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Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of another, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.

Malice may be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

NRS 200.020; Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 6 P.3d 481 (2000) (malice may be implied is the preferred instruction).

Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of another, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.

B

Malice may be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

The abandoned and malignant heart implied malice requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian O'Keefe acted with an extreme recklessness regarding homicidal risk. That is, he must have intended to commit acts which caused the death of Victoria Whitmarsh, he must have known that his acts were likely to cause her death, and he must have consciously disregarded the risk to her life.

Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687, 712-13, 716, 7 P.3d 426, 442, 444 (2000).

The abandoned and matignant heart implied malice requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian O'Keefe acted with an extreme recklessness regarding homicidal risk. That is, he must have intended to commit acts which caused the death of Victoria Whitmarsh, he must have known that his acts were likely to cause her death, and he must have consciously disregarded the risk to her life.

Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being without malice aforethought, but in the commission of a lawful act which might probably produce such a consequence in an unlawful manner.

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If Brian O'Keefe unintentionally or accidentally killed Victoria Whitmarsh during a lawful act, but in doing so acted with a wanton or reckless disregard for human life that is not of the extreme nature that will support a finding of implied matice, then the crime is involuntary manulaughter and not second-degree murder.

NRS 200.070; <u>United States of America v. Crowe</u>, 563 F. 3d 969, ____ (9th Cir. 2009); <u>Crawford v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 746, 751, 752-53, 121 P.3d 582 (2005) (state's burden, definition of malice aforethought, and defendant's entitlement to significance of his theory instruction); <u>Brooks v. State</u>, 124 Nev. ____,180 P.3d 657, 662 (2008) (defendant's entitlement to significance instructions and instructions that are specifically tailored to the facts of the case).

Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being without malice aforethought, but in the commission of a lawful act which might probably produce such a consequence in an unlawful manner.

If Brian O'Keefe unintentionally or accidentally killed Victoria Whitmarsh during a lawful act, but in doing so acted with a wanton or reckless disregard for human life that is not of the extreme nature that will support a finding of implied malice, then the crime is involuntary manslaughter and not second-degree murder.

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was unlawful, but you have a reasonable doubt whether the crime is second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter, you must give the benefit of the doubt to the defendant and find it to be involuntary manslaughter rather than second degree murder.

Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 746, 751, 752-53, 121 P.3d 582 (2005) (state's burden, benefit of the doubt instruction, and defendant's entitlement to significance of his theory instruction); Brooks v. State, 124 Nev. ____, 180 P.3d 557, 662 (2008) (defendant's entitlement to significance instructions and instructions that are specifically tailored to the facts of the case).

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was unlawful, but you have a reasonable doubt whether the crime is second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter, you must give the benefit of the doubt to the defendant and find it to be involuntary manslaughter rather than second degree murder.

An lawful act done without any intention of killing which unfortunately kills another, and which is not done with such extreme or wanton and reckless disregard for human life as would constitute malice aforethought or involuntary manslaughter is not unlawful and does not constitute second degree murder or manslaughter. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the death of Victoria Whitmarsh was caused by such a lawful act, you must give the benefit of the doubt to Brian O'Keefe and return a verdict of Not Guilty.

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NRS 200.180; United States of America v. Crowe, 563 F. 3d 969, ______ (9th Cir. 2009) (definition of involuntary manslaughter recklessness): <u>Ybarra v. Wolff</u>, 662 F. Supp. 44 (D. Nev. 1987) (government's burden); <u>Collman v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 687, 715, 7 P.3d 426, 444 (2000) (State's burden on malice, definition of abandoned and malignant heart malice); <u>Crawford v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 746, 751, 752-53, 121 P.3d 582 (2005) (state's burden, definition of malice aforethought, and defendant's entitlement to significance of his theory instruction); Brooks v. State, 124 Nev. _____ 180 P.3d 657, 662 (2008) (defendant's entitled to significance instructions and instructions that are specifically tailored to the facts of the case).

An lawful act done without any intention of killing which unfortunately kills another, and which is not done with such extreme or wanton and reckless disregard for human life as would constitute malice aforethought or involuntary manslaughter is not unlawful and does not constitute second degree murder or manslaughter. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the death of Victoria Whitmarsh was caused by such a lawful act, you must give the benefit of the doubt to Brian O'Keefe and return a verdict of Not Guilty.

To constitute the crime charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and certain mental state in the mind of the actor. Unless the mental state is proved, the crime to which it relates is not committed.

CALJIC 3.31.5; NRS 193,190,

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To constitute the crime charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and certain mental state in the mind of the actor. Unless the mental state is proved, the crime to which it relates is not committed.

The intent with which an act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done.

Motive is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to prove motive on the part of a defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case.

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Brian O'Keefe is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places on the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged and that Brian O'Keefe committed the offense.

A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Brian O'Keefe, he is entitled to a verdict of Not Guilty.

NRS 175.211; <u>Brooks v. State</u>, 124 Nev. ____,180 P.3d 657, 662 (2008) (defendant's entitled to significance instructions and instructions that are specifically tallored to the facts of the case).

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If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Brian O'Keefe, he is entitled to a verdict of Not Guilty.

б

The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

There are two types of evidence; direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime charged, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a chain of facts and circumstances which tend to show whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.

Statements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case. However, if the attorneys stipulate to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

You must not speculate to be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the court and any evidence ordered stricken by the court.

Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

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You must not speculate to be true any instructions suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the court and any evidence ordered stricken by the court.

Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

INSTRUCT	

A witness who has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in a particular science, profession or occupation is an expert witness. An expert witness may give his opinion as to any matter in which he is skilled.

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You should consider such expert opinion and weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if, in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound.

Prabhu v, Levine, 112 Nev. 1538, 930 P.2d 103 (1996).

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Although you are to consider only the evidence in eh case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in light of common experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess. A verdict should never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

Howard v. State, 102 Nev. 572, 729 P.2d 1341 (1987).

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IO

The right of self-defense is not available to an original aggressor, that is a person who has sought a quarrel with the design to force a deadly issue and thus through his fraud, contrivance or fault, to create a real or apparent necessity for making a felonious assault.

However, where a person without voluntarily seeking, provoking, inviting, or willfully engaging in a difficulty of his own free will, is attacked by an assailant, he has the right to stand his ground and need not retreat when faced with the threat of deadly force.

Culverson v. State, 106 Nev. 484, 797 P.2d 238 (1990).

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When acting in self-defense a person may use the amount of force reasonably necessary to defend themselves.

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Runion v. State, 116 Nev. 1041, 13 P.3d 52, 59 (2000).

When acting in self-defense a person may use the amount of force reasonably necessary to defend themselves.

5% Actual danger is not necessary to justify force used in self-defense. A person has a right to defend from apparent danger to the same extent as he would from actual danger. A person using even deadly force is justified if:

- he is confronted by the appearance of imminent danger which arouses in his mind an honest belief and fear that he is about to be killed or suffer great bodily injury; and
- 2) He acts solely upon these appearances and his fear and actual beliefs; and
- A reasonable person in a similar situation would believe himself to be in like danger.

Such force is justified even if it develops afterward that the person using it was mistaken about the extent of the danger.

Runion v. State, 116 Nev. 1041, 13 P.3d 52, 59 (2000).

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- 2) He acts solely upon these appearances and his fear and actual beliefs; and
- A reasonable person in a similar situation would believe himself to be in like danger.

Such force is justified even if it develops afterward that the person using it was mistaken about the extent of the danger.

Brian O'Keefe is entitled to use even deadly force in self-defense even though the danger to life or personal security may not have been real, if a person in the circumstances and from the viewpoint of Brian O'Keefe would reasonably have believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.

Pineda v. State, 120 Nev. 204, 88 P.3d 827 (2004).

Brian O'Keefe is entitled to use even deadly force in self-defense even thought the danger to life or personal security may not have been real, if a person in the circumstances and from the viewpoint of Brian O'Keefe would reasonably have believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.

If evidence of self-defense is present, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. If you find the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian O'Keefe did not act in self-defense, you must find him Not Guilty.

Runion v. State, 116 Nev. 1041, 13 P.3d 52 (2000).

L

If evidence of self-defense is present, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. If you find the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian O'Keefe did not act in self-defense, you must find him Not Guilty.

Before you may consider evidence of the Statements of Brian O'Keefe made during his interrogation by Homicide Detectives, you must find that the State has established by a preponderance of the evidence that he made those statements voluntarily. Voluntariness under the law requires that the act be a product of rational intellect and free will. In determining voluntariness, you must consider the totality of circumstances present during the interrogation, including, Brian O'Keefe's physical condition, including intoxication, experience with the criminal justice system, age, education, the length of the detention, repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, and use of physical punishment such as deprivation of food or sleep.

A defendant's intoxication will make a statement inadmissible only if the accused is intoxicated to the extent of being incapable of understanding the meaning of his comments. If you determination that Brian O'Keefe was so incapable, then you may not consider his interview with homicide detectives in your assessment of the evidence in this case.

Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 111 P.3d 690 (2005); Laursen v. State, 97 Nev. 568, 634 P.2d 1230 (1981).

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When you retire to consider your verdict, you must select one of you to act as foreperson who will preside over your deliberation and will be your spokesperson here in court.

During your deliberation, you will have all the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions and forms of verdict which have been prepared for your convenience.

Your verdict must be unanimous. As soon as you have agreed upon a verdict, have it signed and dated by your foreperson and then return with it to this room.

The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict must be unanimous.

It is your duty, as jurers to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors.

In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because it is the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.

You are the judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in this case.

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In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because it is the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.

You are the judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to escertain the truth from the evidence in this case.

The non-flight of a person from the location immediately after the act occurred which resulted in a criminal charge is not sufficient in itself to establish innocence, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proved facts in deciding whether the State has met its burden of proof to establish the elements of the offense charged.

CALJIC NO. 2.52

The non-flight of a person from the location immediately after the act occurred which resulted in a criminal charge is not sufficient in itself to establish innocence, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proved facts in deciding whether the State has met its burden of proof to establish the elements of the offense charged.

No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, evidence of intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such purpose, motive or intent.

NRS 193,220

No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, evidence of intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such purpose, motive or intent.

If the evidence in this case is subject to two constructions of interpretations, each of which appears to you to be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of the defendant, and the other to the innocence, it is your duty to adopt the interpretation which will admit of the defendant's innocence, and reject that which points to guilt.

You will notice the rule applies only when both of the two possible opposing conclusions appear to you to be reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the possible conclusions should appear to you to be reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere to the reasonable deduction and to reject the unreasonable, bearing in mind, however, even if the reasonable deduction points to defendant's guilt, the entire proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt to support a verdict of guilty.

<u>Crane v. State</u>, 88 Nev. 684, 687, 504 P.2d 12 (1972); <u>Bails v. State</u>, 92 Nev. 95, 97, 545 P.2d 1155 (1976).

If the evidence in this case is subject to two constructions of interpretations, each of which appears to you to be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of the defendant, and the other to the innocence, it is your duty to adopt the interpretation which will admit of the defendant's innocence, and reject that which points to guilt.

You will notice the rule applies only when both of the two possible opposing conclusions appear to you to be reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the possible conclusions should appear to you to be reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere to the reasonable deduction and to reject the unreasonable, bearing in mind, however, even if the reasonable deduction points to defendant's guilt, the entire proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt to support a verdict of guilty.

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3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
5 6 7 8 9	STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, DEPT NO. XVII DATE: BRIAN K. O'KEEFE, Defendant. CASE NO: C250630 DEPT NO. XVII DATE: TIME:
12 13 14 15 16	VERDICT We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant BRIAN KERRY O'KEEFE, as follows: COUNT 1 - SECOND DEGREE MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON:
18 19 20 21 22	Guilty of Second Degree Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon Guilty of Second Degree Murder Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter Not Guilty
24 15 16	Dated this day of, 2010.
8	Foreperson

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ORDR
PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.
PATRICIA PALM, ESQ.
NEVADA BAR NO. 6009
1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD.
LAS VEGAS, NV 89104
Phone: (702) 386-9113
Fax: (702) 386-9114
Email: Patricia palmiaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Brian O'Keefe

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

AUG 2 3 2010

CAROL DONAHOO, DEP

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff.

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BRIAN K. O'KEEFE.

Defendant.

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT. NO: XVII

DATE:

TIME:

080250839 ORGA Order 824137

ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND DENYING, IN PART, MOTION BY DEFENDANT O'KEEFE FOR DISCOVERY

This matter having come before the Court on August 12, 2010, on a Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe for Discovery, to which an Opposition was filed by the State, and the Court having heard argument and been fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED, in part, except as to the information sought in paragraph 8(a) - (c), pursuant to this Court's Order, the State need provide only information which is sufficient to identify any felony convictions of the

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lay witnesses within the past ten (10) years and the last known addresses for the lay witnesses, as to any additional information sought under paragraph 8(a)-(c), the Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 22 day of August, 2010.

Respectfully submitted by: PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

Man nv District Tudge

PATRICIA A. PALM 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104 (702) 386-9113

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FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

AUG 2 5 2010

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

BY. Canal Donation CAROL DONAHOO, DEPUTY

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-V\$-

BRIAN K. O'KEEFE,

Defendant.

CASE NO. C250630

DEPT. NO. XVII



JURY LIST

- Barbara Butt
- 2. Richard Mathews
- 3. Carolyn Renaud
- 4. Janice Wright
- Vicki Jury
- Deborah Ratanapool
- 7. Rita Wade

- 8. Bill Lamb
- 9. Sergio Olivares
- 11. Jean Fajardo
- 13. Yolanda Ward
- 14. Sherrill Stewart

ALTERNATES

10. Celeste Liston

12. Lindsey Lopez

S:\Wy Documents\Jury List-O'Keefe.doc

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FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

SFP 8 2 2010

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CAROL DONAHOO, DEPLOY

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

CA

CASE NO. C250630

DEPT. NO. XVII

-VS-

BRIAN KERRY O'KEEFE,

Defendant(s).

Plaintiff(s),

OSC250500 VARU Vanded Reduction to the Juny But Returner 924735

VERDICT SUBMITTED TO JURY BUT RETURNED UNSIGNED

Attached hereto is the verdict form which was submitted to the Jury in the above entitled action, but returned unsigned.

DATED: This 2nd day of September, 2010.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

By: Caral Donahow

Carol Donahoo, Deputy Clerk

SAMy Documents\Vardict Submitted Not Signed,doc/\$/8/2010

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4	DISTRICT COURT
5	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
7	Plaintiff, CASE NO: C250360
8	-vs- DEPT NO: XVII
9	BRIAN KERRY O'KEEFE,
10	Defendant.
11	
12	VERDICT
13	We, the jury in the above-entitled case, find the Defendant, BRIAN KERRY
14	O'KEEFE, as follows:
15	(please check the appropriate box, selecing only one)
16	Guilty of Murder of the Second Degree With Use of a Deadly Weapon
17	Guilty of Murder of the Second Degree Without Use of a Deadly Weapon
18	Not Guilty
19	DATED this day of August, 2010
20	To the second se
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22	FOREPERSON
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24	}
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INST 1 FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT 2 3 SEP 0 2 20m 5 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 8 C250630 9 Plaintiff. CASE NO: 10 -VS-DEPT NO: XVII 11 BRIAN KERRY O'KEEFE 12 Defendant. 13 INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY (INSTRUCTION NO. I) 14 MEMBERS OF THE JURY: It is now my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that applies to this case. It is 15 16 your duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts as 17 you find them from the evidence. You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated in these 18 19 instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that 20 given in the instructions of the Court. 21 22 18C2KD639 23 24 25 26 27 28



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Publications:

Dutra, T.F. and Bernard, G.W.: "Size-selective Comparison of Fefal Calverial versus Adult Marrow Osteogenic Colony-forming Entitles", Anatomical Record; 239: 1 - 8: 1994

Dutra, T.F. and Bernard, G.W.: "Post-fracture stimulation of in vitro estengenesis is not systemic", International Journal of Oral Biology; 23: 213 - 217; 1998

Dutra, T. and French, S.: "Marrow stromal fibroblastic cell cultivation in vitro on de-cellularized bone marrow extracellular matrix"; manuscript published in Experimental and Molecular Pathology on 9/22/2009

Presentations:

Dutra, T.F.: "Cultured Human Circulating Fibrocytes Express CO34 and Endotheliai Markers": Hematopojetic Stem Celi Transplantation (Sixth International Symposium); San Diego, CA; 4/18-4/18/88

Dutra, T.F.: "Flow Cylogenetics"; Clinical Cylogenetics Program, California State University at Dominguez Hitls: 4/25/01

Dutra, T.F. and Graham, M.A.: Poster presentation: *Big People, Big Hearts: histochemical and immunohistochemical stain comparisons of hypertrophic heart sections from morbidly obese decedents, compared with heart sections from age matched controls"; 43rd Annual Moeting of the National Association of Medical Examiners: 9/11-9/16/09

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1 OPP DAVID ROGER 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 CLERK OF THE COURT 3 Stephanie A. Graham Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #0010058 020250630 OPPS 4 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 10 Plaintiff. CASE NO: C250630 11 -Y5-DEPT NO: XVII 12 Brian Kerry O'Keefe, 13 #1447732 Defendant. 14 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS STATEMENTS TO POLICE, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO PRECLUDE THE 15 16 STATE FROM INTRODUCING PORTIONS OF HIS INTERROGATION 17 DATE OF HEARING: August 19th, 2010 TIME OF HEARING: 8:15 AM 18 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through 19 Stephanie A. Graham, Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points and 20 Authorities in Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress his Statements to Police, or, 21 Alternatively to Preclude The State From Introducing Portions of His Interrogation. 22 This response is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 23 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 24 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 25 111 26 111 27 28 111

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Facts relevant to the issues are set forth in the argument below.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The Statements Defendant made to Officer Ballejos in response to Officer Ballejos' questions of Defendant at the crime scene were not the product of a custodial interrogation under Miranda as the questioning was not intended to elicit incriminating statements.

On November 06, 2008, Officer Ballejos was dispatched to Defendant's apartment in response to a 911 call. The person reporting claimed someone had been stabbed and was bleeding. Upon arriving at the scene, Ballejos joined other officers and made entry into Defendant's living room.

All of the lights in the apartment were off except for the light in the bedroom. At this point, Ballejos was able to observe an unknown female lying on the floor, Defendant lying next to the female and white sheets covered in blood.

Officers repeatedly issued verbal commands directing Defendant to show his hands and to exit the apartment. At this point, Officers were unaware of the medical condition of the unknown female. Defendant was uncooperative and refused to exit the apartment.

Per policy, emergency responders were unable to assist the female until the Defendant was removed, so out of concern for the victim's condition, Ballejos deployed his tazer. Although one prong of the tazer made contact with Defendant, he remained uncooperative and was tazed again. At this point, Officers were able to subdue Defendant, place him in handcuffs and remove him from the spartment. With Defendant temoved from the apartment, Medical Response was able to make entry to assist the unknown female.

Immediately after removing Defendant from the apartment, and completely unaware of the unknown females condition, Officer Ballejos asked Defendant his name and the female's name. Defendant did not respond to Ballejos questions. Ballejos then explained to Defendant that he needed information regarding the birthdates, blood-types, etc., so the paramedics could render treatment not only to the unknown female but to Defendant as well.

Initially, instead of answering Ballejos' questious, Defendant began to cry a little.

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Defendant then suddenly stopped crying and spontaneously stated "you are mad at me, aren't you?" Ballejos responded by asking Defendant what he meant. Defendant then spontaneously stated "I didn't do this, man, she tried to stab me." Defendant was not advised of his Miranda rights prior to the questions asked by Ballejos.

Under Miranda, a rights advisement is required when a suspect is subjected to a custodial interrogation. Archanian v. State, 122 Nev. 1019, 145 P.3d 1008 (2006). citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). "[A]n individual is deemed 'in custody' where there has been a formal arrest, or where there has been a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest so that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave." State v. Taylor, 114 Nev. 1071, 1082, 968 P.2d 315, 323 (1998); see Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 191, 111 P.3d 690, 695 (2005). An interrogation for Miranda purposes "refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (footnote omitted).

Defendant does not argue that his statements to Officer Ballejos were involuntary. He simply argues that because he was in handcuffs when Officer Ballejos asked him a few brief questions, he was subjected to "custodial interrogation." True enough, Defendant was in handcuffs. Defendant was combative and non-cooperative at the scene. However, asking Defendant his name, date of birth and blood type were simply not questions designed to elicit an incrimating response. Likewise, the question posed to Defendant regarding his relationship with Victoria was nothing other than a qualifying question to determine if Defendant was able to provide her name, date of birth, blood type, etc, so as to provide the necessary information to medical responders on the scene.

Despite the fact that Defendant's argument is unfounded based on the absence of "custodial interrogation," Defendant expands his argument in support of suppression by claiming that the questions Ballejos asked had nothing to do with "booking needs" and there

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was no "exigency" present to justify Ballejos' questions. True enough, the questions were not asked due to "booking needs," however, the fact that an unknown female was lying in Defendant's apartment covered in blood tends to suggest an exigent situation. Under the circumstances, Ballejos' questions were proper, despite the lack of Miranda warning, under the "public safety exception." New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984),

In Quarles, the Supreme Court recognized a public safety exception to the Miranda requirement, holding that Miranda need not "be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety." 467 U.S. at 656, 104 S.Ct. at 2632. The Court distinguished between "questions necessary to secure [the police's] own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect." 467 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2633. The Court concluded that voluntary responses to the first type of questions could be admitted, despite the lack of Miranda warnings. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657-60, 104 S.Ct. at 2632-33. See also, State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz, 116, 871 P.2d 237 (1994) (finding that the public safety exception applies to situations where Officer questioning is geared toward eliciting information to determine the need to render assistance to suspected victim of a crime).

In <u>State v. Ramirez</u>, officers were dispatched in response to a 911 call where the person reporting indicated that they were awakened by banging, screaming and running noises coming from the apartment below. 871.P.2d 237, 240. Further, the person reporting indicated that they heard a female scream "Help' me or something like that" and one last "ugly scream." <u>Id</u>. Additionally, the 911 caller reported that after hearing the screams he ran down to the apartment, knocked on the door but received no response. <u>Id</u>. After receiving no response, he attempted to kick down the door but was unsuccessful. <u>Id</u>. He then ran to a window at the back of the apartment and looked into the window of the bedroom, noticed a lamp on the floor and observed a shadow moving in the hallway near the bathroom. <u>Id</u>. He then dialed 911. <u>Id</u>.

Officers responded 2 - 3 minutes after receiving the 911 call. Ramirez, 871 P.2 at 240. Officers knocked and announced their presence, but no-one responded. Id. Officers

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went to the back of the apartment looked into the window and observed blood on the window frame and latch. <u>Id.</u> Officers then observed a person enter the bedroom. <u>Id.</u> Officers announced their presence and yelled to Defendant to go the front door. Defendant "grunted" and left the bedroom. <u>Id.</u>

Officers remained at the bedroom window and observed Defendant return to the bedroom. Ramirez, 871 P.2 at 240. Once again, officers instructed defendant to go to the front door and unlock it. Id. Defendant did not comply with officers verbal commands. Id. Since Defendant was uncooperative, Officers obtained a pass-key to the apartment from the manager of the apartment complex, returned to the apartment and once again knocked on the door, announced their presence. Ramirez, 871 P.2 at 241. Again, Defendant was instructed to open the door. Id. With no response, Officers used the pass-key provided to them and unlocked the door. Id.

Upon entering the apartment officers immediately observed a knife with a bloody handle lying near the front door. Ramirez, 871 P.2 at 240. As they approached the living room officers observed a body lying on the floor. Id. Officers then shouted for Defendant to put his hands on the back of his head, Id. At this point, Officers were able to physically remove him from the apartment. Id. After removing Defendant from the apartment, he was placed in an arm-bar and forced to kneel in the grass a few feet from the front door. Id. Without informing defendant of his Miranda Rights, officers asked Defendant three questions:

- 1. "What was going on?" to which Defendant responded "we had a big fight."
- 2. "Who else was inside?" to which Defendant replied "My girlfriend and her daughter,"
- 3. If "anyone was hurt" to which Defendant responded "Yeah, they're hurt pretty bad. We're all hurt pretty bad."

Ramirez, 871 P.2 at 244-455.

Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the statements because the statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Id at 244. In denying, Defendant's motion, the trial court ruled the statements were voluntary... they were not obtained in violation of

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 the Defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and... they were obtained pursuant to public safety concerns of the officers at the time, also concern for the opportunity to rescue anybody that might still be in the apartment, and to protect themselves. <u>Id</u> at 244. Ultimately, Defendant was convicted of two counts of First-Degree Murder. <u>Id</u> at 242.

On appeal, Defendant claimed the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements made in response the Officer's questions at the scene because the questions asked were beyond the scope of the public safety exception recognized by the Supreme Court in Quarles, Ramirez, 871 P.2 at 245.

In upholding the trial court's ruling, the Arizona Supreme Court found that although Defendant was clearly in custody when he made the statements in response to officer's questions, the statements were indeed admissible under the public safety exception to the Miranda requirements. Id. The court determined that based on the circumstances when officers arrived on the scene, they did not know what had occurred in the apartment, how many people were involved or whether anyone other than the person lying in the front room needed assistance. Id. The court reasoned that in this case, the officer's questions were directed at discovering what the officers would encounter when they entered the apartment. Id. The court concluded that because the questions were geared toward eliciting information that officers needed to protect themselves and anyone else in the apartment, the statements were admissible under the public safety exception to the Miranda requirements. Ramirez, 871 P.2 at 245.

The facts in <u>Ramirez</u> are analogous to the facts in the instant case. When Officers arrived at Defendant's apartment they faced a great deal of uncertainty as to what had occurred. Officers observed an unknown female lying on the floor covered in blood. Officers had a reasonable belief that the female was injured and required medical assistance. As in <u>Ramirez</u>, the questions that Officer Ballejo asked Defendant were geared toward eliciting information that Officers needed to assist the unknown female in the apartment. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the statements Defendant made in response to Officer Ballejo's questions fail within the public safety exception to the <u>Miranda</u> requirements.

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 Additionally, Defendant requests his non-responsive, spontaneous statements to Officer Ballejos be suppressed. Specifically, Defendant claims that the State should be precluded from eliciting testimony from Officer Ballejos that Defendant spontaneously uttered, "you guys are mad at me, aren't you?" However, "spontaneous" or "volunteered" statements of a suspect in custody are admissible despite the absence of prior Miranda warnings. State v. Billings, 84 Nev. 55, 436 P.2d 212 (1968) See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. Furthermore, Defendant's spontaneous statement is not hearsay if it is offered by the State as a "statement by party opponent." See NRS \$1.035 (3)(a).

Lastly, Defendant seeks to preclude Officer Ballejos from testifying as to his impressions of Defendant's demeanor during his questioning. There is absolutely no rational or legal basis for this Court to exclude such testimony. NRS 50.265 provides, in pertinent part, a laywitness may testify as to opinions rationally based his/her perception that is helpful in the determination of a fact in issue. Officer Ballejos' opinions as Defendant's demeanor are rationally based on his personal interaction and observation of Defendant at the scene of the crime. With the burden on the State to prove malice aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt, Defendant's demeanor is helpful to the determination of a fact in issue. Therefore, so long as the proper foundation is laid, Ballejos' opinions are admissible.

Defendant's Video/Audio Recorded Statement Conducted by Detective Wildemann was Freely and Voluntarily Given and Should not be Suppressed.

From the outset, it should be noted that during Defendant's jury trial, a redacted version (shortening the time) of Defendant's Video/Audio recorded statement was admitted into evidence, played for the jury in its entirety with NO objection by Defendant. 3/18/09 TT 133 (State's Exhibit 68 and 69). Interestingly, Defendant now asserts that his statements must be suppressed.

Defendant does not argue that Detective Wildemann failed to advise Defendant of his Miranda rights. Nor does Defendant claim that he did not acknowledge/understand his Miranda his rights. Instead, Defendant argues that he was too intoxicated to knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and, as a result, his decision to speak with Detective

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Wildemann was not the result of rational intellect or free will. Fortunately, the statement he seeks to suppress was not only audio recorded but, video recorded as well. And, in this case, res ipsa loquitur--"the thing speaks for itself."

Miranda

The prosecutor has the burden to prove that the waiver of a suspect's 5th Amendment Miranda rights was voluntary, knowingly and intelligently made. This burden is on the prosecution by preponderance of the evidence. Falcon v. State, 110 Nev. 530, 874 P.2d 772 (1994). This is generally accomplished by demonstrating to the court that the officer advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and at the conclusion of the advisement asked the suspect if he understood his rights. An affirmative response by the suspect normally satisfies the knowingly and intelligent portion of the waiver.

The voluntariness prong is normally judged under a totality of the circumstances existing at the time that the rights were read to the defendant. A waiver of rights need not be expressed, i.e., the suspect need not say "I waive my Miranda rights" nor need the officer ask the suspect "do you waive your Miranda rights". It is sufficient if the officer obtains an affirmative response to the question whether the suspect understands the rights that were just read to him. See generally Tomarchio v. State, 99 Nev. 572, 665 P.2d 804 (1983); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755 (1979) (defendant refused to sign the waiver but agreed to talk to the officers. This was an adequate waiver according to the United States Supreme Court). See also Taque v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 100 S.Ct. 652 (1980). See also, Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828 (1987), wherein defendant agrees to make oral, but declines written statement.

In Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 130 P.2d 176 (2006), our Nevada Supreme Court addressed the issue of an explicit waiver and held:

A valid waiver of rights under Miranda must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also Floyd, 118 Nev. at 171, 42 P.3d at 259-60. "A waiver is voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, the confession was the

product of a free and deliberate choice rather than coercion or improper inducement." U.S. v.

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Doe, 155 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Pinjon, 800 F.2d 976, 980 (9th Cir.1986)) A written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent is not invariably necessary. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Rather, a waiver may be inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated. Id.

A detective read Mendoza his rights in Spanish, and Mendoza never expressed difficulty understanding the nature of his rights or the content of the subsequent questioning. Further, Mendoza never expressed a desire not to speak. A review of the totality of the circumstances reveals that Mendoza voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Given the wealth of evidence pointing to Mendoza's guilt, even if a Miranda violation occurred, any error in admitting Mendoza's un-Mirandized statement is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See <u>Arizona v. Fulminante</u>, 499 U.S. 279, 295-96, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).

Id., 122 Nev. 267, 130 P.2d 176, 181-182.

In the instant case, it is clear from Defendant's video/ audio statement that Detective Wildemann read Defendant his <u>Miranda</u> rights and Defendant acknowledged he understood them. See Audio/ Video Recording. The question then remains; did he "knowingly and voluntarily" waive his rights. The answer is yes!

Knowing and Voluntary

"A confession is admissible only if it is made freely and voluntarily, without compulsion or inducement." Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 213, 735 P.2d 321, 322 (1987) (citing Franklin v. State, 96 Nev. 417, 610 P.2d 732 (1980). A confession is voluntary if it is the product of a "rational intellect and a free will." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208, 80 S.Ct. 274, 280 (1960). "To determine the voluntariness of a confession, the court must consider the effect of the totality of the circumstances on the will of the defendant, (citation omitted) The question in each case is whether the defendant's will was overborne when he confessed." Passama, 103 Nev. at 214, 735 P.2d at 323. In Passama, the Nevada Supreme Court, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973), delineated the following factors to be considered when evaluating the voluntariness of a confession:

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 the youth of the accused; his lack of education or his low intelligence; the lack of any advice of constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.

ld. at 323.

Intexication

Intoxication rarely renders a confession involuntary. See State v. Clark, 434 P.2d 636 (ariz. 1967); State v. Hall, 54 Nev. 213, 13 P.2d 624 (1932); Wallace v. State, 84 Nev. 603, 447 P.2d 30 (1968); Pickworth v. State, 95 Nev. 547, 553 P.2d 626 (1979). Instead, courts look to the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a confession is involuntary. Id.

The Nevada Supreme Court addressed the issue of the voluntariness of a confession in the case of <u>Chambers v. State</u>, 113 Nev. 974, 944 P.2d 805 (1997). In that case the Court upheld the voluntariness of the Defendant's confession even though at the time of giving the confession the Defendant had a .28 blood alcohol, was in the hospital recovering from a stab wound and was believed to have ingested methamphetamine or crack cocaine.

Prior to trial, Chambers filed a Motion to Suppress his post-Miranda statements to the police claiming that his statements were not voluntarily given in light of the fact that he was questioned for four hours after having been stabbed, that he was not well rested, and that he was intoxicated. The District Court held that the confession was voluntary and this ruling was upheld by the Nevada Supreme Court.

In addressing the voluntariness standard, the Court quoted at length from a previous decision in <u>Passama v. State</u>, 103 Nev. 212 (1998), wherein the Court employed the totality of the circumstances test. The Court stated, "In determining whether a confession is the product of a free will, this Court employs a totality of the circumstances test; the Court must consider the effect of the totality of the circumstances on the will of the Defendant, the question in each case is whether the Defendant's will was overborne when he confessed. Factors to be considered include: the youth of the accused; his lack of education or his low

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intelligence; the lack of any advice of Constitutional Rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the depravation of food or sleep." <u>Id.</u> at 214.

In the instant case, it is undisputed, Defendant had been drinking. Several witnesses testified that he smelled heavily of alcohol and/or appeared to be intoxicated. However, the totality of the circumstances establishes that he was not so intoxicated as to render his statement involuntary.

Totality of Circumstances surrounding the Interview

In the instant case, the youth of Defendant is not an issue. Neither is his lack of education or intelligence. Defendant was 41 yrs old when he murdered Victoria, He graduated from high school and rose to the rank of Sergeant in the United State's Army. See Defendant's Pre- Sentence Investigation Report on file with this Court. Further, Defendant was intimately familiar with the criminal justice system as evidenced by his stealth criminal record. Id. The length of the interview with Detective Wildemann was approximately 1 ½ hours in duration, not accounting for several breaks in the questioning. See State's Exhibits 68 and 69.

Additionally, Detective Wildemann was calm, patient and professional during the questioning; Detective Wildemann did not threaten Defendant and certainly did not physically punish him. <u>Id</u>. In addition, Detective Wildemann provided Defendant with coffee and refills when Defendant asked. <u>Id</u>.

Throughout the interview, Defendant appears to understand and comprehend Detective Wildemann's questions. And, despite Defendant's claim to the contrary, his responses were not shurred or incoherent. See, State's Exhibits 68 and 69. Although at times Defendant's statements' to Detective Wildemann were non-responsive, they were certainly not incoherent ramblings but rather spontaneous, voluntary statements. And, "spontaneous" or "volunteered" statements of a suspect in custody are admissible. State v. Billings, 84 Nev. 55, 436 P.2d 212 (1968) See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630.

Additionally, during Defendant's trial, he testified on his own behalf. The State

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contends that Defendant's demeaner during his testimony during trial is very consistent with his demeaner during his interview with Detective Wildemann. Again, the State asserts the best evidence is the audio/video statement itself. Therefore, based on the totality of circumstances surrounding the interview and, despite the fact that he had been drinking earlier in the night, Defendant's statement was knowingly and voluntarily given and should not be suppressed.

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Further, in Nevada, once this Court determines that Defendant's statement lacks any constitutional violations, the final determination of the voluntariness of a statement is left to the jury. Carlson v. State, 84 Nev. 534, 445 P.2d I57 (1968); Grimaldi v. State, 90 Nev. 83, 89, 518 P.2d 615 (1974). See also Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 825 P.2d 593 (1992); Varner v. State, 97 Nev. 486, 634 P.2d 1205 (1981). Having adopted the "Massachusettes Rule," Detective Wildemann will to testify as to the circumstances under which the statement was made. Id. As required by law, this Court must instruct the jury that the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily given. Brimmage v. State, 93 Nev. 434, 567 P.2d 54 (1977); Falcon v. State, 110 Nev. 530, 874 P.2d 772 (1994); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).

Defendant's request to redact portions of his Statement

In anticipation of this Court ruling against suppression of Defendant's statement; Defendant objects to various portions of the statement. With regard to Defendant's request to suppress various questions asked by Detective Wildemann, the questions are not hearsay because the questions are not offered to prove the truth of any matter asserted but offered simply give context to Defendant's responses. NRS 51.035. Additionally, Detective Wildemann will be testifying at trial and is subject to cross-examination with regard to his interview of Defendant. NRS 51.035(2)(not hearsay if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination). Therefore, the questions asked by Detective Wildemann are admissible.

With regard to Defendant's various statements during the interview where he references his history of domestic violence with Victoria, refers to being in prison, speaks of

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Respectfully submitted.

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

BY /s/ STEPHANIE A. GRAHAM

Stephanie A. Graham Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #0010058

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CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

I hereby certify that service of STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS STATEMENTS TO POLICE, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO PRECLUDE THE STATE FROM INTRODUCING PORTIONS INTERROGATION, was made this _____ day of August, 2010, by facsimile transmission to: PATRICIA PALM ESQ FAX #455-6273 /s/ T. Schessler Secretary for the District Attorney's Office sg/da

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1 **OPPS** DAVID ROGER 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 CLEAK OF THE COURT 3 CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #005398 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 B&C258690 OPPS 6 christopher.lalli@ccdanv.com Opposition Attorney for Plaintiff 7 8 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA 10 11 Plaintiff, Case No: 08C250630-1 Dept. No: XVII 12 -V5-Date: April 19, 2010 8:15 a.m. BRIAN K. O'KEEFE. 13 Time: #1447732 14 Defendant. 15 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO PRECLUDE 16 EXPERT TESTIMONY COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through 17 CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby opposes the 18 Defendant's Motion to preclude expert testimony. This Opposition is made and based upon 19 20 all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable 21 22 Court 23 DATED this 18th day of August, 2010. 24 DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney 25 Nevada Bar #002781 26 BY /s/ Christopher J. Lalli 27 CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI Chief Deputy District Attorney 28 Nevada Bar #005398

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

On November 5, 2008, Brian K. O'Keefe (hereinafter "the Defendant") murdered Victoria Whitmarsh by stabbing the right side of her chest. The knife he used to kill Victoria sliced through various vital organs. It was also apparent that the much-larger Defendant had badly beaten Victoria. Weighing seventy pounds less than him, her body was badly bruised at autopsy.

On July 21, 2010, the Defendant filed a Motion to Preclude the State from Introducing at Trial Other Act or Character Evidence and Other Evidence Which is Unfairly Prejudicial or would Violate his Constitutional Rights. In that Motion, the Defendant argued that Metro Homicide Detective Martin Wildemann should not be allowed to testify about a cut on the Defendant's hand which he personally observed. At the previous trial of this matter, Detective Wildemann testified that it is not uncommon for a suspect in a stabbing case to cut himself during the course of the killing. It was further argued in the Motion that Detective Wildemann should be qualified as an expert before such a statement could be received into evidence.

In response, the State argued that Detective Wildemann's prior testimony was properly received by the Court pursuant to NRS 50.265. As an accommodation to the Defendant and should the Court whish to have Detective Wildemann qualified as an expert before giving such testimony again, the State noticed Detective Wildemann as an expert in the area. Now, apparently dissatisfied with that and wanting to have it both ways, the Defendant objects to the State's notice. He now files his Motion to Preclude Expert Testimony. The Motion should be denied.

ARGUMENT

A. It is Not Necessary to Notice Detective Wildemann as an Expert

As argued in its Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Preclude the State from Introducing at Trial Other Act or Character Evidence and Other Evidence Which is Unfairly Prejudicial or would Violate his Constitutional Rights, it is not necessary that Detective Wildemann be qualified as an expert before testifying about those things he has personally

encountered in this case and during the course of his career as a police officer.

NRS 50.265 provides:

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are: (1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and (2) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

Under this statutory provision, Detective Wildemann properly testified that it is not uncommon for a suspect in a stabbing case to out himself during the course of the killing. Detective Wildemann personally observed the injury on the Defendant's hand and personally worked on many homicide investigations involving stabbings. Therefore, such testimony is rationally based upon his perception as he personally observed the Defendant's injury. Moreover, such testimony is helpful to a clear understand of a fact in issue, namely how the injury was received.

It is altogether proper to allow an experienced police officer to provide lay witness opinion under such circumstances. The Nevada Supreme Court has so held in *Meadow v. Civil Serv. Bd.*, 105 Nev. 624 (1989). That case involved the termination proceedings of a police officer for using excessive force. During the course of the hearing, a police officer with over fourteen years of experience was allowed to testify that, based upon what he heard, "it sounded like somebody getting their butt whipped" in the other room" *Id.* at 626. On appeal, Meadow argued that the board erred by allowing the testifying officer to speculate about things that he neither saw nor of which he had personal knowledge. *Id.* at 625. This argument was rejected. Relying on NRS 50.265, the court held, "Given Officer Berni's experience, his testimony ... was rationally based upon his perceptions at the time."

Meadow is analogous to the instant case. Here, Detective Wildemann enjoys over twenty-two years experience as a police officer. He has served as a homicide detective for more than eight years and has personally worked over 200 murder cases. Just as Officer Berui was allowed to render his opinion about what happened in an adjoining room based only upon what he heard, Detective Wildemann should be allowed to render his opinion about the injury he observed on the Defendant's hand. The noticing of Detective

 Wildemann as an expert is unnecessary.

B. The State Has Not Acted in Bad Faith

Assuming the Court now rules that Detective Wildemann must qualify as an expert before he testifies to the same information he previously testified to, it is not an abuse of discretion for the Court to allow Detective Wildemann to be qualified as an expert in spite of the fact that some provisions of NRS 174.234 have not strictly been complied with. In Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. –, 192 P.3d 721 (2008), the Nevada Supreme Court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for a district court to allow an expert witness to testify where the provisions of NRS 174.234 were not complied with provided the State did not act in bad faith and the defendant did not suffer prejudice to his substantial rights.

Mitchell argued on appear that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a mental health professional to testify where the State failed to make certain disclosures required by NRS 174.234. *Id.* at 729. The State conceded it did not make the disclosures. *Id.* In analyzing the issue, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that the defendant never claimed the prosecution acted in bad faith. Moreover, there was no prejudice found because the defendant had the ability to review the State's file, to talk to the expert and was aware of the gist of the expert's testimony. *Id.* at 729 and n.24.

In this case, there is certainly no bad faith. The State does not believe it is necessary to qualify Detective Wildemann as an expert, especially when he was previously allowed to render the testimony at issue. Furthermore, there is no prejudice to the Defendant. The defense has had access to all of Detective Wildemann's reports as well as his testimony at the preliminary hearing and the previous trial. Moreover, they have had the ability to cross-examine Detective Wildemann on subject while he testified previously. The Defendant would certainly suffer no prejudice from allowing Detective Wildemann to now be qualified as an expert.

Relying on Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. -, 189 P.3d 646 (2008), the Defendant argues that Detective Wildemann should not be allowed to testify on the subject because he does not meet the criteria to be recognized as an expert witness. Indeed, that has yet to be

seen. If the issue ripens to the point of qualifying Detective Wildemann as an expert, that decision should be made in a court proceeding after His Honor has heard the plethora of experience accumulated by this seasoned police investigator. CONCLUSION Based upon all of the foregoing, the State respectfully prays that the Defendant's Motion to Preclude Expert Testimony be denied. DATED this 18th day of August, 2010. DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 BY /s/ Christopher J. Lalli CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005398 CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 18th day of August, 2010, by facsimile transmission to: PATRICIA PALM, ESQ. FAX: (702) 386-9114 BY: /s/ Jennifer Georges Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

User ID: GEORGJE

쨔뺽궣떕썇녺됮괱뮵녺곮곮쟄뫮푀흕춖녺곮찞뙁륹윉첉빏멑묨쯗퇐썇곮쪞횼쳪춖쓡댬뺭퍰뢥냮줐냋束퍰륁첉춖봒넊핕콯턤뽰폋놖푞뚕쾓릠æ숓훣긎댬멾턤찞찤썇귾댬며프찞뎐츴 TO: Name: Patricia Palm, Esq.

Company:

Fax Phone Number: (702) 386-9114

Contact Phone Number:

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• ORIGINAL •

2	DAVID ROGER FILED IN OPEN COURT	
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4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005398	
5	200 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2211 CAROL DONAME PUTY	
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff	
7	08C259439 AINF	
8	DISTRICT COURT AMANDED Information	
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
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12	-vs- Case No. C250630 Dept No. XVII	
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15	Dotondali(.)	
16	STATE OF NEVADA)	
17	COUNTY OF CLARK SS:	
18	DAVID ROGER, District Attorney within and for the County of Clark, State	of
19	Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs the Court:	
20	That BRIAN KERRY O'KEFFE, the Defendant above named, having committed to	hę
21	crime of MURDER OF THE SECOND DEGREE WITH USE OF A DEADL	Υ
22	WEAPON (Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165), on or about the 5th day	of
23	November, 2008, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, for	ce
24	and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity	oſ
25	the State of Nevada, did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, a	nd
26	with malice aforethought, kill VICTORIA WHITMARSH, a human being, by stabbing at	
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1	and into the body of the said VICTORIA WHITMARSH, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a			
2	knife.	HAROLD SALDER SALDER SALDER OF THE SALDER		
3 .				
4		DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY		
5 .	ė.	Nevada Bar #002781		
6		BY Chishlida.		
7	8	CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005398		
8		Nevada Bar #005398		
9				
10	In addition to any other Notice of Witnesses, names of witnesses known to the			
11	District Attorney's Office at the time of filin	~ .		
12	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>		
13	ARMBRUSTER, TODD	5001 OBANNON DR #34 LVNV		
14	BALLEJOS, JEREMIAH	LVMPD #8406		
15	BENJAMIN, JACQUELINE DR	ME 0081		
16	BLASKO, KEITH	LVMPD #2995		
17	BUNN, CHRISTOPHER	LVMPD #4407		
18	COLLINS, CHELSEA	LVMPD #9255		
19	CONN, TODD	LVMPD #8101		
20	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	CDC		
9586	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	LVMPD COMMUNICATIONS		
21	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	LVMPD RECORDS		
22	FORD, DANIEL	LVMPD #4244		
23	FONBUENA, RICHARD	LVMPD #6834		
24	HATHCOX, JIMMY	3955 CHINCHILLA AVE LVNV		
25	HUTCHERSON, CHRISTOPHER	LVMPD #12996		
26	IVIE, TRAVIS	LVMPD #6405		
27	KYGER, TERESA	LVMPD #4191		
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2	LOWREY-KNEPP, ELAINE	DISTRICT ATTORNEY INVESTAGATOR
3	MALDONADO, JOCELYN	LVMPD #6920
4	MORRIS, CHERYL	C/O DISTRICT ATTORNEY
5	MURPHY, KATE	LVMPD #9756
6	NEWBERRY, DANIEL	LVMPD #4956
7	PAZOS, EDUARDO	LVMPD #6817
8	RAETZ, DEAN	LVMPD #4234
9	SANTAROSSA, BRIAN	LVMPD #6930
10	SHOEMAKER, RUSSELL	LVMPD #2096
11	TAYLOR, SEAN	LVMPD #8718
12	TINIO, NORMA	2992 ORCHARD MESA HENDERSONNV
13	TOLIVER, CHARLES	1013 N. JONES #101 LVNV
14	TOLIVER, JOYCE	1013 N. JONES #101 LVNV
15	WHITMARSH, ALEXANDRA	7648 CELESTIAL GLOW LVNV
16	WHITMARSH, DAVID	7648 CELESTIAL GLOW LVNV
17	WILDEMANN, MARTIN	LVMPD #3516
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Email: Patricia palmlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Brian O'Keefe

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN OF GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

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BY Caral Donaha DEPUTY

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA.

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BRIAN K. O'KEEFE.

Defendant

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVII

DATE:

TIME:

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MOTION BY DEFENDANT O'KEEFE

TO PRECLUDE LATE NOTICED EXPERT TESTIMONY FROM DR. DUTRA

COMES NOW, the Defendant, BRIAN O'KEEFE, by and through his attorney, PATRICIA PALM of PALM LAW FIRM, LTD., and hereby moves this Honorable Court to preclude the State's late-noticed witness Timothy Dutra from offering testimony regarding the nature of the "victim's injuries" during the trial of this matter.

This Motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file

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herein, the attached Declaration, and any oral argument at the time set for hearing this Motion.

DATED this 18th Day of August, 2010.

PALM LAWY FIRM, LTD.

Patricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113

Fax: (702) 386-9114

Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

DECLARATION

PATRICIA A. PALM makes the following declaration:

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- I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada; I am the attorney representing Defendant O'Keefe in this matter.
- That on July 29, 2010, well within the time for noticing expert 2. witnesses, O'Keefe filed and served upon the State his Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses.
- That not until the late afternoon of Friday, August 13, 2010, did the 3. State provide to this counsel a Supplemental Notice of Witnesses via email, which notice listed "Detective Marty Wildemann," who "Will testify as to his opinion regarding the nature of injury to Defendant's hand."
 - 4 No Curriculum vitae was attached to the notice.
- That not until the afternoon following calendar call on August 17, 5. 2010, was this counsel served with a Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses, which was filed on August 16, 2010.
- It is not known to this counsel nor has it been made known to the 6. Court to this counsel's knowledge what exact efforts were made to determine whether Dr. Benjamin's presence could be secured before the expert notice deadline.
- 7. That the Supreme Court issued remittitur in the prior appeal in this case on May 6, 2010. That on June 10, 2010, trial was set in this matter to begin August 23, 2010.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. (NRS 53.045).

EXECUTED this 18th day of August, 2010.

PATRICIA A. PALM

Bar No. 6009

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Where the State wishes to introduce expert testimony, special notice is required pursuant to NRS 174.234(2), which provides:

If the defendant will be tried for one or more offenses that are punishable as a gross misdemeanor or felony and a witness that a party intends to call during the case in chief of the State or during the case in chief of the defendant is expected to offer testimony as an expert witness, the party who intends to call that witness shall file and serve upon the opposing party, not less than 21 days before trial or at such other time as the court directs, a written notice containing:

- (a) A brief statement regarding the subject matter on which the expert witness is expected to testify and the substance of the testimony;
- (b) A copy of the curriculum vitae of the expert witness, and
- (c) A copy of all reports made by or at the direction of the expert witness.

(Emphasis added.) With this statutory provision, the Nevada Legislature obviously intended to protect defendants' due process rights and ensure adequate opportunity to review and possibly impeach proposed experts' qualifications and expected testimony. Here, for the second time, the State has deprived O'Keefe of his procedural due process right to 21 days' notice. U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Nev. Const., art. 1, sec. 8.

As asserted in the attached affidavit, O'Keefe filed and served his Supplemental Expert Witness Notice well within the time for noticing expert witnesses. The State failed to serve its notice until after calendar call, but did so just 3 court days prior to the start of trial. Therefore, the State has failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement and should be precluded from presenting this and any other "expert" testimony which has not been properly and timely noticed. See NRS 174.295 (providing that court may impose sanctions, including prohibiting a party from introducing in evidence material not disclosed in compliance with NRS 174.234).

Here, Dr. Dutra was not the medical examiner who performed the autopsy. To the extent that Dr. Dutra has formed his own opinions, O'Keefe has not been given

sufficient notice by which he might have time to prepare to meet any new evidence not already introduced through Dr. Benjamin's prior testimony.

Conversely, to the extent that Dr. Dutra will rely on any information obtained from Dr. Benjamin, which was not subjected to cross-examination, his testimony would violate O'Keefe's Sixth Amendment rights as set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. _____, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Polk v. State, 126 Nev. _____, 233 P.3d 357 (2010). It does not matter whether any other state statute allows for an expert to rely on hearsay, a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights trump such statutes. See Polk, 233 P.3d 357 (rejecting argument that because NRS 50.285 allowed an expert to offer opinion based on inadmissible evidence, an analyst could testify to the results of a test performed by a non-testifying analyst).

Moreover, if the State desired to admit Dr. Benjamin's prior testimony, it would be required to make a timely motion, at least 15 days before trial, and in no event later than calendar call. EDCR 3.20, 3.28, and NRS 174.125. The State would be required to show good cause to support the untimely motion, and reasonable diligence used to secure the testimony of the unavailable witness before the motion deadline. Hemandez v. State, 124 Nev. ____, 188 p.3d 1126 (2008). Here, the State appears to be making an end run around the requirements of the rules by filing a late notice so that another doctor can parrot Dr. Benjamin's testimony, even though the State has made no showing that it would be able to admit that testimony directly.

Considering that the State had since June 10, 2010, when trial was set, to locate and secure the presence of Dr. Benjamin for trial, the prosecution should have known prior to the expiration of the notice and motion deadlines whether she was available. It the State had used reasonable diligence, the prosecutors would have known it was necessary to either notice their intent to use her prior testimony or timely notice another expert.

In sum, based on the State's failure to timely comply with the statues addressing time requirements and good cause and based on O'Keefe's confrontation rights, this Court should preclude the State from allowing Dr. Dutra to testify as an expert witness regarding the nature of the "victim's injuries."

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Brian O'Keefe respectfully requests this Honorable Court issue an order precluding the State from introducing at trial evidence or testimony from its proposed expert Dr. Timothy Dutra related to the nature of any injuries in this case.

Dated this 18th day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

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Attorney for Brian O'Keefe

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AUG 2:3, 2000

CAROL DONAHOO, DEPUTY

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff.

VS.

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BRIAN K. O'KEEFE.

Defendant.

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVII

DATE:

TIME:

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DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

COMES NOW Defendant, Brian K. O'Keefe, by and through his attorney, Patricia Palm of Palm Law Firm, Ltd., and hereby submits to this Honorable Court his attached proposed and requested jury instructions.

Dated this 21st day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

Pátricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104

Phone: (702) 386-9113

Fax: (702) 386-9114

Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

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If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis therein is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance to their relative importance.

Yamaha Motor Co. v. Amoult, 114 Nev. 233, 955 P.2d 661 (1998).

If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis therein is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance to their relative importance.

An information is a formel method of accusing a person of a crime but is not evidence of his guilt.

In this case, Brian O'Reste is obsiged by Second Amended Information with Second Degree Mundar with Use of a Deadly Weston. This charge ancompasses the Resear charge of Involuntary Menaleughter

The jusy must decide if the State had met its burden of proving beyond a resecondle doubt that Bright O'Kearte is guelty of any officese, and if so, which offense

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Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 746, 751, 121 P 3d 582, 586 (2005).

INSTRUCTION NO

An information is a formal method of accusing a person of a prime but a not evidence of his purit.

In this case Brian O'Kaote & crasped by Second Amended information wer Second Degree Murder with Like of a Deedly Wospon. This charge intompeases the laketer charge of Involuntary Munsioughter

The jury must decide if the State has met its burden of proving beyond in resourcebes could that Brian O'Keele is quity of any offened, and if so, whom offense.

An information is a formal method of accusing a person of a crime but is not evidence of his guilt.

In this case, Brian O'Keefe is charged by Second Amended Information with Second Degree Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon. This charge encompasses the lesser charge of Involuntary Manslaughter.

The jury must decide if the State has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian O'Keefe is guilty of any offense, and if so, which offense.

The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by the witness's manner on the stand, his or her relationship to the parties, fears, motives, interests or feelings, and opportunity to have observed the matter to which the witness testified; the reasonableness of the witness's statements and the strength or weaknesses of his or her recollections.

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If you believe a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of the witness's testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

The weight of the evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of witnesses testifying. You should consider all the facts and circumstances in evidence.

Quillen v. State, 112 Nev. 1369, 1381, 929 P.2d 893, 901 (1997).

The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by the witness's manner on the stand, his or her relationship to the parties, fears, motives, interests or feelings, and opportunity to have observed the matter to which the witness testified; the reasonableness of the witness's statements and the strength or weaknesses of his or her recollections.

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The weight of the evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of witnesses testifying. You should consider all the facts and circumstances in evidence.

Evidence that Brian O'Keefe committed the felony offense of domestic battery, or is alleged to have made statements indicating an intent to harm Victoria Whitmarsh, and evidence that he is alleged to have indicated an ability to kill with a knife by cutting a person in the stemum area was not received and may not be considered by you to prove that he is a person of bad character or to prove that he has a propensity to commit any crime. Such evidence was received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining the issue of whether or not Brian O'Keefe had a motive or intent to commit the crime charged.

Neither the felony conviction, nor the other acts, if believed, necessarily establish proof of motive or intent to commit the crime charged. You must weigh this evidence in the same manner as you do all other evidence.

<u>Fields v. State</u>, 125 Nev. ____, 220 P.3d 724, 729 (2009) (trial court, absent waiver from defendant, must give a limiting instruction explaining the purpose for which bad act evidence is being admitted immediately prior to its admission and an instruction at the end of the case reminding jurors of the limited use of the evidence).

Harris v. State, 106 Nev. 667, 799 P.2d 1104 (1990) (addressing the use of felony convictions).

Evidence that Brian O'Keefe committed the felony offense of domestic battery, or is alleged to have made statements indicating an intent to harm Victoria Whitmarsh, and evidence that he is alleged to have indicated an ability to kill with a knife by cutting a person in the stemum area was not received and may not be considered by you to prove that he is a person of bad character or to prove that he has a propensity to commit any crime. Such evidence was received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining the issue of whether or not Brian O'Keefe had a motive or intent to commit the crime charged.

Neither the felony conviction, nor the other acts, if believed, necessarily establish proof of motive or intent to commit the crime charged. You must weigh this evidence in the same manner as you do all other evidence.

The fact a person has been convicted of a felony, may only be considered by your for the purpose of determining the credibility of that person. The fact of such conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair a person's credibility. It is one of the circumstances that you may take into consideration in weighing the testimony of such person.

Harris v. State, 106 Nev. 667, 799 p.2d 1104 (1990).

The fact a person has been convicted of a felony, may only be considered by you for the purpose of determining the credibility of that person. The fact of such conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair a person's credibility. It is one of the circumstances that you may take into consideration in weighing the testimony of such person.

The elements of second degree murder are: (1) an unlawful killing of a human being, and (2) with malice aforethought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be effected by various means.

NRS 200.010

NSTRUCTION N	~

The elements of second degree murder are: (1) an unlawful killing of a human being, and (2) with matice aforethought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be affected by various means.

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Malice aforethought means the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal cause or excuse. The State has the burden of proving the intent to do a wrongful act beyond a reasonable doubt.

This requires that the State also disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was legally excused or justified by accident or self-defense.

If the State fails either to prove malice aforethought or to disprove accident and self-defense, it is your duty to return a verdict of Not Guilty of second degree murder.

NRS 200.010; Ybarra v. Wolff, 662 F. Supp. 44 (D. Nev. 1987) (government's burden); Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687, 715, 7 P.3d 426, 444 (2000) (State's burden on malice); Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 746, 751, 752-53, 121 P.3d 582 (2005) (state's burden, definition of malice aforethought, and defendant's entitlement to significance of his theory instruction); Brooks v. State, 124 Nev. _____, 180 P.3d 657, 662 (2008) (defendant's entitled to significance instructions and instructions that are specifically tailored to the facts of the case).

Malice aforethought means the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal cause or excuse. The State has the burden of proving the intent to do a wrongful act beyond a reasonable doubt.

This requires that the State also disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was legally excused or justified by accident or self-defense.

If the State fails either to prove malice aforethought or to disprove accident and self-defense, it is your duty to return a verdict of Not Guilty of second degree murder.

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In addition to his failure to cite relevant legal authority, the Defendant is asking to admit extrinsic evidence which violates NRS 48.015 (relevance) and NRS 48.035 (prejudice, confusion or waste of time). First, it is wholly irrelevant whether a homicide detective ever collected blood alcohol evidence in another case. It was not done in this case and the Defendant certainly can cross-examine on whether it was done and why it was not done. Moreover, NRS 48.035(2) provides for the exclusion of evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues or of misleading the jury." Because the Defendant is now only charged with murder of the second degree, voluntary intoxication is no longer relevant to these proceedings and allowing evidence on the subject would only serve to prejudice, confuse and mislead the jury.

While the subject of voluntary intoxication may be considered by a jury in cases of murder of the first degree, it has no relevance in cases of murder of the second degree. Because murder of the second degree is a general intent crime (*Poole v. State*, 97 Nev. 175, 178 (1981) ("No premeditation, deliberation or other specific intent is involved in second degree murder"); *Hancock v. State*, 80 Nev. 581, 583 (1964) (holding that a general intent instruction is compatible with the crime of second degree murder)), the general rule of inadmissibility of voluntary intoxication applies.

NRS 193.220 provides that "No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his condition" It is only when "the actual existence of a particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element of the particular species or degree of the crime" that such evidence may be considered. Because the Defendant only stands charged with murder of the second degree (i.e. the particular species or degree of murder is no longer at issue), voluntary intoxication cannot be considered by the jury.

The Nevada Supreme Court made this point perfectly clear in *Leaders v. State*, 92 Nev. 250 (1976). In that case, the defendant argued he was entitled to a jury instruction that the element of malice may be negated by a showing of voluntary intoxication. *Id.* at 251. This argument was flatly rejected.

	the authorities are not all agreed, the great weight thereof in this			
2	country is to the effect that mere intoxication cannot reduce murder to manslaughter." Appellant has advanced no persuasive			
3	reason, and we perceive none, why we should now change this			
4	rule. The refusal to give the instruction was correct.			
5	Id. at 251-252 (quoting State v. Fisko, 58 Nev. 65, 77 (1937), and citing Lisby v. State, 82			
6	Nev. 183 (1966) and Stewart v. State, 92 Nev. 168 (1976)). In this case, the Defendant is			
7	only charged with a malice murder. Therefore, as the Nevada Supreme Court recognized in			
8	Leaders, voluntary intoxication is not a defense to that charge. To admit such evidence			
9	would only serve to prejudice, confuse and mislead the jury.			
10	CONCLUSION			
11	Based upon all of the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that the Defendant's			
12	Motion to Admit Evidence Showing LVMPD Homicide Detectives have Preserved			
13	Blood/Breath Alcohol Evidence in Another Recent Case be denied.			
14	DATED this 10th day of May, 2014.			
15	DAVID ROGER			
16	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781			
17				
18	BY _/s/ Christopher J. Lalli			
9	CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI Chief Deputy District Attorney			
	Nevada Bar #005398			
20 21				
22	CERTIFICATE OF FACER (U.E. TRANS) WARRANG			
	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION			
23	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 10th day of			
4	August, 2010, by facsimile transmission to:			
.5	PATRICIA PALM, ESQ.			
6	FAX: (702) 386-9114			
7	BY: /s/ Jennifer Georges			
Ŷ.	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office			

User ID: GEORGJE

TO: Name: Patricia Palm, Esq.

Company:

Fax Phone Number: (702) 386-9114

Contact Phone Number:

Info Code 1: Info Code 2:

Sant to remote ID:7023869114

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PALM LAW FIRM, LTD. PATRICIA PALM, ESQ. NEVADA BAR NO. 6009 1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD. LAS VEGAS, NV 89104
Phone: (702) 386-9113
Fax: (702) 386-9114
Email: Patricia palmiaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Brian O'Keefe

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff.

VS.

BRIAN K. O'KEEFE.

Defendant.

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVIII

DATE:

TIME:

ORDER AUTHORIZING CONTACT VISIT

Based upon the request of Defendant, BRIAN O'KEEFE, by and through his attorney, PATRICIA A. PALM, of PALM LAW FIRM, LTD., the Court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Bob Jukich is authorized to make a contact visit in the presence of Clark County Detention Center personnel with Defendant, BRIAN O'KEEFE, ID No. 1447732, at the Clark County Detention Center for the sole purpose of cutting Defendant's hair. Mr. Jukich is authorized to bring with him whatever barber tools he will need in that regard.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 10 day of August, 2010.

munu

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

EP

Respectfully submitted by:

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

В

1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104 (702) 386-9113

ROC PALM LAW FIRM, LTD. PATRICIA PALM, ESQ. NEVADA BAR NO. 6009 1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD. LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

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Email: Patricia.palmlaw@gmail.com

CLERI

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Attorney for Brian O'Keete

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff.

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BRIAN K. O'KEEFE.

Defendant.

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVII

DATE:

TIME:

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
I, the undersigned, acknowledge that on this 2010, I received a true copy of O'KEEFE'S REPLY OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE SHOWING LVMPD HOMICIDE DETECTIVES HAVE PRESERVED BLOOD/BREATH ALCOHOL EVIDENCE IN ANOTHER RECENT CASE.

> COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 200 Lewis Ave., 3rd Floor Las Vegas, NV 89155

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CLERK OF THE COURT



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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

RPLY PALM LAW FIRM, LTD. PATRICIA PALM, ESQ. NEVADA BAR NO. 6009 1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD. LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

Aug 13 9 12 AH 10

Email: Patricia.palmlaw@omail.com Attorney for Brian O'Keefe

Plaintiff.

Defendant.

STATE OF NEVADA.

BRIAN K. O'KEEFE.

VS.

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CLERK OF THE COURT

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVII

DATE: 8/17/10

TIME: 8:15 a.m.

O'KEEFE'S REPLY TO STATE'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE SHOWING LYMPD HOMICIDE DETECTIVES HAVE PRESERVED BLOOD/BREATH ALCOHOL EVIDENCE IN ANOTHER RECENT CASE

COMES NOW Defendant, Brian K. O'Keefe, by and through his attorney, Patricial Palm of Palm Law Firm, Ltd., and hereby REPLIES to the State's Opposition to O'Keefe's request to present evidence that in at least one other recent homicide case, LVMPD Homicide Detectives did obtain blood/breath alcohol testing of the murder suspect.

This Reply is made and based upon the record in this case, including the papers and pleadings on file herein, the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Nevada, the points and authorities set forth below, and any

> 080260630 Reply to Opposition

argument of counsel at the time of the hearing on this Motion.

Dated this 12th day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

Patricia Palm, Bar No. 8009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113

Fax: (702) 386-9114

Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

ARGUMENT

The State is apparently arguing that the defectives' lack of good faith and thoroughness is no longer relevant because, the State thinks, O'Keefe's extreme intoxication is no longer relevant now that the State is limited to seeking a second degree murder. However, the manner in which the detectives and police conducted their investigation here is relevant to the entire case, and O'Keefe has a right to confront them.

Again, during O'Keefe's previous trial, Detective Wildemann had testified that in his twenty-one (21) years of experience, a suspect would generally only be administered a blood or breath alcohol test in a DUI. 3/18/09 TT at 183. He had also previously testified at the preliminary hearing that he was not aware of a homicide case where such a test was given. <u>Id.</u> at 182. Further, he was asked, "Does Metro have a protocol, especially in homicide cases, when an officer or detective would offer a suspect a blood or breath alcohol test or take one?" He testified, "We don't have a protocol for that." PHT 92-93.

To challenge Wildemann's testimony and its implication that alcohol-level testing is unheard of, O'Keefe presented testimony from Forensic Scientist George Schiro, who testified that the police should have collected O'Keefe's blood or breath alcohol within the hours after Whitmarsh's death to determine whether his behavior or state of mind might have been affected. The source of authority for this opinion is an industry standard text for crime scene investigations. 3/19/09 TT 123-24, 125-26.

Not only have LVMPD Homicide Detectives done such testing, in the recent case which O'Keefe seeks to show, but their Department Manual addresses it, stating that for felony charges,

Non-consensual, warrantless obtaining of a blood sample to show percentage of alcohol or use of drugs of abuse can be done where probable cause exists that it is relevant to the investigation of a felony.

(i.e., A homicide suspect is arrested on probable cause immediately after the crime and appears slightly intoxicated. A blood sample can be taken to show degree of intoxication which may become an important issue for the state or the defense.)

Manual, Section 5/202.21 (emphasis added). In addition, as this Court is aware, homicide detectives declined to turn over evidence specifically requested for the prior trial, stating that the evidence of the use of force report did not exist, see 3/18/09 TT 179, and causing a motion for a mistrial, see 3/18/09 TT 2-5.

O'Keefe has good reason to challenge the good faith of the investigation and prosecution. And, as was apparent during the previous trial, O'Keefe has consistently attempted to prove that LVMPD officers and detectives were minimizing his intoxication in the reports and in their testimony. The evidence of the other murder case in which testing was done helps show bias and/or lack of good faith/thorough investigation here.

The failure to preserve evidence which is likely to be exculpatory is relevant to the good faith of the investigation, which is an appropriate issue in criminal cases. See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 67, 998 P.2d 25, 32 (2000). Furthermore, extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove a witness's bias or prejudice. See Lobato v. State, 120 Nev. 512, 96 P.3d 765 (2004); Abbott v. State, 122 Nev. 715, 736, 138 P.3d 462, 475 (2006). It would be unfair and a violation of O'Keefe's confrontation rights to tie O'Keefe's hands in impeaching detectives' good faith in the limited manner sought here. It is highly relevant that such testing has occurred in at least one similar and recent case. O'Keefe has not cast a wide net seeking discovery on every case where this was done, he seeks only to admit evidence that it has in fact been done in at least one other case. This proof should be permitted, especially in light of the State's attempt to create a false perception that such testing is unheard of in homicide investigations conducted by LVMPD.

Furthermore, if this Court denies suppression of O'Keefe's interview with homicide detectives, then the validity of any waiver of O'Keefe's Miranda rights is an issue for the jury, and the jury should be able to consider the issues of bias, good faith and thoroughness of the detectives when it is assessing their testimony regarding his condition and whether to consider the interrogation as evidence against O'Keefe.1

The State also seems to be using this opportunity to argue that evidence of intoxication is not even relevant because this case only involves second degree murder now. See Opposition, p. 3. However, the police did not know that O'Keefe's case would not be one of first degree murder when they failed to preserve this crucial evidence. Therefore, the fact that they are now limited by law does not change the reasons for challenging them.

In addition, the State is wrong in claiming that the evidence of intoxication is not relevant. The State relies on Leaders v. State, 92 Nev. 250 (1976), which held that mere intoxication could not reduce murder to manslaughter. However, more recent developments in the law have clarified and strengthened the State's burdens as to proving murder. For instance, in <u>Byford v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 215, 994 P.2d 700 (2000), the Nevada Supreme Court took great care to establish that proof is required on each separate element of murder. In <u>Collman v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 687, 715, 7 P.3d 426, 443-44 (2000), the Court reiterated that the fact that not every murder requires a specific intent to kill does not relieve the State of the burden to prove some kind of malice to establish murder. O'Keefe submits that under a contemporary understanding of Nevada taw, intoxication must be treated as a relevant factor for the jury to consider in determining whether the State has met its burden to prove malice.

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¹If O'Keefe's statements are admitted, then the question of voluntariness must also be submitted to the jury. <u>See Laursen v. State</u>, 97 Nev. 568, 634 P.2d 1230 (1981).

NRS 193,220 provides that

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No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his or her condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of the person's intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining the purpose, motive or intent.

Emphasis added. California Courts have recognized the nearly identical language formerly used in California's statute addressing the same evidence, 2 permits evidence of intoxication to be considered to determine the issue of whether a defendant actually harbored express or implied malice. See People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 276-80 (Cal. 1994); see also People v. Knoller, 158 P.3d 731, 738-43 (Cal. 2007) (addressing subsequent amendments). Recognition of the same rule under Nevada law would be consistent with the language of our statute, as well as the Nevada Supreme Court's treatment of issues affecting criminal intent, such as mental health conditions not meeting the definition of insanity. In Finger v. State, 117 Nev. 548, 576-77, 27 P.3d 66, 84-85 (2001), the Court recognized that evidence that does not rise to the level of legal insanity may still be considered in evaluating whether or not the prosecution has proven each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, for example, in determining whether a killing is first or second degree murder or manslaughter or some other argument regarding diminished capacity. Id. O'Keefe submits that evidence of intoxication is no less relevant than evidence of a defendant's state of mental health in considering whether the State has met its burdens.

²Cf. Former version of Cal. Pen. Code Sec. 22 (1981) providing:

No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time.

NRS 200.010(1) provides that "[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought, either express or implied."

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NRS 200.020(1) defines express malice as "that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof." The crime of second degree murder may involve an intentional killing with express malice, but without the admixture of premeditation and deliberation, i.e., a killing that is the result of passionate impulse but not within the definition of manslaughter. Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 236 & n.4, 994 P.2d 700, 714 & n.4 (2000). Accordingly, with express malice, the defendant must have a purpose or intent to kill.

The alternative form of second degree murder relevant here is one based on implied malice. Malice is implied "when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." NRS 200.020(2). Abandoned and malignant heart refers to "an extreme recklessness regarding homicidal risk." Collman v. Sate, 116 Nev. 687, 712-13, 7 P.3d 426, 442 (2000) (quoting Model Penal Code § 210.2 cmt. 1 at 15). See also Keys v. State, 104 Nev. 736, 738, 766 P.2d 270, 271 (1988) (implied malice signifies a general malignant recklessness). Criminal recklessness requires that "the actor is conscious of a substantial risk that the prohibited events will come to pass." United States v. Mottweiler, 82 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) and quoting Model Penal Code Sec. 2.02(2)(c) (1962) ('[a] person acts recklessly . . . when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a material element exists or will result from his conduct.")). Here, for O'Keefe to have acted with malignant recklessness, he must have understood there was a substantial risk that Whitmarsh's death would come to pass and he must have consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk of death. A killing that is done only in a criminally negligent manner, without realizing the risk involved, is involuntary

manslaughter. See NRS 200.070(1);3 CALJIC 8.51 ("There are many acts which are lawful but nevertheless endanger human life. If a person causes another's death by doing an act or engaging in conduct in a criminally negligent manner, without realizing the risk involved, he is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. If, on the other hand, the person realized the risk and acted in total disregard of the danger to life involved, malice is implied, and the crime is murder."). For an implied malice murder, where the felony murder rule is not applicable, "the defendant must intend to commit acts that are likely to cause death and that show a conscious disregard for human life." Collman, 116 Nev. at 716, 7 P.3d at 444.

Under the above authorities, a necessary element of second degree (non-felony) murder is a purpose or intent to kill (express malice), or a purpose or intent to consciously disregard a known and substantial risk of death (implied malice). Therefore, under the language of NRS 193.220, evidence of intoxication is relevant to whether O'Keefe had such a purpose or intent. If O'Keefe's intent and purpose are no longer probative because second degree murder does not necessarily involve an intent to kill, as suggested by the State, then neither the threats and propensity evidence from Cheryl Morris nor the prior conviction for domestic battery can retain their probative value and this evidence must be precluded.

O'Keefe is not arguing that he intentionally killed Whitmarsh but was too intoxicated to understand his actions. He is arguing that she was accidentally stabbed when he could not maintain his balance during a struggle as he was attempting to get

34NRS 200.070(1) defines involuntary manslaughter, as relevant here:

[f]nvoluntary manslaughter is the killing of a human being, without any intent to do so, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act which probably might produce such a consequence in an unlawful manner, but where the involuntary killing occurs in the commission of an unlawful act, which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent, the offense is murder.

the knife away from Whitmarsh. This was not an intentional or reckless malice murder, but an accident which he could not prevent. O'Keefe's gross intoxication makes it more probable, and thus relevant, that his perceptions, balance and coordination were affected at the time of the incident and that he did not consciously disregard any risk of death; and it explains why he would fall during a struggle over the knife and why he behaved so strangely at the time of and subsequent to arrest; and it affects whether his statements to police were knowingly and voluntarily made (if these statements are admitted). See NRS 48.015 ("relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence). In sum, O'Keefe's extreme intoxication is entirely relevant to his theory of defense.

O'Keefe submits that to deny him the opportunity to rebut the State's evidence of malice by limiting the jury's consideration of evidence of his intoxication in any way, or to deny him the opportunity to confront and cross-examine Detectives with evidence to impeach their testimony as requested herein, would deny him his constitutional rights to a fair trial, to present a defense, to compulsory process and to confront and cross examine the witnesses against him. See U.S. Const., amends. VI and XIV; Nev. Const., art. 1, sec. 8.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Brian O'Keefe moves this Honorable Court for a ruling permitting him to introduce the evidence requested herein pertaining to the other recent homicide case where blood/breath alcohol was obtained from a homicide suspect who claimed no knowledge of a stabbing incident.

Dated this 12th day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

Patricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104

Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

j. . j.

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NOTC DAVID ROGER 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 CLERK OF THE COURT 3 STEPHANIE A. GRAHAM Deputy District Attorney 080250630 4 Nevada Bar #0010058 SUPP Sypplemental 200 Lewis Avenue 394174 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 Plaintiff. 10 CASE NO: C250630 11 -V5-DEPT NO: П BRIAN O'KEEFE. 12 #1447732 13 Defendant 14 SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF EXPERT WITNESSES 15 [NRS 174,234(2)] 16 17 TO: BRIAN O'KEEFE, Defendant; and 18 TO: PATRICIA PALM ESQ, Counsel of Record: 19 YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the STATE OF 20 NEVADA intends to call the following witnesses in its case in chief; 1.) DETECTIVE MARTY WILDEMANN, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 21 Department. Will testify as to his opinion regarding the nature of injury to Defendant's hand. 22 23 Detective Wildemann has been with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department for 24 221/2 years. For the past 81/2 years, Detective Wildemann has been assigned to Homicide and has worked over 200 cases with 25% of those cases involving stabbings. 25 26 The substance of each expert witness' testimony and a copy of all reports made by or 27 at the direction of the expert witness has been provided in discovery.

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A copy of each expert witness' curriculum vitae, if available, is attached hereto.

RY

DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781

CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

I hereby certify that service of SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF EXPERT WITNESSES, was made this _____ day of August, 2010, by facsimile transmission to:

PATRICIA PALM Deputy Public Special Defender FAX #455-6273

/s/T. Schessler
Secretary for the District Attorney's
Office

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FILED RSPN 1 AUG 1 8 2010 DAVID ROGER 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 3 Stephanie A. Graham Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #0010058 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 б Attorney for Plaintiff 020250930 ASPH flowpourse DISTRICT COURT 894515 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 10 Plaintiff. CASE NO: C250630 11 -VS-DEPT NO: XVII 12 Brian Kerry O'Keefe. 13 #1447732 14 Defendant. 15 STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO PRECLUDE THE STATE FROM INTRODUCING AT TRIAL OTHER BAD ACTS OR CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND OTHER EVIDENCE THAT IS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL OR 16 WOULD VIOLATE HIS CONTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 17 18 DATE OF HEARING: August 17th, 2010 TIME OF HEARING: 8:15 AM 19 20 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through Stephanie A. Graham, Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points and 21 22 Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Preclude the State From Introducing at Trial Other Bad Acts or Character Evidence and Other Evidence that is Unfairly Prejudicial 23 24 or Would Violate His Constitutional Rights. 25 This response is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 26 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 27 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. RECEIVED 28 111 AUG 1 6 2010

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A. Defendant's statement to Cheryl Morris that he is "capable of killing anyone with a knife" and his disturbing demand of Cheryl to play the role of victim to demonstrate his ability to slice someone open with a knife are relevant to the State's theory of the case and are otherwise admissible under Nevada law.

Cheryl Morris began dating Defendant in January 2008. 3/17/10 Trial Transcipt 10 [hereinafter "TT]. Their relationship abrubtly ended in August 2008 when Defendant reunited with Victoria Whitmarsh. Id. During Defendant's seven month relationship with Cheryl Morris, he spoke about his disdain for Victoria Whitmarsh on a daily basis; sometimes three or four times a day. 3/17/10 TT 14.

More Specifically, Cheryl has consistently maintained that Defendant stated to her on more than one occasion that he "hated" Victoria for testifying against him, she "put him in jail," she is "poison" and she "took three years of his life away." 12/17/08 Preliminary Hearing Transcipt 69-70 [hereinafter "PHT"]; 3/17/10 TT 21. Further, Defendant made numerous statements to Cheryl declaring his desire "kill the bitch." 12/17/08 PHT 70; 3/17/10 TT 15. According to Cheryl Morris, during their brief seven month relationship, "Victoria was always there", and Defendant spoke of little else. 3/17/10 TT 29. Except, of course, knives. 12/17/08 PHT 69; 3/17/10 TT 17.

Defendant requests this court to preclude the State from eliciting testimony from Cheryl Morris with regard to Defendant's statements touting his profiency with knives and his capability to kill anyone with a knife. Defendant claims that the statements should be precluded because they are irrelevant, highly inflammatory and overly prejudicial. Despite Defendant's claim, under Nevada law, the statements are admissible.

1. The statements are relevant to the State's theory of the case.

NRS 48.015 defines "relevant evidence" as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Although the State is barred from seeking a conviction of First Degree Murder in this case, the State steadfastly maintains that the death of Victoria Whitmarsh was not an accident or self-defense; rather Defendant intended to murder Victoria and he had a motive

to do so. Defendant, on the other hand, claims that Victoria's death was an accident that occurred as a result of self-defense. There is no evidence whatsoever to corrorborate Defendant's theory of the case aside from his self-serving testimony. The fact that Defendant previously demonstrated his profiency/capability of killing someone with a knife tends to disprove any Defense of mistake or accident. According to Cheryl Morris, during her brief relationship with Defendant, he was obsessed with Victoria and how much he hated her. The State contends it is no coincidence that Victoria was stabbed to death by Defendant. Therefore, testimony of Defendant's statements regarding knives tends to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the testimony.

2. The probative value of the statements outweighs the prejudicial effect.

NRS 48.035(1) provides, although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues or of misleading the jury. Based on the State's theory of the case Defendant was obsessed with Victoria, hated her and he had a motive to kill Victoria: he had previously gone to prison for beating her as a result of Victoria's testimony against him.

Indeed, the State recognizes that the statements sought to be excluded are prejudicial. However, relevant evidence is not simply rendered inadmissible because of its "highly prejudicial nature...the best evidence often is!" See United States v. Parker 549 F2.d 1217 at 1222. (9th Cir. 1977).

Defendant is being tried for Second Degree Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon. The deadly weapon used was a knife. It is incumbent upon the state to prove malice aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt as an element to the offense charged. Therefore, Defendant's statements regarding knives have significant probative value to the State's case outweighing any danger of unfair prejudice.

3. The statements fall within an Exception to Hearsay

Pursuant to NRS 51.035, Cheryl Morris may testify as to Defendant's statements during the State's case-in-chief as the statements are an exception to the hearsay rule as statements of a party opponent.

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Therefore based on the foregoing, the Statements are admissible under Nevada law and the State should not be precluded from presenting admissible evidence.

- B. The State has no opposition to Defendant's request for redaction to omit the reference to "concurrent" sentencing contained within the Judgment of Conviction in case number C207835X.
- C. The State has no intention of introducing or eliciting evidence of Sexual Assault charges stemming from case # C202793X during its case- in- chief.

However, should evidence relating to the sexual assault become relevant and/or otherwise admissible to impeach and/or to rebut evidence presented during the Defendant's case-in-chief or become relevant as a result of cross-examination; the State will seek the appropriate ruling.

D. This Court should not preclude the use of the accurate term, "Sexual Assault Kit" by medical professionals called to testify in this case.

The term "sexual assault kit" is not unduly prejudicial but rather an accurate term of art used by medical professionals to describe a group of evidence gathering tools used for a special purpose. In the instant case, a sexual assault kit was utilized during the autopsy of Victoria Whitmarsh. No evidence of a sexual assault could be determined

The Defendant claims that the use of the accurate term"Sexual Assault Kit" is highly prejudicial and seeks to preclude the State from introducing the "term" during retrial. Essentially, the Defendant is requesting this Court to direct the State to admonish members of the legal profession from using terminology which is common parlance within their field of expertise. Requesting those in the medical professional to agree to call a "Sexual Assault Kit" something other than what it is seems absurd. Further, because the accurate term is common parlance among the medical field, it is not unlikely that even if admonished, medical professionals could inadvertently make reference to the "Sexual Assault Kit."

Defendant has failed to show how reference to a "term of art" is highly prejudicial especially since the evidence gathered was favorable to the Defendant with respect to any signs of a sexual assault. Therefore Defendant's request on this point should be denied.

E. Autopsy photos showing the condition of Victoria's body at the time of her death were properly admitted by this Court during Defendant's previous trial and there is no basis to exclude them now.

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The decision to admit autopsy photographs as evidence lies within the sound discretion of the court. Turpen v. State, 94 Nev. 576, 577 (1978). Such a decision of the trial court will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Ybarra v. State, 100 Nev. 167, 172 (1984). In Robins v. State, 106 Nev. 611, 623 (1990), the court upheld the trial judge's decision to allow autopsy photographs of a badly beaten little girl. The court held:

We have reviewed the challenged photographs and although they are indeed graphic and troubling to human sensibility, they were not prejudicial. The photographs depicted exactly what Dr. Hollander described and were undoubtedly helpful in assisting the jury to understand the nature and the gravity of the wounds inflicted upon Brittany by Robins. The trial court did not abuse its discretion; the photographs were properly admitted into evidence.

In the instant case, Defendant claims that the admission of autopsy photos depicting Victoria's bruised body should be excluded because they are highly prejudicial and there is no nexus between the bruises on her body and the cause of Victoria's death. True enough, the cause of Victoria's death was a stab wound to the chest. 3/18/10 TT 99. However, Defendant's claim that Dr. Benjamin "admitted that none of the bruises could be linked to the incident leading to [Victoria]'s death" is a gross misstatement of Dr. Benjamin's testimony.

At trial, Dr. Benjamin specifically testified that blunt force trauma caused the bruising to Victoria's body and that the bruises did, in fact, contribute to her death. 3/18/10 TT 98-105. Further, Dr. Benjamin's testimony is supported by the Autopsy Report that states "cutaneous blunt trauma" as a significant condition related to Victoria's death. Based on Dr. Benjamin's testimony and findings, the autopsy photos depicting the bruising on Victoria's body are relevant to the cause of death and admissible under NRS 48.015. Undoubtedly, the photos have probative value as they will be "helpful in assisting the jury to understand the nature and the gravity" of the blunt force trauma which caused the bruising. See Robins, 106 Nev. At 623.

Also, based on witness testimony, it is the State's theory that before Defendant stabbed Victoria to death, he beat her for almost an hour. Clearly, the photos have significant probative value in establishing Defendant's motive, intent and state of mind prior to stabbing Victoria to death. With the burden resting on the State to prove malice aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt, the probative value of the photos outweigh any danger of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. NRS 48.035(1). Therefore, there is no basis to exclude the photos under Nevada law.

F. The State concurs that reference to racial slurs made by Defendant to an African American Metro Officer after he murdered Victoria are irrelevant to this case.

The State will admonish the officer to make no reference to the Defendant's inappropriate comments to the officer. However, should the statements become relevant and/or otherwise admissible to impeach and/or to rebut evidence presented during the Defendant's case-inchief or become relevant as a result of cross-examination; the State will seek the appropriate ruling.

G. The hearsay statement, "baby, he done killed that girl," made by Charles Toliver to his wife on the night of Victoria's murder is admissible under Nevada law.

The statement Defendant seeks to exclude is admissible as an exception to hearsay. NRS 51.095 provides, statements relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition is not inadmissible under the hearsay rule. Additionally, NRS 51.085 provides, a statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, is not inadmissible under the hearsay rule.

Charles Toliver and his wife, Joyce, lived in the apartment directly below Defendant and Victoria Whitmarsh. On the night of Victoria's murder Charles Toliver was angry when woken up by loud banging noises and crying coming from Defendant's apartment. See generally, 3/16/10 TT pp 229-245. After about ten to fifteen minutes, Charles left his apartment with the intent to confront the Defendant about the noise. Id.

 Upon approaching the Defendant's apartment, Charles noticed the door was wide open and observed Defendant bent over Victoria's bloody body. Id. Charles immediately yelled to Defendant, "what the hell have you done." Id. Defendant did not respond but instead, gave Charles a crazy look that scared him. Id. Charles immediately yelled to another neighbor to call for help and then returned to his apartment and told his wife Joyce, "baby, he done killed that girl." 3/16/10 TT 224.

The State maintains that Charles was under the stress of excitement of a startling event when he made the statement to Joyce. Further, when Charles made the statement, he was describing an event/condition immediately after he perceived the event. So long as a proper foundation is laid during the direct examination of Joyce Toliver, the State can properly elicit the statement pursuant to either NRS 51.095 or NRS 51.085. Therefore, the State requests that this Court reserve its ruling as to this issue until such time as an objection by the Defendant is appropriate.

H. Detective Wildemann is qualified to give his opinion as to the nature and/or cause of injury to Defendant's hand as a Lay Witness or in the alternative as an Expert Witness.

NRS 50.265 provides, in pertinent part: if a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are: 1) rationally based on the perception of the witness; and 2) helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue. During Defendant's jury trial, Detective Wildemann testified that, in his opinion, the injury on Defendant's hand was consistent with injuries present on others suspected of murder with use of a knife. Certainly, his testimony concerns the "determination of a fact in issue."

Detective Wildemann has been with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department for 22 ½ yrs. For the past 8 ½ yrs, Detective Wildemann has been assigned to Homicide and has worked over 200 homicide cases with 25% of those cases involving stabbings. It would stand to reason then, that Detective Wildemann's opinion, as to the nature of Defendant's injury, was "rationally based on his perception" of the injury. Therefore, The State

maintains that Detective Wildemann's testimony was proper opinion testimony by a lay witness.

However, out of an abundance of caution, the State has noticed Detective Wildemann as an expert witness to testify as to his opinion regarding the nature of injury to Defendant's hand. See NRS 50.275 (a witness qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify to matters within the scope of such knowledge); See also State v. Macumber, 112 Ariz. 569, 544 P.2d 1084 (1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006, 99 S.Ct. 621, 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978)(an expert need not be a professional but may be a lay person who has special knowledge superior to men in general through actual experience or careful study). In light of Detective Wildemann's experience as a homicide detective he has the special knowledge that would qualify him to give expert opinion testimony.

H. The State does not intend to introduce evidence of a prior trial, conviction or reversal occurred in this case.

It is the practice of the State, if referring to previous testimony during a prior Jury Trial to characterize the testimony as that of a "prior proceeding."

DATED this _____day of August, 2010.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

BY /s/ STEPHANIE A. GRAHAM

Stephanie A. Graham Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #0010058

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CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

I hereby certify that service of STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO PRECLUDE THE STATE FROM INTRODUCING AT TRIAL OTHER BAD ACT'S OR CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND OTHER EVIDENCE THAT IS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL OR WOULD VIOLATE HIS CONTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, was made this day of August, 2010, by facsimile transmission to:

PATRICIA PALMS Deputy Special Public Defender FAX #455-6273

/s/ T. Schessler
Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

sg/da

• ORIGINAL

OPP DAVID ROGER FILED Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 3 AUG 1 6 2010 Stephanie A. Graham Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #0010058 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 080260630 7 DISTRICT COURT Depositos 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff. CASE NO: C250630 11 -VS-DEPT NO: XVII 12 Brian Kerry O'Keefe, 13 #1447732 14 Defendant. 15 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S MENTAL HEALTH CONDITION 16 HISTORY, INCLUDING PRIOR SUICIDE ATTEMPTS, ANGER OUTBURSTS, ANGER MANAGEMENT THERAPY, SELF-MUTILATION AND ERRATIC BEHAVIOR. 17 18 DATE OF HEARING: August 17th, 2010 TIME OF HEARING: 8:15 AM 19 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through 20 Stephanie A. Graham, Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points and 21 Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Admit Evidence and History, Including 22 Prior Suicide Attempts, Anger Outbursts, Anger Management Therapy, Self-Mutilations and 23 Erratic Behavior. 24 25 This opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of 26 hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Count. 27 28 111 RECEIVED

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CLERK OF THE COURT

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Desendant's Request to Admit the Victim's Medical Records Must be Denied Because Admission of the Information Contained Within the Records Would Constitute the Improper Use of Character Evidence Under Nevada Law.

According to Defendant's theory of the case, the victim, Victoria Whitmarsh, was the initial aggressor and that her death was a result of self-defense and/or accident. Because there is nothing to support his theory other than his self-serving testimony, Defendant requests this Court to allow him to corroborate his theory with Victoria's mental health records. Specifically, Defendant requests that an expert be allowed to offer opinion testimony summarizing Victoria's mental health history and its manifestations based on the content of the records. Remarkably, Defendant indicates that he intends to testify that he has personal knowledge of the specific instances contained in Victoria's mental health records documenting her "prior acts of violence, including violence to herself by cutting/overdosing and her anger problems" even though he was not present when the incidents occurred. Defendant claims the "specific acts" mentioned in the records, corroborate that his only culpability in Victoria's death was simply as an "innocent response to her aggression."

This Court previously ruled that Defendant could certainly testify that Victoria was the initial aggressor pursuant to NRS 48.045 and State v. Daniel, 119 Nev. 498, 78 P.3d 890 (2003). However, this Court specifically ruled that Daniel precluded the use of Victoria's mental health records to corroborate his theory of the case, either through his own testimony or that of an expert (stating the proffered evidence contained within the records did not amount to specific acts of violence towards another person). This Court properly excluded Victoria's mental health records during Defendant's first trial; there is no valid legal basis for their admission now.

As a general rule, character evidence is inadmissible to show that a person acted in conformity with their character. NRS 48.045(1). However, evidence that the victim committed specific acts of violence against others is admissible, when a defendant raises a claim of self-defense. Daniel v. State, 119 Nev. 498. Evidence of specific acts of violence

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 against others can be presented through the defendant's own testimony, through cross-examination of witnesses and with extrinsic evidence of a victim's specific conduct known to the defendant. <u>Id.</u> at 516.

In <u>State v. Daniel</u>, the defendant shot four men, two were killed but two survived their injuries. 119 Nev. 504. The defendant was aquainted with all four victims. <u>Id</u>. Initially, defendant denied any involvement in the shootings but ultimately changed his story and claimed he shot the victims in self-defense. <u>Daniel</u> at 506.

During his trial, the defendant testified and admitted to the shootings but claimed he acted in self-defense. <u>Id</u>. Further, the defendant testified that three of the victims had reputations for violence and was able to describe specific acts of violence by the victims against others he had personal knowledge of. <u>Id</u>. Additionally, several witnesses testified for the defense, including two LVMPD Detectives, who all testified as to the violent reputation of at least two of the victims. <u>Id</u>.

However, the court precluded the defendant from presenting extrinsic evidence, specifically, prior Judgements of Convictions of the victims even though Defendant had personal knowledge of the facts surrounding those conviction. <u>Daniel</u>, at 515. Additionally, the court prevented the defendant from questioning the surving victims about their specific acts of violence against others during cross-examination. <u>Daniels</u>, at 516. The the court also denied the defendant's request to call witnesses on his behalf to testify to being robbed or assaulted by the victims. <u>Id</u>. Ultimately, the jury rejected the defendant's claim of self-defense and was convicted. <u>Daniel</u>, at 506.

The defendant appealed his conviction on multiple grounds. <u>Id.</u> at 507. On appeal, the defendant argued that the District Court abused its discretion by precluding extrinsic evidence offered to corroborate the defendant's testimony as it was relevant to his state of mind when he shot the victims. <u>Daniel</u>, at 515-16. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed and concluded that the evidence was relevant to the defendant's state of mind as to whether he had a reasonable belief that use of force was necessary. <u>Id.</u> at 516. The Court concluded that where a defendant claims he acted in self defense, extrinisic evidence of a victim's specific

conduct known to the defendant in the form of prior convictions or in the form of corroborating witness testimony evidencing specific acts of vioemce, is admissible. <u>Daniel</u> at 516.

In the instant case, Defendant relies on <u>Daniel</u> for the proposition that Victoria's mental health records (containing information regarding prior suicide attempts, anger outbursts, erratic behavior, "cutting" and that her treatment plan included anger management) are admissible as extrinsic evidence to corroborate his claim of self-defense. Defendant's reliance on <u>Daniels</u> is misplaced. The victims in <u>Daniel</u>, had violent reputations for shooting and assaulting others. Additionally, the victims in <u>Daniel</u> had significant criminal histories to support their reputation as evidenced by the fact that two LVMPD Detectives testified as to their violent reputation against others. There is no evidence to suggest that Victoria had such a reputation for violence against others.

Victoria's mental health records do not demonstrate that she had a reputation for violence against others; the records are replete of any mention of specific acts of violence against others. The fact that the records contain information that Victoria had anger outbursts, was undergoing anger management counseling and had attempted suicide on several occasions does not support, in any way, Defendant's claim that she was dangerous or violent to others.

Additionally, Defendant's reliance on a trio of cases, all from outside this jurisdiction, in support of his argument to admit the records is without merit. See State v. Stanley, 37 F. 3d 85, 90 (N.M. 2001); People v. Salcido, 246 Cal. App. 2d 450, 458-60 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1966); State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 407-08 (Utah 1999). In each of those cases, the defendants sought to introduce evidence of the victim's past suicide attempt history, because the defense in each of those trials was that the victims were not murdered, but rather committed suicide. See Stanley, 37 F.3d at 90; Salcido, 246 Cal. App 2d at 458-60; Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 407-08. Consequently, the courts in those cases found where the defense of suicide is being raised such evidence is probative because it supports the defendant's theory that the victim died as a result of a successful suicide attempt. See Stanley, 37 F.3d at 90;

Salcido, 246 Cal. App. 2d at 458-60; Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 407-08.

Here, Defendant does not claim that Victoria committed suicide. Instead, he claims that he killed Victoria in self-defense. The factual circumstances and legal defenses raised in Stanley, Salcido and Jaeger are entirely different than the facts of this case. The issue in this case is not whether it was murder or suicide, but rather murder or self defense. This trio of decisions, consequently, is irrelevant. There is no legal authority to suggest suicidal tendencies are tantamount to having a propensity for violence against others.

Based on the fact that Victoria's mental health history does not document a single specific act of violence against others, the State fails to see how the records provide any corroborative evidence establishing that Victoria was the initial aggressor.

Additionally, the State takes issue with Defendant's claim that during the previous trial the State admitted character evidence of Victoria's reputation of peacefulness. Defendant's claim is simply belied by the record.

During the State's case in chief, Cheryl Morris testified as to statements Defendant made to her regarding Victoria. Cheryl Morris asserted that Defendant told her that he liked Victoria because she was "meek" and "submissive." The testimony the State elicited from Cheryl Morris regarding Victoria's meek and submissive nature was not character evidence. Rather, it was the Defendant's own statement offered by party opponent. Given the fact that Cheryl Morris was not acquainted with Victoria, it would be improper to allow Defendant to question Cheryl Morris with regard to Victoria's character without first seeking judicial authorization as required by NRS 48.045(2)(Limiting the admissibility of character evidence to relevant acts, acts proven by clear and convincing evidence, and proving that the evidence sought to be admitted is more probative than prejudicial).

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i	For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant's request to admit Victoria's mental health
2	records should be denied.
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6	DATED thisday of August, 2010.
7	Respectfully submitted,
8	DAVID ROGER
9	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781
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12	BY /s/ STEPHANIE A. GRAHAM
13	Stephanie A. Graham Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #0010058
14	Nevada Bar #0010058
15	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
16	
17	I hereby certify that service of STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
18	MOTION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S
19	MENTAL HEALTH CONDITION AND HISTORY, INCLUDING PRIOR SUICIDE
20	ATTEMPTS, ANGER OUTBURSTS, ANGER MANAGEMENT THERAPY, SELF-
21	MUTILATION AND ERRATIC BEHAVIOR, was made this day of August, 2010,
22	by facsimile transmission to:
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24	PATRICIA PALMS Deputy Special Public Defender FAX #455-6273
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26	/s/ T. Schessler Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
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OST PALM LAW FIRM, LTD. PATRICIA PALM, ESQ. NEVADA BAR NO. 6009 1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD. LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

FILED

Email: Patricia.palmlaw@gmail.com Attorney for Brian O'Keefe

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

FILE WITH MASTER CALENDAR

STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff.

Va.

BRIAN K. O'KEEFE.

Defendant.

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVII

DATE:

TIME:

080250630

Order Shortening Time



ORDER SHORTENING TIME

Upon application of the Defendant, appearing through counsel, Patricial Palm of Palm Law Firm, Ltd., and good cause appearing therefor:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for hearing Defendant's Motion to Preclude Expert Testimony is hereby shortened and shall be heard on the 19 day of August, 2010, at the hour of 8:15 a.m. in Department 17.

DATED this 6 day of August, 2010.

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Patricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89 RECEIVED

Respectfully submitted by

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

AUG 1 6 2010

CLERK OF THE COURT

By: MMMM DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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001 PALM LAW FIRM, LTD. PATRICIA PALM, ESQ. NEVADA BAR NO. 6009 1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD.

LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

Email: Patricia palmlaw@gmail.com Attorney for Brian O'Keefe

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff.

VS.

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BRIAN K. O'KEEFE,

Defendant.

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVII

DATE:

TIME:

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Motton



notice of motion and motion by defendant o'kerfe

TO PRECLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY

COMES NOW, the Defendant, BRIAN O'KEEFE, by and through his attorney, PATRICIA PALM of PALM LAW FIRM, LTD., and hereby moves this Honorable Court to preclude the State's witness Detective Marty Wildemann from offering his opinion regarding "the nature of injury to Defendant's hand," during the trial of this matter.

This Motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file

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CLERK OF THE COURT

herein, the attached Declaration, and any oral argument at the time set for hearing this Motion. DATED this 16th Day of August, 2010. PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

> Patricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113

Fax: (702) 386-9114

Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff; and

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TO: DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring on the above and foregoing MOTION BY DEFENDANT O'KEEFE TO PRECLUDE EXPERT

TESTIMONY on the 19 day of Horast, 2010, at the hour of 815m., in Department No. XVII of the above-entitled Court, or as soon thereafter as

counsel may be heard.

DATED this 16th day of August, 2010.

PALM LAWLFIRM, LTD.

PATRICIA PALM Nevada Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd.

Las Vegas, NV 89l04 (702) 386-9113

Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

DECLARATION

PATRICIA A. PALM makes the following declaration:

- I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada; I am the attorney representing Defendant O'Keefe in this matter.
- That on July 29, 2010, well within the time for noticing expert witnesses, O'Keefe filed and served upon the State his Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses.
- 3. That not until the late afternoon of Friday, August 13, 2010, did the State provide to this counsel a Supplemental Notice of Witnesses via email, which notice listed "Detective Marty Wildemann," who "Will testify as to his opinion regarding the nature of injury to Defendant's hand." The notice further states, "Detective Wildemann has been with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department for 22 ½ years. For the past 8 ½ years, Detective Wildemann has been assigned to Homicide and has worked over 200 cases with 25% of those involving stabbings."
 - No Curriculum vitae is attached to the notice.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. (NRS 53.045).

EXECUTED this 16th day of August, 2010.

PATRICIA A. PALM Bar No. 6009

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Where the State wishes to introduce expert testimony, special notice is required pursuant to NRS 174.234(2), which provides:

If the defendant will be tried for one or more offenses that are punishable as a gross misdemeanor or felony and a witness that a party intends to call during the case in chief of the State or during the case in chief of the defendant is expected to offer testimony as an expert witness, the party who intends to call that witness shall file and serve upon the opposing party, not less than 21 days before trial or at such other time as the court directs, a written notice containing:

- (a) A brief statement regarding the subject matter on which the expert witness is expected to testify and the substance of the testimony;
- (b) A copy of the curriculum vitae of the expert witness; and
- (c) A copy of all reports made by or at the direction of the expert witness.

(Emphasis added.) With this statutory provision, the Nevada Legislature obviously intended to protect defendants' due process rights and ensure adequate opportunity to review and possibly impeach proposed experts' qualifications and expected testimony. Here, the State has deprived O'Keefe of his procedural due process right to 21 days' notice. U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Nev. Const., art. 1, sec. 8.

As asserted in the attached affidavit, O'Keefe filed and served his Supplemental Expert Witness Notice well within the time for noticing expert witnesses. The State failed to serve its notice until there was one working day before calendar call. No curriculum vitae have been provided with the State's notice. Therefore, the State has failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement and should be precluded from presenting this and any other expert testimony which has not been properly and timely noticed. See NRS 174.295 (providing that court may impose sanctions, including prohibiting a

party from introducing in evidence material not disclosed in compliance with NRS 174.234).

В

Additionally, Detective Wildemann is not qualified to offer an "expert opinion" on the nature of wounds or injuries. NRS 50.275 provides that "[i]! scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify to matters within the scope of such knowledge."

In <u>Hallmark v. Eldridge</u>, 124 Nev. ____, 189 P.3d 646 (2008), the Nevada Supreme Court set forth the factors applicable to the determination of allowing expert testimony. In that case, the Court determined that the district court abused its discretion in allowing a physician with an engineering background to testify as a biomechanical expert. The court stated, "the testimony did not assist the jury in understanding the evidence as the testimony was not based on reliable methodology." <u>Id.</u> at ____, 189 P.3d at 648. The Court stated that when considering whether to admit expert testimony on a subject,

the witness must satisfy the following three requirements: (1) he or she must be qualified in the area of "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge" (the qualification requirement); (2) his or her specialized knowledge must "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" (the assistance requirement); and (3) his or her testimony must be limited 'matters within the scope of [his or her specialized] knowledge" (the limited scope requirement).

Id. at ___, 189 P.3d at 650 (citation omitted). When determining whether the qualification requirement is met, the court should consider: (1) formal schooling and academic degrees, (2) licensure, (3) employment, and (4) practical experience and specialized training. These factors are not exhaustive and may vary in weight or not apply, depending on the case. <u>Id.</u> at ___, 189 P.3d at 650-51.

In considering whether the assistance requirement has been met, a district court should consider whether the opinion is (1) within a recognized field of expertise, (2) testable and has been tested, (3) published and subjected to peer review, (4) generally accepted in the scientific community (which is not always determinative), and (5) based more on particularized facts rather than assumption, conjecture or generalization. <u>Id.</u> at 651-52.

Here, Detective Wildemann fails the first prong of the test. There are no curriculum vitae attached to the State's notice to show that Wildemann has any special qualifications such as formal schooling or degrees, licensure, employment, practical experience or specialized training in the area of the nature of injuries. Therefore, there is no need to go further. He has no expertise by which he could assist the jury or within which his testimony can be confined. See also Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 33-34, 806 P.2d 548, 551 (1991) (a detective's opinion based on his experience as to the significance/cause of injuries on the defendant was improper, the detective was not qualified to give an expert opinion, and layperson opinion is not an appropriate vehicle to illuminate the cause of injuries).

In sum, based on the State's failure to timely comply with the requirements of NRS 174.234(2), and based on Detective Wildemann's lack of expertise in addressing the nature of injuries or wounds, this Court should preclude the State from offering him as an expert and prevent him from giving his opinion on the nature or cause of the wounds in this case.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Brian O'Keefe respectfully requests this Honorable Court issue an order precluding the State from introducing at trial evidence or testimony from its proposed expert Marty Wildemann related to the nature of any injuries in this case.

Dated this / day of August, 2010.

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PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

PATRICIA A. PALM, #6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104

(702) 386-9113

RECEIPT OF COPY

RECEIPT OF COPY of the above and foregoing MOTION BY DEFENDANT O'KEEFE TO PRECLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY is hereby acknowledged this ____ day of August 2010.

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PALM LAW FIRM, LTD. PATRICIA PALM, ESQ. NEVADA BAR NO. 6009

1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD.

LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

Email: Patricia palmlaw@gmail.com Attorney for Brian O'Keele

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff.

VS.

BRIAN K. O'KEEFE,

Defendant.

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVII

DATE:

TIME:

FONT Es Parto Matten

080250630



EX PARTE MOTION FOR AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, BRIAN O'KEEFE, by and through counsel, Patricia Palm of Palm Law Firm, Ltd., and hereby moves this Honorable for an Order Shortening Time pursuant to EDCR 3.60, and requests that this Court shorten the time in which to hear the Motion by Defendant O'Keefe to Preclude the State from Presenting Expert Testimony.

This application is based upon the pleadings and papers on file and the Declaration of Counsel Attached to this Motion.

Dated this 16th day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

Patricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd.

Las Vegas, NV 89104

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AUG 1 6 2010

CLERK OF THE COURT

DECLARATION

PATRICIA A. PALM makes the following declaration:

- I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada; I am the attorney representing Defendant O'Keefe in this matter.
- That on August 13, 2010, the State sent O'Keefe via email a Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses.
- 3. That trial is set to begin on August 23, 2010, and O'Keefe has invoked his statutory right to a speedy trial. Therefore, the MOTION BY DEFENDANT O'KEEFE TO PRECLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY must be set as soon as possible in order to allow O'Keefe sufficient time to plan his trial strategy.
- That this Ex Parte Motion for an Order Shortening Time is made in good faith.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. (NRS 53.045).

EXECUTED this //e day of August, 2010.

PATRICIA A. PALM

C GINAL FILED

NOTO

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD. PATRICIA PALM, ESQ NEVADA BAR NO. 6009

1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD.

LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

Email: Patricia.palmlaw@gmail.com

Attorney for Brian O'Keefe

Aug 16 8 55 AH 10

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff.

VS.

BRIAN K. O'KEEFE,

Defendant.

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT. NO: XVII

DATE:

TIME:

DEC250030 **MOOM** Matter of Writing south

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defendant's supplemental notice of witheases

TO: THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, and

TO: DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff

YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT The Defendant, BRIAN O'KEEFE, by and through his attorney, PATRICIA PALM of PALM LAW FIRM, LTD., intends to call the following witnesses, in addition to those witnesses listed on previously filed notices, in his case in chief:

Skye Campbell

Dorothy Robe

Dodge Slagel RECEIVED

AUG 1 6 2010

CLERK OF THE COURT

Campbell Investigations 2961 industrial Rd., Ste. 113 Las Vegas, NV 89109

424 SaraJane Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89107

1090 Wigwam Pkwy. Ste. 100

1		Henderson, NV 89074
3	COR AMR	4701 Stoddard Rd., Modesto CA 95353
4 5	COR LVF&R	500 N. Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89101
6 7	COR MINES & ASSOC.	10367 W. Centennial Rd., Ste. 100, Littleton, CO 80127
9	COR Military Personnel Records	9700 Page Ave., St. Louis, MO 63132
10	COR M.J. DEAN CONSTRUCTION CO.	5055 W. Patrick Lane, Ste.
11	A.6007-3	Las Vegas, NV 89118
12 13	COR PERINI Bidg. Co.	2955 N. Green Valley Pkwy. Henderson, NV 89014
14 15 16	COR for Unemployment Debit Card Acct. Through NV Dpt. Of Emp. Training & Rehab.	2800 E. St. Louis Ave., Las Vegas, NV 89713
17	These witnesses are in addition to tho	Se previously matical and to-
18	whom a separate Notice has been filed.	- previously moticed and for
20	Dated this 16th day of August, 2010.	
21		LM LAW FIRM, LTD.
22		
23		ate In
24	Pat	ricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 2 Casino Center Blvd.
25	Las	Vegas, NV 89104
26	Pho Fax	one: (702) 386-9113 :: (702) 386-9114
27		orney for Defendant O'Keefe
28	111	

RECEIPT OF COPY I, the undersigned, acknowledge that on this_ 2010, I received a true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF WITNESSES. CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 200 Lewis Ave., Las Vegas, WV 89155-1212

Electronically Filed 08/16/2010 11:13:34 AM

ı	NOTC		Attent blum
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney		CLERK OF THE COURT
3	Nevada Bar #002781 STEPHANIE A. GRAHAM		
4	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #0010058		06C25083A
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212		Notice of Experi Willenson
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		N I I BUTH BUTH BUTH ARE IN HOT
7	352	CT COURT	
8	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)	
10	Plaintiff,	CASE NO:	C250630
11	-vs-	DEPT NO:	II
12	BRIAN O'KEEFE,	{	-
13	#1447732	{	
14	Defendant.	\$	
15 16	SUPPLEMENTAL NOTIC [NRS 1	CE OF EXPERT WI 74.234(2)]	TNESSES
17	TO: BRIAN O'KEEFE, Defendant;	and	
18	TO: PATRICA PALM ESQ, Counse	el of Record:	
19	YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL	PLEASE TAKE NO	TICE that the STATE OF
20	NEVADA intends to call the following witner		
21	1.) DR. TIMOTHY DUTRA and/or Di		
22	victim's injuries.		
23	The substance of each expert witness'	testimony and a cop	y of all reports made by or
24	at the direction of the expert witness has been		
25	///		•••
26	III.		
27	III		
28	III		
(1)			

A copy of each expert witness' curriculum vitae, if available, is attached hereto. Nevada Bar #002781 б CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that service of SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF EXPERT WITNESSES, was made this _____ day of August, 2010, by facsimile transmission to: PATRICIA PALM ESQ FAX #455-6273 /s/ T. Schessler Secretary for the District Attorney's Office C:\Program Files\Nasvia.Com\Document Converter\temp\1127580-1296626.DOC

Curriculum Vitae

Timothy Franklin Dutra, M.D., M.S., Ph.D.

Personal Data:

Permanent Address.

14689 Fieldstone Ct.,

Saratoga, CA 95070

Celiphone:

(314) 610-6841

E-Mail:

Languages:

tdm:tphul@yahoo.com English & Spanish

Board Certifications:

Forensic Pathology ABP Diplomate and certified, September 9, 2009

Blood Banking and Transfusion Medicine ABP Diplomate and certified, September 9, 2005

Anatomic and Clinical Pathology ABP Diplomate and certified, November 11, 1998

Most Recent Fellowship:

Fellowship, Forensic Pathology St Louis University (A.C.G.M.E. accredited: 10/1/08 - 9/30/09) Program Director: Jane W. Turner, M.D., Ph.D. St. Louis City Medical Examiner's Office 1300 Clark Avenue St. Louis, MO 83103

Recent Colleague:

Visiting Colleague, Forensic Pathology (10/5/09 - 10/31/09) Servicio Medico Forense Ninos Heroes #102 Col Doctores, Del Cuauntemac Mexico, D.F. 06720 Director: Dr. Felipe Takajashi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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Supreme Court No.:

District Court Case No.: 08C250630 Filed Dec 01 2015 10:53 a.m. Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX - VOLUME VII - PAGES 1200-1399

MATTHEW D. CARLING 51 East 400 North, Bldg. #1 Cedar City, Utah 84720 (702) 419-7330 (Office) Attorney for Appellant

BRIAN K. O'KEEFE.

THE STATE OF NEVADA

Appellant,

Respondent,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Counsel for Respondent

CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO Attorney General 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 Counsel for Respondent

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a True Pretrial Detainee filed on 10/03/14	5008-5036
"Evidentiary Hearing Request" (Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to NRS 34.360 Exclusive 1 Based on Subject-Matter of Amended Information Vested in Ninth Circuit by Notice of Appeal then "COA" Granted on a Double Jeopardy Violation with No Remand Issued Since) filed on 10/03/14	4995-5007
"Reply" to State's Response and Motion to Dismiss to Defendant's Pro- Per Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Prsuant to NRS 34.360 filed on 10/27/14	5052-5061
"True Pretrial Detainee's" Reply to State's Opposition(s) Admitting the State has a Jurisdictional Defect by the Aung of a Notice of Appeal Which Diveste Jurisdiction of the Matter Appealed; i.e., O'Keefe's Pretrial Habeas Matter Appealed to the 9th Circuit on the Subject Matter of the Amended Information Already Named a Double Jeopardy Violation filed on 10/01/14	4989-4994
Affidavit of Matthew D. Carling, Esq. filed on 06/29/15	5447-5453
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2	Clerks Certificate Judgment Reversed and Remanded filed on 05/06/10	1023-1027
•	Criminal Bindover filed on 12/26/08	0004-0020
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4 5	Defendant O'Keefe's Opposition to Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of Other Bad Acts Pursuant to NRS 48.045 and Evidence of Domestic Violence Pursuant to 48.061 filed on 01/18/11	2877-2907
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8	Defendant's Motion to Require Court to Advise the Prosepective Jurors as to the Mandatory Sentences Required if the Defendant is Convicted of Second Degree Murder filed on 03/04/09	0107 0010
7	Defendant's Motion to Settle Record filed on 03/24/09	0196-0218
10		0317-0322
	Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions filed on 03/20/09 Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions filed on 08/23/10	0302-0316
11		1335-1393
12	Defendant's Submission to Clark County District Attorney's Death Review Committee filed on 12/31/08	0021-0027
13	Defendant's Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions filed on 03/20/09	0290-0292
13	Defendant's Supplemental Notice of Witnesses filed on 08/16/10	1294-1296
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15 16 17	Ex Parte and/or Notice of Motion and Motion to Chief Judge to Reassign Case to Jurist of Reason Based on Pending Suit 3:14-CV-00385-RCJ-WGC Against Judge Michael Villani for proceeding in Clear "Want of Jurisdiction" Thereby Losing Immunity, Absolutely filed on 08/28/14	4903-4912
4077	Ex Parte and/or Notice of Motion filed on 08/28/14	4913
18 19	Ex Parte Application for Order Requiring Material Witness to Post Bail filed on 03/10/09	0232-0236
•	Ex Parte Motion for an Order Shortening Time filed on 08/16/10	1292-1293
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27 28	Ex-Parte Motion for Reimbursement of Incidental Costs Subsequent the Court Declaring Defendant Indigent and Granting Forma Pauperis filed on 01/21/14	4722-4747

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Motion to Place on Calendar filed on 11/28/11 Motion to Withdraw as Counsel filed on 04/29/11 Motion to Withdraw Counsel filed on 11/28/11 Motion to Withdraw Counsel for Conflict and Failure to Present Claims when I.A.C. Claims Must be Raised Per Statute in the First Petition Pursuant Chapter 34 filed on 06/08/15	3044-3047 3193-3198 5148-5153
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Motion to Place on Calendar filed on 11/28/11 Motion to Withdraw as Counsel filed on 04/29/11 Motion to Withdraw Counsel filed on 11/28/11 Motion to Withdraw Counsel for Conflict and Failure to Present Claims when I.A.C. Claims Must be Raised Per Statute in the First Petition Pursuant Chapter 34 filed on 06/08/15 Motion to Withdraw filed on 09/14/10 Notice of Appeal filed on 03/13/14 Notice of Appeal filed on 04/11/14 Notice of Appeal filed on 05/21/09	3044-3047 3193-3198 5148-5153 1434-1437 4843-4849 4858-4861 0332-0333
Motion to Place on Calendar filed on 11/28/11 Motion to Withdraw as Counsel filed on 04/29/11 Motion to Withdraw Counsel filed on 11/28/11 Motion to Withdraw Counsel for Conflict and Failure to Present Claims when I.A.C. Claims Must be Raised Per Statute in the First Petition Pursuant Chapter 34 filed on 06/08/15 Motion to Withdraw filed on 09/14/10 Notice of Appeal filed on 03/13/14 Notice of Appeal filed on 04/11/14 Notice of Appeal filed on 05/21/09 Notice of Appeal filed on 07/31/15	3044-3047 3193-3198 5148-5153 1434-1437 4843-4849 4858-4861 0332-0333 5467-5472
Motion to Place on Calendar filed on 11/28/11 Motion to Withdraw as Counsel filed on 04/29/11 Motion to Withdraw Counsel filed on 11/28/11 Motion to Withdraw Counsel for Conflict and Failure to Present Claims when I.A.C. Claims Must be Raised Per Statute in the First Petition Pursuant Chapter 34 filed on 06/08/15 Motion to Withdraw filed on 09/14/10 Notice of Appeal filed on 03/13/14 Notice of Appeal filed on 04/11/14 Notice of Appeal filed on 05/21/09 Notice of Appeal filed on 08/11/15	3044-3047 3193-3198 5148-5153 1434-1437 4843-4849 4858-4861 0332-0333 5467-5472 5478-5483
Motion to Place on Calendar filed on 11/28/11 Motion to Withdraw as Counsel filed on 04/29/11 Motion to Withdraw Counsel filed on 11/28/11 Motion to Withdraw Counsel for Conflict and Failure to Present Claims when I.A.C. Claims Must be Raised Per Statute in the First Petition Pursuant Chapter 34 filed on 06/08/15 Motion to Withdraw filed on 09/14/10 Notice of Appeal filed on 03/13/14 Notice of Appeal filed on 04/11/14 Notice of Appeal filed on 05/21/09 Notice of Appeal filed on 07/31/15	3044-3047 3193-3198 5148-5153 1434-1437 4843-4849 4858-4861 0332-0333 5467-5472

Notice of Appeal filed on 11/21/14	5067-5069
Notice of Change of Address filed on 06/06/14	4864-4865
Notice of Defendant's Expert Witness filed on 02/20/09	0180-0195
Notice of Defendant's Witnesses filed on 03/06/09	0224-0227
Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact. Conclusion of Law and Order filed on 10/06/15	5537-5546
Notice of Expert Witnesses filed on 03/05/09	0222-0223
Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe for a Reasonable Bail filed on 09/24/10	1441-1451
Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe for Discovery filed on 08/02/10	1211-1219
Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe for Evidentiary Hearing on Whether the State and CCDC have Complied with Their Obligations with Respect to the Recording of a Jail Visit Between O'Keefe and State Witness Cheryl Morris filed on 08/02/10	1220-1239
Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe to Admit Evidence Pertaining to the Alleged Victim's Mental Health Condition and History, Including Prior Suicide Attempts, Anger Outbursts, Anger Management	
Therapy, Self-Mutilation and Errratic Behavior filed on 07/21/10	1064-1081
Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe to Admit Evidence Pertaining to the Alleged Victim's Mental Health Condition and History, Including Prior Suicide Attempts, Anger Outbursts, Anger Management Therapy, Self-Mutilation and Erratic Behavior filed on 07/21/10	1099-1116
Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe to Admit Evidence	1099-1110
Showing LVMPD Homicide Detectives Have Preserved Blood/Breath Alcohol Evidence in Another Recent Case filed on 08/02/10	1199-1210
Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe to Dismiss on Grounds of Double Jeopardy Bar and Speedy Trial Violation and, Alternatively, to Preclude State's New Expert Witness, Evidence and	**************************************
Argument Relating to the Dynamics or Effects of Domestic Violence and Abuse filed on 01/07/11 Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe to Preclude Expert	2785-2811
Testimony filed on 08/16/10	1284-1291
Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe to Preclude the State from Introducing at Trial Other Act or Character Evidence and Other Evidence Which is Unfairly Prejudicial or Would Violate his Constitutional Rights filed on 07/21/10	1047-1063
Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe to Preclude the State from Introducing at Trial Other Act or Character Evidence and Other	1047-1003
Evidence Which is Unfairly Prejudicial or Would Violate his Constitutional Rights filed on 07/21/10	1082-1098
Notice of Motion and Motion by defendant O'Keefe to Preclude the State from Introducing at Trial Improper Evidence and Argument filed on 01/03/11	
Notice of Motion and motion by Defendant O'Keefe to Suppress his	1682-2755

	<u></u>	
1	Statements to Police, or, Alternatively, to Preclude the State from	Ti ·
2	Introducing Portions of his Interrogation filed on 08/02/10	1152-1198
3	Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for	
3	Rehearing – Pursuant to EDCR, Rule 2.24 filed on 08/29/14	4914-4921
4 5	Notice of Motion and Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of Other Bad Acts Pursuant to NRS 48.045 and Evidence of Domestic Violence Pursuant to 48.061 filed on 01/06/11	2762-2784
6	Notice of Motion and Motion to Admit Evidence of Other Crimes filed on 02/02/09	0150-0165
7	Notice of Motion and Motion to Admit Evidence of Polygraph Examination Results filed on 03/29/12	3412-3415
8	Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss based Upon Violation(s) of the Fifth Amendment Component of the Double Jeopardy Clause,	
9	Constitutional Collateral Estoppel and, Alternatively, Claiming Res Judicata, Enforceable by the Fourteenth Amendment Upon the States	
0	Precluding State's Theory of Prosecution by Unlawful Intentional	
1	Stabbing with Knife, the Alleged Battery Act Described in the Amended Information filed on 03/16/12	3201-3224
12	Notice of Motion and Motion to Seal Records filed on 03/22/12	3416-3429
3	Notice of Motion and Motion to Waive Filing Fees for Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed on 12/06/13	4695-4697
4	Notice of Motion and Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record filed on 09/23/15	5517-5519
5	Notice of Motion and Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record filed on 09/29/15	5525-5527
6	Notice of Motion filed on 01/13/14	4721
7	Notice of Motion filed on 01/21/14	4748
	Notice of Motion filed on 01/27/14	4760
8	Notice of Motion filed on 02/24/14	4810
9	Notice of Motion filed on 03/04/14	4833
9	Notice of Motion filed on 06/08/15	5154-5160
)	Notice of Motion filed on 07/23/14	4890
.	Notice of Motion filed on 08/29/14	4922
8	Notice of Motion filed on 09/15/14	4953
2	Notice of Witness and/or Expert Witnesses filed on 02/03/09	0166-0167
	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses filed on 02/17/09	0178-0179
3	NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/ Judgment Affirmed filed on 02/06/15	5072-5081
4 5	NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgment Affirmed filed on 07/26/13	4653-4661
5	NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgment Dismissed filed on 06/18/14	4866-4870
7	NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgment Dismissed filed on 03/12/15	5089-5093
8	NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgment Dismissed filed on	3 - 2.0002.000 1 - 3

1 09/28/15	5520-5524
NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgment Dismissed filed on 10/29/14	5062-5066
O'Keefe's Reply to State's Opposition to Motion to Admit Evidence Showing LVMPD Homicide Detectives have Preserved Blood/Breath Alcohol Evidence in Another Recent Case filed on 08/13/10	1256-1265
Opposition to State's Motion to Admit Evidence of Other Bad Acts filed on 02/06/09	0169-0172
6 Order Authorizing Contact Visit filed on 03/04/09	0219-0220
Order Authorizing Contact Visit filed on 08/12/10	1253-1254
Order Denying Defendant's Ex Parte Motion to Extend Prison Copywork Limit filed on 08/13/15	5486-5488
Order Denying Defendant's Ex-Parte Motion for Reimbursement of Incidental Costs Declaring Defendant Ingigent and Granting Forma pauperis filed on 03/11/14	4840-4842
Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Relief From Judgment Based on Lack of Jurisdiction for U.S. Court of Appeals had not Issues any Remand, Mandare or Remittatture filed on 09/04/14	4927-4929
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed on 04/11/12	3434-3435
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Seal Recoreds and Defendant's Motion to Admit Evidence of Plygraph Examination filed on 05/24/12	3448-3449
Order Denying Defendant's Petition for Writ of Mandamus or in the Alternative Writ of Coram Nobis; Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Waive Filing Fees for Petition for Writ of Mandamus; Order Denying	1
Defendant's Motion to Appoint Counsel filed on 01/28/14	4761-4763
Order Denying Defendant's Pro Per Motion for Judifical Notice- The	4066 4057
State's Failure to File and Serve Response in Opposition filed on 04/01/14 Order Denying Defendant's Pro Per Motion for Leave to File	4855-4857
Supplemental Petition Addressing all Claims in the First Instance Required by Statute for Judicial Economy with Affidavit filed on 07/15/15	5464-5466
Order Denying Defendant's Pro Per Motion to Modify and/or Correct Illegal Sentence filed on03/25/14	4852-4854
Order Denying Defendant's Pro Per Motion to Withdraw Counsel for Conflict and Failure to Present Claims When I.A.C. Claims Must be	<u>-</u>
07/15/15	5461-5463
Order Denying Matthew D. Carling's Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record for Defendant filed on 11/19/15	5574-5575
Order Denying Motion to Disqualify filed on 10/06/14	5037-5040
Order filed on 01/30/09	0149
6 Order filed on 11/06/10	1462-1463
Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on 10/15/14 Order for Production of Immate Brian O'Keefe filed on 05/26/10	5051
Out of Production of Marie Brian O'Rect Med On 03/20/10	1032-1033
Order for Return of Fees filed on 11/10/11	3183

1	Order for Transcripts filed on 04/30/12	3442
2	Order Granting and Denying in Part Defendant's Ex-Parte Motion for	14-14-00-5
4	Production of Documents (Specific) Papers. Pleadings, and Tangible	
3	Property of Defendant filed on 02/28/14	4818-4820
	Order Granting Ex parte Motion for Defense Costs filed on 07/01/10	1044-1045
4	Order Granting Request for Transcripts filed on 01/20/11	2966-2967
5	Order Granting Request for Transcripts filed on 04/27/11	3043
-	Order Granting Request for Transcripts filed on 09/14/10	1430-1431
6	Order Granting Request for Transcripts filed on 09/16/10	1438-1439
-	Order Granting, in Part, and Denying, in Part, Motion by Defendant	
7	O'Keefe for Discovery filed on 08/23/10	1394-1395
8	Order Granting, in Part, and Denying, in Part, Motion by Defendant	
18000	O'Keefe to Preclude the State from Introducing at Trial Other Act or	
9	Character Evidence and Other Evidence Which is Unfairly Prejudicial or	16 visco
10	Would Violate his Constitutional Rights filed on 09/09/10	1427-1429
10	Order Granting, in Part, the State's Motion to Admit Evidence of Other	3199-3200
11	Bad Acts filed on 03/13/12	
	Order Releasing Medical Records filed on 04/08/11	3039-3040
12	Order Requiring Material Witness to Post Bail or be Committed to	
13	Custody filed on 03/10/09	0230-0231
13	Order Shortening Time filed on 08/16/10	1283
14	Petition for a Writ of Mandamus or in the Alternative Writ of Coram	
	Nobis filed on 12/06/13	4663-4694
15	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or in the Alternative Motion to	
16	Preclude Prosecution from Seeking First Degree Murder Conviction	
10	Based Upon the Failure to Collect Evidence filed on 01/26/09	0125-0133
17	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to NRS 34.360 Exclusive 1	
	Based On Subject-Matter of Amended Information Vested in Ninth	
18	Circuit by notice of Appeal Then "COA" Granted on a Double Jeopardy	
19	Violation with No Remand Issued Since filed on 09/15/14	4940-4949
83	Petitioner's Supplement with Exhibit of Oral Argument Scheduled by the	j
20	Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for November 17, 2014, Courtroom #1	
200	filed on 10/01/14	4984-4988
21	Pro Se "Reply to State's Opposition to Defendant's Pro Se Motion to	
22	Modify and/or Correct Illegal Sentence filed on 03/04/14	4821-4832
17.02.2	ProSe "Reply" to State's Opposition to Defendant's (Ex-Parte) "Motion	
23	for Reimbursement of Incidental Costs Subsequent the Courts Declaring	Section (Section Companies)
34 l	Defendant Indigent and Granting Forma Pauperis" filed on 02/24/14	4792-4799
24	Receipt of Copy filed on 01/03/11	2761
25	Receipt of Copy filed on 01/12/11	2812
	Receipt of Copy filed on 01/12/11	2813
26	Receipt of Copy filed on 01/18/11	2876
27	Receipt of Copy filed on 01/27/09	0134
46	Receipt of Copy filed on 01/30/09	0146
28	Receipt of Copy filed on 02/06/09	0168

1	Receipt of Copy filed on 03/04/09	0221
2	Receipt of Copy filed on 03/24/09	0323
: ** *	Receipt of Copy filed on 05/24/10	1031
3	Receipt of Copy filed on 06/13/11	3163
14	Receipt of Copy filed on 06/30/10	1036
4	Receipt of Copy filed on 08/02/10	1240
5	Receipt of Copy filed on 08/02/10	1241
	Receipt of Copy filed on 08/02/10	1242
6	Receipt of Copy filed on 08/02/10	1243
7	Receipt of copy filed on 08/13/10	1255
36	Receipt of Copy filed on 09/14/10	1432
8	Receipt of Copy filed on 09/17/10	1433
	Receipt of Copy filed on 09/21/10	1440
9	Receipt of File filed on 07/01/10	1046
10	Reply in Support of Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	1 F2
12-71	(Post-Conviction) filed on 08/25/15	5500-5510
11	Reply to State's Response to Defendant's Pro Per Post-Conviction	
12	Petition for Habeas Corpus filed on 06/16/15	5423-5432
12	Reply to State's Response to Defendant's Supplemental Petition for Writ	Signal Committee of the
13	of Habeas Corpus filed on 08/24/15	5489-5499
40.40	Request for Rough Draft Transcripts filed on 10/21/15	5549-5551
14	Request for Rough Draft Transcripts filed on 07/17/12	3458-3460
15	Request for Certified Transcript of Proceeding filed on 09/09/09	0772-0723
*2	Request for Rough Draft Transcript filed on 05/21/09	0329-0331
16	Request for Rough Draft Transcripts filed on 11/20/12	4629-4631
	Return to Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on 01/29/09	0135-0145
17	Second Amended Information filed on 08/19/10	1326-1328
18 19	State's Opposition to Defendant's (Ex-Parte) "Motion for Reimbursement of Incidental Costs Subsequent the Courts Declaring Defendant Indigent and Granting Forma Pauperis" filed on 02/07/14	4768-4791
20	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a Reasonable Bail filed on 09/27/10	1452-1461
21 22	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judicial Notice – The State's Failure to File and Serve the Response in Opposition filed on 03/10/14	4974 4070
44	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed on 03/21/12	4834-4839
23	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Preclude the State from	3407-3411
24	Introducing at Trial Improper Evidence and Argument filed on 01/12/11	2814-2871
25	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Seal Records filed on 04/05/12	3431-3433
26	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress his Statements to Police, or, Alternatively, to Preclude the State from Introducing Portions of his Interposition filed on 08/17/10	MATERIAL CALLED
27	of his Interrogation filed on 08/17/10 State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Counsel for	1306-1319
28	Conflict and Failure to Present Claims When LA.C. Claims Must be	

Raised Per Statute in the First Petition Pursuant to Chapter 34 filed on	Ü.
06/25/15	5442-5446
State's Opposition to Defendant's Pro Per Motion for Leave of Court to File MotionRule 2.4 filed on 09/12/14	4935-4939
State's Opposition to Defendant's Pro Per Motion to Chief Judge to	1,000 1,007
Reassign Case to Jurist of Reason Based on Pending Suit Against Judge Michael Villani for Proceeding in Clear "Want of Jurisdiction" Thereby	
Losing Immunity. Absolutely filed on 09/12/14	4930-4934
State's Opposition to Defendant's Pro Per Motion to Modify and/or Correct Illegal Sentence filed on 02/24/14	4811-4817
State's Opposition to Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Whether the	101111111111
State and CCDC have Complied with their Obligations with Respect to the Recording of a Jail Visit Between O'Keefe and State Witness Cheryl	
Morris filed on 08/10/10	1244-1247
State's Opposition to Motion to Admit Evidence Pertaining to the Alleged Victim's Mental Health Condition and History, Including Prior Suicide	
Attempts, Anger Outbursts, Anger Management Therapy, Self-Mutilation and Erratic Behavior filed on 08/16/10	1277-1282
State's Opposition to Motion to Admit Evidence Showing LVMPD	1277-1202
Homicide Detectives Have Preserved Blood/Breath Alcohol Evidence in Another Recent Case filed on 08/10/10	1248-1252
State's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and, Alternatively, to Preclude Expert and Argument Regarding Domestic Violence filed on 01/18/11	2908-2965
State's Opposition to Motion to Preclude Expert Testimony filed on 08/18/10	
State's Response and Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Motion for Relief	1320-1325
from Judgment Based on Lack of Jurisdiction for U.S. Court of Appeals had not Issued any Remand. Mandare or Remittatture of filed on 08/07/14	4891-4902
State's Response and Motion to Dismiss to Defendant's Pro Per Petition	4671-4702
for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to NRS 34.360 Exclusive based on Subject-Matter of Amended Information Vested in Ninth Circuit by	
Notice of Appeal Then "COA" Granted on a Double jEopardy Violatio with No Remand Issued Since (Post Conviction), Amended Peition and	
Accompany Exhibits, Opposition to Request for Evidentiary Hearing, and	5041 5050
Opposition to Pro Per Motion to Appoint Counsel filed on 10/10/14 State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Preclude the State from	5041-5050
Introducint at Trial Other Bad Acts or Character Evidence and Other	
Evidence that is Unfairly Prejudicial or Would Violate his Contitutionsal Rights filed on 08/16/10	1268-1276
State's Response to Defendant's Petition for a Writ of Mandamus or in the Alternative Writ of Coram and Response to Motion to Appoint	
Counsel filed on 12/31/13	4708-4713
State's Response to Defendant's Pro Per Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on 06/02/15	5145-5147
State's Response to Defendant's Pro Per Supplemental Petition for Writ	J. 173-J. 1947

of Habeas Corpus and Evidentiary Hearing Request, "Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition Addressing all Claims in the First Instance Required by Statute for Judicial Economy with Affidavit," "Reply to	
State's Response to Defendant's Pro Per Post Conviction Petition for Habeas Corpus," and "Supplement with Notice Pursuant NRS 47.150(2); NRS 47.140(1), that the Untied States Supreme Court has Docketed (#14-10093) the Pretrial Habeas Corpus Matter Pursuant 28 USC 2241(c)(3) from the Mooting of Petitioner's Section 2241 Based on a Subsequent Judgment Obtained in Want of Jurisdiction While Appeal Pending" filed	
on 07/09/15 State's Response to Defendant's Reply in Support of Supplemental Post-	5455-5458
Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on 09/03/15 State's Response to Defendant's Supplement to Supplemental Petition for	5511-5516
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) filed on 07/31/15	5473-5475
State's Supplemental Opposition to Motion to Seal Records filed on 04/17/12	3436-3437
Stipulation and Order filed on 02/10/09	0173-0174
Substitution of Attorney filed on 06/29/10	1034-1035
Supplement to Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) filed on 07/13/15	5459-5460
the United State's Supreme Court has Docketed (#14-10093) The Pretrial Habeas Corpus Matter Pursuant 28 U.S.C.§ 2241 ©(3) From the Mooting of Petitioner's Section 2241 Based on a Subsequent Judgment Obtained in Want of Jurisdiction While Appeal Pending filed on 06/17/15	5433-5437
Supplemental Appendix of Exhibits to Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Exhibits One (1) Through Twenty Five (25) filed on 06/12/15	5161-5363
Supplemental Notice of Defendant's Expert Witnesses filed on 07/29/10	1117-1151
Supplemental Notice of Expert Witness filed on 05/17/12	3443-3447
Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses filed on 01/03/11	2756-2760
Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses filed on 08/13/10	1266-1267
Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses filed on 08/16/10	1297-1305
Supplemental Notice of Witnesses filed on 01/14/11	2872-2875
Supplemental Notice of Witnesses filed on 03/10/09	0228-0229
Supplemental Notice of Witnesses filed on 03/11/09	0237-0238
Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction) filed on 04/08/15	5094-5144
Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on 06/15/15	5364-5419
Verdict filed on 03/20/09	0289
Verdict filed on 06/15/12	3457
Verdict Submitted to the Jury but Returned Unsigned filed on 09/02/10 Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on 01/30/09	1397-1398

TRANSCRIPTS

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Transcript - All Pending Motions and Calendar Call filed on 02/04/11	2996-3038
Transcript - All Pending Motions filed on 07/10/09	0351-0355
Transcript - All Pending Motions filed on 08/30/12	3461-3482
Transcript - All Pending Motions filed on 11/23/10	1464-1468
Transcript - All Pending Motions on 07/10/09	0348-0350
Transcript - Calendar Call filed on 02/04/11	2968-2973
Transcript - Calendar Call filed on 08/30/12	3520-3535
Transcript – Continued Hearing: Motion in Limine to Present Evidence of Other Bad Acts filed on 08/30/12	3483-3509
Transcript - Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction) filed on 10/29/15	5560-5564
Transcript - Defendant's Pro Per Motion to Dismiss Based Upon Violation(s) filed on 08/30/12	3510-3519
Transcript - Defendaat's Motion to Settle Record filed on 07/10/09	0342-0345
Transcript - Entry of Plea/Trial Setting filed on 07/10/09	0356-0358
Transcript - Jury Trail - Day 1 filed on 10/14/09	0724-1022
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 1 filed on 07/10/09	0582-0651
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 1 filed on 07/10/09	0652-0721
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 1 filed on 09/04/12	4278-4622
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 1 filed on 11/23/10	1579-1602
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 2 filed on 07/10/09	0515-0581
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 2 filed on 11/23/10	1603-1615
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 2 on 09/04/12	4001-4227
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 3 filed on 07/10/09	0462-0514
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 3 filed on 11/23/10	1616-1738
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 3 on 09/04/12	3779-4000
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 4 filed on 07/10/09	0408-0461
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 4 filed on 11/23/10	1739-2032
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 4 on 09/04/12	3600-3778
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 5 filed on 07/10/09	0359-0407
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 5 filed on 09/04/12	3538-3599
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 5 filed on 11/23/10	2033-2281
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 6 filed on 11/23/10	2282-2507
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 7 filed on 11/23/10	2508-2681
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 8 filed on 11/23/10	1469-1470
Transcript - Jury Trial - Day 9 filed on 11/23/10	1471-1478
Transcript - Matthew D. Carling's Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record for Defendant filed on 10/29/15	5557-5559
Transcript - Motions Hearing - August 17, 2010 filed on 11/23/10	1479-1499
Transcript - Motions Hearing - August 19, 2010 filed on 11/23/10	1500-1536
Transcript - Motions Hearing - August 20, 2010 filed on 11/23/10	1537-1578

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Transcript – Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant O'Keefe to Preclude the State from Introducing at Trial Improper Evidence and Argument filed on 02/04/11	2974-2989
Transcript - Partial Transcript of the Jury Trial - Day 2 filed on 03/18/09	0240-0244
Transcript - Petrocelli Hearing filed on 05/19/11	3049-3162
Transcript - Proceedings filed on 01/02/09	0028-0124
Transcript - Sentencing August 16, 2012 filed on 12/03/12	4632-4635
Transcript - Sentencing August 28, 2012 filed on 12/03/12	4636-4652
Transcript - Sentencing filed on 07/10/09	0337-0341
Transcript - Status Check: Availability of Dr. Benjamin for Trial filed on 02/04/11	2990-2995

counsel at the time of the hearing on this Motion.

Dated this 2nd day of August, 2010.

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PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

Patricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104

Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff; and

TO: DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring on the above and foregoing NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION BY DEFENDANT O'KEEFE HOMICIDE DETECTIVES HAVE PRESERVED BLOOD/BREATH ALCOHOL EVIDENCE IN ANOTHER RECENT CASE on the Aday of _ hugun 2010, at the hour m., in Department No. XVII of the above-entitled Court, or as soon thereafter as

counsel may be heard.

DATED this 2nd day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

PATRICIA PALM Nevada Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104

(702) 386-9113

Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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The State charged Defendant Brian K. O'Keefe with murder with use of a deadly weapon. He entered a plea of not guilty and invoked his right to a speedy trial. The State filed a motion to admit evidence of other crimes, which O'Keefe opposed. The Court ruled that the State could introduce evidence of threats to the alleged victim Victoria Whitmarsh that witness Cheryl Morris claims were made by O'Keefe, and his demonstration of proficiency at killing with knives, which Morris claims to have witnessed. The Court further ruled that the State could introduce certified copies of O'Keefe's prior Judgment of Conviction for felony domestic battery, involving Whitmarsh. O'Keefe testified, then the State could inquire into his other prior felony Pursuant to the Court's ruling on his prior Judgments of convictions. Conviction, the State is permitted to introduce only the details of when O'Keefe was convicted, in which jurisdiction, and the name of the offenses, and with the felony domestic battery, the fact that Whitmarsh had testified as a State's witness in that case. 3/16/09 TT 2-10.

The instant case was tried before this Honorable Court beginning March 16, 2009. After five days of trial, on March 20, 2009, the jury returned a verdict finding O'Keefe guilty of second degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. On May 5, 2009, this Court sentenced O'Keefe to 10 to 25 years for second-degree murder and a consecutive 96 to 240 months (8 to 20 years) on the deadly weapon enhancement.

O'Keefe timely appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. After briefing, the Court reversed O'Keefe's conviction, agreeing with him that the district court "erred by giving the State's proposed instruction on second-degree murder because it set forth an alternative theory of second-degree murder, the charging document did not allege this alternate theory, and no evidence

supported this theory." The Court explained, "the State's charging document did not allege that O'Keefe killed the victim while he was committing an unlawful act and the evidence presented at trial did not support this theory of second-degree murder." O'Keefe v. State, NSC Docket No. 53859, Order of Reversal and Remand (April 7, 2010). The Court further stated, "The district court's error in giving this instruction was not harmless because it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational juror would have found O'Keefe guilty of second-degree murder absent the error." Id. at 2.

After remand to this Court, trial was reset to begin on August 23, 2010.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The prior trial testimony in this case showed that Brian O'Keefe and Victoria Whitmarsh met in a treatment facility in 2001. 3/17/09 TT 18, 3/19/09 TT 183-84. They dated and co-habitated off and on and had what could be described as a very tumultuous relationship. 3/19/09 TT 186-90. In 2004, O'Keefe was convicted of burglary for entering into the couple's joint dwelling with the intent to commit a crime against Whitmarsh. O'Keefe was sentenced to probation. He was later convicted of felony domestic battery against Whitmarsh, and he went to prison in 2006. 3/18/09 TT 139-40, 3/19/09 TT 187-88. Whitmarsh testified as a State's witness in the domestic battery case. 3/18/09 TT 139.

When O'Keefe was released from prison in 2007, he met and began a relationship with Cheryl Morris. 3/17/09 TT 10, 3/19/09 TT 189. He would often speak to Morris about his previous relationship with Whitmarsh, and even expressed to her that he still had strong feelings for Whitmarsh. 3/17/09 TT 13-14, 37. Morris claimed at trial that O'Keefe said he was upset with Whitmarsh because she put him in prison and he said he wanted to "kill the bitch." 3/17/09 TT 14-17. Morris testified that O'Keefe left at one point to be with Whitmarsh, and then telephoned Morris, asking her to move out of their

jointly shared apartment so Whitmarsh could move in. 3/17/09 TT 11. Morris testified that Whitmarsh got on the phone with her during that call and told her she had decided to resume her relationship with O'Keefe. The two of them appeared to be a loving couple and were open about their relationship. 3/16/09 TT 259, 3/19/09 TT 18-21, 30-36.

At about 10:00 p.m. on the evening of the incident, in November 2008, a neighbor who lived in the apartment below O'Keefe and Whitmarsh heard what she described as thumping and crying noises coming from upstairs. 3/16/09 TT 185-88. The noise became so loud that it woke her husband, Charles Toliver, who was in bed next to her. Id. at 186-200. Toliver went upstairs to inquire about the noise and found the door to O'Keefe's apartment open. Id. at 206-209. He yelled inside to get the occupants' attention, at which time O'Keefe came out of the bedroom and shouted at Toliver to "come get her!" 1d at 209-10. When Toliver entered the bedroom, he saw Whitmarsh lying on the floor next to the bed and saw blood on the bed covers. Id. at 210. O'Keefe was holding her and saying "baby, baby, wake up, don't do me like this." Id. at 210, 224. O'Keefe did not stop Toliver from going in the apartment or otherwise fight with him. Id. at 224. Toliver left the apartment immediately and shouted at a neighbor who was outside to call the police. Id, at 213. He also brought Todd Armbruster, another neighbor, back upstairs. Id. at 214 O'Keefe was still holding Whitmarsh and told Armbruster to get the hell out of there. Id. at 215. Armbruster called 911. Id. at 238. He thought that O'Keefe was drunk. Id. at 240, 245.

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By this time, shortly after 11:00 p.m., police had arrived on the scene. 3/16/09 TT 215, 3/17/09 TT 65. When they entered the bedroom, they found Whitmarsh lying on the floor next to the bed and an unarmed O'Keefe cradling her in his arms and stroking her head. 3/17/09 at 87, 96. The police believed Whitmarsh to be dead and ordered O'Keefe to let go of her, but he refused. Id.

at 51-52, 60-61, 87. The officers eventually subdued him with a taser gun and carried him out of the bedroom. Id. 88. O'Keefe was acting agitated, id. at 73, the officers testified that he had a strong odor of alcohol on him, and he appeared to be extremely intoxicated. Id. at 127-28, 3/18/09 TT 170-76. Much of his speech was incoherent, but at one point he said that Whitmarsh stabbed herself and he also said that she tried to stab him. 3/17/09 TT 56, 85, 92. They arrested him and brought him to the homicide offices. 3/17/09 TT 177. Subsequent to his arrest, O'Keefe gave a rambling statement indicating he was not aware of Whitmarsh's death or its cause. 3/18/09 TT 133. Police interviewed him at 1:45 a.m., at which time he was crying, raising his voice, talking to himself, and slurring. Detective Wildemann stated that during the interview O'Keefe smelled heavily of alcohol, and when police took photographs of him at about 3:55 a.m., they had to hold him upright to steady him. 3/18/09 TT 146-49. Wildemann said it was pretty obvious that O'Keefe had been drinking, however, law enforcement did not obtain a test for his breath or blood alcohol level either before or after the interview. Id.

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Whitmarsh had also been drinking on the date of the incident, and at the time of her death, her blood alcohol content was 0.24. 3/18/09 TT 94, 117. She died of one stab wound to her side and had bruising on the back of her head. Id. at 93, 103. Medical Examiner Dr. Benjamin testified that Whitmarsh's toxicology screen indicated that she was taking Effexor and that drug should not be taken with alcohol. Id. at 109. Whitmarsh had about three times the target dosage of Effexor in her system. 3/19/09 TT 94-96. The combination of Effexor and alcohol could have caused anxiety, confusion and anger. 3/19/09 TT 95-96. Whitmarsh also had Hepatitis C and advanced Cirrhosis of the liver, which is known to cause bruising with only slight pressure to the body. 3/18/09 TT 93-97. Whitmarsh's body displayed multiple bruises at the time Dr. Benjamin examined her and the bruises were different

colors, but she could not say that they were associated with Whitmarsh's death or otherwise say how long ago Whitmarsh sustained the bruises. 3/18/09 TT 115. DNA belonging to O'Keefe and to Whitmarsh was found on a knife at the scene. 3/18/09 TT 62-67.

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O'Keefe testified. 3/19/09 TT 177. He acknowledged his problems with alcohol and described his history with Whitmarsh. Id. at 177-93. He disputed Morris's claim that he said he wanted to kill Whitmarsh, but he acknowledged being angry with her. Id. at 190. It was Whitmarsh who called O'Keefe and initiated their renewed relationship. Id. at 191. He was aware that Whitmarsh had Hepatitis C when she moved into his apartment. Id. at 197-98. November, 2008, Whitmarsh was stressed because of her financial condition. 3/20/09 TT 17. A couple of days before the incident at issue here, Whitmarsh confronted O'Keefe with a knife. Id. at 18-19. She had been drinking and was on medication. Id. O'Keefe had not been drinking that night and was able to diffuse the situation. Id. at 19. On November 5, 2008, O'Keefe learned that he would be hired for a new job and had two glasses of wine to celebrate. Id. at 21-24. O'Keefe and Whitmarsh went to the Paris Casino where they both had drinks. Id. at 24-25. They returned home, and she was upset and went upstairs while he reclined in the passenger seat of the car for a period of time. ld. at 26-28. He went upstairs and then smoked outside on a balcony while she was in the bathroom. Id. at 29-30. He then went in the bedroom and saw Whitmarsh coming at him with a knife. Id. at 33. He swung his jacket at her and told her to get back. Id. He knew that she was mad at him about a lot of things. Id. He grabbed the knife, she yanked it and cut his hand. Id. at 33. They struggled for a period of time. Id. at 33-36. During the struggle, she held the knife and fell down, he fell on top of her and then he realized that she was bleeding. Id. at 35-37. He was still drunk at this point and was trying to figure out what happened. Id. at 37. He tried to stop the bleeding and panicked. Id.

at 39. He tried taking care of Whitmarsh and asked his neighbor to call someone after the neighbor came into his room. <u>Id.</u> at 40. He became agitated when the neighbor brought another neighbor up to look at Whitmarsh, who was partially undressed, rather than calling the paramedics. <u>Id.</u> at 41. O'Keefe denied hitting or slamming Whitmarsh. <u>Id.</u> at 42. He testified that he did not intentionally kill Whitmarsh, but felt responsible because he drank that night and he should not have done so. <u>Id.</u> at 49.

ARGUMENT

O'Keefe is constitutionally entitled to present evidence to support his theory of defense, which is, in part, that the State has not conducted a good faith investigation and prosecution of this case. For instance, not only did homicide detectives decline to turn over evidence specifically requested for the prior trial, stating that the evidence of the use of force report did not exist, see 3/18/09 TT 179, and causing a motion for a mistrial, see 3/18/09 TT 2-5, but they also failed to offer O'Keefe a blood or breath alcohol test to preserve evidence of the quantitative amount of alcohol in his system subsequent to his arrest and at the time of his statement. O'Keefe hopes to demonstrate at trial that this was part of an effort to minimize O'Keefe's extreme intoxication at the time of the offense, and, therefore, the jury should disbelieve any testimony which plays down his intoxication.

During O'Keefe's previous trial, Detective Wildemann had testified that in his twenty-one (21) years of experience, a suspect would generally only be administered a blood or breath alcohol test in a DUI. 3/18/09 TT at 183. He had also previously testified at the preliminary hearing that he was not aware of a homicide case where such a test was given. Id. at 182.

To challenge Wildemann's testimony and its implication that alcohol-level testing is unheard of, O'Keefe presented testimony from Forensic Scientist

George Schiro, who testified that the police should have collected O'Keefe's blood or breath alcohol within the hours after Whitmarsh's death to determine whether his behavior or state of mind might have been affected. The source of authority for this opinion is an industry standard text for crime scene investigations. 3/19/09 TT 123-24, 125-26. O'Keefe had also subpoensed Detective Clifford Mogg to testify regarding the circumstances of alcohol testing in State v. Franco, Event No. 070408-0444. Franco had stated during his interview with LVMPD homicide detectives that he did not know what happened during the 2007 stabbing of the alleged victim. Homicide detectives determined to administer a breath test to determine the suspect's level of intoxication. When O'Keefe's counsel called Detective Mogg to the stand during O'Keefe's prior trial, the State objected, and the Court ruled that Mogg would not be allowed to testify. 3/19/09 TT 12-14.

The defense should be permitted to attack the good faith of the police investigation by showing that LVMPD homicide detectives have obtained blood or breath alcohol testing in another recent homicide case when the victim claimed he did not know how a stabbing occurred.

The evidence sought to be introduced is relevant to show bias and attack the credibility of the State's witnesses and the State's proof that O'Keefe was not so intoxicated that he could not form an intent to kill and was not so intoxicated that an accidental stabbing during a struggle is likely. If the jury believes that O'Keefe might have been extremely intoxicated, and proof of this was not gathered or documented because of bias, then the jury might disbelieve the State's entire case. Furthermore, if this Court denies suppression of O'Keefe's interview with homicide detectives, then the validity of any waiver of O'Keefe's Miranda rights is an issue for the jury, and the jury should be able to consider the issues of bias, good faith and thoroughness of

the detectives when it is assessing their testimony regarding his condition and whether to consider the interrogation as evidence against O'Keefe.1

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The failure to preserve evidence which is likely to be exculpatory is relevant to the good faith of the investigation, which is an appropriate issue in criminal cases. See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 67, 998 P.2d 25, 32 (2000). Furthermore, extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove a witness's bias or prejudice. See Lobato v. State, 120 Nev. 512, 96 P.3d 765 (2004). In Abbott v. State, 122 Nev. 715, 736, 138 P.3d 462, 475 (2006), the Nevada Supreme Court addressed the issue of when extrinsic evidence should be admitted to protect a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. The Court stated that the purpose of the evidentiary rule banning extrinsic evidence is based on the idea of conserving judicial resources by avoiding mini-trials on collateral issues. Id. However, this policy loses import where extrinsic evidence relates to a crucial issue directly in controversy. Id. Further, witness credibility which is a key factor in determining guilt or acquittal amounts to such a crucial issue. Id. Thus, "an evidentiary rule rendering non-collateral, highly relevant evidence inadmissible must yield to the defendant's constitutional right to present a full defense." Id.

As was apparent during the previous trial, O'Keefe has consistently attempted to prove that LVMPD officers and detectives were minimizing his intoxication in the reports and in their testimony. This was the reason for the motion for mistrial when Officer Ballejos's previously withheld report was disclosed mid-trial and it showed that Ballejos believed that O'Keefe was "extremely intoxicated," a fact which was not recorded on any police report

¹If O'Keefe's statements are admitted, then the question of voluntariness must also be submitted to the jury. <u>See Laursen v. State</u>, 97 Nev. 568, 634 P.2d 1230 (1981).

provided during discovery. O'Keefe should be permitted to support his theory by demonstrating that LVMPD homicide detectives have obtained evidence of blood or breath alcohol in another recent case. The jury should be permitted to consider this evidence in determining whether detectives' failure to gather and preserve the evidence here demonstrates bias and lack of good faith or thoroughness in their investigation of his case.

It would be unfair and a violation of O'Keefe's confrontation rights to again allow the jury to consider Detective Wildemann's testimony that in twenty-one (21) years he never heard of such testing in a murder case, without being confronted with the fact that such testing has in fact occurred in at least one recent case. The jurors can determine for themselves whether Wildemann's testimony is credible and whether he acted in good faith in his investigation. This limited proof on the issue should be permitted, especially in light of the State's attempt to create a false perception that such testing is unheard of in homicide investigations conducted by LVMPD. To prohibit O'Keefe from attacking the investigation in support of his claim that police have minimized his intoxication would deny him his constitutional rights to due process, to confront his accusers and to present a defense. See U.S. Const., amends. VI and XIV; Nev. Const., art. 1, sec. 8.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Brian O'Keefe moves this Honorable Court for a ruling permitting him to introduce the evidence requested herein pertaining to the other recent homicide case where blood/breath alcohol was obtained from a homicide suspect who claimed no knowledge of a stabbing incident.

Dated this 2nd day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

Patricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd.

Las Vegas, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

ORIGINAL

001 PALM LAW FIRM, LTD. PATRICIA PALM STATE BAR NO. 6009 1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD. LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 PHONE: 702-386-9113 3 FAX: 702-386-9114 EMAIL: patricia palmlaw@gmail.com ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT O'KEEFE

FILED

AUG 0 2 2010

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff,

VS.

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BRIAN K. O'KEEFE.

Defendant

Case No.: C250630

Dept. No.: XVII

000250030 Holles at Molley



NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION BY DEFENDANT O'KREFE FOR DISCOVERY

COMES NOW Defendant Brian K. O'Keefe, by and through his attorney, Patricia Palm of Palm Law Firm, Ltd., and hereby moves this Honorable Court for an order granting discovery as requested herein.

This Motion is made and based upon the record in this case, including the papers and pleadings on file herein, NRS Chapter 174, the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Nevada, the points and authorities set forth

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FILED

AUG 0 2 2010

herein, and any argument of counsel at the time of the hearing on this Motion.

Dated this 2nd day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW FIRM LPD.

Patricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104 (702) 386-9113 Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff,

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27 28 TO: DAVID ROGER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Attorney for Plaintiff

DATED this 2nd day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW FIRM LTD.

Patricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104

(702) 386-9113

Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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The State charged Defendant Brian K. O'Keefe with murder with use of a deadly weapon. He entered a plea of not guilty and invoked his right to a speedy trial. The State filed a motion to admit evidence of other crimes, which O'Keefe opposed. The Court ruled that the State could introduce evidence of threats to the alleged victim Victoria Whitmarsh that witness Cheryl Morris claims were made by O'Keefe, and his demonstration of proficiency at killing with knives, which Morris claims to have witnessed. The Court further ruled that the State could introduce certified copies of O'Keefe's prior Judgment of Conviction for felony domestic battery, involving Whitmarsh. Further, if O'Keefe testified, then the State could inquire into his other prior felony convictions. Pursuant to the Court's ruling on his prior Judgments of Conviction, the State is permitted to introduce only the details of when O'Keefel was convicted, in which jurisdiction, and the name of the offenses, and with the felony domestic battery, the fact that Whitmarsh had testified as a State's witness in that case. 3/16/09 TT 2-10.

The instant case was tried before this Honorable Court beginning March 16, 2009. After five days of trial, on March 20, 2009, the jury returned a verdict finding O'Keefe guilty of second degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. On May 5, 2009, this Court sentenced O'Keefe to 10 to 25 years for second-degree murder and a consecutive 96 to 240 months (8 to 20 years) on the deadly weapon enhancement.

O'Keefe timely appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. After briefing, the Court reversed O'Keefe's conviction, agreeing with him that the district court "erred by giving the State's proposed instruction on second-degree murder because it set forth an alternative theory of second-degree murder, the charging document did not allege this alternate theory, and no evidence supported this theory." The Court explained, "the State's charging document

did not allege that O'Keefe killed the victim while he was committing an unlawful act and the evidence presented at trial did not support this theory of second-degree murder." O'Keefe v. State, NSC Docket No. 53859, Order of Reversal and Remand (April 7, 2010). The Court further stated, "The district court's error in giving this instruction was not harmless because it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational juror would have found O'Keefe guilty of second-degree murder absent the error." Id. at 2.

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After remand to this Court, trial was reset to begin on August 23, 2010.

The parties have been cooperating in discovery; however, in an effort to preserve O'Keefe's rights, including his right to a favorable standard of review on appeal, if any, he is now specifically requesting the discovery items set forth below.

DISCOVERY REQUESTED

Defendant BRIAN K. O'KEEFE, hereby requests that this Honorable Court order the Clark County District Attorney's Office to supply or make available the following:

- All written, transcribed, or recorded statements, confessions, or admissions made by Defendant to any person, or copies thereof;
- The substance of any other statements made by Defendant which
 the prosecution intends to use as evidence at the trial of this case, specifically
 including any conversations or correspondence overheard or intercepted by any
 jail personnel or other inmates;
- 3. Copies of all tapes and recorded statements from all witnesses and Defendant, as well as copies of the recorded phone calls or jail visits in a format that can be played on cassette or CD or DVD player;
- The most recent names and addresses of all persons who have given written, recorded, video and/ or oral statements or communications in the

- Copies of statements given by any State lay witness on any case, specifically including any reports of said information prepared by any law enforcement agent;
- 6. All reports and results of scientific tests including, but not limited to, complete reports of fingerprint comparisons, DNA and any other scientific analysis of physical evidence, and any records of requests for such testing to be done;
- 7. Any photographs in the State's possession including, but not limited to, all photographs taken of the alleged victim, the scene of the crime, ariel photographs, photo enlargements of latent prints or other evidence, and all photographs the State intends to introduce as evidence;
- Any evidence which would tend to exculpate Defendant including, but not limited to:
- (a) The most recent names and addresses of any and all witnesses who could provide exculpatory evidence to the defense and are known to the State, though the State does not intend to call them at trial.
- (b) Current NCICs, Pre-Sentencing and/or Probation reports and any other information or documents in the State's possession or available to the State regarding the background, arrest record (state or federal), criminal record (state and federal), pending criminal actions (state or federal), of the deceased and witnesses in this case. The defense specifically requests that the State be required to check the current NCIC information on its lay witnesses and allow the Defense to view that information;
 - (c) The immigration records of all lay witnesses, if any;

(d) All written or taped statements, correspondence, or memorandum concerning any promise of immunity, any promises of leniency, any suggestions of leniency or immunity, any proposed attempts to influence the court or the District Attorney's office with reference to leniency concerning any witness who is expected to testify at trial, the reference to any case of which all of the persons referred to in this paragraph are, or were, a suspect, if the promises or suggestions, or attempts to influence or leniency related to or were in exchange for, such persons' statements, present or past, against Defendant, the names and addresses of all persons present during any such statements, promises, proposals or attempts to exert influence on behalf of the persons mentioned in this paragraph.

9. Copies of all police reports, impound reports, reports regarding the use of force, diagrams, sketches, surveillance tapes, and medical reports in the actual or constructive possession of the District Attorney's Office, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, the Sheriff's Office, the FBI, and I.C.E. This request includes but is not limited to any reports or records documenting O'Keefe's mental or physical condition, including intoxication, at the time of his arrest and his initial interrogation by homicide detectives. It also includes but is not limited to a copy of the crime scene impound report prepared by CSA Maldonado.

AUTHORITIES

A trial court has wide discretion in permitting discovery. See, Marshall v. District Court, 79 Nev. 280, 382 P.2d 214 (1963). Pursuant to NRS 174.235(1)(a), Defendant O'Keefe is entitled to receive copies of any written or recorded statements, confessions or admissions made by him or any State's witness. That statute states, in part, that the prosecuting attorney shall permit the defendant to inspect, copy or photograph any

[w]ritten or recorded statements or confessions made by the Defendant, or any written or recorded statements made by a witness the prosecuting attorney intends to call during the case in chief of the State, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the prosecuting attorney

O'Keefe submits knowledge of any oral statements is as critical as knowledge of written statements in preparing an adequate defense. Fundamental fairness and the absence of any compelling reason for non-disclosure require revelation of any oral statements made by the defendant which the prosecution intends to introduce in its case in chief. State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958), cited in ABA Standards for Criminal Justice - Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, p. 258.

Additionally, constitutional due process guarantees under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as pursuant to the Nevada Constitution, article 1, section 8, require the State to provide a criminal defendant with discovery to include all exculpatory evidence in its possession. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121, 1133, 881 P.2d 1, 8 (1994) (recognizing that state and federal constitutional due process requires disclosure by the prosecution of evidence that would enable effective cross-examination and impeachment). The State must disclose evidence "if it provides grounds for the defense to attack reliability, thoroughness, and good faith of the police investigation, to impeach credibility of the state's witnesses, or to bolster the defense case against prosecutorial attacks[,]" and this obligation is not limited to evidence that will be admissible at trial. Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 442 n.13, 445-51, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995)). Furthermore, the State's

attorney is charged with constructive knowledge and possession of evidence held by other state agents, including law enforcement officers. Id.

The defense is also relying on the Ctark County District Attorney's Office to honor its open file policy and provide access to all exculpatory as well as inculpatory information and evidence related to the government's case against him. "A prosecutor, as an agent of the State, is held to a high ethical standard and must abide by the promises he makes." McKee v. State, 112 Nev. 642, 644, 917 P.2d 940, 944 (1996) (reversing a judgment of conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor did not make available all relevant inculpatory and exculpatory evidence consistent with the county district attorney's open file policy); see also Furbay v. State, 116 Nev. 481, 998 P.2d 553 (2000) (discussing prosecution's duty to provide all evidence in its possession where it has promised to do so).

Together, NRS 174.235, Brady and its progeny, and the District Attorney's open file policy require that the State provide the information requested as to any statements and other information as to any witnesses, regardless of whether the State intends to call them as witnesses and whether the evidence is inculpatory or exculpatory. Witnesses known to the State but not called by the State could prove to have exculpatory evidence which should be made available to the defense. No legitimate interest could be served by precluding the defense from calling such witnesses for trial, and their identity should accordingly be made known. United States v. Elev., 335 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Houston, 339 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. GA 1972).

Similarly, O'Keefe is entitled to access to any reports and results of scientific testing or analysis of the physical evidence in this case. Specifically, NRS 174.235(1)(b) requires the prosecuting attorney to provide access to '[r]esults or reports of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests or

scientific experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to the prosecuting attorney." See also NRS 174.234(2) (addressing notice requirements related to expert witnesses). This evidence would also be subject to disclosure under Brady as well as the District Attorney's open file policy.

Disclosure of any photographs or other police reports or records made in investigating the alleged crime is required pursuant to <u>Brady</u>, the District Attorney's open file policy, and NRS 174.235(1)(c), requiring that the State allow inspection of "[b]ooks, papers, documents, tangible objects, or copies thereof, which the prosecuting attorney intends to introduce during the case in chief of the State and which are within the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of which is known or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the prosecuting attorney."

CONCLUSION

Defendant O'Keefe respectfully requests that this Court order the State to produce the above-requested discovery within a reasonable time so that O'Keefe may present an effective defense at trial.

DATED this 2nd day of August, 2010.

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Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

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PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.
PATRICIA PALM, ESQ.
NEVADA BAR NO. 6009
1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD.
LAS VECAS. NV 80104

FILED AUG 0 2 2010

CLERK OF COURT

LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

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Email: Patricia palmlaw@gmail.com

Attorney for Brian O'Keele

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff.

VS.

BRIAN K. O'KEEFE,

Defendant.

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVII

DATE:

TIME:

68C256630 NOTM Notice of Motion

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION BY DEFENDANT O'KEEPE FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON WHETHER THE STATE AND CCDC HAVE COMPLIED WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RECORDING OF A JAIL VISIT BETWEEN O'KEEPE AND STATE WITNESS CHERYL MORRIS

COMES NOW Defendant, Brian K. O'Keefe, by and through his attorney, Patricia Palm of Palm Law Firm, Ltd., and hereby moves this Honorable Court for an order granting an evidentiary hearing date to address the issues of the existence of a recording of the CCDC visit between witness Cheryl Morris and Defendant O'Keefe, which has been denied by CCDC's Custodian of Records, and whether the State has complied with its discovery obligations and CCDC has complied with its obligations pursuant to NRS 174.235-.385 with respect to this visit.

This Motion is made and based upon the record in this case, including the papers and pleadings on file herein, NRS Chapter 174, the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Nevada, the points and authorities set forth

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CLERK OF COURT

below, the attached declaration of counsel, and any argument of counsel at the time of the hearing on this Motion.

Dated this 2nd day of August, 2010.

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Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff; and

TO: DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff

DATED this 2nd day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW DIRM, LTD

Patricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd.

Las Vegas, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113

Attorney for Defendant O'Keefe

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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The State charged Defendant Brian K. O'Keefe with murder with use of a deadly weapon. He entered a plea of not guilty and invoked his right to a speedy trial. The State filed a motion to admit evidence of other crimes, which O'Keefe opposed. The Court ruled that the State could introduce evidence of threats to the alleged victim Victoria Whitmarsh that witness Cheryl Morris claims were made by O'Keefe, and his demonstration of proficiency at killing with knives, which Morris claims to have witnessed. The Court further ruled that the State could introduce certified copies of O'Keefe's prior Judgment of Conviction for felony domestic battery, involving Whitmarsh. Further, i O'Keefe testified, then the State could inquire into his other prior felony Pursuant to the Court's ruling on his prior Judgments of convictions. Conviction, the State is permitted to introduce only the details of when O'Keefe was convicted, in which jurisdiction, and the name of the offenses, and with the felony domestic battery, the fact that Whitmarsh had testified as a State's witness in that case. 3/16/09 TT 2-10.

The instant case was tried before this Honorable Court beginning March 16, 2009. After five days of trial, on March 20, 2009, the jury returned a verdict finding O'Keefe guilty of second degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. On May 5, 2009, this Court sentenced O'Keefe to 10 to 25 years for second-degree murder and a consecutive 96 to 240 months (8 to 20 years) on the deadly weapon enhancement.

O'Keefe timely appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. After briefing, the Court reversed O'Keefe's conviction, agreeing with him that the district court "erred by giving the State's proposed instruction on second-degree murder because it set forth an alternative theory of second-degree murder, the charging document did not aliege this alternate theory, and no evidence

supported this theory." The Court explained, "the State's charging document did not allege that O'Keefe killed the victim while he was committing an unlawful act and the evidence presented at trial did not support this theory of second-degree murder." O'Keefe v. State, NSC Docket No. 53859, Order of Reversal and Remand (April 7, 2010). The Court further stated, "The district court's error in giving this instruction was not harmless because it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational juror would have found O'Keefe guilty of second-degree murder absent the error." Id. at 2.

After remand to this Court, trial was reset to begin on August 23, 2010.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The prior trial testimony in this case showed that Brian O'Keefe and Victoria Whitmarsh met in a treatment facility in 2001. 3/17/09 TT 18, 3/19/09 TT 183-84. They dated and co-habitated off and on and had what could be described as a very tumultuous relationship. 3/19/09 TT 186-90. In 2004, O'Keefe was convicted of burglary for entering into the couple's joint dwelling with the intent to commit a crime against Whitmarsh. O'Keefe was sentenced to probation. He was later convicted of felony domestic battery against Whitmarsh, and he went to prison in 2006. 3/18/09 TT 139-40, 3/19/09 TT 187-88. Whitmarsh testified as a State's witness in the domestic battery case. 3/18/09 TT 139.

When O'Keefe was released from prison in 2007, he met and began a relationship with Cheryl Morris. 3/17/09 TT 10, 3/19/09 TT 189. He would often speak to Morris about his previous relationship with Whitmarsh, and even expressed to her that he still had strong feelings for Whitmarsh. 3/17/09 TT 13-14, 37. Morris claimed at trial that O'Keefe said he was upset with Whitmarsh because she put him in prison and he said he wanted to "kill the bitch." 3/17/09 TT 14-17. Morris testified that O'Keefe left at one point to be with Whitmarsh, and then telephoned Morris, asking her to move out of their

jointly shared apartment so Whitmarsh could move in. 3/17/09 TT 11. Morris testified that Whitmarsh got on the phone with her during that call and told her she had decided to resume her relationship with O'Keefe. The two of them appeared to be a loving couple and were open about their relationship. 3/16/09 TT 259, 3/19/09 TT 18-21, 30-36.

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At about 10:00 p.m. on the evening of the incident, in November 2008, a neighbor who lived in the apartment below O'Keefe and Whitmarsh heard what she described as thumping and crying noises coming from upstairs. 3/16/09 TT 185-88. The noise became so loud that it woke her husband, Charles Toliver, who was in bed next to her. Id. at 186-200. Toliver went upstairs to inquire about the noise and found the door to O'Keefe's apartment open. Id. at He yelled inside to get the occupants' attention, at which time 206-209. O'Keefe came out of the bedroom and shouted at Toliver to "come get her!" Id at 209-10. When Toliver entered the bedroom, he saw Whitmarsh lying on the floor next to the bed and saw blood on the bed covers. Id. at 210. O'Keefe was holding her and saying "baby, baby, wake up, don't do me like this." Id. at O'Keefe did not stop Toliver from going in the apartment or 210, 224, otherwise fight with him. Id. at 224. Toliver left the apartment immediately and shouted at a neighbor who was outside to call the police. Id. at 213. He also brought Todd Armbruster, another neighbor, back upstairs. Id. at 214. O'Keefe was still holding Whitmarsh and told Armbruster to get the hell out of there. Id. at 215. Armbruster called 911. Id. at 238. He thought that O'Keefe was drunk. Id. at 240, 245.

By this time, shortly after 11:00 p.m., police had arrived on the scene. 3/16/09 TT 215, 3/17/09 TT 65. When they entered the bedroom, they found Whitmarsh lying on the floor next to the bed and an unarmed O'Keefe cradling her in his arms and stroking her head. 3/17/09 at 87, 96. The police believed Whitmarsh to be dead and ordered O'Keefe to let go of her, but he refused. Id.

at 51-52, 60-61, 87. The officers eventually subdued him with a taser gun and carried him out of the bedroom. Id. 88. O'Keefe was acting agitated, id. at 73, the officers testified that he had a strong odor of alcohol on him, and he appeared to be extremely intoxicated. Id. at 127-28, 3/18/09 TT 170-76. Much of his speech was incoherent, but at one point he said that Whitmarsh stabbed herself and he also said that she tried to stab him. 3/17/09 TT 56; 85, 92. They arrested him and brought him to the homicide offices. 3/17/09 TT 177. Subsequent to his arrest, O'Keefe gave a rambling statement indicating he was not aware of Whitmarsh's death or its cause. 3/18/09 TT 133. Police interviewed him at 1:20 a.m., at which time he was crying, raising his voice, talking to himself, and slurring. Detective Wildemann stated that during the interview O'Keese smelled heavily of alcohol, and when police took photographs of him at about 3:55 a.m., they had to hold him upright to steady him. 3/18/09 TT 146-49. Wildemann said it was pretty obvious that O'Keefe had been drinking, however, law enforcement did not obtain a test for his breath or blood alcohol level either before or after the interview. Id.

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Whitmarsh had also been drinking on the date of the incident, and at the time of her death, her blood alcohol content was 0.24. 3/18/09 TT 94, 117. She died of one stab wound to her side and had bruising on the back of her head. Id. at 93, 103. Medical Examiner Dr. Benjamin testified that Whitmarsh's toxicology screen indicated that she was taking Effexor and that drug should not be taken with alcohol. Id. at 109. Whitmarsh had about three times the target dosage of Effexor in her system. 3/19/09 TT 94-96. The combination of Effexor and alcohol could have caused anxiety, confusion and anger. 3/19/09 TT 95-96. Whitmarsh also had Hepatitis C and advanced Cirrhosis of the liver, which is known to cause bruising with only slight pressure to the body. 3/18/09 TT 93-97. Whitmarsh's body displayed multiple bruises at the time Dr. Benjamin examined her and the bruises were different

colors, but she could not say that they were associated with Whitmarsh's death or otherwise say how long ago Whitmarsh sustained the bruises. 3/18/09 TT 115. DNA belonging to O'Keefe and to Whitmarsh was found on a knife at the scene. 3/18/09 TT 62-67.

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O'Keefe testified. 3/19/09 TT 177. He acknowledged his problems with alcohol and described his history with Whitmarsh. Id. at 177-93. He disputed Morris's claim that he said he wanted to kill Whitmarsh, but he acknowledged being angry with her. Id. at 190. It was Whitmarsh who called O'Keefe and initiated their renewed relationship. Id. at 191. He was aware that Whitmarsh had Hepatitis C when she moved into his apartment. id, at 197-98. In November, 2008, Whitmarsh was stressed because of her financial condition. 3/20/09 TT 17. A couple of days before the incident at issue here, Whitmarsh confronted O'Keefe with a knife. Id. at 18-19. She had been drinking and was on medication. Id. O'Keefe had not been drinking that night and was able to diffuse the situation. Id. at 19. On November 5, 2008, O'Keefe learned that he would be hired for a new job and had two glasses of wine to celebrate. Id. at 21-24. O'Keefe and Whitmarsh went to the Paris Casino where they both had drinks. Id. at 24-25. They returned home, and she was upset and went upstairs while he reclined in the passenger seat of the car for a period of time. Id. at 26-28. He went upstairs and then smoked outside on a balcony while she was in the bathroom. Id. at 29-30. He then went in the bedroom and saw Whitmarsh coming at him with a knife. Id. at 33. He swung his jacket at her and told her to get back. Id. He knew that she was mad at him about a lot of things. Id. He grabbed the knife, she yanked it and cut his hand. Id. at 33. They struggled for a period of time. id. at 33-36. During the struggle, she held the knife and fell down, he fell on top of her and then he realized that she was bleeding. Id. at 35-37. He was still drunk at this point and was trying to figure out what happened. Id. at 37. He tried to stop the bleeding and panicked. Id.

at 39. He tried taking care of Whitmarsh and asked his neighbor to call someone after the neighbor came into his room. <u>Id.</u> at 40. He became agitated when the neighbor brought another neighbor up to look at Whitmarsh, who was partially undressed, rather than calling the paramedics. <u>Id.</u> at 41. O'Keefe denied hitting or slamming Whitmarsh. <u>Id.</u> at 42. He testified that he did not intentionally kill Whitmarsh, but felt responsible because he drank that night and he should not have done so. <u>Id.</u> at 49.

ARGUMENT

This motion is made under the authorities providing for a defendant's rights to effective representation by counsel and due process of law, including the right to discovery of evidence that may enable effective cross-examination and impeachment of a government witness. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. B3 (1963), 83 S. Ct. 1194; Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 87 S. Ct. 793 (1967); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995); United States v. Pitt. 717 F.2d 1334 (11th Cir. 1983); Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 918 P.2d 687 (1996); Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121, 1133, 881 P.2d 1, 8 (1994). See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974) (recognizing that denial of the right to effective cross-examination is constitutional error of the first magnitude); U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, XIV; Nev. Const. art. I, sec. 8.

This motion is also based upon NRS Chapter 174. Pursuant to NRS 174.335, and 174.385, a criminal defendant has the right to subpoens documents and objects, and a party who does not comply with such a subpoens may be held in contempt. Pursuant to NRS 174.235(1)(a), a criminal defendant is also entitled to receive copies of any written or recorded statements, confessions or admissions made by him or any State's witness. That statute states, in part, that the prosecuting attorney shall permit the defendant to inspect, copy or photograph any

[w]ritten or recorded statements or confessions made by the Defendant, or any written or recorded statements made by a witness the prosecuting attorney intends to call during the case in chief of the State, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the prosecuting attorney.

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Additionally, constitutional due process guarantees under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as pursuant to the Nevada Constitution, article 1, section 8, require the State to provide a criminal defendant with discovery to include all exculpatory evidence in its possession. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121, 1133, 881 P.2d 1, 8 (1994) (recognizing that state and federal constitutional due process requires disclosure by the prosecution of evidence that would enable effective crossexamination and impeachment). The State must disclose evidence "if it provides grounds for the defense to attack reliability, thoroughness, and good faith of the police investigation, to impeach credibility of the state's witnesses, or to bolster the defense case against prosecutorial attacks[,]" and this obligation is not limited to evidence that will be admissible at trial. Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 442 n.13, 445-51, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995)). Furthermore, the State's attorney is charged with constructive knowledge and possession of evidence held by other state agents, including law enforcement officers. Id.

Witness Cheryl Morris is a crucial witness for the State. She has testified regarding O'Keefe's alleged threat toward Whitmarsh and his alleged demonstration of how he would kill someone with a knife. She also testified regarding a CCDC visit with O'Keefe on December 6, 2008, which was after she had contacted homicide detectives to volunteer information about O'Keefe. She testified that O'Keefe gave to her an account of the events leading to

Whitmarsh's death, which was inconsistent with his own trial testimony regarding the incident. O'Keefe contends that Morris gave false testimony as to all of the above matters, and he desires to impeach her testimony by showing a recording of the December 6, 2008 CCDC visit. O'Keefe has been unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain a recording of that CCDC visit.

O'Keefe's counsel met with Deputy District Attorney Graham on July 30, 2010, and Graham's file did not contain any copies of a recording of the jail visit. O'Keefe has subpoensed a recording of that visit from CCDC, and obtained the vague response that "under normal circumstances our INTEL section does not record normal visiting conversations." See Exh. A (attached hereto). However, when O'Keefe himself sent inmate kites in an attempt to ocate the recording, he was told that all visits are saved for 99 years. See Exh. B. These inconsistent responses have caused O'Keefe anxiety concerning whether yet another discoverable and exculpatory item is being withheld from him.

Thus, in order to effectively prepare for trial, and ascertain whether the State has complied with its discovery obligations and whether CCDC has used due diligence in its effort to respond to O'Keefe's subpoena, O'Keefe requests an evidentiary hearing be set so that he may question CCCD's Custodian of Records and/or INTEL section on the issues of: their diligence used to locate the recording in response to O'Keefe's subpoena; whether anyone decided or directed that the visit would not be recorded; whether they confirmed that the visit was not recorded; whether if recorded, it was subsequently destroyed or not preserved; and, what are the policies on recording and retention of recordings of inmate social visits when a murder case is pending.

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CONCLUSION

O'Keefe respectfully requests that this Honorable Court grant him an evidentiary hearing prior to trial, so that he may question under oath CCDC's Custodian of Records and/or Intel Division Custodian regarding the above matters.

DATED this 2nd day of August, 2010.

PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.

Patricia Palm, Bar No. 6009 1212 Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89104

Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

DECLARATION OF PATRICIA PALM

Pursuant to NRS 53.045, PATRICIA PALM, being first duly sworn according to law, deposes and states as follows:

- That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada and am counsel for Defendant Brian K. O'Keefe.
- 2. That I have read and am familiar with the discovery provided by the State and other records related to this matter, and that I have set forth true and accurate factual representations as to the contents of that discovery and those records.

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- That I have attached true and correct copies of certain records as Exhibits to the foregoing motion.
- That all other matters set forth in the foregoing motion are true and correct to the best of my knowledge upon information and belief.


I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED this 2 day of August, 2010.

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PATRICIA PALM

EXHIBIT A



Visitors

ID Number : "%1447732%" , Start Date : '19-NOV-2008" , End Date : '27-JAN-2009' 27-JAN-09

	ID Number	Elving Unit	Inmate Last Name	Inmate First Name	Start Date & Time	Visit Type	Rel Type	Visitor Last Name	Visitor First Name	Visitor Middle Name
	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	20-Nov-08 09:30:00	LEG	ATT	ROSALES	MARIBEL	MULL
	0001447732	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L:	OKEEPE	BRIAN	20-Nov-08 09:30:00	LEG	IMV	ROSALES	MARIBEL	MULL
	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	20-Nov-08 09:30:00	LEG	o	ROSALES	MARIBEL	NULL
	0001447732	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L;:	OKEEFE	BRIAN	20-Nov-08 09:30:00	LEG	PO	ROSALES	MARIBEL	NULL
\$ T	0001447732	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	SRIAH	01-Dec-08 14:09:00	LEG	ATT	PIKE	RANDALL	NULL
	0001447732	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	01-0ec-08 14:09:00	LEG	O.	PIKE	RANDALL	NULL
::30	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	01-Dec-08 14:09:00	LEG	PD	PIKE	RANDALL	NAL
viii.	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L:	OKEEFE	BRIAN	01-Dec-08 14:09:00	LEG	ÞÞ	PIKE	RANDALL	NULL
11	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-Z4-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	01-0ec-08 14:09:00	LEG	ATT	PALM	PATRICIA	NULL
0	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L:	OKEEFE	BRIAN	01-Dec-08 \$4:09:00	LEG	PD	PALM	PATRICIA	NULL
1	0001447732	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L:	OKEEFE	BRIAN	01-Dec-08 14:09:00	LEG	PP	PAUM	PATRICIA	NULL.
2	0001447732	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	01-Dec-08 14:09:00	LEG	ATT	PEREZ	JOSEPH	NULL
3	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L:	OKEEFE	BRIAN	01-Dec-08 14:08:00	LEG	WV	PEREZ	JOSEPH	NULL
4	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	01-Dec-08 14:09:00	LEG	o	PEREZ	JOSEPH	NULL
5	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	01-Dec-08 14:09:00	LEG	PO	PEREZ	JOSEPH	NULL
6	0001447732	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L;	CKEEFE	BRIAN	04-Dec-06 15:07:00	LEG	ATT	ROSALES	MARIBEL	NULL
7	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	04-Dec-08 15:07:00	LEG	INV	ROSALES	MARIBEL	MULL
8	0001447732	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	ERIAN	04-Dec-06 15:07:00	LEG	o	ROSALES	MARIBEL	NULL
9	0001447732	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	04-Dec-08 15:07:00	LEG	PO	ROSALES	MARIBEL	WILL
0	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	08-Dec-06 21:30:00	SOC	FR	MORRIS	CHERYL	NULL
21	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	08-Dec-08 14:35:00	LEG	ATT	PIKÉ	RANDALL	NULL
2	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKCEFE	BRIAN	08-Dec-08 14:35:00	LEG	0	FIKE	RANDALL	NULL
3	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	08-Dec-08 14:35:00	LEG	PD	PIKE	RANDALL	NULL
4	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L:	OKEEFE	BRIAN	08-Dec-08 14:35:00	LEG	PP	PIKE	RANDALL	NULL
5	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	CKEEFE	BRIAN	08-Dec-08 14:35:00	LEG	ATT	ROSALES	MARISEL	NULL
26	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE.	BRIAN	08-Dec-08 14:35:00	LEG	INV	ROSALES	MARIBEL	NULL
27	0001447732	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	08-Dec-08 14:35:00	LEG	o	ROSALES	MARKEL	NULL
28	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	08-Dec-06 14:35:00	LEG	₽D	ROSALES	MARIBEL.	NULL
9	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	08-Dec-08 14:35:00	LEG	ATT	PALM	PATRICIA	MULL
30	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	08-Dec-08 14:35:00	LEG	PO	PALM	PATRICIA	NULL
11	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	08-Dec-06 14:35:00	LEG	PP	PALM	PATRICIA	NULL.
32		LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	- Transmission	BRIAN	12-Dec-08 09:30:00	LEG	ATT	PIKE	RANDALL	NULL
33	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L	OKEEFE	BRIAN	12-Dec-08 09:30:00	LEG	Ö	PIKE	RANDALL	NULL
34	0061447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	12-Dec-08 09:30:00	LEG	PD	PIKE	RANDALL	NULL
35	0001447732	LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	12-Dec-08 09:30:00	LEG	ρp	PIKE	RANDALL	NULL
16	0001447732	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	12-Dec-08 09:30:00	LEG	ATT	PALM	PATRICIA	NULL
37	0001447732	LVMPD-HT-7A-24-L;	OKEEFE	BRIAN	12-Dec-08 09:30:00	LEG	PD	PALM	PATRICIA	NULL
36	0001447733	LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L	OKEEFE	BRIAN	12-Dec-08 09:30:00	LEG	PP	PALM	PATRICIA	NULL
39		LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L		BRIAN	12-Dec-08 09:30:00		ATT	PEREZ	JOSEPH	MULL
40		LVMPO-NT-7A-24-L	-	BRIAN	12-Dec-08 09:30:00		INV	PEREZ	JOSEPH	NULL
41		LVMPD-NT-7A-24-L;		BRIAN	12-Dec-08 09:30:00	10000	0	PEREZ	JOSEPH	NULL

DOUGLAS C. CILLESPIE, Inenit

Partners with the Community

July 15, 2010

Patricia Palm, Esq. Palm Law Firm 1212 Casino Center Blvd Las Vegas, NV 89104

Re:

Subpoena for Records

Case # C250630

O'Keefe, Brian K. ID# 1447732

Dear Ms. Patricia Palm,

The Clark County Detention Center Records Bureau is in receipt of your subpoena for production of, "and/all video/audio/other recordings of the social visit between Cheryl Morris and CCDC Inmate Brian O'Keele, #0001447732, which occurred on or about December 6, 2008".

Your subpoena is requesting "video/audio recordings" of your client's social visit. Although, the Detention Center gives notice that a visiting phone conversation may be recorded, under normal circumstances our INTEL Section does not record normal visiting conversations.

Sincerely.

DOUGLAS C. GILLESPIE, SHERIFF

BY: CAROL DALY, ER LEST

DSD RECORDS BUREAU

CC:

Maria Lavell

Deputy District Attorney

CCDC Intel Section



DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Distante)	CACENO	
Plaintiff, §	CASE NO. DEPT NO.	C250630 XVII
O'Keefe, Brian K. #0001447732		
Defendant.)	
3	SUBI	POENA III Duces Tecum
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. ≘ PAL	M LAW FIRM, CTD.	
	//-	-//
	Jan-	Has
ක <u>දි</u>	PATRICIA PAL Attorney for Bri	en Cykaele
<u> </u>	State Sar # 60((702) 366-9113	23 D-20-0211 (1038)
	111 W 11505-1605-	
AFFIDAVIT OF SE	FRVICE	
party to or interested in the proceeding in which this Addition in	That at all time herein A	Merit was over 18 years of age, not
2010, and served the same on the day of	201	O by delivering a copy to the witness

Signature of Afficia

EXHIBIT B

Į. LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

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RECORDS

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT INMATE REQUEST/GRIEVANCE

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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TOURT

ROC PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.
PATRICIA PALM, ESQ.
NEVADA BAR NO. 6009
1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD.
LAS VEGAS, NV 89104
Phone: (702) 386-9113
Fax: (702) 386-9114
Email: Patricia

STATE OF NEVADA.

BRIAN K. O'KEEFE.

VS.

Email: Patricia palmlaw@gmail.com Attorney for Brian O'Keefe

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

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CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVII

DATE:

TIME:

RECEIPT OF COPY

I, the undersigned, acknowledge that on this ______

2010, I received a true copy of the NOTICE OF MOTION AND

motion by defendant o'keefe for discovery.

COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 200 Lewis Ave., 3rd Floor Las Vegas, NV 89155

Kasandia //16

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ROC PALM LAW FIRM, LTD. PATRICIA PALM, ÉSQ. NEVADA BAR NO. 6009 1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD.

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LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114

Email: Patricia palmlaw@gmail.com Attorney for Brian O Keele

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff.

VS.

BRIAN K. O'KEEFE.

Defendant.

CASE NO: C250630

DEPT NO. XVII

DATE:

TIME:

Dec250630 Receipt of Copy 678697



RECEIPT OF COPY

I, the undersigned, acknowledge that on this day of Manual 2010, I received a true copy of the NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION BY DEFENDANT O'KEEFE FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING OF WHETHER THE STATE AND CCDC HAVE COMPLIED WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS with respect to the recording of a jail visit between o'keefe and state witness cheryl morris.

> COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 200 Lewis Ave., 3rd Floor Les Vegas, NV 89155

By: Kannoha Hiller

1 2 3	ROC PALM LAW FIRM, LTD. PATRICIA PALM, ESQ. NEVADA BAR NO. 6009 1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD. LAS VEGAS, NV 89104 Phone: (702) 386-9113 Fax: (702) 386-9114	AUG 2 2 15 MY
5	Email: Patricia palmlaw@gmail.com Attorney for Brian O'Keefe	······································
7	DISTRIC CLARK COU	OT COURT INTY, NEVADA
8 9 10 11 12 13	STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, vs. BRIAN K. O'KEEFE, Defendant.	CASE NO: C250630 DEPT NO. XVII DATE: TIME: OSCINGUIA ROC Receipt of Copy A78886
15 16 17 18	I, the undersigned, acknowledge	that on this day ofAugust_
19 20	BY DEFENDANT O'KEEFE TO A	DMIT EVIDENCE SHOWING LVMPD
21 22	EVIDENCE IN ANOTHER RECENT CA	SERVED BLOOD/BREATH ALCOHOL SE.
23	200 Lex	DISTRICT ATTORNEY ris Ave., 3 rd Floor as, NV 89155
25 26	Ву:	Karonetra Musion
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FIGMAL

FILED ROC PALM LAW FIRM, LTD. PALM LAW FIRM, LTD.
PATRICIA PALM, ESQ.
NEVADA BAR NO. 6009
1212 CASINO CENTER BLVD.
LAS VEGAS, NV 89104
Phone: (702) 386-9113
Fax: (702) 386-9114
Email: Patricia palmlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Brian O'Keefe 5 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 CASE NO: C250630 STATE OF NEVADA. 3 DEPT NO. XVII Plaintiff. 10 DATE: VS. 11 TIME: BRIAN K. O'KEEFE. **68C266830** 12 Receipt at Copy Defendant. 13 14 15 RECEIPT OF COPY 16 17 I, the undersigned, acknowledge that on this day of HUGHE 18 2010, I received a true copy of the NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 19 BY DEFENDANT O'KEEFE TO SUPPRESS HIS STATEMENTS TO POLICE. 20 OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO PRECLUDE THE STATE FROM INTRODUCING 21 PORTIONS OF HIS INTERROGATION. 22 COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 23 200 Lewis Ave., 3rd Floor Las Vegas, NV 89155 24 25 Kongreha flow 26 27 28

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1	OPPS		Alm to blum			
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney		CLERK OF THE COURT			
3	Nevada Bar #002781 CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI					
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005398					
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212					
6	(702) 671-2500 christopher.lalli@ccdanv.com					
7	Attorney for Plaintiff					
8	DIS CLARK (TRICT COURT COUNTY, NEVADA				
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)				
10	Plaintiff,) Case No:	C-08-250630-1			
11	-vs-	Dept. No:	XVII			
12	BRIAN K. O'KEEFE	Date:	August 12, 2010 8:15 a.m.			
13	Defendant.	{	0.15.2.11.			
14	STATE'S OPPOSITION	— /				
15	STATE'S OPPOSITION HEARING ON WHETHI	ER THE STATE AND (CDC HAVE			
16	COMPLIED WITH THEIR THE RECORDING OF A JA STATE WITN	OBLIGATIONS WITH AIL VISIT BETWEEN ESS CHERYL MORR	O'KEEFE AND			
17	COMES NOW, the State of Neva	da, by DAVID ROGER	District Attorney, through			
18	CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI, Chief De					
19	Defendant's Motion for an evidentiary he		The state of the s			
20	the papers and pleadings on file herein,					
21	argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.					
22	DATED this 10th day of May, 2014.					
23		DAVID ROGER				
24		Clark County District At Nevada Bar #002781	torney			
25		. 10 Table 17 (102 / 161				
26		BY /s/ Christopher J.	I alli			
27		CHRISTOPHER J	LALLI			
28		Chief Deputy Dist Nevada Bar #0053	98			
-5-2-5						

DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI

CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI makes the following Declaration:

- 1. Declarant is an attorney, duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada and is a Chief Deputy District Attorney in and for the County of Clark, State of Nevada. Declarant has been assigned the prosecution of State of Nevada v. Brian K. O'Keefe, Case No. C250630, and is familiar with the facts and circumstances of the said case.
- 2. That upon reviewing the Defendant's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Whether the State and CCDC have Complied with their Obligations with Respect to the Recording of a Jail Visit Between O'Keefe and State Witness Cheryl Morris, Declarant contacted Detective Robert Foster, a Corrections Officer in the Intelligence Unit at the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC).
- 3. Declarant inquired of Detective Foster whether CCDC was in possession of a video and/or audio recording of a social visit between the Defendant and Cheryl Morris which occurred on December 6, 2008, at 21:30 hours. Declarant was informed that, at that time, Metro's Technical and Surveillance Section (TASS) was responsible for activating the recording equipment in the visiting kiosks. The recording equipment would only be activated if there was a specific request made by either CCDC's Intelligence Unit or by an investigating detective. Declarant was further informed that both CCDC and TASS kept records of any such requests.
- 4. Declarant asked Detective Foster to check CCDC records to determine whether there was a request made to record the above-referenced social visit between the Defendant and Morris. After reviewing the records, Detective Foster indicated that he found no such request.
- 5. Declarant then contacted Detective Michael Correia with Metro's Technical and Surveillance Section. Detective Correia confirmed the information provided by Detective Foster with respect to TASS being responsible for conducting the recordings at that time and that recordings were only made upon specific request. Declarant asked Detective Correia to check TASS records to determine whether there was a request made to

User ID: GEORGJE

TO: Name: Patricia Palm, Esq.

Company:

Fax Phone Number: (702) 386-9114

Contact Phone Number:

Info Code 1: Info Code 2:

Sent to remote ID:7023869114

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3	Nevada Bar #002781 CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI		N. M. Martin (1998) and the control of the contr			
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005398					
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212					
6	(702) 671-2500 christopher.lalli@ccdanv.com					
7	Attorney for Plaintiff DISTR	RICT COURT				
8	The same appear and the same appearance of the same and t	DUNTY, NEVADA				
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	3				
10	Plaintiff,	Case No: Dept. No:	C-08-250630-1 XVII			
11	-vs-)	DEC			
12	BRIAN K. O'KEEFE	Date: Time:	August 12, 2010 8:15 a.m.			
13	Defendant.	_3				
14	STATE'S OPPOSITIO EVIDENCE SHOWING LV	N TO MOTION TO	ADMIT			
15	EVIDENCE SHOWING LV HAVE PRESERVED BI EVIDENCE IN AN	MPD HOMICIDE DI LOOD/BREATH AL OTHER RECENT C	COHOL			
16	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada					
17	CHRISTOPHER J. LALLI, Chief Deput		=			
18	Defendant's Motion to admit evidence from					
19	and based upon all the papers and pleadings					
20	in support hereof, and oral argument at th					
21	Honorable Court.		5000			
22	DATED this 10th day of May, 2014.					
23	D/	AVID ROGER				
24	Cla Ne	ark County District Attevada Bar #002781	orney			
25						
26	В		Lalli			
27		CHRISTOPHER J. Chief Deputy Distr	ict Attorney			
28		Nevada Bar #00539	98			

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

On November 5, 2008, Brian K. O'Keefe (hereinafter "the Defendant") murdered Victoria Whitmarsh by stabbing the right side of her chest. The knife he used to kill Victoria sliced through various vital organs. It was also apparent that the much-larger Defendant had badly beaten Victoria. Weighing seventy pounds less than him, her body was badly bruised at autopsy. On August 2, 2010, the Defendant filed his Motion to Admit Evidence Showing LVMPD Homicide Detectives have Preserved Blood/Breath Alcohol Evidence in Another Recent Case. This Opposition follows.

This matter was first tried in March of 2009. On March 19, 2009, the Defendant called Metro Homicide Detective Clifford Mogg as a witness and began to elicit information regarding an investigation under Metro Event Number 070408-0444. Before too much information could be elicited, the State objected that the evidence was irrelevant and, after a bench conference, the witness was excused. See Transcript of Proceedings of March 19, 2009, at 12-13. In filing the instant Motion, the Defendant appears to be asking the Court to once again consider the issue and reverse its earlier ruling. Not only has the Defendant failed to provide good reason to do so, but there is also a great deal of legal authority supporting the Court's initial decision.

It is initially noted that the Defendant's Motion is woefully lacking in any legal support for the position he takes. Absent a single, obscure reference to the United States Constitution (see Def.'s Mot. at 11), he fails to cite a single rule, statute or case. This – by itself – is a basis upon which the Court should deny his Motion. Arguments or contentions which are unsupported by legal authority should summarily be rejected. See Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 13 (2002) ("Contentions unsupported by specific argument or authority should be summarily rejected on appeal.") (quoting Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 75 (2000) and citing Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673 (1987)); Jones v. State, 113 Nev. 454, 468 (1997) ("[U]nsupported contention[s] should be summarily rejected on appeal.") (citing Bennett v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 98 Nev. 449, 453 (1982), and McKinney v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 70, 71 (1977)).