IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LESLIE LYNN MILLER,

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Appellant

— v. —

BRETT ROBERT MILLER,

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA District Ct. Case No. D-15-511973-D

RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF

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1/18/2017

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

| LESLIE LYNN MILLER, | Supreme Court No. 69353 |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Appellant | District Ct. Case No. D-15-511973-D |
| — v. — | |
| Brett Robert Miller, | |
| Responden | nt |
| | |

RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF

Respondent, Brett Robert Miller, by and through his counsel of record, Christopher P. Burke, Esq., hereby submits his Answering Brief.

Dated: This 18th day of January, 2017

By: /S/Christopher P. Burke, Esq. Christopher P. Burke, Esq. 218 S. Maryland Parkway Las Vegas, NV 89101 Nevada Bar No.: 004093

NRAP 26.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following are persons and entities as described in NRAP 26.1(a), and must be disclosed. These representations are made in order that Judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

There are no such persons, entities, or corporations.

Respectfully submitted this 18th day of January, 2017

/S/Christopher P. Burke, Esq. Christopher P. Burke, Esq. Nevada Bar No.: 004093 218 S. Maryland Parkway Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities. ii I. II. III. IV. 1. District Court did not abuse its discretion...... 6 V. i

| 1 | Table of Authorities |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 2 | |
| 3 | Cases |
| 4 | In re Siriani, 967 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) |
| 5 | United States vs. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) |
| 6 | Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev 1367 (1990) |
| 7 | 777 tg/tt 0. 030 tt/1t, 114 1107 (1990) |
| 9 | Statutes and Rules |
| 10 | NRS 125B.070 |
| 11 | NRS 125B.080 |
| 12 | 11KO 125B.000 |
| 13 | |
| 14 15 | |
| 16 | |
| 17 | |
| 18 | |
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Ι

Statement of the Issue

This appeal presents the following issue to be determined by the District Court:

- (1) Whether the District Court abused its discretion in awarding \$345 in child support?
- (2) Whether there is a formula the Supreme Court wants used to determine support in split physical custody cases?

II

Statement of the Case

The nature of the action at the district court was a divorce involving child custody and child support. The parties have two minor children. One child is shared equally, while the mother has primary custody of the other child. The Court awarded child support to the mother. She did not think the amount was sufficient so she appealed.

III

Statement of Facts

Appellant, Leslie Lynn Miller ("Appellant" or "Leslie"), filed a complaint for divorce on March 24, 2015. (Ex. of Rec., p.1-10) In her complaint, Leslie requested, among other relief, that the district court grant her primary physical custody of the parties' two minor children: Payton Riley Miller born August 24, 2001, and Jordan Timothy Miller born August 9, 2004. In addition, Leslie requested that she be awarded child support in the amount of 25 percent of Respondent Brett Robert Miller's ("Brett") gross monthly income.(Ex. of Rec., p.1-10).

On March 27, 2015, Brett filed his answer and counterclaim. (Ex. of Rec., p.11-15). Leslie filed her reply to counterclaim on April 3, 2015. (Ex. of Rec. p.16-19). Thereafter, the district court referred the parties to the Family Mediation Center ("FMC") to formulate a custody and visitation agreement. (Ex. of Rec., p.65-70). The parties successfully mediated the custody issues of their case, and entered into a stipulated parenting agreement that resulted in a split physical custody schedule. (Ex. of Rec., p.67). Specifically, the parties agreed to share joint physical custody of their son, Jordan, and for Leslie to have primary physical custody of the parties' daughter, Payton. (Ex. of Rec.,

p.67).

The parties reached an agreement on all other issues in their divorce, except for child support. (Ex. of Rec., p.73-86) and (Ex. of Rec., p.140-41). On September 15, 2015, the district court proved up the divorce. (Ex. of Rec., p.124-25). The parties' stipulated terms were then put on the record. (Ex. of Rec., p.125-30).

On September 28, 2015, Leslie's counsel submitted a proposed decree of divorce to judicial chambers, leaving the child support figure blank as the Court requested. (Ex. of Rec., p.73-79 and p.130). The district court then signed the decree and entered a handwritten monthly child support number of \$345 into the parties' decree of divorce. (Ex. of Rec., p.76-79). The decree of divorce was entered on September 29, 2015. (Ex. of Rec., p.73).

On October 9, 2015, Leslie, filed a "Motion for Reconsideration, to Amend Judgment, and for Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Child-Support Calculation." (Ex. of Rec., p.87-98). In her motion, Leslie argued that while there was no specific Nevada law on the proper calculation of child support in split physical situations, also that the \$345 per month amount was below the statutory guidelines, and that it was unreasonable given the parties' circumstances. (Ex. of Rec., p.94-96).

In support, Leslie noted that Brett's gross monthly income was \$4,304.97 according to his September 10, 2015 financial disclosure form, while hers was slightly less at \$3,986.66 per month. (Ex. of Rec., p.41, 46, 91). Leslie also set forth her calculation of the parties' specific custodial timeshares, showing that Brett had physical custody of Jordon for 36.9% of the time, and Payton 14.3% of the time. (Ex. of Rec. p.91). Based on the disparity in the custody timeshare, and the fact that she earned less than Brett, Leslie argued that under the statutory guidelines set forth in NRS 125B.070 and the *Wright v. Osburn* case, she should receive between \$590.40 and \$850.18 per month in child support, not the \$345 per month awarded. (Ex. of Rec., p.94-95).

Brett opposed her motion. He argued: (1) the amount was appropriate because Leslie failed to object to the interim child support award of \$200 per month; and (2) the amount was appropriate because Leslie makes slightly less than Brett. (Ex. of Rec. p.102, 104, 108).

On November 17, 2015, the district court heard oral argument on Leslie's motion and Brett's countermotion. (Ex. of Rec., p.113-14, 142). At the hearing, the district court denied Leslie's motion, and issued a finding that the \$345 per month child support amount was in the children's best interests. (Ex. of

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Rec. p.114). Further, the district court found that the \$345 per month was based on Nevada's statutory percentages, the statutory deviation factors, and "all circumstances." (Ex. of Rec., p.114).

The district court roughly explained how it arrived at its \$345 child support figure. (Ex. of Rec., p.113-14, 132-37). In so doing, the district court stated that the court could use some guidance on how to calculate child support in a split physical custody situation. (Ex. of Rec., p.134). It added, that because there is no set formula, parties in split physical custody situations could receive different presumptive child support amounts based upon which judicial department is hearing the child support case. (Ex. of Rec. p.135). It noted that "[w]ith regard to the calculation of child support under [a split custody] scenario as I've indicated, the Supreme Court has not given us guidance on that." (Ex. of Rec., p.134). Finally, the court added, "we would all love some clarification with regard to [the calculation of child support in a split custody situation] because I know I've had conversations with my colleagues, and we all do it slightly different . . ." (Ex. of Rec., p.135). Despite these remarks, the District Court felt comfortable in the amount it awarded in this case.

Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on December 7, 2015. (Ex. of Rec., p.115-16). This appeal is related to the issues of whether the district court abused its discretion in calculating child support, and for a determination of the proper method of determining child support in a split physical custody situation in the State of Nevada.

IV

Argument

1. District Court did not abuse its discretion.

First, Brett argues the District Court did not abuse its discretion. Why? Because if there is no specific statute on how to calculate the amount, it could not have abused its discretion. The Ninth Circuit has held, that to abuse its discretion, a courts decision must be illogical, implausible or have no support in the record. *United States vs. Hinkson*, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009)(en banc).

In this case, Leslie calculates that actual amount of child support she was awarded is about 7.15% (Appellant Br. p.27). However, this number is reasonable under the formula used by the District Court. How? Well, since there is shared custody with one child, we take Bretts income of \$4,304.97 at

the time, 18% of that is \$774.89. If we then take 18% of Leslies income of

3,986.66, we get 717.59, a difference of 57.30. Next, if we take $7\%^2$ of Bretts income, we get \$301.34. If we add in the \$57.30, the total child support would equal \$358.64. This is roughly equivalent to the \$345, the Court awarded, taking into consideration the "deviation factors" and "all the circumstances" (Ex. of Rec., p.136, ln. 2-4). An appellate court can affirm on any basis in the record. In re Siriani, 967 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1992). And here, it should, as the record amply provides for that option.

Besides, contrary to what the appellant implies, the Court did not just make up a number out of thin air. The District Court explained how it came up with the \$345 child support numbers by specifically stating how it reached its conclusion. First, the Court followed Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 1369 (1990), by "[c]alculat[ing] the appropriate percentage of gross income for each parent; [then] subtract[ing] the difference between the two and requir[ing] the parent with the higher income [Brett] to pay the parent with the lower income that difference".

^{1.} Bretts income is now about \$3,600 per month.

^{2.} Difference between the 25% for a second child and 18% for one child.

| 1 | The Court, then looked at the percentage and deviation factors such as | | |
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| 2 | | | |
| 3 | the costs of health insurance , the age of the children, and the amount of | | |
| 4 | time the child spends with each parent to calculate the child support. | | |
| 5 | See NRS 125 B.080.9(a),(d) and (j). (Ex. of Rec., p.2, 100, 114, 123, and 124). | | |
| 6 | See NKS 125 D.000.9(a),(u) and (j). (Ex. of Rec., p.2, 100, 114, 123, and 124). | | |
| 7 | As the Court explained: | | |
| 8 | | | |
| 9 | | | |
| 10 | NRS 125 B.080.9(a) | | |
| 11 | Health Insurance | | |
| 12 | | | |
| 13 | Mr. Fleeman: | The only other thing is, I think on the child | |
| 14 | | support amount, there's health insurance for the | |
| 15 | | children that my client pays for. He's currently | |
| 16 | | paying half. Half is 160 a month. | |
| 17 | Mr. Miller: | Uh-huh. | |
| 18 | Mr. Fleeman: | And he's current. They're all current on that. | |
| 19 | | | |
| 20 | The Court: | Okay. | |
| 21 | Mr. Fleeman: | In terms of the child support figure, I mean, we | |
| 22 | | haven't discussed that with him. That may it's | |
| 23 | | a split custody arrangement. So I think the Court | |
| 24 | | may need to calculate that based on the FDFs. | |
| 25 | The Court: | Okay. | |
| 26 | | (Ex. of Rec. p.123, ln.12-24)(emphasis added) | |
| 27 | | - | |
| 28 | | | |
| 20 | | | |

| 1 | Mr. Miller: | Oh, geez. One – I had a question. |
|----|--------------|--|
| 2 | The Court: | Vog gir |
| 3 | The Court: | Yes, sir. |
| 4 | Mr. Miller: | As far as the chi– child support goes, does that |
| 5 | | include <i>health care</i> or is that – |
| 6 | The Court: | Health care would come off of it. |
| 7 | 36 360 | |
| 8 | Mr. Miller: | Okay. |
| 9 | The Court: | It would be deducted from it depending on who's |
| 10 | | paying it. |
| 11 | Mr. Miller: | Okay. She's paying it, and then I'd |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | The Court: | Yeah, you'd get a you'd get a credit, whether it's you're paying and you get a credit or it goes |
| 14 | | however we it's taken off of that. It's |
| 15 | | considered as part of the child – |
| 16 | Mr. Miller: | Okay. |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | The Court: | support. So yeah, I would calculate it. You guys |
| 19 | | in your agreement came up with an unusual twist that I have to actually run numbers on to be able |
| 20 | | to get you a final amount – |
| 21 | Mr. Miller: | Okay. |
| 22 | wii. wiiiei. | Okay. |
| 23 | The Court: | on that |
| 24 | | (Ex. of Rec. p.124, ln.5-24)(emphasis added) |
| 25 | | |
| 26 | | |
| 27 | | |
| 28 | | |
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| 1 | The Court: | And you understand that the Court will take that |
|----|---|---|
| 2 | | decision that you've made, apply the child support formulas that that exist and come up |
| 3 | | with a child support amount that's appropriate? |
| 4 | Ma Millon | Voc die |
| 5 | Ms. Miller: | Yes, sir. (Ex. of Rec. p.127, ln.20-24) |
| 6 | | |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | Mr. Fleeman: | Just for clarification, that the <i>health insurance</i> is 320 a month that mom pays. |
| - | The Court: | Okay. |
| 10 | Mr. Fleeman: | Total. |
| 11 | Mr. rieeman: | Total. |
| 12 | The Court: | Which is the 160 that we came up with. |
| 13 | Mr. Fleeman: | Right. |
| 14 | | (Ex. of Rec. p.129, ln.16-21)(emphasis added) |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | The Court: | Questions? |
| 18 | MS. Miller: | Thank you. |
| 19 | Mr. Miller: | Will you read the - the information that I I have |
| 20 | 111111111111111111111111111111111111111 | on the as far as the child support goes? |
| 21 | The Court: | Yes. |
| 22 | | |
| 23 | Mr. Miller: | Do you read okay. |
| 24 | The Court: | Yeah, yeah, I'll take all of that into consideration before I enter that part of it. |
| 25 | | (Ex. of Rec. p.130, ln.10-17) |
| 26 | | (Lm. 01 100, p.1.)0, m.10 1/) |
| 27 | | |

NRS 125B.080.9(j)

<u>Time</u> spent with chil<u>dren</u>

The Court:

There is a request that I make a finding that the custodial arrangement is actually a primary physical custodial arrangement rather than a joint physical of Jordan. In looking at what the parties agreed to just a few months ago, as well as running the analysis under the Rivero standards, I find that the arrangement with regard to Jordan is a joint physical custodial arrangement with the defendant having at least 40 percent of the time with the child as a result of that.

With regard to the calculation of child support, under that scenario as I've indicated, the Supreme Court has not given us guidance on that. I don't know if it's appropriate for me to ask Mr. Fleeman to take this one up on appeal so that we get a resolution on that, but I'll leave that to you and your -- and your counsel.

But I can make the findings that I did run the calculations that we have been given. I've compared the calculations. And as a result, I'm making a finding that the award that I previously entered at 345 a month is in the best interest of the minor child. It's consistent with the codified child support formulas as I'm interpreting them, given the time share and the other factors under NRS 125B.070 and .080 as -- as I run those calculations.

We would all love some clarification with regard to that because I know I've had conversations with my colleagues, and we all do it slightly

1 different, but we all try and stay consistent with the statutes as much as possible. 2 3 So I'm - I'm presuming those are sufficient findings for you to be able to do what you need to 4 do from this point, Mr. Fleeman. 5 (Ex. of Rec. p.134, ln.12-24 and p.135, ln.1-17)(emphasis added) 6 7 8 9 The Court: ... I know I've had conversations with my colleagues, and we all do it slightly different, but 10 we all try and stay consistent with the statutes as 11 much as possible. 12 13 14 The Court: Yeah and - - and I would love to give you the exact 15 calculations; but I don't have my notes when I 16 did it. Essentially, how I run those calculations is I take a look at the 18-percent calculation and 17 the 25-percent calculation. I look at the 18 comparative incomes of the parties. And then I 19 run the deviation factors under .o -- under .o8o [NRS 125B.080] in order to get me to a number 20 that I think is appropriate given all the 21 circumstances that the parties present to me, as well as the custodial arrangement. 22 23 24 Mr. Fleeman: Okay. 25 26 The Court: Not a formula, as I am prohibited from using a formula at that point. But yeah, hopefully that's 27 sufficient to get you there. 28

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Mr. Fleeman: Okay.

(Ex. of Rec., p.135, ln. 12-24 and p.136, ln. 1-10)

Notably, at the time of this exchange, Mr. Fleeman was satisfied with the Courts answer. In fact, he never requested further clarification.

2. Potential formula from here forward.

Second, notwithstanding the District Courts decision below, this Court can still create a set formula going forward. But, it should not change the amount of child support in this case. Here, the formula and deviation factors used by the District Court and described above, were not an abuse of discretion.

As to a potential formula going forward, it is probably easier to take the Wright formula on shared custody children, then subtract the standard percentages based on the number of remaining children. For instance, in this case, that would be the difference between 25% - 18% or 7%. Then, add those numbers together to get the total child support.

 \mathbf{V}

Conclusion

The District Court did not abuse its discretion. The Court indicated the formula it has been using, and that formula has not been held unconstitutional. Therefore, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. Alternatively, and at worst, it should be remanded for the District Court to explain its exact calculation line by line. But in no case, should any increase in child support be retroactive.

DATED this 18^{th} day January, 2017.

/S/CHRISTOPHER P. BURKE, ESQ. CHRISTOPHER P. BURKE, ESQ. Nevada Bar. No.: 004093 218 S. Maryland Pkwy. Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. I hereby certify that this Brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because:

This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface, using WordPerfect X4 in Georgia 14 point font, or

- 2. I further certify that this brief complies with the page-or type-volume limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the Brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points and contains 2,555 words and it does not exceed 30 pages.
- 3. Finally, I certify that I have read this Respondent's Answering Brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular Nev. R. App. Pro. 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the Brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in thee vent that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Dated: This 18th day of January, 2017

By: /S/Christopher P. Burke, Esq. Christopher P. Burke, Esq. 218 S. Maryland Parkway Las Vegas, NV 89101 Nevada Bar No.: 004093 Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 18th day of January, 2017, a true and correct copy of the RESPONDENTS' ANSWERING BRIEF was served upon all counsel of record by electronically filing the document using the Nevada Supreme Court's electronic filing system. By /s/ Adriana Pelayo Employee of Christopher P. Burke, Esq. Jack W. Fleeman, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 010584 Pecos Law Group South Pecos Road, Suite 14A Henderson, Nevada 89074 (702) 388-1851 Attorney for Appellant