


TAB 65

TAB 65

TAB 65



CLERK OF THE COURT

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

RTRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

FREDERIC AND BARBARA
ROSENBERG LIVING TRUST,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
vs.)
)
BANK OF AMERICA, ET AL.,)
)
Defendants.)

CASE NO. A689113
DEPT. NO. 1

BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH C. CORY, DISTRICT JUDGE

WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2015 AT 9:21 A.M.

**RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT RE:
STATUS CHECK: RESET TRIAL DATE**

Recorded by: LISA A. LIZOTTE, COURT RECORDER

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

KAREN HANKS, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS FHP VENTURES,
MICHAEL DOIRON AND MacDONALD
HIGHLANDS REALTY:

SPENCER GUNNERSON, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANT BANK OF
AMERICA:

ARIEL E. STERN, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANT MALEK:

J. MALCOLM DeVOY, ESQ.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2015 AT 9:21 A.M.)

THE CLERK: Page 2 through 3, Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust versus Bank of America, Case Number A689113.

THE COURT: Did Mr. Stern arrive? We got a phone call from Mr. Stern.

Oh, there he is.

MR. STERN: I was a bit of a speed demon on the freeway, Your Honor. I made it.

THE COURT: Oh, well, let's see, the –

MR. STERN: Avoided that –

THE COURT: -- some sort of privilege I'm sure attaches to that statement.

MR. STERN: I somehow managed to avoid that case, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Did everyone receive the Court's order from yesterday?

MS. HANKS: No, Your Honor.

MR. GUNNERSON: No.

MR. DeVOY: No.

THE COURT: You didn't get it, Mr. Stern?

MR. STERN: No.

THE COURT: We decided it was all your client's fault.

MR. STERN: That doesn't surprise me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So no one received it, then?

MS. HANKS: No, Your Honor.

THE CLERK: It was sent out this morning.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Oh, I'm sorry. Well, we were rushing to try
2 and get that done because the purpose of today, of course, was to set trial and
3 we had already submitted the motion to dismiss. Do we have a copy of it that we
4 can hand out? Yeah. We'll print you out copies. I apologize for not getting this
5 to you before because it probably impacts the trial settings.

6 Essentially what the Court has done is agree with the
7 Defendants that – that the alleged covenant sought to be enforced in this case
8 cannot be enforced as against them for reasons argued by the Defendants
9 including the fact – this certainly isn't the only reason, but a part of it was the
10 sophistication of Mrs. Rosenberg, the waivers of everything known to man which
11 were signed, and it's the Court's conclusion that those causes of action as
12 against these Defendants cannot be maintained.

13 That leaves, however, the Defendant's counterclaim against
14 the Plaintiff, and I don't recall exactly what the nature of that was.

15 Oh, that was for slander of title. While I wouldn't judge that to
16 be the strongest claim to ever hit the courtroom, it was one that I didn't feel that I
17 could deal with on a summary judgment or a motion to dismiss basis. That
18 leaves, as near as I can tell, the trial to cover the Plaintiff's claims against Bank
19 of America as well as the counterclaim. I think that would be the extent of it, is
20 that correct?

21 MR. GUNNERSON: Sounds right, Your Honor.

22 THE COURT: I have one question, and I know I went through this
23 with my Law Clerk in the hours that we spent trying to sort out this whole thing,
24 but remind me if you would what the nature of the deed was in this matter, the
25

1 deed to the Rosenberg Trust. Was it a grant, bargain, sale deed? Was it a
2 warrantee deed? Was it a quit claim deed? What was it?

3 MR. GUNNERSON: Without the documents in front of me, Your
4 Honor, I don't want to say for sure. I believe it was a grant, bargain, sale deed
5 only because it was a – it was a pretty standard transaction, I don't think there
6 was much more that went into it, but without the documents in front of me I don't
7 know that I could say for certain.

8 THE COURT: And who was the conveyor?

9 MR. STERN: Typically, Your Honor – the bank was, and typically
10 when the bank conveys a property from – it's REO portfolio it is a grant, bargain
11 and sale deed but it is accompanied by a purchase agreement addendum that, in
12 your phrasing, waives everything known to man, so there are those issues, the
13 deed and whatever warranties come with it but it's accompanied by that
14 purchase addendum that has waivers.

15 THE COURT: Am I correct that the Plaintiff's principal claim of the
16 covenant that runs with the land, the easement would be as against the
17 conveyor, then? In other words, there were various causes of action that really
18 had to do with the expertise of the realtors with the knowledge, perhaps, of
19 MacDonald's, et cetera, et cetera, but the gravamen of your easement claim
20 would be against the conveyor, would it not?

21 MS. HANKS: Well, not – yes and no.

22 THE COURT: Okay.

23 MS. HANKS: So let me see if I can clear it up, at least my
24 understanding.

25

1 THE COURT: Yeah, clear it up. When was the last time a lawyer
2 cleared it up? Okay. Go ahead.

3 MS. HANKS: So we would argue that, yes, when Bank of America
4 conveyed the property our understanding was a restrictive covenant would have
5 existed over the golf parcel where the property was located, but in order to
6 enforce that covenant there's nothing that Bank of America can do at this point
7 because they're just selling the parcel at 590 Lairmont. Where the covenant
8 attaches is to the golf course that surrounds 59 --

9 THE COURT: By virtue of the master deed?

10 MS. HANKS: Correct.

11 THE COURT: Yeah.

12 MS. HANKS: So that's where the claims were against FHP -- well,
13 MacDonald Highlands Realty.

14 Actually we didn't have that against MacDonald Highlands
15 Realty or Doiron, that was more against FHP Ventures because they're the
16 declarant under the CC&Rs and then Mr. Malek because he wanted to build on it,
17 so that's where --

18 THE COURT: Well, to me -- and I'll tell you what my thinking is
19 although I would like the findings of fact, conclusions of law to contain, of course,
20 the plentitude of reasons advanced by the movants and the arguing -- and the
21 arguments advanced by them, but it's just so difficult for me to see how what
22 your client is seeking to do, given the configuration of these -- of the plots, et
23 cetera, et cetera, is anything other than a covenant -- an easement for light and
24 air and view, and in some of your arguments I saw that it -- that you kind of
25 switched off that track because I think it's probably not a winning --

1 MS. HANKS: Well, it's our position we never had that track. The
2 Defendants were saying that was our track but that was never our track. The
3 complaint doesn't even say that, it was that -- the change in the golf parcel.

4 THE COURT: Well, then, tell me -- here I am opening Pandora's
5 Box, but tell me, then, what is the nature of the covenant or easement which you
6 seek to enforce?

7 MS. HANKS: It's keeping the golf parcel a golf parcel. In other
8 words --

9 THE COURT: What kind of easement is that?

10 MS. HANKS: It's -- well, if it's not express, which they can be which
11 we thought it -- we argue that it was to the extent of Mr. Malek's deed, but there's
12 also implied, and that was --

13 THE COURT: Well, sure, and you can have implied covenants or
14 implied easements, but you still must be able to make what you're claiming as an
15 easement be one that fits within those kinds of easements which the law has in
16 the past -- by stare decisis has determined these are enforceable easements.

17 MS. HANKS: Right. And that's where we had the case law in
18 Nevada that did enforce it. Just the one off the top of my head -- I haven't read
19 my brief in a while, but the one was where people bought property in the
20 community that had the airport strip, had a park and it had some other
21 designated areas and someone came in after and decided to change that. And
22 they said, no, when these people bought the property it was induced to buy it
23 with the understanding that the surrounding property remain that way and that
24 was what was at issue, and so that's exactly what we were arguing.

25 THE COURT: What did the Court in that case call the easement?

1 MS. HANKS: A restrictive covenant.

2 THE COURT: Nothing more than a restrictive covenant?

3 MS. HANKS: Yeah. I mean it wasn't an express in any of the
4 deeds but they called it a restrictive covenant, and so you've seen the term and
5 even the restatement has gotten rid of it and they discussed it. The people use it
6 interchangeably.

7 THE COURT: And your contention is that that little piece of ground
8 is tantamount to putting in air strips and et cetera, et cetera, et cetera?

9 MS. HANKS: Yes. When you advertise a community with a plat
10 map – and the other case was the *Reno* case where they had platted the streets,
11 the parks and said, look, people bought the property with the inducement –
12 another one was access to, I think, the beach park area.

13 It's the same idea. The inducement is this area is going to stay
14 the way we have built it because we've advertised it to you this way and this is
15 what you're buying. You're not just buying your acre of land, you're buying the
16 surrounding areas, that's why you're paying the premium for what we've already
17 built and what we've already designed, and this is part of the 9th Hole of the golf
18 course, and so when the Rosenburgs bought the property there, just like the
19 house next to them, just like Mr. Malek next to them, you have an understanding
20 that that golf course is going to stay that way. In other words –

21 THE COURT: Well, what's – what's – what are they being deprived
22 of there, your clients?

23 MS. HANKS: The premium that they paid, in other words, the value
24 they paid for the community that they bought in, so the golf course. In other
25 words, it would be no different –

1 THE COURT: The golf course is still there.

2 MS. HANKS: Part of it but not all of it, and that's what the case law
3 is saying. You can't --

4 THE COURT: Well, what is the fractional part of the golf course
5 that's been lopped off by this sale?

6 MS. HANKS: I'm sorry?

7 THE COURT: What is the fractional part?

8 MS. HANKS: The fractional part is the tail end of the 9th Hole.

9 THE COURT: Right. But I mean given as a percentage of the
10 entire square footage of the golf course --

11 MS. HANKS: Yeah, I don't know.

12 THE COURT: -- it has to be minuscule.

13 MS. HANKS: I don't -- yeah. Well, I would agree with that. From an
14 18-Hole golf course it's probably a small portion, but the case law in Nevada said
15 you don't get to have a portion. It's either an all or nothing. When you have a
16 restrictive covenant to an area of land -- even, in fact, the -- I think it was the
17 *Shearer* case the Supreme Court -- the Nevada Supreme Court remanded for
18 that very reason because the Court did just that. They said, well, I'll give you part
19 of the covenant but I'll strike out another part, and the Court said, no, no, no, no,
20 it's -- when that person bought the property they either get the whole covenant or
21 they don't get any of it.

22 THE COURT: That's not really what I'm saying. I'm not saying I
23 give you part of it but not all of it. I'm not parsing the alleged covenant.

24

25

1 MS. HANKS: No. I'm pointing out that the fact that it might be
2 minimal versus major, that's not the analysis. The analysis is are you changing
3 what was agreed to stay there.

4 THE COURT: Let me just riddle you this, then. What if rather than
5 that particular piece there was a three foot long piece that ran contiguous with
6 the piece that is the subject plan, isn't there some point where it becomes de
7 minimis where the essential character of the land has not been changed and
8 where the only – the only rationale that I can put to this type of an easement as a
9 covenant is light and air and view?

10 MS. HANKS: Well, our position is no, Your Honor, because -- in
11 other words, our position was, and at the time the lawsuit was filed, because the
12 Rosenburgs didn't even know it was happening, if that covenant doesn't exist on
13 even a portion of the golf course then tomorrow the Rosenburgs could buy the
14 grass in front of Mr. Malek's property on part of that golf course and parse out a
15 third of an acre there, and then Joe Smith can come the next day and they can
16 keep on shortening and you could say, well, it's only a third of an acre and we
17 can still have the 9th Hole, and that's the point of the restrictive covenants. You
18 can start to chip away at something like that and then be left with no golf course.
19 That was the whole point of the covenants, the whole point of the inducement to
20 why they designed this community around the golf course, so it opens the door to
21 –

22 THE COURT: Well, given that you could be right that if – that you
23 could have – you could certainly foresee a situation where a conveyor or a
24 declarant of a master covenant might somehow allow that sort of thing to
25 happen, that really isn't the case here. The case here – I mean we're dealing

1 with what we're dealing with. We're dealing with the particular conveyance in this
2 case, and I guess I'm persuaded somewhat by the fact also that particularly
3 when enforcing an implied covenant -- am I correct we're dealing with equity
4 here?

5 MS. HANKS: In terms of the relief, right. If you --

6 THE COURT: The fact that it's an implied covenant.

7 MS. HANKS: -- ask for declaratory injunctive relief, yeah, it's an
8 equitable type of relief.

9 THE COURT: Then ought I not to take into account, again, the
10 sophistication of the buyer that this was someone who had, what, 20 years'
11 experience as a realtor?

12 MS. HANKS: Well, that may be --

13 THE COURT: And if there -- well, you know, and is given warnings
14 that say -- which she signed off on that say essentially what you see is what you
15 get.

16 MS. HANKS: No. And, Your Honor, I understand, but that's --

17 THE COURT: That's a bad way to put it.

18 MS. HANKS: No. Right. And I understand where, you know,
19 Doiron was coming from and MacDonald Highlands but the claim is not against
20 them. In other words, you could still dismiss the claims against Michael Doiron
21 and MacDonald Highlands Realty and still find the covenant exist on the land.
22 That -- that's -- so those two were separate and distinct from us.

23 THE COURT: Do I -- in analyzing the covenant as against one
24 Defendant do I forget what I, you know, found to be the operative facts and which
25 bear upon the application of the analysis of an implied covenant here --

1 MS. HANKS: Well, I ---

2 THE COURT: -- where you have a buyer who is a sophisticated
3 buyer? What would have prevented her from taking -- taking the tone of the
4 documents that she signed off on and saying, I better go check?

5 MS. HANKS: Because it only dealt with 590 Lairmont. That's the
6 point. That dealt with that little plot of land that she's buying a house that's
7 already built.

8 THE COURT: A sophisticated realtor would not be aware that there
9 could be --

10 MS. HANKS: Sale of a golf parcel that had been there since 1990 I
11 would argue no, especially when the community -- that's the center of it and that's
12 the -- I mean I don't go buy a house in Southern Highlands and think, well, I
13 should check if that park is still going to be there. I mean these are planned
14 communities in Las Vegas that -- it's a unique feature, in fact, of Las Vegas you
15 don't really find almost anywhere else, at least from my experience living on the
16 East Coast, that these whole communities are planned, and MacDonald
17 Highlands was planned around the golf course and --

18 THE COURT: Which is still there.

19 MS. HANKS: Right. Which is still there. There's a little less of the
20 9th Hole, and I don't know if tomorrow a little less will be on the 8th Hole or the
21 10th Hole. I don't know because --

22 THE COURT: Is there really a little less on the 9th Hole? Am I
23 correct that this did not impinge on the actual course? Wasn't that that area
24 that's -- it looks like rocks or something?

25

1 MS. HANKS: Well, that was our – that's the issue of fact that we
2 would say it is in play, it's inbound play, but you're correct, it's not green, it's not
3 rough.

4 Well, I guess it could be considered rough by golf terms but it's
5 in play, so it is part of the 9th Hole.

6 THE COURT: I have labored over this because this is obviously of
7 supreme importance to the parties, and it greatly affects the amount of time that's
8 necessary and costs that's necessary to the parties. Moving forward, you know,
9 what will the shape of the trial be as opposed to – one way as opposed to the
10 other way, but I remain convinced that I think the Defendants have the better part
11 of it, that this is – that there is no implied covenant or implied easement of the
12 nature that's being alleged by the Plaintiffs as to that particular sliver of ground.

13 Maybe I'll be wrong and if so then we'll be back and you'll be
14 retrying the whole thing. Knowing that do you wish to reconsider your position on
15 this?

16 MR. GUNNERSON: I do not wish to reconsider my position, Your
17 Honor.

18 MR. DeVOY: No. Nor does Mr. Malek, and we'd just like to point
19 out a few things about the cases that were cited. The precedent that was cited in
20 the motions, and was brought up again here even after the Court's decision, is
21 not apposite to the case before the Court right now. In the *Sandy Valley* case,
22 which had to do with the airport landing strip if I'm not mistaken, that one is
23 where people were actually building on the landing strip, the Defendant was to do
24 that.

25

1 Here, as the Court has noted, there's a little sliver of property
2 that was undeveloped desert land that's being used now so that Mr. Malek can
3 build his house a little bit closer to the golf course. The hole has not changed.
4 This isn't a situation where the 9th Hole –

5 THE COURT: Well, if this is such a nothing, unimportant piece of
6 ground, then why doesn't your client let it go?

7 MR. DeVOY: I can't speak to that right now, Your Honor. I'd have
8 to check with him.

9 MR. GUNNERSON: Your Honor, one question I do have is I believe
10 we also have pending a motion for leave to amend to conform with the evidence
11 that would include one of my parties who had filed a motion for summary
12 judgment but they had asked for additional claims to be added. I don't know if
13 this renders that moot or if forthcoming –

14 THE COURT: I don't either. I haven't taken it that far.

15 MR. GUNNERSON: Okay. So that may still be in play in that
16 situation, then.

17 MS. HANKS: This was an alternative claim to the extent that the
18 implied restrictive covenant didn't exist over the land, so we would argue it's not
19 moot but –

20 MR. GUNNERSON: Okay. So we'll just wait to hear what the Court
21 has to say on it.

22 MS. HANKS: But it would only be against FHP Ventures. It's not
23 against the other – there's no amendments as to any of the other parties. It was
24 just FHP Ventures.

25 THE COURT: And this is on your pending motion to amend?

1 MS. HANKS: Yes, Your Honor. You had it set for in chambers for
2 July 2nd.

3 THE COURT: I don't want to rush to judgment on any of this, but
4 with this kind of a matter I will tell you that I'm – unless I can see that it's really
5 absolutely in vain I would be – sort of my default position would be to allow the
6 amendment so that we can see. I mean I just have to work through these one
7 step at a time, and I can't work through the question of whether or not such a
8 new claim would lie unless we get it teed up and we do it, so –

9 MR. GUNNERSON: I believe those have been fully briefed, so --

10 MS. HANKS: They have been fully briefed.

11 MR. GUNNERSON: -- that's – I'm sure you're going to have an
12 opportunity to look at that sooner than later, and that's been fully briefed and
13 obviously we believe we have some strong evidence as to why – or reasons why
14 it shouldn't go forward and I know Plaintiffs feel the opposite –

15 THE COURT: Sure.

16 MR. GUNNERSON: -- so we'll be waiting to hear your decision.

17 THE COURT: Remind me what the nature of the amendment is.

18 MR. GUNNERSON: The amendment was to essentially bring a
19 breach of contract and –

20 MS. HANKS: Breach of fiduciary duty.

21 MR. GUNNERSON: -- breach of fiduciary duty claims against FHP
22 basically under the CC&Rs. It was a motion to amend to conform with the
23 evidence, which we believe is inappropriate in the procedure, but also insofar as
24 based upon –

25

1 THE COURT: My first take on it, and I frankly have not looked at
2 your briefs yet so I –

3 MR. GUNNERSON: I'd rather you take a look at the briefs because
4 –

5 THE COURT: Yeah. My first take on it is –

6 MR. GUNNERSON: -- those identify much –

7 THE COURT: -- that one may have legal rights that are far different
8 based on something far different than the real estate law –

9 MR. GUNNERSON: Understood.

10 THE COURT: -- involved with implied covenants, so anyway I'll take
11 a look at it and we'll see.

12 MR. GUNNERSON: Okay.

13 MR. DeVOY: If there's nothing new against Shane Malek are we
14 dissolved in terms of the Defendant's claims against him?

15 THE COURT: In the new motion you're saying?

16 MR. DeVOY: In the new amended complaint.

17 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't know.

18 MR. DeVOY: Plaintiff's counsel just represented there's nothing
19 new.

20 THE COURT: Okay.

21 MS. HANKS: No. It was only to add claims – change the claims
22 against FHP Ventures given their motion to dismiss.

23 THE COURT: All right. Well, then, let me ask you a question. If – I
24 mean how could we set a trial date realistically if we don't know whether – what
25 the scope of this case is?

1 MR. GUNNERSON: I think we –

2 MS. HANKS: I would agree with that.

3 MR. GUNNERSON: Yeah. I would agree we really need to have a
4 decision on that motion to amend and understand if FHP is involved yet before
5 we can set a trial date.

6 MS. HANKS: Right. I would agree with that particularly because if
7 you do grant it they might ask for additional discovery, so I don't know how that's
8 going to shake out either.

9 MR. STERN: The other issue, Your Honor, not to complicate things
10 but –

11 THE COURT: I know you've got a stack of motions teed up. You
12 were waiting to see how these guys made out.

13 MR. STERN: No. But I think that's a good idea. We'll take a look at
14 it. It's a joke, yes. We were thinking about that.

15 But we also have – if this claim against the CC&Rs come in
16 and this foreshadows some of the other cases we have to deal with today, we
17 may have an arbitration problem under Chapter 38.

18 THE COURT: Oh, NRED, yeah.

19 MR. STERN: So –

20 MS. HANKS: Which we've – I mean we've opposed and we've
21 explained why it doesn't apply.

22 THE COURT: Yeah, okay.

23 MS. HANKS: Your Honor, could I just get one clarification since –
24 when we go do the order for the – the minute order that you have here, is the
25 Court's finding that Nevada law does not recognize restrictive covenants or that

1 you just don't believe there's issue of fact as to one existing here? And I just
2 need that point of clarification so that we don't get into the fact – because I want
3 to – that's a big contention because that's what they argued, so I just want to
4 make sure in case the client appeals what I know what we're appealing.

5 THE COURT: Not trying to remain too obtuse I will have to decline
6 to – to answer that question. To make all of this fit in what I believe is the correct
7 order of the day, I'm going to need to see both of the orders –

8 MS. HANKS: Okay.

9 THE COURT: -- the proposed orders.

10 MS. HANKS: Fair enough.

11 THE COURT: And if I don't agree with either one of them, then we'll
12 have to fashion our own from it.

13 MS. HANKS: Okay. That's fair.

14 THE COURT: In other words, it's still – as you can tell from the fact
15 that I asked you some questions this morning it's still – I've been wrestling with
16 this a lot and I want to do everything I can to make sure that I come to the correct
17 decision so that you all don't have to redo this whole thing if at all possible.

18 MR. GUNNERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

19 THE COURT: So I'll have to key off of what I assume, then, will be
20 differing findings of fact, conclusions of law. You're going to want me to say
21 something outrageous, you're going to want to protect me from saying something
22 outrageous.

23 MS. HANKS: I don't want you to say anything outrageous. I have
24 no dog in the fight in terms of what it said. I just want to make sure -- because I
25 think we could agree on an order. I just wanted to make sure what the real basis

1 was because that was really their lead argument, that it didn't even exist in
2 Nevada, so I just wanted to make sure where we were going when we started
3 drafting the findings of fact, but we can –

4 THE COURT: Well, that's a good –

5 MS. HANKS: -- leave maybe both in there. I don't know.

6 THE COURT: -- question, which will unfortunately not get a good
7 answer today other than I will need to view the differing findings of fact,
8 conclusions of law proposed so that I can finally cement, frankly, in my own mind
9 that I have come to the right decision and if I conclude that I haven't I'll pull the
10 whole thing back.

11 I wrestle with this issue, frankly, because you have so many
12 different players, you have so many different parties and you're asserting it not
13 against the conveyor in this instance – well, you are but that's for another day.
14 You're really asserting it as against the master conveyor, and you're asserting
15 something that even the nature of it could be questioned, what is this really, and
16 so it becomes difficult to try and figure out precisely what does Nevada law say.

17 So all I can say is I'm having to take this one step at a time,
18 and I'll look at your proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and make a
19 determination of whether -- which if either really express what the Court's – the
20 full body of what the Court's reasoning is on this.

21 MR. GUNNERSON: And I believe the minute order said, Your
22 Honor, we will draft that findings of fact, conclusions of law and we'll run it by you
23 –

24 THE COURT: Okay.

25

1 MR. GUNNERSON: -- at least as far as my client's motion is
2 concerned.

3 THE COURT: Yeah. Yeah.

4 MS. HANKS: We're setting a status check?

5 THE COURT: All right. So we're going to continue this out until –
6 now, are we going to be able to – we're not going to be able to set a trial until we
7 figure out whether or not NRED rears its ugly head.

8 MS. HANKS: That and whether FHP is still in on the amended
9 claims.

10 THE COURT: Right.

11 MS. HANKS: Right.

12 THE COURT: Well, will we know both of those things by the next
13 hearing date?

14 MS. HANKS: That's – the ball's in your court, Your Honor. It's fully
15 briefed.

16 THE COURT: Now, deciding the motion do we decide whether it
17 has to go to NRED?

18 MS. HANKS: Correct, yes.

19 THE COURT: All right.

20 MS. HANKS: You decide that issue and you decide if FHP is still in
21 but on other claims, yes.

22 THE COURT: So obviously the reason I'm asking is because that
23 means that everybody does need to be here for the next hearing because at that
24 point we'll be setting a trial or we'll be imposing a stay and sending it off to
25 NRED.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MS. HANKS: Right.

MR. GUNNERSON: All Right.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GUNNERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. STERN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What date do we have for that hearing?

THE CLERK: Are you talking about the motion to amend?

THE COURT: Yes.

THE CLERK: It was on the chamber calendar.

THE COURT: Oh, yeah.

MS. HANKS: It was for July 2nd.

THE COURT: We're going to have to move that over.

Well, let's do this. Let's be clever so that we don't allow them opportunity to argue it again. Let's set the – move this status check and to set a new trial for immediately after the chambers calendar decision.

MS. HANKS: The chambers calendar has already passed, July 2nd.

THE COURT: Is this the one that we said we were working on today – for this week?

All right. We'll have that for you by Monday. So put this on for Wednesday, then.

MR. STERN: So we're back here on Wednesday, Your Honor, a week from today?

THE COURT: Wednesday, yeah.

MR. GUNNERSON: And just so Your Honor knows, my wife is due on Wednesday of next week, so I may have – I guess we're not going to argue,

1 we're just basically here to set trial, but I know in setting a trial date I might not be
2 present depending on when this baby comes.

3 THE COURT: Oh, no. That can't be. What do you –

4 MR. GUNNERSON: Just so you're aware.

5 THE COURT: Where are you going to be?

6 MR. GUNNERSON: Well, maybe the hospital.

7 THE COURT: Well, you don't have to do that. Do the old style.

8 MS. HANKS: What, the husband doesn't go there and just let me
9 know when the baby's here?

10 MR. STERN: Wait for the cigars.

11 MR. GUNNERSON: Now you're starting to sound like my partner,
12 Will Kemp. He doesn't understand.

13 THE COURT: Well, then, let's not do that, then. Let's make it be
14 the following –

15 MR. GUNNERSON: If we could I would appreciate that.

16 THE COURT: -- Tuesday or Wednesday.

17 THE CLERK: The 29th.

18 THE COURT: 29th.

19 MR. GUNNERSON: Thank you.

20 MS. HANKS: At 9:00 a.m.?

21 THE CLERK: 9:00 a.m.

22 THE COURT: Yes.

23 THE CLERK: Can I have counsel state their name on the record,
24 please?

25 MS. HANKS: Karen Hanks on behalf of Plaintiff.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. STERN: Ariel Stern for Bank of America.

MR. GUNNERSON: Spencer Gunnerson on behalf of MacDonald Highlands Realty, Michael Doiron and FHP Ventures.

MR. DeVOY: Jay DeVoy on behalf of Shane Malek.

THE CLERK: Thank you.

MR. DeVOY: Thank you.

MR. GUNNERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So are you going to be -- if this all goes down -- well, we'll just wait and see.

MR. GUNNERSON: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded.)

* * * * *

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/visual proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.


 —
LISA A. LIZOTTE
Court Recorder

TAB 66

TAB 66

TAB 66

JA_2994



CLERK OF THE COURT

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

TRAN

**EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CIVIL/CRIMINAL DIVISION
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

FREDERIC AND BARBARA ROSENBERG)
LIVING TRUST,)

Plaintiff,)

vs.)

BANK OF AMERICA, et al,)

Defendants.)

CASE NO. A-13-689113

DEPT. NO. I

BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH CORY, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015

TRANSCRIPT RE:
DEFENDANT SHAHIN MALEK'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

DEFENDANT MACDONALD HIGHLANDS REALTY, LLC AND FHP VENTURES
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RETAX AND SETTLE MEMORANDUM
OF COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:

KAREN L. HANKS, ESQ.
JACQUELINE GILBERT, ESQ.

For Defendant Shane S. Malek:

JAMES M. DeVOY, ESQ.

For Defendants Michael Doiron,
MacDonald Highlands Realty, LLC
and Foothill Partners:

MATTHEW S. CARTER, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: Lisa Lizotte, Court Recorder

1 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015

2 PROCEEDINGS

3 (PROCEEDINGS BEGAN AT 1:41 P.M.)

4 THE CLERK: Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust versus Bank
5 of America. Case No. A-689113.

6 MS. HANKS: Karen Hanks and Jacqueline Gilbert on behalf of the plaintiffs.

7 THE COURT: Good afternoon.

8 MR. CARTER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Matthew Carter on behalf of
9 MacDonald Highlands, Michael Doiron and Foothills Partners.

10 MR. DEVOY: Good afternoon. James DeVoy here for defendant Shahin
11 Malek.

12 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Let's take first Mr. Malek's motion for
13 attorney's fees and costs.

14 MR. DEVOY: Okay. Your Honor, I think the motion speaks for itself. It
15 was scheduled to be heard in chambers. I have not received an opposition to it.
16 I looked at the docket before I came here.

17 THE COURT: Oh.

18 MR. DEVOY: It seems that the plaintiff has conceded to the motion.

19 THE COURT: Is the one where we got an opposition this morning?

20 MS. HANKS: Yeah, I believe yesterday we realized we did not send courtesy
21 copies, Your Honor, so we should have sent them yesterday.

22 THE COURT: Oh.

23 MS. HANKS: But we did oppose it.

24 THE COURT: Have you seen the opposition?

1 MR. DEVOY: I have not seen a copy of this opposition.

2 THE COURT: Okay.

3 MR. DEVOY: Do you have a copy?

4 MS. HANKS: I don't. I'm sorry.

5 THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you what. Normally what I do is continue it out
6 so you have an opportunity to look at it. I can either do that, but I think -- I can do
7 that if you want, or you can just argue your opposition verbally. It's up to you.

8 MR. DEVOY: I would much prefer the opportunity to see the written
9 opposition and file a reply brief at a further scheduled date for a hearing. If the
10 Court would like to comply with that, I feel like that would be better so I'm not
11 arguing in the dark here.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 MS. HANKS: And I defer to counsel. I agree. If he wants his reply time,
14 I don't want to deprive him of that.

15 THE COURT: All right.

16 MS. HANKS: I'm sorry.

17 MR. DEVOY: That's okay; it happens.

18 MS. HANKS: I apologize.

19 THE COURT: All right.

20 MR. DEVOY: My position for the record is that it was consented to under
21 EDCR 2.20 (e) and I want to preserve that.

22 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

23 MR. DEVOY: Notwithstanding the fact that an opposition was filed this
24 morning, I believe the motion should be granted on that basis, just so we're all clear

1 on that. But if there was an opposition filed, I'd just like the opportunity to review it.

2 And if the Court would like to set it out --

3 THE COURT: Sure.

4 MR. DEVOY: -- for a time at the Court's discretion, I'd just ask the opportunity
5 to reply.

6 THE COURT: How long do you want to put it out?

7 MR. DEVOY: It depends on the Court's calendar.

8 THE COURT: And you'll want to file -- probably file a reply then?

9 MR. DEVOY: Yes, I would very much like the opportunity to file a reply.

10 THE CLERK: The 10th.

11 THE COURT: The 10th?

12 THE CLERK: That's going to be the earliest.

13 THE COURT: Okay. It looks like November 10th.

14 MS. HANKS: November 10th?

15 THE COURT: That's the quickest we can get back in.

16 MR. DEVOY: I believe that will be fine with me.

17 MS. HANKS: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I can always have someone from my
18 office attend, but my daughter is getting a surgical procedure that morning.

19 THE COURT: Oh, okay.

20 MS. HANKS: So if it's an afternoon hearing, I can do it. It's at eight o'clock
21 her appointment is scheduled for. She should be done by nine.

22 THE COURT: No, let's just --

23 MR. DEVOY: We can do another day. I don't want --

24 THE COURT: Let's just put it on another day.

1 MS. HANKS: I'm sorry.

2 MR. DEVOY: I don't want to put you through that, either.

3 THE COURT: Yeah.

4 MS. HANKS: Okay. I'm sorry.

5 MR. DEVOY: No, it's fine.

6 THE COURT: Christmas?

7 MR. DEVOY: That's actually the best day for litigation.

8 THE COURT: It is. A lot of stuff gets settled that day.

9 MS. HANKS: This is my whole game plan. Let's just hold this off as long
10 as possible.

11 THE CLERK: It's probably going to be November 24th; that's the soonest.

12 MR. DEVOY: I have no travel plans.

13 THE COURT: Just in time for Thanksgiving.

14 MS. HANKS: And I am in Maryland.

15 THE COURT: Oh, sure you are.

16 THE CLERK: Are you guys back the week after?

17 MS. HANKS: I am back the week after. I come back Monday, the 30th,
18 so I'll be back that Tuesday, which I think is December 1st.

19 THE CLERK: I can do December 1st or 2nd.

20 MS. HANKS: I'm clear either of those days.

21 MR. DEVOY: I don't believe I have any conflicts on those days.

22 THE CLERK: We'll do it December 1st.

23 MR. DEVOY: Okay.

24 MS. HANKS: And, Your Honor, I'll look into the filing that seems to have not

1 gone through. If I find it didn't go through, do you want me to file it to make the
2 docket clear or just send the copy that I have to counsel and then he would just
3 file a reply?

4 THE COURT: Do you have any attachments? Sometimes if we get it off --
5 I mean, we can print it off of Odyssey, but what we oftentimes don't get then is the
6 attachments.

7 MS. HANKS: I believe there is one exhibit, Your Honor.

8 THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you get us a courtesy copy, if you would.

9 MS. HANKS: Okay.

10 MR. DEVOY: And if you could just get that to me, and then I'll have an
11 opportunity to reply --

12 MS. HANKS: Okay.

13 MR. DEVOY: -- when the new hearing gets set. So I guess the matter is
14 continued?

15 THE COURT: That's continued, yes.

16 MR. DEVOY: Thank you, Your Honor.

17 THE COURT: That takes us to on my list of things is plaintiff's motion to retax
18 and settle the costs.

19 MS. HANKS: For Mr. Malek, Your Honor? Do you want to take that one?

20 THE COURT: No, this is -- I thought this was plaintiff's.

21 MS. HANKS: It is our -- as to Mr. Malek's request for costs or the MacDonald
22 Highlands request? There's two motions to retax.

23 THE COURT: Oh.

24 MS. HANKS: That's why I was asking. Sorry.

1 MR. DEVOY: I believe just Mr. Malek's is the one on calendar.

2 MS. HANKS: Oh.

3 MR. CARTER: Yeah, I wasn't aware that ours was on calendar.

4 MS. HANKS: It was very minor.

5 MR. CARTER: I mean, our motion to retax is basically unopposed, so --
6 because it was like two hundred dollars.

7 MS. HANKS: It was a minor --

8 THE COURT: Yeah.

9 MS. HANKS: Yeah, so I don't think that one is as big of a dispute. You're
10 right. But we did do a motion to retax the MacDonald Highlands one as well.

11 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay. Well, that's the one we're on.

12 MS. HANKS: Oh.

13 MR. CARTER: Okay. Well, Your Honor, I don't believe we filed an
14 opposition. I think it was only a matter of a couple hundred dollars and we were
15 fine retaxing that couple hundred dollars, so there wasn't a big deal about that one.

16 (The Court confers with the law clerk)

17 THE COURT: Okay. I'm not quite as far wrong as I thought. It is your
18 motion to retax the costs for Malek.

19 MS. HANKS: Yes, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: And as to that --

21 MS. HANKS: Yes.

22 THE COURT: -- what say you?

23 MS. HANKS: Your Honor, the first basis for our motion was under NRS
24 18.020.

1 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

2 MS. HANKS: The type of action that the plaintiff brought against Mr. Malek
3 is not enumerated in that statute, so we would suggest that costs are actually not
4 allowed. If the Court believes in its discretion that it can still allow costs for this
5 type of action, we took issue with certain costs that were incurred by Mr. Malek,
6 and those included deposition costs for witnesses that had no bearing on the claim
7 that plaintiff was bringing against Mr. Malek, and that's specifically Mr. Jiu, which
8 is plaintiff's damages expert; Mr. Tassi, who is a Henderson employee; Mr. Dugan,
9 who was I believe Bank of America's witness, expert witness on damages; Mr.
10 Lubawy, who I believe was MacDonald Highlands' expert witness on damages,
11 and Ms. Woodbridge from Bank of America.

12 It was our position that those depositions had no bearing whatsoever
13 on the claims against Mr. Malek and so there was no need to pay for the transcripts.
14 Also, Mr. Malek, for whatever reasons, shared in the cost of the defendant's depo
15 of our expert, Mr. Jiu, and I'm not really sure why that was done, as that expert had
16 nothing to do with the claims against Mr. Malek and he didn't have any obligation
17 to share in that cost.

18 Finally, with respect to the mediation, we cited several case law from
19 other jurisdictions that state if the parties agree to equally share in a cost, they can't
20 thereafter collect it as a cost for the prevailing party. And Mr. Malek is seeking to
21 collect the mediation costs that both parties agreed to do and both parties agreed to
22 bear equally those charges. So we would ask that reducing those costs -- if you are
23 going to allow anything, our first position is no costs should be allowed, but if you
24 are going to allow anything that it should be reduced to three thousand dollars --

1 three thousand, seven hundred and twenty dollars and twenty-five cents.

2 THE COURT: Okay. And you forgot the part about the late filing.

3 MS. HANKS: Your Honor, I think after I looked it up it's not jurisdictional --

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 MS. HANKS: -- so I can withdraw that.

6 THE COURT: All right.

7 MS. HANKS: I did find that out, that it's not jurisdictional, it's discretionary.

8 THE COURT: Well, I'm sure he'll withdraw any objection he's vouchsafed
9 for the late filing of opposition.

10 MR. DEVOY: Yes, I understand that that was an issue. Most of it was just
11 getting the records together in time, and that was part of the issue that came up in
12 the course of dealing with -- on behalf of Mr. Jiu with the reduction in the amount
13 that's owed him. That's something that Mr. Malek is working with Mr. Jiu's office.
14 If you'd like to reduce it to the amount that Ms. Hanks suggested was appropriate,
15 around the amount of three hundred dollars in her motion to retax the costs, I don't
16 think there would be a problem with that.

17 Where Mr. Malek does have a problem is with the idea that the
18 depositions of Tassi and Woodbridge are not properly taxed to him. Those were
19 relied heavily in his -- relied upon heavily in his motion for summary judgment. They
20 were used extensively. They established the zoning issues that prevented the trust
21 from claiming that there was any kind of easement or implied restrictive covenant in
22 the property that he had purchased and sought to move out into on the golf course.
23 And Ms. Woodbridge was also instrumental in showing that he had complied
24 through MacDonald Highlands in properly noticing the meetings necessary to get

1 the variance in the zoning that allowed him to incorporate the golf parcel into his
2 property.

3 Now, with respect to Mr. Jiu, Mr. Dugan and Mr. Lubawy, my
4 understanding is that there's a slight diversion from what Ms. Hanks said. Mr.
5 Dugan was the expert for the MacDonald Highlands entities and Mr. Lubawy was
6 the expert for Bank of America. The reason that those were necessary is because
7 it was not clear from the timing that we had on the initial scheduling order for the
8 motion for summary judgment that this was going to be resolved on summary
9 judgment. This was very likely a case that was going to go to trial.

10 And one of the key issues for the award of injunctive relief, and it's
11 detailed in the opposition, is that injunctive relief is available where legal relief is
12 improper or unavailable or insufficient. If there is legal relief that compensates
13 them for their damages -- that compensates the trust for its damages that could be
14 recouped from MacDonald Highlands or from Bank of America, then there's no need
15 for injunctive relief against Shane Malek. I understand that he had to be joined in
16 order to have the potential for that to exist, but if they get compensated, if the trust
17 is compensated for the damage for loss of view, such as it is as the case was -- the
18 theory of the case was articulated in its outset, then allowing the trust to have an
19 injunction against Malek's use of the land constitutes a double recovery. So being
20 able to articulate and understand those theories of damages in order to prevent
21 the entry of an injunction at trial was essential to prepare for the case. And even
22 if it wasn't as heavily used in the motion for summary judgment, and I believe in
23 Mr. Lubawy's case at all, it was necessary in furthering the case.

24 And moreover, I'd defer to Ms. Hanks with respect to the cost for

1 mediation. She has researched that position very well --

2 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

3 MR. DEVOY: -- and I defer to the federal courts that she had cited as to
4 that proposition.

5 THE COURT: So what amount do you both agree on that one?

6 MR. DEVOY: I agree to an amount higher than what she is suggesting.

7 Can I sit down and do some math? If I could do this in my head, I'd be a doctor.

8 Can I have a moment?

9 THE COURT: Sure.

10 MR. DEVOY: Okay.

11 (Pause in the proceedings; off-record colloquy)

12 MR. DEVOY: All right. The number that I come out to, removing the
13 mediation fees and reducing the amount owed to Craig Jiu to three sixty-seven fifty
14 is seven thousand, five hundred and sixty-eight dollars and fifty cents.

15 THE COURT: And how much cents?

16 MR. DEVOY: Fifty.

17 THE COURT: Fifty cents.

18 MR. DEVOY: And then to speak more to the issue that Ms. Hanks raised
19 about this not being a proper action under the statute that allows for taxes -- for
20 costs to be taxed to another party, it was the trust that initially made this a case
21 about the possession of property or land or rights therein, which is one of the bases
22 that allows for the costs -- I'm sorry, for the taxing of costs to the non-prevailing
23 party. Initially they filed a lis pendens and it had to be expunged. It's very clear
24 from the outset that claiming an easement or an implied restrictive covenant on

1 somebody else's land is claiming some possessory right, and as was detailed in the
2 briefing also in this case, claiming that you have a right on somebody else's property
3 is claiming some right, some possessory right to either use it or to encumber
4 somebody else's use for your benefit. I just don't think it holds up, given the other
5 filings in this case and the positions that the trust has taken in the past that this is
6 not somehow a case that deals with a possessory right.

7 At this point now that the Court has determined that here is no
8 possessory right, now the trust is trying to align its position to say that it was never
9 about that. But if we look back in the docket to the time that this was filed back in
10 September of 2013, when they filed the lis pendens, this was very much a case
11 about the trust's possessory or property rights in Mr. Malek's property.

12 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Hanks.

13 MS. HANKS: Well, Your Honor, we disagree. And the damages claim, as
14 we've always stated, was an alternative relief to the extent the restrictive covenant
15 didn't exist. At no time was the trust seeking both a restrictive covenant and money
16 damages. And unfortunately with the posture of the case you have to pursue both,
17 depending on what happens, and then at that point I guess you can do an election
18 of remedies, but it never got to that point. But at no time was the trust looking to
19 double recover. And as this Court is well aware, the Rosenberg trust always wanted
20 the restrictive covenant more than the money damages.

21 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

22 MS. HANKS: So we were not doing both, and so under 18.020 we don't think
23 it falls under it. Your Honor, I'm just a little unclear on the amount that they're saying,
24 because I thought the total amount asked for was in the rough neighborhood of

1 eight thousand. Am I wrong?

2 MR. DEVOY: No, it was around -- the deposition transcripts were around
3 seven thousand initially.

4 THE COURT: Eighty-five fifty? Eighty-five fifty is the number I have.

5 MS. HANKS: Right. So if we take out the mediation, which I thought was
6 almost four grand --

7 MR. DEVOY: No, the amount we were asking for was around twelve
8 thousand.

9 MS. HANKS: Oh, I'm sorry.

10 THE COURT: Oh.

11 MR. DEVOY: The initial number was twelve thousand, two hundred and
12 seventy forty-five.

13 MS. HANKS: Oh, okay. Sorry.

14 MR. DEVOY: That's okay. Like we've been saying, we'd all be doctors
15 if we were better at math.

16 THE COURT: Okay. So what's -- Assuming I agree that the mediation
17 comes out and the rest stays in, then what's the number?

18 MS. HANKS: That's what I'm asking. So I don't have that figure. You're
19 saying it's seven thousand, five hundred and sixty-eight dollars? That's what I'm
20 asking.

21 MR. DEVOY: Let me look at the calculator.

22 MS. HANKS: Yeah.

23 MR. DEVOY: I had seven thousand, five hundred and -- closer to seventy-
24 six.

1 THE COURT: Fifty-eight fifty. Seven five five eight fifty is what you said
2 before.

3 MR. DEVOY: Seven five sixty-eight fifty.

4 THE COURT: Oh.

5 MR. DEVOY: Oh, off by ten dollars.

6 THE COURT: Oh, okay, you see how that changes.

7 MR. DEVOY: That was done by reducing the amount due to Craig Jiu for the
8 prorated amount. And the prorated amount that was agreed upon that MacDonald
9 Highlands also paid was three sixty-seven fifty. And then the mediation fees would
10 come out of that. I am standing firm that the deposition fees are proper.

11 MS. HANKS: Okay. And so that's -- and we would just add that because
12 that was an alternative claim, Mr. Malek would have never been responsible for
13 any money damages in this case.

14 THE COURT: I think the deposition fees have to be considered to be
15 appropriately incurred in this case. The way this thing was going, I agree with
16 counsel it would have been -- left his client at grave risk not to go ahead and
17 participate in the deposition. I think it was appropriately incurred and it's
18 presumptively, at least, reasonable. So I think that the other fees are the only
19 ones that come out, so the amount appears to be seven five six eight fifty.

20 Okay, moving on to Highlands Realty's motion for fees and costs.

21 MR. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honor. Our motion is principled on two
22 basic points, the first being the contractual agreement that was really forming the
23 backbone of plaintiff's complaint against not only the other defendants but my
24 clients as well. That was the purchase and sale agreement and you have the

1 addendum to the purchase and sale agreement. And -- I'm sorry, did you have
2 a question?

3 THE COURT: What do you say to her argument that her client was not a
4 party to that? Did I understand that right?

5 MR. CARTER: Well, Your Honor, I have a couple of responses to that. The
6 first is I disagree with that characterization, the first being because my client was
7 named both in the purchase and sale agreement and in the addendum as the agent
8 for the seller in that transaction, being the agent or the individual -- or in this case
9 we have an individual who's working for MacDonald Highlands Realty -- this person
10 who was representing the seller in the transaction. It was acknowledged within the
11 contract that he was acting on that seller's behalf and everybody knew that.

12 Furthermore, Your Honor, if you look at the specific causes of action
13 against my client, for example, the statutory claims regarding the obligations of an
14 agent --

15 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

16 MR. CARTER: -- those statutory obligations only come into play and are only
17 the basis of a lawsuit when you do in fact have a contract like you have the one here
18 that names an agent, much as this one did, which again was my client who was the
19 agent for one of the parties to that contract. So I think strictly from the standpoint
20 of was my client a party to that contract, my client of course was not the seller.
21 I can't sit here and tell you that with a straight face, but I can tell you that as a matter
22 of both that contract and as of that addendum, that client did represent that seller
23 for legal purposes in that sale.

24 And I think that when the contract, this important document is being

1 cited in this action by the plaintiff and all the other parties as the key critical
2 document and it's being wielded against us as much as it is for us, I think that,
3 Your Honor, it's only fair that my client should be able as a matter of not only law
4 but of equity to be able to use those provisions and come back and say, you know
5 what, we got out completely on summary judgment, we're entitled to our fees and
6 costs as a matter of contract. And I can assure you, Your Honor, had the situation
7 been reversed and had the plaintiff prevailed against my clients in a motion for
8 summary judgment, we would probably be arguing a motion for fees by them based
9 on this very same contract, based on the exact same law that I'm citing you right
10 now.

11 And again, this goes all the way back to the complaint where we were
12 sued as the agent for the seller. And, Your Honor, I did brief this so I'm not going
13 to go into it too deeply, but this goes back to the judicial estoppel arguments.
14 There's a California case, Kitty-Anne Music, and Mainor v. Nault is the Nevada
15 case that basically says once a party has taken a position, more or less successfully
16 taken that position, they can't come back and then say the opposite and ask the
17 Court for relief based on that. And here all of the actions against my client were
18 based on this agency relationship, this idea that Bank of America and my client were
19 tied with this very specific agency-principal relationship. If we're now severing that
20 for the purposes of that contract, I see those as completely inconsistent, Your Honor.
21 So that would be my first response to the party question.

22 My second response, and this was delved into both in the opposition
23 and my reply, is the idea of a third party beneficiary and when can a third party
24 beneficiary enforce a contract. And as Your Honor knows and as was in the briefs,

1 the Lipshie case says that when you have an intended -- an intention within the
2 contract to benefit that third party, they then become an intended third party
3 beneficiary.

4 And that is exactly what we have here, Your Honor. Both the original
5 contract and the addendum name my clients as the agent for the seller. There is
6 no clearer idea, in fact, that my clients were intended to benefit from this transaction
7 because they were going to get their brokerage fee. If there is to be any third party
8 beneficiary at all, I think this is absolutely the situation. So I think that from that
9 standpoint as well in terms of being a party to the contract, I think there's a very
10 strong argument, a very strong case to be made that my client is in fact also a third
11 party beneficiary to the contract.

12 Now, I do want to go and I want to talk a little bit about the differences
13 between the purchase agreement and the addendum because there was some --
14 there was some hair-splitting, I think, over that point in the opposition as, well, the
15 addendum is specifically excluding you guys as the parties. And I don't believe that
16 it does specifically exclude my clients as the parties, certainly not in the very specific
17 way that the opposition seems to think that it did, and it certainly doesn't any more
18 than the original purchase and sale agreement.

19 And as for what claims for relief can be recovered on under the
20 addendum, I also -- I disagree with plaintiff's interpretation. I think it's far broader
21 than they would like to believe, obviously, but it's for all of the claims that arise in
22 or related to the enforcement of the contract or its terms, which I think, Your Honor,
23 having decided the motion for summary judgment you know the contract and its
24 terms were basically where a lot of this motion for summary judgment turned upon.

1 So I don't think there's really a dispute about that, but if there is I'm sure you'll
2 correct me and we can talk about it.

3 So -- oh, and there was the other argument where there was a citation
4 to Campbell v. Nocilla, which was also about this idea that the attorney's fees
5 provision must be interpreted very narrowly. And the Campbell provision, I would
6 just point out to the Court, it was very narrow in that that particular provision said
7 if there is an action to enforce this contract then attorney's fees will be provided to
8 the prevailing party. That obviously is much different than the language in this case.
9 Again, if the Court has some doubt about that, we can get into the nitty-gritty of that,
10 but I assume the Court has that pleading and has read that and I'm not going to
11 bore you with that language here in oral argument.

12 THE COURT: Oh, don't worry about boring me.

13 MR. CARTER: Well, that's absolutely fine then. If the Court will look on --
14 we have that language particularly on page 8 of our reply, and it quotes page 47 of
15 the addendum, which is the attorney's fees provision in the addendum. And it reads
16 specifically: "In any action, proceeding or arbitration arising out of, brought under
17 or relating to the terms or enforceability of the agreement, the prevailing party shall
18 be entitled to recover" -- let me flip over to page 9 -- "from the losing party all
19 reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses incurred in such action, proceeding
20 or arbitration."

21 I think that it's a very clear statement that this is intending to be a
22 broad attorney's fee provision. And I want the Court also to recognize, as we cited
23 in our motion and in our reply and also I believe back in the motion for summary
24 judgment, this isn't a contract provision that we're springing on the plaintiff right now.

1 This is something that Barbara Rosenberg in her deposition, she said I'm a realtor,
2 I read every provision of this contract before I signed it, and I understood it and that
3 was that. You know, I think at one point they had even asked, well, can we change
4 a provision here and their realtor had said, no, no, no, you can't change anything,
5 these are the terms of the agreement. And then it was, okay, well, this is the
6 agreement then. So they understood this. We're not springing this on them. This
7 isn't anything like that. It absolutely is what it is and I think the language should be
8 interpreted very strictly here.

9 And one other point that I forgot to mention on the purchase and sale
10 agreement, the original one, on that attorney's fees provision. It does use the
11 language "party" in it, but if the Court looks at the language in the original attorney's
12 fees provision, which is all the way back on -- it's in our original motion. I apologize.
13 The original attorney's fees provision, it's on page 6 of our motion. It's paragraph 26
14 of the purchase and sale agreement. It does not define the term "party" in this strict
15 way that the plaintiff would like to believe that it does. In fact, I don't believe you'll
16 find a definition of party in that original purchase and sale agreement. But what that
17 particular provision says, and again, I'm reading from the bottom of page 6: "Should
18 any party hereto" -- to this agreement -- "retain counsel for the purpose of initiating
19 litigation to enforce or prevent the breach of any provision hereof, or for any other
20 judicial remedy, then the prevailing party shall be entitled to be reimbursed by the
21 losing party for all costs and expenses incurred thereby, including but not limited to
22 reasonable attorney's fees and costs by such prevailing party."

23 Now, the Court certainly doesn't have to interpret it this way, but under
24 the strict language of that agreement that's if a party to the agreement brings a claim

1 for any judicial remedy and there is a losing party to that lawsuit, it appears under
2 this provision the prevailing party does indeed recover the attorney's fees from that.

3 THE COURT: That is provided that your client is a party to it.

4 MR. CARTER: Well, as I discussed, Your Honor, I do believe that to be the
5 case.

6 THE COURT: Which, if nothing else, you're arguing that they're a third party
7 beneficiary at least.

8 MR. CARTER: Right. Right. So, I mean, that was just something that
9 I wanted to point out, that this isn't -- while it's not exactly the model of clarity in
10 contractual drafting, it certainly is not as clean cut as the plaintiff would like the
11 Court to believe. And it looks like you have a question.

12 THE COURT: If you -- yeah. If you go with the third party beneficiary line
13 of thinking --

14 MR. CARTER: Yes.

15 THE COURT: -- then you drop off the party status, don't you? A third party
16 beneficiary is almost by definition not a party to the contract.

17 MR. CARTER: Well, that would be correct, Your Honor. It would be one
18 or the other. And the Court would have to look at -- as I said and I think as was
19 indicated by our briefing here, you know, my initial reading of it in looking at it is
20 looking at it as we're the agent of the seller, so I believe that we're entitled to
21 enforce this agreement as a party. That would absolutely be my first argument to
22 this Court.

23 THE COURT: And let me, as long as we're sort of circling back around to the
24 first part of your argument, remind me the authority you cited for the notion that the

1 non-party agent -- well, the agent of one of the signing parties may lay claim to this
2 language.

3 MR. CARTER: I don't believe there was specific authority for that point, Your
4 Honor. We had cited some general authority regarding what an agent was in our
5 reply and the nature of that relationship, and that was the Catholic Diocese case
6 and that is 349 P. 3d 518, a pinpoint cite of 522. That's on page 5 of our reply. And
7 that particular case said an agency relationship results when one person possesses
8 the contractual right to control another's manner of performing the duties for which
9 they were hired.

10 We also stated -- I'm sorry, we also cited the Restatement Second of
11 Agency for the idea that the agent has the power to alter the legal relations between
12 the principal and third persons and between the principal and himself. And it was
13 that power that we were referring to when we were arguing to the Court that at least
14 in terms of this particular contract and in this particular transaction our client, my
15 client was acting on behalf of Bank of America as its agent, and I believe that we
16 should therefore be able to enforce this particular term of this contract. As I said,
17 we're asking for, you know, alternative legal interpretations, assuming that the Court
18 doesn't agree with that, but I think the Court understands our position.

19 THE COURT: Let me tell you where you are right now.

20 MR. CARTER: Okay.

21 THE COURT: This is the lay of the land. And the reason I tell you is that you
22 had me going. I thought that I had left something out of my analysis, but so far I'm
23 struggling with either of your alternatives. The second one automatically knocks
24 you out of the status of being a party to the agreement, so it really comes back to

1 the first one. And I'm struggling to see how someone who is known as the agent
2 of a party, even named within the contract, is a party because they are -- their
3 designated relationship is that of an agent. I'm struggling to see without some
4 more concrete authority that they can use the party language -- you know, use
5 the language that's intended to preserve or protect the parties, how they can rely
6 upon that.

7 MR. CARTER: Well, and Your Honor, what I'm talking about -- I think Your
8 Honor has perceived correctly the arguments. I think the difference is and our
9 opinion comes is the fact that I'm looking at these particular authorities with regard
10 to agency and what the function of an agent is, and in looking as an operation of law
11 what does that agency relationship mean --

12 THE COURT: Yeah.

13 MR. CARTER: -- both in terms of this contract and in terms of a lawsuit that
14 arises from that contract because --

15 THE COURT: The only --

16 MR. CARTER: Sorry.

17 THE COURT: Oh, go ahead.

18 MR. CARTER: I was going to say but for that agency relationship, Your
19 Honor, and but for --

20 THE COURT: Yeah.

21 MR. CARTER: -- my client acting on behalf --

22 THE COURT: Sure.

23 MR. CARTER: -- of Bank of America, we wouldn't be in this case at all.

24 THE COURT: Sure.

1 MR. CARTER: So I believe that agency relationship --

2 THE COURT: Well, okay, and that leads to my question. What did your
3 client get sued for?

4 MR. CARTER: We were sued under statutory duties for failure to disclose.
5 I believe there was a negligence provision as well.

6 THE COURT: Was your client sued for breach of contract?

7 MR. CARTER: Our client was not sued for breach of contract, Your Honor,
8 but again, that's not a --

9 THE COURT: Specific performance of contract?

10 MR. CARTER: We were not sued for performance of contract. It was not,
11 Your Honor. But that's not a requirement of either of these provisions, Your Honor.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 MR. CARTER: It's simply -- remember, the first provision says any judicial
14 relief related to the contract. That's what the first provision says. That's paragraph
15 26 of the purchase and sale agreement.

16 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

17 MR. CARTER: Paragraph 47 of the addendum says any claim that relates
18 to or is arising from the enforcement or terms of the contract. So it's not simply a
19 breach of contract.

20 THE COURT: Let me go back to that one now --

21 MR. CARTER: Oh, okay.

22 THE COURT: -- and review that.

23 MR. CARTER: Forty-seven, Your Honor, is on page 8 of our reply. It starts
24 on the bottom of the page.

1 THE COURT: I'm looking at what you attached, although it's pretty much
2 illegible.

3 MR. CARTER: It is very difficult to read. I apologize.

4 THE COURT: "In any action." (Reading) "Losing party." I don't know. Okay.

5 MR. CARTER: And, Your Honor, on that point I don't have a lot else to say.
6 I'm certainly willing to answer any more of Your Honor's questions on this.

7 I do want to address -- well, the separate issue of the offers of
8 judgment, which I think that there is maybe less moving parts in that particular area
9 of the motion. But as the Court --

10 THE COURT: Do you want to know the lay of the land on that?

11 MR. CARTER: I would love to, Your Honor.

12 THE COURT: I think it's a hundred and twenty grand.

13 MR. CARTER: And a hundred and twenty grand is for the second offer of
14 judgment, I believe.

15 THE COURT: It's the January 2015. Largely because of the argument that
16 I agree with that by virtue of the subsequent offers of judgment, the prior ones are --
17 what's the word?

18 MR. CARTER: Extinguished.

19 THE COURT: Extinguished. Yeah.

20 MR. CARTER: And just so I understand Your Honor's inclination, Your
21 Honor's inclination is, well, the fees were reasonable --

22 THE COURT: Yeah.

23 MR. CARTER: -- and all of the Beattie factors --

24 THE COURT: Yeah.

1 MR. CARTER: -- were taken care of.

2 THE COURT: Yeah.

3 MR. CARTER: Well --

4 THE COURT: Using all the appropriate tests, the parts and the subparts,
5 I think what I'm inclined to do is a hundred and twenty.

6 MR. CARTER: Okay. I understand that, Your Honor, and with that then
7 I'm not going to bend your ear --

8 THE COURT: Okay.

9 MR. CARTER: -- more than I have to on the offers of judgment. I would ask
10 that the Court consider our contractual arguments --

11 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

12 MR. CARTER: -- understanding that it is a bit of an esoteric situation, it is a
13 bit of a strange situation. But again, I would urge the Court, just as a matter of the
14 operation of -- not only the operation of law, but also the operation of fairness --

15 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

16 MR. CARTER: -- that my client can be brought into court, like I said, with
17 this particular agreement being used --

18 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

19 MR. CARTER: -- this particular agreement that the plaintiff admits that they
20 were thoroughly familiar with and was using in the court against all of the parties,
21 that that can be used to bring my client into this action, and yet my client cannot
22 recover fees or costs under the terms of that agreement.

23 THE COURT: Well, that's kind of why I -- that's kind of why I was asking,
24 you know, is there anything that you could hang your hat on that says that, well,

1 the plaintiff sued me as if I were a party. I mean, is there anything -- did they sue
2 you for contract, did they sue you for specific performance?

3 MR. CARTER: They did not sue for specific -- and I cannot represent that to
4 the Court. I can, however, represent to the Court that the capacity in which we were
5 being sued was directly as a result of that contract, and but for that contract --

6 THE COURT: Yeah. Sure.

7 MR. CARTER: -- which was signed by my client as well, Your Honor.

8 THE COURT: Yeah.

9 MR. CARTER: My client I believe was named in the original one and I believe
10 my client signed the addendum. That is all there, Your Honor. But I cannot claim
11 that we were sued for breach of contract.

12 THE COURT: Just a moment. Hark. Is that going to make your --

13 MR. CARTER: Michael Doiron's name I believe is on the final page of the
14 addendum.

15 THE COURT: Yeah. Is that going to make your client a party to the
16 addendum?

17 MR. CARTER: Well, I don't think that that signature in and of itself makes
18 her a party, no. I think that her relationship to the seller, as I've argued, by operation
19 of law is what would make her a party.

20 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

21 MR. CARTER: But the signature itself, no --

22 THE COURT: Okay.

23 MR. CARTER: -- I don't think that I could credibly argue to this Court the
24 signature itself would simply make her a party.

1 THE COURT: All right.

2 MR. CARTER: So if the Court has any other questions, I'm available.

3 THE COURT: I do not.

4 MR. CARTER: Otherwise, I will let Ms. Hanks talk for awhile.

5 THE COURT: Very good.

6 MS. HANKS: Your Honor, I won't belabor the point because I believe you're
7 not convinced on the contract part of the argument, but I do want to just point out
8 a few things. The Court is correct in that plaintiff did not sue Michael Doiron or
9 MacDonald Highlands or FHP Ventures for breach of contract, breach of implied
10 covenant of fair dealing. It was purely a violation of Ms. Doiron and MacDonald
11 Highlands' statutory, independent duties from this agreement and it was also for
12 negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation.

13 But I would like to address the Court to page 13 of the addendum, and
14 it's paragraph 36. And it says: The Rights of Others. It says: "The agreement does
15 not create any rights, claims or benefits inuring to any person or entity other than
16 seller, successor and/or assigns that is not a party to the agreement, nor does it
17 create or establish any third party beneficiary to the agreement." And this is Bank
18 of America's agreement, Your Honor. So if there's any dispute or any ambiguity
19 or lack of clarity, it has to be read in favor of my client as opposed to in favor of
20 MacDonald Highlands and Michael Doiron. So I would like to point that out.

21 And, Your Honor, paragraph 44 of the addendum clearly provides
22 that the addendum prevails if there's anything inconsistent with this addendum and
23 the original purchase agreement, and that's why the attorney's fees clause at 47
24 is the one that prevails, and it clearly states that it has to be an action for the terms

1 or enforceability of the agreement.

2 And the claims brought by plaintiff had nothing to do with the terms
3 of this contract, had nothing to do with the enforceability of the contract. Counsel
4 indicated that plaintiff is the one who is using this agreement, and in reality we
5 weren't. I know they've used the agreement in the motion for summary judgment
6 to defeat our claims, but plaintiff never pointed to this agreement as the basis
7 for claims against MacDonald Highlands or Michael Doiron. It was all statutory,
8 independent duties and an independent tort for negligent misrepresentation. We
9 never said Michael Doiron or MacDonald Highlands did anything with respect to the
10 terms of this contract, didn't do something in accordance with this contract. In fact,
11 it was my argument --

12 THE COURT: So what they really should have done, Mr. Malek should have
13 turned around and cross-claimed against the bank, I suppose. I'm not sure if the
14 bank --

15 MS. HANKS: You mean MacDonald Highlands and Michael Doiron could
16 have cross-claimed?

17 THE COURT: No, I'm sorry. It would have been a counterclaim against
18 your client, not -- I'm sorry.

19 MS. HANKS: You said Malek.

20 THE COURT: Who did your client buy the property from?

21 MR. CARTER: My -- oh, sorry.

22 MR. DEVOY: Mr. Malek, he brought his property from actually Tom
23 Anderson, who was the original owner of Myspace, and he had nothing to do with
24 this.

1 THE COURT: Okay. So he should have sucked him into the lawsuit, turned
2 it into --

3 MR. DEVOY: Oh, he got sucked in, all right.

4 THE COURT: -- turned it into a contract, debating the enforcement of the
5 agreement.

6 MS. HANKS: Who? Mr. Malek?

7 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

8 MS. HANKS: No, I don't think so. This is with Michael Doiron.

9 THE COURT: It would at least then have been about the enforcement of
10 the agreement, would it not?

11 MS. HANKS: No. I don't know if the Court is confused.

12 THE COURT: No, that's not right.

13 MS. HANKS: Yeah. The Rosenberg Trust bought the property from Bank
14 of America. It had nothing to do with Mr. Malek.

15 THE COURT: B of A.

16 MS. HANKS: Correct, B of A.

17 THE COURT: All right.

18 MS. HANKS: And this is B of A's contract, it's B of A's agreement. Yes.

19 THE COURT: Brother. I can't keep track of who's on first and who's on
20 second. Okay.

21 MS. HANKS: Right. So it has nothing to do with Mr. Malek in that regard.
22 And in fact, that was --

23 THE COURT: But what if it had included, let's just leave it at that, a cause
24 of action disputing the enforceability of the agreement?

1 MS. HANKS: If we had included a cause of action for that?

2 THE COURT: Well, if somebody would have, under the terms of that --

3 MS. HANKS: Yeah, I think I would have to concede that, Your Honor.

4 I mean, if it was certainly -- if someone brought a claim against a party, meaning
5 Bank of America, which Bank of America is still in this case, then yeah, so maybe
6 Bank of America might be able to argue this at some later date. We're still going to
7 trial with them. But not Michael Doiron or MacDonald Highlands Realty because --
8 and certainly not FHP. Let's be clear about that. FHP Ventures is not even in this
9 game.

10 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay.

11 MS. HANKS: And the paragraph states -- 36, though, I think is clear. Not
12 only is there no other party created under this contract, and this is Bank of America's
13 language, they're also not creating a third party beneficiary.

14 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

15 MS. HANKS: So that's where it fails on behalf of MacDonald Highlands,
16 the broker, and Michael Doiron, the realtor.

17 THE COURT: Okay.

18 MS. HANKS: With respect to the January offer of judgment, I believe this
19 Court has already stated that the prior April offers were extinguished by law and
20 we would agree with that. However, I would like to talk about the Beattie factors
21 because I believe this Court at least just indicated that it feels like it's all been met
22 in favor of defendants.

23 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

24 MS. HANKS: I would like to clarify. FHP Ventures was not a party to the

1 offer of judgment. Only MacDonald Highlands and Michael Doiron issued the offer
2 of judgment. So to the extent that any fees would inure to FHP, at this point they
3 have no claim to attorney's fees because they were not the party making the offers
4 of judgment.

5 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

6 MS. HANKS: We would like to, though, address the Beattie factors, and
7 we believe that the first factor is brought the claims in good faith. The courts have
8 already said that that actually switches to the defendant if it's the defendant issuing
9 the offer of judgment. I don't think we would disagree that they defended the case
10 in good faith. However, there's also no disagreement, I don't think, that plaintiffs at
11 least brought their claim in good faith. Just because they simply lost on the issue
12 doesn't mean it wasn't still a good faith claim.

13 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

14 MS. HANKS: Also, with respect to the timing and the amount, we believe it
15 was unreasonable. The amount was -- the offer timing was done before the bulk
16 of discovery in this case. I think only written discovery had issued and maybe one
17 or two depositions had been taken. The key depositions, particularly the damages
18 expert depositions, had not been conducted. The deposition of Michael Doiron
19 hadn't been conducted.

20 THE COURT: Are you talking about the reasonableness of the offer or the --

21 MS. HANKS: The timing.

22 THE COURT: -- or whether or not it was unreasonable to not accept the
23 offer?

24 MS. HANKS: I'm talking -- it's both. The other -- there's two factors. The first

1 factor is the timing and unreasonableness of the offer itself.

2 THE COURT: Right.

3 MS. HANKS: And then the third factor is was it grossly unreasonable for the
4 plaintiff to reject it. And I think both of those are in favor of the plaintiff. I think the
5 timing of the offer, January, before the bulk, really the majority and the key discovery
6 had been done deprived the plaintiff of even actually analyzing the offer and saying
7 should I accept this at this juncture. We had pretty much none of the discovery done
8 in that case except for some written discovery and some minor depositions. None
9 of the key players had been deposed. Mr. MacDonald hadn't been deposed. Mr.
10 Bykowski on behalf of the entity hadn't been deposed. Bank of America hadn't been
11 deposed. Mr. Malek hadn't been deposed. None of the experts have been deposed.
12 So to simply say, hey, this is a reasonable timing and it's a reasonable amount,
13 I think it was twenty-five thousand dollars, at that juncture of the lawsuit it really
14 wasn't a good offer in terms of timing for the plaintiff to actually analyze am I in a
15 position to say am I going to lose this case and what risk am I taking because none
16 of the real discovery had been done. It also -- we also --

17 THE COURT: Does it always key off of when the discovery itself is done or
18 when counsel has made their own inquiries enough to assess the firmness of their
19 legal position?

20 MS. HANKS: I think you can look at it both ways, Your Honor, but it's all
21 contingent upon when the discovery -- not only could plaintiff not have done that
22 analysis, but I couldn't have done that analysis at that time, particularly because all
23 I had at that time was one -- my expert's report that had an opinion of seven hundred
24 and fifty thousand to a million dollars in a diminution of value. But none of the

1 experts had been deposed, not even the opposing expert. So I would argue that
2 it's on both ends. Neither the plaintiff in an independent capacity or me as her
3 attorney to be able to counsel her on this could advise her as to whether this is a
4 risky proposition, given the lay of the land, because at that point the lay of the land
5 was unknown.

6 But we also cited law, Your Honor, that stated that when you make a
7 nominal offer, not really aimed at inducing settlement but simply just to set yourself
8 up to be able to get attorney's fees should you win, that shouldn't be enforced. And
9 we would argue that this is what that was. It was a nominal offer. In other words,
10 that offer at that time was simply asking the plaintiff to accept a win/loss proposition.
11 In other words, it was you take this or you have to lose everything. In other words,
12 we would have no chance of winning to take that offer. We would have had to
13 believe in January that we had no chance of winning even a modicum of damages;
14 more than twenty-five thousand dollars. So essentially I would have had to advise
15 my client you have to take this offer if you believe you're going to lose. That's what
16 the offer was. It was such a minimal amount that it was saying you're going to lose.

17 And so that's where it was unreasonable in its amount and it was
18 nominal. It wasn't really aimed at inducing settlement. It was so little that it was put
19 a back up against the wall and say we only have the decision to say we have to say
20 no to this; otherwise we're saying we have no chance of winning. That's the only
21 way we could have ever accepted the offer for that low of an amount, when all we
22 had was an expert report saying that if a restrictive covenant doesn't exist, you are
23 looking at seven hundred and fifty thousand to one million dollars in diminution of
24 value.

1 And I would like to point out, Your Honor, that Frazier court, that case
2 that recently just came out discussing these elements, they were looking at whether
3 it was grossly unreasonable for the plaintiff to reject offers of judgment in that case.

4 THE COURT: Is that one you cited?

5 MS. HANKS: Yes, Your Honor. It's the most recent supreme court case that
6 came out. I believe it came out two or three months ago.

7 THE COURT: Do you recall where you cited that?

8 MS. HANKS: I don't, Your Honor. I don't have the brief in front of me.

9 THE COURT: Okay.

10 MS. HANKS: It's Frazier.

11 THE COURT: I'll find it.

12 MS. HANKS: Yes. It's a recent case. It was a personal injury action. And
13 interestingly it was my prior firm, but when I wasn't working there.

14 THE COURT: Frazier v. Drake.

15 MS. HANKS: Yes. They actually made --

16 THE COURT: It's on page 9.

17 MS. HANKS: Right. They actually made offers of judgment. I believe it was
18 for eighty thousand and sixty thousand dollars. And the difference in the medical
19 expenses from those offers was a mere thirty thousand and fifty thousand
20 respectively, because there was two plaintiffs. And the court in that case said it
21 wasn't grossly unreasonable. This brings me to the next element. It wasn't grossly
22 unreasonable for the plaintiffs to reject those offers of judgment --

23 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

24 MS. HANKS: -- because they believe they had more damages. And that

1 was a minor discrepancy in the offers. I mean, you're talking a difference of thirty
2 thousand to fifty thousand in actual medical expenses and you have a plaintiff
3 declining that and the court saying, no, that's not grossly unreasonable. The
4 discrepancy here was nine hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars.

5 I mean, the parties can only look at what they think they're going to
6 be able to prove at trial. No one has a crystal ball. We can't say, well, I have to
7 anticipate this is going to -- we all go into trial or all go into a litigation thinking this
8 is my best case, this is what I'm going to board at trial, this is what I'm going to
9 ask the jury to award. And at the time of this offer my clients were looking at a
10 discrepancy of nine hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars. That's essentially
11 what the defendants were asking them to take. Just take the twenty-five and
12 basically convince yourself that you are not going to have any chance --

13 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

14 MS. HANKS: -- at getting anywhere between twenty-six thousand and nine
15 hundred and seventy-five thousand.

16 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

17 MS. HANKS: That's why it was not grossly unreasonable. That's the
18 standard, Your Honor. And the Frazier court made it very clear that it doesn't
19 matter if --

20 THE COURT: And at the time your client said no, they had possession of
21 those facts?

22 MS. HANKS: Of the diminution of value?

23 THE COURT: The amount.

24 MS. HANKS: The amount. Yes, they knew --

1 THE COURT: Based on the expert report.

2 MS. HANKS: We had our expert report. We just didn't have the deposition
3 testimony of the opposing experts or our own expert and none of the other key
4 players. But yes, they at least had their expert disclosed and had their report
5 saying this is the amount we believe you've been damaged.

6 THE COURT: Okay.

7 MS. HANKS: So looking at that, they basically had to say, yeah, I think I'm
8 going to lose and so I have to take this, and that's where we believe it was not
9 grossly unreasonable.

10 Your Honor, if the Court has no other questions, I have nothing further
11 to add on that.

12 THE COURT: Okay. So remind me why it was unreasonable, grossly
13 unreasonable for the plaintiff to refuse the offer.

14 MR. CARTER: Absolutely, Your Honor. And in support for my response, I'm
15 going to go back to the deposition of Barbara Rosenberg, which again was litigated
16 pretty substantially in our motion for summary judgment.

17 THE COURT: Which was done prior to the offer?

18 MR. CARTER: Which was -- I don't believe that was done prior to the offer,
19 but that's not exactly germane to this inquiry, and let me explain why.

20 THE COURT: All right.

21 MR. CARTER: Because she said when she signed this contract --

22 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

23 MR. CARTER: -- she made a very big deal about saying I'm a realtor, I do
24 this, I read every word of this contract, I understood it. And I don't know if she said

1 it in her deposition, but she'd even tried to change it at one point. She knew exactly
2 what was in this contract, Your Honor. And if you want to go back to the MSJ for
3 a moment, I'd rather not re-litigate that, but if we want to go back to that and think
4 about that, remember what that contract said, Your Honor. That contract said if
5 there is an issue regarding noise, regarding boundary lines --

6 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

7 MR. CARTER: -- regarding the suitability of the property due to conditions
8 apart from the property, that is the responsibility of the buyer on due diligence to
9 undertake.

10 THE COURT: So when it comes to unreasonableness, the dollar amounts
11 don't really figure in.

12 MS. CARTER: That's absolutely correct, Your Honor.

13 THE COURT: It's on the liability end that you would say --

14 MR. CARTER: That's absolutely correct, Your Honor.

15 THE COURT: -- unreasonable to expect that you would win at trial.

16 MR. CARTER: That's right. And it goes a little bit back to what you were
17 asking Ms. Hanks earlier about the attorney's inquiry into the facts. And I agree
18 an attorney has to inquire into the facts, but so does the party, too.

19 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

20 MR. CARTER: And here we have a party who no doubt supposedly read
21 every term in this contract, knew exactly what the division of labor, knew what the
22 due diligence provision said, knew what due diligence was, which is more than a lot
23 of home buyers do, and still signed it. Knew all of that information the day she
24 brought this lawsuit. Presumably Ms. Hanks knew that information, too, because

1 she -- or someone in her firm, I don't mean to impute anything to her personally,
2 but someone knew that and they filed this complaint. So that information was all
3 there. They could have had an expert report, Your Honor --

4 THE COURT: This was a sophisticated buyer?

5 MR. CARTER: Yes, it was a very sophisticated buyer, Your Honor, and she
6 made a very big deal of that in her deposition. And it doesn't matter if they had an
7 expert report saying that there was twenty million dollars in damages, Your Honor.
8 That's not an issue that -- first of all, we never got to litigate the reasonableness of
9 that amount.

10 THE COURT: Tell me again why it doesn't matter at what point the
11 deposition was taken.

12 MR. CARTER: Because she had already read the contract. She had read
13 the contract before this and thought about this contract before this action even
14 started. And presumably she thought about bringing the lawsuit before this action
15 even started and looked at it and thought, yeah, this is a good idea, I have a good
16 chance of winning this.

17 THE COURT: Wouldn't that be at least something, though, that counsel
18 would want to be aware of, what was revealed in the deposition --

19 MR. CARTER: Well, presumably.

20 THE COURT: -- in framing their advice?

21 MR. CARTER: Remember, this is counsel's own client that knows this.
22 Presumably she and her client had already spoken about this. The only people
23 that didn't know prior to Barbara Rosenberg's deposition that she had read every
24 word of that was my side and Mr. Malek's side. And at that point we say, well,

1 wait a minute, if you knew everything that was in this agreement, why are we even
2 having this? Which, frankly, Your Honor, I'll tell you, I drafted the motion for
3 summary judgment on our side. That was exactly the reaction that I had because
4 I came into this case basically to draft that motion, and I said why are we fighting
5 so hard about this when this is what the contract says? And I think that was an
6 argument that was put forward to the Court. I don't want to speak for the Court,
7 but I believe the Court accepted that. And they knew that from day one. We didn't
8 know that until the deposition. So the only people that weren't -- that didn't have
9 that information was my side, not their side, so that's the first point there.

10 Now, I'd like to go on and I'd like to address some of the other points
11 that Ms. Hanks made, and first and foremost the idea that this contract should be
12 construed against the drafter, which I guess in terms of this contract would be Bank
13 of America, and of course we've had this conversation about the parties and mine
14 is the agent. That's all well and good. The point is, though, under the particular
15 provisions of the contract, and I believe it was the addendum, page 41 of the
16 addendum says, if you take a look at it, this -- the parties had the chance to have
17 their attorneys review the contract and the terms of this aren't going to be enforced
18 as against -- or not enforced, not going to be construed as against any one party
19 as the drafter of this contract. Again, that's paragraph 41. And as I'm sure Your
20 Honor knows, that's a fairly standard thing --

21 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

22 MR. CARTER: -- that goes in a lot of big contracts, commercial contracts.
23 So that particular rule of construction, while it's a good rule of construction and
24 I agree with Ms. Hanks that is generally the rule, as the Court is aware the parties

1 are free in Nevada to put whatever they want in the contract. This is something
2 that they agreed to. It's also something, presumably, that Barbara Rosenberg
3 read when she went through this entire contract.

4 On the third party beneficiary argument on paragraph 36, I would
5 have liked some more time to have put this in my reply, but what I will say is this.
6 And again, I'll go back to my general history in commercial litigation, is you always
7 have a provision like this in an agreement, that you're not going to create any
8 unintentional third party beneficiary because that's just something that happens.

9 Now, here I think there was a definite intent, despite this paragraph,
10 in both the original agreement and in the addendum, because my client was
11 specifically named. And like I said, all of the parties understood what was going
12 to happen in terms of there was going to be a broker's fee and there was going to
13 be all of that. So I would think that in terms of whether or not there's a third party
14 beneficiary, I think the intent of the agreement is that if you have brokers that you're
15 intending to benefit by reason of your agreement, I think by operation of law they
16 would necessarily have to be a third party beneficiary. Now, of course we weren't
17 trying to make, you know, the neighbors of the parcel, you know, who might benefit
18 by the contract, obviously they couldn't sue as a third party beneficiary. That's how
19 I read that particular paragraph of that contract. But the Court can obviously read
20 the language as well as we can and can come to its own conclusions about that.

21 Now, I do want to talk a little bit about the Beattie factors and I know
22 that the Court has said what its inclination is, but I think there's some things that
23 Ms. Hanks said that need to be addressed. And the first being that FHP Ventures
24 was not a party so the implication was that a fee award should be cut because

1 FHP Ventures was not a party. And, you know, I can explain to this Court and I
2 believe this comes across in the pleadings but I want to be very clear about this,
3 when you're representing multiple parties like this, I don't bill each and every one
4 of the entities of my clients. This is work for FHP Ventures, this is work for Doiron,
5 etcetera. When I did the MSJ it was for everybody. And when Spencer Gunnerson
6 goes to the deposition of Barbara Rosenberg, he was deposing her for all of them.
7 So there is no intelligible difference in terms of when we're splitting things up and
8 who what is for. Everything was for Michael Doiron, everything was for MacDonald
9 Highlands Realty, and to the extent after FHP Ventures came to the case
10 everything was for them, too. I don't think there's any intelligible way that we can
11 draw that line down here.

12 Now, on the actual Beattie factors themselves, Ms. Hanks said there's
13 no disagreement that the claims were brought in good faith. And again, as I said
14 in my pleadings, I'm not going to do it again, I'm not going to accuse anyone of
15 bringing a complaint in bad faith. I don't think that's what happened here. But
16 again, it goes back to this contract. This contract that not only Ms. Rosenberg had
17 but her counsel had before they ever filed the complaint, that contract which was
18 the star of the motion for summary judgment and was what this Court's decision
19 appeared to me at least to hinge upon. And that, Your Honor, is -- like I said, I'm
20 not going to accuse them of bringing it in bad faith, but do I think that was a claim
21 they necessarily should have brought, having had that information? I wouldn't have
22 brought that claim. But for the purposes of the Beattie factors, I believe that is not
23 the good faith claim that it's represented that it is. And again, please understand
24 that I'm not -- I'm not besmirching counsel --

1 THE COURT: Understood.

2 MR. CARTER: -- or the other side.

3 The second and third factors got a little bit smudged together, the
4 reasonableness of the amount of the offer of judgment and the reasonableness of
5 the acceptance. And we talked about this a little bit, but there is something else that
6 I wanted to mention about the reasonableness of that offer. First of all, twenty-five
7 thousand dollars is not an inconsequential amount of money, okay. Twenty-five
8 thousand dollars, I'm still at a point in my life when that's still a lot of money to me.
9 And additionally, I think if we look -- the subjectively of the belief of the other side.
10 There is no case law they can cite you, Your Honor, that says the subjectivity of a
11 plaintiff's belief in the value of their case should be what guides the reasonableness
12 because, like I said, you could have a piece of paper from someone that's unvetted
13 by anyone that says your claim is worth twenty million dollars. That's not a
14 reasonable belief, Your Honor. Reasonableness is the word that we have to look
15 for here.

16 THE COURT: Are you talking -- are you jumping across from your client's
17 reasonableness to the plaintiff's reasonableness?

18 MR. CARTER: I apologize, Your Honor. Right now I'm trying to explain why
19 twenty-five thousand dollars --

20 THE COURT: Yeah, okay.

21 MR. CARTER: -- is a reasonable amount of money, because you have to
22 understand, Your Honor, from my client's perspective we get this complaint and
23 we have this contract and we believe very firmly, Your Honor, that these claims
24 are worth nothing. We believe this is zero. And, you know, I'll tell you about Rich

1 MacDonald. He is not a person who is just, you know, generally let's go, you know,
2 let's just throw money at a problem and make it go away. He's not. This is
3 something that we thought about. We thought about what it would cost us to carry
4 on and defend this lawsuit and we thought even though we believe these claims
5 have no merit, which by the way the facts borne us out, they did have no merit,
6 Your Honor, and we nonetheless made an offer to pay twenty-five thousand dollars
7 to make it go away.

8 That is an inherently reasonable process. Just because the plaintiff
9 had an expectation that its claims were worth one million dollars, that doesn't mean
10 that our -- that the standard of reasonable now has to move for me; that now, say,
11 well, gosh, I can't do a twenty-five thousand dollar offer of judgment because they're
12 expecting a million. If I think they're unreasonable, I've still got to do what I believe
13 is reasonable, and here what the facts have borne out is reasonable, because
14 again, we won. The claims were worth nothing. Twenty-five thousand dollars, as
15 it turns out, would have been a good deal for them. So I think it was a reasonable
16 amount.

17 In terms of the reasonableness of accepting, which I know Your Honor
18 is very careful about keeping these apart --

19 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

20 MR. CARTER: -- the reasonableness of accepting is what we talked about a
21 little bit earlier. If Barbara Rosenberg had this information from the time she signed
22 the contract and her attorneys had this information from the time she came to them
23 with that contract, why would it be reasonable to reject a twenty-five thousand
24 dollar offer? Now, granted, they had an expert report. That doesn't make them

1 reasonable. I assume had we gone further into this case and we had gone to trial,
2 we would be talking right now in a motion in limine about all the things that were
3 wrong with Mr. Jiu's report and the Court would have to decide what -- you know,
4 is this a good report, is this a bad report. But my point about this is the fact that
5 you have a piece of paper that says your damages are one million dollars does
6 not make your position inherently reasonable.

7 And when you look at the objective factors of what the contract says,
8 what their due diligence was, that is key. And again, let's look back at the discovery,
9 too, because they're saying, well, we haven't done discovery yet. You didn't need
10 discovery to see the contract. But we did do some discovery and you'll remember
11 Michael Tassi is a name that's come up I believe a couple times in this hearing.
12 He was the guy that testified. He was an employee of the City of Henderson and
13 he said, well, during their due diligence period the maps were up. They could have
14 gone up, they could have looked at these anytime, you know. So you see Michael
15 Tassi' deposition. That's another thing that I look at and I think, is that reasonable?

16 THE COURT: Had that taken place by the time the offer was made?

17 MR. CARTER: You know, Your Honor, as I sit here I'm not sure I can
18 pinpoint when that was. I know I cited that in the motion for summary judgment.

19 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this. Other than her professed
20 understanding of the agreement itself, what would you look at on the plaintiff's side
21 to say that it was grossly unreasonable for them to not just take the offer and go?

22 MR. CARTER: Well, I think there are a couple things about their positions
23 that they were taking, one of which would be this idea of the restrictive covenant
24 for view, Your Honor. And this I don't believe was an item that was discussed

1 thoroughly in the MSJ, but I happen to know that it was in the pleadings, is one of
2 the items of relief that they were suing for was a restrictive covenant basically to
3 stop any building so they could preserve their view of this particular piece of their
4 property, Your Honor.

5 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

6 MR. CARTER: And if you'll recall, if you look back at our motion for summary
7 judgment, we addressed that head on. There is case law -- I don't believe it's 100
8 years old but it's close to being 100 years old, that says there is no easement in
9 Nevada for light or view; period, full stop. That is not a reasonable position to take,
10 and if someone offers you twenty-five thousand dollars to get rid of that position,
11 I think it's pretty unreasonable to say no, I think I'm going to win this. I think -- as
12 a lawyer speaking, I think that's a fairly unreasonable position to take.

13 And so I think in addition to the contractual terms, and again, I think
14 you could say the same thing about the statutory duties that my client had, there's
15 no evidence that my client not only didn't have any duties under the contract, but
16 breached any duties. I think that they specifically knew that. I think they were
17 looking and they were going to go into discovery, as is their right, but that said, that
18 fact cannot make what they did reasonable by virtue of the fact that, you know, they
19 did discovery later and they turned up nothing. Does that make sense?

20 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

21 MR. CARTER: I'm trying not to repeat myself in here.

22 THE COURT: And remind me, what is the test on the plaintiff's side?

23 MR. CARTER: For?

24 THE COURT: It does need to be grossly unreasonable.

1 MR. CARTER: It does need to be grossly unreasonable, but I would say
2 again it is grossly unreasonable, Your Honor, to assert claims against a plaintiff that,
3 one, not only have no basis in fact, have no basis in the contract that forms the
4 basis of your transaction, but also when you're asserting claims that have no basis
5 in Nevada law in a Nevada court. If someone offers you money for claims that
6 you should reasonably know are worth nothing, I believe, Your Honor, it is grossly
7 unreasonable to reject twenty-five thousand dollars. And that's not a nominal
8 amount. Like I said, that's a lot of money. That is a substantial amount of money
9 for my client to put up, particularly when he has always believed that these claims
10 were not viable. I believe, Your Honor, and I think the record supports that that is
11 grossly unreasonable to take that position factually and legally that you just can't
12 accept twenty-five thousand dollars for claims that have no reason to exist.

13 Now, I do want to just touch briefly on Frazier. I know we discussed
14 it a little bit in Ms. Hanks' oral argument --

15 THE COURT: Yeah.

16 MR. CARTER: -- and she talked about the eighty and sixty thousand dollar
17 offer of judgement and how it was not grossly unreasonable for the plaintiffs to reject
18 because they believed they had more damages. And again, Your Honor, I would
19 urge the Court to go back and look at that if the Court has any doubt. But the
20 subjective belief of the plaintiff cannot -- it cannot serve as the basis for rejection
21 of an offer of judgment because there's all sorts of altered states and viewpoints
22 in which I could think twenty-five thousand dollars is reasonable or unreasonable,
23 but you have to look at the facts and you have to look at the law and say what do
24 the facts and what does the law say? And if objectively you can't support that it

1 was reasonable, then it must be unreasonable.

2 And if it's something that the plaintiff could have seen for herself the
3 moment she signed the contract or that her attorney could have seen the moment
4 that they took the case, well, then, Your Honor, I argue that has to be grossly
5 unreasonable. Then there can be no other I think reasonable use of those terms.
6 Otherwise we'd just call it bad faith or we'd call it a Rule 11 violation or something,
7 which I'm not suggesting that happen here, but that would be the next step. You
8 can be grossly unreasonable, I think is my argument, without violating Rule 11.
9 And I think that's what happened here and I don't think I have to prove a Rule 11
10 violation to get fees and costs for my client under an offer of judgment.

11 I don't have anything else here, Your Honor. I'm happy to answer any
12 other questions you have.

13 THE COURT: No, I don't have any.

14 MR. CARTER: Thank you.

15 THE COURT: Well, all things considered, I find that I must stick with my
16 sort of leaning coming in here. I think that the last offer of judgment, all things
17 considered, should have been taken by the plaintiff. I most particularly rely on the
18 established fact which has been argued right from the start in this litigation that this
19 was perhaps not your usual plaintiff. It was a sophisticated plaintiff who apparently
20 was and claimed to be -- well, apparently was familiar with real estate law from
21 her past life experience and particularly claimed to be entirely familiar with the
22 agreement from the beginning.

23 It is not a happy thing to ever have to wind up telling a party that
24 I think they've been grossly unreasonable in a case, meaning no disparagement

1 at all to the plaintiff. I think simply in terms of applying the test the factors come
2 down to -- established to me that the offer was reasonable under the circumstances
3 and that given the reasons that the Court ultimately granted a motion for summary
4 judgment it would appear to the Court that the plaintiff must be held to be -- it must
5 have been grossly unreasonable to not accept the offer under the circumstances.
6 I would not expect anyone on the plaintiff's side to agree with that, but that's the
7 best I can do.

8 That being the case, then the aware is the hundred and twenty
9 thousand, three fifteen, and the costs in the amount of twelve thousand, six seventy-
10 one forty-eight, which pretty much moots I think the decision on that case -- on that
11 issue, moots the plaintiff's motion to retax and settle memorandum of costs and
12 disbursements. If I'm missing something then -- because that was disputing the
13 twenty thousand that the -- I'm sorry, the twenty-nine thousand, was it, that the
14 defendant was originally requesting? Yeah, twenty-nine thousand, I think, the ruling
15 on this motion.

16 MR. CARTER: Your Honor, I don't remember exactly what it was, but it
17 probably was more than twelve thousand dollars. But, yes, you know, I would say,
18 Your Honor, that under the motion to retax that our costs that we claimed were
19 not as a result of the offer of judgment. They were costs that we had, you know,
20 obviously offered to the Court in our memorandum pursuant to the statute. While
21 I understand your holding today --

22 THE COURT: So does that mean that the appropriate number, inasmuch as
23 I agree that it's that final offer of judgment that is the lynchpin here, does that mean
24 the twelve thousand dollar figure is off for costs?

1 MR. CARTER: The twelve thousand dollar fee would be off, in my
2 understanding, because you understand also when we drafted this motion we
3 believed we were entitled to more costs than we had originally submitted.

4 THE COURT: Right.

5 MR. CARTER: So I would argue, Your Honor, that whatever we're entitled
6 to under the statute would be our cost number --

7 THE COURT: All right.

8 MR. CARTER: -- and then obviously your fees number would be here.

9 THE COURT: All right. So what you're saying is we don't have that number
10 as we sit here.

11 MR. CARTER: Yeah, I don't in front of me right now, Your Honor. I can get
12 you that.

13 THE COURT: All right, then why don't you do this. Why don't you get that
14 to the plaintiff, and see if you have any further objection to it.

15 MS. HANKS: Okay. I have that number if you -- from my --

16 THE COURT: You do? Okay.

17 MS. HANKS: -- motion to retax. It was twenty thousand, seven hundred and
18 twenty-eight dollars and twenty-four cents.

19 MR. CARTER: I'm sorry, can you say that again, Karen?

20 MS. HANKS: Yeah. Twenty thousand, seven hundred and twenty-eight
21 dollars and twenty-four cents.

22 MR. CARTER: That sounds right.

23 MS. HANKS: That was what I asked it to be retaxed to --

24 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

1 MS. HANKS: -- and I think they came in and said they didn't object to that
2 retaxing.

3 MR. CARTER: And we're fine with that, Your Honor.

4 MS. HANKS: So that's the number I had.

5 THE COURT: Okay. So instead of the twelve thousand one, right?

6 MR. CARTER: Yes, that's correct, Your Honor. Yes. I'm sorry.

7 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So twenty thousand, seven twenty-eight
8 twenty-four. You may need to take another look at that.

9 MS. HANKS: I can take another look at it. I just --

10 THE COURT: Let's do this. I'm just going to put that one over to a further
11 chambers calendar just as a calendar control date. If you think there's something
12 amiss with that, file something or send me a letter.

13 MS. HANKS: Okay.

14 MR. CARTER: What we'll do, Your Honor, is --

15 THE COURT: If you agree, send me a letter.

16 MR. CARTER: Yes. We'll compare our numbers and I assume what we'll
17 do is we'll just send a joint letter to your chambers, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: Okay.

19 MR. CARTER: Do you need us to prepare the order, Your Honor?

20 THE COURT: Please. On the -- there's also -- not on calendar today, but
21 it was a 54(b) certification motion.

22 MR. CARTER: Yes.

23 MS. HANKS: Yes, Your Honor. And we would ask -- that was not our
24 motion, Your Honor, but now after today's ruling we would ask for certification to

1 appeal this order once it's entered. I don't know if you've ruled --

2 THE COURT: I'm sorry?

3 MS. HANKS: That was not our request for certification, but today now we're
4 asking for certification of your Court's order today.

5 THE COURT: Okay.

6 MS. HANKS: So if you want to combine both of them, that's fine; I'm just
7 saying.

8 THE COURT: So at last you're all in agreement.

9 MR. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor. We don't have -- It was my motion. I don't
10 have a problem with a final judgment that has the fees and costs number in it so we
11 have all --

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 MR. CARTER: I think the supreme court wants it that way now, so.

14 THE COURT: Yeah. So --

15 MR. CARTER: So if Your Honor could certify this as soon as we get you the
16 final cost number, we would be fine submitting also an order on the 54(b).

17 THE COURT: And are we at the end of the hunt with your client as well?
18 You have no objection to this?

19 MR. DeVOY: No. We still have to hear the -- well, I have no objection to
20 their motion to certify it. As for Mr. Malek, we still have the counterclaim pending
21 and we still have the motion for attorney's fees and costs pending.

22 THE COURT: Oh, yeah, sure, we've got the counterclaim. Yeah.

23 MR. DEVOY: Once we get the -- I mean, to follow up on that, the question
24 I have is would you like me to submit more on the motion to retax costs as well?

1 MS. HANKS: Or wait until the motion for attorney's fees is heard.

2 THE COURT: Yeah, why don't you wait --

3 MR. DEVOY: Okay, that's fine.

4 THE COURT: -- and let's see what happens.

5 MR. DEVOY: I mean, that's the issue that we're waiting for as well to figure
6 it out, just because there's a couple more moving pieces with respect to Mr. Malek.
7 And I don't know where Bank of America is today, either.

8 THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. All right, does that do it?

9 MS. HANKS: So, I'm sorry, are you granting the certification, Your Honor?
10 Are you granting the certification?

11 THE COURT: Well, I am unless there's reason that it needs to hang out until
12 yours completes.

13 MR. DEVOY: We're content to wait.

14 THE COURT: All right.

15 MR. DEVOY: I mean, at least with respect to Mr. Malek.

16 MS. GILBERT: Your Honor.

17 THE COURT: Yes?

18 MS. GILBERT: I apologize.

19 MS. HANKS: She's our appellate guru.

20 MS. GILBERT: I usually handle the appeals. I don't think it would matter
21 because even if we file -- if you certify Mr. Malek's order, we could just take it up
22 and if we had to -- if we had to move upstairs, that's fine.

23 THE COURT: Link it up upstairs. You could --

24 MS. GILBERT: I would like to get this one certified so that we don't run into

1 the problem.

2 THE COURT: You could consolidate upstairs.

3 MS. GILBERT: We'll consolidate upstairs.

4 THE COURT: They like consolidation upstairs.

5 MR. CARTER: They do. So what we'll do then is we'll submit the 54(b) order
6 also -- when we get together on the costs, we'll submit the 54(b) order to you as
7 well.

8 THE COURT: All right.

9 MS. GILBERT: Can we just include the language -- oh, we already have --
10 there's already another order. Never mind.

11 MR. CARTER: Yeah.

12 MS. HANKS: Yeah.

13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

14 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 2:57 P.M.)


15 * * * * *

16

17 ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
18 audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

18

19



20

Liz Garcia, Transcriber
LGM Transcription Service

21

22

23


24

TAB 67

TAB 67

TAB 67

JA_3048



CLERK OF THE COURT

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

RTRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

FREDERIC AND BARBARA)
ROSENBERG LIVING TRUST,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
vs.)
)
BANK OF AMERICA, ET AL.,)
)
Defendants.)

CASE NO. A689113
DEPT. NO. 1

BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH C. CORY, DISTRICT JUDGE
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2015 AT 10:37 A.M.

**RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT RE:
DEFENDANT SHAHIN MALEK'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS**

Recorded by: LISA A. LIZOTTE, COURT RECORDER

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: NO ONE PRESENT

FOR THE DEFENDANTS FHP VENTURES,
MICHAEL DOIRON AND MacDONALD
HIGHLANDS REALTY: NO ONE PRESENT

FOR THE DEFENDANT BANK OF
AMERICA: NO ONE PRESENT

FOR THE DEFENDANT MALEK: J. MALCOLM DeVOY, ESQ.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2015 AT 10:37 A.M.)

THE CLERK: Page 3 and 4, Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust versus Bank of America.

MR. DeVOY: Good morning. Jay DeVoy for Defendant and Movant Shane Malek.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. DeVOY: I am not sure why I'm the only person here. I spoke with Karen Hanks about this hearing prior to Thanksgiving. I left her a voicemail yesterday afternoon. I have not heard from her by email. I checked with the office. I have not heard anything from Howard Kim's office. This is now the second time that we've come here for a hearing on this motion, and –

THE COURT: Is it the second?

MR. DeVOY: Yes. The first one was on October 22nd. We dealt with the motion to retax costs because at that time the opposition to our motion for attorney's fees and costs hadn't been filed, it was not filed until the next morning and then that reset the calendar. We had a colloquy. There were two attorneys here from – the Plaintiff's counsel, Ms. Hanks and Ms. Gilbert. We agreed upon the December 1st date. I didn't think there were any issues with it. It was on the Court's calendar. We had communications about it.

I'm frankly at a loss as to why Mr. Malek has now had to prepare for this hearing twice, and presumably –

THE COURT: I agree with you.

MR. DeVOY: I assume you'd like to table it again but I'd like to go forward. I think – I made the argument under EDCR 2.20 last time that they consented by not filing an opposition. They have now opposed it. I've replied.

1 The hearing that was noticed and everyone agreed upon is now here. I ask the
2 Court consider just the Plaintiff to have consented to the motion and if they want
3 to fight it later that's fine. If there's any other questions the Court has, my
4 position –

5 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me ask you this. Inasmuch as they
6 did file a response –

7 MR. DeVOY: Yes.

8 THE COURT: -- should I not consider that as well?

9 MR. DeVOY: It's untimely. It's within your jurisdiction. I don't think
10 the response changes anything. They said a whole bunch of cases that I think
11 are inept because this case and our motion for fees and costs comes under the
12 premise that it was without reasonable grounds to be brought or maintained, and
13 there's about 20 cases that are cited for the proposition that Nevada recognizes
14 written covenants, they recognize easements, but the reality is that this case is
15 premised on the fact that the Trust brought forward no evidence of anything other
16 than the fact they sought an implied restrictive covenant or negative easement
17 based on view, light and privacy, and in this Court's order that's the only thing
18 that was recognized that the Trust ever articulated its reasons for stopping Shane
19 Malek from building his house, view, light and privacy.

20 That has been disallowed by Nevada law expressly since 1965
21 in *Boyd versus McDonald* and it was reaffirmed in 1969 in *Probasco versus City*
22 *of Reno*, and this case's determination turned almost entirely on those two cases.
23 This isn't something that was new, this isn't something that was in question, and
24 by the close of discovery we knew exactly what the Trust was seeking and its
25 reasons for seeking an easement – or the implied easement, to keep Shane

1 Malek from building his house, and at the last hearing the Court found that the
2 legal position of the Trust was so without legal merit based on the circumstance
3 of the case and the people involved and the fact that the Trustee had extensive
4 real estate experience and had access to very sophisticated counsel and it
5 denied an offer for \$25,000 from the McDonald Highlands' entities, and the Court
6 found that to be objectively unreasonable.

7 So the question is how does that relate to whether it's without
8 reasonable grounds to bring these claims, and I think at this point we've reached
9 that point, and there's other language in NRS 18.010(2)(b) that allows for the
10 imposition of fees in a case like this because the action is maintained to harass
11 the prevailing party. We've now had two hearings on this, and it goes without
12 saying that the entire litigation has been conducted in a way to try to outspend
13 Shane Malek.

14 The Trust opposition makes the argument that they came to
15 court, they made an argument and they lost and they shouldn't have to pay fees
16 because of it and I don't think that holds up because the law is well known, they
17 had knowledge of what was happening, as Ms. Hanks informed the Court in her
18 motion to retax costs the parties went to mediation. There was time for the Trust
19 to discontinue this action anytime it wanted.

20 Part of NRS 18.010(2)(b) considers not only if the action was
21 brought without reasonable grounds but maintained as well, and this action was
22 maintained right until the time that the Court decided as a matter of law that the
23 Trust had no position and no legal claims against Shane Malek. It would be
24 more tenable if the Trust made its argument that it took a run at it and it lost if it
25 went to a jury trial, it was left to six people to decide what the law was, but it was

1 a matter of law that they lost, and the more apt analogy is that they went to a
2 casino and they gambled but they levered up on the attorneys' fees and costs
3 incurred by everybody else and now they don't want to pay it despite taking out
4 that debt to everybody else.

5 So to the extent that NRS 18.010(2)(b) seems to act like a
6 means of tort reform to disincentivize people from bringing actions for the sole
7 purpose of outspending the adversary, and especially in this case outspending a
8 neighbor to try to control their construction plans, I think this is a very accurate
9 use for it. This is a case that went on for more than 2 years. We're now here
10 after the 2 year mark. It was filed in September of 2013. We're at the second
11 hearing of a motion that nobody has made a serious effort to oppose, and I think
12 it should be granted at this point.

13 And, moreover, the case law in Nevada says that we have to
14 look at the specific circumstances of each case to determine if it was without
15 reasonable grounds. To go back to the circumstances that I think the counsel for
16 McDonald Highlands very articulately stated last time, the circumstances were
17 there that they should have known about this. The Trust had massive resources.
18 They hired sophisticated counsel. This wasn't them proceeding pro se or with a
19 new lawyer stumbling throughout the woods when they had no experience with
20 this.

21 They hired the counsel that specifically won the *SFR* case and
22 had experience with real estate litigation. They knew or should have known that
23 this was the likely outcome, and they proceeded anyway and made Shane Malek
24 incur more than \$120,000 in attorney's fees and costs. To the extent they have
25 any arguments about it they should have been made timely, and in the case of

1 the hearing today that we all agreed upon and somehow I managed to
2 remember, you know, they should have shown up to argue that, and now here
3 we are and they won't even dignify the expense that they imposed on him and
4 that he continues to incur as we have successive hearings about this, we have
5 reply briefing and continue to impose these costs that we should have resolved
6 with finality at least a month ago, so that is the sum of my position at this point.

7 THE COURT: All right. How much time did you rack up sitting
8 around last time and this time?

9 MR. DeVOY: This time I got here around 9:00, it is 10:44, so about
10 1.8, and then last time I don't recall off the top of my head. I can look back to my
11 billing records and figure that out, but including preparation time for both last time
12 and this hearing and then the reply brief in between, it depends on how far the
13 Court wants to go, I would say it could be as much as five hours, maybe a little
14 bit more.

15 THE COURT: Well, I'm thinking more of the time you spent sitting
16 around waiting because counsel didn't show up. Didn't we – didn't we wait a
17 while before that came up?

18 MR. DeVOY: For here today?

19 THE COURT: No. For the last time.

20 MR. DeVOY: I don't remember last time. I believe that we were all
21 on time last time. We were close to the top of the calendar. I don't believe it was
22 that excessive. I don't know off the top of my head. I could find out for the Court.

23 THE COURT: All right. Unfortunately I think that in all candor I
24 would probably have to disagree with you about whether or not this was a
25 frivolous action. Maybe it – maybe it was frivolous and the Court was just a little

1 slow in recognizing that your client's position prevailed and the other side did not,
2 but I don't really conclude that that was the case. I think the way that this action
3 arose seemed to me to involve some somewhat novel circumstances, and it is
4 not clear to me that this was an entirely frivolous action to be brought.

5 As to your argument about maintaining it, I find it difficult to say
6 that it was frivolous to maintain it. I think you said right up until the time of
7 mediation was it or the time after mediation?

8 MR. DeVOY: Well, no. I brought up mediation. I bring up the fact
9 they could – well, they could stop it anytime they wanted. This was forced
10 through summary judgment. The motions were filed in April and it wasn't set until
11 July and the orders were entered in August, so it was a long timetable when the
12 facts came out and the Court indicated that it was leaning toward just granting
13 them. So there was a number of indications it was coming.

14 But to go to it, and this is the trap that I think the Trust fell into
15 as well discussing if it was vexatious or frivolous, the standard under NRS
16 18.010(2)(b) is that if the claim is brought without regard to the recovery sought,
17 was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing
18 party.

19 It discusses that those kind of – this kind of award of attorney's
20 fees and costs is particularly appropriate to punish or deter frivolous or vexatious
21 claims but that's not the standard, just if it's without reasonable ground, so it's not
22 as high as saying it's frivolous or vexatious, it's just without a reasonable ground
23 to go forward, and I think we got to that last time when we were discussing the
24 fact that it was unreasonable, objectively unreasonable for the Trust to reject an
25

1 offer of judgment of \$25,000 in order to maintain this action in light of the law at
2 the time and the discovery that was conducted in January of 2015.

3 Now, those circumstances aren't quite the same here because
4 there's no pending offer of judgment, but the standard is whether it was with a
5 reasonable ground, not if it was vexatious or frivolous.

6 THE COURT: Well, and so that would – you're saying that you filed
7 your motion for summary judgment in January?

8 MR. DeVOY: No. No. It was filed in April.

9 THE COURT: Of this year?

10 MR. DeVOY: Yes.

11 THE COURT: I mean I could go so far as to say that it was
12 unreasonable for them to maintain the action once – from the time that you filed
13 the motion for summary judgment because by that point they had already seen
14 the Court's response to every argument that they made, and your motion for
15 summary judgment I mean obviously I granted it, so I think that perhaps should
16 have been a tipoff for them.

17 I think the most I could go is to say that it was probably
18 vexatiously -- or unreasonable, let us say, to maintain the position that forced us
19 to go through the argument itself. I would probably only grant fees from the time
20 of – from after you filed your motion for summary judgment.

21 MR. DeVOY: Okay. So from April 16th onward, and then I think also
22 -- to supplement your point about it being frivolous or vexatious and especially
23 the point about it being vexatious, I think the present conduct indicates that going
24 back to the language of Section (2)(b) it's to harass the prevailing party. We've
25

1 won and we've now had to drag the other side to court to hear our motion and
2 had to go through this numerous times, so –

3 THE COURT: Well, what I am going to do is separate and aside
4 from what I've already said about awarding fees after the filing of your motion for
5 summary judgment I would definitely probably sanction opposing counsel or the
6 client for the time that you've spent here today as well as – you think that you
7 were called right away last time?

8 MR. DeVOY: Excuse me?

9 THE COURT: You think that your matter was called right away last
10 time?

11 MR. DeVOY: It wasn't a normal calendar day. It was scheduled on
12 October 22nd. It was originally scheduled for calendar for October 12th, and then
13 there was a – I'm sorry, go ahead.

14 THE CLERK: I can tell you.

15 (Court conferring with the Clerk.)

16 THE COURT: It was at 1:30 so there wasn't a wait, so I certainly
17 would for the time you've had to wait here today there's no reason to – that
18 should have to be. So I'm going to grant as a separate basis your fees for the
19 time that you've had to wait here let's say for two hours it's taken us to get to this
20 point.

21 MR. DeVOY: Would the Court like to make any calculations and
22 enter an order today or are we going to –

23 THE COURT: Just put it in your order.

24 MR. DeVOY: Okay. So we're granting the fees from April 16th
25 onward?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. DeVOY: And then separately two hours for today because –

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. DeVOY: Okay. Great.

THE COURT: Their failure to show up. Okay.

MR. DeVOY: Anything else?

THE COURT: The costs. The costs are granted.

MR. DeVOY: Yeah. That was separately granted. I have in my notes here from last time it's \$7,568.50, so --

THE COURT: I thought I had – I had it down today for 12,000 something. Is that not right?

MR. DeVOY: That's what we requested. We negotiated down to \$7,568.

THE COURT: Oh, yeah. That's right. That's right. So that figure is granted. I guess we already did that last time, right?

MR. DeVOY: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. DeVOY: That's great. I'll get the calculations done and I'll submit everything to the Court. Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.


MR. DeVOY: Thank you.

(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded.)

* * * * *

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/visual proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.



LISA A. LIZOTTE
Court Recorder

Case No. 69399 c/w 70478

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

FREDERIC AND BARBARA
ROSENBERG LIVING TRUST,
Appellant/Cross-Respondent,

vs.

MACDONALD HIGHLANDS
REALTY, LLC, a Nevada Limited
Liability Company; MICHAEL
DOIRON, an Individual; and FHP
VENTURES, a Nevada Limited
Partnership,
Respondent/Cross-Appellants.

Electronically Filed
Oct 12 2016 01:08 p.m.
Elizabeth A. Brown
Clerk of Supreme Court

FREDERIC AND BARBARA
ROSENBERG LIVING TRUST,
Appellant,

vs.

SHAHIN SHANE MALEK,
Respondent.

APPEAL

from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County
The Honorable KENNETH CORY, District Judge
District Court Case No. District Court Case No. A-13-689113-C

JOINT APPENDIX VOLUME 14

Respectfully submitted by:

JACQUELINE A. GILBERT, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 10593

KAREN HANKS, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 9578

KIM GILBERT EBRON
7625 Dean Martin Drive, Suite 110
Las Vegas, NV 89139
Telephone: (702) 485-3300
Facsimile: (702) 485-3301

Attorneys for Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust

ALPHABETICAL INDEX

Vol.	Tab	Date Filed	Document	Bates Number
1	5	10/29/13	Affidavit of Service - Michael Doiron	JA_0031
1	3	10/24/13	Affidavit of Service - Shahin Shane Malek	JA_0025
1	2	10/24/13	Affidavit of Service - BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP	JA_0022
1	16	1/16/15	Affidavit of Service – Foothill Partners	JA_0114
1	15	1/16/15	Affidavit of Service – Foothills at MacDonald Ranch Master Association	JA_0112
1	14	1/16/15	Affidavit of Service – Paul Bykowski	JA_0110
1	4	10/24/13	Affidavit of Service - Real Properties Management Group, Inc.	JA_0028
1	13	1/12/15	Amended Complaint	JA_0089
2/3	22	4/16/15	Appendix of Exhibits to Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_0229
8/9/ 10/1 1	37	6/22/15	Appendix of Exhibits to Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence	JA_1646
1	6	12/30/13	Bank of America N. A.'s Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint	JA_0034
12	42	7/28/15	Bank of America N.A.'s Answer to First Amended Complaint	JA_2439
8	34	6/19/15	Bank of America N.A.'s Opposition to Motion to Amend to Conform to Evidence and Countermotion for Dismissal	JA_1620
1	1	9/23/13	Complaint	JA_0001
7	30	5/11/15	Errata to Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1497

12	44	8/13/15	Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgement Regarding MacDonald Highlands Realty, Michael Doiron, and FHP Ventures' Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_2476
1	11	3/20/14	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust's Answer to Shahin Shane Malek's Counterclaim	JA_0081
1	19	4/16/15	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Shahin Shane Malek	JA_0139
6	25	5/4/15	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust's Opposition to MacDonald Realty, Michael Dorion, and FHP Ventures' Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1124
6/7	26	5/4/15	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust's Opposition to Shahin Shane Malek's Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1215
7	29	5/11/15	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust's Reply to Malek's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1486
7	27	5/4/15	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust's Response to Malek's Statement of Undisputed Facts	JA_1369
1	9	1/28/14	MacDonald Highland Realty's Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint	JA_0060
1	18	2/2/15	MacDonald Highland's and Michael Dorion's Answer to Amended Complaint	JA_0126
1	20	4/16/15	MacDonald Highlands Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_0175
13	55	12/11/15	MacDonald Highlands Realty, LLC, Michael Doiron and FHP Ventures Notice of Cross-Appeal	JA_2805

8	35	6/22/15	MacDonald Highlands' Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence	JA_1627
12/13	47	9/2/15	Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	JA_2526
7/8	33	6/3/15	Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence	JA_1553
13	54	12/9/15	Notice of Appeal	JA_2801
13	62	5/23/16	Notice of Appeal	JA_2854
12	45	8/13/15	Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgement	JA_2489
13	57	1/20/16	Notice of Entry of Order	JA_2817
1	8	1/13/14	Notice of Entry of Order Dismissing Dragonridge Golf Club, Inc. and MacDonald Properties, LTD.	JA_0055
13	51	11/10/15	Notice of Entry of Order Granting (1) Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs (2) Motion to Re- Tax Costs	JA_2778
13	52	11/10/15	Notice of Entry of Order Granting Motion for Certification	JA_2784
12	46	8/20/15	Notice of Entry of Order on Malek's Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_2504
13	61	5/18/16	Notice of Entry of Order Stipulation and Order	JA_2846
13	59	3/18/16	Notice of Entry of Order Stipulation and Order to Dismiss Bank of America N.A. with Prejudice	JA_2833
6	24	4/22/15	Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Bykowski and Foothills at MacDonald Ranch Master Association	JA_1120
1	12	4/29/14	Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Realty Property Management Group	JA_0086

13	49	10/23/15	Opposition to Malek's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	JA_2763
12	41	7/23/15	Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_2432
13	50	11/10/15	Order Granting (1) Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs (2) Motion to Re- Tax Costs	JA_2774
1	7	1/10/14	Order Granting in Part DRFH Ventures, LLC; Dragonridge Golf Club, Inc. and MacDonald Properties, LTD.	JA_0052
13	56	1/13/16	Order on Shahin Shane Malek's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust's Motion to Re-Tax Costs	JA_2809
12	43	8/13/15	Proposed Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgement on Shahin Shane Malek's Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_2457
14	65	7/15/15	Recorder's Transcript Re: Status Check: Reset Trial Date	JA_2970
14	67	12/1/15	Recorders Transcript Re: Shahin Shane Malek's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	JA_3048
7	32	5/12/15	Reply in Support of MacDonald Realty, Michael Dorion, and FHP Ventures' Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1539
12	38	6/29/15	Reply to Bank of America N.A.'s Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform on Evidence	JA_2404
7	31	5/12/15	Reply to Opposition to Malek's Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1517
12	39	6/29/15	Reply to Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform on Evidence	JA_2413

12	40	6/29/15	Reply to Shahin Shane Malek's Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence	JA_2423
1	21	4/16/15	Shahin Shane Malek Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_0198
1	10	2/20/14	Shahin Shane Malek's Answer and Counterclaim	JA_0072
1	17	1/27/15	Shahin Shane Malek's Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim	JA_0116
13	48	9/9/15	Shahin Shane Malek's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	JA_2684
7	28	5/5/15	Shahin Shane Malek's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1416
8	36	6/22/15	Shahin Shane Malek's Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence	JA_1636
13	53	11/19/15	Shahin Shane Malek's Reply in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	JA_2790
4/5/ 6	23	4/16/15	Shahin Shane Malek's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_0630
13	60	5/17/16	Stipulation and Order for Dismissal of Counterclaim without Prejudice	JA_2841
13	58	3/10/16	Stipulation and Order to Dismiss Bank of America N.A. with Prejudice	JA_2828
13/1 4	63	4/8/15	Transcript Re. FHP Ventures' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint	JA_2858
14	64	6/10/15	Transcript Re. Status Check: Reset Trial Date Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_2898

14	66	10/22/15	Transcript Re: Shahin Shane Malek's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs; MacDonald Highlands Realty, LLC, and FHP Ventures Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs; Motion to Re-Tax and Settle Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements	JA_2994
----	----	----------	---	---------

CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX

Vol.	Tab	Date Filed	Document	Bates Number
1	1	9/23/13	Complaint	JA_0001
1	2	10/24/13	Affidavit of Service - BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP	JA_0022
1	3	10/24/13	Affidavit of Service - Shahin Shane Malek	JA_0025
1	4	10/24/13	Affidavit of Service - Real Properties Management Group, Inc.	JA_0028
1	5	10/29/13	Affidavit of Service - Michael Doiron	JA_0031
1	6	12/30/13	Bank of America N. A.'s Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint	JA_0034
1	7	1/10/14	Order Granting in Part DRFH Ventures, LLC; Dragonridge Golf Club, Inc. and MacDonald Properties, LTD.	JA_0052
1	8	1/13/14	Notice of Entry of Order Dismissing Dragonridge Golf Club, Inc. and MacDonald Properties, LTD.	JA_0055
1	9	1/28/14	MacDonald Highland Reality's Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint	JA_0060
1	10	2/20/14	Shahin Shane Malek's Answer and Counterclaim	JA_0072
1	11	3/20/14	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust's Answer to Shahin Shane Malek's Counterclaim	JA_0081
1	12	4/29/14	Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Realty Property Management Group	JA_0086
1	13	1/12/15	Amended Complaint	JA_0089
1	14	1/16/15	Affidavit of Service – Paul Bykowski	JA_0110

1	15	1/16/15	Affidavit of Service – Foothills at MacDonald Ranch Master Association	JA_0112
1	16	1/16/15	Affidavit of Service – Foothill Partners	JA_0114
1	17	1/27/15	Shahin Shane Malek’s Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim	JA_0116
1	18	2/2/15	MacDonald Highland’s and Michael Doriron’s Answer to Amended Complaint	JA_0126
1	19	4/16/15	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against Shahin Shane Malek	JA_0139
1	20	4/16/15	MacDonald Highlands Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_0175
1	21	4/16/15	Shahin Shane Malek Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_0198
2/3	22	4/16/15	Appendix of Exhibits to Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_0229
4/5/6	23	4/16/15	Shahin Shane Malek’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_0630
6	24	4/22/15	Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Bykowski and Foothills at MacDonald Ranch Master Association	JA_1120
6	25	5/4/15	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust’s Opposition to MacDonald Realty, Michael Dorion, and FHP Ventures’ Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1124
6/7	26	5/4/15	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust’s Opposition to Shahin Shane Malek’s Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1215

7	27	5/4/15	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust's Response to Malek's Statement of Undisputed Facts	JA_1369
7	28	5/5/15	Shahin Shane Malek's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1416
7	29	5/11/15	Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust's Reply to Malek's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1486
7	30	5/11/15	Errata to Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1497
7	31	5/12/15	Reply to Opposition to Malek's Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1517
7	32	5/12/15	Reply in Support of MacDonald Realty, Michael Dorion, and FHP Ventures' Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_1539
7/8	33	6/3/15	Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence	JA_1553
8	34	6/19/15	Bank of America N.A.'s Opposition to Motion to Amend to Conform to Evidence and Countermotion for Dismissal	JA_1620
8	35	6/22/15	MacDonald Highlands' Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence	JA_1627
8	36	6/22/15	Shahin Shane Malek's Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence	JA_1636
8/9/10/11	37	6/22/15	Appendix of Exhibits to Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence	JA_1646
12	38	6/29/15	Reply to Bank of America N.A.'s Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform on Evidence	JA_2404
12	39	6/29/15	Reply to Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform on Evidence	JA_2413

12	40	6/29/15	Reply to Shahin Shane Malek's Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence	JA_2423
12	41	7/23/15	Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_2432
12	42	7/28/15	Bank of America N.A.'s Answer to First Amended Complaint	JA_2439
12	43	8/13/15	Proposed Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgement on Shahin Shane Malek's Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_2457
12	44	8/13/15	Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgement Regarding MacDonald Highlands Realty, Michael Doiron, and FHP Ventures' Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_2476
12	45	8/13/15	Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgement	JA_2489
12	46	8/20/15	Notice of Entry of Order on Malek's Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_2504
12/13	47	9/2/15	Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	JA_2526
13	48	9/9/15	Shahin Shane Malek's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	JA_2684
13	49	10/23/15	Opposition to Malek's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	JA_2763
13	50	11/10/15	Order Granting (1) Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs (2) Motion to Re- Tax Costs	JA_2774
13	51	11/10/15	Notice of Entry of Order Granting (1) Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs (2) Motion to Re- Tax Costs	JA_2778
13	52	11/10/15	Notice of Entry of Order Granting Motion for Certification	JA_2784

13	53	11/19/15	Shahin Shane Malek's Reply in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	JA_2790
13	54	12/9/15	Notice of Appeal	JA_2801
13	55	12/11/15	MacDonald Highlands Realty, LLC, Michael Doiron and FHP Ventures Notice of Cross-Appeal	JA_2805
13	56	1/13/16	Order on Shahin Shane Malek's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Frederic and Barbara Rosenberg Living Trust's Motion to Re-Tax Costs	JA_2809
13	57	1/20/16	Notice of Entry of Order	JA_2817
13	58	3/10/16	Stipulation and Order to Dismiss Bank of America N.A. with Prejudice	JA_2828
13	59	3/18/16	Notice of Entry of Order Stipulation and Order to Dismiss Bank of America N.A. with Prejudice	JA_2833
13	60	5/17/16	Stipulation and Order for Dismissal of Counterclaim without Prejudice	JA_2841
13	61	5/18/16	Notice of Entry of Order Stipulation and Order	JA_2846
13	62	5/23/16	Notice of Appeal	JA_2854
13/14	63	4/8/15	Transcript Re. FHP Ventures' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint	JA_2858
14	64	6/10/15	Transcript Re. Status Check: Reset Trial Date Motion for Summary Judgment	JA_2898
14	65	7/15/15	Recorder's Transcript Re: Status Check: Reset Trial Date	JA_2970

14	66	10/22/15	Transcript Re: Shahin Shane Malek's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs; MacDonald Highlands Realty, LLC, and FHP Ventures Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs; Motion to Re-Tax and Settle Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements	JA_2994
14	67	12/1/15	Recorders Transcript Re: Shahin Shane Malek's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs	JA_3048

1 mentioning the CC&R's. A couple points about the CC&R's. First of all, the CC&R's
2 don't govern my client, FHP Ventures. CC&R's are recorded against the properties
3 and effect the homeowners association and the property owners. So their attempts
4 to bring the CC&R's into this is their attempt because CC&R's have the words
5 covenant in them and have the word restrictions in them, and so the best they can
6 tie these design guidelines to the CC&R's --

7 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

8 MR. GUNNERSON: -- then, you know, the better off they feel they are. But
9 I will say that in the end if the CC&R's become an issue, that's an issue between
10 them and the HOA, not between them and FHP Ventures. And by the way, if the
11 CC&R's become an issue, that's subject to arbitration. So if they're really claiming
12 the CC&R's have been violated, this whole thing might be stayed anyway to allow
13 for them to proceed in arbitration against the HOA.

14 THE COURT: Well, you know, that's a good point. Let me just interrupt you
15 just long enough to toss that at you. If you do go that direction, you do recognize
16 that that's going to put the *quietus* on this whole thing until you --

17 MS. HANKS: Yeah. And they haven't answered, Your Honor. And I've been
18 telling them to -- I was thinking about voluntarily dismissing them because what
19 happened was when we deposed the HOA, the person most knowledgeable for it,
20 we found out that FHP Ventures is the declarant. They're still the party in control
21 of McDonald Highlands under the CC&R's. And they're the party who --

22 THE COURT: Well, as a declarant does that mean you're necessarily still
23 in control?

24 MS. HANKS: Yes.

1 THE COURT: It does?

2 MS. HANKS: It provides that they're in control until 2042, I think.

3 THE COURT: Oh, okay.

4 MS. HANKS: That's why we had to --

5 THE COURT: All right.

6 MS. HANKS: That's why this amended came out to begin with.

7 THE COURT: Well, but so what you're saying is you want them in because --

8 but you recognize that, as Mr. Jones is pointing out --

9 MR. GUNNERSON: By the way, Mr. Gunnerson, by the way.

10 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry.

11 MR. GUNNERSON: Mr. Jones is my partner. But that's okay.

12 MR. SHEVORSKI: Mr. Jones is taller, Your Honor.

13 THE COURT: You don't mind being called Mr. Jones?

14 MR. GUNNERSON: No, I respect both my partners who are both Jones,

15 so if you're confusing me with either one of them, I'm okay.

16 THE COURT: Okay. My apologies.

17 MS. HANKS: No, the HOA has --

18 THE COURT: As Mr. Gunnerson is arguing -- hey, any relation to big AI?

19 MR. GUNNERSON: No. Gunnerson with two n's.

20 THE COURT: Oh, okay.

21 MR. GUNNERSON: I'll tell you, Your Honor, that once somebody asked me

22 that question when I first started, my dad's name is Alan, and so I said, yeah, that's

23 my dad.

24 THE COURT: Yeah, yeah.

1 MR. GUNNERSON: And they said, oh, I knew him on the taxicab litigation.

2 And I said, wait, no, no, my dad is not -- that's the wrong Al Gunnerson, I guess.

3 THE COURT: That could -- yeah, that could cut both ways.

4 MR. GUNNERSON: Yeah.

5 THE COURT: All right. What were you saying?

6 MS. HANKS: Sorry. The CC&R's provide that FHP Ventures is the declarant
7 and they're still in control of McDonald -- they are in control right now.

8 THE COURT: All right.

9 MS. HANKS: The HOA does not have control.

10 THE COURT: Okay. But you do recognize that if you go down that path that
11 he's probably correct, we wind up staying this whole thing while you go arbitrate
12 those things.

13 MS. HANKS: I agree. And I'm really more or less arguing that point as to
14 Mr. Malek and the entity who sold the golf parcel, that when they sold it they knew
15 they had to get approval to do --

16 THE COURT: Let me ask you this.

17 MS. HANKS: Not --

18 THE COURT: Would I be correct that for now you including them in this
19 complaint is really more by way of putting them on notice than it is asking for the
20 injunctive relief or declaratory relief at this stage against FHP?

21 MS. HANKS: FHP. Well, it's probably two-fold. Yes, to put them on notice,
22 but secondarily we do want them -- we want injunctive relief to enforce the design
23 guidelines as originally contemplated --

24 THE COURT: Okay.

1 MS. HANKS: -- because they can be enforced even with Mr. Malek keeping
2 the golf parcel.

3 THE COURT: Mr. Gunnerson, would your argument be if we were at that
4 stage in the proceeding that they were, you know, here on a motion to do that, that
5 whether or not that's going to happen is a matter of arbitration as part of the kind of
6 issues that must go to arbitration, as opposed to this Court issuing an injunction?

7 MR. GUNNERSON: I would have to say, first of all, with the right to change
8 whatever I say now --

9 THE COURT: Sure. Yeah.

10 MR. GUNNERSON: -- just because, I mean, at this point I think that would
11 be. Now, I don't know, I haven't sat down, because the CC&R's aren't at issue in
12 that way and so we have not sat down and discussed -- you know, their allegations
13 as it pertains to my client pertain to them and the design review guidelines, not the
14 CC&R's.

15 THE COURT: Yeah.

16 MR. GUNNERSON: So if that changes and they make a claim against us as
17 it pertains to -- you know, for some kind of breach of the CC&R's, then that might be
18 something we would definitely consider doing, Your Honor, no question.

19 THE COURT: You know --

20 MR. GUNNERSON: And there might be other parties here or involved and
21 if the HOA gets involved, who I do not represent, they may consider that as well.

22 THE COURT: Sure.

23 MR. GUNNERSON: So I definitely think that's a real possibility.

24 THE COURT: Well, you know, this all makes me glad I'm poor, for once.

1 I don't have these kinds of issues.

2 MR. GUNNERSON: Well, Your Honor, if I --

3 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Gunnerson, complete your argument.

4 MR. GUNNERSON: If I could note a couple things about the enforcement
5 issue. First of all, they want -- One reason why this claim fails to state -- or why this
6 claim fails is because they say we want the guidelines to be enforced as anticipated.

7 THE COURT: Yeah.

8 MR. GUNNERSON: Well, are you talking about the document itself or as the
9 Rosenbergs intended for them to be enforced? Because the guidelines are being
10 enforced as stated.

11 THE COURT: Well, it's a little difficult for us to grapple with that, just as
12 some of these, you know, questions I'm throwing out here are difficult because
13 they're not really on the table yet --

14 MR. GUNNERSON: But, Your Honor --

15 THE COURT: -- and, you know, they might be hard pressed to answer that
16 today.

17 MR. GUNNERSON: Your Honor, it's their claim, okay, and we are at the end
18 of discovery. If they can't answer it now, when are they going to answer it? So I
19 would definitely say, though, that the fact --

20 THE COURT: So you want discovery to stay closed?

21 MR. GUNNERSON: Well, depending on what happens today --

22 THE COURT: Oh, oh, oh.

23 MR. GUNNERSON: Well, I represent other parties in this, so when you say
24 "you," I represent those parties as well.

1 THE COURT: Oh, okay. FHP.

2 MR. GUNNERSON: And those parties -- those other parties have no desire
3 to reopen discovery.

4 THE COURT: Yeah.

5 MR. GUNNERSON: So I guess that would be an issue I would have to take
6 up, depending on what happens here today. I will say that they say they want
7 the discovery (sic) guidelines enforced as anticipated, and yet they still have not
8 pointed, Your Honor, to one single statement in there sufficiently that shows any
9 restrictive covenant that we failed to enforce. In fact, they're not unhappy that we've
10 failed to enforce the design review guidelines, they're unhappy because we did
11 enforce them on the new parcel. That's what they're unhappy about. They're
12 unhappy that we -- that when the design review committee went forward and looked
13 at it, they looked at it as one parcel as it is right now.

14 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

15 MR. GUNNERSON: So there's nothing to go forward on --

16 THE COURT: Yeah.

17 MR. GUNNERSON: -- because we can't -- we can't guess.

18 THE COURT: You've already done the thing that they're asking the Court
19 to order you to do.

20 MR. GUNNERSON: Well, we've already applied the design review guidelines
21 to that. And what they're saying is, they're saying, well, the setbacks are gone. No.
22 The setbacks in the design review guidelines are still there, and in fact they were still
23 considered, you know, by the design review committee when they viewed the lot as
24 a whole. They said, well, you know, the cone of vision. No. They may not like the

1 way the cone of vision was applied, but it was applied. They say, well, no, there's
2 other issues that they didn't follow. Your Honor, they have still failed in their
3 pleadings to point to what it was that was done because they know that in the end
4 we're going to be able to show them, no, the design review guidelines were followed
5 as it pertains to this lot as a whole.

6 What they want this Court to do is say design review guidelines create
7 some kind of implication that when new property is added nothing can be put there
8 and design review guidelines have no application whatsoever and nothing can be
9 built. That is not in the guidelines that you were permitted to look at, you were
10 permitted to review because it was brought in their complaint, without moving this
11 to a motion for summary judgment, and you can find legally there's no legal basis
12 to make this request to the Court. I mean, that's part of the complete astonishment
13 my clients had when they're trying to understand why they're involved here.

14 THE COURT: Yeah.

15 MR. GUNNERSON: And again, I have to say, when she says, well, if Mr.
16 Malek is found -- if a jury finds Mr. Malek to be innocent, okay. First of all, let's
17 make it clear these are equitable claims for relief, so the jury is not going to be
18 taking these into -- these aren't for the jury to decide.

19 THE COURT: Okay.

20 MR. GUNNERSON: These are equitable claims for relief for Your Honor to
21 decide. So you have the power, Your Honor, to say, yes, I think Mr. Malek is an
22 innocent party; however, I do believe there was some kind of restrictive covenant
23 created somehow, we're not quite sure, but you would be sure at that time, I guess,
24 and therefore I'm ordering Mr. Malek not to build. Right now as pled that's all they're

1 asking this Court to do. All they are asking is for this Court to use us as some kind
2 of vehicle to keep him from building. You already have that at your fingertips. As an
3 equitable claim, that's ultimately going to be your decision to have. Even if you feel
4 Mr. Malek is innocent, you still can keep him from building if in fact there's some
5 kind of restrictive covenant that applies to him and his property.

6 One last thing -- let me just check my notes real quick. The last thing
7 is they say, Your Honor, what we're asking for you to do is have FHP undo what
8 they have done. We're not even quite sure what that means because, Your Honor,
9 there was an approval given, as they state in their complaint. A letter was given to
10 the parties. If they've applied for a building permit, whether it's been granted or not,
11 that letter has already been given. Ultimately the design review committee gives
12 approval of plans, but they don't issue the building permits. Once the City issues
13 the building permit, we can't go back to the City and say undo what you've done,
14 we're now unapproving what we previously approved.

15 This is, I believe, ultimately going to be a request for equitable -- an
16 equitable request here that ultimately in reality isn't going to be able to be handled.
17 Now, you might say to me, well, Mr. Gunnerson, isn't that something we need more
18 facts on what's going to happen? And perhaps that would be true. But I don't think
19 the answer to that question is necessary for you to grant our motion to dismiss,
20 because I think in the end what it comes down to is as they pled it there are no
21 restrictive covenants and they already have the claims against Mr. Malek if this
22 Court were so to decide that he should not build. And if they somehow deem that
23 there are money damages and they bring that against us, then we'll address that
24 at that time and then we will make the decisions we need to make as far as how

1 we proceed. But I don't want to make -- you know, try to make a decision now as to
2 how we proceed on a money damage claim when nothing has ever been stated as
3 much. There's never been any indication until twenty minutes ago that that was
4 ever going to be an aspect, a potential aspect as it pertains to my client.

5 So we'd still ask that you grant our motion to dismiss.

6 THE COURT: All right, thank you.

7 MR. GUNNERSON: Do you have any questions, Your Honor?

8 THE COURT: No, not at this time.

9 MR. SHEVORSKI: Your Honor, just real briefly --

10 THE COURT: Oh.

11 MR. SHEVORSKI: -- from Bank of America.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 MR. SHEVORSKI: There's a new issue that just arose through Ms. Hanks'
14 oral argument which I had not heard before which impacts this Court's jurisdiction.

15 THE COURT: Oh. What's that?

16 MR. SHEVORSKI: 38.310, subdivision 2, it says shall dismiss the complaint.
17 So before -- not before you rule on Mr. Gunnerson's motion, but my client would like
18 the opportunity at least to brief that issue because that is a subject matter jurisdiction
19 issue.

20 THE COURT: Well, okay. My ruling on his motion does not impact your
21 ability to bring that motion, does it?

22 MR. SHEVORSKI: I understand that, but I want to make sure. Your Honor
23 mentioned the words staying the case.

24 THE COURT: Oh.

1 MR. SHEVORSKI: And before Your Honor considers what is appropriate
2 in light of what Ms. Hanks has argued to this Court, my client would like to be heard
3 on the issue and is not waiving that issue.

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 MR. SHEVORSKI: Not that subject matter jurisdiction could be waived, but
6 we would like the opportunity to address that issue before Your Honor through written
7 paperwork.

8 THE COURT: Sure.

9 MR. SHEVORSKI: And so I didn't want to let that issue go --

10 THE COURT: All right.

11 MR. SHEVORSKI: -- and let Your Honor think that Bank of America was
12 twiddling its fingers while that was going on.

13 THE COURT: I would never accuse Bank of America of twiddling their fingers.
14 Although that's tempting, I will decline to follow that through.

15 But that doesn't, to my mind, impact whether I should go ahead and
16 rule on this and I think it's appropriate for me to go ahead and rule on it. I'm going
17 to continue to deny the motion at this time. I think the best thing that I can do,
18 dealing in equity, I guess, is to say that the plaintiff -- while the plaintiff certainly may
19 not have to forego one remedy in order to invoke another, give up one right -- you
20 know, a putative right, at least, in order to invoke another, i.e., injunctive relief if it
21 turns into you're going to go after FHP and others for money damages, that may
22 happen. I don't want to see your client foreclosed from that. But there is also --
23 it is incumbent on the Court to make sure that a party's resources aren't sort of
24 squandered by having to defend themselves in a lawsuit which is necessarily a little

1 undefined because you don't quite know whether you're going to turn that corner
2 or not and go and turn it into a claim for money damages relief.

3 What I'm saying is that you need to make that election and make --
4 your client needs to make the determination of what this lawsuit is really about and
5 what relief you're really going to go for, because if it appears to the Court at the
6 end of the day that there really was no sound basis to hold this defendant in this
7 litigation, then there remains the very real possibility that the Court might award
8 them -- in the course of dismissing them might award them attorney's fees. I mean,
9 that's always there. That's always there as a possibility, but I'm just kind of putting
10 you on notice that while your client doesn't have to give up one right to pursue
11 another, if they don't do it expeditiously and determine which direction this thing is
12 going to go, then there is a very real possibility that your client gets to pay for two
13 attorneys here today, you and Mr. Gunnerson (with two n's). So the motion is
14 denied.

15 Does BofA wish to -- Do you anticipate filing a motion then that has
16 to do with jurisdiction?

17 MR. SHEVORSKI: We do, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: All right. I don't know that we're operating under any time
19 lines. Oh, we certainly are.

20 MR. GUNNERSON: We are, Your Honor.

21 THE COURT: We're looking at a May trial. What does that do to the trial?
22 Anything?

23 MR. GUNNERSON: Your Honor, before we get to that, can I --

24 THE COURT: Well, the most that it could do is carve your client out, right?

1 MR. SHEVORSKI: No, Your Honor.
2 THE COURT: No?
3 MR. SHEVORSKI: This is a subject matter jurisdiction.
4 THE COURT: For the entire litigation.
5 MR. SHEVORSKI: The entire litigation --
6 THE COURT: Okay.
7 MR. SHEVORSKI: -- shall be dismissed under 38.310, subdivision 2.
8 THE COURT: Because -- Is this if it goes to arbitration?
9 MR. SHEVORSKI: It has to go to arbitration first. When you're asking for
10 an interpretation of --
11 THE COURT: Of CC&R's.
12 MR. SHEVORSKI: -- of CC&R's --
13 THE COURT: Okay.
14 MR. SHEVORSKI: -- or any aspect of the lawsuit turns on an interpretation
15 of CC&R's --
16 THE COURT: Uh-huh.
17 MR. SHEVORSKI: -- the Nevada Legislature has made a policy decision
18 that as a condition precedent to an action you have to go to arbitration first.
19 THE COURT: Uh-huh.
20 MR. SHEVORSKI: And what I just heard is that their entire case is seeking
21 an interpretation of the homeowners association's governing documents.
22 THE COURT: Well, that's interesting. What I heard was that it might go that
23 direction.
24 MS. HANKS: Yeah, the HOA hasn't answered yet and we haven't decided

1 if we even need to keep them in on that.

2 THE COURT: Okay.

3 MS. HANKS: But I want to be clear, though, the design review committee is
4 created under the CC&R's.

5 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

6 MS. HANKS: But Mr. Gunnerson is arguing it's not the CC&R's and now we
7 have Bank of America saying it is the CC&R's, and I just want to make sure we're
8 going in the right direction. I mean, I'm not opposed to having to go to arbitration if
9 that's the case, but that's not my understanding of what this case was about. But
10 they are discussed in the CC&R's.

11 MR. GUNNERSON: Your Honor, this is their --

12 THE COURT: Your understanding is what controls.

13 MS. HANKS: Well, no.

14 MR. GUNNERSON: The CC&R issues aren't there. I mean --

15 MS. HANKS: What I mean is that it's not -- the design guidelines exist --
16 there's a whole set of guidelines that exist outside the CC&R's. They're a separate
17 document. But they're discussed within the CC&R's. That's what created it. So if
18 that's what they're arguing and they bring the motion then we'll deal with it, but that's
19 never been -- we've been proceeding through this whole course of litigation as if
20 we're not suing under the CC&R's per se.

21 THE COURT: Okay.

22 MS. HANKS: But if that's what they want to argue, that's fine. We can deal
23 with that motion. I'm just putting it out there that Mr. Gunnerson, who is McDonald
24 Highlands, is saying no, the design review committee is not under the CC&R's.

1 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

2 MS. HANKS: So there seems to be some discrepancy between --

3 MR. GUNNERSON: Well, I'm not arguing as McDonald Highlands, I'm
4 arguing as FHP Ventures, just to be clear on that.

5 THE COURT: You've got a different hat on today.

6 MS. HANKS: He's got a different his hat on, yes, but he's --

7 MR. GUNNERSON: But, Your Honor, just to make clear, if counsel -- if the
8 CC&R's aren't at issue and she's not going to claim any violation of them that
9 somehow inures to my client, why are money damages being considered? And if
10 what we're talking about here then is -- you know, we're as confused apparently as
11 plaintiff is on what -- we've been going on this for a year and suddenly now FHP
12 Ventures gets brought in under these design guidelines that they say are attached
13 to the CC&R's. And like counsel for Bank of America brought up, this brings up a
14 whole another --

15 THE COURT: Well, it's an odd case. It is an odd case. I mean, it's -- you
16 know, it implicates --

17 MR. SHEVORSKI: Even more reason to have written briefing, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: Huh?

19 MR. SHEVORSKI: Even more reason to have written briefing to lay it all out.

20 THE COURT: Well, sure, yeah. Yeah. All right. So I will await a motion
21 from BofA and maybe in the course of that maybe that sheds some light and you
22 guys can determine which direction you're going to go. And the only thing I'm going
23 to put out there is what I already did --

24 MR. GUNNERSON: Your Honor --

1 THE COURT: -- but you do need to figure out which direction you're going.
2 And I recognize it's a difficult decision under all these circumstances, but you've got
3 to decide because if you ultimately -- if I wind up dismissing FHP out, I'd just -- if I
4 need to to make it appropriate, I would consider their motion for attorney's fees.

5 MR. GUNNERSON: Your Honor --

6 THE COURT: I'm not ruling on it in advance, I'm just letting you know that's
7 a real consideration, too.

8 MR. GUNNERSON: If I could, for a point of clarification on your order
9 denying the motion?

10 THE COURT: Ah, yes, I love the point of clarifications.

11 MR. GUNNERSON: Just to be clear, your ruling granting the motion to
12 dismiss is based upon their potential for bringing in other claims, other relief against
13 my client which they have not done so yet?

14 THE COURT: I thought I denied your motion.

15 MR. GUNNERSON: Oh, excuse me. Denying the motion based upon that.
16 I may have said granting.

17 MR. SHEVORSKI: Freudian slip.

18 MR. GUNNERSON: Well, I think it should have been granted, but.

19 THE COURT: You're in such shock.

20 MR. GUNNERSON: Yeah, I'm having a hard time with this.

21 THE COURT: You're in such shock that I didn't grant your motion that it's
22 taken you by surprise.

23 MR. GUNNERSON: Yeah, I apologize. I slipped. I apologize. To repeat,
24 your denial of our motion to dismiss is based then upon the fact that they might

1 bring additional money damages if in fact --

2 THE COURT: Not entirely.

3 MR. GUNNERSON: Okay. Because in essence you've said that we might
4 bring another motion and get out of this. We are still unclear as to what we're
5 responding to, as you can tell from the arguments that we presented, so we still
6 don't know exactly what claims against us. And I guess we're going to have to deal
7 with that if you're denying our motion and just try to make that determination. You
8 said if they're going to make decisions as it pertains to money damages, they need
9 to do it expeditiously. I don't know if there's a time limit for them to determine that --

10 THE COURT: That's --

11 MR. GUNNERSON: -- or when can I bring this back and say, Your Honor,
12 they haven't done money damages, we still have the issue we had before, we'd like
13 this dismissed again, and bring it back for your consideration?

14 THE COURT: Well, it may be that having denied your motion to dismiss you
15 file your answer and now if discovery is closed or nearly closed you might decide
16 you want to reopen it. That's up to you. In any event, I would anticipate, as is often
17 the case, that even though I need to because of the way the law works, I need to
18 deny issues -- deny a motion to dismiss that raises issues which later those same
19 issues armed or buttressed and supported by facts become determinative of the
20 issue.

21 MR. GUNNERSON: We can do that. We can bring a motion, Your Honor,
22 and we'll do that. I guess two quick points. Number one, I guess one of my fears
23 is that we bring a motion for summary judgment and they come back and say,
24 well, Your Honor, you know, everything had been closed and now we see a motion,

1 we think we're going to try to amend the claim --

2 THE COURT: Yeah.

3 MR. GUNNERSON: -- and we want to bring in money damages, then we're
4 right back where we started and I'm getting a denial on my motion for summary
5 judgment based on the same reasons.

6 THE COURT: Yeah.

7 MR. GUNNERSON: I just don't know how long they have to make this
8 decision and how long my client is going to have to be involved and be involved in
9 motion practice and trial prep and all this.

10 THE COURT: I understand your point and I think I've kind of apprehended
11 that point, which is why I have made the comment that if you have to jump through
12 a bunch of hoops to defend your client and then it turns out there's really no relief
13 to be granted against your client, I would anticipate you'll probably file a motion for
14 attorney's fees and I would listen to it.

15 MR. GUNNERSON: You've got a good nose for those things.

16 And then finally, right now we have a motion for summary judgment
17 deadline that's set for April 16th, and obviously my client will -- FHP Ventures will
18 want to file a motion for summary judgment. We have not answered yet and we
19 have not yet made the decision as to whether or not we need additional discovery.
20 I don't know if there's a way to -- you know, I know the parties had agreed to put
21 aside -- to try and get the trial extended. We tried to file a stipulation, which Your
22 Honor sent back --

23 THE COURT: Yeah.

24 MR. GUNNERSON: -- saying file a motion. And so --

1 THE COURT: Yeah. I don't -- that's just a general policy. I don't just have
2 counsel just stipulate trials away and then we wind up with 11th hour crushes on the
3 five year rule, etcetera, etcetera. I can see, though, that in this case there appears
4 to be some -- Are you really going to be taking this thing to trial on May 26th?

5 MS. HANKS: No, Your Honor. All the parties agreed to move it, and so we
6 are looking at the motion being submitted today.

7 THE COURT: Well, I can see that there is reason to do that at this point,
8 so -- Have you already filed the joint motion?

9 MS. HANKS: No. I was filing it today is the plan, and then --

10 THE COURT: Well, let me save you some paper then. I'm going to go
11 ahead and vacate the trial, based on everything that's happened here today. I can
12 see that there is a basis to do that. And I'm not going to reset the trial because --

13 MS. HANKS: Based on what happens.

14 THE COURT: -- I'm not sure what shape or form this lawsuit is going to be
15 in. The only thing I can caution you is what I've already said. You do need to reach
16 a point where you determine which road you're going to go down, whether that
17 means this just gets dismissed and you go to arbitration first or whether you bypass
18 that and stick with this. Whether that means you turn it into money damages, I have
19 no idea. I don't have to decide all those things.

20 MS. HANKS: Okay.

21 MR. GUNNERSON: And, Your Honor, to be clear, I think the request at this
22 point for us is an extension of time to file our motion for summary judgment as well.
23 I know that that's usually set by Discovery and we are not asking at this time to
24 extend discovery, so I would hope that maybe the parties would be open to giving

1 us some extra time, FHP Ventures, to file a motion.

2 THE COURT: Well, let's do this then. I'm going to vacate the trial. So far
3 you don't have to go back to the Discovery Commissioner and get a whole new, you
4 know, timeline, which is what sometimes happens, and it may be that we can just
5 do some motion work and reset this for trial and take it then.

6 MS. HANKS: I would agree with that.

7 MR. GUNNERSON: Okay. So as long as plaintiff will work with me on our
8 deadline for filing a motion for summary judgment, we're okay and we'll just work
9 with the trial deadline for now, Your Honor, and those deadlines, and I don't think
10 we need to go back to the Discovery Commissioner at this point as well, so.

11 THE COURT: All right. Then I'm going to vacate this trial and I'm going to
12 have this come back in about, what, sixty or ninety days for the purpose of resetting
13 the trial?

14 MS. HANKS: Can we do sixty?

15 THE COURT: By that time you will have filed your motion --

16 MR. SHEVORSKI: Certainly, Your Honor.

17 THE COURT: -- and we'll know better where we're going.

18 MR. GUNNERSON: Sixty is fine.

19 MS. HANKS: Can we do a sixty day status check?

20 THE COURT: Sixty?

21 MS. HANKS: Yes.

22 THE COURT: Okay. So a sixty day status check and to reset trial date.

23 THE CLERK: June 10th at 9:00 a.m.

24 MR. GUNNERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

MR. SHEVORSKI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. When you come in to reset the trial, I hope you'll be prepared to give me an up-to-date trial time estimate as well --

MS. HANKS: Yes.

THE COURT: -- which means I hope we know by then what kind of animal this is.

MR. GUNNERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.


THE COURT: All right. You'll do order on this, please.

MS. HANKS: The order. Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 10:02 A.M.)

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.




Liz Garcia, Transcriber
LGM Transcription Service

TAB 64

TAB 64

TAB 64

JA_2898



CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

* * * * *

FREDERIC AND BARBARA
ROSENBERG LIVING TRUST,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BANK OF AMERICA, et al.

Defendants.

.

CASE NO. A-689113

DEPT. NO. I

**TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS**

BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH CORY, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

**STATUS CHECK: RESET TRIAL DATE
COUNTER DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DEFENDANT SHAHIN SHANE MALEK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANT SHAHIN SHANE MALEK**

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10, 2015

COURT RECORDER:

LISA LIZOTTE
District Court

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

VERBATIM DIGITAL REPORTING, LLC
Englewood, CO 80110
(303) 798-0890

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript
produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

KAREN HANKS, ESQ.
JACQUELINE GILBERT, ESQ.
MELISSA BARISHMAN, ESQ.
JESSIE PANOFF, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

JON RANDALL JONES, ESQ.
SPENCER GUNNERSON, ESQ.
PRESTON P. REZAEI, ESQ.
JAMES M. DeVOY, ESQ.
WILLIAM HABDAS, ESQ.

1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10, 2015, 9:13 A.M.

2 THE CLERK: -- versus Bank of America.

3 THE COURT: Good morning. Wow, should we enter
4 appearances?

5 MS. HANKS: Good morning, Your Honor. Karen Hanks
6 on behalf of the plaintiff.

7 MS. BARISHMAN: Melissa Barishman on behalf of the
8 plaintiff.

9 MS. GILBERT: Jacqueline Gilbert on behalf of
10 plaintiff.

11 MR. PANOFF: Jessie Panoff on behalf of the
12 plaintiff.

13 THE COURT: Hum.

14 MR. DeVOY: Jay DeVoy on behalf of defendant, Shane
15 Malek.

16 THE COURT: Um-hum.

17 MR. GUNNERSON: Spencer Gunnerson on behalf of
18 MacDonald Highlands Realty, and Michael Doiron, and FHP
19 Ventures.

20 MR. JONES: Randall Jones on behalf of the same
21 parties as Mr. Gunnerson.

22 MR. HABDAS: William Habdas here for Bank of
23 America.

24 MR. REZAEI: And good morning, Your Honor. Preston
25 Rezaee on behalf of Mr. Malek.

1 THE COURT: Good morning. I don't suppose you all
2 are ready to go to mediation?

3 Can we go ahead and set the trial date? I realize
4 that there are Motions for Summary Judgment on, as well.

5 MR. GUNNERSON: Your Honor, I was just going to say,
6 in addition to there being Motions for Summary Judgment on for
7 today, we also have -- I believe they filed a Motion to Amend
8 to conform with the evidence that's to be heard early July.
9 Obviously, you know, we will be opposing that. We don't think
10 there's a lot of merit to that.

11 So we -- I don't know if maybe we push this off on
12 -- as far as the trial date goes, until then, and wait and see
13 what happens today.

14 THE COURT: That makes more sense.

15 MR. GUNNERSON: And wait to see maybe what happens
16 July 6th. I don't know.

17 MS. HANKS: I would agree with that, Your Honor.
18 You put it -- or the master calendar put it on the chambers
19 calendar, so I don't know if you want to make it a hearing
20 instead.

21 THE COURT: What we'll do is we'll just set a reset
22 date after the decision on those motions.

23 MS. HANKS: Okay.

24 THE COURT: Do you know -- let's see, I have
25 chambers calendar for 7/6, Motion to Amend.

1 MS. HANKS: Correct.

2 THE COURT: Is that the only motion --

3 MS. HANKS: Yes, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: -- that's hanging out there? So if we
5 put it -- if we have you come in after July 6th -- boy, that's
6 going to be a terrible day. I come back from family reunion
7 that day. So sometime after July 6th to reset the trial.

8 THE CLERK: July 15, at 9:00 a.m.

9 THE COURT: I'm sorry?

10 THE CLERK: July 15.

11 THE COURT: July 15th. July 15th. And obviously,
12 if I grant all -- all the motions -- well, if I grant some of
13 the motions, it appears that the case may be gone, hum? How
14 about that?

15 MR. GUNNERSON: That'd be great.

16 MR. DeVOY: Works for me.

17 THE COURT: All right. Well, let's do Motion for
18 Summary Judgment by the counter defendant, plaintiff.

19 MR. GUNNERSON: I saw that it was identified that
20 way. I don't know if there's actually a counter defendant
21 motion. But --

22 MS. HANKS: Oh, Your Honor, that's -- yes, you mean
23 plaintiff's summary judgment against Mr. Malek on his slander
24 of title claim?

25 THE COURT: Um-hum.

1 MS. HANKS: Yes, we'd be a counter defendant. So
2 you want to start with that one?

3 THE COURT: Yeah.

4 MS. HANKS: Okay.

5 THE COURT: Let's just do the order we have them
6 written down in so --

7 MS. HANKS: Sure. Your Honor, this is a Motion for
8 Summary Judgment by the Rosenberg Trust on Mr. Malek's claim
9 for slander of title, he brought a counterclaim for slander of
10 title, based on the Lis Pendens recorded by the Rosenberg
11 Trust.

12 The basis of the motion, mind you, we do not concede
13 that the Lis Pendens was false. But for purposes of the
14 motion, we wanted to focus on the other two elements that we
15 believe there just clearly is no issue of fact.

16 THE COURT: Okay.

17 MS. HANKS: And that is, there's no evidence of
18 malice. Under the slander of title claim, the party, Mr.
19 Malek, has to prove that the Rosenberg Trust when it recorded
20 the Lis Pendens did it with malice, i.e. reckless disregard
21 for the truth of that document.

22 And the only testimony on file is Mrs. Rosenberg's
23 testimony. And they ask, basically, two questions regarding
24 that issue and she explained, I believed that the Lis Pendens
25 was filed to thwart any construction on that golf parcel that

1 was at dispute.

2 And then when later drilled about, well, do you know
3 what a Lis Pendens is, and what was the purpose, she said, I
4 don't know, I'm not an attorney. That's the full extent of
5 the questioning of Mrs. Rosenberg on what was the intent
6 behind recording the Lis Pendens.

7 Now, we've also had written discovery answers by the
8 Trust, where they indicated that the impetus for filing a Lis
9 Pendens was the reliance of counsel. And we attached Mr.
10 Bernhardt's (phonetic) declaration in that regard. He was the
11 counsel at the time. My firm did not represent the Rosenberg
12 Trust at the time the Lis Pendens was recorded. And he
13 explained that he believed in good faith, under the Rule 11,
14 that he had a good faith basis under the law to file a Lis
15 Pendens. And then it was at his advice that they file the Lis
16 Pendens.

17 So based on that evidence, Mr. Malek cannot prove
18 malice. That's the quintessential element of the slander of
19 title claim. That's all the evidence that we have as of now
20 and that just -- that does not rise to the level of
21 maliciousness.

22 Even if that were enough to prove maliciousness, he
23 still fails under his claim because he hasn't proven the
24 special damages. So the case law in Nevada states that you
25 have to plead special damages specifically under Rule 9. It

1 is not sufficient to do the general allegation in excess of
2 \$10,000 or attorney's fees and costs. And that's exactly how
3 his counterclaim is plead.

4 The case law has also interpreted that Rule 16.1 to
5 provide, you have to provide a computation of damages for
6 special damages and support it by documentation. He has not
7 done that in this case.

8 In fact, I even asked him during his deposition,
9 what are your attorney's fees that you're claiming with
10 respect to this claim, the slander of title claim? And he did
11 not know. And I said, well, do you know when I can expect to
12 get that information, and he still didn't know, and nothing
13 came. Discovery closed.

14 Now, I know Mr. Malek, in his opposition, indicated
15 that a fourth supplement was provided. That was not served on
16 our office. Still has not been served on our office. And I
17 provided my own declaration that it was e-mailed, and I
18 understand counsel was having trouble with Wiznet.

19 But even so, that disclosure merely alleges \$45,000
20 in attorney's fees. It doesn't have any specific
21 documentation to support that.

22 And, in fact, the opposition would suggest that
23 they're including all of their attorney's fees for opposing
24 this entire lawsuit, which would not be the special damages
25 related to just the slander of title, which is why the Supreme

1 Court requires that documentation for special damages.

2 If he's allowed to come to court and say, it's just
3 \$45,000, we have been deprived of any right to defend that
4 claim. We have no records to dispute. We don't know what
5 that money is related to. It'd be hard to imagine that he
6 paid an attorney \$45,000 to draft one motion to lift a Lis
7 Pendens. So really, we're only talking about a Lis Pendens
8 that was recorded on the property for, I think, 57 days.

9 So if anything, the damages would be limited to
10 that. But he hasn't produced any damages, so that's where we
11 say that there's no issues of fact and summary judgment in
12 favor of the Rosenberg Trust on the slander of title claim is
13 appropriate.

14 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

15 MR. DeVOY: Good morning, Your Honor.

16 THE COURT: Good morning.

17 MR. DeVOY: Jay DeVoy. I represent defendant Malek.
18 To respond to those two points, first of all, the question of
19 actual malice as Ms. Hanks pointed out is a question as to
20 whether the statement is knowingly false, or made with a
21 reckless disregard from the truth.

22 Ms. Rosenberg goes on to say that she is not an
23 attorney, but she has substantial experience as a real estate
24 agent. She testified in her deposition that she knew what a
25 Lis Pendens was. She knew what the effect of it was. And she

1 did not want Shane Malek to build his house. As a result, we
2 have evidence to show that she knew what the purpose was.

3 And even though she could say, well, I don't know
4 what the legal meaning is, I'm not trained in that, we have
5 evidence that she knew exactly what she was doing. She worked
6 with her counsel and she retained someone specifically to file
7 the Lis Pendens to obfuscate Mr. Malek's ability to build his
8 home, which seems to be the entire purpose of this litigation.

9 The declaration of Mr. Bernhardt is devoid of any
10 useful details that might exculpate the Rosenbergs' conduct in
11 this regard. There is one statement saying that he believed
12 it was proper, and it discharged his duties under Nevada Rule
13 of Civil Procedure 11, but it says nothing about if his client
14 actually relied upon him. There's no information about any
15 kind of conversations they might have had, and what the
16 consultative process might have been.

17 THE COURT: Well, okay, but you understand at this
18 point it -- it's not enough to just say there's no evidence of
19 this, no evidence of that. What have you got that counters?

20 MR. DeVOY: As submitted in the opposition, there's
21 testimony from Barbara Rosenberg that contradicts her idea
22 that she doesn't know what a Lis Pendens is. She knew what
23 she was doing. She knew what she was doing when she was
24 filing it, and it was with the intent to keep Mr. Malek from
25 building on his property.

1 THE COURT: What is the malice requirement on this
2 -- on this --

3 MR. DeVOY: Oh, the malice requirement essentially
4 goes --

5 THE COURT: -- on this cause of action?

6 MR. DeVOY: It essentially goes back to New York
7 Times vs. Sullivan (phonetic). It's the actual malice
8 requirement that would apply to a defamation action. It
9 requires knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
10 truth. And it's that reckless disregard for the truth that
11 applies here, and there are facts --

12 THE COURT: Where -- where do you get -- what is the
13 evidence as to any of those elements?

14 MR. DeVOY: It comes back from Barbara Rosenberg's
15 deposition testimony where she knew what a Lis Pendens was,
16 she knew that she didn't want Shane Malek to build on the --
17 on his property, and she had her counsel file the Lis Pendens
18 with that purpose in mind.

19 THE COURT: Okay.

20 MR. DeVOY: Now, going to the issue of damages, and
21 Ms. Hanks' declaration on the reply, I have the e-mail that I
22 responded with. Can I forward this to you and approach the
23 bench to supply it?

24 THE COURT: I'm sorry?

25 MR. DeVOY: I have the e-mail that I responded to

1 with Ms. Hanks. She identified it in her declaration --

2 THE COURT: Oh.

3 MR. DeVOY: -- in the reply. Can I approach the
4 bench and submit a copy?

5 THE COURT: Sure. Show counsel what it is.

6 MR. DeVOY: All right. Let me give it to everyone
7 else, too.

8 THE COURT: Just give it to me, if you would.

9 MR. DeVOY: Oh, okay. Absolutely.

10 So as seen in this e-mail, it was sent the same day
11 that Ms. Hanks identified her e-mail. There are a number of
12 attachments showing numerous attempts to serve the disclosures
13 through Wiznet. And then finally there's an e-mail from the
14 Trust's own counsel regarding its own inability to serve its
15 expert disclosures through Wiznet, and nobody had an issue
16 with that.

17 THE COURT: Um-hum.

18 MR. DeVOY: This is an issue where I didn't see the
19 thing -- I didn't see the disclosures go through and they
20 weren't served in the time for the deadline. I wanted to make
21 sure they went through.

22 In the past when this issue would have arisen,
23 technology is not perfect, and everyone went along with it,
24 and to disregard the initial -- the supplemental initial
25 disclosures on that basis would put form over substance and

1 require compliance with the substantive -- with a procedural
2 rule when the substance has been given to everyone in time.

3 Now, the issue is that within the calculation of
4 damages there is a bit of contrast in the Nevada law as to
5 when attorneys fees are allowable in slander of title claims.

6 THE COURT: Um-hum.

7 MR. DeVOY: It goes to when the slander and the
8 cloud over title is removed and that can't be adjudicated
9 until the end of the lawsuit.

10 Now, the measure of damages may well be just the
11 damages that were incurred to remove the Lis Pendens and
12 expunge it and that was resolved in 2014. But attorneys fees
13 continued to accrue in this case, and that's the relevant
14 measure of damages. This Court or a jury can adjudicate the
15 amount of damages that are properly awardable for what was
16 necessary to clear the cloud on title, which is the relevant
17 standard. But the damages that were incurred --

18 THE COURT: Are you satisfied that your last 16.1
19 includes all of the evidence that you want to put in on that
20 issue?

21 MR. DeVOY: I frankly wish I had the ability to put
22 in more, because more attorneys fees have accrued since that
23 time.

24 THE COURT: Well, and what is it that's been given;
25 just a dollar amount, isn't it?

1 MR. DeVOY: Yes. It's the dollar amount that have
2 been incurred in the case, because it's not yet been resolved
3 and the Nevada case law indicates that it is at the resolution
4 of the action that this title cloud is fully clear.

5 THE COURT: Well, at trial wouldn't you be
6 submitting timesheets and all that sort of thing?

7 MR. DeVOY: That's the goal. It's briefed in our
8 Motion for Summary Judgment. We only wanted to establish
9 liability on this and show that there have been damages. We
10 could submit fee affidavits and have the Court adjudicate what
11 the proper measure of damages is.

12 THE COURT: So the -- the jury would be determining
13 that the amount that you ask at trial for attorneys fees is
14 appropriate, right?

15 MR. DeVOY: Yes.

16 THE COURT: But they'd be doing it without the
17 timesheets?

18 MR. DeVOY: The timesheets would be submitted later.
19 I -- that would be the plan for that. There's some issues
20 with confidentiality that --

21 THE COURT: How --

22 MR. DeVOY: -- would have to go into that.

23 THE COURT: How would they do that if you're --
24 isn't -- wasn't the final -- I'm sorry, when is this set for
25 trial?

1 MS. HANKS: It's not, Your Honor. Remember, we're
2 resetting it?

3 THE COURT: Oh, okay. Okay. Never mind what I said
4 then. All right. Okay.

5 MR. DeVOY: Well, the point is we've submitted
6 evidence to these damages, that's all that is necessary at
7 this point. There are questions of fact that are created by
8 Barbara Rosenberg's own testimony which I believe leads to the
9 opposite conclusion; that she knew what she was doing when she
10 filed the Lis Pendens. She did it for an improper purpose.

11 She was not claiming title or possession to Shane
12 Malek's property. She did it solely for the purpose of
13 keeping him from building. And the Trust has been on notice
14 of the fact that he has incurred attorneys fees and costs as
15 damages in this action to remove the slander of title.

16 Just because Shane Malek didn't have the number at
17 the tip of his tongue in his deposition doesn't mean that
18 those damages don't exist.

19 THE COURT: Um-hum.

20 MR. DeVOY: It just means exactly what he said at
21 his deposition; he didn't know as he sat there that day. The
22 evidence is --

23 THE COURT: Well, it -- it would be nice to have
24 something documentary in hand to --

25 MR. DeVOY: And they received it. And if the Trust

1 is able to amend its Complaint they will receive more of it.

2 THE COURT: And you're talking about these
3 documents?

4 MR. DeVOY: Yes, the disclosures. The disclosures
5 are not attached in there. Those are just the e-mails in
6 response to the e-mail Karen Hanks identified.

7 THE COURT: All right.

8 MR. DeVOY: Anything further? Oh. Thank you.

9 MS. HANKS: Your Honor, I don't have much to add.
10 You've -- you've hit the nail on the head. We don't have
11 documentation of the attorneys fees. Those are documentation
12 that even setting aside the lack of service of the fourth
13 supplement, should have been produced during the course of
14 discovery. It's their burden of proof. This is their claim.
15 I'm basically going to trial by ambush right now.

16 And the jury would decide damages, not this -- not
17 Your Honor. This is not an attorneys fees motion.

18 THE COURT: Discovery is closed, you said?

19 MS. HANKS: Correct. Discovery is closed.

20 THE COURT: Okay.

21 MS. HANKS: All right. So at this point, we don't
22 have any documentation to defend against. We don't know what
23 they're claiming. We don't know what the \$45,000 entails.
24 Frankly, it's impossible to believe it's an even number like
25 that. So it seems like they've even approximated it

1 themselves within their own 16.1 disclosure. I mean, that's
2 the point.

3 And then the other point with respect to the malice,
4 as Your Honor was pointing to, you have two statements made by
5 Mrs. Rosenberg in her deposition testimony, which was, well, I
6 believe the reason for the Lis Pendens was to halt any
7 construction. And then when further pressed, I don't know.
8 I'm not a lawyer. That's it.

9 THE COURT: Um-hum.

10 MS. HANKS: There's nothing -- and her experience as
11 a real estate agent has no bearing on whether she filed the
12 Lis Pendens falsely. She testified she's not a lawyer, and
13 then Mr. Bernhardt further is going to testimony, it was my
14 advice, it was my belief it was in good faith.

15 So there's just nothing that they have proven to
16 show malice. There's nothing that the jury is going to hear
17 that's going to rise to the level of malice.

18 MR. DeVOY: Your Honor, if I may be heard on those
19 issues. Proof is unnecessary at this point. It's just
20 creating a question of material fact. Here we have Barbara
21 Rosenberg's own testimony from her deposition about her
22 apparent true motives --

23 THE COURT: Okay. All right. All right. Well,
24 that's the same thing I heard.

25 MS. HANKS: Yeah, I have nothing further, Your

1 Honor, unless you have any questions.

2 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to deny the
3 motion, but I am troubled, and I don't think it's -- I don't
4 think it's over because if discovery has closed and the final
5 16.1 has been done, I mean, it may -- it may not be that there
6 is opportunity for you to put in the documents which you would
7 pretty much need to have, I would think, unless you're going
8 to -- I'm not sure what you do -- generally, that's what we
9 get is on these kinds of causes of action when attorney's fees
10 are alleged as damages. It -- because you don't leave the
11 sorting process until the very end.

12 So I'm denying it, but it's almost on the 56(f)
13 basis. And I don't -- it may be this issue is not over,
14 because I don't know what plaintiff's, counter defendants'
15 response is going to be if they start getting more documents
16 after discovery is closed. But we'll leave -- we'll leave
17 that for a later day.

18 MS. HANKS: So, Your Honor, just --

19 THE COURT: I will -- I will clarify that I'm
20 denying it without prejudice. Yes?

21 MS. HANKS: And with regard to the 56(f) relief, are
22 they then going to produce some documentation and then we will
23 file motions with respect to that or we will be able to do
24 discovery? That's where I'm confused as to how we actually go
25 -- I mean, we've already, you know, issued our written

1 discovery to Mr. Malek. We've already deposed Mr. Malek. So
2 if that's -- if they're able to produce documentation then I
3 would need a second deposition.

4 THE COURT: I suspect somebody's going to be
5 appearing before the Discovery Commissioner is what I suspect.

6 MS. HANKS: Your Honor, if the discovery is
7 closed --

8 THE COURT: How are you going to do any of that if
9 -- if discovery is closed?

10 MR. DeVOY: We can resolve that between counsel
11 later on. If -- if the Court wishes to deny the motion
12 without prejudice, we can resolve that and talk about the next
13 steps, depending on the adjudication of the other motions that
14 are pending before the Court.

15 MS. HANKS: I hate to be difficult. I would like to
16 be in that group that can resolve things, but I'm not going to
17 go leave here today and then say, yes, you can produce
18 documentation and I'm not going to do any further discovery.
19 So I'm going to be left in the same position I'm standing in
20 right now.

21 THE COURT: There's just one step in there somewhere
22 that I can't quite get across and grant the Motion for Summary
23 Judgment. Particularly, when as you know the standard on that
24 is pretty high in Nevada, to say that there is no issue as to
25 any of this, and that to characterize the statements made as

1 impugning no bad intent, that's a little difficult.

2 But I don't think this issue's over. So, I'm
3 denying it. I am going to deny it, but without prejudice. I
4 don't think we have the full picture here. I mean, if you get
5 -- if you're staring trial in the face and you start getting
6 documents now, then the Court may wind up having to make a
7 decision as to whether that evidence is going to come in. And
8 if it's not, then it's very possible that your Motion for
9 Summary Judgment could be renewed.

10 MS. HANKS: What about the issue of if they do
11 produce, which I imagine they're going to. We're closed, so
12 discovery is closed.

13 THE COURT: Um-hum.

14 MS. HANKS: So I -- it would a Motion to Strike
15 before Your Honor as a Motion in Limine.

16 THE COURT: It's a lot of extra work, isn't it?

17 MS. HANKS: And I don't -- and I'm not really
18 pointing that out. What I am pointing out is that I can't --
19 I don't want to rely on the Motion to Strike being granted and
20 not doing my discovery on those documents.

21 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

22 MS. HANKS: So am I entitled -- can you rule that
23 I'm entitled to a continued -- a deposition of Mr. Malek on
24 any documents that they may produce?

25 THE COURT: Well, yeah, I'm not going to. That's

1 why I said, I think somebody's going to be back in front of
2 the Discovery Commissioner, because it may be that you decide
3 that rather than --

4 MS. HANKS: Do the Motion to Strike.

5 THE COURT: -- move to block it and strike it, that
6 you're going to do discovery on it, and be prepared. And,
7 well, you know, there are decisions to be made yet by both
8 sides and probably the Discovery Commissioner -- I'm not sure
9 -- before this issue can be fully resolved, before --

10 MR. DeVOY: Your Honor, whatever the case may be, if
11 we go before the Discovery Commissioner, or if we work it out
12 independently, I think that it can be tabled until the other
13 pending motions are resolved. As I indicated previously, the
14 more you discuss it, the more it seems there's a thicket of
15 other issues that may be ripe for further discovery. And I
16 think that after the July 6th deadline for determinations on
17 the motion file a further amended Complaint, that might be a
18 good time to take it up with the Discovery Commissioner, if at
19 all.

20 THE COURT: Well, I would suggest that if you --
21 whatever you're going to do, you ought to do it soon.

22 MR. DeVOY: Understood, Your Honor.

23 THE COURT: These are your documents back.

24 MR. DeVOY: Oh, thank you.

25 THE COURT: Um-hum.

1 All right. Next motion is, defendants' motion.

2 MR. GUNNERSON: Your Honor, there are two
3 defendants' motions remaining, one filed by my clients and one
4 filed by Mr. Malek. I would say that Mr. Malek's motion
5 concerns predominantly the easement issue.

6 THE COURT: Um-hum.

7 MR. GUNNERSON: And our motion deals with multiple
8 issues, including the easement issue. I don't know if perhaps
9 addressing the easement issue all at once and perhaps let me
10 argue that small part of ours, along with them, would be a way
11 to perhaps deal with this --

12 THE COURT: All right.

13 MR. GUNNERSON: -- avoiding having us to --

14 THE COURT: Okay.

15 MR. GUNNERSON: -- argue the same thing twice. But
16 I don't know if counsel's okay with that, so.

17 THE COURT: Well, it'd be a good day not to say
18 things twice.

19 MR. GUNNERSON: All right.

20 THE COURT: All right? Um-hum.

21 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I just wanted to make a
22 point.

23 THE COURT: Yes.

24 MR. JONES: I have a hearing in front of Judge Allf
25 at 10:00. So if you see me get up and leave, I -- it's no

1 offense to the Court. I just wanted to let you know why I'm
2 leaving if I have to go.

3 THE COURT: I just put it down in my little black
4 book. No problem.

5 MR. JONES: Thank you.

6 THE COURT: No problem. Okay.

7 MR. DeVOY: Your Honor, this is a case about a Trust
8 bringing a lawsuit to prevent its neighbor from building its
9 house. To do that, the Trust has asserted four causes of
10 action against Mr. Malek. The first is easement.

11 The basis for the Trust easement is that it believes
12 Mr. Malek's construction on a sliver of out-of-bounds golf
13 parcel that was part of the out-of-bounds area with the
14 DragonRidge Golf Club, that both Ms. Rosenberg and Richard
15 MacDonald have described as brush desert land, they believe
16 that any construction that will affect their view and their
17 privacy. They have stated this in their discovery responses
18 to both MacDonald Highlands Realty and to Bank of America, and
19 that is the basis for bringing this lawsuit.

20 Unfortunately, this is contradicted by Nevada law
21 that prohibits easements from being granted to protect a view
22 and privacy. This goes back to 1967, the case of Boyd v.
23 McDonald (phonetic), where the Nevada Supreme Court
24 specifically said that you are not entitled to easements to
25 protect view and privacy. Yet, the Trust has identified no

1 other concerns in the course of this litigation that would
2 entitle it to any form of relief.

3 THE COURT: Um-hum.

4 MR. DeVOY: Now, the Trust had tried to use a number
5 of watch words to masquerade the fact that its true intent
6 here is to protect its view and its privacy which is
7 impermissible under Nevada law. It says it wants to retain
8 the character of the golf course. It wants to protect the
9 golf course.

10 Number one, this is an interesting proposition
11 coming from somebody who in her deposition testified she knows
12 nothing about golf and is not golfer and has no real strong
13 feelings towards the game. But secondly, looking through the
14 words of these allegations, the substance of them, and what
15 they truly go to is the privacy and light inherent to living
16 on a golf course.

17 There is no other reason why they concerned about
18 this (sic) and they believe that what is going to going to
19 happen is that their view and privacy is going to be changed
20 and that is what they have testified to throughout discovery
21 in this case, notwithstanding the current post-fact
22 rationalization that was enunciated in their opposition to the
23 Motion for Summary Judgment.

24 This is a new theory, and the reason for that is,
25 because it was invented to try to hide the fact that this is a

1 case about view, light and privacy which is prohibited by
2 Nevada law.

3 Second, the Trust attempts to pull and end-run
4 around this by alleging a claim from implied restrictive
5 covenant. Now, implied restrictive covenant is a recognized
6 legal concept in Nevada, but it hasn't been turned into an
7 offensive cause of action. For example, Nevada law recognizes
8 estoppel, but I cannot bring a claim against somebody for
9 estoppel. It's a legal principal. It hasn't been weaponized
10 and turned into something I can assert against another party.

11 Now, this has been recognized in other states, but
12 the tests vary greatly, and this has been detailed in pages 22
13 through 23 of the Motion for Summary Judgment. The tests have
14 certain common elements, but they diverge widely. And the
15 Nevada Supreme Court looks unfavorably upon new causes of
16 action, especially where they have inconsistent elements.

17 In Bidio v. American Brands (phonetic) the Nevada
18 Supreme Court declined to recognize a cause of action for
19 medical monitoring because the standards across the states
20 were widely disparate and had very few common elements, and it
21 was difficult for the Nevada Supreme Court, if not impossible,
22 to synthesize a consistent standard for the Court to apply.

23 Second, this claim, for the same reason why the
24 Nevada Supreme Court has previously refused to allow for
25 implied restrictive covenants and easements in order to

1 protect a view and privacy is highly subjective. In both
2 Bidio and in Greco v. United States (phonetic) the Nevada
3 Supreme Court declined to recognize cause of actions that have
4 difficult or highly subjective standards of proof.

5 In Bidio, the medical monitoring that we discussed
6 previously, it was a difficult standard of proof. But in
7 Greco v. United States, the question was whether there could
8 be causes of action for wrongful life. In that case, an
9 infant was born with horrible defects that would ruin its
10 life, essentially, and the Court declined to recognize that
11 cause of action as a alternate theory of liability to medical
12 malpractice, because the Court determined that the question of
13 whether it's better to not be born at all is better left to
14 theologians, academics and philosophers rather than the Court.

15 It's too subjective, much as, what is -- the
16 question of what is a harm to one's privacy, light or view?
17 It's that reason why the Nevada Supreme Court didn't recognize
18 it in cases going back to Boyd and is not going to recognize
19 it now.

20 And the Nevada Supreme Court recently affirmed its
21 commitment to looking skeptically at new causes of action in
22 Brown v. Eddie World (phonetic) which was decided on the very
23 day that Mr. Malek filed his Motion for Summary Judgment. In
24 that case, the Nevada Supreme Court refused to recognize a
25 cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public

1 policy.

2 This is not cherry-picking cases out of the Nevada
3 Supreme Court's long history of jurisprudence to say that
4 there are a few causes of action that haven't been recognized.
5 This is the norm in Nevada. And that's the norm that this
6 Court should abide by, and not recognize this new cause of
7 action just because there's a legal principal that supports
8 it.

9 There is a big difference between having a legal
10 principle that supports something, which is codified in many
11 places throughout the Nevada Revised Statutes, that does not
12 give rise to its separate cause of action and that is the case
13 here.

14 And finally, the Trust asserts two other tag-on
15 causes of action that aren't causes of action at all. They're
16 requests for relief. Declaratory relief is entirely
17 duplicative of the two existing claims. It says that,
18 basically, we want a declaration of this, but it doesn't
19 assert any other right. And without an underlying finding of
20 liability, there's no declaration to be made.

21 And the same logic applies to its claim for
22 injunction. Without an underlying finding of liability, there
23 can be no injunctive relief. As the United States District
24 Court of -- for the District of Nevada has opined, it is a
25 remedy. It is not a standalone cause of action, and there has

1 to be some basis for it to issue from the Court.

2 Here, there is none. And if nothing else, those two
3 causes of action can be resolved in Mr. Malek's favor with
4 judgment entered against the Trust, simply on the basis that
5 they aren't causes of action at all. But the original two
6 causes of action do not have any evidentiary basis to support
7 that one neighbor can sue another to prevent building on the
8 property that they own with plans that have been approved and
9 by taking all the necessary steps to build their house. Thank
10 you.

11 THE COURT: Notwithstanding -- they can't do that
12 even notwithstanding restrictive covenants?

13 MR. DeVOY: Assuming the -- I'm sorry, assuming that
14 a restrictive covenant exists.

15 THE COURT: Yeah.

16 MR. DeVOY: Here there is none. There has been no
17 evidence of one.

18 THE COURT: Okay.

19 MR. DeVOY: The only evidence that has been produced
20 that there might be a restrictive covenant, MacDonald
21 Highlands, is that the Rosenburgs thought there might be one,
22 and that's it. And that kind of subjective intent shows
23 wishes and dreams. It does not show an applied restrictive
24 covenant that prevents somebody from building their house.

25 THE COURT: Okay.

1 MR. DeVOY: Thank you.

2 THE COURT: Thank you.

3 MR. GUNNERSON: Your Honor, is -- the following
4 motions also going to argue on the easement issue, I would ask
5 that I can also be heard at this time.

6 THE COURT: All right. Is that all right?

7 MS. HANKS: Sure.

8 THE COURT: Does that work for you?

9 MS. HANKS: Sure.

10 THE COURT: I usually separate them out the other
11 way, but I agree with you, that what you're going to say is --
12 you probably can't talk as fast as he does, but you're going
13 to sound much the same.

14 MR. GUNNERSON: That is true. That is true. I
15 don't have a lot to add. In fact, I think with our motion we
16 would adopt many of the arguments presented by Mr. Malek in
17 his motion, as plaintiff has adopted their arguments in that
18 motion as it pertains to our motion. The easement issue is
19 one that affects all the parties here.

20 Just to be clear, I want to make three, I think,
21 very important points. Number one, there is no easement for
22 view or privacy recognized in Nevada, period. There just is
23 none. Now, they've attempted to put lipstick on this one
24 and --

25 THE COURT: The lipstick argument, yes. Okay.

1 MR. GUNNERSON: -- by using a different terminology.
2 They -- instead of saying that this is an easement for view,
3 or an easement for privacy, which they know is unsuccessful in
4 Nevada, they've called it now an easement for use of land,
5 which -- which the only use they have for this land is view
6 and privacy.

7 So they've kind of tried to switch horses mid-stream
8 with their terminology in order to avoid the difficult legal
9 issues that are presented to them. But the fact remains the
10 same; what they want is an easement for view or privacy.

11 A second important point to note is that this third
12 acre of bare land wasn't used for anything at all. They want
13 that land to be continued to used (sic) as it was, but it
14 wasn't used for anything. It was a bare lot, scrub oak,
15 rocks, perhaps the errant teenage golfer approaching the green
16 who bladed his shot might have had to have trampled in there
17 to try and find their ball and bring it out.

18 THE COURT: Um-hum.

19 MR. GUNNERSON: There's otherwise -- this was not a
20 part of the golf course as laymen use it as it pertains to the
21 actual grass area of the course. This is behind the green.
22 This is behind the sand trap behind the green. This is behind
23 the rough behind the sand trap behind the green. This was not
24 used for anything.

25 //

1 So the fact that they're now asking for an easement
2 to allow the land to continue to be used for what it was
3 previously is simply -- has no merit and this is simply an
4 attempt to avoid the negative law regarding view and privacy.

5 Lastly, if they could apply the easement law that
6 they've identified in their motions, I think the ultimate
7 question is, what use do the Rosenburgs have for that land?
8 How have they been using it, how do they intend to use it? If
9 they claim they have some kind of an easement, which they have
10 stated in their own motions that easement and restrictive
11 covenant are one in the same -- I don't know that I
12 necessarily agree, but that's what they've stated -- then what
13 use are they going to have for that land? The only use would
14 be to protect their view and their privacy.

15 So we ought to call a spade a spade and address this
16 for what it is. And I think as was -- been presented by
17 Malek's counsel, there simply is no law that supports their
18 request for any type of implied easement or implied
19 restrictive covenant whatsoever.

20 THE COURT: Okay.

21 MR. GUNNERSON: Thank you.

22 THE COURT: So do you have a cause of action or is
23 it just, you know, an equitable estoppel of some sort?

24 MS. HANKS: Your Honor, we do have a cause of
25 action, and the cause of action is -- you can ask for

1 equitable relief in the term of an implied restrictive
2 covenant. The case law that I cited on page 7 of our
3 opposition shows that. Every single one of those Nevada cases
4 dating back from 1913, I think the last one I cited was 2008,
5 all dealt with an implied restrictive covenant.

6 And it was in the confines of usually declaratory
7 relief, or injunctive relief, or equitable relief. But there
8 was a claim. Clearly, there was a claim that the Court was
9 considering and the jury had to consider of whether an implied
10 restrictive covenant existed to limit what someone could do
11 with their property to the benefit of the other person
12 neighboring the property.

13 It belies reality to say that this doesn't exist
14 when there is a whole page citation of cases where courts and
15 juries have analyzed whether an implied restrictive covenant
16 exists between one property owner and another property owner.

17 And in all of those cases it was couched as
18 injunctive relief because you're essentially asking someone to
19 say, tell this other property owner that an implied
20 restrictive covenant exists on that particular property that
21 limits what they want to do with it, whether it be build, use
22 it in a certain way, and that's what all those cases did.

23 And the Boyd case actually laid out the elements in
24 Nevada for when an implied restrictive covenant exists. And
25 that was actually a jury trial that the Supreme Court remanded

1 back to state court because the trial judge changed the
2 covenant. He recognized a covenant existed, but he changed
3 it. And the Supreme Court said, no, it's an all or nothing
4 approach, so we're remanding this case.

5 So it seems axiomatic that if it wasn't really a
6 cause of action the Supreme Court would have remanded this and
7 set a standard that has been followed since that time from the
8 1960s all the way up until present date.

9 THE COURT: Remind me, what gives rise to your
10 implied covenant?

11 MS. HANKS: Restrictive covenant? Your Honor, if
12 you look at the Boyd elements, it is the unity of title it's
13 the apparent and continuance use, and then the necessary
14 element would be it is the intention of the parties.

15 So what we have in this case, and similar to other
16 jurisdictions that have actually looked at it in the context
17 of a golf course, in the cases that we cited, the Skyline is
18 almost exactly on point to what we have here.

19 You have a community, MacDonald Highlands, that
20 developed a golf course, DragonRidge Golf Course, first. Then
21 everything around that golf course was designed around it. It
22 was designed as a golf course community. It was advertised as
23 a golf course community. Restrictions were placed on
24 properties abutting the golf course in both the CC&Rs and the
25 design guidelines.

1 So all of those covenants run with all of those
2 properties in MacDonald Highlands. So that goes to the
3 continuous use. So what this case is about is not view and
4 privacy. In our Complaint -- and I do want to address that --
5 our Complaint does allege restrictive covenant and the
6 easement. And the terms have been used interchangeably
7 through the case law, and even the restatement has done away
8 with the term "easement" and has just used implied -- or
9 excuse, restrictive covenant. And they could be both express
10 or implied.

11 But -- so we're not changing the game plan here.
12 It's always been alleged that way. Who's changing the game
13 plan is, they want to keep on saying that we're asking for an
14 easement for view and privacy and light and air. And we've
15 never even said that. Those words don't even appear anywhere
16 in the Complaint.

17 Now, does -- does view get affected? Yes. That's a
18 byproduct of what we're talking about. That's a byproduct of
19 every implied restrictive covenant. But what we're talking
20 about is value. When the Rosenberg Trust purchased property
21 in MacDonald Highlands, they purchased it with the expectation
22 that they were purchasing property on a golf course. And
23 because of that, they paid a premium, just like everyone else
24 did, with the expectation that that community would stay as
25 advertised and as it appeared.

1 Just like all the CC&Rs, every owner gets a benefit
2 from having those covenants and restrictions on all the
3 property owners around them, because unlike a non-CC&R
4 community, your neighbor can paint their house purple, or
5 pink, or bright blue and you can't say anything about it.

6 But when you come into a community like MacDonald
7 Highlands that is governed by restrictive covenants, you are
8 buying -- paying a premium and having the reliance that all
9 the other owners are not going to be able to change their
10 house in such a way that would affect the value of your
11 property. And that's what happened here.

12 Now, the interesting thing about the -- how they
13 describe this golf parcel, it's false. It's just flat out
14 false. It was inbound play based on the evidence that we've
15 adduced during the discovery. It was specific desert palette.
16 Mr. MacDonald testified to that. They have three palette's in
17 MacDonald Highlands. It was the third palette. It has an
18 irrigation system.

19 So to suggest it's this sliver brush almost just
20 ridiculous piece of land that no one cares about it's a
21 misstatement of the facts. And this is a Motion for Summary
22 Judgment. So if there's any question of what that piece of
23 land was, that has to be determined by a jury. And the facts
24 that we produced and the deposition shows, it's actually one-
25 third of an acre of property that was a specific palette of

1 desert landscape that was inbound play for the golf course.

2 In fact, Mr. Bykowski (phonetic) even testified that
3 before he severed it and sold it to Mr. Malek he talked to the
4 golf company and asked, how much do you need of this still to
5 be considered part of the golf course.

6 And so that's where those issue of facts and a jury
7 needs to consider that, that when the Rosenberg Trust bought
8 their property, they were taking in the whole surrounding
9 area. And this is where it gets -- this is where the crux of
10 it comes in, Your Honor. If you accept -- if Mr. Malek is
11 right and there's no restrictive covenant, that means someone
12 can buy the one-third acre of the golf course right in front
13 of him, and then the next guy can come the next week and buy
14 the one-third acre of golf course in front of him, and you can
15 just start slowly and surely severing the golf course to the
16 point where it no longer exists. And that is the reason why
17 the implied restrictive covenant exists.

18 That's the -- all those cases were talking about
19 that. When you buy property, all the Nevada cases, and even
20 the Skyline case talked about that. When you buy property and
21 you pay a premium and you're induced to pay more money because
22 we've advertised, it's going to look like this. You're going
23 to be on a golf course. You're going to have this premier
24 view. You're going to have this premier surrounding area.
25 You don't then get to change it, because once you've sold

1 (sic) one property, that right to that property staying that
2 way, it vests immediately, and Nevada law has held that.

3 And that's where Mr. Malek knew it. When he
4 purchased that golf parcel, he knew there were restrictive
5 covenants. He knew that it was part of the golf course. He
6 had lived in the community since 2006. The golf course was
7 built -- this goes to the continuous use element -- the golf
8 course was built and open for play as early as 2000. Mr.
9 MacDonald admitted, it's a centerpiece of the community. It's
10 the heart of the community. It's in the center of the maps,
11 everything show it, and the plat maps show it. The community
12 maps show it.

13 And the restrictive covenants even exist on people
14 who buy property on the golf course. People who buy
15 properties on the golf course have different restrictions on
16 them than someone who bought a house within MacDonald
17 Highlands that is not on a golf course. And why is that?
18 It's to preserve the golf course. And that's -- that's what
19 this is about.

20 The byproducts of view and just the esthetic
21 pleasingness of the property, yes, that's a byproduct. But we
22 -- what we're trying to prove here and what we're trying to
23 show here is that the Rosenberg Trust bought A, and they're
24 ending up with B. And that affects their value, and that's
25 why they're entitled to that restrictive covenant.

1 The statement by counsel that -- and it's probably
2 not as important but they said, well, Mrs. Rosenberg doesn't
3 even play golf. Well, they should have deposed Frederic
4 Rosenberg, because he does play golf. And he will testify at
5 trial that he picked this particular property. They put a lot
6 of time and effort and research into the property they wanted
7 to buy. And he picked it because of its proximity to the
8 clubhouse, because of its location on the 9th hole, and
9 because of how it's situated and looked. And he liked the
10 view from his property.

11 So to suggest that somehow because Mrs. Rosenberg
12 doesn't play golf, that she -- don't worry about the value she
13 paid for this house, \$2.3 million, let her pay for it, and
14 then lose the value of it, don't worry about her. But Mr.
15 Malek, he can increase the value of his property to the
16 detriment of another owner. I mean, that's what this is
17 about. One owner is not allowed to increase the value of
18 their property by changing the scheme and overall look of a
19 community to the detriment of other property owners, depriving
20 them of the value that they paid for.

21 Your Honor, if you don't have any other questions --

22 THE COURT: No, not at this point.

23 MS. HANKS: Well, actually, Your Honor, they didn't
24 address the zoning changes. I don't know if you want me to
25 address that. They kind of cut their argument a little short.

1 THE COURT: Yeah. Why don't you go ahead, because
2 I'm sure they will when you --

3 MS. HANKS: Okay.

4 THE COURT: -- you plan to address those, right?

5 MR. DeVOY: Yes, they were addressed in the --

6 THE COURT: The zoning?

7 MR. DeVOY: -- motion, but.

8 THE COURT: Okay.

9 MS. HANKS: And, Your Honor, the case law in Nevada
10 says that zoning changes cannot alter a restrictive covenant.
11 The zoning -- the zoning change itself does not change the
12 nature of the land. So the fact that it happened, and then
13 possibly the Rosenburgs observed some stakes, again, an issue
14 of fact, that the Rosenburgs dispute that they observed any
15 stakes. The only stakes they observed was the golf stakes
16 showing inbound play and the out-of-bound play. So that would
17 be an issue of fact.

18 But regardless, even if they had observed those
19 stakes and the zoning changes were made, they cannot change a
20 restrictive covenant under Nevada law.

21 And they also suggest, well, the MacDonald Highlands
22 has done this before. They have sold pieces of the golf
23 parcel. Well, that's another fact that's not true. When you
24 look at the deposition testimony of Mr. Bykowski and Mr.
25 MacDonald, there are three instances where some change to the

1 golf course was made, so to speak.

2 The one was Mr. MacDonald's property. He added to
3 his property and took a piece of the golf course. But he had
4 testified it was an out-of-bound play area. Has not changed
5 it in any way. It's still the desert palette that it had
6 always been.

7 So other than the fact that he may be able to do
8 something to it, and maybe when he tries to do that, there'll
9 be someone else who will argue that he can't. But right now,
10 it's remaining the same. That also happened, by the way,
11 after this litigation was already instituted, so it's not
12 something that happened prior.

13 The second one is there was a large -- or a small
14 hill, so to speak, that was blocking the view of some houses
15 to the golf course. Mr. Bykowski testified it wasn't even a
16 part of the golf course. That hill was not any part of the
17 golf course. But they just leveled it so that now the houses
18 had a straight view to the golf course. That's it. They
19 didn't change anything. They didn't sell it to anyone. No
20 one's building a house on that piece.

21 And the third example of doing something different
22 to the golf course is whereby they -- they say -- Mr. Bykowski
23 testified that there was a corner piece between a tee box that
24 they just extended someone's lot so he could fit his house on
25 there. Didn't sell the lot to him. It didn't -- he says a

1 small corner piece. There was not -- it's not a third of an
2 acre. It's not changing the nature of it.

3 Those do not give rise to the general and -- changes
4 that's required by Nevada law. It has to be so pervasive that
5 someone would know that no longer. The example would be, the
6 golf course, first nine holes were completely changed and
7 started building houses on it. That would be the example of
8 what Nevada law has recognized as a pervasive change, whereby
9 no one can then depend on the restrictive covenant. That's
10 just not happening here. It hasn't happened here.

11 And nevertheless, you can look at the fact that even
12 if you believe what they're saying, there's clearly issues of
13 fact as to whether those three instances did rise to the level
14 of a severance that would take away the implied restrictive
15 covenant that exists on the golf piece.

16 We also argue, Your Honor, there's an express
17 covenant. You don't even need to get to the implied covenant
18 because we believe there's an express covenant in Mr. Malek's
19 deed. It says he'll take, subject to, all covenants,
20 restrictions and easements. And Mr. Malek admitted that he
21 knew when he took the property he was taking it subject to
22 those guidelines.

23 And the Nevada law provides, you can look at parole
24 evidence, extrinsic evidence, to determine what do you mean by
25 that. Because admittedly, the language is broad. But if we

1 look at the community maps, the plat maps, the CC&Rs, and the
2 design guidelines, all of them are recognized in the golf
3 course being the centerpiece of that community. They're
4 putting restrictions on property owners so that golf course is
5 protected and maintained. And that's where we argue that
6 that's the express covenant that exists. We don't even need
7 to get to the implied covenant.

8 Just lastly, Your Honor, that's the gist of it, Your
9 Honor. This case is not about view, light or air. It's about
10 maintaining value and maintaining an expectation that the
11 property you purchased, and the surrounding area will stay the
12 same.

13 THE COURT: Okay. Back to you. It's your motion.

14 MR. DeVOY: Thank you. A number of issues that have
15 arisen, and I'll try to work through them as efficiently as
16 possible.

17 First of all, this idea that the Rosenbergs paid
18 \$2.3 million for the house, that is true. \$2.3 million is not
19 nothing, but it's not as if they sunk their life savings into
20 this. They are a group of people that have five houses -- own
21 five additional houses owned between them and their Trust in
22 numerous other states -- well, no, just California. But
23 numerous other communities. So these are sophisticated real
24 estate investors. Barbara Rosenberg is a realtor. They could
25 have done more research about this to understand that the

1 zoning is not what they thought it was.

2 First of all, we're not denying that an implied
3 restrictive covenant exists as a legal principle. It doesn't
4 apply here. The fact that going back to 2004, people have
5 been able to break off little parts of land that arguably may
6 or may not be part of the golf course, but were not in-play,
7 does not show that the golf course is completely sacrosanct.
8 It can never be moved.

9 What Mr. Malek is proposing is not paving a road
10 down the fairway of the 9th hole or building a cul-de-sac on
11 the green. He is taking a sliver of area, the desert palette
12 that was referenced just means undeveloped desert land, and it
13 was clarified in Richard McDonald's deposition testimony, and
14 using it in the same manner that Ms. Hanks identified as
15 Richard MacDonald and another owner had done to move their
16 property a little bit closer.

17 There might be some construction in it, but he's not
18 building up right to the end. The fact that Mr. Malek has to
19 -- wants to use that property to move his house closer to the
20 golf course doesn't mean he's building up right to the end of
21 it. He still has to abide by the same rules that everybody
22 else does for getting their house design approved. And he has
23 done that to date.

24 Additionally --

25 THE COURT: Why does he want to move his house?

1 MR. DeVOY: Just because of the size of the house.
2 That's my understanding. It's the footprint of the house.
3 It's kind of a Frank Lloyd Wright style house, is my
4 understanding of the plans that I've seen.

5 THE COURT: Hum.

6 MR. DeVOY: Additionally, going back to that point,
7 and related to this case law that plaintiff cites, namely, the
8 Skyline and the Ute Park (phonetic) decision, those relate to
9 an entire golf course being developed, at least in Ute Park.
10 And Skyline relates to a golf course being left to basically
11 die in the desert, and left to stop operating (indecipherable)
12 neglect.

13 Again, those are inapposite here. We're talking
14 about a little bit of land that was potentially
15 (indecipherable) play being used in a manner that's consistent
16 with the way that it's been used in other areas of the
17 community and has been used in other communities throughout
18 Las Vegas. This is perhaps the poorly kept -- the worst kept
19 secret in high-end real estate in Las Vegas, that this is a
20 routine practice.

21 Additionally, the question here is not whether
22 there's any fact that causes a question; it's a question of
23 material fact. The fact that there is some idea that maybe
24 the Rosenbergs wanted that and they thought there was a
25 question as to what they thought they were getting, that

1 doesn't mean it's a material fact.

2 What the Rosenbergs thought they were getting does
3 not mean they get to protect that. They talk about in terms
4 of property value and maintaining that property value, but
5 what they're really getting to is the view and the privacy
6 that create that.

7 And going to boilerplate language that shows up
8 repeatedly in Exhibit 16 and 17 to the Motion for Summary
9 Judgment, this clause is used in responding to Bank of
10 America, MacDonald Highlands Realty in its substantive -- and
11 its substance a number of times. "Plaintiff's use, enjoyment
12 and value of the Rosenberg property will be substantially
13 altered in terms of, among other things, the view of the golf
14 course and mountains, privacy and light entering the Rosenberg
15 property if Malek begins construction on the golf course
16 parcel."

17 This case cannot be about anything but view, light
18 and privacy. The Trust did not have any prior use of the
19 land. And if anything, the fact that it was rezoned is
20 probative of the fact that there was no implied restrictive
21 covenant or any covenant that would prohibit it. Every one
22 except the Rosenbergs knew about this, because the Rosenbergs
23 didn't bother to look. My client contacted Michael Doiron and
24 contacted and got in touch about buying this parcel so that he
25 could expand his lot and build closer to the golf course on

1 it.

2 MacDonalld Highlands Realty signed off on it. They
3 were the ones who filed the applications with the City of
4 Henderson to get it approved, and the City of Henderson
5 approved it, that it had done before, and continues to do
6 during this process.

7 If there had been a problem, somewhere along the
8 way, whether MacDonalld Highlands Realty, or the MacDonalld
9 Highlands entity, Foothill Partner -- I'm sorry -- FHP
10 Ventures -- I know the name has changed in the course of the
11 facts of this case -- whether it's FHP Ventures, MacDonalld
12 Highlands Realty, the City of Henderson, if there were a
13 problem that would have inhibited this, someone would have
14 noticed it in the approximately 10 years that this has been
15 happening before this case started.

16 Additionally, the golf -- I'm sorry, let me get it
17 back together on this. The onus shows that the golf course
18 was not meant to be used solely to be kept there. It had been
19 rezoned in the past. It was sold with the purpose of
20 rezoning. Everyone knew what the purpose of it was going to
21 be along the process, as I mentioned. Paul Bykowski knew
22 about it. He was the one who signed off in the applications.

23 And again, if it alters the value, that's a question
24 of damages, it is not a question of whether there's an
25 injunction. This is a question about whether the value of the

1 property is being altered. Respectfully, if that is the case,
2 then the losses fall someplace else and it's a question of
3 legal value -- a question of legal damages.

4 If there's a change in value, whether there's a
5 remedy for that at all, it can be measured monetarily. It
6 doesn't warrant an injunction against Mr. Malek's construction
7 on the property.

8 And finally, the Trust makes an issue about the fact
9 that Mr. Malek signed a deed that accepts the covenants that
10 exist on the land. That's true. Much like the idea that Mr.
11 Malek recognizes that the principle of an implied restrictive
12 covenant exists, but not here.

13 There may be covenants that run with the land. For
14 example, people who live on the golf course have to accept the
15 fact that golf balls might fly onto their property. But that
16 doesn't mean he exists -- covenants that exist solely in the
17 minds of the Rosenburgs. Just because they believe something
18 was the case, does not mean it rises to the level of implied
19 restrictive covenant, and it doesn't mean Mr. Malek accepted
20 it, especially when everyone -- I'm sorry -- every --
21 especially when MacDonald Highlands Realty sold him the land,
22 FHP Ventures approved it, the City of Henderson approved it
23 for rezoning, and nobody had raised a problem with it.

24 This is -- the evidence before the Court shows that
25 there isn't an implied restrictive covenant. If there had

1 been, it wouldn't have gotten to this point. And it wouldn't
2 have gotten to this point, not just for Mr. Malek, but for the
3 other people who have bought portions of the out-of-bounds
4 area of the golf course.

5 At the end of the day, the idea here is that the
6 Rosenburgs wish to have the owners have plans that accommodate
7 its needs. The idea that there's this hypothetical that
8 somebody might be able to buy land in front of Mr. Malek is
9 not a reason to deny the Motion for Summary Judgment. It
10 requires evidence, it requires genuine issues of material
11 facts, not hypotheticals that if this is accepted, then other
12 people can buy land. That hasn't happened. That's not a
13 credible scenario to deny the Motion for Summary Judgment.

14 But what has happened here is that the idea that
15 there's an implied restrictive covenant because the Rosenburgs
16 believed one existed has allowed this litigation to go on and
17 for somebody to be sued and prevented from building their
18 house because somebody didn't like the plan, because by their
19 own admissions in discovery it would affect their view, light
20 and privacy, which is prohibited under Nevada law.

21 THE COURT: Okay.

22 MR. DeVOY: Thank you.

23 MR. GUNNERSON: Your Honor, there are no genuine
24 issues of material fact as it pertains to the issue of whether
25 or not an easement exists. To create an easement now, the one

1 they're suggesting, would -- is quite frankly an absurd
2 proposition. You're talking about taking someone's property
3 and without consideration for the covenant, being able to
4 restrict golf course owners, anyone who ever purchases a piece
5 of golf course owner, they're asking you to create new law.

6 And now they say there's express covenants, as was
7 stated, those express covenants have nothing to do with not
8 building on the land. They have to do with maintenance, they
9 have to do with people being able to come on the property to
10 grab a ball. They don't have anything to do with building on
11 the property.

12 They're asking this Court to do something that has,
13 quite frankly, never been done before. They say that they
14 expected a golf course community. And guess what; they still
15 have it. They said they wanted their -- the location of the
16 proximity of the 9th hole, the location of the clubhouse, as
17 well as the view of the golf course all remains. Nothing is
18 being changed here.

19 So even if they could create some kind of an
20 easement, it is not effective. The things that they have
21 argued are putting them or creating their damages. They still
22 have it. The golf course is still the centerpiece of the
23 community. The green has not changed, the fairway has not
24 changed, and their view of those have not changed.

25 In fact, if you look at page 4 of our reply that's

1 coming up you can see there's a picture on there that shows
2 the way the house is built. And the house is built to take in
3 the view of the fairway and the green and the grass and
4 valley, and catch some mountainviews in the distance. The
5 home was not built to get a view of this bare lot of land.

6 And to now create some kind of -- state that there's
7 implied or express covenants that create an implied covenant,
8 it's just so beyond the pale that it's -- that it would create
9 an absurd result.

10 Again, there are no genuine issues of material fact.
11 They don't get to mischaracterize the facts to create one.
12 They say it was inbound play. I've looked at their citations
13 to the inbound play. I would encourage the Court to do so as
14 well. What they've cited to states nothing about inbound
15 play.

16 So they -- they've -- they've hung their hat on
17 that. Quite frankly, even if there was an issue there, it's
18 not a genuine issue. So I don't think that that creates a
19 covenant. Covenants must be created by contact or action or
20 consideration. None of that is here.

21 They said that if --

22 THE COURT: When you say a consideration; what about
23 her argument that they paid more for that lot than they
24 otherwise would have?

25 MR. GUNNERSON: They paid more for the golf course

1 views. That may be true. I think there is a premium --

2 THE COURT: Um-hum.

3 MR. GUNNERSON: -- placed on those, and those golf
4 course views remain intact, exactly as they were before. I
5 don't know, quite frankly, I think golf courses change from
6 time to time. I think that holes change, things change. And
7 I have never, as of yet, seen in Nevada a court rule that
8 there is a restrictive covenant, an implied restrictive
9 covenant over golf course land. I just -- I have not seen it.
10 And they're asking you to be the first to do that.

11 The law is clearly in favor of finding that no
12 easement existed. And we'd request and admonish the Court to
13 please find that so that we don't have to go on with this view
14 and light and privacy easement that's really what is at stake
15 here. Thank you.

16 THE COURT: All right. I am going to take another
17 look at some of the authorities. This is a fairly -- reading
18 the authorities sometimes leads to opposite conclusions about
19 what -- what would be the result in this case and I need to
20 look at those some more.

21 So I'm going to take these under submission for
22 approximately three weeks. I'm going into trial, so it will
23 take me a little while to plow through these at night. So can
24 we go out about three weeks? We can just do it on a chambers
25 calendar. Is that a chambers? Yeah.

1 THE CLERK: June 29th.

2 THE COURT: June 29th. It's a chambers calendar, no
3 appearance necessary.

4 Okay. What about the other one?

5 MR. GUNNERSON: The last one.

6 THE COURT: Okay.

7 MS. HANKS: I'm surprised you didn't hear a
8 collective cheer from the back of the room.

9 THE COURT: Or at least a sigh of relief.

10 MR. GUNNERSON: Again, Your Honor, Spencer Gunnerson
11 on behalf of MacDonald Highlands Realty, Michael Doiron, the
12 real estate agent, and FHP Ventures.

13 We've talked a lot about view and privacy and
14 easement, and I'll note again that that was also part of our
15 argument in our motion. And so I would ask that insofar as
16 you take that issue under advisement on their matter, that at
17 least as to that part of our argument, will probably likely
18 have to be taken under advisement as well. So I won't go over
19 that again.

20 The claims against my clients range from -- range
21 from misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, negligent --
22 fraudulent misrepresentation, statutory disclosure violations,
23 as well as the easement, which I won't talk about.

24 And yet this is ripe for summary adjudication at
25 this time. The reason being, and as we've put in our motion

1 papers, the Rosenbergs bought this property as-is. They knew
2 when they bought it that there were problems potentially with
3 this property. They, in fact -- they -- they really wanted
4 this property. They made aggressive efforts to buy it.

5 THE COURT: Um-hum.

6 MR. GUNNERSON: They -- in fact, before it was ever
7 even listed, they were seeking to get it. They -- this was
8 what they wanted, and they wanted it as soon as possible.

9 In fact, it began with an original Letter of Intent.
10 And I think it's -- it's important to note that original
11 Letter of Intent states that the buyers would be obligated to
12 conduct all necessary studies and that would include zoning,
13 as well as other environmental construction, marketable,
14 feasibility and title. They presented very -- from the
15 get-go, look, we'll get this as-is and we'll conduct -- we'll
16 do the due diligence on this and we'll figure out what it is
17 we have.

18 They were put off for a time so it could be listed.
19 But eventually, when they did their final offer in March of
20 2013, again, they reiterate that they will take the property
21 as-is.

22 Now, Mrs. Rosenberg has stated and her counsel has
23 argued that when she said -- they said they were taking the
24 property as-is, they meant, you know, the structure. That --
25 that if -- if there was a hole in the wall, they would deal

1 with it, or if there was a broken tile, that was on them.

2 But that's not the extent of an as-is property. You
3 take it with all its defects. And I would note that Mrs.
4 Rosenberg testified in her deposition that she considers this
5 sale of the property to Mr. Malek as a defect in the property.
6 They took -- they took as-is, and they should not now be able
7 to walk away from -- from having taken the property as-is.

8 Furthermore, in -- as they proceed on with the
9 litigation -- or excuse me, as they proceeded on with the
10 purchase, they signed the Purchase Agreement. Now, not only
11 did they say they'd buy it as-is, not only did they say we'll
12 do the due diligence on issues, including zoning, they
13 continued to say that they will waive claims against the
14 brokers and their agents.

15 This is a piece of property people don't know a lot
16 about, and they're willing to waive -- again, "Buyer waives
17 all claims against brokers or their agents for defects in the
18 property." But not just that, they say, it only has to do
19 with the property though, not outside the property.

20 But they also waive it as it pertains to the
21 property's proximity to freeways, airports or other nuisances.
22 So obviously, it's -- expands outside the property, these
23 defects potentially could. The zoning of the property.
24 Factors related to buyer's failure to conduct walk-throughs,
25 inspections and research are also waived.

1 Well, we're claiming that they had the ability to
2 research. In fact, they took it upon themselves to be
3 obligated to do the research as it pertains to this property.
4 And they failed to do one important thing, and that was to
5 look at the zoning of this property. They failed to go to the
6 City of Henderson, look at a map. A short drive from
7 MacDonald Highlands and take a look at it. They failed to go
8 online for five minutes, and in that five minutes be able to
9 pull up a map.

10 And if they had done that, what they would have seen
11 is what we attached to our reply, which is, residential
12 property that extends beyond what they believed Malek's
13 property to be. They had the ability to do this. They waived
14 any claims against my clients in an effort to get this
15 property as quickly as possible.

16 Not only did they waive these rights in the Purchase
17 Agreement, these rights to bring claims, they did it then
18 again in an addendum. In fact, that addendum is even -- I
19 think is even broader and more applicable in this situation.

20 Now, that -- Section 1 of the addendum, which
21 applies not just to the seller. If you'll look at the last
22 paragraph of the addendum, or of Section 1 of the Addendum, it
23 says that it also applies to brokers -- well, it says it
24 applies to implied parties, and implied parties is identified
25 as my clients, brokers and agents.

1 And that Section 1 says that they waive to the
2 fullest extent permitted by the law any claims arising out of
3 or relating in any way to encroachments, easements,
4 boundaries, shortages, or any other matter that would be
5 disclosed or revealed by a survey or inspection of the
6 property or search of public records.

7 Zoning maps are public records. They have waived
8 their claims for anything that could have been revealed from a
9 search of the public record. This case should be over as it
10 pertains to my clients. I don't know why my clients are
11 required to continue on in this matter when they affirmatively
12 and actively waived those rights.

13 Now, in their opposition they say, well, you've
14 cited law that says, you know, we can only waive facts that we
15 know about. No, that's not what it says. It's a -- waiver
16 has to do with rights that you know about.

17 THE COURT: Um-hum.

18 MR. GUNNERSON: We're talking about the Rosenbergs.
19 We're talking about multiple homes. Mrs. Rosenberg, 25 years
20 of real estate experience, over 500 sales she testified doing.
21 They knew what they were giving up when they signed here.
22 They knew the rights they were giving up. They knew the
23 claims they would be able to make, otherwise that they were
24 giving up, by not searching the public records when they
25 signed this document. They knew it. So they are very well

1 aware of what was -- what was happening.

2 Additionally, in that Section 1, the damages are
3 limited. So even if somehow they can make it past this idea
4 that our waiver doesn't apply, or their waiver doesn't apply,
5 and they can still bring claims regarding this public record
6 that they should have reviewed and they didn't, their damages
7 are limited to \$5,000.

8 And so as a -- as a -- you know, I would say as an
9 alternative, although I don't think we even get there -- this
10 -- they should be limited this time to understand that that's
11 all they get from my clients.

12 Now, they've made some arguments and said well --

13 THE COURT: That -- does that apply to all
14 defendants or some of the defendants?

15 MR. GUNNERSON: That applies to the seller -- that
16 would also apply -- I would argue, although Bank of America
17 has -- doesn't seem -- have a horse in this motion -- that
18 would apply, I believe, to the seller as well.

19 THE COURT: Um-hum.

20 MR. GUNNERSON: That's -- I think that was the
21 language in that document. They have stated, well, Michael
22 Doiron should have disclosed it. She knew about it. Well,
23 let's talk about what the facts really say. And I -- there's
24 no dispute with this. Michael Doiron was aware that a
25 property -- that a sale was pending for Mr. Malek. She knew

1 that. But she did not know -- she has stated that she doesn't
2 remember when she found out the zoning was changed. She
3 doesn't remember. So any statement that she knew before they
4 bought the property, there's simply nothing to base that claim
5 on.

6 She knew that the property lines were going to be
7 changed, but she didn't have the new final map yet. The final
8 map showing the change in the lot lines was finalized after
9 the Rosenburgs bought the property. So any representation
10 they say she's making where she's showing him a final map --

11 THE COURT: Um-hum.

12 MR. GUNNERSON: -- and they're saying, well, this is
13 from 2004, well, that was the only final map available, was
14 that one from 2004. She discloses that zoning -- that they --
15 that the zoning information she's given -- they signed a
16 zoning disclosure statement. She hands it to them and on
17 there in bold it says, this is current as of 2000 -- I think
18 it was February 2010. If you want more information, go to the
19 City of Henderson. They didn't care.

20 You know, I bought a home 10 years ago, three-story,
21 a little -- on a postage stamp, big empty lot behind me. I
22 was so eager to get into a house I didn't even look at it.
23 Didn't even consider it. I thought, communities all around
24 me. I'm going to get a neighborhood behind me. This will be
25 great. A year-and-a-half later I had a tropical smoothie

1 drive through right behind my backyard. Was that on me? Yes.
2 And I took responsibility for that, because I did not check
3 the zoning of that property.

4 THE COURT: It sounds like plaintiff's counsel might
5 get a new client.

6 MR. GUNNERSON: That's potential. It depends how
7 she does today.

8 But in any event -- in any event, there is -- so
9 then they say, well, she should have still disclosed these
10 issues. Well, we don't have evidence that she knew the zoning
11 had actually changed yet. We know the final map hadn't been
12 done yet. But any duty to disclose, which they cite to, it's
13 mitigated by the fact that this was an as-is property. And
14 as-is properties, the duty to disclose is limited.

15 Now, it's limited, and it's in our briefing, there's
16 still a duty to disclose if the information is unavailable to
17 the buyer.

18 THE COURT: Um-hum.

19 MR. GUNNERSON: Now, here we have public records
20 showing a zoning change, showing that this property that
21 they're very concerned about was made residential. That was
22 available to them. They had availability to that information,
23 and therefore, there's -- the duty to disclose is mitigated,
24 eliminated, quite frankly, all together.

25 //

1 So in any event, Your Honor, as we've stated, this
2 waiver is express, it's direct. I believe if you confined
3 that, in fact, this waiver, they should live by what they
4 waived and my client should be dismissed. I think that
5 there's no reason to keep us in because of the fact that the
6 easement issue, which we've been tied to, doesn't apply the
7 real estate company or the real estate agent.

8 THE COURT: Um-hum.

9 MR. GUNNERSON: Unjust enrichment wouldn't apply in
10 that case. And therefore, we're requesting that there be a
11 summary adjudication dismissing my clients from this -- from
12 this matter.

13 THE COURT: Okay.

14 MR. GUNNERSON: Thank you.

15 MS. HANKS: I'm struggling with the fact that they
16 want to say on the one hand that the Rosenberg Trust waived
17 any defects, nuisances, and you're stuck. And on the other
18 hand, hey, that meaningless scrub piece of land, don't worry
19 that it's changed, it's meaningless. It doesn't change your
20 house. It can't be a defect and a nuisance that Rosenberg
21 Trust waived, and at the same time be meaningless and not
22 affect the value of the Rosenberg Trust. It's one or the
23 other.

24 And the bottom line is, they did not waive anything
25 with respect to restrictive covenants or surrounding areas of

1 the community. It was just the as-is only relates to 590
2 Lairmont Place (phonetic) and that specific lot, those lot
3 lines, those zoning for that lot, the residential zoning,
4 nothing to do with the surrounding area, the golf course.
5 Those are all believing -- they've bought that property
6 believing all that's going to stay the same. They had no
7 reason to believe that they had to research the zoning of a
8 golf course, in a community that was advertised as a golf
9 course.

10 THE COURT: Well, is that -- is that really enough
11 to get around the duty, the due diligence duty?

12 MS. HANKS: I believe so, Your Honor, because
13 they're trying to put -- they're trying to ignore their duties
14 under the statutes to disclose material relevant facts
15 affecting the property and imposing some type of duty of
16 detective on the Rosenberg Trust, when the Rosenberg Trust
17 would have no reason to believe there was going to be anything
18 different. Because you have to understand, the golf course is
19 set, unlike -- you know, I appreciate Mr. Gunnerson's
20 situation. That's not evidence. But when he's buying
21 property, it's not yet built.

22 But when the Rosenbergs bought this particular
23 property --

24 THE COURT: Right. You don't want to dis your --

25 MS. HANKS: My future client.

1 THE COURT: -- potential client.

2 MS. HANKS: That this property was not built -- or
3 at least not purchased in a community that was not yet built.
4 The golf course was there, it was in place. The surrounding
5 lots were in place. The house on this lot was even built.
6 Some of the other lots were unbuilt up. But their -- this
7 particular property that the Rosenberg Trust purchased already
8 had the house constructed.

9 So there really is no reason and when looking at
10 that landscape to say, okay, no one has told me anything about
11 the surrounding area so now I'm going to go down to the zoning
12 -- City of Henderson, look up the zoning and make sure the lot
13 next to me is going to be what? They had every expectation
14 that the lot next to it was going to be a residential lot and
15 that someone was going to build a home there. There was no
16 reason for them to look at the zoning of the golf course
17 because the golf course was already in place, everything was
18 designed already. There was no suggestion there was
19 construction there or any changes there.

20 And so that's where they ignore their duties. And I
21 want to address that. The -- NRS 645.252 imposes a duty on a
22 real estate agent to disclose material and relevant facts
23 affect or relating to the property. And they want to classify
24 the zoning and the changing of the lot lines, the sale of the
25 golf parcel as immaterial or minor. I think, in fact, the

1 zoning applications were even classified that change as minor,
2 and even state in there, it doesn't affect any surrounding
3 property owners, which is, that's the issue of fact that we
4 contend was not true and that was misleading.

5 And it intimates when someone is using those types
6 of terms, minor, immaterial, it intimates that you know that
7 if you don't classify this that way, then you did have a duty.
8 Because if it's material or major then you do have a duty
9 under the statute.

10 And that's where, again, we're at a Motion for
11 Summary Judgment phase. A jury, upon hearing those facts,
12 could reasonably differ and say, yes, this fact was material.
13 It was relevant and it did affect the Rosenberg property and
14 you should have disclosed it.

15 Now, they're going to argue it wasn't, but that's --
16 the fact finder has to determine that. That is not an issue
17 that can be determined summarily.

18 The next duty to disclose is under the statute for
19 the seller, NRS 645.259, they have a duty to correct, if they
20 know their seller is making misrepresentations. And Bank of
21 America, on the seller disclosure form, made several
22 misrepresentations. The one representation, the major
23 misrepresentation they made was there was no expected
24 construction around the surrounding areas. Well, that's not
25 true. They even made a very basic misrepresentation about the

1 property being subject to CC&Rs. And it was the Rosenberg
2 Trust's own agent who had to point it out.

3 So it just goes to show you that this was almost a
4 robotic type of situation where a seller is just checking
5 things off and Michael Doiron was not doing her job under the
6 statute and making sure her seller was not making incorrect
7 disclosures.

8 And it's really -- that's what it comes down to,
9 Your Honor. They want to avoid liability and attach this
10 as-is condition of the property and say that's -- affects
11 everything around you.

12 And even though Doiron and MacDonald Realty is the
13 party with this knowledge, they can tell the Rosenbergs at any
14 time about this, they want to say, well, we didn't have
15 liability even though we're the party with all the knowledge,
16 but you, Rosenberg Trust, with no knowledge, no reason to
17 doubt anything was wrong with the surrounding area, you had a
18 duty to go and figure this out on your own.

19 And I would also suggest, Your Honor, if they --
20 even if they did have a reason to look at the zoning, all they
21 would have seen is a change in zoning. Mr. Malek's purchase
22 was not finalized until after the Rosenberg Trust purchased
23 their property.

24 So all they would have seen is a change in zoning;
25 no change in lot lines, no purchase by Mr. Malek, no

1 suggesting Mr. Malek was going to build his house on the lot.
2 It still would not have even given them all the information.

3 Now, may it have raised some questions? Certainly.
4 But again, they had no reason to even consider looking at the
5 zoning of the golf course that was already in place since
6 2000. It's in place, it's constructed, there's no evidence
7 that it's going to change at any time.

8 And when Ms. Doiron is handing over maps that still
9 show the current zoning as a golf course, they certainly have
10 no basis to go and play detective. She's the party with all
11 the knowledge. She should have disclosed it.

12 And finally, Your Honor, with regard to the waiver
13 argument, it's not just -- the case they cited is the State
14 University v. Sutton, it's 120 Nev. 972, and they stated in
15 their motion, it says, "Recognizing that a waiver is valid
16 where made with knowledge of all material facts." That's the
17 case they cited. And the Rosenbergs just did not have
18 knowledge of all the material facts. But Michael Doiron did,
19 and MacDonald Realty did, and they chose not to disclose it,
20 and that's why we're here.

21 And to the extent that the Rosenberg Trust does not
22 get the equitable relief, the implied restrictive covenant,
23 that they're entitled then to damages. Even if they get the
24 implied covenant, they're entitled to damages, because they
25 had to bring the lawsuit to preserve the value of their

1 property because they did not make these disclosures.

2 And that's why this issue should go before a jury to
3 determine all of these issues.

4 MR. GUNNERSON: They shouldn't have waived their
5 rights to any claims on information that can be found in the
6 public record. Why did they have a reason to search the
7 public record regarding all aspects of their property?
8 Because they said if they didn't they're waiving the rights to
9 them. That's why. It's that simple.

10 They say waiver cannot happen unless you have all
11 material facts. They didn't have them. But they had
12 access -- first of all, materiality is not at issue in this --
13 in our motion. That would -- whether or not it is or is not
14 material is ultimately going to be a question of fact. That
15 does not have to be decided here. It was not presented in our
16 motion and it was not presented in our reply. It doesn't
17 matter. What matters is they had access -- if it is material,
18 as they claim, they had access to it.

19 And they say, you know, all it would have shown is a
20 change; that map we show at the back of our reply that shows
21 what would have come up if they'd gone, taken what the City of
22 Henderson said would be less than five minutes to look at,
23 they would see out of the blue this residential property that
24 jets out. And plaintiff's counsel is right, it would have
25 definitely raised questions and required them to look further

1 into what was going on and then they could have found out what
2 was happening.

3 What else actually leads them to the need to look --
4 check out zoning, Your Honor? Apparently, as a result of this
5 case, this piece of bare land, according to their client, made
6 the property worth zero. If this had such weight and would
7 have affected their complete decision, and their -- the way
8 they valued this property, I would think that would be the
9 first thing they would do, would see what the zoning was like
10 around their property if how the property is kept and who owns
11 what.

12 Mr. Malek's lot was bare next to them. He hadn't
13 built yet. They were on notice that there was going to be
14 development coming. Who know when? Development, what does
15 that mean? How much? How far in the future? They say, well,
16 there were misrepresentations made regarding water. Whether
17 they were or weren't, it was discovered by the -- before the
18 close and it was agreed that they were okay with it.

19 And their third misrepresentation has directly to do
20 with the issue that could be found in the public record, and
21 that is the change of the zoning.

22 So, look, they bought it as-is. They could have had
23 the knowledge that would have led them to understand what they
24 were dealing with.

25 Now, they brought up the fact that Michael Doiron

1 had a duty to disclose material issues. We cited the McIntosh
2 (phonetic) case and we believe and would submit that the
3 McIntosh says, yes, unless it's an as-is property, in which
4 case, if they had the ability to check that then, in fact,
5 that duty is no longer there.

6 They also cite to 645.259. They conveniently, as
7 we've noted in our reply, don't reference section 2. Section
8 2 actually limits the duties in cases where -- where
9 information was available as a matter of public record. So
10 the two issues they say, well, disclosure should still be an
11 issue and Michael Doiron should still remain, just don't hold
12 any water.

13 They -- at the beginning they said, we're trying to
14 argue two points. There is a such thing as meaningless
15 defects. So they -- they say we can't claim there's a defect
16 that's meaningless or that's meaningless and a defect at the
17 same time. Sure, we can. If -- we think it's meaningless.
18 They're calling it a defect. Insofar as it's a defect, they
19 had the ability to discern that and discover that and
20 therefore, Your Honor, we would ask that you grant our Motion
21 for Summary Judgment.

22 THE COURT: Okay.

23 MR. GUNNERSON: Thank you.

24 THE COURT: I'm going to put this with the -- with
25 the other motion.

1 Except I have one more question for plaintiff's
2 counsel and that is, who determines the materiality?

3 MS. HANKS: Of the disclosure?

4 THE COURT: Yeah.

5 MS. HANKS: The jury.

6 THE COURT: So you think that's a jury issue?

7 MS. HANKS: I do.

8 THE COURT: And you have instructions in mind --

9 MS. HANKS: Yes.

10 THE COURT: -- that are tested in time in the Nevada
11 courts that the --

12 MS. HANKS: I don't know if I can guarantee Nevada
13 courts, but --

14 THE COURT: Oh.

15 MS. HANKS: -- but --

16 THE COURT: You're going to branch out?

17 MS. HANKS: But yes, I do believe that that -- that
18 would be the issue of fact, of whether that particular
19 disclosure -- whether it was material; yes, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: Okay. Do you agree?

21 MR. GUNNERSON: I would agree that materiality is a
22 question of fact --

23 THE COURT: Okay.

24 MR. GUNNERSON: -- for the trier. However, I would
25 also emphasize significantly that the materiality has nothing

1 to do with our motion and that this motion can still be
2 granted without a determination of materiality.

3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You'll get
4 notified.

5 THE CLERK: So, under submission?

6 THE COURT: Yes. Submission until --

7 THE CLERK: Same date, June 29th?

8 THE COURT: -- yeah.

9 MS. HANKS: Thank you, Your Honor.

10 THE COURT: Um-hum.

11 MR. GUNNERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

12 THE COURT: Thank you.

13 (Proceeding was concluded at 10:36 a.m.)

14 * * * * *

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25


CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

Verbatim Digital Reporting, LLC
Englewood, CO 80110
(303) 798-0890



JULIE LORD, TRANSCRIBER

7-2-15

DATE