You submit the -- the materials to the DA's Office for --

for prosecution or request for prosecution.

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25

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After that is done, do you have further discussions with Mr. Mitchell and/or Eric Jorgenson about what to charge and if to charge and who to charge?

A: No. Once -- once -- once we decided to submit the case, from what I recall and I -- it -- again, this was a long time ago, there was a long pause between the time that we -- we gave the information over to the time that we went to the grand jury and then we were just subpoenaed to testify in the grand jury.

Q: Okay. And of the materials that -- I mean, I assume that there were a lot of materials in your overall investigation; is that correct?

A: Yes, sir, there's quite a bit.

Q: How many books, binders or -- or the like were there?

A: I want to say 15, 20.

Q: And were in addition to that, were there other productions like custodian of records production of actual bank records and the like that were produced?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Okay. And so those were collected by Metro. Was all of that material provided in the submission or a portion of it based on what charges you thought were going to be brought or should be brought?

A: I couldn't tell you. I thought it was a portion based on what we thought we were going to submit, but I couldn't tell you

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not, I don't remember if that's in there. But we did recommend
1
   that we shouldn't go after ACS, but there would be supporting
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3
   information in the body of the report that would talk about what we
   found during the investigation.
4
              Okay. So at least from your perspective on the original
5
        Q:
   submission, there was never anything represented to the DA's Office
6
   or -- or in the materials that ACS had done no work at UMC; is that
7
8
   fair?
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        A:
              I --
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              Was not?
        Q:
        MR. ALBREGTS: Again, Judge, object on relevance grounds.
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12
   This gets back to the same issue.
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        MR. STAUDAHER: It's what was turned over or not turned over,
   Your Honor.
14
                     I'm going to allow the question.
15
         THE COURT:
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        THE WITNESS: Are you saying if I know what's in the report if
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   it says --
   BY MR. STAUDAHER:
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             Let me ask it again --
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        Q:
20
              Okay.
        A:
              -- since we're -- we're clear on this. Is -- in turning
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         Q:
   over the materials supporting the charges that you were
22
23
   recommending?
24
              Yes, sir.
        A:
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Q:

Okay. Was there any material that indicated that ACS, in

fact, did no work at the hospital? 1 Not that I'm aware of. No, sir. 2 A: 3 Okay. So, the only information that you recall turning Q: over would have shown that ACS did some work? 4 Yes, sir. 5 A: And that was also contained at least discussed that you 6 Q: believe in your officers -- in the officer's report? 7 Yes, sir. 8 A: And you said that it was your recommendation to the DA's 9 Q:Office to not charge ACS because they had, in fact -- you at least 10 had evidence that they had, in fact, done some work at the 11 hospital? 12 13 Right. A: 14 Now all of that is part of the original case materials Q:that are submitted, fair? 15 Yes, sir. 16 A: 17 So, then you said a number of months pass by and then the Q:case goes to the District Attorney or the case goes to the grand 18 jury. Did you testify at the grand jury? 19 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Before you testified at the grand jury, did you Q: know, in fact, what charges the DA was actually pursuing at that 22 23 point? 24 No, sir. A:

When did you, if you ever did, learn what -- what charges

25

Q:

discussions --

A:

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Charging documents is I guess was what we never saw.

with at Metro ever specifically decided hey, we're not turning this

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over because this looks bad or anything like that? 1 THE WITNESS: No, we would --2 3 MR. ALBREGTS: Your Honor, object on relevance. We're not contesting that. That's not an issue here. 4 I'm going to allow the question. He's answered. 5 THE COURT: I heard the answer. Go ahead. 6 7 MR. STAUDAHER: Okay. Next question. 8 THE COURT: THE WITNESS: We would never do something like that. 9 10 BY MR. STAUDAHER: Okay. Was there ever a time when he -- when you talk 11 Q: with Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Jorgenson at least during the production 12 13 of that case where you said, you know what, let's not turn 14 something over to the defense? 15 That never happened. A: As a matter of fact, if you were -- if you had a request 16 Q:to let's say come down and look at all your books or anything like 17 that, would you have honored that? 18 Absolutely. 19 A: In fact, did you do that at a subsequent time at a vault 20 Q: 21 review? 22 Yes, sir. A: 23 And this was after the trial, fair? Q: 24 Yes. A: 25 So you go down to the vault with Mr. Albregts? Q:

1 Yes, sir. A: 2 He reviews all the vault materials? Q: 3 Yes, sir. A: Is there anything that you would have not provided or 4 Q:allowed him access of had he requested looking at the vault 5 6 materials before trial? MR. ALBREGTS: Again, relevance, Judge. This -- this isn't 7 the issue. I'm not -- I'm not alleging he hid something or didn't 8 9 give me access. That's not the issue. 10 MR. STAUDAHER: Well, he's talking about turning over documents or not turning over documents. 11 Well, it's turning over after the trial. 12 THE COURT: 13 MR. ALBREGTS: And that's after the trial. 14 MR. STAUDAHER: No, I'm just --15 MR. ALBREGTS: It's also not relevant. I'll talk about them before. 16 MR. STAUDAHER: 17 So, I have question. THE COURT: 18 MR. STAUDAHER: Okay. So -- and then follow-up, Mr. Staudaher. 19 THE COURT: 20 Sir, you had said you received some discs from Mr. Campbell or there's a meeting with Mr. Campbell, correct? 21 22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 23 Do you remember how many discs you received? THE COURT: It's either one or two. I can't remember. 24 THE WITNESS: THE COURT: And then there was a question what did you do with 25

them and you said you did not give the discs to the DA; is that 1 2 correct? 3 THE WITNESS: I did not give the discs to the DA. No, sir. Where -- where did those discs go? Where were THE COURT: 4 they kept? 5 6 THE WITNESS: They --You received them? What did you do with them? 7 THE COURT: The disc would have been put into a binder like 8 THE WITNESS: the ones that they have and, you know, they would have been downloaded into a binder and that's what Nancy did. She actually 10 11 printed them out, put them into the binder for them and then we have a shelf where we keep our -- we keep copies of all the stuff 12 13 that we use for our case in chief and we put that on the shelf right there --14 15 THE COURT: And that binder --16 THE WITNESS: -- in the office. 17 -- what happened -- was that binder given to the THE COURT: DA or defense attorney? 18 THE WITNESS: The binder, as far as I know, was not given to 19 20 the DA or the defense attorney. All right. Mr. Staudaher, go ahead. 21 THE COURT: BY MR. STAUDAHER: 22 23 Okay. And my point is is there any -- even though Q: something's given or not given over to the DA or to the defense, do 24 you maintain those records at least in an accessible form for 25

1	either side if they wish to look at them?			
2	A: Yes, sir.			
3	Q: Have you ever precluded or said we're not going to let			
4	anybody look at these materials in this case?			
5	A: No, I'd never do that.			
6	Q: Okay. So, if at any time there was a request to look at			
7	certain information, your case file, anything like that, would you			
8	have honored that request?			
9	MR. ALBREGTS: Asked and answered, Judge.			
10	THE COURT: Sustained. He said he would have he would have			
11	honored the request from either side.			
12	MR. STAUDAHER: Okay.			
13	In fact, during the preparation up to to trial, there			
14	were specific requests made for materials that Metro had that were			
15	not provided to the DA, correct? Like computer files and the like			
16	THE WITNESS: Computer file is right 'cause the voluminous of			
17	it, yes. And there is stuff in the evidence vault that wasn't			
18	turned over that, you know, was part of the search warrant, but it			
19	wasn't what we found relevant to the investigation.			
20	BY MR. STAUDAHER:			
21	Q: So so you got a search warrant, it delineates the			
22	things that are collected, that information's turned over clearly,			
23	right?			
24	A: Yes.			
25	Q: But the actual items themselves are housed at the vault?			

And because the nature of being a telephonic search 1 A: warrant, we're only allowed to search a certain portion of -- of 2 3 the computers itself. So, therefore, there's a whole vast area of stuff on those computers that we wouldn't be able to allow the 4 search due to the limitations of the search warrant, so that stuff 5 we couldn't even turn over or look at ourself. 6 7 So pretrial there was a specific request to get that Q: information, correct? 8 9 Yes. A: And you gave it over? 10 Q: Yes, sir. 11 A: 12 Q:Plus --13 Your Honor, so the records clear, who made that MR. ALBREGTS: request and who was it given to? I'm not --14 15 THE COURT: Just clarify that. Thank you. 16 BY MR. STAUDAHER: The defense made the request, correct? 17 Q:Sure. 18 Yes, sir. A: As a matter of fact, when the defense made a specific 19 Q: 20 request for computer files, it wasn't defense counsel who went and tried to obtain those; is that correct? 21 22 I believe it was Mr. Thomas that obtained them. A:

He came down?

Yes, sir.

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Q:

A:

Q:

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And initially when you do a sort of request like that, is

there something called like a mirror image of the hard drive or something that you have?

- A: Yes, sir. And I'm not a computer guru, but what I understand the process is is they create an exact mirror image of what the hard drive contains and that information becomes the best evidence in the case, not the computers itself.
- Q: Was that information at least from Mr. Thomas' perspective at that time when it was produced accessible? Meaning searchable or look -- someone can look into it.
- A: I'm assuming they could 'cause there was no complaints, but you know, I couldn't tell you on the back side. I mean, yes, it was provided, but I don't know if it was searchable or lookable or whatever.
- Q: You know that there were -- there were emails and things that were produced at the trial from those documents?
  - A: Yes, sir.
- Q: Okay. So obviously there was access that was obtained from those materials, correct?
- MR. ALBREGTS: I'm going to object on relevance grounds as to -- the issue is what they did with the book and whether they ever gave it to us. I mean, the access --
- THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection. That this Court's focus.
- 24 | BY MR. STAUDAHER:

Q: Correct. But in general, the book is part of the entire

1	THE WITNESS: honored.			
2	THE COURT: last time. Go ahead.			
3	THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. I'm sorry. Every request is			
4	honored.			
5	MR. STAUDAHER: Okay. Nothing further, Your Honor.			
6	THE COURT: Anything?			
7	REDIRECT EXAMINATION			
8	BY MR. ALBREGTS:			
9	Q: The information in the notebook that Nancy Sampson			
10	compiled, that came from ACS directly didn't it?			
11	A: It came from Don Campbell's office from ACS. Yes, sir.			
12	Q: So that wouldn't have been anything that would have been			
13	on Lacy Thomas' computer if he would have gone down to the evidence			
14	vault and looked at it, would it?			
15	A: I would say no, but I couldn't answer that one hundred			
16	percent.			
17	Q: And prior to trial, a lot of the information that you			
18	or if not all of the information and documents that you seized and			
19	had as a result of this investigation, they were at the evidence			
20	vault for Metro, correct?			
21	A: Yes, sir.			
22	Q: And you indicated this notebook would have been would			
23	that have been in your detective offices; is that where that would			
24	have been stored?			
25	A: Yes, sir. We have an office. We've got notebooks that			

are compiled that look just like that --1 2 On all your cases? Q: 3 -- of all the cases that we do. A: Did Mr. Mitchell or any representative from the DA's 4 Q:Office go down to the evidence vault -- pretrial to go over the 5 6 evidence or meet with you to discuss the evidence and what was there? 7 Not that I recall. No, sir. 8 A: 9 Did Mr. Mitchell ever go to your office to look over your Q: notebooks and the information that was there prior to trial to see 10 what you had? 11 12 Not that I recall. No, sir. A: 13 MR. ALBREGTS: No further questions. 14 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Staudaher? 15 MR. STAUDAHER: No, Your Honor. Okay. Thank you, Sergeant --16 THE COURT: Thanks, Your Honor. 17 THE WITNESS: 18 THE COURT: -- for your testimony. You are excused. Any other witnesses? 19 20 MR. ALBREGTS: Ford real quickly, Judge. 21 All right. THE COURT: 22 Excuse me, Mr. Staudaher, Mr. Albregt, how long do you envision this witness to be? 23 MR. ALBREGTS: I've got five minutes with him. 24 Okay, 'cause I have a trial starting in one 25 THE COURT:

1	minute. I mean, I'll finish up with the witness. We'll have to			
2	come back another any other witnesses besides this gentleman?			
3	MR. STAUDAHER: I don't anticipate him being long, Your Honor.			
4	MR. ALBREGTS: No. And I don't have any other witnesses.			
5	THE COURT: Okay. Good. Counsel, if you can just tell			
6	everyone else because we're just getting you know, running late			
7	here, we will start at 11:15.			
8	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, Your Honor.			
9	THE COURT: Thank you.			
10	MICHAEL FORD			
11	having been called as a witness and being first duly sworn,			
12	testified as follows:			
13	THE CLERK: Please be seated and then state and spell your			
14	name for the record.			
15	THE WITNESS: My name is Michael Ford, F-O-R-D.			
16	DIRECT EXAMINATION			
17	BY MR. ALBREGTS:			
18	Q: Mr. Ford, you're a sergeant with the Las Vegas			
19	Metropolitan Police Department?			
20	A: I am.			
21	Q: You used to be a detective?			
22	A: Yes, sir.			
23	Q: In your capacity as a detective, were you involved in the			
24	investigation the criminal investigation of UMC and Lacy Thomas?			
25	A: I was.			

1	Q: A	and was that one all-encompassing investigation about Mr.		
2	Thomas, UMC	and various vendors and entities that did business with		
3	UMC?			
4	A: T	hat's correct.		
5	Q: A	and was one of those entities business' ACS?		
6	A: I	t was.		
7	Q: A	and ACS was affirmed it was hired or contracted to help		
8	collect rec	eivables and other bills for UMC that was a general		
9	overview of what they were to do?			
10	A: I	ncrease their baseline to yeah find other revenue funds		
11	to increase profit for UMC.			
12	Q: I	n connection with this case, were you working with		
13	Detective W	hiteley?		
14	A: I	was.		
15	Q: A	and did you conduct in your investigation of the ACS		
16	aspect of t	he case which we want to focus on today, did you conduct		
17	interviews	of two ACS' principals?		
18	A: I	did.		
19	Q: A	and that would have been Ross Fidler and Bob Mills?		
20	A: Y	es, sir.		
21	Q: A	and that was at Don Campbell's office?		
22	A: Y	es, it was.		
23	Q: D	ouring the course of the interview did the issue arise as		
24		s, information, records that ACS might have that you		
25	would want	to look at as an investigator?		

Yes, sir. 1 A: And did you or -- and/or Detective Whiteley make a 2 Q: 3 request of Mr. Campbell and ACS to provide that information to you? Yes, sir. 4 A: And did they ultimately do that? 5 Q: They did. 6 A: And do you remember how that was provided to you? 7 Q: It was by a letter by -- from Mr. Campbell at his office 8 A: and on a disc. 9 10 And do you know where there multiple discs provided by Q:Mr. Campbell over time or was there just one? 11 12 I can't -- I think there was just one disc that came with A: it and then we created a folder out of that with his letter that 13 was provided -- that he provided the information we requested. 14 15 And you're familiar with the notebook which is at issue Q: in this case --16 17 I am. A: 18 -- the ACS action items? Q:Yes, sir. 19 A: 20 And that notebook contains documents that were received Q: by you from Mr. Campbell on behalf of ACS which was ultimately 21 Exhibit G in the trial; is that correct? 22 23 A: Yes. Now, what did you do with those discs when you got them? 24 Q:We took them back to the office. We made a copy of each

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A:

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**A:** 

Yes, sir.

We

1	Q: You didn't feel it was criminal?				
2	A: I didn't feel it was as criminal as the other one. So I				
3	wasn't as confident that we can get it on compared to the other				
4	other charges that we had.				
5	Q: And Mr. Mitchell was a part of that conversation?				
6	A: Yes, sir.				
7	MR. ALBREGTS: I have nothing further.				
8	THE COURT: Any cross examination?				
9	MR. STAUDAHER: Couple of things.				
10	CROSS EXAMINATION				
11	BY MR. STAUDAHER:				
12	Q: You were actually author of the officer's report,				
13	correct?				
14	A: Yes, sir.				
15	Q: So you have a discussion with with Mr. Mitchell. You				
16	provided the officer's report. And you provide discovery,				
17	supporting documents to Mr. Mitchell.				
18	A: Yes, sir.				
19	Q: Your investigation though was was quite more				
20	expansive, was it not?				
21	A: Quite a bit.				
22	Q: Okay. Fair to say there were it ended up being many,				
23	many binders of stuff that				
24	A: Twenty-six or thirty-two of them I think total.				
25	Q: Okay. And search warrants stuff and computer things, and				

all of that stuff, right? 1 2 A: Yup. 3 So the -- the materials that you provide as part of the Q: submission, was it all of that stuff? 4 It was all of it, yeah. 5 A: 6 You provided all the computer materials, all -- all the Q: discovery that was at the vault, everything? 7 8 Oh no, no, no. Oh no. A: Okay. So let's -- let's make sure we're clear on this. 9 Q:Yes, sir. 10 A: When you make a submission --11 Q: 12 Uh-huh. A: -- even though your -- your essential investigation maybe 13 Q: 26 binders of -- of stuff and computer things and whatever, do you 14 15 submit all of that typically with your submission? 16 A: No. Okay. So at least the materials you submit, do they 17 Q: typically support whatever charges you think are valid? 18 19 A: Correct. 20 Oaky. Is that what you did in this case? Q:That's what we did. Yes, sir. 21 A: 22 So you had a discussion with Mr. Mitchell and I think Q:even in your officer's report you indicate that there at least was 23 evidence of ACS doing work at UMC? 24

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A:

Correct.

So you don't recommend charges related to UM -- when I 1 Q:2 said UMC, I meant ACS. 3 Correct. A: That you don't recommend charges related to ACS? 4 Q:5 Correct. A: The theft stuff like you had done with the other ones. 6 Q: The others it was -- it wasn't as apparent. Correct. 7 A: Okay. So in the other ones that you were recommending, 8 Q: those were indications that they had done a little or no work or 9 10 something to that affect? 11 Absolutely. A: But ACS was different and that's why you didn't recommend 12 Q: charges related to ACS? 13 14 A: Correct. Okay. So, this is before any -- any grand jury takes 15 Q: 16 place or trial or anything like that? 17 Yes, sir. A: 18 In fact, you never testified at the trials, is that Q:right? 19 20 Never did. Yes, sir. A: Were you even in town? Was there something going on at 21 Q: Do you remember? the time? 22 23 MR. ALBREGTS: Objection, relevance. 24 THE COURT: Sustained. He didn't testify.

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MR. STAUDAHER: Fair enough. You didn't testify at the trial.

Was there any discussion with Mr. Mitchell or further 1 providing of -- of records or evidence from this larger 2 3 investigation after you submitted it to the DA's Office, before the grand jury was -- was done? 4 THE WITNESS: 5 No.6 BY MR. STAUDAHER: 7 Okay. So did a number of months pass after your Q: 8 submission before there was an indictment? 9 Yes, sir. A: Did you know what charges were actually going to be 10 Q:levied at the time of the indictment? 11 12 No, we did not. A: Did you learn that later on? 13 Q: We learned it after the fact. 14 A: 15 Okay. Did you after the fact provide additional Q:materials to Mr. Mitchell? 16 We did. 17 A: 18 And what did those contain, if anything? Q: It was I believe another binder for ACS is what it was. 19 A: 20 We had created another folder for him because the way -- when we found out that he had actually charged ACS in the indictment, we 21 22 had a conversation with him in regards to what the materials or 23 And I can't remember if he remembered if he had it at whatever. 24 his office or he didn't have it.

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Q:

Okay.

Let me -- let me go back. I've got to ask about

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4 the constant
5 6
7 8 know
9 10 found
11 found

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So after the fact -- after the indictment, after the charges had been brought, you learned that ACS is -- is charged in the case?

- A: Yes, sir.
- Q: When was that?
- A: I don't know -- I don't know what the year was. I don't know what the day was. But it was -- it was after the grand jury.
  - Q: How long, a month, a year, two years? What?
- A: Probably pretty -- pretty immediately right after when we found out what the charges were.
- Q: So when did you find out when the charges were or what the charges were?
- A: When we had a discussion with -- with Scott Mitchell at the DA's Office.
- Q: Okay. And -- and you know that the charges related to ACS at least in the indictment did not have an allegation that ACS did no work, correct?
  - A: Correct.
    - Q: Okay. So, again that --
  - A: I see what you're saying.
- Q: -- that specific charge is different than the other charge?
- A: Yes, sir. Yeah.
- Q: So the information that you say that you -- you would

have provided to Mr. Mitchell, do you recall what that was? 1 2 A: No, I don't. No.Okay. You were -- had done an investigation involving 3 Q: tail numbers and the like, things like that, right? 4 5 Yes, sir. A: 6 That was part -- part of an -- of investigation that you Q: had done; is that right? 7 8 A: That's correct. 9 Do you remember what it was that you were talking about Q: 10 with Mr. Mitchell related to ACS at that point? We were talking about -- it was a little more convoluted. 11 A: We were looking at the actually when ACS was Superior Consultants 12 prior to turning into ACS. And they had -- the contract that they 13 had established with UMC was a pretty large contract. 14 15 So looking at them gathering that contract, we felt that maybe it helped this ACS purchased Superior for a lot more money 16 than it was worth. 17 18 Q: Okay. 19 It was --A: 20 So that --Q: 21 A: -- so ---- so that what we're talking about is not related to the 22 nuts and bolts of ACS at UMC --23 24 Not at all. A:

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Q:

-- but how Superior Consultants essentially and ACS came

together and what was going on with the Superior Consultants? 1 2 A: Correct. Yes. Okay. So it predated any action by ACS at UMC? 3 Q: UMC, yeah. That was not of our discussions about UMC. A: 4 5 Okay. That's what I was concerned about. Q: 6 Oh, I'm sorry about that. A: Okay. 7 Q: I didn't know what you were talking about. 8 A: All right. 9 Q: 10 I'm sorry. I apologize. A: I have nothing further, Your Honor. 11 MR. STAUDAHER: Anything further, Mr. Albregts? 12 THE COURT: 13 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ALBREGTS: 14 So, you had --15 Q: THE COURT: Actually, Mr. Albregts, let me -- I have a 16 question. This way it'll allow the two of you --17 18 MR. ALBREGTS: Absolutely. THE COURT: 19 -- to follow-up. 20 MR. ALBREGTS: Absolutely. Sir, you had stated that you had received at least 21 THE COURT: one disc --22 23 Uh-huh. THE WITNESS: 24 -- from Mr. Campbell. THE COURT: 25 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And then later it says I gave the disc, but I 1 heard with an S plural to Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall now was it 2 3 one disc from Mr. Campbell or more than one disc? THE WITNESS: I can't recall the number of discs, Your Honor. 4 But when I said disc, what I was referring to when we -- when we 5 provided the initial submittal to the office, we would have 6 provided the disc of all the interviews that we had done, so it 7 would have been 20 or 30 discs in there. They would have that. 8 Everything in the officer's report with the interview that we recorded interviews on would have been submitted with that on disc. 10 So the -- I think the number of discs we received from 11 12 Mr. Campbell was just one disc with a letterhead attached to it and 13 that's what we turned over. 14 And I think you said you gave the disc to Mr. THE COURT: 15 Mitchell. Were you referring to the disc relating to the Campbell 16 meeting? 17 Yes, sir. THE WITNESS: 18 Okay. And did you actually give him a disc or was THE COURT: it something that was printed out from the disc? 19 20 THE WITNESS: I can't -- I can't -- I really can't recall Like I said, I -- I can't recall that. 21 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 It's been so long. I apologize. THE WITNESS: 24 THE COURT: Fair enough, sir. Mr. Albregts? BY MR. ALBREGTS:

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1	1 Q: So in the	charging meeting	that you	had with	Mr. M	itchell
2	2 before the case went	to the grand jur	y, the re	ecommendat	cion n	ot to
3	3 criminally charge AC	S was discussed,	correct?			
4	4   A: No.					
5	5 Q: That was j	ust in your repor	t?			
6	6 A: Yes.					
7	7   Q: Okay. So	you don't recall	actually	having th	nat	
8	8 discussion with Mr.	discussion with Mr. Mitchell?				
9	9 A: Not in the	charging meeting	, no. We	e we ta	alked	with
10	Mr. Mitchell on seve	Mr. Mitchell on several occasions prior to the grand jury.				
11	1 Q: Okay. So	it wasn't necessa	rily a qu	ote, chai	rging	
12	2 meeting, end quote,	meeting, end quote, but during the meeting you had a discussion at				ion at
13	3 some stage with Mr.	some stage with Mr. Mitchell about not pursuing ACS criminally?				ly?
14	A: Correct.					
15	5 Q: And the re	ason for that was	because	of the ir	ntervi	ews
16	6 with the two princip	with the two principals and the documents that they had provided t				ided to
17	7 Mr. Campbell?					
18	A: Yes.	A: Yes.				
19	9   Q: And and	you discussed th	at and to	old that t	o Mr.	
20	0   Mitchell	Mitchell				
21	1 A: Yes.					
22	2   Q: about t	he interview and	the docum	nents, com	rect?	
23	A: Yes, sir.					
24	4  Q: And you sa	y when the indict	ment came	e out and	you s	aw that
25	5 ACS had been include	d at least as a -	- as a co	ount agair	nst Mr	•

1 | Thomas, did that somewhat surprise you?

- A: We were a little a surprised by it. Yes, sir.
- Q: And then you provided him other information you said another notebook about ACS?

A: I can't remember at that time what we had done because when we had looked at it there was some other -- along with ACS like I said this investigation was -- was still going on quite a different things, so when we had talked to Mr. Mitchell about why he had charged the ACS, we had seen some of the other incidents that had taken place.

From the interviews that we had did referenced Mr. Thomas going down and trying to get another addendum done to a contract to change some things. So we could see that yeah, there was some favoritism there, there was some misconduct and I could see why he charged it. So yeah -- so we saw some of that. And we -- and I believe we had interviews of the people we talked too with that that we -- that Mr. Mitchell might have requested again from our office to provide him to support that.

- Q: Was that the only time then after that the indictment came down that you had a discussion with Mr. Mitchell about ACS or -- or that evidence?
  - A: Yes, sir.
- 23 MR. ALBREGTS: Nothing further.
- 24 | THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Staudaher?
- 25 MR. STAUDAHER: Yes.

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- 2 | BY MR. STAUDAHER:
- Q: Again, I have to go back to the initial submission. You said during the submission of the materials to Mr. Mitchell or -and was Eric Jorgenson available or involved with this at some
- 6 | point?
- 7 | A: In the very beginning Jorgenson was involved in that.
- 8 | But I don't know if we had submitted evidence to him. I think --
- 9 | Q: Okay.
- 10 | A: -- Mr. Mitchell took over by that time, sir.
- 11 Q: All right. So at least we got a couple of DA's that you're dealing with at some point?
  - A: Yeah. Uh-huh.
- 14 Q: You do your investigation. It was there -- and I'm
  15 talking about pre-indictment --
  - A: Pre-indictment.
  - Q: -- was there just a single submission or where there more than one submission?
  - A: Oh, it was -- it was kind of continually coming in as we gathered stuff. You know, it wasn't like we came in there and dropped the box of everything on Mr. Mitchell's desk.
  - Q: Okay.
  - A: It was, you know, hey, we have this, let's look at this together and we discussed, you know, this PBL or we discussed this other thing -- issues as we came in. So he was gathering quite a

bit of, you know, stuff as we brought it in to him. 1 2 Okay. So, again I just want to be clear on this. Q: The large -- the whole investigation --3 Uh-huh. 4 A: -- all of the stuff that you had, not all of that goes to 5 Q: 6 Mr. Mitchell during this investigation, fair? 7 MR. ALBREGTS: Asked and answered. MR. STAUDAHER: Well --8 MR. ALBREGTS: And beyond the scope of cross. 9 10 MR. STAUDAHER: -- it doesn't actually --Sustained. I understood his testimony in that 11 THE COURT: 12 regard. BY MR. STAUDAHER: 13 14 When the Judge asked you a question about you giving the Q:15 -- Mr. Campbell materials to Scott Mitchell, do you actually 16 remember giving Don Campbell's materials to Scott Mitchell? No, I don't. 17 A: 18 Okay. Q: I apologize. 19 A: 20 And your recommendation at that time was to not charge Q: ACS? 21 22 Correct. A: 23 Is it -- I mean, does it seem reasonable that you would Q: have provided evidence to Mr. Mitchell about an entity that you 24 felt shouldn't even be charged during the original submission? 25

1	A: No, I wouldn't have.			
2	Q: Okay. So you don't have a recollection of ever providing			
3	that material to Mr. Mitchell during the original submission, is			
4	that fair?			
5	A: That's fair.			
6	MR. STAUDAHER: Nothing further, Your Honor.			
7	THE COURT: Mr. Albregts, anything further?			
8	FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION			
9	BY MR. ALBREGTS:			
10	Q: Well, didn't you just testify earlier that you gave the			
11	information on ACS along with the the interview transcripts to			
12	Mr. Mitchell along with the other documents? I mean well, you			
13	don't have a specific recollection of the day			
14	A: Correct.			
15	Q: you handed it over.			
16	A: Right.			
17	Q: Do you have any doubt that you would not have given the			
18	DA the information that ACS provided to you when you recommended			
19	not to go after ACS criminally?			
20	A: They would have no. Especially after we have found			
21	out that they had charged, the DA's office they they definitely			
22	would have got that information.			
23	Q: Nothing further.			
24	THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Staudaher, to the last			
25	auestion?			

1	MR. STAUDAHER: No, Your Honor.			
2	THE COURT: All right.			
3	And can the sergeant be released for today?			
4	MR. ALBREGTS: Yes.			
5	THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir, for your testimony.			
6	You are excused.			
7	Is this our last witness?			
8	MS. FORSMAN: Yes, that's the last witness, Your Honor.			
9	MR. ALBREGTS: Yes, Judge.			
10	THE COURT: All right.			
11	Now now, we need to set a time to argue any motion.			
12	MR. ALBREGTS: Does the Court feel it necessary for			
13	supplemental briefing given the evidence or have we beat this hors			
14	to a pulp?			
15	THE COURT: If I will give the parties if you want some			
16	time to do these supplemental briefing, you don't have to, we can			
17	just go ahead and set a hearing date for the the argument. All			
18	right.			
19	MR. ALBREGTS: We don't think we need to supplement.			
20	THE COURT: Okay. Then you don't need to. Okay.			
21	Carol, like probably mid-July, Carol on a Friday.			
22	MR. ALBREGTS: Your Honor, go ahead and throw out a date, but			
23	I'm going to be I've got some out-of-state time in July, but le			
24	me see if it works.			
25	THE CLERK: July 17 <sup>th</sup> .			

1 MR. ALBREGTS: Yeah, that's right in the middle. I'm sorry. 2 THE COURT: How about the next week? MR. ALBREGTS: We should be back. Yeah, we're back the 24<sup>th</sup>. 3 The  $24^{th}$ ? THE CLERK: 4 MR. ALBREGTS: Yeah. My father turns 80. 5 How about the 31<sup>st</sup>? 6 THE COURT: MR. ALBREGTS: My father turns 80 this July, so we're --7 Is the 31<sup>st</sup> good for you, Mr. Staudaher? 8 THE COURT: 9 MS. FORSMAN: Thirty-first. 10 MR. ALBREGTS: Thirty-first. MR. STAUDAHER: Thirty-first. One second, Your Honor. 11 That looks to be good, Your Honor. 12 13 THE COURT: All right. That'll be at 10:30 'cause we do have some probably at 9:30 this way -- all right. 14 And, counsel, I have a question. I don't know. 15 I think this was brought up before unrelated to our hearing today. 16 Supreme Court dismissed Count 1. Count 6, misconduct of a public 17 officer relates to Count 1. 18 19 MR. STAUDAHER: Correct. 20 MS. FORSMAN: Correct. Does that need to be -- is that still good? 21 THE COURT: Yes, it's still good. 22 MR. STAUDAHER: 23 Okay. All right. THE COURT: 24 MS. FORSMAN: And we'll try to explain it at the time of the argument if I can. 25

1	THE COURT: Okay.		
2	MR. STAUDAHER: Supreme Court said it was still good, so		
3	that's part of the order. The only thing they dismissed was Count		
4	1.		
5	THE COURT: I didn't know if there was some confusion or		
6	MR. ALBREGTS: Oh, there was confusion.		
7	MS. FORSMAN: Oh, there's confusion.		
8	MR. ALBREGTS: But that's another issue.		
9	MR. STAUDAHER: Okay.		
10	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.		
11	MR. STAUDAHER: Thank you, Your Honor.		
12	[Proceeding concluded at 11:21 a.m.]		
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21	ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly		
22	transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.		
23	michelle Ransey		
24	Michelle Ramsey		
25	Court Recorder/Transcriber		

How to Colorie 1 RTRAN **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 3 4 5 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 CASE NO. 08C241569 Plaintiff, 10 DEPT. XVII VS. 11 LACY L. THOMAS, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL P. VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 15 FRIDAY, JULY 31, 2015 16 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: 17 ARGUMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS (DOUBLE JEOPARDY) ... RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON FAILURE OF INDICTMENT TO STATE A CRIME, 18 OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS OF THE STATUTES ... MOTION TO COMPEL 19 20 APPEARANCES: 21 MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, ESQ., For the State: Deputy District Attorney 22 For the Defendant: DANIEL J. ALBREGTS, ESQ., 23 FRANNY A. FORSMAN, ESQ., 24 25 RECORDED BY: MICHELLE L. RAMSEY, COURT RECORDER 1

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA; FRIDAY, JULY 31, 2015	
2	[Proceeding commenced at 9:35 a.m.]	
3		
4	THE COURT: Now, Lacy Thomas.	
5	THE COURT RECORDER: Appearances please.	
6	MR. STAUDAHER: Michael Staudaher on behalf of the State.	
7	MR. ALBREGTS: Dan Albregts and Franny Forsman on behalf of	
8	Lacy Thomas. Your Honor, we'd ask that his appearance be waived	
9	today. He had a	
10	THE COURT: And that is fine because of the nature of this	
11	matter. I think he was here a couple of weeks ago as well.	
12	MR. ALBREGTS: Yes, he was here for the evidentiary hearing.	
13	THE COURT: And if I recall he was here when we set the trial	
14	date, correct?	
15	MR. ALBREGTS: Yes, Your Honor.	
16	THE COURT: All right. We have two matters this	
17	morning. One is to three motions one is to compel disclosur	
18	of certain documents regarding this matter. Let's deal with that	
19	one first.	
20	[Defense attorney conferring]	
21	MS. FORSMAN: Judge, one moment please, Your Honor.	
22	THE COURT: Sure.	
23	[Defense attorney conferring]	
24	MS. FORSMAN: Your Honor, we actually that motion was	
25	was pending for a while. We went through various attempts to get	

the Prosecutor to provide us -- basically it's connected to the evidentiary hearing. We believe at this point that the evidentiary hearing and the evidence that came out of the evidentiary hearing probably solves the problem. We were trying to find out.

I think the only time it would -- would come into play would be if the Court were to find that there were insufficient proof that Mr. Mitchell had the documents because that's what we were -- that's the discovery we're attempting to conduct was -- was to show that the -- that the communications between the law enforcement people and Mr. Mitchell. The detectives who came in I think solved the problem.

THE COURT: Okay. So that -- that matter is off calendar.

And then part and parcel we have one for it's a double jeopardy and part of that is also that the failure for the indictment to state a crime or unconstitutional vagueness of the statute that what they have alleged is not a crime; is that correct?

MS. FORSMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ALBREGTS: Yes.

THE COURT: Who's going to handle that?

MR. ALBREGTS: Judge, if we could I'd like to do the motion on double jeopardy first --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. ALBREGTS: -- and I'll be handling that. I'll just argue from the podium if that's all right?

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. ALBREGTS: Your Honor, obviously the evidentiary hearing shed a lot of light on -- on some of the issues that the Court needs to decide factually and applying those facts to the case law.

I'm not going to reiterate everything that we cited in our briefs.

I'm sure the Court's read it and is familiar with the case law.

So let me just try to do a brief argument as to what we think the evidentiary hearing and the evidence that's now in the record on this, what that does with the legal standard the Court has to use to decide whether or not the case should be dismissed.

First, I'd like to touch briefly on the exculpatory nature of the evidence in question. And we all know that it's the notebooks relating to ACS.

First, those show the progress of the -- the meetings and the work that ACS was trying to do which is exculpatory. It's exculpatory because first of all UMC employees testified prior to me receiving that book about the fifth day of trial. And many of them testified that ACS was not doing much work, that there were not many people there and so basically its impeachment evidence on these witnesses who testified to that. If I would have had the notebook, it would have impeached them. Therefore, been exculpatory regarding the work done and the efforts of ACS.

And more importantly that also shows the need to renegotiate the ACS contract. State alleges that Mr. Thomas went back and renegotiated that out of the goodness of his heart to

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benefit his friends, but those notebooks show that -- that the testimony that it had to be renegotiated because they were doing a lot of work and were not going to be making any money out of the job and would have walked off the job; that's why the contract was renegotiated. So there was no nefarious reason.

They also demonstrate that -- like I said the witnesses that the DA called from UMC were untruthful about what ACS was doing that would have really hurt their credibility.

And then finally, the State's theme of the whole trial as the other counts allege and the State alleges that Lacy Thomas was hiring people that were doing no work, that were coming in and just taking the money and running. And that was their theme through the trial and ACS was included in that in terms of that theme. this would give me ample argument to show how that theme was not correct, that ACS was doing work just like the other vendors were doing work as well.

But I think if there's any question about whether it was exculpatory or not that was answered by the detectives themselves because as they testified they recommended that ACS not be charged in part because of all the information that Don Campbell had provided to them. And the reason they recommended that is because the information Don Campbell provided to them was exculpatory. that's why they recommended to the DA after six, eight, ten months, whatever it was an investigation, we don't think the ACS count should go forward. And the District Attorney's Office decided

differently.

So what are the undisputed facts that we learn at the evidentiary hearing, Judge? And I again suggest to the Court that these are undisputed given the record in the case. Well first of all it's undisputed that I did not have the materials until the time of trial.

Now I think the Court found that at least inferentially in granting the mistrial that I hadn't seen them, but Mr. Campbell merely reiterated that in his testimony. He indicated that at one stage me, Albregts, asked him what documents have been produced and he said, me, said something to the effect I don't have what you're talking about.

And I think Mr. Campbell talked about the holy S moment of when it clicked in my mind as -- at our meetings that -- that I had never seen any of this stuff. And so there's no evidence to rebut whatsoever that I hadn't seen it.

Now it's also important to note that the standard is not that I had access to it. It's not that you could have come down and looked through the mountains of evidence that -- that was seized during the course of this enormous investigation and you could have find -- they could have found it. That's not the standard and access, Judge, is not the standard and it's just the State if they argue that trying to detract from the fact that they know they had it and it wasn't turned over.

We also know that the failure to turn over the documents

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caused a mistrial. Again, I think that's in the record. evidentiary hearing really didn't do much more to add to that, but there's no question that the failure to turn it over is what caused me to have to ask for the mistrial and the Court to grant the mistrial.

Now, most importantly there's no question, no question at all that ACS gave the material to the detective long before the trial. All three or actually two testified about that, Mr. Campbell and Sergeant Ford. Whitely testified that he could not remember specifically giving the discs and the books to the State, but he did say that they talked about the evidence. They went over the merits of the case and that included the information contained in the notebooks. So there's absolutely no question whatsoever the State through the detectives had the ACS material long before the trial.

Now there's also no question whatsoever that the detectives gave it to the District Attorney's Office long before the trial. Now Sergeant Whitely again indicated he couldn't recall the specific date or specifically the acts of giving the material to the DA, but he testified that they discussed it and the fact that's the reason they suggested that the ACS charges not go forward.

Detective Ford though was much more certain. testified that -- that they received it, that they put it on a disc, that it was eventually made into binders, but most

importantly testified throughout that they met with Mr. Mitchell, they provided the materials to him, that they discussed it in the context of the charging decision and that's why they made the recommendation not to go forward on the ACS counts.

I think what was most telling was toward the end of his cross examination. He was asked, do you remember actually giving Don Campbell the materials. And he indicated, no, I don't. And I got up and asked him, didn't you just testify earlier that you'd given it to him. And he said, that's correct. I said, you handed it over. He said, right. And then I said, do you have any doubt that you would not have given the DA the information that ACS provided to you when you recommended them not to go after ACS criminally. And he said, no, they would have. Especially after we found out that they had charged the DA's Office, they definitely had that information.

And so Detective Ford was unequivocally testified that that was handed over to the District Attorney's Office. They discussed it. It's exculpatory because the District -- or the detectives recommended that no charges be filed. And, in fact, they were surprised when the ACS counts were charged. And it was never turned over to us and therefore you declared a mistrial.

So the question then becomes, Judge, under the case law with that very fact specific record under <u>Hilton</u> and the types of cases that -- that discuss these issues, is whether it was intentional or negligent. And if it was negligent, then the

question is whether it was excusable or inexcusable.

Now, there's a couple of important things about this record. Namely, Mr. Mitchell or nobody from the District Attorney's Office was called to testify, so we have a record of the two detectives and Mr. Campbell. We, in the motion to compel asking for emails and some of the things that the Court brought up a minute ago tried to see if there would be any further information from the District Attorney's Office regarding the circumstances of getting the information regarding the circumstances of not disclosing it to me. We didn't get that. And so we don't know whether it's intentional or not.

Now we do know that the DA's Office got a recommendation from the detectives who did the extensive investigation not to charge the ACS materials. So, one could certainly in further perhaps it was intentional. They wouldn't turn that over because they knew how exculpatory it was. But I don't know that the record supports that and I -- more importantly don't think that you need to find that. Because if we go to the next step, is it negligence. The question becomes is it excusable or is it inexcusable. They didn't offer an excuse.

Mr. Mitchell didn't testify. Nobody's come in here and said this is the reason we didn't turn it over. And so without an excuse by definition, it becomes inexcusable. There's simply no reason for them not to have turned over the documents to us.

Now one might argue and rightly so in this case that

there was a mountain of evidence. There were searches of Mr. Thomas' office, UMC records, bank records. Literally a mountain of evidence over the course of the extensive investigation that the DA had not only at the DA's Office, but at the Metropolitan Police Department evidence vault.

Now one might argue that it could be excusable if Mr. Mitchell would have come in and said, you know, it was such a huge case. I just missed it. We didn't see it. We didn't mean to do it. There were so many things going on and so much of an investigation that might be excusable. But again, that's not the record.

The two detectives were clear when they repeated, both of them that they discussed the material that were in the notebooks. Ford said that they gave the notebooks to the DA. Well in advance of trial they discussed it in the context of a charging decision and then they went back after the charging decision 'cause they were surprised that ACS counts have been charged and discussed it even further with the DA.

So this isn't a case where they can say, geez, it was some -- so much evidence, there's no way we could have -- it was just an accident or a mistake on our part it's excusable. There's no evidence whatsoever. In fact, the evidence supports that it was not excusable. And if it's not excusable, then, Judge, you should grant the motion for dismissal based upon double jeopardy.

Now again, Judge, the double jeopardy, and we cited the

cases and I won't get into that or I won't repeat them, but I'll just touch on, the fact that double jeopardy doesn't mean the ACS counts then go. The double jeopardy has to do with whether Mr. Thomas has to face the specter of a whole new criminal trial on all these charges after we got halfway through a criminal trial and it was mistried as a result of the DA's actions and no fault of his own.

Why is that -- the case law goes through it? But I'll just touch on a number of things. The effect that a retrial would have on a Defendant's life. That's clear in the case law that appellate courts look at that. That a person shouldn't have to go through a second trial under the circumstances that we have here because of what it does to his life. He's had these charges hanging over him for years. It's affected his employment. He's had to pay for attorney's fees. He's had to adjust schedules. And basically the case law says in this sort of case, the circumstances here, a Defendant shouldn't have to go through that.

They also talk about the State getting a second chance to correct the problems from the first trial, so they now had the opportunity to go a week, week and a half of trial, see what my cross examinations are going to be, see what our theory of defense is going to be and they can go back and clean it up and correct it.

And appellate courts have found repeatedly that that is another reason why a Defendant shouldn't be subjected to having try the case a second time after a mistrial in these circumstances and

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then the chance for them to strengthen their case. They looked at the impeachment that we had of their witnesses and the theory. This gives them time on a second shot to go out strengthen case and

try to have a better case against Mr. Thomas the second time. that's why Court's continue to say double jeopardy means the whole case goes.

So just because the evidence related to only Counts 1 and 6 doesn't mean that the rest of the counts aren't affected by the double jeopardy clause. It applies to the whole case.

So, Judge, in closing I think your decision in this case is largely based upon the specific facts of this case. And those are that they had it well in advanced. They discussed it. The DA had it. He knew about it. And he didn't turn it over. No excuse has been offered, so it's inexcusable. Under those facts, specific to this case, the law requires dismissal of the charges on double jeopardy grounds and that's what we'd ask the Court to do.

So you don't -- I mean, it's clear, but just so THE COURT: I'm clear that merely striking Counts 1 and 6, and I know there's -- there's an issue on Count 6 which references Count 1 --

MR. ALBREGTS: Right.

-- would be insufficient here.

MR. ALBREGTS: Absolutely. The case says and the case law says on double jeopardy it's not the counts, it's the retrial that violates the Defendant. In this case, Mr. Thomas' constitutional rights.

And so no, it wouldn't be enough to say we just take -carve out the ACS counts because the other counts were part and
parcel of all the benefits they would get on a retrial that Courts
of Appeal say that they shouldn't get. And so it's the retrial of
the trial and the effects on a Defendant that double jeopardy
protects. Not just certain counts.

And so because of that it would protect him from a retrial of all of these counts as a result of the mistrial. So a mistrial may only be on a certain issue or fact or -- or something that arises in the case. It doesn't mean that that gets carved out because of double jeopardy. The whole case gets dismissed.

THE COURT: In ever -- in every situation where there's a mistrial for a discovery violation, are you saying that our Supreme Court would state that the entire case now has to be dismissed for -- for double jeopardy purposes? I know there's been numerous cases up in the Supreme Court and for every Judge in this Court has I'm sure has granted mistrials for discovery issues. So you're saying that -- it sounds like what you're telling me is that if it's on discovery issues that -- and the State knew about it either assuming not intentional, but either gross negligence or just negligently, that the case should be dismissed because of double jeopardy?

MR. ALBREGTS: Not ever case. I think the Court needs to look at it on a fact -- case by case basis on the facts before the Court. And so I would say that if -- if in this case if somebody

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came in and -- and we didn't -- let's say the detective said, you know, we turned it over with all the other stuff we had and all the other stuff we had was extensive. And the State came in and said yes it was extensive, it was a huge investigation, we were doing our best with our resources, we simply didn't see it, and we're sorry, but here it is. And you declare a mistrial under those circumstances, I don't think under <u>Hilton</u> that double jeopardy would necessarily apply because it's excusable.

So I don't think it's a blanket rule that says every time this happens double jeopardy attaches and the case is dismissed. That's why the -- this case is so fact specific, that they had it well in advanced. There's no question that he had to know about it because the evidence that the Court heard was the detectives talked to him about it. Not only before the grand jury because it was in their charging -- their hundred and twenty page report where they said this is why we don't think you should charge ACS. And then after the grand jury, well before trial where they came back and said that they were surprised because in part the notebooks showed that there wasn't a crime at least in the eyes of the detectives which make it exculpatory.

So the specific facts of this case they had it, they knew about it, they didn't turn it over and that's what caused the mistrial because it was exculpatory. That's why double jeopardy attaches in this specific case.

So I would say no, it's not every case. But this is not

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every case. This is a very unusual set of facts whether detectives unequivocally said they discussed the information. One detective said they gave the information and the detectives themselves said that's why we didn't think you should charge ACS. If that's not exculpatory, then I don't know what is from the investigating detectives. But that's the reason you don't charge it. That's what exculpatory evidence is.

And so no I'm not suggesting that's a blanket rule. I'm saying under the facts of this case applied to the case law. At the very least, the records clear that it was negligent and there was no excuse for it. And I think under Hilton jeopardy attaches.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Albregts. Mr. Staudaher, let's deal with one of these legal issue at a time.

MR. STAUDAHER: At a time.

Well, first of all he's not entitled to a dismissal or the case going away, but under double jeopardy grounds because, in fact, not only did he have the material however it came into his possession, he had the material before the close of the trial. He had the material at a time when he would actually use it because he was introducing it into evidence, so he clearly had it in time for the witnesses that he had.

That being said, clearly the State based on the testimony, based on the fact that it was part of a police investigation was at least constructively in possession of -- of the book so to speak.

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Now, going again to why he's not entitled to under double jeopardy grounds another essentially a removal of the case from the Court system. He -- he actually not only had the material, but he requested the mistrial. He requested the mistrial under a discovery violation grounds. The fact that he claims this material is exculpatory I will get into a moment, but the fact is that he declared that or he actually requested the Court to grant the mistrial. So he's not entitled to come back and say that he's -- he is somehow prejudiced under double jeopardy and cannot go forward again at trial because he was the one who requested it.

Secondly, this Court found even though the Court wasn't obligated to do so because the defense had requested a mistrial on those grounds that there was no -- there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. Court's not obligated to do so unless there's a situation where something presents itself and the Court sua sponte makes a determination, but the case cannot go forward and the defense is not requesting a mistrial.

So under both situations there's no indication that the State acted in bad faith or intentionally hid something from the defense. I don't even think that they made that allegation. Clearly it was a surprise by both counsel at time of trial that this book was even being introduced. We didn't know -- hadn't seen it at least that was my -- I had never seen it. I had been involved in the case. As we came up to trial I was brought into the case. I went through the discovery and materials we had within

our office. It wasn't there. I brought Mr. Albregts over to our office and had him go through the materials that were in our office plus the materials that had been provided, the supporting documents from the Metro's detectives. It was not there.

So the fact that that information was not in our office whether it had ever come to the office 'cause the case had a long history, had ever come to the office at some point and was lost or whatever, I don't know that there was any unequivocal finding by this Court that the State had it in its possession and actually prevented the defense from getting it, that we did something active to -- to prevent them from having it especially in light of the fact that he did get it before trial.

So two points on that. One not entitled to double jeopardy because he requested the mistrial. Secondly, the Court declared that there as manifest necessity to declare the mistrial. So under both -- both prongs there is no basis for a claim of double jeopardy in this particular case.

Secondly, the normal course of things for any kind of discovery violation in a case before it gets to jury verdict, before there's actually a verdict in the case, that's when if there is a verdict in the case and information comes to light later on that shows that somehow or another the jury verdict would have been different. It would have altered the defenses. It would have changed what could have been presented at trial to come out with a different outcome. That's an exculpatory Brady violation. Meaning

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that there was something that would have changed the outcome of the trial in favor of the defense and it happened after all was said and done.

This did not happen in this case. We were in trial. He had the book. He was going to use it. And then the Court had the arguments, entertained things and declared the mistrial. So we had never gotten -- we hadn't even gotten through the presentation of -- of the State's case in chief. It hadn't gone to the defense case yet. The State was still presenting -- hadn't even presented evidence on some of the contracts I think TBL specifically. And I can't remember if we finished on -- on one of the other contracts or not. But there were five contracts in this case.

And one of the most important parts about this is that the five contracts are not considered nor were they charged, nor were they argued or presented evidence on equally. There are four contracts, Premier Alliance, Crystal Communications, TBL Construction and Frazier Systems. Those four contracts all allege that little or no work was done. No work product was provided or that they didn't do the work for -- for what they got the money for. That is the state for those contracts.

The last contract and the one that is the first count in the indictment is the ACS contract. I've got the charging document before me. I know the Court has reviewed it. I can read through the points about what we're alleging here. In no place in this particular indictment does the State ever allege that no work was

done.

I went through the arguments and counsel in his -- I think when he was arguing to the Court about this in the past said I would like to see Mr. Mitchell's opening statement to say -- 'cause he was convinced that Mr. Mitchell at least related to the ACS contract had said that there was no evidence of work being done by ACS. I've got the -- got it -- I went through it this morning again just to make sure. There's not a single argument by Mr. -- by Mr. Mitchell that ACS did no work.

It all boiled down to basically a single document that a contract was in place. And -- and under the charging document under Count 1 it says the three main points that we charged under, and this is the State making the decision on charging. The police don't make the decision. One, that they were collecting money owed under contract terms that were grossly unfavorable. That by itself shows that they were doing something, but that they were collecting the money under contract terms that were grossly unfavorable.

Two, that they allowed Superior Consulting and/or ACS to sell valuable assets at a price that was unreasonably low. That also doesn't denote anything related to no work being done.

And finally that the Superior Consulting and ACS modifying the contract to greatly increase the amount of money UMC would pay to them for services and other property that was being used or excuse me, for services that were being rendered through collection services. All of that denotes that ACS is doing

something.

Now whether or not what they were doing was effective, ineffective, that came into what plays down the road. Clearly, the minutes -- meeting minutes that were contained in the book showed that ACS was meeting in an attempt to try and increase the revenue stream for their own purposes. They had the -- as the Court was aware there was a baseline amount of money that they could -- they had to meet before they could collect a single dime.

And above that baseline they would get 25 percent of whatever they collected. They were not meeting that -- not every month. They were doing the work, but they weren't getting that money. As a matter of fact, they collected less money than UMC had done before ACS got involved.

So the problem here and the basis of Count 1, the basis of all this related to the book and the book is only connected to Count 1 and Count 6 tangent -- excuse me -- tangentially. Count 1 ACS binder that does not reflect any allegation -- any allegation that they did no work and the book only shows that they were trying to do something to increase the revenue stream.

That's why when the Court declared the mistrial and said that the material in the book because the Court hadn't reviewed it was potentially exculpatory. There's never been a finding that that material was exculpatory because in order for it to be determined to be exculpatory, you would have to find that it was contrary to something that was shown in the charging document as

being alleged.

Since we never alleged that no work was done related to Count 1, I would submit to the Court that it's no exculpatory. Beyond that, the information came to light through whatever resources the defense had. Before trial they attempted to introduce it and it was -- the Court concluded the trial before the case or the State's case in chief was even done.

There was never an issue of a jury verdict and some information that comes to light later that would change or alter what the jury's verdict might have been. So, therefore, no <a href="mailto:Brady">Brady</a> violation per say.

The fact of the matter is that this was at best a discovery violation. And I would agree with counsel, the Court, the state of the record that whether we possessed the book physically in our possession or should have had it or it was lost or some -- or people are mistaken about things, whatever the -- the situation is, the State is constructively in possession of that book. No question about that.

I think I've argued at least now that I do not believe based on the charge, and that's what we're talking about and the reason why the double jeopardy is so important here at least this argument related to it is because it's important for the Court to make sure that the Court looks at this charge and what is alleged to have been done wrong or not wrong.

Now the Supreme Court -- when this went up to the Supreme

Court, they specifically say that this first count is either too vague and ambiguous. It doesn't basically put the defense on notice of what he's charged with doing. The terms like that they were collecting money under terms grossly unfavorable to the State. That the -- allowing them to sell valuable assets at a price that was lower than it should have been. That modifying a contract to -- to increase the amount of money they could have collected; that those things didn't put the defense -- Defendant on notice.

The other contracts they said did because they alleged that essentially they were getting paid for work that either didn't get done or that was just placidly sort of window dressing for something that they were supposed to do, but didn't actually do.

That's why the Supreme Court I would submit in the order comes back and says look, all those other charges are fine because they allege something that puts them on notice of what conduct is criminal. Under Count 1, the theft count it did not put him on notice according to the Supreme Court of what actions constituted theft; that's what they said. That is -- and that is why they don't dismiss or say that Count 6 the related count is somehow tainted so much that it needs to go away as well because it's talking about misconduct of a public officer.

And that count related to misconduct -- misconduct of a public officer was after the contract, after ACS' attempt to do things in -- under the contract and a single action with Bob Mills, Lacy Thomas together trying to alter the material terms of the

contract to the disadvantage of the County.

And that whole thing, that whole part of it, that administrative clarification in Lacy Thomas' involvement in it is what the misconduct count is based on. And it has nothing to do with theft because it never happened. What happened was he attempted to do, he was called on it, he agreed not to go forward with it and then he turned around and did it anyway. All of that is misconduct of a public officer.

That's why Count 6 does not go away and why the Supreme Court found that it didn't. But the Supreme Court also said that you can use the factual allegations essentially from the first count to support that because that's what is contained in the Count 6.

So with regard to this -- the double jeopardy coming back around, and then I'll finish, Your Honor, not entitled to it because he asked for the mistrial. The Court declared it a manifest necessity and declared the mistrial anyway even though the Court didn't wasn't obligated to do so. We hadn't gotten through the State's case in chief, so there's no Brady violation because we never got to a verdict and any information came to light later on.

And regardless of how the information comes there, if the State has information and unless there's some evidence that the State purposely withheld this and there is none in the case. I mean, I think that is undisputed as well. When I brought Mr. Albregts over to my office and he -- he looked at all the boxes

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that were there and I showed him the materials and when I first got involved in the case, I went through the police report. And in the police report and we're not talking about anything that's hidden.

This is something that has -- has been present since the inception of the case. Years before essentially I was ever involved in the case. I'm looking at this and I see recorded interview of this person, recorded interview of this person. I did not see all those recorded interviews in the State's file that we had in our office. I asked Mr. Albregts if he had those. He said he didn't.

Now I assume that he had read the police report. So the police report when it says recorded interview would denote that there had been a recorded interview. I then went off and got the materials. Got those to Mr. Albregts. Asked if there was anything in addition. Wet get up to trial, he's aware of the computer materials. Mr. Thomas comes into town in advance of trial. It was only then that he asked -- Mr. Albregts asked for access to the computer materials. They went through the computer materials. At least Mr. Thomas did. Mr. Thomas was the one who actually went down to Metro and got the discs and specifically which discs he wanted of the computer materials that were accessible.

As far as discovery is concerned and even Mr. Albregts in his -- in his first portion of this when he was talking to the Court said, access is not the issue. Access is completely the issue. The State is required to provide the Defendant access to

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the discovery. We don't have to copy a single page and provide We have to provide them with access to the material. that to them.

Now if there's something that is clearly exculpatory, we have to -- we have an obligation to provide that information or make sure they're aware of it. They claim to this day that that book is exculpatory. I pointed out to the Court based on the charging document what it shows and what we have actually alleged and why the Supreme Court dismissed that charge that it is not exculpatory pertaining to that charge because there's never been ever an allegation that ACS did no work in the case.

I went through the opening statement of Mr. Mitchell at the time of trial. He never alleges, ever says that ACS did no work. Mr. Albregts references witnesses within the trial who said ACS did no work. I failed to see any witness testimony -- we got the transcripts of the entire trial that shows that a witness pointing to it and saying look I'm Jerry Carol or, you know, Mr. Fidler or somebody came in and said ACS didn't do anything in this Nobody said that. case.

So because that is the state of the evidence before this Court and because the allegation is that the book contains information which shows they did do work, there's not a Brady violation because we never got to a verdict and there's no discovery violation because he had the material and there's never been an allegation that shows that that somehow is favorable to him.

Now he can get up and say use the book, use testimony of witnesses to say, yes, ACS had 40 people there. ACS had, you know, they had come and done their due diligence, that the mother ship company was -- was maneuvering. Whatever the issues are to show that they're doing things; fine.

Whatever they were doing was not enough. Whatever they were doing was never making the nut that they had on their own -they wrote that portion of the contract. They put in the
information about what their due diligence said that the baseline
should be. When they don't make that nut, it's that point after
the contract, after the administration that Lacy Thomas gets
involved and actually comes forward and materially attempts to
change the contract. That was the misconduct. That was the basis
of the State's charging the ACS count regardless of what the police
wanted to do or not. The Supreme Court didn't agree with that.
They dismissed Count 1 based on that.

There's now no double jeopardy issue even related to

Count 1 because it does not exist in the case. The count related

to the misconduct is not affected in any way by the book because it

deals with the -- and solely deals with Lacy Thomas' actions

regarding the administrative clarification only. It doesn't relate

-- well not only because it -- some of his things that he did

subsequent to that.

But that is the basis, that's the focus of why Lacy
Thomas' actions were improper. So there is no basis for a double

jeopardy argument in this case because of those points I've mentioned. I will submit it to the Court.

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THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Albregts?

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Yes, please. MR. ALBREGTS:

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You know, Judge, I don't know where in Brady it says that the violation cast -- either has to be a verdict or a case has to go through trial to verdict for Brady to be -- come into play, that's not the case at all. And, in fact, that's why access is not an issue either. To say there's access to the evidence and I could have found it, is just trying to mislead the Court on what the issues are in the -- or divert the Court's attention in any way on what the issues are because access isn't the standard.

The Brady standard puts an obligation on the State if they are aware of exculpatory evidence to provide that to the defense. So to say we have an open door and that takes care of any Brady issues or our Brady obligation is just -- flies in the face of the law. And there's absolutely no question on this record that they knew about it because the detectives both said they talked about it and the information that caused the mistrial. And one detective said he was certain he gave it to the Prosecutor. So he knew about the exculpatory evidence and didn't turn it over and that's why it's a Brady violation.

And it's just interesting because not one part of the State's argument talked about inexcusable or excusable neglect and what the reason or the excuse was for not providing it to the

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defense. They simply say you had access and oh by the way it's not exculpatory.

And even if you take the State's theory on that charge, let's just dismiss the no work argument and let's look at the State's theory. They're exculpatory because it shows what work and how much effort and time that ACS was putting into it which precipitated the need to change the contract.

And so instead of just changing the contract to the detriment of the County and helping his friends, the evidence related to those notebooks show this is why we needed too because they weren't making any money and they weren't going to leave and that would not be good for the County. So it's clearly exculpatory to that extent.

Now the retrial doesn't go to counts or a double jeopardy doesn't go to counts. It goes to the retrial. It goes to the effect on a citizen of having to go through the whole process all over again. The knots in your stomach as the jury is coming in. The day to day coverage where your friends have to see you in the newspaper with allegations that you believe are unfounded. And now if there's a second trial, the State being able to go in and clean it up, even more so.

And you found when you declared the mistrial that this was exculpatory because witnesses have already testified and left and I could have asked them questions had I known about this and I couldn't now which is why you found the mistrial.

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And when I asked for the mistrial, that doesn't somehow take double jeopardy and throw it away, Judge. What the case law says is you then have to determine was it caused by the Prosecution because I as a defense attorney had no choice but to declare a mistrial.

And in this case the record is utterly and absolutely clear and unequivocal that the mistrial was caused by the Prosecution's failure to turn over that information. No questions at all.

And I will leave you, Judge, with Hilton because Hilton's the case at least in the State of Nevada. And there they said it wasn't intentional. The mistake was either excusable or inexcusable. And in assessing the State's negligence in that situation, the Supreme Court had to decide excusable or inexcusable and they considered the reasons that the State proffered in that case. The trial Prosecutor didn't perceive the problem and that the -- in the Sixth Amendment context and that there was a communication breakdown within the District Attorney's Office. In Hilton they had some justification. Here we have not.

And the Supreme Court found that although the Prosecutor was subjectively unaware of the substantive ramifications of calling a witness who could invoke an attorney client privilege on cross examination, we cannot accept such an error of judgment as excusable when weighed against the Defendant's constitutional right to be free from repeated attempts to convict him of the alleged

offense.

Judge, we don't even have any excuses here. And the Supreme Court doesn't distinguish between counts or theories on counts. It's the retrial that the double jeopardy clause of the constitution protects, protects the citizen against. And in this case, to try to focus simply on Count 1 or Count 6 with this evidence flies in the face of what the jurisprudence is and what the constitutional protection is. And in this case there's no excuse 'cause it's inexcusable. And double jeopardy attaches and the case should be dismissed.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel, on this particular issue.

If -- I seem to recall when the binder came up we had already called 13 or 15 witnesses. Somehow that number sticks out in my mind. I think it's probably 13 witnesses. And I also recall that it was at the end of one of the weeks of trial like Thursday or Friday. The reason why I recall that and I think it's important here is that we had numerous witnesses -- had testified. I think we were in the third -- in the third week of trial and I think -- again, I think it's a Thursday or Friday when this came out.

And I believe it was Mr. Mitchell who had stated that well, Judge, we have no objection to the defense recalling these 13 witnesses and perhaps examine them further. I didn't find that that was workable for a couple of reasons. One is the defense lost part of their cross examination because now the witnesses were on

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notice of the cross examination and perhaps of some shortcomings of their testimony.

At the time, and also after our evidentiary hearing, I'm not convinced that there was any intentional act by the District Attorney to withhold the information. Clearly, there was a Brady There were -- I'm convinced after evidentiary hearing violation. that the detective did -- did give the binder I think he said to Mr. Mitchell.

And the reason why I found it to be exculpatory in nature was because those documents showed that ACS representatives were trying to perform on the contract to working diligently to perform on the contract. I think that would negate the allegations in Count 1.

The Supreme Court has determined that Count 1 should be dismissed and so because of that -- and I also I don't find this to be intentional and I don't see a carryover to the other counts, I'm going to deny the motion on the -- for the double jeopardy.

Just so we're clear, clearly I found them to be exculpatory. The State had the documents. Metro had the documents if I recall, almost a year before trial. The documents were not produced to the defense. And again, when the binder came in and Mr. Campbell was in Court, I recall doing a cursory review of the -- of the binder.

And just with the cursory review it appeared to me that you could establish that ACS was diligently working on it and is

trying to perform on the contract. But nevertheless I don't find we rise to the level of -- of the violation of double jeopardy for the -- on this particular matter.

Now, with the other motion here is that the charge are unconstitutional because of vagueness or as applied to this particular case. Who's going to handle that for the defense?

MS. FORSMAN: I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. FORSMAN: I think that what -- where I'd like to start is to talk about what I think the Supreme Court did. I think I'm -- I'm a little confused I have to tell you. I must have read the opinion of the Supreme Court 20 times to try to figure out what they did.

The one thing that is clear in the Supreme Court opinion is that they did not decide the issue which we raised. They decided that the opinion, the order affirming in part reversing in part in remanding is based upon what the State said the issue was. Not the issue that was decided by this Court which was that the —that there was a failure to state a crime. They did not decide that issue. They decided an issue which the — the State kept reiterating this is the issue in both their briefs before you and the briefs before the Supreme Court. And that was whether there was sufficient notice.

Now to try to explain why Count 1 why they -- why they decided that Count 1 should -- should remain dismissed and not

Count 6 when the facts were identical is a little harder to explain. But it appears that what the Supreme Court believed was that in order for the theft -- theft counts I believe although they -- they didn't have information with regard to the thefts counts that you'd have information with regard to the -- or the evidence that was going to be adduced on the theft counts. But with regard to Count 1 basically what the -- what the Supreme Court said is that because there was evident --

THE COURT: Which page are you on of their decision? Can you

MS. FORSMAN: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: -- can you reference me the page?

MS. FORSMAN: Yes, it's page 3 is where they -- where they discuss Count 1.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. FORSMAN: And what they -- I think the reason I'm -- I -- so I can figure out what they did is they -- they put in italics the word unauthorized, unauthorized from the theft statute. And they're looking at what is the state of the record with regard to whether or not there was unauthorized transfer. And it was alleged that -- that the contract called for the completion of debt collection work that was already being performed by another entity. And it is alleged the work was performed poorly by ACS leading to a decrease in overall debt collection.

Well, Count 1 included the relevant dates, the parties,

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etcetera, etcetera. They failed to allege how Thomas' conduct was unlawfully authorized or how his use of payments to ACS articulate the intended unlawful purpose when actual work had been performed through the contract. I think what they're saying and if -- if we have to go back to reach to a new trial, we will ask the Court to decide as they appear to be saying it none -- that theft cannot be made out under this statute in this case if there's any evidence of actual work being performed.

And I think they'll -- so in other words if you don't say that there's no work being performed and -- and the Court should know and can -- and from some of the testimony does know that the other counts include work being performed. It's just they don't like the amount of work. They knew they didn't produce a report at this point. I can remember Tom Riley's testimony about the fact that he did consulting jobs, you consult and you may not have a report. So there's all that sort of stuff. So we -- this is not the issue before you today though.

The interesting thing to get to the constitutionality of the statutes 'cause it -- the failure to state a crime in the unconstitutional statute are inter -- interrelated. If the -- if their -- if the statute is unconstitutional and you find that it's unconstitutional as applied or unconstitutional on its face, we're done. But if the statute is not unconstitutional on its face, then you have to look at the conduct which is what you did last time; is that you have to look at the conduct that's alleged and say does

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this constitute a crime under this statute then? If -- if we can salvage the statute, it's like <u>Skilling</u> 'cause that's what happened in <u>Skilling</u>'s. The statute is unconstitutional. Well, we can salvage the statute by saying this particular conduct doesn't constitute a crime.

In all of the briefing before the Supreme Court and all of the briefing before this Court although they -- they simply -- the State simply attached a copy of it's brief to argue this issue, all of the State statutes that they looked at, all of the -- I put a chart with -- with the statute with the conduct that was alleged with the holdings of the Court, no they -- the State was unable to come up with one case, one case under -- under official misconduct or theft statutes which involve the -- the performance of contracts that -- that don't meet some standard. In other words, bad workmanship or not -- not doing enough work under contract. No criminal case where an official such as Lacy Thomas has been charged.

I -- so -- all right so -- so let me -- let me start with the unconstitutionality of the statute. I think the easiest way to look at this is to look at it from -- from the perspective of the Court having to come up with instructions -- jury instructions. I challenge the State to do that in our briefing and said, come up with instructions, tell us how you're going to define use -- use or unauthorized in this State. How are you going to tell the jury when the line is crossed; when the line is crossed where it creates

a crime? This is not a civil case.

And that was the struggle that this Court had during the trial to try to get the State to articulate that theory. It was the struggle that even one of the grand jurors had is how do you know when the line is crossed. That's what vagueness is. That's what vagueness is is that do -- can you tell from the statute what conduct will constitute a crime. When do you cross that line? Is it -- is it -- we can put a fair market value on the services and if it's this much away from what they were paid or, you know, you can't in this case tell what the line for the conduct is. And that's exactly what vagueness is about. That's exactly it is.

Does it leave to the Prosecutor the discretion to charge Lacy Thomas?

I have to tell you that -- that -- that in discussions in this courtroom about why, you know, what -- what is up with this case. Why is this case here? I was told by a member of the Prosecution team because we need to send the message that this is not Chicago. I think we need to send a message that this is not the Mississippi of the west.

This is case is unusual. It is unique. There is -- the -- there is not one case that the State has cited at either level where this kind of conduct is charged as a crime. So what. We can come up with an unusual theory. Well you can if you can't articulate what jury instructions you would give to the jury sitting over that in that box to say this is where you cross the

line. This is the conduct that crosses the line.

If you look at all of the other States, the statutes that are salvaged with vagueness challenges are statutes to say well he violated a regulation. He violated statute. He violated a policy. They cannot do that here. We demonstrated that. They can't do that here. In fact, all of the conduct that's in this case was authorized by the District Attorney, by the County Manager, by the County Commission.

And so when you have that, in order to salvage this -- in order to salvage this statute for constitutional purposes, then you go to well then can I look at the conduct just as they did in <a href="Skilling">Skilling</a>, can I look at the conduct and can I say that okay I've salvaged the statute, can I say that this particular conduct constitutes a crime under the statute. That was not decided.

I know Mr. Staudaher is going to stand up and say well the Supreme Court already decided; that's what they're arguing. You cannot look at the Supreme Court decision and find anywhere in the Supreme Court decision where they address vagueness. You cannot find anywhere in the decision where they address failure to state a crime. They go strictly on the theory of the State because it's easier for them -- for the State to argue that there was sufficient notice in the indictment. That is now what we argued. That is not what you decided previously. That is not -- the Supreme Court simply didn't -- didn't address the issue that you decided, so that's why we brought it back.

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Let me mention this and this is for -- for you, Ms. Forsman, for Mr. Staudaher to address here. I've reviewed my order of dismissal and this is at page 6 --

MS. FORSMAN: Uh-huh.

-- of the order. I said the characterization of THE COURT: the crimes charged in the indictment, in my opinion at the time, does nothing more than put Thomas on notice that -- that he slash UMC may have entered into basically a bad contract. And by entering such a contract his conduct is now deemed criminal. The indictment is allowed to stand would be tantamount to this Court sanctioning the proposition that if UMC and/or Clark County entered into an ill-conceived contract that's more beneficial to a vendor, but now that conduct, I'm just paraphrasing, is criminal in nature. And I said this Court, my Court, me, did not accept this proposition.

So, the State appealed the decision and the Supreme Court in their first decision of September 2013 stated, and this is at page 4 of their decision, and I was at first a little perplexed by this because I -- I said I thought the allegations were clear, but the allegations were not establishing a crime.

Correct. MS. FORSMAN:

So then the Supreme Court decision said we THE COURT: conclude that Thomas was sufficiently put on notice of the criminal acts charged. According we reverse the District Court's dismissal. When I first read it, I said I never said the allegations were

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unclear. I think they were crystal clear. But the allegations in my opinion did not allege a crime. The Supreme Court disagreed and as a District Court Judge I will respect their decision and I go along with that.

And I know the defense filed a motion for reconsideration. And I think at that time the defense said Supreme Court we understand -- we would agree to a certain extent that yes it's clear, but that's -- that's not our issue.

MS. FORSMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: Our issue that we brought up and what Judge
Villani brought up was it's not alleging a criminal or criminal
conduct. But then the Supreme Court, you know, just rejected the
motion for reconsideration on that issue. So aren't I to assume
that they specifically address the issue you're bringing up today
and -- I mean, am I now -- are you putting me now in a position to
overrule the Supreme Court?

MS. FORSMAN: I'm not. I'm not, Your Honor, because -because the language on the face of the order affirming the denial
the motion for reconsideration doesn't tell us anything other than
the fact that I said wait a minute you didn't decide the right
issue, you know, that isn't the issue we raised.

The Supreme Court -- the Supreme Court is always free to affirm something on a different ground than that one that was raised. You've seen those opinions. They do it -- they've done it repeated times. That's what happened here. That's what happened

here is because you -- I think the Court has articulated the same ruling that I heard and that I saw on your decision which was you said this -- this conduct which is alleged which we know what the conduct is that's alleged it simply doesn't constitute a crime.

The Supreme Court didn't address that at all. Didn't cite to <u>Castaneda</u>. Didn't -- didn't cite to any case which talks about the failure to state a crime. Didn't cite to anything. They simply decided we're going to affirm it on -- on the fact that he had sufficient notice of what the conduct was.

So no, you are not reversing the Supreme Court. You're simply -- they left that issue out. So it's still there to be decided.

THE COURT: But wasn't that brought up in your motion for reconsideration, the specific issue?

MS. FORSMAN: It was, but they -- it was, but they didn't -- they didn't say where all -- they didn't say anything that helped us to determine whether or not -- whether or not they were going to decide it on a different ground which is what they did. I think you have to look at the face of the opinion itself.

THE COURT: And actually their decision was motion for rehearing denied.

MS. FORSMAN: Right. That's -- exactly. I [indecipherable] got a number of those. So -- but yeah -- so it doesn't -- it doesn't tell us anything. It just says we already made our decision and we're just not going to back off of it.

But I don't think you can -- you can point to any place in their original order that addresses the vagueness, addresses failure to state a crime. It's not in there. So I -- so it's not decided. It has not been decided. And the only way you would be bound by this and not be able to do something different is if they actually decided the issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MS. FORSMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Staudaher.

MR. STAUDAHER: With all due respect to counsel and the Court, I would -- I would argue just the opposite. I think the Supreme Court did address the issue. Maybe not in -- in the direct words that counsel would have liked them to use. However, I believe the Supreme Court in my reading of their -- of their opinion essentially equate vague -- vagueness with notice that although they don't use the word vagueness, they put the -- they talked about notice.

Putting someone on notice of -- of conduct which is considered criminal and what they did to actually breach that or to cause that conduct which was, in fact, criminal means that it must be sufficiently defined so that the person of ordinary intelligence would be able to understand what -- what they did was wrong and why. That's what the Supreme Court says essentially. And that's why that's the vagueness and the notice I think go hand in hand. They're one in the same essentially.

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This is the law of the case as it stands right now. And even though counsel says they never addressed the issue. She raises the issue saying look you missed the point. This is what we were really bringing to the Court. This is what the Court was bringing up. This is what we're bringing up. And their response was motion denied. Motion denied on their previous ruling. And so I think the Court is bound by that ruling from the Supreme Court at this point.

With regard to a comment that counsel made about they just attached -- the State just attached a copy of their brief to the briefing before this Court. And I'm talking about the brief up at the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STAUDAHER: The reason the State did that was the almost verbatim argument that was made to the Supreme Court and which was essentially denied by the Supreme Court as having validity that would have given them the redress that they were seeking. They put that argument in total and put a caption on it before this Court and resubmitted it to this Court. That is why the State submitted and put in our briefing. I said look this argument is identical to the one made before the Supreme Court. This is the State's response to that. And we know what the Supreme Court ruled and didn't rule. But that is why there was essentially an attachment of the documents that were presented to the Supreme Court in this case.

So essentially what the defense is doing is -- is they didn't get what they wanted in front of the Supreme Court so they rebranded the same argument presented to this Court hoping that this Court will do something different than the Supreme Court did on the exact same argument.

With regard to the issue about -- gosh, I don't know who counsel was talking too, but I don't believe I've ever spoken to her and said that we needed to send a message that this wasn't Chicago. And I'm the Prosecution team right now. And she came on board after Mr. Mitchell was off the team. So I don't know who she's specifically referring to.

But related to conduct that was alleged in the charging document that somehow denotes that conduct that the Defendant, Mr. Thomas, was engaged in was somehow different than simply doing -- entering into a contract the person who entering the contract does a bad job and you're charged criminally. That has never been the State's position. It is not in the charging document. It is not in the arguments before the -- before the jury when we did do it. It's not been in any argument that we've made before this Court.

So I'm going to reiterate what I'm talking about here and I will give two crystal clear examples. TBL Construction is one of the contracts. Frazier Systems is another one of the contracts. TBL Construction, the actual company that was going to forward to do the work that was Mr. Thomas' doing in getting TBL involved -- first of all, they didn't need to be involved because the County

was already paying for that exact supervisory work that would have been done under the change order that was already contemplated under the contract.

In fact, the County paid more because they had to supervise the supervisor to do the work which they were obligated to do and being paid for. The issue with TBL was they never did any work. TBL is an entity ceased to exist at the time that the supervisory work that they would have been doing was taking place. It's one of the few places that Mr. Thomas flat out lied to the police when he was being interviewed them. He said, oh yeah, I went down to the site and I shook hands with the TBL people and they were doing a good job. None of that's true. TBL did not exist when the electrical connect was being supervised to the North Tower project. They disbanded it. It happened after the fact.

So, TBL not only could not have done any supervising work, they did no supervising work. And yet \$35,000 was carved out to pay them for this work that never got done. Clear example. That's not somebody doing a bad job. That's somebody doing no job for payment of money under a contract that was orchestrated by Mr. Thomas.

If we moved to Frazier Systems, another very clear cut example. There were actually multiple contracts. I think three separate contracts totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars in payments to Greg Boone the person who was involved with Frazier Systems. He was brought in to do things to essentially produce and

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put together a project management office under the IT Department.

He was brought in to supervise and run the IT Department to do

these projects and to this work. He didn't do any of it. He

produced basically a couple of PowerPoints. He never did the

project manager office. He never did anything specifically related

to that.

And, in fact, the testimony that came out before Your Honor, before the jury when it was impaneled before related to why Mr. Frazier -- excuse me -- why Greg Boone was even in the hospital was not to do anything for the IT Department. It -- it was to be the eyes and ears of Lacy Thomas within the -- within the hospital.

Now the contract was for him to provide services under the IT Department to do specific things. He did not do those things. He was essentially a spy for Lacy Thomas. Whether that's appropriate or not appropriate is not the issue. The issue was Lacy Thomas entered into a contract with him to do certain things that were not done. Clear examples. So those are two of the five contracts total that we're talking about in the case.

The actual allegations and the reason that the Supreme Court said look, he's on notice of what the criminal conduct is because if you get -- if you enter into a contract with the lawn mower, I think the Court used that -- that example a couple of times, that Lacy Thomas hires a person to mow the lawns at UMC Hospital. And the person does a terrible job. But they actually show up with the lawn mower and they attempt to mow the lawn even

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if they do a bad job. How would that be criminal? I think the Court -- we've already said that.

The State has always been in the position of saying that is not what is alleged. The allegation is that Lacy Thomas hired essentially the lawn mower to come mow the lawn and Lacy -- and the lawn mower doesn't even do it. The lawn mower either doesn't come and do the work at all or they come and do something else and say they moved the lawn. That's what we're talking about here. There's a material complete difference in what we're -- what we're referring to and what is actually in the charging document that the Supreme Court said is sufficiently clear to go forward on to put him on notice of their criminal conduct.

And we're not saying the person did a bad job. We're saying the person either did no job or they did something to make it look like they were doing the work when, in fact, they weren't doing it at all. Yet, they're getting for that work at the behest of Mr. Thomas by the County. And the misconduct part of that is that that is absolutely, diametrically opposed to his mission and what he was charged with and employed with by the County to do.

As far as the -- I think there was -- one of the arguments that counsel made was all of the conduct was authorized. I defy counsel to come with any testimony or evidence in this case that said that Mr. Con -- Mr. -- Mr. Thomas' conduct in this case in the manner that he's charged by the State was in any way authorized.

Now there's a difference between saying that a contract that Mr. Thomas floats meets the structural requirements that are there to have a contract. And if that contract goes up to the Board of County Commissioners, this is actually approved. When, in fact, Mr. Thomas knows. And, in fact, the actual production of whatever occurs never happens related to the contract and he fully well knows that.

There's a big difference there between saying that a contract has an offer and acceptance consideration, the things that are all -- that are all necessary and required by the State or by the County to have a contract entered into. When the purpose of the contract itself is to do something other than what is in the contract and Mr. Thomas knows it, that's misconduct. And no one is going to come and nobody did come in and say that that conduct was authorized.

So to get up here and say that all of the conduct that Mr. Thomas did was authorized is flat out wrong and completely opposite of what the evidence that actually did come into trial showed.

THE COURT: Well, didn't they -- Civil Deputy District

Attorney come in and testify? Although I -- if I recall, her

testimony was that her job is not to determine that a contract

perhaps is in the best interest of the County, but to make sure all

the appropriate -- it's in the appropriate form, appropriate

bidding --

MR. STAUDAHER: That the parts are there.

And then after that -- I think I didn't know -- I

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THE COURT:

THE COURT:

-- I's dotted, T's crossed.

don't recall if it went to another level, but then it's my

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MR. STAUDAHER: Right.

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understanding there's testimony that it went to the County

Commissioners --

Correct. MR. STAUDAHER:

-- and the County Commissioners would review it THE COURT: and then when it's on the agenda they would vote in an open forum. It's just I think at the time and I don't know if it's germaine to this issue, it seems to me that the County Commissioner staff reviews the contracts and then County Commissioner decide to vote And I would hope they don't blindly vote on contracts, that they would evaluate the contract and make the determination whether it's in the best interest of the County.

Well part of that, and I think it did come out MR. STAUDAHER: at trial, I think it will come out if we go to another trial is that the County Commission in their role with UMC as well as the civil DA who looks at the contract that might -- a contract that might come up to see if it has all the right parts and then says yeah, it has all the right parts, pass. Doesn't look at content. Doesn't look at whether it's a good deal, bad deal, whatever. 'Cause frankly those people, the Commission and that person don't really know what the issues are specifically to the County. That

is why having a person like Lacy Thomas who is responsible for the initiation of the contract itself, why that person as a public officer is essentially supposed to act and is authorized only to act in the best interest of the County for things that actually need to be done and not to put forth a bogus contract to help out some friend or colleague or somebody that he's associated with. If that is the purpose, that's contrary to what their mission is.

Once that person does that, whether it's Lacy Thomas or someone else in his capacity, they're the ones that actually know what is needed and why the contract is being brought forth in the first place.

The County Commission -- I will defy you to find anybody in the County Commission will say we went back and parsed out everything and then double checked it and count, made phone calls and investigate it to see if it's contract was actually something that was one, real. Two, was really needed, was appropriate. They take the recommendations of their counsel, of their staff. They take the recommendations from the civil DA to say that it's all proper and whatever. And then they rely upon the public officer who is submitting it in the first place. They have to do that. They cannot go through and look at every contract and vet every single contract that comes before them for approval to that degree. They have to be able to rely upon those people.

And that's why it's a crime for a public officer to breach that trust. To act in essentially opposition to what their

mandate is a public officer for the County. When that happens, there's a breakdown. And if they do it knowingly, it's criminal. It's -- that's what is charged here.

There's not really an issue of vagueness because the actual conduct that's alleged absent Count 1 which is no longer in the case that there's no issue of what conduct constitutes one misconduct by -- by Mr. Thomas. And two, the actual losses to the County because of the bogus contracts that he did enter into constitute theft because he's using County resources that he's responsible for for a purpose other than what they were designated for.

Even if what Mr. -- using Frazier -- Frazier Systems as an example. Even if it would have been a completely okay for Lacy Thomas, and maybe just for argument sake, and to say that he was completely authorized to have a spy within the department and to actually -- and within UMC and to actually pay that person this exorbitant amounts of money to spy for him. Even if that had been authorized, the fact that he enters into a contract that essentially makes it look like this person is being paid for work that is going to be done, but never gets done or is basically just window-dressing and never does what he is supposed to do, that is an act which is unauthorized. You can't do that.

There's got to -- that's why when it goes to the County Commission, County Commission looks at it and says, gosh, it looks like you validly have a person in the IT, they're trying to put

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together this -- or this, you know, sort of program or thing that's within the IT Department, sounds valid, sounds reasonable, we'll sign off on it.

Do you really think that if the County Commission had had a proposal for Mr. Thomas to say, look, I want to pay Greg Boone six -- nine hundred thousand dollars to be my spy in the hospital, that they would have approved that? Absolutely not. It's because the only way he could get that money dispersed to his buddy was to make fraudulent representations to the County Commission in order for them to approve that expenditure. And that -- that expenditure was never for the purpose for which it was intended. That's what we're talking about here with relation to all of these contracts. That we're talking about his misconduct and in some instances the Premier Alliance, Crystal Communications, Frazier Systems, TBL Construction now, not ACS at this point, that all of that resulted in a monetary loss that is actually definable to the County because of the misconduct constituting theft. That's what we're talking That's why the indictment as it stands should remain with the exception of Count 1 obviously, but that we can go forward because he's on notice of the conduct that he's being charged with.

THE COURT: Ms. Forsman.

MS. FORSMAN: Briefly, Your Honor.

Mr. Staudaher has not mentioned one time that the Supreme Court decided that the indictment and the conduct that was alleged constituted a crime because it's not in that opinion.

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Let me use Mr. Staudaher's example of the consultant. And he said, well you only produce three PowerPoints and you didn't produce a report. What are you going to tell the jury about if he produced five PowerPoints and a three-page report? Will that -will that bring it back behind the line of what's a crime? That's the problem.

I've challenged the State on several occasions to try to come up with a definition of use for the benefit of another which is the misconduct statute or unauthorized which is the theft statute to be able to say how are you going to instruct the jury based upon the facts of this case.

The State has repeatedly said -- now they say well for abuse of a friend. If there were a conflict of interest, they would have alleged a conflict of interest. We went through all of the disclosure statutes. They're not alleging that. In fact, Mr. Mitchell told this Court clearly it doesn't have to be a conflict of interest. It doesn't have to be that -- that there was -- that Mr. -- Mr. Thomas benefited in any way 'cause they' ve never alleged that he personally benefited in any way.

There is a rotten core to this case which simply cannot be ignored and it's this business about friends and colleagues. The way they presented that to the grand jury was despicable. they said to the grand jury was isn't it true that these people are all black and that's the rotten core of this case 'cause they're alleging, well their friends and colleagues 'cause they're member

of a service fraternity, a service fraternity to which Thurgood Marshall belonged. Martin Luther King belonged. And that's the rotten core of this case.

This courthouse -- this courthouse, the elevators don't work. Did anybody get charged with a crime where the work was done so shoddy that you can't -- that you for years we couldn't get up in the elevator? Is anybody charged with a crime when a friend of a County Commissioner made -- may get a piece of -- of County land and then uses it for development? No one is charged with a crime in those cases. And I think that must be considered here.

The reason this case is so highly unusual, the reason that it -- that it cannot possibly state a crime is that you can't tell me where the line is crossed. Is it -- are you going to instruct the jury that a crime is committed when a public official does not -- does not act consistently with his mission which is what -- which is what the Prosecutor is suggesting? Is that a crime? Is that what the jury is going to be instructed?

Here's the mission of a County official, a mission of a County official is to act on behalf of the County. If you find that Mr. Thomas failed to act consistently with his mission, you can then find that he's committed a felony. That's the problem in this case. I saw it throughout the transcript of the trial.

And I will tell you who said that this -- we need to send a message that this is not Chicago. It was the detective. And it was in this hearing. It was before the evidentiary hearing. I was

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shocked to hear that, that that was the whole point of this Prosecution at least from his perspective.

Your Honor, this -- the case should not go forward. This man should not have to be put through this based upon the kind of prosecution that this is.

Thank you, counsel. THE COURT:

When reviewing this matter for this morning I reviewed my decisions, in-Court decision, motion for reconsideration and one sentence denial of the motion for reconsideration. I have to assume that the Supreme Court reviewed the entire record when this case was up on appeal. I'm assuming that they reviewed my decision because like I said it was crystal clear to me that I never said the -- that the allegations were unclear. I said the allegations in my opinion at the time did not constitute a crime or it was more of I called it an ill-conceived -- I think I said something like an ill-conceived contract. Yeah, ill-conceived contract.

But the Supreme Court came out with their decision and said that Mr. Thomas was sufficiently put on notice. And I would look at page 4 of their decision, the original one, Thomas was sufficiently put on notice of the criminal acts charged in Counts 2 And by the Supreme Court deciding the matter in a way they did as well as by denying the motion for consideration, I believe that they took into consideration the arguments today.

And I think I'm being asked to overrule the Supreme Court because it just seems to me that the defense and the motion for

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reconsideration said, look, Judges or Justices -- Villani didn't say it wasn't clear. He said it is clear. But it's not -- it's not -- it's not alleging a crime. And then they just said denied. And so I've got to believe they reviewed the entire record and the briefs. And based upon that, I'm going to deny the motion at this point.

If anything is unclear, then the defense will appeal this decision today and hopefully we'll have more clarity down the road, but -- and maybe the State will -- the State does say it's crystal clear where we're at and the Supreme Court perhaps it's saying it's crystal clear as well. I didn't read it that way, but I file -- I will follow the directives of the Nevada Supreme Court. And so I'm going to deny the motion for the unconstitutional as applied here.

And, Mr. Staudaher, would you please prepare an order so then -- I don't know if the defense is going to appeal this. They can't appeal until we have a formal order signed by the Court.

Anything else for today?

MS. FORSMAN: Your Honor, I would like to request that if the -- if the Prosecutors can prepare the order that it'd be provided to the defense.

THE COURT: Oh yeah, I was going to have him run it by counsel.

MS. FORSMAN: Yeah.

THE COURT: Yes. Approved as to form and content.

MR. STAUDAHER: Your Honor, would I be able to get a

transcript of this then to make sure that the wording, the findings of the Court were -- I just don't put something --

THE COURT: You should request it from Michelle.

MR. STAUDAHER: -- and have an issue.

THE COURT: And she'll get it to you.

MR. STAUDAHER: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, we have a trial date and there was an issue with that.

Counsel, I -- I think this has happened probably twice in the last eight years because events come up with my schedule. I will be at the Judicial College as a facilitator for the two-week course for new Judges from October 19 to October -- October 29.

So, I don't know if we can start November 2<sup>nd</sup> and then go for -- I don't know if this case may take two to three weeks. I'm assuming it might take three weeks or hope -- is it going to be five weeks, three weeks? Anyone have a good --

MR. STAUDAHER: I think it will be shorter based on -although it'll still be long, but it should be shorter based on the
fact that Count 1 is not the case any longer. Let me look and see.
You said the Court wants to start in November.

MR. ALBREGTS: Well --

THE COURT: You know, I'm just -- you know, my calendar is similar to any other Judge here. You know, I've got trials booked through the end of next year and I know we try to double and triple stack them because cases get continued, cases get negotiated. But

I do have for the first week of November I have two murder cases.

One is a death penalty case which we typically take priority for,

you know, death penalty cases. That one's been continued numerous

times.

I mean, I just can't tell you when I'm going to have a five week stack where I don't have murder cases or death penalty cases. It's supposed to be random. It just seems like I'm getting more other departments. I don't know.

MR. STAUDAHER: Would it be possible to be inserted in a civil stack then, Your Honor, for this -- just because of the issues with regard to -- when we might be able to get this case tried? I know that's not the Court's preference, but based on all of the capital cases that the Court has.

THE COURT: Can counsel approach on a scheduling issue please?

MR. ALBREGTS: Sure.

# [Bench Conference]

THE COURT: And then Mr. Staudaher how long will it take you for the -- to prepare the order for this --

MR. STAUDAHER: I mean, as soon as -- as soon as I get the -- the transcript. What do you want from me? Do you want an order from transcript? Okay. I'll go back and get the request for transcript.

THE COURT: Is that going to be three weeks, Michelle?

THE COURT RECORDER: Let's just do 30 days just to make it safe.

1	THE COURT: All right. No, 30 days. Right, 30 days?
2	THE COURT RECORDER: Yeah.
3	MR. STAUDAHER: And I can do it off the minutes and my notes,
4	but especially because the issues I just prefer to have it straight
5	out of what the Court has stated.
6	THE COURT: All right. Let's do 45 days status check from
7	today if the order is filed. This way it's on everyone's tickler
8	system. And if it's been filed, we'll vacate this date. So,
9	Carol, if you can give us 45 days from today.
10	THE CLERK: August September 10 <sup>th</sup> , 8:30.
11	THE COURT: All right. Anything else before I leave the
12	bench?
13	MR. STAUDAHER: No thanks or no, Judge.
14	MS. FORSMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
15	[Proceeding concluded at 11:08 a.m.]
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21	ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case
22	to the best of my ability.
23	michelle Pansey
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Michelle Ramsey

Court Recorder/Transcriber

Electronically Filed 09/29/2015 11:21:14 AM

1 FCLSTEVEN B. WOLFSON **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER 3 Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #008273 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 5 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, 10 CASE NO: 08C241569 11 -VS-**DEPT NO:** XVII LACY L. THOMAS, #2676662 12 13 Defendant. 14 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 15 LAW AND ORDER DATE OF HEARING: 7/31/15 16 TIME OF HEARING: 9:30 A.M. 17 THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable MICHAEL P. 18 VILLANI, District Judge, on the 31th day of July, 2015, the Defendant being present, 19 REPRESENTED BY DANIEL J. ALBREGTS, ESQ., AND FRANNY A. FORSMAN, ESQ., 20 the State being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by 21 and through MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court 22 having considered the matter, including testimony, briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, 23 and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact 24 and conclusions of law: 25 // 26

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#### FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court has reviewed the briefs filed by the parties, has heard argument from the parties, the testimony of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing and has also reviewed the applicable case law cited by the parties in their briefs.

THE COURT FINDS THAT, with regard to the issue of the "binder," that the "binder" contained exculpatory evidence indicating that ACS representatives were working diligently and were trying to perform under the contract with University Medical Center which would negate the allegations in Count 1.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT and that there was a <u>Brady</u> violation by the State because the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing showed that the "binder" was given to the District Attorney's Office by the police. The Court does not, however, find that there was any intentional act by the District Attorney to withhold the evidence.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT because the Nevada Supreme Court determined that Count 1 of the original indictment should be dismissed and also because there was no intention to withhold any evidence by the State, that there is no carryover to the other counts so jeopardy did not attach to those counts.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT the Nevada Supreme Court has previously determined that Defendant was sufficiently put on notice of the criminal acts charged in the remaining counts of the indictment. The court assumes that the Nevada Supreme Court considered the arguments made by Defendant in the briefs and Motion for Reconsideration and therefore this court is without authority to consider the Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss Based on Failure to State a Crime, or in the alternative, Unconstitutional Vagueness of the Statutes.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT Defendant's motion to compel is most since the requested information by Defendant was obtained during the evidentiary hearing which was held in the instant matter.

1	<u>ORDER</u>	
2	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss on	
3	Double Jeopardy grounds is denied.	
4	IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss	
5	Based on Failure to State a Crime, or in the Alternative, Unconstitutional Vagueness of the	
6	Statutes is also denied.	
7	IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Compel is moot and,	
8	therefore, is taken off calendar.	
9	DATED this 29 day of September, 2015.	
10	MMM NV	
11	DISTRICT JUDGE	
12	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney	
13	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565	
14	BY Market Mar	
15	MICHAEL V. STAVIDAHER Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273	
16 17	Nevada Bar #008273	
18		
19	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
20	I certify that on the 24th day of September, I e-mailed a copy of the foregoing	
21	proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to:	
22	proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Eaw, and Order to.	
23	DANIEL J. ALBREGTS, ESQ. albregts@hotmail.com	
24	FRANNY A. FORESMAN, ESQ. <u>f.forsman@cox.net</u>	
25		
26	BY <u>J. J.</u> Secretary for the District-Attorney's Office	
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28	MS/tgd/MVU	

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9	LACY THOMAS, ) Case No. 69074	
10	Petitioner,	
11	vs.	
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
13	Respondent, {	
14		
15		
16	PETITIONER'S APPENDIX	
17	Volume II	
18	v orume 11	
19		
20		
21		
22	DANIEL J. ALBREGTS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 004435	
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25	FRANNY A. FORSMAN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000014	
26	P.O. Box 43401 Las Vegas, Nevada 89116	
27	City, Nevada 89701	
28	Attorneys for Petitioner	

Docket 69074 Document 2015-33087

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6	П	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - JULY 31, 2015 ARGUMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS		
7		(DOUBLE JEOPARDY)RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON FAILURE OF THE INDICTMENT		
8		TO STATE A CRIME OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS OF THE STATUTE		
9		(8/18/15)		
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	EXPR	Alun D. Chum				
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13	DISTRIC	CT COURT				
14	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA				
15	THE STATE OF NEVADA, )					
16	Plaintiff,	CASE NO. C241569 DEPT. NO. XVII				
17	vs.					
18	LACY L. THOMAS,					
19	Defendant.					
20						
21		N TO DISMISS (DOUBLE JEOPARDY)				
22		ary hearing on March 20, 2015. Defendant submits				
		Dismiss. Exhibit 1 consists of a lengthy order from				
	the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada issued on September 1, 2004, nearly six (6) years prior to the trial in this case which resulted in a mistrial. The mistrial resulted from the failure of the					
		sclose materials which were subject to <u>Brady v.</u>				
	Maryland, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995) and Giglio v. United States, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972). The attached exhibit demonstrates that the Clark County District					
40	<u>piaies, 32 8.01. 703 (1972). The attached exhib</u>	n demonstrates that the Clark County District				

Attorney's office has been on notice that in order to insure that a defendant's constitutional rights to due process, and in this case, to not be placed in jeopardy twice, materials in the possession of investigators with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department must be reviewed to insure that adequate disclosure has been made. The attached order in Homick v. McDaniel, Case No. CV-N-99-0299-DWH (RAM). 5 Defendant asks that the court consider the findings of the federal court with regard to the practices of the Clark County District Attorney's office which apparently continued until the time of the trial in this case. The findings which are relevant to the question before this court are as follows: The "open file' policy of the CCDA may have been neither "open" nor complete, Ex. 1, p. 9 10 The failure to insure that full Kyles, Brady and Giglio disclosures have been made has resulted in reversals of capital cases by Nevada courts. Ex. 1, p. 7-8 and cases cited therein. 11 No "institutional procedure" exists "by means of which Metro assures that all Kyles material 12 in its possession is forwarded to the CCDA's office for review. 13 [T]he CCDA's office apparently lacks an institutional procedure or policy by means of which it may ensure that its "open file" contains everything which it is required to disclose. 14 The lack of an institutional procedure "demonstrates a pattern of organization behavior." Ex. 15 1, p. 9. 16 As a result of these findings, Judge Pro ordered discovery in federal court to assure that full 17 constitutional disclosure was made. 18 The right protecting a defendant from being placed in jeopardy more than once and against 19 the kind of hardship created here by the failure of the Clark County District Attorney to assure that 20 this defendant was provided with those materials to which he was constitutionally entitled is an 21 important constitutional right. When the CCDA decided to continue with its practices despite 24 25 26

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
<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The order of the federal court is not a published order, however, it is not cited here as authority but rather, as proof of notice of the constitutional flaws in the practices of the District Attorney.

1	repeated warnings by courts and by the U.S. District Court, it did so at risk that if its conduct caused		
2	a mistrial, the defendant is not required to shoulder the resulting hardship.		
3	DATED this 18 <sup>th</sup> day of March, 2015.		
4	DANIEL J. ALBREGTS, LTD.		
5	By: /s/ Daniel J. Albregts		
6	DANIEL J. ALBREGTS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 004435		
7	LAW OFFICES OF FRANNY FORSMAN, PLLC		
8			
9	By: <u>/s/ Franny A. Forsman</u> FRANNY A. FORSMAN		
10	Nevada Bar No. 000014		
11	Attorneys for Defendant THOMAS		
12	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
13			
14	The undersigned, an employee of DANIEL J. ALBREGTS, LTD., hereby certifies that on		
	the 18th day of March, 2015, she served a copy of the above and foregoing EXHIBIT IN SUPPORT		
16	OF MOTION TO DISMISS (DOUBLE JEOPARDY), via Odyssey E-File and Serve to the emails		
	below:		
18			
19	Michael Staudaher Chief Deputy District Attorney		
20	michael.staudaher@clarkcountyda.com		
21	Clark County District Attorney's Office		
22 23	pdmotions@clarkcountyda.com		
23			
25	Kimberly LaPointe		
26	An Employee of Daniel J. Albregts, Esq		
27			
28			
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# EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1





# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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STEVEN M. HOMICK,

Petitioner,

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E. K. MCDANIEL, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. CV-N-99-0299-DWH(RAM)

ORDER REGARDING REMAINING DISCOVERY ISSUES

Petitioner has filed a motion for leave to conduct discovery. Docket #73. In support of the motion, petitioner has filed and served voluminous exhibits. Dockets #74 through #85,  $22 \parallel$  containing Exhibits #1 through #357. Respondents have filed and served their points and authorities in opposition to the petitioner's Docket #99. Petitioner has tendered his reply points and motion. authorities in support of his motion for leave to conduct discovery. Petitioner has also filed with his reply points and Docket #106.

authorities supplemental exhibits in support of the motion for leave to conduct discovery. These additional exhibits are attached to the reply points and authorities themselves. The court has reviewed in detail the petitioner's motion, the opposing points and authorities, as well as the reply points and authorities. Furthermore, the court has reviewed all exhibits tendered in support of the motion for leave to conduct discovery. Based upon that review, and good cause appearing, the court concludes that petitioner has demonstrated good cause for leave to conduct some of the discovery he desires. Before petitioner is allowed to serve his discovery requests, however, he shall be required to file a supplemental brief in which he associates the specific proposed discovery request (subpoena) by Exhibit number with the allowed category of discovery.

# 1. Good Cause Showing.

As with all habeas corpus discovery questions, the court must turn first to the analysis of the "good cause" requirement of Rule 6, and as further defined in Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997). In Bracy, case, the petitioner claimed that his trial judge, Maloney, had been exposed in the infamous "Operation Greylord" FBI sting and investigation in Chicago. "Greylord" revealed that Maloney was sodden with corruption, and that he accepted money from defense lawyers to "fix" all manner of criminal trials on his docket. So pervasive was Maloney's corruption, according to Bracy, that a criminal defendant such as he that did not (or could not afford to) bribe the jurist faced a form of retaliatory action. Maloney would

demonstrate a "compensatory bias" (i.e., give harsher rulings than warranted under the facts and law) against those criminal defendants not bribing him in part to attempt to deflect charges of corruption, but also to assure the future flow of depraved cash into his coffers in other important matters. Bracy, supra, 520 U.S. at 907-909.

The Supreme Court ruled that Bracy's discovery request established "good cause" based upon a number of specific factors: 1) petitioner's request was grounded in specific and demonstrable facts; 2) the discovery request established a logical and direct nexus between the discovery sought and the pending claims; 3) there was real and factual evidence to which the petitioner could point in order to establish that the claims had a factual basis and were not purely speculative; and 4) the discovery request was narrowly tailored to obtain specific, identifiable things. The Court specifically emphasized

that petitioner supports his discovery request by pointing not only to Maloney's [the judge's] conviction for bribe taking in other cases, but also to additional evidence ... that lends support to his claim that Maloney was actually biased in petitioner's own case. That is, he presents "specific allegations" that his trial attorney, a former associate of Maloney's in a law practice that was familiar and comfortable with corruption, may have agreed to take this capital case to trial so quickly so that petitioner's conviction would deflect any suspicion that rigged Rosario and Chow cases might attract.

Bracy, 520 U.S., at 909 (emphasis in original).

The petitioner in Bracy could point to an actual parade of horribles in terms of specific and detailed facts with direct nexus

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the claim before the court, including: 1) Judge Maloney's conspiracy conviction; 2) the trial lawyer's having acted as Maloney's "bag man"; 3) Maloney's having appointed that lawyer to represent Bracy; 4) that lawyer's statement that he was ready to take the case to trial after only a few week's appointment; 5) the lawyer's failure to request a continuance to investigate any mitigation evidence for the penalty phase: 6) the lawyer's failure to call any witnesses at trial; 7) the fact that Bracy's trial was sandwiched in between two other murder trials in which the defense actually had bribed Maloney; and 8) a history of Maloney's having retaliated against those defendants that did not bribe him. Id., at 906-07.

In the case at bar, the petitioner has demonstrated the required nexus in some of the discovery requests, particularly those in which he seeks Brady material. In order to establish a Brady claim, the petitioner must demonstrate: 1) that the state suppressed evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; 2) that the evidence at issue was favorable to the accused, either as exculpatory or impeachment material; and 3) that the evidence was material to the outcome such that the petitioner was prejudiced by the suppression. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

As set forth below, petitioner has made the required showings for some of the discovery which he desires. In his motion, 23 petitioner seeks specific categories of discovery. These consist 24 almost exclusively of Brady, Giglio and Kyles material which 25 petitioner maintains he was denied prior to trial. Specifically, 26 petitioner seeks:

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- Norma Thompson Interview and FBI Informant Reports; Α.
- Art Taylor Interview Reports and Raw Notes; В.
- Records of Payments to Art Taylor; С.
- Impeachment Information Regarding the Testimony of D. Michael Dominguez;
- Impeachment Evidence regarding testimony of LAPD Ε. Detective Jack Holder;
- FBI Surveillance Records; F.
- Impeachment Evidence regarding Stewart Siegel; G.
- Depositions and Third Party Alibi Evidence. Η.

Petitioner seeks much of this discovery from Las Vegas police enforcement entities. and law The investigation of petitioner's case, however, was conducted not only by Las Vegas In addition to the Las Vegas area police authorities, entities. petitioner was being investigated by both the Los Angeles Police Department and the FBI for murder (in Nevada and California), arson (in Hawaii), drug trafficking, and other crimes. Indeed, when petitioner stood trial for the Nevada murders (the Tipton murders), the Clark County District Attorney (herein "CCDA") introduced into evidence during petitioner's penalty phase evidence tending to show his culpability in the California murders (the "Ninja" or Woodman murders), as well as various other facts which were the basis for 22 petitioner's federal RICO prosecution. Petitioner argues that all of the various investigations are inextricably bound together, and that all investigations up with the others.

As a result of the "cross-pollination" of the investigations and trials involving petitioner, he sought informal discovery from various divisions of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (herein "Metro"), numerous field offices of the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Postal Service, and various divisions of the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office.

Petitioner approached these entities in an informal manner, insofar as this case was designated an "open file" case by the Clark County District Attorney. As fully set forth below, the designation of this case as an "open file" matter, together with the integration of the California and federal prosecutions into the penalty phase, have generated substantial debate whether petitioner should have been given access to more documents.

#### 2. "Open File" Debate

The Clark County District Attorney's generally maintains an "open file" policy with respect to all capital murder cases, and this case was no exception. Indeed, the state court trial judge in this case entered an order directing that discovery should be given to the defense under that policy. See Exhibit 38, attached to petitioner's motion for leave to conduct discovery, Docket #73. What "open file" means is not entirely clear, but petitioner here contends that the term conveyed to his trial counsel that the CCDA's file was a complete representation of law enforcement's files and documents regarding the petitioner and the case against him, including all Brady, Giglio and Kyles material. Petitioner claims that because his case was "open file," his trial counsel was not obliged to look any further than the

CCDA's file for documents and evidence, the sort of which a prosecutor is compelled by law to disclose to the accused. Thus, all of the Brady, Giglio or Kyles material ought to reside in the "open file," according to petitioner, and trial counsel ought to have been able to rely on the completeness of that file. In the alternative, those documents which were not in the CCDA's file ought, in petitioner's view, to have been provided to the defense without any further request or demand by the petitioner's counsel.

Petitioner's reliance on the "open file" policy may have been misplaced. Asserting numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the petition, petitioner claims that his lawyers failed to conduct adequate investigation into a vast number of matters, including, but not limited to, mitigation evidence available from federal and state records, and potential Brady, Giglio and Kyles material. The particular twist which makes all of this difficult is as follows. Because the petitioners' lawyers were officially informed that this case was "open file," they may (or may not) have been within their rights to assume that all of the information which law enforcement officials should have disclosed to them (particularly Brady, Giglio and Kyles material) was actually located in the physical files of the district attorney.

Petitioner has presented evidence that the "open file" policy of the CCDA may have been neither "open" nor complete, much to the petitioner's detriment. In particular, petitioner has provided evidence from various other capital cases from our district, in which Nevada courts have found that the CCDA's office has failed to comply

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duties of disclosure in "open file" cases such as with its petitioner's. For example, in State v. Butler, Case No. C155791, the Eighth Judicial District Court vacated a capital sentence because of the prosecution's failure to disclose evidence, following a previous incident in which the state had deliberately failed to disclose, despite a pending request for complete discovery. Petitioner has cited almost ten other similar cases in which Nevada courts have either vacated capital and length non-capital sentences for failure to disclose by the CCDA, or in which members of the CCDA's office have admitted to serious defaults regarding their obligations regarding disclosure of documents in "open file" cases. See e.g., Jiminez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 620-21, 918 P.2d 687 (1996) (court finding that CCDA failed to comply with disclosure obligations regarding Giglio material and exculpatory evidence); Miranda v. McDaniel, Clark County Case No. C057788, Findings of fact and Conclusions of (2/13/96) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate inconsistencies in testimony of key prosecution witnesses, where inconsistences known to prosecution and information was disclosed partially by prosecution); Haberstroh v. McDaniel, Clark County Case No. C076013 (prosecution devoted much of the penalty phase in this death penalty case to the evidence suggesting petitioner had 22 | made a "shank" [a jail-made stabbing weapon]; prosecution failed to disclose evidence in possession of Clark County Detention Center that suggested the "shank" was in fact a digging tool, used by another inmate in an escape attempt, and which had then allegedly been hidden in petitioner's cell without his knowledge; prosecutor did not

disclose this evidence to defense, because he was himself unaware of it.) 1

This particular alleged failing may have significant The records custodians of the CCDA and of the LVMPD consequences. (herein "Metro") have given sworn testimony in the Haberstroh case to the effect that no institutional procedure exist by means of which Metro assures that all Kyles material in its possession is forwarded to the CCDA's office for review. Further, the CCDA's office apparently lacks an institutional procedure or policy by means of which it may ensure that its "open file" contains everything which it is required to disclose. This testimony is certainly relevant to the issue at hand, insofar as it demonstrates a pattern of organizational behavior under Fed. R. Evid. 406. See generally Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, Inc., 226 F.3d 489, 493 (4th Cir. 2000). An "open file" case which does not contain all of the material it is supposed to have is not only misleading, it may also violate the requirements of Kyles and its progeny. See generally Smith v. Secretary, New Mexico Dept. of Corrections, 50 F. 3d 801, 828 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 905 (1995).

Petitioner has alleged in this case that his own counsel was

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The court is aware that the cases cited herein and by petitioner in his brief are not reported authorities. As such, they may not be cited for their precedential value. Petitioner has has not cited them for that purpose, nor has the court relied on them in that role. Instead, petitioner has cited these cases as evidence of the alleged problems in transmission of critical documents between the outlying police enforcement agencies in Las Vegas and the Clark County District Attorney's office. Insofar as the cases are cited as evidence, they are not precedential, and do not violate any of the court's or the Ninth Circuit's proscriptions against citation of unpublished authorities.

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constitutionally ineffective, because he was apparently unaware that large volumes of discoverable material, even though arguably "open file," lay buried deep within the files of Metro, the LAPD or the FBI. Petitioner claims that at least some of this evidence was employed at trial to convict him, even though his counsel was previously unaware of its existence. Because trial counsel was unaware of this evidence prior to trial, there is simply no means by which petitioner may be assured that documents critical to the litigation of this case have been found. And, as a result, petitioner claims that there is simply no way to tell whether critical Brady, Giglio and Kyles material has been glossed over as in Haberstroh.

Adding to this problem, numerous documents and other discovery in the possession the California and federal authorities was never transmitted to the CCDA, nor placed in its "open file." Metro, the Los Angeles Police and the FBI cooperated substantially with each other throughout the investigation of petitioner. There are several documents attached to petitioner's motion for leave to conduct discovery in which the FBI officials in charge of their portion of the investigation compliment the Nevada and California police and 20 prosecution agencies for their assistance in the "joint" investigation Particularly telling is a series of letters from of petitioner. 22 William Webster, the Director of the FBI, to Metro detectives, in which Webster compliments the individual detectives for their outstanding work in this "joint" investigation. See, Exhibit #191-198. Respondents claim that the FBI and the LAPD were independent of the Nevada investigation, but these exhibits suggest the contrary.

Moreover, the sheer volume of documents and testimony introduced into evidence in Nevada that came from FBI and California sources proves that all three entities were operating as one, hybrid investigating agency. Petitioner has provided charts in support of his motion which detail the significant degree to which all of the evidence was used by all three investigating agencies. See Exhibits #176-178; #233-236.

Petitioner claims that the status of the "open file" material, and the degree to which documents were withheld alone constitutes "good cause" for discovery. First, the case was officially designated as an "open file" matter by the trial court. Petitioner ought to have been provided with that information in the possession of the prosecutor which was in their actual or constructive Moreover, petitioner has shown that the FBI and LAPD possession. investigations were part and parcel of the Nevada investigation, and that evidence which the FBI and LAPD had also ought to have been produced to petitioner.

Petitioner's first discovery request is that he be allowed to copy all of the "open file" material in the possession of the CCDA. Since this case was originally designated an "open file" matter by the trial court, there seems to be no logical reason that the petitioner should be prevented from having access to all of the "open file" 22 materials in the CCDA's possession. Indeed, the respondents do not object to this request, and the court shall allow this discovery as

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requested and stipulated to by respondents.2

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#### 3. Lack of Exhaustion of Claims.

Notwithstanding the showing of "good cause" which may be promoted by the "open file" evidence, it appears that discovery cannot be had for claims that do not relate to an exhausted claim for relief. Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Nicolaus), 98 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1233 (1997); McDaniel v. U.S. District Court, (Jones), 127 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1997); Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Hill), 120 F.3d 927, 928 (9th Cir. 1997). In Nicolaus, for example, the Circuit vacated by means of mandamus a district court's order granting a pre-petition discovery request. Noting specifically the impropriety of granting a discovery request upon unverified, unspecific allegations, the Circuit concluded that

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. . . pre-petition discovery is impermissible for at least four reasons. First, a prisoner must outline factual allegations in a petition before the district court will be able to determine the propriety of the discovery. the Supreme Court stated in Harris v. Nelson, (1969), which established 394 U.S. 286 ... the basis for Rule 6: "In appropriate circumstances, a district court, confronted by a petition for relief, may use or authorize the use of suitable discovery procedures." ... In sum, we hold that the district court erred in granting Nicolaus' discovery request before Nicolaus presented specific allegations in the

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The court emphasizes that all that is allowed under this request is an exact duplicate of that which existed in the CCDA's "open file." The CCDA is obliged under this request to make available for inspection and copying its entire and complete file as it exists today, and should make any changes from the file at the time of trial readily apparent.

#### form of a verified petition.

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Nicolaus, supra, 98 F.3d at 1106-07 (emphasis added). If pre-petition discovery is not allowable unless the petitioner has made specific allegations by means of which the district court may judge the propriety of the discovery, then surely post-petition discovery (such as that requested here) is equally improper. Absent specific allegations, the district court cannot determine whether the discovery requests are the sort of "specific allegations before the court," which, "if the facts are fully developed, ... demonstrate that [the petitioner] is ... entitled to relief... ." Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-909.

The court concludes that discovery in federal habeas cases extends only to currently exhausted claims. As the Circuit noted in Hill, "[u]ntil [a petitioner] has filed a federal habeas petition on an exhausted claim, he cannot avail himself of Rule 6 discovery." Hill, supra, 120 F.3d at 928 (quoting Nicolaus, 98 F.3d at 1109). Aside from all of the obvious reasons of comity and federal-state judicial balance for requiring exhaustion prior to granting Rule 6 discovery, it appears to the Court that Bracy and Rule 6 themselves compel this result.

There is no dispute that "a habeas petitioner, unlike the civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course." Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. supra, at 908 (1997). Only if a petitioner can demonstrate, by means of a showing of "... specific allegations before the court ... that the petitioner

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may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief," is it "the duty of the courts to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry. "Bracy, supra, and Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299, (1969))(emphasis added).

This analysis raises the following question: "How is it possible for a habeas petitioner to be entitled to relief on an unexhausted claim?" The answer is that he is not. Perhaps the most fundamental principle of habeas litigation is that all claims for relief must be exhausted, or the federal courts cannot grant relief on them. 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A). So sacrosanct is this principle, that the federal courts are obliged to dismiss an entire petition if it contains even one unexhausted claim. Id; Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). This being the case, can a federal court grant discovery on a claim, for which the petitioner is not entitled to relief by virtue of that claim's lack of exhaustion? The Bracy case itself compels the answer: the court cannot allow discovery unexhausted claim, for the petitioner cannot demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on a claim that is not exhausted.

The court shall therefore not grant the wide-ranging discovery sought by petitioner with respect to claims that he has not 22 | exhausted in state court. To do so would undermine the exhaustion requirement, which is based on the doctrine of federal-state comity, and which is one of the foundational prerequisites of a federal habeas

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>The District Court may <u>deny</u> relief on an unexhausted claim. 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(2). It merely cannot grant relief on an unexhausted claim.

corpus petition. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 432-34 (2000): "The state court is the appropriate forum for resolution of factual issues in the first instance, and creating incentives for the deferral of fact-finding to later federal-court proceedings can only degrade the accuracy and efficiency of judicial proceedings."

The case law indicates that the question of exhaustion of claims remains an important aspect of this court's discretion in considering discovery requests under Rule 6. The court will exercise that discretion to deny the discovery that petitioner seeks on claims that he not yet exhausted in state court.

It is the intersection of the exhaustion principle with the existing claims in this case which causes difficulties to arise. As noted above, all of the existing claims in the petition are, in fact, fully exhausted in state court. Only some of the discovery requests, however, relate to one of the existing, exhausted claims in the petition.

The current petition consists of the following, fully exhausted claims:

Claim #1. That petitioner's conviction and sentence violate his 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination. In specific, the petitioner contends that statements made by the prosecutor implicated the petitioner's right to remain silent. During closing argument, the

prosecution allegedly commented on the petitioner's right to remain silent, observing that petitioner left out of his allocution various critical facts. Because petitioner did not testify in the merits of his guilt phase, he claims that the prosecution's comment on his allocution constitutes a violation of his right to remain silent.

Claim #2. That petitioner's conviction and sentence violate his 8th and 14th Amendment due process of law and his rights to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, because his sentence was a result of arbitrary and capricious standards. Petitioner contends here that the state was allowed to utilize both burglary and robbery as separate aggravating circumstances, despite the fact that both crimes were based upon the same alleged acts. In petitioner's view, such "stacking" of the offenses results in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.

Claim #3. That petitioner's conviction and sentence violate his

5th and 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment rights to due process of law, in
that the joint prosecution team failed to collect and
preserve specific, critical evidence, or intentionally
destroyed exculpatory evidence during the
investigation. A crucial aspect to the defense was

the alibi testimony of witnesses Susan Hines and Lawrence Ettinger, specifically that on December 11, 1985, after leaving Stewart Bell's office, petitioner, Ettinger and Hines had gone to the New York deli for this evidence had been Ιf something to eat. sufficiently documented authorities, by the the petitioner would have had much stronger alibi evidence for the time during which the crimes were committed.

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Claim #4. That petitioner's conviction and sentence violate his 8th and 14th Amendment rights in that he was prevented from using residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance. Petitioner submitted a jury instruction on mitigating circumstances that included lingering or residual doubt as mitigation. The trial court refused this instruction, and instead instructed the jury using the two statutory mitigating circumstances and

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Claim #5. That petitioner's conviction and sentence violate his 4th and 14th Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches, seizures, intrusions and invasions of privacy. In this claim, the petitioner argues that numerous irregularities in the electronic

circumstances"

surveillance infected the conduct of the investigating parties. The illegal conduct, which was known to trial counsel, was raised on trial and on direct appeal from the conviction and sentence.

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Claim #6. That petitioner's conviction and sentence violate his 6th Amendment to reasonably effective assistance of counsel at trial, as well as his 14th Amendment right to a fair trial and due process of law. Petitioner identifies two intertwined areas which consist of the trial counsel's failures, specifically: the failure to prepare for trial and present available evidence; and the inability or failure to obtain evidence necessary to prepare present a full and adequate defense on petitioner's behalf. The errors of counsel consist of the following: (a) the failure to call Raymond Jackson; (b) the failure to identify Dominguez as the Tipton murderer; (c) the failure to call Dominguez's associates to identify him and Danielson the actual murderers; and (d) the failure to contact witnesses in order to impeach Timothy Catt's testimony.

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Claim #7. That petitioner's conviction and sentence violate his  $5^{\rm th}$  and  $14^{\rm th}$  Amendment rights, based upon the withholding of substantial exculpatory materials

until long after his Nevada trial. Petitioner claims that Las Vegas homicide detectives worked hand-in-hand with both the FBI and the Los Angeles Police Department to develop evidence against petitioner in the Nevada murders as well as the California cases. particular, petitioner claims that evidence developed by the prosecution about Art Taylor's meeting with petitioner was critical to the theory of The Taylor evidence could have supported defense. petitioner's alibi that he was chauffeuring Hines and Ettinger around Las Vegas at the time of the Tipton murders.

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Claim #8. That petitioner's conviction and sentence violate his 5th and 14th Amendment rights to the presumption of innocence and due process, and his right to a fundamentally fair trial. In petitioner's view, the state failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence presented by the state, in petitioner's view, was more consistent with his innocence than with this guilt. There were no eyewitnesses to the murders, and no murder weapon was ever recovered. Further, nothing discovered at the Tipton residence or observed outside of the Tipton home directly linked the petitioner to the murders. If anything, petitioner claims the evidence arguably

pointed to Michael Dominguez, not him. Petitioner observes that the only evidence tied him to the homicides was that of accomplice turned informant Michael Dominguez and petitioner's alleged confession as recollected by Catt.

Claim #9. That petitioner's conviction and sentence violate his

14<sup>th</sup> Amendment right to due process and a fair trial.

In this regard, petitioner claims improper and prejudicial evidence was introduced during trial.

Among the illegal evidence improperly permitted by the trial court was the following:

- (A) in July, 1985, Michael Dominguez attempted to kill Craig Maraldo and Cheryl McDowell, allegedly at the petitioner's request. Ballistics results showed that same .22 caliber shots fired in the Maraldo crime matched those found at the Tipton residence;
- (B) petitioner had sold an ounce of cocaine to Dominguez in the past, and Dominguez attempted to kill Maraldo in order to pay off his cocaine debt to petitioner;
- (C) petitioner's participation in a burglary and robbery of Mr. Godfrey included torture by applying pliers to the victim's fingernails, and

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dunking him into a tub of water to get him to disclose were his money was kept; and

(D) petitioner threatened Timothy Catt and his girlfriend to refrain from cooperating with the authorities about the jewelry in the petitioner's possession.

In the petitioner's view, the incidents detailed above were evidence of other bad acts, and failed to meet the test of admissibility. Petitioner claims his conviction was infected with constitutional error, as such "character" evidence prevents adequate cross-examination of witnesses to the prior events.

That petitioner's conviction and sentence Claim #10. violate his 5th and 14th Amendment right to the presumption of innocence, due process of law, and a fair trial, in that the state intentionally violated a pretrial ruling and elicited evidence of the Woodman Before trial commenced, the murders in California. court made specific rulings that the state could not introduce testimony concerning the Woodman murders against the petitioner during the guilt phase of the The prosecution intentionally violated this trial. action by eliciting from detective Dillard evidence that the petitioner was under suspicion for the Woodman murderers in California.

That petitioner's conviction and sentence Claim #11. violate his 14th Amendment right to due process and a refused fair trial, because the trial court petitioner's request for continuances. Petitioner argued that he was being denied discovery and that had previously located that he witnesses, interviewed, had recently become unavailable to him. As result, petitioner argued for continuances of trial which the state trial court denied.

That petitioner's conviction and sentence Claim #12. violate his 8th and 14th Amendment rights to due process and freedom from the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, because improper evidence was admitted during the petitioner's penalty phase. The state introduced considerable testimony concerning the charges pending against petitioner in California. This testimony was elicited from Los Angeles County Police Department Holder and consisted of Detective hearsay and information during his secondhand gathered investigation.

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Claim #13. That petitioner's conviction and sentence violate his 5th and 14th Amendments rights to due process and a fair trial by the continued concealment exculpatory evidence. particular, of In the

petitioner argued that the veracity of informant Steward Siegel was crucial to numerous search warrants and wiretaps that were secured by the prosecution. Petitioner has uncovered evidence suggesting that Steward Siegel's reliability is subject to question. If reliance upon Siegel could be shown to be unfounded, the evidence From Siegel used to convict petitioner could arguably be considered unreliable.

Claim #14. That petitioner's conviction and sentence violate his 4<sup>th</sup> Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioner argues that the evidence seized in violation of his fourth amendment rights with respect to the pen registers constitutes constitutional error and should result in the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

#### 4. Discussion of Specific Requests

With these principles in mind, the Court has reviewed each of the petitioner's specific discovery requests. In addition, the Court has reviewed all of the exhibits petitioner has supplied in support of his motion for leave to conduct discovery. Based upon that review, the Court shall grant and the deny the requests as set forth below.

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### A. Norma Thompson Interview and FBI Informant Reports.

Petitioner first seeks interview and FBI informant reports for Norma Thompson, a friend of the petitioner who lives in New Jersey.

At trial, the prosecution introduced the testimony of Timothy Catt. Catt testified that during the second week of January, 1986, petitioner came to his house, showed him the Tipton jewelry and threatened him into silence. Catt also testified that petitioner admitted to the Tipton homicides while they sat in Catt's car outside of the Town Pump Liquor Store in Las Vegas on January 28<sup>th</sup> or 29<sup>th</sup>.

Petitioner claims Catt's testimony was false, for FBI reports establish that petitioner was on the East coast in January, 1986. On March 18th, 1986, FBI agents interviewed Norma Thompson. During her interview, Ms. Thompson advised the FBI that petitioner was in New Jersey and Philadelphia between January 1st through January 12th, and in New Jersey again from January 28th through January 30th. In petitioner's view, these reports are Brady material, and ought to have been produced to the petitioner as part of any "open file" proceeding.

In addition, petitioner claims that his presence in New Jersey and Philadelphia during the critical time periods is further corroborated by informant interview reports, all of which were withheld from petitioner during the Nevada proceedings. Each of these documents is a report prepared by FBI Agent Livingston from the

Newark, New Jersey field office. In these reports, Livingston reports the petitioner's location during the critical time frames in January, 1986 as either Newark, New Jersey, or Philadelphia. Petitioner maintains that none of these documents was produced to him during "open file" proceedings.

These documents consist of Brady material in petitioner's view, for, if petitioner was in Newark or Philadelphia as the Livingston reports suggest, it is unlikely that he could also have been in Las Vegas during the second week of January, 1986 threatening Catt and confessing murder to him. The documents also consist of Giglio material, for Catt's testimony could have been effectively cross-examined if petitioner's counsel had possession of the documents during trial.

It appears that this evidence passes all three of the Brady tests. First, it seems that the prosecution has, either willfully or inadvertently, suppressed this information, which otherwise ought to have been produced to petitioner. Further, the evidence was certainly favorable to petitioner, for it tends to show that he was not in Las Vegas during the critical time periods in question, and could therefore not have committed the Tipton murders. Likewise, this evidence was material to petitioner's case, for he raised an alibit defense, and the suppressed evidence related directly to his alibit claim. As such, this evidence ought to have been produced under Brady.

Unfortunately for petitioner, none of this requested discovery relates directly to an exhausted claim in the petition.

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Although there are claims in the petition which are founded upon Brady, Giglio and Kyles, none of those claims mentions even remotely the facts set forth above. These fact issues cannot be "exhausted," for they have yet to be "fairly presented" to the state supreme court for its decision. Exhaustion is an element of the "good cause" analysis, for, if the claim to which the discovery relates is not exhausted, it is not a claim for which relief could be granted, and, therefore, cannot give rise to "good cause" under either Rule 6 or Bracy. Because this discovery fails to relate to an exhausted claim, the discovery shall not be allowed.

#### Art Taylor Interview Reports and Raw Notes. В.

At trial, petitioner sought to establish an alibi based upon his driving Ettinger and Hines to and from a meeting with attorney Stewart Bell. The prosecution made a two-pronged attack on the alibi. First, the prosecution contended that petitioner did not drive on the day of the Tipton murders, since the only proof that he did came from Susan Hines. The prosecution strongly suggested Hines was lying to protect petitioner because she was his paramour. Second, the prosecution also attacked the timing of the proposed alibi. Ιf petitioner drove Hines and Ettinger to the meeting as suggested, they left Bell's office no later than 10:30 a.m. Even if this were true, 22 | according to the prosecution, petitioner then still had plenty of time to drive to Ettinger's house, get a cup of coffee, and then make it to the Tipton house to commit the murders at 11:00 a.m.

Both arguments could be attacked by the information provided by a paid government informant, Art Taylor. Taylor reported to FBI

Agent Livingston that petitioner was with him on the morning of the Tipton murders. Taylor reported that petitioner was driving Ettinger's Cadillac and that they went together to a bank to cash a check. While at the bank, Taylor reported that petitioner received a telephonic page to return to a lawyer's office to pick up Hines and Ettinger. After he received the page, Taylor said, petitioner drove him back to Taylor's shop and then left for the lawyer's office, Taylor testified in the California proceedings that it would have taken 15-20 minutes to drive to Bell's office after petitioner received the page.

This information was never disclosed to petitioner during the "open file" proceedings prior to trial. Petitioner received some of the information post-conviction, during petitioner's federal RICO prosecution. According to petitioner, certain "raw notes" were even more explicit regarding Taylor's comments about petitioner's activities.

This requested discovery passes all three of the Brady tests. There seems no doubt that the prosecution has, either willfully or inadvertently, refused to produce this information, which otherwise ought to have been produced to petitioner. The evidence was certainly favorable to petitioner, for it tends to support his alibicaim. If the jury had believed petitioner's alibi, it may have found that he was physically unable to have committed the Tipton murders. Furthermore, petitioner's defense rested partly on an alibi, and the suppressed evidence was material to his defense. As such, this evidence ought to have been produced under Brady.

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This evidence also relates directly to exhausted claims in the petition. Specifically, in Claims Three and Seven of the petition, petitioner argues that the prosecution had evidence from Art Taylor which related to petitioner's contacts with Susan Hines and Larry Ettinger on the day of the Tipton murders. That this evidence was withheld, petitioner further claims, amounts to error of constitutional magnitude. The discovery which petitioner now seeks is related directly to an exhausted claim for relief, and petitioner ought to be allowed the discovery which he seeks.

#### C. Records of Payments to Art Taylor.

During the penalty phase of the Nevada murder trial, prosecutors called LAPD Detective Jack Holder to provide a hearsay summary of the California Woodman murder investigations. In that testimony, Holder offered the hearsay statement of Art Taylor to place petitioner in Los Angeles on the afternoon and evening of the Woodman killings. Petitioner's attorneys introduced evidence that placed petitioner in a divorce hearing in Las Vegas on that same morning, but that information could not directly rebut Taylor's statements about petitioner's whereabouts in the afternoon and evening of the same day. Despite petitioner's presence in Las Vegas in the morning, it still would have been possible for him to have traveled to Los Angeles in the afternoon.

Apparently, Art Taylor had been paid \$10,000 for the information which he had provided against petitioner. Petitioner claims that his attorneys were unaware at trial of the fact that Taylor had received any money at all, much less an amount such as

\$10,000. By virtue of the substantial bias which could have arisen from payments of such size to Taylor, petitioner claims that this Giglio material ought to have been disclosed prior to trial.

As with the previous discovery regarding Art Taylor, this evidence also constitutes Brady and Giglio material. Petitioner was not informed of the existence of payments to Taylor, nor their amount, prior to trial. Without question, counsel would have used this information to impeach Taylor's statements regarding petitioner's whereabouts on the date of the murder. And, it seems to the Court that a payment of \$10,000 to any witness for his testimony could have a substantial impact on the believability of that witness.

As the with note of the Taylor interviews, these requests also relate to claims Three and Seven of the petition. These claims all deal with petitioner's alibi, and this evidence would have a significant impact on petitioner's alibi claims. These requests relate to an exhausted claim, and shall be allowed.

## D. Giglio Material Regarding Michael Dominguez' Testimony.

Dominguez testified that at approximately 1:30 p.m. on the day of the Tipton murders, he saw a .22 caliber weapon on the floorboard of petitioner's car. Dominguez also testified that this was the same weapon that he had personally used in a burglary and attempted homicide of Craig Maraldo and Cheryl McDowell, which he had committed months earlier. Cartridges removed from the scene of the Maraldo attempted homicide matched those recovered from the Tipton murders. Petitioner's attorneys attempted to diffuse Dominguez'

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testimony, arguing that he was lying, and that he was the actual perpetrator of the Tipton murders because he had admitted possession and prior use of the apparent murder during weapon the Maraldo/McDowell crimes.

In efforts to corroborate statements made by Dominguez during their investigations, the FBI investigated these and other claims which Dominguez had made. Specifically, Dominguez claimed that be had committed an arson in Texas at the petitioner's direction. Although this claims was investigated, the FBI never uncovered any evidence which corroborated this claim in any significant detail. None of this evidence was ever provided to petitioner during or prior to trial.

This evidence does not qualify as Brady material. Ιt appears that the FBI may never have told the CCDA or Metro about the existence of the evidence, which would qualify as inadvertent suppression of the material under Brady. As noted herein, the court agrees with petitioner that the FBI, Los Angeles County Police and Las Vegas authorities were a "joint" team, at least for purposes of prosecution. Much inculpatory evidence which the CCDA used to convict petitioner was provided by either the FBI or the Los Angles authorities; the same ought to have been true of any exculpatory 22 | evidence in the possession of those parties as well.

In this case, however, the court is at a loss to understand why the possibility that Dominguez may have lied about having committed an arson in Texas is of substantial materiality in this That Dominguez may have misrepresented the truth to the FBI case.

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about an arson unrelated to the facts of this case simply does not rise to the level of materiality required by Brady. If, for example, the arson had been that which petitioner allegedly solicited in Maui (and which was a predicate act in his RICO trial), Dominguez' alleged lack of truthfulness may have had some degree of materiality to this That he may have lied to the FBI about an unrelated arson in Texas, however, does not provide sufficient grist for the Brady mill here. The Court will therefore deny petitioner's motion with respect to this discovery request.

#### Giglio Material Regarding LAPD Detective Jack Holder.

Detective Holder was the conduit through which much of the evidence of the California Woodman murders was introduced in the Nevada case. His hearsay summary was offered during the Nevada penalty phase, but petitioner claims his cross examination was substantially hindered because Holder could not recall inconsistences within the hearsay declarants' statements, or he minimized those inconsistencies to fit his testimony. In addition, petitioner alleges that the day before the Nevada trial began, Holder signed a book contract with an author for the purposes of writing about his involvement in the Woodman murder case. As part of that deal, Holder 22 | received a \$500 advance and a promise of future royalties. existence of this contract and its benefits were not disclosed to the defense during or prior to trial. As a result, petitioner never had an opportunity to examine Holder on any bias he might have developed and the motive for making the case against petitioner appear stronger

than the available evidence.

This appears to be Brady material. There seems no dispute that this material was not provided to petitioner until well after the trial was complete. Certainly, the fact that a crucial witness was authoring a book about the subject matter of his testimony would be useful to the petitioner as impeachment material, as a jury could find that the witness had shaded his testimony in order to make the book more interesting and saleable. Moreover, the subject matter of Holder's testimony was of great significance. In the penalty phase of a capital murder trial, evidence that the defendant had only recently committed another murder (and a murder for hire, at that) could have a substantial impact on the jury's sentencing decisions.

Once again, however, this evidence does not relate directly to an exhausted claim in the petition. The closest claim in the petition is Claim 12. There, petitioner alleges that his sentence of death was based upon Holder's uncorroborated hearsay testimony of the California Woodman homicides. Because this was evidence of prior "bad acts" was complete hearsay, petitioner had no means of challenging the evidence as it related to the detective. Nowhere in this claim, however, does petitioner mention the fact that Holder had signed a book deal prior to his trial. Likewise, allegations regarding Holder's book deal are absent from the remainder of the petition. This discovery request therefore fails for lack of association with a claim exhausted in state court.

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#### F. FBI Surveillance Records.

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As the Nevada trial progressed, FBI Special Agent Donn Owens testified that he personally tracked petitioner at least 200 times between March 1985 and March 1986. Based upon this pattern of surveillance, Owens testified regarding certain driving patterns of the petitioner, such as his tendency to speed and run red lights, which allegedly made possible petitioner's trip to the Tipton house at the alleged murder time (11:00 a.m.) on December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1985. The prosecution did not produce records for all of the 200 or more days on which Owens had "staked-out" petitioner. Petitioner's counsel requested production of all of these surveillance records, but the trial court denied the request.

As of this date, petitioner still has not received any information regarding Owen's surveillance of petitioner. Petitioner has managed to garner from all pertinent sources (the Nevada and California cases, the ongoing FOIA litigation and the RICO prosecutions), the fact that Owens was positioned to observe petitioner's driving habits for a total of only five days. Either a significant amount of surveillance information was withheld from petitioner prior to and during trial, or Owens' testimony regarding the number of times which he had tracked petitioner itself was false.

As with the previous request, this discovery material cannot be associated with a claim which has been exhausted in state court. There is no claim in the petition to which Owen's surveillance itself is directly related. Likewise, the fact that Owen himself may have misrepresented the actual number of time he observed petitioner does

not appear in the current variant of the habeas corpus petition. This claim therefore also fails for lack of exhaustion in state court.

#### G. Impeachment Evidence regarding Steward Siegel.

Prior to trial, prosecutors represented that Steward Siegel was a government informant that had supplied information in the case. During the penalty phase, Detective Holder of the LAPD testified regarding certain hearsay statements of Siegel. Holder either failed to relate, or the prosecutor failed to elicit certain critical impeachment evidence regarding Siegel's testimony.

For example, during the FOIA litigation, petitioner uncovered an FBI teletype, dated October 4<sup>th</sup>, 1985, in which Siegel was described as a "man without integrity which reflects upon his morals." This document was located in Siegel's FBI file, and was produced in redacted form as a result of the FOIA litigation.

Also located in Siegel's FBI file, and produced in redacted form to petitioner in the FOIA litigation, was an FBI teletype dated September 10<sup>th</sup>, 1985. The document relates that

"[i]n view of the past prior difficulties involved in the operation of captioned individual (Siegel) as an informant for the Tampa Division and also in view of the current investigation being conducted into alleged illegal activities concerning his association with Bingo games in the San Diego Division, FBIHQ [Headquarters] denies Las Vegas request to utilize captioned individual as an informant."

A further FBI memo, dated August 31<sup>st</sup>, 1977, reveals that "Atlantic City had no interest in Siegel and that in [the FBI's] opinion he was possibly using the Bureau for his own interests." This

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redacted document was also revealed to petitioner during the FOIA Yet another such FBI memo, dated January 1st, 1976, litigation. uncovered during the FOIA litigation, stated that "Siegel is so unreliable and would do or say anything to weasel out of appearing in court or going to trial in any matter."

This is Brady material. For whatever reason, the federal authorities suppressed this evidence until the petitioner himself uncovered it during the course of the FOIA litigation. This material would have been of significant use to petitioner during trial, for he could have used it to attack Holder's testimony during the penalty phase. At a minimum, petitioner could have shown the jury that the FBI believed Siegel to be highly untrustworthy, and that he was using the FBI for his own purposes. Such evidence could have had a significant impact on the jury, for they might have then disregarded at least that portion of Holder's testimony which related to Siegel. Accordingly, this material ought to have been produced to petitioner prior to trial.

This discovery request relates directly to two fully exhausted claim in the petition. As noted above, claim 12 presents petitioners's argument that Holder's testimony is constitutionally infirm because he could not cross-examine any of the hearsay 22 declarants, such as Siegel. In claim 13, petitioner claims that the truthfulness of Siegel was critical to numerous warrants and wiretaps in the case, and that much of the evidence used to convict petitioner could be found inadmissible if the truth regarding Siegel's lack of reliability had been known. Petitioner shall therefore be allowed to

serve these discovery requests.

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#### Additional Discovery Requests **H**.

In addition to these requests petitioner has made further additional requests that may be grouped into three major areas: the depositions of all prosecutors in the case; records from third parties concerning petitioner's alibi; and records from third parties concerning alternative suspects.

#### Law Enforcement Depos.

As to the first of these requests, petitioner seeks leave to conduct depositions of the prosecutors who tried the case against him, as well as the lead law enforcement officers from Metro, the FBI and LAPD. These individuals are: Mel Harmon; Brad Jerbic; James Livingston; Jerome Doherty; Tom Dillard; Robert Leonard; Jack Holder; and Richard Crotsley. Petitioner claims that "good cause" has been established to depose these individuals based upon the status of the "open file" dispute in Clark County.

The court does not consider the "open file" controversy alone to be sufficient to give rise to good cause in and of itself. Certainly, the CCDA's, the FBI's and the LAPD's alleged failure to coordinate documents and provide Brady or Giglio material to the petitioner is evidence which suggests the existence of good cause. But, as in the Bracy case, evidence of generalized malfeasance alone The petitioner must show exactly how that is not sufficient. malfeasance has negatively affected his client. Thus, in this case, 25 petitioner has demonstrated that evidence regarding Art Taylor has been withheld from him, and that that evidence relates to an exhausted

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claim in the petition. As such, he shall be allowed to serve the subpoenas regarding the Art Taylor discovery.

With respect to these depositions, however, petitioner has not limited their scope in any way. He claims that the "open file" controversy establishes good cause, and that he should be allowed to depose these law enforcement officials without limitation. This argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, there is no indication that the proposed examination relates in any way to an exhausted claim in the petition. As noted above, all discovery must relate to an exhausted claim, or it cannot qualify as having qualified for "good cause." With respect to these depositions, none of them is related specifically to any claim in the petition, and they cannot therefore be considered to be exhausted.

Moreover, these depositions do not appear to be related to any specific items of evidence or claim in the petition. The court has consented to allow petitioner's request to subpoena the CCDA's "open file" records to determine the exact contents of the CCDA files. That discovery is, by its very nature, limited to that which is present in the CCDA files. All that the district attorney must do is make its files (as they currently exist) available to petitioner for inspection and copying. With respect to these depositions, petitioner has not limited the scope or nature of the proposed examination. This sort of wide-open discovery was specifically discounted in the Bracy case, in which the Court declared that, among other things, discovery requests had to be narrowly tailored to obtain specific, identifiable things. Bracy, supra, 520 U.S. at 909. These depositions will

therefore not be allowed.

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#### ii. Third Party Alibi Evidence

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Petitioner next seeks leave to conduct discovery of certain third parties as to any evidence they may have that supports petitioner's alibi claim. First, petitioner seeks leave to subpoena Michael's Gourmet Steaks and Fine Seafood (Exhibit 351), seeking employment records regarding the victim, James Meyers. Petitioner seeks records relating to other deliveries that Meyers may have made the morning of the murder, as well as for the purpose of further refining the exact time of the murders.

Petitioner also seeks to subpoena telephone records from Sprint Telephone (Exhibit 350), seeking the records of David Tipton, the husband of the victim, Bobbi Tipton, for calls made to the Tipton residence on the date of the murder.

Also sought is a subpoena for Wells Fargo Bank (Exhibit 349), the successor bank to First Interstate Bank, the institution in which petitioner alleged cashed a check for petitioner or Mr. Taylor on the morning of the murders. To the extent that documents still exist, a time stamp may further define the time when petitioner and Taylor were in the bank. Wells Fargo is also the successor institution to Continental Bank, the bank in which Hines, Ettinger and 22 petitioner allegedly stopped on their way to the meeting at the attorney's office. Again, petitioner hopes that a time stamp may exist, which may further define the exact time when these individuals were at the bank.

Petitioner also seeks information regarding Bill Keeton, a

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former Metro police officer who issued the check cashed by Mr. Taylor and petitioner on the morning of the Tipton murders, December 11th, 1985. Keeton was disciplined by Metro for his conduct involving petitioner, and it is possible that the bank's and/or Metro's records may contain information regarding the check which was cashed.

It appears to the court that all of this discovery should be allowed. First, the material relates directly to exhausted claims Specifically, issues regarding petitioner's in the petition. whereabouts on the day of the Tipton murder, the cashing of checks and banks, and telephone calls were raised in claims Three, Six and Seven The proposed discovery thus relates to exhausted of the petition. claims in the petition and is not subject to fault on that count.

Likewise, there is independent "good cause" to allow this discovery to go forward. Although the material in this case does not appear to have been withheld by the prosecution, either intentionally or negligently, and would therefore not qualify as Brady evidence, it nonetheless all falls within the Bracy guidelines for "good cause" discovery.

First, the discovery requested is grounded in specific and demonstrable facts. The material sought generally consists of banking records which, in all likelihood, have been transferred to either microfilm or computer records and archived. As such, the material is very identifiable and demonstrable. Second, there is a logical and direct nexus between the discovery sought and the pending claims. If 25 petitioner can locate any of the documents which he seeks, they may 26 very well help establish his alibi claim to a degree greater than has

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been before demonstrated. Moreover, these claims do not appear to be purely speculative. Although the prosecution successfully defeated the alibi claim at trial, there was a least "some evidence" supporting the alibi claim, and it therefore cannot be said to be purely Finally, these specific discovery requests have been speculative. narrowly tailored to obtain specific, identifiable things. As opposed to many of the petitioner's other discovery requests (more about this later), these four claims are narrowly tailored to seek out specific items, and will therefore be allowed.

# iii. Third Party Alternative Suspect Records

Petitioner here seeks leave to subpoena the Department of the Interior, Steve Stein and Stuart Bell for information relating to alternative suspects. The Department of the Interior investigated a boating accident which allegedly occurred on January 31st, 1986, involving Kelly Danielson and Laurence O'Dell, These men were 16 associates of Mr. Dominguez, and someone fitting the description of Mr. Danielson was seen in the vicinity of the Tipton home on the morning of the murders (December 11th, 1985). Further, Danielson paid a visit to District Attorney Rex Bell in January sometime prior to the marine incident, ostensibly for social purposes.

This material relates only very tangentially to one of the exhausted claims in the petition. In claim Six, petitioner accuses 23 his trial counsel of ineffectively representing him during the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Petitioner alleges that his lawyers ought to have explored more deeply the existence of other potential suspects, such as Dominguez and Danielson. But this claim makes no

mention of a boating accident or of a social call by Danielson to Rex Bell. Yet, giving the petitioner the benefit of the doubt, it would seem that these discovery requests could relate to this claim in the petition.

"good cause" analysis. First, although the requests are grounded in specific and demonstrable facts, there does not appear to be a logical and direct nexus between the discovery regarding the boating accident sought and the pending claims. Whether O'Dell and Danielson were involved in a boating accident of January 31st, 1986 seems to have little to do with their location on the morning of December 11th, 1985. Likewise, whether Danielson visited Rex Bell during January, 1986, does not have any impact on his potential as an alternative suspect in the Tipton murder. Accordingly, the court concludes that these requests fail to establish "good cause" under Bracy, and the requests shall, for that reason, be denied.

#### I. Identification and Formulation of Subpoenas.

The court has concluded that petitioner ought to be allowed to serve the discovery requests identified above as:

- B. Art Taylor Interview Reports and Raw Notes;
- C. Records of Payments to Art Taylor;
- G. Impeachment Material of Steward Siegel; andH(ii). Third Party Alibi Evidence.

Unfortunately, with the exception of category H(ii), petitioner has failed to identify with any degree of reliable

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specificity which of the dozens of subpoenas relate to these specific discovery requests. In category H(ii), for example, petitioner has identified Exhibit #351 to be served on Michael's Fine Steaks and Seafoods. This discovery request and subpoena request employment and delivery records of James Meyers regarding the date of the Tipton murders, in order that petitioner might refine the exact time of the murders on December 11th, 1985. The court has reviewed the subpoena, and finds that it is acceptable in form and content.

Petitioner has failed to identify which proposed subpoenas correspond with the discovery requests which the court has granted. Until such time as petitioner can specifically pair a subpoena (and its corresponding (Exhibit number) with the discovery which the court has granted above, the court is unable to authorize the issuance of any subpoenas for discovery. Accordingly, the court shall allow the petitioner a short period of time within which to correlate the existing exhibits/subpoenas with the allowed discovery. Petitioner may do this by means of a short set of points and authorities, in which the specific exhibit attached to the motion is associated by exhibit number with discovery claims B, C, G and H(ii).

Respondent should be allowed a short period of time within which to comment on the petitioner's filing, in order to point out to 22 | the court any proposed subpoenas which do not readily relate to the discovery requests which the court has actually authorized.

As a final matter, the court notes that petitioner's subpoenas generally cast extremely broad nets. And, while Rule 26(b) discovery generally tends to be inclusive, rather than exclusive,

petitioner must bear in mind that this discovery is borne out under the auspices of Rule 6 of the Habeas Rules and the "good cause" case law which Bracy begot. As such, petitioner's discovery requests ought to be tailored as narrowly as possible to ferret out only those specific items that petitioner seeks. Discovery requests which seek out every possible document in the respondents' possession, and which contain lengthy definitions of "document" and other such obvious terms will fall under jaundiced eyes. The court has allowed specific categories of discovery, and the petitioner's proposed subpoenas should limit themselves as narrowly as possible to those documents, items and things which fall into those categories. Therefore, petitioner should use this opportunity to tailor the subpoenas as narrowly as possible so as to comply with Bracy's requirement of specificity.

## 5. Conclusion

Petitioner is entitled to some, but not all of the discovery which he seeks. In addition, he is obliged to file a supplemental document with the court in which he specifically identifies those subpoenas and/or exhibits which he contends would be those served pursuant to the court's order granting discovery. Concurrently with that document, petitioner ought to utilize the opportunity to review and review those subpoenas which are not specifically tailored enough to pass muster under *Bracy*'s requirement of specificity.

Respondents shall, of course, be given an suitable period of time within which to file any appropriate opposing points and

authorities.

In addition, it should be apparent to all that the time for collection of records and other documents is close to, if not already at an end. Accordingly, the court wishes the petitioner and his counsel to focus their next budget proposal on the discovery as outlined in this order, and on the development of the amended petition. It is fully the intention of the Court to enter a final order regarding discovery before the end of September.

After the discovery order is entered, the scheduling order will oblige petitioner to complete discovery within 120 days. That order will require the petitioner to file and serve the amended petition within 60 days of the termination of discovery. The Court will hold all parties strictly to these time deadlines. Accordingly, petitioner must draft his next budget proposal with these requirements in mind.

IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner's motion for leave to conduct discovery (Docket #73) is **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED**IN PART. The court finds that petitioner has demonstrated good cause for the discovery requests identified as

- B. Art Taylor Interview Reports and Raw Notes;
- C. Records of Payments to Art Taylor;
- G. Impeachment Material of Steward Siegel; and
- H(ii). Third Party Alibi Evidence.

Petitioner and respondents have further stipulated to the discovery of the CCDA's files regarding the petitioner's case, and petitioner

shall be allowed to conduct that discovery. Petitioner shall not, however, be allowed to serve his discovery requests until further ordered of the court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner shall have ten days from the date of the entry of this order on the record within which to file and serve supplemental points and authorities in which he specifically identifies those subpoenas and/or exhibits which would be those served pursuant to the court's order granting discovery. Concurrently with those points and authorities, petitioner shall attach any and all subpoenas which have been specifically tailored enough to pass muster under Bracy's requirement of specificity.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall have ten days from the filing and service of the petitioner supplemental document within which to file and serve any opposing points and authorities.

Dated, this the day of September, 2004.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1 RTRAN **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 3 4 5 DISTRICT COURT 6 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 CASE NO. 08C241569 Plaintiff, 10 DEPT. XVII VS. 11 LACY L. THOMAS, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL P. VILLANI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 15 FRIDAY, MAY 15, 2015 16 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: 17 EVIDENTIARY HEARING: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING 18 DISCLOSURE OF DOCUMENTS 19 20 **APPEARANCES:** 21 For the State: MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, ESQ., Deputy District Attorney 22 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS, ESQ., For the Defendant: 23 The Law Office of Daniel J. Albregts 24 RECORDED BY: MICHELLE L. RAMSEY, COURT RECORDER 25 1

## 1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA; FRIDAY, MAY 15, 2015 2 [Proceeding commenced at 9:43 a.m.] 3 4 THE COURT: This is the Lacy Thomas matter. And we were going 5 to have some -- some testimony regarding the receipt of these 6 records that came out in the last trial, correct? 7 MR. ALBREGTS: That's correct. 8 THE COURT: Okay. And how many witnesses do we have? 9 MR. ALBREGTS: Three. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. ALBREGTS: And I don't suspect any of them will be lengthy 12 at all because of the -- the limited scope of the issues before the 13 Court. 14 All right. You ready, Mr. Staudaher? THE COURT: 15 I believe so, yes. MR. STAUDAHER: All right. Who's our --16 THE COURT: 17 MR. ALBREGTS: Your Honor -- Your Honor --18 -- who's our first witness? THE COURT: 19 MR. ALBREGTS: Don Campbell. I've asked for an exclusionary 20 before the Court, but the officer's already went outside. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. ALBREGTS: So we're ready to go. 23 THE COURT: I'm just -- I'm going to in an abundance of 24 caution, probably more caution than I need, okay, Mr. -- Mr. 25 Campbell represented me in a election matter. I have to announce

1	that the bill's been paid in full, okay. In an abundance of
2	caution I'm going to disclose.
3	MR. ALBREGTS: From our perspective, I don't see any issues
4	with that and we appreciate the disclosure.
5	THE COURT: Anything from the, State?
6	MR. STAUDAHER: No, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: All right. Let's have Mr. Campbell come on up.
8	He'll get sworn in.
9	DONALD JUDE CAMPBELL
10	having been called as a witness and being first duly sworn,
11	testified as follows:
12	THE CLERK: Please be seated and then state and spell your
13	name on the record.
14	THE WITNESS: Donald Judge Campbell, C-A-M-P-B-E-L-L.
15	THE COURT: Interesting. I was told by one person that I jus-
16	need to make that disclosure probably for the six months after the
17	last event, so I don't know if that's true or not, but that's what
18	I'm going to do. Okay.
19	MR. ALBREGTS: Your Honor, may we proceed from the
20	THE COURT: Yes.
21	MR. ALBREGTS: counsel table? Thank you.
22	DIRECT EXAMINATION
23	BY MR. ALBREGTS:
24	Q: Mr. Campbell, what is your profession?
25	A: I'm an attorney

Attorney's Office directly?

- A: I can never recall ever dealing with anyone at the District Attorney's Office.
- Q: Who specifically did you deal with at Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department?
- A: Principally as I recall, Detective Whitley or Whitely.

  I'm not quite sure how he pronounces his name.
- Q: And he's the individual that was in the courtroom earlier?
  - A: Yes. Correct.
- Q: Briefly tell the Court some of the things you did on behalf of ACS in relation to defending them in this investigation?
- A: I was contacted by the client with reference to the representation. There were a number of articles written and published in the Las Vegas newspapers including the Review Journal. There were also a number of -- of news stations that covered hearings as I recall before the Clark County Commission. All of which were generally alleging wrongdoing at the -- the UMC University Medical Center with respect to contractual issues.

And their focus was principally on a loss of revenue, a continuing stream or loss of revenue that had been occurred. And that the contracts that have been entered into were contracts that essentially were facially valid only in the sense that they were there, but they weren't being -- my recollection of the allegation, they weren't being subject to any sort of reciprocal services.

That they were basically paying for services that were not rendered.

- Q: Was it your goal in representing ACS to avoid charges being filed in the first place?
- A: My principal goal was to represent the company with respect to these -- these allegations because it was alleged that ACS was at least one of the vendors that was engaged in wrongdoing and that had achieved contracts for which they were not providing services. So that was my principal engagement as I recall.
- Q: And did you gather evidence, documents, information and the like from your clients to provide to Metro during the course of the investigation?
  - A: I did.
- Q: And could you explain briefly for the Judge what it was that you provided and what did to provide that?
- A: Initially, there was an inquiry made by Detective Whiteley along with the FBI to conduct interviews. As I think most good criminal defense counsel you've -- you generally say no to that. But in that I was representing the corporation in that the individuals that was subject of the request for interviews were -- were demanding to be interviewed almost and wanted to be interviewed.
- I secured counsel for them through Mr. Stan Hunterton as I recall. And I believe he represented -- I know he represented an individual by the name of Bob Mills. He may have also represented

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another individual that was very much involved in the process of providing services to UMC and that was an individual by the name of Ross Fidler.

There was -- ultimately Mr. Mills insisted upon being interviewed. Asked that Mr. Fidler -- I remember specifically the Mills' interview because it was conducted in my -- in my conference In attendance were detectives from the Metropolitan Police room. Department. As I recall it was conducted specifically by Detective Whiteley and an FBI agent was present as well. That interview was conducted over a number of hours and I know following that interview when Mr. Mills had contested and informed Detective Whiteley that the allegations that have been made were false and that they were not substantive with those allegations and further that there were a number of documents which would specifically prove the false of the allegations that had been made by individuals at UMC to Detective Whiteley and that he was pursuing insofar as pursuing as rightfully he should allegations of wrongdoing.

ACS contended those allegations were completely without foundation and fact and we have documents to back that up. He asked for those documents on successive requests and we provided every single document that he asked for.

- Q: When you say he, you mean Detective Whiteley?
- A: Correct.
- Q: And so, how were those provided those documents? Do you

recall? Were they hard copies, electronically?

A: My best recollection is that they were on -- they were provided on a disc that -- a digital -- digital copies were provided on disc.

Q: Do you know how many times over the course of the period after the interview you were asked to -- to provide documents? Was it --

A: You know, I tried to look at that this morning knowing I was coming over this morning and our -- all of our files are in storage. My best recollection and that's all what it is is that it involved thousands of documents and they were contained on at least three discs that I can recall.

Q: Now, you're aware of a -- of a binder notebook with ACS action items in it that as ultimately created in relation to this case?

A: I'm aware that there was some controversy regarding a binder of books; that's correct.

Q: And you've seen at least -- maybe not recently, but had - had seen that binder before?

A: I think at one time, yes.

Q: And that binder had ACS minutes and other information from ACS records regarding the work they conducted at UMC?

A: Yeah. My recollection is it had the one stop meeting minutes and other minutes demonstrating Mr. Fidler's involvement.

As I recall with respect to services that he was providing on an

was that no such meetings ever took place.

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Q: So --

That's the one thing I do -- as I can recall, I think A: there may have also been documents we provided demonstrating that -- and I think that this is a case because there was also, Your Honor, and I don't know if his Honor's aware there was also a tandem civil case in which ACS was owed money and I sent that case to the firm of Pisanelli Bice. They later sued USMA -- US -- UMC and the County and achieved a judgment of several hundreds of thousands of dollars for services that were, in fact, rendered that UMC said were not rendered.

ongoing basis that the original claim by UMC officials internally

So I can't recall all of these documents. They may blend into one another. But I think that that also delved into the fact that these contracts were, in fact, reviewed by UMC's internal counsel.

You have no question in your mind as you sit here today Q:that the documents in this book and other documents showing the work ACS did were provided to the detectives pursuant to their request?

Well, I don't know what you have sitting in front of you, A: but I -- but I have no doubt that there were thousands of documents that were, you know, that were sent to them because I reviewed them generally before they were sent.

Just so the record's clear if I may approach, let me just Q:

have you take a quick look at the book and make sure that that be the type of documents that you provided to the detective at their request, obviously not with the stickies on there.

A: Okay. Yeah. The one stop meeting -- steering meetings I know we provided all of those.

MS. FORSMAN: Your Honor, the -- this -- this binder is in evidence. We actually got it out of the evidence vault. I'm sorry I don't remember the exhibit number, but it was actually admitted into evidence already.

THE WITNESS: That's what all this is, then yeah, we provided all this.

THE COURT: All right. There should be a sticker on it --

MR. ALBREGTS: It is.

THE COURT: -- if this --

THE WITNESS: G.

MR. ALBREGTS: Exhibit G.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. We provided all the steering committee meetings and the one stops and I believe those are the ones that Mr. Ross Fidler was directly involved with. And he was the one conducting all those meetings which was in stark contrast to the original claim that had made internally at UMC by others to the Metropolitan Police Department.

MR. ALBREGTS: I have no further questions. Thank you.

THE COURT: Are there any cross-examination?

MR. STAUDAHER: Yes.

BY MR. STAUDAHER: 2

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I guess first thing that I want to make sure we're clear Q: on is the attorney-client privilege issue. I mean, he represented

ACS as I understand. Is that correct? 5

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That's correct. A:

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Did you represent Mr. Fidler? Q:

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I represented Mr. Fidler insofar as he was an ACS A: employee and representative of the company, that's -- I represented

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him in his representative capacity. Stan Hunterton was his

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personal attorney. And quite frankly I don't even know if Stan was

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there for his interview. But I know his interview was recorded by the Metropolitan Police Department so he can -- I'm sure that they

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can tell you if Stan was there or not.

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What about Bob Mills? Did you represent him? Q: Sure.

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Bob Mills. I was there for the Bob Mills and A: Excuse me. Bob Mills I know is represented by Stan. That's the one interview

that I can recall. I don't know if Ross Fidler was actually --

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Okay. So you didn't represent Bob Mills at that Q:

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interview, but you were present; is that right?

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No, I did represent him in his representative capacity. A:

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officer, director or senior management of that corporation, you

In that I represented the corporation. If you represent an

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represent them in their representative capacity -- did not

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represent him in his personal capacity. That was done by Stan

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Hunterton. And I don't know if Stan Hunterton was there for the
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   interview. My recollection was that he may have been, but I don't
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   know.
              Okay. So my concern would be issues of -- related to
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         Q:
   procuring, disseminating contents of documents and so forth, any
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   attorney-client privilege issue related to what we're here to
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   discuss that there would have to be a waiver of that related to how
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   the documents came into possession, where they came from, who he
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   gave them to, under what request, that kind of thing.
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              I can answer all that for you.
        A:
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              You can?
        Q:
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        A:
              Yes.
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             Okay. I just want to make sure that we don't --
        Q:
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         THE COURT:
                    All right.
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        MR. STAUDAHER: -- err into an area --
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         THE WITNESS:
                       No.
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        MR. STAUDAHER: -- that's a problem.
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         THE WITNESS:
                       No.
                            No.
19
   BY MR. STAUDAHER:
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              So if we do, will you let us know --
         Q:
21
              Sure.
        A:
              -- if we get into something?
22
         Q:
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              Absolutely.
        A:
              Okay. So let's -- let's go back just a little bit.
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         Q:
   said that essentially the records that you produced to UMC and they
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-- and I believe Mr. Albregts already came up to you, not to UMC, 1 but to the police department --2 3 Police department. A: -- related to UMC. 4 Q:Correct. 5 A: 6 That those -- among the documents that you provided was Q: this book; is that correct? 7 No, I don't think I provided a book. 8 A: Well, a disc containing documents that was represented to 9 Q: 10 you. We provided multiple discs of documents. 11 A: And I mean there were thousands of discs because what had happened is that 12 there was literally like a laundry list of allegations that had 13 been made internally by some people at UMC that Detective Whitley 14 15 or Whitely was -- was following up on. And in his investigation of those topical inquiries --16 listed inquiries, he would ask whether or not we could provide 17 18 certain documents. For example, another one of the things that I remember was they were suggesting that Mr. -- they weren't 19 20 suggesting, they said that Mr. Mills had been provided a trip to the Caribbean aboard a jet and we had to provide the company's jet 21 log, the flight logs --22 23 Tail numbers, things like that? Q:24 A: Yeah.

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Okay.

Q:

A: Demonstrating that he had never been on a plane. And we have to maintain those logs pursuant to the FAA standards. He'd never been a plane. We didn't give him any free trip or anything like that. We had to get that like right away.

But the other thing that I remember that they were keenly interested in were these minutes because there was -- there was the allegation right up front that we weren't providing services. And our people are saying, absolutely, completely untrue. There's a documented history of this. So when all this came tumbling out in the interviews, Detective Whiteley would ask for those documents and every single document that he asked for we provided.

- Q: Okay.
- A: And there were thousands of them.
- Q: So this way before any charges are brought in the case?
- A: Absolutely, yes.
- Q: Okay. And may I approach? I just want to make sure we're talking about the same document, Your Honor. And this is the cover page I think that the documents that are contained in the book.

#### [Colloquy between counsel]

- A: And there would have been -- it would have been our practice if we send something out to a detective, there'd be a forwarding letter.
  - Q: Yes.
  - A: You know, here we have X, Y and Z. Here they are.

1 Okay. So, does that look familiar to you? Q: 2 Okay. Bates stamp, yeah 'cause that's our practice to A: 3 bates stamp everything including the UMC one stop [indecipherable] status for Deloitte Touche recommendations, Lacy Thomas memorandum 4 [indecipherable] -- yup. 5 And it bares your signature? 6 Q: 7 A: It does. And if -- just so I'm clear on this. 8 Q: 9 And this probably -- and this would have been in my view, A: this absolutely would -- would have been our first production 10 because of the bates stamp numbers that we have here. 11 12 As a matter fact, the bates stamp numbers that we're Q:talking about here are entitled ACS followed by it looks like five 13 leading zeros and then two. 14 15 Correct. A: So it starts with. And then going through ACS, three 16 Q:17 leading zeros, two, the number five seventy-nine. 18 That is correct. A: Is that correct? 19 Q:20 Right. A: I assume that means that it would all numbers and 22 and 21 Q: five seventy-nine? 22 23 It would have. A: 24 And so we're talking about at least delineating four or Q: actually five different things. UMC one stop committee meeting 25

provided to the police.

Some of it. A:

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Some of it. When -- at least during the investigation Q: was being done, fair?

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Yes, sir. A:

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Now, eventually that information makes its way to Mr. Q: Albregts from you; is that correct?

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A: No.

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How did Mr. Albregts -- I mean, did he communicate with Q: you to get this book or get this information?

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What happened is I think during the course of the trial, A: Mr. Albregts contacted me to arrange scheduling for Mills. Fidler and maybe somebody else. I don't know.

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Okay. Q:

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He asked me about what documents had been produced. A: Ι had a conversation with him what documents had been produced. Не said something to the effect I don't have what you're talking to me about. And my recollection -- and I may be wrong in this regard, okay. It's been awhile. However, many years that trial was. my recollection was is that I had the letters and we -- because he was asking about what -- what were in my recollection the one stop and the other minutes that would demonstrate that we had, in fact,

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provided services and he said, I don't know what you're talking or

something to that effect or -- and I offered to get them for him.

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Okay. So he asked you for the documents then --Q:

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And he said how many there were and we started counting A:

them up and there were a lot and so. 1 Did you provide --2 Q: I think that's --3 A: -- those to him? 4 Q: To my recollection, I don't think I did. I think that 5 A: 6 this happened in -- in the midst of a trial --Uh-huh. 7 Q: -- in which testimony as ongoing. As I sit here, I may 8 A: have, but I don't know. I just -- I just have no recollection as I sit here today that I did. 10 So you talked about them and it may be that you provided 11 Q: the documents to him? 12 13 It maybe, but what makes me think that I probably did not A: is because when I told him about these, I think it was in the eve. 14 15 It was actually in the evening. And my recollection is that I was not at my office and I don't remember where it was. 16 17 Did you ever -- beside giving to them to the police --Q:18 Yes. A: -- did you ever give them to anybody else? 19 Q: 20 Not that I can ever recall, no. A: 21 So at least the police would have had it -- had them at Q: some point during their investigation preceding any charges? 22 23 They would have had what -- they would have had whatever A: I sent them on or about the dates of the forwarding letters. 24 Fair enough. 25 Q:

- A: So for example on that one, I don't know what the date of that one was.
  - Q: 2000 -- February of 2007.
- A: Okay. So they would have had whatever I sent them on that date on or about.
- Q: Okay. So just so I'm clear on this, you -- you had -- you could have produced those at any time, right, 'cause you still had a copy of the documents that you've given to the police?
  - A: That's a good question.
  - Q: You have them 'til this day?
- A: I don't know. And the reason I don't know that is because they're in storage. It would probably -- it would likely be my practice that I would have kept a master disc or a copy of what we had copied at QUiVX. For example, we take all the stuff, send it to QUiVX, they put it on a disc and then send it out. So I'd either have the hard copies or I'd have the hard copies and the disc or I just might have one disc because they may have been compiled at ACS headquarters and sent to me by a paralegal at their headquarters.
- Q: Fair enough.
  - A: See what I'm saying?
- Q: If it was represented at trial that the documents came from you, does that refresh your memory at all?
  - A: That -- that -- the defense?
- Q: Uh-uh.

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questions.

MR. STAUDAHER: It is. That's why I'm asking him these

If Mr.

That's my recollection as well. 1 THE COURT: 2 And so I'll stipulate to that. MR. ALBREGTS: 3 MR. STAUDAHER: Yeah. MR. ALBREGTS: I mean, I --4 MR. STAUDAHER: 5 Okay. I'm sorry. I can't recall. 6 THE WITNESS: BY MR. STAUDAHER: 7 8 No, that's okay. And that's why I'm saying --Q: The more gray hair I get, the less --9 A: 10 Right. Q: -- my memory is --11 A: 12 MS. FORSMAN: You're pretty good. 13 THE WITNESS: Right. BY MR. STAUDAHER: 14 15 I mean, I was there too. I remember how they came in. Q: Okay. 16 A: 17 So I'm -- and that's why I'm asking that you actually Q: provided them to --18 19 A: Right. 20 -- I know we got a stipulation here, but in -- in reality Q: it sounds like you discussed the documents. He must have requested 21 You provide them to him, so he had them. 22 23 Okay. A: 24 Because he had a copy of them that -- it was at least was Q: represented by you --25

1 A: Makes sense to me. -- that you provided them. 2 Q: 3 Right. A: They came into trial. Okay. 4 Q: That would have been -- I would have been the only party 5 A: he would have gotten them from. 6 So let's -- let's leave that for just a moment. 7 Q: Sure. want to go and talk to you briefly about Bob Mills. 8 9 Now, you said that you represented him as a corporate 10 attorney and he being --My client --11 A: 12 -- and employee. Q: 13 Right. My client was ACS. A: 14 ACS. Q:15 And I represented him in his representative capacity as A: 16 an executive with ACS. 17 How did he become employed at ACS or part of ACS? Q:18 MR. ALBREGTS: Your Honor, I'm going to object as to relevance on this line of questioning. I don't know what it has to do with 19 20 present. 21 What's the relevance to that 'cause we're dealing THE COURT: how and when Metro received these documents from Mr. Campbell? 22 23 MR. STAUDAHER: Well -- and I'm sorry I'm not standing, Your 24 Honor. But the -- the issue is related to again the relevance 25 related to the charge and whether or not these documents are

somehow exculpatory. If there was an allegation, for example, that ACS at least in the charging document did no work, then I think that there's an issue. But since the charging document never alleged that ACS did no work, that's something that if in fact the -- what's alleged in the charging document relates primarily to Bob Mills' interaction directly with Lacy Thomas.

So the extent that ACS and Bob Mills are together, then whether or not these meeting minutes are relevant to the case at all really becomes an issue. And I think that's at the heart of the matter is whether or not the documents that are contained here that were ultimately given to counsel by an outside source, that originally had been provided to the police that those documents somehow show that Mr. -- excuse me -- Mr. Thomas did not commit a crime as it pertains to Count 1 and a companion count related to the misconduct, the theft count and a misconduct count.

MR. ALBREGTS: Here's

MR. STAUDAHER: That is important to know what the relationship is between Mr. Mills and ACS because the -- if you boil the entire ACS thing down, it comes down to essentially one page, a single document, entitled administrative clarification.

And in that administrative clarification at the bottom of it, it is signed by Bob Mills, not ACS, but Bob Mills and Lacy Thomas. That is in a sense the underpinning foundation for Count 1 charge.

It's important to know then if -- if we're charging -- ACS was never obviously charged in the case. The recommendation is

we're going to hear from the police is that their recommendation was to not charge ACS, but the actions of Bob Mills were central because Bob Mills had the relationship with Lacy Thomas. Because of that, knowing how Bob Mills came to be at -- at ACS because during the initial phases of the -- the relationship with UMC, Lacy Thomas, Bob Mills, it was under a different corporate entity, Superior Consulting, which was later taken up or at least absorbed by ACS. And from that point forward, ACS is at the hospital.

So the whole issue of Bob Mills, how he interacts, how he, you know, falls under ACS, what -- what sort of power he has to represent ACS is important in the case. And that's why since we're talking about documents that specifically relate to ACS' actions at the hospital and Bob Mills potentially subverting something related to a contract that ACS entered into, I want to know what essential authority he had, what role he played and what -- and how it is that Superior Consulting and Bob Mills become part of ACS going forward. I think it's relevant.

MR. ALBREGTS: You know, Your Honor, sometimes I -- and absolutely at a lost as to how to respond. I mean, that has absolutely nothing to do with this.

First of all, you've already found that it was exculpatory evidence.

MR. STAUDAHER: Actually, you've never found that.

MR. ALBREGTS: You have too --

MR. STAUDAHER: Never have found that.

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1
        MR. ALBREGTS: -- on page 10 --
2
                    Okay. You know what?
        THE COURT:
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        MR. ALBREGTS: -- of the transcript.
                    One attorney talks. You guys know better.
        THE COURT:
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                                                                 One
   attorney talks at a time and then -- then we move on. Go ahead,
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   Mr. Albregts.
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        MR. ALBREGTS: You've already found -- counsel should read the
   transcript from day 10 of the trial when you -- when you found for
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9
   a mistrial. You found that it was exculpatory. That's not the
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   issue here today. The issue today is what the State had when they
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   had it and what happened to it.
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             Bob Mills' relationship and what -- whether this is
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   relevant or not isn't today's hearing, Judge.
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                    I'm going to sustain the objection.
        THE COURT:
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        MR. STAUDAHER: Well, Your Honor, I must correct the correct.
   And if counsel can actually point --
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17
        THE COURT:
        MR. STAUDAHER:
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                       -- to the page --
                     -- I'm going to sustain --
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        THE COURT:
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        MR. STAUDAHER:
                         -- that says that the Court --
                     -- the objection. Let's move on.
21
        THE COURT:
        MR. STAUDAHER: But -- but there's a material miss --
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23
   inaccuracy in the record. This Court, and I defy counsel to pull
   the transcript up and show it, has never made a finding.
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I want to know how the documents got to Metro, you

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THE COURT:

know, who held them and when the DA's Office received them, why 1 didn't they receive them, etcetera. That's why we're here today, 2 okay. Let's -- next question. 3 [Colloquy between counsel] 4 THE COURT: Counsel -- gentlemen, you know better. 5 6 MR. ALBREGTS: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Objection. Makes a ruling. You like it or you 7 THE COURT: 8 don't. You move on. 9 MR. ALBREGTS: I'll try to hold my frustrations better. apologize. 10 THE COURT: Next question please. 11 12 BY MR. STAUDAHER: 13 So you at least testified just a moment ago about an Q:interview that you participated in I believe it was at UMC with the 14 police and --15 It was in my -- it was in my conference room. 16 A: No. In your office? Okay. 17 Q:18 So Bob Mills is present? Bob Mills is present. Detective Whiteley --19 A: 20 You're present? Q: -- is present. My recollection is an FBI agent and FBI 21 A: special agent was present. And Stan Hunterton likewise may have 22 23 been present, but I have -- I can't say with any degree of accuracy that he was. 24 And it's my understanding, and please correct me I'm 25 Q:

2 | A: Sure.

Q: -- that meeting is when the issue of -- of production of these documents come -- comes out; is that fair?

A: No. When Mills is being -- when Mills is being interviewed, Whiteley is taking him through like a bullet point list of allegations that apparently were made by people internal to UMC of wrongdoing, okay. He's going through this laundry list -- list. And as he's going through it, Mills is saying no, that's not the case and that's not the case because X, Y and Z happened and we can provide documents to that effect.

And I gave an example of the -- they were all over this notion that he had taken -- we had given him this trip or ACS had given this trip to -- I think it was Aruba -- and put him on a jet, there was a lavish party or something for him. It was just completely and totally untrue. And I think that -- that was one of the things that was discussed.

And also one of the -- you know, he said well, show me the corroboration for that. And as a result of that we gave him the flight logs and that sort of thing. So that's what happened. I can't -- I don't believe that we gave him any documents.

I believe what happened is with, you know, Detective Whiteley then did is he said okay I want to see whatever documents that set up on these topics. We said okay. We went back, got all of the documents on those topics and I would have had ACS retrieve

operating all over. Internationally I think. 1 2 Okay. Have you ever seen the charging document in this Q: 3 case? The indictment? 4 A: MR. ALBREGTS: Objection, relevance. 5 6 Indictment. THE WITNESS: What's the -- what's the relevance? 7 THE COURT: It has everything to do with whether or not 8 MR. STAUDAHER: there -- there was even a charge in this case that ACS did no work. 9 I'm asking him if he seen since --10 Well, that's for me to --11 THE COURT: 12 MR. STAUDAHER: -- that was the allegation --13 -- that's for me to decide whether or not Mr. THE COURT: Campbell thinks that there's allegations against his former client. 14 His interpretation of the indictment is irrelevant --15 16 MR. STAUDAHER: No, I'm not asking ---- to my determination. 17 THE COURT: 18 MR. STAUDAHER: -- I wasn't asking about his interpretation of the indictment. 19 20 Okay. If he's --THE COURT: MR. STAUDAHER: I'm asking --21 22 -- why is it relevant? THE COURT: It's relevant because his entire testimony 23 MR. STAUDAHER: roll production of these documents relates to allegations that ACS 24 did no work, fair? 25

MR. ALE

MR. ALBREGTS: It gets back to the argument, Judge.

That's no argument. I'm just saying that's

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why he produced the documents.

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THE COURT: It's not relevant here. Sustained.

MR. STAUDAHER:

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BY MR. STAUDAHER:

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Q: Your role with ACS and Bob Mills was to at least provide information that the police were requesting in either interview form or document form, fair?

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A: Right. There was a determination made that we will cooperate fully.

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Q: And is -- and was it your understanding that at least during the investigation, predating any charges in this case, the investigation, that there had been in the newspaper internally at

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UMC somewhere allegations that ACS did no work at UMC?

A: That was one of the allegations of many allegations. I

mean, there were a lot of allegations. There are other allegations

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that contracts had been reformed, you know, to give ACS a better

18 19 deal or to -- or to release them from contractual obligations that

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otherwise they would have been compelled to make that they did certain -- I remember one thing some sort of a sweetheart deal with

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respect to collections of outstanding accounts receivables that --

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I mean, there were just so many allegations, and that was only one

of the many allegations in that bullet point list that -- that Whiteley was going through.

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Q: Okay. So let's -- let's just talk about that briefly

- A: I don't want to mislead you in that regard.
- Q: Right.
- A: If you listen to that interview, he went through and asked a number of questions about a number of different subjects. And I didn't mean to say that there was only one subject matter that was discussed.
- Q: So when we look at the -- what is actually contained in this book which are steering committee meeting minutes, one stop committee meeting minutes, memorandum from to Jeremiah Carol and audit from Jeremiah Carol and it looks like a status of Deloitte and Touche recommendations; did that have to do anything with the question about whether a contract was modified or anything?
  - MR. ALBREGTS: Again, relevance.
- MR. STAUDAHER: I mean, is there anything in here related to whether a contract is modified?
- 7 | THE WITNESS: I don't recall because --
  - MR. ALBREGTS: Objection, relevance, Judge, again.
- MR. STAUDAHER: It's following upon an answer that he provided.
  - THE COURT: I'm going to allow the witness to answer. He said he doesn't recall.
- 23 | THE WITNESS: Well, I do recall.
  - THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. Here's what I do recall. I do recall recall that the -- the minutes were related to not providing any

1 services.

BY MR. STAUDAHER:

- Q: Not providing services, correct?
- A: Yes. Or -- or providing, you know, minutes -- you know, minimum amount of services or something. That's what the minutes related too. Those other three subject matters or documents that are in there, I don't know what they relate to. I have no -- I haven't reviewed them. I can't recall. I've made hundreds of productions and hundreds of cases since then.
  - Q: So at least you're -- as you're testifying today --
- 11 | A: Right.
  - Q: -- the -- for this evidentiary hearing --
- 13 | A: Right.
  - Q: -- and the purpose is of this evidentiary hearing, it sounds like the only thing you can -- that you can remember related to what these -- this document -- and I keep referring to the book and I know it was a disc and it was produced later on, but the information contained in this book, the meeting minutes and the like, your best recollection is that this had to do with whether or not ACS was performing services at UMC; is that fair?
  - MR. ALBREGTS: Well, again, I'm going to object as to relevance because it's not Mr. Campbell's job in this case to determine what relevance this book had to Mr. Thomas' defense.
  - THE COURT: Right. 'Cause I remember when it came in I had some time to review it, and I made -- and I know this is in the

record, I made a determination that there's documentation showing 1 they were at least having meetings, doing some work --2 3 MR. STAUDAHER: Yes. -- and I felt that was exculpatory. 4 THE COURT: And to cut to the -- to cut to the chase, it 5 MR. ALBREGTS: 6 also shows why the contract had to be modified so ACS --THE COURT: Well, that's --7 8 MR. ALBREGTS: -- could make money. We're not arguing that right now. 9 THE COURT: 10 MR. ALBREGTS: I know, but -- but --Okay. I'm going to sustain your objection. 11 Let's THE COURT: 12 move on. 13 MR. STAUDAHER: 14 So at least there were other discussion -- there were Q:15 discussions at the meeting about other factors beyond whether there were any services provided at UMC. 16 17 MR. ALBREGTS: Asked and answered. 18 Sustained. Besides, it's not up to Mr. Campbell THE COURT: to give his interpretation as to what these minutes, notes, what 19 20 have you. I didn't say anything about minutes and 21 MR. STAUDAHER: meetings. I said the meeting --22 23 THE COURT: Documents. 24 MR. STAUDAHER: Okay. Let me --THE COURT: Okay. I determine if the documents are relevant

to the defense and I made that initial determination. 1 2 MR. STAUDAHER: Then let me ask it a different way. 3 THE COURT: Okay. BY MR. STAUDAHER: 4 I'm not going to talk about the book or the documents 5 Q:6 that you've provided. I'm going to talk about your -- your actual knowledge of what happened at that meeting which -- which 7 facilitated this production, okay. And when I say which 8 facilitated the production, I'm talking about the actual documents. 9 10 The interview of Mills by Detective Whiteley? A: 11 Correct. Q: 12 Okay. A: 13 So there were multiple subject matters that were covered. Q:14 Right. A: One of those was the services issue --15 Q:MR. ALBREGTS: 16 Again. 17 -- or lack thereof. MR. STAUDAHER: 18 This has all been asked and answered, Jude. MR. ALBREGTS: Your Honor, if I could just go through it, I 19 MR. STAUDAHER: 20 think it's important for me to establish it. 21 You don't need to -- I take good notes. THE COURT: We have a transcript. You don't need to recap everything. Ask the next 22 23 question. And you'll hear the next answer. MR. STAUDAHER: 24

There were many areas of inquiry that had nothing to do

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Q:

with the services issue, correct? You mentioned some of them.

- A: There was some, yes.
- Q: Collections --
- A: Yes.

- Q: -- contracts, modifications and the like.
- A: Well, those were the services that's the point. I mean, there were a lot of services that ACS provided. A lot of them. I mean, from soup to nuts. So that's --
  - Q: So contract modifications were a service?
- A: No, but it would relate to the services that were provided. If for example they had to provide A, B and C and there was a modification of those services for whatever reason, that they're either expanded or retracted, there would either be an expansion, corresponding expansion of or retraction of services under the contract. So, I don't want to mislead you and say that had nothing to do with services.

It may have been -- the contract had -- there was something else with respect to -- I don't know. They modified the term for all I know. I have no recollection as to what the modification was, but I remember that there was a discussion modifications, the contract, why the modifications took place, but also who was involved in that process. And I remember there was some talk about the County being actually having people represent them in these modifications.

Q: Okay.

1 A: And that --2 So you --Q: 3 -- very well may relate to this Jerry Carol thing. I A: think he was an auditor or something with the County. 4 So let's -- let's go back to what the -- let's go back to 5 Q:6 the conversation you have with Mr. Albregts at trial, okay, where you disclose that there were these documents that were provided by 7 the police to you or actually by you to the police; correct? 8 9 Yes, but it wasn't during -- well, it was during the time A: of the trial, but it wasn't during the actual trial. It was --10 Oh, it's before trial started then? 11 Q: 12 It was -- it was after trial started, but it was on A: an evening. That's all I can recall. It was an actual evening 13 14 that he contacted me on it. 15 So it was after trial started during the time of the Q: trial? 16 17 Correct. A: 18 Okay. So during the time of the trial, you have the Q: 19 discussion and he becomes aware of these materials? 20 A: Correct. And this is all been asked and answered, Judge. 21 MR. ALBREGTS: 22 True. Next question. Go ahead. THE COURT: 23 BY MR. STAUDAHER: 24 In that discussion --Q: Right. 25 A:

1 -- that you have with Mr. Albregts --Q: Right. Do you -- do you recall the substance of the 2 A: conversation first of all? 3 MR. ALBREGTS: All been asked and answered, Judge. 4 MR. STAUDAHER: I have not asked that question. 5 6 THE WITNESS: Yeah. It was --I'm going to allow it. Go head. 7 THE COURT: 8 THE WITNESS: Yeah. It was like a holy s-h-i-t moment. 9 BY MR. STAUDAHER: 10 So, he wanted those records? Q: 11 Uh-huh. A: 12 Okay. And we know that they were provided. Q:And he said I don't have these. He said I don't know, 13 A: you know, I don't know what you're talking about --14 15 Q:Uh-huh. -- 'cause I initially told him about them. 16 A: 17 Did you tell him what the contents of them were? Q:18 I told him what the contents of some of them were. A: tell you that for sure. 19 20 Were there any documents that you had that you withheld Q: from him? 21 22 Because he had never asked me for any documents A: 23 I hadn't withheld anything. He asked me if there were any before. -- any documents that I had given to the Metropolitan Police 24 Department supporting this and it's my recollection that I had Ross 25

Fidler with me at that time and we were saying yeah, we gave him
documents of $X$ , $Y$ and $Z$ and we requested this and that and the
other thing. And there were he says, I'm telling you I haven't
got those documents type of deal. I said, okay. And whether he
asked me for them and I then arranged to give them to him or not, I
honestly have no recollection.

Q: Do you have any recollection of the -- of the actual scope of the documents that you gave him? I mean, this is a segment 'cause you said there were thousands of pages, three discs and this is one disc.

A: I don't. I don't know. All I know is that we were talking about some documents and he said, I don't know what you're talking about. I don't have those documents. And that was sort of like what I referred to as the holy s moment. And then I said I'm happy to, you know, retrieve them or something to that effect.

Q: And you get them 'cause obviously we got them, right?

MR. ALBREGTS: This has all been asked and answered.

THE COURT: Okay. We know we have them.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Right.

THE COURT: Next question.

MR. STAUDAHER: But we only have a portion of them, Your Honor. And I want to make sure at least the ones that are at trial that are an exhibit, I want to him to find if in fact others were given to Mr. -- at least he had access to them.

THE COURT: What's your best -- you may have already answered

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I would have given them. But it -- you know, my impression was
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   that the things that we were talking about were things he didn't
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   have because he was saying, I don't have these. So I said, I'll
   get you those or --
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        MR. ALBREGTS: Your Honor, this --
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                      -- I can provide them --
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        THE WITNESS:
        MR. ALBREGTS: -- as it relates to the --
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8
        THE WITNESS: -- or something to that effect.
9
                    Hang on. Let him finish his answer.
        THE COURT:
        MR. ALBREGTS: I thought -- I'm sorry. As it relates to the
10
   other stuff, this isn't -- the books the only issue for today, so
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   anything else you may have given Metro or me is irrelevant for the
12
   purposes of our hearing.
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14
                    I mean, it's not an issue for today, but if you
        THE COURT:
15
   were given other information, reciprocal discovery, that needs to
16
   be turned over. I don't know what you -- I don't know if you did
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20 MR. STAUDAHER: I think that does it. I'm done, Your Honor.

discovery rules and defense has reciprocal discovery required,

receive anything or not, but just both parties need to be aware of

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Albregts?

MR. ALBREGTS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. May Mr. Campbell be released this morning?

MR. ALBREGTS: Please.

MR. STAUDAHER: Yes.

okay. Next question.

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1	THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir, for your testimony.
2	THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: Next witness.
4	THE WITNESS: Do I have to stick around today or anything?
5	I'm not going to be recalled.
6	MS. FORSMAN: No.
7	MR. ALBREGTS: No. No.
8	MR. STAUDAHER: I don't think so. No, I think you're done.
9	THE COURT: Next witness.
10	MR. ALBREGTS: Detective Whiteley. I guess he's a sergeant
11	now.
12	THE COURT: Let's have the witness sworn. I'm going to take a
13	less than I'm just going to take a five minute break. I have to
14	take some medicine.
15	MR. ALBREGTS: Absolutely.
16	THE COURT: Okay.
17	MR. STAUDAHER: Sure.
18	[Court recessed from 10:32 a.m. to 10:36 a.m.]
19	THE COURT: Good morning, Detective. I believe he's been
20	sworn in.
21	MR. ALBREGTS: He has.
22	THE COURT: All right. Let's go ahead.
23	DIRECT EXAMINATION
24	BY MR. ALBREGTS:
25	Q: Sergeant Whiteley, you used to be a detective with the

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department? 1 2 Yes, sir. A: And in that capacity were you assigned to the UMC 3 Q: criminal investigation? 4 5 Yes, sir, I was. A: And would you consider that -- well, one all-encompassing 6 Q: investigation focusing around UMC and Lacy Thomas? 7 8 There was a myriad of individuals involved I guess. A: There was one individual investigation. 9 10 And you and Detective Ford were the two lead detectives? Q:Yes, sir. I'm sorry. 11 Yes, sir. A: 12 I'd like to focus your testimony to one of the entities Q:13 in addition to UMC and Lacy Thomas, and that would be ACS. recall that entity? 14 15 Yes, sir. A: And were they a part of the investigation -- the criminal 16 Q:investigation? 17 18 Yes, sir. Initially they were. A: Do you recall interviewing two of their principals, Bob 19 Q: 20 Mills and a Ross Fidler? 21 Yes, sir. A: 22 Q: Do you recall where that was at? 23 It was at Don Campbell's office, sir. A:

And was Don Campbell there?

Yes, he was.

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Q:

A:

1	Q:	And during that interview, was there a discussion about	
2	documents	, evidence, records that ACS had that they wanted to	
3	provide t	o you?	
4	A:	Yes, sir. We made a request for those records.	
5	Q:	And was that request honored?	
6	A:	Yes, it was.	
7	Q:	And how was that done?	
8	A:	It was done through I believe one or two CD's that were	
9	provided	to us that we had signed for.	
10	Q:	And those CD's contained hundreds of pages of documents	
11	related t	o ACS and their work at UMC?	
12	A:	Yes, sir.	
13	Q:	From those documents, did you and/or Detective Ford	
14	create a notebook?		
15	A:	That notebook would have been created by Nancy Sampson.	
16	Q:	Okay. And Nancy Sampson is a financial analyst with the	
17	Las Vegas	Metropolitan Police Department?	
18	A:	Yes, sir.	
19	Q:	And you're aware of that notebook generally?	
20	A:	Yes.	
21	Q:	And you had reviewed that notebook previously?	
22	A:	Yes.	
23	Q:	And and that was Exhibit number G that was admitted	
24	back w	ay back when in the trial; do you recall that?	
25	A:	I don't remember what exhibit it was or I think that was	

I didn't personally. No, sir.

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A:

1 Do you know if they were provided? Q: 2 I do not know. I understand that they didn't get them, A: 3 but I do not know if they were actually provided to him. When you say they didn't get them, what do you mean? 4 Q:Well, there -- from -- from what I understand from the 5 A: 6 case, Scott was saying he didn't get those discs or he wasn't aware of them. 7 Okay. I'm not asking what you heard from Scott or what 8 Q:9 Scott said. Do you know specifically what you did or whether you would give them -- you gave them to the DA? 10 11 I did not give them to the DA. No, sir. A: Did you have -- do you know if Detective Ford gave them 12 Q: 13 to him? 14 I could not say either way. A: 15 Okay. Did --Q: I don't know. 16 A: -- did you ever sit down and meet with Mr. Mitchell 17 Q:during the course of the investigation about what was happening in 18 the investigation? 19 20 Yes, sir, we did. A: 21 How many occasions do you recall? Q: 22 I want to say two or three, but it was a long time ago. 23 And did you talk about evidence that had been presented Q: 24 to you by ACS during the course of your investigation to Mr. Mitchell? 25

1	A: Yes, sir. We'd go over the merits of the case.
2	Q: Would that have included the information contained in the
3	notebook as it relates to ACS and the investigation related to
4	that?
5	A: Yes, sir.
6	Q: Were you there or did you make recommendations regarding
7	a charging decision as to whether ACS or the principal should be
8	charged as well as Mr. Thomas?
9	A: Yes. As outlined in our officer's report, we put in
10	there that we recommended that ACS not be charged due to the fact
11	that we were able to show that some work had been done.
12	Q: And due to the fact that the information that was
13	provided to you by by Mr
14	A: Yes, sir.
15	Q: Campbell?
16	A: And the interviews we did.
17	MR. ALBREGTS: Nothing further.
18	THE COURT: Any cross examination?
19	MR. STAUDAHER: Yes.
20	CROSS EXAMINATION
21	BY MR. STAUDAHER:
22	Q: So, it's to the best of your recollection you when you
23	made this submission I mean, you had discussions with Scott
24	Mitchell and/or Eric Jorgenson about the case during the time you
25	were investigating it?