# **ORIGINAL**

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 2 3 4 RAUL GARCIA, 5 Appellant, 6 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA, No. 37816 FILED 8 Respondent. 9 NOV 29 2001 10 RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF JANETTE M. BLOOM CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 11 DEPUTY CLERK MICHAEL R. SPECCHIO RICHARD A. GAMMICK Public Defender District Attorney 13 CHERYL BOND GARY H. HATLESTAD Appellate Deputy P. O. Box 30083 14 Chief Appellate Deputy P. O. Box 30083 15 Reno, Nevada 89520-3083 Reno, Nevada 89520-3083 16 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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the prosecutor. <u>Id.</u> pp. 106, 116. No evidence was presented suggesting that Deputy Walling saw similar action from Ms. Torrenses when Anna testified, however. Deputy Walling went on to say, however, that the answers given by Palma were either yes/no answers, and appeared to correspond to Ms. Torrenses' nodding or shaking her head. <u>Id.</u> p. 106. Initially, Walling said he watched Ms. Torrenses, who was seated in the front row of the gallery, shaking or nodding her head two times and let it go, but he looked up from his desk a few minutes later and saw her do it two or three more times. <u>Id.</u> pp. 106-7. As a result, Deputy Walling looked at Ms. Torrenses, and she stopped. <u>Id.</u> Walling said he looked up again later, but Ms. Torrenses was not nodding anymore. <u>Id.</u> p. 106.

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While Walling did not say which questions were being asked when Ms. Torrenses nodded, the key question, according to defense counsel, involved whether Palma had ever seen Raul Garcia with the girls before or had played with the girls before; to this question, Palma said no. (This exchange is found at 2 TT, p. 7, lines 4-19.) Defense counsel went on to say that "our defense is that [Raul Garcia] has played with the girls before." Id. pp. 123-25. Curiously, Appellant never presented any evidence proving he had been with or played with the girls before or ever. Moreover, Anna denied such activity too. 1 TT, p. 60.

After listening to Garcia and Walling, the trial judge reviewed Palma's testimony. When he completed his review of the testimony, the trial judge, who is in the best position to

Heretofore, this Court's cases have condemned coaching the witnesses, particularly in cases in which childvictims have been tainted by improper interview techniques by detectives and other experts. See, e.g., Felix v. State, 109 Nev. 151, 849 P.2d 220 (1993). But to get to a point where substantive condemnation, and therefore a new trial is required, a factual threshold must be cleared and, in those cases, was cleared. Garcia's counterargument, presented in his brief, proceeds on the assumption that coaching was proved when it was not. Moreover, it must be shown from the factual threshold that the trial judge manifestly abused his discretion in refusing to allow Ms. Garcia and/or Deputy Walling to testify. Accord, Beck v. District Court, 113 Nev. 624, 939 P.2d 1059 (1997). It is in this respect that Appellant Garcia's argument is undercut. Even if we were to look at the record in the light most favorable to Garcia, he proved virtually nothing upon which the lower court ruling could be reversed. Accord, State v. Rodriquez, 509 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Neb. 1993) - cross-examination allowed, but only if improper action proved.

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For example, Appellant Garcia presented absolutely no evidence establishing Ms. Torrenses suggested answers to Anna. The best Appellant Garcia could show through Ms. Garcia's testimony is that when Ms. Torrenses nodded, Anna was answering "I don't remember." Moreover, it should be noted that Ms. Garcia speaks no English, or very little English, but Anna testified in English. In either event, the crucial portions of Anna's testimony came as narrative answers posed by the prosecutor and which called for

narrative, open-ended answers. 1 TT, pp. 29-54. On cross-examination, however, Anna said "I don't remember" approximately two times. Id. pp. 68, 69.

In short, insofar as Anna is concerned, Garcia failed to prove that Ms. Torrenses even suggested answers to her daughter. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in refusing to allow Roberta Garcia to testify in this case.

While Garcia goes on, at some length in his brief, respecting how cross-examination is the great engine of truth production, and that most of Anna's answers to the cross-examination were yes/no answers, it should be remembered that the answers were to leading questions, but more importantly, Ms. Garcia was not paying much attention and only weighed in on the "I don't remember" answers. Indeed, defense counsel pressed Ms. Garcia to move beyond those answers to other more provocative answers, but she would not. 2 TT, p. 132, lines 2-22.

A similar result should follow with respect to the trial judge's ruling refusing to allow Deputy Walling to testify: namely, Appellant Garcia failed to prove that Ms. Torrenses suggested answers to Mr. Palma. Read in the light most favorable to Garcia, the record merely reflects that Ms. Torrenses nodded her head four or five times when Palma was on direct examination; Walling saw no similar conduct on cross-examination. If Ms. Torrenses was suggesting answers to Palma, then we should have expected him to be completely stumped when it came to cross-examination, but he was not. Moreover, not every question put to

Mr. Palma required a yes/no response; indeed, the key details provided by Palma were given in a narrative:

- Q. Mr. Palma, as precisely as you can, I want you to describe for the ladies and gentlemen exactly what you saw.
- A. When I went into the room I saw Raul in the room of the girls. When I was going in I saw . . . I saw the girl, that she was pulling her shorts up. And as soon as Raul saw me, he kind of got scared and turned around . . . he told me that he was looking at the decorations. Because I asked him, what are you doing? And he told me nothing.

And I saw the girl nervous.

And I . . . grabbed her and asked her what he was doing to her. And she told me to tell Chino [Raul Garcia] to go so she can tell me what happened.

2 TT, p. 20.

During the hearing, as noted above, defense counsel claimed the key questions put to Mr. Palma dealt with whether Raul Garcia had played with Anna and her sister before, and whether Palma had seen Raul Garcia with the girls before. 2 TT, p. 123. To pique the trial judge's curiosity, defense counsel stated "that our defense is that he has played with the girls before." Id. Anna answered similar questions negatively, however, and since no evidence corroborated Anna's claim of sexual assault, Palma's corroboration on this point of Anna's testimony was crucial to her credibility, at least according to defense counsel.

Defense counsel's reliance on this sequence of questions to make his point is very problematic and only serves to underscore the propriety of the trial judge's ruling. First, Walling never Ms. Torrenses was nodding. Secondly, if these questions were key to the defense, it is not clear why. Despite defense counsel's claim to the contrary, the excerpted narrative, quoted above, is the key piece of corroborating evidence. Moreover, Raul Garcia did not present any evidence, from any witness, that he had ever played with Anna at any time; both Anna and Palma said no to these questions, and their testimony on this point was uncontradicted. And finally, it is not this sequence of questions which Garcia relies on here on appeal to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

In his brief, Garcia latches onto another exchange. Since Garcia does not bother to quote the exchange in full, we will:

- Q. Thank you. Mr. Palma, you had described if I remember correctly, that Anna Karen was doing something with her hands. Could you show the ladies and gentlemen where her hands were?
- A. Can I stand up?
- Q. Please.

- A. She was like this with her hands like that.
- Q. What was she holding onto with her hands, kind of around your fly towards the front of your pants?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Defense counsel's claim that there was no other corroboration, Opening Brief, p. 10, line 25, is dubious in that there was a forensic medical examination conducted by a nurse practitioner. 2 TT, pp. 51-70. While the examination revealed no physical trauma, <u>Id.</u> pp. 55-57, and Anna's hymen was in tact, the nurse practitioner noted that the absence of such injuries was not surprising. Id. pp. 66-68.

- A. Her shorts that she was wearing.
- Q. Were her shorts down that far?
- A. Yes.

MR. BOSLER: Objection. That's leading.

THE COURT: We were having a little difficulty in translation so I will go ahead and allow that. Overruled.

#### BY MR. HAHN:

- Q. Could you see the back of her shorts where they were? You have described where the front of the shorts are. Where were the back of the shorts in relation to her body?
- A. Over here like this.

2 TT, pp. 23-24.

Garcia's present argument respecting this sequence reads as follows:

In addition, the court was in error about a crucial point of Mr. Garcia's testimony. One of the questions to which he answered "yes" was "Were her shorts down that far?" 2 TT, p. This was not a follow-up to something Mr. Garcia had just stated. Mr. Garcia had just stated that his daughter had her hands holding onto her shorts. He said nothing about the shorts being down. When the prosecutor asked if the shorts were "down that far," defense counsel objected to the leading nature of the This is the crucial key to the question. father's corroboration of the daughter's testimony. This could have been one of the questions to which Mr. Palma received the coaching from his wife. The court even overruled the objection stating "we were having a little difficulty in translation so I will allow that." 2 TT, p. 24. There was a problem with translation. The court allowed a crucial question to be asked in a leading Then the court denied the jury the opportunity to hear the truth: Mr. Palma's

wife had, during at least some parts of his testimony, nodded her head in the affirmative or the negative prior to Mr. Palma giving the corresponding yes or no answer. (Emphasis supplied).

Opening Brief, p. 11, lines 7-19.

Despite Garcia's rhetoric to the contrary, we would know if Ms. Torrenses was nodding during this exchange if defense counsel had asked Walling that question during the hearing, but he didn't. It is certainly conceivable that defense counsel knew the answer already and did not want it on the record, or that he did not know the answer and didn't want to find out under oath. In addition, despite Garcia's present claim that Palma had said "nothing about the shorts being down," the record obviously belies this representation. Indeed, the State excerpted that part of Palma's testimony in full just so there would no misunderstandings about such things.

In closing, and despite Garcia's very insulting comments to the contrary, Opening Brief, p. 11, lines 20-26, it did matter to the trial judge that Ms. Torrenses may have suggested answers to Anna and/or Palma. If it didn't matter to him, then why even bother with an evidentiary hearing. The fact of the matter is the trial judge was seriously irritated by this situation, and wanted to get to the bottom of it. Once he did, by virtue of an evidentiary hearing, he ruled against Garcia. The trial judge's action was prudent and undertaken with care, and his ruling on the merits, given the information before him, did not constitute an

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abuse of discretion.3

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# THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN THE MANNER IN WHICH HE INSTRUCTED THE JURY.

When jury instructions were settled, the trial judge proposed to give, and ultimately did give, the following instruction:

> or Inconsistencies discrepancies testimony of a witness, may or may not cause the jury to discredit such testimony. innocent misrecollection, like failure recollect, is not an uncommon experience. weighing the effect of a discrepancy, consider whether it pertains to a matter of importance, or an unimportant detail, and whether the discrepancy results from innocent error or willful falsehood.

Instruction 20, Appellant's Appendix, p. 25.

Trial counsel claimed this instruction "is not only duplicative and misleading but not a correct statement of the law." 2 TT, pp. The trial judge disagreed and gave the 101-2. instruction.

Garcia contends that the trial judge erred in giving this instruction. Specifically, he claims that Instruction 20 (1) was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Garcia, of course, remarks that the jury trial would only be extended 10 or 15 minutes if Mr. Garcia's and Deputy Walling's testimony were presented. Despite Garcia's claim that the trial judge's action should be viewed as promoting expediency and not fairness, it is clear that the trial judge appreciated the extrinsic side show the jury would be forced to endure if relief While Ms. Garcia and Deputy Walling might take only was granted. 15 or 20 minutes, the State's rebuttal case, including Ms. Torrenses, Anna, Palma and the prosecutor's investigator who, allegedly, sat next to Ms. Torrenses, would take some time and would certainly be viewed as distracting for a jury and therefore legally irrelevant under NRS 48.035. In contrast to Garcia's failure of proof, legal relevance may not be completely dispositive 26 but neither should it be ignored.

substantially covered by other instructions, (2) unnecessarily singled out the complaining witness, (3) reduced the State's burden of proof, (4) was confusing, superfluous and distorted the law by excusing discrepancies in testimony as nothing more than innocent misrecollections. The State respectfully submits that Garcia's contention lacks merit.

First, it is well settled that a trial judge is entitled to instruct jurors on all matters of law he thinks necessary for their information in giving their verdict. NRS 175.161(2). To reverse a trial judge's decision to give a jury instruction, it must be the case that the trial judge abused his broad discretion in giving a particular instruction, but an abuse occurs only if the trial judge's discretion is arbitrary, capricious or exceeds the bounds of law. <u>Jackson v. State</u>, 117 Nev. \_\_\_\_\_, 117 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001).

In the present case, Garcia has not cited any authority supporting the view that the trial judge's decision in giving Instruction 20 constitutes an abuse of discretion. Moreover, none of Garcia's claims is well taken.

First, Garcia's claim that Instruction 20 is an incorrect statement of law is meritless. See, for example, People v. Beardslee, 806 P.2d 1311, 1324 (Cal. 1991); United States v. Butler, 56 F.3d 941, 945 (8th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Lancaster, 78 F.3d 888, 895 (4th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, since Instruction 20 is a correct statement of law, Garcia must establish the trial judge's action was arbitrary and capricious, but he has

failed to do so.

Obviously, Garcia would be on much stronger footing if Instruction 20 singled out Anna as the subject of the instruction, but the instruction singles out no one. Consequently, the scope of the instruction covers all witnesses. In addition, despite Garcia's claim to the contrary, Instruction 20 is not superfluous or cumulative in relation to, for example, Instruction 18; instead, Instruction 20 supplements Instruction 18. Finally, the presence of these so-called falsus in uno falsus in omnibus instructions could not have prejudiced Garcia, because their application, if deemed operative by the jury, would operate to the State's detriment and not the other way around.

In short, the lower court did not err in giving Instruction 20. Garcia's contention to the contrary should be rejected.

## III. CONCLUSION

Based on the above arguments and points and authorities cited in support thereof, the State respectfully urges this Court to affirm Garcia's convictions.

DATED: November 29, 2001.

RICHARD A. GAMMICK District Attorney

By M. HATLESTAD

Chief Appellate Deputy

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRAP Rule 25, I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Washoe County District Attorney's Office and that on this date, I forwarded a true copy of the foregoing document, through the Washoe County Interagency Mail, addressed to:

CHERYL BOND Appellate Deputy Washoe County Public Defender's Office Reno, Nevada 89501

DATED: November 29, 2001

- Kinda Jackling

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