SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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The Board of Review for the Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation, Employment Security Division; and the Administrator of the Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation, Employment Security Division,

Petitioners,

VS.

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The Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe, and the Honorable Scott Freeman, District Judge,

Respondent.

and,

McDonald's of Keystone,

Real Party in Interest.

Supreme Court No. 69499
District Court No. CV15-00671

McDONALD'S OF KEYSTONE'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO STRIKE PETITIONER'S APPLICATION TO THE SUPREME COURT FOR A STAY

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I. Introduction

The petitioner, the Employment Security Department of the State of Nevada (ESD), has filed with this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, coupled with an application for a stay of the proceedings before the District Court. The application for a stay is contained in the conclusion to the petition. *See*, Petition, pp. 9;18-19, 10;1-15. Nothing in the application for a stay indicates that ESD asked the District Court, first, for a stay of the proceedings before it. As explained below, the application for a stay to this Court is premature without an indication that the ESD had first asked the District Court and was denied such relief or that there was some showing that an application to the District Court for the stay would have been impracticable.

II. Because the ESD's Application for a Stay Fails to Indicate That It Had First Requested a Stay From the District Court Which Was Denied Or That It Would Have Been Impracticable For The ESD To Seek a Stay From The District Court, Initially, The Application For A Stay Made To This Court Is Premature And Should, Therefore, Be Denied

The ESD has asked this Court to stay the proceedings on a petition for judicial review before the District Court below, pending this Court's disposition of ESD's petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. From a review of the ESD's application to the Court for a stay made as a part of ESD's request for the extraordinary relief of mandamus or prohibition, it is evident that no such request for a stay was first made to the District Court, below. No showing was made, either, that the application for a stay to the District Court would have been impracticable. The application for a stay, thus, runs afoul of Rule 8, NRAP.

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Rule 8, NRAP, plainly states:

Rule 8. STAY OR INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL OR RESOLUTION OF ORIGINAL WRIT PROCEEDINGS

- (a) Motion for Stay.
 - (1) **Initial Motion in the District Court.** A party must ordinarily move first in the district court for the following relief:
 - (A) a stay of the judgment or order of, or proceedings in, a district court pending appeal or resolution of a petition to the Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ.... Rule 8, NRAP.

Rule 8, NRAP, therefore, describes precisely the situation we have, here, before the Court. ESD has filed with this Court, an application for extraordinary relief, applications for mandamus and prohibition. Thus, based upon the plain wording of Rule 8, NRAP, which should be applied to an unambiguous command such as that set forth in the Rule, *see, State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Bokelman*, 113 Nev. 1116, 1122, 946 P.2d 179 (1997); *Maxwell v. SIIS*, 109 Nev. 327, 330, 849 P.2d 267 (1993), the petitioner should have first approached the District Court for leave to stay the proceedings before it. The word, "ordinarily" could be interpreted no other way. Rule 8(1)(A), NRAP, requires the petitioner to first petition, then, the District Court if it wants the proceedings before it to be stayed pending disposition by this Court of ESD's petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition.

There is a qualification, however, to the clear requirement of Rule 8(a)(1)(A), NRAP. Rule 8(a)(2), NRAP, allows a petitioner to proceed with an application for a stay when the applicant can "(A)(i)...show that moving first in the district court would be impracticable; or (ii) state that, a motion having been made, the district court denied the motion or failed to afford the relief requested...." Rule

8(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii),NRAP. If either of these subsections of Rule 8(a)(2), NRAP, are met, the ESD would be able to proceed directly to this Court with its application for a stay.

Reading, however, Rule 8(a)(1) and (2),NRAP, in concert, however, it is evident that an application for a stay must be made in the first instance with the District Court, if the clause "ordinarily move in the first instance" is to have any meaning, absent a showing that the application to the District Court would have been impracticable. The ESD, here, has made no attempt to show that it would have been impracticable to have asked for a stay in the first instance from the District Court. Further, there is no showing that the ESD asked the District Court, respondent herein, for a stay and was denied.

The ESD has, thus, failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8, NRAP, for pursuing an application for a stay with this Court. The application for a stay is premature, since ESD failed to give the District Court the first opportunity to consider the application for a stay as required by Rule 8, NRAP, or failed to make a showing it should not have been required to ask the District Court for such relief on impracticality grounds. The application of ESD for a stay submitted to this Court should be denied as the elements for asking this Court to stay the proceedings in the first place, bypassing the District Court, have not been met.

CONCLUSION

Having made no showing in its application for a stay that the District Court had denied an application, in the first instance, for a stay of the proceedings before the District Court, or that it would have been impracticable to seek a stay from the District Court in the first place, the ESD's application for a stay to this Court is premature. It should therefore be denied.

1	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not
2	contain the social security number of any person.
3	Dated this // day of January, 2016.
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5	But all all
6	By: Khelli Charles R. Zeh, Esq. Nevada State Bar No. 1739
7	THE LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES R. ZEH, ESQ.
8	575 Forest Street, Suite 200 Reno, NV 89509
9	Phone: 775.323.5700
.0	Attorneys for McDonald's of Keystone
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of The Law Offices of Charles R. Zeh, Esq., and that on this date I served the attached *McDonald's of Keystone's Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Strike Petitioner's Application to the Supreme Court for a Stay*, on those parties identified below by placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope, postage prepaid, placed for collection and mailing in the United States Mail, at Reno, Nevada:

Joseph L. Ward, Jr., Esq. 1340 South Curry Street Carson City, NV 89703

Honorable Scott Freeman Department 9 Second Judicial District Court 75 Court Street Reno, NV 89501

Dated this // Enday of January, 2016.

Karen Kennedy Kennede

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Electronically Filed Jan 12 2016 08:34 a.m. Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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Supreme Court No. 69499

District Court No. CV15-00671

McDONALD'S OF KEYSTONE'S MOTION TO STRIKE PETITIONER'S APPLICATION TO THE SUPREME COURT FOR A STAY

COMES NOW, McDonald's of Keystone, the real party in interest, and moves this Court pursuant to Rule 8, NRAP, for an order striking the petitioners' application for a stay. The application for a stay fails to indicate any attempt to approach the District Court, the respondent herein, in the first instance for a stay of the proceedings before the District Court and, therefore, pursuant to Rule 8, NRAP, the application for a stay is premature and should be denied. This motion is based upon the accompanying points and authorities and upon all other documents and records on file herein.

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security number of any person.

Dated this <u>//</u> day of January, 2016.

By:

Charles R. Zeh, Esq.

Nevada State Bar No. 1739 THE LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES R.

575 Forest Street, Suite 200 Reno, NV 89509

Phone: 775.323.5700

Attorneys for McDonald's of Keystone

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of The Law Offices of Charles R. Zeh, Esq., and that on this date I served the attached *McDonald's of Keystone's Motion to Strike Petitioner's Application to the Supreme Court for a Stay*, on those parties identified below by placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope, postage prepaid, placed for collection and mailing in the United States Mail, at Reno, Nevada:

Joseph L. Ward, Jr., Esq. 1340 South Curry Street Carson City, NV 89703

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Dated this // th day of January, 2016.

Haren Hennidy Karen Kennedy

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