

EXHIBIT 8

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1 HARRIET H. ROLAND, ESQ. 2 CLERK OF THE COURT NV Bar No. 5471 ROLAND LAW FIRM 3 2470 E. St. Rose Pkwy, Ste. 105 4 Henderson, NV 89074 Telephone: (702) 452-1500 5 Facsimile: (702) 920-8903 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com 6 7 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 8366 8 TIFFANY S. BARNEY, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 9754 9 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 10 3317 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite B Las Vegas, NV 89102 11 Telephone: (702) 438-7878 Facsimile: (702) 259-1116 12 Attorneys for Christopher D. Davis 13 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 14 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 15 In the matter of: 16 Case No.: P-15-083867-T 17 Dept. No.: 26 The BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE 18 TRUST, dated July 28, 2000, as amended on Hearing Date: April 22, 2015 February 24, 2014. 19 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m. 20 21 22 ORDER 23 This matter came before the Court for hearing on the 22nd day of April, 2015 at 9:00 24 a.m., upon the Christopher D. Davis's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b) and NRCP 25 19 and Caroline Davis's Petition to Assume Jurisdiction over the Beatrice B. Davis Family 26 27 Heritage Trust, Dated July 28, 2000, as Amended on February 24, 2014, to Assume Jurisdiction 28 over Christopher D. Davis as Investment Trust Advisor and Stephen K. Lehnardt as Distribution

Trust Advisor, to Confirm Dunham Trust Company as Directed Trustee, and for Immediate Disclosure of Documents and Information from Christopher D. Davis. Christopher D. Davis was represented by Harriet Roland, Esq. of the Roland Law Firm and Anthony L. Barney, Esq., of the law office of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd., Caroline Davis was represented by Mark Solomon, Esq., of the law firm of Solomon Dwiggins and Freer, Ltd.; Stephen K. Lehnardt was represented by Jonathan W. Barlow, Esq. of the law office of Clear Counsel Law Group; and Dunham Trust Company was represented by Charlene N. Renwick, Esq., of the law office of Lee Hernandez Landrum & Garofalo. After reviewing the pleadings on file and in the court record, hearing oral arguments by both parties in this matter, being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby finds and orders the following:

IT IS FOUND that since the first amendment, Christopher has been directing the trust in Nevada, and that everyone involved relied on this amendment as being proper.

IT IS FURTHER FOUND that the Court has no affidavit that another beneficiary existed at the time the first amendment was signed.

IT IS FURTHER FOUND that the Court has jurisdiction as a constructive trust because action on behalf of the trust has been taken in Nevada.

IT IS SO FOUND.

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Petition to Assume Jurisdiction over Christopher D. Davis as Investment Trust Advisor is granted without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Petition to Assume Jurisdiction over Stephen K. Lehnardt as Distribution Trust Advisor is denied until a more definite statement is filed.

1 Approved as to Form and Content: 2 3 ANTHONY L. BARNEY CHARLENE RENWICK, ESQ. 4 Nevada Bar No. 8366 LEE, HERNANDEZ, LANDRUM. TIFFANY S. BARNEY, ESO. GARFOFALO, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 5 Nevada Bar No. 9754 7575 Vegas Drive, Suite 150 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 3317 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite B Telephone: (702) 880-9750 7 Las Vegas, NV 89102 Facsimile: (702) 314-1210 Telephone: (702) 438-7878 Attorneys for Dunham Trust Company 8 Facsimile: (702) 259-1116 Attorneys for Christopher D. Davis 9 10 Approved as to Form and Content: 11 12 13 MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ. NV Bar No. 0418 14 JOSHUA M. HOOD, ESQ. NV Bar No. 12777 15 SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 16 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 17 Telephone: (702) 853-5483 18 Facsimile: (702) 853-5485 Attorneys for Caroline D. Davis 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28



EXHIBIT 9

NOTC 1 HARRIET H. ROLAND, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5471 CLERK OF THE COURT 2 ROLAND LAW FIRM 2470 E. Saint Rose Pkwy., Suite #105 3 Henderson, Nevada 89074 Telephone: (702) 452-1500 Facsimile: (702) 920-8903 4 Email: hroland@rolandlawfirm.com 5 Attorney for Christopher D. Davis 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 In the Matter of Case No.: P-15-083867 Dept. No.: Probate (26) 10 The BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE TRUST, dated July 28, 2000, as 11 amended on February 24, 2014. ROLAND LAW FURN 2470 E. Saim Rose Plays, Ste. 165 Henderson, NV 89074 12 13 (702) 152-1500 14 15 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 16 17 YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Order was entered 18 by the Court on June 24, 2015 in the above-entitled matter, a copy of which is attached hereto. 19 DATED this ______day of July, 2015. 20 ROLAND 21 22 HARRIET H. ROLAND, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5471 23 Attorney for Christopher D. Davis 24 25 26 27 28

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1 HARRIET H. ROLAND, ESQ. CLERK OF THE COURT 2 NV Bar No. 5471 ROLAND LAW FIRM 3 2470 E. St. Rose Pkwy, Ste. 105 Henderson, NV 89074 Telephone: (702) 452-1500 5 Facsimile: (702) 920-8903 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com 6 7 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8366 8 TIFFANY S. BARNEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9754 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 10 3317 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite B Las Vegas, NV 89102 11 Telephone: (702) 438-7878 Facsimile: (702) 259-1116 12 Attorneys for Christopher D. Davis 13 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 14 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 15 In the matter of: 16 Case No.: P-15-083867-T 17 Dept. No.: 26 The BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE 18 TRUST, dated July 28, 2000, as amended on Hearing Date: April 22, 2015 February 24, 2014. 19 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m. 20 21 22 ORDER 23 This matter came before the Court for hearing on the 22nd day of April, 2015 at 9:00 24 a.m., upon the Christopher D. Davis's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b) and NRCP 25 19 and Caroline Davis's Petition to Assume Jurisdiction over the Beatrice B. Davis Family 26 27 Heritage Trust, Dated July 28, 2000, as Amended on February 24, 2014, to Assume Jurisdiction 28 over Christopher D. Davis as Investment Trust Advisor and Stephen K. Lehnardt as Distribution 1

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Trust Advisor, to Confirm Dunham Trust Company as Directed Trustee, and for Immediate Disclosure of Documents and Information from Christopher D. Davis. Christopher D. Davis was represented by Harriet Roland, Esq. of the Roland Law Firm and Anthony L. Barney, Esq., of the law office of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd., Caroline Davis was represented by Mark Solomon, Esq., of the law firm of Solomon Dwiggins and Freer, Ltd.; Stephen K. Lehnardt was represented by Jonathan W. Barlow, Esq. of the law office of Clear Counsel Law Group; and Dunham Trust Company was represented by Charlene N. Renwick, Esq., of the law office of Lee Hernandez Landrum & Garofalo. After reviewing the pleadings on file and in the court record, hearing oral arguments by both parties in this matter, being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby finds and orders the following:

IT IS FOUND that since the first amendment, Christopher has been directing the trust in Nevada, and that everyone involved relied on this amendment as being proper.

IT IS FURTHER FOUND that the Court has no affidavit that another beneficiary existed at the time the first amendment was signed.

IT IS FURTHER FOUND that the Court has jurisdiction as a constructive trust because action on behalf of the trust has been taken in Nevada.

IT IS SO FOUND.

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Petition to Assume Jurisdiction over Christopher D. Davis as Investment Trust Advisor is granted without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Petition to Assume Jurisdiction over Stephen K. Lehnardt as Distribution Trust Advisor is denied until a more definite statement is filed.

1 Approved as to Form and Content: 2 3 ANTHONY L. BARNEY PSO CHARLENE RENWICK, ESQ. 4 Nevada Bar No. 8366 LEE, HERNANDEZ, LANDRUM. TIFFANY S. BARNEY, ESQ. GARFOFALO, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 7575 Vegas Drive, Suite 150 Nevada Bar No. 9754 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 6 3317 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite B Telephone: (702) 880-9750 7 Facsimile: (702) 314-1210 Las Vegas, NV 89102 Telephone: (702) 438-7878 Attorneys for Dunham Trust Company Facsimile: (702) 259-1116 Attorneys for Christopher D. Davis 10 Approved as to Form and Content: 11 12 13 MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ. NV Bar No. 0418 14 JOSHUA M. HOOD, ESQ. NV Bar No. 12777 15 SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 16 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 17 Telephone: (702) 853-5483 Facsimile: (702) 853-5485 18 Attorneys for Caroline D. Davis 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28



EXHIBIT 10

HARRIET H. ROLAND, ESQ. NV Bar No. 5471 CLERK OF THE COURT 2 ROLAND LAW FIRM 2470 E. St. Rose Pkwy, Ste. 105 3 Henderson, NV 89074 4 Telephone: (702) 452-1500 Facsimile: (702) 920-8903 5 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com 6 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESO. 7 Nevada Bar No. 8366 TIFFANY S. BARNEY, ESQ. 8 Nevada Bar No. 9754 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 9 3317 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite B 10 Las Vegas, NV 89102 Telephone: (702) 438-7878 11 Facsimile: (702) 259-1116 Attorneys for Christopher D. Davis 12 13 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 14 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 15 In the matter of: 16 Case No.: P-15-083867-T 17 Dept. No.: 26 The BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE 18 TRUST, dated July 28, 2000, as amended on February 24, 2014. 19 20 21 22 NOTICE OF PETITION AND PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE 23 ORDER DATED MAY 19, 2015 RE: PETITION TO ASSUME JURISDICTION 24 OVER THE BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE TRUST DATED JULY 28. 2000, AS AMENDED ON FEBRURARY 24, 2014, TO ASSUME 25 JURISDICTION OVER CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS AS INVESTMENT TRUST ADVISOR, STPEHEN K. LEHNARDT AS DISTRIBUTION TRUST ADVISOR. 26 TO CONFIRM DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY AS DIRECTED TRUSTEE, AND 27 FOR IMMEDIATE DISCLOSURE OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

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FROM CHIRSTOPHER D. DAVIS:

NOTICE: YOU ARE REQUIRED TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THIS MOTION WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND TO PROVIDE THE UNDERSIGNED WITH A COPY OF YOUR RESPONSE WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION.

FAILURE TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION MAY RESULT IN THE REQUESTED RELIEF BEING GRANTED BY THE COURT WITHOUT HEARING PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED HEARING DATE.

TO: Caroline Davis, through her attorneys Mark Solon, Esq. and Joshua Hood Esq. of Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd.

TO: Dunham Trust Company, through its attorney Charlene Renwick, Esq., of the law firm of Lee, Hernandez, Landrum & Garofalo,

TO: Stephen Lehnardt, through his attorney Jonathan Barlow, of Clear Counsel Law Group.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing motion on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Sturman in Dept. 26 of the Eighth Judicial District Court, located at 200 Lewis Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89155, on the 19th day of August 2015, at 9:00 am o'clock of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

Christopher D. Davis, by and through his attorneys HARRIET H. ROLAND, Esq., of the ROLAND LAW FIRM and ANTHONY L. BARNEY, Esq., of the law office of ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. hereby present their petition to reconsider this Court's order regarding Caroline Davis' petition to assume jurisdiction over the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust, dated July 28, 2000, as amended on February 24, 2014, to assume jurisdiction over Christopher D. Davis as Investment Trust Advisor, Stephen K. Lehnardt as Distribution Trust Advisor, to confirm Dunham Trust Company as Directed Trustee, and for immediate disclosure of documents and information from Christopher D. Davis. This pleading is based on the

| 1 | Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto, any exhibits attached hereto, and any |
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| 2 | oral argument that will be heard in this matter. |
| 3 | DATED this 14 th day of July, 2015 |
| 4 | Respectfully Submitted: |
| 5 | ROLAND LAW FIRM |
| 7 | HARRIET H. ROLAND |
| 8 | Nevada Bar No.: 5471 |
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. FACTS PRESENTED

Christopher Davis hereby incorporates the Facts Presented in his Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b) and NRCP 19 ("Original Motion") as if set forth fully herein. By way of summary, he alleges:

Christopher's mother, Beatrice B. Davis ("Beatrice"), a life-long resident of Missouri, created several trusts and did extensive, sophisticated estate planning after her husband Ilus W. Davis died. Her long-time attorney was the Missouri firm of Lehnardt & Lehnardt. She created the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Trust, in Missouri, on April 4, 1990, (the Revocable Trust) and the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust (the "FHT"), in Missouri, on July 28, 2000. She participated in the Davis Family Office, a Missouri limited liability company, formed on November 3, 1999. None of these entities had any Nevada contacts until the purported appointment of Dunham Trust Company on February 24, 2014.

Christopher Davis ("Christopher") and his wife Tarja are residents of Missouri. Caroline Davis is a resident of Washington. (Caroline and Christopher serve as co-trustees of the Revocable Trust which is administered under Missouri law, in Missouri.) Winfield Davis and his son Ace Davis are residents of Japan, but citizens of the United States. Stephen Lehnardt, the Trust Protector, is a resident of Missouri. Alaska Trust Company and its successor in interest, Alaska USA Trust Company, do business in Alaska and, upon information and belief, have no Nevada contacts. Among all the entities and assets, the only contact with Nevada is Dunham Trust Company, ("Dunham") which is alleged to be currently acting as directed trustee of the FHT. Even the Ashley Cooper insurance policy (the product of a tax-free exchange from the year 2000), which is the primary asset of the trust and the subject matter of Caroline's petition,

is not administered in Nevada. It is administered under a custodian domiciled in Puerto Rico, and its investment advisor is a Canadian broker-dealer.

Dunham created FHT Holdings, LLC, ("FHT Holdings") on March 28, 2014, and transferred the insurance policy to it. Dunham is the 100% owner/member of FHT Holdings. Christopher is the manager, and Dunham purportedly acts as "directed trustee" pursuant to the purported First Amendment to the FHT dated February 24, 2014. Upon information and belief, the directed trustee and LLC structure was put into place by Dunham in an attempt to shield itself from the fiduciary liability inherent in holding large assets without diversification.

Christopher Davis, as manager of FHT Holdings, has no power over the Ashley Cooper policy, or over the Puerto Rico custodian, or over the Canadian broker-dealer investment adviser. Upon information and belief, the sole purpose of his appointment and the formation of FHT Holdings, LLC, was to shield Dunham from fiduciary liability for its action or inaction. Christopher receives no compensation or benefit in his position as manager of FHT Holdings. Because FHT Holdings is solely owned by Dunham, Christopher can be removed by Dunham at any time.

In the Order filed June 24, 2015, this Court found that "the Court has jurisdiction as a constructive trust because action on behalf of the trust has been taken in Nevada." Based on this finding that jurisdiction was proper this Court assumed Jurisdiction over Christopher D. Davis and granted immediate disclosure of "all information in his possession, custody and control in his role as investment trust advisor and or his role as manager of FHT holdings."

II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

¹ See Order, filed June 24, 2015

² Id.

A. Inherent Authority to Reconsider the Court's Prior Order

A court has inherent authority to reconsider its prior orders.³ Reconsideration is also proper pursuant to E.D.C.R. 2.24 which states in pertinent part:

- (a) No motions once heard and disposed of may be renewed in the same cause, nor may the same matters therein embraced be reheard, unless by leave of the court granted upon motion therefor, after notice of such motion to the adverse parties.
- (b) A party seeking reconsideration of a ruling of the court, other than any order which may be addressed by motion pursuant to N.R.C.P. 50(b), 52(b), 59 or 60, must file a motion for such relief within 10 days after service of written notice of the order or judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order....
- (c) If a motion for rehearing is granted, the court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument or may reset it for reargument or resubmission or may make such other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case.

A petition for reconsideration may is appropriate when there is clear error or to prevent manifest injustice, and when a court overlooks controlling decisions.⁴

B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Invalidates Nevada's Jurisdiction Due To
Absence of Conditions Precedent to Change of Situs from Alaska to Nevada.

The entirety of Caroline's petition and her opposition to the motion to dismiss, and her request for the Nevada court to assert jurisdiction over Christopher and the Revocable Family Trust, rests defectively upon the presumed validity of the change of situs of the Beatrice B.

³ Trail v. Faretto, 91 Nev. 401, 536 P. 2d 1026 (1975); Murphy v. Murphy, 64 Nev. 440 (1947).

⁴ Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 2004); See also Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 332 F.3d 147 (2nd Cir. 2003).

Davis Family Heritage Trust dated July 28, 2000 (the "FHT") from Alaska to Nevada, purportedly accomplished by the February 24, 2014 First Amendment.

It is important to note that the question of the validity of the change of situs is different than the question of the validity of the First Amendment. Although Caroline asserts that the purported First Amendment is "presumed to be valid unless proven otherwise", all the facts and evidence prove the change of situs (a condition precedent to any amendment) was invalid and not permitted under the terms of the FHT. The validity of the FHT (and presumably its amendments) must be determined under Alaska law, by the express mandate of Article 14, Section 6 of the FHT.

Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the FHT provides the requirements for a change of situs as:

Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of all of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting Protector and the Trustee thereof, which shall be given only after Trustee has obtained advice from counsel as to the tax and other consequences of a change in situs.⁵

The conditions precedent to the change of situs require that all of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions must consent to the change of the situs. In addition, both the FHT Trust Protector and Trustee must consent to the change of situs after the Trustee has been able to meet with an attorney to discuss the tax and other consequences of a change in situs, and after all the current income beneficiaries of the FHT have consented. These conditions did not occur. Therefore the situs of the FHT remains in Alaska, and jurisdiction

⁵ See Article 14, Section 4, Page 14-7, attached as Exhibit 1 to Caroline Davis's Original Petition (emphasis added).

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Caroline recognizes that Tarja Davis is a discretionary beneficiary of the FHT. This is immediately clear by a simple review of its terms of the FHT⁶ and by a simple review of the certificate of service.7 Furthermore, Caroline asserts and provides written proof that Alaska USA Trust Company ("Alaska USA") resigned as Trustee on December 5, 2013. The resignation of Alaska USA as Trustee occurred almost three months prior to the execution of the purported first amendment on February 24, 2014 and the appointment of Dunham Trust Company ("Dunham") as successor Trustee.

There is no evidence that anyone or any entity assumed the office of Trustee and was in authority to act and provide consent of the Trustee during the period between the resignation of Alaska USA in December 2013 and the purported first amendment appointing Dunham almost three months later. In contravention of the terms of the FHT, there was a purported change in situs made while there was no acting Trustee to provide informed consent to the change in situs. Further, it appears everyone overlooked the necessity of obtaining the consent Christopher's wife, Taria, who was and is a beneficiary entitled to discretionary distributions. Taria did not consent to the change in situs, and her signature cannot be found on any of the documents purporting to achieve the change in situs to Nevada and Dunham's appointment as successor trustee. Tarja was not given proper and adequate notice of the proceedings upon which this Court issued its order to protect her interests or file a responsive pleading.

See Trust, Article Three, Section 1, Page 3-1; See also Article Eight, Section 3.d., Page 8-4, See also Article 8-4.b.1-2, Pages 8-12 and 8-13 attached as Exhibit 1 to Caroline Davis' Original Petition.

⁷ See Certification of Service for Opposition to Chrisopher D. Davis' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP (12)(b) and NRCP 19 dated April 13, 2015 (This corrected mail service was belatedly and deficiently made by Caroline Davis after Christopher Davis filed his Motion to Dismiss alerting the parties as to the defectiveness of both the service of process and the defective nature of the purported first amendment). 8 1d.

The law of Alaska, as the situs and place of administration of the FHT before the attempted change of situs, and the place of residence of Alaska USA Trust Company, the then Trustee, governs the validity of the First Amendment's change of situs to Nevada, the appointment of Dunham, and the other terms of the First Amendment, as well as the validity of the First Amendment itself.

Article 12, Section 3 of the FHT requires "Any proceedings to seek judicial instructions or a judicial determination shall be initiated by my Trustee in the appropriate state court having original jurisdiction of those matters relating to the construction and administration of trusts. Because under the terms of the FHT, questions of validity must be determined under Alaska law, and Alaska was the original jurisdiction of the FHT until the attempted change of situs, an Alaska court must determine whether the change of situs and the First Amendment were valid. Only then should the Nevada court take jurisdiction over the FHT, and only if jurisdiction is then appropriate.

Alaska law allows for modification of an irrevocable trust upon consent, but only by court approval. AS 13.36.360. Modification or Termination of Irrevocable Trust By Consent, reads:

(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, on petition by a trustee, settlor, or beneficiary, a court may modify or terminate an irrevocable trust if <u>all</u> of the beneficiaries consent and if continuation of the trust on the existing terms of the trust is not necessary to further a material purpose of the trust. However, the court, in its discretion, may determine that the reason for modifying or terminating the trust under the circumstances outweighs the interest in accomplishing the material purposes of the trust. The inclusion of a restriction on the voluntary or involuntary transfer of trust interests under AS 34,40.110 may constitute a material

purpose of the trust under this subsection, but is not presumed to constitute a material purpose of the trust under this subsection.

- (b) Unless otherwise provided in the trust instrument, an irrevocable trust may not be modified or terminated under this section while a settlor is also a discretionary beneficiary of the trust.
- (c) If a beneficiary other than a qualified beneficiary does not consent to a modification or termination of an irrevocable trust that is proposed by the trustee, settlor, or other beneficiaries, a court may approve the proposed modification or termination if the court determines
- (1) if all the beneficiaries had consented, the trust could have been modified or terminated under this section; and
- (2) the rights of a beneficiary who does not consent will be adequately protected or not significantly impaired.
 - (d) In (c) of this section, "qualified beneficiary" means a beneficiary who
- on the date the beneficiary's qualification is determined, is entitled or eligible to receive a distribution of trust income or principal; or
- (2) would be entitled to receive a distribution of trust income or principal if the event causing the trust's termination occurs.

It is well settled that a trust may only be modified in accordance with its specific terms. 9

Where a trust instrument requires the consent of specific parties in order for an amendment to be

⁹ Dallinger v. Abel, 199 Ili. App. 3d 1057, 1059-1060 (Ili. App. Ct. 1990) citing Parish v. Parish (1963), 29 Ili. 2d 141, 149, 193 N.E.2d 761, 766.) (It is elementary that if the method of exercising a power of modification is described in the trust instrument, the power can be asserted only in that manner.)

valid, the lack of consent will invalidate a purported amendment. This required consent demonstrates the importance of having Alaska USA Trust Company ("Alaska USA") or their successor-in-interest (and predecessor trustee) Alaska Trust Company demonstrate authority and consent to change the situs of the FHT from Alaska to Nevada, because unless this evidence of consent is provided, the FHT situs cannot be changed. The consent of <u>some</u> of the beneficiaries and the FHT Trust Protector was not enough to meet the strict requirements of the condition precedent (i.e. change of situs) for the purported First Amendment.

Caroline has provided no evidence of any written or even oral consent of any trustee authorizing the FHT's change in situs prior to Alaska USA's resignation on December 5, 2013. She has not provided any evidence of Tarja having consented to the change of situs. In fact, she never even provided proper statutory notice to Tarja to enable her to file even a simple affidavit to protect her rights under the Trust. She has not provided any evidence of the unanimous agreement of Beatrice Davis's children to appoint a successor trustee in the event the Trust Protector fails to appoint a Successor Trustee within thirty (30) days after Alaska USA resigned, and even if they had, the successor trustee and Tarja would have had to consent to the change of situs. Therefore, the change of situs under the purported First Amendment must be presumed invalid until such evidence of an acting Trustee's consent can be produced and evidence of the Trustee's and all beneficiaries' consent of the change in situs can be obtained. Further and most importantly, such a dispute, which includes the validity of the First

¹⁰ Williams v. Springfield Marine Bank, 131 [II. App. 3d 417, 475 N.E.2d 1122 (1985) (This rule was applied where the trust instrument permitted amendment by the settlors, the appellate court holding that an attempted amendment by only one settlor, after the other had died, was invalid.); See also Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 331, Explanatory Notes, comment e, at 144 (1959) ("If the settlor reserves a power to modify the trust only with the consent of one or more of the beneficiaries, or of the trustee, or of a third person, he cannot modify the trust without such consent.").

¹¹ See Trust, Article Eleven, Section 3(c), Page 11-3, attached as Exhibit 1 to Caroline Davis's Original Petition.

Amendment, must be brought in Alaska, as the original situs of the FHT before the purported First Amendment and the attempted change of situs.

Christopher asserts that the change of situs is invalid because of the lack of consent of all beneficiaries and the absence of action by an Alaska Trustee. The determination of the validity of the purported First Amendment and the change of situs (as well as its other provisions) is a condition precedent to the Nevada court taking jurisdiction over the FHT. That determination must be made under Alaska law before the Nevada court can assert jurisdiction over the FHT. Caroline alleges that the FHT Trust Protector validly appointed Dunham as successor Trustee on February 24, 2014, citing the second paragraph of Article 14, Section 6 as his authority to do so; however as noted herein, she omitted the preceding paragraph relating to the change of situs which is the condition precedent before an amendment can be authorized. Although the FHT authorizes the Trust Protector and/or the beneficiaries to appoint a successor trustee in certain circumstances, the change of situs could only be authorized upon consent by all beneficiaries, and approval by a trustee in the original situs of Alaska

When the terms of a trust are not followed, the resulting actions based upon such deviation must be invalidated. Under the terms of the FHT, discussed above, it was not Dunham's consent that was required to change the situs. The timing of the purported First Amendment and Dunham's consent put the cart before the horse. In order to move the situs of the FHT from Alaska to Nevada or any other jurisdiction, all the beneficiaries had to consent, the "then acting Trust Protector" had to consent, and the Alaska trustee had to consent only after obtaining the requisite legal advice. Only then could a change in situs occur. (This is a

¹² Northwestern University v. McLoraine, 108 III. App. 3d 310, 438 N.E.2d 1369 (1982) (This rule was applied where the settlor had neglected to follow the terms of the trust which required for an amendment only that the settlor put the amendment in writing, sign it, and deliver it to the trustees during the settlor's lifetime.)

different and more demanding standard than merely changing the trustee to another Alaska trustee. Another Alaska Trustee could have been appointed, and the consent of all the beneficiaries could have been obtained; then upon agreement by the Trustee, all beneficiaries, and the Trust Protector, the situs could have been validly changed. However, the FHT's purported First Amendment attempts to change the FHT's situs while concurrently appointing Dunham as a "directed trustee". Again, Dunham's valid appointment as a Trustee, and its consent to serve, could have been achieved only after the situs of the FHT was changed from Alaska to Nevada. Had all of the beneficiaries consented, the decision to change the situs may have found a more stable legal basis had Dunham been doing business in Alaska. But as a Nevada trustee, Dunham would have had to already be in tenure as trustee, procured advice from legal counsel about the tax and other consequences of moving the FHT situs, and then authorized the actual change in FHT's situs from Alaska. The requisite consent of an authorized Alaska trustee and all the beneficiaries does not appear in the purported First Amendment or in any other document, and Caroline Davis does not provide any other evidence of a Trustee's consent between December 2013 and February 2014. The condition precedent of all the beneficiaries' consents and the Alaska trustee's consent was not met in order to provide authority to then acting Trust Protector, Stephen Lehnardt, to change the situs of the FHT without the consent of an Alaska Trustee as required by the terms of the FHT. The FHT's purported First Amendment's change of situs is, therefore, invalid.

Establishing the validity of the FHT's purported First Amendment under NRS 164.010 without invoking Alaska jurisdiction is Caroline's "attempted foothold" in her urging for this Court to take improper *in rem* jurisdiction over the FHT, FHT Holdings, and personal jurisdiction over Dunham, but more importantly is the defective basis upon which she urges this

Court to assume jurisdiction over Christopher in all his capacities within any family entity, foreign or domestic, including the Revocable Trust and the Davis Family Office which are residents of Missouri. Even assuming arguendo that jurisdiction is proper through the untenable theory that the purported First Amendment is valid, this Court is only statutorily authorized to obtain jurisdiction over the FHT if the prerequisites of NRS 164.010 are met. As such, Caroline is more than willing to overlook the FHT's requirements for change of situs and the jurisdictional prerequisites, and arrive at the erroneous conclusion that somehow Christopher and Mr. Lenhardt "consented to the jurisdiction of this Court by operation of law." Noticeably, Caroline cites NRS 163.5555 as authority for this statement but ignores the requirement that the FHT be subject to the laws of Alaska, which, is clearly in dispute precisely because of the invalidity of the purported First Amendment's change of the FHT's situs to Nevada.

It is clear that even during the life of Beatrice B. Davis, the situs of the FHT could not be changed unless her Alaska trustee had obtained an opinion of legal counsel to the effect that the change in situs would not impact adversely on the spendthrift provisions of the FHT. The express purpose of the FHT was to support and protect Beatrice's family for generations to come, through the protection for the shares allocated to each beneficiary, so that no situation would be created that could expose any of the beneficiary's shares to the claims of creditors including amongst any beneficiary acting as a creditor to another. In the same of the shares allocated to each beneficiary of the claims of creditors including amongst any beneficiary acting as a creditor to another.

Beatrice Davis, the trustmaker, was very clear that even if a power was granted to her Trustee by applicable state and federal statutes, it would be strictly limited to any express limitations or contrary directions in the FHT. Any amendment to change the situs of the FHT

¹³ See Trust, Article Fourteen, Section 6, Page 14-7 and 14-8.

¹⁴ See Trust, Article 8, Section 3 (b), Page 8-3

¹⁵ See Trust, Article Thirteen, Section 3.z, Page 13-19.

would require the opinion of legal counsel as to its effect and be curtailed, if applicable, by the terms of the FHT. This protection is implicit in the requirement that the advice of legal counsel be sought by the Trustee prior to a change in situs of the FHT. There is simply no evidence to suggest that such an opinion was obtained by the Alaska Trustee prior to the purported change in FHT situs.

Because of the lack of evidence of the required consent by the Alaska trustee and all the beneficiaries, and because the Alaska trustees initiated and completed all the transactions for which Caroline is demanding an account, the presence of the predecessor Alaska trustees acting prior to February 24, 2014 (the date of the purported First Amendment) is indispensable to this matter, in order to determine the validity and consent issues discussed herein. Without the indispensible party(ies) being joined, including Alaska Trust, the predecessor trustee and successor in interest of Alaska USA, and/or another Alaskan successor after December 5, 2013, the matter cannot properly adjudicated.

C. Indispensible Parties to this Action and Caroline's Failure to Provide Notice or Service

Caroline alleges that, "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska¹⁷ and Alaska USA distributed approximately \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, to Christopher individually, as Trustee of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust, dated April 4, 1990, as amended (the "Revocable Trust"), and as Manager of the Davis Family Office, a Missouri limited liability company (the "Davis Office"). Caroline apparently believes that the Alaska trustees which allegedly procured more than two million

¹⁶ See Trust, Article Fourteen, Section 6, Page 14-7 and 14-8.

Alaska Trust Company was the predecessor trustee of the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust dated July 28, 2000 prior to Alaska USA Trust Company.

dollars in policy loans from Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy for various FHT purposes, including making loans to Beatrice and paying their own fees, are not indispensible parties, simply because she alleges that, Christopher, in his individual capacity, and in capacity as Trustee of the Revocable Trust, and as Manager of the Davis Office, was the only individual to receive distributions as a result of such loans and the only one privy to the information sought by Ms. Davis,..." Her allegation is misplaced and unsupported by the evidence that was tendered to the Court.

Caroline apparently believes that neither Beatrice, nor the Alaska trustees, nor any other entity, were the recipients of any of the FHT funds borrowed from the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, which based upon the administration expenses by Alaska and/or Alaska USA or the Trust Protector is improbable at best. Under Alaska law and almost every other jurisdiction in the United States, a trustee is entitled to fees, and the mandate of an accounting of trust assets is directed to the trustee that actually administered the trust funds or assets, not to a beneficiary or other creditor or debtor of the trust. ¹⁹ In this case, those trustees required to account would be Alaska Trust and Alaska USA (now merged into Alaska USA) and they are the only ones who could account for these transactions and whether or not they received any of those funds including but not limited to their administration costs or other investment expenses. Because only they would have such information, they are a necessary and indispensible party. Caroline's request would greatly prejudice and unduly burden Christopher to secure information from the prior trustees in Alaska for documentation that Caroline desires through a proceeding in Nevada, during the time that she had co-equal status with him as a beneficiary. Alaska and/or Alaska USA would be the proper parties from whom to request her requested information.

¹⁸ See Opposition at 7:20-22.

Notably, Caroline alleges that Dunham Trust Company is an indispensible party, having allegedly received a mere \$25,000 of the total amount of policy loans (presumably for its fees and expenses) while Alaska and Alaska USA are not indispensible parties after having allegedly received and distributed \$2,164,744.68 as well as allegedly transferring all the assets of the FHT to Dunham. Even the \$25,000 allegedly received by Dunham Trust Company was never proven or the basis upon which to take jurisdiction. Interestingly, the information Caroline Davis is requesting would be in the possession of the two Alaska trustees that she claims are not indispensable, which is an unreasonable argument. It is unclear if Caroline even bothered to request an accounting from either Alaska Trust or Alaska USA concerning their alleged receipt and distribution of \$2,164,744.68, or from Dunham regarding the \$25,000 that was allegedly loaned during Dunham Trust Company's alleged trusteeship before rushing to this court for a remedy. As a beneficiary, she could have easily requested this information from these trustees without filing the present court action.

Because of her rush to court without apparently requesting these documents from the trustees, Caroline now attempts twice to indicate that she is "not now objecting to the loans and distributions being made or claiming any breach of fiduciary duty..." or she "is not now claiming any willful misconduct or gross negligence by Alaska or Alaska USA." However, whether or not she is now objecting to loans or making claims against Alaska or Alaska USA is irrelevant to the fact that they are the parties holding the information she seeks. She has asked this Court to assume jurisdiction over the Nevada trustee, the FHT, the Trust Protector and trust adviser, and if she succeeds, she will likely file any future action in this same Nevada case. Therefore, her allegation that "Alaska and Alaska USA have no interest in the outcome of the

¹⁹ See Alaska Statute 13.36.080; See also NRS 164.015 and NRS 153.031(1)(h).

relief being sought by Ms. Davis in her Petition" is simply a pretext for allowing her to later name them as party defendants. In addition to Christopher, Alaska and Alaska USA would have every interest in the outcome of this action because they were trustees of the Trust who made the Trust loans which are the subject of Caroline's concerns, and over which she has asked this Court to exercise *in rem* jurisdiction. Furthermore, they were trustees for the time periods in which Caroline seeks all information and, therefore, logically any information and/or claims arising from the information in Alaska and Alaska USA's possession are relevant to them.

Relying on the purported validity of the First Amendment to the FHT, Caroline comes to the misleading conclusion that according to her, "[because] Dunham Trust lacked the authority to act, the transfer of the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy must have been done at the direction of Christopher, as Investment Trust Advisor." Noticeably, Caroline removes any reference to the Alaska or Alaska USA Trustees who would have the information, and who approved any alleged transfers and have the information pertaining thereto. Caroline freely omits information to wrongfully obtain the information she seeks. She further ignores that Christopher, as manager of an LLC wholly owned by the Trustee would not have the authority to transfer the policy to the FHT Holdings, LLC. Caroline leaps to her finger-pointing apparently without bothering to request the transfer documents either from Dunham, as owner of the FHT Holding, LLC or the Puerto Rico custodian.

Caroline is simply attempting to gain access to records that she could request from the parties that she claims are not indispensable, and to delve into Christopher's personal affairs. She has asked for an accounting from him as to the use of all the loan proceeds or distribution from the FHT, without regard to the entity or person who in fact was the borrower! It is a

²⁰ See Page 7, lines 24-25 and Page 8, lines 17-18 of Caroline Davis's Objection.

question for the Alaska trustee as to whether the loans or distributions were made in accordance with the provisions of the FHT. With 20/20 hindsight, Caroline may regret that she did not borrow funds, request distributions, or demand an accounting from the Alaska trustees while she was able to do so. Now she is asking this Court to turn a blind eye and "look beyond" her failure to even make any appropriate request on the proper parties or serve the proper parties that would have the information that she is seeking. Christopher respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its order and grant his motion to dismiss and further deny Caroline's claims in their entirety.

D. Individual Parties or Entities Were Not Properly Served for the Court to Exercise Jurisdiction, and FHT Holdings' Corporate Form May Not Be Disregarded

In an effort to buttress their argument regarding their lack of proper service upon FHT Holdings, LLC, Caroline cited to inapplicable case law from Surrogate's Court of New York, New York County, which does not address the necessity of providing proper service to a corporation. In similar fashion to her omission of the language of the FHT as it related to the condition precedent to any future amendment, she even withheld the pertinent language for the cited case which actually held that, "It is sometimes said that where an estate or trust owns all or substantially all of the shares of a corporation, the corporate form may be disregarded and the situation viewed just as if the fiduciaries held title to the corporate assets. This would appear to be an oversimplification of the matter. It is not so much a matter of disregarding the corporate form, but rather of giving paramount consideration to the testamentary plan and scheme, and effectuating it in the manner prescribed by the testator. (citation omitted) Sometimes, due consideration of the testamentary plan demands that the corporate form be respected. This is

²¹ Petition at 7:5-6.

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Under the facts of this case, Beatrice, as Trustmaker, did not form FHT Holdings, Inc.,

one formed during his lifetime. (citation omitted).²²

particularly true where the testator directed the formation of a corporation or the continuance of

and did not specify that FHT Holdings, Inc. be given consideration as part of her testamentary plan and scheme. Based upon the definition of the case cited by Caroline, she is attempting to oversimplify this matter, which cannot be done with regard to the facts presented in this matter.

Furthermore, in Swensen v. Sheppard, our Nevada Supreme Court recognized that NRS 164.010(1) and NRS 164.015(6) do not give the court jurisdiction to impose personal iudgments.23 Likewise, it found that it could not impose personal liability on individuals or entities which "required the court to acquire 'personal jurisdiction over [them as] part[ies], normally through appropriate process based on contacts with the jurisdiction or through [their] general appearance therein to defend on the merits."24

In her Opposition, however, Caroline attempts to request this court take exception to the requirements for proper service and notice, which is entirely improper. Caroline is attempting to use the relaxed standards of statutory in rem jurisdiction for the more stringent requirements necessary to obtain the necessary personal jurisdiction over Christopher Davis, individually or upon FHT Holdings, LLC. Again, this is improper. Proper notice and service are required for personal jurisdiction over a party especially when requesting the court to exercise power and authority over an individual party or upon a business entity.

²² In the Matter of Schnur. 39 Misc. 2d 880, 887, 242 N.Y.S.2d. at 132 (1963).

²³ Swensen v. Sheppard (In re Aboud), 314 P.3d 941, 946 (Nev. 2013)

²⁴ Id, citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 30(2) cmt. c; see Young v. Nev. Title Co., 103 Nev. 436, 442, 744 P.2d 902, 905 (1987) ("A court does not have jurisdiction to enter judgment for or against one who is not a party to the action.")

Therefore, even if the Court were to obtain jurisdiction over the insurance policy administered by a Puerto Rico insurer with the advice of the Canadian broker-dealer investment advisor, Caroline would also have to seek personal jurisdiction over Christopher, individually, or FHT Holdings, LLC to obtain any relief she seeks. She did not do so.

Therefore, the due process rights of the corporation must be respected, and service properly administered in order to obtain jurisdiction over Christopher, individually, and as manager of FHT Holdings, LLC. Therefore, Caroline's Original Petition should be dismissed.

E. Additional Indispensable Parties Named in Opposition Were Not Served; therefore, Jurisdiction is Improper over Them.

Caroline admittedly did not include additional parties in her Original Petition that she now alleges were recipients of FHT funds and loans from the insurance policy. Caroline alleges that, "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska and Alaska USA distributed approximately \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, to Christopher individually, as co-Trustee (with her) of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust, dated April 4, 1990, as amended (the "Revocable Trust"), and as Manager of the Davis Family Office, a Missouri limited liability company (the "Davis Office"). In order to allegedly distribute loans, Alaska and Alaska USA must have been recipients of FHT funds. In order to make a loan of FHT funds to Alaska and Alaska, the custodian of the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy must have been in receipt of FHT funds. If, as alleged, FHT funds were received by Christopher, the Revocable Trust, and the Davis Family Office from Alaska and Alaska USA, all three would have been recipients of those funds as distributions. Of the prior six alleged recipients, none of them was afforded proper notice or service in this matter. Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction over these parties. Particularly, Nevada law does not

allow for this Court to take jurisdiction over the Revocable Trust and the Davis Family Office, which are Missouri entities, without examining the requirements necessary for jurisdiction over foreign entities holding only personal property.

Caroline, in effect, argues 1) the entity authorized to make the policy loan is not an indispensible party, 2) that the party making the loans or distributions does not even need to be noticed or served concerning the policy loans, 3) the only individual alleged as a recipient does not need to be served pursuant to NRCP 4; and 4) that notice or service either under NRCP 4 or NRS 155.010 does not need to be provided to the remaining alleged distributees and recipients of FHT funds. These four arguments violate all constitutionally protected due process rights and related laws existent in Nevada, and likely every other jurisdiction in the United States. Proper parties should be included in lawsuits affecting their rights or responsibilities and proper personal and subject matter jurisdiction should be obtained over all parties in such lawsuits.

Caroline admittedly understands the importance of obtaining *in rem* jurisdiction over a trustee of a trust pursuant to NRS 164.010, because she asks this Court to assume jurisdiction of the FHT pursuant to this statutory authority. Notwithstanding this admission, she sought jurisdiction over Christopher Davis, individually, as trustee of the Revocable Trust, and as manager for FHT Holdings without even bothering to properly serve them with personal service pursuant to NRCP 4. Furthermore, Caroline failed to serve the custodian of the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy of which she claims provided the loans to the FHT. Caroline did not even properly serve Tarja (a mandatory beneficiary for purposes of consent to the purported First Amendment) properly under 155.010, which failure further renders a fatal blow to any finding that Tarja subsequently acquiesced to purported First amendment which she never consented to in the first place. The aforementioned parties were admittedly never even properly served by

Caroline, and therefore her Petition must be dismissed for lack of proper jurisdiction over these parties.

Notice and service of process were never properly given to these parties, and the Court is without jurisdiction over them. Therefore, Caroline's claims in her Petition must be dismissed.

F. The Alaska Trustees are Indispensible Parties and Meet NRCP 19 Requirements; therefore, without a Joinder of these Parties, this Matter Must be Dismissed.

In Reply to the NRCP 19 factors discussed by Caroline in her Opposition, it is evident that Caroline belies her own statements. Caroline indicates on the one hand that Alaska and Alaska USA would not be "placed in a position in which they would need to protect any interest" while on the same page indicating that Caroline is "not **now** claiming any willful misconduct or gross negligence by Alaska or Alaska USA" suggesting that when she obtains any of Alaska or Alaska USA documents that possible claims are likely to follow. Alaska or Alaska USA must be allowed to defend themselves if necessary or protect themselves from liability in the accuracy of information that may be provided during their tenure as Trustees of the FHT to avoid claims of willful misconduct or gross negligence by Caroline. More importantly, they must be responsible for the information that Caroline seeks improperly from Christopher.

Christopher will be subjected to double or multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations in possibly many jurisdictions as a result of Caroline's claims without the necessary parties, Alaska and Alaska USA, joined to the present matter. Caroline seems to ignore the fact that she has now named multiple Defendants in this matter whose interests must all be considered,

²⁵ See Caroline's Opposition, Page 8, Jines 21-22.

See Caroline's Opposition, Page 8, lines 17-18 (emphasis added).

especially in light of the fact that proper service has not been effectuated on them for an order or judgment to be rendered against them in this matter.

Curiously, Caroline then requests the Court to seek relief from Christopher individually if the Court does find that Alaska and Alaska USA are indispensable parties. She wrongfully asks the court to order Christopher to provide the documents that are in the possession of Alaska and Alaska USA's without gaining proper jurisdiction over him individually. She wrongfully alleges that such a request would allegedly not be prejudicial to Christopher and allegedly would be an adequate remedy, although the requested documents would be in the Trustee's possession.

She also falsely alleges that Alaska cannot allegedly assume jurisdiction over Christopher, erroneously citing NRCP 19(b) for this proposition.²⁷ With proper service to Christopher, Caroline could obtain jurisdiction over Christopher in Alaska if Alaska has jurisdiction over the FHT.²⁸

Joinder of Alaska and Alaska USA, Inc., is necessary as previously explained in Christopher's Motion to Dismiss and herein. If their joinder is not feasible, then this matter must be dismissed, because they are necessary and indispensable parties to this matter.

G. The Court Cannot Assume Jurisdiction based on the Remedy of Constructive Trust as Jurisdiction is Subject to Statutory and Due Process Limitations

²⁷ See Caroline's Opposition, Page 9, lines 14-15 and fn 24.

²⁸ See AS 13.36.375. Trustee Advisor: (a) A trust instrument may provide for the appointment of a person to act as an advisor to the trustee with regard to all or some of the matters relating to the property of the trust. (b) Unless the terms of the trust instrument provide otherwise, if an advisor is appointed under (a) of this section, the property and management of the trust and the exercise of all powers and discretionary acts exercisable by the trustee remain vested in the trustee as fully and effectively as if an advisor were not appointed, the trustee is not required to follow the advice of the advisor, and the advisor is not liable as or considered to be a trustee of the trust or a fiduciary when acting as an advisor to the trust.; See also AS 13.36.035 (a) The court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the internal affairs of trusts, including trusts covered by (c) of this section. Except as provided in (c) and (d) of this section, proceedings that may be maintained under this section

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The Nevada Supreme Court reviews jurisdictional issues de novo. 29 In rem jurisdiction only allows the Court to enter judgment against specific property. 30 NRS § 164.010 provides that the court may take in rem jurisdiction over a trust statutorily if requisite evidence is found by the Court to exist. NRS 164.010 provides in pertinent part that:

- 1. Upon petition of any person appointed as trustee of an express trust by any written instrument other than a will, or upon petition of a settlor or beneficiary of the trust, the district court of the county in which the trustee resides or conducts business, or in which the trust has been domiciled, shall consider the application to confirm the appointment of the trustee and specify the manner in which the trustee must qualify. Thereafter the court has jurisdiction of the trust as a proceeding in rem.
- 2. If the court grants the petition, it may consider at the same time any petition for instructions filed with the petition for confirmation.
- 3. At any time, the trustee may petition the court for removal of the trust from continuing jurisdiction of the court.
- 4. As used in this section, "written instrument" includes, without limitation, an electronic trust as defined in NRS 163.0015.

However, this Court took jurisdiction not based upon the statutory prerequisites set forth in NRS § 164.010, but purportedly upon the theory of constructive trust.

Without even determining whether Christopher resides or conducts business here in the capacity of a trustee, the Court reasoned that purportedly since action has been taken here, the

are those concerning the administration and distribution of trusts, the declaration of rights, and the determination of other matters involving trustees and beneficiaries of trusts.

²⁹ Baker v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 527, 531, (2000).

³⁶ Chapman v. Duetsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (2013).

Court had the power to construct a trust and take jurisdiction. However, a constructive trust is a remedy the court can pronounce after establishing jurisdiction, not a means to obtain it.

In order to create a constructive trust the court must first have jurisdiction over the property. Here, the Court has no valid basis for jurisdiction over the Trust property. The change in situs is facially deficient because it does not have unanimous consent of all beneficiaries nor does it have the consent of an Alaska trustee provided after obtaining an opinion of counsel. Additionally, the sole asset of the trust, the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, is not within the state of Nevada. Finally, with an invalid change in situs the trust is still an Alaska trust, the role of investment trust advisor does not exist, and there is no connection whatsoever to Nevada. Alaska has jurisdiction over the trust and has the power to create a constructive trust over any property in Nevada. This Court simply did not have jurisdiction to create a constructive trust and therefore cannot exercise jurisdiction over the Trust or Christopher D. Davis based on the theory of constructive trust.

Even improbably assuming arguendo that there is some basis for *in rem* jurisdiction, where a state statute authorizes consent to jurisdiction based upon a finding of *in rem* jurisdiction, that statute is still subject to the requirements of federal due process. Federal due process requires that the defendant has purposely developed substantial minimum contacts with the forum state and that the assumption of jurisdiction does not violate traditional notions of justice and fair play. NRS §163.5555 provides that:

If a person accepts an appointment to serve as a trust protector or a trust adviser of a trust subject to the laws of this State, the person submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, regardless of any term to the contrary in an agreement or instrument. A trust protector

²¹ Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922, (9th Cir. 2001)

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or a trust adviser may be made a party to an action or proceeding arising out of a decision or action of the trust protector or trust adviser. 33 (emphasis added).

Assuming the untenable position that this Court had jurisdiction to create a constructive trust, this fact standing alone does not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Christopher D. Davis. NRS § 163.5555 provides jurisdiction over trust advisors, however the trust advisor may only be made a party to an action or proceeding based upon a determinant decision or action.

In order to understand the extent of jurisdiction granted under NRS § 163.5555, several factors must be considered. First, this statute must be read in conjunction with NRS § 164.010 which only provides the court limited *in rem* jurisdiction over trusts. Therefore, jurisdiction under NRS 164.010 acts a condition precedent to a finding of jurisdiction under NRS §163.5555, where the powers of an advisor are simply a subset of the overall fiduciary powers granted to a trustee, who may be confirmed under NRS 164.010.

Second, in order for NRS § 163.5555 to provide for jurisdiction over the trust advisor, it must comply with the requirements of federal due process. These requirements include a finding that the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, that the defendant purposefully availed himself of the laws of the forum state and that the assumption of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of justice and fair play. This court made no findings of minimal contacts, purposeful availment, or whether jurisdiction would offend notions of justice and fair play. The statute itself highlights that fact that a "trust adviser may be made a party to an action or proceeding arising out of a decision or action." Clearly, if the decision or action causing sufficient minimum contacts with the Trust in the state of Nevada is absent, there can be no jurisdiction over the trust adviser. This means, in effect, that liability is

³³ Nev. Rev. Stat. § 163.5555

tied to the decisions made by the advisor in the capacity of trust advisor. Therefore, this Court's exercise of jurisdiction over Christopher in his purported role as investment adviser is improper, as there is no evidence of any decision or action with the Trust in the state of Nevada.

This Court also lacks jurisdiction over Christopher as manager of FHT holdings. Assuming the court finds that the change in situs was not deficient or that it can legitimately assume jurisdiction over the Trust based on a theory of constructive trust and that NRS § 163.5555 allows the court to assume jurisdiction over Chris as investment trust adviser, the Court still did not properly establish jurisdiction over Christopher in his role as manager of the FHT. There is no statute that grants *in rem* jurisdiction individually over the manager of an LLC solely based on his or her acceptance of an officer's position. Additionally, as discussed above, due process requires a finding of minimum contacts, purposeful availment and that jurisdiction does not offend the notions of justice and fair play. Again this court entered no such findings to justify jurisdiction over Christopher as manager of the LLC. Christopher respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its order and grant his requested relief.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Christopher respectfully requests the Court do the following,

- Reconsider the Order filed June 24, 2015, and grant Christopher D. Davis's motion to dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(b) and NRCP 19;
- Reconsider the Order filed June 24, 2015, and vacate its finding of jurisdiction over Christopher D. Davis in his role as investment trust advisor and in his role as manager of FHT Holdings, LLC;
- Reconsider the Order filed June 24, 2015, and find that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Trust and over Christopher D. Davis based on the lack of condition precedent in the

form of a failure to procure unanimous consent by the Trust beneficiaries to change the Trust situs purportedly effectuated by the First Amendment dated February 24, 2014, and/or alternatively, based upon lack of statutory prerequisites as defined under NRS §164.010 to form a basis for jurisdiction and/or lack of determinant action or decision under NRS §163.5555 by the purported trust adviser.

DATED this 14 day of July, 2015.

Respectfully Submitted, ROLAND LAW FIRM

Harriet H. Roland, Esq.

NV Bar No. 5471

2470 E. St. Rose Pkwy, Ste. 105

Henderson, NV 89074 Telephone: (702) 452-1500 Facsimile: (702) 920-8903

hroland@rolandlawfirm.com

Attorney for Christopher D. Davis

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| 1 | CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE |
|----|--|
| 2 | I hereby certify that I am an employee of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd., and not a party to this action. |
| 3 | I further certify that except as otherwise noted on July 14, 2015, I served the foregoing |
| 4 | NOTICE OF PETITION AND PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DATED MAY 19, 2015 RE: PETITION TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER THE |
| 5 | BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE TRUST DATED JULY 28. 2000, AS |
| 6 | AMENDED ON FEBRURARY 24, 2014, TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS AS INVESTMENT TRUST ADVISOR, STPEHEN K. |
| | LEHNARDT AS DISTRIBUTION TRUST ADVISOR, TO CONFIRM DUNHAM |
| 7 | TRUST COMPANY AS DIRECTED TRUSTEE, AND FOR IMMEDIATE DISCLOSURE OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION FROM CHIRSTOPHER D. |
| 8 | DAVIS, by first class US mail, postage prepaid, upon the following persons or entities: |
| 9 | |
| LO | Tarja Davis |
| 11 | 3005 North Beverly Glen Circle |
| 12 | Las Angeles, California 90077 And |
| 13 | 514 West 26 th Street, #3E |
| | Kansas City, Missouri 64108 |
| L4 | Ace Davis |
| 15 | c/o Winfield B. Davis 366-6 Habu Aridagawa Arida |
| 16 | Wakayama 643-0025 |
| 17 | JAPAN |
| 18 | Christopher D. Davis |
| 19 | 3005 North Beverly Glen Circle Los Angeles, California 90077 |
| 20 | And |
| 21 | 514 West 26 th Street, #3E |
| | Kansas City, Missouri 64108 |
| 22 | Registered Agent Solutions, Inc. |
| 23 | Resgistered Agent for FHT Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company 4625 West Nevso Drive, Suite 2 |
| 24 | Las Vegas, Nevada 89103 |
| 25 | Stephen Lehnardt |
| 26 | 20 Westwoods Drive |
| 27 | Liberty, Missouri 64068 Stephen@lehnardt.com |
| | <u> </u> |

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| 1. | DUNHAM TRUST |
|----|--|
| 2 | c/o SHANNA CORESSAL, CTFA 241 Ridge Street, Suite 100 |
| 3 | Reno, Nevada 89501 |
| 4 | Winfield D. Davis |
| 5 | Winfield B. Davis 366-6 Habu Aridagawa Arida |
| 6 | Wakayama 643-0025 JAPAN |
| 7 | |
| 8 | Mark Solomon, Esq. Joshua Hood, Esq. |
| 9 | SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 9060 W. Cheyenne Ave. |
| 10 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 |
| 11 | Attorney for Petitioner Caroline Davis |
| 12 | Charlene Renwick, Esq. |
| 13 | Lee, Hernandez, Landrum & Garofalo |
| 14 | 7575 Vegas Drive, #150 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 |
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| 19 | |
| 20 | Employee of Anthony L. Barney |
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| 28 | |



EXHIBIT 11

Electronically Filed 07/28/2015 09:23:11 AM

CLERK OF THE COURT

DECL
Tarja Davis
3005 North Beverly Glen Circle
Los Angeles, California 90077
Appearing Pro Per

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of:

The Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust,

dated July 28, 2000

Case No.: P-15-083867-T

Dept. 26

DECLARATION OF TARJA DAVIS

- I, Tarja Davis, do hereby declare under penalty of perjury the following:
 - I am over the age of majority, and my current address is 3005 North Beverly Glen Circle in Los Angeles California, 90077.
 - 2. I am the wife of Christopher D. Davis.
 - Christopher D. Davis and I were married on February 22, 2012 in Los Angeles County and I have attached a copy of my marriage certificate to this affidavit.
 - 4. We have been living together since our marriage to one another in 2012.
 - 5. As the spouse of the Christopher D. Davis, I am a beneficiary of The Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust dated July 28, 2000, an Alaska Trust.
 - 6. I was not informed of any amendment to The Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust during the time of my marriage to Christopher B. Davis and did not consent to move the The Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust from Alaska to Nevada.

DECLARATION OF TARJA DAVIS - I

7. I was not informed of and did not consent to any change in situs of The Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust from Alaska to Nevada.

Dated this $\frac{\lambda^{\mu}}{2}$ day of July, 2015.

Tarja Davis, Declarant

DECLARATION OF TARJA DAVIS - 2

CALIFORNIA JURAT WITH AFFIANT STATEMENT

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- + See Allached Document (Notary to cross out lines 1-6 below)
- I See Statement Below (Lines 1-5 to be completed only by document signer(s), not Notary)

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

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Exhibit 1

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This is to certify that this document is a true copy of the official record filed with the Registrar-Recorder-County Clerk.

DEAN C. LOGAN

Registrar-Recorder/County Clark



sign on an amendment where they were only appointed in that same amendment? It's impossibly, Your Honor.

Clearly, the trust envisioned that it was the Alaska Trustee that would obtain advice and understanding from counsel before they agreed to transfer the situs. Dunham Trust couldn't even agree to have it transferred and administered under a situs other than Nevada because they're only licensed in Nevada to administer this trust and clearly it wasn't them.

So we know in this matter that neither the Trustee nor the beneficiary under the trust consented. So we didn't have all of the beneficiaries as required. We didn't have the Trustee, therefore no condition precedent of the situs actually being changed and thereby allowing any amendment to the trust. And that was originally what I raised in the first -- in my first pleading in the Motion to Dismiss. I expanded upon that in our Reply where I set forth the very parameters of what the Court needed in order to justify jurisdiction.

In effect, Your Honor, what we have is the -- it's the first time I've seen it in my career where someone is actually asking for information obviously in the context of an accounting not from the Trustee, Your Honor, but form the beneficiaries, the purported beneficiaries, of that distribution. Therein lies the concern. We've got several

entities that have been named as supposedly distributees of this money under the tenure of the Alaska Trustee to the tune of \$2.2 million at a time when Christopher Davis was not a fiduciary in any capacity. And yet, now under this purported amendment that's clearly defective, for the amount of \$25,000 apparently that Dunham Trust received most likely for their administration costs, that there is a backend run to try to use this \$25,000 out of the \$2.2 million to obtain jurisdiction to find documents that are in the possession of the prior Trustee who would have had to account for that under Alaska law and yet the recipients of that money are the ones that are being asked, under our statute, to account -- under a trustee statute, under 164.015.

And therein lies the indispensible party dilemma that we have. We've got a situation now where, A, the whole basis of their jurisdiction is based upon a faulty amendment that never should have occurred and to which Mr. Lehnardt, it's my understanding, has agreed is a faulty amendment based upon the fact that all of the parties were not brought to the table and the Trustee did not properly consent.

And then we have the issue, Your Honor, that is also concerning in that under NRCP 19(b), we're asking that the case be dismissed because the parties that are asked to

provide the documents apparently are all indispensible parties or not indispensible parties, according to Caroline, but apparently are indispensible for purposes of providing the documents that they need. None of the service in this matter was provided properly under 164.010.

And, in fact, let's look at the recipients that they want to receive the funds from or get an accounting of those funds. They want to get it from a distributee, the Davis Family Office, which is a Missouri Corporation.

Now, Your Honor, I don't see anything on the service record that would indicate that that Davis Family Office partnership was properly served. There's no Rule 4 service. I don't see anything that indicates that any of the companies that are considered persons under our law were properly served under Rule 4. They're using the relaxed standard of 155.010, essentially, to serve everyone and then those people that they want documents from that they think essentially they can dispense with, they don't notice it even at all.

And, so, we have a real dilemma here. One of the important things about the 164.010 jurisdiction is that it was given to courts essentially to reach out and to take jurisdiction over property, not persons. Even in the fact of trust proceedings, if we want to go against a Trustee, we've got to serve personal service and get a citation on

1 the Trustee because this Court has limited jurisdiction, and rightly so under the relaxed standards that are set 3 forth under 155.010, which is simply a mailing. There's no 4 clear understanding of whether or not any of these 5 individuals would even receive it under the relaxed 6 standard, but, in this case, we know that they didn't 7 receive it at all because they weren't even noticed up. 8 And the ones that were noticed up, in hindsight, when they 9 realized, oops we forgot, we didn't get that other 10 beneficiary's consent and therefore we have the invalidity 11 now of the first amendment, we're going to try to serve her 12 under 155.010 and send her notice through the mail at --13 not upon the original motion but upon their Opposition to 14 the Motion to Dismiss. 15

And, therefore, Your Honor, I would respectfully request that this matter be dismissed entirely for lack of jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm still trying to understand where they have an error in this amendment.

MR. BARNEY: Okay.

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THE COURT: I'm looking at Article 11.

MR. BARLOW: It's Article 14, Section 6 is where the change of situs provision.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BARNEY: It's on page 14-7.

1 THE COURT: So the issue is not changing the Trustee? That's not what you're arguing about? 2 3 MR. BARNEY: The --4 THE COURT: Your argument changing the situs? MR. BARNEY: The change in Trustee could 5 6 potentially be --7 THE COURT: Because that doesn't require it --8 MR. BARNEY: No. That could be potentially 9 changed by Mr. Lehnardt but it -- but the fact is it could 10 not be changed under an amendment unless the change in 11 situs had occurred in that regard. 12 So, his ability to appoint a Trustee in Nevada to 13 work over an Alaska trust where they're not licensed to do 14 so would obviously most likely be invalidated even under 15 that theory of whether or not he could appoint a Trustee. 16 Apparently, they're appointing a Nevada Trustee based upon 17 a defection -- or a defective change in situs which was --18 never occurred. 19 THE COURT: Yeah. 20 MR. BARNEY: And they did it --21 THE COURT: So --22 MR. BARNEY: -- in the same amendment. 23 THE COURT: So: Except as expressly provided in 24 here in the situs of this agreement or any sub trust

established hereunder, may be changed by the unanimous

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        consent of all of the beneficiaries then eligible to
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        receive mandatory or discretionary distributions.
            MR. BARNEY: Okay.
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            THE COURT: So isn't that just the children?
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            MR. BARNEY: What's that?
            THE COURT: That's the children and who else?
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7
            MR. BARNEY: Well the --
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            THE COURT: In other words, Christopher -- the two
9
   -- who -- to the children. Who else is entitled to
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   mandatory or discretionary --
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            MR. BARLOW: No. So the children are the
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   mandatory dis --
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            THE COURT: Right.
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            MR. BARLOW: Beneficiaries.
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            THE COURT: Right.
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            MR. BARLOW: But the trust also provides that
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   their spouses and their decedents are discretionary
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   beneficiaries of the --
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            THE COURT: Okay.
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            MR. BARLOW: -- trust. So that would be the
21
   discretionary -- the spouses and decedents.
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            THE COURT: Okay. So --
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            MR. BARLOW: Those -- that would be encompassed in
   the all.
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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. BARLOW: And --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BARLOW: If I just -- really briefly. I'd just add also on that point then -- so the position of the Protector who took this and, of course, he's very hesitant to come and say, yeah it looks like I made a mistake, but upon review, it does look like we're missing some of the beneficiaries.

And then the second clause of that sentence that you just started says with all the -- consent of all the beneficiaries, then, comma, and then it also says:

With the consent of the then acting Protector -obviously, he consented, and the Trustee that are involved.
We had an absence of Trustee actually at that point because
the previous Trustee had resigned about three months
earlier.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BARLOW: So technically what should have happened, it appears now in retrospect, is a new Alaskabased Trustee should have been appointed in the interim for the purpose of consenting to the change of situs to Nevada so that that Trustee could get the advice of counsel that was called for in that paragraph to make sure that there were no adverse consequences. So that appears to be the step that was missing and Mr. Lehnardt's going to have to

go back to the drawing board to determine whether he needs 1 to go now go appoint an Alaska Trustee and whether it's 3 then advisable to then move it down here to Nevada if all 4 beneficiaries consent to do so. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. BARLOW: So that's position on that. 7 THE COURT: Great. 8 MR. SOLOMON: Your Honor, I'd like to spell the 9 word sandbag because this is the first time I've heard the 10 issue that's been raised. It's not in their brief, despite 11 what Mr. Barney just said. They've never taken the 12 position that Taria [phonetic] was a beneficiary. We understood she was divorced and first time I've ever heard 13 14 it. 15 THE COURT: And she was the wife of --16 MR. SOLOMON: Supposedly. 17 THE COURT: -- the grandson? 18 MR. BARNEY: No. She was the wife of Chris Davis. 19 THE COURT: But she's not the one with the life 20 insurance policy? 21 MR. BARNEY: No. 22 MR. BARLOW: No. 23 MR. BARNEY: She is the wife of Chris Davis and 24 was during this period.

MR. SOLOMON: Where is the evidence of that, Your

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Honor? There is none. They didn't file an affidavit.

They didn't file -- they didn't even raise this issue in any of their pleadings. Total sandbag to wait until you get here and say: Hold on. We all made a mistake that we've been acting on for over a year.

I guess their whole theory now is that since she didn't consent to this amendment and jurisdiction here that the whole first amendment is invalid. Chris is -- Christopher is not the --

MR. HOOD: Trust Advisor.

MR. SOLOMON: Trust Advisor, no --

MR. HOOD: Investment Advisor.

MR. SOLOMON: Investment Advisor. He's been wrongfully investing and holding and making all of the decisions for this trust for the last year.

THE COURT: There's apparently no Trustee.

MR. SOLOMON: This -- apparently there's no

Trustee. Dunham has been administering this for the last

year without -- it's all a big mistake because Taria

[phonetic] didn't join in this thing, there's not even a

line for her signature in the agreement. Mr. Lehnardt

prepared it, contrary to counsel's statement, he did have

an opinion of counsel in Missouri, Mr. Bresolan [phonetic],

say that it was valid and parties went off and proceeded on

that basis. That is a -- as I said, a complete sandbag

without any support from the record other than counsel standing up here and making this argument at this late date without any ability to check the facts or determine what the heck happened here.

THE COURT: Yeah, because the change in situs it's done by Christopher Davis, Caroline Davis, and the copy I have -- I don't see the signature of Winfield [phonetic] but --

MR. SOLOMON: It is there. There's a signature page in there that --

THE COURT: Was there a signature page because I didn't it?

MR. SOLOMON: I think it's the last page.

MR. HOOD: it's one more page over.

MR. SOLOMON: One more page over. It just sort of does a little w. That's the way he signs on everything.

Actually there are two agreements. I can point to both exhibits that are signed the same way that accomplish the same thing.

Let me put this in context though. We had a petition to assume jurisdiction over this trust to confirm Dunham as the Directed Trustee, to confirm Christopher individually and as manager of FHT Holdings, LLC, as the Investment Trust Advisor, which I guess they're going to contend that's not valid either because we'll hear that was

created in this last year, we also wanted to confirm

Stephen Lehnardt as the Distribution Trustee -- I'm sorry.

Distribution Trust Advisor and the Trust Protector. And we wanted an order for immediate disclosure of the books, records, and information from Chris -- Christopher regarding over \$2,000,000 of loans that were taken against a \$35,000,000 policy that's owned by the trust and apparently now signed by Dunham, who they're claiming isn't the Trustee, to a wholly owned LLC called FHT Holdings which is managed by Chris.

These funds were paid out or leant to Christopher individually, to Christopher as the Trustee of the Beatrice B. Davis Family Revocable Trust, which is another trust in Missouri, Your Honor, which my client is a 50 percent beneficiary and a co-Trustee of but can't get any information from her brother, calling for an outright distribution. And we have now filed a proceeding in Missouri with respect to that one because he won't give us any information with respect to that trust or why distributions haven't been sent to us because mom died over three years ago. And then, finally, monies were leant to Chris again as manager of the Davis Family Office, LLC. They won't give us information with respect to that entity.

The Family Heritage Trust's main asset is this Ashley Cooper [phonetic] life insurance policy for

\$35,000,000 according to notice that it was on the life of Cheryl Davis [phonetic], a former wife of Chris's and there's a \$4,000,000 line of credit on it.

Article 8, Section 1 of this Trust says: Upon these death, the trust is to split into two equal shares, one for Caroline and one for Chris and his issue and his spouse. So that's interesting all by itself. That was supposed to have already happened. I don't know if that's happened or not because we can't get information as to whether that trust is even split into two separate shares and Christopher, his wife, if he had one, and wouldn't even be beneficiaries of our share.

Now, under Section 8 -- Article 8, Section 4, Caroline is entitled to distributions of income and principal in the discretion of the Trustee but has never received a dime and this is extremely significant, Your Honor. Article 12, Section 4 says:

The trust's books and records along with all trust documentation shall be available and open at all reasonable times to the inspection of the trust beneficiaries and their representatives.

Despite the fact that those books and records are supposed to be open to beneficiaries, including one who is the -- currently the sole beneficiary of her share, we spent over three months the last quarter of 2012 trying to

get information and documents from Christopher and his counsel, Harriet Rowland [phonetic], regarding who got the loan proceeds or the benefit of those, what was the purpose of those loans, how were those loan proceeds being used, what's the repayment terms of the loans, has any repayment been made, was there any collateral given, is there a collateral agreement, is there a promissory note, is there a loan agreement? We were virtually stonewalled. Just stonewalled. We're not getting anything with respect to this even though Caroline is entitled to half of this and half of everything to the entities that these were leant to with Chris's control.

Now the Alaska Trust Company was the original Trustee. Stephen Lehnardt was the original Trust Protector. On August 2nd, 2011, Mr. Lehnardt, in his capacity pursuant to the provisions of the trust, removed Alaska Trust Company and appointed Alaska USA Trust Company. And then two years later -- a little over two years later, on December 5th, 2013, Alaska USA Trust Company resigned and Mr. Lehnardt appointed Dunham Trust Company in Reno and I think he has the right to do that, period.

On February 24th, 2014, which is Exhibit 7 to the Motion to Dismiss, Alaska USA -- that may be a different document than Your Honor was looking at.

THE COURT: Okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SOLOMON: Oh Exhibit 7 is a Motion to Dismiss. I'm sorry.

[Colloquy between Mr. Solomon and Mr. Hood]

MR. SOLOMON: It's Exhibit 5, Your Honor, I
misspoke.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SOLOMON: And actually it's Exhibit 1 to the Motion -- Christopher D. Davis' Motion to Dismiss Exhibit 1. It's called Release -- Resignation, Release, Acknowledgement, Consent, and Indemnification Agreement.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SOLOMON: And the parties to that, contrary to what counsel said, include Alaska USA, which is the present Trustee, Dunham Trust, Mr. Lehnardt, Chris, Caroline, Winfield [phonetic], and they all executed this changing the situs -- [indiscernible] to change the situs of the trust from Alaska to Nevada, purports to be signed by all of the beneficiaries and it consented to Mr. Lehnardt amending the trust to change the situs, applicable law, provisions required by Dunham, and other amendments.

And then after this document was signed, then Mr. Lehnardt went out and got his advice of counsel, got a written opinion, and prepared the first amendment. And that was dated on February 24th, 2014 and that, again, was executed by Mr. Lehnardt, Dunham Trust, and specifically

proved by Chris, Caroline, and Winfield [phonetic] and that's the document that names Chris as the Investment Trust Advisor under NRS 163.5543, as a fiduciary under 163.554, that names Mr. Lehnardt as the Distribution Trust Advisor under 164.5537, a fiduciary under 163.554, and then it -- so basically it's Chris individually or as manager of an LLC to be owned by the trust full power to manage investments and reinvestments of the trust and to direct Dunham with respect to the same.

And then, finally, on March 28th, 2014, Dunham, presumably at the direction of Chris, because that's what he was up -- empowered to do, created a -- the FHT Holdings Company, naming Chris as manager and thereafter assigning the policy to the LLC which Chris is now managing.

So, you know, we start off with the resumption of where we were that the first amendment to the trust is presumed valid and there was contrary to this new claim that there was another beneficiary out there that didn't sign, it was never challenged until this moment, other than to say likely that we have a burden to prove validity. That's all they said in their moving papers, Your Honor. We have the power -- we have the obligation to prove validity. They didn't specify one reason in that or in his Reply that -- did we see a Reply?

MR. HOOD: No. He just did a Joinder in

opposition to --

MR. SOLOMON: I don't think he --

MR. HOOD: -- our petition.

MR. SOLOMON: Counsel alluded to a Reply. I haven't seen a Reply.

THE COURT: I saw your Reply.

MR. SOLOMON: Yes. But I have not seen a Reply by Mr. Barney --

THE COURT: I have no Reply from Mr. Baney.

MR. SOLOMON: -- but he alluded in his argument that, you know, they specified the grounds for invalidity in this motion an then reinforced them in the Reply. They didn't. All they said is: We have the burden to prove the validity of the first amendment before we could move forward and our response was: Well, take a look at NRS 47.250 subsection 18(c). There's a rebuttal for resumption that it's valid. And then we said: Nobody has suggested any particular grounds of invalidity.

And then I pointed out that Chris, who is the only person challenging it, expressly consented to it. Not once, but twice in two different documents you just looked at. So how can he raise it? I don't think he can even raise this issue he's now trying to raise with respect to some other party, especially when he consented to it and then he took repeated actions.

THE COURT: Well the only person who I'm going to have standing would be Taria [phonetic]?

MR. SOLOMON: I believe she would, assuming she is a beneficiary. I don't even know that, Your Honor. I was advised that he wasn't married at that time, at the time the thing was done. He may be married now, so I gave her notice now, but, at this time, I don't know that they were and none of their documents suggest that she was a beneficiary. I'm hearing it for the first time and that's why I stood up and said sandbag because that's what's happening here.

Now, I think the Court had jurisdiction at least over Dunham, irrespective of this issue, but based upon the record that you have now, anything in front of you, all of the beneficiaries can sign -- consented to it. This isn't evidence standing up here and saying this.

Nevada situs, our Court can clearly give Nevada jurisdiction over this. It's Nevada situs under the first amendment, Nevada law applies, you have a Nevada Trustee. That's sufficient all by itself under 164.010 because it's doing business here. We know books and records are kept here because contrary to counsel's argument, the first thing we did, Your Honor, is go to Dunham Trust to try to get this information. We're not stupid and they said: We don't have it. We have to get it from Chris. They

supplied us what they have. They gave us a few indications of what's going on, but they don't' have the information. They do have books and records of the trust though, including they have possession of the policy and recently transferred, as I said, to FHT Holdings Company, a Nevada LLC.

over these people that are in front of you. 163.5555 says that Chris and Stephen Lehnardt submitted to this jurisdiction by accepting their appointments as Investment and Distribution Advisors. Again, FHT Holdings, LLC, is a Nevada entity doing business here. There's no question we have in personam jurisdiction.

And then this argument that Alaska Trust and Alaska USA are somehow necessary or indispensible parties, it's ridiculous. When is a former Trustee a necessary or indispensible party in any proceeding that you are not asking for any relief from them? And the answer -- are you telling me every time I have to do something that some event occurred even though they're not being asked to be held responsible for it, I have to name them because they have some input? Well of course not. It's ridiculous.

Caroline is not objecting in her petition to any act or admission of Alaska or Alaska USA. She seeks no relief against them. Chris, in one capacity or another,

received all of the money that we're talking about here. He has all of the information we seek about the use and the status of those loans to him. The former Trustees are not being placed in the position by our petition where they need to protect their interest and no one's being exposed to multiple liability or prejudice, except for us, if the Court doesn't take jurisdiction and require him to produce this information because Alaska Trustees are not subject to jurisdiction here and I don't think Alaska has jurisdiction over Chris. There's no reason to believe he does. This is the jurisdiction.

And [indiscernible] process our statute, 164, specifically tells you you serve it under 155.010 and we complied in that regard.

THE COURT: Now Mr. Barlow didn't address this separate issue, but his issue with respect to the petition was that it doesn't specifically state a claim against Mr. Lehnardt. It doesn't --

MR. SOLOMON: I'll over that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- allege -- okay. Mr. Barlow, you'll get a chance to --

MR. SOLOMON: As Your Honor knows, there wasn't an action until recently that we amended Chapter 164 in 1999 [indiscernible]. Prior to that date, you used to file a petition to ask the Court to assume jurisdiction and you

weren't allowed to do anything more and all the Court could do at the initial point was to determine whether sufficient connections nexus to Nevada were sufficient to assume jurisdiction and confirm the Trustees. Then you had to file separate petitions for any type of relief.

So in 1999, we amended the statute and added subsection 2 that says that at the same time that you file the petition to assume jurisdiction under subsection 1, you may file additional petitions for relief. So the law hasn't changed. In order to get jurisdiction over a trust, you have to assume jurisdiction over the trust and confirm the Trustees or the fiduciaries. That's what we're doing. I think it may have been defective if we didn't try and confirm. That's all we're doing is confirming the Trustees or the Trust Protectors and the fiduciaries at this point.

One other additional petition request for relief which is to ask for an order that Chris, who is in possession of all of this information that belongs to the trust, produce it to the beneficiary to whom the trust says is entitled to it explicitly.

So, it is true that we're not seeking any additional relief against Stephen Lehnardt at this time but it's appropriate to confirm him in the role that's done. That gives the Court interim jurisdiction over this and if we can't get the information that we need from Chris for

any reason, we certainly intend to seek it from Mr.

Lehnardt and if we have to use another petition to do that or discovery to do that, we will and that's appropriate to do and we don't have to re-file a petition to confirm him as Trust Protector, which is a step that we are accomplishing now.

We know that Mr. Lehnardt was intimately involved in these loan transactions and we put that in our Reply, Your Honor. There's designation after designation in his time sheet showing that he was involved in these transactions. So he is presumable a repository of some information. We just wanted to get it from the horse's mouth, the person who actually got the use -- apparent use and benefit of these proceeds first, which is Chris, and hopefully that will satisfy our inquiry. But if we have additional issues and have additional claims of Mr. Lehnardt, then we if are, based upon a Court order, confirming him as the fiduciary, we can proceed.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SOLOMON: So that's where I think we are, Your Honor.

There is nothing before this Court at this point that in any way, shape, or form shows the petition that we didn't [sic] file is not proper in every respect. They had the burden to come in here to show that anything was

invalid and they haven't done that. There's no evidence before this Court at this point and I -- you know, if this were, in fact, invalid, what if -- there would be a, you know, I haven't had a lot of time to ruminate about this because I'm just hearing it for the first time, but there would be a constructive trust here anyway. This has been operated -- this trust has been in Nevada for over a year and huge transactions, including the assignment of a \$35,000,000 policy all taken place. There's a whole slew of actions that have taken place by the very people who are now coming here and saying: Oh, well, it's all invalid. Without presenting any evidence whatsoever of why it's not true or is in fact true and I think our petition should be granted, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Barlow.

MS. RENWICK: Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. RENWICK: Charlene Renwick on behalf of Dunham Trust.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. RENWICK: I do have to agree with Mr. Solomon with respect to the issue, the invalidity of Dunham Trust being appointed as the successor Trustee. I don't believe that issue was clearly addressed in the moving papers, to which extent, I did not respond to it as I didn't

understand that was that argument that was going --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RENWICK: -- to be raised before the Court today.

To the extent that the Court is being asked to determine whether the assignment to Nevada was valid, I request that the hearing be continued and that a briefing schedule be provided to the parties so that we can properly address that --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RENWICK: -- address that issue.

THE COURT: Good point. Thank you. All right.

Mr. Barlow.

MR. BARLOW: Your Honor, just briefly because I think our role in this is really [indiscernible] here, but, again, the issues about the validity of the first amendment were raised to us just yesterday for the first time and I went through the analysis of the trust and it appears that there are problems with the first amendment as far as the consents that were necessary to do that. That's where that came from.

Our concern, if the Court is tending toward taking jurisdiction of this in some manner, 164.010 only requires the Court to assume jurisdiction -- or excuse me, to confirm the appointment of the Trustee. If the Court wants

to confirm the appointment of Dunham Trust Company, then you have a Trustee that you confirmed the appointment of in this matter.

There -- in his capacity as the Trust Protector and Trust Advisor, he may be a fiduciary under the statute, not necessarily the Trustee in that situation. And Mr. Solomon himself just said, in response to the question, I don't need to bring in these two Alaskan Trustees because I'm not bringing any claims against the Alaska Trustees. Well why is he trying to bring Mr. Lehnardt into this as well if he's not bringing any claims -- admittedly not bringing any claims against Mr. Lehnardt?

THE COURT: Oh but he might be amending this if the issue is that Mr. Lehnardt screwed up moving it.

MR. BARLOW: Maybe. But that's the point. If he has a claim, bring the claim and bring us in.

Court Right.

MR. BARLOW: But he -- don't bring us in and make us sit here and wait --

THE COURT: Doesn't he have a point that when you move a trust, even if ineffectually you move a trust,

Dunham takes it over, they start operating, they assumed they are responsible as a Trustee. There's all this activity that goes on. Doesn't this Court in this jurisdiction, doesn't that give me jurisdiction? I mean, I

1 -- you know, you're kind of somewhat changing your position 2 on this, but originally it seemed -- it was my 3 understanding that it was conceded that even though your 4 client had come to this jurisdiction, you weren't -- didn't 5 think that they necessarily needed to be in the case, but 6 that the case was -- it was properly in this jurisdiction. 7 MR. BARLOW: If the first amendment is valid --8 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BARLOW: -- and were going to be treated as 9 10 valid, then we're operating under 163, which sets out what 11 happens in these [indiscernible] jurisdiction, things of 12 that nature. It does say that a --13 THE COURT: Well doesn't this Court have to assume it's valid absent some evidence? I don't know who Taraja 14 15 [phonetic] is or however her name is pronounced. 16 MR. BARLOW: Taria [phonetic]. 17 THE COURT: Taria [phonetic]? Okay. 18 MR. BARLOW: Right. And --19 THE COURT: She's not mentioned anywhere. 20 MR. BARLOW: And, at this point, we --21 THE COURT: Doesn't seem to be a big life 22 insurance policy on her life. Who is she? 23 MR. BARLOW: By the representations of counsel, 24 that's -- as Ms. Renwick just suggested, maybe there may be

further briefing required to get that information in front

of the Court and sort that particular issue out.

If we're going to assume that's it valid and go back to the original argument we had originally made in our Opposition, when Mr. Lehnardt accepted the employment as Distribution Trust Advisor under NRS 163, yes that -- the statute does say he submits to the jurisdiction of Nevada. I've submitted to the jurisdiction of Nevada. Your Clerk has submitted to the jurisdiction of Nevada. It doesn't mean that we are -- that you have to observe that jurisdiction over them in this case just to make us sit around with no claims being brought against us.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BARLOW: And that's the point. Just because there is jurisdiction in Nevada, doesn't mean you should exercise it over Mr. Lehnardt where there are no current claims against him or they're not --

THE COURT: Because, I mean, it did --

MR. BARLOW: -- asking for any information from him.

THE COURT: -- occur to me that -- well, nothing is mentioned but just out of -- is that a grounds to dismiss it or does it just require more definite statement?

MR. BARLOW: I'm just saying in this situation that Mr. Lehnardt doesn't need to be a party to this case.

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THE COURT: Okay.

1 MR. BARLOW: Okay. Until an order or something --THE COURT: At this point? 2 3 MR. BARLOW: That's --4 THE COURT: If I said -- if there is this issue 5 that this was somehow missed, --6 MR. BARLOW: Right. 7 THE COURT: -- that there's a central person --8 MR. BARLOW: If there --9 THE COURT: -- missed --10 MR. BARLOW: -- are claims brought against him, if 11 -- some other basis to bring something that would make him 12 be necessary to this action, then revisit that when that 13 arises, but as it stands right now, there's no point in 14 making him just come here and hang out and --15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. BARLOW: -- sit around and wait to be -- to 17 have a claim brought against him. 18 THE COURT: Understood. Okay. Mr. Barney. 19 Interesting. 20 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. BARNEY: 21 You didn't really give me a chance to answer the 22 question that you had asked previously about the trust and 23 changing the trust situs. You began to read it. It says: Expressly as under Article 14, Section 6, changing 24

the trust situs, such as expressly provided herein, the

situs of this agreement or any sub trust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of all of the beneficiaries.

It didn't say the majority consent. It said the unanimous consent, okay, of all of the beneficiaries.

Then eligible to receive mandatory and discretionary distributions of net income.

Now, there have been allegations of sandbagging and yet my Motion to Dismiss hit on this very issue right out of the gate. I said: In order for this Court to take proper jurisdiction over this case, there was a condition precedent that had to have been met and it wasn't met. And therefore, the Trust Protector could not amend this instrument by written action to change the references to [indiscernible] references to such new situs or the law of such new situs and take such action as may be required to conform the terms of the agreement of this trust.

That's exactly what happened in this amendment.

It was changed purportedly without the consent of

Christopher Davis' wife who was a discretionary distributee

and included as part of the all requirement.

Now, the person that drafted that amendment, the purported first amendment, has already indicated that it was defective. He stands here today and says: It was defective. Okay. He didn't get all of the necessary

requirements of all of the beneficiaries.

THE COURT: But your client acted on it.

MR. BARNEY: The --

THE COURT: Your client did things based on the assumption that he had this new role and this amendment. He accepted the role.

MR. BARNEY: And under what legal theory would -with him without independent counsel would he be able to
effectuate a document that by the terms of the trust
couldn't be effectuated? He clearly isn't res judicata
because there was no prior proceeding. Okay. And our
courts have been very clear about the res judicata
requirements.

Under this situation, Chris was clearly under a mistake that this could have been done and it wasn't -- the irony of this whole situation is for an argument of res judicata even to have grounds, they would have had to follow the statute in Alaska that was succinctly set forth in my moving papers. They could have gone to the Court. They could have ratified the amendment in Alaska. They didn't. And, in fact, when it became defective, what Mr. Solomon offered was a document dated February 2014, after his admitted document that he put in before where the Trustee resigned on December 5th. Okay?

So on December 5th, 2013, Mr. Solomon alleges in

his moving papers, in his petition, and also in his documentary evidence that he provided to the Court that this Trustee had in fact resigned two months earlier. And so, what I did in my Motion to Dismiss, was I put the Court on notice of that very fact. Not to hide the document, but to actually put the Court on notice that this document was invalid. It couldn't have been signed by a Trustee who had already advocated and had no authority to sign on that amendment.

And with that, --

THE COURT: But Mr. Solomon's constructive trust point is that if that has to be litigated, whether this was a valid amendment or not, doesn't the Court still have to take jurisdiction so that we can litigate that? Because your clients acted on it. They've moved -- they turned this over to Dunham. They're acting as the Trustee. There's all this activity taking place based on the assumption that it was valid. You client's now coming in and saying all that activity I took was based on a void document. So everything I have done is wrong. Mr. Lehnardt screwed up because he did this wrong.

MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, I'm --

THE COURT: Everything we've done is wrong. We shouldn't have taken any of the action that we took. It's all wrong, but you can't sue us for it because it's all

wrong.

MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, on numerous occasions --

THE COURT: It doesn't make any sense.

MR. BARNEY: On numerous occasions we've had the Court look at situations that were admittedly all wrong and we've had to go back and we've had to fix it. And, in this case, it needs to go back to Alaska so that they can fix it.

I've got no objection. If the Alaska Trustee that's appointed with power and authority that hasn't already resigned wants to change the situs and they have an opinion from their counsel, you know, in Alaska that moving it down to Nevada is a great idea and that we get all of the signatures on that paper that are requisite under the terms of the trust, I've got no objection to this Court in a situation like that taking jurisdiction but that didn't occur in this situation and the idea that --

THE COURT: But we've already got a Nevada --

MR. BARNEY: -- things have happened --

THE COURT: -- Trustee acting as Nevada Trustee on the assumption they were acting under a valid amendment and change of situs. They're acting on that. They're taking instruction apparently from your client.

MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, they were an independent professional fiduciary that has the right to counsel before

1 they sign any document. I'm not going to propose that --2 THE COURT: Right, but --3 MR. BARNEY: -- my client had any duty --4 THE COURT: -- the fact is there --5 MR. BARNEY: -- or Mr. Lehnardt, for that matter, 6 had any duty to Dunham Trust --7 THE COURT: I'm not saying they did. MR. BARNEY: -- for their --8 THE COURT: I'm saying that doesn't this Court 9 10 have jurisdiction because Dunham is operating under the 11 assumption hat these guys gave me a document that they 12 reported -- they purported to me and hold out to me as 13 being valid because -- how -- they were told. That's your 14 point is shouldn't I have a chance to argue this and brief 15 this because nobody told me there is a wife out there somewhere? 16 17 MR. BARNEY: So, if I'm understanding you 18 correctly, you're saying that Dunham should be appointed as 19 a Trustee to respond to the 25,000 out of the \$2.2 million 20 that occurred up in Alaska? Because that's really what 21 they're asking. They're saying that, in essence, there was 22 \$25,000 supposedly in a loan and they're asking for the

information regarding that \$25,000 loan supposedly that

and that was argued, and which is completely false, is

Dunham received and the irony of the whole situation of --

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supposedly it was received by FHT Holdings that supposedly was established by -- actually it was established by Dunham. Okay? Dunham is the sole member of that.

Now, the idea of -- you said earlier -- you said:
Well I don't know Taria [phonetic]. Your Honor, with all
respect, I don't think that matters that you know whether,
you know, the identity of Taria [phonetic]. The fact is
that they knew who Taria [phonetic] was. They put her on
the notice for their Opposition and ironically that didn't
even -- that wasn't even proper under 155.010 because she
wasn't given the requisite period. So they knew about her
because they were the ones that noticed her. Not us,
originally, because the fact is she was -- she wasn't made
a party to this but she was a beneficiary that required her
consent in order for this Court to take jurisdiction.

And the idea that things have happened, Your Honor, things happen all of the time. That's what courts are about and that's what litigation is all about. It's attempting to right the wrongs that have happened, but, in this case, by assuming jurisdiction over a trust amendment that is clearly defective by the drafter's own words -- by the drafter's own counsel they've admitted is defective in order to transfer jurisdiction, I think this Court would be stepping outside of what authority it's been given under 164.010 to take jurisdiction.

And if the Court is inclined to want us to brief this, I'd be more than happy to brief this, Your Honor. In fact, when you were newly called, I actually prepared a brief for you on this very issue with regard to interim jurisdiction on an in personam matter and I'd be happy to reply to this and indicate, but clearly this matter must be dismissed under the facts that we have. Even the evidence that's been presented actually lends credence to the fact that this amendment was improper.

THE COURT: Okay. Well my problem here is that everybody relied on it as being proper and Dunham has been acting in good faith on the assumption that they're the properly appointed Trustee, that situs has been changed and they're the proper Trustee. And now you're coming in here and saying: Oh, I, as Trust Protector, or whatever -- or Trust Investment Protector, whatever your client's role is, whatever Mr. Lehnardt's role is, we were all wrong. We did this wrong because we forgot Chris was married.

MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, you're --

THE COURT: Ah, what?

MR. BARNEY: -- assuming that my client even had counsel to know what was going on in this and the fact is he --

THE COURT: I'm not saying he did have counsel or didn't have counsel.

MR. BARNEY: He was not. He was --

THE COURT: He knows whether he's married or not.

MR. BARNEY: He does know whether he's married or not, but the fact is he is not --

THE COURT: I have no affidavit in front of me telling me that he is married, that the marriage was valid at the time, that she was therefore entitled to take under — I mean, I don't have anything. All I have is the Trustee that's acting apparently based on instructions from you and Mr. Lehnardt dealing with this trust having been told we have a valid change of situs. They're acting in reliance on it. They assume they've got proper authority and now you're coming in here and saying: All of those things I've told you to do in the last year, I was wrong. I never should have told you to do those things because I don't have a valid authority. Ooops. My bad. Let's go back to Alaska and fix it.

Well okay. Go back to Alaska and fix it, but, in the meantime, I think I have jurisdiction of -- at least as put by Mr. Solomon, at least we have the constructive trust because it's here. There is --

MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, --

THE COURT: -- action you've taken here.

MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, I would respectfully disagree in the fact that we have demonstrated the actual

drafter of the amendment has admitted that it is incorrect.

Now, if somebody wants to bring an action for unjust reliance or they want to bring a claim of that sort, let them do it in the proper fashion and serve them pursuant to Rule 4 to get proper jurisdiction over these parties.

However, we have the truth and the fact that they noticed up the wife. They clearly knew who the wife was. They're the first ones who noticed the wife in this proceeding. She was the wife. She was the wife during the period of the reported first amendment. The drafter of that amendment has admitted that neither an acting Trustee nor all of the beneficiaries that were required did sign and that it was invalid.

Any presumption that would be there has been clearly rebutted. We have the person that drafted it. We have the notice that was given by Caroline to Taria [phonetic] on -- and it wasn't timely notice, which would invalidate, you know, the proceeding in that regard, but they did know who she was and the idea that we sandbagged when they came up with the notice first, really shocks the conscience, Your Honor, because --

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Solomon, do you have anything further to say on your Petition to -- for Jurisdiction?

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            MR. SOLOMON: Just one. I'll give you another
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   basis to get where we need to go.
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            They just admitted their own downfall. Taria
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   [phonetic] was given notice of this proceeding timely and
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   she's had the full time to do it and she has never
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   objected. She has never raised that she didn't know about
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   this, didn't consent to it, was even married at the time.
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   Now she --
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            THE COURT: Isn't she in Japan? Is she in Japan?
            MR. SOLOMON: No. I think that's --
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            THE COURT: Somebody's in Japan.
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            MR. SOLOMON: Windield [phonetic].
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            THE COURT: Windield [phonetic] is in Japan.
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            MR. SOLOMON: Yeah, but -- and I don't know where
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            MR. HOOD: California or Missouri.
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            THE COURT: Oh. It's the person with the two
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   houses.
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            MS. HOOD: Taria [phonetic].
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            MR. SOLOMON: Yeah.
                                 This --
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            THE COURT: Okay.
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            MR. SOLOMON: -- is Christopher's -- step up, the
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   father, who is apparently --
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            THE COURT: okay.
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            MR. SOLOMON: -- now married. I don't know how
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long he's been married. I've never -- this is the first time.

But the point is she has full notice, never objected. She's waived her objection by not appearing and not making that. The only person here objecting is the person who acted upon it and never, ever raised this issue until you got in front of this Court on this hearing.

and this is -- where I think counsel has indicated that they would like a chance to be heard on this and brief this. I think I have to take jurisdiction over this at least under a theory of constructive trust because they've been relying on this in good faith thinking they're operating properly and all of a sudden they're being told, by the very people who made that representation to them, cops, my bad, even though my sister knew I was married, she who -- I don't know if she had legal counsel telling her anything, but I didn't have legal counsel, so I didn't know -- needed it. So she went and hired and is now saying maybe I messed up here. I mean, but everybody's been relying on that.

MR. SOLOMON: And you don't have the evidence.

All you have --

THE COURT: And acting on it.

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            MR. SOLOMON: -- is a statement.
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            THE COURT: And so I just --
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            MR. SOLOMON: There is no evidence at this point
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   other than --
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            THE COURT: It's -- I just have a real problem
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   with this --
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            MR. SOLOMON: -- that.
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            THE COURT: -- in saying that there's no
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   jurisdiction because there's no Trustee in Alaska. The
10
   only Trustee is here.
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            MR. SOLOMON: It's true.
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            THE COURT: And that's my problem with tis -- you
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   have a trust with no Trustee.
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            MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, --
            THE COURT: If I follow your theory, Mr. Barney,
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   you have a trust with no Trustee and --
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            MR. BARNEY: And the Court --
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            THE COURT: -- and your client has been acting
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   without any authority and this is -- I mean, do you
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   seriously want us to go down that road?
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            MR. BARNEY: I do, Your Honor, and under the terms
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   of the trust --
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            THE COURT: Okay.
            MR. BARNEY: -- if the Protect --
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            THE COURT: I think that -- doesn't that expose
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1 your client to huge liability? MR. BARNEY: If the Protector does not appoint a 2 3 Trustee, they can come together unanimously and they can 4 appoint a Trustee. 5 The whole idea is -- what you're saying, Your 6 Honor, is: Okay, well, there would be no Trustee. Do you 7 know how many trusts come before us where there is no 8 Trustee and the courts appoint a Trustee? Numerous times. 9 THE COURT: Okav. 10 MR. BARNEY: A Trustee dies. There is no Trustee 11 for a certain period. 12 THE COURT: Yeah, but there's no Trustee in 13 Alaska. We have a Trustee. 14 MR. BARNEY: The Trustee could be appointed in 15 Alaska by the very terms of the --16 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. 17 MR. BARNEY: -- trust. 18 THE COURT: I'm done, Mr. Barney. I'm done. 19 MR. BARNEY: Okay. 20 I'm going to take jurisdiction over THE COURT: 21 this trust and I'm going to confirm Dunham as Trustee. 22 But we have this issue, which they've asked for 23 the opportunity because this is not well developed. 24 think it raises some issues. I have a real concern about

Mr. Lehnardt because I didn't really see anything

specifically alleged about him in this pleading. But Mr. Barlow's got a point. However -- we now know what the issue is so I think we need a more definite statement.

So I'm granting Mr. Barlow alternative relief in the form of I think he's entitled to -- his client is entitled to a more definite statement as to what it is allegedly Mr. Lehnardt already did. I think we all know it, but he's entitled to have it in a pleading. So, Mr. Lehnardt's Motion is granted with alternative relief. We need a more definite statement as to what it is Mr. Lehnardt allegedly did.

MR. BARLOW: If anything.

THE COURT: If anything. He's entitled to that. So it's -- we need a more definite statement because right now we don't' have anything about him. He's right. We need something about him.

So, the issue is Chris. My problem here, even if it's just constructive trust because Dunham's acting -- as I've indicated, I believe in a good faith reliance on what everybody told them that here's a valid change of situs and trust amendment, I think that -- I appreciate this argument that it's all invalid and so Mr. Davis can't be sued, but my problem with that is he's been acting here, I have to assume because stuff has been going on, apparently giving instruction to Dunham and I just think that means he's

consented to the jurisdiction of this Court.

MR. SOLOMON: Yeah, I mean, he's de facto at a minimum.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, did you say that Mr. Davis could be sued?

THE COURT: Yeah. I think he's consented to the jurisdiction of this Court.

MR. BARNEY: And in what capacity are you making - I just want to be clear for the record?

THE COURT: He has been acting in -- under the assumption, and I understand your argument that it may all be void. If so, it all gets unwound some other way but I think I have to -- I have to take jurisdiction at this point and we have to have some form in which this can be litigated. I respectfully don't think it's Alaska. I think it's here because you've got a Trustee appointed here. Everybody is acting on this assumption and your client, perhaps in as good of faith as Dunham, has been acting under the assumption that he had a role and he had authority to take certain actions. He considered the jurisdiction of this Court by acting on it. So I think he's -- I think he can be sued here. He's consented to it by acting --

MR. BARNEY: And when you say he can be sued, are

you saying in his individual capacity or are you saying -
THE COURT: That's -- what -- I keep forgetting.

It was Investor?

MR. BARNEY: Investment Trust Advisor.

THE COURT: Investment Trust Advisor, yes.

MR. BARNEY: Because they're not asking to sue him. At least the pleadings I read, they're not asking to sue him. They're asking for information, Your Honor, and your -- you jumped to the he can be sued --

THE COURT: No. I'm saying I've got jurisdiction over it. So in his capacity as this Investment Trust Advisor, if they want to get records and stuff from him, then fine. He's consented to act in that capacity in this jurisdiction. Until it's shown that, in fact, he didn't have that capacity, I think he's consented because he acted on it.

MR. BARNEY: Okay. So, just to be clear, you're assuming jurisdiction under 164.010 in what capacity? Over Dunham Trust?

THE COURT: Dunham Trust because there's a trust - they -- the trust has been -- they took the role of
Trustee acting on an assumption that they were properly
appointed and they had a valid amendment and the change of
situs. They acted on that. Your client also acted on it
in his role of Investment Trust Advisor.

1 So, to the extent that that's a role that he was 2 acting in, then I think we've got like a jurisdiction over 3 him in that role because everybody was acting on that. If 4 it's proven that, in fact, that's all void because Taria 5 [phonetic] was entitled to be a signator, if we've got 6 evidence on that and it's proven, then we've got a whole 7 different problem, but we've got to litigate that somewhere 8 and I don't think it's Alaska because this trust isn't in 9 Alaska. Everybody is operating on the assumption that it 10 is here. If it shouldn't be here, that's a problem for 11 another day. 12 MR. BARNEY: And just as a point of clarification, 13 when you're indicating that you have jurisdiction, are you 14 -- is the extent of your ruling that you have jurisdiction 15 or that you're just taking jurisdiction over Dunham and --16 because there's relief that's been requested and I'm --17 MR. SOLOMON: And I'd like to get to that, Your 18 Honor. 19 THE COURT: I know. 20

MR. SOLOMON: You've already -- you indicated that you're going to assume jurisdiction over Chris, --

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. SOLOMON: -- and --

THE COURT: In his role of Investment Trust Advisor.

MR. SOLOMON: I understand. Again, Article 12, Section 4 of the trust, and nobody disputes this, says, quote:

The trust books and records along with all trust documents shall be available and open at all reasonable times for the inspection of the trust beneficiaries and the representatives.

He has not opposed that he has these type of records in his possession. In fact, I know he does because Harriet Rowland [phonetic] told me that she had them, that he had produced them to her. She was prepared to turn them over to me when he said: No, don't give them anything.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So you asked for multiple types of relief. The petition is to assume jurisdiction over this trust. I'm going to assume jurisdiction over this trust, even though, as I said, it's without prejudice to litigate whether it's actually validly moved. If it's not, then, you know, we've got a problem, but it appears that everybody is acting on the assumption that it's here. So we have to take jurisdiction.

So, then I'm assuming jurisdiction over Christopher Davis as Investment Trust Advisor, which is the specific relief requested.

Stephen Lehnardt, I agree, I would also have jurisdiction for the same analysis, but the problem is we

don't have a statement as to what it is he's allegedly done. So, for the moment, I'm not taking jurisdiction over him because we need a more definite statement in order to say whether or not we can go forward against Mr. Lehnardt.

And then to confirm the Dunham Trust Company as Directed Trustee, for now, it appears they're acting in good faith on what was represented to them to be a valid amendment and change of situs. They have been acting, as far as I can tell, nobody's raised that that they would have any notice. So, I think we have to confirm them. They're the Trustee, until it's proven that maybe they shouldn't be because unknown to them there was a wife out there.

Okay. And then the final thing was immediate disclosure of documents and information from the Investment Trust Advisor.

MR. BARNEY: And what would that include with regard to those records? Clearly Alaska Trust has the records of their tenure as Trustee for the \$2.2 million.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BARNEY: And they're not a party to this action. So --

THE COURT: It's what Mr. -- it's what he has in his role as Investment Trust Advisor. That's it.

MR. BARNEY: Because they've alleged \$25,000 was

1 handled between Dunham and Christopher Davis in Nevada. 2 THE COURT: If that's not -- you know, if that's 3 not in his possession, it's not in his possession. It's 4 only what's -- what he's got in his possession. 5 MR. SOLOMON: I'll prepare the --THE COURT: So you'll prepare the order. Okay? 6 MR. SOLOMON: -- order, Your Honor. 7 8 THE COURT: Thank you. 9 MR. SOLOMON: And I'll submit it to counsel. 10 THE COURT: And we'll be -- like I said, this is 11 all without prejudice to actually litigate and give, you 12 know, Dunham a chance to --13 MR. BARNEY: Did you --14 THE COURT: -- lay out this whole issue. 15 MR. BARNEY: So to understand this correctly --16 and I'd like to sign off on the order, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Sure. Absolutely. Mr. Solomon --18 MR. BARNEY: If that's --19 THE COURT: -- always very good about that. 20 MR. BARNEY: But you're giving jurisdiction 21 subject to a determination of whether or not --22 THE COURT: Yeah. It's without prejudice to --23 allergies. Without prejudice to raise the issue. 24 MR. SOLOMON: I understand. 25

MR. BARNEY: Of the validity --

1 THE COURT: Properly --2 MR. BARNEY: -- of the first amendment. Is that correct? 3 4 THE COURT: Properly with evidence and -- because 5 right now we don't even have an affidavit from Tarjia 6 [phonetic] and who knows? I don't have her -- Taria 7 [phonetic]. 8 MR. BARNEY: Taria [phonetic]. 9 THE COURT: Thank you. 10 And Dunham. You know, surely they'd like to be 11 So, you know, it's without prejudice on that issue, 12 but right now, everybody is acting on it, so --13 MR. SOLOMON: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 MS. RENWICK: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- we'll litigate it all later. Thank 15 16 you all for coming in. 17 THE CLERK: Is this [indiscernible]? 18 THE COURT: Yes. We're keeping it. Mr. Solomon, 19 specifically just for the record, Mr. Solomon specifically 20 requested that this be handled from its inception here and 21 nobody's objected to that part. So we're --22 MR. BARNEY: Yeah. I'd prefer that, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: You got it. Okay. We're good. We'll 24 see you guys back here.

MR. BARNEY: If the Court has jurisdiction.

| 1 | | | THE | COURT: | Ex | actly. | . Su | bje | ct | to | your |
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Subject to your right to say

CERTIFICATION

4 5

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the audio-visual recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

AFFIRMATION

I affirm that this transcript does not contain the social security or tax identification number of any person or entity.

KRISTEN LUNKWITZ

INDEPENDENT TRANSCRIBER

| 1 | | |
|----|--|--|
| 2 | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF | THE STATE OF NEVADA |
| 3 | CIDICTORIED D. DAVIC | 70000 |
| 4 | CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS, | Case No.: Electronically Filed Oct 08 2015 01:44 p.m. |
| 5 | Petitioner | District CTracies KN Lindeman P-15-083 Gerk of Supreme Court |
| 6 | VS. | P-15-083869-T of Supreme Swart |
| 7 | 3000 | |
| 8 | THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, | |
| 9 | IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK | , |
| 10 | AND THE HONORABLE JUDGE GLORIA J. STURMAN, | |
| 11 | Respondent | |
| 12 | and | |
| 13 | CAROLINE DAVIS, | |
| 14 | Real Party in Interes | t |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | PETITIONER'S | APPENDIX |
| 17 | VOLUME | <u> Z III</u> |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | | espectfully Submitted, |
| 20 | ROLAND LAW FIRM A | NTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. |
| 21 | - Admir of BKOK A) | Julian & Jarry |
| 22 | | nthony L. Barney, Esq. evada Bar No. 8366 |
| 23 | Tiorada Bar xio. biii x | 317 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite B |
| 24 | Henderson, NV 89074 La | as Vegas, NV 89102 |
| 25 | | elephone: (702) 438-7878 acsimile: (702) 259-1116 |
| 26 | | fice@anthonybarney.com |
| 27 | | torney for Christopher D. Davis |
| 28 | | |

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| 9 | | | 2014, to Assume Jurisdiction Over Christopher D. Davis as Investment Trust Advisor, Stephen K. | |
| 0 | | | Lehnardt as Distribution Trust Advisor, to | |
| 1 | | | Confirm Dunham Trust Company as Directed Trustee, and for Immediate Disclosure of | |
| 2 | | | Documents and Information from Christopher D. | |
| 3 | | | Davis; and Counterpetition for Sanctions; | |
| | | | (2)Amendment and Supplement to Counterpetition for Sanctions; and (3)Motion to Amend or Modify | |
| 4 | | | Order Pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(3) | |
| 5 | VIII | 34 | Notice of Non-Appearance of Christopher D. | 001358- |
| 6 | | | Davis | 001363 |
| 7 | VIII | 35 | Notice of Partial Withdrawal of Petition and Partial Withdrawal of Petition to Stay Discovery | 001364- 001367 |
| 8 | | | until the August 19th, 2015 Hearing on Motion for | 001307 |
| 9 | | | Reconsideration or in the Alternative, Petition for | |
| 0 | | | Protective Order from Discovery by Subpoena | |
| | VIII | 36 | Errata to Christopher D. Davis' Petition to Stay | 001368- |
| 1 | | | Discovery Until the August 19, 2015 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative, | 001372 |
| 2 | | | Petition for Protective Order from Discovery by | |
| 3 | | | Subpoena | |
| 4 | VIII | 37 | Christopher D. Davis' Opposition to Caroline | 001373- |
| 5 | | | Davis' Motion to Strike Christopher D. Davis' Arguments and Requests for Relief in his Reply to | 001390 |
| 6 | | | Caroline D. Davis' Objection to Petition for | |
| 7 | | | Reconsideration in Excess of Thirty (30) Pages as | |
| 8 | | | the Reply Violates EDCR 2.20 and Countermotion for Leave to File a Reply in Excess of Thirty (30) Pages | |

| | IX | 38 | Transcript of Proceedings All Pending Motions, | 001391- |
|---|----|----|---|---------|
| | | | September 2, 2015 | 001476 |
| | IX | 39 | Motion to Compel Attendance at Deposition and | 001477- |
| | | | Motion for Sanctions | 001520 |
| | IX | 40 | Supplement to Opposition to Caroline Davis' | 001521- |
| | | | Motion to Hold Christopher D. Davis in Contempt | 001532 |
| | | | and for Attorney's Fees and Costs | |
| | IX | 41 | Reply to Christopher D. Davis Opposition to | 001533- |
| | | | Caroline Davis' Motion to Hold Christopher D. | 001538 |
| | | | Davis in Contempt and for Attorneys' Fees and | |
| | | | Costs | |
| | IX | 42 | Court Minutes dated September 16, 2015 | 001539- |
| | | | 110 | 001541 |
| | IX | 43 | Court Minutes dated September 30, 2015 | 001542 |
| | | | | 001543 |
| | IX | 44 | Proposed Order Regarding September 30, 2015 | 001544 |
| | | | Hearing | 001548 |
| | IX | 45 | Email from Anthony L. Barney, Esq. dated | 0001549 |
| ш | | | October 7, 2015 | 000155 |

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| - 1 | |
|-----|--|
| 2 | I hereby certify that I am an employee of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd., and no |
| 3 | |
| 4 | a party to this action. I further certify that, on the 8th day of October 2015, |
| 5 | served the foregoing PETITIONER'S APPENDIX VOLUME III upon the |
| 6 | C-11 |
| 7 | following persons or entities as follows: |
| 8 | Cheryl Davis First Class US Mail |
| 9 | 5403 West 134 Terrace, Unit 1525 Overland Park, KS 66209 |
| LO | Overrand Fark, RS 00205 |
| 11 | Tarja Davis First Class US Mail |
| L2 | 3005 North Beverly Glen Circle Las Angeles, California 90077 |
| L3 | And State of the Community of the Commun |
| 14 | 514 West 26 th Street, #3E Kansas City, Missouri 64108 |
| 15 | Transas City, Missouri 6 1766 |
| 16 | Winfield B. Davis First Class US Mail |
| L7 | Skyline Terrace Apts. 930 Figueroa Terr. Apt. 529 |
| 18 | Los Angeles, California 90012-3072 |
| L9 | Ace Davis First Class US Mail |
| 20 | c/o Winfield B. Davis |
| 21 | Skyline Terrace Apts. 930 Figueroa Terr. Apt. 529 |
| 22 | Los Angeles, California 90012-3072 |
| 23 | |
| 24 | Christopher D. Davis First Class US Mail 3005 North Beverly Glen Circle |
| 25 | Los Angeles, California 90077 |
| 26 | And 514 West 26 th Street, #3E |
| 27 | Kansas City, Missouri 64108 |
| 28 | |

| 1 | Registered Agent Solutions, Inc. First Class US Mail |
|----|---|
| 2 | Registered Agent for FHT Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company |
| 3 | 4625 West Nevso Drive, Suite 2 |
| 4 | Las Vegas, Nevada 89103 |
| 5 | JONATHAN W. BARLOW, ESQ. Hand Delivered |
| 6 | CLEAR COUNSEL LAW GROUP |
| 7 | 50 Stephanie Street, Suite 101 Henderson, Nevada 89012 |
| 8 | Jonathan@clearcounsel.com |
| 9 | Attorneys for Stephen K. Lenhardt |
| 10 | Mark Solomon, Esq. Hand Delivered |
| 11 | Joshua Hood, Esq. |
| 12 | SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 9060 W. Cheyenne Ave. |
| 13 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 |
| 14 | Attorney for Petitioner Caroline Davis |
| 15 | DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY Hand Delivered |
| 16 | SHANNA CORESSAL, CTFA |
| 17 | c/o Charlene Renwick, Esq. Lee, Hernandez, Landrum & Garofalo |
| 18 | 7575 Vegas Drive, #150 |
| 19 | Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 |
| 20 | Honorable Judge Sturman Hand Delivered |
| 21 | Dept. 26, Eighth Judicial Dist. Court |
| 22 | Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Ave. |
| 23 | Las Vegas, NV 89101 |
| 24 | \sim \sim \sim \sim \sim \sim |
| 25 | (Wa PIX and) |
| 26 | Jacq C Jack |
| 27 | Employee of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd. |
| 28 | , |



EXHIBIT 6

Alun b. Burn

CLERK OF THE COURT HARRIET H. ROLAND, ESQ. NV Bar No. 5471 ROLAND LAW FIRM 2470 E. St. Rose Pkwy, Ste. 105 Henderson, NV 89074 Telephone: (702) 452-1500 Facsimile: (702) 920-8903 5 hroland@rolandlawfirm.com 6 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ. 7 Nevada Bar No. 8366 TIFFANY S. BARNEY, ESQ. 8 Nevada Bar No. 9754 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 3317 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite B 10 Las Vegas, NV 89102 Telephone: (702) 438-7878 11 Facsimile: (702) 259-1116 Attorneys for Christopher D. Davis 12 13 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 14 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 15 In the matter of: 16 Case No.: P-15-083867-T 17 Dept. No.: 26 The BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY HERITAGE 18 TRUST, dated July 28, 2000, as amended on February 24, 2014. 19 20 21 22 CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS' REPLY TO CAROLINE DAVIS' OPPOSITION TO HIS 23 MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP (12)(b) AND NRCP 19 24 CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS ("Christopher"), by and through his attorneys HARRIET H. 25 ROLAND, Esq., of the ROLAND LAW FIRM and ANTHONY L. BARNEY, Esq., of the law 26 office of ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD., and hereby submits his reply to Caroline Davis' 27

("Caroline") opposition to his motion to dismiss the Petition of Caroline Davis ("Caroline")

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pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) and for failure to join an indispensible party under NRCP 19. This pleading is based on the Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto, any exhibits attached hereto, and any oral argument that will be heard in this matter.

DATED this 17th day of April, 2015.

Respectfully Submitted, ROLAND LAW FIRM

Harriet H. Roland, Esq.

Attorney for Christopher D. Davis

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. FACTS PRESENTED

Christopher Davis hereby incorporates the Facts Presented in his Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b) and NRCP 19 ("Original Motion") as if set forth fully herein. By way of summary, he alleges:

Christopher's mother, Beatrice B. Davis ("Beatrice"), a life-long resident of Missouri, created several trusts and did extensive, sophisticated estate planning after her husband Ilus W. Davis died. Her long-time attorney was the Missouri firm of Lehnhardt & Lehnardt. She created the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Trust, in Missouri, on April 4, 1990, (the Revocable Trust) and the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust (the "FHT"), in Missouri, on July 28, 2000. She participated in the Davis Family Office, a Missouri limited liability company, formed on November 3, 1999. None of these entities had any Nevada contacts until the purported appointment of Dunham Trust Company on February 24, 2014.

Christopher Davis ("Christopher") and his wife Tarja are residents of Missouri. Caroline Davis is a resident of Washington. (Caroline and Christopher serve as co-trustees of the Revocable Trust which is administered under Missouri law, in Missouri.) Winfield Davis and his son Ace Davis are residents of Japan, but citizens of the United States. Stephen Lehnardt, the Trust Protector, is a resident of Missouri. Alaska Trust Company and its successor in interest, Alaska USA Trust Company, do business in Alaska and, upon information and belief, have no Nevada contacts. Among all the entities and assets, the only contact with Nevada is Dunham Trust Company, ("Dunham") which is alleged to be currently acting as directed trustee of the FHT. Even the Ashley Cooper insurance policy (the product of a tax-free exchange from the

year 2000), which is the primary asset of the trust and the subject matter of Caroline's petition, is not administered in Nevada. It is administered under a custodian domiciled in Puerto Rico, and its investment advisor is a Canadian broker-dealer.

Dunham created FHT Holdings, LLC, ("FHT Holdings") on March 28, 2014, and transferred the insurance policy to it. Dunham is the 100% owner/member of FHT Holdings. Christopher is the manager, and Dunham purportedly acts as "directed trustee" pursuant to the purported First Amendment to the FHT dated February 24, 2014. Upon information and belief, the directed trustee and LLC structure was put into place by Dunham in an attempt to shield itself from the fiduciary liability inherent in holding large assets without diversification.

Christopher Davis, as manager of FHT Holdings, has no power over the Ashley Cooper policy, or over the Puerto Rico custodian, or over the Canadian broker-dealer investment adviser. Upon information and belief, the sole purpose of his appointment and the formation of FHT Holdings, LLC, was to shield Dunham from fiduciary liability for its action or inaction. Christopher receives no compensation or benefit in his position as manager of FHT Holdings.

II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Invalidates Nevada's Jurisdiction Due To
Absence of Conditions Precedent to Change of Situs from Alaska to Nevada.

The entirety of Caroline's petition and her opposition to the motion to dismiss, and her request for the Nevada court to assert jurisdiction over Christopher and the Revocable Family Trust, rests defectively upon the presumed validity of the change of situs of the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust dated July 28, 2000 (the "FHT") from Alaska to Nevada, purportedly accomplished by the February 24, 2014 First Amendment.

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It is important to note that the question of the validity of the change of situs is different than the question of the validity of the First Amendment. Although Caroline asserts that the purported First Amendment is "presumed to be valid unless proven otherwise", all the facts and evidence prove the change of situs (a condition precedent to the amendment) was invalid and not allowed under the terms of the FHT. The validity of the change of situs of the FHT (and presumably the amendment purporting to accomplish it) must be determined under the express mandate of Article 14, Section 6 of the FHT.

Section 6, Paragraph 1, of the FHT provides the requirements for a change of situs as:

Except as expressly provided herein, the situs of this agreement or any subtrust established hereunder may be changed by the unanimous consent of all of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions of net income under this agreement or such subtrust, with the consent of any then-acting Protector and the Trustee thereof, which shall be given only after Trustee has obtained advice from counsel as to the tax and other consequences of a change in situs.1

The conditions precedent to the change of situs require that all of the beneficiaries then eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary distributions must consent to the change of the situs. In addition, both the FHT Trust Protector and Trustee must consent to the change of situs after the Trustee has been able to meet with an attorney to discuss the tax and other consequences of a change in situs, and after all the current income beneficiaries of the FHT have consented. These conditions did not occur. Therefore the situs of the FHT remains in Alaska until the conditions are performed.

Caroline recognizes that Tarja Davis is a discretionary beneficiary of the FHT. This is immediately clear by a simple review of the terms of the FHT2 and by a simple review of the

See Article 14, Section 4, Page 14-7, attached as Exhibit 1 to Caroline Davis's Original Petition (emphasis added). ² See Trust, Article Three, Section 1, Page 3-1; See also Article Eight, Section 3.d., Page 8-4, See also Article 8-4.b.1-2, Pages 8-12 and 8-13 attached as Exhibit 1 to Caroline Davis' Original Petition.

certificate of service filed by Caroline.³ Furthermore, Caroline asserts and provides written proof that Alaska USA Trust Company ("Alaska USA") resigned as Trustee on December 5, 2013. The resignation of Alaska USA as Trustee occurred almost three months prior to the execution of the purported first amendment on February 24, 2014 and the appointment of Dunham Trust Company ("Dunham") as successor Trustee.

There is no evidence that anyone or any entity assumed the office of Trustee and was in authority to act and provide consent of the Trustee during the period between the resignation of Alaska USA in December 2013 and the purported first amendment attempting the change of situs and appointing Dunham almost three months later. In contravention of the terms of the FHT, there was a purported change in situs made while there was no acting Trustee to provide informed consent to the change in situs. Further, it appears everyone overlooked the necessity of obtaining the consent Christopher's wife, Tarja, who was and is a beneficiary entitled to discretionary distributions. Tarja did not consent to the change in situs, and her signature cannot be found on any of the documents purporting to achieve the change in situs to Nevada and Dunham's appointment as successor trustee.

The law of Alaska, as the situs and place of administration of the FHT before the attempted change of situs, and the place of residence of Alaska USA Trust Company, the then Trustee, governs the validity of the First Amendment's change of situs to Nevada, the appointment of Dunham, and the other terms of the First Amendment, as well as the validity of the Trust and the First Amendment itself.

³ See Certification of Service for Opposition to Chrisopher D. Davis' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP (12)(b) and NRCP 19 dated April 13, 2015 (This correction was made by Caroline Davis after Christopher Davis filed his Motion to Dismiss alerting the parties as to the defectiveness of both the service of process and the defective nature of the purported first amendment).

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Article 12, Section 3 of the FHT requires "Any proceedings to seek judicial instructions or a judicial determination shall be initiated by my Trustee in the appropriate state court having original jurisdiction of those matters relating to the construction and administration of trusts. Because under the terms of the FHT, questions of validity must be determined under Alaska law, and Alaska is the venue which has original jurisdiction of the FHT until the attempted change of situs is accomplished, and an Alaska court must determine whether the change of situs and the First Amendment were valid. Only then should the Nevada court take jurisdiction over the FHT, and only if jurisdiction is then appropriate.

Alaska law allows for modification of an irrevocable trust upon consent, but by court approval. AS 13.36.360 Modification or Termination of Irrevocable Trust By Consent, reads:

- (a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, on petition by a trustee, settlor, or beneficiary, a court may modify or terminate an irrevocable trust if all of the beneficiaries consent and if continuation of the trust on the existing terms of the trust is not necessary to further a material purpose of the trust. However, the court, in its discretion, may determine that the reason for modifying or terminating the trust under the circumstances outweighs the interest in accomplishing the material purposes of the trust. The inclusion of a restriction on the voluntary or involuntary transfer of trust interests under AS 34.40.110 may constitute a material purpose of the trust under this subsection, but is not presumed to constitute a material purpose of the trust under this subsection.
- (b) Unless otherwise provided in the trust instrument, an irrevocable trust may not be modified or terminated under this section while a settlor is also a discretionary beneficiary of the trust.

- (c) If a beneficiary other than a qualified beneficiary does not consent to a modification or termination of an irrevocable trust that is proposed by the trustee, settlor, or other beneficiaries, a court may approve the proposed modification or termination if the court determines
- if all the beneficiaries had consented, the trust could have been modified or terminated under this section; and
- (2) the rights of a beneficiary who does not consent will be adequately protected or not significantly impaired.
 - (d) In (c) of this section, "qualified beneficiary" means a beneficiary who
- on the date the beneficiary's qualification is determined, is entitled or eligible to receive a distribution of trust income or principal; or
- (2) would be entitled to receive a distribution of trust income or principal if the event causing the trust's termination occurs.

It is well settled that a trust may only be modified in accordance with its specific terms.⁴
Where a trust instrument requires the consent of specific parties in order for an amendment to be valid, the lack of consent will invalidate a purported amendment.⁵ This required consent demonstrates the importance of having Alaska USA Trust Company ("Alaska USA") or their successor-in-interest (and predecessor trustee) Alaska Trust Company demonstrate authority and consent to change the situs of the FHT from Alaska to Nevada, because unless this evidence of

^a Dallinger v. Abel, 199 III. App. 3d 1057, 1059-1060 (III. App. Ct. 1990) citing Parish v. Parish (1963), 29 III. 2d 141, 149, 193 N.E.2d 761, 766.) (It is elementary that if the method of exercising a power of modification is described in the trust instrument, the power can be asserted only in that manner.)

Williams v. Springfield Marine Bank, 131 III. App. 3d 417, 475 N.E.2d 1122 (1985) (This rule was applied where the trust instrument permitted amendment by the settlors, the appellate court holding that an attempted amendment by only one settlor, after the other had died, was invalid.); See also Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 331, Explanatory Notes, comment e, at 144 (1959) ("If the settlor reserves a power to modify the trust only with the

consent is provided, the FHT situs cannot be changed. The consents of <u>some</u> of the beneficiaries and the FHT Trust Protector was not enough to meet the strict requirements of the condition precedent (i.e. change of situs) for the purported First Amendment.

Caroline has provided no evidence of any written or even oral consent of any trustee authorizing the FHT's change in situs prior to Alaska USA's resignation on December 5, 2013. She has not provided any evidence of Tarja having consented to the change of situs. She has not provided any evidence of the unanimous agreement of Beatrice Davis's children to appoint a successor trustee in the event the Trust Protector fails to appoint a Successor Trustee within thirty (30) days after Alaska USA resigned, ⁶ and even if they had, the successor trustee and Tarja would have had to consent to the change of situs. Therefore, the change of situs under the purported First Amendment must be presumed invalid until such evidence of an acting Trustee's consent can be produced and evidence of the Trustee's and all beneficiaries' consent of the change in situs can be obtained. Further and most importantly, such a dispute, which includes the validity of the First Amendment, must be brought in Alaska, as the original situs of the FHT before the purported First Amendment and the attempted change of situs.

Christopher asserts that the change of situs is invalid because of the lack of consent of all beneficiaries and the absence of action by an Alaska Trustee. The determination of the validity of the purported First Amendment and the change of situs (as well as its other provisions) is a condition precedent to the Nevada court taking jurisdiction over the FHT. That determination must be made under Alaska law before the Nevada court can assert jurisdiction over the FHT. Caroline alleges that the FHT Trust Protector validly appointed Dunham as successor Trustee on

consent of one or more of the beneficiaries, or of the trustee, or of a third person, he cannot modify the trust without such consent."

⁶ See Trust, Article Eleven, Section 3(c), Page 11-3, attached as Exhibit 1 to Caroline Davis's Original Petition.

February 24, 2014, citing the second paragraph of Article 14, Section 6 as his authority to do so; however as noted herein, she omitted the preceding paragraph relating to the change of situs which is the condition precedent before an amendment can be authorized. Although the FHT authorizes the Trust Protector and/or the beneficiaries to appoint a successor trustee in certain circumstances, the change of situs could only be authorized upon consent by <u>all</u> beneficiaries, and approval by a trustee in the original situs of Alaska

When the terms of a trust are not followed, the resulting actions based upon such deviation may be invalidated. Under the terms of the FHT, discussed above, it was not Dunham's consent that was required to change the situs. The timing of the purported First Amendment and Dunham's consent put the cart before the horse. In order to move the situs of the FHT from Alaska to Nevada or any other jurisdiction, all the beneficiaries had to consent, the "then acting Trust Protector" had to consent, and the Alaska trustee had to consent only after obtaining the requisite legal advice. Only then could a change in situs occur. (This is a different and more demanding standard than merely changing the trustee to another Alaska trustee.) Another Alaska Trustee could have been appointed, and the consent of all the beneficiaries could have been obtained; then upon agreement by the Trustee, all beneficiaries, and the Trust Protector, the situs could have been validly changed. However, the FHT's purported First Amendment attempts to change the FHT's situs while concurrently appointing Dunham as a "directed trustee". Again, Dunham's valid appointment as a Trustee, and its consent to serve, could have been achieved only after the situs of the FHT was changed from Alaska to Nevada. Had all of the beneficiaries consented, the decision to change the situs may

Northwestern University v. McLoraine, 108 III. App. 3d 310, 438 N.E.2d 1369 (1982) (This rule was applied where the settlor had neglected to follow the terms of the trust which required for an amendment only that the settlor put the amendment in writing, sign it, and deliver it to the trustees during the settlor's lifetime.)

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Nevada trustee, Dunham would have had to already be in tenure as trustee, procured advice from legal counsel about the tax and other consequences of moving the FHT situs, and then authorized the actual change in FHT's situs from Alaska. The requisite consent of an authorized Alaska trustee and all the beneficiaries does not appear in the purported First Amendment or in any other document, and Caroline Davis does not provide any other evidence of a Trustee's consent between December 2013 and February 2014. The condition precedent of all the beneficiaries' consents and the Alaska trustee's consent was not met in order to provide authority to then acting Trust Protector, Stephen Lehnardt, to change the situs of the FHT without the consent of an Alaska Trustee as required by the terms of the FHT. The FHT's 13 purported First Amendment's change of situs is, therefore, invalid. 14

have found a more stable legal basis had Dunham been doing business in Alaska. But as a

Establishing the validity of the FHT's purported First Amendment under NRS 164.010 without invoking Alaska jurisdiction is Caroline's "attempted foothold" in her urging for this Court to take improper in rem jurisdiction over the FHT, FHT Holdings, and personal jurisdiction over Dunham, but more importantly it is the defective basis upon which she urges this Court to assume jurisdiction over Christopher in all his capacities within any family entity, foreign or domestic, including the Revocable Trust and the Davis Family Office which are residents of Missouri. Even assuming arguendo that jurisdiction is proper through the untenable theory that the the First Amendment is valid, this court could only obtain jurisdiction over the FHT. Thus, Caroline is more than willing to overlook the FHT's requirements for change of situs and the jurisdictional prerequisites, and arrive at the erroneous conclusion that somehow Christopher and Mr. Lenhardt "consented to the jurisdiction of this Court by operation of law." Noticeably, Caroline cites NRS 163,5555 as authority for this statement but ignores the

7 requirement that the FHT be subject to the laws of Alaska, which, is clearly in dispute precisely because of the invalidity of the purported First Amendment's change of the FHT's situs to Nevada.

It is clear that even during the life of Beatrice B. Davis, the situs of the FHT could not be changed unless her Alaska trustee had obtained an opinion of legal counsel to the effect that the change in situs would not impact adversely on the spendthrift provisions of the FHT.⁸ The express purpose of the FHT was to support and protect Beatrice's family for generations to come, through the protection for the shares allocated to each beneficiary, so that no situation would be created that could expose any of the beneficiary's shares to the claims of creditors including amongst any beneficiary acting as a creditor to another.⁹ The attempted appointment as Dunham as a directed trustee shedding all its liability onto Christopher clearly contravened her intent.

Beatrice Davis, the trustmaker, was very clear that even if a power was granted to her Trustee by applicable state and federal statutes, it would be strictly limited to any express limitations or contrary directions in the FHT. Any amendment to change the situs of the FHT would require the opinion of legal counsel as to its effect and be curtailed, if applicable, by the terms of the FHT. This protection is implicit in the requirement that the advice of legal counsel be sought by the Trustee prior to a change in situs of the FHT. There is simply no evidence to suggest that such an opinion was obtained by the Alaska Trustee prior to the purported change in FHT situs.

⁸ See Trust, Article Fourteen, Section 6, Page 14-7 and 14-8.

⁹ See Trust, Article 8, Section 3 (b), Page 8-3.

¹⁰ See Trust, Article Thirteen, Section 3.z, Page 13-19.

¹¹ See Trust, Article Fourteen, Section 6, Page 14-7 and 14-8.

which Caroline is demanding an account, the presence of the predecessor Alaska trustees acting prior to February 24, 2014 (the date of the purported First Amendment) is indispensable to this matter, in order to determine the validity and consent issues discussed herein. Without the indispensible party(ies) being joined, including Alaska Trust, the predecessor trustee and successor in interest of Alaska USA, and/or another Alaskan successor after December 5, 2013, the matter cannot properly adjudicated.

B. Indispensible Parties to this Action and Caroline's Failure to Provide Notice or Service

Because of the lack of evidence of the required consent by the Alaska trustee and all the

beneficiaries, and because the Alaska trustees initiated and completed all the transactions for

Caroline alleges that "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska¹² and Alaska USA distributed approximately \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, to Chrstioher individually, and as a co-trustee with Caroline of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust, dated April 4, 1990, as amended (the "Revocable Trust"), and as Manager of the Davis Family Office, a Missouri limited liability company (the "Davis Office"). Caroline apparently believes that the Alaska trustees which allegedly procured more than two million dollars in policy loans from Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy for various FHT purposes, including making loans to Beatrice and paying their own fees, are not indispensible parties, simply because she alleges that, Mr. Davis, in his individual capacity, and in capacity as Trustee of the Revocable Trust, and as Manager of the Davis Office, was the only individual to

Alaska Trust Company was the predecessor trustee of the Beatrice B. Davis Family Heritage Trust dated July 28, 2000 prior to Alaska USA Trust Company.

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receive distributions as a result of such loans and the only one privy to the information sought by Ms. Davis,..."

Her allegation is misplaced.

Caroline apparently believes that neither Beatrice, nor the Alaska trustees, nor any other entity, were the recipients of any of the FHT funds borrowed, distributed, or otherwise disbursed from the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, which based upon the administration expenses by Alaska and/or Alaska USA or the Trust Protector is improbable at best. Under Alaska law and almost every other jurisdiction in the United States, a trustee is entitled to fees, and the mandate of an accounting for trust assets is directed to the trustee that actually administered the trust funds or assets, not to a beneficiary or other creditor or debtor of the trust. 14 In this case, those trustees required to account would be Alaska Trust and Alaska USA (now merged into Alaska USA) and they are the only ones who could account for these transactions, and whether or not they received any of those funds including but not limited to their administration costs or other investment expenses, as well as for what purposes the loans, distributions, or disbursements were made. Because only they would have such information, they are a necessary and indispensible party. Caroline's request would greatly prejudice and unduly burden Christopher to attempt secure information from and in the possession of the prior trustees in Alaska for documentation that Caroline desires through a proceeding in Nevada, during the time that she had co-equal status with him as a beneficiary. Alaska and/or Alaska USA would be the proper parties from whom to request her desired information.

Notably, Caroline alleges that Dunham Trust Company is an indispensible party, having allegedly received a mere \$25,000 of the total amount of policy loans (presumably for its fees and expenses) while Alaska and Alaska USA are not indispensible parties after having

¹³ See Opposition at 7:20-22.

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allegedly received and distributed \$2,164,744.68 as well as allegedly transferring all the assets of the FHT to Dunham, Interestingly, the information Caroline Davis is requesting would be in the possession of the two Alaska trustees that she claims are not indispensable, which is an unreasonable argument. It is unclear if Caroline even bothered to request an accounting from either Alaska Trust or Alaska USA concerning their alleged receipt and distribution of \$2,164,744.68, or from Dunham regarding the \$25,000 that was allegedly loaned during Dunham Trust Company's alleged trusteeship before rushing to this court for a remedy. As a beneficiary, she could have easily requested this information from these trustees without filing the present court action.

Because of her rush to court without apparently requesting these documents from the trustees, Caroline now attempts twice to indicate that she is "not now objecting to the loans and distributions being made or claiming any breach of fiduciary duty..." or she "is not now claiming any willful misconduct or gross negligence by Alaska or Alaska USA."15 However, she has asked this court to assume jurisdiction over the Nevada trustee, the FHT, the Trust Protector and trust adviser, and if she succeeds, she will file any future action in this same Nevada case. Therefore, her allegation that "Alaska and Alaska USA have no interest in the outcome of the relief being sought by Ms. Davis in her Petition" is incorrect. Alaska and Alaska USA would have every interest in the outcome of this action because they were trustees of the Trust who made the trust loans which are the subject of Caroline's concerns, and over which she has asked this Court to exercise in rem jurisdiction. Furthermore, they were trustees for the time periods in which Caroline seeks all information and, therefore, logically any information and/or claims arising from the information in Alaska and Alaska USA's possession is relevant to them.

See Alaska Statute 13.36.080; See also NRS 164.015 and NRS 153.031(1)(h).

Relying on the purported validity of the First Amendment to the FHT, Caroline comes to the misleading conclusion that, "[because] Dunham Trust lacked the authority to act, the transfer of the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy must have been done at the direction of Mr. Davis, as Investment Trust Advisor." Noticeably, Caroline removes any reference to the Alaska or Alaska USA Trustees who would have the information or approved any alleged transfers and have the information pertaining thereto. Caroline freely omits information to wrongfully obtain the information she seeks. She further ignores that the manager of an LLC wholly owned by the Trustee who is a beneficiary of the trust would not have the authority to transfer the policy to itself. Caroline leaps to her finger-pointing apparently without bothering to request the transfer documents either from Dunham or the Puerto Rico custodian.

Caroline is simply attempting to gain access to records that she could request from the parties that she claims are not indispensable, and to delve into Christopher's personal affairs. She has asked for an accounting from him as to the use of all the loan proceeds, disbursements or distributions from the FHT, without regard to the entity or person who in fact was the borrower or recipient. It is a question for the Alaska trustee as to whether the loans or distributions were made in accordance with the provisions of the FHT. With 20/20 hindsight, Caroline may regret that she did not borrow funds, request distributions, or demand an accounting from the Alaska trustees while she was able to do so. Now she is asking this Court to turn a blind eye and "look beyond" her failure to even make any appropriate request on the proper parties or serve the proper parties that would have the information that she is seeking. Christopher respectfully requests that this Court grant his motion to dismiss and deny Caroline's claims in their entirety.

¹⁵ See Page 7, tines 24-25 and Page 8, lines 17-18 of Caroline Davis's Objection.

C. Individual Parties or Entities Were Not Properly Served for the Court to Exercise Jurisdiction, and FHT Holdings' Corporate Form May Not Be Disregarded

In an effort to buttress her argument regarding their lack of proper service upon FHT Holdings, LLC, Caroline cites to inapplicable case law from Surrogate's Court of New York, New York County, which does not address the necessity of providing proper service to a corporation. In similar fashion to her omission of the language of the FHT as it related to the condition precedent to any future amendment, she even withheld the pertinent language for the cited case which actually held that, "It is sometimes said that where an estate or trust owns all or substantially all of the shares of a corporation, the corporate form may be disregarded and the situation viewed just as if the fiduciaries held title to the corporate assets. This would appear to be an oversimplification of the matter. It is not so much a matter of disregarding the corporate form, but rather of giving paramount consideration to the testamentary plan and scheme, and effectuating it in the manner prescribed by the testator. (citation omitted) Sometimes, due consideration of the testamentary plan demands that the corporate form be respected. This is particularly true where the testator directed the formation of a corporation or the continuance of one formed during his lifetime. (citation omitted).¹⁷

Under the facts of this case, Beatrice, as Trustmaker, did not form FHT Holdings, LLC, and did not specify that FHT Holdings be given consideration as part of her testamentary plan and scheme. Based upon the definition of the case cited by Caroline, she is attempting to oversimplify this matter, which cannot be done with regard to the facts presented in this matter.

8 16 Petition at 7:5-6.

¹⁷ In the Matter of Schnur, 39 Misc. 2d 880, 887, 242 N.Y.S.2d, at 132 (1963).

 Furthermore, in Swensen v. Sheppard, our Nevada Supreme Court recognized that NRS 164.010(1) and NRS 164.015(6) do not give the court jurisdiction to impose personal judgments. Likewise, it found that it could not impose personal liability on individuals or entities which 'required the court to acquire 'personal jurisdiction over [them as] part[ies], normally through appropriate process based on contacts with the jurisdiction or through [their] general appearance therein to defend on the merits."

In her Opposition, however, Caroline attempts to request this court take exception to the requirements for proper service and notice, which is entirely improper. Caroline is attempting to use the relaxed standards of statutory in rem jurisdiction for the more stringent requirements necessary to obtain the necessary personal jurisdiction over Christopher Davis, individually or upon FHT Holdings, LLC. Again, this is improper and contrary to due process requirements. Proper notice and service are required for personal jurisdiction over a party especially when requesting the court to exercise power and authority over an individual party or upon a business entity.

Furthermore, when assets are transferred with proper authority to a business entity, then the property becomes part of the business entity and not the trust.²⁰ Thus, a district court's *in rem* jurisdiction under NRS 164.010(1) and NRS 164.015(6) over the trust assets do not extend to assets transferred from the trust to a business entity or to a third party from that business entity.²¹ Therefore, even if the Court were to obtain jurisdiction over the insurance policy administered by a Puerto Rico insurer with the advice of the Canadian broker-dealer investment

¹⁸ Swensen v. Sheppard (In re Aboud), 314 P.3d 941, 946 (Nev. 2013)

¹⁹ Id, citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 30(2) cmt. c, see Young v. Nev. Title Co., 103 Nev. 436, 442, 744 P.2d 902, 905 (1987) ("A court does not have jurisdiction to enter judgment for or against one who is not a party to the action.")

²⁰ Swensen v. Sheppard (In re Aboud), 314 P.3d 941, 945-946 (Nev. 2013)

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advisor, Caroline would also have to seek personal jurisdiction over Christopher, individually, or FHT Holdings, LLC to obtain any relief she seeks. She did not do so.

Therefore, the due process rights of the entities must be respected, and service properly administered in order to obtain jurisdiction over Christopher, individually, and FHT Holdings, LLC. Therefore, Caroline's Original Petition should be dismissed.

D. Additional Indispensable Parties Named in Opposition Were Not Served; therefore, Jurisdiction is Improper over Them.

Caroline admittedly did not include additional parties in her Original Petition that she now alleges were recipients of FHT funds and loans from the insurance policy. Caroline alleges that, "During their tenure as Trustee, both Alaska and Alaska USA distributed approximately \$2,164,744.68, from loans taken against the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy, to Mr. Davis individually, as co-Trustee (with her) of the Beatrice B. Davis Revocable Living Trust, dated April 4, 1990, as amended (the "Revocable Trust"), and as Manager of the Davis Family Office, a Missouri limited liability company (the "Davis Office"). In order to allegedly distribute loans, Alaska and Alaska USA must have been recipients of FHT funds. In order to make a loan of FHT funds to Alaska and Alaska, the custodian of the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy must have been in receipt of FHT funds. If, as alleged, FHT funds were received by Christopher, the Revocable Trust, and the Davis Family Office from Alaska and Alaska USA, all three would have been recipients of those funds. Of the prior six alleged recipients, none of them was afforded proper notice or service in this matter. Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction over these parties. Particularly, Nevada law does not allow for this Court to take jurisdiction over the Revocable Trust and the Davis Family Office, which are Missouri entities,

without examining the requirements necessary for jurisdiction over foreign entities holding only personal property.

Caroline, in effect, argues 1) the entity authorized to make the policy loan is not an indispensible party, 2) that the party making the loans or distributions does not even need to be noticed or served concerning the policy loans, 3) the only individual alleged as a recipient does not need to be served pursuant to NRCP 4; and 4) that notice or service either under NRCP 4 or NRS 155.010 does not need to be provided to the remaining alleged distributees and recipients of FHT funds. These four arguments violate all constitutionally protected due process rights and related laws existent in Nevada, and likely every other jurisdiction in the United States. Proper parties should be included in lawsuits affecting their rights or responsibilities and proper personal and subject matter jurisdiction should be obtained over all parties in such lawsuits.

Caroline admittedly understands the importance of obtaining *in rem* jurisdiction over a trustee of a trust pursuant to NRS 164.010, because she asks this Court to assume jurisdiction of the FHT pursuant to this statutory authority. Notwithstanding this admission, she seeks jurisdiction over Christopher Davis, individually, as trustee of the Revocable Trust, and as manager of FHT Holdings without even bothering to serve notice under NRS 155.010 or pursuant to NRCP 4. Furthermore, Caroline failed to serve the custodian of the Ashley Cooper Life Insurance Policy of which she claims provided the loans to the FHT.

Admittedly, all of these parties were admittedly never even served by Caroline, and therefore her Petition must be dismissed for lack of proper jurisdiction over these parties.

Notice and service of process were never given to these parties, and the Court is without jurisdiction over them. Therefore, Caroline's claims in her Original Petition must be dismissed.

E. The Alaska Trustees are Indispensible Parties and Meet NRCP 19 Requirements; therefore, without a Joinder of these Parties, this Matter Must be Dismissed.

In Reply to the NRCP 19 factors discussed by Caroline in her Opposition, it is evident that Caroline belies her own statements. Caroline indicates on the one hand that Alaska and Alaska USA would not be "placed in a position in which they would need to protect any interest" while on the other indicating that Caroline is "not now claiming any willful misconduct or gross negligence by Alaska or Alaska USA" suggesting that when she obtains any of Alaska or Alaska USA documents that possible claims are likely to follow. Alaska or Alaska USA must be allowed to defend themselves if necessary or protect themselves from liability in the accuracy of information that may be provided during their tenure as Trustees of the FHT to avoid claims of willful misconduct or gross negligence by Caroline.

Furthermore, Christopher will be subjected to double or multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations in possibly many jurisdictions as a result of Caroline's claims without the necessary parties, Alaska and Alaska USA, joined to the present matter. Caroline seems to ignore the fact that she has now named multiple Defendants in this matter whose interests must all be considered, especially in light of the fact that proper service has not been effectuated on them for an order or judgment to be rendered against them in this matter.

Curiously, Caroline then requests the Court to seek relief from Christopher individually if the Court does find that Alaska and Alaska USA are indispensable parties. She wrongfully asks the court to order Christopher to provide the documents that are in Alaska and Alaska USA's possession without gaining proper jurisdiction over him individually. She wrongfully alleges that such a request would aliegedly not be prejudicial to Christopher and allegedly

²² See Catoline's Opposition, Page 8, lines 21-22.

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27 28 would be an adequate remedy, although the requested documents would be in the Trustee's possession.

She also falsely alleges that Alaska cannot allegedly assume jurisdiction over Christopher, erroneously citing NRCP 19(b) for this proposition.²⁴ With proper service to Christopher, Caroline could obtain jurisdiction over Christopher in Alaska if Alaska has jurisdiction over the FHT.²⁵

Joinder of Alaska and Alaska USA, Inc., is necessary as previously explained in Christopher's Original Motion to Dismiss and herein. If their joinder is not feasible, then this matter must be dismissed, because they are necessary and indispensable parties to this matter.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Christopher respectfully requests the Court do the following,

- 1. Deny Caroline's Original Petition in its entirety;
- 2. Deny Caroline's Opposition in its entirety; and
- Grant the relief requested in Christopher's Original Motion to Dismiss and all further requests made in his Reply to Caroline's Opposition to his Original Motion to Dismiss;
- Deny jurisdiction over the FHT Trust as a proceeding in rem until an Alaska court determines the validity of the change in situs, and/or the First Amendment;

²¹ See Caroline's Opposition, Page 8, lines 17-18 (emphasis added).

²⁴ See Caroline's Opposition, Page 9, lines 14-15 and fn 24.

²⁵ See AS 13.36.375. Trustee Advisor: (a) A trust instrument may provide for the appointment of a person to act as an advisor to the trustee with regard to all or some of the matters relating to the property of the trust. (b) Unless the terms of the trust instrument provide otherwise, if an advisor is appointed under (a) of this section, the property and management of the trust and the exercise of all powers and discretionary acts exercisable by the trustee remain vested in the trustee as fully and effectively as if an advisor were not appointed, the trustee is not required to follow the advice of the advisor, and the advisor is not liable as or considered to be a trustee of the trust or a fiduciary when acting as an advisor to the trust.; See also AS 13.36.035 (a) The court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the internal affairs of trusts, including trusts covered by (c) of this section. Except as provided in (c) and (d) of this section, proceedings that may be maintained under this section are those concerning the administration and distribution of trusts, the declaration of rights, and the determination of other matters involving trustees and beneficiaries of trusts.

- 5. Deny jurisdiction over the Revocable Trust and the Davis Family office:
- 6. Deny jurisdiction over Christopher Davis personally;

DATED this 17th day of April, 2015.

Respectfully Submitted, ROLAND LAW FIRM

larriet H. Roland, Esq.

NV Bar No. 5471

2470 E. St. Rose Pkwy, Ste. 105

Henderson, NV 89074

Telephone: (702) 452-1500 Faesimile: (702) 920-8903

hroland@rolandlawfirm.com

Attorney for Christopher D. Davis

| 1 | CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE |
|---------|---|
| 2 | I hereby certify that I am an employee of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd., and not a party to this action. |
| 3 | I further certify that except as otherwise noted on April 20, 2015, I served the foregoing CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS' REPLY TO CAROLINE DAVIS' OPPOSITION TO HIS |
| 4 | MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP (12)(b) AND NRCP 19 by first class US |
| 5 | mail, postage prepaid, upon the following persons or entities: |
| 6 | Tarja Davis |
| 7 | 514 West 26th Street, #3E |
| 8 | Kansas City, Missouri 64108 |
| 9 | Ace Davis |
| 10 | c/o Winfield B. Davis 366-6 Habu Aridagawa Arida |
| 11 | Wakayama 643-0025 |
| | JAPAN |
| 12 | - Christopher D. Davis |
| 13 | 514 West 26 th Street, #3E |
| 14 | Kansas City, Missouri 64108 |
| 15 | Registered Agent Solutions, Inc. |
| 16 | Resgistered Agent for FHT Holdings, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company 4625 West Nevso Drive, Suite 2 |
| ******* | Las Vegas, Nevada 89103 |
| 17 | |
| 18 | Stephen Lehnardt 20 Westwoods Drive |
| 19 | Liberty, Missouri 64068 |
| 20 | Stephen@lehnardt.com |
| 21 | Winfield B. Davis |
| 22 | 366-6 Habu Aridagawa Arida |
| 23 | Wakayama 643-0025 JAPAN |
| 24 | Mark Solomon, Esq. |
| 25 | Joshua Hood, Esq. |
| | SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 9060 W. Cheyenne Ave. |
| 26 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 |
| 27 | Attorney for Petitioner Caroline Davis |

Charlene Renwick, Esq. Lee, Hernandez, Landrum & Garofalo 7575 Vegas Drive, #150 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Attorney for Dunham Trust Company

Employee of Aminony L. Barney, Ltd.



EXHIBIT 7

1 TRAN DISTRICT COURT **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST OF:) CASE NO. P-15-082867 9 THE BEATRICE DAVIS HERITAGE DEPT. NO. XXVI TRUST. 10 Transcript of Proceedings 11 BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLORIA J. STURMAN, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 12 MOTION TO DISMISS: MOTION ON CHRISTOPHER DAVIS' MOTION TO 13 DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(B) AND NRCP 19; PETITION TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER THE BEATRICE B. DAVIS FAMILY 14 TRUST. ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CHRISTOPHER DAVID AS INVESTMENT TRUST ADVISOR AND STEPHEN K. LEHNARDT AS 15 DISTRIBUTION TRUST ADVISOR, TO CONFIRM DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY AS DIRECTED TRUSTEE, AND FOR IMMEDIATE DISCLOSURE OF 16 DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION FROM CHRISTOPHER D. DAVIS 17 WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2015 18 APPEARANCES: 19 20 For Caroline Davis: MARK ALAN SOLOMON, ESO. JOSHUA M. HOOD, ESQ. 21 For Christopher Davis: ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ. For Stephen Lehnartdt: JONATHAN W. BARLOW, ESQ. 22 For Dunham Trust Company: CHARLENE N. RENWICK, ESQ. 23 RECORDED BY: KERRY ESPARZA, DISTRICT COURT 24 TRANSCRIBED BY: KRISTEN LUNKWITZ 25 Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

| 1 | WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2015 AT 10:09 A.M. |
|----|--|
| 2 | |
| 3 | THE COURT: Okay. Will everybody state |
| 4 | appearances and we're ready to go? |
| 5 | MR. BARLOW: Jonathan Barlow for Stephen Lehnardt, |
| 6 | the Trust Protector. |
| 7 | THE COURT: Okay. |
| 8 | MS. RENWICK: Charlene Renwick on behalf of |
| 9 | Dunham Trust Company. |
| 10 | MR. BARNEY: Anthony Barney on behalf of |
| 11 | Christopher Davis. |
| 12 | THE COURT: All right. |
| 13 | MR. SOLOMON: And Mark Solomon and Joshua Hood or |
| 14 | behalf of Caroline Davis. |
| 15 | THE COURT: Okay. So, this is, again, my day to |
| 16 | deal with these family issues. So, anyway, let's discuss. |
| 17 | This is Mr. Solomon, your Petition to Assume |
| 18 | Jurisdiction over the Trust. I didn't really see that that |
| 19 | issue, the assuming that jurisdiction over the trust, was |
| 20 | really opposed. So to that specific relief requested, is |
| 21 | anybody really opposing that? |
| 22 | MR. BARNEY: Yes. I filed a Motion to Dismiss |
| 23 | THE COURT: Okay. |
| 24 | MR. BARNEY: his Petition in that regard. |
| 25 | THE COURT: Okay. All right. But I thought that |

1 was -- just to dismiss the petition or just to dismiss your client or to dismiss the petition? 2 3 MR. BARNEY: Dismiss the --4 THE COURT: Okay. It was Mr. Barlow who was just 5 looking -- who did his Joinder the right way. Nobody ever 6 does Joinders the right way. He --7 MR. BARLOW: Well, thank you. 8 THE COURT: He made it really clear: I'm only 9 joining -- people always just file joinders and I'm like: 10 What are you joining? He made it real clear what he's 11 joining. He is joining only to the extent that --12 MR. BARLOW: Right. We turned in Mr. Barney's 13 arguments --14 THE COURT: Right. 15 MR. BARLOW: -- related to the jurisdiction and --16 THE COURT: Jurisdiction only. 17 MR. BARLOW: -- the -- limited to the --18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. BARLOW: -- joinder parties. There was a 20 concern that we had that we didn't join and subsequent 21 conversations after review of the Reply that we may have 22 changed our position on that. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. BARLOW: So, essentially, we're all 25 essentially in full joinder with the --

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            THE COURT: Okay. So you're --
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            MR. BARLOW: -- Motion now after reviewing --
            THE COURT: All right. So then --
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            MR. BARLOW: -- the Reply.
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            THE COURT: -- what's your client's position on --
6
   any other --
7
            MR. SOLOMON: Yeah, we did file a Reply, Your
8
   Honor.
9
            THE COURT: Okay.
            MR. SOLOMON: You mean to Mr. Barlow?
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            THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.
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            MR. SOLOMON: Yeah, our position is that we
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   properly, under our statute, asked the Court to confirm him
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   as Trust Protector and Distribution Advisor because that's
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   what our law requires.
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            THE COURT: Okay. So, --
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            MR. SOLOMON: How do you want to tackle this, Your
18
   Honor?
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            THE COURT: I think -- that's why -- I think,
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   first of all, can we just make it clear who is on first?
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   So, --
22
            MR. SOLOMON: It's my petition but they never
23
   really responded to my petition --
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            THE COURT: Right. So, --
25
            MR. SOLOMON: -- substantively.
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            THE COURT: -- the interests --
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            MR. SOLOMON: What they did was just took this
3
   jurisdictional --
4
            THE COURT: Right.
            MR. SOLOMON: -- Motion to Dismiss --
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6
            THE COURT: That was why I was wondering because -
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            MR. SOLOMON: -- which I don't -- I opposed
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   specifically --
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            THE COURT: I know. It seemed like nobody was
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   really -- it didn't -- it had gotten to this jurisdictional
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   issue, we didn't really get to the issue of, you know, does
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   this Court have -- can this Court, you know, assume
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   jurisdiction?
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            MR. BARNEY: And, Your Honor, therein lies the
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   Motion to Dismiss. If the Motion to Dismiss is determined
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   on its merits, --
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            THE COURT: So --
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            MR. BARNEY: -- this Court does not have
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   jurisdiction to --
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            THE COURT: -- I guess that's my question is --
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            MR. SOLOMON: We only accept jurisdiction to
23
   determine jurisdiction, obviously. So, --
24
            THE COURT: Right.
25
            MR. SOLOMON: -- that's where I think we are, Your
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1 Honor.

THE COURT: So, yeah. And -- okay. So I guess that's the question then is: Does it make more sense to start with the Petition to Dismiss --

MR. SOLOMON: I think so, yes.

THE COURT: -- and make the decision with respect to jurisdiction --

MR. SOLOMON: And I can cover both in my response

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SOLOMON: -- because --

THE COURT: Perfect.

MR. SOLOMON: -- they're relevant.

THE COURT: Then excellent. And I don't know, Mr. Barney, who is arguing -- okay. Good. Thanks.

MR. BARNEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, as you are aware, the issue of jurisdiction arises or fails under the issue of whether or not there is a valid amendment to the trust. The terms of the trust specifically indicate that in order to create an amendment there must be a change in situs that is effectively ratified as a condition precedent to any amendment amending the trust to the laws of the state of Nevada.

Under the terms of the trust, the change in situs

is required only after the consent of all of the beneficiaries. The then acting Protector and the consent of the Trustee after it has received its counsel during the life of the testator a written opinion and thereafter an opinion by counsel that a change in situs is proper.

In this case, in order for there to be a first amendment, to even give the Court jurisdiction on the basis upon which to take jurisdiction under 164.010, there had to be a proper change in situs and there didn't occur a proper of situs in this case. There are certain beneficiaries of this trust. We have Christopher Davis, we have Caroline Davis, we have their son, and we also have Taria [phonetic] Davis. Okay. The amendment would have required all of their consents to --

THE COURT: But it said it was unanimous.

MR. BARNEY: It was unanimous.

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. BARNEY: And the trust, Your Honor, doesn't require unanimous consent, it requires all beneficiaries.

That's the pertinent part of the trust and that's set forth under Article 14. All beneficiaries must consent to this.

As far as we know --

MR. SOLOMON: Who didn't consent?

MR. BARNEY: Taria [phonetic].

MR. SOLOMON: Who is that?

MR. BARNEY: Taria [phonetic] is the wife of Christopher Davis.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SOLOMON: Not at the time of this.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. BARNEY: Yes. And, in fact, it's clear that they understood she was a beneficiary because in their Opposition to our Motion to Dismiss, they actually notice - they took to notice her, okay, but they hadn't previously done so. Okay. It's clear that she did not consent to this.

There also wasn't an acting Alaska Trustee at that point to consent to the transfer. Mr. Solomon presented evidence that was very clear that on December 5th that Alaska Trust USA tendered their resignation and was no longer the Trustee at that point. Then, allegedly, in February, the first amendment was produced wherein the change in situs occurred, allegedly, and a new Trustee was appointed in that same document.

Now, Your Honor, that begs the question: How could a Nevada Trustee based in Nevada who could only operate within that situs be the Trustee that referred to in the trust but had to receive counsel before they made the change in situs that would also make the amendment operative as a condition precedent and then go ahead and