (Vol. XI PA 1843; Vol. XVII PA 3855 n.13.)<sup>14</sup> However, the protective  
2 order is insufficient to protect the disclosure of Wynn Resorts' confidential,  
3 proprietary, and non-public information from the Okada Parties, which are  
4 admittedly developing their own gaming operation and are a Wynn Resorts  
5 competitor. The Okada Parties' cries of "maybe" finding something to recast as  
6 supposed "pretext" are insufficient to overcome the irreparable harm that Wynn  
7 Resorts suffers if forced to disclose all of its Board of Directors packets from its  
8 inception.

9 ...

10 ...

11 ...

---

14 The Okada Parties proposed withdrawing "notes" from this Request. *See*  
supra note 7.

1 **V. CONCLUSION**

2 The District Court's unbounded order of production for 78 different discovery  
3 requests is the definition of blanket discovery Order. The District Court made no  
4 relevancy analysis whatsoever. That is hardly remarkable considering that the party  
5 propounding these overbroad requests – the Okada Parties – could themselves not  
6 articulate any actual factual predicate for the requests. Thus, all they could proffer  
7 self-serving speculation couched in the tell-all terms of "maybe", "could have" or  
8 "possibly." None of that provides a basis for discovery, let alone the scorched earth  
9 approach advanced by the Okada Parties. That they are in need of a deflection for  
10 the facts considered by Wynn Resorts' Board of Directors in redeeming the shares –  
11 facts that cannot be attacked because this is a matter that falls within the Board's  
12 business judgment – only highlights the impropriety of these requests and the Order  
13 compelling Wynn Resorts to produce. This is on top of the impropriety of an order  
14 requiring the production of confidential and protected information, including that of  
15 unrelated third-parties. Thus, this Court should enter a writ setting aside the District  
16 Court's blanket discovery Order.

17 DATED this 17th day of July, 2015.

18 PISANELLI BICE PLLC

19  
20 By: /s/ Todd L. Bice  
James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027  
Todd L. Bice, Esq., Bar No. 4534  
Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695  
400 South 7th Street, Suite 300  
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

23 Attorneys for Petitioner Wynn Resorts, Limited  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28



VERIFICATION

I, Todd L. Bice, declare as follows:

1. I am one of the attorneys for Wynn Resorts, Ltd., the Petitioner.

2. I verify that I have read and compared the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR ALTERNATIVELY, MANDAMUS and that the same is true to my own knowledge, except for those matters stated on information and belief, and as those matters, I believe them to be true.

3. I, as legal counsel, am verifying the petition because the question presented is a legal issue as to the proper scope of a discovery order under this Court's precedence which is a matter for legal counsel.

4. I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

This declaration is execution on 17th day of July, 2015 in Las Vegas, Nevada.

By: /s/ Todd L. Bice  
Todd L. Bice, Esq., Bar No. 4534

## CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Office Word 2007 in size 14 font in double-spaced Times New Roman.

I further certify that I have read this brief and that it complies with the page or type-volume limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and 10, 659 words.

Finally, I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires that every assertion in this brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by appropriate references to the record on appeal. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DATED this 17th day of July, 2015.

PISANELLI BICE PLLC

By: /s/ Todd L. Bice  
James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027  
Todd L. Bice, Esq., Bar No. 4534  
Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695  
400 South 7th Street, Suite 300  
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Petitioner Wynn Resorts, Limited

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC and that, on this 17th day of July 2015, I electronically filed and served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing **PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR ALTERNATIVELY, MANDAMUS** properly addressed to the following:

**SERVED VIA U.S. MAIL**

J. Stephen Peek, Esq.  
Bryce K. Kunimoto, Esq.  
Robert J. Cassity, Esq.  
Brian G. Anderson, Esq.  
**HOLLAND & HART LLP**  
9555 Hillwood Drive, Second Floor  
Las Vegas, NV 89134  
and  
David S. Krakoff, Esq.  
Benjamin B. Klubes, Esq.  
Joseph J. Reilly, Esq.  
**BUCKLEY SANDLER LLP**  
1250 – 24th Street NW, Suite 700  
Washington, DC 20037

*Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest*  
*Kazuo Okada; Universal*  
*Entertainment Corp.; Aruze USA, Inc.*

**SERVED VIA HAND-DELIERY**  
The Honorable Elizabeth Gonzalez  
Eighth Judicial District court, Dept. XI  
Regional Justice Center  
200 Lewis Avenue  
Las Vegas, Nevada 89155  
*Respondent*

Ronald L. Olson, Esq.  
Mark B. Helm, Esq.  
Jeffrey Y. Wu, Esq.  
**MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON LLP**  
355 South Grand Avenue, 35th Floor  
Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560  
and  
William R. Urga, Esq.  
Martin A. Little, Esq.  
**JOLLEY URGa WOODBURY & LITTLE**  
3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, 16th Floor  
Las Vegas, NV 89169  
*Attorneys for Elaine Wynn*

Donald J. Campbell, Esq.  
J. Colby Williams, Esq.  
**CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS**  
700 South 7th Street  
Las Vegas, NV 89101  
*Attorneys for Stephen Wynn*

/s/ Shannon Thomas  
An employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC