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ex rel. Office of the Labor Commissioner,
Office of the Labor Commissioner and
Shannon Chambers*

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2015 JUL 27 PM 12:24
SUSAN HERRING
CLERK

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* THE
OFFICE OF THE LABOR
COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
LABOR COMMISSIONER; and THORAN
TOWLER, Nevada Labor Commissioner in
his official capacity,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14 OC 00080 1B

Dept No.: 2

ERRATA TO OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Respondents STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER,
the OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER and SHANNON CHAMBERS in her official
capacity as the Nevada Labor Commissioner (collectively "Labor Commissioner"), hereby files
this errata to the Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The original
opposition on page 6 contained an incorrect citation to the Labor Commissioner's statutory
enforcement and rulemaking authority as NRS 706.160(1)(a) and (b). The correct citation for

1 the Labor Commissioner's statutory enforcement and rulemaking authority is NRS
2 607.160(1)(a) and (b).

3 DATED this 21 day of July, 2015

4 ADAM PAUL LAXALT
5 Attorney General

6 By: 


7 Scott R. Davis, # 10019
8 Deputy Attorney General
9 555 E. Washington Ave., Ste. 3900
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12 Office of the Labor Commissioner;
13 Office of the Labor Commissioner; and
14 Shannon Chambers

15 **AFFIRMATION**

16 The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document filed in this court
17 does not contain the social security number of any person.

18 DATED this 21 day of July, 2015.

19 ADAM PAUL LAXALT
20 Attorney General

21 By: 

22 Scott Davis, # 10019
23 Deputy Attorney General
24 Attorneys for the State of Nevada ex rel
25 Office of the Labor Commissioner;
26 Office of the Labor Commissioner and
27 Shannon Chambers
28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of the State of Nevada Office of the Attorney General and that on the 22nd day of July, 2015 I served the foregoing ERRATA TO OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by serving a copy via U.S. Mail, first-class, postage-paid, as follows:

Don Springmeyer, Esq.
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REC'D & FILED
2015 JUL 31 PM 2:27
SUSAN MERRIWETHER
CLERK
BY J. HARKLER

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual,
Plaintiff,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* THE
OFFICE OF THE LABOR
COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
LABOR COMMISSIONER; and SHANNON
CHAMBERS, Nevada Labor Commissioner
in her official capacity,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14 OC 00080 1B

Dept. No.: 2

DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COME NOW Defendants the STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* OFFICE OF THE LABOR
COMMISSIONER, the OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER and SHANNON
CHAMBERS in her official capacity as the Nevada Labor Commissioner (collectively "Labor
Commissioner"), by and through counsel of record ADAM PAUL LAXALT, Attorney General of
the State of Nevada, and Scott Davis, Deputy Attorney General and pursuant to FJDCR 15(4)
and the stipulated briefing schedule previously adopted in this matter and hereby replies to
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

This is not a difficult case, despite Plaintiff's best attempts to muddy the waters of constitutional interpretation. The touchstone of this Court's analysis should be the well-established rule that each part of the constitutional text should be given meaning. This cannot be achieved in a manner that conflicts with the Labor Commissioner's regulations. In opposing to the Labor Commissioner's motion, Plaintiff fails to articulate a cogent or coherent reading of the constitutional text that conflicts with the regulations. Plaintiff bears a heavy burden of proof in this case to show a clear conflict between the regulations and the minimum wage amendment, and as he cannot meet that burden the Court should grant summary judgment to the Labor Commissioner.

II. "OFFER" VERSUS "PROVIDE"

A. Plaintiff's Proposed Application of "Offer" Versus "Provide" Would Undermine the Amendment's Lower-Tier Wage Rate

As stated in the Labor Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, NAC 608.100 and 608.102 are intended to answer the question of "what happens if the employee declines health insurance?" No party to this case has suggested that the minimum wage amendment should be interpreted in a way that strips an employee of the ability to decline an employer's offer of health insurance if the employee so desires. In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff argues that if an employee declines an offer of health insurance then the insurance is not being sufficiently "provided" under the amendment and hence the employer must pay the higher wage rate.

Yet Plaintiff still asserts that the minimum wage amendment must offer a real choice between health insurance coverage and the higher-tier minimum wage. Plaintiff states that "...there was a bargain, a set of choices by both employees and employers, inherent in the minimum wage amendment." (Resp. p. 6). This is true. The minimum wage amendment, and

1 the lower-tier exception in particular, do strike a bargain between employers and employees.
2 The problem with Plaintiff's approach to mandate the higher-tier wage rate where an
3 employee rejects an offer of insurance is that it would effectively deny employers the benefit of
4 that bargain. For example, if an employer complies with the minimum wage amendment and
5 makes qualifying health insurance available to its employees and Employee A accepts the
6 health insurance then the minimum wage amendment allows the employer to pay Employee A
7 the lower-tier wage rate. But if Employee B performs the same job and happens to decline
8 the health insurance then, under Plaintiff's reading, the employer would be obligated to pay a
9 different wage rate to Employee B.

10 The practical effect of Plaintiff's proposed approach would be that employers would
11 inevitably be faced with a scenario where employees are paid different wages for equal work.
12 The precariousness of this scenario should be self-evident. If Employee A happens to be of
13 the opposite sex than Employee B, then this circumstance alone is enough to hand Employee
14 A a *prima facie* case of pay discrimination under the federal Equal Pay Act. *Corning Glass*
15 *Works v. Brennan*, 417 U.S. 188, 197 (1974). While an employer may be able to rebut such a
16 case of pay discrimination in some cases, the legal framework that has developed under the
17 Equal Pay Act clearly places an employer on the defensive and under a "heavy burden" to
18 prove non-discrimination.¹ Plaintiff's approach would allow employees to dictate different
19 wage rates but still leave the employer legally responsible under other law for wage rate
20 disparities. The bargain inherent in the minimum wage amendment was not intended to lead
21 to this unnecessary exposure.

22 In order to avoid the scenario that Plaintiff envisions where employees would receive
23 different wages for equal work, the employer would have to raise the wages of Employee A to
24 the higher-tier wage rate, despite meeting every condition specified in the minimum wage

25 ¹ The Equal Pay Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The statutory exceptions are viewed as an affirmative
26 defense that must be pled and proved by an employer. Establishing a legitimate affirmative defense is described
27 as a "heavy burden." *Odomes v. Nucare, Inc.*, 653 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1981); see also *Cooke v. United*
28 *States*, 85 Fed. Cl. 325, 342 (2008) (discussing the analytical framework for claims under the Equal Pay Act).
Nevada has adopted the Equal Pay Act into state law at NRS 608.017.

1 amendment to pay the lower-tier wage rate. This outcome effectively eliminates the benefit of
2 the bargain that is reflected in the minimum wage amendment's lower-tier wage rate and
3 acknowledged by Plaintiff in his opposition. Plaintiff's proposed approach should be rejected
4 outright. While the minimum wage amendment is a remedial act and is primarily intended to
5 raise wages, this abstract purpose does not provide free license to nullify the lower-tier
6 exception or re-write the bargain inherent in the amendment by requiring the higher-tier wage
7 rate if an employee voluntarily rejects an offer of insurance.

8 **B. "Offer" and "Provide" Are Synonymous Under the Amendment**

9 In moving for summary judgment, the Labor Commissioner pointed out that the terms
10 "offer" and "provide" as used in the amendment are synonymous. In opposition Plaintiff does
11 not raise any legitimate dispute otherwise, and the Labor Commissioner is entitled to
12 summary judgment.

13 It is not difficult to conclude that "offer" and "provide" are synonymous because each
14 term under the amendment has been given the same meaning. That meaning is the definition
15 that is stated in the amendment itself: "making health insurance available to the employee for
16 the employee and the employee's dependents at a total cost to the employee for premiums of
17 not more than 10 percent of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer." Nev.
18 Const. Art. 15 § 16(A).

19 The difference between Plaintiff's approach and the Labor Commissioner's approach is
20 that the Labor Commissioner looks to the definition provided in the constitutional text to supply
21 the meaning of these terms whereas Plaintiff looks outside the constitutional text to extrinsic
22 sources such as dictionaries and thesauruses.

23 Where a statutory, or in this case constitutional, definition is provided within the law
24 itself then it is that definition that controls over any dictionary definition. This is the central
25 holding of the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in *State, Dep't of Bus. & Indus. v. Check*
26 *City*, 130 Nev. ____, 337 P.3d 755 (Adv. Op. 90, 2014). Under the express definition provided
27 in the amendment, "offer" and "provide" have the same meaning: "...making health insurance
28

1 available..." This is not a battle of dictionaries. The amendment's text trumps any dictionary
2 definition offered by Plaintiff. Plaintiff's argument that the Court should settle the meaning of
3 these terms by looking outside the amendment's text to dictionary and thesaurus offerings is
4 an invitation for this Court to commit the same error for which the district court was reversed in
5 *Check City*. It is an invitation that this Court should decline. Instead the Court should follow
6 *Check City* and look to the definition provided in the amendment itself.

7 Even if this were a battle of the dictionaries, then the Labor Commissioner would still be
8 entitled to summary judgment. The flaw in Plaintiff's reasoning is that even in a battle of
9 dictionaries Plaintiff is looking to the definition of "provide" and searching for the specific term
10 "offer." Instead, Plaintiff should be looking to the meaning of "provide" and looking for a
11 substantive meaning similar to "make available" because making available is the substantive
12 meaning of "offer" under the amendment. When this course correction is made to Plaintiff's
13 reasoning, Plaintiff's position that distinguishes between "offer" and "provide" crumbles. This is
14 because the ordinary dictionary definition of the term "provide" is indeed "to make available."
15 *Webster's New World College Dictionary*, 1155 (4th ed. 2002); *Merriam-Websters Collegiate*
16 *Dictionary* 941 (10th ed. 1999) (defining "provide" as "to make something available to"). The
17 meaning of "offer" as used in the amendment is to make health insurance available. Nev.
18 Const. art. 15 § 16(A); NAC 608.102(2). In this case "offer" and "provide" each mean the
19 same thing: to make health insurance available. As each term has the same meaning under
20 the amendment, they are synonymous in this case.

21 Because the amendment's text provides an actual definition Plaintiff cannot rely upon
22 *Lorton v. Jones*, 130 Nev. ___, 322 P.3d 1051, 1056 (2014) and the general presumption that
23 a different term denotes a different idea. *Lorton* did not concern a constitutional provision that
24 included a specific definition as the minimum wage amendment does in this case. The
25 presumption discussed in *Lorton* is overcome by the principle followed in *Check City* that a
26 specific definition stated in the law supplies the controlling meaning of term. In this case the
27
28

1 constitutional text assigns the same meaning to both "offer" and "provide" and the
2 presumption discussed in *Lorton* is inapplicable.

3 **C. The Amendment Does Not Make Sense if "Offer" and "Provide" Are Not**
4 **Accepted as Synonymous**

5 There is no getting around the constitutional definition that assigns the same meaning
6 to "offer" and "provide." Plaintiff argues in opposition that the definition of "offering health
7 insurance" is the predicate act to complying with the amendment's command to provide health
8 insurance. This does not make a tremendous amount of sense, nor is it faithful to the
9 constitutional text.

10 If "offer" and "provide" really are segregated to the extent Plaintiff claims then the 10
11 percent cost cap is rendered illusory, as the cost cap is integral to the definition of "offering
12 health benefits," but the supposed command to provide health benefits makes no mention of
13 the 10 percent cost cap. If the definition of "offering health benefits" is only a predicate act
14 and does not translate to the amendments supposed command to "provide" health insurance
15 then neither will the 10 percent cost cap. Under Plaintiff's reading of the text an employer's
16 offer of insurance is subject to the 10 percent cost cap, but because offering does not equate
17 to providing health insurance an employer need not actually provide health insurance that
18 satisfies the 10 percent cost cap in order to pay the lower-tier wage rate. This interpretation
19 would do much more to render the higher tier wage rate illusory than anything that the Plaintiff
20 has accused the Labor Commissioner of having done through regulation. The only way to
21 mitigate this consequence is by committing the same error that taints Plaintiff's entire
22 approach to the minimum wage amendment- selectively emphasizing the beneficial portions
23 of the constitutional text and simply disregarding the portions of the text that do not benefit
24 Plaintiff's position.

25 These self-contradictions in Plaintiff's position only highlight the impossibility of
26 achieving a cogent and coherent reading of the constitutional text that differs from the
27 interpretation reflected in the Labor Commissioner's regulations. There is no such difficulty if
28

1 the Court simply follows the amendment's plain text and the Labor Commissioner's adopted
2 regulations, as well as common sense, by ascribing the same meaning under the amendment
3 to the terms "offer " and "provide." That meaning is plainly stated as "making health insurance
4 available." Nev. Const. art. 15 § 16(A); NAC 608.102(2).

5 **D. This Court Has Authority to Address the Constitutional Question**

6 Finally, in opposition Plaintiff points to an order from a judge in the Eighth District Court,
7 ostensibly for the information of this Court, in which a judge of that court apparently made a
8 partial decision about an employer's offer of health insurance. The Labor Commissioner does
9 not object to Plaintiff's request for judicial notice of this order; however it should also be
10 judicially noticed that this order is not the only decision coming out of the Eighth District Court
11 addressing the minimum wage amendment. A decision from Department 31 of the same
12 Eighth District Court in the case of *McLaughlin v. Deli Planet, Inc.*, Eighth Judicial District
13 Court, Case No. A703656 appears to have reached a different conclusion. In that case the
14 District Court found and concluded as follows:

15 The Minimum Wage Amendment requires employers like
16 Defendant to offer health benefits as described in the minimum
17 wage amendment in order to pay employees less than the higher
minimum wage rate.

18 The Minimum Wage Amendment defines offering health benefits as
19 "making health insurance available to the employee for the
20 employee and the employee's dependents at a total cost to the
21 employee for premiums of not more than 10 percent of the
22 employee's gross taxable income from the employer." The
Minimum Wage Amendment does not address the quality of
insurance that an employer must offer to pay lower minimum wage
rate.

23 (Exhibit 9, pp.4-5).

24 Even if this Court considers the order offered by Plaintiff, the Court should recognize
25 that the decisions coming out of the Eighth District Court have not been consistent on this
26 point.

1 But this case should not be should not be decided based upon the dueling decisions
2 from Clark County judges. As a procedural matter, neither of these decisions could directly
3 confront the validity of the Labor Commissioner's regulations under the constitution as neither
4 case had complied with the procedural requirements of NRS 233B.110. (Exhibit 10). These
5 dueling decisions, to the extent they are even considered by this Court, are not legally capable
6 of anything more than speaking only to the peripheries of this case.

7 This case is the case, rather than the private wage disputes in Las Vegas, in which a
8 proper consideration of the constitutionality of the administrative regulations can be made as a
9 matter of first impression. In deciding this case, the Court should undertake its own analysis
10 of the minimum wage amendment. As set forth above, the administrative regulations that
11 view "offer" and "provide" as synonymous do not conflict with the text of the amendment. The
12 Labor Commissioner is therefore entitled to summary judgment and the Court should not
13 hesitate to grant it.

14 **III. IT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR THE LABOR COMMISSIONER TO LOOK TO**
15 **FEDERAL TAX LAW TO MEASURE AN EMPLOYEE'S GROSS TAXABLE INCOME**

16 **A. Plaintiff's Box 3 Solution is Not Faithful to the Constitutional Text**

17 The 10 percent cost cap is based upon an "employee's gross taxable income from the
18 employer." Nev. Const. art. 15 § 16(A). NAC 608.104 provides that when this cost cap is
19 applied, tips are counted as part of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer.
20 This issue does not present a difficult question either, as only the federal government can
21 establish income tax requirements that apply to Nevada employers. Under the Internal
22 Revenue Code tips are plainly counted as taxable income. 26 U.S.C. § 3401(f). In opposition,
23 Plaintiff does not dispute that tips are taxable income, nor does Plaintiff dispute that state law
24 is incapable of supplying the measure of an employee's income tax. But Plaintiff's proposed
25 solution is to look at Box 3 rather than Box 1 on the employees Form W-2.

1 Plaintiff's proposed Box 3 solution is at best only a partial solution, and as with each of
2 Plaintiff's proposed approaches to the constitutional text it fails because it violates the
3 principle that each term in the constitution must be given meaning.

4 The amendment bases the cost cap on the employee's "gross taxable income." Nev.
5 Const. art. 15 § 16(A). Box 3 of the W-2 reflects a subset of the employee's taxable income,
6 but does not reflect the gross amount of the employee's taxable income. Gross income
7 means "total income from all sources before deductions, exemptions, or other tax restrictions."
8 Blacks Law Dictionary "gross income" (under "income") (10th ed. 2014); 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)
9 ("...gross income means all income from whatever source derived..."). Gross taxable income
10 includes tips. *Roberts v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue*, 176 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1949).

11 In order to give effect to each word in the phrase "gross taxable income," the 10
12 percent cost cap must be based upon the gross amount of an employee's income that is
13 subject to income tax. Plaintiff's Box 3 solution fails to do this because it is based upon a
14 subset rather than the gross amount of the employee's taxable income.

15 As explained in the Labor Commissioner's opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary
16 judgment, this still gives meaning the term "from the employer" because tips are income
17 gained by the employee from his labor and services to the employer. See *Roberts*, 176 F.2d
18 at 225 ("Any monies which come to the taxpayer as the fruits of his labor are 'income'"). It
19 further clarifies that the amount is based upon the gross taxable income that is earned in
20 connection with a particular employer rather than gross taxable income from any other source.
21 If the amendment had read only "gross taxable income" and did not then specify "from the
22 employer" then conceivably the 10 percent cost cap could be based on income unrelated to
23 employment. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (income such as rents, dividends and alimony is counted
24 as gross income). The "from the employer" tag indicates that these other sources of gross
25 income are not part of the 10 percent cost cap equation.

26 By directing employers to base the cost cap upon the gross taxable income amount of
27 the Form W-2, rather than a subset of the taxable income, the Labor Commissioner gives
28

1 effect to the amendment's entire clause as the information reflected in Box 1 of the Form W-2
2 does provide the gross amount of the employees taxable income and is limited to gross
3 income earned in connection with the employment with an individual employer.

4 **B. Plaintiff's Approach Creates A Disparity Between Tipped and Non-Tipped**
5 **Employees**

6 In opposition Plaintiff also argues that the Labor Commissioner's approach equates to
7 a 137% increase in allowable monthly premiums for Employee Z, whose W-2 was attached to
8 the opposition. This is true, but rather unremarkable as Employee Z's gross taxable income is
9 approximately 137% of Employee Z's base wages alone.

10 The amendment calls for a cost cap that is proportional to the employee's gross taxable
11 income. The Labor Commissioner's approach stipulates that the proportional rate is the same
12 regardless of whether an employee is a tipped employee or a non-tipped employee- a flat
13 10% of the employee's gross taxable income. NAC 608.104. Plaintiff's approach would tilt the
14 amendment in favor of tipped employees by capping the premium costs at a lower percentage
15 of gross taxable income than would apply to non-tipped employees. In order to adopt this
16 approach this Court must implicitly find that the amendment intended to create this disparity,
17 despite no reference to this effect in the constitutional text itself. As there is no textual basis to
18 ground such an interpretation, the Court should reject this approach.

19 The drafters of the amendment did provide a benefit in favor of tipped employees
20 elsewhere in the amendment, by requiring that tips cannot be credited toward satisfaction of
21 the minimum wage rate. Nev. Const. art. 15 § 16. But nothing in the text of the amendment
22 suggests an intent to discriminate between tipped and non-tipped employees when applying
23 the premium cost cap. The text of the amendment strongly suggests otherwise by providing a
24 straight proportional cost cap of 10 percent and basing that cost cap on an employee's gross
25 taxable income. The result of the Labor Commissioner's regulations is that health insurance
26 must be just as affordable for non-tipped employees as it is for tipped employees – 10 percent
27 of the employee's gross taxable income.

1 IV. CONCLUSION

2 The Labor Commissioner is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot
3 show that the challenged regulations clearly conflict with the minimum wage amendment. The
4 regulations do not conflict at all with the amendment and are faithful to both the text of the
5 amendment and the bargain that is inherent in the amendment.


6 The terms "offer" and "provide" clearly have the same meaning as used in the
7 amendment. That meaning is the meaning the Labor Commissioner has recognized in NAC
8 608.100 and NAC 608.102(2) as making health insurance available. Any different reading of
9 the amendment cannot be reconciled with the mandate to give meaning to each word and
10 phrase of the amendment.

11 NAC 608.104 does not conflict with the amendment by looking to federal tax law and
12 the Form W-2 to supply the amount of gross taxable income because this approach is faithful
13 to each word in the constitutional text. This does include tips as taxable income, but this is
14 simply a result of the language used in the amendment to base the 10 percent cost cap on the
15 "the employee's gross taxable income from the employer." When crafting regulations the
16 Labor Commissioner is not at liberty to ignore the gross taxable income requirement.

17 The end result is that Plaintiff cannot meet his considerable burden of proof in this case
18 and consequently the Labor Commissioner is entitled to summary judgment.

19 DATED this 27 day of July, 2015

20
21 ADAM PAUL LAXALT
ATTORNEY GENERAL

22
23 BY: 


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Office of the Labor Commissioner; and
Shannon Chambers

AFFIRMATION

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document filed in this court does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 27 day of July, 2015.

ADAM PAUL LAXALT
Attorney General

By: 

Scott Davis, # 10019
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Nevada ex rel
Office of the Labor Commissioner;
Office of the Labor Commissioner and
Shannon Chambers

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of the State of Nevada Office of the Attorney General and that on the 28th day of July, 2015 I served the foregoing DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by serving a copy via U.S. Mail, first-class, postage-paid, as follows:


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Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
Attorneys for Plaintiff


An Employee of the Attorney General's Office

INDEX TO EXHIBITS

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>No. of pages</u>
9	Order in <i>McLaughlin v. Deli Planet, Inc.</i> , Eighth District Court Case No. A-14- 703656-C	6
10	Affidavit of Labor Commissioner Chief Compliance Officer	1

Exhibit 9



CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **ORDR**

2 FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP

3 MARK J. RICCIARDI, ESQ.

4 Nevada Bar No. 3141

5 DAVID B. DORNAK, ESQ.

6 Nevada Bar No. 6274

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Attorneys for Defendant

DELI PLANET, INC. d/b/a JASON'S DELI

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CHRISTOPHER MCLAUGHLIN, an
individual, on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DELI PLANET, INC., a Nevada limited
liability company, d/b/a/ JASON'S DELI,
and DOES 1 through 100, Inclusive

Defendant.

) CASE NO.: A-14-703656-C

) DEPT NO.: XXXI

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**ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss First Amended Class Action Complaint having
come on regularly for hearing on March 3, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. in Department XXXI of the
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Joanna Kishner presiding, Plaintiff being
represented by Bradley Schrager, Esq. and Daniel Bravo, Esq., and Defendant being

TC21

FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP
3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 950
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169

1 represented by Anthony B. Golden, Esq., the Court having considered the briefs of the
2 parties, the arguments of counsel and otherwise being fully advised in the premises and
3 good cause appearing therefor finds, concludes, and orders as follows:

4 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

5 1. On December 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Class Action
6 Complaint ("Amended Complaint"). The Amended Complaint contained one claim for
7 relief. That claim was an alleged violation of Nevada Constitutional Article XV,
8 Section 16 (the "Minimum Wage Amendment"). According to Plaintiff, Defendant
9 violated the Minimum Wage Amendment by paying him less than \$8.25 per hour
10 despite Defendant not offering Plaintiff a qualifying health insurance plan. As alleged
11 by Plaintiff, Defendant's health insurance plan was not "comprehensive in its coverage"
12 for Defendant to qualify to pay anything less than the higher-tier minimum wage rate.
13 Plaintiff is not maintaining that the premiums he paid for any health insurance exceeded
14 10 percent of his gross taxable income from Defendant.

15 2. On January 29, 2015, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff
16 filed his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on February 18, 2015, and Defendant filed
17 its Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss on February 24, 2015. A hearing on the
18 Motion to Dismiss was then held on March 3, 2015.

19 3. In its Motion and as argued at the hearing, Defendant maintained that the
20 Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it only challenged the quality of
21 Defendant's health insurance and not the cost of such insurance. According to
22 Defendant, the Nevada Supreme Court in *Thomas v. Yellow Cab Corp.*, 130 Nev. Adv.
23 Op. No. 52 at p. 8, 327 P.3d 518 (2014) requires the Court to apply the clear textual
24 meaning of the Minimum Wage Amendment. Because the Minimum Wage Amendment
25 defines health benefits as "making insurance available to the employee for the employee
26 and the employee's dependents at a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more
27 than 10 percent of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer", Defendant
28 took the position that the Minimum Wage Amendment does not require its health plan to

1 cover certain categories of health care expenses in order for Defendant to pay the lower
2 minimum wage rate. Based upon a strict reading of the Minimum Wage Amendment,
3 Defendant argued the Minimum Wage Amendment only addresses the cost and not
4 quality of health insurance necessary to pay less than the \$8.25 per hour.

5 4. Defendant further argued that, in order for Plaintiff to challenge the
6 quality of its health plan, Plaintiff must first seek relief with the Nevada Labor
7 Commissioner. As advanced by Defendant, the Nevada Labor Commissioner
8 promulgated NAC 608.102 to address the type of health care expenses that employers'
9 health insurance plans must cover to allow employers to pay the lower minimum wage
10 rate. Although Defendant recognizes that the Minimum Wage Amendment created a
11 private right of action for violations of the amendment, Defendant maintained that
12 Plaintiff cannot rely upon that private right of action to challenge NAC 608.102.
13 Relying on *Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC*, 124 Nev. 951, 194 P.3d 96 (2008),
14 Defendant asserted that the Court should not imply a private cause of action when one is
15 not expressly provided and that the Nevada Labor Commissioner is best tasked to
16 interpret and enforce her regulations. As articulated by Defendant, if complaints
17 addressing the quality requirement are not first brought before the Nevada Labor
18 Commissioner, multiple judges throughout Nevada would have to decide on a case by
19 case basis when a particular health plan meets the minimum coverage requirement to
20 pay the lower minimum wage rate. This would render NAC 608.102 irrelevant.

21 5. In its Opposition, Plaintiff took the position that Defendant's health plan
22 is "junk insurance" and, therefore, does not satisfy the requirements of the Minimum
23 Wage Amendment. Plaintiff also argued that the Minimum Wage Amendment contains
24 a broad and express right of access to Nevada courts for remedial enforcement. Plaintiff
25 also asked the Court to determine the intent of the drafters' of the Minimum Wage
26 Amendment regarding the remedy and enforcement provisions contained in the
27 Minimum Wage Amendment. According to Plaintiff, the drafters never intended for
28 plaintiffs to first have to resolve quality of coverage issues with the Nevada Labor

1 Commissioner. Plaintiff further stated that *Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC*, 124
2 Nev. 951, 194 P.3d 96 (2008) does not apply because that case “is about whether and
3 how Nevada courts should imply private rights of action in statutes where no express
4 right is evident.” Unlike *Baldonado*, Plaintiff maintained that his right of action is
5 manifested in the Minimum Wage Amendment.

6 6. At the hearing, Plaintiff raised a new argument. Specifically, Plaintiff
7 claimed that the Minimum Wage Amendment defines “health benefits” as offering
8 “health insurance.” As such, Plaintiff argued that the Minimum Wage Amendment goes
9 from a general representation to a more specific requirement. Because the Minimum
10 Wage Amendment requires “health insurance”, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant’s
11 alleged “junk insurance” does not satisfy the requirements of the Minimum Wage
12 Amendment to pay less than \$8.25 per hour. Plaintiff also argued that nothing in the
13 Minimum Wage Amendment “carves out for the Labor Commissioner” a claim based
14 upon the quality of insurance offered by an employer.

15 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

16 1. *Thomas v. Yellow Cab Corp.*, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 52 at p. 8, 327
17 P.3d 518 (2014) requires the Court to apply the clear textual meaning of the Minimum
18 Wage Amendment. In doing so, the Court should consider what the Minimum Wage
19 Amendment actually states and not what the drafters who drafted the language in or the
20 voters who voted for the Minimum Wage Amendment might have intended.

21 2. The Minimum Wage Amendment requires employers like Defendant to
22 offer health benefits as described in the Minimum Wage Amendment in order to pay
23 employees less than the higher minimum wage rate.

24 3. The Minimum Wage Amendment defines offering health benefits as
25 “making health insurance available to the employee for the employee and the
26 employee’s dependents at a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more than
27 10 percent of the employee’s gross taxable income from the employer.” The Minimum
28

1 Wage Amendment does not address the quality of insurance that Defendant must offer
2 to pay lower minimum wage rate.

3 4. The Labor Commissioner created NAC 608.102 to fill the gap regarding
4 what is not covered by the Minimum Wage Amendment. That administrative code –
5 titled “Minimum wage: Qualification to pay lower rate to employee offered health
6 insurance” – specifically addresses what categories of health care expenses an employer
7 must cover in order to pay the lower minimum wage rate. Unlike NAC 608.102, the
8 Minimum Wage Amendment addresses the premium cost and not coverage
9 requirements.

10 5. Plaintiff is not challenging the premium costs he paid for Defendant’s
11 health insurance and has not alleged that such costs exceeded 10 percent of his gross
12 taxable income from Defendant. Instead, Plaintiff is only claiming that Defendant’s
13 health insurance did not provide sufficient coverage to pay less than the higher
14 minimum wage rate. Such a claim, however, is not a claim for violation of the
15 Minimum Wage Amendment. It is in reality a violation of the interpretation by the
16 Labor Commissioner under the governing regulations and clearly falls within the scope
17 of the Labor Commissioner to interpret and to provide remedies.

18 6. Because Plaintiff’s claim is fundamentally an alleged violation of the
19 administrative code, there is no private right of action for the specific claim contained
20 in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff must first seek recourse with the Labor
21 Commissioner. Such a finding is in line with *Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC*, 124
22 Nev. 951, 194 P.3d 96 (2008).

23 7. Any findings of fact that are really conclusions of law shall be
24 considered as such and any conclusions of law that are really findings of fact shall be
25 considered as such.

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

1 ORDER

2 Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT IS HEREBY
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
4 granted and that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice.


5 DATED this 19th day of March 2015.

6
7  JOANNA S. KISHNER

8  DISTRICT COURT JUDGE


9 Approved as to Form and Content:

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
Exhibit 10

STATE OF NEVADA)
COUNTY OF CLARK) ss.

1. I am Chief Compliance Officer for the State of Nevada, Office of the Labor Commissioner.
2. I am familiar with the operations and activities of the Office of the Labor Commissioner.
3. I am familiar with the litigation involving the Office of the Labor Commissioner.
4. The Office of the Labor Commissioner is not a party to the case of *Diaz et. al v. MDC Restaurants*, Eighth District Court Case No. A-14-701533-C.
5. The Office of the Labor Commissioner is not a party to the case of *McLaughlin et. al v. Deli Planet, Inc.*, Eighth District Court Case No. A-14-703656-C.


LLETA BROWN

CARRA TOLEY
Notary Public



REC'D & FILED

2015 AUG 14 PM 12:50

SUSAN HERRIWETHER
CLERK

BY V. Alegria
DEPUTY

THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARSON CITY, NEVADA

CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual and
resident of Nevada,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA ex rel. THE
OFFICE OF THE NEVADA LABOR
COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
NEVADA LABOR COMMISSIONER; and
SHANNON CHAMBERS, Nevada Labor
Commissioner, in her official capacity,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: 14 OC 00080 1B
DEPT. NO.: II

**DECISION AND ORDER, COMPRISING FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW¹**

On April 30, 2015, Plaintiff Cody C. Hancock ("Plaintiff"), pursuant to N.R.S. 233B.110, filed a complaint for declaratory relief against Defendants the State of Nevada *ex rel.* Office of the Nevada Labor Commissioner, the Office Of The Nevada Labor Commissioner, and Shannon Chambers, in her official capacity as the Nevada Labor Commissioner (collectively, "Defendants"), seeking to invalidate two administrative regulations—N.A.C. 608.100(1) and N.A.C. 608.104(2)—purporting to implement article XV, section 16 of the Nevada Constitution (the

¹ If any finding herein is in truth a conclusion of law, or if any conclusion stated is in truth a finding of fact, it shall be deemed so.

1 seeking to invalidate two administrative regulations—N.A.C. 608.100(1) and N.A.C.
2 608.104(2)—purporting to implement article XV, section 16 of the Nevada Constitution (the
3 “Minimum Wage Amendment” or the “Amendment”). Plaintiff also sought to enjoin the
4 Defendants from enforcing the challenged regulations.

5 On or about June 25, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. After a brief stay of
6 proceedings for the parties to consider resolution through a renewed rulemaking process,
7 Defendants’ motion to dismiss was withdrawn by stipulation of the parties, entered
8 March 30, 2015, in which the parties also agreed to permit Plaintiff to amend the complaint, and to
9 seek to resolve this action by respective motions for summary judgment. The parties agreed that no
10 discovery was necessary in this case, and that the determinative issues were matters of law.

11 On or about June 11, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on
12 Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief. On or about June 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Motion for
13 Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief. Subsequently, each party responded
14 in opposition to the other parties’ motion, and replied in support of their own. Plaintiff had
15 previously asked the Nevada Labor Commissioner to pass upon the validity of the challenged
16 regulations, and the Court finds that all prerequisites under N.R.S. 233B.110 have been satisfied
17 sufficient for the Court to enter orders resolving this matter.

18 The Court, having considered the pleadings and being fully advised, now finds and orders
19 as follows:

20 As an initial matter, summary judgment under N.R.C.P. 56(a) is “appropriate and shall be
21 rendered forthwith when the pleadings and other evidence on file demonstrate that no genuine issue
22 as to any material fact [remains] and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
23 law.” *Wood v. Safeway*, 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (internal quotations
24 omitted). Further, in deciding a challenge to administrative regulations pursuant to N.R.S.
25 233B.110, “[t]he court shall declare the [challenged] regulation invalid if it finds that it violates
26 constitutional or statutory provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency.” N.R.S.
27 223B.110. The burden is upon Plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged regulations violate the
28 Minimum Wage Amendment.

1 The Minimum Wage Amendment was enacted by a vote of the people by ballot initiative at
2 the 2006 General Election, and became effective on November 28, 2006. It is a remedial act, and
3 will be liberally construed to ensure the intended benefit for the intended beneficiaries. *See, e.g.,*
4 *Washoe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co.*, 112 Nev. 494, 496, 915 P.2d 288, 289 (1996); *see also*
5 *Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen's Club*, __ Nev. __, 336 P.2d 951, 954 (2014).

6 Here, in order to determine whether the challenged regulations conflict with or violate the
7 Minimum Wage Amendment, the Court will first determine the meaning of the pertinent textual
8 portions of the Amendment. Courts review an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute of
9 constitutional provision *de novo*, and may do so with no deference to the agency's interpretations.
10 *United States v. State Engineer*, 117 Nev. 585, 589, 27 P.3d 51, 53 (2001) ("An administrative
11 agency's interpretation of a regulation or statute does not control if an alternate reading is
12 compelled by the plain language of the provision."); *Bacher v. State Engineer*, 122 Nev. 1110,
13 1118, 146 P.3d 793, 798 (2006) ("The district court may decide purely legal questions without
14 deference to an agency's determination.").

15 The Minimum Wage Amendment raised the minimum hourly wage in Nevada, but also
16 established a two-tier wage system by which an employer may pay employees, currently, \$8.25 per
17 hour, or pay down to \$7.25 per hour if the employer provides qualifying health insurance benefits,
18 to the employee and all of his or her dependents, at a certain capped premium cost to employee.

19 Section A of the Minimum Wage Amendment provides:

20 A. Each employer shall pay a wage to each employee of not less than the hourly
21 rates set forth in this section. The rate shall be five dollars and fifteen cents (\$5.15)
22 per hour worked, if the employer provides health benefits as described herein, or six
23 dollars and fifteen cents (\$6.15) per hour if the employer does not provide such
24 benefits. Offering health benefits within the meaning of this section shall consist of
25 making health insurance available to the employee for the employee and the
26 employee's dependents at a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more
27 than 10 percent of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer. These
28 rates of wages shall be adjusted by the amount of increases in the federal minimum
wage over \$5.15 per hour, or, if greater, by the cumulative increase in the cost of
living. The cost of living increase shall be measured by the percentage increase as of
December 31 in any year over the level as of December 31, 2004 of the Consumer
Price Index (All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average) as published by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor or the successor index or federal
agency. No CPI adjustment for any one-year period may be greater than 3%. The
Governor or the State agency designated by the Governor shall publish a bulletin by
April 1 of each year announcing the adjusted rates, which shall take effect the

1 following July 1. Such bulletin will be made available to all employers and to any
2 other person who has filed with the Governor or the designated agency a request to
3 receive such notice but lack of notice shall not excuse noncompliance with this
4 section. An employer shall provide written notification of the rate adjustments to
5 each of its employees and make the necessary payroll adjustments by July 1
6 following the publication of the bulletin. Tips or gratuities received by employees
7 shall not be credited as being any part of or offset against the wage rates required by
8 this section.

9 Nev. Const. art. XV, § 16(A).

10 N.A.C. 608.104(2) states, in pertinent part:

11 2. As used in this section, "gross taxable income of the employee attributable to the
12 employer" means the amount specified on the Form W-2 issued by the employer to
13 the employee and includes, without limitation, tips, bonuses or other compensation
14 as required for purposes of federal individual income tax.

15 N.A.C. 608.100(1) states, in pertinent part:

16 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections 2 and 3, the minimum wage for an
17 employee in the State of Nevada is the same whether the employee is a full-time,
18 permanent, part-time, probationary or temporary employee, and:

19 (a) If an employee is offered qualified health insurance, is \$5.15 per
20 hour; or

21 (b) If an employee is not offered qualified health insurance, is \$6.15 per
22 hour.

23 **N.A.C. 608.104(2) Is Invalid**

24 Plaintiff contends that N.A.C. 608.104(2) unlawfully permits employers to figure in tips and
25 gratuities furnished by customers and the general public when establishing the maximum allowable
26 premium cost to the employee of qualifying health insurance. He argues that "10% of the
27 employee's gross taxable income from the employer" can only mean compensation and wages paid
28 by the employer to the employee, and excludes tips earned by the employee.

29 Defendants argue that the term "gross taxable income" directed the Labor Commissioner to
30 interpret the entire provision as meaning all income derived from working for the employer,
31 whether as direct wages or as tips and gratuities, because Nevada has no state income tax and state
32 law contains no definition of "gross taxable income." Therefore, the State argues, resort to federal
33 tax law is appropriate, and because tips and gratuities earned by the employee constitute, for him or
34 her, gross taxable income upon which federal taxes must be paid. In that regard, Defendants
35 contend that N.A.C. 608.104(2)'s definition of "income attributable to the employer" best

1 implements the language of the Amendment.

2 The Court finds the text of the Minimum Wage Amendment which N.A.C. 608.104(2)
3 purports to implement—"10% of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer"—to be
4 unambiguous. As the Court reads the plain language of the constitutional provision, it indicates that
5 the term "10% of the employee's gross taxable income" is limited to such income that comes "from
6 the employer," as opposed to gross taxable income that emanates from any other source, including
7 from tips and gratuities provided by an employer's customers. "[T]he language of a statute should
8 be given its plain meaning unless doing so violates the spirit of the act ... [thus] when a statute is
9 clear on its face, a court may not go beyond the language of the statute in determining the
10 legislature's intent." *University and Community College System of Nevada v. Nevadans for Sound*
11 *Government*, 120 Nev. 712, 731, 100 P.3d 179, 193 (2004).

12 There are no particular difficulties in determining an employee's gross taxable income that
13 comes *from the employer*, as this figure must be reported to the United States Internal Revenue
14 Service as part of the employee's tax information, including on his or her annual W-2 form, along
15 with the employee's income from tips and gratuities. The Court further presumes that employers
16 are aware of, or can easily compute, how much they pay out of their business revenue to each
17 employee, this being a major portion of the business's expenses for which records are surely
18 maintained by the employer.

19 The Court does note that N.A.C. 608.104(2)'s inclusion of "bonuses or other compensation"
20 presents no constitutional problem under the Amendment, as long as the income in question comes
21 "from the employer."

22 The Court understands Defendants' interpretation of this portion of the Amendment, and in
23 support of the administrative regulation purporting to implement and enforce it, to emphasize the
24 phrase "gross taxable income" in isolation, at the expense of a full reading giving meaning to the
25 qualifying term "from the employer." As Defendants note in their briefing, "[i]n expounding a
26 constitutional provision, such constructions should be employed as will prevent any clause,
27 sentence or word from being superfluous, void or insignificant." *Youngs v. Hall*, 9 Nev. 212
28 (1874). To arrive at Defendants' preferred interpretation of the Amendment, however, the Court

1 would have to first find the provision ambiguous, and then engage in an act of interpretation in
2 order to agree that the phrase "gross taxable income" modifies the term "from the employer," rather
3 than the other way around. In that formulation, "gross taxable income from the employer" is
4 rendered as "gross taxable income earned but for employment by the employer," or, "gross taxable
5 income earned as a result of having worked for the employer," and "from the employer" is rendered
6 more or less insignificant to the provision. This is, indeed, what N.A.C. 608.104(2) attempts to
7 indicate when it designates "gross taxable income attributable to the employer" as the measure of
8 the Amendment's ten-percent employee premium cost cap calculation. The Court disagrees, and
9 instead finds the constitutional language plain on its face.

10 But even if the Court were to find the pertinent portion of the Amendment to be ambiguous,
11 its context, reason, and public policy would still support the conclusion that tips and gratuities
12 should not be included in the calculation of allowable employee premium costs when an employer
13 seeks to qualify to pay below the upper-tier minimum hourly wage. The drafters of the Amendment
14 expressly excluded tips and gratuities from the calculation of the minimum hourly wage ("Tips or
15 gratuities received by employees shall not be credited as being any part of or offset against the
16 wage rates required by this section."), and gave no other indication that tips and gratuities should
17 be allowed as a form of credit against the cost of the health insurance benefits the Minimum Wage
18 Amendment was designed to encourage employers to provide employees in exchange for the
19 privilege of paying a lower hourly wage rate. Further, as Plaintiff points out, the effect of
20 permitting inclusion of tips and gratuities is to increase, in some cases precipitously, the cost of
21 health insurance benefits to employees, a result that is not supported by the policy and function of
22 the Amendment generally.

23 Defendants argue that permitting tips and gratuities in the premium calculations for tipped
24 employees eliminates an advantage for those employees that non-tipped employees do not enjoy. It
25 is not strictly within the province of the Nevada Labor Commissioner, however, to make such
26 policy choices in place of the Legislature, or the people acting in their legislative capacity. Her
27 charge is to enforce and implement the labor laws of this State as written. N.R.S. 607.160(1). In
28 any event, and apart from the Amendment's express treatment of the issue, Nevada has prohibited

1 administrative regulation. See N.R.S. 608.160.

2 The Court finds that N.A.C. 608.104(2), insofar as it permits employers to include tips and
3 gratuities furnished by the customers of the employer in the calculation of income against which in
4 measured the Minimum Wage Amendment's ten percent income cap on allowable health insurance
5 premium costs, violates the Nevada Constitution and therefore exceeds the Nevada Labor
6 Commissioner's authority to promulgate administrative regulations. The Court determines the
7 regulation in question to be invalid, and will further enjoin Defendants from enforcing N.A.C.
8 608.104(2) for the reasons stated herein.

9 **N.A.C. 608.100(1) Is Invalid**

10 Plaintiff argues that, in order to qualify for the privilege of paying less than the upper-tier
11 hourly minimum wage, an employer must actually provide qualifying health insurance, rather than
12 merely offer it. He contends that, read as a whole and giving all parts of the Amendment meaning
13 and function, the basic scheme of the provision is to propose for both employers and employees a
14 set of choices, a bargain: an employer can pay down to \$7.25 per hour, currently, but the employee
15 must receive something in return, qualified health insurance. A mere offer of health insurance—
16 which the employee has not played a role in selecting and may not meet the needs of an employee
17 and his or her family for any number of reasons—permits the employer to receive the benefit of the
18 Minimum Wage Amendment, but can leave the employee with less pay and no insurance provided
19 by the employer.

20 In support of this interpretation, Plaintiff suggests that “provide” and “offering,” as used in
21 the Amendment, are not synonyms, but rather that the basic command of the constitutional
22 provision (in order to pay less than the upper-tier wage level) is to *provide* health benefits, and that
23 the succeeding sentence that begins with the term “offering” only dictates certain requirements of
24 the benefits that must be offered as a step in their provision to employees paid at the lower wage
25 rate.

26 Defendants argue that “provide” and “offering” are synonymous, and that an employer need
27 only make available qualified health insurance in order to pay below the upper-tier wage level,
28 whether the employee accepts the benefit or not. Defendants argue that the usage, by the

1 Amendment's drafters, of "offering" and "making available" in the sentence succeeding those
2 employing "provide" modifies and defines "provide" to mean merely "offering" of health
3 insurance.

4 A further argument by Defendants is that the benefit of the bargain inherent in the
5 Amendment is the offer itself, having employer-selected health insurance made available to the
6 employee, and that interpreting the Amendment to require that employees accept the benefit in
7 order for an employer to pay below the upper-tier minimum wage denies the value of the Minimum
8 Wage Amendment to the employer. They deny that "provide" is the command, or mandate, of the
9 Minimum Wage Amendment where qualification for paying the lesser wage amount is concerned.

10 The Court finds that the Minimum Wage Amendment requires that employees actually
11 receive qualified health insurance in order for the employer to pay, currently, down to \$7.25 per
12 hour to those employees. Otherwise, the purposes and benefits of the Amendment are thwarted, and
13 employees (the obvious beneficiaries of the Amendment) who reject insurance plans offered by
14 their employer would receive neither the low-cost health insurance envisioned by the Minimum
15 Wage Amendment, nor the raise in wages its passaged promised, \$7.25 per hour already being the
16 federal minimum wage rate that every employer in Nevada must pay their employees anyway. The
17 amendment language does not support this interpretation.

18 The Court agrees with Plaintiff's argument that "provide" and "offering" are not
19 synonymous, and that the drafters included both terms, intentionally, to signify different concepts.
20 "[W]here the document has used one term in one place, and a materially different term in another,
21 the presumption is that the different term denotes a different idea." Antonin Scalia and Bryan A.
22 Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts*, 170 (2012). It is also instructive that the
23 drafters used "provide," a verb, and "offering," a gerund, ostensibly to make a distinction between
24 their functions as parts of speech within the text of the Amendment. The Amendment easily could
25 have stated that "[t]he rate shall be X dollars per hour worked, if the employer **offers** health
26 benefits as described herein, or X dollars per hour if the employer does not **offer** such benefits." It
27 did not so state. Instead, it required that the employer "provide" qualified health insurance if it
28 wished to take advantage of the lower wage rate. The Court agrees with Plaintiff, furthermore, that

1 the overall definitional weight of the verb phrase "to provide" lends credence to his interpretation
2 that it means to furnish, or to supply, rather than merely to make available, especially when the
3 overall context and scheme of the Minimum Wage Amendment is taken into consideration.

4 The distinction the parties here draw between "provide" and "offering" is no small matter.
5 Allowing employers merely to offer health insurance plans rather than provide, furnish, and supply
6 them, alters significantly the function of this remedial constitutional provision. The fundamental
7 operation of the Minimum Wage Amendment, fairly construed, demands that employees not be left
8 with none of the benefits of its enactment, whether they be the higher wage rate or the promised
9 low-cost health insurance for themselves and their families.

10 Because N.A.C. 608.100(1) impermissibly allows employers only to offer health insurance
11 benefits, but does not take into account whether the employee accepts those benefits when
12 determining how and when the employer may pay below the upper-tier minimum wage rate, it
13 violates the Nevada Constitution and therefore exceeds the Nevada Labor Commissioner's
14 authority to promulgate administrative regulations. The Court determines the regulation in question
15 to be invalid, and will further enjoin Defendants from enforcing N.A.C. 608.104(2) for the reasons
16 stated herein.

17 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED**, therefore, and for good cause appearing, that Plaintiff's
18 Motion for Summary Judgment is **GRANTED** and the Defendant's Motion for Summary
19 Judgment is **DENIED**.

20 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that N.A.C. 608.104(2) is declared invalid and of no effect,
21 for the reasons stated herein;

22 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that N.A.C. 608.100(1) is declared invalid and of no effect,
23 for the reasons stated herein;

24 ///

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1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants are enjoined from enforcing the challenged
2 regulations.

3
4 IT IS SO ORDERED this 12 day of August, 2015.

5
6 James E. Mulvey
7 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

8 Submitted by:

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10 **THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT**
11 **IN AND FOR CARSON CITY, NEVADA**
12

13 CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual and
14 resident of Nevada,

15 Plaintiff,

16 vs.

17 THE STATE OF NEVADA ex rel. THE
OFFICE OF THE NEVADA LABOR
18 COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
NEVADA LABOR COMMISSIONER; and
19 THORAN TOWLER, Nevada Labor
20 Commissioner, in his official capacity,

21 Defendants.

REC'D & FILED

2015 AUG 18 AM 9:57

G. COOPER
SUSAN HERRIWETHER
CLERK
BY _____ DEPUTY

CASE NO: 14 OC 00080 1B

DEPT. NO: II

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a **DECISION AND ORDER, COMPRISING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW** was filed with the First Judicial District Court on the 14th day of August, 2015, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.

Dated this 17th day of August, 2015.

By:

DON SPRINGMEYER, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 1021
BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 10217
DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 13078
3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
(702) 341-5200
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 17th day of August, 2015, a true and correct copy of the **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER** was served by depositing a true copy of the same for mailing, in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, at Las Vegas, Nevada, said envelope addressed to:

Scott Davis, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
Nevada State Bar No. 10019
555 E. Washington Ave., # 3900
Las Vegas, NV 89101
(702) 486-3894

*Attorneys for State of Nevada ex rel. Office of the Labor Commissioner;
Office of the Labor Commissioner and Commissioner Thoran Towler*


By 
Dannielle R. Fresquez, an Employee of
WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN &
RABKIN, LLP

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

REC'D & FILED

2015 AUG 14 PM 12: 50

SUSAN HERRIWETHER
CLERK

BY V. Alegria
DEPUTY

THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARSON CITY, NEVADA

CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual and
resident of Nevada,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA ex rel. THE
OFFICE OF THE NEVADA LABOR
COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
NEVADA LABOR COMMISSIONER; and
SHANNON CHAMBERS, Nevada Labor
Commissioner, in her official capacity,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: 14 OC 00080 1B
DEPT. NO.: II

**DECISION AND ORDER, COMPRISING FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW¹**

On April 30, 2015, Plaintiff Cody C. Hancock ("Plaintiff"), pursuant to N.R.S. 233B.110, filed a complaint for declaratory relief against Defendants the State of Nevada *ex rel.* Office of the Nevada Labor Commissioner, the Office Of The Nevada Labor Commissioner, and Shannon Chambers, in her official capacity as the Nevada Labor Commissioner (collectively, "Defendants"), seeking to invalidate two administrative regulations—N.A.C. 608.100(1) and N.A.C. 608.104(2)—purporting to implement article XV, section 16 of the Nevada Constitution (the

¹ If any finding herein is in truth a conclusion of law, or if any conclusion stated is in truth a finding of fact, it shall be deemed so.

1 seeking to invalidate two administrative regulations—N.A.C. 608.100(1) and N.A.C.
2 608.104(2)—purporting to implement article XV, section 16 of the Nevada Constitution (the
3 “Minimum Wage Amendment” or the “Amendment”). Plaintiff also sought to enjoin the
4 Defendants from enforcing the challenged regulations.

5 On or about June 25, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. After a brief stay of
6 proceedings for the parties to consider resolution through a renewed rulemaking process,
7 Defendants’ motion to dismiss was withdrawn by stipulation of the parties, entered
8 March 30, 2015, in which the parties also agreed to permit Plaintiff to amend the complaint, and to
9 seek to resolve this action by respective motions for summary judgment. The parties agreed that no
10 discovery was necessary in this case, and that the determinative issues were matters of law.

11 On or about June 11, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on
12 Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief. On or about June 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Motion for
13 Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief. Subsequently, each party responded
14 in opposition to the other parties’ motion, and replied in support of their own. Plaintiff had
15 previously asked the Nevada Labor Commissioner to pass upon the validity of the challenged
16 regulations, and the Court finds that all prerequisites under N.R.S. 233B.110 have been satisfied
17 sufficient for the Court to enter orders resolving this matter.

18 The Court, having considered the pleadings and being fully advised, now finds and orders
19 as follows:

20 As an initial matter, summary judgment under N.R.C.P. 56(a) is “appropriate and shall be
21 rendered forthwith when the pleadings and other evidence on file demonstrate that no genuine issue
22 as to any material fact [remains] and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
23 law.” *Wood v. Safeway*, 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (internal quotations
24 omitted). Further, in deciding a challenge to administrative regulations pursuant to N.R.S.
25 233B.110, “[t]he court shall declare the [challenged] regulation invalid if it finds that it violates
26 constitutional or statutory provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency.” N.R.S.
27 223B.110. The burden is upon Plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged regulations violate the
28 Minimum Wage Amendment.

1 The Minimum Wage Amendment was enacted by a vote of the people by ballot initiative at
2 the 2006 General Election, and became effective on November 28, 2006. It is a remedial act, and
3 will be liberally construed to ensure the intended benefit for the intended beneficiaries. *See, e.g.,*
4 *Washoe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co.*, 112 Nev. 494, 496, 915 P.2d 288, 289 (1996); *see also*
5 *Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen's Club*, __ Nev. __, 336 P.2d 951, 954 (2014).

6 Here, in order to determine whether the challenged regulations conflict with or violate the
7 Minimum Wage Amendment, the Court will first determine the meaning of the pertinent textual
8 portions of the Amendment. Courts review an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute of
9 constitutional provision *de novo*, and may do so with no deference to the agency's interpretations.
10 *United States v. State Engineer*, 117 Nev. 585, 589, 27 P.3d 51, 53 (2001) ("An administrative
11 agency's interpretation of a regulation or statute does not control if an alternate reading is
12 compelled by the plain language of the provision."); *Bacher v. State Engineer*, 122 Nev. 1110,
13 1118, 146 P.3d 793, 798 (2006) ("The district court may decide purely legal questions without
14 deference to an agency's determination.").

15 The Minimum Wage Amendment raised the minimum hourly wage in Nevada, but also
16 established a two-tier wage system by which an employer may pay employees, currently, \$8.25 per
17 hour, or pay down to \$7.25 per hour if the employer provides qualifying health insurance benefits,
18 to the employee and all of his or her dependents, at a certain capped premium cost to employee.

19 Section A of the Minimum Wage Amendment provides:

20 A. Each employer shall pay a wage to each employee of not less than the hourly
21 rates set forth in this section. The rate shall be five dollars and fifteen cents (\$5.15)
22 per hour worked, if the employer provides health benefits as described herein, or six
23 dollars and fifteen cents (\$6.15) per hour if the employer does not provide such
24 benefits. Offering health benefits within the meaning of this section shall consist of
25 making health insurance available to the employee for the employee and the
26 employee's dependents at a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more
27 than 10 percent of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer. These
28 rates of wages shall be adjusted by the amount of increases in the federal minimum
wage over \$5.15 per hour, or, if greater, by the cumulative increase in the cost of
living. The cost of living increase shall be measured by the percentage increase as of
December 31 in any year over the level as of December 31, 2004 of the Consumer
Price Index (All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average) as published by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor or the successor index or federal
agency. No CPI adjustment for any one-year period may be greater than 3%. The
Governor or the State agency designated by the Governor shall publish a bulletin by
April 1 of each year announcing the adjusted rates, which shall take effect the

1 following July 1. Such bulletin will be made available to all employers and to any
2 other person who has filed with the Governor or the designated agency a request to
3 receive such notice but lack of notice shall not excuse noncompliance with this
4 section. An employer shall provide written notification of the rate adjustments to
5 each of its employees and make the necessary payroll adjustments by July 1
6 following the publication of the bulletin. Tips or gratuities received by employees
7 shall not be credited as being any part of or offset against the wage rates required by
8 this section.

9 Nev. Const. art. XV, § 16(A).

10 N.A.C. 608.104(2) states, in pertinent part:

11 2. As used in this section, "gross taxable income of the employee attributable to the
12 employer" means the amount specified on the Form W-2 issued by the employer to
13 the employee and includes, without limitation, tips, bonuses or other compensation
14 as required for purposes of federal individual income tax.

15 N.A.C. 608.100(1) states, in pertinent part:

16 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections 2 and 3, the minimum wage for an
17 employee in the State of Nevada is the same whether the employee is a full-time,
18 permanent, part-time, probationary or temporary employee, and:

19 (a) If an employee is offered qualified health insurance, is \$5.15 per
20 hour; or

21 (b) If an employee is not offered qualified health insurance, is \$6.15 per
22 hour.

23 **N.A.C. 608.104(2) Is Invalid**

24 Plaintiff contends that N.A.C. 608.104(2) unlawfully permits employers to figure in tips and
25 gratuities furnished by customers and the general public when establishing the maximum allowable
26 premium cost to the employee of qualifying health insurance. He argues that "10% of the
27 employee's gross taxable income from the employer" can only mean compensation and wages paid
28 by the employer to the employee, and excludes tips earned by the employee.

29 Defendants argue that the term "gross taxable income" directed the Labor Commissioner to
30 interpret the entire provision as meaning all income derived from working for the employer,
31 whether as direct wages or as tips and gratuities, because Nevada has no state income tax and state
32 law contains no definition of "gross taxable income." Therefore, the State argues, resort to federal
33 tax law is appropriate, and because tips and gratuities earned by the employee constitute, for him or
34 her, gross taxable income upon which federal taxes must be paid. In that regard, Defendants
35 contend that N.A.C. 608.104(2)'s definition of "income attributable to the employer" best

1 implements the language of the Amendment.

2 The Court finds the text of the Minimum Wage Amendment which N.A.C. 608.104(2)
3 purports to implement—"10% of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer"—to be
4 unambiguous. As the Court reads the plain language of the constitutional provision, it indicates that
5 the term "10% of the employee's gross taxable income" is limited to such income that comes "from
6 the employer," as opposed to gross taxable income that emanates from any other source, including
7 from tips and gratuities provided by an employer's customers. "[T]he language of a statute should
8 be given its plain meaning unless doing so violates the spirit of the act ... [thus] when a statute is
9 clear on its face, a court may not go beyond the language of the statute in determining the
10 legislature's intent." *University and Community College System of Nevada v. Nevadans for Sound*
11 *Government*, 120 Nev. 712, 731, 100 P.3d 179, 193 (2004).

12 There are no particular difficulties in determining an employee's gross taxable income that
13 comes *from the employer*, as this figure must be reported to the United States Internal Revenue
14 Service as part of the employee's tax information, including on his or her annual W-2 form, along
15 with the employee's income from tips and gratuities. The Court further presumes that employers
16 are aware of, or can easily compute, how much they pay out of their business revenue to each
17 employee, this being a major portion of the business's expenses for which records are surely
18 maintained by the employer.

19 The Court does note that N.A.C. 608.104(2)'s inclusion of "bonuses or other compensation"
20 presents no constitutional problem under the Amendment, as long as the income in question comes
21 "from the employer."

22 The Court understands Defendants' interpretation of this portion of the Amendment, and in
23 support of the administrative regulation purporting to implement and enforce it, to emphasize the
24 phrase "gross taxable income" in isolation, at the expense of a full reading giving meaning to the
25 qualifying term "from the employer." As Defendants note in their briefing, "[i]n expounding a
26 constitutional provision, such constructions should be employed as will prevent any clause,
27 sentence or word from being superfluous, void or insignificant." *Youngs v. Hall*, 9 Nev. 212
28 (1874). To arrive at Defendants' preferred interpretation of the Amendment, however, the Court

1 would have to first find the provision ambiguous, and then engage in an act of interpretation in
2 order to agree that the phrase "gross taxable income" modifies the term "from the employer," rather
3 than the other way around. In that formulation, "gross taxable income from the employer" is
4 rendered as "gross taxable income earned but for employment by the employer," or, "gross taxable
5 income earned as a result of having worked for the employer," and "from the employer" is rendered
6 more or less insignificant to the provision. This is, indeed, what N.A.C. 608.104(2) attempts to
7 indicate when it designates "gross taxable income attributable to the employer" as the measure of
8 the Amendment's ten-percent employee premium cost cap calculation. The Court disagrees, and
9 instead finds the constitutional language plain on its face.

10 But even if the Court were to find the pertinent portion of the Amendment to be ambiguous,
11 its context, reason, and public policy would still support the conclusion that tips and gratuities
12 should not be included in the calculation of allowable employee premium costs when an employer
13 seeks to qualify to pay below the upper-tier minimum hourly wage. The drafters of the Amendment
14 expressly excluded tips and gratuities from the calculation of the minimum hourly wage ("Tips or
15 gratuities received by employees shall not be credited as being any part of or offset against the
16 wage rates required by this section."), and gave no other indication that tips and gratuities should
17 be allowed as a form of credit against the cost of the health insurance benefits the Minimum Wage
18 Amendment was designed to encourage employers to provide employees in exchange for the
19 privilege of paying a lower hourly wage rate. Further, as Plaintiff points out, the effect of
20 permitting inclusion of tips and gratuities is to increase, in some cases precipitously, the cost of
21 health insurance benefits to employees, a result that is not supported by the policy and function of
22 the Amendment generally.

23 Defendants argue that permitting tips and gratuities in the premium calculations for tipped
24 employees eliminates an advantage for those employees that non-tipped employees do not enjoy. It
25 is not strictly within the province of the Nevada Labor Commissioner, however, to make such
26 policy choices in place of the Legislature, or the people acting in their legislative capacity. Her
27 charge is to enforce and implement the labor laws of this State as written. N.R.S. 607.160(1). In
28 any event, and apart from the Amendment's express treatment of the issue, Nevada has prohibited

1 administrative regulation. See N.R.S. 608.160.

2 The Court finds that N.A.C. 608.104(2), insofar as it permits employers to include tips and
3 gratuities furnished by the customers of the employer in the calculation of income against which in
4 measured the Minimum Wage Amendment's ten percent income cap on allowable health insurance
5 premium costs, violates the Nevada Constitution and therefore exceeds the Nevada Labor
6 Commissioner's authority to promulgate administrative regulations. The Court determines the
7 regulation in question to be invalid, and will further enjoin Defendants from enforcing N.A.C.
8 608.104(2) for the reasons stated herein.

9 **N.A.C. 608.100(1) Is Invalid**

10 Plaintiff argues that, in order to qualify for the privilege of paying less than the upper-tier
11 hourly minimum wage, an employer must actually provide qualifying health insurance, rather than
12 merely offer it. He contends that, read as a whole and giving all parts of the Amendment meaning
13 and function, the basic scheme of the provision is to propose for both employers and employees a
14 set of choices, a bargain: an employer can pay down to \$7.25 per hour, currently, but the employee
15 must receive something in return, qualified health insurance. A mere offer of health insurance—
16 which the employee has not played a role in selecting and may not meet the needs of an employee
17 and his or her family for any number of reasons—permits the employer to receive the benefit of the
18 Minimum Wage Amendment, but can leave the employee with less pay and no insurance provided
19 by the employer.

20 In support of this interpretation, Plaintiff suggests that “provide” and “offering,” as used in
21 the Amendment, are not synonyms, but rather that the basic command of the constitutional
22 provision (in order to pay less than the upper-tier wage level) is to *provide* health benefits, and that
23 the succeeding sentence that begins with the term “offering” only dictates certain requirements of
24 the benefits that must be offered as a step in their provision to employees paid at the lower wage
25 rate.

26 Defendants argue that “provide” and “offering” are synonymous, and that an employer need
27 only make available qualified health insurance in order to pay below the upper-tier wage level,
28 whether the employee accepts the benefit or not. Defendants argue that the usage, by the

1 Amendment's drafters, of "offering" and "making available" in the sentence succeeding those
2 employing "provide" modifies and defines "provide" to mean merely "offering" of health
3 insurance.

4 A further argument by Defendants is that the benefit of the bargain inherent in the
5 Amendment is the offer itself, having employer-selected health insurance made available to the
6 employee, and that interpreting the Amendment to require that employees accept the benefit in
7 order for an employer to pay below the upper-tier minimum wage denies the value of the Minimum
8 Wage Amendment to the employer. They deny that "provide" is the command, or mandate, of the
9 Minimum Wage Amendment where qualification for paying the lesser wage amount is concerned.

10 The Court finds that the Minimum Wage Amendment requires that employees actually
11 receive qualified health insurance in order for the employer to pay, currently, down to \$7.25 per
12 hour to those employees. Otherwise, the purposes and benefits of the Amendment are thwarted, and
13 employees (the obvious beneficiaries of the Amendment) who reject insurance plans offered by
14 their employer would receive neither the low-cost health insurance envisioned by the Minimum
15 Wage Amendment, nor the raise in wages its passed promised, \$7.25 per hour already being the
16 federal minimum wage rate that every employer in Nevada must pay their employees anyway. The
17 amendment language does not support this interpretation.

18 The Court agrees with Plaintiff's argument that "provide" and "offering" are not
19 synonymous, and that the drafters included both terms, intentionally, to signify different concepts.
20 "[W]here the document has used one term in one place, and a materially different term in another,
21 the presumption is that the different term denotes a different idea." Antonin Scalia and Bryan A.
22 Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts*, 170 (2012). It is also instructive that the
23 drafters used "provide," a verb, and "offering," a gerund, ostensibly to make a distinction between
24 their functions as parts of speech within the text of the Amendment. The Amendment easily could
25 have stated that "[t]he rate shall be X dollars per hour worked, if the employer **offers** health
26 benefits as described herein, or X dollars per hour if the employer does not **offer** such benefits." It
27 did not so state. Instead, it required that the employer "provide" qualified health insurance if it
28 wished to take advantage of the lower wage rate. The Court agrees with Plaintiff, furthermore, that

1 the overall definitional weight of the verb phrase "to provide" lends credence to his interpretation
2 that it means to furnish, or to supply, rather than merely to make available, especially when the
3 overall context and scheme of the Minimum Wage Amendment is taken into consideration.

4 The distinction the parties here draw between "provide" and "offering" is no small matter.
5 Allowing employers merely to offer health insurance plans rather than provide, furnish, and supply
6 them, alters significantly the function of this remedial constitutional provision. The fundamental
7 operation of the Minimum Wage Amendment, fairly construed, demands that employees not be left
8 with none of the benefits of its enactment, whether they be the higher wage rate or the promised
9 low-cost health insurance for themselves and their families.

10 Because N.A.C. 608.100(1) impermissibly allows employers only to offer health insurance
11 benefits, but does not take into account whether the employee accepts those benefits when
12 determining how and when the employer may pay below the upper-tier minimum wage rate, it
13 violates the Nevada Constitution and therefore exceeds the Nevada Labor Commissioner's
14 authority to promulgate administrative regulations. The Court determines the regulation in question
15 to be invalid, and will further enjoin Defendants from enforcing N.A.C. 608.104(2) for the reasons
16 stated herein.

17 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED**, therefore, and for good cause appearing, that Plaintiff's
18 Motion for Summary Judgment is **GRANTED** and the Defendant's Motion for Summary
19 Judgment is **DENIED**.

20 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that N.A.C. 608.104(2) is declared invalid and of no effect,
21 for the reasons stated herein;.

22 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that N.A.C. 608.100(1) is declared invalid and of no effect,
23 for the reasons stated herein;

24 ///

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1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants are enjoined from enforcing the challenged
2 regulations.


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4 IT IS SO ORDERED this 12 day of August, 2015.

5
6 James E. Mulvey
7 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

8 Submitted by:

9 WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,
10 SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
11 DON SPRINGMEYER, ESQ.
12 Nevada State Bar No. 1021
13 BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ.
14 Nevada State Bar No. 10217
15 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
16 Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
17 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

18
19 /s/ Bradley S. Schrager
20 Bradley S. Schrager, Esq.
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ADAM PAUL LAXALT
Attorney General
Scott Davis #10019
Deputy Attorney General
555 E. Washington Avenue, Suite 3900
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 486-3894
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*Attorneys for Defendants State of Nevada
ex rel. Office of the Labor Commissioner,
Office of the Labor Commissioner and
Shannon Chambers*

REC'D & FILED

2015 SEP -4 PM 12: 24

SUSAN MERRIWEATHER
CLERK

BY V. Alegria
DEPUTY

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual,
Plaintiff,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* THE
OFFICE OF THE LABOR
COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
LABOR COMMISSIONER; and SHANNON
CHAMBERS, Nevada Labor Commissioner
in her official capacity,
Defendants.

Case No.: 14 OC 00080 1B

Dept. No.: 2

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: CODY C. HANCOCK, Plaintiff; and

TO: WOLF, RIKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, counsel of record for Plaintiff.


Notice is hereby given that the STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* THE OFFICE OF THE
LABOR COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER and SHANNON
CHAMBERS in her official capacity as Labor Commissioner of Nevada, Defendants above-
named, hereby

.....

1
2 appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada from the attached "Decision and Order
3 Comprising Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" entered in this action on August 14,
4 2015.

5 DATED this 28 day of August, 2015.

6
7 ADAM PAUL LAXALT
Attorney General

8
9 By: 

10 Scott Davis
11 Deputy Attorney General
12 Office of the Attorney General
13 555 E. Washington Ave., Ste. 3900
14 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
15 (702) 486-3326
16 Attorneys for Appellants State of Nevada,
17 Ex rel. Office of the Labor Commissioner;
18 Office of the Labor Commissioner and
19 Shannon Chambers
20
21
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28

AFFIRMATION

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document filed in this court does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 28 day of August, 2015.

ADAM PAUL LAXALT
Attorney General

By: 
Scott Davis, #10019
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Nevada ex rel
Office of the Labor Commissioner;
Office of the Labor Commissioner and
Shannon Chambers

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of the State of Nevada Office of the Attorney General and that on the 31st day of August, 2015 I served the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL by serving a copy via U.S. Mail, first-class, postage-paid, as follows:

Don Springmeyer, Esq.
Bradley Schrager, Esq.
Daniel Bravo, Esq.
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP
3556 E. Russell Road, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
Attorneys for Plaintiff



An Employee of the Attorney General's Office

EXHIBIT 1

DECISION AND ORDER

REC'D & FILED

2015 AUG 14 PM 12:50

SUSAN HERRMETHOR
CLERK

BY V. Alegria
DEPUTY

THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARSON CITY, NEVADA

CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual and
resident of Nevada,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* THE
OFFICE OF THE NEVADA LABOR
COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
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SHANNON CHAMBERS, Nevada Labor
Commissioner, in her official capacity,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: 14 OC 00080 1B
DEPT. NO.: II

**DECISION AND ORDER, COMPRISING FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW¹**

On April 30, 2015, Plaintiff Cody C. Hancock ("Plaintiff"), pursuant to N.R.S. 233B.110, filed a complaint for declaratory relief against Defendants the State of Nevada *ex rel.* Office of the Nevada Labor Commissioner, the Office Of The Nevada Labor Commissioner, and Shannon Chambers, in her official capacity as the Nevada Labor Commissioner (collectively, "Defendants"), seeking to invalidate two administrative regulations—N.A.C. 608.100(1) and N.A.C. 608.104(2)—purporting to implement article XV, section 16 of the Nevada Constitution (the

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13 Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief. Subsequently, each party responded
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15 previously asked the Nevada Labor Commissioner to pass upon the validity of the challenged
16 regulations, and the Court finds that all prerequisites under N.R.S. 233B.110 have been satisfied
17 sufficient for the Court to enter orders resolving this matter.

18 The Court, having considered the pleadings and being fully advised, now finds and orders
19 as follows:

20 As an initial matter, summary judgment under N.R.C.P. 56(a) is “appropriate and shall be
21 rendered forthwith when the pleadings and other evidence on file demonstrate that no genuine issue
22 as to any material fact [remains] and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
23 law.” *Wood v. Safeway*, 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (internal quotations
24 omitted). Further, in deciding a challenge to administrative regulations pursuant to N.R.S.
25 233B.110, “[t]he court shall declare the [challenged] regulation invalid if it finds that it violates
26 constitutional or statutory provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency.” N.R.S.
27 223B.110. The burden is upon Plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged regulations violate the
28 Minimum Wage Amendment.

1 The Minimum Wage Amendment was enacted by a vote of the people by ballot initiative at
2 the 2006 General Election, and became effective on November 28, 2006. It is a remedial act, and
3 will be liberally construed to ensure the intended benefit for the intended beneficiaries. *See, e.g.,*
4 *Washoe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co.*, 112 Nev. 494, 496, 915 P.2d 288, 289 (1996); *see also*
5 *Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen's Club*, ___ Nev. ___, 336 P.2d 951, 954 (2014).

6 Here, in order to determine whether the challenged regulations conflict with or violate the
7 Minimum Wage Amendment, the Court will first determine the meaning of the pertinent textual
8 portions of the Amendment. Courts review an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute of
9 constitutional provision *de novo*, and may do so with no deference to the agency's interpretations.
10 *United States v. State Engineer*, 117 Nev. 585, 589, 27 P.3d 51, 53 (2001) ("An administrative
11 agency's interpretation of a regulation or statute does not control if an alternate reading is
12 compelled by the plain language of the provision."); *Bacher v. State Engineer*, 122 Nev. 1110,
13 1118, 146 P.3d 793, 798 (2006) ("The district court may decide purely legal questions without
14 deference to an agency's determination.").

15 The Minimum Wage Amendment raised the minimum hourly wage in Nevada, but also
16 established a two-tier wage system by which an employer may pay employees, currently, \$8.25 per
17 hour, or pay down to \$7.25 per hour if the employer provides qualifying health insurance benefits,
18 to the employee and all of his or her dependents, at a certain capped premium cost to employee.

19 Section A of the Minimum Wage Amendment provides:

20 A. Each employer shall pay a wage to each employee of not less than the hourly
21 rates set forth in this section. The rate shall be five dollars and fifteen cents (\$5.15)
22 per hour worked, if the employer provides health benefits as described herein, or six
23 dollars and fifteen cents (\$6.15) per hour if the employer does not provide such
24 benefits. Offering health benefits within the meaning of this section shall consist of
25 making health insurance available to the employee for the employee and the
26 employee's dependents at a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more
27 than 10 percent of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer. These
28 rates of wages shall be adjusted by the amount of increases in the federal minimum
wage over \$5.15 per hour, or, if greater, by the cumulative increase in the cost of
living. The cost of living increase shall be measured by the percentage increase as of
December 31 in any year over the level as of December 31, 2004 of the Consumer
Price Index (All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average) as published by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor or the successor index or federal
agency. No CPI adjustment for any one-year period may be greater than 3%. The
Governor or the State agency designated by the Governor shall publish a bulletin by
April 1 of each year announcing the adjusted rates, which shall take effect the

1 following July 1. Such bulletin will be made available to all employers and to any
2 other person who has filed with the Governor or the designated agency a request to
3 receive such notice but lack of notice shall not excuse noncompliance with this
4 section. An employer shall provide written notification of the rate adjustments to
5 each of its employees and make the necessary payroll adjustments by July 1
6 following the publication of the bulletin. Tips or gratuities received by employees
7 shall not be credited as being any part of or offset against the wage rates required by
8 this section.

9 Nev. Const. art. XV, § 16(A).

10 N.A.C. 608.104(2) states, in pertinent part:

11 2. As used in this section, "gross taxable income of the employee attributable to the
12 employer" means the amount specified on the Form W-2 issued by the employer to
13 the employee and includes, without limitation, tips, bonuses or other compensation
14 as required for purposes of federal individual income tax.

15 N.A.C. 608.100(1) states, in pertinent part:

16 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections 2 and 3, the minimum wage for an
17 employee in the State of Nevada is the same whether the employee is a full-time,
18 permanent, part-time, probationary or temporary employee, and:

19 (a) If an employee is offered qualified health insurance, is \$5.15 per
20 hour; or

21 (b) If an employee is not offered qualified health insurance, is \$6.15 per
22 hour.

23 **N.A.C. 608.104(2) Is Invalid**

24 Plaintiff contends that N.A.C. 608.104(2) unlawfully permits employers to figure in tips and
25 gratuities furnished by customers and the general public when establishing the maximum allowable
26 premium cost to the employee of qualifying health insurance. He argues that "10% of the
27 employee's gross taxable income from the employer" can only mean compensation and wages paid
28 by the employer to the employee, and excludes tips earned by the employee.

29 Defendants argue that the term "gross taxable income" directed the Labor Commissioner to
30 interpret the entire provision as meaning all income derived from working for the employer,
31 whether as direct wages or as tips and gratuities, because Nevada has no state income tax and state
32 law contains no definition of "gross taxable income." Therefore, the State argues, resort to federal
33 tax law is appropriate, and because tips and gratuities earned by the employee constitute, for him or
34 her, gross taxable income upon which federal taxes must be paid. In that regard, Defendants
35 contend that N.A.C. 608.104(2)'s definition of "income attributable to the employer" best

1 implements the language of the Amendment.

2 The Court finds the text of the Minimum Wage Amendment which N.A.C. 608.104(2)
3 purports to implement—"10% of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer"—to be
4 unambiguous. As the Court reads the plain language of the constitutional provision, it indicates that
5 the term "10% of the employee's gross taxable income" is limited to such income that comes "from
6 the employer," as opposed to gross taxable income that emanates from any other source, including
7 from tips and gratuities provided by an employer's customers. "[T]he language of a statute should
8 be given its plain meaning unless doing so violates the spirit of the act ... [thus] when a statute is
9 clear on its face, a court may not go beyond the language of the statute in determining the
10 legislature's intent." *University and Community College System of Nevada v. Nevadans for Sound*
11 *Government*, 120 Nev. 712, 731, 100 P.3d 179, 193 (2004).

12 There are no particular difficulties in determining an employee's gross taxable income that
13 comes *from the employer*, as this figure must be reported to the United States Internal Revenue
14 Service as part of the employee's tax information, including on his or her annual W-2 form, along
15 with the employee's income from tips and gratuities. The Court further presumes that employers
16 are aware of, or can easily compute, how much they pay out of their business revenue to each
17 employee, this being a major portion of the business's expenses for which records are surely
18 maintained by the employer.

19 The Court does note that N.A.C. 608.104(2)'s inclusion of "bonuses or other compensation"
20 presents no constitutional problem under the Amendment, as long as the income in question comes
21 "from the employer."

22 The Court understands Defendants' interpretation of this portion of the Amendment, and in
23 support of the administrative regulation purporting to implement and enforce it, to emphasize the
24 phrase "gross taxable income" in isolation, at the expense of a full reading giving meaning to the
25 qualifying term "from the employer." As Defendants note in their briefing, "[i]n expounding a
26 constitutional provision, such constructions should be employed as will prevent any clause,
27 sentence or word from being superfluous, void or insignificant." *Youngs v. Hall*, 9 Nev. 212
28 (1874). To arrive at Defendants' preferred interpretation of the Amendment, however, the Court

1 administrative regulation. *See* N.R.S. 608.160.

2 The Court finds that N.A.C. 608.104(2), insofar as it permits employers to include tips and
3 gratuities furnished by the customers of the employer in the calculation of income against which in
4 measured the Minimum Wage Amendment's ten percent income cap on allowable health insurance
5 premium costs, violates the Nevada Constitution and therefore exceeds the Nevada Labor
6 Commissioner's authority to promulgate administrative regulations. The Court determines the
7 regulation in question to be invalid, and will further enjoin Defendants from enforcing N.A.C.
8 608.104(2) for the reasons stated herein.

9 **N.A.C. 608.100(1) Is Invalid**

10 Plaintiff argues that, in order to qualify for the privilege of paying less than the upper-tier
11 hourly minimum wage, an employer must actually provide qualifying health insurance, rather than
12 merely offer it. He contends that, read as a whole and giving all parts of the Amendment meaning
13 and function, the basic scheme of the provision is to propose for both employers and employees a
14 set of choices, a bargain: an employer can pay down to \$7.25 per hour, currently, but the employee
15 must receive something in return, qualified health insurance. A mere offer of health insurance—
16 which the employee has not played a role in selecting and may not meet the needs of an employee
17 and his or her family for any number of reasons—permits the employer to receive the benefit of the
18 Minimum Wage Amendment, but can leave the employee with less pay and no insurance provided
19 by the employer.

20 In support of this interpretation, Plaintiff suggests that “provide” and “offering,” as used in
21 the Amendment, are not synonyms, but rather that the basic command of the constitutional
22 provision (in order to pay less than the upper-tier wage level) is to *provide* health benefits, and that
23 the succeeding sentence that begins with the term “offering” only dictates certain requirements of
24 the benefits that must be offered as a step in their provision to employees paid at the lower wage
25 rate.

26 Defendants argue that “provide” and “offering” are synonymous, and that an employer need
27 only make available qualified health insurance in order to pay below the upper-tier wage level,
28 whether the employee accepts the benefit or not. Defendants argue that the usage, by the

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23 the succeeding sentence that begins with the term “offering” only dictates certain requirements of
24 the benefits that must be offered as a step in their provision to employees paid at the lower wage
25 rate.

26 Defendants argue that “provide” and “offering” are synonymous, and that an employer need
27 only make available qualified health insurance in order to pay below the upper-tier wage level,
28 whether the employee accepts the benefit or not. Defendants argue that the usage, by the

1 Amendment's drafters, of "offering" and "making available" in the sentence succeeding those
2 employing "provide" modifies and defines "provide" to mean merely "offering" of health
3 insurance.

4 A further argument by Defendants is that the benefit of the bargain inherent in the
5 Amendment is the offer itself, having employer-selected health insurance made available to the
6 employee, and that interpreting the Amendment to require that employees accept the benefit in
7 order for an employer to pay below the upper-tier minimum wage denies the value of the Minimum
8 Wage Amendment to the employer. They deny that "provide" is the command, or mandate, of the
9 Minimum Wage Amendment where qualification for paying the lesser wage amount is concerned.

10 The Court finds that the Minimum Wage Amendment requires that employees actually
11 receive qualified health insurance in order for the employer to pay, currently, down to \$7.25 per
12 hour to those employees. Otherwise, the purposes and benefits of the Amendment are thwarted, and
13 employees (the obvious beneficiaries of the Amendment) who reject insurance plans offered by
14 their employer would receive neither the low-cost health insurance envisioned by the Minimum
15 Wage Amendment, nor the raise in wages its passaged promised, \$7.25 per hour already being the
16 federal minimum wage rate that every employer in Nevada must pay their employees anyway. The
17 amendment language does not support this interpretation.

18 The Court agrees with Plaintiff's argument that "provide" and "offering" are not
19 synonymous, and that the drafters included both terms, intentionally, to signify different concepts.
20 "[W]here the document has used one term in one place, and a materially different term in another,
21 the presumption is that the different term denotes a different idea." Antonin Scalia and Bryan A.
22 Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts*, 170 (2012). It is also instructive that the
23 drafters used "provide," a verb, and "offering," a gerund, ostensibly to make a distinction between
24 their functions as parts of speech within the text of the Amendment. The Amendment easily could
25 have stated that "[t]he rate shall be X dollars per hour worked, if the employer **offers** health
26 benefits as described herein, or X dollars per hour if the employer does not **offer** such benefits." It
27 did not so state. Instead, it required that the employer "provide" qualified health insurance if it
28 wished to take advantage of the lower wage rate. The Court agrees with Plaintiff, furthermore, that

1 the overall definitional weight of the verb phrase "to provide" lends credence to his interpretation
2 that it means to furnish, or to supply, rather than merely to make available, especially when the
3 overall context and scheme of the Minimum Wage Amendment is taken into consideration.

4 The distinction the parties here draw between "provide" and "offering" is no small matter.
5 Allowing employers merely to offer health insurance plans rather than provide, furnish, and supply
6 them, alters significantly the function of this remedial constitutional provision. The fundamental
7 operation of the Minimum Wage Amendment, fairly construed, demands that employees not be left
8 with none of the benefits of its enactment, whether they be the higher wage rate or the promised
9 low-cost health insurance for themselves and their families.

10 Because N.A.C. 608.100(1) impermissibly allows employers only to offer health insurance
11 benefits, but does not take into account whether the employee accepts those benefits when
12 determining how and when the employer may pay below the upper-tier minimum wage rate, it
13 violates the Nevada Constitution and therefore exceeds the Nevada Labor Commissioner's
14 authority to promulgate administrative regulations. The Court determines the regulation in question
15 to be invalid, and will further enjoin Defendants from enforcing N.A.C. 608.104(2) for the reasons
16 stated herein.

17 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED**, therefore, and for good cause appearing, that Plaintiff's
18 Motion for Summary Judgment is **GRANTED** and the Defendant's Motion for Summary
19 Judgment is **DENIED**.

20 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that N.A.C. 608.104(2) is declared invalid and of no effect,
21 for the reasons stated herein;.

22 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that N.A.C. 608.100(1) is declared invalid and of no effect,
23 for the reasons stated herein;

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1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants are enjoined from enforcing the challenged
2 regulations.


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4 IT IS SO ORDERED this 12 day of August, 2015.

5
6 James Scully
7 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

8 Submitted by:

9 WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,
10 SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
11 DON SPRINGMEYER, ESQ.
12 Nevada State Bar No. 1021
13 BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ.
14 Nevada State Bar No. 10217
15 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
16 Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
17 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

18 /s/ Bradley S. Schrager
19 Bradley S. Schrager, Esq.



REC'D & FILED

2015 OCT 12 AM 10:01

SUSAN MERRIWETHER

G. WINDER

BY DEPUTY

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* THE
OFFICE OF THE LABOR
COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
LABOR COMMISSIONER; and SHANNON
CHAMBERS, Nevada Labor Commissioner
in her official capacity,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14 OC 00080 1B

Dept. No.: 2

**ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STAY ORDER PENDING
APPEAL**

Defendants State of Nevada *ex rel.* the Office of the Labor Commissioner, the Office of the Labor Commissioner and Shannon Chambers in her official capacity as the Labor Commissioner of Nevada (collectively referred to as "Labor Commissioner") have moved this Court to stay enforcement of its order pending appeal. Plaintiff has opposed the motion.

"In deciding whether to issue a stay, [a district] court generally considers the following factors: (1) Whether the object of the appeal or writ petition will be defeated if the stay is denied; (2) Whether appellant/petitioner will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is denied; (3) Whether respondent/real party in interest will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is granted; and (4) Whether appellant/petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits in the appeal or writ petition." *Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark*, 116 Nev.

1 650, 657, 6 P.3d 982, 986 (2000). Under the factor considering a likelihood of success on the
2 merits, a stay may be warranted if there is "...a substantial case on the merits when a serious
3 legal question is involved and show that the balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of
4 granting the stay." *Id.* at 659, 6 P.3d at 987. No one factor is dispositive when it comes to
5 granting a stay, however "...if one or two factors are especially strong, they may
6 counterbalance other weak factors." *Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. McCrea*, 120 Nev. 248, 251, 89
7 P.3d 36, 38 (2004).

8 The Court has weighed these factors and finds that the requested stay is appropriate in
9 this case. The Court's order affects how the Labor Commissioner approaches the minimum
10 wage calculation in her enforcement proceedings. These enforcement proceedings are
11 actions taken in the public interest and will necessarily concern persons who are not parties to
12 this matter. These proceedings should be allowed to continue unimpeded until the Nevada
13 Supreme Court has given finality to the issues raised in this case. This implicates the first two
14 factors of under *Hansen*, as weighing in favor of staying the order pending appeal. Conversely
15 there is no indication that Plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury if a stay is granted.

16 The Court recognizes that a serious legal question is involved in this case as it involves
17 the interpretation of a constitutional provision with ramifications affecting persons throughout
18 the State. While the final interpretation of the amendment is a judicial question, the
19 constitutional interpretation of the legislative and executive departments is entitled to some
20 weight in the analysis. *e.g. State v. Glenn*, 18 Nev. 34, 44, 1 P. 186, 190-191 (1883). Further,
21 as the Court's order will affect non-parties pursuing wage claims through the Labor
22 Commissioner's administrative process, the equities weigh in favor of staying the order while
23 the appeal remains pending.

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
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1 Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing therefore:

2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion to stay the order pending appeal is
3 Granted.

4
5 October 9, 2015
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
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8 
9 JAMES E. WILSON JR.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
4

5 The undersigned, an employee of the First Judicial District Court, hereby
6 certifies that on the 12 day of October, 2015, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
7 foregoing Order to:
8

9 Scott Davis, DAG
10 555 E. Washington Ave, Ste 3900
11 Las Vegas, NV 89101

Don Springmeyer, Esq.
3556 E. Russell Road, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, NV 89120

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Gina Winder
Judicial Assistant

data, quarterly if not. I think we will probably work on quarterly adjustments.

MR. MCCracken:

The interesting issues are the ones set forth in regulation section 4, subsection 2. I think b-4, shows you how difficult this is to implement. What do you do with somebody who is just hired; how do you know exactly when they are hired whether they qualify or they don't? I think the theory would be to offer health insurance and they may qualify. You can either do a quick calculation day by day or you can try and use two pay periods and extrapolate into the 10-percent test and see. If you do not do it, then I think there is probably—you pay them at \$5.15, but if they didn't qualify and you probably have to look back and correct it over some time. Those are the kind of difficulties that are in this.

The constitutional language is very simple but those kinds of implementations are right on point in the middle of this reg. Again, we are working on them, and I want to compliment the people that have—at least the staff and the Labor Commission Office who have been working a lot of nights to make sure this is in play. The things that aren't really evident are the kind of implications of the minimum wage and its impact into overtime. We're functionally now going to have a two-tiered overtime system based on what rate of pay you're at. That is going to be difficult for businesses. Those are things that we will get done once we have gotten the basic rules and try to figure out exactly how we do it and make sure it is done correctly. Everyone on the committee knows there are federal laws that applies to this. We have to follow them as well. We appreciate the fact —there has not been a double system built where employers are trying to implement, based on two sets of standards, both federal and state to the greatest extent possible. We have tried to minimize that.

MR. McMULLEN:

I would just like to clarify one thing for the record, or at least make sure it is on the record. I think we talked about one side of the accumulative CPI adjustments. There are two sides and I want to make sure my understanding is incorrect that we make sure that at least I am corrected. Mr. McCracken talked about the issue of banking the CPI and I think that is correct. Of course, you would implement that in 3-percent increments until you get there. The interesting thing about what we are going to be doing with—in reality here a \$2.10 increase in the minimum wage will effectively be the equivalent of about—currently based on a \$5.15 base of 40.78-percent increase in the CPI. If I read what it says to me is that we will go through a number of years and under that calculation we would be somewhere between the 13th and 14th year where you would finally exceed the accumulative increase in the CPI. The adjustment for that 14th or 15th year, depending on when it hits, would then have the additional increment up to the 3 percent of that year and then the CPI would start to kick in. I think that does a couple of things; it shows you the order of magnitude of the federal increase as it relates to this constitutional amendment, but also we want to make sure we are implementing it correctly. In fact, until you cumulatively go over that 40 percent, whatever it correctly calculates out to be, I would not trust my math. It wouldn't be until that year, wherever that happens, 13 or 14 years down the road here that the CPI accumulative starts to have impact and raise our basic State rate.

Second of all, I think we need to make sure your staff clarifies Mr. McCracken's statement about how it would be implemented on the April report and the July implementation. I think that is extremely reasonable, very practical and I just want to make sure that in fact the effect comports with our obligations under federal law in terms of an increase in the federal law which I think that is a question we would have no matter what we are doing on regulations, which can be a difficulty we may have to accommodate, if in fact, we find out it can't be implemented the way it was testified to today. There are a ton of issues in this, but the great part is the process is still ongoing and the workshops

have been great. The dialogue and the drafting of language and the reiterative process of that have been great. We still have a whole month to finalize things and to adjust them correctly. I do agree with Mr. McCracken, getting the word out though is extremely important. We are trying to do that with our members because it is huge. Even though it is just a few employees affected, in terms of percentage of workforce for these employers that have to deal with it, it is a lot of practicality and burden. We appreciate the interest in doing it as efficiently and cost-effectively for those small businesses. I thank you and would be happy to answer any questions.

LEAH LIPSCOMB (Retail Association of Nevada):

I will be very brief and simply echo the remarks and concerns of Mr. Ostrovsky and Mr. McMullen. We would like to ensure that the regulation language be clear and simple as to minimize the paperwork and ease the implementation process for our members and their employees. The Retail Association has also participated in the workshop process of the Labor Commissioner and at this point we would just like to express our desire to continue working with Commissioner Tanchek as we move forward to further clarify and refine the language. Thank you.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

Mr. McMullen, I am looking at a chart we developed and if the passage of the federal minimum wage, I think it is 70 cents, 70 cents, 70 cents. Based on our calculations, that is about a 36-plus percent, those 70 cents.

MR. McMULLEN:

"I could be wrong again."

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

I just happen to have it in front of me.

MR. McMULLEN:

"I do believe that the calculation is as simple as dividing 70 cents in the first increase by \$5.15 so that I think comes out I think to 13.6."

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

That means 12 percent is the next one and 10.7 is next.

MR. McMULLEN:

"I get 2.10 off a base of \$5.15. That is the only difference in my—"

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

I understand your point is that preliminary increase outstrips the CPI.

MR. McMULLEN:

"I would say I don't want to argue with your people, but again the constitution is very clear. It is the percentage increase over \$5.15. It is not the percentage increase over \$5.15 as adjusted up and then adjusted up and adjusted up."

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

So you are probably closer to right.

MR. McMULLEN:

"I don't know, but again, that again I liked Mr. Tanchek's statement that I would not rely on him or me for your math."

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

Let us find someone we can rely on.

MICHAEL D. PENNINGTON (Public Policy Director, Reno-Sparks Chamber of Commerce):

You have had a lot of wise experts in very proficient fields come before you and go through a lot of the technical issues relative to this. I had come prepared to address three primary bullet issues, one with regards to getting the information out to employers so that way they are aware of the issues. We've had had the pleasure to work with Commissioner Tanchek since November. He has been very responsive to the Chamber in helping us. We have been able to get those emergency regs out and work with them, as well as get quick-fax and any information he has been able to provide to us so we could provide to our members. He has been very responsive, but I would if there is anything that the legislature can do to ensure that Mr. Tanchek has those resources and tools to help

organizations and help employers out. That would be something that we think would be advisable. I received many calls in late November, early December about where do we go from here and he was responsive, but I know he is very short-staffed and very limited and so we're trying to do what we can to help him out and get that information. The discussion earlier relative to the federal and the State that was an issue that we have been discussing. We appreciate the passionate concerns Senator Hardy and the Chairman have brought to the table relative to that this morning. We think that is very important.

MR. PENNINGTON:

The third bullet point that I wanted to address this morning which kind of goes off the reservation a little bit for the scope of this Committee but I think the Committee members might be concerned. I know Senator Heck would be serving on the Health Care Committee is the provisions relative to the health care coverage. I think it is important for us to work for solutions in trying to see if we can get some of Nevada's uninsured insured, a lot of those people come in the small business area. Last week I was in a meeting and I think an individual had told me that Washoe County specifically their estimated numbers are 70,000 relative to how many people that need some good coverage in the Reno-Sparks area. There is going to be some proposals that I think the interim Committee on Health Care worked on between the last session to maybe look at some pilot programs, some innovative solutions to come forth to provide coverage. Groups in Washoe County are seeing if they can't find a way to get 10,000 of those 70,000 uninsured on the insured rolls. I think that will go to some extent of minimizing some of the impacts of the issues that we talked about today as well as improving the quality of life for, you know, employees. Members I represent would like to provide that coverage. So, I know this Committee does have some concerns on that. I know that down the road, working with the Insurance Commissioner as well that would be an issue that has purview within this jurisdiction here today. Beyond that, those are my remarks and I appreciate the time to appear this morning.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

As you know, Senator Heck is a member of Senate Committee on Human Resources and Education and at a time that will work for him I am sure he will brief us on what they are working on. On the flip-side of that, I believe Senator Schneider and I are the two members from the Senate Committee on Taxation. We are working on some additional changes on that payroll issue relative to health care. It could be very helpful to our small-to medium-size people. We are trying to figure it out with the budget committees because you know they—whatever the tax committee gives them they always want just a little bit more than that. We know for a fact that the more we can encourage small-to medium-sized employers to cover people, the less fiscal responsibility we have on the other end of the spectrum, particularly in the emergency room and lost days, lost time, etc. So we are trying to work on it. Any creative ideas that Human Resources can come up with I think we are going to be very enthused to hear.

MR. PENNINGTON:

"Senator, I appreciate the invitation and I will look forward to working with each and all of you during the session on those issues and more."

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

Does anyone else want to testify on the regulation that Mr. Tanchek has put out; provide something additionally informative? We are trying to get the Legislative Counsel Bureau, and particularly Brian Davie in southern Nevada has been remarkable in trying to get more rooms in southern Nevada so people can hear what is going on. We are trying on a regular basis make sure the three committees that meet in the Senate at each time slot can teleconference. I know we are trying to work with the Assembly to give them as many slots as we can for the hearings. Any time something happens in Judiciary that is of great interest to the State, we are just working through some normal bills and are trying to give them the slots. We are trying to work together so more Nevadans can take advantage.

Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor
February 8, 2007
Page 21

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

Are there any other questions? The meeting of the Senate Committee on
Commerce and Labor is officially adjourned at 9:43 a.m.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

Gloria Gaillard-Powell,
Committee Secretary

APPROVED BY:

Senator Randolph J. Townsend, Chair

DATE: _____

EXHIBIT 8

EXHIBIT 8

**Discussion of the Impacts of the New
Minimum Wage Law**

**Senate Commerce and Labor Committee
February 8, 2007**

**Michael Tanchek
State Labor Commissioner**

www.laborcommissioner.com

INTRODUCTION

At the general election in November of 2006, the voters passed Question 6, a Constitutional Amendment governing minimum wages for all employees in Nevada. The amendment became effective on November 28, 2006 when the State Supreme Court certified the election.

With the amendment going into effect so quickly, my office was inundated with requests from employers, employees, trade associations, law firms, and the press; all seeking to find out what it all meant. After consultation with the Governor's office and the Attorney General, I held a public information workshop and we drafted some emergency regulations to give at least some guidance. The emergency regulations were, at best, a stop gap measure and left a lot of issues unresolved.

At the present time, I have started the temporary rulemaking process. A copy of the proposed temporary regulations is attached. There is some procedural overlap between my rulemaking and any action the Legislature may undertake. Because of the statutory time requirements for rulemaking, this was unavoidable. As the Legislature moves forward in addressing these issues, they will be deleted from the proposed regulations.

The proposed regulations do not answer all of the questions. However, they do deal with the major areas where clarification appears to

be the most needed. I hope that the Legislature will find the work that we have done so far to be useful.

I also want to take a moment to publicly thank the two hundred or so people who participated in the public workshops that we held last month. The quality of the participation was excellent with a lot of good ideas and solutions being generated by the participants.

TEXT OF THE AMENDMENT

Sec. 16. Payment of minimum compensation to employees. [Effective November 28, 2006, if the proposed amendment is approved and ratified by the voters at the 2006 General Election.]

A. Each employer shall pay a wage to each employee of not less than the hourly rates set forth in this section. The rate shall be five dollars and fifteen cents (\$5.15) per hour worked, if the employer provides health benefits as described herein, or six dollars and fifteen cents (\$6.15) per hour if the employer does not provide such benefits. Offering health benefits within the meaning of this section shall consist of making health insurance available to the employee for the employee and the employee's dependents at a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more than 10 percent of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer. These rates of wages shall be adjusted by the amount of increases in the federal minimum wage over \$5.15 per hour, or, if greater, by the cumulative increase in the cost of living. The cost of living increase shall be measured by the percentage increase as of December 31 in any year over the level as of December 31, 2004 of the Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average) as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor or the successor index or federal agency. No CPI adjustment for any one-year period may be greater than 3%. The Governor or the State agency designated by the Governor shall publish a bulletin by April 1 of each year announcing the adjusted rates, which shall take effect the following July 1. Such bulletin will be made available to all employers and to any other person who has filed with the Governor or the designated agency a request to receive such notice but lack of notice shall not excuse noncompliance with this section. An employer shall provide written notification of the rate adjustments to each of its employees and make the necessary payroll adjustments by July 1 following the publication of the bulletin. Tips or gratuities received by employees shall not be credited as being any part of or offset against the wage rates required by this section.

Section A is the most substantive part of the amendment. It deals with several issues including:

1. The requirement for all employers to pay and the entitlement for all employees to receive at least one of the minimum wages.
2. It establishes two minimum wage rates. A basic rate of \$6.15 per hour and an alternative rate of \$5.15 per hour for employees who receive health benefits.
3. The requirement that the rates be adjusted to reflect changes in both the federal minimum wage and the Cost of Living.
4. It prohibits offsetting the minimum wage with tips and gratuities received by the employees.

B. The provisions of this section may not be waived by agreement between an individual employee and an employer. All of the provisions of this section, or any part hereof, may be waived in a bona fide collective bargaining agreement, but only if the waiver is explicitly set forth in such agreement in clear and unambiguous terms. Unilateral implementation of terms and conditions of employment by either party to a collective bargaining relationship shall not constitute, or be permitted, as a waiver of all or any part of the provisions of this section. An

employer shall not discharge, reduce the compensation of or otherwise discriminate against any employee for using any civil remedies to enforce this section or otherwise asserting his or her rights under this section. An employee claiming violation of this section may bring an action against his or her employer in the courts of this State to enforce the provisions of this section and shall be entitled to all remedies available under the law or in equity appropriate to remedy any violation of this section, including but not limited to back pay, damages, reinstatement or injunctive relief. An employee who prevails in any action to enforce this section shall be awarded his or her reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

Section B deals with what could be described as some of the legal issues in the amendment. Section B deals with several issues including:

1. The prohibition against waiving the requirements by private agreement between employers and their employees.
2. An exception that permits non-compliance with the amendment if the matter is clearly addressed in a collective bargaining agreement.
3. The creation of a private right of action for employees who wish to take their employers to court.
4. A prohibition against retaliatory action against an employee for exercising his rights under the amendment.

C. As used in this section, "employee" means any person who is employed by an employer as defined herein but does not include an employee who is under eighteen (18) years of age, employed by a nonprofit organization for after school or summer employment or as a trainee for a period not longer than ninety (90) days. "Employer" means any individual, proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, corporation, limited liability company, trust, association, or other entity that may employ individuals or enter into contracts of employment.

Section C is the definitional section and contains the definition of employee and employer.

D. If any provision of this section is declared illegal, invalid or inoperative, in whole or in part, by the final decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining provisions and all portions not declared illegal, invalid or inoperative shall remain in full force or effect, and no such determination shall invalidate the remaining sections or portions of the sections of this section.

Section D contains the severability provisions of the amendment to preserve the balance of the language should the Court declare any portion invalid.

ISSUES

1. To whom does the minimum wage apply?

The amendment says "Each employer shall pay a wage to each employee..." The language is clear and straightforward. The starting point is: If you are an employer you have to pay each of your employees the minimum wage. The analysis doesn't stop there, however, because you have to look at the language in Section C to determine who is an employer and who is an employee.

Employer is broadly defined, specifically listing individuals and a variety of organizations as being employers. In addition, there is a catch-all phrase "...or other entity that may employ individuals."

An employee is "...any person who is employed by an employer..." There are some exceptions that I will discuss further on.

2. Does the amendment extend to state and local government employees?

The Labor Commissioner's jurisdiction relative to the minimum wage is limited to the private sector. I cannot address this question authoritatively. However, I have been assisting state and local governments with their analysis.

Under NRS 608.011, the term employer "...includes every person having control or custody of any employment, place of employment or any employee." NRS 0.039 defines a person and specifically says "[T]he term does not include a government, governmental agency or political subdivision of a government." The result is that under Chapter 608 state and local governments are not included, but the same thing cannot be said under the terms of the amendment because it uses the term "entity" rather than "person" in defining employers.

3. Are there any exemptions or exceptions to the minimum wage?

Yes. While the amendment does not specifically use the words exception or exemption it provides for them by excluding certain classes of people from the definition of employee. These classes are:

- a. everyone under the age of 18,
- b. those who are employed by a non-profit organization for after school or summer employment, and
- c. "trainees," but only for a maximum of 90 days.

In addition, Section B also provides for an exemption where it states "All of the provisions of this section, or any part hereof, may be waived in a bona fide collective bargaining agreement, but only if the waiver is explicitly set forth in such agreement in clear and unambiguous terms."

4. What is the status of the exemptions that were provided for in NRS 608.250(2)?

NRS 608.250(2) provided for six specific exemptions to the statutory minimum wage law. These were:

- (a) Casual babysitters.
- (b) Domestic service employees who reside in the household where they work.
- (c) Outside salespersons whose earnings are based on commissions.
- (d) Employees engaged in an agricultural pursuit for an employer who did not use more than 500 man-days of agricultural labor in any calendar quarter of the preceding calendar year.
- (e) Taxicab and limousine drivers.
- (f) Severely handicapped persons whose disabilities have diminished their productive capacity in a specific job and who are specified in certificates issued by the Rehabilitation Division of the Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation.

The general rule is that if a provision of a statute conflicts with a constitutional provision, the statute must give way. The exemptions in 608.250 are statutory and are not included among the exemptions allowed by the amendment. Unless they fit within one of the constitutional exemptions, employees listed in the statute are no longer exempt.

5. How do health benefits fit into the process?

We have two minimum wages, \$5.15 and \$6.15. The simplest way to approach it is to assume that, initially, all employers have to use the \$6.15 rate. Then, if they make insurance available to the employees that meets the requirements of the amendment, they can pay less than \$6.15.

The amendment sets out three requirements for the health benefits:

- a) Health insurance must be made "...available to the employee..."
- b) The insurance must be "...for the employee and the employee's dependents..."
- c) The "...total cost to the employee for premiums..." cannot be "...more than 10 percent of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer."

In order to qualify to use the lower rate, the employer must meet all three requirements. If any one of the requirements is not met, the employer must pay the higher rate. This is the major area of confusion over the amendment.

6. Do these requirements have to be met for all employees in order for an employer to use the lower rate?

The amendment imposes an affirmative duty on the employer to make the health benefits available if the employer wants to utilize the lower rate. The multitude of types of health benefits available as well as the wide range of variations within the individual benefit plans themselves results in an incredible number of possible outcomes.

Initially, I took the approach that it was a "yes" or "no" proposition. Either the employer meets all of the criteria or the employer doesn't. If they do, they do they can use the lower rate. If not, they must use the upper. This was referred to as the "employer specific" approach. As a result of the public workshops, the currently recommended approach is what we call "employee specific." The employer looks at each employee individually and determines on a case-by-case basis which minimum wage applies.

7. What is health insurance?

8 of 17

That is a very good question. The amendment doesn't say what it is, just that the employer has to offer it in order to take advantage of the lower rate. As pointed out earlier, there are all sorts of different kinds of health benefits that are available. Think of group health, HMO's, PPO's, self-funded plans, cost reimbursement plans, and the list goes on.

You have to be careful with this question because it is really easy to get bogged down in the complexity insurance. I have insurance companies sending me copies of their insurance policies wanting to know whether or not the plan complies with the amendment. I don't have the time, the expertise, or the staff to get into that level of detail. The preferred approach is to set understandable standards so the employers and employees can draw their own conclusions.

With the help of the Insurance Division, I was able to cobble together some language for the emergency regulation. I didn't like my solution then and I still don't like it. Fortunately, we have come with what seems to a pretty good approach since those early struggles.

The current approach is to adopt the standard used in the business tax provisions of NRS 363A and 363B. This has several advantages. We didn't need to "reinvent the wheel." It is a standard that is already in existence and with which employers are familiar. Employers know whether their insurance meets the standard. Since it is statutory, there is a legislative history behind it. Finally, we were able to get a good consensus for that approach from business and the drafters of the amendment. In addition, we included ERISA plans and Taft-Hartley plans. Those types of plans are rooted in pre-emptive federal law, are regulated, and cover some types of plans not covered under our statutes.

8. What if an employee doesn't want the health insurance?

The amendment only requires the employer to make qualifying insurance available to the employee. If the employer offers the insurance and the employee declines, the employer has met the requirement and can pay the lower rate to that employee.

9. What about waiting periods and eligibility?

Even if employers have qualifying health insurance available, not all employees can receive it when they first start work. There are two main reasons for this. Either the employer has a business policy not to make it available to all employees or else there is a waiting period in the policy itself.

If it is the employer's policy, for example they don't offer benefits to probationary, temporary, or part-time employees, then the employer is not making the policy available and would have to pay that employee the higher rate.

On the other hand, if the policy has a built-in restriction, such as a waiting period. If the health insurance has been made available to the employee, then the employer has met the requirement and can pay the lower rate. Waiting periods vary. We are considering six months as the outer limit.

In some cases, there could be a restriction in the plan that disqualifies the employee from coverage altogether. In that event, the employer would be obligated to pay the higher rate to that employee.

10. How is the "10% of the employee's gross taxable income" determined?

Nevada does not have a personal income tax. As a result, an employee's gross taxable income is not tracked for state purposes. The common denominator for all Nevada employees, however, is the gross taxable income that is reported to the Internal Revenue Service. That is the recommended income figure to use.

The problem with using gross taxable income is that it is generally not known until the end of the tax year when employees are given their W-2 forms. Currently, we consider three methods to calculate the 10% figure as being a reasonable approximation:

- a) If the employer issued a W-2 in the prior year, they can use that figure.

- b) If the employer did not issue a W-2 in the prior year, but has reported quarterly information, they can use that figure.
- c) If the employer doesn't have any historical information, they can make an annualized calculation based on the information they do have.

11. How much can the insurance premium be?

For minimum wage purposes, there is no requirement as to the cost of the insurance premium. It depends on the policy because there are a lot of variables that go into the premium. It is easy to get sidetracked on this issue. It is important to stay focused on the fact the only purpose that the 10% figure serves is to determine which minimum wage rate the employer has to use.

12. How do tips figure into the 10% calculation?

In the amendment it states: "Tips or gratuities received by employees shall not be credited as being any part of or offset against the wage rates required by this section." As a result, there has been some confusion regarding how tips fit into the calculation.

There is a difference between the "wage rates" and "gross taxable income." The wage rates are the \$5.15 and \$6.15 rates established in the amendment. The employer cannot use tips to offset the requirement to pay the minimum wage. Nevada and five other states do not allow employers to offset the minimum wage with tips. This language reflects a continuation of that policy. The employer must pay the required minimum in addition to any tips that might be earned. The federal government and most other states do allow a deduction to be made.

The gross taxable income as reported to the IRS includes tips, commissions, and other types of payments to employees that are generally considered taxable. As stated above, the only purpose for the 10% number is to determine which minimum wage to use as a base wage rate.

13. How does the federal minimum wage fit in and how is the cost of living adjustment calculated?

I have requested an Attorney General's Opinion on this issue. I won't have a good answer until I get the opinion.

14. Can an employer and employee agree to something other than the minimum wage?

No. The terms of the amendment cannot be waived by agreement between an employer and employee.

15. How do collective bargaining agreements affect the minimum wages?

All of the minimum wage requirements can be waived in a bona fide collective bargaining agreement. However, the terms and conditions of the waiver must be explicit, clear, and unambiguous.

16. Who enforces the new law?

There are two options. First of all, the Labor Commissioner can enforce the law on behalf of an employee consistent with the statutory authority in NRS 607 and 608. As an alternative, an employee can file a court action against the employer on his or her own. This is an either/or choice.

17. What effect does the amendment have on overtime?

NRS 608.018(1) states:

1. An employer shall pay 1 1/2 times an employee's regular wage rate whenever an employee who receives compensation for employment at a rate less than 1 1/2 times the minimum rate prescribed pursuant to NRS 608.250 works:

(a) More than 40 hours in any scheduled week of work; or

(b) More than 8 hours in any workday unless by mutual agreement the employee works a scheduled 10 hours per day for 4 calendar days within any scheduled week of work.

This is Nevada's daily overtime statute. Employees who are paid less than 1 1/2 times the minimum wage are entitled to be paid overtime whenever they work more than eight hours in a workday. Prior to passage of the amendment, the minimum wage rate was pegged at the federal rate of \$5.15 per hour. Consequently, the daily overtime rate

was set at \$7.725 per hour. Any employee paid less than that amount was entitled to daily overtime.

I estimate that there were about 162,000 workers statewide in the class of workers entitled to daily overtime before the amendment was passed. (The actual number is probably lower because many employers used a starting hourly wage above \$7.73 in order to avoid dealing with the daily overtime calculation in addition to the more familiar weekly overtime requirement.) As a result of the amendment, the daily overtime rate ceiling increased to 1½ times \$6.15 per hour or \$9.225 per hour. This correlates to approximately 260,000 workers potentially eligible for daily overtime, an increase of 100,000.

From an enforcement standpoint, this is probably the biggest impact from the amendment. Historically, minimum wage problems have been extremely rare. Even though the legal requirements may be more complex under the amendment, I don't expect compliance to be much of a problem once the requirements are known.

Daily overtime is a different story and constitutes a significant portion of our existing caseload. The reason is fairly simple. Most employers and employees are familiar with the requirement to pay overtime anytime a non-exempt employee works more than 40 hours in a workweek. We get our share of claims for weekly overtime, but it is not what I would characterize as a major problem.

On the other hand, I am constantly amazed by the number of employers who don't know they are supposed to pay daily overtime and the number of employees who don't know they are supposed to receive it, even though Nevada's daily overtime requirement has been on the books for over 30 years. The most common problem we have found in this regard is that while most payroll software includes a computation for weekly overtime, they don't include a daily overtime component.

Going forward, enforcement will be complicated by an increased number of employers who will have to pay daily overtime who did not have to consider it previously, the increased number of potential claimants, and the confusion of dealing with three different overtime

rates rather than two. In addition, calculating back wages will be complicated by any annual adjustments that may occur in the minimum wage with the concurrent adjustment in the daily overtime thresholds.

PROPOSED REGULATION OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER

LCB File No. Too4-07

February 2, 2007

EXPLANATION- Matter that is *italicized* is new; matter in brackets [omitted material] is material to be omitted.

AUTHORITY: § § 1-10; Article 15, Section 16, the constitution of the State of Nevada, NRS 607.110, NRS 607.160.

Section 1. Chapter 608 of NAC is hereby amended by adding thereto the provisions set forth as sections 2 to 9, inclusive, of this regulation.

Sec. 2. *Definition of minimum wage tiers.*

1. *The lower tier is from \$5.15 to \$6.14 per hour for employees who offered qualified health insurance benefits.*
2. *The upper tier is \$6.15 per hour for employees who are not offered qualified health benefits.*
3. *An employer must pay the upper tier rate unless the employee qualifies for the lower tier rate.*
4. *These rates may change based on the annual adjustments as set forth in Article 15, Section 16 of the Constitution of Nevada.*

Sec. 3. *Applicability of Minimum Wage.*

1. *The minimum wage applies to all employees in Nevada.*
2. *The only exceptions to the minimum wage are*
 - (a) *Persons under the age of 18; or*
 - (b) *Persons employed by a nonprofit organization for after school or summer employment; or*
 - (c) *Persons employed as trainees for a period not longer than ninety (90) days as interpreted by the U. S. Department of Labor pursuant to Section 6(g) of the Fair Labor Standards Act; or*
 - (d) *Persons employed under a valid collective bargaining agreement where Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada Constitution relating to minimum wage, tip credit or other provisions included therein have been waived in clear and unambiguous terms.*
3. *There is no distinction between full-time, permanent, part-time, probationary, or temporary employees.*

Sec. 4. *In order to qualify for the lower minimum wage tier an employer must comply with all of the following:*

1. *Qualified health insurance coverage must be made available to the employee and the employee's dependents, if any. For the purposes of this section, qualified health insurance coverage is "available to the employee and employee's dependents" when an employer contracts for and maintains qualified health insurance for the class of employees of which*

the employee is a member, subject only to fulfillment of the conditions required to complete the coverage which are applicable to all similarly-situated employees within this class, unless the waiting period exceeds 120 days; and

2. The employee's share of the cost of the premium cannot exceed 10% of the employee's gross taxable income attributable to the employer as defined under the Internal Revenue Code;

- (a) "Gross Taxable Income" attributable to the employer means the amount specified on the employee's W-2 issued by the employer and includes tips, bonuses or other compensation as required for purposes of federal individual income tax.

- (b) To determine whether the employee's share of the premium does not exceed 10% of the employee's gross taxable income, the employer may:

- I. For an employee for whom the employer has issued a W-2 for the immediately preceding year, divide the gross taxable income from the employer into the projected employee's share of the premiums for qualified health insurance for the current year;

- II. For an employee for which the employer has not issued a W-2 and has payroll information for the four prior quarters, divide the combined total of gross taxable income normally calculated from this payroll information from these four quarters into the projected employee's share of the premiums for qualified health insurance for these four quarters;

- III. For an employee for which there is less than an aggregate year of payroll information, the employer shall

- 1) take the total payroll information available for the employee determine the combined total of gross taxable income normally calculated from this payroll information; and

- 2) After dividing it by the number of weeks it represents and multiplying it by 52, divide this annualized number into the projected employee's share of the premiums for qualified health insurance for the current year;

- IV. For a new employee or an employee who turns eighteen years of age during employment, the employer shall wait until the employee has completed two normal payroll periods and then utilize this payroll information as set forth in subsection 3 above relating to an employee for which there is less than a complete year of employment; and

3. Offers a health benefit plan that meets one of the following requirements:

- (a) The plan covers only those categories of health care expenses that are generally deductible by employees on their individual federal income tax returns pursuant to the provisions of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 213 and any federal regulations relating thereto, if those expenses had been borne directly by those employees; or

- (b) Provides health benefits pursuant to a Taft-Hartley trust which:

- I. Is formed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Sec. 186(c)(5); and
 - II. Qualifies as an employee welfare benefit plan under the Internal Revenue Service guidelines; or
- (c) Is a qualified employee welfare benefit plan pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 et seq.

Sec. 5. An employer may decide to pay the maximum wage rate for minimum wage currently applicable in lieu of making any determination under this regulation that the employee may be paid the lower minimum wage rate.

Sec. 6. If a determination is made that the employee's share of the premium does not exceed 10% of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer, the employer may pay the employee through the end of the calendar year for which the determination has been made either:

1. The lowest minimum wage rate currently applicable; or
2. Any amount within the lower minimum wage tier currently applicable.

Sec. 7. If an employee declines coverage under a qualified health insurance plan offered by the employer, the employee may be paid in the lower minimum wage tier, however, the employer must document that the employee has declined coverage and the documentation must include the employee's signed waiver of coverage. Declining coverage may not be a term or condition of employment.

Sec. 8. If an employer offers qualified health insurance with a standard waiting period of no more than 6 months, the employee may be paid at the lower tier wage rate. If an employer does not offer a qualified health insurance plan or the health benefit plan is not available or the health benefit plan is not provided within 6 months of employment, the employee must be paid the upper tier wage rate until such time as the employee becomes eligible and is offered coverage or when the insurance becomes effective.

Sec. 9. For the purposes of complying with the daily overtime provisions of NRS 608.018(1), an employer shall pay overtime based on the minimum wage tier for which that employee is qualified.

Sec. 10. NAC 608.110 is hereby repealed

[NAC 608.110 Minimum wage. (NRS 608.250) The minimum wage for an employee in private employment who:

1. Is 18 years of age or older is \$5.15 per hour.
2. Is under 18 years of age is \$4.38 per hour.]

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8 **THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT**
9 **IN AND FOR CARSON CITY, NEVADA**

10 CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual and
11 resident of Nevada,
12 Plaintiff,

13 vs.

14 THE STATE OF NEVADA ex rel. THE
OFFICE OF THE NEVADA LABOR
15 COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
NEVADA LABOR COMMISSIONER; and
16 SHANNON CHAMBERS, Nevada Labor
Commissioner, in her official capacity,
17 Defendants.
18

CASE NO.: 14 OC 00080 1B
DEPT. NO.: II

**PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Hearing Date: August 11, 2015
Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.

19 Plaintiff CODY C. HANCOCK ("Plaintiff"), by and through his attorneys of record, here
20 responds to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to N.R.C.P. 56. This response is
21 based on the Memorandum of Points and Authorities below, all papers and exhibits on file herein¹,
22 and any oral argument this Court sees fit to allow at hearing on this matter.

23 ///

24 ///

25 ///

26 _____
27 ¹ See Declaration of Bradley Schrager, Esq., attached as **Exhibit 1**.
28

1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2 Understanding that the particular form of briefing this matter has taken—three briefs from
3 each side, six in all—is likely to become wearisome and repetitive, and that certain arguments that
4 respond to Defendants’ positions are already set out in his original motion, Plaintiff here
5 incorporates his Motion for Summary Judgment [filed June 12, 2015] and confines himself,
6 succinctly, to responding directly to Defendants’ arguments previously left unaddressed. With a
7 further reply brief still to be submitted by each side, it is presumed all arguments necessary for the
8 Court to make its determinations will be before it by the close of filings.

9 **I. ARGUMENT**

10 **A. “Gross taxable income from the employer”**

11 Defendants pledge faith to the text of article XV, section 16 of the Nevada Constitution (the
12 “Minimum Wage Amendment” or the “Amendment”), but the defense of N.A.C. 608.104’s
13 inclusion of tips in the calculation of allowable premium costs to minimum wage employees seems
14 instead to be one long, over-analytical journey around the plain words of the provision. At what
15 point is the Commissioner required to confront the meaning of the phrase “from the employer”?
16 Instead, the Commissioner truncates the phrase “gross taxable income from the employer” in order
17 to focus solely upon “gross taxable income,” a subtraction from the text that the Commissioner
18 then asserts triggers resort to federal tax law to ground the agency’s interpretation. But there is
19 nothing in Nevada or federal law that commands such a reading. There is no reference to such a
20 reading in the Amendment itself; clearly it takes an act of interpretation to construct such a
21 triggering and such resort. The fact that Nevada has no income tax does not mean that the phrase
22 “gross taxable income from the employer” is somehow unintelligible in this state; that the federal
23 government, rather than the State of Nevada, is doing the taxing on an employee’s income earned
24 in Nevada should have no bearing of an interpretation of the constitutional text. Again, as argued in
25 Plaintiff’s Motion, the creation of the concept in N.A.C. 608.102(3) of “gross taxable income of the
26 employee attributable to the employer” finds no support in the Amendment itself, and establishes,
27 unlawfully, a type of “but-for employment with the employer” standard that does not withstand
28 textual scrutiny.

1 The Commissioner maintains in her brief, referencing N.A.C 608.104, that “the principal
2 method of determining whether the amendment’s 10% threshold in met is by looking to an
3 employee’s IRS Form W-2 for the preceding year[.]” Defs.’ Mot. for S.J. at 11. Further, this is all
4 judged to be an “unavoidable consequence” with “no viable alternative,” because Nevada has no
5 state income tax, and therefore “gross taxable income from the employer” must mean “gross
6 taxable income of the employee attributable to the employer, or all taxable income derived from
7 working for an employer,” whether the income came from the employer or from the general public
8 as tips. *Id.* This does not make a tremendous amount of sense, and appears to over-complicate the
9 constitutional text in support of a post-hoc defense of the challenged regulation.

10 It also leads Plaintiff to believe that Defendants do not have much occasion to study
11 examples of tipped employees’ W-2s. For reference, therefore, Plaintiff here attaches, as **Exhibit 2**,
12 a copy of one such form (not Mr. Hancock’s, but a real example from one of the cases listed in
13 footnote 4 of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 5, properly redacted and offered for
14 exemplary purposes; *see Exhibit 1*, Schrager Decl., ¶ 2).

15 Look closely at **Exhibit 2**. It belongs to a tipped employee (“Employee Z”), a Nevada
16 restaurant server much like Mr. Hancock, and stems from the 2014 tax year.

17 • In **Box 1**—the middle column, counter-intuitively—shows Employee Z’s total 2014
18 “Wages, tips, other comp:” \$15,979.16 (and note that the IRS described those two, “wages” and
19 “tips,” separately, even if taken together they constitute total taxable income).

20 • In **Box 3**, just below Box 1 in the middle column, gives Employee Z’s “Social Security
21 wages,” which are the wages gained directly *from the employer*: \$6,746.66.

22 • In **Box 7**, one finds Employee Z’s income derived from tips and gratuities in 2014:
23 \$9,232.50.

24 If you add Boxes 3 and 7—wages and tips—you get Employee Z’s total gross income of
25 \$15,979.16. Only Box 3, however, shows income paid to the employee solely by the employer. The
26 Commissioner’s reading of the Amendment points to Box 1—total income while working for the
27 employer, no matter what the source—as the necessary amount for calculating the 10% threshold
28 for premium costs of health insurance under the Minimum Wage Amendment. Plaintiff’s reading

1 points instead to Box 3—total wages paid by the employer.

2 If an employer is to look at the employee's W-2 to figure the base amount from which to
3 calculate the allowable premium cost of insurance for payment of the sub-minimum wage—which
4 the Commissioner in her motion says employers are to do—why look at one box and not the other?
5 Any employer looking at the form has both amounts readily displayed and available. Which box,
6 which figure, best comports with the direction of the Minimum Wage Amendment? The
7 Commissioner's interpretation (Box 1) attends only to the "gross taxable income" portion of the
8 Amendment's text. Plaintiff's interpretation (Box 3) has the virtue of giving meaning to all the
9 words in the constitutional text, "gross taxable income *from the employer*." As the Commissioner
10 notes, courts are to give constructions that "prevent any clause, sentence, or word from being
11 superfluous, void, or insignificant." Defs.' Mot. for S.J. at 12 (citing *Youngs v. Hall*, 9 Nev. 212,
12 222 (1874)). The Commissioner's regulation does not appear to achieve that standard in this
13 respect.

14 The Commissioner then asserts that even if Plaintiff has a point, her interpretation should
15 stand because it is a "permissible policy choice because it does not conflict with the actual text" of
16 the Amendment. *Id.* at 13. But, in the first instance, the Commissioner is not charged with making
17 these sorts of policy choices, especially not choices that contravene the text—or the policy—of a
18 constitutional provision enacted by the people acting in their legislative capacity. And the
19 interpretation does, in fact, conflict with the actual text, as demonstrated. This is not a six-of-one,
20 half-dozen-of-the-other situation; there is no *Chevron*-type agency deference owed here. *See State*
21 *Div. of Ins. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.*, 116 Nev. 290, 293, 995 P.2d 482, 485
22 (2000) ("... a court will not hesitate to declare a regulation invalid when the regulation violates the
23 constitution, conflicts with existing statutory provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the
24 agency or is otherwise arbitrary and capricious[.]").

25 Look again at **Exhibit 2**, the sample W-2. Under the Commissioner's interpretation of the
26 Amendment, Employee Z could be charged \$1,597.92 annually, or \$133.16 per month, in health
27 insurance premiums, and the employer could still ostensibly qualify to pay Employee Z the sub-
28 minimum hourly wage. Under Plaintiff's rendering, those premium costs would be capped at

1 \$674.67 per year, or \$56.22 a month. The difference equates to a 137% increase in allowable
2 monthly insurance premiums for Employee Z. And let us not forget that this entire analysis is
3 undertaken by employers in order to pay, currently, down to \$7.25 per hour rather than \$8.25—
4 itself a 12.2 % reduction in the employee's pay. There is no scenario where a policy choice with
5 such negative impact upon the intended beneficiaries of the Minimum Wage Amendment—
6 Nevada's working poor—is permissible in the face of what is an improper reading of the text of the
7 state constitution.

8 No one is arguing that tips and gratuities given to employees are not taxable income under
9 the Internal Revenue Code. Those amounts are, however, merely a subset of an employee's gross
10 taxable income, which the IRS helpfully breaks out on employee tax information. They are a subset
11 that the Amendment excludes, plainly, from allowable premium calculations, if an employer is
12 going to pay below the upper-tier minimum hourly wage. The Amendment could have stated
13 "gross taxable income of the employee" or "all income received while employed by the employer;"
14 it did not. It states "gross taxable income from the employer," and it is that figure—easily obtained
15 and ascertainable—upon which the Amendment commands that calculation be made.

16 Lastly, the Commissioner notes that the challenged regulations do not create a tip credit
17 against the minimum wage. True enough, if immaterial. The analogy of the tip credit was offered to
18 demonstrate that Nevada does not, and never has, permitted employers to claim tips earned by
19 employers as a benefit to themselves in fulfilling their responsibilities under state labor laws. *See*
20 Pl.'s Mot. for S.J. at 19-20. Nevada employers do not figure tips earned by employees into payroll
21 taxes, either. Here, however, the Commissioner's regulation allows employers to use tips to avoid a
22 fundamental responsibility under the Minimum Wage Amendment. The way the Amendment is
23 written, with its hard 10% cap on premium costs to employees paid less than the full minimum
24 wage, employers were intended to have to make up for any premium cost overruns for the
25 insurance coverage they provided in order to pay the sub-minimum wage. As shown above in the
26 premium comparison examples of Employee Z, one can readily see the benefit to the employer—
27 and detriment to the Employee Z—that accrues by including tips in the allowable premium
28 calculation. If, for example, a particular policy cost \$1,200 annually in premiums, under the

1 Commissioner's interpretation the employer has no subsidy obligations and Employee Z must pay
2 for all of the premiums herself. Under Plaintiff's view, for the privilege of paying her less than the
3 full \$8.25 per hour, the employer would necessarily have to make up for approximately \$525 in
4 overcharges under the Amendment. This was the set of choices the Amendment was supposed to
5 place before employers and employees: employees get to make choices regarding accepting or
6 rejecting health insurance and the required level of their minimum wage; employers get to choose
7 whether paying employees up to a dollar less per hour made economic sense knowing that
8 participation by employees in health benefits plans may incur employer costs due to premium caps.
9 The regulation regarding inclusion of tips in premium calculations, however, skews the workings
10 of the Amendment, and is not in keeping with its text or policy. N.A.C. 608.104(2) should be
11 declared invalid.

12 **B. "Provide" vs. "Offer"**

13 As stated just above, the choices offered the minimum wage employee by the Amendment
14 were—or were supposed to be—real ones, between health insurance coverage or the full minimum
15 wage, between providing health insurance coverage or paying the full rate to workers. The
16 Commissioner disputes this reading of the Amendment directly in her brief. Arguing that if "an
17 employee voluntarily declines ... health insurance then an employer is deemed to have satisfied the
18 condition" for paying below the upper-tier minimum hourly wage. Defs.' Mot. for S.J. at 8.
19 "Plaintiff's claim," the Commissioner continues, "would radically alter this approach and would
20 condition the lawful rate not upon the employer's actions ... but instead upon the employee's
21 actions and his or her choice to accept an offer of insurance." *Id.* at 8-9.

22 This line of thinking reveals the fundamentally different visions of the meaning of the
23 Amendment between the parties. The Commissioner sees the Amendment as solely focused on
24 employer conduct. Plaintiff sees it as a remedial act of the people whose intent was to raise the
25 minimum wage and encourage provision of health insurance to low-paid workers in Nevada. As
26 outlined above, and in his original brief, Plaintiff argues that there was a bargain, a set of choices
27 by both employees and employers, inherent in the Minimum Wage Amendment.

28 Think of it this way: if all an employer has to do is "offer" benefits in order to pay 12.2%

1 less in wages to an employee, why would any employer ever pay the full \$8.25? The upper-tier
2 would be rendered illusory. Especially given the fact that the employee has no input into what type
3 or quality of insurance is being offered by the employer, a wily employer could (and this absolutely
4 occurs, as evidenced by the pleadings in all the cases noted in footnote 4 of Plaintiff's Motion)
5 arrange to offer benefits the employee is unlikely to accept. Employers could target their hiring
6 from populations unlikely to want to accept their insurance—those under 26 and covered by
7 parents' policies or spouses on their partner's insurance. Employees may simply think the
8 particular policies on offer by the employer are junk plans, like limited-benefits plans or hospital
9 indemnity plans that provide worthless coverage more likely to drive sick employees to bankruptcy
10 than to get them well. This sort of gaming of the Amendment cannot be in line with its meaning,
11 and the Commissioner ought to be regulating in ways that prevent rather than facilitate that sort of
12 abuse.

13 The structure, text, and meaning of the Minimum Wage Amendment insist that the lower-
14 tier wage level have some meaning, that employees receive something for their loss of a dollar per
15 hour worked. In the Commissioner's interpretation, employers always get the benefit of the
16 bargain—a significantly lower wage bill. What do employees get? The answer, following the
17 Commissioner's logic, is they get nothing tangible, merely the opportunity to accept whatever
18 benefit plan the employer has arranged for. Employees like Plaintiff are paying 12.2% of their
19 wages and getting nothing in return. If, as the Commissioner states in her Motion, the Amendment
20 "was presented to voters principally as an increase in the state minimum wage, with a built-in
21 adjustment mechanism to ensure that the state minimum wage remained at a higher rate than the
22 federal minimum wage," how can a regulation that guts that stated intent and policy be valid? *See*
23 *Defs.' Mot. for S.J.* at 4. The federal minimum wage currently is \$7.25 per hour, meaning that any
24 employee whose employer has figured out the friendly wage loophole that N.A.C. 608.100(1)
25 furnishes get no raise at all above the federal rate.

26 Furthermore, the Commissioner points to the ballot materials that came with the 2004 and
27 2006 initiative that became the Amendment, which noted that "living expenses such as housing,
28 healthcare, and food have far outpaced wage levels for Nevada's working families." *Id.* at 4. That is

1 as true today as it was a decade ago, and yet the Commissioner's interpretations allow employers
2 merely to "offer" rather than "provide" health insurance, and take a dollar off of wages every hour.
3 That means an employee who does not accept the employer's benefits—perhaps because of
4 substandard coverage, for example—is left with less money in his or her pocket as wages, but still
5 needs (either because of the Affordable Care Act or out of common sense and desire for wellness
6 and peace of mind) to procure health insurance. In short, none of the Commissioner's policy
7 understandings appear to be matched by the regulations that purport to implement the Amendment,
8 and instead do it very little credit.

9 As for the text of the Amendment, which is really the thrust of the Commissioner's
10 approach, Plaintiff has addressed most of these arguments in his original Motion and will not
11 belabor those further, except to note three things for the Court. *See* Pl.'s Mot. for S.J. at 9-12.

12 First, the Commissioner states that her "regulations read the terms 'offer' and 'provide' as
13 synonymous. But those terms are not synonyms. If the original motions provided then usual "battle
14 of the dictionaries" over these terms, let us extend it for a moment to a battle of the thesauruses.
15 Roget's Thesaurus lists 54 synonyms for "provide;" none of them are "offer."² More importantly,
16 however, is the basic rule of construction that "[w]here the document has used one term in one
17 place, and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the different term denotes
18 a different idea." *Lorton v. Jones*, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 8, 322 P.3d 1051, 1057 (2014) (quoting
19 Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts*, 170 (2012)).
20 "Provide" and "offer" are not synonyms, therefore, neither in the everyday sense of those words
21 nor in the sense that is to be employed when court's engage in constitutional or statutory
22 construction. The drafters of the Amendment could very well have used "offer" in each instance in

23
24 ² Add, administer, afford, arrange, bring, cater, contribute, equip, furnish, give, grant, hand over,
25 implement, keep, lend, maintain, prepare, present, produce, serve, transfer, yield, accommodate,
26 bestow, care, dispense, favor, feather, feed, fit, heel, impart, indulge, line, minister, outfit, procure,
27 proffer, provision, ration, ready, render, replenish, stake, stock, store, sustain, fit out, fix up, fix up
28 with, look after, stock up, take care of, turn out.

27 *See* <http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/provide?s=t> (accessed on July 9, 2015).

1 its text; they did not, and insisting that they mean the same thing, especially where the difference
2 between them has (much like the tip inclusion issue) such a negative impact upon the intended
3 beneficiaries of the Minimum Wage Amendment is just not sustainable.

4 Second, the Commissioner argues that the Amendment does not make sense if “provide”
5 and “offer” are not accepted as synonymous. This is not accurate. The text reads:

6 Each employer shall pay a wage to each employee of not less than the hourly rates
7 set forth in this section. The rate shall be five dollars and fifteen cents (\$5.15) per
8 hour worked, if the employer **provides** health benefits as described herein, or six
9 dollars and fifteen cents (\$6.15) per hour if the employer **does not provide** such
10 benefits. **Offering** health benefits within the meaning of this section shall consist of
making health insurance available to the employee for the employee and the
employee’s dependents at a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more
than 10 percent of the employee’s gross taxable income from the employer.

11 Nev. Const. art. XV, §16(A) (emphasis supplied). The command of the constitutional provision is
12 that the employer must provide health benefits as described therein in order to pay an employee at
13 the lower-tier wage rate; that much is clear. The next sentence, however, does not operate to define
14 that command. An employer may, in the process of providing benefits to employees, offer one,
15 three, or a dozen different types of health insurance options. But it must provide that insurance in
16 order to gain the lower-tier wage privilege. “Offering” the insurance is a predicate act to complying
17 with the command of the Amendment, which is to “provide” it; one must provide *health benefits*,
18 but to do so there must be an offering of *health insurance* of a certain type and at a certain limited
19 cost. The appearance of “provide” and “offering” in the provision quoted above neither renders the
20 passages difficult to interpret, nor determines that the two must be read synonymously, in conflict
21 with normal; rules of construction. There is, as demonstrated, a perfectly natural manner of reading
22 the passages that comports with Plaintiff’s interpretation and effects the meaning and remedial
23 import of the Amendment generally.

24 Third, and last, just about two weeks ago, in the matter of *Diaz, et al. v. MDC Restaurants*
25 *LLC, et al.*, Eighth Judicial District Court, Case No. A701633 (noted in footnote 4 of Plaintiff’s
26 Motion as an ongoing matter touching upon issues under the Amendment), the district court
27 determined that:

28 ///

1 The language of the Nevada Minimum Wage Amendment is unambiguous: An
2 employer must actually provide, supply, or furnish qualifying health insurance to an
3 employee as a precondition to paying that employee the lower-tier hourly minimum
wage in the sum of \$7.25 per hour. Merely offering health insurance coverage is
insufficient.³


4 The district court in that matter was not asked to invalidate the Commissioner's regulations; it
5 arose as part of a liability determination, on motion for partial summary judgment, regarding a food
6 server's claims that she was underpaid the lawful minimum wage where she had declined what she
7 considered to be substandard health benefits, and her employer nonetheless proceeded to pay her at
8 the rate of \$7.25 per hour. The district court granted the motion, as detailed in **Exhibit 3**. It is
9 presented here for the information of the Court.

10 **II. CONCLUSION**

11 For the foregoing reasons, and for those contained in the incorporated Motion for Summary
12 Judgment filed by Plaintiff on June 12, 2015, Plaintiff requests that the challenged regulations of
13 the Commissioner be ruled invalid and of no effect, and that Defendants be enjoined from their
14 further enforcement.

15 DATED this 10th day of July, 2015.

16 **WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,**
17 **SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP**

18 By: 

19 DON SPRINGMEYER, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 1021
20 BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 10217
21 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
22 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

23
24
25
26 ³ See **Exhibit 3**, an accurate copy of the Minute Order, dated July 1, 2015, issued in the Eighth
27 Judicial District Court, Case No. A701633. When the entered order comes available, Plaintiff will
28 file it with this Court with a request for judicial notice, in aid of the Court's deliberations.

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AFFIRMATION

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document filed in this Court does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 10th day of July, 2015.

**WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,
SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP**

By: 

DON SPRINGMEYER, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 1021
BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 10217
3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
Attorneys for Plaintiff

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2 I hereby certify that on this 10th day of July, 2015, a true and correct copy of
3 **PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**
4 was placed in an envelope, postage prepaid, addressed as stated below, in the basket for outgoing
5 mail before 4:00 p.m. at WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP. The firm
6 has established procedures so that all mail placed in the basket before 4:00 p.m. is taken that same
7 day by an employee and deposited in a U.S. Mail box.

8 Scott Davis, Esq.
9 Deputy Attorney General
10 Nevada State Bar No. 10019
11 555 E. Washington Ave., # 3900
12 Las Vegas, NV 89101
(702) 486-3894
Attorneys for State of Nevada ex rel. Office of the Labor Commissioner;
Office of the Labor Commissioner and Commissioner Thoran Towler

13
14 By: Dannielle Fresquez
15 Dannielle Fresquez, an Employee of
16 WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN &
17 RABKIN, LLP
18
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27
28

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 1

1 DON SPRINGMEYER, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 1021
2 BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 10217
3 **WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,**
SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
4 3556 E. Russell Road, 2nd Floor
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5 Telephone: (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300
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6 Email: bschrager@wrslawyers.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

7
8 **THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT**
9 **IN AND FOR CARSON CITY, NEVADA**

10 CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual and
11 resident of Nevada,

12 Plaintiff,

13 vs.

14 THE STATE OF NEVADA ex rel. THE
OFFICE OF THE NEVADA LABOR
15 COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
NEVADA LABOR COMMISSIONER; and
16 SHANNON CHAMBERS, Nevada Labor
Commissioner, in her official capacity,

17 Defendants.
18

CASE NO.: 14 OC 00080 1B
DEPT. NO.: II

**DECLARATION OF BRADLEY
SCHRAGER, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

19 **DECLARATION OF BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ.**

20 I, Bradley Schrager, Esq., under penalty of perjury, declare as follows:

21 1. I am an attorney with the law firm Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP,
22 duly admitted to practice law in the state of Nevada, and counsel for Plaintiff in the above-
23 captioned action. I make this declaration of personal, firsthand knowledge and, if called and sworn
24 as a witness, I could and would testify competently thereto. I have personal knowledge of the facts
25 stated herein and submit this Declaration in support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion
26 for Summary Judgment.

27 2. Attached, as **Exhibit 2**, is a true and accurate copy of a W-2 from a plaintiff in one
28 of the cases listed in footnote 4 of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, which is properly

1 redacted and offered for exemplary purposes. The plaintiff whose W-2 is provided is a food server
2 at a Nevada casual dining restaurant not unlike Mr. Hancock's, and was paid the lower-tier
3 minimum wage of \$7.25 per hour by her employer during 2014.

4 3. Attached, as **Exhibit 3**, is a true and accurate copy of a Minute Order, dated
5 July 1, 2015, issued by the Eighth Judicial District Court in the matter of *Diaz, et al. v. MDC*
6 *Restaurants LLC, et al.*, Case No. A701633.

7 Under penalties of perjury under the laws of the United States of America and the State of
8 Nevada, I declare that the foregoing is true and correct to my own knowledge, except as to those
9 matters stated on information and belief, and that as to such matters I believe to be true.

10 DATED this 10th day of July, 2015.

11 By:


BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ.

Exhibit 2

Exhibit 2

REDACTED

500

OMB No. 1545-0046 Form W-2

Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement 2014		7 Social security tips	8 Allocated tips	9 Advance EIC payment	10 Dependent care benefits	11 Nonqualified plans	12a Code - See instructions for line 12
1 Employer's name, address, and ZIP code 500		9,232.50					
2 Employee's name, address, and ZIP code [REDACTED]		1 Wages, tips, other comp 15,979.18	3 Social security wages 8,746.68	5 Medicare wages and tips 15,979.18	6 Medicare tax withheld 231.70	7 Federal income tax withheld 58.84	4 Social security tax withheld 990.71
13a Statutory Retirement Plan 13b Other		14 Other		15a Code - See instructions for line 15a		15b - 15d Codes	
16 State Employer's state ID no.		17 State income tax		18 Local wages, tips, etc.		19 Local income tax	
20 Locality name							

Copy B to be filed with employee's FEDERAL Tax Return.

Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement 2014		7 Social security tips	8 Allocated tips	9 Advance EIC payment	10 Dependent care benefits	11 Nonqualified plans	12a Code - See instructions for line 12
1 Employer's name, address, and ZIP code 500		9,232.50					
2 Employee's name, address, and ZIP code [REDACTED]		1 Wages, tips, other comp 15,979.18	3 Social security wages 8,746.68	5 Medicare wages and tips 15,979.18	6 Medicare tax withheld 231.70	7 Federal income tax withheld 58.84	4 Social security tax withheld 990.71
13a Statutory Retirement Plan 13b Other		14 Other		15a Code - See instructions for line 15a		15b - 15d Codes	
16 State Employer's state ID no.		17 State income tax		18 Local wages, tips, etc.		19 Local income tax	
20 Locality name							

Copy C for EMPLOYER'S RECORDS. (See Notice to Employees.)

Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement 2014		7 Social security tips	8 Allocated tips	9 Advance EIC payment	10 Dependent care benefits	11 Nonqualified plans	12a Code - See instructions for line 12
1 Employer's name, address, and ZIP code 500		9,232.50					
2 Employee's name, address, and ZIP code [REDACTED]		1 Wages, tips, other comp 15,979.18	3 Social security wages 8,746.68	5 Medicare wages and tips 15,979.18	6 Medicare tax withheld 231.70	7 Federal income tax withheld 58.84	4 Social security tax withheld 990.71
13a Statutory Retirement Plan 13b Other		14 Other		15a Code - See instructions for line 15a		15b - 15d Codes	
16 State Employer's state ID no.		17 State income tax		18 Local wages, tips, etc.		19 Local income tax	
20 Locality name							

Copy D to be filed with Employer's State, City or Local Tax Return.

Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement 2014		7 Social security tips	8 Allocated tips	9 Advance EIC payment	10 Dependent care benefits	11 Nonqualified plans	12a Code - See instructions for line 12
1 Employer's name, address, and ZIP code 500		9,232.50					
2 Employee's name, address, and ZIP code [REDACTED]		1 Wages, tips, other comp 15,979.18	3 Social security wages 8,746.68	5 Medicare wages and tips 15,979.18	6 Medicare tax withheld 231.70	7 Federal income tax withheld 58.84	4 Social security tax withheld 990.71
13a Statutory Retirement Plan 13b Other		14 Other		15a Code - See instructions for line 15a		15b - 15d Codes	
16 State Employer's state ID no.		17 State income tax		18 Local wages, tips, etc.		19 Local income tax	
20 Locality name							

Copy E to be filed with Employer's State, City or Local Tax Return.

Exhibit 3

Exhibit 3

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Other Civil Filing

COURT MINUTES

July 01, 2015

A-14-701633-C Paulette Diaz, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
MDC Restaurants LLC, Defendant(s)

July 01, 2015 1:30 PM **Minute Order: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability as to Plaintiff Paulette Diaz s First Claim for Relief**

HEARD BY: Williams, Timothy C.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 12D

COURT CLERK: Lorna Shell

PARTIES None
PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- After review and consideration of the record, the points and authorities on file herein, and oral argument of counsel, COURT ORDERED, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability as to Plaintiff Paulette Diaz's First Claim for Relief GRANTED as follows:

The language of the Nevada Minimum Wage Amendment is unambiguous: An employer must actually provide, supply, or furnish qualifying health insurance to an employee as a precondition to paying that employee the lower-tier hourly minimum wage in the sum of \$7.25 per hour. Merely offering health insurance coverage is insufficient. As a result, COURT ORDERED, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability as to Plaintiff Paulette Diaz's First Claim for Relief GRANTED; Counsel for the prevailing party shall prepare the appropriate Order in accordance with this Minute Order and the record on file herein. This is to be submitted to adverse counsel for review and approval and/or submission of a competing Order or objections, prior to submitting to the Court for review and signature.

CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this minute order was placed in the attorney folder(s) of: Kathryn Blakey, Esq. (Littler Mendelson) and Daniel Bravo, Esq. (Wolf, R,S,S & R LLP). /ls 7-1-15

PRINT DATE: 07/01/2015

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date: July 01, 2015

ADAM PAUL LAXALT
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**IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR CARSON CITY**

CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* THE
OFFICE OF THE LABOR
COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
LABOR COMMISSIONER; and SHANNON
CHAMBERS, Nevada Labor Commissioner
in her official capacity,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14 OC 00080 1B

Dept. No.: 2

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COME NOW Defendants the STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* OFFICE OF THE LABOR
COMMISSIONER, the OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER and SHANNON
CHAMBERS in her official capacity as the Nevada Labor Commissioner (collectively "Labor
Commissioner"), by and through counsel of record ADAM PAUL LAXALT, Attorney General of
the State of Nevada, and Scott Davis, Deputy Attorney General and hereby oppose Plaintiff
Cody Hancock's motion for summary judgment. This opposition is based upon the provisions

1 of NRCP 56, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, and any oral argument that
2 the Court may entertain at a hearing on said motion.

3 DATED this 13 day of July, 2015

4
5 ADAM PAUL LAXALT
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6
7 By: 

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16 Shannon Chambers

17 **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

18 **I. INTRODUCTION**

19 Plaintiff Cody Hancock is not entitled to summary judgment because he does not meet
20 his exceptional burden to show that the challenged provisions of the Nevada Administrative
21 Code conflict with the minimum wage amendment.

22 Plaintiff fails to make this showing because Plaintiff's arguments each ask the Court to
23 disregard or minimize portions of the constitutional text in order to emphasize other textual
24 language that is more favorable to the Plaintiff. But in doing so Plaintiff only sets up a false
25 dilemma as a harmonious construction of the amendment is possible, and is in fact achieved
26 through the Labor Commissioner's administrative regulations. For this reason, Plaintiff fails to
27 show any conflict with the constitutional text.

28 Plaintiff does not show that NAC 608.100 conflicts with the amendment by using the
term "offer." Both the terms "offer" and "provide" are terms that are lifted from text of the
amendment itself, but regardless of the preferred term the substantive meaning is the same in

1 either case – that health insurance must be made available to the employee in order to qualify
2 to pay the lower-tiered wage rate as defined by the amendment. Because the term “offer” is
3 taken from the amendment itself, and because the administrative regulations specify the
4 meaning of this term as making health insurance available, there is no conflict between NAC
5 608.100 and the amendment.

6 Plaintiff also fails to show a conflict between the amendment and NAC 608.104
7 because Plaintiff does not adequately account for the fact that the amendment requires that
8 the 10 percent cap on premium costs be based upon “gross taxable income.” Plaintiff’s
9 approach to construing this requirement would either require this Court to ignore the
10 amendment’s “gross taxable income” language or else leave it to this Court to provide for a
11 new measure of taxable income untethered to federal income tax law or state tax law. Neither
12 is a viable option. In contrast, the Labor Commissioner’s construction of the “gross taxable
13 income from the employer” clause achieves a harmonious construction of the entire phrase by
14 deferring to federal tax law to determine the employee’s gross taxable income.

15 Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment because in both of his contentions he fails
16 to show any actual conflict between the minimum wage amendment and the administrative
17 regulations. As Plaintiff cannot meet his considerable burden to demonstrate a conflict
18 between the amendment and the regulations, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s motion for
19 summary judgment.

20 **II. THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE ARISE UNDER THE EXCEPTION TO THE MINIMUM** 21 **WAGE AMENDMENT’S GENERAL RULE**

22 Plaintiff argues that the primary feature and purpose of the minimum wage amendment
23 was to raise the minimum wage in Nevada. This argument is correct as far as it goes. The
24 main thrust of the minimum wage amendment was indeed to provide for a higher minimum
25 wage as the general rule. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, 2006 Ballot Question). However, as a
26 secondary feature, the minimum wage amendment also allows for a second and lower-tier
27
28

1 wage rate that creates an exception to the regular minimum wage rate. It is with the details of
2 this exception, rather than the general rule, that this lawsuit is concerned.

3 The basic parameters of this exception are spelled out in the text of the minimum wage
4 amendment itself, and the regulations adopted by the Labor Commissioner are faithful to the
5 amendment because the regulations are based upon the amendment's textual language. In
6 this case, Plaintiff selectively emphasizes the textual language favorable to his position, while
7 largely disregarding the amendment's textual language that undermines his arguments. The
8 Labor Commissioner's regulations are faithful to the entirety of the amendment's text, and
9 thus the Court should deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

10 **III. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

11 **A. Plaintiff Must Overcome An Exceptionally High Burden In Order to Obtain** 12 **Summary Judgment**

13 The applicable analytical rules that guide the Court's review of the regulations in this
14 case require that the Court must presume the regulations to be valid, and must place upon Mr.
15 Hancock the full burden to make a clear showing of their invalidity. *Ottenheimer v. Real*
16 *Estate Div. of Nevada Dep't of Commerce*, 97 Nev. 314, 315, 629 P.2d 1203, 1205 (1981).
17 Any doubt as to the validity of the regulations must be resolved in favor of the Labor
18 Commissioner and in favor of finding that the regulations are valid and permissible. *Koscot*
19 *Interplanetary, Inc. v. Draney*, 90 Nev. 450, 456, 530 P.2d 108, 112 (1974).

20 There is no genuine issue of material fact in this case, but Plaintiff's motion for
21 summary judgment should still be denied because it does not make the clear showing of
22 invalidity that is necessary in order for him to carry his burden of proof. He is thus not entitled
23 to judgment as a matter of law. *See* NRCP 56(c).

24 **B. The Labor Commissioner's Regulatory Authority**

25 While Plaintiff is correct to state that administrative regulations cannot conflict with the
26 constitution, and must give way if there truly is such a conflict, Plaintiff is incorrect to claim that
27 the Labor Commissioner has no authority to construe the law she is charged with enforcing.
28

1 Courts do indeed have the final authority to construe statutes and constitutional provisions,
2 but that that does not preclude other branches of government, including an administrative
3 agency, from doing so. *e.g. Office of the Labor Commissioner v. Granite Construction Co.*,
4 118 Nev. 83, 40 P.3d 423 (2002) (deferring to the Labor Commissioner's interpretation of
5 Nevada's prevailing wage statutes).

6 The Nevada Supreme Court has long recognized that an administrative agency that is
7 "...charged with the duty of administering an act is impliedly clothed with power to construe it
8 as a necessary precedent to administrative action." *Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Local Gov't Emp.*
9 *Mgmt. Relations Bd.*, 90 Nev. 442, 446, 530 P.2d 114, 117 (1974); *see also Int'l Game Tech.,*
10 *Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada*, 122 Nev. 132, 157, 127 P.3d 1088, 1106 (2006)
11 (recognizing that administrative agencies have the authority to interpret statutes and citing
12 various cases). When an agency does so, a court that reviews the agency's construction
13 should presume the agency's interpretation to be correct. *See United States v. State*
14 *Engineer*, 117 Nev. 585, 589, 27 P.3d 51, 53 (2001). Interpretive administrative regulations
15 are one recognized device for an agency to construe the law. *See County of Clark v. LB*
16 *Props., Inc.*, 129 Nev. ___, 315 P.3d 294, 296 (Adv. Op. 96, 2013) (explaining the difference
17 between interpretative regulations and legislative regulations). When administrative
18 regulations are codified into the Nevada Administrative Code, they have the force of law. NRS
19 233B.040(1).

20 Not only are the Labor Commissioner's regulations appropriate to fill in the
21 administrative details of the amendment, they are in fact a legal necessity. Just two months
22 before Nevadans voted to finally approve the amendment in 2006 the Nevada Supreme Court
23 issued an opinion in *Nevadans for the Prot. of Prop. Rights, Inc. v. Heller*, 122 Nev. 894, 141
24 P.3d 1235 (2006). In *Heller*, the Nevada Supreme Court held that an initiative petition to
25 amend the state constitution may only include general policy, and may not include the
26 administrative details of that policy. *Id.*, 122 Nev. at 914-915, 141 P.3d 1248-1249. As the
27 minimum wage amendment was adopted through this same initiative process it could not, as a
28

1 matter of law, spell out all the administrative details necessary for the implementation of its
2 policy.

3 The preceding year, in 2005, the Attorney General's Office had opined that the Labor
4 Commissioner's enforcement authority under NRS 608.270 and NRS 706.160(1)(a) would
5 likely extend to enforcement of the minimum wage amendment. Op Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-
6 04 (March 2, 2005) (cited with approval in *Thomas v. Yellow Cab Corp.*, 130 Nev. ____ 327
7 P.3d 518, 521, n. 2. (Adv. Op. 52, 2014)). NRS 706.160(1)(b) specifically grants rulemaking
8 authority to the Labor Commissioner to carry out the duties specified in subsection (1)(a).
9 Thus, it follows that the Labor Commissioner has regulatory authority to fill in the
10 administrative details that are necessitated by the amendment, but which the amendment
11 itself may not lawfully provide.

12 After the amendment was passed, the need to provide administrative interpretation of
13 the amendment was so dire that Governor Guinn endorsed emergency rulemaking by the
14 Labor Commissioner to do so. (Exhibit 1). It was in this environment that the Labor
15 Commissioner identified a need to provide clarification to the amendment by administrative
16 regulation and then exercised the lawful authority to do so. The Labor Commissioner's
17 regulations are plainly within her regulatory authority.

18 **C. The Terms "Offer" and "Provide" Should Be Read Synonymously**

19 1. The Terms Offer and Provide As Used in the Constitutional Text

20 In arguing that the Court must make a distinction between the terms "offer" and
21 "provide" Plaintiff's argument is premised on a false dilemma that the Court should reject. The
22 actual text of the amendment does not support construing the term "offer" differently than the
23 term "provide," because the amendment in fact uses both the terms "offer" and "provide"
24 interchangeably.¹

25 _____
26 ¹ Since the amendment arose entirely through the initiative process it was not reviewed for internal consistency
27 before it was placed on the ballot. In 2007 the Legislature altered the initiative process to provide for such a
28 review and for technical suggestions to be made by the Legislative Counsel Bureau. Act of June 13, 2007, ch.
476, § 24(b) 2007 Nev. Stat. 2543. Thus, the minimum wage amendment was one of the last initiative petitions
that did not first undergo a linguistic review for internal consistency by the Legislative Counsel Bureau. This

1 The amendment states in relevant part:

2 The rate shall be five dollars and fifteen cents (\$5.15) per hour
3 worked, if the employer provides health benefits as described
4 herein, or six dollars and fifteen cents (\$6.15) per hour if the
5 employer does not provide such benefits. Offering health benefits
6 within the meaning of this section shall consist of making health
7 insurance available to the employee for the employee and the
8 employee's dependents at a total cost to the employee for
9 premiums of not more than 10 percent of the employee's gross
10 taxable income from the employer.

11 Nev. Const. art 15 § 16(A).

12 The Labor Commissioner has always read the terms "offer" and "provide"
13 synonymously, and as implicating the definitional requirement that health insurance must be
14 "made available" to the employee in order to claim the exception provided by the lower-tier
15 wage rate. An analysis of the amendment's textual language supports the Labor
16 Commissioner's position.

17 The context and surrounding language is an aid to interpreting a disputed provision of
18 law. *Gold Ridge Partners v. Sierra Pac. Power Co.*, 128 Nev. ___, 285 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Adv.
19 Op. 47, 2012). In this case, the term "provide" is part of a larger clause that reads "...if the
20 employer provides health benefits as described herein." The tag of "as described herein" is a
21 plain indicator that the description of health benefits that is to then follow will apply to the
22 employer's option to "provide" health insurance. But the language that follows speaks of
23 "offering health benefits" and defines an acceptable offer of insurance as "making the
24 insurance available to the employee and employee's dependents." Nev. Const. art 15 § 16(A).

25 "In expounding a constitutional provision, such constructions should be employed as
26 will prevent any clause, sentence or word from being superfluous, void or insignificant."
27 *Youngs v. Hall*, 9 Nev. 212, 222 (1874). The insuperable difficulty with Plaintiff's argument is
28 that, if it is accepted, it would force this Court to reject this long-held bedrock of constitutional
interpretation. If the clause that reads "[o]ffering health benefits within the meaning of this

accounts for the fact that amendment uses both terms and tends to indicate that the terms "offer" and "provide"
should be read as interchangeable.

1 section shall consist of making health insurance available to the employee for the employee
2 and the employee's dependents..." is to have any meaning, then it must define the directive
3 for an employer to "provide" those same benefits in order to claim the lower-tier exception to
4 the general minimum wage rate.

5 Plaintiff's motion addresses this language but offers no cogent argument for reading
6 the constitutional text any other way. Plaintiff argues that the sentence defining an offer of
7 health benefits does not provide the command of the amendment, which is true.² However, as
8 Plaintiff correctly acknowledges, this sentence that defines "offering health benefits" informs
9 the preceding sentence, which calibrates the correct wage rate based upon whether the
10 employer "provides" qualifying insurance. This approach however is only consistent with the
11 directive reflected in the administrative regulations to make insurance available. NAC
12 608.102(2).

13 Plaintiff's argument is even self-defeating as to Plaintiff's second contention in this
14 lawsuit. The 10 percent cost cap on health insurance premiums is a feature of the same
15 sentence that defines "offering health benefits". If "provide" truly means something other than
16 the offering of health benefits defined in the succeeding sentence of the amendment then the
17 10 percent cost cap does attach at all, as that provision is specifically tied to an "offer" of
18 insurance. The better approach is to accept that "offer" and "provide" are synonymous for
19 purposes of the minimum wage amendment.

20 Whether the preferred term is "offer" or "provide," it does not affect the substantive
21 requirement defined in the amendment. That substantive standard is that health insurance
22 must be made available to the employee and the employee's dependents. As the amendment
23 provides for the definition of this term, it is this constitutional definition, and not a selective
24

25 _____
26 ² Plaintiff however is not correct in asserting that the command of the amendment is to provide health insurance.
27 The command of the amendment is for an employer to pay its employees at least the required minimum wage.
28 As explained above the main thrust of the amendment was to raise the minimum wage and the language
concerning the provision of health insurance treats only the exception to the general rule that raised the minimum
wage. Thus, the language to "provide" health insurance is not the command of the amendment.

1 dictionary definition that must control. *State, Dep't of Bus. & Indus. v. Check City*, 130 Nev.
2 ____, 337 P.3d 755 (Adv. Op. 90, 2014).

3 2. The Administrative Regulations Do Not Conflict with the Amendment

4 NAC 608.100 is consistent with the constitutional standard because it determines the
5 correct wage rate based upon whether or not qualified health insurance is offered, *i.e.* made
6 available to the employee. NAC 608.102 informs the requirements of NAC 608.100. NAC
7 608.102(1). This regulation unambiguously states that in order for an employer to qualify to
8 pay the lower tier wage, "[t]he health insurance plan must be made available to the employee
9 and any dependents of the employee." NAC 608.102(2) (emphasis added). Thus, whether or
10 not one prefers the term "offer" or "provide" the substantive requirement is the same in either
11 case. It is the same requirement defined in the text of the amendment - the requirement that
12 the health insurance must be "made available." Nev. Const. art 15 § 16(A).

13 The Labor Commissioner has steadfastly maintained this same position since the
14 amendment was adopted in 2006. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, the Labor Commissioner
15 has never vacillated on this requirement. The Labor Commissioner's emergency regulations
16 did state in section 2 of those regulations that the lower tier was "from \$5.15 to \$6.14 per hour
17 for employers who provide qualified health insurance benefits." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, § 2).
18 However those same emergency regulations elsewhere clearly specified what was meant by
19 this language. In section 5 of the same emergency regulations the Labor Commissioner listed
20 the criteria for an employer to qualify for the lower tier. The first criterion under this section
21 was that health insurance "must be made available to the employee and the employee's
22 dependents." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 § 5). Thus, from the very outset the Labor Commissioner's
23 regulations maintain the same substantive standard that health insurance must be "made
24 available" in order to qualify to pay the lower tier.

25 This same "made available" language was then included in the temporary regulations,
26 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, § 4(1)) and is included today in the permanent regulations at NAC
27 608.102(2). Thus, the emergency regulations do not reflect any different understanding of the
28

1 amendment than do the current regulations. The standard in 2006 under the emergency
2 regulations for an employer to claim the lower-tier exception was to make health insurance
3 available and the standard today for an employer to claim the lower-tier exception is to make
4 health insurance available. The Court should therefore disregard Plaintiff's attempts to impugn
5 the integrity of the rulemaking process by insinuating that lobbying somehow led to a change
6 in the substantive standard.

7 Plaintiff's references to other agencies and to other contemporary publications
8 discussing the amendment do not show a clear conflict with the constitutional language. As
9 recognized by the declaration of emergency endorsed by Governor Guinn, (Exhibit 1) there
10 was a great deal of confusion in the aftermath of the amendment's approval in 2006. But the
11 Governor's office and the Nevada Legislature³ each looked to the Labor Commissioner to
12 address and remedy that confusion. When the Labor Commissioner did so a consistent
13 standard emerged – the standard that health insurance must be “made available” to the
14 employee and employees dependents. This standard that can fairly be read under either the
15 term “offer” or “provide.” As the Labor Commissioner has statutory authority to adopt the
16 regulations in question, and thus provide a definitive answer that carries with it the weight of
17 law, see NRS 233B.040(1), it is the Labor Commissioner's regulations that are dispositive.

18 Plaintiff's motion fails to make a clear showing that the administrative regulations
19 conflict with the minimum wage amendment. Instead the administrative regulations are based
20 on the text of the amendment and substantively require that health insurance be made
21 available to the employee in order for an employer to claim the lower-tiered minimum wage.
22 Because the amendment itself supplies the controlling standard of “making health insurance
23 available,” Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on this point.

24 ///

25 ³ The Administrative Procedures Act requires that permanent regulations must be reviewed and approved by a
26 committee of legislators before they may be finally codified. NRS 233B.067. Further legislative consent to the
27 Labor Commissioner's interpretation may be inferred by the fact that the Legislature has not since taken any
28 action to disturb the Labor Commissioner's regulatory provisions. See *Hughes Properties, Inc. v. State*, 100 Nev.
295, 680 P.2d 970 (1984).

D. The Inclusion of Tips to Determine an Employee's Gross Taxable Income Does Not Conflict with the Amendment

Plaintiff's second contention is that NAC 608.104's inclusion of tips and gratuities as taxable income, consistent with federal income tax law, is defective. On this point as well, Plaintiff fails to show any conflict between the regulations and the minimum wage amendment.

1. The Practical Implications of NAC 608.104(2) Eliminate the Disproportionate Impact that Plaintiff Seeks to Create in this Case

Plaintiff's motion offers the example of "Employee A" to demonstrate the perceived inequality between the premium rates between an employee who makes only \$7.25 per hour without tips and one who makes \$7.25 per hour with tips. (Plaintiff's Motion, p. 18). Plaintiff concludes that in this example the tipped employee's cost for insurance premiums is 2.4 times the cost of the premiums for a non-tipped employee. Plaintiff's calculations appear to be accurate on this score. However, when tips are factored in, the tipped employee in this example also makes approximately 2.4 times the income of the non-tipped employee.

Plaintiff's proposed application of the minimum wage amendment would create rather than remedy a disparity between tipped employees and non-tipped employees, despite the fact that both tipped and non-tipped employees must be paid the same base wage rate. Put another way, if Employee A from Plaintiff's same example is a non-tipped employee and earns the same \$435.00 per pay period, the premium rate for health insurance benefits should be no more than \$43.50 per pay period, which is 10 percent of the employees taxable earnings and a net benefit of \$391.50 in favor the employee. Continuing with Plaintiff's hypothetical, if that same employee is a tipped employee that earns \$1,035.00 per pay period (including tips), but is under the same cost-cap of \$43.50 proposed by the Plaintiff, this amount would be only 4.2 percent of the employee's taxable earnings with the net benefit to the employee of \$991.50. Clearly such a rule would disparately favor tipped employees over non-tipped employees.

Whether or not tipped employees should receive this benefit over non-tipped employees is a question of policy, and one that is answered by the minimum wage

1 amendment itself. The amendment specifies that the cost cap on premiums must be based
2 upon the same percentage of the employee's "gross taxable income" in either case. Nev.
3 Const. art. 15 § 16(A).

4 The practical implication of the Labor Commissioner's rule is to clarify that this disparity
5 is eliminated. Regardless of whether an employee's income is the base wage rate alone, or is
6 base wages plus tips, the cost of insurance is based upon the same percentage in each case.
7 Both tipped and non-tipped employees fall under the same 10 percent rule.

8 2. NAC 608.104 Does Not Conflict with the Amendment

9 Plaintiff argues that the inclusion of tips and gratuities in determining an employee's
10 income level violates the amendment. But as stated above, the amendment requires that the
11 measure of income relative to the cost of a health insurance premium is to be based upon the
12 "gross taxable income from the employer." Nev. Const. art. 15, § 16(A).

13 There are two possible ways to construe this "gross taxable income from the employer"
14 language. Either this language (1) means the amount of gross taxable income that is
15 attributable to the employer that is easily ascertainable under existing tax law; or (2) means
16 the creation of an entirely new standard that bases income tax only upon base wages and
17 excludes tips. The Labor Commissioner has interpreted the minimum wage amendment to
18 mean the former, and Plaintiff advocates for the latter in this case. In order to prevail in this
19 motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must not only show that the latter construction is
20 permissible; he must show that the former construction adopted by the Labor Commissioner is
21 impermissible.

22 3. Plaintiff's Argument is Untenable In Light of the Amendment's "gross
23 taxable income" Language

24 The chief difficulty in Plaintiff's argument is the fact that, at least for tipped employees,
25 the employee's gross taxable income is not measured by base-wages-minus-tips under
26 existing income tax law. Plaintiff's proposed base-wages-minus-tips construction might fairly
27 be read as consistent with the snippet of "income from an employer," but as a matter of law
28

1 cannot be read to be consistent with the full phrase "gross taxable income from the employer."
2 Unfortunately for Plaintiff's position, the amendment does include the "gross taxable income"
3 requirement. This means that in order to give effect to Plaintiff's position, either the "gross
4 taxable income" language from the amendment must be discarded or else a new definition of
5 "gross taxable income" must be propounded. Both approaches are problematic.

6 a. *The Court Should Not Disregard the "Gross Taxable Income"*
7 *Requirement*

8 As with Plaintiff's preceding argument, Plaintiff again advocates for an approach on this
9 issue that would require the Court to disregard a portion of the constitutional text. The Court
10 should not cast aside the amendment's "gross taxable income" language. To do so would run
11 afoul of a fundamental canon of constitutional interpretation – the aforementioned canon that
12 every provision in the constitution must be afforded meaning if possible. *State ex rel. Herr v.*
13 *Laxalt*, 84 Nev. 382, 441 P.2d 687 (1968). Yet, this is what Plaintiff is again asking the Court
14 to do in this case.

15 Plaintiff's argument places a hyper-emphasis on the "from the employer" portion of the
16 amendment's sentence, while disregarding the portion of that same sentence that refers to
17 "gross taxable income." Plaintiff only addresses the "gross taxable income" requirement
18 indirectly by collaterally attacking a Labor Commissioner declaratory order on the grounds that
19 the declaratory order did not sufficiently focus on the "from the employer" portion of the
20 sentence. But a collateral attack on a separate order is an inadequate substitute for meeting
21 the Plaintiff's burden in this case to show that the regulation clearly conflicts with the
22 amendment.

23 Plaintiff's only other argument on this issue is to emphasize his own understanding of
24 voters' intent over the actual text of the amendment. But this argument is foreclosed by
25 *Thomas v. Yellow Cab Corp.* in which the Nevada Supreme Court rejected that same
26 approach. *See Thomas*, 130 Nev. ___, 327 P.3d at 522 (stating "[t]o seek the intent of the
27 provision's drafters or to attempt to aggregate the intentions of Nevada's voters into some
28

1 abstract general purpose underlying the Amendment, contrary to the intent expressed by the
2 provision's clear textual meaning, is not the proper way to perform constitutional
3 interpretation.") (internal citations omitted).

4 Simply disregarding the amendment's "gross taxable income" requirement is not a
5 viable approach.

6 *b. The Court Should Not Create a New Measurement of Income Tax*

7 As the Court cannot simply ignore the "gross taxable income" requirement, the other
8 avenue for the Court adopt Plaintiff's base-wages-minus-tips proposal is to create an entirely
9 new measure of income tax that deems only an employee's base wages, minus tips, to be
10 counted as the "gross taxable income from the employer." This approach is problematic
11 because, as set forth below, base-wages-minus-tips is not an accurate measure of gross
12 taxable income under federal tax law, and no other provision of state law even purports to
13 measure an employee's income tax. Nev. Const. art. 10 §1(9).

14 Creating a new measure of state income tax, even if it were permissible under the state
15 constitution, is not a judicial function. Moreover, as neither any legislative body nor any
16 executive branch agency has adopted a standard that excludes tips from an employee's gross
17 taxable income apart from the Internal Revenue Code, the task would fall to this Court to erect
18 such a measure of an employee's income tax. This difficulty is further compounded by the fact
19 that if the Court were to follow Plaintiff's invitation, any such decision must be based solely
20 upon the amendment's phrase "gross taxable income from the employer." But this reveals yet
21 another problematic entanglement against Supreme Court precedent. As stated above, the
22 amendment itself was adopted through the initiative process. Under *Heller*, this means that
23 the amendment, properly considered, cannot include administrative details and must include
24 but a single subject. *Heller*, 122 Nev. at 908-917, 141 P.3d at 1243-1251. If this Court were to
25 construe the language of "gross taxable income from the employer" as creating a new way to
26 calculate income tax on the basis of base-wages-minus-tips, it would unnecessarily create a

1 conflict with *Heller* by construing the amendment as providing for administrative details and
2 encompassing more than a single subject.

3 Thus, simply creating a new measure of income tax by way of constitutional
4 interpretation in this case is not a viable other either.

5 As the Court should neither disregard the "gross taxable income" language nor
6 construe it to create a new measure of employee income tax separate from the Internal
7 Revenue Code, the Court should reject Plaintiff's argument that the amendment's measure of
8 "gross taxable income from the employer" means base-wages-minus-tips and deny Plaintiff's
9 motion for summary judgment.

10 *c. The Labor Commissioner's Regulation Harmonizes the Entire*
11 *Clause*

12 Similar to the preceding argument, the notion that the Court must emphasize the "from
13 the employer" language at the expense of the "gross taxable income" language sets up a false
14 dilemma. A construction of the amendment that gives a harmonious effect to the entire phrase
15 "gross taxable income from the employer" is achievable. It is the construction that has been
16 adopted by the Labor Commissioner in NAC 608.104. That construction interprets the
17 amendment's language as meaning income to the employee that is taxable and is "attributable
18 to the employer" under federal income tax law. NAC 608.104(2).

19 In this litigation, the Labor Commissioner has emphasized the "gross taxable income"
20 language specified in the amendment. But the Labor Commissioner's construction does not
21 do so at the expense of the entire constitutional text because the Labor Commissioner merely
22 defers to the Internal Revenue Code to supply the measure of "gross taxable income from the
23 employer."

24 Under the Internal Revenue Code, income taxes are collected on an employee's
25 "wages." 26 U.S.C. § 3402(a)(1). The term "wages" is defined as "...all remuneration (other
26 than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer..."
27 26 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (ellipsis in original). An "employer" under this tax code is defined as
28

1 "...the person for whom an individual performs or performed any service, of whatever nature,
2 as the employee of such person..." 26 U.S.C. § 3401(d). Tips are specifically included as
3 "wages" pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 3401(f); *see also* 26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(f)-1.⁴ Under 26
4 U.S.C. § 3402(a)(1), an employer is required to make a withholding for the employee's income
5 tax from its payment of "wages" to an employee. Under 26 U.S.C. § 3403 it is the employer
6 that is liable for the income tax, including, as appropriate, taxes upon tipped income.

7 The amendment itself does not state that the 10 percent cost cap must be measured
8 against "gross taxable income that is paid to the employee by the employer." The amendment
9 instead uses the more pliable language "gross taxable income from the employer." Thus,
10 construction of this phrase as meaning income "attributable to the employer," even if not
11 directly paid by the employer, is permissible under the amendment. As outlined above in the
12 Internal Revenue Code, tips are income attributable to the employer in the sense that they are
13 deemed "wages" and hence "remuneration for services performed by an employee for his
14 employer." 26 U.S.C. § 3401(a). In this light, because tips are generated by an employee's
15 service to his employer, they are income "attributable to the employer" even if the actual
16 source of a tip is the end-user. This does not create a clear conflict with the minimum wage
17 amendment. Hence, the Labor Commissioner's construction achieves a harmonious reading
18 of the entire phrase "gross taxable income from the employer."

19 From this point, the Labor Commissioner's regulations then simply specify a relatively
20 straightforward way to determine the employee's gross taxable income attributable to the
21 employer – by looking to the readily available Form W-2, or if not available, by projecting the
22 amount of taxable income attributable to the employer via mathematical formulae. NAC
23 608.104(1).

26 ⁴ The Internal Revenue Code does contain some detailed rules for counting tips as "wages" for which an
27 employer is liable for the income tax. *See e.g.* 26 C.F.R. § 3402(k)-1; 26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(a)(16)-1. However, it
28 is not necessary to address each of these nuanced rules because NAC 608.104 defers to federal law *in toto* to
determine taxable income.

1 Another plausible construction of the phrase "gross taxable income from the employer"
2 is to interpret the term "from the employer" as clarifying that the measure of taxable income
3 should not be based upon other sources of income apart from the employment with a given
4 employer. Thus, for example, in the case of an employee that works multiple jobs and has
5 multiple sources of income from multiple employers the amendment's "from the employer"
6 language would mean that each employer can individually rely upon its own bookkeeping and
7 the income earned by the employee with that same employer, as opposed to asking
8 employers to attempt to determine an employee's total taxable income from multiple sources.
9 The Labor Commissioner's regulations do not conflict with this interpretation of the meaning of
10 "from the employer."

11 *d. Including Tips As Income Is Limited to Satisfying the Amendment's*
12 *"gross taxable income" Requirement*

13 Nothing in the foregoing approach authorizes or sanctions an understanding that an
14 employer may credit tips towards its obligations to actually pay an employee the required
15 minimum wage. The Labor Commissioner fully agrees with Plaintiff that Nevada wage and
16 hour laws, including the minimum wage amendment itself, clearly prohibit an employer from
17 doing so. Nev. Const. art. 15, § 16(A); *see also Jane Roe Dancer I-VII v. Golden Coin, Ltd.*,
18 124 Nev. 28, 176 P.3d 271 (2008). The administrative regulations do not change this
19 requirement. Rather, the inclusion of tips applies only in the very limited circumstance to
20 quantitatively establish the measure of an employee's "gross taxable income" pursuant to the
21 express language in the minimum wage amendment, and as necessary to establish the
22 applicable minimum wage tier. Outside of this limited context, NAC 608.104(2)'s inclusion of
23 tips as gross taxable income does not apply.

24 Plaintiff correctly states the standard that the voters who approved the minimum wage
25 amendment are presumed to know the state of the law in existence at the time they voted.
26 This only reinforces the conclusion that NAC 608.104 is proper because tax law then, as now,
27 generally includes tips and gratuities as an employee's taxable income, as set forth above.

1 The text of the amendment as approved by the voters included the "gross taxable income"
2 language.

3 The Labor Commissioner agrees with Plaintiff that the stated policy of the minimum
4 wage amendment was to benefit Nevadans by raising the minimum wage for the state's
5 lowest-paid workers. However as was recognized in *Thomas v. Yellow Cab*, the amendment's
6 policy does not create a license to disregard the actual text of the amendment. The actual
7 text of the amendment refers to "gross taxable income" and NAC 608.104 is consistent with
8 this language.

9 **IV. CONCLUSION**

10 Plaintiff does not make the required showing that the challenged administrative
11 regulations clearly conflict with the minimum wage amendment.

12 As set forth above, the term "offer" is based upon the amendment's text that defines an
13 adequate offer of health benefits. Consistent with that same textual definition, the substantive
14 meaning is that an employer must make health insurance benefits available to its employees,
15 regardless of whether the preferred terminology is "offer" or "provide."

16 Plaintiff does not show that NAC 608.104 clearly conflicts with the amendment because
17 the amendment itself refers to "gross taxable income" and the regulation merely refers to the
18 Internal Revenue Code to establish gross taxable income. Plaintiff's reading of the minimum
19 wage amendment would require the Court to either disregard the "gross taxable income"
20 language or else create a new device to measure taxable income that is not based upon the
21 Internal Revenue Code. NAC 608.104 offers a better approach that harmonizes the entire
22 clause that refers to "gross taxable income from the employer."

23 ///

24 ///

25 ///


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27 ///

1 As Plaintiff fails to make the required showing that the regulations create a clear conflict
2 with the minimum wage amendment, the Court should deny Plaintiff's motion for summary
3 judgment.

4 DATED this 13 day of July, 2015

5
6 ADAM PAUL LAXALT
ATTORNEY GENERAL

7
8 By: 


9 Scott Davis, #10019
10 Deputy Attorney General
11 555 E. Washington Avenue, Suite 3900
12 Las Vegas, NV 89101
13 Attorneys for State of Nevada *ex rel*
14 Office of the Labor Commissioner;
15 Office of the Labor Commissioner; and
16 Shannon Chambers
17
18
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21
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28

AFFIRMATION

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document filed in this court does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 13 day of July, 2015.

ADAM PAUL LAXALT
Attorney General


By: 

Scott Davis, # 10019
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Nevada ex rel
Office of the Labor Commissioner;
Office of the Labor Commissioner and
Shannon Chambers

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of the State of Nevada Office of the Attorney General and that on the 13th day of July, 2015 I served the foregoing OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by serving a copy via U.S. Mail, first-class, postage-paid, as follows:

Don Springmeyer, Esq.
Bradley Schrager, Esq.
Daniel Bravo, Esq.
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP
3556 E. Russell Road, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
Attorneys for Plaintiff


An Employee of the Attorney General's Office

INDEX TO EXHIBITS

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>No. of pages</u>
1	Statement and Declaration in Support of Emergency Rulemaking	4

KENNY C. GUINN
Governor

STATE OF NEVADA

REPLY TO:

☐ OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
555 E. WASHINGTON AVENUE, SUITE 4100
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101
PHONE: (702) 486-2650
FAX: (702) 486-2660

☒ OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
675 FAIRVIEW DRIVE, SUITE 206
CARSON CITY, NEVADA 89701
PHONE: (775) 687-4850
FAX: (775) 687-6409

SYDNEY H. WICKLIFFE, C.P.A.
Director

MICHAEL TANCHEK
State Labor Commissioner



DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY
OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER

<http://www.LaborCommissioner.com>

December 11, 2006

Honorable Kenny Guinn
Governor
Capitol Building
Carson City, Nevada 89701

Re: Request for Emergency Minimum Wage Regulations

Dear Governor Guinn,

I am requesting your approval of the attached emergency regulations concerning the recently adopted Constitutional amendment changing Nevada's minimum wage laws.

The amendment goes beyond a simple one-dollar increase in the wage rate and we are being flooded with requests for interpretive guidance from employers and employees. Among the more common issues we are addressing are the nature of the insurance requirements, the effect on overtime, and the effect on previously exempt employees. Many employers are at risk for questions for which they currently have no formal answers. Originally, we dealt with inquiries through a "frequently asked questions" link on our website, but this has quickly proven inadequate and legally tenuous.

Emergency regulations take effect after approval by the Governor and filing with the Secretary of State and expire after 120 days; early to mid-April of 2007. I already have a temporary rulemaking in its early stages and would merge these regulations into that process, so a "temporary" regulation would be in place when the emergency regulations expire. The temporary regulations would expire on November 1, 2007, but I would begin permanent rulemaking shortly after July 1.

Adopting the emergency regulations for the short-term can provide a small element of certainty for employers and employees. If you have any additional questions, please call me at (775) 684-8188.

Sincerely,

Michael Tanck
Labor Commissioner

SECRETARY OF STATE
FILING DATA

2006 DEC 12 P 3:27

CLERK OF COURTS
CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
CLERK OF COUNTY COURT
CLERK OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL
CLERK OF JUDICIAL BRANCH

CLERK OF JUDICIAL BRANCH


For Filing
Administrative Regulations

Agency:
Office of the Labor Commissioner
Department of Business and Industry

FOR EMERGENCY
REGULATIONS ONLY

Effective date December 12, 2006

Expiration date April 11, 2006


Governor's signature

Classification: ☐ PROPOSED : ☐ ADOPTED BY AGENCY : ☒ EMERGENCY

Brief description of action Adopt regulations related to various provisions in the recently adopted Article 15, Section 16 of the Constitution of Nevada concerning the minimum wage rates to be paid to workers in the State of Nevada.

Authority citation other than 233B: Article 15, Section 16 of the Constitution of Nevada; NRS 607.160(1)(b), NRS 608.270, NRS 608.018.

Notice dates: N/A

Date of Adoption by Agency: December 12, 2006

Adoption Hearing: N/A

Hearing dates: N/A

Adoption Hearing: N/A

Written Statement of Emergency in Support of Emergency Regulations

The Nevada Labor Commissioner has determined that an emergency exists sufficient to warrant the enactment of emergency regulations pertaining to the enforcement of the recently adopted Constitutional amendment governing the minimum wage to be paid workers in the State of Nevada as set forth in Article 15, Section 16 of the Constitution of Nevada. The reasons for the Commissioner's determination are as follows:

-Pursuant to NRS 607.160, "The Labor Commissioner...[S]hall enforce all labor laws of the State of Nevada...[T]he enforcement of which is not specifically and exclusively vested in any other officer, board or commission." Prior to the enactment of the amendment, the Labor Commissioner was charged with enforcing Nevada's minimum laws as set forth in NRS 608.250-290, inclusive.

-The statutory scheme established a single minimum wage rate that was designed to mirror and follow the federal minimum wage rate as set forth in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, currently \$5.15 per hour.

-The amendment significantly alters the existing minimum wage law by establishing two minimum wages (\$5.15 and \$6.15 per hour) which are dependent upon whether or not employers make "health insurance" available to their employee's and their dependents, eliminates certain previous exemptions to the minimum wage, creates new classes of workers who are not considered employees for the purposes of the minimum wage, and will require an adjustment to the rates to be published by the Governor by April 1, 2007.


-The amendment impacts the requirements of NRS 608.018 which requires the payment of overtime to employees whose wage rate is less than one and one half times the minimum wage as set forth in NRS 608.250. With the minimum wage now being established as a Constitutional provision rather than as a regulation pursuant to a statute, this has resulted in two different daily overtime rates.

-The emergency regulations set forth the rules of general applicability by which the Labor Commissioner will interpret and enforce the provisions of the new Constitutional provisions. These rules are necessary to provide guidance to employers that will enable them to comply with their new legal obligations.

-The Labor Commissioner is currently involved in the early stages of temporary rulemaking related to other provisions of NAC Chapter 608. These emergency regulations will be included in that rulemaking allowing for additional public workshops and hearings that will help ensure further

analysis and refining of the emergency regulations. Given the short-term nature of the emergency regulations, the temporary rule should be in effect prior to the expiration date of the emergency regulations. A third rulemaking would take place between July 1, 2007 and November 1, 2007 in order to adopt permanent regulations. Because the Constitutional provisions went into effect so shortly after the election, there was insufficient time to engage in the temporary rulemaking process.

December 12, 2006.


MICHAEL TANCHEK
Labor Commissioner, State of Nevada

I, Governor Kenny C. Guinn, endorse the Labor Commissioner Michael Tanchek's statement of emergency.

December ____, 2006.


KENNY C. GUINN
Governor

ADAM PAUL LAXALT
Attorney General
Scott Davis #10019
Deputy Attorney General
555 E. Washington Avenue, Suite 3900
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(702) 486-3894
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*Attorneys for Defendants State of Nevada
ex rel. Office of the Labor Commissioner,
Office of the Labor Commissioner and
Shannon Chambers*

REC'D & FILED
2015 JUN 12 PM 3:41
SUSAN HERRIKETHER
CLERK
BY V. Alegria
DEPUTY

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

CODY C. HANCOCK, an individual,
Plaintiff,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* THE
OFFICE OF THE LABOR
COMMISSIONER; THE OFFICE OF THE
LABOR COMMISSIONER; and SHANNON
CHAMBERS, Nevada Labor Commissioner
in her official capacity,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14 OC 00080 1B

Dept. No.: 2


MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COME NOW Defendants the STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel.* OFFICE OF THE LABOR
COMMISSIONER, the OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER and SHANNON
CHAMBERS in her official capacity as the Nevada Labor Commissioner (collectively "Labor
Commissioner"), by and through counsel of record ADAM PAUL LAXALT, Attorney General of
the State of Nevada, and Scott Davis, Deputy Attorney General and hereby move this Court
for entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. This motion is based upon the

1 provisions of NRCP 56, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, and any oral
2 argument that the Court may entertain at a hearing on said motion.

3 DATED this 04 day of June, 2015

4
5 ADAM PAUL LAXALT
Attorney General

6
7 By: 

8 Scott Davis, # 10019
9 Deputy Attorney General
10 555 E. Washington Ave., # 3900
11 Las Vegas, NV 89101
12 (702) 486-3894
13 Attorneys for State of Nevada *ex rel.*
14 Office of the Labor Commissioner;
15 Office of the Labor Commissioner; and
16 Shannon Chambers

17
18 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

19 I. INTRODUCTION

20 The administrative regulations challenged by Plaintiff in this case are not
21 constitutionally defective. The regulations do not conflict with Nevada's constitutional minimum
22 wage amendment because the regulations themselves are textually grounded in the very
23 language of the amendment. The regulations' contribution to the overall wage structure
24 established by the minimum wage amendment is only to provide clarity and to fill in the gaps
25 left by the amendment.

26 The minimum wage amendment contains an allowance for employers to pay a lower-
27 tiered wage when the employer makes health insurance available to its employees, provided
28 that other criteria are met as well. The Labor Commissioner's regulations provide an answer
to the question of "what is an acceptable offer of insurance?" The regulations thus clarify the
circumstances in which the employer's offer of insurance is acceptable to satisfy the
conditions of the amendment.

1 The minimum wage amendment also includes a criterion that an offer of insurance
2 cannot charge premiums that exceed 10% of the employee's gross taxable income from the
3 employer. Again, the Labor Commissioner's regulations contribute clarity to this requirement
4 by identifying taxable income as determined by the Internal Revenue Code, which is the only
5 income tax scheme applicable to Nevada employees, and specifying the formulae to use in
6 order to calculate whether an employer has indeed met the amendment's 10% threshold in
7 different situations.

8 The clarity provided by the Labor Commissioner's regulations benefit both Nevada
9 workers and Nevada employers by establishing a clear framework in which both workers and
10 employers can determine which of the two wage rates established by the minimum wage
11 amendment will apply in any given situation.

12 Because these regulations clarify the minimum wage amendment by filling in the gaps
13 of the amendment's requirements and are themselves grounded in the actual text of the
14 amendment, they do not conflict with the amendment. Therefore the regulations are not
15 constitutionally infirm and the Labor Commissioner is entitled to summary judgment.

16 **II. NEVADA'S MINIMUM WAGE AMENDMENT**

17 **A. The Minimum Wage Amendment is Proposed and Approved by the Voters**

18 In Nevada, minimum wage is a constitutional matter. The Nevada Constitution
19 establishes a two-tiered system of minimum wage. Nev. Const. art. 15 § 16. This minimum
20 wage amendment was adopted into the Nevada Constitution following approval by voters in
21 the 2004 and 2006 general elections.

22 Prior to the 2006 approval of the minimum wage amendment, Nevada's minimum wage
23 scheme was a statutory matter. NRS 608.250-290. Under this system the Labor
24 Commissioner was tasked with setting and regulating the minimum wage "in accordance with
25 federal law." NRS 608.250. The Labor Commissioner was also tasked with administering and
26 enforcing the minimum wage system. NRS 608.270(1). After the amendment was passed, the
27 Governor looked to the Labor Commissioner's office and charged it as the agency responsible
28

1 for publishing an annual bulletin to adjust the wage rate pursuant to the constitutional
2 amendment. (Exhibit 1). Currently that wage rate is \$7.25 per hour for employees to whom
3 qualifying health benefits have been made available by the employer, and \$8.25 per hour for
4 all other employees. (Exhibit 2).

5 The minimum wage amendment was adopted entirely through the initiative petition
6 process, see Nev. Const. art. 19 § 2, rather than through the more traditional process for
7 amending the state constitution in which constitutional amendments originate in the
8 legislature. See *Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp.*, 130 Nev.____, 327 P.3d 518, 520
9 (Adv. Op. 52) (2014) (explaining the background of the minimum wage amendment). As the
10 minimum wage amendment bypassed the legislature entirely there is no legislative history
11 available for this particular amendment.

12 The minimum wage amendment, which is formally known as "the Raise the Minimum
13 Wage for Working Nevadans Act," was presented to the voters principally as an increase in
14 the state minimum wage, with a built-in adjustment mechanism to ensure that the state
15 minimum wage remained at a higher rate than the federal minimum wage.¹ (Exhibit 3, 4). The
16 ballot question summary for this amendment does not refer to or discuss the two-tiered
17 structure of the minimum wage system or to the language concerning health benefits, except
18 that section 2 of the measure included a finding that "living expenses such as housing,
19 healthcare, and food have far outpaced wage levels for Nevada's working families." (Exhibit 3,
20 4). The amendment became effective upon approval following the 2006 general election.

21 **B. The Need to Clarify the Amendment by Interpretive Regulations**

22 Even before the voters approved the amendment in 2006, the Labor Commissioner's
23 office had already received confirmation that its pre-existing authority to administer and
24 enforce minimum wage laws under NRS 608.270(1)(a) would likely continue under the newly-
25 adopted minimum wage amendment. Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 2005-04 (March 2, 2005).

26 _____
27 ¹ The Fair Labor Standards Act expressly allows for states to set minimum wage rates higher than the federal
28 minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).

1 The move away from a single minimum wage to a two-tiered minimum wage system
2 immediately after the November 2006 election created a great deal of confusion concerning
3 how to implement the minimum wage amendment and how to ascertain which of the two tiers
4 was applicable in different situations. Prompted by this rampant confusion Governor Kenny
5 Guinn approved emergency rulemaking by the Labor Commissioner² in order to immediately
6 provide clarity regarding an employer's obligations under the new minimum wage amendment.
7 See NRS 233B.0613; (Exhibit 5). This declaration recognized that emergency regulation was
8 necessary "...to provide guidance to employers that will enable them to comply with their new
9 legal obligations." (Exhibit 5). Those emergency regulations established the same basic
10 framework as the current permanent regulations. (Exhibit 6).

11 As emergency regulations expire by law within 120 days, the Labor Commissioner set
12 about converting the emergency regulations to temporary regulations³ and then finally to the
13 current permanent regulations that Plaintiff now challenges.

14 After the 2006 adoption of the minimum wage amendment, and while temporary
15 rulemaking was ongoing, Labor Commissioner Michael Tanchek testified before the Senate
16 Commerce and Labor Committee to discuss the impacts of the newly adopted minimum wage
17 amendment. See Minutes of Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor, 74th Leg. (Feb. 8,
18 2007). (A copy of these minutes is attached as Exhibit 7). Commissioner Tanchek provided
19 the committee with an exhibit that details many of the questions that surfaced after the
20 amendment was adopted. (Exhibit 8). According to Commissioner Tanchek, the major area of
21 confusion was over how the health benefits provision of the amendment fit into the process.
22 (Exhibit 8, p. 8 of 17).

23
24
25 ² Pursuant to NRS 607.160(1)(a) the Labor Commissioner has authority to enforce all labor laws of the state,
26 unless another agency has been specifically vested with enforcement authority. The Labor Commissioner is also
vested with the authority to promulgate regulations in aid of the agency's enforcement authority. NRS
607.160(1)(b).

27 ³ An administrative agency's adoption of regulations as temporary rather than permanent is dictated by the timing
28 of the regulations. NRS 233B.063(3).

1 Some of the specific questions that arose, as pertaining to this case, were questions
2 such as "what if an employee doesn't want the health insurance?" and "How is the '10% of an
3 employee's gross taxable income' determined?" (Exhibit 8). The regulations now challenged
4 by Mr. Hancock in this case were adopted by the Labor Commissioner in order to answer
5 these questions.

6 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

7 A. Applicable Legal Standard

8 1. Plaintiff Bears the Burden to Make A Clear Showing of Invalidity

9 "[T]he law cannot be declared unconstitutional unless it be clearly, palpably, and plainly
10 in conflict with some of the provisions of the Constitution. This is a rule recognized by all the
11 Courts, and probably has never been questioned." *Gibson v. Mason*, 5 Nev. 283, 299 (1869).

12 The regulations challenged by Plaintiff Cody Hancock in this case have the force of
13 law. NRS 233B.040(1)(a). The same presumptions and standards applicable to constitutional
14 challenges to a statute also apply with equal force to a constitutional challenge to
15 administrative regulations. 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 167.

16 When considering a facial constitutional challenge such as this then, the Court must
17 presume the regulations are valid and must place the burden to show otherwise entirely on
18 the Plaintiff. *Universal Elec., Inc. v. State ex rel. Office of Labor Commissioner*, 109 Nev. 127,
19 129, 847 P.2d 1372, 1374 (1993) (quoting *List v. Whisler*, 99 Nev. 133, 137, 660 P.2d 104,
20 106 (1983)). In order to meet his burden, Mr. Hancock must make a "clear showing" of
21 invalidity. *Id.*

22 When attempting to meet this burden, Mr. Hancock cannot rely upon an abstract
23 assignment of purpose or general intent underlying the minimum wage amendment. *Yellow*
24 *Cab Corp.*, 130 Nev. at ___, 327 P.3d at 522. Instead, the touchstone of the Court's analysis in
25 this case should be the text of the amendment itself. *Id.*

26 ///

27 ///

1 2. Standard for Summary Judgment

2 Under NRCP 56, summary judgment should be granted by the Court when the
3 pleadings and evidence before the Court demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of
4 material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Wood v.*
5 *Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 731, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005).

6 Summary judgment is especially appropriate in cases such as this that raise a facial
7 constitutional challenge because such challenges concern questions of law and do not hinge
8 on factual determinations. *See Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos*, 125 Nev. 502,
9 508, 217 P.3d 546, 551 (2009). The allegations made in Plaintiff's second amended complaint
10 turn entirely upon the relation between the challenged administrative regulations and the
11 minimum wage amendment. As the complaint presents a pure question of law, the Labor
12 Commissioner submits that there is no material question of fact at issue in this case that might
13 preclude entry of summary judgment. The applicable question then is whether the Labor
14 Commissioner is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

15 Because the administrative regulations at issue in this suit do not clearly conflict with
16 the minimum wage amendment, and Mr. Hancock cannot meet his considerable burden to
17 show otherwise, the Labor Commissioner is entitled to summary judgment at this time.

18 **B. The Labor Commissioner's Regulations That Clarify When an Employer**
19 **May Pay the Lower-Tiered Wage Do Not Conflict with the Minimum Wage**
20 **Amendment**

21 Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief, as stated in the second amended complaint, challenges
22 the validity of NAC 608.100(1), and more specifically the provision of this regulation that states
23 an employer may pay the lower-tiered wage if it offers qualified health insurance to an
24 employee. 2nd Am. Comp. ¶ 26-34, 45-48; *see also* NAC 608.100(1)(a) (specifying the
25 minimum wage rate that applies "[i]f an employee is offered qualified health insurance"). Mr.
26 Hancock alleges that an employee must actually receive the health insurance in order for an
27 employer to lawfully pay the lower tiered wage. The Labor Commissioner's regulation,
28

1 however, is constitutionally acceptable and does not conflict with the amendment because the
2 regulation is based upon the text of the minimum wage amendment.

3 The Nevada Constitution at article 15, section 16 provides in relevant part:

4
5 The [minimum wage] rate shall be five dollars and fifteen cents
6 (\$5.15) per hour worked, if the employer provides health benefits as
7 described herein, or six dollars and fifteen cents (\$6.15) per hour if
8 the employer does not provide such benefits. Offering health
9 benefits within the meaning of this section shall consist of making
10 health insurance available to the employee for the employee and
11 the employee's dependents at a total cost to the employee for
12 premiums of not more than 10 percent of the employee's gross
13 taxable income from the employer.

14 (emphasis added).

15 In order to implement this section and clarify the conditions in which the lower wage
16 rate may lawfully be applied, the Nevada Labor Commissioner has adopted NAC 608.100,
17 NAC 608.102 and NAC 608.106. These regulations identify the conditions that an employer
18 must meet in order to lawfully qualify to pay the lower tier minimum wage. These conditions
19 include that an employer must offer a health insurance plan to its employees, specifies the
20 minimum conditions of a qualifying health insurance plan, and specifies that the health
21 benefits must be made available to the employee and any dependents of an employee. NAC
22 608.102(1) and (2). NAC 608.106 further allows for an employee to voluntarily decline an offer
23 of health insurance and includes an important employee protection provision that prohibits an
24 employer from making a declination of health benefits a requirement for employment. In other
25 words, if an employee declines health insurance that declination must truly be the employee's
26 choice.

27 Thus, the upshot of these regulations is that where an employer offers qualifying health
28 insurance to its employees and their dependents but the employee voluntarily declines that
health insurance then an employer is deemed to have satisfied the condition specified in the
minimum wage amendment of "making health insurance available." Plaintiff's claim would
radically alter this approach and would condition the lawful wage rate not upon the employer's

1 actions, and whether the employer makes qualifying health insurance available to its
2 employees, but instead upon the employee's actions and his or her choice to accept an offer
3 of insurance.

4 NAC 608.100 does not conflict with the minimum wage amendment because the
5 standard of making health insurance available as an acceptable offer of insurance is taken
6 directly from the text of the amendment itself. The minimum wage amendment holds that if an
7 employer provides qualifying health benefits then the employer may lawfully pay the lower-
8 tiered wage. Nev. Const. art. 15 § 16(A). The amendment then immediately defines "offering
9 health benefits" as "making health insurance available to the employee and the employee's
10 dependents." *Id.* The Labor Commissioner's regulations mirror this make-health-insurance-
11 available language. NAC 608.102(2) ("[t]he health insurance plan must be made available to
12 the employee and any dependents of the employee.").

13 In effect the Labor Commissioner's regulations read the terms "offer" and "provide" as
14 synonymous, when used in the first two sentences of the minimum wage amendment. This
15 does not conflict with the minimum wage amendment because the amendment itself provides
16 a definition to the phrase "offering health benefits." Nev. Const. art. 15 § 16(A). That definition
17 can only plausibly refer to an employer providing health benefits in the preceding sentence of
18 the amendment because the word "offer" does not appear anywhere else in the amendment. If
19 the phrase "offering health benefits" does not refer to the preceding sentence in the
20 amendment, then the entire definition of "offering health benefits" is reduced to a bizarre
21 superfluity – a definition of a non-existent term. The better interpretation of the amendment
22 is that which the Labor Commissioner has consistently followed, and which the legislature has
23 approved,⁴ which treats "offer" and "provide" as synonyms.

24 This approach is also consistent with the ordinary language used in the amendment, as
25 the ordinary meaning of the word "provide" means "to make something available." See
26

27 ⁴ NRS 233B.067 requires permanent regulations such as NAC 608.100 to be reviewed and approved by the
28 Legislative Commission before they become effective.

1 *Webster's II New College Dictionary*, 912 (3rd ed. 2005) (defining "provide" as "to make
2 available").

3 The text of the amendment does not suggest any different reading of the term "provide"
4 other than "making health insurance available to the employees and their dependents"
5 according to the amendment's own definition.

6 NAC 608.100, and the attendant regulations that establish the specifics for a qualifying
7 offer of health benefits, are not constitutionally defective because the foundational premise of
8 those regulations that an employer may qualify to pay the lower-tiered wage if it makes
9 qualifying health insurance available to its employees is rooted in the very text of the
10 amendment. In this there is no conflict with the constitution and the Labor Commissioner is
11 entitled to judgment that these regulations are lawful under the minimum wage amendment.

12 **C. The Regulations That Specify Gross Taxable Income From the Employer Is**
13 **Determined By Internal Revenue Code Do Not Conflict with the Minimum**
14 **Wage Amendment**

15 One of the conditions for an offer of health insurance to be a qualifying offer under the
16 amendment is that it be affordable to the employee.

17 The minimum wage amendment itself supplies the basic metrics with which to measure
18 affordability of health insurance: "...a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more than
19 10 percent of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer." Nev. Const. art. 15 §
20 16(A).

21 1. It is Within the Language of the Amendment to Look to Federal Tax Law
22 to Supply the Measure of Income Tax

23 The reference to an "employee's gross taxable income" must, out of necessity, refer to
24 taxable income under federal tax law as any measure of income tax at the state level that
25 could be used to satisfy this metric is a legal impossibility. Nev. Const. art. 10, § 1(9). ("No
26 income tax shall be levied upon the wages or personal income of natural persons").
27
28

1 As there is no legal standard to measure gross taxable income on employees provided
2 for at the state level, there is simply no viable alternative to measuring an "employee's gross
3 taxable income" than to look to federal tax law. NAC 608.102(3) clarifies this unavoidable
4 consequence by directly stating that an "employee's gross taxable income from the employer"
5 is based upon the income tax as measured by Internal Revenue Code. NAC 608.102(3).

6 NAC 608.104 further expounds on this measurement requirement and clarifies how an
7 employer is to calculate the cost requirements of the minimum wage amendment's 10%
8 threshold. The principal method for determining whether the amendment's 10% threshold is
9 met is by looking to an employee's IRS Form W-2 for the preceding year and using that form
10 to supply the quantitative sum of the employee's gross taxable income that is then divided into
11 the projected share of the employee premiums. NAC 608.104(1)(a). Subsections (b) through
12 (d) of NAC 608.104 provide the formulae for an employer to use to calculate the 10%
13 threshold in those cases where a Form W-2 is not available.

14 In this case, Plaintiff contends that the reference to the Internal Revenue Code in NAC
15 608.102(3) and the ensuing consequence that most tips and gratuities count as gross taxable
16 income⁵ from the employer, NAC 608.104(2), is in violation of the minimum wage amendment.
17 But including tips and gratuities as taxable income is a consequence of federal tax law. *e.g.*
18 *Killoran v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 709 F.2d 31, 32 (9th Cir. 1983); 26 C.F.R. §
19 1.61-2. In turn, the use of federal tax law as a baseline to determine whether the cost of
20 health insurance exceeds 10% of the employee's gross taxable income is a consequence of
21 the minimum wage amendment's language to look to "the employee's gross taxable income
22 from the employer." Mr. Hancock's claim is untenable, and the Labor Commissioner is
23 consequently entitled to summary judgment, because Hancock's claim can only be maintained
24 if the word "taxable" is read out of the amendment entirely.

25 _____
26 ⁵ The Internal Revenue Code contains detailed rules for including tips as taxable income. 26 U.S.C. § 3101
27 imposes an income tax on an employee's wages received by an individual with respect to employment, and 26
28 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(12)(B) defines wages to include tips when the monthly total of tips is \$20 or more. 26 U.S.C. §
3102 requires an employer to collect the income tax. In some cases the amount of tips that count as taxable
income may be based upon an estimate. See 26 U.S.C. § 3102(c).

1 "In expounding a constitutional provision, such constructions should be employed as
2 will prevent any clause, sentence or word from being superfluous, void or insignificant."
3 *Youngs v. Hall*, 9 Nev. 212, 222 (1874). The reference to an employee's "gross taxable
4 income" is plainly included in the text of the minimum wage amendment and the Labor
5 Commissioner is not at liberty to disregard this constitutional language. The only applicable
6 income tax system on Nevada employees is the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, not only is it
7 permissible to look to the Internal Revenue Code to measure employee income, it is in fact the
8 only possibility that can supply a baseline to determine "gross taxable income" under the
9 minimum wage amendment.

10 2. The Labor Commissioner's Regulations Are Limited to the 10% Threshold
11 Calculation and Do Not Permit an Employer to Credit Tips or Gratuities
12 Towards its Obligation to Pay the Correct Wage Rate

13 Nothing in the amendment itself leads to a different conclusion. The only language in
14 the minimum wage amendment itself that speaks to tips states that "[t]ips or gratuities
15 received by employees shall not be credited as being any part of or offset against the wage
16 rates required by this section." Nev. Const. art. 15, § 16(A). The Labor Commissioner's
17 regulations do not offend this section because they only permit tips to be counted as income
18 for the limited purpose of determining "whether the share of the cost of the premium of the
19 qualified health insurance paid by the employee does not exceed 10 percent of the gross
20 taxable income of the employee attributable to the employer." NAC 608.104(1).

21 The specific language in this regulation limits its application only to the 10% threshold
22 calculation provided in NAC 608.104. See NAC 608.104(2). Once the correct wage rate is
23 established, an employer is then obligated to pay that full wage to its employees. NAC
24 608.104, by its terms, does not apply to the actual payment of wages. Nothing in the
25 regulatory language in Chapter 608 permits an employer to apply tips and gratuities towards
26 its obligation to actually pay the correct minimum wage. See NRS 608.160(1)(b).

3. Even if A Different Measure of Gross Taxable Income From the Employer
Were Possible, the Labor Commissioner's Regulations Are Still
Permissible

Even if another alternative to measure "gross taxable income from the employer" could possibly be promulgated, the Labor Commissioner's determination to simply look to federal tax law and the amount reported by the employer as income on the Form W-2 would still be a permissible policy choice because it does not conflict with the actual text of the minimum wage amendment. Further, any other attempt at the state level to erect a new definition or measure of "gross taxable income from the employer" would only invite a new set of constitutional challenges under the income tax prohibition of Nev. Const. art. 10, § 1(9). Thus, the decision to look only to federal law to supply the measure of "gross taxable income from the employer" is within the language of the constitution. The Labor Commissioner is entitled to summary judgment against this claim as well.

D. The Labor Commissioner is Entitled to Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief As Well

The Third Claim for Relief seeks injunctive relief to prevent the Labor Commissioner from enforcing the challenged regulations. An injunction may be an appropriate remedy incidental to a declaratory relief, but such relief is contingent upon the merits of the allegations supporting it. *See Lamb v. Doe*, 92 Nev. 550, 551, 554 P.2d 732, 733 (1976) (explaining that injunctive relief is inappropriate when there is no justiciable controversy with the named defendant). As the Labor Commissioner is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's underlying claims for declaratory relief, summary judgment is likewise appropriate for Plaintiff's stated Third Claim for Relief.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Labor Commissioner is entitled to summary judgment because this case presents a pure question of law, and Mr. Hancock cannot overcome his considerable burden to show that the challenged regulations clearly conflict with the minimum wage amendment. Mr.

1 Hancock cannot meet this burden because the challenged regulations are grounded in the
2 actual text of the minimum wage amendment.


3 The amendment itself defines an offer of health benefits as "making health insurance
4 available" and the Labor Commissioner's regulations are premised upon this language.

5 The amendment itself also specifies that a qualifying offer of health insurance may not
6 exceed "a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more than 10 percent of the
7 employee's gross taxable income from the employer." The Labor Commissioner's regulations
8 clarify this provision, and give effect to the "taxable income" language by specifying that an
9 employee's income tax is measured by the Internal Revenue Code.

10 Ultimately, there is no conflict between the challenged administrative regulations and
11 the minimum wage amendment, and the Court should enter summary judgment in favor of the
12 Labor Commissioner.

13 DATED this 04 day of June, 2015

14
15 ADAM PAUL LAXALT
ATTORNEY GENERAL

16
17 BY: 

18 SCOTT DAVIS, #10019
19 Deputy Attorney General
20 555 E. Washington Avenue, Suite 3900
21 Las Vegas, NV 89101
22 Attorneys for State of Nevada *ex rel*
23 Office of the Labor Commissioner;
24 Office of the Labor Commissioner; and
25 Shannon Chambers
26
27
28

AFFIRMATION

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document filed in this court does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 04 day of June, 2015.

ADAM PAUL LAXALT
Attorney General

By: 

Scott Davis, # 10019
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Nevada ex rel
Office of the Labor Commissioner;
Office of the Labor Commissioner and
Shannon Chambers

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of the State of Nevada Office of the Attorney General and that on the 11th day of June, 2015 I served the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by serving a copy via U.S. Mail, first-class, postage-paid, as follows:

Don Springmeyer, Esq.
Bradley Schrager, Esq.
Daniel Bravo, Esq.
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP
3556 E. Russell Road, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
Attorneys for Plaintiff



An Employee of the Attorney General's Office

INDEX TO EXHIBITS

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>No. of pages</u>
1	Designation by Governor Gibbons	1
2	2015 Minimum Wage Bulletin	1
3	Excerpt from 2004 Ballot Guide Pertaining to Question 6 (Raise the Minimum Wage for Working Nevadans Act)	10
4	Excerpt from 2006 Ballot Guide Pertaining to Question 6 (Raise the Minimum Wage for Working Nevadans Act)	11
5	Statement and Declaration in Support of Emergency Rulemaking	4
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7	Minutes of Committee Meeting	21
8	Copy of Exhibit Provided by Commissioner Tanchek to the Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor	17

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

JIM GIBBONS
GOVERNOR



One Hundred One North Carson Street
Carson City, Nevada 89701
Office: (775) 684-5670
Fax: (775) 684-5683

Office of the Governor

March 28, 2007

Michael Tanchek
Labor Commissioner
675 Fairview Drive, Suite
Carson City, Nevada 89701-5474

RE: Agency Designation

Dear Mr. Tanchek,

Pursuant to the Nevada Constitution Article 15, Section 16, I hereby designate the Department of Business and Industry, Office of Labor Commission as the agency designated to determine any adjustments to the minimum wage and to publish a bulletin by April 1 of each year announcing the adjusted minimum wage rates, which shall take effect the following July 1.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jim Gibbons".

JIM GIBBONS
Governor

JAG/kc

RECEIVED

MAR 29 2007

NEVADA
LABOR COMMISSIONER-CC

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

BRIAN SANDOVAL
Governor

BRUCE BRESLOW
Director

SHANNON CHAMBERS
Labor Commissioner

STATE OF NEVADA



Department of Business & Industry
OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
<http://www.LaborCommissioner.com>

REPLY TO:

- O OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
555 E. WASHINGTON AVENUE, SUITE 4100
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101
PHONE (702) 486-2650
FAX (702) 486-2680
- O OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
675 FAIRVIEW DRIVE, SUITE 226
CARSON CITY, NEVADA 89701
PHONE (775) 687-4850
FAX (775) 687-6409

**STATE OF NEVADA
MINIMUM WAGE
2015 ANNUAL BULLETIN**
POSTED APRIL 1, 2015

PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 15, SECTION 16(A) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, THE GOVERNOR HEREBY ANNOUNCES THAT THE FOLLOWING MINIMUM WAGE RATES SHALL APPLY TO ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE STATE OF NEVADA UNLESS OTHERWISE EXEMPTED. THESE RATES ARE EFFECTIVE AS OF JULY 1, 2015.

FOR EMPLOYEES TO WHOM QUALIFYING HEALTH BENEFITS HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE BY THE EMPLOYER:

NO LESS THAN \$7.25 PER HOUR

FOR ALL OTHER EMPLOYEES:

NO LESS THAN \$8.25 PER HOUR

Copies may also be obtained from the Labor Commissioner's Offices at

675 Fairview Drive, Suite 226
Carson City, Nevada 89701
(775) 687-4850

or

555 East Washington, Suite 4100
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 486-2650

EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 3

State of Nevada

**Statewide
Ballot Questions**

2004



**To Appear on the November 2, 2004
General Election Ballot**

**Issued by
Dean Heller
Secretary of State**

DEAN HELLER
Secretary of State

RENEE L. PARKER
*Chief Deputy Secretary
of State*

PAMELA A. RUCKEL
*Deputy Secretary for
Southern Nevada*

STATE OF NEVADA



**OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF STATE**

CHARLES E. MOORE
Securities Administrator

SCOTT W. ANDERSON
*Deputy Secretary
for Commercial Recordings*

RONDA L. MOORE
*Deputy Secretary
for Elections*

Dear Fellow Nevadan:

You will soon be taking advantage of one of your most important rights as an American citizen: the right to vote! As Secretary of State and the state's Chief Election Officer, I take the job of informing the public about various statewide ballot questions very seriously. An informed and knowledgeable electorate is a cornerstone to fair and just elections.

With that in mind, the Secretary of State's office has prepared this booklet detailing the statewide questions that will appear on the 2004 General Election Ballot. The booklet contains "Notes to Voters," a complete listing of the exact wording of each question, along with a summary, arguments for and against each question's passage, and, where applicable, a fiscal note. Any fiscal note included in this booklet explains only adverse impacts and does not note any possible cost savings.

I encourage you to carefully and thoughtfully review the ballot questions listed in the booklet. As a voter, your actions on these ballot questions can create new laws, amend existing laws or amend the Nevada Constitution.

On the 2004 General Election Ballot, there are eight statewide questions. Ballot Question Numbers 7 and 8 appear on the ballot through the actions of the Nevada State Legislature. Ballot Question Numbers 1 through 6 qualified for this year's ballot through the initiative petition process.

You can also view these ballot questions on the Secretary of State's web site at www.secretaryofstate.biz. If you require further assistance or information, please feel free to contact my office at 775/684-5705.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Dean Heller".

DEAN HELLER
Secretary of State

LAS VEGAS OFFICE
555 E. Washington Avenue
SECURITIES: Suite 5200
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
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MAIN OFFICE
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Fax (775) 684-5725

CORPORATE SATELLITE OFFICE
202 N. Carson Street
Carson City, Nevada 89101
Telephone (775) 684-5708
Fax (775) 684-5725

2004 STATEWIDE BALLOT QUESTIONS SUMMARY

Question #	Title	Originated	If passed in 2004
1	Education First	Initiative Petition	Will Go Onto The 2006 General Election Ballot
2	Improve Nevada Public School Funding to the National Average	Initiative Petition	Will Go Onto The 2006 General Election Ballot
3	Keep Our Doctors in Nevada	Initiative Petition	Becomes Law
4	The Insurance Rate Reduction and Reform Act	Initiative Petition	Will Go Onto The 2006 General Election Ballot
5	Stop Frivolous Lawsuits and Protect Your Legal Rights Act	Initiative Petition	Will Go Onto The 2006 General Election Ballot
6	Raise the Minimum Wage for Working Nevadans	Initiative Petition	Will Go Onto The 2006 General Election Ballot
7	Repeals an Obsolete Provision Concerning Those Permitted to Vote	Legislature AJR #3 of the 71 st Session	Becomes Law
8	Sales and Use Tax of 1955	Legislature AB 514 of the 72 nd Session Including Note To Voters	Becomes effective January 1, 2006

QUESTION NO. 6

Amendment to the Nevada Constitution

CONDENSATION (ballot question)

Shall the Nevada Constitution be amended to raise the minimum wage paid to employees?

Yes.....☒ 545,490
No.....☐ 252,162

EXPLANATION (ballot question)

The proposed amendment, if passed, would create a new section to Article 15 of the Nevada Constitution. The amendment would require employers to pay Nevada employees \$5.15 per hour worked if the employer provides health benefits, or \$6.15 per hour worked if the employer does not provide health benefits. The rates shall be adjusted by the amount of increases in the federal minimum wage over \$5.15 per hour, or, if greater, by the cumulative increase in the cost of living measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), with no CPI adjustment for any one-year period greater than 3%.

The following arguments for and against and rebuttals for Question No. 6 were prepared by a committee as required by Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 293.252.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF QUESTION NO. 6

All Nevadans will benefit from a long-overdue increase in the state's minimum wage through a more robust economy, a decreased taxpayer burden and stronger families.

Low-income workers who do not currently earn enough to cover the basic costs of living for their families – housing, health care, food and child care – will clearly benefit. Many low-income Nevada families live in poverty even though they have full-time jobs. A Nevada worker at the current minimum wage for 40 hours per-week — every week, all year – makes only \$10,712. If the minimum wage had been increased to keep up with rising prices over the last 25 years, it would now bring in \$15,431 per-year – not \$10,712. At the current \$5.15 an hour, many minimum wage workers in Nevada have incomes below the federal poverty line. We want to encourage people to work and be productive members of society. It's economic common sense.

Taxpayers will benefit as an increased minimum wage allows low-income working families to become more financially able to free themselves from costly taxpayer-provided services such as welfare, childcare and public health services.

Our state's economy will benefit as we develop a workforce that will earn more spendable income and put dollars directly into local stores and businesses.

Raising the minimum wage one dollar affirms Nevadan's beliefs that we value work, especially the difficult jobs performed by nursing home employees, childcare workers, and restaurant employees.

Minimum wage workers are not just teenagers working part-time to pay for movies, CDs and fast food. The vast majority of minimum wage workers in Nevada are adults (79% are 20 and older). Most work full-time. Six out of 10 minimum wage earners are women. Twenty-five percent are single mothers. And altogether they are the parents of 25,000 children. The paycheck these workers bring home accounts for about half of their families' earnings.

No matter what special interests and big corporations who oppose a fair minimum wage tell you, virtually *every* reputable economic study has found that workers don't get fired when minimum wages are passed or increased. In fact, employment increases. Eight of the eleven states that had a minimum wage above the federal level in 2003 are producing more jobs than the United States as a whole.

Raising the minimum wage makes sense for *all* of Nevada. Cast a vote for Nevada working people, Nevada taxpayers, Nevada values and a stronger Nevada economy.

REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF QUESTION NO. 6

Contrary to claims by those eager to change Nevada's constitution, the most credible economic research for over 30 years has shown that minimum wage hikes hurt, rather than help, low-wage workers.

A recent example is the study, *The Effects of Minimum Wages Throughout the Wage Distribution*, by David Neumark, National Bureau of Economic Research; Mark Schweitzer, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; and William Wascher, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve - Division of Research and Statistics: "The evidence indicates that workers initially earning near the minimum wage are adversely affected by minimum wage increases.... Although wages of low-wage workers increase, their hours and employment decline, and the combined effect of these changes is a decline in earned income." *National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 7519, 5/8/2000.*

The same year, Stanford University's Thomas MaCurdy & Frank McIntyre showed that the effect of a minimum wage increase is very similar to a "sales tax levied only on selective commodities" and conclude: "... three in four of the poorest workers *lose* from shouldering the costs of higher prices resulting from the wage increase. When these benefits and costs are considered, the minimum wage is *ineffective* as an anti-poverty policy."

ARGUMENT AGAINST QUESTION NO. 6

This constitutional amendment would actually *increase* poverty in Nevada, rather than fight it.

Suffering the most would be single mothers with little education, and other unskilled workers who are just entering the job market.

Today, such entry-level employees are paid not just with wages, but also the chance to learn new job skills. With those new skills—and the work habits they learn—they are able to climb the job ladder and make better lives for themselves and their families.

But if government forces entry-level wages artificially higher, fewer businesses will be able to hire these unskilled workers. That's because their *total* cost to the company—their pay, plus their training costs—will often be greater than these workers contribute to the company. So some workers will be let go, and others will never be hired.

Nevada has long been known as a state where businesses enjoy economic opportunities they cannot find elsewhere. But this constitutional amendment would end all that.

It would suddenly place Nevada at a big economic disadvantage to many other states—states without these high wage requirements. Under this amendment, wages paid in Nevada must, from now on, exceed the federal minimum wage by about \$1 an hour. This would seriously damage Nevada businesses—especially small mom and pop businesses, which usually have fewer resources to work with.

This proposal also would discriminate against non-union companies—which means against the great majority of small businesses in Nevada. It would give labor union officials the power, under the law, to permit *union* companies to hire new employees at rates *below* the new minimum wage. This is unfair to both companies and union members. It is also a virtual invitation to union corruption.

The key to fighting poverty—and to achieving higher wages for *all* workers—is long-term economic growth. Artificially higher wages imposed by government will only obstruct such growth.

This proposed constitutional amendment should be rejected.

Fiscal impact: Negative.

Environmental impact: Neutral.

Public health, safety and welfare impact: Negative.

REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT AGAINST QUESTION NO. 6

Raising the minimum wage in Nevada will decrease poverty as it increases people's participation in the State's economy. If increased wages actually made people poorer – as the special interests opposed to this amendment ridiculously claim – *nobody* in Nevada would ever ask for a raise.

Single mothers, as well as anyone else working a minimum wage job, will see an increase in their wages that will actually allow them to pay for housing, healthcare, food and childcare.

All available economic studies show that *everyone* wins when the minimum wage is increased. Low-income workers earn more, become less dependent on welfare and other public programs which eases the burden on taxpayers, and have more money to spend on local goods and services -- which strengthens the economy and generates more jobs.

There is *nothing* in the amendment to raise the minimum wage that would exempt union companies – it's a federal minimum that all companies must follow.

Raise low-income workers' wage. Spur Nevada's economic growth. Generate more buying power to support Nevada businesses. Create jobs. Move low-wage workers away from dependence on public programs and ease taxpayers' burden.

You can achieve *all* of these goals by voting YES on the minimum wage amendment.

FISCAL NOTE

Financial Impact – Cannot be determined.

Although the proposal to amend the *Nevada Constitution* to increase the minimum wage in Nevada could result in additional costs to Nevada's businesses, the impact on a particular business would depend on the number of employees working at a wage below the new requirement, the amount by which the wages would need to be increased and any actions taken by the business to offset any increased costs associated with the increased wage requirement.

The proposal would, however, result in beneficial financial impacts for employees who receive a wage increase as a result of the proposal and who are not impacted adversely by any actions taken by the business to offset the increased costs associated with the increased wage requirement.

In addition, if the proposal results in an increase in annual wages paid by Nevada's employers, revenues received by the State from the imposition of the Modified Business Tax would also increase.

FULL TEXT OF THE MEASURE

RAISE THE MINIMUM WAGE FOR WORKING NEVADANS

Explanation – Matter in *bolded italics* is new; matter between brackets [deleted material] is material being deleted.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. Title.

This Measure shall be know and may be cited as “**The Raise the Minimum Wage for Working Nevadans Act.**”

Section 2. Findings and Purpose

The people of the State of Nevada hereby make the following findings and declare their purpose in enacting this Act is as follows:

1. No full-time worker should live in poverty in our state.
2. Raising the minimum wage is the best way to fight poverty. By raising the minimum wage form \$5.15 an hour to \$6.15 an hour, a full-time worker will earn an additional \$2,000 in wages. That’s enough to make a big difference in the lives of low-income workers to move many families out of poverty.
3. For low –wage workers, a disproportionate amount of their income goes toward cost of living expenses. Living expenses such as housing, healthcare, and food have far outpaced wage levels for Nevada’s working families.
4. In our state, 6 out of 10 minimum wage earners are women. Moreover 25 percent of all minimum wage earners are single mothers, many of whom work full-time.
5. At \$5.15 an hour, minimum wage workers in Nevada make less money than they would on welfare. When people choose work over welfare, they become productive members of society and the burden on Nevada taxpayers is reduced.
6. Raising the minimum wage from \$5.15 an hour to \$6.15 an hour affirms Nevadan’s beliefs that we value work, especially the difficult jobs performed by hotel maids, childcare workers, and nursing home employees. We need to make sure the workers who are the backbone of our economy receive fair paychecks that allow them and their families to live above the poverty line.

Section 3.

Article 15 of the Constitution of the State of Nevada is hereby amended by adding thereto a new section to read as follows:

Sec. 16. Payment of minimum compensation to employees.

- A. Each employer shall pay a wage to each employee of not less than the hourly rates set forth in this section. The rate shall be five dollars and fifteen cents (\$5.15) per hour worked, if the employer provides health benefits as described herein, or six dollars and fifteen cents (\$6.15) per hour if the employer does not provide such benefits. Offering health benefits within the meaning of this section shall consist of making health insurance available to the employee for the employee and the employee's dependents at a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more than 10 percent of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer. These rates of wages shall be adjusted by the amount of increases in the federal minimum wage over \$5.15 per hour, or, if greater, by the cumulative increase in the cost of living. The cost of living increase shall be measured by the percentage increase as of December 31 in any year over the level as of December 31, 2004 of the Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average) as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor or the successor index or federal agency. No CPI adjustment for any one-year period may be greater than 3%. The Governor or the State agency designated by the Governor shall publish a bulletin by April 1 of each year announcing the adjusted rates, which shall take effect the following July 1. Such bulletin will be made available to all employers and to any other person who has filed with the Governor or the designated agency a request to receive such notice but lack of notice shall not excuse noncompliance with this section. An employer shall provide written notification of the rate adjustments to each of its employees and make the necessary payroll adjustments by July 1 following the publication of the bulletin. Tips or gratuities received by employees shall not be credited as being any part of or offset against the wage rates required by this section.*
- B. The provisions of this section may not be waived by agreement between an individual employee and an employer. All of the provisions of this section, or any part hereof, may be waived in a bona fide collective bargaining agreement, but only if the waiver is explicitly set forth in such agreement in clear and unambiguous terms. Unilateral implementation of terms and conditions of employment by either party to a collective bargaining relationship shall not constitute, or be permitted, as a waiver of all or any part of the provisions of this section. An employer shall not discharge, reduce the compensation of or otherwise discriminate against any employee for using any civil remedies to enforce this section or otherwise asserting his or her rights under this section. An employee claiming violation of this section may bring an action against his or her employer in the courts of this State to*

enforce the provisions of this section and shall be entitled to all remedies available under the law or in equity appropriate to remedy any violation of this section, including but not limited to back pay, damages, reinstatement or injunctive relief. An employee who prevails in any action to enforce this section shall be awarded his or her reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

- C. As used in this section, "employee" means any person who is employed by an employer as defined herein but does not include an employee who is under eighteen (18) years of age, employed by a nonprofit organization for after school or summer employment or as a trainee for a period not longer than ninety (90) days. "Employer" means any individual, proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, corporation, limited liability company, trust, association, or other entity that may employ individuals or enter into contracts of employment.*
- D. If any provision of this section is declared illegal, invalid or inoperative, in whole or in part, by the final decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining provisions and all portions not declared illegal, invalid or inoperative shall remain in full force or effect, and no such determination shall invalidate the remaining sections or portions of the sections of this section.*

EXHIBIT 4

EXHIBIT 4

State of Nevada

**Statewide
Ballot Questions**

2006



**To Appear on the November 7, 2006
General Election Ballot**

**Issued by
Dean Heller
Secretary of State**

DEAN HELLER
Secretary of State

KIM A. HUYS
*Chief Deputy Secretary
of State*

PAMELA A. RUCKEL
*Deputy Secretary for
Southern Nevada*

STATE OF NEVADA



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*Deputy Secretary
for Operations*

Dear Fellow Nevadan:

You will soon be taking advantage of one of your most important rights as an American citizen: the right to vote! As Secretary of State and the state's Chief Election Officer, I take the job of informing the public about various statewide ballot questions very seriously. An informed and knowledgeable electorate is a cornerstone to fair and just elections.

With that in mind, the Secretary of State's office has prepared this booklet detailing the statewide questions that will appear on the 2006 General Election Ballot. The booklet contains "Notes to Voters," a complete listing of the exact wording of each question, along with a summary, arguments for and against each question's passage, and, where applicable, a fiscal note. Any fiscal note included in this booklet explains only adverse impacts and does not note any possible cost savings.

I encourage you to carefully and thoughtfully review the ballot questions listed in the booklet. As a voter, your actions on these ballot questions can create new laws, amend existing laws or amend the Nevada Constitution.

On the 2006 General Election Ballot, there are ten statewide questions. Ballot Question Numbers 8, 9, 10 and 11 appear on the ballot through the actions of the Nevada State Legislature. Ballot Question Numbers 2, 4, 5, and 7 qualified for this year's ballot through the initiative petition process. Ballot Question Numbers 1 and 6 also qualified through the initiative petition process, passed at the 2004 General Election and appear for the second and last time on the 2006 General Election Ballot. Ballot Question Number 3 was removed from the Ballot by the Nevada Supreme Court.

You can also view these ballot questions on the Secretary of State's web site at www.secretaryofstate.biz. If you require further assistance or information, please feel free to contact my office at 775-684-5705.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Dean Heller".

DEAN HELLER
Secretary of State

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2006 STATEWIDE BALLOT QUESTIONS SUMMARY

Question #	Title	Originated	If passed in 2006
1	Education First	Initiative Petition	Becomes Law
2	Nevada Property Owner's Bill of Rights (PISTOL)	Initiative Petition	Will Go Onto The 2008 General Election Ballot
3	Tax and Spending Control for Nevada (TASC)	Initiative Petition	Removed by the Nevada Supreme Court
4	Responsibly Protect Nevadans from Second Hand Smoke	Initiative Petition	Becomes Law
5	Clean Indoor Air Act	Initiative Petition	Becomes Law
6	Raise the Minimum Wage for Working Nevadans	Initiative Petition	Becomes Law
7	Regulation of Marijuana	Initiative Petition	Becomes Law
8	Sales and Use Tax of 1955	Legislature AB 554 of the 73 rd Session Including Note To Voters	Becomes effective January 1, 2007

9	Board of Regents	Legislature AJR 11 of the 72 nd Session	Becomes effective January 1, 2008
10	Legislators Call Special Session	Legislature AJR 13 of the 72 nd Session	Becomes effective upon canvass
11	Legislators Paid Every Day of Session	Legislature SJR 11 of the 72 nd Session	Becomes effective upon canvass

QUESTION NO. 6
Amendment to the Nevada Constitution

CONDENSATION (Ballot Question)

Shall the Nevada Constitution be amended to raise the minimum wage paid to employees?

Yes.....	☒	395,367
No.....	☐	180,085

EXPLANATION (Ballot Question)

The proposed amendment, if passed, would create a new section to Article 15 of the Nevada Constitution. The amendment would require employers to pay Nevada employees \$5.15 per hour worked if the employer provides health benefits, or \$6.15 per hour worked if the employer does not provide health benefits. The rates shall be adjusted by the amount of increases in the federal minimum wage over \$5.15 per hour, or, if greater, by the cumulative increase in the cost of living measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), with no CPI adjustment for any one-year period greater than 3%.

The following arguments for and against and rebuttals for Question No. 6 were prepared by a committee as required by Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 293.252.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF QUESTION NO. 6

All Nevadans will benefit from a long-overdue increase in the state's minimum wage through a more robust economy, a decreased taxpayer burden and stronger families.

Low-income workers who do not currently earn enough to cover the basic costs of living for their families – housing, health care, food and child care – will clearly benefit. Many low-income Nevada families live in poverty even though they have full-time jobs. A Nevada worker at the current minimum wage for 40 hours per-week — every week, all year — makes only \$10,712. If the minimum wage had been increased to keep up with rising prices over the last 25 years, it would now bring in \$15,431 per-year – not \$10,712. At the current \$5.15 an hour, many minimum wage workers in Nevada have incomes below the federal poverty line. We want to encourage people to work and be productive members of society. It's economic common sense.

Taxpayers will benefit as an increased minimum wage allows low-income working families to become more financially able to free themselves from costly taxpayer-provided services such as welfare, childcare and public health services.

Our state's economy will benefit as we develop a workforce that will earn more spendable income and put dollars directly into local stores and businesses.

Raising the minimum wage one dollar affirms Nevadan's beliefs that we value work, especially the difficult jobs performed by nursing home employees, childcare workers, and restaurant employees.

Minimum wage workers are not just teenagers working part-time to pay for movies, CDs and fast food. The vast majority of minimum wage workers in Nevada are adults (79% are 20 and older). Most work full-time. Six out of 10 minimum wage earners are women. Twenty-five percent are single mothers. And altogether they are the parents of 25,000 children. The paycheck these workers bring home accounts for about half of their families' earnings.

No matter what special interests and big corporations who oppose a fair minimum wage tell you, virtually *every* reputable economic study has found that workers don't get fired when minimum wages are passed or increased. In fact, employment increases. Eight of the eleven states that had a minimum wage above the federal level in 2003 are producing more jobs than the United States as a whole.

Raising the minimum wage makes sense for *all* of Nevada. Cast a vote for Nevada working people, Nevada taxpayers, Nevada values and a stronger Nevada economy.

The above argument was submitted by the Ballot Question Committee composed of citizens in favor of this question as provided for in NRS 293.252

REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF QUESTION NO. 6

Contrary to claims by those eager to change Nevada's constitution, the most credible economic research for over 30 years has shown that minimum wage hikes hurt, rather than help, low-wage workers.

A recent example is the study, *The Effects of Minimum Wages Throughout the Wage Distribution*, by David Neumark, National Bureau of Economic Research; Mark Schweitzer, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; and William Wascher, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve - Division of Research and Statistics: "The evidence indicates that workers initially earning near the minimum wage are adversely affected by minimum wage increases.... Although wages of low-wage workers increase, their hours and employment decline, and the combined effect of these changes is a decline in earned income." *National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 7519, 5/8/2000.*

The same year, Stanford University's Thomas MaCurdy & Frank McIntyre showed that the effect of a minimum wage increase is very similar to a "sales tax levied only on selective commodities" and conclude: "... three in four of the poorest workers *lose* from shouldering the costs of higher prices resulting from the wage increase. When these benefits and costs are considered, the minimum wage is *ineffective* as an anti-poverty policy."

The above argument was submitted by the Ballot Question Committee composed of citizens opposed to this question as provided for in NRS 293.252

ARGUMENT AGAINST QUESTION NO. 6

This constitutional amendment would actually *increase* poverty in Nevada, rather than fight it.

Suffering the most would be single mothers with little education, and other unskilled workers who are just entering the job market.

Today, such entry-level employees are paid not just with wages, but also the chance to learn new job skills. With those new skills—and the work habits they learn—they are able to climb the job ladder and make better lives for themselves and their families.

But if government forces entry-level wages artificially higher, fewer businesses will be able to hire these unskilled workers. That's because their *total* cost to the company—their pay, plus their training costs—will often be greater than these workers contribute to the company. So some workers will be let go, and others will never be hired.

Nevada has long been known as a state where businesses enjoy economic opportunities they cannot find elsewhere. But this constitutional amendment would end all that.

It would suddenly place Nevada at a big economic disadvantage to many other states—states without these high wage requirements. Under this amendment, wages paid in Nevada must, from now on, exceed the federal minimum wage by about \$1 an hour. This would seriously damage Nevada businesses—especially small mom and pop businesses, which usually have fewer resources to work with.

This proposal also would discriminate against non-union companies—which means against the great majority of small businesses in Nevada. It would give labor union officials the power, under the law, to permit *union* companies to hire new employees at rates *below* the new minimum wage. This is unfair to both companies and union members. It is also a virtual invitation to union corruption.

The key to fighting poverty—and to achieving higher wages for *all* workers—is long-term economic growth. Artificially higher wages imposed by government will only obstruct such growth.

This proposed constitutional amendment should be rejected.

Fiscal impact: Negative.

Environmental impact: Neutral.

Public health, safety and welfare impact: Negative.

The above argument was submitted by the Ballot Question Committee composed of citizens opposed to this question as provided for in NRS 293.252

REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT AGAINST QUESTION NO. 6

Raising the minimum wage in Nevada will decrease poverty as it increases people's participation in the State's economy. If increased wages actually made people poorer – as the special interests opposed to this amendment ridiculously claim – *nobody* in Nevada would ever ask for a raise.

Single mothers, as well as anyone else working a minimum wage job, will see an increase in their wages that will actually allow them to pay for housing, healthcare, food and childcare.

All available economic studies show that *everyone* wins when the minimum wage is increased. Low-income workers earn more, become less dependent on welfare and other public programs which eases the burden on taxpayers, and have more money to spend on local goods and services -- which strengthens the economy and generates more jobs.

There is *nothing* in the amendment to raise the minimum wage that would exempt union companies – it's a federal minimum that all companies must follow.

Raise low-income workers' wage. Spur Nevada's economic growth. Generate more buying power to support Nevada businesses. Create jobs. Move low-wage workers away from dependence on public programs and ease taxpayers' burden.

You can achieve *all* of these goals by voting YES on the minimum wage amendment.

The above argument was submitted by the Ballot Question Committee composed of citizens in favor of this question as provided for in NRS 293.252

FISCAL NOTE

FINANCIAL IMPACT – CANNOT BE DETERMINED

Although the proposal to amend the *Nevada Constitution* to increase the minimum wage in Nevada could result in additional costs to Nevada's businesses, the impact on a particular business would depend on the number of employees working at a wage below the new requirement, the amount by which the wages would need to be increased and any actions taken by the business to offset any increased costs associated with the increased wage requirement.

The proposal would, however, result in beneficial financial impacts for employees who receive a wage increase as a result of the proposal and who are not impacted adversely by any actions taken by the business to offset the increased costs associated with the increased wage requirement.

In addition, if the proposal results in an increase in annual wages paid by Nevada's employers, revenues received by the State from the imposition of the Modified Business Tax would also increase.

FULL TEXT OF THE MEASURE
RAISE THE MINIMUM WAGE FOR WORKING NEVADANS

EXPLANATION – Matter in *bolded italics* is new; matter between brackets [omitted material] is material to be omitted.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. Title.

This Measure shall be know and may be cited as “**The Raise the Minimum Wage for Working Nevadans Act.**”

Section 2. Findings and Purpose

The people of the State of Nevada hereby make the following findings and declare their purpose in enacting this Act is as follows:

1. No full-time worker should live in poverty in our state.
2. Raising the minimum wage is the best way to fight poverty. By raising the minimum wage form \$5.15 an hour to \$6.15 an hour, a full-time worker will earn an additional \$2,000 in wages. That’s enough to make a big difference in the lives of low-income workers to move many families out of poverty.
3. For low –wage workers, a disproportionate amount of their income goes toward cost of living expenses. Living expenses such as housing, healthcare, and food have far outpaced wage levels for Nevada’s working families.
4. In our state, 6 out of 10 minimum wage earners are women. Moreover 25 percent of all minimum wage earners are single mothers, many of whom work full-time.
5. At \$5.15 an hour, minimum wage workers in Nevada make less money than they would on welfare. When people choose work over welfare, they become productive members of society and the burden on Nevada taxpayers is reduced.
6. Raising the minimum wage from \$5.15 an hour to \$6.15 an hour affirms Nevadan’s beliefs that we value work, especially the difficult jobs performed by hotel maids, childcare workers, and nursing home employees. We need to make sure the workers who are the backbone of our economy receive fair paychecks that allow them and their families to live above the poverty line.

Section 3.

Article 15 of the Constitution of the State of Nevada is hereby amended by adding thereto a new section to read as follows:

Sec. 16. Payment of minimum compensation to employees.

- A. Each employer shall pay a wage to each employee of not less than the hourly rates set forth in this section. The rate shall be five dollars and fifteen cents (\$5.15) per hour worked, if the employer provides health benefits as described herein, or six dollars and fifteen cents (\$6.15) per hour if the employer does not provide such***

benefits. Offering health benefits within the meaning of this section shall consist of making health insurance available to the employee for the employee and the employee's dependents at a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more than 10 percent of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer. These rates of wages shall be adjusted by the amount of increases in the federal minimum wage over \$5.15 per hour, or, if greater, by the cumulative increase in the cost of living. The cost of living increase shall be measured by the percentage increase as of December 31 in any year over the level as of December 31, 2004 of the Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average) as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor or the successor index or federal agency. No CPI adjustment for any one-year period may be greater than 3%. The Governor or the State agency designated by the Governor shall publish a bulletin by April 1 of each year announcing the adjusted rates, which shall take effect the following July 1. Such bulletin will be made available to all employers and to any other person who has filed with the Governor or the designated agency a request to receive such notice but lack of notice shall not excuse noncompliance with this section. An employer shall provide written notification of the rate adjustments to each of its employees and make the necessary payroll adjustments by July 1 following the publication of the bulletin. Tips or gratuities received by employees shall not be credited as being any part of or offset against the wage rates required by this section.

- B. The provisions of this section may not be waived by agreement between an individual employee and an employer. All of the provisions of this section, or any part hereof, may be waived in a bona fide collective bargaining agreement, but only if the waiver is explicitly set forth in such agreement in clear and unambiguous terms. Unilateral implementation of terms and conditions of employment by either party to a collective bargaining relationship shall not constitute, or be permitted, as a waiver of all or any part of the provisions of this section. An employer shall not discharge, reduce the compensation of or otherwise discriminate against any employee for using any civil remedies to enforce this section or otherwise asserting his or her rights under this section. An employee claiming violation of this section may bring an action against his or her employer in the courts of this State to enforce the provisions of this section and shall be entitled to all remedies available under the law or in equity appropriate to remedy any violation of this section, including but not limited to back pay, damages, reinstatement or injunctive relief. An employee who prevails in any action to enforce this section shall be awarded his or her reasonable attorney's fees and costs.*
- C. As used in this section, "employee" means any person who is employed by an employer as defined herein but does not include an employee who is under eighteen (18) years of age, employed by a nonprofit organization for after school or summer employment or as a trainee for a period not longer than ninety (90) days. "Employer" means any individual, proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, corporation, limited liability company, trust, association, or other entity that may employ individuals or enter into contracts of employment.*

D. If any provision of this section is declared illegal, invalid or inoperative, in whole or in part, by the final decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining provisions and all portions not declared illegal, invalid or inoperative shall remain in full force or effect, and no such determination shall invalidate the remaining sections or portions of the sections of this section.

EXHIBIT 5

EXHIBIT 5

KENNY C. GUINN
Governor

STATE OF NEVADA

REPLY TO:

SYDNEY H. WICKLIFFE, C.P.A.
Director

MICHAEL TANCHEK
State Labor Commissioner



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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER

<http://www.LaborCommissioner.com>

December 11, 2006

Honorable Kenny Guinn
Governor
Capitol Building
Carson City, Nevada 89701

Re: Request for Emergency Minimum Wage Regulations

Dear Governor Guinn,

I am requesting your approval of the attached emergency regulations concerning the recently adopted Constitutional amendment changing Nevada's minimum wage laws.

The amendment goes beyond a simple one-dollar increase in the wage rate and we are being flooded with requests for interpretive guidance from employers and employees. Among the more common issues we are addressing are the nature of the insurance requirements, the effect on overtime, and the effect on previously exempt employees. Many employers are at risk for questions for which they currently have no formal answers. Originally, we dealt with inquiries through a "frequently asked questions" link on our website, but this has quickly proven inadequate and legally tenuous.

Emergency regulations take effect after approval by the Governor and filing with the Secretary of State and expire after 120 days; early to mid-April of 2007. I already have a temporary rulemaking in its early stages and would merge these regulations into that process, so a "temporary" regulation would be in place when the emergency regulations expire. The temporary regulations would expire on November 1, 2007, but I would begin permanent rulemaking shortly after July 1.

Adopting the emergency regulations for the short-term can provide a small element of certainty for employers and employees. If you have any additional questions, please call me at (775) 684-8188.

Sincerely,

Michael Tanchek
Labor Commissioner

SECRETARY OF STATE
FILING DATA

2006 DEC 12 P 3:27

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
For Filing
Administrative Regulations

Agency:
Office of the Labor Commissioner
Department of Business and Industry

FOR EMERGENCY
REGULATIONS ONLY

Effective date December 12, 2006

Expiration date April 11, 2006


Governor's signature

Classification: ☐ PROPOSED : ☐ ADOPTED BY AGENCY : ☒ EMERGENCY

Brief description of action Adopt regulations related to various provisions in the recently adopted Article 15, Section 16 of the Constitution of Nevada concerning the minimum wage rates to be paid to workers in the State of Nevada.

Authority citation other than 233B: Article 15, Section 16 of the Constitution of Nevada; NRS 607.160(1)(b), NRS 608.270, NRS 608.018.

Notice dates: N/A

Date of Adoption by Agency: December 12, 2006

Adoption Hearing: N/A

Hearing dates: N/A

Adoption Hearing: N/A

Written Statement of Emergency in Support of Emergency Regulations

The Nevada Labor Commissioner has determined that an emergency exists sufficient to warrant the enactment of emergency regulations pertaining to the enforcement of the recently adopted Constitutional amendment governing the minimum wage to be paid workers in the State of Nevada as set forth in Article 15, Section 16 of the Constitution of Nevada. The reasons for the Commissioner's determination are as follows:

-Pursuant to NRS 607.160, "The Labor Commissioner...[S]hall enforce all labor laws of the State of Nevada...[T]he enforcement of which is not specifically and exclusively vested in any other officer, board or commission." Prior to the enactment of the amendment, the Labor Commissioner was charged with enforcing Nevada's minimum laws as set forth in NRS 608.250-290, inclusive.

-The statutory scheme established a single minimum wage rate that was designed to mirror and follow the federal minimum wage rate as set forth in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, currently \$5.15 per hour.

-The amendment significantly alters the existing minimum wage law by establishing two minimum wages (\$5.15 and \$6.15 per hour) which are dependent upon whether or not employers make "health insurance" available to their employee's and their dependents, eliminates certain previous exemptions to the minimum wage, creates new classes of workers who are not considered employees for the purposes of the minimum wage, and will require an adjustment to the rates to be published by the Governor by April 1, 2007.


-The amendment impacts the requirements of NRS 608.018 which requires the payment of overtime to employees whose wage rate is less than one and one half times the minimum wage as set forth in NRS 608.250. With the minimum wage now being established as a Constitutional provision rather than as a regulation pursuant to a statute, this has resulted in two different daily overtime rates.

-The emergency regulations set forth the rules of general applicability by which the Labor Commissioner will interpret and enforce the provisions of the new Constitutional provisions. These rules are necessary to provide guidance to employers that will enable them to comply with their new legal obligations.

-The Labor Commissioner is currently involved in the early stages of temporary rulemaking related to other provisions of NAC Chapter 608. These emergency regulations will be included in that rulemaking allowing for additional public workshops and hearings that will help ensure further

analysis and refining of the emergency regulations. Given the short-term nature of the emergency regulations, the temporary rule should be in effect prior to the expiration date of the emergency regulations. A third rulemaking would take place between July 1, 2007 and November 1, 2007 in order to adopt permanent regulations. Because the Constitutional provisions went into effect so shortly after the election, there was insufficient time to engage in the temporary rulemaking process.

December 12, 2006.


MICHAEL TANCHEK
Labor Commissioner, State of Nevada

I, Governor Kenny C. Guinn, endorse the Labor Commissioner Michael Tanchek's statement of emergency.

December ____, 2006.


KENNY C. GUINN
Governor

EXHIBIT 6

EXHIBIT 6

EMERGENCY REGULATIONS OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
CHAPTER 608 OF THE NEVADA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
DECEMBER 12, 2006
LCB FILE _____

EXPLANATION- Matter that is underlined is new; matter in brackets [omitted material] is material to be omitted.

AUTHORITY: §§1-13, NRS 607.160(1)(b), NRS 608.270, NRS 608.018, and NRS 233B.0613.

Section 1. Chapter 608 of NAC is hereby amended by adding thereto the provisions set forth as sections 2 to 10, inclusive, of this regulation. This regulation shall expire at the end of 120 days from filing with the Secretary of State or upon the filing of a temporary or permanent regulation whichever should occur first.

Sec.2. Definition of minimum wage tiers.

- A. The lower tier is from \$5.15 to \$6.14 per hour for employers who provide qualified health insurance benefits.
- B. The upper tier is \$6.15 per hour for employers who do not provide qualified health benefits.
- C. An employer must pay the upper tier rate unless the employer qualifies for the lower tier rate.

Sec.3. The minimum wage shall be adjusted annually.

- A. These rates will be adjusted annually to include increases in the federal minimum wage or if greater a yearly cost of living adjustment, as set forth in Article 15, Section 16 of the Constitution of Nevada.
- B. The annual adjustments will be announced on or before April 1 and become effective on July 1 of each year.
- C. Each minimum wage tier will increase by the same dollar amount as the federal rate increase or by the cost of living adjustment, whichever is greater.

Sec. 4. Applicability of Minimum Wage.

- A. The minimum wage applies to all employees in Nevada.
- B. The only exceptions to the minimum wage are
 - 1. Persons under the age of 18;
 - 2. Persons employed by a nonprofit organization for after school or summer employment; or
 - 3. Persons employed as trainees for a period not longer than ninety (90) days.
- C. There is no distinction between full-time, permanent, part-time, probationary, or temporary employees.

Sec. 5. In order to qualify for the lower minimum wage tier an employer must comply with all of the following:

- A. Qualified health insurance coverage must be made available to the employee and the employee's dependents; and
- B. The employee's share of the cost of the premium cannot exceed 10% of the employee's gross taxable income as defined under the Internal Revenue Code;
- C. Insures human beings against bodily injury, disablement or death by accident or accidental means, or the expense thereof, or against disablement or expense resulting from sickness, and every insurance appertaining thereto, together with provisions operating to safeguard contracts of health insurance against lapse in the event of strike or layoff due to labor disputes; and
- D. Complies with the requirements of NRS 608.1555 through 608.1576, inclusive.

Sec.6. Qualified health insurance must be a policy, contract, certificate or agreement offered or issued by a carrier authorized by the Nevada Insurance Commissioner to provide, deliver, arrange for, pay for or reimburse any of the costs of health care services or, in the alternative, any federally approved self-funded plan established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended, except that medical discount plans as defined by NRS 695H.050 does not qualify as health insurance.

Sec.7 For the purposes of determining whether or not the premium exceeds 10% of gross taxable income, an employer may use the historical gross taxable income as previously reported to the Internal Revenue Service, but may not rely on information that precedes the previous tax year or the employer may base the 10% of gross taxable income on actual income and premiums paid.

Sec. 8. If an employee declines coverage under a qualified health insurance plan offered by the employer, the employee may be paid in the lower minimum wage tier, however, the employer must document that the employee has declined coverage and the documentation must include the employee's signed wavier of coverage. Declining coverage may not be a term or condition of employment.

Sec. 9. If an employer offers qualified health insurance, but as the result of the employer's decision, the employee is not eligible to receive the coverage provided by the employer or there is a delay before the coverage can become effective that is not the result of a term or condition of the insurance plan, the employee must be paid the upper tier wage until such time as the employee becomes eligible and is offered coverage or when the insurance becomes effective.

Sec. 10. For the purposes of complying with the daily overtime provisions of NRS 608.018(1), an employer shall pay overtime based on the minimum wage tier for which that employer is qualified.

**INFORMATIONAL STATEMENT FOR EMERGENCY REGULATIONS AS
REQUIRED BY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT, NRS 233B.066
LCB FILE _____**

The following statement is submitted for the emergency regulations pertaining to Nevada Administrative Code chapter 293, in accordance with NRS 233B.066(2).

1. The estimated economic effect of the adopted regulation on the business which it is to regulate and on the public. These must be stated separately, and each case must include:

- (a) Both adverse and beneficial effects; and**
- (b) Both immediate and long-term effects.**

These emergency regulations do not have any economic effect on any business or on the public. The economic impact of the underlying Constitutional amendment may be substantial, but is unknown at this time.

2. The estimated cost to the agency for enforcement of the proposed regulation.

No additional cost is anticipated to enforce these emergency regulations. These regulations clarify the enforcement position of the Office of the Labor Commissioner related to implementing the new Constitutional provisions. There could be ultimately be a significant additional cost to the agency to implement the terms of the amendment itself, however.

3. A description of any regulations of the state or government agencies which the proposed regulation overlaps or duplicates and a statement explaining why the duplication or overlapping is necessary. If the regulation overlaps or duplicates a federal regulation, the name of the regulating federal agency.

The emergency regulations do not duplicate or overlap any other state or government agency regulations.

4. If the regulation includes provisions which are more stringent than a federal regulation which regulates the same activity, a summary of those provisions.

Because the Constitutional provisions establish a minimum wage law that is much more stringent than the parallel federal provisions, all of the regulations are necessarily more stringent than the federal laws regulating minimum wage. The exception is to the exempted classes of employees who are no longer subject to the state minimum wage law and would fall strictly under the jurisdiction of the US Department of Labor relative to the minimum wage.

5. If the regulation establishes a new fee or increases an existing fee, a statement indicating the total annual amount the agency expects to collect and the manner in which the money will be used.

The emergency regulations do not establish a new fee or increase an existing fee.

EXHIBIT 7

EXHIBIT 7

**MINUTES OF THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE AND LABOR**

**Seventy-fourth Session
February 8, 2007**

The Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor was called to order by Chair Randolph J. Townsend at 8:03 a.m. on Thursday, February 8, 2007, in Room 2135 of the Legislative Building, Carson City, Nevada. The meeting was videoconferenced to the Grant Sawyer State Office Building, Room 4412E, 555 East Washington Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada. Exhibit A is the Agenda. Exhibit B is the Attendance Roster. All exhibits are available and on file in the Research Library of the Legislative Counsel Bureau.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Senator Randolph J. Townsend, Chair
Senator Warren B. Hardy II, Vice Chair
Senator Joseph J. Heck
Senator Michael A. Schneider

COMMITTEE MEMBERS ABSENT:

Senator Maggie Carlton (Excused)

STAFF MEMBERS PRESENT:

Laura Adler, Committee Secretary
Duncan Burke, Intern to Senator Townsend
Kelly S. Gregory, Committee Policy Analyst
Wil Keane, Committee Counsel
Scott Young, Committee Policy Analyst
Gloria Gaillard-Powell, Committee Secretary

OTHERS PRESENT:

Michael Tanchek, Labor Commissioner, Office of Labor Commissioner,
Department of Business and Industry
Ed Guthrie, Executive Director, Opportunity Village

Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor
February 8, 2007
Page 2

Richard G. McCracken, Attorney at Law, McCracken, Stemerman and Holsberry
Jim Greely, Progressive Choice
Robert A. Ostrovsky, Nevada Resort Association
Samuel P. McMullen, Nevada Restaurant Association; Retail Association of
Nevada; Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce
Lea Lipscomb, Retail Association of Nevada
Michael D. Pennington, Public Policy Director, Reno-Sparks Chamber of
Commerce

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

The hearing on issues pertaining to the minimum wage is opened. This is a unique issue because there is not much flexibility. Those who testify today after Mr. Tanchek are to be put "on the record." Today will not be a debate and the wage amounts are set.

MICHAEL TANCHEK (Labor Commissioner, Office of Labor Commissioner,
Department of Business and Industry):

The constitutional amendment on the minimum wage was passed and certified in November 2006. It will go into effect on November 28, 2006.

We are the State enforcement agency for these types of issues and have been inundated with calls and questions from people seeking information. After consultation with Governor Guinn's office and the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), emergency regulations were drafted to deal with the issues.

I have presented a written testimony and explanation for the constitutional amendment (Exhibit C, original is on file in the Research Library). The constitutional amendment has four basic parts. Section A establishes the requirement for all employers to pay the minimum wage to employees. It establishes two minimum wage rates for Nevada. Currently, they are \$5.15 and \$6.15 per hour depending on whether insurance benefits are provided. There is a requirement that the rates be adjusted to reflect changes in the federal minimum wage and the cost-of-living wage. The amendment prohibits offsetting the minimum wage with tips and gratuities received by employees.

Section B deals with the legal issues of the amendment. This section prohibits waiving any of the legal requirements between an employer and an employee. There is an exception that permits the minimum wage issue be dealt with in collective bargaining agreements. It creates a private right-of-action for

employees. Individuals need not go through the Labor Commissioner, Office of Labor Commissioner, Department of Business and Industry, to enforce their rights under the amendment. They can go into court on their own. It also prohibits retaliatory action against an employee for exercising his rights under the amendment.

Section C contains the definitions of employee and employer.

Section D contains the severability provisions of the amendment to preserve the balance of the language, should the court rule any portion invalid. If any part of this amendment is deemed invalid, it does not affect the remaining portions.

Please refer to Exhibit C for issues and questions.

The last section of the handout covers the proposed regulations of the Labor Commissioner. Many of the regulations are amendable by statutes. The provisions are set for a hearing on March 5, 2007.

SENATOR HARDY:

The point of confusion is the annual-adjustment concept and how it will be handled.

MR. TANCHEK:

The cost-of-living adjustment and increases in the federal minimum wage are the two areas for which we are seeking legal advice. If the federal government raises the minimum wage, the question is when does it impact the minimum wage in our State?

SENATOR HARDY:

This should be pursued aggressively to get a definitive answer for employers, or the employers will be in violation of the Nevada State Constitution or the federal law.

MR. TANCHEK:

The opinion has been drafted and is in the review stage. The adjustment has to be made in April and will need to be resolved quickly.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

Mr. Keane, will the Legislative Counsel Bureau (LCB) rule on the issue posed by Senator Hardy?

Mr. Tanchek, do you think our only dealings will be with the consumer price index (CPI)? When the minimum wage becomes effective and if it does not correspond to the Nevada Constitution, do you have a concern about the State of Nevada's responsibility?

MR. TANCHEK:

There could be some issues for example; if we make a cost-of-living wage adjustment less than the 70-cent jump in the federal minimum wage, there could be a problem. We could see a situation where our minimum wage is actually lower than the federal minimum wage. This is one of the issues before the Attorney General. The key is how we will make the calculations.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

When the employer pays the employee is the most important issue. What happens if the CPI adjustment is negative, or if we have a recession or depression?

MR. TANCHEK:

Those questions are part of what we asked the OAG for a resolution.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

Section 4, middle of subsection 1, Exhibit C, of the proposed regulation of the Labor Commissioner, "when an employer contracts for," this is a concern. This is okay if it is a private company because they contract, but is not okay if it is a self-funded plan. The same section a couple of lines down states, "required to complete the coverage which is applicable to all similarly situated employees within this class, unless the waiting period exceeds 120 days" and section 8 speaks about "no more than six months." Both sections seem to have inconsistencies. I want to make sure these issues are on the list for clarification. Contact the OAG to make sure they are working closely with the LCB on the regulatory process.

ED GUTHRIE (Executive Director, Opportunity Village):

Opportunity Village is a training center similar to 14 other community training centers (CTC) throughout the State of Nevada. Some of our colleagues in southern Nevada are the Easter Seals of Southern Nevada and up north, High Sierra Industries and Washoe Association for Retarded Citizens that you are familiar with. All of us provide similar types of services. At Opportunity Village, we provide services to approximately 200 people in a community-based contract and about 450 people in center-based contracts. We are the largest CTC in the State of Nevada. We are certified by the Division of Mental Health and Developmental Services. Other CTCs might be certified by the Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation through the Bureau of Services for the Blind and Visually Impaired or through the Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation. There are multiple avenues for individuals to be certified. The services that are provided at these CTCs are primarily rehabilitative and therapeutic in nature. They are not really an industrial type of model; not a model that people would use to—make money. They are here to provide training and services for individuals with severe disabilities. There is also not the normal employer-employee relationship between one of these centers and the people they serve.

People are assigned to those centers by a department in the State. They are usually subsidized by a department of the State. There is not the normal ability to hire and fire. If one of the people we serve were to reach over and slap a fellow service recipient or one of our staff, we would not have the ability to fire that individual. We would design a behavior plan; we would work with the individual and make sure things like that do not happen. As opposed to our staff, if one of my staff reached over and slapped one of their fellow staff members or one of the people that we served, they probably would not have a job by that afternoon. We simply would not allow that.

MR. GUTHRIE:

That is just one example of—we were very concerned, in the initial readings of the constitutional amendment it said all employees were subject to the new minimum wage law. We had been providing services under the State Labor Regulations. Those regulations had recognized the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and specifically section 14, subsection c of the FLSA. The FLSA recognizes some people with very severe disabilities do not have the ability to produce at a level that would allow them to receive minimum wage. They are offered a special minimum wage through the FLSA section 14, subsection c. That is what we have done for 20 to 30 years; since section 14, subsection c has existed.—what we were looking at, and what we thought we were facing, was the problem of having literally thousands of people throughout the State of Nevada lose the ability to have vocational rehabilitation and employment training services taken away from them because of the new constitutional amendment and the new regulations. In our concern, we contacted a number of people, including the Assembly Speaker, Barbara Buckley. Barbara Buckley, in turn, contacted Richard McCracken who helped to develop the initiative for us. Mr. McCracken and I discussed potential language that would say the people we serve, since the services we provide are primarily rehabilitative and therapeutic in nature, and since we do not have the normal employer-employee relationship, those individuals are not therefore employees, they are in another class. If they are not employees, they are not covered by the constitutional amendment or the wage. Mr. McCracken can speak to the language he developed. I circulated that through the 15 CTCs in the State of Nevada. They are all happy with the language which I think is exceptional, because finding an agreement between those 15 CTCs is like herding cats. I think Mr. McCracken has done an exceptional job.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

Do we have copies of the language?

MR. GUTHRIE:

We can provide a copy of that language. That language is going to be in a bill that is sponsored by Speaker Buckley so we are able to deal with the issue and go on from there.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:
I hope nobody sues you.

MR. GUTHRIE:

Yes. We need this entered into the regulations; try and have it in law and then we are going to go back. I am not necessarily praying that nobody sues me because I think there is enough background in what we have done. When and if a lawsuit occurs, we feel there is a comfortable risk in going to court with this lawsuit. Some of the people we serve have multiple challenges; they have mental health challenges, as well as other challenges, and I fully expect to get sued one day. It is not a question of if; it is a question of when. That is why we are trying to structure this in such a way that we have the best defense we possibly can against the lawsuit.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:
I have served on the Washoe Association for Retarded Citizens Board since 1972. You are associated with a remarkable organization and I appreciate all you do on behalf of that organization.

RICHARD MCCrackEN (Attorney at Law; McCracken, Stemerman, and Holsberry):

Let me address Mr. Guthrie's point. It has been very enjoyable working with him in solving this. The solution was really quite evident because his clients and those of the other 15 CTCs were never regarded as employees by any body of law. The Internal Revenue Service does not regard them as employees; there is no withholding and no employment taxes for them. The National Labor Relations Board does not regard them as employees. They can't be organized by unions. We are talking about a problem that was easily resolved by making clear what already has been true for all

the time these workshops have been in existence. No body of government has regarded them as employees.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

If one of the clients is injured while working in a shop, how do we cover the injury?

MR. MCCrackEN:

I don't know the answer whether they are covered by workers' compensation law in Nevada. My suspicion would be no to that. I would imagine the injuries are being covered by the agencies under whose authority they work.

MR. GUTHRIE:

Under our workers' compensation policy, we cover volunteers; we cover all different kinds of people in addition to employees of the agency, and I am assuming they are covered under the same provisions that allow us to cover volunteers. If someone gets injured at the Magical Forest, we have 75 volunteers a night assisting us. Inevitably during the 38 nights of the Magical Forest, one of the volunteers gets injured. It is going to happen and is not a question of if, but a question of when it is going to happen. We have always used our workers' compensation policy and the coverage from that, to take care of the medical expenses of that volunteer.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

The committee working with Mr. McCracken needs the Legislative Counsel Bureau's opinion. We need to make sure all 15 of the organizations understand they are not considered employees, but still will be covered under the workers' compensation policy.

MR. MCCrackEN:

Senator, we anticipated the potential for unintended effects of this, so the amendment to the definition of employee in NRS 608 that we drafted only refers to minimum wages. It does not have an

effect on any other part of the code. I will be able to provide the draft this afternoon to all members of this Committee. Senator Hardy asked about how the adjustments work, and I can at least tell how I think they should work. The consumer price index adjustments are called adjustments. They increase over federal minimum wage and it is called an adjustment too. Finally, in that first section of the amendment, adjustments generally incorporate both CPI adjustments and adjustments to the federal minimum wage. They are determined as of April 1, announced and then go into effect the following July 1. The purpose of that structure is to make sure everyone has time to adjust to the increased cost that will be visited by the increase. Congress makes laws and amends laws on a regular basis. I don't think even if we know what the minimum wage is going to be after April 1, it is an adjustment that is incorporated into the April 1 announcement. I think it only gets incorporated when it is in effect. If the federal minimum wage this year were to increase before April 1, it would be incorporated into the adjustment and announced as of that date.

If Congress passes a bill and the President signs it, providing for an increase, it would go into effect sometime later in 2007, after April 1. I do not believe that is in effect and therefore not something that should be incorporated into the April 1 announcement. I believe that is a bright line. I also believe that is what the amendment, fairly read, means. It will enable everyone to not be surprised. I think the idea that if the federal minimum wage increased at a particular date in the middle of the year, not before April 1, all of a sudden it would be a jump up in the State minimum wage and not at all consistent with the structure of this. Again, the structure is to have an announcement April 1, then give everyone three months' time to adjust to the fact this is going to be part of their budget.

MR. MCCracken:

On the question Senator Townsend raised about whether the CPI adjustments could be negative, I think the answer is no. The amendment refers only to an increase in the CPI. The increase due to the CPI is cumulative over a baseline of December 31, 2004.

That is specified. The way the CPI works is that it is actually an index number. The base year for the CPI we use now is 1982, it was 100. If you see a CPI number it will be something like 190.3. That is actually the index number as of the end of 2004. That is the baseline for this amendment. We can look to see what the CPI index was at the end of 2006. That is a computation that already has been made. It is simply a matter of comparing that index number to the end of 2004 baseline and determining what percentage increase that is. At the end of 2006, the increase is slightly over 6 percent not for one year but cumulative since the end of 2004. There is a CPI cap of 3 percent. That means that even though there has been a 6-percent increase in the 2 years since the end of 2004, the maximum CPI increase that could be announced as of April 1 is 3 percent, which is a few pennies above each of these rates. That is what it will be if Congress does not put in effect a new rate before then.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

Mr. McCracken, do you read it as accumulative from 2004 to 2008; making it 12 percent?

MR. MCCRACKEN:

Yes. In effect, there is a carryover and the unused portion increases bank for the future. If we end up with inflation like we did in the latter 1970s with 12- to 13-percent inflation, the CPI adjustment will still be capped at 3 percent and there may be a bank that runs out for many years after that.

One other thing I would like to say which I had not planned on saying, but I had coffee this morning over at Comma Coffee. I entered into a debate with June about this amendment. It was not the start of the morning I had anticipated, but it taught me something very important. She had been told that she had to increase the wages of all of her employees to \$6.15. Someone called her and told her she had to do that. Being the person she is, she went ahead and put those increases into effect, even for her 15-year-old employee. Nobody told her. She did not know until this morning that under 18s are totally exempt from this obligation. It

was not really welcome news to her. It brought home to me was that even though many of us who are interested in this have gone to the workshops that Mr. Tanchek has organized which have been very beneficial, very constructive and had a lot of consensus evolve out of them. They have been great. It is only those of us who have been involved, who really know.

MR. MCCracken:

One of the things that need to be done as quickly as possible is to endorse the statement you made about the need for speed here. We need to get out to the employer community, especially the small business community, the ones most likely to be paying low wages, that there are exemptions. Some of the basic parts of the structure here, including the exemption for people who are under 18, is the 90-day trainee exemption. The knowledge has to be distributed out to the community very rapidly. That is one of the things I hope to work on with Commissioner Tanchek to do, pending the resolution of some of these more esoteric issues. Let's get the basics out to the employer so they do not make mistakes and do not underpay or do not overpay.

SENATOR HECK:

Is the CPI index from December to December? Is the measurement from December 2004 to December 2006? It would be 5.7 percent from December to December versus 6.3 percent annually.

MR. MCCracken:

"It would be—what I calculated it came to a little bit above 6 percent. But that is using the annual change. It is whatever the percentage increase is from December 31, 2004, to the present."

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

The committee received an e-mail/fax (Exhibit D) from the Ruby Mountain Resource Center. They wanted to make sure their remarks were entered for the record.

JIM GREELY (Progressive Choices):

"The group that I am here with today were just wondering if we were going to be able to see the language before it is presented."

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

I have been assured by Mr. Guthrie that it has been sent to you.

ROBERT A. OSTROVSKY (Nevada Resort Association):

Just skipping what I was going to say about the regulation, and going to the issues relative to the testimony you have taken here regarding Opportunity Village and associated-type providers of services, I do have a concern about workers' compensation in CTCs. I would urge this committee to make sure we have a definition in 616 and 617 which is adequate to capture those people, because the insurers have to take a hard line on third parties and independent contractors that are usually not covered. Volunteers that show up for the other events are covered under specific language in the statute which talks about volunteers. I don't believe these people are volunteers. If they are not employees, then we have to make sure there is a definition they fit into. I think everyone wants these people's status not to change from what it is today, because of this amendment I would be happy to work on it. I would be very careful about the language. I do not know who the insurers are, but there are a bunch of insurers like—I do represent one of those insurers who have been around Nevada forever, as the old State fund. There are insurers who buy their policy from some insurer out in New York, Georgia or Hartford, Connecticut, who take a vastly different view of the world than we do here in Nevada. We need to make sure the language is there. I will volunteer to help and take a look. I am sure we will look at that.

CHAIR TOWNSEND:

There is no intent by the proposers. I just need to make sure there is no gap for those folks. The tragedy is if you have to litigate a workers' compensation case the claimant who might legitimately been injured on the job and deserves compensation, he is now in a fight with an insurance company, and he is not getting help.

MR. OSTROVSKY:

Most of the concerns that I had, have been addressed. I would just like to be "on the record" to state there are concerns. I did participate in the workshop process that the commissioner held. I appreciate the commissioner's efforts to try to respond to the needs of the employer community that I represent. We didn't go back and look at the current emergency regulations, the regulation has a lot of substantive change from what the emergency regulation says today. I support the effort to get this worked out as quickly as possible. I would like to go on record to show I do have concerns about the definition of annual adjustment in section 2, sub 4. I think how that turns out could make a potential significant difference on what ways will be paid, this year and next year but also what could be paid in 2015 and 2020; assuming this is on the books for a long time. It is a constitutional matter. The accumulative effects and how they will be applied have consequences way out in the outer years. We want to make sure the definition is adequate. I understand that the Labor Commissioner has punted and said; well we will just use the language in the Constitution until they can get better direction from the OAG. The sooner we get that, the better. I also would like to resolve the issue of the waiting period. I think, Senator Townsend, you raised the issue of the inconsistency between section 4 and section 8. I think I have supported six months and others have supported other time periods and we will be raising the issue again at the hearing. Hopefully, we will be able to resolve this so employers know what—and we will be raising that issue again at the hearing—the standard waiting period is, and pay the lower tier during the waiting period as long as they meet all the other qualifications of offering insurance. Other than that, I am quite satisfied with what the Commissioner has done to define what an insurance policy is and to define some of the other issues that are out there. I look forward to working with the Commissioner on March 5, to try to resolve the issues we just talked about that are unresolved. The Commissioner agrees these have yet to be resolved. Those are the comments I would like to have "on the record."

SAMUEL P. McMULLEN (Nevada Restaurant Association; Retail Association of Nevada; Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce):

I would like to echo that this has actually been a very good process in a lot of ways. We have had some very difficult things to implement after the constitutional amendment was passed and of course as everyone knows, immediately effective. I agree with Mr. McCracken, the process we have gone through has resolved issues. I think there are still some wrinkles that need to be straightened out as we go through this next month before the final reg, at least the temporary regulation, excuse me I should use the correct term. I really wanted to say I think the process has been good. Labor Commissioner Tanchek and his staff really need to be complimented for a lot of hard work. I also appreciated the involvement of other people myself, like Mr. McCracken, who have given good interpretations of what they mean, what they wrote, and the clarity of that. I would say it is important for this Committee to understand that even though there has not been testimony to them today, there has been an awful lot of issues that were out there that have been resolved.

You have heard about some of them, the definitions of insurance, the application when someone comes on before the insurance is actually "effective" for an individual but offered. The test of course is offering it; trying to reduce some of the roller coasters, but more importantly, from our point of view, trying to reduce the cost and the difficulty of implementing this and making sure there is as much as possible some practical rule of reason in how this works. I think Mr. McCracken was sort of the commercially reasonable —would like also to compliment him for really good thought on things that would implement this more practically. I also think there has been a lot of progress made on this regulation. We will be able to tell the employers for instance they—as Mr. Tanchek said today they don't have to do this every pay period. You could effectively say that gross taxable income is arguably defined every pay period. It could in some cases make you crazy and say it is defined every day. You have to do the test to find out whether you are paying people correctly or not. By doing it this way, I think we have allowed that to be stretched out and done annually, if you have the

1 **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA**

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4 Electronically Filed
5 Nov 30 2015 03:43 p.m.
6 Tracie K. Lindeman
7 Clerk of Supreme Court

8 STATE OF NEVADA, *ex rel.* OFFICE OF
9 THE LABOR COMMISSIONER; and
10 SHANNON CHAMBERS in her official
11 capacity as Labor Commissioner of Nevada,

Supreme Court No. 68770

 District Court Case No.: 14 OC 00080 1B

 Appellants,

 vs.

 CODY C. HANCOCK,

 Respondent.

12
13 **JOINT APPENDIX**

14 **VOLUME II of II**

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Comes now the Appellants, STATE OF NEVADA, EX REL. OFFICE OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER; AND SHANNON CHAMBERS IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS LABOR COMMISSIONER OF NEVADA, by and through its undersigned attorneys, ADAM PAUL LAXALT, Attorney General, and SCOTT DAVIS, Deputy Attorney General, and Respondent CODY C. HANCOCK, by and through his attorney, BRADLEY SCHRAGER, Esq., and hereby submit their Joint Appendix as follows:

PLEADING	VOL.	BATES #
Complaint for 1) Declaratory Relief Pursuant to NRS 233B.110; 2) Injunctive Relief Pursuant to NRS 33.010; and 3) Writ of Mandamus Pursuant to NRS 34.160, filed April 30, 2014	I	JA0000-JA0033
Amended Complaint for 1) Declaratory Relief Pursuant to NRS 233B.110; 2) Injunctive Relief Pursuant to NRS 33.010; and 3) Writ of Mandamus Pursuant to NRS 34.160, filed June 6, 2014	I	JA0034-JA0079
Stipulation and Proposed Order Staying Action, filed July 18, 2014	I	JA0080-0082
Order Lifting Temporary Stay, filed March 4, 2015	I	JA0083-JA0084
Joint Status Report, dated March 6, 2015	I	JA0085-JA0088
Second Amended Complaint for 1) Declaratory Relief Pursuant to NRS 233B.110; and 2) Injunctive Relief Pursuant to NRS 33.010, filed March 20, 2015	I	JA0089-JA0121
Stipulation and Order Withdrawing Motion to Dismiss and Permitting Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, filed March 20, 2015	I	JA0122-JA0125
Answer to Second Amended Complaint, filed April 10, 2015	I	JA0126-JA0135

1	Stipulation and Proposed Order to Set Briefing	I	JA0136-JA0138
2	Schedule, filed May 26, 2015		
3	Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated	I	JA0139-JA0244
4	June 11, 2015		
5	Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 12, 2015	II	JA0245-JA0337
6	Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for	II	JA0338-JA0356
7	Summary Judgment, dated July 10, 2015		
8	Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary	II	JA0357-JA0381
9	Judgment, filed July 14, 2015		
10	Errata to Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for	II	JA0382-JA0384
11	Summary Judgment, filed July 27, 2015		
12	Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion for	II	JA0385-JA0406
13	Summary Judgment, filed July 31, 2015		
14	Decision and Order, Comprising Findings of Fact	II	JA0407-JA0416
15	and Conclusions of Law, filed August 14, 2015		
16	Notice of Entry of Order, filed August 18, 2015	II	JA0417-JA0430
17	Notice of Appeal, filed September 4, 2015	II	JA0431-JA0444
18	Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Stay Order	II	JA0445-JA0448
	Pending Appeal, filed October 12, 2015		

19 DATED this 30th day of November, 2015.

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