

CASE NOS. 70083, 71045

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

Electronically Filed
Sep 07 2017 04:19 p.m.

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,
d/b/a CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER; AND
UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Appellants,

vs.

ESTATE OF JANE DOE, BY AND THROUGH ITS SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, MISTY PETERSON,

Respondent.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC; MICHAEL PRANGLE,
ESQ.; KENNETH M. WEBSTER, ESQ.; AND JOHN F. BEMIS, ESQ.,

Petitioners,

vs.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE
HONORABLE RICHARD SCOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE,

Respondents,

And

MISTY PETERSON, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF JOHN DOE,

Real Party in Interest.

APPEAL FROM THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
HONORABLE JUDGE RICHARD SCOTTI, CASE NO. A-09-595780-C

APPELLANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

DENNIS L. KENNEDY
NEV. BAR NO. 1462
JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN
NEV. BAR NO. 10125
JOSHUA P. GILMORE
NEV. BAR. NO. 11576
BAILEY ♦ KENNEDY
8984 SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89148
TELEPHONE: (702) 562-8820
FACSIMILE: (702) 562-8821
DKENNEDY@BAILEYKENNEDY.COM
JLIEBMAN@BAILEYKENNEDY.COM
JGILMORE@BAILEYKENNEDY.COM

MICHAEL E. PRANGLE
NEV. BAR NO. 8619
KENNETH M. WEBSTER
NEV. BAR NO. 7205
JOHN F. BEMIS
NEV. BAR NO. 9509
**HALL PRANGLE &
SCHOONVELD, LLC**
1160 N. TOWN CENTER DRIVE, STE. 200
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89144
TELEPHONE: (702) 889-6400
FACSIMILE: (702) 384-6025
MPRANGLE@HPSLAW.COM
KWEBSTER@HPSLAW.COM
JBEMIS@HPSLAW.COM

Attorneys for Appellants

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC,
a Nevada limited liability company,
d/b/a CENTENNIAL HILLS
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER;
AND UNIVERSAL HEALTH
SERVICES, INC., a Delaware
corporation,

Appellants,

vs.

ESTATE OF JANE DOE, by and
through its Special Administrator,
MISTY PETERSON,

Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 70083

District Court No. A595780

HALL PRANGLE &
SCHOONVELD, LLC; MICHAEL
PRANGLE, ESQ.; KENNETH M.
WEBSTER, ESQ.; AND JOHN F.
BEMIS, ESQ.,

Petitioners,

vs.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE
OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE
HONORABLE RICHARD SCOTTI,
DISTRICT JUDGE,

Respondents,

And

Supreme Court No. 71045

District Court No. A595780

1 MISTY PETERSON, AS SPECIAL
2 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
3 ESTATE OF JOHN DOE,

Real Party in Interest.

4 **APPELLANTS' NRAP 26.1 DISCLOSURE**

5 The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following are
6 persons and entities as described in NRAP 26.1(a), and must be disclosed.
7 These representations are made in order that the judges of this Court may
8 evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

9 Appellant Valley Health System, LLC d/b/a Centennial Hills Hospital
10 Medical Center ("Centennial Hills") is a Delaware Limited Liability Company.
11 It is wholly owned and operated by UHS of Delaware, Inc., a Delaware
12 Corporation, the management company for Appellant Universal Health
13 Services, Inc. ("UHS"), also a Delaware Corporation. UHS is a holding

14 ///

15 ///

16 ///

17 ///

18 ///

1 company that is a wholly owned subsidiary of Universal Health Services, a
2 publicly held company that owns 10% or more of Appellants' stock.

3 DATED this 7th day of September, 2017.

4 BAILEY ♦ KENNEDY

5
6 By: /s/ Dennis L. Kennedy

DENNIS L. KENNEDY
JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN
JOSHUA P. GILMORE

7
8 AND

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC
MICHAEL E. PRANGLE
KENNETH M. WEBSTER
JOHN F. BEMIS

10 *Attorneys for Appellants*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW	1
II.	STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO JUSTICIABILITY	2
III.	ARGUMENT	5
A.	The Future Adverse Impact of the Sanction Order Requires a Decision on the Merits of the Appeal	5
B.	The Appeal of the Sanction Order Includes a Live Controversy of \$18,000.00 in Monetary Sanctions	9
IV.	CONCLUSION	11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>Adams v. Ford Motor Co.,</i> 653 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999)	5, 6
<i>Albany v. Arcata Associates, Inc.,</i> 106 Nev. 688, 799 P.3d 566 (1990)	5
<i>Am. Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Equitable Life Assur.</i> <i>Society of the U.S.,</i> 406 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2005)	9
<i>Butler v. Biocore Med. Tech., Inc.,</i> 348 F.3d 1163 (10 th Cir. 2003)	5
<i>Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc.,</i> 142 F.3d 1041 (7 th Cir. 1998)	9, 10
<i>Foster v. Dingwall,</i> 126 Nev. 56, 227 P.3d 1042 (2010).....	7
<i>Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Central, Inc.,</i> 580 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 2009)	6
<i>Lasar v. Ford Motor Co.,</i> 399 F.3d 1101 (9 th Cir. 2005)	10
<i>Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Administrators, Inc.,</i> 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)	7
<i>Office of Washoe County Dist. Atty. v. Dist. Ct.,</i> 116 Nev. 629, 5 P.3d 562 (2000)	5

1	<i>Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp.,</i>	
2	965 F.2d 597 (8 th Cir. 1992)	6
3	<i>Personhood Nevada v. Bristol,</i>	
4	126 Nev. 599, 245 P.3d 572 (2010)	5
5	<i>U.S. v. Taleo,</i>	
6	222 F.3d 11333 (9 th Cir. 2000)	5
7	<i>Walker v. City of Mesquite, Tex.,</i>	
8	129 F.3d 831 (5 th Cir. 1997)	5, 6
9	<i>Watson Rounds v. Dist. Ct.,</i>	
10	131 Nev. Adv. Op. 79, 358 P.3d 228 (2015).....	5
11	<i>Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc.,</i>	
12	106 Nev. 88, 787 P.2d 777 (1990).....	7, 11
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		

I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Pursuant to this Court’s July 19, 2017 Order Directing Supplemental Briefing, the sole issue relates to “whether [A]ppellant[s] ha[ve] presented a justiciable controversy in the appeal....” As explained in detail below, the global settlement between the parties did not moot the Sanction Order for two reasons.

First, the Sanction Order¹ painted Appellants with a “Scarlet Letter,” forcing them to attempt to explain its circumstances *and* minimize its effect on discovery disputes in future litigation, especially because this Court has identified deterrence as one of the non-exhaustive discovery sanction factors. Reversal of the Sanction Order is necessary for Appellants to avoid collateral damage in future matters.

Second, the Sanction Order included \$18,000.00 in monetary sanctions, with \$9,000.00 payable to Doe and \$9,000.00 payable to a non-party. The global settlement does not preclude Appellants from seeking reimbursement of these monetary sanctions, thereby presenting a live controversy to this Court.

///

¹ Capitalized terms have the meaning assigned to them in Appellants’ Opening Brief.

1 **II. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO JUSTICIABILITY**

2 Appellants’ Opening Brief includes the relevant facts underlying the
3 merits of the appeal. For the purposes of this brief, Appellants will highlight
4 the facts relevant to justiciability (*i.e.*, mootness).

5 On July 14, 2015, in response to Doe’s Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions,
6 Commissioner Bulla ordered Centennial Hills and UHS, *inter alia*, to pay
7 \$18,000.00 in monetary sanctions (\$9,000.00 to Doe and \$9,000.00 to a non-
8 party). (Appellants’ Appendix (“AA”), Vol. IV, Tab 19, at 608). On
9 November 4, 2015, as part of the Sanction Order, the District Court
10 “re-affirmed” the \$18,000.00 in monetary sanctions issued by Commissioner
11 Bulla. (*Id.*, Vol. VII, Tab 23, at 1346.)² On December 7, 2015, Centennial
12 Hills and UHS paid the \$18,000.00 in monetary sanctions. (*Id.*, Vol. XVII,
13 Tab 83, at 3254-3255.)³

14 The Sanction Order also included harsh findings against Centennial
15 Hills and UHS, including, but not limited to, the following.

16 ² The District Court approved and signed Commissioner Bulla’s Report
17 and Recommendations on August 15, 2015. (*Id.*, Vol. VII, Tab 23, at 1314.)

18 ³ Appellants did not contest payment of the monetary sanctions *at that*
time, and instead complied with that aspect of the Sanction Order in order to
continue litigating. As explained in detail below, the monetary portion of the
Sanction Order was preserved for appeal despite the payment.

- “Centennial [and UHS] intentionally and willfully (a) violated its discovery obligations under NRCP 16.1....” (*Id.*, Vol. VII, Tab 23, at 1311.)
- Centennial and UHS “unfairly and wrongfully inflicted” extreme prejudice upon Plaintiff. (*Id.* at 1312.)
- “Centennial’s failure to comply with its NRCP 16.1 obligations was material, substantial, and extremely prejudicial to Plaintiff Jane Doe.” (*Id.* at 1331.)
- “Centennial provided false discovery responses under oath, designed to mislead this Court.” (*Id.* at 1334.)
- “The discovery abuse was indeed extreme, and warrants a very severe sanction against Defendant Centennial.” (*Id.* at 1336).
- “Centennial is the party that elected to hide evidence to prevent Jane Doe from adjudicating its claim on the merits.” (*Id.* at 1344.)
- “The misconduct in this case is clearly that of Centennial, to an equal or greater extent that [sic] its lawyers.” (*Id.*)

On February 29, 2016, following a global settlement between the parties, the District Court entered an Order dismissing “each and every claim”

1 with prejudice. (*Id.*, Vol. X, Tab 32, at 1858). Each party (including Doe) and
2 the District Court agreed to the following:

3 [T]he Parties hereby stipulate and agree that,
4 notwithstanding the dismissal of this matter and the
5 terms of the Settlement Agreement and Release
6 between the Parties, Centennial Hills and Hall Prangle
7 & Schoonveld hereby preserve their right to appeal the
8 November 4, 2015 Order Striking Answer of
9 Defendant Valley Health System LLC as Sanction for
10 Discovery Misconduct (the “November Order”), along
11 with the associated December 10, 2015 Order Denying
12 Motion for Reconsideration (the “December Order”)
13 (the November Order and the December Order are
14 jointly referred to as the “Sanction Order”). This Court
15 shall retain jurisdiction over this matter until thirty days
16 following resolution of the appeal.

11 (*Id.*) Consistent with the February 29, 2016 Stipulation and Order, the terms
12 of the Settlement Agreement and Release do not preclude Appellants from
13 appealing the Sanction Order and do not release Appellants’ right to seek
14 reimbursement of the monetary sanctions that were paid on December 7,
15 2015.⁴

16 ///

17 _____
18 ⁴ The Settlement Agreement and Release is confidential and therefore has
not been filed with the Court. If the Court requests a copy, Appellants will
immediately file it under seal.

III. ARGUMENT

A. The Future Adverse Impact of the Sanction Order Requires a Decision on the Merits of the Appeal.

The justiciability of an appeal includes whether or not the appeal is moot. *Personhood Nevada v. Bristol*, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010). “[A] controversy must be present through all stages of the proceeding....” *Id.* However, sanction orders are analyzed differently with respect to mootness. For example, this Court has repeatedly permitted attorneys to seek review of sanction orders by extraordinary writs regardless of whether or not they affect the underlying litigation. *See Watson Rounds v. Dist. Ct.*, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 79, 358 P.3d 228, 231 (2015); *Office of Washoe County Dist. Atty. v. Dist. Ct.*, 116 Nev. 629, 635, 5 P.3d 562, 566 (2000); *Albany v. Arcata Associates, Inc.*, 106 Nev. 688, 690 n. 1, 799 P.3d 566, 567 n. 1 (1990). Federal courts also allow attorneys to challenge sanction orders by direct appeal recognizing the stigma and reputational damage of such findings. *See U.S. v. Taleo*, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); *Butler v. Biocore Med. Tech., Inc.*, 348 F.3d 1163, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 2003); *Adams v. Ford Motor Co.*, 653 F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 1999); *Walker v. City of*

1 *Mesquite, Tex.*, 129 F.3d 831, 832 (5th Cir. 1997).

2 Although few courts have addressed the injurious effect of a sanction on
3 a party (as opposed to an attorney), two courts have permitted a party to
4 pursue an appeal of a sanction (along with its attorney) following settlement of
5 the underlying case. *See Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Central, Inc.*, 580
6 F.3d 119, 133 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Appellants respond that the settlements did not
7 moot the appeals because the Appellants experienced (and continue to
8 experience) reputational harm. This court’s precedent supports Appellants’
9 position.”); *Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 965 F.2d 597, 600 (8th Cir. 1992).

10 Based on the authority above, as well as Nevada’s approach to
11 discovery sanctions, this Court should permit appellate review of harsh
12 sanctions against parties (not just attorneys) regardless of whether or not the
13 underlying case has been settled. As reflected in the Sanction Order, Nevada
14 adopted the following non-exhaustive factors for the issuance of discovery
15 sanctions.

16 The factors a court may properly consider include, but
17 are not limited to, the degree of willfulness of the
18 offending party, the extent to which the non-offending
party would be prejudiced by a lesser sanction, the
severity of the sanction of dismissal relative to the

1 severity of the discovery abuse, whether any evidence
2 has been irreparably lost, the feasibility and fairness of
3 alternative, less severe sanctions, such as an order
4 deeming facts relating to improperly withheld or
5 destroyed evidence to be admitted by the offending
6 party, the policy favoring adjudication on the merits,
7 whether sanctions unfairly operate to penalize a party
8 for the misconduct of his or her attorney, and the need
9 to deter both the parties and future litigants from
10 similar abuses.

11 *Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc.*, 106 Nev. 88, 93, 787 P.2d 777, 780

12 (1990). The first and last factors are particularly relevant. The Nevada

13 Supreme Court previously affirmed the consideration of prior discovery

14 misconduct in the same action in order to measure the level of willfulness (the

15 first factor). *See, e.g., Foster v. Dingwall*, 126 Nev. 56, 65, 227 P.3d 1042,

16 1049 (2010) (“[W]e conclude that appellants’ continued discovery abuses and

17 failure to comply with the district court’s first sanction order evidences their

18 willful and recalcitrant disregard of the judicial process....”). California

courts have done the same. *See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL*

Administrators, Inc., 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 200, (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he

sanctioned party’s history as a repeat offender is not only relevant, but also

significant, in deciding whether to impose terminating sanctions.”). This

rationale would likewise allow a district court to consider sanctions from prior cases in order to analyze the level of sanction needed for deterrence (the last factor).

Thus, if Centennial Hills and/or UHS are accused of discovery misconduct in future litigation (a common occurrence regardless of diligence), they will be forced to explain the circumstances of the Sanction Order and to try to convince the Court that it should not be considered with respect to that discovery dispute.⁵ As shown above, the Sanction Order includes numerous findings that are extremely damaging to Appellants' reputation. For the reasons set forth in Appellants' Opening Brief, those findings are factually inaccurate and are based on incorrect applications of the law. Yet, without appellate review, Appellants face the daunting task of attempting to explain this Sanction Order time and time again in future litigation. Just like an attorney who has the right to redress reputational damage through an extraordinary writ, parties should not be forced to forego settlement in order to

⁵ To be sure, the District Court issued the Sanction Order, in part, "to deter further misconduct by Centennial." (AA, Vol. VII, Tab 23, at 1345.) If the District Court had been aware of a sanction against Appellants from a prior case, it would have undoubtedly factored that into its analysis and used it as a basis for an even harsher sanction.

1 ensure they have the right to appeal a wrongful sanction. Because the
2 Sanction Order presents the risk of collateral damage in future litigation, the
3 Sanction Order is a live controversy and was not mooted by the global
4 settlement. *See Am. Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Equitable Life*
5 *Assur. Society of the U.S.*, 406 F.3d 867, 876-77 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that
6 an appeal was not moot because the party faced adverse consequences from
7 the discovery sanction even though the underlying case was dismissed).

8 **B. The Appeal of the Sanction Order Includes a Live Controversy of**
9 **\$18,000.00 in Monetary Sanctions.**

10 As described above, the Sanction Order included the District Court's
11 affirmance of \$18,000.00 in monetary sanctions against Appellants (\$9,000.00
12 to Doe and \$9,000.00 to a non-party). Despite Appellants' payment of
13 \$18,000.00 on December 7, 2015, this Court has the authority to order
14 reimbursement of that payment. *Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc.*, 142
15 F.3d 1041, 1057 (7th Cir. 1998). As stated by the Seventh Circuit:

16 We have said that when a party or its counsel are
17 sanctioned in the course of litigation, immediate
18 payment of the sanction is the cost the two must bear
for the privilege of continuing to litigate. The propriety
of the sanction may then be challenged on appeal once

1 there is a final decision in the case, even if that is long
2 after the sanction was paid. Payment of the sanction
3 does not moot the appeal because the appellate court
4 can fashion effective relief to the appellant by ordering
5 that the sum paid in satisfaction of the sanction be
6 returned.

7 *Id.* (internal citations omitted). Thus, Appellants’ payment of the monetary
8 sanctions did not moot the appeal. *Id.*

9 Further, the global settlement between the parties did not moot the
10 appeal because it did not preclude Appellants from seeking reimbursement of
11 the monetary sanctions. *See Lasar v. Ford Motor Co.*, 399 F.3d 1101, 1108-
12 09 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Ford therefore has a stake in the outcome of our
13 evaluation of the legality of the monetary sanctions that were made payable to
14 the district court. This issue is not moot.”). Specifically, following the
15 execution of the Settlement Agreement and Release, each and every party
16 (including Doe) and the District Court agreed that Appellants shall have the
17 right to appeal the Sanction Order, which included the \$18,000.00 in monetary
18 sanctions.⁶ As a result, that portion of the Sanction Order remains a live
19 controversy for this Court’s appellate review.

20 ⁶ Likewise, the Settlement Agreement and Release does not include a
21 release of Appellants’ right to seek reimbursement of any portion of the

IV. CONCLUSION

The appeal is not moot for two reasons. First, the Sanction Order will undoubtedly harm Appellants in future discovery disputes considering the severity of the findings and the relevancy of deterrence under *Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc.* Second, this Court has the authority to reverse the Sanction Order and direct reimbursement of the \$18,000.00 monetary sanction paid to Doe and to a non-party.

DATED this 7th day of September, 2017.

BAILEY ♦ KENNEDY

By: /s/ Dennis L. Kennedy
DENNIS L. KENNEDY
JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN
JOSHUA P. GILMORE

AND

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC
MICHAEL E. PRANGLE
KENNETH M. WEBSTER
JOHN F. BEMIS

Attorneys for Appellants

monetary sanctions, including the \$9,000.00 paid to Doe and the \$9,000.00 paid to a non-party.

NRAP 28.2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5), and the type-style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because:

[x] This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in Times New Roman font 14.

2. I further certify that this brief complies with the page- or type-volume limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is:

[x] Proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and contains 2,126 words.

3. Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the

1 transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found.

2 I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the
3 accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada
4 Rules of Appellate Procedure.

5 DATED this 7th day of September, 2017.

6 BAILEY ♦ KENNEDY

7
8 By: /s/ Dennis L. Kennedy
DENNIS L. KENNEDY
JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN
JOSHUA P. GILMORE

9 AND

10 HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC
11 MICHAEL E. PRANGLE
KENNETH M. WEBSTER
JOHN F. BEMIS

12 *Attorneys for Appellants*
13
14
15
16
17
18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY❖KENNEDY and that on the 7th day of September, 2017, service of the foregoing **APPELLANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF** was made by electronic service through Nevada Supreme Court's electronic filing system and/or by depositing a true and correct copy in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, and addressed to the following at their last known addresses:

Robert E. Murdock, Esq.
Eckley M. Keach, Esq.
KEACH MURDOCK, LTD.
521 South Third Street
Las Vegas, NV 89101

Email: lasvegasjustice@aol.com
emkeach@yahoo.com
KeachMurdock2@gmail.com

Attorneys for Respondent and Real
Party in Interest

STATE OF NEVADA
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
ADAM PAUL LAXALT
KETAN D. BHIRUD
JORDAN T. SMITH
555 East Washington Avenue
Suite 3900
Las Vegas, NV 89101

Email: kbhirud@ag.nv.gov
jsmith@ag.nv.gov

Attorneys for the Honorable Richard
Scotti, Respondent

/s/ Sharon L. Murnane
Sharon L. Murnane, an Employee of
Bailey❖Kennedy