

EXHIBIT 17

	Electronically Filed 04/28/2015 10:56:02 AM
1	TRAN A. Comm
2	DISTRICT COURT CLERK OF THE COURT
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
4	* * * *
5	
6	
7	
8) IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST OF:) CASE NO. P-15-082867
9) THE BEATRICE DAVIS HERITAGE) DEPT. NO. XXVI
10	TRUST.)
11) Transcript of Proceedings
12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLORIA J. STURMAN, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
	MOTION TO DISMISS: MOTION ON CHRISTOPHER DAVIS' MOTION TO
13	DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(B) AND NRCP 19; PETITION TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER THE BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY
14	TRUST, ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CHRISTOPHER DAVID AS INVESTMENT TRUST ADVISOR AND STEPHEN K. LEHNARDT AS
15	DISTRIBUTION TRUST ADVISOR AND STEPHEN R. LEHNARDT AS DISTRIBUTION TRUST ADVISOR, TO CONFIRM DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY
16	AS DIRECTED TRUSTEE, AND FOR IMMEDIATE DISCLOSURE OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION FROM CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS
17	DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION FROM CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS
18	WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2015
19	APPEARANCES:
20	For Caroline Davis: MARK ALAN SOLOMON, ESQ.
21	JOSHUA M. HOOD, ESQ. For Christopher Davis: ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.

22	For Stephen Lehnartdt: JONATHAN W. BARLOW, ESQ.
23	For Dunham Trust Company: CHARLENE N. RENWICK, ESQ.
24	RECORDED BY: KERRY ESPARZA, DISTRICT COURT
	TRANSCRIBED BY: KRISTEN LUNKWITZ
25	Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.
	Page 1
	CHRISDAVIS000593

1	WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2015 AT 10:09 A.M.
2	
3	THE COURT: Okay. Will everybody state
4	appearances and we're ready to go?
5	MR. BARLOW: Jonathan Barlow for Stephen Lehnardt,
6	the Trust Protector.
7	THE COURT: Okay.
8	MS. RENWICK: Charlene Renwick on behalf of
9	Dunham Trust Company.
10	MR. BARNEY: Anthony Barney on behalf of
11	Christopher Davis.
12	THE COURT: All right.
13	MR. SOLOMON: And Mark Solomon and Joshua Hood on
14	behalf of Caroline Davis.
15	THE COURT: Okay. So, this is, again, my day to
16	deal with these family issues. So, anyway, let's discuss.
17	This is Mr. Solomon, your Petition to Assume
18	Jurisdiction over the Trust. I didn't really see that that
19	issue, the assuming that jurisdiction over the trust, was
20	really opposed. So to that specific relief requested, is
21	anybody really opposing that?
22	MR. BARNEY: Yes. I filed a Motion to Dismiss
23	THE COURT: Okay.
24	MR. BARNEY: his Petition in that regard.
25	THE COURT: Okay. All right. But I thought that
	Page 2
	CHRISDAVIS000594

1	was just to dismiss the petition or just to dismiss your
2	client or to dismiss the petition?
3	MR. BARNEY: Dismiss the
4	THE COURT: Okay. It was Mr. Barlow who was just
5	looking who did his Joinder the right way. Nobody ever
6	does Joinders the right way. He
7	MR. BARLOW: Well, thank you.
8	THE COURT: He made it really clear: I'm only
9	joining people always just file joinders and I'm like:
10	What are you joining? He made it real clear what he's
11	joining. He is joining only to the extent that
12	MR. BARLOW: Right. We turned in Mr. Barney's
13	arguments
14	THE COURT: Right.
15	MR. BARLOW: related to the jurisdiction and
16	THE COURT: Jurisdiction only.
17	MR. BARLOW: the limited to the
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	MR. BARLOW: joinder parties. There was a
20	concern that we had that we didn't join and subsequent
21	conversations after review of the Reply that we may have

~	conversations after review of the Reply that we may have
22	changed our position on that.
23	THE COURT: Okay.
24	MR. BARLOW: So, essentially, we're all
25	essentially in full joinder with the
	Page 3
	CHRISDAVIS000595

1	THE COURT: Okay. So you're
2	MR. BARLOW: Motion now after reviewing
3	THE COURT: All right. So then
4	MR. BARLOW: the Reply.
5	THE COURT: what's your client's position on
6	any other
7	MR. SOLOMON: Yeah, we did file a Reply, Your
8	Honor.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MR. SOLOMON: You mean to Mr. Barlow?
11	THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.
12	MR. SOLOMON: Yeah, our position is that we
13	properly, under our statute, asked the Court to confirm him
14	as Trust Protector and Distribution Advisor because that's
15	what our law requires.
16	THE COURT: Okay. So,
17	MR. SOLOMON: How do you want to tackle this, Your
18	Honor?
19	THE COURT: I think that's why I think,
20	first of all, can we just make it clear who is on first?
21	So,

22	MR. SOLOMON: It's my petition but they never
23	really responded to my petition
24	THE COURT: Right. So,
25	MR. SOLOMON: substantively.
	Page 4
	CHRISDAVIS000596

1 THE COURT: -- the interests --2 MR. SOLOMON: What they did was just took this jurisdictional --3 4 THE COURT: Right. MR. SOLOMON: -- Motion to Dismiss --5 6 THE COURT: That was why I was wondering because -7 8 MR. SOLOMON: -- which I don't -- I opposed specifically --9 10 THE COURT: I know. It seemed like nobody was really -- it didn't -- it had gotten to this jurisdictional 11 issue, we didn't really get to the issue of, you know, does 12 this Court have -- can this Court, you know, assume 13 jurisdiction? 14 MR. BARNEY: And, Your Honor, therein lies the 15 Motion to Dismiss. If the Motion to Dismiss is determined 16 on its merits, --17 18 THE COURT: So --19 MR. BARNEY: -- this Court does not have 20 jurisdiction to --THE COURT: -- I guess that's my question is --21

22	MR. SOLOMON: We only accept jurisdiction to
23	determine jurisdiction, obviously. So,
24	THE COURT: Right.
25	MR. SOLOMON: that's where I think we are, Your
	Page 5
	CHRISDAVIS000597

1 Honor.

2	THE COURT: So, yeah. And okay. So I guess
3	that's the question then is: Does it make more sense to
4	start with the Petition to Dismiss
5	MR. SOLOMON: I think so, yes.
6	THE COURT: and make the decision with respect
7	to jurisdiction
8	MR. SOLOMON: And I can cover both in my response
9	
10	THE COURT: Okay.
11	MR. SOLOMON: because
12	THE COURT: Perfect.
13	MR. SOLOMON: they're relevant.
14	THE COURT: Then excellent. And I don't know, Mr.
15	Barney, who is arguing okay. Good. Thanks.
16	MR. BARNEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
17	Your Honor, as you are aware, the issue of
18	jurisdiction arises or fails under the issue of whether or
19	not there is a valid amendment to the trust. The terms of
20	the trust specifically indicate that in order to create an
21	amendment there must be a change in situs that is
22	effectively ratified as a condition precedent to any
23	amendment amending the trust to the laws of the state of
24	Nevada.
25	Under the terms of the trust, the change in situs
	Page 6
	CHRISDAVIS000598


1 is required only after the consent of all of the
2 beneficiaries. The then acting Protector and the consent
3 of the Trustee after it has received its counsel during the
4 life of the testator a written opinion and thereafter an
5 opinion by counsel that a change in situs is proper.

In this case, in order for there to be a first 6 amendment, to even give the Court jurisdiction on the basis 7 upon which to take jurisdiction under 164.010, there had to 8 9 be a proper change in situs and there didn't occur a proper of situs in this case. There are certain beneficiaries of 10 this trust. We have Christopher Davis, we have Caroline 11 Davis, we have their son, and we also have Taria [phonetic] 12 13 Davis. Okay. The amendment would have required all of 14 their consents to --

15 THE COURT: But it said it was unanimous.
16 MR. BARNEY: It was unanimous.

17 || THE COURT: Oh.

MR. BARNEY: And the trust, Your Honor, doesn't
require unanimous consent, it requires all beneficiaries.
That's the pertinent part of the trust and that's set forth
under Article 14. All beneficiaries must consent to this.



MR. BARNEY: Taria [phonetic] is the wife of2 Christopher Davis.

3 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SOLOMON: Not at the time of this. 4 THE COURT: 5 Okay. All right. MR. BARNEY: Yes. And, in fact, it's clear that 6 they understood she was a beneficiary because in their 7 Opposition to our Motion to Dismiss, they actually notice -8 - they took to notice her, okay, but they hadn't previously 9 done so. Okay. It's clear that she did not consent to 10 11 this. There also wasn't an acting Alaska Trustee at that 12 point to consent to the transfer. Mr. Solomon presented 13

point to consent to the transfer. Mr. Solomon presented
evidence that was very clear that on December 5th that
Alaska Trust USA tendered their resignation and was no
longer the Trustee at that point. Then, allegedly, in
February, the first amendment was produced wherein the
change in situs occurred, allegedly, and a new Trustee was
appointed in that same document.

20 Now, Your Honor, that begs the question: How
21 could a Nevada Trustee based in Nevada who could only

22	operate within that situs be the Trustee that referred to
23	in the trust but had to receive counsel before they made
24	the change in situs that would also make the amendment
25	operative as a condition precedent and then go ahead and
	Page 8
	CHRISDAVIS000600

1 sign on an amendment where they were only appointed in that
2 same amendment? It's impossibly, Your Honor.

Clearly, the trust envisioned that it was the Alaska Trustee that would obtain advice and understanding from counsel before they agreed to transfer the situs. Dunham Trust couldn't even agree to have it transferred and administered under a situs other than Nevada because they're only licensed in Nevada to administer this trust and clearly it wasn't them.

10 So we know in this matter that neither the Trustee nor the beneficiary under the trust consented. 11 So we didn't have all of the beneficiaries as required. 12 We didn't have the Trustee, therefore no condition precedent 13 of the situs actually being changed and thereby allowing 14 any amendment to the trust. And that was originally what I 15 raised in the first -- in my first pleading in the Motion 16 to Dismiss. I expanded upon that in our Reply where I set 17 forth the very parameters of what the Court needed in order 18 to justify jurisdiction. 19

In effect, Your Honor, what we have is the -- it's the first time I've seen it in my career where someone is

22	actually asking for information obviously in the context of
23	an accounting not from the Trustee, Your Honor, but form
24	the beneficiaries, the purported beneficiaries, of that
25	distribution. Therein lies the concern. We've got several
	Page 9
	CHRISDAVIS000601

1	entities that have been named as supposedly distributees of
2	this money under the tenure of the Alaska Trustee to the
3	tune of \$2.2 million at a time when Christopher Davis was
4	not a fiduciary in any capacity. And yet, now under this
5	purported amendment that's clearly defective, for the
6	amount of \$25,000 apparently that Dunham Trust received
7	most likely for their administration costs, that there is a
8	backend run to try to use this \$25,000 out of the \$2.2
9	million to obtain jurisdiction to find documents that are
10	in the possession of the prior Trustee who would have had
11	to account for that under Alaska law and yet the recipients
12	of that money are the ones that are being asked, under our
13	statute, to account under a trustee statute, under
14	164.015.

And therein lies the indispensible party dilemma that we have. We've got a situation now where, A, the whole basis of their jurisdiction is based upon a faulty amendment that never should have occurred and to which Mr. Lehnardt, it's my understanding, has agreed is a faulty amendment based upon the fact that all of the parties were not brought to the table and the Trustee did not properly

22	consent.

23	And then we have the issue, Your Honor, that is
24	also concerning in that under NRCP 19(b), we're asking that
25	the case be dismissed because the parties that are asked to
	Page 10
	CHRISDAVIS000602

1	provide the documents apparently are all indispensible
2	parties or not indispensible parties, according to
3	Caroline, but apparently are indispensible for purposes of
4	providing the documents that they need. None of the
5	service in this matter was provided properly under 164.010.
6	And, in fact, let's look at the recipients that
7	they want to receive the funds from or get an accounting of
8	those funds. They want to get it from a distributee, the
9	Davis Family Office, which is a Missouri Corporation.
10	Now, Your Honor, I don't see anything on the
11	service record that would indicate that that Davis Family
12	Office partnership was properly served. There's no Rule 4
13	service. I don't see anything that indicates that any of
14	the companies that are considered persons under our law
15	were properly served under Rule 4. They're using the
16	relaxed standard of 155.010, essentially, to serve everyone
17	and then those people that they want documents from that
18	they think essentially they can dispense with, they don't
19	notice it even at all.
20	And, so, we have a real dilemma here. One of the

21 important things about the 164.010 jurisdiction is that it

22	was given to courts essentially to reach out and to take
23	jurisdiction over property, not persons. Even in the fact
24	of trust proceedings, if we want to go against a Trustee,
25	we've got to serve personal service and get a citation on
	Page 11
	CHRISDAVIS000603

1	the Trustee because this Court has limited jurisdiction,
2	and rightly so under the relaxed standards that are set
3	forth under 155.010, which is simply a mailing. There's no
4	clear understanding of whether or not any of these
5	individuals would even receive it under the relaxed
6	standard, but, in this case, we know that they didn't
7	receive it at all because they weren't even noticed up.
8	And the ones that were noticed up, in hindsight, when they
9	realized, oops we forgot, we didn't get that other
10	beneficiary's consent and therefore we have the invalidity
11	now of the first amendment, we're going to try to serve her
12	under 155.010 and send her notice through the mail at
13	not upon the original motion but upon their Opposition to
14	the Motion to Dismiss.
15	And, therefore, Your Honor, I would respectfully
16	request that this matter be dismissed entirely for lack of

17 jurisdiction.
18 THE COURT: Okay. I'm

18 THE COURT: Okay. I'm still trying to understand19 where they have an error in this amendment.

20 MR. BARNEY: Okay.

21 THE COURT: I'm looking at Article 11.

22	MR. BARLOW: It's Article 14, Section 6 is where
23	the change of situs provision.
24	THE COURT: Okay.
25	MR. BARNEY: It's on page 14-7.
	Page 12
	CHRISDAVIS000604

1	THE COURT: So the issue is not changing the
2	Trustee? That's not what you're arguing about?
3	MR. BARNEY: The
4	THE COURT: Your argument changing the situs?
5	MR. BARNEY: The change in Trustee could
6	potentially be
7	THE COURT: Because that doesn't require it
8	MR. BARNEY: No. That could be potentially
9	changed by Mr. Lehnardt but it but the fact is it could
10	not be changed under an amendment unless the change in
11	situs had occurred in that regard.
12	So, his ability to appoint a Trustee in Nevada to
13	work over an Alaska trust where they're not licensed to do
14	so would obviously most likely be invalidated even under
15	that theory of whether or not he could appoint a Trustee.
16	Apparently, they're appointing a Nevada Trustee based upon
17	a defection or a defective change in situs which was
18	never occurred.
19	THE COURT: Yeah.
20	MR. BARNEY: And they did it
21	THE COURT: So

22	MR. BARNEY: in the same amendment.
23	THE COURT: So: Except as expressly provided in
24	here in the situs of this agreement or any sub trust
25	established hereunder, may be changed by the unanimous
	Page 13
	CHRISDAVIS000605

1	consent of all of the beneficiaries then eligible to
2	receive mandatory or discretionary distributions.
3	MR. BARNEY: Okay.
4	THE COURT: So isn't that just the children?
5	MR. BARNEY: What's that?
6	THE COURT: That's the children and who else?
7	MR. BARNEY: Well the
8	THE COURT: In other words, Christopher the two
9	who to the children. Who else is entitled to
10	mandatory or discretionary
11	MR. BARLOW: No. So the children are the
12	mandatory dis
13	THE COURT: Right.
14	MR. BARLOW: Beneficiaries.
15	THE COURT: Right.
16	MR. BARLOW: But the trust also provides that
17	their spouses and their decedents are discretionary
18	beneficiaries of the
19	THE COURT: Okay.
20	MR. BARLOW: trust. So that would be the
21	discretionary the spouses and decedents.

22		THE	COURT:	Okay.	So					
23		MR.	BARLOW:	Those		that	would	be	encompasse	d in
24	the all.									
25		THE	COURT:	Okay.						
					Page	14				
					U				CHRISDA	VIS000606

1	MR. BARLOW: And
2	THE COURT: Okay.
3	MR. BARLOW: If I just really briefly. I'd
4	just add also on that point then so the position of the
5	Protector who took this and, of course, he's very hesitant
6	to come and say, yeah it looks like I made a mistake, but
7	upon review, it does look like we're missing some of the
8	beneficiaries.
9	And then the second clause of that sentence that
10	you just started says with all the consent of all the
11	beneficiaries, then, comma, and then it also says:
12	With the consent of the then acting Protector
13	obviously, he consented, and the Trustee that are involved.
14	We had an absence of Trustee actually at that point because
15	the previous Trustee had resigned about three months
16	earlier.
17	THE COURT: Okay.
18	MR. BARLOW: So technically what should have
19	happened, it appears now in retrospect, is a new Alaska-
20	based Trustee should have been appointed in the interim for

21 the purpose of consenting to the change of situs to Nevada

22	so that that Trustee could get the advice of counsel that
23	was called for in that paragraph to make sure that there
24	were no adverse consequences. So that appears to be the
25	step that was missing and Mr. Lehnardt's going to have to
	Page 15
	CHRISDAVIS000607

1	go back to the drawing board to determine whether he needs
2	to go now go appoint an Alaska Trustee and whether it's
3	then advisable to then move it down here to Nevada if all
4	beneficiaries consent to do so.
5	THE COURT: Okay.
6	MR. BARLOW: So that's position on that.
7	THE COURT: Great.
8	MR. SOLOMON: Your Honor, I'd like to spell the
9	word sandbag because this is the first time I've heard the
10	issue that's been raised. It's not in their brief, despite
11	what Mr. Barney just said. They've never taken the
12	position that Taria [phonetic] was a beneficiary. We
13	understood she was divorced and first time I've ever heard
14	it.
15	THE COURT: And she was the wife of
16	MR. SOLOMON: Supposedly.
17	THE COURT: the grandson?
18	MR. BARNEY: No. She was the wife of Chris Davis.
19	THE COURT: But she's not the one with the life
20	insurance policy?
21	MR. BARNEY: No.

~	MR. DARNEI: NO.
22	MR. BARLOW: No.
23	MR. BARNEY: She is the wife of Chris Davis and
24	was during this period.
25	MR. SOLOMON: Where is the evidence of that, Your
	Page 16
	CHRISDAVIS000608

1	Honor? There is none. They didn't file an affidavit.
2	They didn't file they didn't even raise this issue in
3	any of their pleadings. Total sandbag to wait until you
4	get here and say: Hold on. We all made a mistake that
5	we've been acting on for over a year.
6	I guess their whole theory now is that since she
7	didn't consent to this amendment and jurisdiction here that
8	the whole first amendment is invalid. Chris is
9	Christopher is not the
10	MR. HOOD: Trust Advisor.
11	MR. SOLOMON: Trust Advisor, no
12	MR. HOOD: Investment Advisor.
13	MR. SOLOMON: Investment Advisor. He's been
14	wrongfully investing and holding and making all of the
15	decisions for this trust for the last year.
16	THE COURT: There's apparently no Trustee.
17	MR. SOLOMON: This apparently there's no
18	Trustee. Dunham has been administering this for the last
19	year without it's all a big mistake because Taria
20	[phonetic] didn't join in this thing, there's not even a
21	line for her signature in the agreement. Mr. Lehnardt

22	prepared it, contrary to counsel's statement, he did have
23	an opinion of counsel in Missouri, Mr. Bresolan [phonetic],
24	say that it was valid and parties went off and proceeded on
25	that basis. That is a as I said, a complete sandbag
	Page 17
	CHRISDAVIS000609

1 without any support from the record other than counsel
2 standing up here and making this argument at this late date
3 without any ability to check the facts or determine what
4 the heck happened here.

THE COURT: Yeah, because the change in situs it's 5 done by Christopher Davis, Caroline Davis, and the copy I 6 have -- I don't see the signature of Winfield [phonetic] 7 8 but --MR. SOLOMON: It is there. There's a signature 9 page in there that --10 THE COURT: Was there a signature page because I 11 didn't it? 12 13 MR. SOLOMON: I think it's the last page. 14 MR. HOOD: it's one more page over. 15 MR. SOLOMON: One more page over. It just sort of does a little w. That's the way he signs on everything. 16 Actually there are two agreements. I can point to both 17 exhibits that are signed the same way that accomplish the 18 same thing. 19 20 Let me put this in context though. We had a petition to assume jurisdiction over this trust to confirm 21

22	Dunham as the Directed Trustee, to confirm Christopher
23	individually and as manager of FHT Holdings, LLC, as the
24	Investment Trust Advisor, which I guess they're going to
25	contend that's not valid either because we'll hear that was
	Page 18
	CHRISDAVIS000610

1	created in this last year, we also wanted to confirm
2	Stephen Lehnardt as the Distribution Trustee I'm sorry.
3	Distribution Trust Advisor and the Trust Protector. And we
4	wanted an order for immediate disclosure of the books,
5	records, and information from Chris Christopher
6	regarding over \$2,000,000 of loans that were taken against
7	a \$35,000,000 policy that's owned by the trust and
8	apparently now signed by Dunham, who they're claiming isn't
9	the Trustee, to a wholly owned LLC called FHT Holdings
10	which is managed by Chris.

These funds were paid out or leant to Christopher 11 individually, to Christopher as the Trustee of the Beatrice 12 B. Davis Family Revocable Trust, which is another trust in 13 Missouri, Your Honor, which my client is a 50 percent 14 beneficiary and a co-Trustee of but can't get any 15 16 information from her brother, calling for an outright distribution. And we have now filed a proceeding in 17 Missouri with respect to that one because he won't give us 18 any information with respect to that trust or why 19 20 distributions haven't been sent to us because mom died over 21 And then, finally, monies were leant to three years ago.

22	Chris again as manager of the Davis Family Office, LLC.
23	They won't give us information with respect to that entity.
24	The Family Heritage Trust's main asset is this
25	Ashley Cooper [phonetic] life insurance policy for
	Page 19
	CHRISDAVIS000611

1 \$35,000,000 according to notice that it was on the life of 2 Cheryl Davis [phonetic], a former wife of Chris's and 3 there's a \$4,000,000 line of credit on it.

4 Article 8, Section 1 of this Trust says: Upon these death, the trust is to split into two equal shares, 5 one for Caroline and one for Chris and his issue and his 6 spouse. So that's interesting all by itself. That was 7 supposed to have already happened. I don't know if that's 8 happened or not because we can't get information as to 9 whether that trust is even split into two separate shares 10 and Christopher, his wife, if he had one, and wouldn't even 11 be beneficiaries of our share. 12

Now, under Section 8 -- Article 8, Section 4,
Caroline is entitled to distributions of income and
principal in the discretion of the Trustee but has never
received a dime and this is extremely significant, Your
Honor. Article 12, Section 4 says:

The trust's books and records along with all trust
documentation shall be available and open at all
reasonable times to the inspection of the trust
beneficiaries and their representatives.

22	Despite the fact that those books and records are
23	supposed to be open to beneficiaries, including one who is
24	the currently the sole beneficiary of her share, we
25	spent over three months the last quarter of 2012 trying to
	Page 20
	CHRISDAVIS000612

get information and documents from Christopher and his 1 counsel, Harriet Rowland [phonetic], regarding who got the 2 3 loan proceeds or the benefit of those, what was the purpose of those loans, how were those loan proceeds being used, 4 what's the repayment terms of the loans, has any repayment 5 been made, was there any collateral given, is there a 6 collateral agreement, is there a promissory note, is there 7 8 a loan agreement? We were virtually stonewalled. Just stonewalled. We're not getting anything with respect to 9 this even though Caroline is entitled to half of this and 10 half of everything to the entities that these were leant to 11 with Chris's control. 12

13 Now the Alaska Trust Company was the original Trustee. Stephen Lehnardt was the original Trust 14 Protector. On August 2nd, 2011, Mr. Lehnardt, in his 15 capacity pursuant to the provisions of the trust, removed 16 Alaska Trust Company and appointed Alaska USA Trust 17 18 Company. And then two years later -- a little over two years later, on December 5th, 2013, Alaska USA Trust Company 19 resigned and Mr. Lehnardt appointed Dunham Trust Company in 20 Reno and I think he has the right to do that, period. 21

22	On February 24 th , 2014, which is Exhibit 7 to the
23	Motion to Dismiss, Alaska USA that may be a different
24	document than Your Honor was looking at.
25	THE COURT: Okay.
	Page 21
	CHRISDAVIS000613

1 MR. SOLOMON: Oh Exhibit 7 is a Motion to Dismiss. 2 I'm sorry. 3 [Colloquy between Mr. Solomon and Mr. Hood] MR. SOLOMON: It's Exhibit 5, Your Honor, I 4 misspoke. 5 6 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SOLOMON: And actually it's Exhibit 1 to the 7 Motion -- Christopher D. Davis' Motion to Dismiss Exhibit 8 It's called Release -- Resignation, Release, 9 1. 10 Acknowledgement, Consent, and Indemnification Agreement. 11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MR. SOLOMON: And the parties to that, contrary to what counsel said, include Alaska USA, which is the present 13 Trustee, Dunham Trust, Mr. Lehnardt, Chris, Caroline, 14 Winfield [phonetic], and they all executed this changing 15 the situs -- [indiscernible] to change the situs of the 16 trust from Alaska to Nevada, purports to be signed by all 17 of the beneficiaries and it consented to Mr. Lehnardt 18 amending the trust to change the situs, applicable law, 19 provisions required by Dunham, and other amendments. 20 And then after this document was signed, then Mr. 21

22	Lehnardt went out and got his advice of counsel, got a
23	written opinion, and prepared the first amendment. And
24	that was dated on February 24 th , 2014 and that, again, was
25	executed by Mr. Lehnardt, Dunham Trust, and specifically
	Page 22
	CHRISDAVIS000614

1	proved by Chris, Caroline, and Winfield [phonetic] and
2	that's the document that names Chris as the Investment
3	Trust Advisor under NRS 163.5543, as a fiduciary under
4	163.554, that names Mr. Lehnardt as the Distribution Trust
5	Advisor under 164.5537, a fiduciary under 163.554, and then
6	it so basically it's Chris individually or as manager of
7	an LLC to be owned by the trust full power to manage
8	investments and reinvestments of the trust and to direct
9	Dunham with respect to the same.

10 And then, finally, on March 28th, 2014, Dunham, 11 presumably at the direction of Chris, because that's what 12 he was up -- empowered to do, created a -- the FHT Holdings 13 Company, naming Chris as manager and thereafter assigning 14 the policy to the LLC which Chris is now managing.

15 So, you know, we start off with the resumption of 16 where we were that the first amendment to the trust is 17 presumed valid and there was contrary to this new claim 18 that there was another beneficiary out there that didn't 19 sign, it was never challenged until this moment, other than 20 to say likely that we have a burden to prove validity. 21 That's all they said in their moving papers, Your Honor.

22	We have the power we have the obligation to prove
23	validity. They didn't specify one reason in that or in his
24	Reply that did we see a Reply?
25	MR. HOOD: No. He just did a Joinder in
	Page 23
	CHRISDAVIS000615

1 || opposition to --

2 MR. SOLOMON: I don't think he --3 MR. HOOD: -- our petition. MR. SOLOMON: Counsel alluded to a Reply. I 4 5 haven't seen a Reply. 6 THE COURT: I saw your Reply. MR. SOLOMON: Yes. But I have not seen a Reply by 7 8 Mr. Barney --I have no Reply from Mr. Baney. 9 THE COURT: 10 MR. SOLOMON: -- but he alluded in his argument that, you know, they specified the grounds for invalidity 11 in this motion an then reinforced them in the Reply. 12 They didn't. All they said is: We have the burden to prove the 13 validity of the first amendment before we could move 14 forward and our response was: Well, take a look at NRS 15 47.250 subsection 18(c). There's a rebuttal for resumption 16 that it's valid. And then we said: Nobody has suggested 17 18 any particular grounds of invalidity. And then I pointed out that Chris, who is the only 19 person challenging it, expressly consented to it. 20 Not

21 once, but twice in two different documents you just looked

22	at. So how can he raise it? I don't think he can even
23	raise this issue he's now trying to raise with respect to
24	some other party, especially when he consented to it and
25	then he took repeated actions.
	Page 24
	Page 24
	CHRISDAVIS000616

1THE COURT: Well the only person who I'm going to2have standing would be Taria [phonetic]?

3 MR. SOLOMON: I believe she would, assuming she is a beneficiary. I don't even know that, Your Honor. 4 I was advised that he wasn't married at that time, at the time 5 the thing was done. He may be married now, so I gave her 6 notice now, but, at this time, I don't know that they were 7 8 and none of their documents suggest that she was a beneficiary. I'm hearing it for the first time and that's 9 why I stood up and said sandbag because that's what's 10 happening here. 11

Now, I think the Court had jurisdiction at least over Dunham, irrespective of this issue, but based upon the record that you have now, anything in front of you, all of the beneficiaries can sign -- consented to it. This isn't evidence standing up here and saying this.

17 Nevada situs, our Court can clearly give Nevada
18 jurisdiction over this. It's Nevada situs under the first
19 amendment, Nevada law applies, you have a Nevada Trustee.
20 That's sufficient all by itself under 164.010 because it's
21 doing business here. We know books and records are kept

22	here because contrary to counsel's argument, the first
23	thing we did, Your Honor, is go to Dunham Trust to try to
24	get this information. We're not stupid and they said: We
25	don't have it. We have to get it from Chris. They
	Page 25
	CHRISDAVIS000617

supplied us what they have. They gave us a few indications of what's going on, but they don't' have the information. They do have books and records of the trust though, including they have possession of the policy and recently transferred, as I said, to FHT Holdings Company, a Nevada LLC.

164.010 is met. There's in personam jurisdiction
over these people that are in front of you. 163.5555 says
that Chris and Stephen Lehnardt submitted to this
jurisdiction by accepting their appointments as Investment
and Distribution Advisors. Again, FHT Holdings, LLC, is a
Nevada entity doing business here. There's no question we
have in personam jurisdiction.

14 And then this argument that Alaska Trust and Alaska USA are somehow necessary or indispensible parties, 15 it's ridiculous. When is a former Trustee a necessary or 16 indispensible party in any proceeding that you are not 17 asking for any relief from them? And the answer -- are you 18 telling me every time I have to do something that some 19 20 event occurred even though they're not being asked to be held responsible for it, I have to name them because they 21

22	have some input? Well of course not. It's ridiculous.
23	Caroline is not objecting in her petition to any
24	act or admission of Alaska or Alaska USA. She seeks no
25	relief against them. Chris, in one capacity or another,
	Page 26
	CHRISDAVIS000618

1	received all of the money that we're talking about here.
2	He has all of the information we seek about the use and the
3	status of those loans to him. The former Trustees are not
4	being placed in the position by our petition where they
5	need to protect their interest and no one's being exposed
6	to multiple liability or prejudice, except for us, if the
7	Court doesn't take jurisdiction and require him to produce
8	this information because Alaska Trustees are not subject to
9	jurisdiction here and I don't think Alaska has jurisdiction
10	over Chris. There's no reason to believe he does. This is
11	the jurisdiction.
12	And [indiscernible] process our statute, 164,
13	specifically tells you you serve it under 155.010 and we
14	complied in that regard.
15	THE COURT: Now Mr. Barlow didn't address this
16	separate issue, but his issue with respect to the petition
17	was that it doesn't specifically state a claim against Mr.
18	Lehnardt. It doesn't
19	MR. SOLOMON: I'll over that, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: allege okay. Mr. Barlow, you'll
24	

 $\|get a chance to --$

22	MR. SOLOMON: As Your Honor knows, there wasn't an
23	action until recently that we amended Chapter 164 in 1999
24	[indiscernible]. Prior to that date, you used to file a
25	petition to ask the Court to assume jurisdiction and you
	Page 27
	CHRISDAVIS000619

weren't allowed to do anything more and all the Court could do at the initial point was to determine whether sufficient connections nexus to Nevada were sufficient to assume jurisdiction and confirm the Trustees. Then you had to file separate petitions for any type of relief.

So in 1999, we amended the statute and added 6 subsection 2 that says that at the same time that you file 7 the petition to assume jurisdiction under subsection 1, you 8 may file additional petitions for relief. So the law 9 10 hasn't changed. In order to get jurisdiction over a trust, you have to assume jurisdiction over the trust and confirm 11 the Trustees or the fiduciaries. That's what we're doing. 12 I think it may have been defective if we didn't try and 13 That's all we're doing is confirming the Trustees 14 confirm. or the Trust Protectors and the fiduciaries at this point. 15 One other additional petition request for relief 16 which is to ask for an order that Chris, who is in 17

18 possession of all of this information that belongs to the 19 trust, produce it to the beneficiary to whom the trust says 20 is entitled to it explicitly.

21 So, it is true that we're not seeking any

22	additional relief against Stephen Lehnardt at this time but
23	it's appropriate to confirm him in the role that's done.
24	That gives the Court interim jurisdiction over this and if
25	we can't get the information that we need from Chris for
	Page 28
	CHRISDAVIS000620

1	any reason, we certainly intend to seek it from Mr.
2	Lehnardt and if we have to use another petition to do that
3	or discovery to do that, we will and that's appropriate to
4	do and we don't have to re-file a petition to confirm him
5	as Trust Protector, which is a step that we are
	accomplishing now.

We know that Mr. Lehnardt was intimately involved 7 in these loan transactions and we put that in our Reply, 8 There's designation after designation in his 9 Your Honor. time sheet showing that he was involved in these 10 transactions. So he is presumable a repository of some 11 information. We just wanted to get it from the horse's 12 mouth, the person who actually got the use -- apparent use 13 and benefit of these proceeds first, which is Chris, and 14 hopefully that will satisfy our inquiry. But if we have 15 additional issues and have additional claims of Mr. 16 Lehnardt, then we if are, based upon a Court order, 17 18 confirming him as the fiduciary, we can proceed. 19 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SOLOMON: So that's where I think we are, Your 20

21 Honor.

22	There is nothing before this Court at this point
23	that in any way, shape, or form shows the petition that we
24	didn't [sic] file is not proper in every respect. They had
25	the burden to come in here to show that anything was
	Page 29
	CHRISDAVIS000621

1	invalid and they haven't done that. There's no evidence
2	before this Court at this point and I you know, if this
3	were, in fact, invalid, what if there would be a, you
4	know, I haven't had a lot of time to ruminate about this
5	because I'm just hearing it for the first time, but there
6	would be a constructive trust here anyway. This has been
7	operated this trust has been in Nevada for over a year
8	and huge transactions, including the assignment of a
9	\$35,000,000 policy all taken place. There's a whole slew
10	of actions that have taken place by the very people who are
11	now coming here and saying: Oh, well, it's all invalid.
12	Without presenting any evidence whatsoever of why it's not
13	true or is in fact true and I think our petition should be
14	granted, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Barlow.
16	MS. RENWICK: Your Honor, if I may?
17	THE COURT: Yes.
18	MS. RENWICK: Charlene Renwick on behalf of Dunham
19	Trust.
20	THE COURT: Yes.
21	MS. RENWICK: I do have to agree with Mr. Solomon

	Ind. Herwiter, i de nave te agree wren ni. beremen
22	with respect to the issue, the invalidity of Dunham Trust
23	being appointed as the successor Trustee. I don't believe
24	that issue was clearly addressed in the moving papers, to
25	which extent, I did not respond to it as I didn't
	Page 30
	CHRISDAVIS000622

1	understand that was that argument that was going
2	THE COURT: Okay.
3	MS. RENWICK: to be raised before the Court
4	today.
5	To the extent that the Court is being asked to
6	determine whether the assignment to Nevada was valid, I
7	request that the hearing be continued and that a briefing
8	schedule be provided to the parties so that we can properly
9	address that
10	THE COURT: Okay.
11	MS. RENWICK: address that issue.
12	THE COURT: Good point. Thank you. All right.
13	Mr. Barlow.
14	MR. BARLOW: Your Honor, just briefly because I
15	think our role in this is really [indiscernible] here, but,
16	again, the issues about the validity of the first amendment
17	were raised to us just yesterday for the first time and I
18	went through the analysis of the trust and it appears that
19	there are problems with the first amendment as far as the
20	consents that were necessary to do that. That's where that
21	came from.
22	Our concern if the Court is tending tourned taking

22	Our concern, if the Court is tending toward taking
23	jurisdiction of this in some manner, 164.010 only requires
24	the Court to assume jurisdiction or excuse me, to
25	confirm the appointment of the Trustee. If the Court wants
	Page 31
	CHRISDAVIS000623

1 to confirm the appointment of Dunham Trust Company, then
2 you have a Trustee that you confirmed the appointment of in
3 this matter.

4 There -- in his capacity as the Trust Protector and Trust Advisor, he may be a fiduciary under the statute, 5 not necessarily the Trustee in that situation. And Mr. 6 Solomon himself just said, in response to the question, I 7 don't need to bring in these two Alaskan Trustees because 8 I'm not bringing any claims against the Alaska Trustees. 9 Well why is he trying to bring Mr. Lehnardt into this as 10 well if he's not bringing any claims -- admittedly not 11 bringing any claims against Mr. Lehnardt? 12 13 THE COURT: Oh but he might be amending this if 14 the issue is that Mr. Lehnardt screwed up moving it. 15 MR. BARLOW: Maybe. But that's the point. If he has a claim, bring the claim and bring us in. 16 17 Court Right. 18 MR. BARLOW: But he -- don't bring us in and make 19 us sit here and wait --20 THE COURT: Doesn't he have a point that when you move a trust, even if ineffectually you move a trust, 21

22	Dunham takes it over, they start operating, they assumed
23	they are responsible as a Trustee. There's all this
24	activity that goes on. Doesn't this Court in this
25	jurisdiction, doesn't that give me jurisdiction? I mean, I
	Page 32
	CHRISDAVIS000624

1	you know, you're kind of somewhat changing your position
2	on this, but originally it seemed it was my
3	understanding that it was conceded that even though your
4	client had come to this jurisdiction, you weren't didn't
5	think that they necessarily needed to be in the case, but
6	that the case was it was properly in this jurisdiction.
7	MR. BARLOW: If the first amendment is valid
8	THE COURT: Okay.
9	MR. BARLOW: and were going to be treated as
10	valid, then we're operating under 163, which sets out what
11	happens in these [indiscernible] jurisdiction, things of
12	that nature. It does say that a
13	THE COURT: Well doesn't this Court have to assume
14	it's valid absent some evidence? I don't know who Taraja
15	[phonetic] is or however her name is pronounced.
16	MR. BARLOW: Taria [phonetic].
17	THE COURT: Taria [phonetic]? Okay.
18	MR. BARLOW: Right. And
19	THE COURT: She's not mentioned anywhere.
20	MR. BARLOW: And, at this point, we
21	THE COURT: Doesn't seem to be a big life
22	incurrence policy on how life. When is shell

22	insurance policy on her life. Who is she?
23	MR. BARLOW: By the representations of counsel,
24	that's as Ms. Renwick just suggested, maybe there may be
25	further briefing required to get that information in front
	Page 33
	CHRISDAVIS000625

1 of the Court and sort that particular issue out.

2	If we're going to assume that's it valid and go
3	back to the original argument we had originally made in our
4	Opposition, when Mr. Lehnardt accepted the employment as
5	Distribution Trust Advisor under NRS 163, yes that the
6	statute does say he submits to the jurisdiction of Nevada.
7	I've submitted to the jurisdiction of Nevada. Your Clerk
8	has submitted to the jurisdiction of Nevada. It doesn't
9	mean that we are that you have to observe that
10	jurisdiction over them in this case just to make us sit
11	around with no claims being brought against us.
12	THE COURT: Okay.
13	MR. BARLOW: And that's the point. Just because
14	there is jurisdiction in Nevada, doesn't mean you should
15	exercise it over Mr. Lehnardt where there are no current
16	claims against him or they're not
17	THE COURT: Because, I mean, it did
18	MR. BARLOW: asking for any information from
19	him.
20	THE COURT: occur to me that well, nothing
21	is mentioned but just out of is that a grounds to

22	dismiss it or does it just require more definite statement?
23	MR. BARLOW: I'm just saying in this situation
24	that Mr. Lehnardt doesn't need to be a party to this case.
25	THE COURT: Okay.
	Page 34
	CHRISDAVIS000626

1	MR. BARLOW: Okay. Until an order or something
2	THE COURT: At this point?
3	MR. BARLOW: That's
4	THE COURT: If I said if there is this issue
5	that this was somehow missed,
6	MR. BARLOW: Right.
7	THE COURT: that there's a central person
8	MR. BARLOW: If there
9	THE COURT: missed
10	MR. BARLOW: are claims brought against him, if
11	some other basis to bring something that would make him
12	be necessary to this action, then revisit that when that
13	arises, but as it stands right now, there's no point in
14	making him just come here and hang out and
15	THE COURT: Okay.
16	MR. BARLOW: sit around and wait to be to
17	have a claim brought against him.
18	THE COURT: Understood. Okay. Mr. Barney.
19	Interesting.
20	MR. BARNEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
21	You didn't really give me a chance to answer the

- ·	I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
22	question that you had asked previously about the trust and
23	changing the trust situs. You began to read it. It says:
24	Expressly as under Article 14, Section 6, changing
25	the trust situs, such as expressly provided herein, the
	Page 35
	CHRISDAVIS000627

situs of this agreement or any sub trust established 1 hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of 2 3 all of the beneficiaries. It didn't say the majority consent. It said the 4 unanimous consent, okay, of all of the beneficiaries. 5 Then eligible to receive mandatory and 6 discretionary distributions of net income. 7 8 Now, there have been allegations of sandbagging and yet my Motion to Dismiss hit on this very issue right 9 out of the gate. I said: In order for this Court to take 10 proper jurisdiction over this case, there was a condition 11 precedent that had to have been met and it wasn't met. 12 And therefore, the Trust Protector could not amend this 13 14 instrument by written action to change the references to [indiscernible] references to such new situs or the law of 15 such new situs and take such action as may be required to 16 conform the terms of the agreement of this trust. 17 18 That's exactly what happened in this amendment. It was changed purportedly without the consent of 19 Christopher Davis' wife who was a discretionary distributee 20 and included as part of the all requirement. 21

22	Now, the person that drafted that amendment, the
23	purported first amendment, has already indicated that it
24	was defective. He stands here today and says: It was
25	defective. Okay. He didn't get all of the necessary
	Page 36
	CHRISDAVIS000628

1 || requirements of all of the beneficiaries.

THE COURT: But your client acted on it. 2 3 The --MR. BARNEY: THE COURT: Your client did things based on the 4 assumption that he had this new role and this amendment. 5 He accepted the role. 6 MR. BARNEY: And under what legal theory would --7 8 with him without independent counsel would he be able to effectuate a document that by the terms of the trust 9 couldn't be effectuated? He clearly isn't res judicata 10 because there was no prior proceeding. Okay. And our 11 courts have been very clear about the res judicata 12 13 requirements.

14 Under this situation, Chris was clearly under a mistake that this could have been done and it wasn't -- the 15 irony of this whole situation is for an argument of res 16 judicata even to have grounds, they would have had to 17 follow the statute in Alaska that was succinctly set forth 18 19 in my moving papers. They could have gone to the Court. They could have ratified the amendment in Alaska. They 20 didn't. And, in fact, when it became defective, what Mr. 21

22	Solomon offered was a document dated February 2014, after
23	his admitted document that he put in before where the
24	Trustee resigned on December 5 th . Okay?
25	So on December 5 th , 2013, Mr. Solomon alleges in
	Page 37
	CHRISDAVIS000629

his moving papers, in his petition, and also in his 1 documentary evidence that he provided to the Court that 2 3 this Trustee had in fact resigned two months earlier. And so, what I did in my Motion to Dismiss, was I put the Court 4 on notice of that very fact. Not to hide the document, but 5 to actually put the Court on notice that this document was 6 invalid. It couldn't have been signed by a Trustee who had 7 already advocated and had no authority to sign on that 8 amendment. 9

And with that, --

10

11 THE COURT: But Mr. Solomon's constructive trust point is that if that has to be litigated, whether this was 12 a valid amendment or not, doesn't the Court still have to 13 take jurisdiction so that we can litigate that? Because 14 your clients acted on it. They've moved -- they turned 15 this over to Dunham. They're acting as the Trustee. 16 There's all this activity taking place based on the 17 assumption that it was valid. You client's now coming in 18 and saying all that activity I took was based on a void 19 20 document. So everything I have done is wrong. Mr. Lehnardt screwed up because he did this wrong. 21

22	MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, I'm
23	THE COURT: Everything we've done is wrong. We
24	shouldn't have taken any of the action that we took. It's
25	all wrong, but you can't sue us for it because it's all
	Daga 29
	Page 38
	CHRISDAVIS000630

1 wrong.

2	MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, on numerous occasions
3	THE COURT: It doesn't make any sense.
4	MR. BARNEY: On numerous occasions we've had the
5	Court look at situations that were admittedly all wrong and
6	we've had to go back and we've had to fix it. And, in this
7	case, it needs to go back to Alaska so that they can fix
8	it.
9	I've got no objection. If the Alaska Trustee
10	that's appointed with power and authority that hasn't
11	already resigned wants to change the situs and they have an
12	opinion from their counsel, you know, in Alaska that moving
13	it down to Nevada is a great idea and that we get all of
14	the signatures on that paper that are requisite under the
15	terms of the trust, I've got no objection to this Court in
16	a situation like that taking jurisdiction but that didn't
17	occur in this situation and the idea that
18	THE COURT: But we've already got a Nevada
19	MR. BARNEY: things have happened
20	THE COURT: Trustee acting as Nevada Trustee on
21	the assumption they were acting under a valid amendment and
22	change of gitug They we acting on that They we taking

22	change of situs. They're acting on that. They're taking
23	instruction apparently from your client.
24	MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, they were an independent
25	professional fiduciary that has the right to counsel before
	Page 39
	CHRISDAVIS000631

they sign any document. I'm not going to propose that --1 2 THE COURT: Right, but --3 MR. BARNEY: -- my client had any duty ---- the fact is there --4 THE COURT: 5 MR. BARNEY: -- or Mr. Lehnardt, for that matter, had any duty to Dunham Trust --6 THE COURT: I'm not saying they did. 7 8 MR. BARNEY: -- for their --THE COURT: I'm saying that doesn't this Court 9 10 have jurisdiction because Dunham is operating under the assumption hat these guys gave me a document that they 11 reported -- they purported to me and hold out to me as 12 13 being valid because -- how -- they were told. That's your point is shouldn't I have a chance to argue this and brief 14 15 this because nobody told me there is a wife out there somewhere? 16 MR. BARNEY: So, if I'm understanding you 17 correctly, you're saying that Dunham should be appointed as 18 a Trustee to respond to the 25,000 out of the \$2.2 million 19 20 that occurred up in Alaska? Because that's really what they're asking. They're saying that, in essence, there was 21

\$25,000 supposedly in a loan and they're asking for the information regarding that \$25,000 loan supposedly that
Dunham received and the irony of the whole situation of
and that was argued, and which is completely false, is
Page 40
CHRISDAVIS000632

1 supposedly it was received by FHT Holdings that supposedly
2 was established by -- actually it was established by
3 Dunham. Okay? Dunham is the sole member of that.

Now, the idea of -- you said earlier -- you said: 4 Well I don't know Taria [phonetic]. Your Honor, with all 5 respect, I don't think that matters that you know whether, 6 you know, the identity of Taria [phonetic]. The fact is 7 8 that they knew who Taria [phonetic] was. They put her on the notice for their Opposition and ironically that didn't 9 even -- that wasn't even proper under 155.010 because she 10 wasn't given the requisite period. So they knew about her 11 because they were the ones that noticed her. Not us, 12 originally, because the fact is she was -- she wasn't made 13 14 a party to this but she was a beneficiary that required her consent in order for this Court to take jurisdiction. 15

And the idea that things have happened, Your Honor, things happen all of the time. That's what courts are about and that's what litigation is all about. It's attempting to right the wrongs that have happened, but, in this case, by assuming jurisdiction over a trust amendment that is clearly defective by the drafter's own words -- by

22	the drafter's own counsel they've admitted is defective in
23	order to transfer jurisdiction, I think this Court would be
24	stepping outside of what authority it's been given under
25	164.010 to take jurisdiction.
	Page 41
	CHRISDAVIS000633

And if the Court is inclined to want us to brief
this, I'd be more than happy to brief this, Your Honor. In
fact, when you were newly called, I actually prepared a
brief for you on this very issue with regard to interim
jurisdiction on an in personam matter and I'd be happy to
reply to this and indicate, but clearly this matter must be
dismissed under the facts that we have. Even the evidence
that's been presented actually lends credence to the fact
that this amendment was improper.
THE COURT: Okay. Well my problem here is that
everybody relied on it as being proper and Dunham has been
acting in good faith on the assumption that they're the
properly appointed Trustee, that situs has been changed and
they're the proper Trustee. And now you're coming in here
and saying: Oh, I, as Trust Protector, or whatever or
Trust Investment Protector, whatever your client's role is,
whatever Mr. Lehnardt's role is, we were all wrong. We did
this wrong because we forgot Chris was married.
this wrong because we forgot Chris was married. MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, you're

21 MR. BARNEY: -- assuming that my client even had

22	counsel to know what was going on in this and the fact is
23	he
24	THE COURT: I'm not saying he did have counsel or
25	didn't have counsel.
	Page 42
	CHRISDAVIS000634

MR. BARNEY: He was not. He was --

1

2 THE COURT: He knows whether he's married or not. 3 MR. BARNEY: He does know whether he's married or 4 not, but the fact is he is not --

I have no affidavit in front of me 5 THE COURT: telling me that he is married, that the marriage was valid 6 at the time, that she was therefore entitled to take under 7 8 -- I mean, I don't have anything. All I have is the 9 Trustee that's acting apparently based on instructions from you and Mr. Lehnardt dealing with this trust having been 10 told we have a valid change of situs. They're acting in 11 reliance on it. They assume they've got proper authority 12 and now you're coming in here and saying: All of those 13 things I've told you to do in the last year, I was wrong. 14 I never should have told you to do those things because I 15 don't have a valid authority. Ooops. My bad. Let's go 16 back to Alaska and fix it. 17

Well okay. Go back to Alaska and fix it, but, in the meantime, I think I have jurisdiction of -- at least as put by Mr. Solomon, at least we have the constructive trust because it's here. There is --

22	MR. BARNEY: Your Honor,
23	THE COURT: action you've taken here.
24	MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, I would respectfully
25	disagree in the fact that we have demonstrated the actual
	Page 43
	CHRISDAVIS000635

1	drafter of the amendment has admitted that it is incorrect.
2	Now, if somebody wants to bring an action for
3	unjust reliance or they want to bring a claim of that sort,
4	let them do it in the proper fashion and serve them
5	pursuant to Rule 4 to get proper jurisdiction over these
6	parties.
7	However, we have the truth and the fact that they
8	noticed up the wife. They clearly knew who the wife was.
9	They're the first ones who noticed the wife in this
10	proceeding. She was the wife. She was the wife during the
11	period of the reported first amendment. The drafter of
12	that amendment has admitted that neither an acting Trustee
13	nor all of the beneficiaries that were required did sign
14	and that it was invalid.

Any presumption that would be there has been
clearly rebutted. We have the person that drafted it. We
have the notice that was given by Caroline to Taria
[phonetic] on -- and it wasn't timely notice, which would
invalidate, you know, the proceeding in that regard, but
they did know who she was and the idea that we sandbagged
when they came up with the notice first, really shocks the

22	conscience, Your Honor, because
23	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Solomon, do you have
24	anything further to say on your Petition to for
25	Jurisdiction?
	Page 44
	CHRISDAVIS000636

1	MR. SOLOMON: Just one. I'll give you another
2	basis to get where we need to go.
3	They just admitted their own downfall. Taria
4	[phonetic] was given notice of this proceeding timely and
5	she's had the full time to do it and she has never
6	objected. She has never raised that she didn't know about
7	this, didn't consent to it, was even married at the time.
8	Now she
9	THE COURT: Isn't she in Japan? Is she in Japan?
10	MR. SOLOMON: No. I think that's
11	THE COURT: Somebody's in Japan.
12	MR. SOLOMON: Windield [phonetic].
13	THE COURT: Windield [phonetic] is in Japan.
14	MR. SOLOMON: Yeah, but and I don't know where
15	
16	MR. HOOD: California or Missouri.
17	THE COURT: Oh. It's the person with the two
18	houses.
19	MS. HOOD: Taria [phonetic].
20	MR. SOLOMON: Yeah. This
21	THE COURT: Okay.

22	MR. SOLOMON: is Christopher's step up, the
23	father, who is apparently
24	THE COURT: okay.
25	MR. SOLOMON: now married. I don't know how
	Page 45
	CHRISDAVIS000637
	CHRISDAVIS000637

1 long he's been married. I've never -- this is the first
2 time.

But the point is she has full notice, never objected. She's waived her objection by not appearing and not making that. The only person here objecting is the person who acted upon it and never, ever raised this issue until you got in front of this Court on this hearing.

8 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess my concern is -and this is -- where I think counsel has indicated that 9 they would like a chance to be heard on this and brief 10 this. I think I have to take jurisdiction over this at 11 least under a theory of constructive trust because they've 12 been relying on this in good faith thinking they're 13 operating properly and all of a sudden they're being told, 14 by the very people who made that representation to them, 15 oops, my bad, even though my sister knew I was married, she 16 who -- I don't know if she had legal counsel telling her 17 anything, but I didn't have legal counsel -- or at least 18 his attorney says he didn't have legal counsel, so I didn't 19 know -- needed it. So she went and hired and is now saying 20 maybe I messed up here. I mean, but everybody's been 21

22	relying on that.
23	MR. SOLOMON: And you don't have the evidence.
24	All you have
25	THE COURT: And acting on it.
	Page 46
	CHRISDAVIS000638

1 MR. SOLOMON: -- is a statement. THE COURT: And so I just --2 3 MR. SOLOMON: There is no evidence at this point other than --4 THE COURT: It's -- I just have a real problem 5 6 with this --7 MR. SOLOMON: -- that. THE COURT: -- in saying that there's no 8 jurisdiction because there's no Trustee in Alaska. 9 The only Trustee is here. 10 MR. SOLOMON: It's true. 11 12 THE COURT: And that's my problem with tis -- you 13 have a trust with no Trustee. 14 MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, --THE COURT: If I follow your theory, Mr. Barney, 15 you have a trust with no Trustee and --16 MR. BARNEY: And the Court --17 18 THE COURT: -- and your client has been acting without any authority and this is -- I mean, do you 19 20 seriously want us to go down that road? 21 MR. BARNEY: I do, Your Honor, and under the terms

22	of the tru	ıst			
23	l I	CHE	COURT:	Okay.	
24	ŀ	/R.	BARNEY:	if the Protect	
25	1	THE	COURT:	I think that doesn't that exp	ose
				Page 47	
				CHI	RISDAVIS000639

1 your client to huge liability?

MR. BARNEY: If the Protector does not appoint a
Trustee, they can come together unanimously and they can
appoint a Trustee.

The whole idea is -- what you're saying, Your 5 Honor, is: Okay, well, there would be no Trustee. Do you 6 know how many trusts come before us where there is no 7 Trustee and the courts appoint a Trustee? Numerous times. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. BARNEY: A Trustee dies. There is no Trustee for a certain period. 11 12 THE COURT: Yeah, but there's no Trustee in 13 Alaska. We have a Trustee. 14 MR. BARNEY: The Trustee could be appointed in Alaska by the very terms of the --15 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. 16 17 MR. BARNEY: -- trust. THE COURT: I'm done, Mr. Barney. I'm done. 18 MR. BARNEY: Okay. 19 THE COURT: I'm going to take jurisdiction over 20

21 this trust and I'm going to confirm Dunham as Trustee.

22	But we have this issue, which they've asked for							
23	the opportunity because this is not well developed. I							
24	think it raises some issues. I have a real concern about							
25	Mr. Lehnardt because I didn't really see anything							
	Page 48							
	CHRISDAVIS000640							

1	specifically alleged about him in this pleading. But Mr.
2	Barlow's got a point. However we now know what the
3	issue is so I think we need a more definite statement.
4	So I'm granting Mr. Barlow alternative relief in
5	the form of I think he's entitled to his client is
6	entitled to a more definite statement as to what it is
7	allegedly Mr. Lehnardt already did. I think we all know
8	it, but he's entitled to have it in a pleading. So, Mr.
9	Lehnardt's Motion is granted with alternative relief. We
10	need a more definite statement as to what it is Mr.
11	Lehnardt allegedly did.
12	MR. BARLOW: If anything.
13	THE COURT: If anything. He's entitled to that.
14	So it's we need a more definite statement because right
15	now we don't' have anything about him. He's right. We
16	need something about him.
17	So, the issue is Chris. My problem here, even if
18	it's just constructive trust because Dunham's acting as
19	I've indicated, I believe in a good faith reliance on what
20	everybody told them that here's a valid change of situs and
21	trust amendment, I think that I appreciate this argument
22	that it / a all invalid and as Mr. David app/t he gued but

22	that it's all invalid and so Mr. Davis can't be sued, but
23	my problem with that is he's been acting here, I have to
24	assume because stuff has been going on, apparently giving
25	instruction to Dunham and I just think that means he's
	Page 49
	CHRISDAVIS000641

1 consented to the jurisdiction of this Court.

2 MR. SOLOMON: Yeah, I mean, he's de facto at a
3 minimum.

THE COURT: Yeah.

4

5 MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, did you say that Mr.6 Davis could be sued?

7 THE COURT: Yeah. I think he's consented to the 8 jurisdiction of this Court.

9 MR. BARNEY: And in what capacity are you making 10 - I just want to be clear for the record?

THE COURT: He has been acting in -- under the 11 assumption, and I understand your argument that it may all 12 be void. If so, it all gets unwound some other way but I 13 think I have to -- I have to take jurisdiction at this 14 point and we have to have some form in which this can be 15 litigated. I respectfully don't think it's Alaska. 16 Ι think it's here because you've got a Trustee appointed 17 here. Everybody is acting on this assumption and your 18 client, perhaps in as good of faith as Dunham, has been 19 20 acting under the assumption that he had a role and he had authority to take certain actions. He considered the 21

22	jurisdiction of this Court by acting on it. So I think
23	he's I think he can be sued here. He's consented to it
24	by acting
25	MR. BARNEY: And when you say he can be sued, are
	Page 50
	CHRISDAVIS000642

1	you saying in his individual capacity or are you saying
2	THE COURT: That's what I keep forgetting.
3	It was Investor?
4	MR. BARNEY: Investment Trust Advisor.
5	THE COURT: Investment Trust Advisor, yes.
6	MR. BARNEY: Because they're not asking to sue
7	him. At least the pleadings I read, they're not asking to
8	sue him. They're asking for information, Your Honor, and
9	your you jumped to the he can be sued
10	THE COURT: No. I'm saying I've got jurisdiction
11	over it. So in his capacity as this Investment Trust
12	Advisor, if they want to get records and stuff from him,
13	then fine. He's consented to act in that capacity in this
14	jurisdiction. Until it's shown that, in fact, he didn't
15	have that capacity, I think he's consented because he acted
16	on it.
17	MR. BARNEY: Okay. So, just to be clear, you're
18	assuming jurisdiction under 164.010 in what capacity? Over
19	Dunham Trust?
20	THE COURT: Dunham Trust because there's a trust -
21	- they the trust has been they took the role of

21	- they the trust has been they took the role of							
22	Trustee acting on an assumption that they were properly							
23	appointed and they had a valid amendment and the change of							
24	situs. They acted on that. Your client also acted on it							
25	in his role of Investment Trust Advisor.							
	Page 51							
	CHRISDAVIS000643							

1	So, to the extent that that's a role that he was
2	acting in, then I think we've got like a jurisdiction over
3	him in that role because everybody was acting on that. If
4	it's proven that, in fact, that's all void because Taria
5	[phonetic] was entitled to be a signator, if we've got
6	evidence on that and it's proven, then we've got a whole
7	different problem, but we've got to litigate that somewhere
8	and I don't think it's Alaska because this trust isn't in
9	Alaska. Everybody is operating on the assumption that it
10	is here. If it shouldn't be here, that's a problem for
11	another day.
12	MR. BARNEY: And just as a point of clarification,
13	when you're indicating that you have jurisdiction, are you
14	is the extent of your ruling that you have jurisdiction
15	or that you're just taking jurisdiction over Dunham and
16	because there's relief that's been requested and I'm
17	MR. SOLOMON: And I'd like to get to that, Your
18	Honor.
19	THE COURT: I know.
20	MR. SOLOMON: You've already you indicated that
21	you're going to assume jurisdiction over Chris,
22	THE COURT. Bight

22		THE	COURT:	Right.				
23		MR.	SOLOMON	: an	nd			
24		THE	COURT:	In his	role c	of Investmen ⁻	: Trust	
25	Advisor.							
					Page 52			
							С	CHRISDAVIS000644

MR. SOLOMON: I understand. Again, Article 12, Section 4 of the trust, and nobody disputes this, says, quote:

4

5

6

7

21

The trust books and records along with all trust documents shall be available and open at all reasonable times for the inspection of the trust beneficiaries and the representatives.

He has not opposed that he has these type of 8 records in his possession. In fact, I know he does because 9 10 Harriet Rowland [phonetic] told me that she had them, that he had produced them to her. She was prepared to turn them 11 over to me when he said: No, don't give them anything. 12 13 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So you asked for multiple types of relief. The petition is to assume 14 jurisdiction over this trust. I'm going to assume 15 jurisdiction over this trust, even though, as I said, it's 16 without prejudice to litigate whether it's actually validly 17

18 moved. If it's not, then, you know, we've got a problem,

19 || but it appears that everybody is acting on the assumption

20 | that it's here. So we have to take jurisdiction.

So, then I'm assuming jurisdiction over

22	Christopher Davis as Investment Trust Advisor, which is the
23	specific relief requested.
24	Stephen Lehnardt, I agree, I would also have
25	jurisdiction for the same analysis, but the problem is we
	Page 53
	CHRISDAVIS000645

1	don't have a statement as to what it is he's allegedly
2	done. So, for the moment, I'm not taking jurisdiction over
3	him because we need a more definite statement in order to
4	say whether or not we can go forward against Mr. Lehnardt.
5	And then to confirm the Dunham Trust Company as
6	Directed Trustee, for now, it appears they're acting in
7	good faith on what was represented to them to be a valid
8	amendment and change of situs. They have been acting, as
9	far as I can tell, nobody's raised that that they would
10	have any notice. So, I think we have to confirm them.
11	They're the Trustee, until it's proven that maybe they
12	shouldn't be because unknown to them there was a wife out
13	there.
14	Okay. And then the final thing was immediate

Okay. And then the final thing was immediate 14 disclosure of documents and information from the Investment 15 Trust Advisor. 16

MR. BARNEY: And what would that include with 17 18 regard to those records? Clearly Alaska Trust has the 19 records of their tenure as Trustee for the \$2.2 million. 20 THE COURT: Right. 21

MR. BARNEY: And they're not a party to this

22	action.	So
23		THE COURT: It's what Mr it's what he has in
24	his role	as Investment Trust Advisor. That's it.
25		MR. BARNEY: Because they've alleged \$25,000 was
		Page 54
		CHRISDAVIS000646


1	handled between Dunham and Christopher Davis in Nevada.
2	THE COURT: If that's not you know, if that's
3	not in his possession, it's not in his possession. It's
4	only what's what he's got in his possession.
5	MR. SOLOMON: I'll prepare the
6	THE COURT: So you'll prepare the order. Okay?
7	MR. SOLOMON: order, Your Honor.
8	THE COURT: Thank you.
9	MR. SOLOMON: And I'll submit it to counsel.
10	THE COURT: And we'll be like I said, this is
11	all without prejudice to actually litigate and give, you
12	know, Dunham a chance to
13	MR. BARNEY: Did you
14	THE COURT: lay out this whole issue.
15	MR. BARNEY: So to understand this correctly
16	and I'd like to sign off on the order, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Sure. Absolutely. Mr. Solomon
18	MR. BARNEY: If that's
19	THE COURT: always very good about that.
20	MR. BARNEY: But you're giving jurisdiction
21	subject to a determination of whether or not

~	Subject to a determination of whether of not
22	THE COURT: Yeah. It's without prejudice to
23	allergies. Without prejudice to raise the issue.
24	MR. SOLOMON: I understand.
25	MR. BARNEY: Of the validity
	Page 55
	CHRISDAVIS000647

1	THE COURT: Properly
2	MR. BARNEY: of the first amendment. Is that
3	correct?
4	THE COURT: Properly with evidence and because
5	right now we don't even have an affidavit from Tarjia
6	[phonetic] and who knows? I don't have her Taria
7	[phonetic].
8	MR. BARNEY: Taria [phonetic].
9	THE COURT: Thank you.
10	And Dunham. You know, surely they'd like to be
11	heard. So, you know, it's without prejudice on that issue,
12	but right now, everybody is acting on it, so
13	MR. SOLOMON: Thank you, Your Honor.
14	MS. RENWICK: Thank you, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: we'll litigate it all later. Thank
16	you all for coming in.
17	THE CLERK: Is this [indiscernible]?
18	THE COURT: Yes. We're keeping it. Mr. Solomon,
19	specifically just for the record, Mr. Solomon specifically
20	requested that this be handled from its inception here and
21	nobody's objected to that part. So we're

	hobbedy b objected to that part. Do we re
22	MR. BARNEY: Yeah. I'd prefer that, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: You got it. Okay. We're good. We'll
24	see you guys back here.
25	MR. BARNEY: If the Court has jurisdiction.
	Page 56
	CHRISDAVIS000648

1	THE COURT: Exactly. Subject to your right to say
2	I don't have jurisdiction.
3	
4	PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 11:15 A.M.
5	* * * *
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	



1	CERTIFICATION
2	
3	
4	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the audio-visual recording of the proceedings in the
5	above-entitled matter.
6	
7	
8	AFFIRMATION
9	
10	I affirm that this transcript does not contain the social security or tax identification number of any person or
11	entity.
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	






EXHIBIT 16

Electronically Filed 04/13/2015 06:05:22 PM m J. Kl 1 **OPP** Mark A. Solomon, Esq., Bar No. 418 2 CLERK OF THE COURT msolomon@sdfnvlaw.com Joshua M. Hood, Esg. Bar No. 12777 3 jhood@sdfnvlaw.com SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 4 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 5 Telephone: 702.853.5483 Facsimile: 702.853.5485 6 Attorneys for Caroline Davis, Petitioner 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 9 In the Matter of: Case No.: P-15-083867-T 10 Probate (26) Dept.: 11 The BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY Hearing Date: April 22, 2015 9:00 a.m. HERITAGE TRUST, dated July 28, 2000, as Hearing Time: 12 amended on February 24, 2014 13 **OPPOSITION TO CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS' MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO** 14 NRCP (12)(b) AND NRCP 19 15 Caroline D. Davis, as beneficiary of the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust, dated 16 July 28, 2000, as amended February 24, 2014, by and through her counsel, the law firm of 17 Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd., hereby files this Opposition To Christopher D. Davis' Motion 18 To Dismiss Pursuant To NRCP (12)(b) And NRCP 19 (the "Opposition"). The foregoing 19 Opposition is made and based on the pleadings and papers on file in this action, the attached 20 Memorandum Of Points And Authorities, all attached exhibits, and any oral argument that this 21 honorable Court may entertain at the time of hearing. 22 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES** 23 I. **INTRODUCTION** 24 Beatrice B. Davis ("Beatrice") executed the Beatrice B. Davis Heritage Trust on July 28, 25 2000 (the "Trust").¹ Pursuant to Article One, Section 1 of the Trust, Alaska Trust Company 26 27 See, Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over The Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust, Dated July 28, 28 2000, As Amended On February 24, 2014; To Assume Jurisdiction Over Christopher D. Davis As Investment Trust 1

9060 WEST CHEYENNE AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89129 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89129 FACSIMILE (702) 853-5483 FACSIMILE (702) 853-5485 WWW SDFNVLAM.COM

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER

AND ESTATE ALTORNEYS

CHRISDAVIS000580

("Alaska") was named as the initial Trustee, and Stephen K. Lehnardt ("Mr. Lehnardt") was
 named as the initial Protector.² The primary asset held within the Trust is an Ashley Cooper Life
 Insurance Policy, on which there is a revolving line of credit for \$4,000,000.00.³

Article Three of the Trust, entitled "My Lifetime Beneficiaries", provides that
Christopher D. Davis ("Mr. Davis"), Caroline D. Davis ("Ms. Davis"); and Winfield Davis
("Winfield") were the beneficiaries during Beatrice's lifetime.⁴ Upon Beatrice's death, January
5, 2012, the Trust was to be divided into two (2) shares, one for each of Beatrice's living
children, namely: (1) Mr. Davis and (2) Ms. Davis.⁵

9 On August 2, 2011, Mr. Lehnardt, as Protector, removed Alaska as Trustee and appointed
10 Alaska USA Trust Company ("Alaska USA").⁶ Alaska USA resigned as Trustee on December
11 5, 2013.⁷ During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska and Alaska USA distributed approximately
12 \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, to Mr. Davis
13 individually, as Trustee of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust, dated April 4, 1990, as
14 amended (the "Revocable Trust"), and as Manager of the Davis Family Office, a Missouri
15 limited liability company (the "Davis Office").⁸

Shortly after Alaska USA's resignation, Dunham Trust Company, located in Reno, Nevada ("Dunham"), was appointed by Mr. Lehnardt as a Directed Trustee.⁹ Dunham accepted

- 21
 21
 22
 3
 22
 3
 3
 3
 3
 3
 4
 3
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 <l
- 26 1^7 Id., at Ex. 4.
- 27 $\|^8$ See, Petition, at \P 21, and accompanying exhibits.
- 28 See, Petition, at Ex. 5.

16

17

Advisor And Stephen K. Lehnardt As Distribution Trust Advisor; To Confirm Dunham Trust Company As Directed
 Trustee; And For Immediate Disclosure Of Documents And Information From Christopher D. Davis, filed with this
 Court on February 10, 2015 (the "Petition"), at Ex. 1.

such position on or about February 24, 2014. Article One, Section 2 of the Trust provides that
Alaska law is the governing law.¹⁰ However, Article Fourteen, Section 6 of the Trust provides
that, upon unanimous consent of all of the beneficiaries entitled to receive mandatory or
discretionary distributions, "the situs of this agreement...may be changed...with the consent of
any then-acting Protector and the Trustee thereof..."¹¹ Article Fourteen, Section 6 further
provides that:

"[u]pon the change of situs, the Trust Protector may amend this instrument by its written action to change the references to Alaska or Alaska law to reference to such new situs or the law of such new situes, and take such action as may be required to conform the terms of this agreement to the terms of law of such situs in order to achieve the purposes for which this trust was created".¹²

On February 24, 2014, Mr. Lehnardt, as Protector, executed the First Amendment to the Trust (the "First Amendment"), effectively transferring the situs of the Trust to Nevada, and amending the Trust to comply with Nevada law.¹³ Alaska USA, as Trustee, and Mr. Davis, Ms. Davis, and Winfield as the beneficiaries entitled to distributions from the Trust, acknowledged and consented to the change in situs of the Trust from Alaska to Nevada and further acknowledged that Nevada law shall govern the administration of the Trust.¹⁴

The First Amendment appointed Mr. Davis "<u>individually or in his capacity as manager of</u> <u>an LLC wholly-owned by the trust</u>" as the "Investment Trust Advisor" pursuant to NRS 163.5543, and designated him a "Fiduciary" under NRS 163.554.¹⁵ The First Amendment

- 21 I_{0} *Id*, at Ex. 1, Art 1, § 2.
- 22 11 Id., at Ex. 1, Art. 14, § 6.
- 23 1^{12} Id.

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

9060 WEST CHEYENNE AVENUE LAS VEGAS. NEVADA 89129 TELEPHONE (702) 853-5483 FACSIMILE (702) 853-5485 WWW.SDFNVLAW.COM

DWIGGINS & FREER

 $24 \qquad ^{13} \qquad See, Petition, at Ex. 5.$

Id., at p. 8-10. See also, Christopher D. Davis' Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To NRCP (12)(b) And NRCP
 (the "Motion To Dismiss"), at Ex. 1, entitled "Resignation, Release, Acknowledgement, Consent And
 Indemnification (providing that "[t]he Beneficiaries unanimously consent to changing the situs of the Trust from
 Alaska to Nevada, further unanimously consent to the amendment of the trust by the Protector to reflect the change in
 situs, applicable law...")

28

15

Id., at Art. Thirteen, § 2d (Second) (Emphasis added).

further appointed Mr. Lehnardt as the "Distribution Trust Advisor" pursuant to NRS 163.5537, and designated him as a "Fiduciary" pursuant to NRS 163.554 as well.¹⁶ 2

3 On or about March 28, 2014, Dunham, ostensibly at the direction of Mr. Davis as the 4 Trust Investment Advisor, created FHT Holdings, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, as 5 an investment tool for the Trust. Indeed, according to Mr. Davis' Motion to Dismiss, Dunham "is the sole member of FHT, Holdings, LLC", and the primary asset of the Trust, the Ashley 6 Cooper Life Insurance Policy, was transferred to FHT Holdings, LLC.¹⁷ According to the 7 Nevada Secretary of State, Mr. Davis is also the Manager of FHT Holdings, LLC. 8

II. This Court May Properly Assume Jurisdiction Over The Trust, As Amended; Over Christopher D. Davis, As Investment Trust Advisor And As Manager Of FHT Holdings, LLC; And Over Stephen K. Lehnardt, As Distribution Trust Advisor And May Grant The Relief Requisted.

Replete throughout Mr. Davis' Motion To Dismiss is his notion that before this Court may assume jurisdiction over the Trust, Mr. Davis, and Mr. Lehnardt, it must first be determined whether or not the First Amendment is valid,¹⁸ (which, according to Mr. Davis, is a question of Alaska or Missouri law¹⁹). Such circular argument is, however, baseless for the following reasons. First, Article Fourteen, Section 6 of the Trust expressly authorizes the Protector to amend the Trust for the purposes of ensuring compliance with the laws of the new situs.²⁰ Indeed, the First Amendment specifically states that "Article Fourteen of the trust permits the Trust Protector to amend the trust...²¹ In addition to the express authority provided to the Trust Protector to amend the Trust, all of the beneficiaries of the Trust, including Mr. Davis, expressly

- 9060 WEST CHEYENNE AVENUE Las VEGAS, NEVADA 89129 FLEEVEGAS, NEVADA 89129 FTELEPHONE (702) 853-5485 WWW SDFN/LAW, COM DWIGGINS & FREET
- 2021

22

1

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

- 16 Id, at Art. Thirteen, § 2d (Third).
- 17 23 See, Motion to Dismiss, at p. 4:5-6,

Id., at Ex. 1, preamble.

- 18 Id., at p. 11:7-8 24
- 19 Id., p. 3:7-10. 25

See, Petition at, Ex. 1, at Art. 14, § 6 (providing that "the Trust Protector may amend this instrument by its 26 written action to change the references to Alaska or Alaska law to references to such new situs, and take such actions as may be required to confirm the terms of this agreement to the terms of the law of such situs...") (Emphasis added). 27

4

28

9060 WEST CHEYENNE AVENUE LAS VEGAS. NEVADA 89129 TELEPHONE (702) 853-5485 FACSIMILE (702) 853-5485 WWW.SDFNVLAW.COM SOLOMON & FREER

1

7

9

acknowledged and consented to the transfer of the Trust situs to Nevada and for the 2 administration thereof to be governed by Nevada law.²² Notwithstanding the aforementioned, 3 there have been no allegations brought before this Court regarding the validity or invalidity of the 4 First Amendment. Indeed, other than an unsupported contention that this Court must first 5 determine the validity of the First Amendment, Mr. Davis has not produced any evidence that the 6 First Amendment is anything other than valid. As such, the First Amendment is presumed to be valid, unless proven otherwise, and this Court has the authority to assume jurisdiction over the 8 Trust, as amended.²³

In addition to this Court having jurisdiction over the Trust, this Court has jurisdiction over 10 Mr. Davis, as the Investment Trust Advisor, pursuant to NRS 163.5543, NRS 163.554, and NRS 11 164.5555. As mentioned above, Mr. Davis was nominated as the Investment Trust Advisor in 12 either his individual capacity or in his "capacity as manager of an LLC wholly owned by the 13 trust."24 Indeed, Mr. Davis, has accepted his position as Investment Trust Advisor, either 14 individually or as Manager of FHT Holdings, LLC, and acted in such capacity. The First 15 Amendment expressly provides that Dunham, as the Directed Trustee, "shall have no authority 16 and shall not interfere with any actions of the Investment Trust Advisor [and] shall act solely on 17 the direction of the Investment Trust Advisor with respect to all matters relating to the 18 management and investment of trust assets...²⁵ As Dunham Trust lacked the authority to act, the 19 transfer of the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy must have been done at the direction of Mr. 20 Davis, as Investment Trust Advisor. This Court also has jurisdiction over Mr. Lehnardt, as the 21 Trust Protector and as Distribution Trust Advisor, pursuant to NRS 163.5537, NRS 163.554 and 22

24 Id., at Ex. 5, Art.13, §2.d(Second). 27

25 28

Id.

²² Id., at Ex. 1, p. 8-10. See also, Motion To Dismiss, at Ex. 1. 24

See, NRS 47.250(18)(c) (providing "[t]hat private transactions have been fair and regular.") See, also <u>In re</u> Melter, 167 Wash.App. 285, 298, 273 P.3d 991, 998 (Wash.App. 2012) (providing that unless proven otherwise, "[a] 25 will [or trust] is presumed to be valid."). 26

NRS 163.5555. Pursuant to the nomination and acceptance of Mr. Davis and Mr. Lehnardt in their respective capacities as Investment Trust Advisor and Distribution Trust Advisor, Mr. Davis and Mr. Lehnardt have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court by operation of law.²⁶

With specific reference to FHT Holdings, LLC, and the information requested from such 5 entity, this Court has the authority to compel Mr. Davis, as Manager thereof, to produce the 6 requested documents as Mr. Davis is Manager of FHT Holdings, LLC, which is wholly-owned by 7 the Trust, because he is a fiduciary of the Trust. Indeed, Mr. Davis is acting as Investment Trust 8 Advisor and Manager of the LLC and must not be permitted to use FHT Holdings, LLC as a 9 shield to his obligation to provide the requested documents and information. The information and 10 documentation that Mr. Davis possesses or controls as Manager of FHT Holdings, LLC is also in 11 his possession and control as Investment Trust Advisor and must be disclosed. Indeed, a trustee 12 who is acting as manager or director of a corporation is not alleviated from his duties and 13 obligations as a Trustee (including the duty of full disclosure), and may be held liable to a 14 beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty where the exercise of such discretion is inconsistent with 15 or contrary to the terms of a trust. See, In the Matter of Schnur Estate, 39 Misc.2d 880, 886, 242 16 N.Y.S.2d 126, 132 (1963). While Mr. Davis has certain discretion acting as Manager of FHT Holdings, LLC, Mr. Davis, as Investment Trust Advisor-Manager, must still take into account the 18 terms of the Trust where the entity is owned or controlled by the Trust or Trustee Id., 39 Misc.2d, at 877, 242 N.Y.S.2d, at 132 ("where an estate or trust owns all or substantially all of the shares 20 of a corporation, the corporate form may be disregarded and the situation viewed just as if the fiduciaries held title to the corporate assets...It is not so much a matter of disregarding the 22 corporate form, but rather giving paramount consideration to the testamentary plan and scheme, and effectuating it in the manner prescribed by the testator.") 24

25

26

17

19

21

23

1

2

3

4

9060 WEST CHEYENNE AVENUE 128 VEGSA. NEVADA 89129 128 TELEPHONE (702) 853-5483 154CSIMILE (702) 853-5485 154CSIMILE (702) 853-5485 1490 WWW.SDFNVLAW.COM

DWIGGNS & FREET

See, NRS 163.5555 (providing that "[i]f a person accepts an appointment to serve as a trust protector or a 27 trust adviser of a trust subject to the laws of this State, the person submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, regardless of any term to the contrary in an agreement or instrument. A trust protector or a trust adviser may be made 28 a party to an action or proceeding arising out of a decision or action of the trust protector or trust adviser.)

9060 WEST CHEYENNE A VENUE 1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 891 29 1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 891 29 1 ELEPHONE (702) 853-5483 1 FACSIMILE (702) 853-5485 WWW.SDFNVLAW.COM

OLOMON & FREER

In the instant matter, FHT Holdings, LLC has received the primary asset of the Trust (i.e. the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy with a face cover value of \$35,000,000.00)²⁷ at the direction of Mr. Davis as Investment Trust Advisor-Manager. As such, the administration of the Trust and the management of FHT Holdings, LLC by Mr. Davis are inextricably intertwined, and this Court has the authority to look beyond the entity structure of the LLC to ensure that Mr. Davis is abiding by his fiduciary obligations as Investment Trust Advisor. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over the Trust, as amended; FHT Holdings, LLC, as an asset of the Trust; Mr. Davis, as Investment Trust Advisor and Manager of FHT Holdings, LLC; and Mr. Lehnardt, as Distribution Trust Advisor, and possesses the authority to grant the relief requested in Ms. Davis' Petition.

III. Alaska And Alaska Trust Are Not Or Necessary Indispensable Parties

Mr. Davis' contends that Alaska and Alaska Trust are necessary or indispensable parties pursuant to NRCP 19 because the documents and information requested are perhaps still in their possession, and because the loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy were done so during Alaska and/or Alaska USA's tenure as Trustee. Such contention is, however, without merit.

NRCP 19(a), in relevant part, requires the joinder of a party to an "action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties." Although the loans from the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy were taken/distributed during Alaska and/or Alaska USA's tenure as Trustee, Mr. Davis in his individual capacity, his capacity as Trustee of the Revocable Trust, or as Manager of the Davis Office, was the only individual to receive distributions as a result of such loans and the only one privy to the information sought by Ms. Davis, particularly the use and status of those distributions during such period.

Ms. Davis is not now objecting to the loans and distributions being made or claiming any breach of fiduciary duty on Alaska or Alaska USA's part. Rather, Ms. Davis is simply requesting

See, Petition at, Ex. 6.

DEPENDENT SOLOMON LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89129 DWIGGINS & FREER RECEMINE (702) 853-5483 FACSIMILE (702) 853-5483 FACSIMILE (702) 853-5485 MWW SDENVLAW.COM 1

from Mr. Davis information related to who received and/or benefited from the loans, the purpose 2 of the loans, the circumstances surrounding the distribution and use of the loan proceeds, the 3 repayment of such loans, the collateral, and any other relevant information. As Mr. Davis has 4 complete access to or possession and control over such information, relief can be granted without 5 joining either Alaska or Alaska USA. Alaska and Alaska USA are not prejudiced in any manner 6 whatsoever as Ms. Davis is not seeking any relief against them. Although Ms. Davis executed an 7 Indemnification²⁸ as to Alaska USA, such indemnification only acknowledged that the Trust 8 instrument provided indemnification for Alaska USA except for "willful misconduct or gross 9 negligence."29 Indeed, the Indemnification simply states that "[Alaska USA], Dunham, and the 10 Beneficiaries hereby acknowledge the provisions of the Trust which provide for the 11 indemnification of Trustee from liability, excepting only willful misconduct or gross 12 negligence."30 Specifically, Article 12, Section 7, entitled "Indemnification of the Trustee, in 13 relevant part, provides that the Trustee shall be indemnified, "except for any claim or demand 14 based on my Trustee's own willful misconduct or gross negligence proven by clear and 15 convincing evidence."³¹ As such, the Indemnification simply acknowledges the terms of the 16 Trust, and is not a release of any conduct or liability that may arise from Alaska USA's willful 17 misconduct or gross negligence. Once more, however, Ms. Davis is not now claiming any willful 18 misconduct or gross negligence by Alaska or Alaska USA, and, therefore, Alaska and Alaska 19 USA have no interest in the outcome of the relief being sought by Ms. Davis in her Petition.

Further, Mr. Davis's reliance on NRCP 19(a)(2) is misplaced because by Ms. Davis
seeking information from Mr. Davis, Alaska and Alaska USA are not being placed in a position in
which they would need to protect any interest, nor are they subjected to any "substantial risk of

- $||^{28} \qquad See, Motion To Dismiss, at Ex. 1.$
- ²⁹ See, Petition, at Ex. 1, Art. 12, § 7.
- ³⁰ *Id.*, at ¶ 3.

24

25

26

27

28

³¹ See, Petition, at Ex. 1, Art 12, § 7.

DWICGINS & FREER I DWICGINS & FREER FACSIMILE (702) 853-5483 FACSIMILE (702) 853-5483 FACSIMILE (702) 853-5485 FACSIMILE (702) 853-5485 WWW.SDFNVLAW.COM incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest."³² Additionally, NRCP 19(b) is inapplicable to the matter at hand as Alaska and Alaska USA are not "person[s] described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) [of NRCP 19(a)]."³³ If, however, this Court determines that Alaska and Alaska USA are persons described in NRCP 19(a)(1)-(2), this Court may nevertheless proceed and grant the relief requested by Ms. Davis for the following reasons:

- Ordering Mr. Davis to provide the requested information and documentation without the presence of Alaska or Alaska USA will not result in any prejudice to Mr. Davis;
- As Mr. Davis is not subjected to any prejudice, this Court need not consider any methods to lessen or avoid prejudice to Mr. Davis;
- (3) Ordering Mr. Davis to provide the requested information and documentation will be an adequate remedy; and
- (4) Dismissal of Ms. Davis' Petition will result in eliminating any adequate remedy as
 Alaska cannot assume jurisdiction over Mr. Davis.³⁴

Therefore, joinder of Alaska and Alaska USA in the instant matter is not necessary or integral to granting Ms. Davis' relief requested (i.e. compelling Mr. Davis to produce information and documents relative to the Trust administration pursuant to his obligation to do so as Investment Trust Advisor).

20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

22

23

24

25

26

27

IV. Service Of Process Has Been Properly Provided

NRS 155.010, in pertinent part, provides as follows:

"a petitioner shall cause notice of the time and place of the hearing of a petition to be given to each interested person and to every other person entitled to notice pursuant to this title or his or her attorney if the person has appeared by attorney or requested that notice be sent to his or her attorney. Notice must be given:

- ³² See, NRCP 19(a)(2)(i)-(ii).
 - ³³ See, NRCP 19(b).

Id.

28

(a) By mailing a copy thereof at least 10 days before the time set for the hearing by certified, registered or ordinary first-class mail addressed to the person being notified at the post office address given in the person's demand for notice, if any, or at his or her office or place of residence, if known, or by personally delivering a copy thereof to the person being notified at least 10 days before the time set for the hearing."

On March 5, 2015, Ms. Davis, by and through her counsel, sent Notice to each interested

party as required by NRS 155.010.35

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

2060 WEST CHEYENNE AVENUE AS VEGAS, NEVADA 89129

853-5483

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 891 TELEPHONE (702) 853-548 FACSIMILE (702) 853-548 WWW.SDFNVLAW.COM

DWIGGINS & REER

WHEREFORE, Ms. Davis respectfully request that Mr. Davis' Motion To Dismiss be denied in its entirety.

DATED this 13th day of April, 2015.

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD

Mark A. Solomon, Esq. (Bar No. 418) Joshua M. Hood, Esg. (Bar No. 12777) 9060 Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada Telephone: (702) 853-5483 Facsimile: (702) 853-5485 Attorneys for Caroline D. Davis

25

26 35 See, Second Amended Notice Of Hearing On Petition To Assume Jurisdiction Over The Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust, Dated July 28, 2000, As Amended On February 24, 2014; To Assume Jurisdiction Over 27 Christopher D. Davis As Investment Trust Advisor And Stephen K. Lehnardt As Distribution Trust Advisor; To Confirm Dunham Trust Company As Directed Trustee; And For Immediate Disclosure Of Documents And 28 Information From Christopher D. Davis, filed with this Court on March 5, 2015.

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on the 13 th day of April 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the
3	above and foregoing OPPOSITION TO CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS' MOTION TO
4	DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP (12)(b) AND NRCP 19, by depositing a copy of the same in
5	the United States Mail, addresses are as follows:
6	Tarja Davis
7	3005 North Beverly Glen Circle Los Angeles, California 90077
8	and
9	514 West 26 th Street, #3E Kansas City, Missouri 64108
10 11	Ace Davis
11	c/o WINFIELD B. DAVIS 366-6 Habu Aridagawa Arida
12	Wakayama 643-0025 JAPAN
14	CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS, Individually
15	INVESTMENT TRUST ADVISOR
16	MANAGER of FHT HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company 3005 North Beverly Glen Circle
17	Los Angeles, California 90077 and
18	514 West 26 th Street, #3E Kansas City, Missouri 64108
19	REGISTERED AGENT SOLUTIONS, INC.
20	REGISTERED AGENT for FHT HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company 4625 West Nevso Drive, Suite 2
21	Las Vegas, Nevada 89103
22	STEPHEN LEHNARDT
23	DISTRIBUTION TRUST ADVISOR 20 Westwoods Drive
24	Liberty, Missouri 64068 Stephen@lehnardt.com
25	WINFIELD B. DAVIS
26	366-6 Habu Aridagawa Arida
27	Wakayama 643-0025 JAPAN
28	winsane@gmail.com
	11
	CHRISDAVIS000590

PORD SOLOMON LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 87129 DWICCINS & FREER | TELEPHONE (702) 853-5483 TELEPHONE (702) 853-5483 FACSIMILE (702) 853-5485 WWW.SDFINULAW.COM

 $\boldsymbol{\omega}$

	1	11
	1	DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY
	2	TRUSTEE SOLE MEMBER of FHT HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company
	3	c/o SHANNA CORESSEL, CTFA 241 Ridge Street, Suite 100
	4	Reno, Nevada 89501
	5	Shanna.coressel@dunham.com
	6	And did email Via the Court's electron system via WizNet pursuant to Rule 9 of NEFCR at the email address noted to the following:
	7	
	8	HARRIET ROLAND, ESQ., ROLAND LAW FIRM
	9	2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200 Henderson, NV 89052
	10	hroland@rolandlawfirm.com
	11	ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.
	12	ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 3317 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B
	13	Las Vegas Nevada 89102 abarney@anthonybarney.com
	14	
	15	CHARLENE RENWICK, ESQ. LEE HERNANDEZ LANDRUM & GAROFALO
		7575 Vegas Drive, #150 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
	16	crenwick@lee-lawfirm.com
	17	$\sim \sim \sim \sim$
2	18 19	Star (GG
		An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.
	20	
	21	
	22 23	
	23	
	25	
	26	
	27	
	28	
		12
		CHRISDAVIS000591

DWIGGINS & FREET DWIGGINS & FREET INDUCINS & FREET FACSIMILE (702) 853-5483 REST AND ESTIN ALTORNESS NUMBER OF ALTORNESS NUMBER OF ALTORNESS NUMBER OF ALTORNESS



Ехнівіт 15

Electronically Filed 04/20/2015 02:58:22 PM

٠

Alexa J. Ehren

	04/20/2015 02.56.22
	Alun D. Elin
HARRIET H. ROLAND, ESQ.	CLERK OF THE COUR
NV Bar No. 5471	
ROLAND LAW FIRM	
2470 E. St. Rose Pkwy, Ste. 105	
Henderson, NV 89074 Telephone: (702) 452-1500	
Facsimile: (702) 920-8903	
hroland@rolandlawfirm.com	
ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.	
Nevada Bar No. 8366 TIFFANY S. BARNEY, ESQ.	
Nevada Bar No. 9754	
ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD.	
3317 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite B	
Las Vegas, NV 89102	
Telephone: (702) 438-7878 Facsimile: (702) 259-1116	
Attorneys for Christopher D. Davis	
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTR	AICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NI	EVADA
In the matter of:	Case No.: P-15-083867-T
	Dept, No.: 26
The BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE	
TRUST, dated July 28, 2000, as amended on February 24, 2014.	
CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS' REPLY TO CAROLI	
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO N	RCP (12)(D) AND NRCP 19

CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS ("Christopher"), by and through his attorneys HARRIET H.

ROLAND, Esq., of the ROLAND LAW FIRM and ANTHONY L. BARNEY, Esq., of the law 26

24

25

- office of ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD., and hereby submits his reply to Caroline Davis' 27
- 28 ("Caroline") opposition to his motion to dismiss the Petition of Caroline Davis ("Caroline")

pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) and for failure to join an indispensible party 2 ~ under NRCP 19. This pleading is based on the Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto, any exhibits attached hereto, and any oral argument that will be heard in this matter. ğ DATED this 17th day of April, 2015. 5 Respectfully Submitted, Ś **ROLAND LAW FIRM** 3 8 Harriet H. Roland, Esq. 9 Attorney for Christopher D. Davis 10 i i 1. P 13 14 intentionally left blank] fremainder 15 page хŊ 16 18 19 20 21 22 23



MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. FACTS PRESENTED

Christopher Davis hereby incorporates the Facts Presented in his Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to NRCP 12(b) and NRCP 19 ("Original Motion") as if set forth fully herein. By way
of summary, he alleges:

8 Christopher's mother, Beatrice B. Davis ("Beatrice"), a life-long resident of Missouri, 3 created several trusts and did extensive, sophisticated estate planning after her husband Ilus W. 20 Davis died. Her long-time attorney was the Missouri firm of Lehnhardt & Lehnardt. She 11 created the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Trust, in Missouri, on April 4, 1990, (the Revocable 12 Trust) and the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust (the "FHT"), in Missouri, on July 28, 13 14 2000. She participated in the Davis Family Office, a Missouri limited liability company, formed 22 None of these entities had any Nevada contacts until the purported on November 3, 1999. 18 appointment of Dunham Trust Company on February 24, 2014. 17

Christopher Davis ("Christopher") and his wife Tarja are residents of Missouri. Caroline Davis is a resident of Washington. (Caroline and Christopher serve as co-trustees of the Revocable Trust which is administered under Missouri law, in Missouri.) Winfield Davis and his son Ace Davis are residents of Japan, but citizens of the United States. Stephen Lehnardt, the Trust Protector, is a resident of Missouri. Alaska Trust Company and its successor in interest,

Ą

- Alaska USA Trust Company, do business in Alaska and, upon information and belief, have no
 Nevada contacts. Among all the entities and assets, the only contact with Nevada is Dunham
 Trust Company, ("Dunham") which is alleged to be currently acting as directed trustee of the
 FHT. Even the Ashley Cooper insurance policy (the product of a tax-free exchange from the
 - 3

year 2000), which is the primary asset of the trust and the subject matter of Caroline's petition,
 is not administered in Nevada. It is administered under a custodian domiciled in Puerto Rico,
 and its investment advisor is a Canadian broker-dealer.

5 Dunham created FHT Holdings, LLC, ("FHT Holdings") on March 28, 2014, and 6 transferred the insurance policy to it. Dunham is the 100% owner/member of FHT Holdings. 7 Christopher is the manager, and Dunham purportedly acts as "directed trustee" pursuant to the 8 purported First Amendment to the FHT dated February 24, 2014. Upon information and belief, 9 the directed trustee and LLC structure was put into place by Dunham in an attempt to shield 10 itself from the fiduciary liability inherent in holding large assets without diversification.

Christopher Davis, as manager of FHT Holdings, has no power over the Ashley Cooper
 policy, or over the Puerto Rico custodian, or over the Canadian broker-dealer investment
 adviser. Upon information and belief, the sole purpose of his appointment and the formation of
 FHT Holdings, LLC, was to shield Dunham from fiduciary liability for its action or inaction.
 Christopher receives no compensation or benefit in his position as manager of FHT Holdings.

II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

ų,

18

19A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Invalidates Nevada's Jurisdiction Due To20Absence of Conditions Precedent to Change of Situs from Alaska to Nevada.

The entirety of Caroline's petition and her opposition to the motion to dismiss, and her
 request for the Nevada court to assert jurisdiction over Christopher and the Revocable Family

Trust, rests defectively upon the presumed validity of the change of situs of the Beatrice B.
Davis Family Heritage Trust dated July 28, 2000 (the "FHT") from Alaska to Nevada,
purportedly accomplished by the February 24, 2014 First Amendment.


It is important to note that the question of the validity of the change of situs is different than the question of the validity of the First Amendment. Although Caroline asserts that the purported First Amendment is "presumed to be valid unless proven otherwise", all the facts and evidence prove the change of situs (a condition precedent to the amendment) was invalid and not allowed under the terms of the FHT. The validity of the change of situs of the FHT (and presumably the amendment purporting to accomplish it) must be determined under the express mandate of Article 14, Section 6 of the FHT. Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the FHT provides the requirements for a change of situs as: Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting Protector and the Trustee thereof, which shall be given only after .
than the question of the validity of the First Amendment. Although Caroline asserts that the purported First Amendment is "presumed to be valid unless proven otherwise", all the facts and evidence prove the change of situs (a condition precedent to the amendment) was invalid and not allowed under the terms of the FHT. The validity of the change of situs of the FHT (and presumably the amendment purporting to accomplish it) must be determined under the express mandate of Article 14, Section 6 of the FHT. Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the FHT provides the requirements for a change of situs as: Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
than the question of the validity of the First Amendment. Although Caroline asserts that the purported First Amendment is "presumed to be valid unless proven otherwise", all the facts and evidence prove the change of situs (a condition precedent to the amendment) was invalid and not allowed under the terms of the FHT. The validity of the change of situs of the FHT (and presumably the amendment purporting to accomplish it) must be determined under the express mandate of Article 14, Section 6 of the FHT. Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the FHT provides the requirements for a change of situs as: Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
purported First Amendment is "presumed to be valid unless proven otherwise", all the facts and evidence prove the change of situs (a condition precedent to the amendment) was invalid and not allowed under the terms of the FHT. The validity of the change of situs of the FHT (and presumably the amendment purporting to accomplish it) must be determined under the express mandate of Article 14, Section 6 of the FHT. Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the FHT provides the requirements for a change of situs as: Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
evidence prove the change of situs (a condition precedent to the amendment) was invalid and not allowed under the terms of the FHT. The validity of the change of situs of the FHT (and presumably the amendment purporting to accomplish it) must be determined under the express mandate of Article 14, Section 6 of the FHT. Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the FHT provides the requirements for a change of situs as: Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
not allowed under the terms of the FHT. The validity of the change of situs of the FHT (and presumably the amendment purporting to accomplish it) must be determined under the express mandate of Article 14, Section 6 of the FHT. Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the FHT provides the requirements for a change of situs as: Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
presumably the amendment purporting to accomplish it) must be determined under the express mandate of Article 14, Section 6 of the FHT. Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the FHT provides the requirements for a change of situs as: Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
 mandate of Article 14, Section 6 of the FHT. Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the FHT provides the requirements for a change of situs as: Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the FHT provides the requirements for a change of situs as: Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting
Protector and the Trustee thereof, which shall be given only after Trustee has obtained
advice from counsel as to the tax and other consequences of a change in situs. ¹
The conditions precedent to the change of situs require that all of the beneficiaries then eligible
to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions must consent to the change of the situs. In
addition, both the FHT Trust Protector and Trustee must consent to the change of situs after the
Trustee has been able to meet with an attorney to discuss the tax and other consequences of a
change in situs, and after all the current income beneficiaries of the FHT have consented. These
conditions did not occur. Therefore the situs of the FHT remains in Alaska until the conditions
are performed.
Caroline recognizes that Tarja Davis is a discretionary beneficiary of the FHT. This is
immediately clear by a simple review of the terms of the FHT^2 and by a simple review of the
See Article 14, Section 4, Page 14-7, attached as Exhibit 1 to Caroline Davis's Original Petition (emphasis added). See Trust, Article Three, Section 1, Page 3-1; See also Article Eight, Section 3.d., Page 8-4, See also Article 8- 4.b.1-2, Pages 8-12 and 8-13 attached as Exhibit 1 to Caroline Davis' Original Petition.
5

:

certificate of service filed by Caroline.³ Furthermore, Caroline asserts and provides written 1 2 proof that Alaska USA Trust Company ("Alaska USA") resigned as Trustee on December 5, 1 2013. The resignation of Alaska USA as Trustee occurred almost three months prior to the Å, execution of the purported first amendment on February 24, 2014 and the appointment of 5 Dunham Trust Company ("Dunham") as successor Trustee. ÷ There is no evidence that anyone or any entity assumed the office of Trustee and was in 13 13 authority to act and provide consent of the Trustee during the period between the resignation of 9 Alaska USA in December 2013 and the purported first amendment attempting the change of 10 situs and appointing Dunham almost three months later. In contravention of the terms of the 11 FHT, there was a purported change in situs made while there was no acting Trustee to provide 12 informed consent to the change in situs. Further, it appears everyone overlooked the necessity 3.3 14 of obtaining the consent Christopher's wife, Tarja, who was and is a beneficiary entitled to 15 discretionary distributions. Tarja did not consent to the change in situs, and her signature cannot 16 be found on any of the documents purporting to achieve the change in situs to Nevada and 17 Dunham's appointment as successor trustee. 18 The law of Alaska, as the situs and place of administration of the FHT before the 29 20 attempted change of situs, and the place of residence of Alaska USA Trust Company, the then 21 Trustee, governs the validity of the First Amendment's change of situs to Nevada, the a a appointment of Dunham, and the other terms of the First Amendment, as well as the validity of 23

24	the Trust and the First Amendment itself.	
25		
.26		
27	³ See Certification of Service for Opposition to Chrisopher D. Davis' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP (12)(b)	
28	and NRCP 19 dated April 13, 2015 (This correction was made by Caroline Davis after Christopher Davis filed his Motion to Dismiss alerting the parties as to the defectiveness of both the service of process and the defective nature of the purported first amendment).	
	6	********************************

Article 12, Section 3 of the FHT requires "Any proceedings to seek judicial instructions 3 all. or a judicial determination shall be initiated by my Trustee in the appropriate state court having 3 original jurisdiction of those matters relating to the construction and administration of trusts. ş Because under the terms of the FHT, questions of validity must be determined under Alaska 5 law, and Alaska is the venue which has original jurisdiction of the FHT until the attempted 6 change of situs is accomplished, and an Alaska court must determine whether the change of 100 8 situs and the First Amendment were valid. Only then should the Nevada court take jurisdiction 9 over the FHT, and only if jurisdiction is then appropriate. 10 Alaska law allows for modification of an irrevocable trust upon consent, but by court 11 approval. AS 13.36.360 Modification or Termination of Irrevocable Trust By Consent, reads: Ĩ.Ã (a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, on petition by a trustee, 13 14 settlor, or beneficiary, a court may modify or terminate an irrevocable trust if all of the 13 beneficiaries consent and if continuation of the trust on the existing terms of the trust is 26 not necessary to further a material purpose of the trust. However, the court, in its 27 discretion, may determine that the reason for modifying or terminating the trust under 18 29 the circumstances outweighs the interest in accomplishing the material purposes of the 20 trust. The inclusion of a restriction on the voluntary or involuntary transfer of trust 22 interests under AS 34.40.110 may constitute a material purpose of the trust under this 22 subsection, but is not presumed to constitute a material purpose of the trust under this 23



subsection.

(b) Unless otherwise provided in the trust instrument, an irrevocable trust

may not be modified or terminated under this section while a settlor is also a

discretionary beneficiary of the trust.

(c) If a beneficiary other than a qualified beneficiary does not consent to a modification or termination of an irrevocable trust that is proposed by the trustee, settlor, or other beneficiaries, a court may approve the proposed modification or termination if the court determines (1) if all the beneficiaries had consented, the trust could have been modified or terminated under this section; and (2) the rights of a beneficiary who does not consent will be adequately protected or not significantly impaired. (d) In (c) of this section, "qualified beneficiary" means a beneficiary who (1) on the date the beneficiary's qualification is determined, is entitled or eligible to receive a distribution of trust income or principal; or (2) would be entitled to receive a distribution of trust income or principal if the event causing the trust's termination occurs. It is well settled that a trust may only be modified in accordance with its specific terms.⁴

Where a trust instrument requires the consent of specific parties in order for an amendment to be valid, the lack of consent will invalidate a purported amendment.⁵ This required consent demonstrates the importance of having Alaska USA Trust Company ("Alaska USA") or their successor-in-interest (and predecessor trustee) Alaska Trust Company demonstrate authority and consent to change the situs of the FHT from Alaska to Nevada, because unless this evidence of 33

24	
25	
26	* Dallinger v. Abel, 199 III. App. 3d 1057, 1059-1060 (III. App. Ct. 1990) citing Parish v. Parish (1963), 29 III. 2d 141, 149, 193 N.E.2d 761, 766.) (It is elementary that if the method of exercising a power of modification is
52	described in the trust instrument, the power can be asserted only in that manner.) 5 Williams v. Springfield Marine Bank, 131 III, App. 3d 417, 475 N.E.2d 1122 (1985) (This rule was applied where
28	the trust instrument permitted amendment by the settlors, the appellate court holding that an attempted amendment by only one settlor, after the other had died, was invalid.); See also Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 331, Explanatory Notes, comment e, at 144 (1959) ("If the settlor reserves a power to modify the trust only with the
	8

consent is provided, the FHT situs cannot be changed. The consents of <u>some</u> of the beneficiaries
 and the FHT Trust Protector was not enough to meet the strict requirements of the condition
 precedent (i.e. change of situs) for the purported First Amendment.

Ą,

Caroline has provided no evidence of any written or even oral consent of any trustee 5 authorizing the FHT's change in situs prior to Alaska USA's resignation on December 5, 2013. S She has not provided any evidence of Tarja having consented to the change of situs. She has not 7 8 provided any evidence of the unanimous agreement of Beatrice Davis's children to appoint a 9 successor trustee in the event the Trust Protector fails to appoint a Successor Trustee within 20 thirty (30) days after Alaska USA resigned, ⁶ and even if they had, the successor trustee and 11 Tarja would have had to consent to the change of situs. Therefore, the change of situs under the 12 purported First Amendment must be presumed invalid until such evidence of an acting Trustee's 13 14 consent can be produced and evidence of the Trustee's and all beneficiaries' consent of the 2.8 change in situs can be obtained. Further and most importantly, such a dispute, which includes 25 the validity of the First Amendment, must be brought in Alaska, as the original situs of the FHT 17 before the purported First Amendment and the attempted change of situs. 18

Christopher asserts that the change of situs is invalid because of the lack of consent of all
 beneficiaries and the absence of action by an Alaska Trustee. The determination of the validity
 of the purported First Amendment and the change of situs (as well as its other provisions) is a
 condition precedent to the Nevada court taking jurisdiction over the FHT. That determination

24	must be made under Alaska law before the Nevada court can assert jurisdiction over the FHT.
25	Caroline alleges that the FHT Trust Protector validly appointed Dunham as successor Trustee on
26	
27	consent of one or more of the beneficiaries, or of the trustee, or of a third person, he cannot modify the trust without
28	such consent."). ⁶ See Trust, Article Eleven, Section 3(c), Page 11-3, attached as Exhibit 1 to Caroline Davis's Original Petition.
	9

ĩ	February 24, 2014, citing the second paragraph of Article 14, Section 6 as his authority to do so;
2	however as noted herein, she omitted the preceding paragraph relating to the change of situs
3	which is the condition precedent before an amendment can be authorized. Although the FHT
4	authorizes the Trust Protector and/or the beneficiaries to appoint a successor trustee in certain
6	circumstances, the change of situs could only be authorized upon consent by all beneficiaries,
7	and approval by a trustee in the original situs of Alaska
8	When the terms of a trust are not followed, the resulting actions based upon such
9	deviation may be invalidated. ⁷ Under the terms of the FHT, discussed above, it was not
10 11	Dunham's consent that was required to change the situs. The timing of the purported First
12	Amendment and Dunham's consent put the cart before the horse. In order to move the situs of
13	the FHT from Alaska to Nevada or any other jurisdiction, all the beneficiaries had to consent,
14	the "then acting Trust Protector" had to consent, and the Alaska trustee had to consent only after
15	obtaining the requisite legal advice. Only then could a change in situs occur. (This is a
16 17	different and more demanding standard than merely changing the trustee to another Alaska
18	trustee.) Another Alaska Trustee could have been appointed, and the consent of all the
19	beneficiaries could have been obtained; then upon agreement by the Trustee, all beneficiaries,
20	and the Trust Protector, the situs could have been validly changed. However, the FHT's
21	purported First Amendment attempts to change the FHT's situs while concurrently appointing
22	Dunham as a "directed trustee". Again, Dunham's valid appointment as a Trustee, and its
24	consent to serve, could have been achieved only after the situs of the FHT was changed from
25	Alaska to Nevada. Had all of the beneficiaries consented, the decision to change the situs may
26	
27	
28	⁷ Northwestern University v. McLoraine, 108 III. App. 3d 310, 438 N.E.2d 1369 (1982) (This rule was applied where the settlor had neglected to follow the terms of the trust which required for an amendment only that the settlor put the amendment in writing, sign it, and deliver it to the trustees during the settlor's lifetime.)
	10

.

f -

have found a more stable legal basis had Dunham been doing business in Alaska. But as a 1 Nevada trustee, Dunham would have had to already be in tenure as trustee, procured advice S. from legal counsel about the tax and other consequences of moving the FHT situs, and then \$ authorized the actual change in FHT's situs from Alaska. The requisite consent of an authorized 3 Alaska trustee and all the beneficiaries does not appear in the purported First Amendment or in ŝ any other document, and Caroline Davis does not provide any other evidence of a Trustee's 1 8 consent between December 2013 and February 2014. The condition precedent of all the 9 beneficiaries' consents and the Alaska trustee's consent was not met in order to provide 3.0 authority to then acting Trust Protector, Stephen Lehnardt, to change the situs of the FHT 11 without the consent of an Alaska Trustee as required by the terms of the FHT. The FHT's 12 purported First Amendment's change of situs is, therefore, invalid. 23 14

Establishing the validity of the FHT's purported First Amendment under NRS 164.010 15 without invoking Alaska jurisdiction is Caroline's "attempted foothold" in her urging for this 3.6 Court to take improper in rem jurisdiction over the FHT, FHT Holdings, and personal 17 jurisdiction over Dunham, but more importantly it is the defective basis upon which she urges 28 19 this Court to assume jurisdiction over Christopher in all his capacities within any family entity, 20 foreign or domestic, including the Revocable Trust and the Davis Family Office which are 22 residents of Missouri. Even assuming arguendo that jurisdiction is proper through the untenable 22 theory that the the First Amendment is valid, this court could only obtain jurisdiction over the 23

24	FHT. Thus, Caroline is more than willing to overlook the FHT's requirements for change of
25	situs and the jurisdictional prerequisites, and arrive at the erroneous conclusion that somehow
26 27	Christopher and Mr. Lenhardt "consented to the jurisdiction of this Court by operation of law."
28	Noticeably, Caroline cites NRS 163.5555 as authority for this statement but ignores the

1 | requirement that the FHT be subject to the laws of Alaska, which, is clearly in dispute precisely
 2 because of the invalidity of the purported First Amendment's change of the FHT's situs to
 3 | Nevada.

It is clear that even during the life of Beatrice B. Davis, the situs of the FHT could not be 2 changed unless her Alaska trustee had obtained an opinion of legal counsel to the effect that the ស័ change in situs would not impact adversely on the spendthrift provisions of the FHT.8 The 7 8 express purpose of the FHT was to support and protect Beatrice's family for generations to 9 come, through the protection for the shares allocated to each beneficiary, so that no situation 20 would be created that could expose any of the beneficiary's shares to the claims of creditors 22 including amongst any beneficiary acting as a creditor to another.⁹ The attempted appointment 12 as Dunham as a directed trustee shedding all its liability onto Christopher clearly contravened 23 14 her intent.

25 Beatrice Davis, the trustmaker, was very clear that even if a power was granted to her 16 Trustee by applicable state and federal statutes, it would be strictly limited to any express 17 limitations or contrary directions in the EHT.¹⁰ Any amendment to change the situs of the FHT 18 29 would require the opinion of legal counsel as to its effect and be curtailed, if applicable, by the 20 terms of the FHT. This protection is implicit in the requirement that the advice of legal counsel 21 be sought by the Trustee prior to a change in situs of the FHT.¹¹ There is simply no evidence to 22 suggest that such an opinion was obtained by the Alaska Trustee prior to the purported change 23

in FHT situs.
⁸ See Trust, Article Fourteen, Section 6, Page 14-7 and 14-8.
 ⁹ See Trust, Article 8, Section 3 (b), Page 8-3. ¹⁰ See Trust, Article Thirteen, Section 3.z., Page 13-19. ¹¹ See Trust, Article Fourteen, Section 6, Page 14-7 and 14-8.
12


1	Because of the lack of evidence of the required consent by the Alaska trustee and all the
2	beneficiaries, and because the Alaska trustees initiated and completed all the transactions for
3	which Caroline is demanding an account, the presence of the predecessor Alaska trustees acting
4 33	prior to February 24, 2014 (the date of the purported First Amendment) is indispensable to this
6	matter, in order to determine the validity and consent issues discussed herein. Without the
7	indispensible party(ies) being joined, including Alaska Trust, the predecessor trustee and
8	successor in interest of Alaska USA, and/or another Alaskan successor after December 5, 2013,
9	the matter cannot properly adjudicated.
10 11	B. Indispensible Parties to this Action and Caroline's Failure to Provide Notice or
12	
	Service
13	Caroline alleges that "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska ¹² and Alaska USA
	Caroline alleges that "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska ¹² and Alaska USA
23	Caroline alleges that "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska ¹² and Alaska USA distributed approximately \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life
13 14	Caroline alleges that "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska ¹² and Alaska USA
13 14 15	Caroline alleges that "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska ¹² and Alaska USA distributed approximately \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life
13 14 15 16	Caroline alleges that "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska ¹² and Alaska USA distributed approximately \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, to Chrstioher individually, and as a co-trustee with Caroline of the Beatrice B.
13 14 15 16 17	Caroline alleges that "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska ¹² and Alaska USA distributed approximately \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, to Chrstioher individually, and as a co-trustee with Caroline of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust, dated April 4, 1990, as amended (the "Revocable Trust"), and as
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Caroline alleges that "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska ¹² and Alaska USA distributed approximately \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, to Chrstioher individually, and as a co-trustee with Caroline of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust, dated April 4, 1990, as amended (the "Revocable Trust"), and as Manager of the Davis Family Office, a Missouri limited liability company (the "Davis Office").
13 14 15 16 17 18	Caroline alleges that "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska ¹² and Alaska USA distributed approximately \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, to Chrstioher individually, and as a co-trustee with Caroline of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust, dated April 4, 1990, as amended (the "Revocable Trust"), and as Manager of the Davis Family Office, a Missouri limited liability company (the "Davis Office"). Caroline apparently believes that the Alaska trustees which allegedly procured more than two
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Caroline alleges that "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska ¹² and Alaska USA distributed approximately \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, to Chrstioher individually, and as a co-trustee with Caroline of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust, dated April 4, 1990, as amended (the "Revocable Trust"), and as Manager of the Davis Family Office, a Missouri limited liability company (the "Davis Office"). Caroline apparently believes that the Alaska trustees which allegedly procured more than two million dollars in policy loans from Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy for various FHT

:

Trustee of the Revocable Trust, and as Manager of the Davis Office, was the only individual to	
¹² Alaska Trust Company was the predecessor trustee of the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust dated July 28, 2000 prior to Alaska USA Trust Company.	
13	
	 ¹² Alaska Trust Company was the predecessor trustee of the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust dated July 28, 2000 prior to Alaska USA Trust Company.

receive distributions as a result of such loans and the only one privy to the information sought
 by Ms. Davis,...^{*13} Her allegation is misplaced.

3 Caroline apparently believes that neither Beatrice, nor the Alaska trustees, nor any other \$ entity, were the recipients of any of the FHT funds borrowed, distributed, or otherwise disbursed 8 from the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, which based upon the administration expenses 5 by Alaska and/or Alaska USA or the Trust Protector is improbable at best. Under Alaska law 7 8 and almost every other jurisdiction in the United States, a trustee is entitled to fees, and the 9 mandate of an accounting for trust assets is directed to the trustee that actually administered the 20 trust funds or assets, not to a beneficiary or other creditor or debtor of the trust. ¹⁴ In this case, 11 those trustees required to account would be Alaska Trust and Alaska USA (now merged into 22 Alaska USA) and they are the only ones who could account for these transactions, and whether 23 14 or not they received any of those funds including but not limited to their administration costs or 25 other investment expenses, as well as for what purposes the loans, distributions, or 16 disbursements were made. Because only they would have such information, they are a 17 necessary and indispensible party. Caroline's request would greatly prejudice and unduly 13 burden Christopher to attempt secure information from and in the possession of the prior 18 20 trustees in Alaska for documentation that Caroline desires through a proceeding in Nevada, ĨĨ during the time that she had co-equal status with him as a beneficiary. Alaska and/or Alaska 22 USA would be the proper parties from whom to request her desired information. 23



allegedly received and distributed \$2,164,744.68 as well as allegedly transferring all the assets 1.1 di. of the FHT to Dunham. Interestingly, the information Caroline Davis is requesting would be in 3 the possession of the two Alaska trustees that she claims are not indispensable, which is an 4 unreasonable argument. It is unclear if Caroline even bothered to request an accounting from 5 either Alaska Trust or Alaska USA concerning their alleged receipt and distribution of 8 \$2,164,744.68, or from Dunham regarding the \$25,000 that was allegedly loaned during 7 Ï Dunham Trust Company's alleged trusteeship before rushing to this court for a remedy. As a 9 beneficiary, she could have easily requested this information from these trustees without filing 10 the present court action. 11 Because of her rush to court without apparently requesting these documents from the 12 trustees, Caroline now attempts twice to indicate that she is "not now objecting to the loans and 13 14 distributions being made or claiming any breach of fiduciary duty ... " or she "is not now 15 claiming any willful misconduct or gross negligence by Alaska or Alaska USA."15 However, 2.6 she has asked this court to assume jurisdiction over the Nevada trustee, the FHT, the Trust 17 Protector and trust adviser, and if she succeeds, she will file any future action in this same 18 Nevada case. Therefore, her allegation that "Alaska and Alaska USA have no interest in the 19

Nevada case. Therefore, her anegation that Ataska and Ataska Cove have do interest in the outcome of the relief being sought by Ms. Davis in her Petition" is incorrect. Alaska and Alaska
USA would have every interest in the outcome of this action because they were trustees of the Trust who made the trust loans which are the subject of Caroline's concerns, and over which she

24	has asked this Court to exercise in rem jurisdiction. Furthermore, they were trustees for the time
25 26 27	periods in which Caroline seeks all information and, therefore, logically any information and/or claims arising from the information in Alaska and Alaska USA's possession is relevant to them.
28	¹⁴ See Alaska Statute 13,36,080; See also NRS 164,015 and NRS 153,031(1)(h).
	15


	Relying on the purported validity of the First Amendment to the FHT, Caroline comes to
th	e misleading conclusion that, "[because] Dunham Trust lacked the authority to act, the transfer
o	f the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy must have been done at the direction of Mr. Davis,
as	s Investment Trust Advisor." Noticeably, Caroline removes any reference to the Alaska or
A	laska USA Trustees who would have the information or approved any alleged transfers and
ha	ave the information pertaining thereto. Caroline freely omits information to wrongfully obtain
th	e information she seeks. She further ignores that the manager of an LLC wholly owned by
th	e Trustee who is a beneficiary of the trust would not have the authority to transfer the policy
to	itself. Caroline leaps to her finger-pointing apparently without bothering to request the
tra	ansfer documents either from Dunham or the Puerto Rico custodian.
	Caroline is simply attempting to gain access to records that she could request from the
pa	arties that she claims are not indispensable, and to delve into Christopher's personal affairs.
S	he has asked for an accounting from him as to the use of all the loan proceeds, disbursements
01	distributions from the FHT, without regard to the entity or person who in fact was the
bo	prrower or recipient. It is a question for the Alaska trustee as to whether the loans or
dí	stributions were made in accordance with the provisions of the FHT. With 20/20 hindsight,
C	aroline may regret that she did not borrow funds, request distributions, or demand an
ac	counting from the Alaska trustees while she was able to do so. Now she is asking this Court
to	turn a blind eye and "look beyond" ¹⁶ her failure to even make any appropriate request on the
pr	oper parties or serve the proper parties that would have the information that she is seeking.
С	bristopher respectfully requests that this Court grant his motion to dismiss and deny Caroline's
cl	aims in their entirety.
15	See Page 7, lines 24-25 and Page 8, lines 17-18 of Caroline Davis's Objection.
	16

1

C. Individual Parties or Entities Were Not Properly Served for the Court to Exercise Jurisdiction, and FHT Holdings' Corporate Form May Not Be Disregarded

In an effort to buttress her argument regarding their lack of proper service upon FHT 4 Holdings, LLC, Caroline cites to inapplicable case law from Surrogate's Court of New York, 5 New York County, which does not address the necessity of providing proper service to a 8 2 corporation. In similar fashion to her omission of the language of the FHT as it related to the 8 condition precedent to any future amendment, she even withheld the pertinent language for the 9 cited case which actually held that, "It is sometimes said that where an estate or trust owns all or 20 substantially all of the shares of a corporation, the corporate form may be disregarded and the 22 situation viewed just as if the fiduciaries held title to the corporate assets. This would appear to 22 13 be an oversimplification of the matter. It is not so much a matter of disregarding the corporate 14 form, but rather of giving paramount consideration to the testamentary plan and scheme, and 25 effectuating it in the manner prescribed by the testator. (citation omitted) Sometimes, due 26 consideration of the testamentary plan demands that the corporate form be respected. This is 17 particularly true where the testator directed the formation of a corporation or the continuance of 19 19 one formed during his lifetime. (citation omitted).¹⁷

20 Under the facts of this case, Beatrice, as Trustmaker, did not form FHT Holdings, LLC, 21 and did not specify that FHT Holdings be given consideration as part of her testamentary plan 22 and scheme. Based upon the definition of the case cited by Caroline, she is attempting to 23



5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	
r.s.	Furthermore, in Swensen v. Sheppard, our Nevada Supreme Court recognized that NRS
2	164.010(1) and NRS 164.015(6) do not give the court jurisdiction to impose personal
3	judgments. ¹⁸ Likewise, it found that it could not impose personal liability on individuals or
4	entities which "required the court to acquire 'personal jurisdiction over [them as] part[ies],
6	normally through appropriate process based on contacts with the jurisdiction or through [their]
7	general appearance therein to defend on the merits.""19
8	In her Opposition, however, Caroline attempts to request this court take exception to the
9	requirements for proper service and notice, which is entirely improper. Caroline is attempting
10	to use the relaxed standards of statutory in rem jurisdiction for the more stringent requirements
11 12	necessary to obtain the necessary personal jurisdiction over Christopher Davis, individually or
13	upon FHT Holdings, LLC. Again, this is improper and contrary to due process requirements.
14	Proper notice and service are required for personal jurisdiction over a party especially when
18	
16	requesting the court to exercise power and authority over an individual party or upon a business
17	entity.
18	Furthermore, when assets are transferred with proper authority to a business entity, then
19	the property becomes part of the business entity and not the trust. ²⁰ Thus, a district court's in
20	rem jurisdiction under NRS 164.010(1) and NRS 164.015(6) over the trust assets do not extend
21	to assets transferred from the trust to a business entity or to a third party from that business
22	
23	entity. ²¹ Therefore, even if the Court were to obtain jurisdiction over the insurance poincy

24	administered by a Puerto Rico insurer with the advice of the Canadian broker-dealer investment
28	
26	¹⁸ Swensen v. Sheppard (In re Aboud), 314 P.3d 941, 946 (Nev. 2013)
27	¹⁹ Id, citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 30(2) cmt. c; see Young v. Nev. Title Co., 103 Nev. 436, 442, 744 P.2d 902, 905 (1987) ("A court does not have jurisdiction to enter judgment for or against one who is not a
28	party to the action. ^w) ²⁰ Swensen v. Sheppard (In re Aboud), 314 P.3d 941, 945-946 (Nev. 2013) ²¹ Id.
	18

~ 2 % 4 % 6 7 %	 advisor, Caroline would also have to seek personal jurisdiction over Christopher, individually, or FHT Holdings, LLC to obtain any relief she seeks. She did not do so. Therefore, the due process rights of the entities must be respected, and service properly administered in order to obtain jurisdiction over Christopher, individually, and FHT Holdings, LLC. Therefore, Caroline's Original Petition should be dismissed. D. Additional Indispensable Parties Named in Opposition Were Not Served; therefore,
9	Jurisdiction is Improper over Them.
10	Caroline admittedly did not include additional parties in her Original Petition that she
11	now alleges were recipients of FHT funds and loans from the insurance policy. Caroline alleges
12	that, "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska and Alaska USA distributed approximately
13	\$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, to Mr. Davis
14	individually, as co-Trustee (with her) of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust, dated
15	April 4, 1990, as amended (the "Revocable Trust"), and as Manager of the Davis Family Office,
16	a Missouri limited liability company (the "Davis Office"). In order to allegedly distribute loans,
18	Alaska and Alaska USA must have been recipients of FHT funds. In order to make a loan of
19	FHT funds to Alaska and Alaska, the custodian of the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy
20	must have been in receipt of FHT funds. If, as alleged, FHT funds were received by
21	Christopher, the Revocable Trust, and the Davis Family Office from Alaska and Alaska USA,
22	all three would have been recipients of those funds. Of the prior six alleged recipients, none of
24	them was afforded proper notice or service in this matter. Therefore, this court lacks
25	jurisdiction over these parties. Particularly, Nevada law does not allow for this Court to take
26	jurisdiction over the Revocable Trust and the Davis Family Office, which are Missouri entities,
27	
28	
	19

.

without examining the requirements necessary for jurisdiction over foreign entities holding only
 personal property.

13 Caroline, in effect, argues 1) the entity authorized to make the policy loan is not an 4 indispensible party, 2) that the party making the loans or distributions does not even need to be 3 noticed or served concerning the policy loans, 3) the only individual alleged as a recipient does 8 not need to be served pursuant to NRCP 4; and 4) that notice or service either under NRCP 4 or 1 8 NRS 155.010 does not need to be provided to the remaining alleged distributees and recipients 9 of FHT funds. These four arguments violate all constitutionally protected due process rights 20 and related laws existent in Nevada, and likely every other jurisdiction in the United States. 11 Proper parties should be included in lawsuits affecting their rights or responsibilities and proper 12 personal and subject matter jurisdiction should be obtained over all parties in such lawsuits. 13

14 Caroline admittedly understands the importance of obtaining in rem jurisdiction over a 15 trustee of a trust pursuant to NRS 164.010, because she asks this Court to assume jurisdiction of 28 the FHT pursuant to this statutory authority. Notwithstanding this admission, she seeks 17 jurisdiction over Christopher Davis, individually, as trustee of the Revocable Trust, and as 18 manager of FHT Holdings without even bothering to serve notice under NRS 155.010 or 19 20 pursuant to NRCP 4. Furthermore, Caroline failed to serve the custodian of the Ashley Cooper 21 Life Insurance Policy of which she claims provided the loans to the FHT. 22

Admittedly, all of these parties were admittedly never even served by Caroline, and

33

therefore her Petition must be dismissed for lack of proper jurisdiction over these parties.
 Notice and service of process were never given to these parties, and the Court is without
 jurisdiction over them. Therefore, Caroline's claims in her Original Petition must be dismissed.
 28

1

E. The Alaska Trustees are Indispensible Parties and Meet NRCP 19 Requirements; therefore, without a Joinder of these Parties, this Matter Must be Dismissed.

In Reply to the NRCP 19 factors discussed by Caroline in her Opposition, it is evident \$ that Caroline belies her own statements. Caroline indicates on the one hand that Alaska and 3 Alaska USA would not be "placed in a position in which they would need to protect any б interest²² while on the other indicating that Caroline is "not now claiming any willful 7 B misconduct or gross negligence by Alaska or Alaska USA" suggesting that when she obtains Ŷ any of Alaska or Alaska USA documents that possible claims are likely to follow.23 Alaska or 10 Alaska USA must be allowed to defend themselves if necessary or protect themselves from 11 liability in the accuracy of information that may be provided during their tenure as Trustees of 12 the FHT to avoid claims of willful misconduct or gross negligence by Caroline. 23

Furthermore, Christopher will be subjected to double or multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations in possibly many jurisdictions as a result of Caroline's claims without the necessary parties, Alaska and Alaska USA, joined to the present matter. Caroline seems to ignore the fact that she has now named multiple Defendants in this matter whose interests must all be considered, especially in light of the fact that proper service has not been effectuated on them for an order or judgment to be rendered against them in this matter.

Curiously, Caroline then requests the Court to seek relief from Christopher individually
 if the Court does find that Alaska and Alaska USA are indispensable parties. She wrongfully

24	asks the court to order Christopher to provide the documents that are in Alaska and Alaska
25	USA's possession without gaining proper jurisdiction over him individually. She wrongfully
26	alleges that such a request would allegedly not be prejudicial to Christopher and allegedly
27	
28	
	²² See Catoline's Opposition, Page 8, lines 21-22.
	21
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	

would be an adequate remedy, although the requested documents would be in the Trustee's
 possession.

She also falsely alleges that Alaska cannot allegedly assume jurisdiction over
Christopher, erroneously citing NRCP 19(b) for this proposition.²⁴ With proper service to
Christopher, Caroline could obtain jurisdiction over Christopher in Alaska if Alaska has
jurisdiction over the FHT.²⁵

Joinder of Alaska and Alaska USA, Inc., is necessary as previously explained in Christopher's Original Motion to Dismiss and herein. If their joinder is not feasible, then this matter must be dismissed, because they are necessary and indispensable parties to this matter.

III. CONCLUSION

3

8

9

10

33

12

23

14

18

2.6

18

19

20

22

22

For the foregoing reasons, Christopher respectfully requests the Court do the following,

1. Deny Caroline's Original Petition in its entirety;

2. Deny Caroline's Opposition in its entirety; and

3. Grant the relief requested in Christopher's Original Motion to Dismiss and all further

requests made in his Reply to Caroline's Opposition to his Original Motion to Dismiss;

4. Deny jurisdiction over the FHT Trust as a proceeding *in rem* until an Alaska court determines the validity of the change in situs, and/or the First Amendment;

23 | ²³ See Caroline's Opposition, Page 8, lines 17-18 (emphasis added).

²⁴ See Caroline's Opposition, Page 9, lines 14-15 and fn 24.

²⁵ See AS 13.36.375. Trustee Advisor: (a) A trust instrument may provide for the appointment of a person to act as 24 an advisor to the trustee with regard to all or some of the matters relating to the property of the trust. (b) Unless the terms of the trust instrument provide otherwise, if an advisor is appointed under (a) of this section, the property and 25 management of the trust and the exercise of all powers and discretionary acts exercisable by the trustee remain vested in the trustee as fully and effectively as if an advisor were not appointed, the trustee is not required to follow 28 the advice of the advisor, and the advisor is not liable as or considered to be a trustee of the trust or a fiduciary when acting as an advisor to the trust.; See also AS 13.36.035 (a) The court has exclusive jurisdiction of 27 proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the internal affairs of trusts, including trusts covered by (c) of this section. Except as provided in (c) and (d) of this section, proceedings that may be maintained under this section 28 are those concerning the administration and distribution of trusts, the declaration of rights, and the determination of other matters involving trustees and beneficiaries of trusts.

5. Deny jurisdiction over the Revocable Trust and the Davis Family office:

6. Deny jurisdiction over Christopher Davis personally;

DATED this 17th day of April. 2015.

Respectfully Submitted, ROLAND LAW FIRM

Harriet H. Roland, Esq. NV Bar No. 5471 2470 E. St. Rose Pkwy, Ste. 105 Henderson, NV 89074 Telephone: (702) 452-1500 Facsimile: (702) 920-8903 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com

Attorney for Christopher D. Davis

		2
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
	23	
		ļ

ŝ	
1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd., and not a party to this action.
3	I further certify that except as otherwise noted on April 20, 2015, I served the foregoing
	CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS' REPLY TO CAROLINE DAVIS' OPPOSITION TO HIS
4	MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP (12)(b) AND NRCP 19 by first class US mail, postage prepaid, upon the following persons or entities:
5	mail, postage prepate, upon the following persons or chornes.
6	
	Tarja Davis
7	514 West 26 th Street, #3E
8	Kansas City, Missouri 64108
9	Ace Davis
10	c/o Winfield B. Davis 266 6 States Anida
19. A.	366-6 Habu Aridagawa Arida Wakayama 643-0025
11	JAPAN
12	
**	Christopher D. Davis
13	514 West 26 th Street, #3E
14	Kansas City, Missouri 64108
15	Registered Agent Solutions, Inc.
1.6	Resgistered Agent for FHT Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company 4625 West Nevso Drive, Suite 2
.17	Las Vegas, Nevada 89103
1.8	Stephen Lehnardt
19	20 Westwoods Drive Liberty, Missouri 64068
20	Stephen@lehnardt.com
21	Winfield B. Davis
22	366-6 Habu Aridagawa Arida
	Wakayama 643-0025
23	JAPAN

Mark Solomon, Esq.
Joshua Hood, Esq.
SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.
9060 W. Cheyenne Ave.
Las Vegas, NV 89129
Attorney for Petitioner Caroline Davis

Charlene Renwick, Esq. Lee, Hernandez, Landrum & Garofalo 7575 Vegas Drive, #150 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorney for Dunham Trust Company

Employee of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd.

24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
	25



Ехнівіт 14

2000 - 2000		Electronically Filed 03/04/2015 07:07:20 PM
		Alm D. Colum
1	HARRIET H. ROLAND, ESQ.	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	NV Bar No. 5471 Roland Law Firm	
З	2470 E. St. Rose Pkwy, Ste. 105	
4	Henderson, NV 89074 Telephone: (702) 452-1500	
5	Facsimile: (702) 920-8903 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com	
6	Inorandageorandiawinneoon	
7	ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8366	
8	TIFFANY S. BARNEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9754	
9	ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD.	
10	3317 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite B Las Vegas, NV 89102	
11	Telephone: (702) 438-7878	
12	Facsimile: (702) 259-1116 Attorneys for Christopher D. Davis	
13	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DIST	RICT COURT
14	CLARK COUNTY,	NEVADA
15		
16	In the matter of:	Case No.: P-15-083867-T
17		Dept. No.: 26
18	The BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE TRUST, dated July 28, 2000, as amended on	The rear no
19	February 24, 2014.	
20		
21		
22		
23	CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS' MOTION TO DIS	

	AND NKCF 19	:
24		I
25	COMES NOW, CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS ("Christopher"), by and through his	
26	attorneys HARRIET H. ROLAND, Esq., of the ROLAND LAW FIRM and ANTHONY L.	
27	BARNEY, Esq., of the law office of ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD., and hereby submits his	
28	motion to dismiss the Petition of Caroline Davis ("Caroline") pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil	i

`

1	Procedure 12(b) and for failure to join an indispensible party under NRCP 19, and his refusal to	
2	have this matter heard before the Honorable Probate Commissioner. This pleading is based on	
З	the Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto, any exhibits attached hereto, and	
4	any oral argument that will be heard in this matter.	
5		
6	DATED this 4th day of March. 2015.	
7	Respectfully Submitted, ROLAND LAW FIRM,	
8	iii O	
9	<u>+tikaka</u>	
10	Harriet H, Roland, Esq. Attorney for Christopher D. Davis	
11		
12		
13		
14		
15 16		
17	[remainder of page intentionally left blank]	
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		



CHRISDAVIS000529

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

3

Ĭ.

1

2

FACTS PRESENTED

The Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust (the "Trust") was settled by Beatrice B.
Davis on July 28, 2000, as an irrevocable trust. The Trust was purportedly amended on
February 24, 2014 by the Trust Protector. (The validity of the trust and the amendment are
guestions of Alaska or Missouri law, not Nevada law, and the determinations of their validity
are conditions precedent to any finding of jurisdiction by this Court and to the fiduciary's
delegation of duties.)

The Trust was part of the very sophisticated estate plan of Beatrice B. Davis
("Beatrice"), who was a Missouri resident until her death. Before his death, her husband llus
W. Davis, was an accomplished attorney and the mayor of Kansas City, Missouri. Beatrice and
Hus had two children, Caroline, and Christopher. Christopher is a resident of Missouri, who has
one child, Winfield, who resides in Japan. Caroline is an attorney in Seattle, Washington. Those
three descendants are the current beneficiaries of the Trust.

The Trust at all times relevant has held as its primary asset a single-premium life
 insurance policy which would not mature until the death of Beatrice's daughter-in-law. The
 policy was exchanged for a different policy, Ashley Cooper Policy, Policy Number ACLI 1105 8007 PC (the "Policy") during Beatrice's lifetime. The then-custodian of the policy was a

company in the Cayman Islands. Now, the custodian is in Puerto Rico. Initially, Alaska Trust
 Company ("ATC") served as trustee, until its removal in 2011, at which time Alaska USA Trust
 Company ("AUTC") became successor Trustee. Neither ATC nor AUTC is registered to do
 business in Nevada. ATC and AUTC were the Trustees and sole fiduciaries acting on behalf of

the Trust from 2000 until December 5, 2013, during the times of the transactions questioned by
 Caroline as Petitioner herein.

3 On February 24, 2014, Dunham Trust Company ("DTC") took office as next successor 4 trustee. On March 28, 2014, DTC created FHT Holdings, LLC, and effectuated the transfer of 5 the current life insurance policy to it. DTC is the sole member of FHT Holdings, LLC. 6 7 Christopher did not serve in any fiduciary capacity relating to the Trust until his purported 8 appointment as Investment Advisor of the Trust under the 2014 First Amendment ("first 9 amendment"), which was consented to, in writing, by all beneficiaries, including Caroline. (By 10 her consent, Caroline also indemnified AUTC from liability, excepting willful misconduct or 11 gross negligence.) 12 13 It is important that only ATC and AUTC borrowed funds from the insurer; and that the

14 settlor and the beneficiaries were not able to access or borrow any money from the insurer or the 15 policies. All loans were made with funds from the Trust, by the Alaskan trustees, with the sole 16 exception of the \$25,000 June 2014 withdrawal made by DTC, which presumably was for trust 17 purposes. Caroline is requesting documents and information concerning funds borrowed from 18 19 the insurer by ATC and AUTC while the policy was owned and controlled by them as trustees 20 of the Trust, yet she has not requested the Court take jurisdiction over either ATC or AUTC, 21 possibly because she has previously agreed in writing to AUTC's indemnification. 22

Contrary to Petitioner's assertions, Christopher did not at any time have authority to

24	direct ATC, AUTC, or the custodian of the Policy to make the loans, nor to obtain specific
25	information about the loans between the trustees and the insurer. He had no authority to borrow
26	from the policy, and he had no investment authority over the FHT assets during ATC's and
27	from the poney, and no mar no involution dubtority of a diversity about about about a diversity of a diversity
28	
	4

1	AUTC's tenure as trustee. ¹ He had only the same beneficiary rights as Caroline has, to request,
2	not demand, information or a loan of Trust funds from the trustee.
3	Petitioner is requesting documents and information produced during the tenure of ATC and
4	AUTC, ² which she admits would be in the possession of AUTC. ³ Thus, ATC and AUTC as the
6	Alaskan trustees who borrowed the funds from the insurer, and who made loans to any person or
7	entity, are necessary and indispensable parties herein. The Court must dismiss Petitioner's
8	Petition pursuant to NRCP 12(b) and 19, because relief cannot be awarded as a result of the
9	non-joinder of indispensable parties, ATC and AUTC, and due to a lack of jurisdiction over the
10 11	subject matter, lack of jurisdiction over the parties, insufficiency of process in these
12	proceedings, and an insufficiency of service of process.
13	II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
14	A. Petitioner has failed to bring a necessary party to entitle her to relief against
15	
~ ~	Defendants pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(6) and the Court should find AUTC is an
16 17	Defendants pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(6) and the Court should find AUTC is an indispensable party.
16 17 18	
17	indispensable party.
17 18	indispensable party. Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure ("NRCP") 12(b)(6), a party can bring a
17 18 19 20 21	indispensable party. Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure ("NRCP") 12(b)(6), a party can bring a motion for failure to join a party under NRCP 19. Herein, Petitioner has failed to join an
17 18 19 20 21 22	indispensable party. Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure ("NRCP") 12(b)(6), a party can bring a motion for failure to join a party under NRCP 19. Herein, Petitioner has failed to join an indispensable party pursuant to NRCP 19; therefore, a dismissal of Petitioner's requested relief
17 18 19 20 21	indispensable party. Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure ("NRCP") 12(b)(6), a party can bring a motion for failure to join a party under NRCP 19. Herein, Petitioner has failed to join an indispensable party pursuant to NRCP 19; therefore, a dismissal of Petitioner's requested relief is warranted as a matter of law, because complete relief cannot be accorded among the named
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	indispensable party. Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure ("NRCP") 12(b)(6), a party can bring a motion for failure to join a party under NRCP 19. Herein, Petitioner has failed to join an indispensable party pursuant to NRCP 19; therefore, a dismissal of Petitioner's requested relief is warranted as a matter of law, because complete relief cannot be accorded among the named parties.
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	indispensable party. Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure ("NRCP") 12(b)(6), a party can bring a motion for failure to join a party under NRCP 19. Herein, Petitioner has failed to join an indispensable party pursuant to NRCP 19; therefore, a dismissal of Petitioner's requested relief is warranted as a matter of law, because complete relief cannot be accorded among the named parties. NRCP 19(a) and (b) provide the following, ¹ The Petitioner goes to great lengths to discuss the Successor Trustees of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	indispensable party. Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure ("NRCP") 12(b)(6), a party can bring a motion for failure to join a party under NRCP 19. Herein, Petitioner has failed to join an indispensable party pursuant to NRCP 19; therefore, a dismissal of Petitioner's requested relief is warranted as a matter of law, because complete relief cannot be accorded among the named parties. NRCP 19(a) and (b) provide the following, ¹ The Petitioner goes to great lengths to discuss the Successor Trustees of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust in her Petition, but this is <u>not</u> the Trust over which Petitioner requests this Court take jurisdiction. ² See Petition, Page 5:3-5. Petitioner further admits to the necessary statement from AUTC stating at footnote 35,
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	indispensable party. Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure ("NRCP") 12(b)(6), a party can bring a motion for failure to join a party under NRCP 19. Herein, Petitioner has failed to join an indispensable party pursuant to NRCP 19; therefore, a dismissal of Petitioner's requested relief is warranted as a matter of law, because complete relief cannot be accorded among the named parties. NRCP 19(a) and (b) provide the following, ¹ The Petitioner goes to great lengths to discuss the Successor Trustees of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust in her Petition, but this is not the Trust over which Petitioner requests this Court take jurisdiction.
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	indispensable party. Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure ("NRCP") 12(b)(6), a party can bring a motion for failure to join a party under NRCP 19. Herein, Petitioner has failed to join an indispensable party pursuant to NRCP 19; therefore, a dismissal of Petitioner's requested relief is warranted as a matter of law, because complete relief cannot be accorded among the named parties. NRCP 19(a) and (b) provide the following, 'The Petitioner goes to great lengths to discuss the Successor Trustees of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust in her Petition, but this is <u>not</u> the Trust over which Petitioner requests this Court take jurisdiction. 'See Petition, Page 5:3-5. Petitioner further admits to the necessary statement from AUTC stating at footnote 35, 'Note that we do not have possession of statements from Alaska USA Trust Company indicating the disposition of the loan proceeds.''

(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.

1

2

3

ů,

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

The Nevada Supreme Court has indicated that "this court has required all persons materially 15 16 interested in the subject matter of the suit be made parties so that there is a complete decree to 17 bind them all. If the interest of absent parties may be affected or bound by the decree, they must 18 be brought before the court or it will not proceed to decree."4 It also concluded, that "[f]ailure 19 join an indispensable party is fatal to a judgment and may be raised by an appellate court sua 20 sponte."5 21 22 The U.S. Supreme Court has also held the following: 23

founder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is

24	the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and
25	bound by a judgment or decree. The parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else the nature and scope of relief sought in the action, and at whose expense
26	such relief might be granted. It makes sense, therefore, to place on them a burden of
27	
28	⁴ Olsen Family Trust v. District Court, 110 Nev. 548, 553 (1994). ⁵ Schwob v. Hemsath, 98 Nev. 293, 294 (1982), citing Provident Bank v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968) and Johnson v. Johnson, 93 Nev. 655, 572 P.2d 925 (1977).
	6

1	bringing in additional parties where such a step is indicated, rather than placing on
2	potential additional parties a duty to intervene when they acquire knowledge of the lawsuit. ⁶
3	Petitioner has failed to request jurisdiction over ATC or AUTC in its Petition, the very
4	
5	party(ies) that she admits was the party who borrowed the funds and under whose authority and
6	tenure the loans were made, and who was or is in possession of the information and documents
7	requested.7 The indispensible parties are located in the state of Alaska, were the trustees during
8	the period in which documents and information are requested to be disclosed, and, therefore,
9 10	ATC and/or AUTC would possess the requested documents and information that are being
11	requested.
12	ATC and AUTC are necessary parties because the time period in which the documents
13	and information are being requested was during the period that ATC and AUTC were trustees
14	of the Trust, and it was ATC and AUTC who borrowed the funds and made the loans.
15	
16	Furthermore, complete relief cannot be afforded among the remaining parties because ATC and
17	AUTC were the trustees who possessed the requested documents and information, and under
18	whose tenure the transactions occurred, before Christopher purportedly became Investment
19	Advisor, and before DTC took office. ⁸ Additionally, if the Court makes a ruling on behalf of

inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest to those documents,9 particularly in 23

the actions of these absent trustees (ATC and AUTC), then it would leave those persons already

parties to the case subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise

20

21

22

24	light of the Petitioner's indemnifications of AUTC. In other words, the named parties (over	
25		
26	⁶ Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1988).	
27	⁶ Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1988). ⁷ See Petition, Page 5:3-5.	
28	⁸ NRCP 19(a)(1).	
	⁹ NRCP 19(a)(2)(ii)	
	7	

which Petitioner requests this Court take jurisdiction) may be exposed unnecessarily to other
 court actions in other jurisdictions with double or multiple obligations by reason of Petitioner's
 requested relief.

ATC and AUTC are corporate residents of Alaska, and the transactions and occurrences 5 for which Petitioner has requested documents and information occurred by these trustees in 6 Alaska. Upon information and belief, the Trust hand no connections to Nevada during the time 7 8 period in which the documents and information have been requested. The Petitioner is 9 attempting to bootstrap her requests concerning the actions and records of ATC and AUTC to 10 DTC, the current trustee of the Trust. Because the Petitioner has failed to request jurisdiction 11 over ATC and AUTC, this Court is without authority to assume jurisdiction over ATC and 12 AUTC as indispensable parties.¹⁰ Petitioner even admits that AUTC is necessary party even as 13 14 to the sole transaction of \$25,000.00 purportedly made by DTC on June 13, 2014, stating in her 15 footnote that, "Note that we do not have possession of statements from Alaska USA Trust 16 Company indicating the disposition of the loan proceeds." Mr. Davis respectfully requests that 17 the Court find that ATC and AUTC are indispensable parties because they alone had actually 18 19 authority to borrow from the policy and invest FHT assets. 20 B. Agreement by Petitioner under Alaska Law to Release Alaska USA Trust Company

21

22

4

of Anchorage, Alaska

23 While it remains unclear why ATC was omitted as a necessary party, it has become more

24 25 26 27	clear why AUTC was intentionally omitted as a necessary party. The Petitioner agreed to release AUTC from serving as Trustee and acknowledged indemnification of AUTC under the terms of the Trust for the period of the Policy loans, and agreed that her consent effectuating the removal	
28	¹⁰ See NRCP 19(b). 8	

1	of AUTC would be governed under Alaska law, with venue in Anchorage, Alaska. ¹¹ The
2	Petitioner's agreement came after the Policy loans were authorized and approved by ATC and
3	AUTC, who were the legal owners of the Policy. At the time of ATC's and AUTC's ownership,
4	Christopher had no authority to direct ATC, AUTC, or the custodian of the Policy to make loans
5	nor did he have authority to direct Trust assets. The Petitioner, a resident of Seattle,
6 7	
8	Washington, is now attempting to avoid the jurisdiction of her neighboring state of Alaska in
9	favor of Nevada, because of her prior release and indemnification of AUTC, an indispensible
10	party to this action.
11	C. Because joinder is not feasible, the Court should make the determination that the
12	case be dismissed.
13	Pursuant to NRCP 19(b) quoted above, which outlines the various factors for this
14	Court's determination, Mr. Davis respectfully requests the Court make the determination that
15	the case be dismissed for the following reasons. First, an order or judgment rendered without
16 17	ATC and AUTC would be prejudicial to the named parties, because the information and
18	
	documents requested would have been produced or received by ATC and AUTC during the time
	documents requested would have been produced or received by ATC and AUTC during the time
19 20	period in which ATC and AUTC were trustees of the Trust. The named parties would be forced
19	
19 20	period in which ATC and AUTC were trustees of the Trust. The named parties would be forced

named parties, prejudice would still exist (it would not be lessened or avoided), because the sole
 relief being requested is for documents and information during the period in which ATC and
 AUTC were trustees, and during a period of time neither DTC nor Christopher had any
 See Resignation, Release, Acknowledgment, Consent and Indemnification Agreement dated February 24, 2014

9

•

1	fiduciary relationship to the Trust. These documents and information for this period would be
2	in the possession and control of ATC and AUTC.
3	Third, judgment rendered in ATC's and AUTC's absence would not be adequate,
4	because, again, the relief being requested is for documents and information during the time
5 6	period in which ATC and AUTC were the trustees of the Trust. The documents and information
7	
8	requested are in the possession and control of ATC and AUTC.
9	Fourth, Petitioner would still have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
10	nonjoinder, because Petitioner is not foreclosed from seeking her relief in another jurisdiction,
11	specifically, Alaska through proper service upon ATC and AUTC. In other words, Petitioner
12	has the possibility to obtain the information she seeks in a jurisdictionally appropriate forum.
13	Mr. Davis thus requests that the Court find that ATC and AUTC are indispensable
14	parties and that the case should be dismissed as a result, noting each of the four factors above.
15	D. Lack of Jurisdiction of the Nevada Court over Parties Due to Lack of Service of
16	Process
17	NRCP 12 (b) sets for the following jurisdictional and process grounds for a motion to
18 19	
20	dismiss as (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
21	person, (3) insufficiency of process, and (4) insufficiency of service of process.
22	Petitioner is relying solely upon the validity of a purported amendment to an irrevocable
23	trust ¹² which must be properly determined under Alaskan law. ¹³ Only after a determination of

~~ }	
24	the validity of purported amendment to an irrevocable trust by an Alaskan court, could the Court
25	
26	attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
27	¹² See Beatrice B. Davis FHT dated July 28, 2000 at Section 4 (This trust is irrevocable, and I shall have no power
28	toalter, amend, revoke, or terminate") emphasis added.
	¹⁰ See Beatrice B. Davis FHT dated July 28, 2000 at Section 2 and Section 7(e).
	10

properly rely upon the jurisdictional arguments raised by the Petitioner as a basis to assert ĩ 2 jurisdiction over the Trust. If the first amendment is invalid, then there is no basis upon which 3 to assume in rem jurisdiction over the Trust. \$ Without determining the validity of the purported amendment, Petitioner seeks to bootstrap 5 her request for this Court to take in rem jurisdiction by confirming DTC as the trustee of the 6 7 Trust without addressing her the condition precedent (i.e. validity of the first amendment) or the 8 clear lack of service of process necessary to take in personam jurisdiction in this proceeding 9 over the parties. 10 The Nevada Supreme Court held, "It is a fundamental and universal rule of law that a 11 court must have jurisdiction of the matter before it and of the proceedings concerning that 12 matter, or else its proceedings therein will be nullity."14 The Court explained that "it is the 13 14 primal duty of all courts to keep strictly within their jurisdiction...But unless prohibited by the 15constitutional provisions creating a court and providing the jurisdiction thereof, such court may 16 be given special and limited jurisdiction in certain specified cases by the legislature."15 17 The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that in rem proceedings were 18 19 developed primarily to expand the reach of the courts, which might have lacked in personam 20 jurisdiction over the owner of property.¹⁶ In Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., the United 21 States Supreme Court held that a proceeding in rem is not a remedy afforded by common law, it 22 is a proceeding under the civil law.¹⁷ The U.S. Supreme Court cited its earlier cases in which it 23

24	
25	¹⁴ State ex rel. Smith v. Sixth Judicial Court, 58 Nev. 214 (Nev. 1937).
26	¹⁵ State ex rel. Smith v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 58 Nev. 214 (Nev. 1937).
27 28	¹⁶ Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 616 (U.S. 1993).
28	¹⁷ 531 U.S. 438, 444-445 (U.S. 2001).
	11

held that when a proceeding in rem is used in the common-law courts, it is given strictly by 1 2 statute.18

З There are substantial differences between in rem and in personam jurisdiction that have 4 been defined by the courts.¹⁹ The Ninth Circuit defined the differences between in personam 5 jurisdiction and in rem jurisdiction as such, "In personam jurisdiction, simply stated, is the 6 power of a court to enter judgment against a person. In rem jurisdiction is the court's power 7 8 over property. Before a court may exercise the state's coercive authority over a person or 9 property, some statute must authorize the act."20 10

Even assuming arguendo that there was a proper jurisdictional basis for confirming DTC 11 as trustee under a proceeding in rem, there is no basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction over 12 Christopher in his personal capacity or FHT Holdings, LLC (a Nevada limited liability 13 14 company) under the current circumstances which would warrant intrusion into their records. 15 Again, even if the first amendment were proven valid, the Nevada Supreme Court held, "It is 16 one thing to possess jurisdiction. It is another to exercise it.⁵²¹ 17

20 18 The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411, 4 Wall, 411, 431, 18 L. Ed. 397, 32 How. Pr. 460 (1867) and The Hine v. Trevor, 21 71 U.S. 555, 4 Wall, 555, 571-572, 18 L. Ed. 451 (1867). 22 ¹⁹ SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2007); See also Hanson v. Denckla 357 U.S. 235, 246 fb 12 (1958) ("A 23

18

19

	judgment in personam imposes a personal liability or obligation on one person in favor of another. A judgment m	
24	rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property.")	
25	²⁰ Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1985) emphasis added; See also Trump v.	
26	Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 698-700 (1993).austina.)	
27	²¹ State ex rel. Crummer v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 276, 280-281 (Nev. 1952).	
28		

12

1	Under Nevada law, a limited liability company is considered a person. ²² And while the	ł
2	Nevada legislature set forth certain relaxed standards for service of process regarding certain	
3	persons such as a trust by statute, ²³ it did not do so for foreign or domestic limited liability	
4 5	companies. ²⁴ The Nevada Supreme Court held, "In addition to authority, however, the courts	
6	must by statute be provided with the necessary machinery. Thus it is recognized that exercise of	
7	jurisdiction through its courts by a state over its domiciliaries (other than by personal service of	
8	process) cannot be had in the absence of express statutory provision. ³²⁵ There is no such express	
9 10		
11		
12	²² NRS 0.039 "Person" defined. Except as otherwise expressly provided in a particular statute or required by	
13	the context, "person" means a natural person, any form of business or social organization and any other nongovernmental legal entity including, but not limited to, a corporation, partnership, association, trust or	
14	unincorporated organization. The term does not include a government, governmental agency or political subdivision of a government. (emphasis added). ²³ See Id., see also NRS 164.010 and 155.010 (Service by mail vs. personal service pursuant to NRCP 4).	
15 16	²⁴ The Nevada Legislature was well aware that in the absence of voluntary submission to the Court's jurisdiction by an interested party, an attempt by the Court to assert in personam jurisdiction under the relaxed requirements of	
17	NRS 155.010 over an interested party may violate the due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; See also <i>Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.</i> , 336 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); NRCP 4(d)	
18	Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the summons attached to a copy of the complaint as follows:	
19	(1) Service Upon Nevada Corporation. If the suit is against an entity or association formed under the laws of this state or registered to do business in this state, to the registered agent thereof or, if the entity or	
20	association is (i) a corporation, to any officer thereof; (ii) a general partnership, to any partner thereof; (iii) a limited partnership, to any general partner thereof; (iv) a member-managed limited-liability company, to any member	
21 22	thereof; (v) a manager-managed limited-liability company, to any manager thereof; (vi) a business trust, to any trustee thereof; (vii) a miscellaneous organization mentioned in NRS Chapter $\$1$, to any officer or director thereof; provided, when for any reason service cannot be had in the manner hereinabove provided, then service may be	
22	made upon such entity by delivering to the secretary of state, or the deputy secretary of state, a copy of said summons attached to a copy of the complaint, and by posting a copy of said process in the office of the clerk of the	
	court in which such action is brought or pending; defendant shall have 20 days after such service and posting in	

which to appear and answer; provided, however, that before such service shall be authorized, plaintiff shall make or cause to be made and filed in such cause an affidavit setting forth the facts showing that personal service on or notice to the entity or association cannot be had in the manner provided in this subsection within the state; and provided further, that if it shall appear from such affidavit that there is a last known address of a known officer, general partner, member, manager, trustee or director of said entity or association outside the state, plaintiff shall, in addition to and after such service upon the secretary of state and posting, mail or cause to be mailed to such known officer, general partner, member, manager, trustee or director at such address by registered or certified mail, a copy of the summons and a copy of the complaint, and in all such cases defendant shall have 20 days from the date of such mailing within which to answer or plead.

²⁵ State ex rel. Crummer v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 276 at 281 (Nev. 1952).

13

statutory provision that relaxed the standard of service of process required under NRCP 4 for
 service upon Christopher, individually or upon FHT Holdings, LLC.

It is clear that personal service of process was not effectuated upon Christopher,
 individually or upon FHT Holdings, LLC, either by summons and complaint or service pursuant
 to the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 4, therefore the Petitioner's improper demand for
 company records from FHT Holdings, LLC must fail for insufficiency of process, insufficiency
 of service of process and a lack of jurisdiction regarding Christopher, individually, and FHT
 Holdings, LLC.

Furthermore, Petitioner is requesting that FHT Holdings, LLC, a Nevada limited liability
 company, be required to turn over its records to her concerning prior Policy Loans, without
 bothering to make this request upon those trustees, ATC and AUTC, that authorized and
 initiated the Policy loans.

10


15

The Trust was settled by a Missouri resident in Missouri, and its situs and applicable law was Alaska. Upon information and belief, the policy is held by a custodian in Puerto Rico. The validity of the Trust, which is irrevocable, and the validity of the amendment to the irrevocable trust are determinations which must be made before the court can assert subject matter jurisdiction over the Trust. This determination cannot be made under Nevada law. It is respectfully submitted that this court cannot assert subject matter jurisdiction at this time.


23 E. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Purported First Amendment

- The Trust was settled by a Missouri resident, in Missouri, invoking Alaska law and
 declaring Alaska situs. The irrevocable Trust was amended to change not only the situs but the
 terms under which the trust would be governed, and to provide for a delegation of fiduciary
 duties. The validity of the Trust and the purported first amendment are determinations which
 - 14

1	must	be made before the court can assert subject matter jurisdiction over the Trust; these		
2		ninations are a condition precedent for jurisdiction. ²⁶		
З	III. CONCLUSION			
ą	L & .8			
5		WHEREFORE, Christopher D. Davis respectfully requests the following of the Court:		
6	1.	The Court find that ATC and AUTC are indispensable parties;		
7	2.	The Court dismiss Petitioner's claims for failure to bring an indispensable party pursuant		
8		to NRCP 19, noting the four factors under NRCP 19(b);		
9	3,	The Court dismiss Petitioner's claims for insufficiency of process, insufficiency of		
10		service of process and a lack of jurisdiction over the person of Christopher D. Davis,		
12		individually;		
13	4.	The Court dismiss Petitioner's claims for insufficiency of process, insufficiency of		
14		service of process and a lack of jurisdiction over the person of FHT Holdings, LLC;		
15	5.	The Court dismiss Petitioner's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to all		
16		named parties,		
17				
18	6,	The Court dismiss all Petitioner's claims against all named parties in this matter;		
19	7.	The Court deny Petitioner's Petition in its entirety;		
20	8.	The Court award attorney fees and costs to Christopher D. Davis in an amount deemed		
21 22		reasonable by this court; and		
23	- 17			



1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 9. The Court awards such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper in the premises. DATED this 4th day of March, 2015. Respectfully Submitted, ROLAND LAW FIRAJ Harriet H. Roland, Esg.
9	NV Bar No. 5471
10	2470 E. St. Rose Pkwy, Ste. 105 Henderson, NV 89074
11	Telephone: (702) 452-1500 Facsimile: (702) 920-8903
12	hroland@rolandlawfirm.com
13	Attorney for Christopher D. Duvis
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	



1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd., and not a party to	
3	this action. I further certify that except as otherwise noted on March 4, 2015, I served the	
4 5	foregoing CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS' MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP	
6	12(b) and NRCP 19 by first class US mail, postage prepaid, upon the following persons or	
7	entities:	
8		
9	Mark Solomon, Esq.	
10	Joshua Hood, Esq. Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd.	
11 12	9060 W. Cheyenne Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89129	
13	Attorney for Petitioner Caroline Davis U.S. Mail and Facsimile	
14	DUNHAM TRUST	
15	SHANNA CORESSAL, CTFA 241 Ridge Street, Suite 100	
16	Reno, Névada 89501	
17	Éta de la companya (
18 19	Stephen Lehnardt 20 Westwoods Drive	
20	Liberty, Missouri 64068	
21	Win B. Davis	
22	366-6 Habu Aridagawa Arida Wakayama 643-0025	
23	JAPAN	




EXHIBIT 1

RESIGNATION, RELEASE, ACKNOWLEDGMENT, CONSENT AND INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT

This Agreement ("Agreement") is executed as of this 24th day of February, 2014, by and among Alaska USA Trust Company of Anchorage, Alaska ("AUTC"), Dunham Trust Company of Reno, Nevada ("Dunham"), Christopher D. Davis of Kansas City, Missouri ("Chris"), Caroline D. Davis of Seattle, Washington ("Caroline"), and Winfield B. Davis of Los Angeles, California ("Win") (Chris, Caroline and Win are collectively referred to herein as the "Beneficiaries"), and Stephen K. Lehnardt, in his capacity as "Protector" of the BEATRICE B, DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE TRUST, dated July 28, 2000 (the "Trust").

RECITALS

WHEREAS, AUTC is the currently serving trustee of the Trust and has stated that it is unwilling to continue to serve as trustee and wishes to resign;

WHEREAS, Article Eleven, Section 3.b. of the Trust grants the Protector the authority to remove and replace the trustee when a trustee is unable or unwilling to serve;

WHEREAS, Article Twelve, Section 7 of the Trust indemnifies the trustee of the trust from all liability in connection with its service as trustee, excepting only willful misconduct or gross negligence;

WHEREAS, Article Fourteen, Section 6 of the Trust authorizes the change of situs of the trust, upon the unanimous consent of all of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under the trust, and the consent of any then-acting Protector and Trustee. Article Fourteen, Section 6 further authorizes the Protector to amend the Trust in writing so as to change situs, conform the terms of the trust so that it may achieve its purposes in the new situs; and

WHEREAS, Dunham is willing to accept its appointment as successor trustee to AUTC, expressly conditioned on the appointment of one or more outside (non-Dunham) investment advisors and/or investment trustees so that Dunham serves as a directed trustee under Nevada law.

AGREEMENT

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree to and do hereby take the following actions:

1. <u>Consent to Change of Situs and Amendment of Trust</u>. The Beneficiaries hereby unanimously consent to changing the situs of the Trust from Alaska to Nevada, and further

Resignation, Release, Acknowledgment, Consent and Indemnification Agreement Page 1 of 4

unanimously consent to the amendment of trust by the Protector to reflect the change of sites, applicable law, provision required by Dunham, and other amendments as required to allow the trust to achieve its purposes, substantially in the form of First Amendment to the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust attached hereto as <u>Exhibit 1</u>. AUTC and the Protector hereby consent to changing the situs of the Trust from Alaska to Nevada.

2. <u>Removal of AUTC and Appointment of Dunham</u>. Protector shall, effective February 24, 2014, take the actions described in the Memorandum of Action by Protector, substantially in the form of memorandum attached hereto as <u>Exhibit 2.1</u>, and shall issue written notices to AUTC and Dunham, substantially in the forms attached hereto as <u>Exhibit 2.2</u> and <u>Exhibit 2.3</u>, to remove AUTC as Trustee of the Trust, and Appoint Dunham as successor trustee of the Trust.

3. <u>Acknowledgment of Indemnification of Trustee</u>. AUTC, Dunham, and the Beneficiaries hereby acknowledge the provisions of the Trust which provide for the indemnification of Trustee from liability, excepting only willful misconduct or gross negligence.

4. <u>Miscellaneous</u>.

a. <u>Independent Counsel</u>. The parties hereto acknowledge and agree that each of them has had an opportunity to review this Agreement and all Exhibits and to seek its own independent legal counsel with respect to the legal consequences of entering this Agreement.

b. <u>Attorney's Fees</u>. In any action brought either party to enforce any of the terms of this Agreement, the prevailing party in such action shall be entitled to such reasonable attorney fees as the court or arbitrator shall determine to be appropriate

c. <u>Entire Agreement</u>. This Agreement shall not be modified, amended or changed in any respect except by written document signed by all parties hereto. This Agreement and all attachments thereto, contain the entire agreement and understanding of the parties and supersedes any and all prior negotiations, understandings and written agreements.

d. <u>Interpretation/Venue</u>. If any portion of this Agreement shall be held to be void or unenforceable, the balance thereof shall nonetheless be effective. This Agreement has been made and entered into in the State of Alaska and shall be governed by the laws of the State of Alaska. Venue for any dispute shall be Anchorage, Alaska.

e. <u>Headings</u>. The headings used herein are for convenience only, and shall not be construed as a part of this Agreement or as a limitation on the scope of the particular paragraphs to which they refer.

Resignation, Release, Acknowledgment, Consent and Indemnification Agreement

Page 2 of 4

f. <u>Binding Effect</u>. This Agreement shall bind and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties.

g. <u>Counterparts/Facsimile Signatures</u>. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, which together shall constitute one instrument. The parties hereto agree to accept signatures transmitted by facsimile.

[REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE INTENTIONALY BLANK]

Resignation, Release, Acknowledgment, Consent and Indemnification Agreement Page 3 of 4

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first written above.

ALASKA USA TRUST COMPANY

By: Name: DHicor Title: Sinin Inist

DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY

By:

Name: 2 S & S a man a

+21915 Title; ₹ o C

MANDATORY AND DISCRETIONARY BENEFICIARIES

Cliristopher D. Davis

Caroline D. Davis

Winfield B. Davis

PROTECTOR of the BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE TRUST, dated July 28, 2000

By:_______Stephen K. Lehnardt, Protector

Resignation, Release. Acknowledgment, Consent and Indemnification Agreement

Page 4 of 4

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first written above.

ALASKA USA TRUST COMPANY

~~~	
1.432	4
$\Delta V$	
	· ····································

Name:

Title:_____

#### DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY

By:_____

Name:_____

Title:_____

#### MANDATORY AND DISCRETIONARY BENEFICIARIES

Christopher D. Davis

apr V


Caroline D. Davis

Winfield B. Davis

#### PROTECTOR of the BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE TRUST, dated July 28, 2000

By: ________Stephen K. Lehnardt, Protector

Resignation, Release, Acknowledgment, Consent and Indemnification Agreement Page 4 of 4



Qanasi



RELEASE AND INDEMNIFIC... & Funding

Funding Instructions - Single

### DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY

 $\mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{Y}_{n}}$ 


Name:

Title:

### MANDATORY AND DISCRETIONARY BENEFICIARIES

Christopher D. Davis

Caroline D. Davis



**PROTECTOR** of the

#### BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY

HERITAGE TRUST, dated July 28, 2000

₿v:

Stephen K. Lehnardt, Protector

Resignation, Release, Acknowledgment, Consent and Indemnification Agreement

Page 1 of 4

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first written above.

#### ALASKA ÜSÄ TRÜST COMPANY

By:_____

Name:_____

Title:

### DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY

By:

Name:_____

Title:

#### MANDATORY AND DISCRETIONARY BENEFICIARIES


······

-----

Christopher D. Davis

Caroline D. Davis

Winfield B. Davis



Resignation, Release, Acknowledgment, Consent and Indomnification Agreement

Page 4 of 4



# EXHIBIT 13

		Electronically Filed 08/27/2015 10:24:19 AM
ì	HARRIET H. ROLAND, ESQ.	Alun D. Column
2	NV Bay No. 5471 Roland Law Firm	CLERK OF THE COURT
3	2470 B. St. Rose Pkwy, Ste. 105 Henderson, NV 89074	
4	Telephone: (702) 452-1500	
5	Facsimile: (702) 920-8903 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com	
6	anthony L. Barney, ESQ.	
7	Nevada Bar No. 8366	
8	TIFFANY S. BARNEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9754	
9	ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 3317 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite B	
10	Las Vegas, NV 89102	
11	Telephone: (702) 438-7878 Facsimile: (702) 259-1116	
12	Attorneys för Christopher D. Davis	
13	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DIST	RICT COURT
14	CLARK COUNTY, I	NEVADA
15		
16	In the matter of:	Case No.: P-15-083867-T
17	THE BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE	Dept. No.: 26
18	TRUST, dated July 28, 2000, as amended on	
.19	February 24, 2014.	
20		
21		
22	DECT ARATION OF CHRIST	OPHER D. DAVIS
23	DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS I, Christopher Davis, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada, do	
24		
25	hereby declare and state as follows:	
26	1. I am over the age of eighteen.	
27	2, I am a resident of Missouri.	
28		


2 3. I am a primary beneficiary of the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust, dated 2 July 28, 2000, as allegedly amended on February 24, 2014. 3 4. At no time during the alleged amendment to the trust was I represented by 4 independent legal counsel. 5 5. While I was made aware of Stephen Lehnardt's efforts to change the situs of the 6 7 Trust to Nevada, at no time did I receive independent legal advice regarding the legal effects of 8 a change in situs or my appointment as investment trust advisor. 9 6. At no time was I made aware that an opinion of counsel had been provided to Mr. 10 Lehnardt, Alaska USA, or Danham Trust Company. I conveyed to Mr. Barney that no opinion 21 of counsel had been provided to myself or the other beneficiaries of which I am aware. 12 13 7. I was married to Cheryl Davis at the time the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage 14 Trust was created. 15 8. I was married to Tarja Davis at the time of the alleged amendment dated February 16 24, 2014, and I remain married to Tarja Davis. I currently reside with my wife, Tarja Davis. 17 18 9. Caroline Davis, through her attorney Mr. Solomon, has served subpoenas on Mr. 19 Barney and Ms. Roland seeking information regarding assets and entities that are not related to 20 my alleged roles as investment trust advisor and manager of FHT holdings. 21 10. Caroline is seeking information regarding loans and distributions made prior to my 22 alleged appointment as investment trust advisor. 23 24 I declare under senalty of perjury under the law of the state of Nevada that the foregoing 25 Dated this 15 day of August 2015 is true and correct. 26 27 28 Christopher D. Davis, Declarant 2



# **EXHIBIT 12**

		Electronically Filed 03/05/2015 03:54:02 PM
		Alun D. Elim
1	NOTC Mark A. Solomon, Esq., Bar No. 418	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	msolomon@sdfnvlaw.com Joshua M. Hood, Esq. Bar No. 12777	
3	jhood@sdfnvlaw.com Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd.	
4	9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129	
5	Telephone: 702.853.5483 Facsimile: 702.853.5485	
6 7	Attorneys for Caroline Davis, Petitioner	
8	DISTRIC	T COURT
0 9	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
10	In the Matter of:	Case No.: P-15-083867-T Dept.: 26
11	The BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE TRUST, dated July 28, 2000, as	To be heard by Judge Sturman
12	amended on February 24, 2014	Hearing Date: April 22, 2015 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.
13		
14	SECOND AMENDED NO	OTICE OF HEARING ON
15		OVER THE BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY 00, AS AMENDED ON FEBRUARY 24, 2014;
16	TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CH	RISTOPHER D. DAVIS AS INVESTMENT LEHNARDT AS DISTRIBUTION TRUST
17	ADVISOR; TO CONFIRM DUNHAM TRU	JST COMPANY AS DIRECTED TRUSTEE;
18		OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION OPHER D. DAVIS
19 20	NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that CAR	OLINE DAVIS ("Petitioner") by and through her
20 21	counsel, Mark A. Solomon, Esq., and Joshua	M. Hood, Esq., of the law firm of Solomon
21	Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd., hereby Petitions t	his Court to Assume Jurisdiction over THE
23	BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE	TRUST, dated July 28, 2000, as amended on
24	February 24, 2014 ("Trust") to assume Jurisdiction	on and for granting the aforementioned Petitions.
25	A hearing in this matter has been set for	Wednesday, April 22, 2015, at 9:00 a.m. before
26	the Honorable Judge Sturman in Department 26	6, Courtroom 3H at the Regional Justice Center,
27	200 Lewis Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89155;	
28	///	
	1 0	of 4

POLO WILL SOLOMON LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89129 TRUES AND CONS & FREER IN FACEPHONE (702) 853-5483 TRUES AND ESTATE ATORNER IN PACEMILE (702) 853-5485 TRUES AND ESTATE ATORNER WWW.SDENVLAW.COM



1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE			
2	I hereby certify that on the 5 th day of March 2015, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above			
3	and foregoing SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING ON THE PETITION TO			
4	ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER THE BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE TRUST,			
5	DATED JULY 28, 2000, AS AMENDED ON FEBRUARY 24, 2014; TO ASSUME			
6	JURISDICTION OVER CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS AS INVESTMENT TRUST ADVISOR			
7				
8	AND STEPHEN K. LEHNARDT AS DISTRIBUTION TRUST ADVISOR; TO CONFIRM			
9	DUHAM TRUST COMPANY AS DIRECTED TRUSTEE; AND FOR IMMEDIATE			
10	DISCLOSURE OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION FROM CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS			
11	AND the PETITION to the following persons at their last known address, by depositing a copy of			
12	the same in the United States Mail, via certified mail, addresses are as follows:			
13				
14	CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS, Individually INVESTMENT TRUST ADVISOR			
15	MANAGER of FHT HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company			
16	3005 North Beverly Glen Circle Los Angeles, California 90077			
17	and 514 West 26 th Street, #3E			
18	Kansas City, Missouri 64108			
19	REGISTERED AGENT SOLUTIONS, INC.			
20	REGISTERED AGENT for FHT HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company 4625 West Nevso Drive, Suite 2			
21	Las Vegas, Nevada 89103			
22	And having previously mailed the Petition to the following, did EMAIL and send via US Mail			
23	ONLY THE SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING AS FOLLOWS:			
24	STEPHEN LEHNARDT			
25	DISTRIBUTION TRUST ADVISOR 20 Westwoods Drive			
26	Liberty, Missouri 64068 Stephen@lehnardt.com			
27				
28				
	3 of 4			

SOLOMON LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89129 DWIGGINS & FREER INUSI AND ESTATE AVENUE (702) 853-5483 INUSI AND ESTATE ATIONNARY SUBMILLE (702) 853-5485 WWW SDENVLAW, COM

1       WINFIELD B. DAVIS         266-6 Habu Aridagawa Arida       Wakayama 643-0025         3       JAPAN         winsanc@gmail.com       1         4       DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY         5       TRUSTEE         8       SOLE MEMBER of FHT HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company         e'or SHANNA CORESSEL, CITEA         2       241 Ridge Street, Suite 100         7       Reno, Nevada 89501         8       Sharma, corressel@dunham.com         9       And did mail via US Mail and email Via the Court's electron system via WizNet pursuant to Rul         9 of NEFCR at the email address noted to the following:         11       HARRIET ROLAND, ESQ.,         ROLAND LAW FIRM       2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200         Henderson, NV 89052       Henderson, NV 89052         13       hroland@zolandlawfirm.com         14       ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD.         3317 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B       Las Vegas Nevada 89102         abarney@lanthonybarney.com       An Bmployce of SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD         21       4 of 4			
366-6 Habu Aridagawa Arida         Wakayama 643-0025         JAPAN         winsane@gmail.com         DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY         SOLE MEMBER of FHT HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company         c/o SHANNA CORESSEL, CTFA         7 241 Ridge Street, Suite 100         Reno, Nevada 89501         8 Shanna.coressel@dunham.com         9 And did mail via US Mail and email Via the Court's electron system via WizNet pursuant to Rul         9 of NEFCR at the email address noted to the following:         11         HARRIET ROLAND, ESQ.,         ROLAND LAW FIRM         2 2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200         Henderson, NV 89052         13 hroland@zolandlawfirm.com         14         ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.         15       ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.         16       Las Vegas Nevada 89102         17       abarnev@@anthonybarney.com         18       Market Sol ONION DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD         21       22         23       24         24       25         26       27         28       28			
<ul> <li>Many and one of the second s</li></ul>			
<ul> <li>³ winsane@gmail.com</li> <li>DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY</li> <li>TRUSTEE</li> <li>SOLE MEMBER of FHT HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company</li> <li>⁶ co SHANNA CORESSEL, CTFA</li> <li>241 Ridge Street, Suite 100</li> <li>Reno, Nevada 89501</li> <li>Shanna.coresel@dunham.com</li> <li>9 And did mail via US Mail and email Via the Court's electron system via WizNet pursuant to Rul</li> <li>9 of NEFCR at the email address noted to the following:</li> <li>11 HARRIET ROLAND, ESQ.,</li> <li>ROLAND LAW FIRM</li> <li>2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200</li> <li>Henderson, NV 8052</li> <li>13 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com</li> <li>14 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.</li> <li>15 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.</li> <li>16 Las Vegas Nevada 89102</li> <li>abarney@anthonybarney.com</li> <li>17</li> </ul>			Wakayama 643-0025
DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY         TRUSTEE         SOLE MEMBER of FHT HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company         c/o SHANNA CORESSEL, CTFA         241 Ridge Street, Suite 100         Reno, Nevada 89501         Shanna coressel@dunham.com         9         And did mail via US Mail and email Via the Court's electron system via WizNet pursuant to Rul         9 of NEFCR at the email address noted to the following:         11         HARRIET ROLAND, ESQ.,         ROLAND LAW FIRM         12       2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200         Henderson, NV 89052         hroland@rolandlawfirm.com         14         ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.         ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.         3117 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B         Las Vegas Nevada 89102         abarney@anthonybarney.com         18         19         21         22         23         24         25         26         27         28		3	
SOLE MEMBER of FHT HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company c/o SHANNA CORESSEL, CTFA 241 Ridge Street, Suite 100 Reno, Nevada 89501 8 Shanna.coressel@dunham.com 9 And did mail via US Mail and email Via the Court's electron system via WizNet pursuant to Rul 9 of NEFCR at the email address noted to the following: 11 HARRIET ROLAND, ESQ., ROLAND LAW FIRM 12 2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200 Henderson, NV 89052 13 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com 14 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ. 15 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ. 16 Las Vegas Nevada 89102 abarney@anthonybarney.com 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 24 25 26 27 28		4	DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY
<ul> <li>c/o SHANNA CORESSEL, CTFA</li> <li>241 Ridge Street, Suite 100</li> <li>Reno, Nevada 89501</li> <li>8 Shanna.coressel@dunham.com</li> <li>9 And did mail via US Mail and email Via the Court's electron system via WizNet pursuant to Rul</li> <li>9 of NEFCR at the email address noted to the following:</li> <li>11 HARRIET ROLAND, ESQ.,</li> <li>ROLAND LAW FIRM</li> <li>12 2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200</li> <li>Henderson, NV 9052</li> <li>13 hroland@zolandlawfirm.com</li> <li>14 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.</li> <li>15 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.</li> <li>16 Las Vegas Nevada 89102</li> <li>abarney@anthonybarney.com</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> <li>27</li> <li>28</li> </ul>		5	
<ul> <li>Reno, Nevada 89501</li> <li>Shanaa.coressel@dunham.com</li> <li>And did mail via US Mail and email Via the Court's electron system via WizNet pursuant to Rul 9 of NEFCR at the email address noted to the following:</li> <li>HARRIET ROLAND, ESQ., ROLAND LAW FIRM</li> <li>2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200 Henderson, NV 89052</li> <li>hroland@rolandlawfirm.com</li> <li>ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.</li> <li>ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.</li> <li>ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 3317 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B Las Vegas Nevada 89102 abarney@anthonybarney.com</li> <li>Mamma An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS &amp; FREER, LTD An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS &amp; FREER, LTD </li> </ul>		6	c/o SHANNA CORESSEL, CTFA
<ul> <li>Shanna.coressel@dunham.com</li> <li>And did mail via US Mail and email Via the Court's electron system via WizNet pursuant to Rul 9 of NEFCR at the email address noted to the following:</li> <li>HARRIET ROLAND, ESQ., ROLAND LAW FIRM</li> <li>2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200 Henderson, NV 89052</li> <li>hroland@rolandlawfirm.com</li> <li>ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.</li> <li>ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.</li> <li>ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 3317 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B</li> <li>Las Vegas Nevada 89102 abarney@anthonybarney.com</li> <li>Maximum An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS &amp; FREER, LTD</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> <li>27</li> <li>28</li> </ul>		7	
<ul> <li>9 of NEFCR at the email address noted to the following:</li> <li>11 HARRIET ROLAND, ESQ., ROLAND LAW FIRM</li> <li>12 2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200 Henderson, NV 89052</li> <li>13 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com</li> <li>14 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.</li> <li>15 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD.</li> <li>3317 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B</li> <li>16 Las Vegas Nevada 89102 abarney@anthonybarney.com</li> <li>18</li> <li>19 An Elmployee of SOLOMON pWIGGINS &amp; FREER, LTD</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> <li>27</li> <li>28</li> </ul>		8	
<ul> <li>HARRIET ROLAND, ESQ., ROLAND LAW FIRM</li> <li>2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200 Henderson, NV 89052</li> <li><u>hroland@rolandlawfirm.com</u></li> <li>ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.</li> <li>ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD.</li> <li>3317 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B</li> <li>Las Vegas Nevada 89102 <u>abarney@anthonybarney.com</u></li> <li>Las Vegas Nevada 89102 <u>abarney@anthonybarney.com</u></li> <li>An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS &amp; FREER, LTD</li> <li>An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS &amp; FREER, LTD</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> <li>27</li> <li>28</li> </ul>		9	And did mail via US Mail and email Via the Court's electron system via WizNet pursuant to Rule
<ul> <li>ROLAND LAW FIRM</li> <li>2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200 Henderson, NV 89052</li> <li>hroland@rolandlawfirm.com</li> <li>ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ.</li> <li>ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD.</li> <li>3317 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B</li> <li>Las Vegas Nevada 89102 abarney@anthonybarney.com</li> <li>18</li> <li><i>Just Charleston Boulevard, Suite B</i></li> <li>Las Vegas Nevada 89102</li> <li>abarney@anthonybarney.com</li> <li>An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS &amp; FREER, LTD</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> <li>27</li> <li>28</li> </ul>		10	9 of NEFCR at the email address noted to the following:
12 2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200 Henderson, NV 89052 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com 14 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ. 15 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 3317 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B 16 Las Vegas Nevada 89102 abarney@anthonybarney.com 17 18 19 An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28		11	
13 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com 14 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ. 15 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 3317 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B 16 Las Vegas Nevada 89102 abarney@anthonybarney.com 17 18 19 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28		12	2850 W. Horizon Ridge Parkway, #200
ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 3317 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B 16 Las Vegas Nevada 89102 abarney@anthonybarney.com 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28		13	
ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 3317 West Charleston Boulevard, Suite B Las Vegas Nevada 89102 <u>abarney@anthonybarney.com</u> Interpret of SoloMon DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD Interpret of SoloMo		14	ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESO
16 Las Vegas Nevada 89102 abarnev@anthonybarney.com       17       18       19       20       21       22       23       24       25       26       27       28		15	ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD.
17       18         19       Image: An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD         20       21         21       22         23       24         25       26         27       28		16	Las Vegas Nevada 89102
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28		17	<u>abarney@anthonybarney.com</u>
An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	\$	18	$\bigcirc$ $(I I)$
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	)	19	Jere Kyt
22 23 24 25 26 27 28		20	An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.
23 24 25 26 27 28		21	
23 24 25 26 27 28		22	
24 25 26 27 28			
25 26 27 28			
26 27 28		- 1	
27 28		1	
28			
4 01 4			
			4 OI 4

÷

DWIGGINS & FREER DWIGGINS & FREER TELEPHONE (702) 853-5483 TELEPHONE (702) 853-5483 TELEPHONE (702) 853-5483 TELEPHONE (702) 853-5485 WWW.SDFIVLAW.COM established from one or more sources, nonexempt property or trusts shall not be added to or combined with exempt property or trusts, even if this requires the establishment of additional separate trusts with the same terms and provisions. If, for example, the terms of what would otherwise be one trust direct that, on termination (or on failure to exercise a power of appointment), trust property is to be added to another trust, the exempt property of a separate trust that had been derived from the terminating trust shall be added only to an exempt trust derived from the recipient trust; nonexempt property shall be added only to a nonexempt recipient trust; and if no appropriate recipient trust of that character shall be established with the same terms and provisions as those of the trust that would otherwise receive that property under the original trust terms.

(d) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "exempt" refers to a trust or property that has a generation-skipping tax inclusion ratio of zero, and the term "nonexempt" refers to a trust or property that has a generation-skipping inclusion ratio of one.

34. The Trustees may entrust sole custody of any securities, cash, or other property held by them to either of them. Either Trustee may, by instrument in writing, from time to time, delegate to the other the exercise of any or all of the powers conferred upon the Trustees by this instrument, and may at pleasure revoke any such delegation, which revocation shall be effective upon receipt. Any person dealing with the Trustees shall be absolutely protected in relying upon the certification of any Trustee as to (a) who are the Trustees at any time and from time to time; and (b) the extent of the authority of the Trustee or Trustees by reason of any delegation or otherwise.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed, as of the day and year first above written, in multipart, each one of which shall be deemed an original, by the Settlor and the Trustee.

BEATRICE B. DAVIS, SETTLOR

BEATRICE B. DAVIS,

-18-

STATE OF MISSOURI COUNTY OF JACKSON >

SS.


On this <u>//</u> day of <u>///a/</u>, 1998, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, personally appeared BEATRICE B. DAVIS, to me known to be the same person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged that she executed the same as her free and voluntary act and deed as Settlor and Trustee of this Trust.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal on the day and year last above written.

Public in and for said

County and State

My commission expires:



-19-

Exhibit 23

Ĺ

12. A CANADA MANAGANA INA MANAGANA I

# Exhibit 23

CHRISDAVIS000510

and the results for a set of the REPORT of the first of the strategy strategy and the strategy of the set of the

WHE ADDRESS STREET STREET, STRE

·····		The Beatrice BE	avis-Revocable-Trust-Indenture	
1.	The fc	blowing trust is the subject of thi	s Affidavit:	
		successors in trust, under the	Caroline D. Davis, Trustees, or their BEATRICE B. DAVIS REVOCABLE April 4, 1990, as amended. (the "Trust")	
2.	The name and address of the currently acting Trustees of the trust is as follows:			
		Name: Christopher D. Davis	Address: 514 West 26 th Street, Suite 3E Kansas City, Missouri 64108	
		Caroline D. Davis	2501 Nob Hill Place North Seattle, Washington 98109	
3.	hospita	l nurses as periodically exhibitin	Trust, who had been observed by home healthcare workers, g impaired judgment and behavior, was diagnosed by her iffering from mild dementia on or about March 13, 2007.	, and

- 4. Article Eighth, Paragraph 1 of the Trust states: "If for any reason Beatrice B. Davis is incapacitated or otherwise cannot act or shall cease to serve as Trustee hereunder, Christopher D. Davis and Caroline D. Davis shall serve as Successor Trustees."
- 5. On March 22, 2007, Christopher D. Davis and Caroline D. Davis, after discussion, determined that it would be in the best interest of Beatrice B. Davis for them to assume their roles as Successor Trustees pursuant to Article Eight of the Trust.
- 6. The Trust was amended on February 3, 1997, was subsequently amended on May 11, 1998, and has not been amended since May 11, 1998. The Trust is presently in full force and effect.
- 7. The signatories of this Affidavit are the currently acting Trustees of the Trust and hereby declare that the foregoing statements and the attached trust provisions are true and correct, under penalty of perjury.
- 8. This Affidavit is dated March 22, 2007.

AND DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION

[ SIGNATURES AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ON NEXT PAGE ]

Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Trust Indenture-Affidavit of Trust

Page 1 of 2

Interferences Editor Anno Security - Providence Anno Security and Security and Company of Security (1997)

物理影响

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, as affiants, we have executed this Affidavit as of this 22nd day of March, 2007 in multiple counterpart originals, and have directed photographic copies of this Affidavit be made which shall have the same force and effect as an original.

Christopher D. Davis

Caroline D. Davis

STATE OF SS: COUNTY OF _

On this _____ day of March, 2007, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public, in and for the County and State aforesaid, personally appeared Christopher D. Davis, to me known to be the person who signed the foregoing affidavit and acknowledged that he signed the same as his free act and deed.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal in day and year last above written.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

(Seal)

STATE OF __ COUNTY OF ____

____ day of March, 2007, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public, in and for the County and On this State aforesaid, personally appeared Caroline D. Davis, to me known to be the person who signed the foregoing affidavit and acknowledged that she signed the same as her free act and deed.

SS:

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal in day and year last above written.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

(Seal)

Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Trust Indenture--Affidavit of Trust

Page 2 of 2

Exhibit 24

í.,

i

:

## Exhibit 24

#### DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

I, Caroline D. Davis Successor Trustee under the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Trust Indenture, dated April 4, 1990, as amended (the "Trust"), hereby delegate to Christopher D. Davis, Successor Trustee of the Trust:

> Authority to act singly on behalf of the Trust, and without prior consultation or agreement in exercising the all of the powers granted in Article NINTH of the Trust, and to perform all acts on behalf of the Trust as may be appropriate, necessary, or proper for the Trust in contemplation of such Article NINTH.

I hereby agree to ratify and confirm all and whatsoever acts Christopher D. Davis may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of this Delegation of Authority.

This Delegation of Authority is made pursuant to Article NINTH, Paragraph 34 of the Trust and shall remain effective until revoked, in writing, by the undersigned.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed this Delegation of Authority as of the  $22^{nd}$  day of March, 2007.

Caroline D. Davis, Trustee

Exhibit 25

्र*ए* १

÷ ..

## Exhibit 25

#### **REVOCATION OF DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY**

This Revocation of Delegation of Authority is made and entered into this _____ day of September, 2014 by CAROLINE D. DAVIS, as Successor Co-Trustee of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Trust, dated April 4, 1990, as amended (the "Trust").

WHEREAS, pursuant to Article Ninth, Section 34, CAROLINE D. DAVIS executed a "Delegation of Authority" on March 22, 2007, authorizing CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS, as Successor Co-Trustee, to act singly on behalf of the Trust, and without prior consultation or agreement in exercising all of the powers granted in Article Ninth of the Trust, and to perform all acts on behalf of the Trust as may be appropriate, necessary, or proper for the Trust in contemplation of such Article Ninth.

WHEREAS, pursuant to Article Ninth, Section 34, CAROLINE D. DAVIS possesses the authority to terminate such Delegation of Authority.

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Article Ninth, Section 34, CAROLINE D. DAVIS does hereby revoke the Delegation of Authority, executed on March, 22, 2007. Such Revocation of Delegation of Authority shall become effectively immediately upon receipt by CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS.

Dated this 23 day of September, 2014.

CAROLINE D. DAVIS, Successor Co-Trustee

## Exhibit 26

## Exhibit 26



Ms, Shanna Coressel Dunham Trust Company 241 Ridge Street, Suite 100 Reno, Nevada 89501

Dear Shanna,

#### Re: Ashley Cooper Life Policy # 1105-8007

Eurther to your recent request to transfer the ownership of policy ACII 1105-8007PC, please be advised that this life insurance policy has outstanding loans totaling \$2,164,744.68.

We require confirmation that the new owner is aware of the responsibility to repay these loans and that the policy has been pledged as collateral for these loans. Would you kindly attange for an authorised signatory of the FHT Holdings LLC to sign below as acknowledgement of the loans?

Yourspincerel

Paul Foidham Client Services Manager

Confirming acknowledgement of the outstanding policy loans:

Signature:

Authorised Signatory, FHT Holdings LLC,

Date

Ashtey Cobpter Life Litternintförnit Lusbrer, SPC Administration Officer, St Frog: Windward 3, Rogana Office, Bafa, West Bay Road, P.Ö. Box 2183 Graide Cayman 16(7)-1105, Cayman Islanda Tel: (2)-(5) 949: ISS9, Fax: (2)45) 949 0520; Email: <u>hita@Crusider.com.Ev</u>;

Registerul O'Mee: Fiddler Geezälez & Redriguez P.S.C. BUVA Tower, 254 Muhoz River, Avenile, 6th Floir: Flato Rey, Pilda Rico.00918: PAULS

В. When each descendant for whom a trust is created shall attain the age of twenty-five (25) years, or upon establishment of these separate trusts for any descendant who has attained the age of twenty-five (25) years but not attained the age of thirty (30) years at that time, one-third (1/3) of the assets at that time comprising his or her trust estate shall be distributed to him or her free and clear of all trusts. When each descendant, for whom a trust is created shall attain the age of thirty (30) years, or upon establishment of these separate trusts for any descendant who has attained the age of thirty (30) years but who has not attained the age of thirty-five (35) years at that time, one half (1/2) of the assets at that time comprising his or her trust estate shall be distributed to him or her free and clear of all frusts. When each descendant for whom a trust is created shall attain the age of thirty-five (35) years, or upon establishment of these separate trusts for any descendant who has attained the age of thirty-five (35) years at that time, all of the assets at that time comprising his or her trust estate, including all accrued interest and income, shall be distributed to him or her free and clear of all trusts.

C. If any descendant of Settlor for whom a trust is created shall die during the administration of his or her trust without attaining the age of thirty-five (35) years, his or her trust shall terminate and all of the unappointed assets at that time comprising his or her trust estate shall be distributed as he or she appoints by Will specifically referring to this power of

-7-

appointment, each such descendant of Settlor hereby being granted full power to appoint, free of the trust, the entire principal and income remaining in his or her trust at the time of his or her death, so appointing the same in favor of his or her estate or in favor of any one or more persons or partly in favor of any one or more persons in any manner, either outright or in trust, and under any conditions, limitations or provisions which he or she may designate, and said general power of appointment shall be exercisable by Settlor's descendant alone and in all events. If, however, Settlor's descendant fails to exercise said general power of appointment; or if any exercise by him or her is invalid or for any reason whatsoever fails to take effect, his or her trust shall terminate and all of the unappointed assets at that time comprising his or her trust estate shall be distributed to such descendant's issue then living, per stirpes. If such descendant has no issue then living, all of the unappointed assets at that time comprising his or her trust estate shall be distributed to his or her parent's issue then living, per stirpes, and if none, then to Settlor's issue then living, per stirpes, provided, that if any then living descendant of Settlor is under the age of thirty-five (35) years, the assets which otherwise would be distributed to him or her outright if he were not under such age shall be distributed to his or her trust estate. If Settlor has no issue then living, any trust then in existence shall terminate and the Trustees shall distribute all of the unappointed assets then comprising the trust estate, including all accrued interest and income, to such person

- 8 -

or persons in the shares and proportions in which Settlor's Administrator would have been required to distribute the same had Settlor died intestate, a resident of the State of Missouri and possessed of such property at such time.

4. In any event, and regardless of each and any of the above and foregoing provisions, twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last to die of all of the beneficiaries herein named or described who are living at the date of Settlor's death, all trusts hereunder shall terminate, if the same have not already terminated by said time, and all of the assets then comprising the trust estate, including all accrued interest and income, shall be distributed free and clear of all trusts to the person or persons then entitled to receive the same in accordance with the foregoing provisions.

#### EIGHTH.

1. If for any reason BEATRICE B. DAVIS is incapacitated or otherwise cannot act of shall cease to serve as Trustee hereunder, CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS and CAROLINE D. DAVIS shall serve as Successor Trustees. If either CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS or CAROLINE D. DAVIS cannot act or shall cease to serve as Trustee. CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON shall serve as Trustee in his or her place. If for any reason any two of the above three persons cannot act or shall cease to serve as Trustee, the remaining Trustee shall serve as sole Trustee.

- 9 -

Part -

2. The individual Trustees, acting unarimously if there is more than one, may appoint, as Co-Trustee or as Successor Trustee, any bank or trust company possessing trust powers and having an aggregate capital, surplus and undivided profits of at least Five Million Bollars (\$5,000,000.00). In the event a Successor Trustee is designated, such designation shall include the consent of the Successor Trustee to serve as such. Any such designated corporate Co-Trustee or Successor Trustee may be removed at any time by the individual Trustee or Trustees (acting unanimously if there is more than one).

3. Any Trustee acting hereunder may resign at any time by delivering not less than thirty (30) days' written notice to Sattlor, during her lifetime, and, after her death, to all of the legally competent beneficiaries over twenty-one (21) years of age to whom income may then be payable and, thereafter, the successor Trustee or Trustees, as provided herein, shall serve intil all trusts hereunder are terminated. Settlor may remove any Trustee at any time acting hereunder by an instrument in writing delivered to her not less than thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of such removal.

4. Settlor, or the beneficiaries, to whom such notice of resignation shall be given by the Trustee or who shall exercise such power of removal, may, without liability to any present or future beneficiary, approve the accounts of, and give a full and complete release and discharge to, any such resigned or removed Trustee and if there are no Trustees named in paragraph 1 or

-10-

designated in paragraph 2 willing and able to serve, may appoint as Successor Trustee any bank or trust company organized under the laws of the United States, or one of the States thereof, possessing trust powers and having an aggregate capital, surplus and undivided profiles of at least Five Million Dollars (\$5,000,000.00).

NINTH. The Trustee shall have the following powers, and any others that may be granted by law, with respect to each trust, to be exercised as the Trustee in her discretion shall determine to be to the best interests of the beneficiaries:

1. To retain any property or undivided interests in property received from any source, including residential property, regardless of any lack of diversification, risk or nonproductivity;

2. To invest and reinvest the trust estate in bonds, notes, stocks of corporations regardless of class, common trust funds, real estate or any interest in real estate, interests in trusts or in any other property or undivided interests in property, wherever located, without being limited by any statute or rule of law concerning investments by trustees;

3. To sell any trust property, for cash or on credit, at public or private sales; to exchange any trust property for other property; to grant options to purchase or acquire any trust property; and to determine the prices and terms of sales, exchanges and options;

4. To operate, maintain, repair, rehabilitate, alter, improve or remove any improvements on real estate; to make leases and subleases for terms of any length, even though the terms may extend beyond the termination of the trust; to subdivide real estate; to grant easements, give consents and make contracts relating to real estate or its use; and to release or dedicate any interest in real estate;

5. To borrow money for any purpose, either from the banking department of a corporate trustee or from others, and to mortgage or pledge any trust property;

6. To employ attorneys, auditors, depositaries and agents, with or without discretionary powers; to exercise in person or by proxy all voting and other rights with respect to stocks or other securities; and to keep any property in bearer form or in the name of the Trustee, a nominee of the Trustee or a nominee of the depositary used by the Trustee with or without disclosure of any fiduciary relationship;

-11-

7. To determine in an equitable manner with due regard to the respective interests of any income beneficiary and any remainderman the allocation or apportionment of all receipts and disbursements between income and principal; the Trustee shall not set aside reserves for depreciation unless the Trustee deems it to be necessary for the preservation of tangible property to create reasonable reserves for rehabilitation, major repairs or replacement of such property;

8. To take any action with respect to conserving or realizing upon the value of any trust property and with respect to foreclosures, reorganizations or other changes affecting the trust property; to collect, pay, contest, compromise or abandon demands of or against the trust estate wherever situated; and to execute contracts, notes, conveyances and other instruments, including instruments containing covenants; representations and warranties binding upon and creating a charge against the trust estate and containing provisions excluding personal liability;

9. To receive additional property from any source and add it to the trust estate;

10. To enter into any transaction authorized by this paragraph with trustees, executors or administrators of any trust or estate in which any beneficiary has an interest even though any such trustee or representative is also a trustee under this instrument; and in any such transaction to purchase property, or make loans on notes secured by property, even though similar or identical property constitutes all or a large proportion of the balance of the trust estate, and to retain any such property or note with the same freedom as if it had been an original part of the trust estate;

11. To make any distribution or division of the trust property in cash or in kind or both, and to continue to exercise any powers and discretion for a reasonable period after the termination of the trust, but only for so long as no rule of law relating to perpetuities would be violated;

12. To allocate different kinds on disproportionate shares of property or undivided interests in property among the beneficiaries or trusts, and to determine the value of any such property; and to make joint investments of funds in the trusts, and to hold the several trusts as a common fund dividing the net income among the beneficiaries of the several trusts proportionately;

13. To transfer the assets of any trust to another situs and to appoint as a special trustee any individual or corporation authorized under the laws of the United States or of any state to administer trusts and to remove any special trustee and reappoint itself:

- 12 -

14. To collect in any manner the het proceeds of any employee benefit plan, individual retirement account, deferred compensation plan or life insurance policy, payment to and the receipt of the Trustee shall be a full discharge of the liability of any payor, which need not take notice of this instrument or see to the application of any payment; the Trustee need not engage in litigation to enforce payment without indemnification satisfactory to her for any resulting expense.

15. The Trustee shall allow Settlor the right personally to occupy rent-free any residential property, which property or any interest therein (including any interest as owner, lessee, shareholder, trust beheficiary, or otherwise) from time to time forms a part of the trust principal. At any time or times while Settlor shall have that right the Trustee may, with Settlor's written approval (that approval being required only if Settlor is not incapacitated):

(a) Sell the interest in residential property forming a part of the trust principal and invest such amounts as the Trustee believes desirable in any other interest in residential property selected by the Trustee; or

(b) Terminate the right given to Settlor under this paragraph and lease, sell, or otherwise dispose of or administer any such interest in residential property in the same manner as any other trust asset.

Additionally, for so long as any such residential property is encumbered with a mortgage or deed of trust incorporating a "due on sale" acceleration clause, the Trustee shall have no authority to sell or transfer any interest in the property to any one except Settlor without the lender's written consent (or payment of the balance due secured by the mortgage or deed of trust); and no amendment to this Indenture which changes the beneficiary during Settlor's lifetime shall be effective unless the lender gives its prior written consent to such amendment.

16. If any beneficiary to whom the Trustee is directed in a preceding provision to distribute any share of trust principal is under the age of twenty-one years or a legal disability other than age when the distribution is to be made and if the Trustee is not otherwise directed in this instrument to hold such share in trust, such beneficiary's share shall vest in interest in him indefeasibly, but the Trustee may in her discretion distribute such share to a custodian under any transfer to minors law (including any appropriate Gifts to Minors Act or Transfer to Minors Law) or hold it as a separate trust for such period of time as the Trustee deems advisable, but not after the time the beneficiary reaches that age or is no longer under a disability other than age. If the Trustee Holds such share as a separate trust, the Trustee may use for the benefit of the beneficiary so much of the income and

-13-

1	]	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF T	HE STATE OF N	EVADA
2				
3				
4	CHRIST	TOPHER D. DAVIS,	Case No.:Ebsstug	nically Filed 2015 09:30 a.m.
5			Eighth Jucifat D	2015 09:30 a.m. K. Lindeman
		Appellant,	Eighth Judicial D	Supreme Court
6	v. v. the Beatrice B. Davis Family			
7	CAROL	INE DAVIS,	Heritage Trust, da	•
8			2000)	
9		Respondent.		
10				
11		EXHIBITS '		
	E	EMERGENCY MOTION U		
12	<u><u>F</u>(</u>	OR 1) STAY PENDING APPEAL	AND 2) AFFIKIVIA	AIIVE KELIEF
13		TABLE OF CON	TENTS	
14				
15	<u>Exhibit</u>	<u>Title of Document</u>		Bates Numbers
16	1	Emergency Writ Under NRAP 27(e	•	1-40
	Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus Action Necessary On or Before October 23, 2015			
17	2	Email dated October 5, 2015 from A		41-43
18	-	Barney, Esq.		
19	3	Email dated October 5, 2015 from I	Dana Dwiggins,	44-45
20		Esq.		
21	4	September 2, 2015 Transcript		46-131
	5	Christopher D. Davis' Motion for P		132-168
22	6	and to Quash or Modify the Subpoe Notice of Petition and Petition to St		169-202
23	0	Until the August 19, 2015 Hearing		109-202
24		Reconsideration, or in the Alternativ		
25		Protective Order from Discovery by		
	7	September 30, 2015 Court Minutes	•	203-204
26	8 Notice of Entry of Order, filed with Order 205-210			205-210
27	9	Subpoenas Duces Tecum dated June	e 25, 2015	211-234
28	10	September 16, 2015 Court Minutes		235-237
	11	Petition to Assume Jurisdiction Ove	er the Beatrice B.	238-518
		1		

1		Davis Family Heritage Trust, Dated July 28, 2000, as	
2		Amended on February 24, 2014; to Assume	
		Jurisdiction over Christopher D. Davis as Investment	
3		Trust Advisor and Stephen K. Lehnardt as	
4		Distribution Trust Advisor; to Confirm Dunham	
5		Trust Company as Directed Trustee; and for	
		Immediate Disclosure of Dcouments and	
6	10	Information from Christopher D. Davis	510 500
7	12	Second Amended Notice of Hearing on Petition to	519-523
8		Assume Jurisdiction Over the Beatrice B. Davis	
		Family Heritage Trust, Dated July 28, 2000, as Amended on February 24, 2014; to Assume	
9		Jurisdiction over Christopher D. Davis as Investment	
10		Trust Advisor and Stephen K. Lehnardt as	
11		Distribution Trust Advisor; to Confirm Dunham	
12		Trust Company as Directed Trustee; and for	
12		Immediate Disclosure of Dcouments and	
13		Information from Christopher D. Davis	
14	13	Declaration of Christopher Davis	524-526
15	14	Christopher D. Davis' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to	527-552
		NRCP 12(b) and NRCP 19	
16	15	Christopher D. Davis' Reply to Caroline Davis'	553-578
17		Opposition to His Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to	
18	1.6	NRCP 12(b) and NRCP 19	
	16	Opposition to Christopher D. Davis' Motion to	579-591
19	17	Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b) and NRCP 19	502 (50
20	17	Transcript of Proceedings – Wednesday, April 22, 2015	592-650
21		2015	
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			
		2	
		Z	

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd., and not
3	
4	a party to this action. I further certify that on the 8 th day of October, 2015, I
5	served the foregoing <b>EXHIBITS TO EMERGENCY MOTION UNDER</b>
6	NRAP 27(e) FOR 1) STAY PENDING APPEAL AND 2) AFFIRMATIVE
7	
8	<b><u>RELIEF</u></b> by first class US mail, postage prepaid, upon the following persons or
9 10	entities or as otherwise noted:
11	Cheryl Davis
12	5403 West 134 Terrace, Unit 1525
13	Overland Park, KS 66209
14	Tarja Davis
15	3005 North Beverly Glen Circle
16	Las Angeles, California 90077 And
17	514 West 26 th Street, #3E
18	Kansas City, Missouri 64108
19	Winfield B. Davis
20	Skyline Terrace Apts. 930 Figueroa Terr. Apt. 529
21	Los Angeles, California 90012-3072
22	A co Davis
23	Ace Davis c/o Winfield B. Davis
24	Skyline Terrace Apts.
25	930 Figueroa Terr. Apt. 529 Los Angeles, California 90012-3072
26	2001 ingolos, cuitorina 70012 3072
27	Christopher D. Davis 3005 North Beverly Glen Circle
28	Los Angeles, California 90077
	And
	3

1	514 West 26 th Street, #3E
2	Kansas City, Missouri 64108
3	Registered Agent Solutions, Inc.
4	Registered Agent for FHT Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability
5	Company ACO5 W + N = D i = C i + 2
6	4625 West Nevso Drive, Suite 2 Las Vegas, Nevada 89103
7	
8	JONATHAN W. BARLOW, ESQ. Via Hand Delivery CLEAR COUNSEL LAW GROUP
9	50 Stephanie Street, Suite 101
10	Henderson, Nevada 89012
11	<u>Jonathan@clearcounsel.com</u> Attorneys for Stephen K. Lenhardt
12	Attorneys for Stephen K. Lennardt
13	Mark Solomon, Esq. Via Hand Delivery
14	Joshua Hood, Esq. Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd.
	9060 W. Cheyenne Ave.
15	Las Vegas, NV 89129 Attorney for Potitionen Canoline Davis
16	Attorney for Petitioner Caroline Davis
17	DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY   Via Hand Delivery
18	SHANNA CORESSAL, CTFA c/o Charlene Renwick, Esq.
19	Lee, Hernandez, Landrum & Garofalo
20	7575 Vegas Drive, #150
21	Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
22	
23	
24	1 the constant of the constant
25	Employee of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd.
26	
27	
28	
	4
I	