1 NOTC Gregory H. King, Bar No. 7777 ghk@paynefears.com Sarah J. Odia, Bar No. 11053 sjo@paynefears.com Chad D. Olsen, Bar No. 12060 cdo@paynefears.com PAYNE & FEARS LLP 7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 525 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Telephone: (702) 851-0300 Facsimile: (702) 851-0315 7 Attorneys for Defendant U.S. HOME CORPORATION

CLERK OF THE COURT

Electronically Filed Sep 14 2015 03:16 p.m. Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE MICHAEL BALLESTEROS TRUST: RODRIGO ASANION, individually; FEDERICO AGUAYO, individually; FELIPE ENRIQUEZ, individually; JIMMY FOSTER JR., individually; THE GARCIA FAMILY TRUST: ARNULFO ORTEGA-GOMEZ and ELVIRA GOMEZ-ORTEGA, individually; JOHN J. and IRMA A. OLSON, individually; OMAR PONCE, individually; BRANDON WEAVER, individually; JON YATES, individually; MINTESNOT WOLDETSADIK, individually; and ROES 1 through 500, inclusive,

Plaintiffs,

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U.S. HOME CORPORATION, a Delaware 21 Corporation; CAMPBELL CONCRETE OF NEVADA, INC. a Nevada Corporation; 22 VALENTE CONCRETE, LLC. a Nevada Limited-Liability Company; RED ROSE, INC., a Nevada Corporation, REPUBLIC

ELECTRIC, INC., a Nevada Corporation; and DOES 1 through 500, inclusive, 24

25 Defendants.

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Case No. A-15-714219-D Dept. No. XXXI

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that Defendant U.S. Home Corporation appeals to the Supreme

Court of Nevada from the District Court order entered on August 18, 2015 (filed on August 20),

which denied Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration.

DATED: September 10, 2015

PAYNE & FEARS LLP

By

/s/ Chad D. Olsen

GREGORY H. KING, NV Bar No. 7777 SARAH J. ODIA, NV Bar No. 11053 CHAD D. OLSEN, NV Bar No. 12060 7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 525 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Tel. (702) 851-0300

Attorneys for Defendant U.S. HOME CORPORATION

4827-8189-1624.1

PAYNE & FEARS LLP

Ballesteros, et al. v. Greystone Nevada, LLC, et al. Clark County District Court Case No. A-15-714219-D

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 10, 2015, I deposited a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing, **NOTICE OF APPEAL** in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at Las Vegas, NV, to the last known address as follows:

Duane E. Shinnick, Esq.
Melissa Bybee, Esq.
Bradley S. Rosenberg, Esq.
Shinnick, Ryan & Ransavage, P.C.
4001 Meadows Lane
Las Vegas, NV 89107
Tel/Fax: (702) 631-8014/(702) 631-8024
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/s/ Nancy Babas
Nancy Babas
An Employee of PAYNE & FEARS LLP

4850-5922-6914.1

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1 **ASTA** Gregory H. King, Bar No. 7777 ghk@paynefears.com Sarah J. Odia, Bar No. 11053 sjo@paynefears.com Chad D. Olsen, Bar No. 12060 cdo@paynefears.com PAYNE & FEARS LLP 7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 525 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Telephone: (702) 851-0300 Facsimile: (702) 851-0315 7 Attorneys for Defendant U.S. HOME CORPORATION 8 9

Alun J. Lum

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE MICHAEL BALLESTEROS TRUST; RODRIGO ASANION, individually; FEDERICO AGUAYO, individually; FELIPE ENRIQUEZ, individually; JIMMY FOSTER JR., individually; THE GARCIA FAMILY TRUST; ARNULFO ORTEGA-GOMEZ and ELVIRA GOMEZ-ORTEGA, individually; JOHN J. and IRMA A. OLSON, individually; OMAR PONCE, individually; BRANDON WEAVER, individually; JON YATES, individually; MINTESNOT WOLDETSADIK, individually; and ROES 1 through 500, inclusive,

Plaintiffs,

•

U.S. HOME CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; CAMPBELL CONCRETE OF NEVADA, INC. a Nevada Corporation; VALENTE CONCRETE, LLC. a Nevada Limited-Liability Company; RED ROSE, INC., a Nevada Corporation; REPUBLIC ELECTRIC, INC., a Nevada Corporation; and DOES 1 through 500, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. A-15-714219-D Dept. No. XXXI

CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

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Pursuant to NRAP 3(f), Appellant U.S. Home Corporation respectfully files this Case Appeal Statement. This Case Appeal Statement concerns the appeal taken by U.S. Home to the

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Supreme Court of Nevada from a District Court order entered on August 18, 2015 (filed on August 20), which denied U.S. Home's Motion to Compel Arbitration.

- Name of appellants filing this case appeal statement: U.S. Home Corporation. 1.
- 2. Identify the judge issuing the decision, judgment, or order appealed from: The Honorable Susan H. Johnson.
- 3. Identify each appellant and the name and address of counsel for each appellant: U.S. Home Corporation is represented by:

Gregory H. King, NV Bar No. 7777 Sarah J. Odia, NV Bar No. 11053 Chad D. Olsen, NV Bar No. 12060 PAYNE & FEARS LLP 7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 525 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Telephone: (702) 851-0300

4. Identify each respondent and the name and address of appellate counsel, if known, for each respondent (if the name of a respondent's appellate counsel is unknown, indicate as much and provide the name and address of that respondent's trial counsel): The Michael Ballesteros Trust; Rodrigo Asanion; Federico Aguayo; Felipe Enriquez; Jimmy Foster Jr.; The Garcia Family Trust; Arnulfo Ortega-Gomex & Elvira Gomez-Ortego; John J. & Irma A. Olson; Omar Ponce; Brandon Weavor; Jon Yates; and Mintesnot Woldetsadik, each of whom is represented by:

> Duane E. Shinnick, NV Bar No. 7176 Melissa Orr, NV Bar No. 8390 Courtney K. Lee, NV Bar No. 8154 Bradley S. Rosenberg, NV Bar No. 8737 SHINNICK, RYAN & RANSAVAGE P.C. 4001 Meadows Lane Las Vegas, NV 89107 Telephone: (702) 631-8014

5. Indicate whether any attorney identified above in response to question 3 or 4 is not licensed to practice law in Nevada and, if so, whether the district court granted that attorney permission to appear under SCR 42 (attach a copy of any district court order granting such permission): None, not applicable.

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- 6. Indicate whether appellants were represented by appointed or retained counsel in the district court: Retained counsel.
- Indicate whether appellant is represented by appointed or retained counsel on 7. appeal: Retained counsel.
- 8. Indicate whether appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the date of entry of the district court order granting such leave: No, not applicable.
- 9. Indicate the date the proceedings commenced in the district court: Complaint was filed on February 20, 2015.
- 10. Provide a brief description of the nature of the action and result in the district court, including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the district court:

This is a construction defect case involving 12 single-family homes located in North Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S. Home developed the homes at issue.

Each Respondent entered into a purchase and sale agreement with U.S. Home or Greystone in connection with the purchase of their homes. Pursuant to these purchase and sale agreements, each Respondent agreed to submit to binding arbitration any dispute relating to their homes, including construction defect disputes. Further, Respondents' homes are subject to CC&Rs, which state that both U.S. Home and Respondents must submit any construction dispute to binding arbitration.

On April 30, 2015, U.S. Home filed a motion to compel arbitration, seeking to enforce the arbitration agreements as to each Respondent. On June 3, the District Court held a hearing to address the motion to compel arbitration. On August 18, an order was entered denying the motion to compel arbitration.

- U.S. Home is now appealing the District Court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration.
- 11. Indicate whether the case has previously been the subject of an appeal to or original writ proceeding in the Supreme Court and, if so, the caption and Supreme Court docket number of the prior proceeding: No, not applicable.
- 12. Indicate whether this appeal involves child custody or visitation: No, not applicable.

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1	13. If this is a civil case,	, indicate w	hether this appeal involves the possibility of	
2	settlement: No.			
3	DATED: September 10, 2015	PAYNE & FEARS LLP		
4				
5		Ву	/s/ Chad D. Olsen	
6			GREGORY H. KING, NV Bar No. 7777 SARAH J. ODIA, NV Bar No. 11053	
7			CHAD D. OLSEN, NV Bar No. 12060 7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 525 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128	
8			Tel. (702) 851-0300	
9			Attorneys for Defendant U.S. HOME CORPORATION	
10	4814-2333-0344.1			
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Ballesteros, et al. v. Greystone Nevada, LLC, et al. Clark County District Court Case No. A-15-714219-D

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1 1

I hereby certify that on September 10, 2015, I deposited a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing, CASE APPEAL STATEMENT in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at Las Vegas, NV, to the last known address as follows:

Duane E. Shinnick, Esq.
Melissa Bybee, Esq.
Bradley S. Rosenberg, Esq.
Shinnick, Ryan & Ransavage, P.C.
4001 Meadows Lane
Las Vegas, NV 89107
Tel/Fax: (702) 631-8014/(702) 631-8024
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/s/ Nancy Babas
Nancy Babas
An Employee of PAYNE & FEARS LLP

4850-5922-6914.1

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-15-714219-D

Michael Ballesteros Trust, Plaintiff(s) U.S. Home Corporation, Defendant(s)

Location: Department 31 Judicial Officer: Kishner, Joanna S. Filed on: **02/20/2015** Cross-Reference Case A714219 Number:

CASE INFORMATION

Case Type: Chapter 40

Case Flags: Appealed to Supreme Court Jury Demand Filed

Arbitration Exemption Granted

DATE CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment

Case Number Court Date Assigned Judicial Officer A-15-714219-D Department 31 02/20/2015 Kishner, Joanna S.

	PARTY INFORMATION	
Plaintiff	Aguayo, Federico	Lead Attorneys Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W)
	Asanion, Rodrigo	Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W)
	Enriquez, Felipe	Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W)
	Foster, Jimmy, Jr.	Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W)
	Garcia Family Trust	Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W)
	Gomez -Ortega, Elvira	Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W)
	Michael Ballesteros Trust	Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W)
	Olson, Irma A	Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W)
	Olson, John J	Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W)
	Ortega-Gomez, Arnulfo	Shinnick, Duane E. Retained

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-15-714219-D

702-631-8014(W)

7023823574(W)

Ponce, Omar Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W) Weaver, Brandon Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W) Woldetsadik, Mintesnot Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W) Yates, Jon Shinnick, Duane E. Retained 702-631-8014(W) **Defendant** Campbell Concrete of Nevada Inc **Red Rose Inc** Luh, Charlie H. Retained 7023678899(W) Republic Electric Inc U.S. Home Corporation King, Gregory H. Retained

Valente Concrete LLC

DATE	EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT	INDEX
02/20/2015	Complaint (CD, Complex) Filed By: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Construction Defect Complaint	
02/20/2015	Case Opened	
04/21/2015	Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Defendant U.S. Home Corporation Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure	
04/21/2015	Answer (CD, Complex) Filed By: Defendant U.S. Home Corporation Defendant U.S. Home Corporation's Answer to Complaint	
04/21/2015	Disclosure Statement Party: Defendant U.S. Home Corporation Defendant U.S. Home Corporation's NRCP 7.1 Disclosure	
04/24/2015	Affidavit of Non-Service Filed By: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Affidavit of Non-Service-Republic Electric, Inc.	
04/24/2015	Affidavit of Non-Service Filed By: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Affidavit of Non-Service-Campbell Concrete of Nevada, Inc.	
04/27/2015	Summons Filed by: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust	

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-15-714219-D

	CASE NO. A-15-/14219-D
	Summons-U.S. Homes
04/28/2015	Summons Filed by: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Summons-Civil
04/30/2015	Motion to Compel Filed By: Defendant U.S. Home Corporation Defendant U.S. Home Corporation's Motion to Compel Arbitration
05/05/2015	Affidavit of Service Filed By: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Affidavit of Service-Republic Electric, Inc.
05/13/2015	Affidavit of Service Filed By: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Affidavit of Service-Red Rose, Inc.
05/13/2015	Summons Filed by: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Summons-Civil
05/13/2015	Affidavit of Non-Service Filed By: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Affidavit of Non-Service-Valente Concrete, Inc.
05/13/2015	Affidavit of Non-Service Filed By: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Affidavit on Non-Service-Republic Electric, Inc.
05/13/2015	Certificate of Mailing Filed By: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Certificate of Mailing-Valente Concrete, Inc.
05/14/2015	Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Filed By: Defendant Red Rose Inc Defendant Red Rose, Inc.'s Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure
05/14/2015	Answer (CD, Complex) Filed By: Defendant Red Rose Inc Defendant Red Rose, Inc.'s Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint
05/14/2015	Demand for Jury Trial Filed By: Defendant Red Rose Inc Defendant Red Rose, Inc.'s Demand for Jury Trial
05/15/2015	Opposition to Motion to Compel Filed By: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Plaintiffs' Opposition To Defendant U.S. Home Corporation's Motion To Compel Arbitration
05/21/2015	Commissioners Decision on Request for Exemption - Granted Commissioner's Decision on Request for Exemption
05/27/2015	

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. A-15-714219-D

Reply in Support

Plaintiff Enriquez, Felipe Total Charges

Total Payments and Credits **Balance Due as of 9/11/2015**

	Filed By: Defendant U.S. Home Corporation Reply in Support of U.S. Home Corporation's Motion to Compel Arbitration	
06/03/2015	Motion to Compel (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Kishner, Joanna S.) 06/03/2015, 06/26/2015 Defendant U.S. Home Corporation's Motion to Compel Arbitration	
06/16/2015	Certificate of Mailing Filed By: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Certificate of Mailing-Campbell Concrete of Nevada, Inc.	
06/16/2015	Affidavit of Due Diligence Filed By: Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust Affidavit of Due Diligence-Valente Concrete, LLC.	
08/20/2015	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Filed By: Defendant U.S. Home Corporation Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order	
08/21/2015	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Defendant U.S. Home Corporation Notice of Entry of Order	
09/10/2015	Notice of Appeal Filed By: Defendant U.S. Home Corporation Notice of Appeal	
09/10/2015	Case Appeal Statement Filed By: Defendant U.S. Home Corporation Case Appeal Statement	
DATE	FINANCIAL INFORMATION	
	Defendant Red Rose Inc Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	473.00 473.00 0.00
	Defendant U.S. Home Corporation Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	497.00 497.00 0.00
	Plaintiff Aguayo, Federico Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	30.00 30.00 0.00
	Plaintiff Asanion, Rodrigo Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	30.00 30.00 0.00

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CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-15-714219-D

CASE NO. A-15-/14219-D	
Plaintiff Foster, Jimmy, Jr.	
Total Charges	30.00
Total Payments and Credits	30.00
Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	0.00
Plaintiff Garcia Family Trust	
Total Charges	30.00
Total Payments and Credits	30.00
Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	0.00
Plaintiff Gomez -Ortega, Elvira	
Total Charges	30.00
Total Payments and Credits	30.00
Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	0.00
Plaintiff Michael Ballesteros Trust	
Total Charges	520.00
Total Payments and Credits	520.00
Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	0.00
Plaintiff Olson, Irma A	
Total Charges	30.00
Total Payments and Credits	30.00
Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	0.00
Plaintiff Olson, John J	
Total Charges	30.00
Total Payments and Credits	30.00
Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	0.00
Plaintiff Ortega-Gomez, Arnulfo	
Total Charges	30.00
Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	30.00 0.00
Datance Due as 01 9/11/2015	0.00
Plaintiff Ponce, Omar	
Total Charges	30.00
Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	30.00 0.00
Datance Due as 01 3/11/2013	0.00
Plaintiff Weaver, Brandon	20.00
Total Payments and Cradita	30.00
Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	30.00 0.00
Datance Due as of 7/11/2013	0.00
Plaintiff Woldetsadik, Mintesnot	20.00
Total Charges Total Payments and Credits	30.00 30.00
Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	0.00
DI 1 (100 37) I	
Plaintiff Yates, Jon Total Charges	30.00
Total Payments and Credits	30.00
Balance Due as of 9/11/2015	0.00
Defendant U.S. Home Corporation	
Appeal Bond Balance as of 9/11/2015	500.00

DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET Clark County. Nevada A - 15 - 714219 - D

Clark County, Nevada

Case No. _____(Assigned by Clerk's Office)

XXXI

I. Party Information (provide both home and mailing addresses if different)			
Plaintiff(s): The Michael Ballesteros Trust 6137 Darnley Street North Las Vegas, NV 89081 Attorney (name/address/phone): Bradley S SHINNICK RYAN & RANSAVAGE P.C. 4001 Meadows Lane Las Vegas, NV 89107 (702) 631-8014	S. Rosenberg, Esq.	Defendant(s): U.S. Hor 2490 Paseo Verde Park Henderson, NV 89074 Attorney (name/addres	xway, Suite 120
II. Nature of Controversy (Please select the one most applicable filing type below)			
Civil Case Filing Types			T
Real Property Landlord/Tenant Unlawful Detainer Other Landlord/Tenant Title to Property Judicial Foreclosure Other Title to Property Other Real Property Condemnation/Eminent Domain	Negligence Auto Premises Liability Other Malpractice Medical/Dental Legal Accounting		Other Torts Product Liability Intentional Misconduct Employment Torts Insurance Tort Other Tort
Other Real Property	Other Malpractice		
Probate	Construction Defe	ect & Contract	Judicial Review/Appeal
Probate (select case type and estate value) Summary Administration General Administration Special Administration Set Aside Trust/Conservatorship Other Probate Estate Value Over \$200,000 Between \$100,000 and \$200,000 Under \$100,000 or Unknown Under \$2,500	Construction Defect Chapter 40 Other Construction Defect Contract Case Uniform Commercial Code Building and Construction Insurance Carrier Commercial Instrument Collection of Accounts Employment Contract Other Contract		Judicial Review Foreclosure Mediation Case Petition to Seal Records Mental Competency Nevada State Agency Appeal Department of Motor Vehicle Worker's Compensation Other Nevada State Agency Appeal Other Appeal from Lower Court Other Judicial Review/Appeal
Civil	Writ		Other Civil Filing
Civil Writ Writ of Habeas Corpus Writ of Mandamus Writ of Quo Warrant	☐ Writ of Prohibition ☐ Other Civil Writ	1	Other Civil Filing Compromise of Minor's Claim Foreign Judgment Other Civil Matters
Business Court	filings should be filed u	using the Business Court	civil coversheet.
February 20, 2015		/s/ B	radley S. Rosenberg
Date			initiating party or representative

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FFCO
Gregory H. King, Bar No. 7777
ghk@paynefears.com
Sarah J. Odia, Bar No. 11053
sjo@paynefears.com
PAYNE & FEARS LLP
7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 525
Las Vegas, Nevada 89128
Telephone: (702) 851-0300
Facsimile: (702) 851-0315

Attorneys for Defendant
U.S. HOME CORPORATION

Alma J. Chim

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE MICHAEL BALLESTEROS TRUST; RODRIGO ASANION, individually; FEDERICO AGUAYO, individually; FELIPE ENRIQUEZ, individually; JIMMY FOSTER JR., individually; THE GARCIA FAMILY TRUST; ARNULFO ORTEGA-GOMEZ and ELVIRA GOMEZ-ORTEGA, individually; JOHN J. and IRMA A. OLSON, individually; OMAR PONCE, individually; BRANDON WEAVER, individually; JON YATES, individually; MINTESNOT WOLDETSADIK, individually; and ROES 1 through 500, inclusive,

Plaintiffs,

U.S. HOME CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; CAMPBELL CONCRETE OF NEVADA, INC. a Nevada Corporation; VALENTE CONCRETE, LLC. a Nevada Limited-Liability Company; RED ROSE, INC., a Nevada Corporation; REPUBLIC ELECTRIC, INC., a Nevada Corporation; and DOES 1 through 500, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. A-15-714219-D Dept. No. XXXI

FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

This matter, concerning DEFENDANT U.S. HOME CORPORATION'S

("DEFENDANT" or "US HOME") Motion to Compel Arbitration filed on April 30, 2015, came

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on for hearing on the 3rd day of June 2015 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before Department XXXI of the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for Clark County, Nevada with the honorable JUDGE JOANNA S. KISHNER presiding. PLAINTIFFS appeared by and through their attorney, DUANE E. SHINNICK, ESQ. of the law firm, SHINNICK, RYAN & RANSAVAGE, P.C.; and DEFENDANT U.S. HOME CORPORATION appeared by and through its attorney, GREGORY KING, ESQ. of the law firm, PAYNE & FEARS LLP. All other appearances noted in the record. Having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file herein, and heard the oral arguments of the attorneys, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

- PLAINTIFFS THE MICHAEL BALLESTEROS TRUST; RODRIGO ASANION; 1. FEDERICO AGUAYO; FELIPE ENRIQUEZ; JIMMY FOSTER JR.; THE GARCIA FAMILY TRUST; ARNULFO ORTEGA-GOMEZ and ELVIRA GOMEZ-ORTEGA; JOHN J. and IRMA A. OLSON; OMAR PONCE; BRANDON WEAVER; JON YATES; and MINTESNOT WOLDETSADIK ("PLAINTIFFS") are alleged to be owners of individual residences within the "Azure Manor/Rancho de Paz" development located in Las Vegas, Nevada.
- The "Azure Manor/Rancho de Paz" community was developed and/or built by 2. DEFENDANT and sold to PLAINTIFFS, or PLAINTIFFS' predecessors, from approximately 2004 to 2005.
- On February 20, 2015, twelve (12) of the PLAINTIFF homeowner groups filed 3. their Complaint against DEFENDANT as a result of an alleged multitude of constructional defects located within the single family residences and common area elements² located within the Azure Manor/Rancho de Paz community. The matter was assigned to Department XXXI.
- 4. On April 30, 2015, DEFENDANT moved this Court to compel all twelve (12) of the PLAINTIFF homeowner groups to seek redress of their construction defect disputes via arbitration (the "Motion") based upon arbitration provisions within the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions ("CC&Rs") of the Azure Manor/Rancho de Paz community where their homes are

A "homeowner group" encompasses those owners who jointly own the residence.

² See PLAINTIFFS' Construction Defect Complaint filed on February 20, 2015, Paragraphs 3, 21, 22, 23, and 24.

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located. DEFENDANT further seeks to specifically compel arbitration for construction defects for PLAINTIFFS John and Irma Olson, and Michael Ballesteros, as trustee of the Michael Ballesteros Trust, based upon the arbitration provisions provided within Paragraph 18 of their purchase and sales agreements ("PSAs") entered into with DEFENDANT US HOME.

DEFENDANT argues that all PLAINTIFFS are bound by the CC&Rs, and the 5. arbitration provisions contained therein. DEFENDANT further contends that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), Title 9 U.S.C. §§1 et seq. mandates enforcement of the arbitration provisions, and any state laws providing the contrary are preempted by the FAA. DEFENDANT asserts that the arbitration provisions are neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable, therefore such provisions must be enforced. PLAINTIFFS opposed the Motion stating that there are no valid agreements to arbitrate, that the FAA does not apply, that the arbitration provisions are procedurally and substantively unconscionable, the arbitration provisions are contrary to Nevada law, and that compelling arbitration would not be judicially efficient. There would have to be twelve (12) separate arbitrations (assuming that agreements to arbitrate were proven as to all PLAINTIFFS).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- In analyzing the matter, this Court first notes that in order to compel arbitration, 6. DEFENDANT US HOME must show that there is a valid and enforceable agreement between the parties to arbitrate. See Mitri, et al. v. Arnel Management Company, et al., 157 Cal.App.4th 1164, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 223 (Cal.App. 2007). Here, PLAINTIFFS do not dispute the existence of the arbitration provisions at issue, or that the claims fall within the scope of the arbitration provisions, but rather contend that the arbitration provisions are unenforceable in light of the NRS Chapter 40 protections of homeowner rights, and the fact that the provisions are unconscionable.
- The United States Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1925 7. in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements. See AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, U.S., 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011), citing Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008).

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Title 9 U.S.C. § 2, the 'primary substantive provision of the Act," provides in relevant part as follows:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract

- 8. The United States Supreme Court has described Title 9 U.S.C. § 2 as reflecting both a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration," and the "fundamental principal that arbitration is a matter of contract." Keeping in line with these principles, the high court has held judges must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them according to their terms. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 131 S.Ct. at 1745-46.
- 9. The Court notes that the FAA specifically sets forth in part, "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,..." Title 9 U.S.C. §2 (Emphasis added). As other state and federal courts have found, in order to activate the application of the FAA, the commerce involved in the contract must be interstate or foreign. See Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 398 S.C. 447, 454, 730 S.E.2d 312, 315-16 (2012), citing 2 S.C. Jur. Arbitration § 6 (Supp. 2012) ("Interstate commerce is a necessary basis for application of the federal act, and a contract not so predicated must be governed by state law. To activate application of the federal act, the commerce involved in the contract must be interstate or foreign.").
- 10. The United States Supreme Court has held that the phrase "involving commerce" is the same as "affecting commerce," which has been broadly interpreted to mean Congress intended to use its powers to regulate interstate commerce to its full extent. See Blanton v. Stathos, 351 S.C. 534, 540, 570 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ct.App. 2002), citing Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed. 753 (1995). "Congress' Commerce Clause power 'may be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon ³ Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 U.S. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765

⁴ Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. at 24.

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interstate commerce' if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent 'a general practice...subject to federal control." Citizens Bank v. Alafabco. Inc., 539 U.S. 53, 56-57, 123 S.Ct. 2037, 156 L.Ed.2d 46 (2003), quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236, 68 S.Ct. 996, 92 L.Ed.2d 1328 (1948). "Despite this expansive interpretation of the FAA, the FAA does not reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration." Zabinski v. Bright Acres Associates, 346 S.C. 580, 592, 553 S.E.2d 110, 116 (2001), citing Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (Emphasis added).

- 11. Both state and federal jurisdictions addressing the issue have held the sale of residential real estate is inherently intrastate, whereby the FAA does not apply. See Saneii v. Robards, 289 F.Supp.2d 855, 858 (W.D.Ky. 2003); SI V, LLC v. FMC Corporation, 223 F.Supp.2d, 1059, 1062 (N.D.Cal. 2002), citing Cecala v. Moore, 982 F.Supp. 609,612 (N.D.Ill. 1997); Bradley, 298 S.C. at 456, 730 S.E.2d at 317; see also Garrison v. Palmas Del Mar Homeowners Association, Inc., 538 F.Supp.2d 468, 473 (D.P.R. 2008). These courts reason that contracts strictly for the sale of residential real estate focus entirely on the commodity, which is the land firmly planted in one particular state. The citizenship of the immediate parties, the buyer and seller, or their movements to and from that state are incidental to the real estate transaction. That is, those movements are not part of the transaction itself.
- 12. In the present case, this Court concludes that the FAA does not apply to the arbitration agreements because the construction defect claims at issue relate to real property contained entirely within the state of Nevada, and therefore do not affect interstate commerce. Furthermore, no federal law is implicated by the construction defect claims. For these reasons, logic suggests such transactions are not among those considered as involving interstate commerce,
- Although the Court finds the FAA to be inapplicable here⁶, arbitration may still be 13. compelled pursuant to Nevada law. In Nevada, strong public policy favors arbitration, and such clauses generally are enforceable. Gonski v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 126 Nev. , 245 P.3d

⁶ Even if the FAA were found to apply, "[g]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening. . [the FAA]". Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 1653 (1996).

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1164, 1168 (2010), citing D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 120 Nev. 549, 553, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (2004). The Supreme Court of Nevada has held that there is a "presumption of arbitrability" where there is an agreement to arbitrate. Phillips v. Parker, 106 Nev. 415, 417, 794 P.2d 716, 718 (1990). Even though the party seeking to enforce an arbitration clause bears the burden or proving the clause's valid existence, any party opposing the arbitration may establish a defense to enforcement. Gonski, 245 P.3d at 1169, citing D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 553, 96 P.3d at 1162.

- The arbitration clause may be invalidated if it is found by this Court to be 14. unconscionable. Cf Picardi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. ____, 251 P.2d 723, 726 (2011), effectively overruled by AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011), quoting Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 429, 216 P.3d 213, 226 (2009) ("Parties are free to contract, and the courts will enforce their contracts if they are not unconscionable, illegal, or in violation of public policy."). In order to find the arbitration provisions to arbitrate unconscionable, the Court must determine whether the arbitration provisions are both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 553, quoting Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 438, 442, 49 P.3d 647, ___ (2002). That is, a finding of unconscionability requires the "procedural" element focusing on "oppression" or "surprise" due to unequal bargaining power, and the "substantive" factor on "overly harsh" or "one-sided" results. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Service, Inc., 24 Cal, 4th 83, 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, ___, 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000).
- An arbitration agreement is "procedurally unconscionable when a party lacks a 15. meaningful opportunity to agree to the clause terms either because of unequal bargaining power, as in an adhesion contract, or because the clause and its effects are not readily ascertainable upon a review of the contract." D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 554. "Procedural unconscionability" often involves the "use of fine print or complicated, incomplete or misleading language that fails to inform a reasonable person of the contractual language's consequences." D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 556. The defendant does not have a duty to explain in detail each and every right the plaintiff would be waiving by agreeing to arbitration for the provision to be enforceable. However, an

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arbitration clause, at the least, must be conspicuous and clearly place him or her on notice that he/she is waiving important rights under Nevada law. D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 556-57.

- 16. In the present matter, the Court finds that the arbitration clause set forth in the CC&Rs is procedurally unconscionable. The arbitration provision is located on page 76 of 86 of the CC&Rs, and is in the same sized font as the rest of the CC&Rs. The arbitration provisions are inconspicuously placed within the voluminous document, and there is nothing to draw attention to the average home buyer of the important rights being waived. The text of the arbitration provisions is not bolded or capitalized, is in the same font as the other provisions of the CC&Rs, and does not stand out to draw attention to the fact that significant rights are being waived.
- 17. Furthermore, the CC&Rs abrogate Nevada's Chapter 40 and are against public policy in requiring different timelines and/or additional procedures to bring construction defect claims. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that arbitration provisions in homes sales contracts (and presumably in CC&Rs) that abrogate a homeowner's NRS Chapter 40 rights are not enforceable as they are unconscionable and violate the public policy behind NRS Chapter 40. See Gonski v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 126 Nev. ____, 245 P.3d 1164 (2010). Here, the arbitration hearing is to be convened no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the arbitrator is appointed. This timeline and procedure is not mandated under NRS Chapter 40.
- 18. The arbitration provisions in Paragraph 18 of the PSAs are also procedurally unconscionable because they do not draw attention to the arbitration provisions. To the contrary, the text of the arbitration clauses is not capitalized or bolded to bring attention to such provisions. There is no explicit "construction defect" term mentioned indicating that such claims must be arbitrated. The arbitration clauses, like many others within the PSAs, are inconspicuous on page 2 of 4. There is nothing to highlight the importance of the arbitration provisions. Furthermore, the arbitration provisions are confusing because they state that claims should be arbitrated, not by or in a court of law. However, shortly thereafter the provisions state that "in the event the Homeowner's Warranty provided by Seller does not provide for binding arbitration, a claim under, or covered by, the warranty will be administered as provided in the warranty prior to submission to binding arbitration." It is therefore uncertain whether Plaintiffs must first proceed through a

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Homeowner's Warranty process prior to seeking arbitration for any claims. Even had Plaintiffs been aware that there were arbitration provisions and read them, it would be difficult to understand this confusing and apparently contradictory provision.

- 19. The arbitration provisions do not clearly state that the purchaser is waiving his right to a jury trial, nor does it mention any impact on the purchaser's rights under NRS Chapter 40. The Court finds that the arbitration provisions lack clarity. While a DEFENDANT does not have the duty to explain in detail each and every right the prospective home buyer would be waiving by agreeing to Paragraph 18, the arbitration provisions must be conspicuous and clearly place the purchaser on notice that he or she is waiving substantial rights under Nevada law. As previously indicated, PLAINTIFFS were not given an opportunity to negotiate the terms of the arbitration provisions, and/or that they would be given up certain important rights, including Chapter 40 rights. For these reasons, this Court concludes that Paragraph 18 of the PSAs is "procedurally unconscionable".
- 20. The next issue is whether the arbitration clauses in the CC&Rs and PSAs are "substantively unconscionable". "Substantive unconscionability" focuses on the "one-sidedness of the contract terms." D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 554. In D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 554, the Nevada Supreme Court relied upon the substantive unconscionability analysis employed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.2d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003). In that case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals required an arbitration agreement have a "modicum of bilaterality." Ting, 319 F.2d at 1149, quoting Armendariz, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d at 692.
- 21. Section 17.16 of the CC&Rs state that "costs of the arbitration shall be borne equally by the parties." The Nevada Supreme Court in the D.R. Horton case found substantively unconscionability when there was a requirement that each party pay equally for the costs of arbitration. D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 1165.
- 22. Further, the arbitration provisions contained in the CC&Rs would not be binding on any subcontractors. As the subcontractors would not be required to arbitrate, there would be inconsistent results – those reached in arbitration versus the court, along with a duplication of

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efforts, and no saving of costs. As written, the CC&Rs would give US HOME the sole right to bring subcontractor parties in the separately arbitrated matters or to consolidate proceedings.

- In Paragraph 18, page 3, of the PSA, the "Seller shall have the option to include its 23. subcontractors and suppliers as parties in the mediation and arbitration". There is no bilaterality in the sole option of DEFENDANT to include subcontractors and suppliers in mediation and arbitration. This provision is impermissibly one-sided as it divests PLAINTIFFS of the similar right to include subcontractors and suppliers that it would ordinarily be given under NRS Chapter 40 in litigation. Further, Paragraph 18 of the PSAs requires the parties to equally share the costs of the arbitration, and implicitly to bear their own attorneys' fees. Such provisions contradict the policies underlying NRS 40,600 et seq. which provide the claimant is entitled to reimbursement of his or her attorney's fees if a constructional defect is proven, and the contractor or builder elected not to inspect and repair. See NRS 40.655. This is in abrogation of a claimant's right under NRS Chapter 40, which alone is enough for a finding of substantive unconscionability. See Gonski v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 126 Nev. , 245 P.3d 1164, 1173 (2010). In addition, under Nevada law, the prevailing party is entitled to reimbursement of costs. See NRS Chapter 18. In this Court's view, such provisions, essentially stripping the home buyer of his entitlements, indicate "impermissible one-sidedness". Furthermore, the PLAINTIFFS were not given the opportunity to negotiate the terms of such provisions, therefore they were contracts to "take it or leave it", which are impermissibly adhesive. All in all, this Court concludes that the arbitration provisions in the CC&Rs and in Paragraph 18 of the PSAs are "substantively unconscionable" consistent with the findings in D.R. Horton, Gonski, and Burch cases.
- 24. As the arbitration provisions in both the CC&Rs and PSAs are both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, the Court finds that the arbitration provisions are unenforceable.

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1	Accordingly, and based upon the aforementioned Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
2	Law,
3	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that DEFENDANT U.S.
,4°	HOME CORPORATION'S Motion to Compel Arbitration filed April 30, 2015 is denied.
5	DATED this 18 day of 2015.
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8	HONORABLE JOANNA S. KISHNER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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10	Respectfully submitted by:
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12	
13	Gregory H. King, Esq. Sarah J. Odia, Esq.
14	PAYNE & FEARS LLP 7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 525
15	Las Vegas, NV 89128
16	Attorneys for DEFENDANT
1.7	U.S. HOME CORPORATION
18	4837-5337-6549.1
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1 **NEOJ** Gregory H. King, Bar No. 7777 ghk@paynefears.com Sarah J. Odia, Bar No. 11053 3 sjo@paynefears.com PAYNE & FEARS LLP 7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 525 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Telephone: (702) 851-0300 Facsimile: (702) 851-0315 6 Attorneys for Defendant 7 U.S. HOME CORPORATION 8

Hun J. Com

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE MICHAEL BALLESTEROS TRUST: RODRIGO ASANION, individually; FEDERICO AGUAYO, individually; FELIPE ENRIQUEZ, individually: JIMMY FOSTER JR., individually; THE GARCIA FAMILY TRUST; ARNULFO ORTEGA-GOMEZ and ELVIRA GOMEZ-ORTEGA, individually; JOHN J. and IRMA A. OLSON, individually: OMAR PONCE, individually; BRANDON WEAVER, individually; JON YATES, individually; MINTESNOT WOLDETSADIK, individually; and ROES 1 through 500, inclusive.

Plaintiffs,

ν.

U.S. HOME CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; CAMPBELL CONCRETE OF NEVADA, INC. a Nevada Corporation; VALENTÉ CONCRETE, LLC. a Nevada Limited-Liability Company; RED ROSE, INC., a Nevada Corporation; REPUBLIC ELECTRIC, INC., a Nevada Corporation; and DOES 1 through 500, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. A-15-714219-D Dept. No. XXXI

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order was entered and filed on the 20th day of August, 2015, a copy of which is attached hereto.

DATED: August 21, 2015

PAYNE & FEARS LLP

By /s/ Sarah J. Odia

GREGORY H. KING, NV Bar No. 7777 SARAH J. ODIA, NV Bar No. 11053 7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 525 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Tel. (702) 851-0300

Attorneys for Defendant U.S. HOME CORPORATION

PAYNE & FEARS LLP

Ballesteros, et al. v. Greystone Nevada, LLC, et al. Clark County District Court Case No. A-15-714219-D

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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. .

I hereby certify that on August 21, 2015, I deposited a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing, **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER** in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at Las Vegas, NV, to the last known address as follows:

Duane E. Shinnick, Esq.
Melissa Bybee, Esq.
Bradley S. Rosenberg, Esq.
Shinnick, Ryan & Ransavage, P.C.
4001 Meadows Lane
Las Vegas, NV 89107
Tel/Fax: (702) 631-8014/(702) 631-8024
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/s/ Nancy Babas
Nancy Babas
An Employee of PAYNE & FEARS LLP

4850-5922-6914.1

10 11 ATTORNEYS AT LAW 7261 W. LAKE MEAD BLVD., SUITE 528 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128 (702) 851-0300 12 15

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Í FFCO Gregory H. King, Bar No. 7777 ghk@paynefears.com Sarah J. Odia, Bar No. 11053 sjo@paynefears.com PAŸNE & FEARS LLP 7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 525 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Telephone: (702) 851-0300 Facsimile: (702) 851-0315 6 Attorneys for Defendant U.S. HOME CORPORATION 7 8

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE MICHAEL BALLESTEROS TRUST; RODRIGO ASANION, individually; FEDERICO AGUAYO, individually; FELIPE ENRIQUEZ, individually; JIMMY FOSTER JR., individually; THE GARCIA FAMILY TRUST; ARNULFO ORTEGA-GOMEZ and ELVIRA GOMEZ-ORTEGA, individually; JOHN J. and IRMA A. OLSON, individually; OMAR PONCE, individually, BRANDON WEAVER, individually; JON YATES, individually; MINTESNOT WOLDETŠADIK, individually; and ROES 1 through 500, inclusive,

Plaintiffs,

U.S. HOME CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; CAMPBELL CONCRETE OF NEVADA, INC. a Nevada Corporation; 21 VALENTE CONCRETE, LLC. a Nevada Limited-Liability Company; RED ROSE, INC., a Nevada Corporation; REPUBLIC ELECTRIC, INC., a Nevada Corporation; and DOES 1 through 500, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. A-15-714219-D Dept. No. XXXI

FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

This matter, concerning DEFENDANT U.S. HOME CORPORATION'S

("DEFENDANT" or "US HOME") Motion to Compel Arbitration filed on April 30, 2015, came

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on for hearing on the 3rd day of June 2015 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before Department XXXI of the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for Clark County, Nevada with the honorable JUDGE JOANNA S. KISHNER presiding. PLAINTIFFS appeared by and through their attorney, DUANE E. SHINNICK, ESQ. of the law firm, SHINNICK, RYAN & RANSAVAGE, P.C.; and DEFENDANT U.S. HOME CORPORATION appeared by and through its attorney, GREGORY KING, ESQ. of the law firm, PAYNE & FEARS LLP. All other appearances noted in the record. Having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file herein, and heard the oral arguments of the attorneys, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

- 1. PLAINTIFFS THE MICHAEL BALLESTEROS TRUST; RODRIGO ASANION: FEDERICO AGUAYO; FELIPE ENRIQUEZ; JIMMY FOSTER JR.; THE GARCIA FAMILY TRUST; ARNULFO ORTEGA-GOMEZ and ELVIRA GOMEZ-ORTEGA; JOHN J. and IRMA A. OLSON; OMAR PONCE; BRANDON WEAVER; JON YATES; and MINTESNOT WOLDETSADIK ("PLAINTIFFS") are alleged to be owners of individual residences within the "Azure Manor/Rancho de Paz" development located in Las Vegas, Nevada.
- 2. The "Azure Manor/Rancho de Paz" community was developed and/or built by DEFENDANT and sold to PLAINTIFFS, or PLAINTIFFS' predecessors, from approximately 2004 to 2005.
- On February 20, 2015, twelve (12) of the PLAINTIFF homeowner groups' filed 3. their Complaint against DEFENDANT as a result of an alleged multitude of constructional defects located within the single family residences and common area elements² located within the Azure Manor/Rancho de Paz community. The matter was assigned to Department XXXI.
- 4. On April 30, 2015, DEFENDANT moved this Court to compel all twelve (12) of the PLAINTIFF homeowner groups to seek redress of their construction defect disputes via arbitration (the "Motion") based upon arbitration provisions within the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions ("CC&Rs") of the Azure Manor/Rancho de Paz community where their homes are

¹ A "homeowner group" encompasses those owners who jointly own the residence.

² See PLAINTIFFS' Construction Defect Complaint filed on February 20, 2015, Paragraphs 3, 21, 22, 23, and 24.

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located. DEFENDANT further seeks to specifically compel arbitration for construction defects for PLAINTIFFS John and Irma Olson, and Michael Ballesteros, as trustee of the Michael Ballesteros Trust, based upon the arbitration provisions provided within Paragraph 18 of their purchase and sales agreements ("PSAs") entered into with DEFENDANT US HOME.

5. DEFENDANT argues that all PLAINTIFFS are bound by the CC&Rs, and the arbitration provisions contained therein. DEFENDANT further contends that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), Title 9 U.S.C. §§1 et seq. mandates enforcement of the arbitration provisions, and any state laws providing the contrary are preempted by the FAA. DEFENDANT asserts that the arbitration provisions are neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable, therefore such provisions must be enforced. PLAINTIFFS opposed the Motion stating that there are no valid agreements to arbitrate, that the FAA does not apply, that the arbitration provisions are procedurally and substantively unconscionable, the arbitration provisions are contrary to Nevada law, and that compelling arbitration would not be judicially efficient. There would have to be twelve (12) separate arbitrations (assuming that agreements to arbitrate were proven as to all PLAINTIFFS).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 6. In analyzing the matter, this Court first notes that in order to compel arbitration, DEFENDANT US HOME must show that there is a valid and enforceable agreement between the parties to arbitrate. See Mitri, et al. v. Arnel Management Company, et al., 157 Cal. App. 4th 1164, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 223 (Cal.App. 2007). Here, PLAINTIFFS do not dispute the existence of the arbitration provisions at issue, or that the claims fall within the scope of the arbitration provisions, but rather contend that the arbitration provisions are unenforceable in light of the NRS Chapter 40 protections of homeowner rights, and the fact that the provisions are unconscionable.
- 7. The United States Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements. See AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, __U.S.__, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011), citing Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008).

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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract

- 8. The United States Supreme Court has described Title 9 U.S.C. § 2 as reflecting both a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration," and the "fundamental principal that arbitration is a matter of contract." Keeping in line with these principles, the high court has held judges must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them according to their terms. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 131 S.Ct. at 1745-46.
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interstate commerce' if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent 'a general practice...subject to federal control." Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 53, 56-57, 123 S.Ct. 2037, 156 L.Ed.2d 46 (2003), quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236, 68 S.Ct. 996, 92 L.Ed.2d 1328 (1948). "Despite this expansive interpretation of the FAA, the FAA does not reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration." Zabinski v. Bright Acres Associates, 346 S.C. 580, 592, 553 S.E.2d 110, 116 (2001), citing Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (Emphasis added).

- Both state and federal jurisdictions addressing the issue have held the sale of 11. residential real estate is inherently intrastate, whereby the FAA does not apply. See Saneii v. Robards, 289 F.Supp.2d 855, 858 (W.D.Ky. 2003); SI V, LLC v. FMC Corporation, 223 F.Supp.2d. 1059, 1062 (N.D.Cal. 2002), citing Cecala v. Moore, 982 F.Supp. 609,612 (N.D.III. 1997); Bradley, 298 S.C. at 456, 730 S.E.2d at 317; see also Garrison v. Palmas Del Mar Homeowners Association, Inc., 538 F.Supp.2d 468, 473 (D.P.R. 2008). These courts reason that contracts strictly for the sale of residential real estate focus entirely on the commodity, which is the land firmly planted in one particular state. The citizenship of the immediate parties, the buyer and seller, or their movements to and from that state are incidental to the real estate transaction. That is, those movements are not part of the transaction itself.
- 12. In the present case, this Court concludes that the FAA does not apply to the arbitration agreements because the construction defect claims at issue relate to real property contained entirely within the state of Nevada, and therefore do not affect interstate commerce. Furthermore, no federal law is implicated by the construction defect claims. For these reasons, logic suggests such transactions are not among those considered as involving interstate commerce.
- Although the Court finds the FAA to be inapplicable here⁶, arbitration may still be 13. compelled pursuant to Nevada law. In Nevada, strong public policy favors arbitration, and such clauses generally are enforceable. Gonski v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 126 Nev. ____, 245 P.3d

⁶ Even if the FAA were found to apply, "[g]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening, ... [the FAA]". Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 1653 (1996).

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1164, 1168 (2010), citing D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 120 Nev. 549, 553, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (2004). The Supreme Court of Nevada has held that there is a "presumption of arbitrability" where there is an agreement to arbitrate. Phillips v. Parker, 106 Nev. 415, 417, 794 P.2d 716, 718 (1990). Even though the party seeking to enforce an arbitration clause bears the burden or proving the clause's valid existence, any party opposing the arbitration may establish a defense to enforcement. Gonski, 245 P.3d at 1169, citing D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 553, 96 P.3d at 1162.

- 14. The arbitration clause may be invalidated if it is found by this Court to be unconscionable. Cf Picardi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. ____, 251 P.2d 723, 726 (2011), effectively overruled by AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, U.S. , 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011), quoting Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 429, 216 P.3d 213, 226 (2009) ("Parties are free to contract, and the courts will enforce their contracts if they are not unconscionable, illegal, or in violation of public policy."). In order to find the arbitration provisions to arbitrate unconscionable, the Court must determine whether the arbitration provisions are both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 553, quoting Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 438, 442, 49 P.3d 647, ____ (2002). That is, a finding of unconscionability requires the "procedural" element focusing on "oppression" or "surprise" due to unequal bargaining power, and the "substantive" factor on "overly harsh" or "one-sided" results. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Service, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83, 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, __, 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000).
- 15. An arbitration agreement is "procedurally unconscionable when a party lacks a meaningful opportunity to agree to the clause terms either because of unequal bargaining power, as in an adhesion contract, or because the clause and its effects are not readily ascertainable upon a review of the contract." D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 554. "Procedural unconscionability" often involves the "use of fine print or complicated, incomplete or misleading language that fails to inform a reasonable person of the contractual language's consequences." D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 556. The defendant does not have a duty to explain in detail each and every right the plaintiff would be waiving by agreeing to arbitration for the provision to be enforceable. However, an

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arbitration clause, at the least, must be conspicuous and clearly place him or her on notice that he/she is waiving important rights under Nevada law. D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 556-57.

- 16. In the present matter, the Court finds that the arbitration clause set forth in the CC&Rs is procedurally unconscionable. The arbitration provision is located on page 76 of 86 of the CC&Rs, and is in the same sized font as the rest of the CC&Rs. The arbitration provisions are inconspicuously placed within the voluminous document, and there is nothing to draw attention to the average home buyer of the important rights being waived. The text of the arbitration provisions is not bolded or capitalized, is in the same font as the other provisions of the CC&Rs, and does not stand out to draw attention to the fact that significant rights are being waived.
- 17. Furthermore, the CC&Rs abrogate Nevada's Chapter 40 and are against public policy in requiring different timelines and/or additional procedures to bring construction defect claims. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that arbitration provisions in homes sales contracts (and presumably in CC&Rs) that abrogate a homeowner's NRS Chapter 40 rights are not enforceable as they are unconscionable and violate the public policy behind NRS Chapter 40. See Gonski v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 126 Nev. , 245 P.3d 1164 (2010). Here, the arbitration hearing is to be convened no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the arbitrator is appointed. This timeline and procedure is not mandated under NRS Chapter 40.
- 18. The arbitration provisions in Paragraph 18 of the PSAs are also procedurally unconscionable because they do not draw attention to the arbitration provisions. To the contrary, the text of the arbitration clauses is not capitalized or bolded to bring attention to such provisions. There is no explicit "construction defect" term mentioned indicating that such claims must be arbitrated. The arbitration clauses, like many others within the PSAs, are inconspicuous on page 2 of 4. There is nothing to highlight the importance of the arbitration provisions. Furthermore, the arbitration provisions are confusing because they state that claims should be arbitrated, not by or in a court of law. However, shortly thereafter the provisions state that "in the event the Homeowner's Warranty provided by Seller does not provide for binding arbitration, a claim under. or covered by, the warranty will be administered as provided in the warranty prior to submission to binding arbitration." It is therefore uncertain whether Plaintiffs must first proceed through a

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Homeowner's Warranty process prior to seeking arbitration for any claims. Even had Plaintiffs been aware that there were arbitration provisions and read them, it would be difficult to understand this confusing and apparently contradictory provision.

- 19. The arbitration provisions do not clearly state that the purchaser is waiving his right to a jury trial, nor does it mention any impact on the purchaser's rights under NRS Chapter 40. The Court finds that the arbitration provisions lack clarity. While a DEFENDANT does not have the duty to explain in detail each and every right the prospective home buyer would be waiving by agreeing to Paragraph 18, the arbitration provisions must be conspicuous and clearly place the purchaser on notice that he or she is waiving substantial rights under Nevada law. As previously indicated, PLAINTIFFS were not given an opportunity to negotiate the terms of the arbitration provisions, and/or that they would be given up certain important rights, including Chapter 40 rights. For these reasons, this Court concludes that Paragraph 18 of the PSAs is "procedurally unconscionable".
- 20. The next issue is whether the arbitration clauses in the CC&Rs and PSAs are "substantively unconscionable". "Substantive unconscionability" focuses on the "one-sidedness of the contract terms." D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 554. In D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 554, the Nevada Supreme Court relied upon the substantive unconscionability analysis employed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.2d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003). In that case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals required an arbitration agreement have a "modicum of bilaterality." Ting, 319 F.2d at 1149, quoting Armendariz, 99 Cal, Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d at 692.
- 21. Section 17.16 of the CC&Rs state that "costs of the arbitration shall be borne equally by the parties." The Nevada Supreme Court in the D.R. Horton case found substantively unconscionability when there was a requirement that each party pay equally for the costs of arbitration. D.R. Horton, 120 Nev. at 1165.
- 22. Further, the arbitration provisions contained in the CC&Rs would not be binding on any subcontractors. As the subcontractors would not be required to arbitrate, there would be inconsistent results – those reached in arbitration versus the court, along with a duplication of

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efforts, and no saving of costs. As written, the CC&Rs would give US HOME the sole right to bring subcontractor parties in the separately arbitrated matters or to consolidate proceedings.

- 23. In Paragraph 18, page 3, of the PSA, the "Seller shall have the option to include its subcontractors and suppliers as parties in the mediation and arbitration". There is no bilaterality in the sole option of DEFENDANT to include subcontractors and suppliers in mediation and arbitration. This provision is impermissibly one-sided as it divests PLAINTIFFS of the similar right to include subcontractors and suppliers that it would ordinarily be given under NRS Chapter 40 in litigation. Further, Paragraph 18 of the PSAs requires the parties to equally share the costs of the arbitration, and implicitly to bear their own attorneys' fees. Such provisions contradict the policies underlying NRS 40.600 et seq. which provide the claimant is entitled to reimbursement of his or her attorney's fees if a constructional defect is proven, and the contractor or builder elected not to inspect and repair. See NRS 40.655. This is in abrogation of a claimant's right under NRS Chapter 40, which alone is enough for a finding of substantive unconscionability. See Gonski v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 126 Nev. , 245 P.3d 1164, 1173 (2010). In addition, under Nevada law, the prevailing party is entitled to reimbursement of costs. See NRS Chapter 18. In this Court's view, such provisions, essentially stripping the home buyer of his entitlements, indicate "impermissible one-sidedness". Furthermore, the PLAINTIFFS were not given the opportunity to negotiate the terms of such provisions, therefore they were contracts to "take it or leave it", which are impermissibly adhesive. All in all, this Court concludes that the arbitration provisions in the CC&Rs and in Paragraph 18 of the PSAs are "substantively unconscionable" consistent with the findings in D.R. Horton, Gonski, and Burch cases.
- 24. As the arbitration provisions in both the CC&Rs and PSAs are both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, the Court finds that the arbitration provisions are unenforceable.

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Chapter 40 COURT MINUTES June 03, 2015

A-15-714219-D Michael Ballesteros Trust, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

U.S. Home Corporation, Defendant(s)

June 03, 2015 9:00 AM Motion to Compel

HEARD BY: Kishner, Joanna S. COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 12B

COURT CLERK: Sandra Harrell

RECORDER: Rachelle Hamilton

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: King, Gregory H. Attorney

Shinnick, Duane E. Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFENDANT U.S. HOME CORPORATION'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Extensive arguments by counsel. RULING DEFERRED; Court to further review and a Decision will issue from Chambers. If the Court receives written notification before 6/23/15 that parties jointly want matter stayed, then the Court will defer its decision until farther out.

CONTINUED FOR DECISION: 6/26/15 (CHAMBERS)

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

COLIDT MINILITEC

Chapter 40		COURT MINUTES	June 26, 2015
A-15-714219-D	vs.	steros Trust, Plaintiff(s) orporation , Defendant(s)	
June 26, 2015	3:00 AM	Motion to Compel	Defendant U.S. Home Corporation's Motion to Compel Arbitration
HEARD BY: Kishner, Joanna S.		COURTROOM:	
COURT CLERK: A	andrea Natali		
RECORDER:			
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESENT:			

JOURNAL ENTRIES

This matter came before the Court on June 3, 2015, on Defendant US Home Corporation's Motion to Compel Arbitration. Present at the hearing was Gregory King, Esq., counsel for Defendant US Home Corporation ("US Home") and Duane Shinnick, Esq., counsel for Plaintiffs. The Court deferred ruling on the motion to further review the issues presented. After a full review of all the papers, pleadings, documents on file, oral arguments of counsel, and all applicable statutes and case law, the Court finds as follows.

Defendant US Home seeks to compel arbitration for the construction defects alleged by Plaintiffs in this case. Defendant asserts that each of the homeowners is bound by the arbitration provision contained within the CC&Rs of the Rancho de Paz community where their homes are located, and that Plaintiffs John and Irma Olson and Michael Ballesteros, as trustee of the Michael Ballesteros Trust, are also specifically bound by the arbitration provisions in their purchase agreements with US Home. Plaintiffs do not dispute the existence of the arbitration provisions at issue, or that the claims fall within the scope of the agreements, but rather contend that the arbitration provisions are unenforceable in light of the NRS Chapter 40 protections of homeowner rights, and the

PRINT DATE: 09/10/2015 Page 2 of 4 Minutes Date: June 03, 2015

fact that the provisions are unconscionable.

Defendant first argues that the arbitration provisions are subject to the terms of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") codified in 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The Court finds that the FAA does not apply to the instant arbitration agreements, because the construction defect claims at issue relate to property contained entirely within the state of Nevada, and therefore do not affect interstate commerce. Furthermore, no federal law is implicated by the claims. As such, the Court finds that the FAA does not apply to the instant arbitration provisions.

Although the Court finds the FAA to be inapplicable here, arbitration may still be compelled pursuant to Nevada law. The Supreme Court of Nevada has held that there is a "presumption of arbitrability" where there is an agreement to arbitrate. Phillips v. Parker, 106 Nev. 415, 417, 794 P.2d 716, 718 (1990). In order to invalidate an arbitration agreement based on unconscionability, the Court must determine that the agreement is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. DR Horton v. Green, 120 Nev. 549, 553, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (2004).

Here, the Court finds the arbitration provision contained within the CC&Rs to be procedurally unconscionable. The provision is located on page 76 of 86 of the CC&Rs, and is in the same sized font as the rest of the CC&Rs. The provision is therefore inconspicuously placed within the voluminous document, and there is nothing to draw attention to the average home buyer of the important rights being waived. The format of the text also does not provide enough notice to Plaintiffs as well as the other aspects set forth in the pleadings. Furthermore, the procedural timing, requiring the matter to be heard no later than 180 days from when the arbitrator is appointed, is also inconsistent with NRS Chapter 40.

The Court further finds the arbitration provisions within the CC&Rs to be substantively unconscionable. The provision in the CC&Rs and the purchase agreements require the parties to pay equally for the costs of arbitration, which is inconsistent with the provisions of NRS Chapter 40. Thus under the ruling of DR Horton wherein the Court found a similar situation to be unconscionable the Court would in the present case find the provisions to not be appropriate. Furthermore, as the arbitration provision appears not to be binding on any subcontractors, the arbitration provision further creates the possibility of inconsistent results and duplicative proceedings. It also does not save costs or comply with other provisions of Chapter 40.

For the same reason as the CC&Rs, the provision in the purchase agreement is similarly procedurally unconscionable. Although the purchase agreement was only four pages, the arbitration provision appears on the second page, and is in the same sized font as the rest of the agreement. There is nothing to highlight or draw attention to the arbitration provision or separate it from the other provisions of the contract. The arbitration provision is also unclear as to what rights are being foregone and does not even mention the term "construction defects." To the extent that arbitration provision in the purchase agreement is less inconspicuous as it is on the second of four pages, it is still procedurally unconscionable because of the lack of clarity it provides for the rights that are being waived by the purchaser. Specifically, the provision first says that the claims should be arbitrated, not

A-15-714219-D

by or in a court of law, and then shortly thereafter states "in the event the Homeowner's Warranty provided by the Seller does not provide for binding arbitration, a claim under, or covered by, the warranty will be administered as provided in the warranty prior to submission to binding arbitration." The provision is therefore confusing and apparently contradictory in certain aspects. The provision does not clearly state that purchaser is waiving their right to a jury trial, nor does it mention any impact on the purchaser's rights under NRS Chapter 40.

The provision in the purchase agreement is substantively unconscionable because, like the agreements at issue in DR Horton, Gonski v. Dist. Ct., 126 Nev. Adv. Op. 51, 245 P.3d 1164 (2010) and Burch v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 438, 49 P.3d 647 (2002), the contract is adhesive and one-sided. Furthermore, the Seller has the option to include subcontractors as parties to the arbitration whereas the Buyer does not, potentially resulting, as noted above, in inconsistent results and duplicative proceedings. Gonski furthermore held that a provision which abrogates a homeowner's rights under NRS Chapter 40 are unconscionable and violate public policy.

As the arbitration provision in both the CC&Rs and the purchase agreements are both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, the Court finds the arbitration provision to be unenforceable, and as such, the Motion to Compel Arbitration is DENIED without prejudice.

As the instant minute order is a summary, incorporating the arguments of the opposition, Plaintiff's counsel is directed to prepare detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law with sufficient analysis of all of the relevant issues, consistent herewith, circulating to all parties for approval as to content and form, and submit to chambers within 10 days in accordance with EDCR 7.21.

CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of the foregoing minute order was distributed to the following parties via electronic mail: Gregory King, Esq. via ghk@paynefears.com and Duane Shinnick, Esq. via dshinnick@ssllplaw.com (6/26/15 amn).

Certification of Copy

State of Nevada
County of Clark

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET; FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES

THE MICHAEL BALLESTEROS TRUST; RODRIGO ASANION; FEDERICO AGUAYO; FELIPE ENRIQUEZ; JIMMY FOSTER JR.; THE GARCIA FAMILY TRUST; ARNULFO ORTEGA-GOMEZ; ELVIRA GOMEZ-ORTEGA; JOHN J. OLSON; IRMA A. OLSON; OMAR PONCE; BRANDON WEAVER; JON YATES; MINTESNOT WOLDETSADIK,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

U.S. HOME CORPORATION; CAMPBELL CONCRETE OF NEVADA INC.; VALENTE CONCRETE, LLC; RED ROSE, INC.; REPUBLIC ELECTRIC, INC.,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: A714219

Dept No: XXXI

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office. Las Vegas, Nevada This 11 day of September 2015.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Mary Kielty, Deputy Clerk

ORIGINAL CHECK HAS A COLORED BACKGROUND PRINTED ON CHEMICAL REACTIVE PAPER AMERICAN BUSINESS BANK ORANGE COUNTY REGION PAYNE & FEARS LLP 16-4280/1220 Jamboree Center, 4 Park Plaza, Sulte 1100 Irvine, CA 92614 DATE . CHECK ND. T 949,851,1100 . F 949.851.1212 087193 8/19/2015 TWO HUNDRED FIFTY AND XX / 100 Dollars **AMOUNT** ****\$250.00 Clerk of the Supreme Court PAY TO THE Void After 6 Months ORDER OF A-15-714219-D 2 Signatures Required on Amounts Over \$10,000.00 IMAGES THROUGH TO BACK OF SHEET

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