IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA CASE NO. 70504

Electronically Filed Nov 20 2018 10:26 a.m.

JAMES NALDER, GUARDIAN AD LITEM ON BEHALF OF INSTITUTION NALDER; AND GARY LEWIS, INDIVIDUAL Office of Supreme Court Appellants,

v.

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

APPENDIX TO RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERING BRIEF TO SECOND CERTIFIED QUESTION VOLUME II

Ninth Circuit Case No. 13-17441 U.S.D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01348-RCJ-GWF

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APPENDIX

Date	DOCUMENT	Appendix Page Number
10/19/18	Notice of Entry of Order on Intervenor United Automobile Insurance Company's Motion to Intervene, <i>Cheyenne Nalder v. Gary Lewis</i> , Case No. A-18-77220-C	APPX 0112 – APPX 0115
12/12/2018	UAIC's Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to NRC 60, James Nalder v. Gary Lewis, Case No. 07A549111	APPX 0116 – APPX 0156
10/19/2018	UAIC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint & Motion for Court to Deny Stipulation to Enter Judgment between Plaintiff and Lewis and/or, in the Alternative to Stay Same Pending Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, <i>Cheyenne Nalder v. Gary Lewis</i> , Case No. A-18-772220-C	APPX 0157 – APPX 0270
8/10/2018	Correspondence to Tommy Christensen, Esq. from Stephen Rogers, Esq.	APPX 0271 – APPX 0292
8/13/2018	Correspondence to Stephen Rogers, Esq. from Tommy Christensen	APPX 0293 – APPX 0294
9/12/2018	Stipulation to Enter Judgment, <i>Cheyenne Nalder v. Gary Lewis</i> , Case No. A-18-77220-C	APPX 0295 – APP 0298

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Attorneys for Intervenor United Automobile Ins. Co.

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CHEYANNE NALDER,

Plaintiff,

VS.

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GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-18-772220-C DEPT. NO.: XXIX

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER ON INTERVENOR UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION TO INTERVENE

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the attached **ORDER ON INTERVENOR**UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION TO INTERVENE was entered by the Court on the 19th day of October, 2018.

DATED this 19th day of October, 2018.

ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD

Matthew J. Douglas // Nevada Bar No. 11371 1117 South Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

Attorneys for Intervenor United Automobile Ins. Co.

Page 1 of 2

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APPX0112

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18.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this 19th day of October, 2018, the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY		
ORDER ON INTERVENOR UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY'S		
MOTION TO INTERVENE was served on the following by [] Electronic Service pursuant to		
NEFR 9 [X] Electronic Filing and Service pursuant to NEFR 9 - to all counsel on the service lis		
[] hand delivery [] overnight delivery [] fax [] fax and mail [X] mailing by depositing with		
the U.S. mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope with first class postage		
prepaid, addressed as follows:		

David Stephens, Esq. STEPHENS & BYWATER, P.C. 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, NV 89130

Randall Tindall, Esq. Carissa Christensen, Esq. RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. 8925 West Russell Road Suite 220 Las Vegas, NV 89148

Breen Arntz, Esq. 5545 S. Mountain Vista St. Suite F Las Vegas, NV 89120

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Steven D. Grierson
CLERK OF THE COURT
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MATTHEW J. DOUGLAS
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Attorneys for Intervenor United Automobile Insurance Company

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CHEYANNE NALDER,

CASE NO.: A-18-772220-C

DEPT. NO.: 29

Plaintiff,

vs.

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GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V, inclusive,

Defendants.

ORDER

Intervenor UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY'S Motion to Intervene came on for hearing on the Chambers Calendar before the Honorable Judge David Jones, on September 19, 2018, and upon review of and consideration of the proceedings and circumstances of this matter, the papers and pleadings on file, and for good cause appearing,

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Page 1 of 2

APPX0114

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Intervenor UNITED AUTOMBILE INSURANCE COMPANY'S Motion to Intervene is GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Intervenor UNITED AUTOMBILE INSURANCE COMPANY'S shall file its responsive pleading within seven (7) days from the date of entry of this Order.

DATED this // day of October 2018

Submitted by:

ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD

Matthew J. Douglas Nevada Bar No.1137/1 1117 South Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Intervenor UNITED

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

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Intervenor.

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Attorneys for Intervenor United Automobile Insurance Company

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JAMES NALDER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V, inclusive,

Defendants,

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

CASE NO.: 07A549111 DEPT. NO.: XXIX

UAIC'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO NRCP 60

COMES NOW, UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter referred to as "UAIC"), by and through its attorney of record, ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD and hereby brings its Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to NRCP 60(b), asking that this Court declare as void the Amended Judgment entered on March 28, 2018, because the underlying Judgment expired on 2014 and is snot capable of being revived.

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This Motion s made and based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein, the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto, and such oral argument as the Court
may permit.
may permit. DATED this day of CAUBEL

ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD

Matthew J. Douglas Nevada Bar No. 11371 1117 South Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Intervenor UAIC

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: ANY AND ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO NRCP 60 for hearing before the above-entitled Department XXIX on the 12 day of December at the hour of 9:00 a. m. in the forenoon of said date, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD

Matthew Douglas, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11371 117 South Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Intervenor UAIC

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Court made a mistake of law based on incomplete/incorrect facts presented in and Ex Parte Motion to Amended Judgment, when entering the Oder granting the Motion on March 28, 2018. The judgment which Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder ("Cheyenne") moved to amend was entered on June 3, 2008. The judgment creditor, Cheyenne's guardian ad litem, James Nalder, did not renew the Judgment as required By Nevada Law before it expired on June 3, 2014, six (6) years after it was entered.

The Amended Judgment ostensibly revived the expired Judgment, despite the fact that Cheyenne presented this Court with no legal support for such revival. Cheyenne's Motion proposes that tolling provisions applicable to causes of action are also applicable to the deadlines to renew judgments. However, none of the authority cited in her Motion supports misappropriating tolling provisions applicable to certain causes of action to extend the time to renew a judgment, nor does any other authority. Pursuant to NRCP 60, the Court should declare that the Amended Judgment is void and that the original judgment has expired, and therefore is not enforceable.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case involves a July 8, 2007 accident, Cheyenne Nalder, ("Cheyenne") who was then a minor, alleged injuries. On October 9, 2007, Cheyenne's guardian ad litem, James Nalder, filed a Complaint against Gary Lewis ("Lewis"). See Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit "A."

UAIC, the putative insurer for Lewis, initially denied coverage due to a lapse in

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coverage¹. Lewis did not respond to the Complaint and a default was taken against him. Id. On June 3, 2008.² a judgment was entered against him in the amount of \$3.5 million. See Judgment attached hereto as Exhibit "B". James Nalder as guardian ad litem for Cheyenne was the judgment creditor. Id. NRS 11.190(1)(a) provides that a judgment expires in six (6) years, unless it is timely renewed. As such, the Judgment expired on June 3, 2014.

On March 22, 2018 nearly 10 years after the Judgment was entered, and nearly four (4) years after it expired, Cheyenne filed an "Ex Parte Motion to Amend Judgment in the Name of Cheyenne Nalder, Individually" ("Ex Parte Motion") in her personal injury case, Case No. A-07-54911-C. See Exhibit "C." Her Motion did not advise the Court that the Judgment she sought to amend had expired. Rather, it cited two statutes, NRS 11280 and 11.300, without explaining why they were applicable to her request, and asked the Court to amend the Judgment to be in her name alone. In short, the Court was not put on notice that it was being asked to ostensibly revive an expired judgment. Id.

With an incomplete account of the issues presented, the Court granted Cheyenne's Ex Parte Motion and issued an Amended Judgment on March 28, 2018 which was filed with a Notice of Entry on May 18, 2018. See Exhibit "D."

As the judgment had expired and an Amended Judgment could not be issued to revive it. UAIC brings the instant Motion pursuant to NRCP 60(b), as it has now been found to be the insurer of Lewis under an implied policy and, thus, has an interest in this matter, and seeks to avoid the Amended Judgment and declare that the original Judgment has expired.

¹ Later, during the subsequent action against UAIC (which remains on appeal in the Ninth Circuit for the U.S. Court of Appeals and, currently, on a 2nd certified question to the Nevada Supreme Court) the Court found an ambiguity in the renewal statement for Lewis' policy and, accordingly, implied a policy of insurance for Lewis' \$15,000 policy limits in December 2013. Importantly, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed their was no "bad faith" on the part of UAIC. Regardless, per the orders of the Federal District Court and Ninth Circuit, UAIC has now been found to be Lewis' insurer, under this implied policy.

² Judgments are entered when filed, not when a Notice of Entry is made. NRCP 58(c).

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III.

ARGUMENT

A. The Judgment Expired on June 3, 2014

Nevada law provides that the statute of limitations for execution upon a judgment is six(6) years. NRS 11.190(1)(b). The judgment creditor may renew a judgment (and therefore the statute of limitation) for an additional six years by following the procedure mandated by NRS 17.214. The mandated procedures were not followed. Therefore the judgment expired.

NRS 17.214(1)(a) sets forth the procedure that must ne followed to renew a judgment. A document titled "Affidavit of Renewal" containing specific information outlined in the statute must be filed with the clerk of the court where the judgment is filed within 90 days before the date the judgment expires. Here, the Affidavit of Renewal was required to be filed by March 5, 2014. No such Affidavit of Renewal was filed by James Nalder, the judgement creditor. Cheyenne was still a minor on March 5, 2014. The Affidavit of Renewal must also be recorded if the original judgment was recorded, and the judgment debtor must be served. No evidence of recordation (if such was required) or service on Lewis is present in the record.

The Nevada Supreme Court, in Leven v Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 168 P.3d 712 (2007), held that judgment creditors must strictly comply with the procedure set forth in NRS 17.214 in order to validly renew a judgment. Id. At 405-408, 168 P.3d 717-719. There is no question that neither Cheyenne nor her guardian ad litem did so. Therefore the Judgment expired.

1. The deadline to renew the Judgment was not tolled by any statute or rule

In her Ex Parte Motion, Cheyenne suggested that the deadlines mandated by NRS 17.214 were somehow extended because certain statutes of information can be tolled for causes of action under some circumstances. No such tolling applies to renewal of a judgment because renewal of a judgment is not a cause of action.

The introduction to NRS 11.090, the statute of limitation law, states that it applies to: APPX0120

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"...actions other than those from the recovery of real property, unless further limited by specific statute..." The list which follows includes various causes of action for which suit can be brought. Nowhere in the list is renewing a judgment defined as or analogized to a cause of action.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that actions to enforce a judgment fall under the six year "catch all" provision of NRS 11.090(1)(a). Leven at 403, 168 P.3d at 715 ("An action on a judgment or its renewal must be commenced within six years under NRS 11.190 (1) (a); thus a judgment expires by limitation in six years"). In summary, neither statute, NRS 11.190 nor NRS 17.214, provides for any tolling of the time period to renew a judgment.

2. The deadline to renew the Judgment was not tolled by Cheyenne's minority

Setting aside the fact that the deadline to renew a judgment is not an action to which statutes of limitation/tolling apply, Cheyenne's proposition that the deadlines set forth in NRS 17.214 were tolled by her minority are inapt for a few reasons. First, the tolling statute cited by Cheyenne, NRS 11.280, does not universally toll all statutes of limitations while a plaintiff is a minor. Rather, it is expressly limited to actions involving sales of probate estates.

Legal disability prevents running of statute. NRS 11.260 and 11.270 shall not apply to minors or others under any legal disability to sue at the time when the right of action first accrues, but all such persons may commence an action at any time within 1 year after the removal of the disability.

Emphasis added. NRS 11.260 applies to actions to recover an estate sold by a guardian. NRS 11.270 applies to actions to recover estates sold by an executor or administrator. Neither of those causes of action are at issue here. Therefore, NRS 11.260 would not authorize tolling the deadline for the renewal of a judgment while a judgment creditor was a minor. This statute would not apply in any instance because the judgment creditor, James, was not a minor, and so did not have a legal disability.

On March 5, 2014, the deadline to file the Affidavit of Renewal, Cheyenne was still a APPX0121

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minor. The judgment creditor was her guardian ad litem James Nalder. It was James Nalder, not Cheyenne, who had the responsibility to file the Affidavit of Renewal by the March 5, 2014 deadline. The fact that Cheyenne, the real party in interest was a minor is not legally relevant.

As Cheyenne was not the judgment creditor at any time prior to the date of the issuance of the Amended Judgment, anyone looking at the Judgment would believe that it expired on June 4, 2014, since there was no Affidavit of Renewal filed. If Cheyenne's apparent argument were given credence, either the judgment never expired, because she was the real party in interest and was a minor at the time, the Judgment would have otherwise expired, or the judgment did expire but was revived upon her reaching the age of majority. To adopt this proposition would frustrate the certainty NRS 17.214 was enacted to promote - the reliability of the title to real property.

If tolling of deadlines to amend judgments were sanctioned, title to real property owned by anyone who had ever been a judgment debtor would be clouded, as a title examiner would not know whether a judgment issued more that six years prior had expired pursuant to statute, or was still valid, or could be revived when a real party in interest who was a minor reached the age of majority. As the court held in *Leven*, one of the primary reasons for the need to strictly comply with NRS 17.214's recordation requirement is to "procure reliability of the title searches for both creditors and debtors since any lien on real property created when a judgment is recorded continues upon that judgment's proper renewal." Id. At 408-409, 168 P.3d 712, 719. Compliance with the notice requirement of NRS 17.124 is important to preserve the due process rights of the judgment debtor. Id. If a judgment debtor is not provided with notice of the renewal of a Judgment, he may believe that the judgment has expired and he need take no further action to defend himself against execution.

3. Lewis' residency in California did not toll the deadline to renew the Judgment

Cheyenne's Ex Parte Motion next cites NRS 11.3000, which provides "If, when the cause of action shall accrue against a person, the person is out of State, the action may be commenced

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within the time herein limited after the person's return to the State; and if after the cause of action shall have accrued the person departs from the State, the time of the absence shall not be part of the time prescribed for the commencement of the action." Cheyenne's argument that the deadline to renew the Judgment are tolled by NRS 11.300 fails because, again renewing a judgment is not a cause of action. As the Supreme Court of North Dakota, a state with similar statutes to Nevada regarding judgments, held in F/S Manufacturing v Kensmore, 789 N.W.2d 853 (N.D. 2011), "Because the statutory procedure for renewal by affidavit is not a separate action to renew the judgment, the specific time period[provided to renew] cannot be tolled under [the equivalent to NRS 11.300] based on a judgment debtor's absence for the state." Id. At 858.

In addition, applying Cheyenne's argument that the time to renew a judgment was tolled because of the judgment debtor's absence from Nevada would have a similarly negative impact on the ability for property owners to obtain clear title to their property. Nothing on a judgment would reflect whether a judgment debtor was outside of the state and a facially expired judgment was still valid. Therefore, essentially, a responsible title examiner would have to list any judgment that had ever been entered against a property owner on the title insurance policy, because he could not be sure the judgments older that six years for which no affidavit of renewal had been filed were expired or the expiration was tolled.

B. The Court made an Error of Law, Likely Based on Mistake of Fact, When it Granted the Ex Parte Motion to Amend Judgment

NRCP 60(b) allows this Court to relieve a party from a final judgment due to mistake (NRCP 60(b)(1) or because a judgment is void (NRCP 60(b)(4). Both of these provisions apply.

1. The Court mad a mistake of law when it granted the Amended Judgment

Because the Ex Parte Motion was ex parte, it was not served on Lewis or UAIC nor did Lewis or UAIC have an opportunity to make the Court aware that the Judgment had already expired on its own terms, and that Cheyenne's position that the deadline to renew the judgment

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was tolled was inapt. The Ex Parte Motion did not advise the Court that the Judgment had expired in 2014 and had not been properly renewed. Had the court been fully apprised of the facts, it likely would not have granted the Ex Parte Motion. Since the Amended Judgment was entered on March 28, 2018, and the Notice of Entry not filed until May 18, 2018, a motion to set aside the amended judgment on the basis of mistake is timely as it is made within six months of the entry of the judgment. Accordingly, this Motion is timely and this Court should rectify the mistake and void the Amended Judgment in accordance with NRCP 60(b)(1).

The Amended Judgment is void.

As demonstrated above, the Judgment expired. It was not renewed. There is no legal or equitable basis for the Court to revive it. The six-month deadline does not apply to requests for relief from a judgment because the judgment is void. Therefore, the instant motion is timely. The Amended Judgment is void and, pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(4) this Court should declare it void and unenforceable.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Since the Judgment expired in 2014, the Amended Judgment should not have been issued. It should be voided, and the Court should declare that the Judgment has expired.

day of (1/2006 , 2018. DATED this

ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD

Matthew Douglas, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11371 1117 S. Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for UAIC

A TKIN WINNER A SHERROD

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this day of October, 2018, the foregoing UAIC'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO NRCP 60 was served on the following by Electronic Service pursuant to NEFR 9 Electronic Filing and Service pursuant to NEFR 9 hand delivery [] fax [] fax and mail mailing by depositing with the U.S. mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope with first class postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

David Stephens, Esq. STEPHENS & BYWATER, P.C. 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, NV 89130

Randall Tindall, Esq. Carissa Christensen, Esq. RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. 8925 West Russell Road Suite 220 Las Vegas, NV 89148

An employee of ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD

EXHIBIT "A"

Case 2:09 cv-01348-RCJ-GWF	Document 89-9	Filed 03/26/18:	RageBof406
Case 2.05 CV 020 10 NO - 11			•

- 2. That Plaintiff, Gary Lewis, was at all times relevant to this action a resident of the County of Clark, State of Nevada.
- 3. That Defendant, United Automobile Insurance Co. (hereinafter "UAI"), was at all times relevant to this action an automobile insurance company duly authorized to act as an insurer in the State of Nevada and doing business in Clark County, Nevada.
- 4. That the true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, partnership, associate or otherwise, of Defendants, DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS I through V, are unknown to Plaintiffs, who therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that each of the Defendants designated herein as DOE or ROE CORPORATION is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings referred to and caused damages proximately to Plaintiffs as herein alleged, and that Plaintiffs will ask leave of this Court to amend this Complaint to insert the true names and capacities of DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS I through V, when the same have been ascertained, and to join such Defendants in this action.
- 5. That, at all times relevant hereto, Gary Lewis was the owner of a certain 1996 Chevy Silverado with vehicle identification number 1GCEC19M6TE214944 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Vehicle").
- 6. That Gary Lewis had in effect on July 8, 2007, a policy of automobile insurance on the Plaintiff's Vehicle with Defendant, UAI (the "Policy"); that the Policy provides certain benefits to Cheyanne Nalder as specified in the Policy; and the Policy included liability coverage in the amount of \$15,000.00/\$30,000.00 per occurrence (hereinafter the "Policy Limits").

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	.7.	That Gary L	ewis paid hi	is monthly	premium	to UAI for	the po	licy pe	riod of June	: 30
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)	2007 t	hrough July 3	1, 2007.							

- 8. That on July 8, 2007 on Bartolo Rd in Clark County Nevada, Cheyenne Nalder was a pedestrian in a residential area, Plaintiff's vehicle being operated by Gary Lewis when Gary Lewis drove over top of Cheyanne Nalder causing serious personal injuries and damages to Cheyanne Nalder.
- 9. That Cheyanne Nalder made a claim to UAI for damages under the terms of the Policy due to her personal injuries.
- 10. That Cheyanne Nalder offered to settle his claim for personal injuries and damages against Gary Lewis within the Policy Limits, and that Defendants, and each of them, refused to settle the claim of Cheyanne Nalder against Gary Lewis within the Policy Limits and in fact denied the claim all together indicating Gary Lewis did not have coverage at the time of the accident.
- 11. That Plaintiff, Gary Lewis has duly performed all the conditions, provisions and terms of the Policy relating to the loss sustained by Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalder, and has furnished and delivered to the Defendants, and each of them, full and complete particulars of said loss and have fully complied with all of the provisions of the Policy relating to the giving of notice of said loss, and have duly given all other notices required to be given by the Plaintiffs under the terms of the Policy, including paying the monthly premium.
- 12. That Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalder, is a third party beneficiary under the Policy as well as a Judgment Creditor of Gary Lewis and is entitled to pursue action against the Defendants directly under Hall v. Enterprise Leasing Co., West, 122 Nev. 685, 137 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2006), as well as Denham v. Farmers Insurance Company, 213 Cal.App.3d 1061, 262 Cal.Rptr. 146 (1989).

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- 1 13. That Cheyanne Nalder conveyed to UAI her willingness to settle her claim against Gary
- 2 Lewis at or within the policy limits of \$15,000.00 provided they were paid in a commercially
- 3 reasonable manner.
- 4 14. That Cheyanne Nalder and Gary Lewis cooperated with UAI in its investigation
- 5 | including but not limited to providing a medical authorization to UAI on or about August 2,
- 6 2007.
- 7 15. That on or about August 6, 2007 UAI mailed to Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalders' attorney,
- 8 Christensen Law Offices, a copy of "Renewal Policy Declaration Monthly Nevada Personal
- 9 Auto Policy" for Gary Lewis with a note that indicated "There was a gap in coverage".
- 10 16. That on or about October 10, 2007 UAI mailed to Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalders'
- 11 attorney, Christensen Law Offices, a letter denying coverage.
 - 17. That on or about October 23, 2007, Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalder provided a copy of the
- 13 | complaint filed against UAI's insured Gary Lewis.
 - 18. That on or about November 1, 2007, UAI mailed to Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalders'
- attorney, Christensen Law Offices, another letter denying coverage.
- 16 19. That UAI denied coverage stating Gary Lewis had a "lapse in coverage" due to non-
- 17 payment of premium.
- 18 20. That UAI denied coverage for non-renewal.
- 19 21. That UAI mailed Gary Lewis a "renewal statement" on or about June 11, 2007 that
- 20 indicated UAI's intention to renew Gary Lewis' policy.
- 21 | 22. That upon receiving the "renewal statement", which indicated UAI's intention to renew
- 22 Gary Lewis' policy, Gary Lewis made his premium payment and procured insurance coverage
- 23 with UAI.

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- 1 . 23. That UAI was required under the law to provide insurance coverage under the policy
- 2 Gary Lewis had with UAI for the loss suffered by Cheyenne Nalder, and was under an
- 3 | obligation to defend Gary Lewis and to indemnify Gary Lewis up to and including the policy
- 4 | limit of \$15,000.00, and to settle Cheyyene's claim at or within the \$15,000.00 policy limit
- 5 when given an opportunity to do so.
- 6 24. That UAI never advised Lewis that Nalder was willing to settle Nalder's claim against
- 7 Lewis for the sum of \$15,000.00.
- 8 25. UAI did not timely evaluate the claim nor did it tender the policy limits.

services of an attorney to pursue his rights under her claim against Lewis.

- Due to the dilatory tactics and failure of UAI to protect their insured by paying the policy limits when given ample opportunity to do so, Plaintiff, Nalder, was forced to seek the
 - 27. Due to the dilatory tactics and failure of UAI to protect their insured by paying the policy limits when given ample opportunity to do so, Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalder, was forced to file a complaint on October 9, 2007 against Gary Lewis for her personal injuries and damages suffered in the July 8, 2007 automobile accident.
 - 28. The filing of the complaint caused additional expense and aggravation to both Cheyanne Nalder and Gary Lewis.
- 18 29. Cheyanne Nalder procured a Judgment against Gary Lewis in the amount of \$3,500,000.00.
- 20 30. UAI refused to protect Gary Lewis and provide Gary Lewis with a legal defense to the lawsuit filed against Gary Lewis by Cheyanne Nalder.
- That Defendants, and each of them, are in breach of contract by their actions which include, but are not limited to:




-						
	a.	Unreason	able condi	act in inv	estigating t	he loss;

- b. Unreasonable failure to provide coverage for the loss;
- c. Unreasonable delay in making payment on the loss;
- d. Failure to make a prompt, fair and equitable settlement for the loss;
- e. Unreasonably compelling Plaintiffs to retain an attorney before making payment on the loss.
- 32. As a proximate result of the aforementioned breach of contract, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer in the future, damages in the amount of \$3,500,000.00 plus continuing interest.
- 33. As a further proximate result of the aformentioned breach of contract, Plaintiffs have suffered anxiety, worry, mental and emotional distress, and other incidental damages and out of pocket expenses, all to their general damage in excess of \$10,000.00.
- 34. As a further proximate result of the breach of contract, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain legal counsel to prosecute this claim, and Defendants, and each of them, are liable for their attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection therewith.
- 35. That Defendants, and each of them, owed a duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.
- 36. That Defendants, and each of them, were unreasonable by refusing to cover the true value of the claim of Cheyanne Nalder, wrongfully failing to settle within the Policy Limits when they had an opportunity to do so, and wrongfully denying coverage.
- 37. That as a proximate result of the aforementioned breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer in the future, damages in the amount of \$3,500,000.00 plus continuing interest.

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	38. That as a further proximate result of the aformentioned breach of the implied covenant
:	of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs have suffered anxiety, worry, mental and emotional
	distress, and other incidental damages and out of pocket expenses, all to their general damage
	in excess of \$10,000.00.

- 39. That as a further proximate result of the aforementioned breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain legal counsel to prosecute this claim, and Defendants, and each of them, are liable for their attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection therewith.
- 40. That Defendants, and each of them, acted unreasonably and with knowledge that there was no reasonable basis for its conduct, in its actions which include but are not limited to: wrongfully refusing to cover the value of the claim of Cheyanne Nalder, wrongfully failing to settle within the Policy Limits when they had an opportunity to do so and wrongfully denying the coverage.
- 41. That as a proximate result of the aforementioned bad faith, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer in the future, damages in the amount of \$3,500,000.00 plus continuing interest.
- 42. That as a further proximate result of the aformentioned bad faith, Plaintiffs have suffered anxiety, worry, mental and emotional distress, and other incidental damages and out of pocket expenses, all to their general damage in excess of \$10,000.00.
- 43. That as a further proximate result of the aforementioned bad faith, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain legal counsel to prosecute this claim, and Defendants, and each of them, are liable for their attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection therewith.



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]	44. That Defendants, and each of them, violated NRS 686A.310 by their actions, including
2	but not limited to: wrongfully refusing to cover the value of the claim of Cheyanne Nalder,
3	wrongfully failing to settle within the Policy Limits when they had an opportunity to do so and

- 45. That NRS 686A.310 requires that insurance carriers conducting business in Nevada adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies, and requires that carriers effectuate the prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability of the insurer has become reasonably clear.
- That UAI did not adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and processing of claims arising under its insurance policies, and did not effectuate the a prompt, fair and/or equitable settlement of Nalder's claim against Lewis in which liability of the insurer was very clear, and which clarity was conveyed to UAI.
- That NAC 686A.670 requires that an insurer complete an investigation of each claim within 30 days of receiving notice of the claim, unless the investigation cannot be reasonably completed within that time.
- 48: That UAI received notice of Nalder's claim against Lewis, at the very latest, on or before August 6, 2007. That it was more than reasonable for UAI to complete its investigation of Nalder's claim against Lewis well within 30 days of receiving notice of the claim.
- 19 49. That UAI did not offer the applicable policy limits.

wrongfully denying coverage.

- 20 50. That UAI did failed to investigate the claim at all and denied coverage.
 - 51. That as a proximate result of the aforementioned violation of NRS 686A.310, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer in the future, damages in the amount of \$3,500.000.00 plus continuing interest,



Ĺ	52. That as a further proximate result of the aforementioned violation of NRS 686A.310,
2	Plaintiffs have suffered anxiety, worry, mental and emotional distress, and other incidental
,	damages and out of pocket expenses, all to their general damage in excess of \$10,000.00.

- That as a further proximate result of the aforementioned violation of NRS 686A.310, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain legal counsel to prosecute this claim, and Defendants, and each of them, are liable for their attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection therewith.
- That the Defendants, and each of them, have been fraudulent in that they have stated that they would protect Gary Lewis in the event he was found liable in a claim. All of this was done in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs' rights and therefore Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, pray for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as follows:

- 1. Payment for the excess verdict rendered against Lewis which remains unpaid in an amount in excess of \$3,500,000.00;
- 2. General damages for mental and emotional distress and other incidental damages in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00;
 - 3. Attorney's fees and costs of suit incurred herein; and
 - 4. Punitive damages in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00;

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For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this

day of April, 2009.

CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC.

By:

Thomas Christensen, Esq. David F Sampson, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6811 1000 South Valley View Blvd Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

EXHIBIT "B"

JUDG DAVID F. SAMPSON, ESQ., Nevada Bar #6811 Aug 26 11 00 AH '08 THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., Nevada Bar #2326 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 (702) 870-1000 Attorney for Plaintiff, JAMES NALDER As Guardian Ad Litem for minor, CHEYENNE NALDER DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA JAMES NALDER, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for 10 CHEYENNE NALDER, a minor. 11 Plaintiffs, 12 CASE NO: A549111 VS. 13 DEPT. NO: VI GARY LEWIS, and DOES I 14 through V, inclusive ROES I 15 through V 16 Defendants. 17 18 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Judgment against Defendant, GARY LEWIS, was 19 entered in the above-entitled matter on June 2, 2008. A copy of said Judgment is attached 20 21 hereto. 22 day of June, 2008. 23 CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC 24 By: 25 DAVID P. SAMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar #6811 26 THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., Nevada Bar #2326 27 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. 28 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 Attorneys for Plaintiff

Case 2:09-cv-01348-RCJ-GWF Document 88-2 Filed 03/04/13 Page 2 of 5

1 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 3 4 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of CHRISTENSEN LAW 5 OFFICES, LLC., and that on this < day of March, 2008, I served a copy of the 6 foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT as follows: 7 8 U.S. Mail—By depositing a true copy thereof in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid and addressed as listed below; and/or 9 10 Facsimile—By facsimile transmission pursuant to EDCR 7.26 to the facsimile number(s) shown below and in the confirmation sheet filed herewith. Consent to 11 service under NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) shall be assumed unless an objection to service by 12 facsimile transmission is made in writing and sent to the sender via facsimile within 24 hours of receipt of this Certificate of Service; and/or 13 14 Hand Delivery—By hand-delivery to the addresses listed below. 15 Gary Lewis 16 5049 Spencer St. #D Las Vegas, NV 89119 17 18 An employee of CHRISTEN 19 OFFICES, LLC 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Case 2:09-cv-01348, RCJ-GWF Document 88-2 Filed 03/04/13 Page 4 of 5 1 JMT THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., Nevada Bar #2326 DAVID F. SAMPSON, ESQ., 3 1 52 PM '08 Nevada Bar #6811 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 (702) 870-1000 Attorney for Plaintiff, 6 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 JAMES NALDER, as Guardian ad Litem for 10 CHEYENNE NALDER, a minor. 11 Plaintiffs, 12 vs. CASE NO: A549111 13 DEPT. NO: VI GARY LEWIS, and DOES I 14 through V, inclusive 15 Defendants. 16 17 JUDGMENT 18 In this action the Defendant, GARY LEWIS, having been regularly served with the 19 Summons and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the 20 21 legal time for answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the 22 Default of said Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according 23 to law; upon application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as 24 follows: 25 26 27 28

as	Case 2:09-cv-01348-RCJ-GWF Document 88-2 Filed 03/04/13 Page 5 of 5
1	IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the
2	sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,444.63 in
3	pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007,
4	
5	until paid in full. DATED THIS day of May, 2008.
6	DATED THIS day of May, 2008.
7	·
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9	DISTRICT JUDGE
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11	
12	Submitted by:
13	CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC.
14	\wedge
. 15	DV.
16	BY: / DAVID SAMPSON
17	Nevada Bar #6811 1000 S. Valley View
18	Las Vegas, Nevada 89107
19	Attorney for Plaintiff
20	
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EXHIBIT "C"

Electronically Filed 3/22/2018 11:15 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT MTN 1 David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS. GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 07-A-549111 CHEYENNE NALDER, CASE NO.: -A549111 DEPT NO.: XXIX 10 Plaintiff, 11 12 GARY LEWIS, 13 Defendants. 14 EX PARTE MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT IN THE NAME OF 15 CHEYENNE NALDER, INDIVIDUALLY 16 17 Date: N/A Time: N/A 18 NOW COMES Cheyenne Nalder, by and through her attorneys at STEPHENS, GOURLEY 19 & BYWATER and moves this court to enter judgment against Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in her 20 21 name as she has now reached the age of majority. Judgment was entered in the name of the 22 guardian ad litem. (See Exhibit 1) Pursuant to NRS 11.280 and NRS 11.300, Cheyenne now moves this court to issue the judgment in her name alone (See Exhibit 2) so that she may pursue 23 collection of the same. Cheyenne turned 18 on April 4, 2016. In addition, Defendant Gary Lewis, 24 25 has been absent from the State of Nevada since at least February 2010. 26 27 28

APPX0143

Therefore, Cheyenne Nalder hereby moves this court to enter the judgment in her name of \$3,500,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full.

Dated this 19 day of March, 2018.

STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER

David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT "1"

JMT THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., Nevada Bar #2326 DAVID F. SAMPSON, ESQ., 3 1 52 PH '08 Nevada Bar #6811 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 FILED 5 (702) 870-1000 Attorney for Plaintiff, 6 7 **DISTRICT COURT** CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 JAMES NALDER, as Guardian ad Litem for 10 CHEYENNE NALDER, a minor. 11 Plaintiffs, 12 CASE NO: A549111 ٧S، 13 DEPT. NO: VI GARY LEWIS, and DOES I 14 through V, inclusive 15 Defendants. 16 17 **JUDGMENT** 18 In this action the Defendant, GARY LEWIS, having been regularly served with the 19 Summons and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the 20 21 legal time for answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the 22 Default of said Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according 23 to law; upon application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as 24 follows: 25 26 27 28

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APPX0146

 IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,444.63 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full.

DATED THIS 2 day of May, 2008.



Submitted by: CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC.

BY: / DAVID SAI

DAVID SAMPSON
Nevada Bar # 6811
1000 S. Valley View
Las Vegas, Nevada 89107
Attorney for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT "2"

3 4 5 6 7	JMT DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff T: (702) 656-2355 F: (702) 656-2776 E: dstephens@sbglawfirm.com Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder	
8	DISTRI	CT COURT
9	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA
10	V3	
11		
12	CHEYENNE NALDER,	CASE NO: A549111 DEPT. NO: XXIX
13	Plaintiff, vs.	
14		
15	GARY LEWIS,	
16	Defendant.	
17	AMENI	DED JUDGMENT
18		
19	In this action the Defendant, Gary Lewis	s, having been regularly served with the Summons
20	and having failed to appear and answer the Pla	intiff's complaint filed herein, the legal time for
21	answering having expired, and no answer or de	emurrer having been filed, the Default of said
22	Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, ha	wing been duly entered according to law; upon
23	application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereb	v entered against said Defendant as follows:
24	77	,
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2 3 4 5	IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the sum of \$3,500,000,000, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,4444.63 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full.
6	DATED this day of March, 2018.
7	
8	
9	
10	District Judge
12	Submitted by:
13	STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER
14	Da a A
15	DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902
16	STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER
17	3636 North Rancho Dr Las Vegas, Nevada 89130
18	Attorneys for Plaintiff
19	
20	
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EXHIBIT "D"

Electronically Filed 5/18/2018 3:37 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	CLERK OF THE COURT
1	NOE Dovid A Stanhans Figs
2	David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902
3	Stephens & Bywater 3636 North Rancho Drive
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355
5	Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com
6	Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder
7	DISTRICT COURT
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
9	
10	CHEYENNE NALDER,
11	Plaintiff, Case No. 07A549111
	vs. Dept. No. XXIX
12	GARY LEWIS 2
13	Defendant.
14	
15	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT
16	NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 26th day of March, 2018, the Honorable David
ا 17	M. Jones entered an AMENDED JUDGMENT, which was thereafter filed on March 28, 2018, in
18	the above entitled matter, a copy of which is attached to this Notice.
19	Dated this day of May, 2018.
20	STEPHENS & BYWATER
21	
22	Day and
23	David A. Stephens, Esq.
24	Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive
25	Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorney for Brittany Wilson
26	
27	
28	

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I am an employee of the law office of STEPHENS & BYWATER
and that on the 18th day of May, 2018, I served a true copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT, by depositing the same in a sealed envelope upon
which first class postage was fully prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Gary Lewis

733 S. Minnesota Ave. Glendora, California 91740

M/4/c/S/O,, An employee of Stephens & Bywater

3/28/2018 3:05 PM ١ Steven D, Grierson **JMT** CLERK OF THE COURT 2 DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff 5 T: (702) 656-2355 F: (702) 656-2776 6 E: dstephens@sbglawfirm.com 7 Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder 8 DISTRICT COURT ŋ CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 07A5A9111 CASE NO: A549111 CHEYENNE NALDER, 12 DEPT. NO: XXIX Plaintiff, 13 VS. 14 GARY LEWIS, 15 Defendant. 16 AMENDED JUDGMENT 17 18 In this action the Defendant, Gary Lewis, having been regularly served with the Summons 19 and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the legal time for 20 answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the Default of said 21 22 Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according to law; upon 23 application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as follows: 24 35 26 27

Case Number: 07A549111

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Electronically Filed

1 2 3 4 5 6	JMT DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff T: (702) 656-2355 F: (702) 656-2776 E: dstephens@sbglawfirm.com Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder	
8	DISTRICT C	COURT
9	CLARK COUNTY	Y, NEVADA
10		
11	CHEYENNE NALDER,	07A549111 CASE NO: A 549111
12	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO: XXIX
13	vs.	
14	GARY LEWIS,	
16	Defendant.	
17	AMENDED	JUDGMENT
18		
19	In this action the Defendant, Gary Lewis, hav	ing been regularly served with the Summons
20	and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff	's complaint filed herein, the legal time for
21	answering having expired, and no answer or demurr	er having been filed, the Default of said
22	Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having	been duly entered according to law; upon
23	application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby enter	
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IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in (\$ 3,434,4444).	the 63
Sun of \$5,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.57 in medical expenses, and \$65,555,577 in	,,
in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October	9,
2007, until paid in full.	
DATED this day of March, 2018.	
District Judge	
() The	
Ibmitted by: FEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER	
. ^	
made	
AVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. evada Bar No. 00902	
FEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER	
536 North Rancho Dr as Vegas, Nevada 89130	-
ttorneys for Plaintiff	
·	

MATTHEW J. DOUGLAS Nevada Bar No. 11371 ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD 1117 South Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Phone (702) 243-7000 Facsimile (702) 243-7059 mdouglas@awslawyers.com

Attorneys for Intervenor United Automobile Insurance Company

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CHEYANNE NALDER,

Plaintiff,

VS.

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GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V, inclusive.

Defendants,

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Intervenor.

CASE NO.: A-18-772220-C DEPT. NO.: XXIX

UAIC'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT & MOTION FOR COURT TO DENY STIPULATION TO ENTER JUDGMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND LEWIS AND/OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO STAY SAME PENDING HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

COMES NOW, UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter referred to as "UAIC"), by and through its attorney of record, ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD and hereby brings its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety and Motion for Court to Deny Entry of Stipulation to Enter Judgment as between Plaintiff and Lewis and/or, in the alternative, to Stay same pending hearing on the instant Motion. Plaintiff's personal injury claims have been previously litigated, and judgment entered. Plaintiff's request for a second amended judgment should be dismissed because the original judgment expired in 2014, was not properly renewed, and cannot be revived via an amended judgment more than four years after it expired. Moreover, Plaintiff and Lewis' collusive attempt to enter a stipulated judgment should be denied or, alternatively, stayed, pending resolution of this Motion as UAIC has standing to oppose this Complaint and stipulation as intervenor.

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Case Number: A-18-772220-C

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M^{*}
<i>'''</i>
This Motion s made and based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein, the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto, and such oral argument as the Court
may permit. DATED this day of Covered, 2018.
ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD
Matthew J. Douglas
Nevada Bar No. 11371∜
1117 South Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102
Attorneys for Intervenor UAIC
NOTICE OF MOTION
TO: ANY AND ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring
the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Deny Stipulated Judgment and/or, stay same
stipulated judgment, for hearing before the above-entitled Court Department 29 on the 12 day
of December, 2018, at the hour of 9:00 am. in the forenoon of said date, or as soon
thereafter as counsel can be heard.
DATED this Gay of October, 2018.
ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD
The transfer of the transfer o
Matthew Douglas, Esq. / Nevada Bar No. 11371
117 South Rancho Drive
Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Intervenor UAIC

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Cheyenne Nalder, ("Cheyenne") alleges in her Complaint that she was injured in an accident in 2007. Cheyenne was 11 years old at the time. She did not wait until she reached the age of majority to pursue her claim for damages against the alleged at-fault driver, Gary Lewis ("Lewis"). Guardian ad litem, James Nalder, was appointed to pursue her claim. He did so, filing a complaint on her behalf and obtaining a Judgment for \$3.5 million. Nalder filed suit against UAIC (as Lewis' insurer), eventually obtained an assignment from Lewis and ultimately received Lewis' \$15,000 auto policy limit on the Judgment. That case remains on Appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and, the Nevada Supreme Court on a certified question of law wherein the viability of said expired judgment is before those courts. It is unknown what efforts James Nalder made to enforce the Judgment prior to this action, if any. What is known is that he did not renew the Judgment before it expired in 2014 while Cheyenne was still a minor.

Despite the fact that Lewis' liability for any injuries Cheyenne may have sustained in the 2007 accident have already been adjudicated and judgment entered, Cheyenne now re-asserts those claims in the instant Complaint. Those claims are subject to dismissal pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion.

Cheyenne also seeks a second amended judgment from the Court. Seeking an amended judgment is not a cause of action; rather; it is a motion. Cheyenne's request for a second amended judgment should be dismissed and she should be directed to file a motion.

Finally, Cheyenne seeks a declaration from the court that the statute of limitations to enforce an Amended Judgment (and the second amended judgment she seeks in her Complaint)

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was tolled because she was a minor and Lewis resides in California. Declaratory Relief is not appropriate in this matter because there is no justiciable controversy and the issues upon which Cheyenne requests declaratory relief are unripe. In addition, since the Amended Judgment should not have been issued. The original judgment expired in 2014 and was not subject to revival, there is nothing for Cheyenne to enforce.

In summary, the court should dismiss the Complaint as there are no facts under which Cheyenne is entitled to relief. UAIC has intervened as the insurer for Lewis, per a 2013 Federal Court order finding an implied policy of insurance existed between Lewis and UAIC for the above-noted loss and, as it appears Lewis is attempting to collude with Plaintiff in this action, UAIC has an interest to protect.

Moreover, as this Court can plainly see, in a collusive attempt to try and prevent UAIC from contesting this action, Plaintiff and Lewis filed, on September 13, 2018, a stipulation to enter judgment. See Exhibit "F." UAIC had previously filed its Motion to Intervene in this cause nearly a month prior, on August 16, 2018, and, thus, this sham stipulation was obviously filed in attempt to pre-empt UAIC's Motion to dismiss this action by filing same before UAIC intervention had been granted. The court should see through this sham and deny the stipulation or, in the alternative, stay same pending resolution of this Motion and other issues as UAIC has standing and, an interest, as Lewis insurer, to contest this matter.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case involves a July 8, 2007 accident, Cheyenne Nalder, ("Cheyenne") who was then a minor, alleged injuries. On October 9, 2007, Cheyenne's guardian ad litem, James Nalder, filed a Complaint against Gary Lewis ("Lewis"). See Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit "A."

UAIC, the putative insurer for Lewis, initially denied coverage due to a lapse in

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coverage¹. Lewis did not respond to the Complaint and a default was taken against him. Id. On June 3, 2008, a judgment was entered against him in the amount of \$3.5 million with a Notice of Entry filed August 26, 2018.² See Judgment attached hereto as Exhibit "B." James Nalder as guardian ad litem for Cheyenne was the judgment creditor. Id. NRS 11.190(1)(a) provides that a judgment expires in six (6) years, unless it is timely renewed. As such, the Judgment expired on June 3, 2014 as no timely renewal was filed.

On March 22, 2018 nearly 10 years after the Judgment was entered, and nearly four (4) years after it expired, Cheyenne filed an "Ex Parte Motion to Amend Judgment in the Name of Cheyenne Nalder, Individually" ("Ex Parte Motion") in her personal injury case, Case No. A-07-54911-C, which is also assigned to this Court. See Exhibit "C." Her Motion did not advise the Court that the Judgment she sought to amend had expired. Id. The Court granted Cheyenne's Ex Parte Motion and issued an Amended Judgment on March 28, 2018. See Exhibit "D." Contemporaneous with the filing of the instant motion, UAIC will be moving, in the original case, Case No. A-07-549111-C, for Motion for Relief from Judgment, detailing the reasons the Court should void the Amended Judgment.

On April 3, 2018, one day before the statute of limitations ran for Cheyenne to file a personal injury claim (but ten years after she already obtained a judgment), she filed a Complaint alleging identical injuries from the same accident. See Exhibit "A," the 2007 Complaint, and the 2018 Complaint, attached as Exhibit "E." In the 2018 Complaint, she does not explain why she believes she is entitled to damages for the same injuries for which she received a judgment in

¹ Later, during the subsequent action against UAIC (which remains on appeal in the Ninth Circuit for the U.S. Court of Appeals and, currently, on a 2nd certified question to the Nevada Supreme Court) the Court found an ambiguity in the renewal statement for Lewis' policy and, accordingly, implied a policy of insurance for Lewis' \$15,000 policy limits in December 2013. Importantly, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed their was no "bad faith" on the part of UAIC. Regardless, per the orders of the Federal District Court and Ninth Circuit, UAIC has now been found to be Lewis' insurer, under this implied policy.

² Judgments are entered when filed, not when a Notice of Entry is made. NRCP 58(c).

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2008. See Exhibit "E." However, the 2018 Complaint does acknowledge that she already received a judgment against Lewis. *Id.* At p.3,11.10-11.

Finally, the 2018 Complaint seeks an amended judgment to add interest to the 2008 judgment, and declaratory relief that the statute of limitations to enforce the judgment was tolled because she was a minor and Lewis was a resident of California.

As the judgment had expired and an Amended Judgment could not be issued to revive it and this action is improper. UAIC brings the instant Motion to dismiss, as it has now been found to be the insurer of Lewis under an implied policy and, thus, has an interest in this matter, and seeks to avoid the Amended Judgment and declare that the original Judgment has expired.

III.

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

A party is entitled to dismissal when a plaintiff fails "to state a claim up which relief can be granted." NRCP 12(b)(5). The Nevada Supreme Court has Declared that the dismissal of a complaint is appropriate where "it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] could prove no set of facts which, if true, would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief Bra Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P. 3d 670,672 (2008).

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, courts primarily focus on the allegations in the complaint. Id. As the Nevada Supreme Court held in Baxter v. Dignity Health, 131 Nev Adv. Op. 76,357 P 3d at 930 (2015) "the court is not limited to the four corners of the complaint." Citing 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 1357, at 376 (3d ed. 2004). The Baxter Court also held that courts "may also consider unattached evidence on which the complaint necessarily relies if (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the document." Id., citing United States v. Corinthian Colleges 655 F. 3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation omitted). The Baxter Court continued "while presentation of matters outside APPX0162

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the pleadings will convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); NRCP 12 (b), such conversion is not triggered by a court's consideration of matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim," Id. Citing 5B Wright & Miller, supra, §1357, at 376.

While Intervenor's Motion to Dismiss does rely on certain documents which were not attached to the Complaint, those documents are either incorporated by reference (the Judgment and Amended Judgment) or integral to the claim (the Complaint in the 2007 case). Therefore, this Court should consider this matter a motion to dismiss and not convert it to a motion for summary judgment. As discussed below, the re is no doubt that there are no facts pursuant to which Cheyenne is entitled to the relief her 2018 Complaint seeks.

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. The Doctrine of Claim Preclusion Mandates Dismissal of Plaintiff's Claims Related to the July 8, 2007 Accident

The October 9, 2007 Complaint filed by Cheyenne's guardian ad litem, James Nalder, alleged personal injuries caused by the July 8, 2007 accident. See Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit "A." When Lewis did not respond to that Complaint, a Default was entered against him. On June 3, 2008, a Judgment in the amount of \$3.5 million was entered against Lewis. See Judgment, attached hereto as Exhibit "B." Plaintiff acknowledged this in Paragraph 10 of her 2018 Complaint. Because the personal injury claims in the 2018 Complaint have already been litigated, it should be dismissed.

Cheyenne's claims should be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion. In 2008, the Nevada Supreme Court set forth a three-part test to be applied to determine when claim preclusion applies. Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048,1054-55, 194 P.3d 709,713 (2008), holding modified by Weddell v Sharp 151 Nev. Adv. Op.28, 3520 P.3d 80 (2015)(the

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modification is not applicable to this case); (2) the final judgment is valid; and (3) the new action is based on the same claims that were or could have been brought in the first action. Cheyenne's claims for personal injury in the instant (2018) suit clearly meet the *Five Star* factors for dismissal under the doctrine of claim preclusion.

First, the parties are the same. The only difference between the 2007 suit and the 2018 suits is that Cheyenne is now an adult, so her claims need not ne litigated via a guardian ad litem.

Second, the final judgment is valid. There is no question that the Judgment issued in 2008 was valid until it expired in 2014. It could have been renewed, and if so, would have still been valid today. However, it was not renewed. Cheyenne's (or rather her guardian ad litem's) failure to fully execute on the Judgment while it was valid does not open the door for her to re-litigate her claims.

Third, the same claims are involved in both actions. A review of the 2008 Complaint and the 2018 Complaint reveal that the personal injury claims are identical.

As the *Five Star* Court noted, public policy support claims preclusion in situations such as this. The *Five Star* Court cited Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 19, comment (a), noting that "the purposes of claim preclusion are 'based largely on the ground that fairness to the defendant, and sound judicial administration require that at some point litigation over the particular controversy come an end; and that such reasoning may apply ;even though the substantive issues have not been tried ... *Id.* At 1058, 194 P..3d at 715, These policy reasons are applicable here. Lewis and UAIC are entitled to finality. A Judgment was already entered against Lewis. Renewing the Judgment was not Lewis' responsibility-that was the responsibility of Cheyenne's guardian ad litem, James Nalder. Lewis should not be exposed to judgment being entered against him a second time due to Nalder's failure to act.

Cheyenne's personal injury claims are the very type to which claims preclusion applies.

The public policy considerations supporting claims preclusion cited with approval the court in APPX0164

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Five Star apply to this action. The claims for personal injuries alleged in the Complaint should be dismissed.

B. Plaintiff's Request for A Second Amended Judgment Should Be Dismissed Because it is not a Cause of Action

Regarding Cheyenne's request that the Court enter another amended judgment, adding interest accrued through April 3, 2018, it is unclear why this was included in a Complaint. Seeking to amend judgment is not a cause of action. Cheyenne has demonstrated that she knows how to properly petition the Court to amend a judgment, as she has already done so once. This claim is inappropriately included in the Complaint, and should be dismissed.

C. Cheyenne's Request for Declaratory Relief Should Be Dismissed.

Cheyenne does not ask for relief relative to enforcing an amended judgment, which is a cause of action. Rather, she asks the Court to declare that the statute of limitations on her original judgment was tolled because she was a minor and because the judgment debtor lived in another State: California. Presumably, Plaintiff means the statute of limitations to enforce the judgment, but that is not clear.

Declaratory relief is only available if: "(1) a justiciable controversy exists between persons with adverse interests, (2) the party seeking declaratory relief has a legally protectable interest in the controversy, and (3) the issue is ripe for judicial determination." City. Of Clark, ex rel. Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Upchurch, 114 Nev. 749, 752, 961 P.2d, 764, 756 (1998), citing Knittle v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 112 Nev. 8,10,908 P. 2d,724,725 (1996). Here, declaratory relief is not available because the issue as to whether the Amended Judgment or any future amended judgment is enforceable, or whether the statute of limitations has expired, is not ripe.

The conditions under where a justiciable controversy exists were addressed by the Nevada Supreme Court in Kress v Corey, 65 Nev. 1, 189 P,2d 352 (1948), where the Court noted a justiciable controversy does not exist, where damage "... is merely apprehended or feared..." Id.

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Likewise, there is no "concrete dispute' that the statute of limitations would bar an attempt by Cheyenne to collect on the Amended Judgment because she has not tried. Unless and until Cheyenne actually tried to enforce the Amended Judgment, there is no 'immediate' need for a "definite" determination of the parties' rights. Therefore, there is no justiciable controversy regarding Cheyenne's ability to seek to enforce the Amended Judgment at this time.

"Ripeness focuses on the timing of the action rather than on the party bringing the action... The factors to be weighed in deciding whether a case is ripe for judicial review include: (1) the hardship of the parties of withholding judicial review, and (2) the suitability of the issues for review." Herbst Gaming, Inc. v, Heller, 122 Nev. 887, 887, 141 P.3d 1244, 1230-31 (2006)(alteration in original)(quoting *In re T.R.*, 119 Nev. 646, 651, 80 P.3d 1276, 1279 (2003). In the unpublished decision in Cassady v. Main, 2016 WL412835, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "E." the Nevada Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff in that case would suffer no harm if declaratory relief were not considered, because he could file a complaint seeking direct redress for complaints. Id. At *2. Similarly here, Cheyenne could seek to have a court address her statute of limitations concerns in an action to execute on the Amended Judgment. There is no need for such a determination at this time.

Regardless as to whether Cheyenne's request for declaratory relief is appropriate at this juncture, Cheyenne's request for declaratory relief should be dismissed because there is no valid

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judgment to enforce. The original Judgment issued on June 3, 2008 expired on June 3, 2014. No effort to renew the Judgment was undertaken prior to its expiration. Cheyenne obtained an Amended Judgment, entered on March 28, 2018. As demonstrated in Intervenor's Motion for Relief From Judgment Pursuant to NRCP 60, the Court should not have entered and Amended Judgment, and no other amended judgments should be entered. Nevada law does not permit renewal of expired judgments by amendment.

Nor is the deadline to file the appropriate documents to renew a judgment tolled by any statute or rule. The time limit to renew the Judgment was not tolled by Cheyenne's minority because her guardian ad litem, and adult, was the judgment creditor. The time limit to renew the Judgment was not tolled by the judgment creditor's absence from the state because the requirement that a judgment be renewed is not a cause of action to which such tolling provisions might apply. Because no valid judgment exists, Cheyenne's request for declaratory relief regarding the tolling of the time to enforce a judgment should be dismissed as a matter of law.

V.

MOTION TO DENY THE STIPULATION TO ENTER JUDGMENT AND OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO STAY SAME

As this Court knows, an Intervenor is allowed to come in and contest a matter where it has interest to protect. Here, UAIC, as the insurer for Lewis, has an interest in preventing a new judgment from being entered against him and/or having declarations made about the validity of an expired judgment which is currently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit and the Nevada Supreme Court on a second certified question. See UAIC's Motion to Intervene herein, with attached exhibits, Exhibit "G." Despite filing its Motion to Intervene on August 16, 2018, Plaintiff and Lewis attempted to enter a collusive and sham "stipulation to enter judgment, which they filed on September 13, 2018. See Exhibits "F" and "G." This clear attempt to pre-empt APPX0167

UAIC's right to contest this action should be denied or, alternatively, stayed.

NRCP 24(a)(2) provides for the intervention of right under the following circumstances:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene an action: ...(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

Once a party intervenes, said party is afforded all the rights of a party to the action. Las Vegas Police Protective Ass'n Metro, Inc. v Eight Jud. Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 230, 130 P.2d 182 (2006).

UAIC has been granted intervention. Moreover, it is clear UAIC has an interest to protect and has all the rights afforded to it of any party – including the right to contest any judgment on the action. Accordingly, UAIC has the right to contest this action with the present Motion to dismiss. As such, Plaintiff and Lewis sham attempt to try and quickly enter a "stipulated judgment" prior to UAIC's intervention should be seen for what it is – a ruse intended to deny UAIC the right to contest this action. Accordingly, as UAIC filed its Motion to intervene prior to this attempted "stipulated judgment", UAIC prays this court deny same stipulation or, alternatively, stay same pending resolution.

VI.

UAIC also asks this Court to consider, based on all of the above, that there has been an attempt at a fraud upon the Court and hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

UAIC argues that the circumstances set forth in this matter show clear conflict of interest and attempts at perpetrating a fraud upon the court by Plaintiff. Plaintiff is represented by Mr. Christensen. Mr. Christensen also purports to be counsel for Lewis and has informed UAIC's first retained counsel for Lewis that he may not appear and attempt to defend this action. Indeed, Breen Arntz, Esq. has stated to retained defense counsel and, this office, that Mr. Christensen retained him to defend Lewis. Now, after learning of all of this and trying to intervene to protect

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Lewis and, its own interests, UAIC was told by Plaintiff it cannot intervene. So, per Plaintiff, UAIC's retained defense counsel cannot defend this case and - UAIC cannot either. Then, while UAIC's Motion to intervene is pending, new counsel for Nalder and Mr. Arntz for Lewis attempt to file a stipulation for judgment to try and quickly avoid any attempt to contest this sham action. This is clearly an attempt at a fraud upon the court solely to benefit Plaintiff and her counsel and same should not be tolerated.³

In NC-DSH, Inc. v Garner, 125 Nev. 647 (2009) the Nevada Supreme Court set forth the definition of a fraud upon the Court in considering motion for relief from judgment under NRCP 60. In NC-DSH, Inc. the lawyer for a plaintiff's malpractice case forged settlement documents and disappeared with the settlement funds. Id. In allowing the Plaintiff's Rule 60 motion to set aside the dismissal (and settlement) the Court set forth the following definition for such a fraud, as follows:

"The most widely accepted definition, which we adopt, holds that the concept embrace[s] only that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, subvert the integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases ... and relief should be denied in the absence of such conduct.

Id at 654.

In the case at bar it seems clear that Plaintiff's counsel (Mr. Christensen) is attempting just such a fraud. That is, besides the original judgment being expired and, the effect of its expiration on appeal before both the Nevada Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Plaintiff still attempted this 'amendment of judgment' and, then, filed this new action. Moreover, Mr. Christensen (Plaintiff's additional Counsel) represents both the Plaintiff/judgment-creditor and Defendant/judgment-debtor. Further, in his role as counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant, Mr. Christensen is attempting, as an officer of the court, to prevent UAIC from exercising its contractual and legal duty to defend Mr. Lewis and defend this farce of

³ Indeed, perhaps this should be reported to the State bar.

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lawsuit by telling UAIC's first retained counsel to not to appear or file anything to defend Lewis. Additionally, Plaintiff has sought to deny UAIC a chance to intervene and, now, MR. Artnz is retained for Lewis and he and Plaintiff file a "stipulation for judgment." UAIC pleads this clearly a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases. In other words, Mr. Christensen, Counsel for Plaintiff, is seeking on the one hand to enforce an invalid judgment and, with the other, prevent anyone from contesting it - by representing both sides. This is the definition of a conflict of interest. After all, Plaintiff's is attempting to improperly "fix" an expired multimillion judgment, while at the same time Counsel for Plaintiff is also claiming to represent the judgment-debtor (Lewis) and arising retained counsel not to vacate the amended judgment or contest this action. How could this possibly benefit Mr. Lewis? Is having a multi-million dollar judgment against him which had expired be resurrected by an improper amendment of the judgment to his benefit? Is preventing anyone from vacating or setting aside this improper amended judgment to his benefit? In short, it does not – it only benefits Plaintiff and her counsel. UAIC argues this is clear fraud and collusive conduct and, at the very least, the Court should therefore exercise its equitable power and allow UAIC's intervention and, thereafter, hold an evidentiary hearing on this fraud. ///

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VII.

CONCLUSION

In her 2018 Complaint, Plaintiff sets forth no facts which, if true, would entitle her to the relief she seeks. Her Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. Additionally, UAIC seeks an order denying Plaintiff and Lewis' "stipulation for entry of judgment" and/or, alternatively, staying same.

day of <u>October</u>, 2018.

ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD

Matthew Douglas, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11371 1117 S. Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for UAIC

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

David Stephens, Esq. STEPHENS & BYWATER, P.C. 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, NV 89130

Randall Tindall, Esq. Carissa Christensen, Esq. RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. 8925 West Russell Road Suite 220 Las Vegas, NV 89148

E. Breen Arntz, Esq. 5545 S. Mountain Vista Street, Suite F Las Vegas, NV 89120

An employee of ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD

APPX0172

EXHIBIT "A"

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- 2. That Plaintiff, Gary Lewis, was at all times relevant to this action a resident of the County of Clark, State of Nevada.
- 3. That Defendant, United Automobile Insurance Co. (hereinafter "UAI"), was at all times relevant to this action an automobile insurance company duly authorized to act as an insurer in the State of Nevada and doing business in Clark County, Nevada.
- That the true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, partnership, associate or otherwise, of Defendants, DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS I through V, are unknown to Plaintiffs, who therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that each of the Defendants designated herein as DOE or ROE CORPORATION is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings referred to and caused damages proximately to Plaintiffs as herein alleged, and that Plaintiffs will ask leave of this Court to amend this Complaint to insert the true names and capacities of DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS I through V, when the same have been ascertained, and to join such Defendants in this action.
- 5. That, at all times relevant hereto, Gary Lewis was the owner of a certain 1996 Chevy Silverado with vehicle identification number 1GCEC19M6TE214944 (hereinafter 'Plaintiff's Vehicle').
- 6. That Gary Lewis had in effect on July 8, 2007, a policy of automobile insurance on the Plaintiff's Vehicle with Defendant, UAI (the "Policy"); that the Policy provides certain benefits to Cheyanne Nalder as specified in the Policy; and the Policy included liability coverage in the amount of \$15,000.00/\$30,000.00 per occurrence (hereinafter the "Policy Limits").

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That Gary Lewis paid his monthly premium to UAI for the policy period of June 30, 2 2007 through July 31, 2007.

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- 8. That on July 8, 2007 on Bartolo Rd in Clark County Nevada, Cheyenne Nalder was a pedestrian in a residential area, Plaintiff's vehicle being operated by Gary Lewis when Gary Lewis drove over top of Cheyanne Nalder causing serious personal injuries and damages to Cheyanne Nalder.
- 7 9. That Cheyanne Nalder made a claim to UAI for damages under the terms of the Policy due to her personal injuries.
 - 10. That Cheyanne Nalder offered to settle his claim for personal injuries and damages against Gary Lewis within the Policy Limits, and that Defendants, and each of them, refused to settle the claim of Cheyanne Nalder against Gary Lewis within the Policy Limits and in fact denied the claim all together indicating Gary Lewis did not have coverage at the time of the accident.
 - That Plaintiff, Gary Lewis has duly performed all the conditions, provisions and terms of the Policy relating to the loss sustained by Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalder, and has furnished and delivered to the Defendants, and each of them, full and complete particulars of said loss and have fully complied with all of the provisions of the Policy relating to the giving of notice of said loss, and have duly given all other notices required to be given by the Plaintiffs under the terms of the Policy, including paying the monthly premium.
 - 12. That Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalder, is a third party beneficiary under the Policy as well as a Judgment Creditor of Gary Lewis and is entitled to pursue action against the Defendants directly under Hall v. Enterprise Leasing Co., West, 122 Nev. 685, 137 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2006), as well as Denham v. Farmers Insurance Company, 213 Cal.App.3d 1061, 262 Cal.Rptr. 146 (1989).

- 1 That Cheyanne Nalder conveyed to UAI her willingness to settle her claim against Gary 2 Lewis at or within the policy limits of \$15,000.00 provided they were paid in a commercially
- 3 reasonable manner.
- That Chevanne Nalder and Gary Lewis cooperated with UAI in its investigation 4
- including but not limited to providing a medical authorization to UAI on or about August 2,
- 6 2007.

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- 7 15, That on or about August 6, 2007 UAI mailed to Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalders' attorney,
- . 8 Christensen Law Offices, a copy of "Renewal Policy Declaration Monthly Nevada Personal
- 9 Auto Policy" for Gary Lewis with a note that indicated "There was a gap in coverage".
- 10 That on or about October 10, 2007 UAI mailed to Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalders'
- attomey, Christensen Law Offices, a letter denying coverage. 11
 - 17. That on or about October 23, 2007, Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalder provided a copy of the
- 13 complaint filed against UAI's insured Gary Lewis.
 - 18. That on or about November 1, 2007, UAI mailed to Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalders'
- 15 attorney, Christensen Law Offices, another letter denying coverage.
- 16 19. That UAI denied coverage stating Gary Lewis had a "lapse in coverage" due to non-
- 17 payment of premium.
- 20. That UAI denied coverage for non-renewal. 18
- 19 21. That UAI mailed Gary Lewis a "renewal statement" on or about June 11, 2007 that
- 20 indicated UAI's intention to renew Gary Lewis' policy.
- 21 22. That upon receiving the "renewal statement", which indicated UAI's intention to renew
- 22 Gary Lewis' policy, Gary Lewis made his premium payment and procured insurance coverage
- 23 with UAI.

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1.	23.	That UAI was	required under	the law to	provide insurance	coverage under	the policy

- Gary Lewis had with UAI for the loss suffered by Chevenne Nalder, and was under an
- 3 obligation to defend Gary Lewis and to indemnify Gary Lewis up to and including the policy
- limit of \$15,000.00, and to settle Cheyyene's claim at or within the \$15,000.00 policy limit 4
- 5 when given an opportunity to do so.
- That UAI never advised Lewis that Nalder was willing to settle Nalder's claim against 6
- 7 Lewis for the sum of \$15,000.00.
 - 25. UAI did not timely evaluate the claim nor did it tender the policy limits.

services of an attorney to pursue his rights under her claim against Lewis.

- 9 26, Due to the dilatory tactics and failure of UAI to protect their insured by paying the policy limits when given ample opportunity to do so, Plaintiff, Nalder, was forced to seek the
 - Due to the dilatory tactics and failure of UAI to protect their insured by paying the policy limits when given ample opportunity to do so, Plaintiff, Cheyanne Nalder, was forced to file a complaint on October 9, 2007 against Gary Lewis for her personal injuries and damages suffered in the July 8, 2007 automobile accident.
 - 28. The filing of the complaint caused additional expense and aggravation to both Cheyanne Nalder and Gary Lewis.
- 29. Cheyanne Nalder procured a Judgment against Gary Lewis in the amount of 18 \$3,500,000.00. 19
- UAI refused to protect Gary Lewis and provide Gary Lewis with a legal defense to the 20 21 lawsuit filed against Gary Lewis by Cheyanne Nalder.
- 22 That Defendants, and each of them, are in breach of contract by their actions which 23 include, but are not limited to:

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а		Unreasonable	conduct in	Investigating	The loss:
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- Unreasonable failure to provide coverage for the loss;
- Unreasonable delay in making payment on the loss;
- Failure to make a prompt, fair and equitable settlement for the loss;
- Unreasonably compelling Plaintiffs to retain an attorney before making payment on the loss.
- 32. As a proximate result of the aforementioned breach of contract, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer in the future, damages in the amount of \$3,500,000.00 plus continuing interest.
- As a further proximate result of the aformentioned breach of contract, Plaintiffs have 33. suffered anxiety, worry, mental and emotional distress, and other incidental damages and out of pocket expenses, all to their general damage in excess of \$10,000.00.
- 34. As a further proximate result of the breach of contract, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain legal counsel to prosecute this claim, and Defendants, and each of them, are liable for their attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection therewith.
- 35. That Defendants, and each of them, owed a duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.
- That Defendants, and each of them, were unreasonable by refusing to cover the true 36, value of the claim of Cheyanne Nalder, wrongfully failing to settle within the Policy Limits when they had an opportunity to do so, and wrongfully denying coverage.
- 37. That as a proximate result of the aforementioned breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer in the future, damages in the amount of \$3,500,000,00 plus continuing interest,

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38. That as a further proximate result of the aformentioned breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs have suffered anxiety, worry, mental and emotional
distress, and other incidental damages and out of pocket expenses, all to their general damage
in excess of \$10,000.00.

- 39. That as a further proximate result of the aforementioned breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain legal counsel to prosecute this claim, and Defendants, and each of them, are liable for their attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection therewith.
- 40. That Defendants, and each of them, acted unreasonably and with knowledge that there was no reasonable basis for its conduct, in its actions which include but are not limited to: wrongfully refusing to cover the value of the claim of Cheyanne Nalder, wrongfully failing to settle within the Policy Limits when they had an opportunity to do so and wrongfully denying the coverage.
- 41. That as a proximate result of the aforementioned bad faith, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer in the future, damages in the amount of \$3,500,000.00 plus continuing interest.
- 42. That as a further proximate result of the aformentioned bad faith, Plaintiffs have suffered anxiety, worry, mental and emotional distress, and other incidental damages and out of pocket expenses, all to their general damage in excess of \$10,000.00.
- 43. That as a further proximate result of the aforementioned bad faith, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain legal counsel to prosecute this claim, and Defendants, and each of them, are liable for their attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection therewith.

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- 44. That Defendants, and each of them, violated NRS 686A.310 by their actions, including but not limited to: wrongfully refusing to cover the value of the claim of Cheyanne Nalder, wrongfully failing to settle within the Policy Limits when they had an opportunity to do so and wrongfully denying coverage.
- 45. That NRS 686A.310 requires that insurance carriers conducting business in Nevada adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies, and requires that carriers effectuate the prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability of the insurer has become reasonably clear.
- 46. That UAI did not adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and processing of claims arising under its insurance policies, and did not effectuate the a prompt, fair and/or equitable settlement of Nalder's claim against Lewis in which liability of the insurer was very clear, and which clarity was conveyed to UAI.
- 47. That NAC 686A.670 requires that an insurer complete an investigation of each claim within 30 days of receiving notice of the claim, unless the investigation cannot be reasonably completed within that time.
- 48. That UAI received notice of Nalder's claim against Lewis, at the very latest, on or before August 6, 2007. That it was more than reasonable for UAI to complete its investigation of Nalder's claim against Lewis well within 30 days of receiving notice of the claim.
- 19 49. That UAI did not offer the applicable policy limits.
 - 50. That UAI did failed to investigate the claim at all and denied coverage.
- That as a proximate result of the aforementioned violation of NRS 686A.310, Plaintiffs
 have suffered and will continue to suffer in the future, damages in the amount of \$3,500.000.00
 plus continuing interest.

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connection therewith.

1	52.	That as a further proximate result of the aforementioned violation of NRS 686A.310
2	Plaint	iffs have suffered anxiety, worry, mental and emotional distress, and other incidental

damages and out of pocket expenses, all to their general damage in excess of \$10,000.00. 3

That as a further proximate result of the aforementioned violation of NRS 686A.310, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain legal counsel to prosecute this claim, and Defendants, and

each of them, are liable for their attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in

That the Defendants, and each of them, have been fraudulent in that they have stated that they would protect Gary Lewis in the event he was found liable in a claim. All of this was done in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs' rights and therefore Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, pray for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as follows:

- Payment for the excess verdict rendered against Lewis which remains unpaid in 1. an amount in excess of \$3,500,000.00;
- General damages for mental and emotional distress and other incidental 2. damages in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00;
 - Attorney's fees and costs of suit incurred herein; and 3.
 - Punitive damages in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00; 4.

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EXHIBIT "B"

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LOCATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF

1 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 3 4 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of CHRISTENSEN LAW 5 OFFICES, LLC., and that on this < day of March, 2008, I served a copy of the 6 foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT as follows: 7 8 U.S. Mail—By depositing a true copy thereof in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid and addressed as listed below; and/or 9 10 ☐ Facsimile—By facsimile transmission pursuant to EDCR 7.26 to the facsimile number(s) shown below and in the confirmation sheet filed herewith. Consent to 11 service under NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) shall be assumed unless an objection to service by 12 facsimile transmission is made in writing and sent to the sender via facsimile within 24 hours of receipt of this Certificate of Service; and/or 13 14 Hand Delivery—By hand-delivery to the addresses listed below. 15 Gary Lewis 16 5049 Spencer St. #D Las Vegas, NV 89119 17 18 An employee of CHRISTEN 19 OFFICES, LLC 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Case 2:09-cv-01348-RCJ-GWF Document 88-2 Filed 03/04/13 Page 4 of 5 **JMT** THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., Nevada Bar #2326 DAVID F. SAMPSON, ESQ., 1 52 PM '08 Nevada Bar #6811 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 5 (702) 870-1000 Attorney for Plaintiff, 6 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 JAMES NALDER, 9 as Guardian ad Litem for 10 CHEYENNE NALDER, a minor. 11 Plaintiffs, 12 CASE NO: A549111 VS. 13 DEPT. NO: VI GARY LEWIS, and DOES I 14 through V, inclusive 15 Defendants. 16 17 **JUDGMENT** 18 In this action the Defendant, GARY LEWIS, having been regularly served with the 19 Summons and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the 20 21 legal time for answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the 22 Default of said Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according 23 to law; upon application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as 24 follows: 25 26 27 28

Service | Garage Carrier | les date de la lacación de la companya del companya de la companya del companya de la companya del companya de la companya de la companya de la companya del companya de la companya della companya de la companya de la companya de la companya della companya de la companya della companya della companya della co

EXHIBIT "C"

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Therefore, Cheyenne Nalder hereby moves this court to enter the judgment in her name of \$3,500,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full.

Dated this 19 day of March, 2018.

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STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER

THE PROPERTY AND THE PARTY AND THE PARTY.

David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT "1"

1 **JMT** THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., 2 THE COURT Nevada Bar #2326 DAVID F. SAMPSON, ESQ., 3 1 52 PM '08 Nevada Bar #6811 4 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 FILED 5 (702) 870-1000 Attorney for Plaintiff, 6 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 JAMES NALDER, as Guardian ad Litem for 10 CHEYENNE NALDER, a minor. 11 Plaintiffs, 12 CASE NO: A549111 vs. 13 DEPT. NO: VI GARY LEWIS, and DOES I 14 through V, inclusive 15 Defendants. 16 17 **JUDGMENT** 18 In this action the Defendant, GARY LEWIS, having been regularly served with the 19 Summons and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the 20 21 legal time for answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the 22 Default of said Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according 23 to law; upon application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as 24 follows: 25 26 27

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APPX0193

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IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,444.63 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full.

Participation of the participa

DATED THIS 2 day of May, 2008



Submitted by: CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC.

BY:

DAVID SAMPSON

Nevada Bar #6811

1000 S. Valley View

Las Vegas, Nevada 89107

Attorney for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT "2"

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF

Electronically Filed 5/18/2018 3:37 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** NOE 1 David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 2 Stephens & Bywater 3636 North Rancho Drive 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355
Facsimile: (702) 656-2776
Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com 4 5 Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 CHEYENNE NALDER, 10 Case No. 07A549111 Plaintiff, 11 Dept. No. XXIX vs. 12 **GARY LEWIS** 13 Defendant. 14 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT 15 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 26th day of March, 2018, the Honorable David 16 17 M. Jones entered an AMENDED JUDGMENT, which was thereafter filed on March 28, 2018, in 18 the above entitled matter, a copy of which is attached to this Notice. 19 Dated this 17 day of May, 2018. 20 STEPHENS & BYWATER 21 22 David A. Stephens, Esq. 23 Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive 24 Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorney for Brittany Wilson 25 26 27 28

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I am an employee of the law office of STEPHENS & BYWATER, and that on the Aday of May, 2018, I served a true copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT, by depositing the same in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid, and addressed as follows:

Gary Lewis 733 S. Minnesota Ave. Glendora, California 91740

An employee of Stephens & Bywater

3/28/2018 3:05 PM 1 Steven D, Grierson **JMT** CLERK OF THE COURT 3 DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff 5 T: (702) 656-2355 6 F: (702) 656-2776 E: dstephens@sbglawfirm.com 7 Attorney for Chevenne Nalder 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 07A549111 CHEYENNE NALDER, CASE NO: A549111 12 DEPT. NO: XXIX Plaintiff, 13 vs. 14 GARY LEWIS, 15 Defendant. 16 AMENDED JUDGMENT 17 18 In this action the Defendant, Gary Lewis, having been regularly served with the Summons 19 and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the legal time for 20 answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the Default of said 21 22 Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according to law; upon 23 application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as follows: 24 35 26

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Í	JMT			
2	DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ.			
3	Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER			
4	3636 North Rancho Dr Las Vegas, Nevada 89130			
5	Attorneys for Plaintiff			
6	T: (702) 656-2355 F: (702) 656-2776			
7	E: dstephens@sbglawfirm.com Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder	·		
8	DISTR	UCT COURT		
9	CLARK CO	DUNTY, NEVADA		
10				
11		074549111		
12	CHEYENNE NALDER,	CASE NO: A 549111 DEPT. NO: XXIX		
13	Plaintiff,			
14	VS.	·		
15	GARY LEWIS,			
16	Defendant.			
17	AME	NDED JUDGMENT		
18		· •		
19	In this action the Defendant, Gary Lew	vis, having been regularly served with the Summor		
20	and having failed to appear and answer the P	laintiff's complaint filed herein, the legal time for		
21	answering having expired, and no answer or	demurrer having been filed, the Default of said		
22	Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, l	naving been duly entered according to law; upon		
23	application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is here	eby entered against said Defendant as follows:		

APPX0202

2	IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the \$ 3,434,444.63 sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,4444.63	nc
3	in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9,	·
5	2007, until paid in full.	** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
6	DATED this 26 day of March, 2018.	
7		. 2
8		3.
9		1.
10	District Judge	 :
11	() he	ii.
12	Submitted by: STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER	÷ .
13	STATILLIA GOURDA WALLA	.·
14	Day after	::
15	DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902	
16	STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr	
17	Las Vegas, Nevada 89130	
18	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
19		
20	·	}}
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24) 2. 4. 5. 7.
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EXHIBIT "E"

Electronically Filed 4/3/2018 3:07 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

COMP David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar Ño. 00902 STEPHENS, GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 CASE NO.: A5491+1 A-18-772220-C CHEYENNE NALDER, DEPT NO.: XXIX Department 29 10 Plaintiff. 11 12 GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V, 13 inclusive, Defendants. 14 15 **COMPLAINT** 16 Date: n/a Time: n/a 17 COMES NOW the Plaintiff, CHEYENNE NALDER, by and through Plaintiff's attorney, 18 DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ., of STEPHENS & BYWATER, and for a cause of action against the 19 Defendants, and each of them, alleges as follows: 20 Upon information and belief, that at the time of the injury the Defendant, GARY 1. 21 LEWIS, was a resident of Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, and that on or about December 2008 GARY LEWIS moved out of state and has not been present or resided in the jurisdiction since that 24 time. That Plaintiff, CHEYENNE NALDER, was at the time of the accident, a resident of 2. 25 the County of Clark, State of Nevada 26 That the true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or 27 3. otherwise, of Defendants names as DOES 1 through V, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiff, who

APPX0205

 therefore sues said Defendant by such fictitious names. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein as DOE is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings referred to and caused damages proximately to Plaintiff as herein alleged, and that Plaintiff will ask leave of this Court to amend this Complaint to insert the true names and capacities of DOES I through V, when the names have been ascertained, and to join such Defendants in this action.

- 4. Upon information and belief, Defendant, Gary Lewis, was the owner and operator of a certain 1996 Chevy Pickup (hereafter referred as "Defendant vehicle") at all times relevant to this action.
- 5. On the 8th day of July, 2007, Defendant, Gary Lewis, was operating the Defendant's vehicle on private property located in Lincoln County, Nevada; that Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, was playing on the private property; that Defendant, did carelessly and negligently operate Defendant's vehicle so to strike the Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, and that as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence of Defendant, Gary Lewis, and each of the Defendants, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, sustained the grievous and serious personal injuries and damages as hereinafter more particularly alleged.
- 6. At the time of the accident herein complained of, and immediately prior thereto, Defendant, Gary Lewis, in breaching a duty owed to Plaintiffs, was negligent and careless, inter alia, in the following particulars:
 - A. In failing to keep Defendant's vehicle under proper control;
 - B. In operating Defendant's vehicle without due care for the rights of the Plaintiff;
 - C. In failing to keep a proper lookout for plaintiffs
- D. The Defendant violated certain Nevada Revised Statutes and Clark County Ordinances, and the Plaintiff will pray leave of Court to insert the exact statutes or ordinances at the time of trial.
- 7. By reason of the premises, and as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence and carelessness of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, sustained a broken leg and was otherwise injured in and about her neck, back, legs, arms, organs, and

systems, and was otherwise injured and caused to suffer great pain of body and mind, and all or some of the same is chronic and may be permanent and disabling, all to her damage in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00

- 8. By reason of the premises, and as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence and carelessness of the Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, has been caused to expend monies for medical and miscellaneous expenses as of this time in excess of \$41,851.89, and will in the future be caused to expend additional monies for medical expenses and miscellaneous expenses incidental thereto, in a sum not yet presently ascertainable, and leave of Court will be requested to include said additional damages when the same have been fully determined.
- 9. Prior to the injuries complained of herein, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, was an ablebodied female, capable of being gainfully employed and capable of engaging in all other activities for which Plaintiff was otherwise suited. By reason of the premises, and as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the said Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, was caused to be disabled and limited and restricted in her occupations and activities, and/or suffered a diminution of Plaintiff's earning capacity and future loss of wages, all to her damage in a sum not yet presently ascertainable, the allegations of which Plaintiff prays leave of Court to insert here when the same shall be fully determined.
- 10. That James Nalder as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, obtained judgment against Gary Lewis.
- 11. That the judgment is to bear interest at the legal rate from October 9, 2007 until paid in full.
- 12. That during Cheyenne Nalder's minority which ended on April 4, 2016 all statutes of limitations were tolled.
- 13. That during Gary Lewis' absence from the state of Nevada all statutes of limitations have been tolled and remain tolled.
- 14. That the only payment made on the judgment was \$15,000.00 paid by Lewis's insurer on February 5, 2015. This payment extends any statute of limitation.

1	6. For such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper in the	
2	premises.	
3	DATED this 3 rd day of April, 2018.	
4	STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER	
5	STEITIENS GOORDET & DI WATER	
6	le David A. Stenhens	
7	/s David A. Stephens David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive	
8	3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas Nevada 89130	
9	Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff	
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EXHIBIT "F"

Electronically Filed 9/13/2018 12:26 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

STPJ (CIV)
David A. Stephens, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 00902
Stephens & Bywater
3636 North Rancho Drive
Las Vegas, Nevada 89130
Telephone: (702) 656-2355
Facsimile: (702) 656-2776
Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com
Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CHEYENNE NALDER,

Plaintiff,

Case No. A-18-772220-C

vs.

Dept. No. XXIX

GARY LEWIS,

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Defendant.

STIPULATION TO ENTER JUDGMENT

Date: n/a Time: n/a

Gary Lewis, through his attorney, E. Breen Arntz, Esq., and Cheyenne Nalder, through her attorney, David A. Stephens, Esq., to hereby stipulate as follows:

- 1. Gary Lewis has been continuously absent from the State of Nevada since at least 2010.
- 2. Gary Lewis has not been subject to service of process in Nevada since at least 2010 to the present.
- 3. Gary Lewis has been a resident and subject to service of process in California from 2010 to the present.
- 4. Plaintiff obtained a judgment against GARY LEWIS which was entered on August 26, 2008. Because the statute of limitations on the 2008 judgment had been tolled as a result of GARY LEWIS' absence from the State of Nevada pursuant to NRS 11.300, Plaintiff obtained an amended judgment that was entered on May 18, 2018.
 - 5. Plaintiff filed an action on the judgment under Mandlebaum v. Gregovich, 50 P. 849, 851

(Nev. 1897), in the alternative, with a personal injury action should the judgment be invalid.

- 6. Gary Lewis does not believe there is a valid statute of limitations defense and Gary Lewis does not want to incur greater fees or damages.
- 7. Cheyenne Nalder is willing to allow judgment to enter in the amount of the judgment plus interest minus the payment of \$15,000.00 and without additional damages, attorney fees or costs. Plaintiff is also willing to accept the judgment so calculated as the resulting judgment of the alternatively pled injury claim. Plaintiff will not seek additional attorney fees from Defendant.
- 8. The parties stipulate to a judgment in favor of Cheyenne Nalder in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, plus interest through September 4, 2018 of \$2,211,820.41 minus \$15,000.00 paid for a total judgment of \$5,696,820.41, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 4, 2018, until paid in full.
 - 9. The attached judgment may be signed and entered by the Court.

Dated this 12-day of September, 2018

David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902

Nevada Bar No. 00903 Stephens & Bywater

3636 North Rancho Drive

Las Vegas, Nevada 89130

Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder

Las Vegas, NV 89120 Attorney for Gary Lewis

Breen Arntz, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 03853

5545 Mountain Vista, #E

1 2	JMT (CIV) David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902	
3	Stephens & Bywater, P.C. 3636 North Rancho Drive Lee Yeggs, Neveda 80130	
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776	
5	Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder	
6		CT COURT
7 8		NTY, NEVADA
9	CHEYENNE NALDER,)
10	Plaintiff,) Case No. A-18-772220-C
11	vs.) Dept. No. XXIX
12	GARY LEWIS,)
13	Defendant.)
14	JUDGN	EMENT
15 16	Date: Time:	
17	Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, an	and good cause appearing therefore,
18	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED	O AND DECREED, that Plaintiff Cheyenne Nalder
19	have and recover judgment from Defendant Gary	ry Lewis in the sum of three million five hundred
20	thousand dollars, (\$3,500,000.00), plus prejudgme	nent interest through September 4, 2018 in the sum
21	of two million two hundred eleven thousand	nd eight hundred twenty and 41/100 dollars,
22	(\$2,211,820.41), minus fifteen thousand dollars ,(\$	(\$15,000.00), previously paid to Cheyenne Nalder,
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1	for a total judgment of five million six hundred ninety six thousand eight hundred twenty and 41/100
2	dollars, (\$5,696,820.41), with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 4, 2018, until paid in
3	full.
4	DATED this day of September, 2018.
5	
6	
7	DISTRICT JUDGE
8	DISTRICT TODGE
9	Submitted by:
10	STEPHENS & BYWATER, P.C.
11	
12	DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive
13	3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130
14	Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff
15	
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EXHIBIT "G"

TKIN WINNER SHERROD

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VS.

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Steven D. Grierson
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MATTHEW J. DOUGLAS
Nevada Bar No. 11371
ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD
1117 South Rancho Drive
Las Vegas, Nevada 89102
Phone (702) 243-7000
Facsimile (702) 243-7059
mdouglas@awslawyers.com

Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor United Automobile Insurance Company

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CHEYANNE NALDER,

CASE NO.: A-18-772220-C DEPT. NO.: 29

DE

Plaintiff,

UAIC'S MOTION TO INTERVENE

GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V, inclusive.

Defendants.

COMES NOW, UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter referred to as "UAIC"), by and through its attorney of record, ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD and hereby submits this Motion to Intervene in the present action, pursuant to the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all exhibits attached hereto, all papers and pleadings on file with this Court and such argument this Court may entertain at the time of hearing.

DATED this W day of Allas , 2018

ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD

Matthew J. Douglas / Nevada Bar No. 11371/ 1117 South Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Intervenor

2728

Case Number: A-18-772220-C

A TKIN WINNER & SHERROD

NOTICE OF MOTION

DATED this W day of AUMS , 2018.

thereafter as counsel can be heard.

ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD

Matthew Douglas, Esq. // Nevada Bar No. 11371 117 South Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Intervenor

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR INTERVENTION

I.

Introduction & Factual Background

Although this action was only recently filed, this matter actually has a long history that dates back eleven (11) years, to July 2007 when the loss underlying this action occurred. Proposed Intervenor will not re-state the entire history as it is adequately set forth in Order Certifying a Second Question to the Nevada Supreme Court by United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which was filed on January 11, 2018. A copy of the Order certifying the second question of law is attached hereto as Exhibit 'A.' Rather, the salient points are that Plaintiff's causes of action are premised on a judgment which had been entered against Gary

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Lewis on August 26, 2008. After obtaining the judgment. Counsel for Plaintiff¹ then filed an action against Mr. Lewis' insurer, United Automobile Insurance Company ("UAIC"), Proposed Intervenor herein, Despite the prohibition against direct actions against an insurer, Plaintiff failed to obtain an assignment prior to filing that action against UAIC and, only later, during the litigation obtained an assignment from Lewis.

In any event, that action - on coverage for the 2008 judgment by Nalder against UAIC has proceeded in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada and, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, since 2009. During the pendency of those appeals it was observed that Plaintiff had failed to renew her 2008 judgment against Lewis pursuant to Nevada law. Specifically, as this Court is aware, under N.R.S. 11.190(1)(a) the limitation for action to execute on such a judgment would be six (6) years, unless renewed under N.R.S. 17.214. Upon realizing the judgment had never been timely renewed, UAIC filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal for Lack of Standing with the Ninth Circuit on March 14, 2017. On December 27, 2017 the Ninth Circuit certified a second question to the Nevada Supreme Court – specifically certifying the following question:

"Under Nevada law, if a plaintiff has filed suit against an insurer seeking damages based on a separate judgment against its insured, does the insurer's liability expire when the statute of limitations on the judgment runs, notwithstanding that the suit was filed within the six-year life of the judgment?"

On February 23, 2018 the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order accepting this second certified question and ordered Appellants to file their Opening brief within 30 days, or by March 26, 2018. A copy of the Order accepting the second certified question is attached hereto as Exhibit B. In accepting the certified question, the Nevada Supreme Court rephrased the question as follows:

¹ At that time, in 2008, Ms. Nalder was a minor so the judgment was entered in favor of her through her Guardian Ad Litem and, father, James Nalder.

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In an action against an insurer for breach of the duty to defend its insured, can the plaintiff continue to seek consequential damages in the amount of a default judgment obtained against the insured when the judgment against the insured was not renewed and the time for doing so expired while the action against the insurer was pending?

On August 2, Plaintiff (Appellant therein) filed her Opening Brief on this question and, UAIC has yet to file its Response Brief an, accordingly, the above-quoted question and, issue, remains pending before the Nevada Supreme Court.

Despite the above, in what appears to be a clear case of forum shopping, Plaintiff retained additional Counsel (Plaintiff's Counsel herein) who filed an ex parte Motion before this Court on March 22, 2018 seeking, innocently enough, to "amend" the 2008 expired judgment to be in the name of Cheyenne Nalder individually. A copy of the Ex Parte Motion is attached hereto as Exhibit 'C.' Thereafter, this Court obviously not having been informed of the above-noted Nevada Supreme Court case, entered the amended judgment and same was filed with a notice of entry on May 18, 2018. A copy of the filed Amended Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit 'D.'

Furthermore, Plaintiff then initiated this "new" action in a thinly veiled attempt to have this Court rule on issues pending before the Nevada Supreme Court and "fix" their expired judgment. This intent appears clearly evidenced by paragraph five (5) of Plaintiff's prayer for relief herein which states Plaintiff is seeking this Court to make "a declaration that the statute of limitations on the judgment on the judgment is still tolled as a result of Defendant's continued absence from the state." A copy of Plaintiff's Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit 'E." Plaintiff then apparently served Lewis and, on July 17, 2018, sent a letter to UAIC's counsel with a copy of a "three Day notice to Plead", and, as such, threatening default of Lewis on this "new" action. A copy of Plaintiff's letter and three day notice is attached hereto as Exhibit 'F.'

Upon learning of this new action and, given the United States District Court's ruling that Gary Lewis is an insured under an implied UAIC policy for the loss belying these judgments and, present action, UAIC immediately sought to engage counsel to appear on Lewis' behalf in

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the present action. A copy of the Judgment of the U.S. District Court finding coverage and implying an insurance policy is attached hereto as Exhibit 'G." Following retained defense Counsel's attempts to communicate with Mr. Lewis to defend him in this action and, potentially, vacate this improper amendment to an expired judgment – retained defense counsel was sent a letter by Tommy Christensen, Esq. – the Counsel for Plaintiff judgment-creditor in the abovereferenced action and appeal - stating in no uncertain terms that Counsel could not communicate with Mr. Lewis, nor appear and defend him in this action. A copy of Tommy Christensen's letter of August 13, 2018 is attached hereto as Exhibit 'H."

Despite the apparent contradiction of counsel representing both the judgment-creditor and judgment-debtor in the same action, it is also clear that Mr. Christensen's letter has caused the need for UAIC to intervene in the present action and, this Motion follows.

II.

ARGUMENT

A. The insurer UAIC must be permitted to intervene in this action because it has an interest to protect given UAIC's duty to defend LEWIS per the October 30, 2013 Order of the U.S. District court.

NRCP 24(a)(2) provides for the intervention of right under the following circumstances:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene an action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

The named Defendant LEWIS has been found to be an insured per the United States District Court Order under an implied policy of insurance with UAIC policy at the time of the accident underlying the judgments for which Plaintiff seeks relief in the present action. Exhibit 'G." When UAIC became informed of the present action and attempted to retain counsel to defend LEWIS, UAIC was informed by Counsel for Plaintiff that he would not allow retained defense

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counsel to file any motion to defend LEWIS or vacate the amended judgment. Exhibit "H." Without the ability of retained defense counsel to appear and mount a defense on LEWIS' behalf, it is apparent that UAIC cannot provide him an effective defense. As long as UAIC is obligated to provide such a defense, and to potentially pay any judgment against LEWIS, UAIC's interests are clearly at stake in this action. Therefore, pursuant to NRCP 24(a)(2), UAIC should be allowed to intervene in this action.

Intervention is governed by NRCP 24 and NRS 12.130. Although strikingly similar, NRCP 24 requires "timely application" to intervene whereas NRS 12.130 merely requires intervention at the district court level. Stephens v. First National Bank, 64 Nev. 292, 182 P.2d 146 (1947). NRS 12.130(1)(c), however, specifically provides that intervention may be made as provided by the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, given this mandate, the procedural rule will be specifically addressed in the instant Motion.

NRCP 24(a)(2) imposes four (4) requirements for the intervention of right: (1) the application must be timely; (2) it must show an interest in the subject matter of the action; (3) it must show that the protection of the interest may be impaired by the disposition of the action; and (4) it must show that the interest is not adequately represented by an existing party. State Indus, Ins. Sys. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 111 Nev. 28, 888 P.2d 911 (1995). 2

When determining the timeliness of an application for intervention, it is not the length of the delay by the intervenor that is of primary importance, per se, but the extent of prejudice to the rights of existing parties resulting from the delay, Lawler v. Ginochio, 94 Nev. 623, 584 P.2d 667 (1978). This determination is, of course, within the sound discretion of the court. Id. Here, this

² The Rule specifically reads: (a) Intervention of Right, Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

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matter is newly filed, LEWIS was only recently served, no default has been taken, no discovery has progressed, and the matter has had no dispositive rulings made nor trial date set; as such, UAIC'S intervention in the instant matter will not delay the trial proceedings and, thus, should be considered timely.

Furthermore, as outlined above, it is clear that UAIC's Petition meets the other three requirements for intervention as of right based upon the clear fact that UAIC has a significant interest in the action as the insurer for LEWIS under the aforenoted U.S. District Court Order. By dint of this fact UAIC could potentially be responsible for any damages LEWIS is found liable for. This substantial interest serves to satisfy the two remaining requirements as protection of the interest will be impaired by disposition of this action as any judgment entered against LEWIS - without his ability to defend it -would necessarily impair UAIC. Finally, that as there is currently no defendant defending this cause - UAIC's interest is not sufficiently protected.

Moreover, it also true that these very issues - the validity of the 2008 judgment against Lewis – are also at issue in a case involving UAIC before the Nevada Supreme Court, as set for above. The fact that Plaintiff now seeks this Court to make declarations about the validity to the 2008 judgment not only would appear to infringe upon issues before the Nevada Supreme Court and, Ninth Circuit, but also may directly affect UAIC's interests, adding further good cause to show UAIC is an interested third party whom should be allowed to intervene.

The final requirement under N.R.C.P. 24(c) is that the Motion to intervene "shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought. Accordingly, attached hereto as Exhibit "I", is a copy of UAIC's proposed responsive pleading to this action, a Motion to Dismiss.

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A TKIN WINNER & SHERROD

III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is necessary for UAIC to intervene in this matter to protect its interests and LEWIS'.

DATED this day of Allas, 2018.

ATKIN WINNER & SHERROD

Matthew Douglas, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11371 1117 S. Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for UAIC

A TKIN WINNER & SHERROD

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this day of August, 2018, the foregoing MOTION TO <u>INTERVENE</u> was served on the following by [\] Electronic Service pursuant to NEFR 9 Electronic Filing and Service pursuant to NEFR 9 [] hand delivery [] overnight delivery [] fax [] fax and mail [] mailing by depositing with the U.S. mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope with first class postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL

David A. Stephens, Esq. STEPHENS, GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 N. Rancho Dr. Las Vegas, Nevada 89130

EXHIBIT "A"

FILED

JAN 1 1 2018

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT

CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES NALDER, Guardian
Ad Litem on behalf of
Cheyanne Nalder, GARY
LEWIS, individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. No. 13-17441

D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01348-RCJ-GWF

ORDER CERTIFYING QUESTION TO THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 6, 2016 San Francisco, California

Filed December 27, 2017

Before: Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.*

^{*}This case was submitted to a panel that included Judge Koziński, who recently retired.



18PPX16263

SUMMARY"

Certified Question to Nevada Supreme Court

The panel certified the following question of law to the Nevada Supreme Court:

Under Nevada law, if a plaintiff has filed suit against an insurer seeking damages based on a separate judgment against its insured, does the insurer's liability expire when the statute of limitations on the judgment runs, notwithstanding that the suit was filed within the six-year life of the judgment?

ORDER

Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, we certify to the Nevada Supreme Court the question of law set forth in Part II of this order. The answer to this question may be determinative of the cause pending before this court, and there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court or the Nevada Court of Appeals.

Further proceedings in this court are stayed pending receipt of an answer to the certified question. Submission remains withdrawn pending further order. The parties shall notify the Clerk of this court within one week after the

[&]quot;This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Nevada Supreme Court accepts or rejects the certified question, and again within one week after the Nevada Supreme Court renders its opinion.

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Plaintiffs-appellants, James Nalder, guardian ad litem for Cheyanne Nalder, and Gary Lewis will be the appellants-before the Nevada Supreme Court. Defendant-appellee, United Automobile Insurance Company ("UAIC"), a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Florida, will be the respondent.

The names and addresses of counsel for the parties are as follows:

Thomas Christensen, Christensen Law Offices, LLC, 1000 South Valley View Boulevard, Las Vegas, Nevada 89107, and Dennis M. Prince, Eglet Prince, 400 South Seventh Street, Suite 400, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101, for appellants.

Thomas E. Winner, Susan M. Sherrod and Matthew J. Douglas, Atkin Winner & Sherrod, 1117 South Rancho Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89102, for respondent.

 \mathbf{II}

The question of law to be answered is:

Under Nevada law, if a plaintiff has filed suit against an insurer seeking damages based on a separate judgment against its insured, does the insurer's liability expire when the statute of limitations on the judgment runs, notwithstanding that the suit was filed within the six-year life of the judgment?

The Nevada Supreme Court may rephrase the question as it deems necessary.

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This is the second order in this case certifying a question to the Nevada Supreme Court. We recount the facts essentially as in the first order.

On July 8, 2007, Gary-Lewis ran over Cheyanne Nalder. Lewis had taken out an auto insurance policy with UAIC, which was renewable on a monthly basis. Before the accident, Lewis had received a statement instructing him that his renewal payment was due by June 30, 2007. The statement also specified that "[t]o avoid lapse in coverage, payment must be received prior to expiration of your policy." The statement listed June 30, 2007, as the policy's effective date and July 31, 2007, as its expiration date. Lewis did not pay to renew his policy until July 10, 2007, two days after the accident.

James Nalder ("Nalder"), Cheyanne's father, made an offer to UAIC to settle her claim for \$15,000, the policy limit. UAIC rejected the offer, arguing Lewis was not covered at the time of the accident because he did not renew the policy by June 30. UAIC never informed Lewis that Nalder was willing to settle.

Nalder sued Lewis in Nevada state court and obtained a. \$3.5 million default judgment. Nalder and Lewis then filed the instant suit against UAIC in state court, which UAIC removed to federal court. Nalder and Lewis alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, bad faith, fraud, and breach of section 686A.310 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. UAIC moved for summary judgment on the basis that Lewis had no insurance coverage on the date of the accident. Nalder and Lewis argued that Lewis was covered on the date of the accident because the renewal notice was ambiguous as to when payment had to be received to avoid a lapse in coverage, and that this ambiguity had to be construed in favor of the insured. The district court found that the contract could not be reasonably interpreted in favor of Nalder and Lewis's argument and granted summary judgment in favor of UAIC.

We held that summary judgment "with respect to whether there was coverage" was improper because the "[p]laintiffs came forward with facts supporting their tenable legal position." Nalder v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 500 F. App'x 701, 702 (9th Cir. 2012). But we affirmed "[t]he portion of the order granting summary judgment with respect to the [Nevada] statutory arguments." Id.

On remand, the district court granted partial summary judgment to each party. First, the court found the renewal statement ambiguous, so it construed this ambiguity against UAIC by finding that Lewis was covered on the date of the accident. Second, the court found that UAIC did not act in bad faith because it had a reasonable basis to dispute coverage. Third, the court found that UAIC breached its duty to defend Lewis but awarded no damages "because [Lewis] did not incur any fees or costs in defending the underlying

action" as he took a default judgment. The court ordered UAIC "to pay Cheyanne Nalder the policy limits on Gary Lewis's implied insurance policy at the time of the accident." Nalder and Lewis appeal.

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Nalder and Lewis claim on appeal that they should have been awarded consequential and compensatory damages resulting from the Nevada state court judgment because UAIC breached its duty to defend. Thus, assuming that UAIC did not act in bad faith but did breach its duty to defend Lewis, one question before us is how to calculate the damages that should be awarded. Nalder and Lewis claim they should have been awarded the amount of the default judgment (\$3.5 million) because, in their view, UAIC's failure to defend Lewis was the proximate cause of the judgment against him. The district court, however, denied damages because Lewis chose not to defend and thus incurred no attorneys' fees or costs. Because there was no clear state law and the district court's opinion in this case conflicted with another decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada on the question of whether liability for breach of the duty to defend included all losses consequential to an insurer's breach, we certified that question to the Nevada Supreme Court in an order dated June 1, 2016. In that order, we also stayed proceedings in this court pending resolution of the certified question by the Nevada Supreme Court,

After that certified question had been fully briefed before the Nevada Supreme Court, but before any ruling or oral argument, UAIC moved this court to dismiss the appeal for lack of standing. UAIC argues that the six-year life of the default judgment had run and that the judgment had not been renewed, so the judgment is no longer enforceable. Therefore, UAIC contends, there are no longer any damages above the policy limit that Nalder and Lewis can seek because the judgment that forms the basis for those damages has lapsed. For that reason, UAIC argues that the issue on appeal is moot because there is no longer any basis to seek damages above the policy limit, which the district court already awarded.

In a notice filed June 13, 2017, the Nevada Supreme Court stayed consideration of the question already certified in this case until we ruled on the motion to dismiss now pending before us.

IV

In support of its motion to dismiss, UAIC argues that under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(1)(a), the six-year statute of limitations during which Nalder could enforce his default judgment against Lewis expired on August 26, 2014, and Nalder did not renew the judgment. Therefore, says UAIC, the default judgment has lapsed, and because it is no longer enforceable, it no longer constitutes an injury for which Lewis or Nalder may seek damages from UAIC.

In response, Nalder and Lewis do not contest that the sixyear period of the statute of limitations has passed and that they have failed to renew the judgment, but they argue that UAIC is wrong that the issue of consequential damages is mooted. First, they make a procedural argument that a lapse in the default judgment, if any, may affect the amount of damages but does not affect liability, so the issue is inappropriate to address on appeal before the district court has evaluated the effect on damages. Second, they argue that their suit against UAIC is itself "an action upon" the default judgment under the terms of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(1)(a) and that because it was filed within the six-year life of the judgment it is timely. In support of this argument, they point out that UAIC has already paid out more than \$90,000 in this case, which, they say, acknowledges the validity of the underlying judgment and that this suit is an enforcement action upon it.

Neither side can point to Nevada law that definitively answers the question of whether plaintiffs may still recover consequential damages based on the default judgment when six years passed during the pendency of this suit. Nalder and Lewis reach into the annals of Nevada case law to find an opinion observing that at common law "a judgment creditor may enforce his judgment by the process of the court in ... which he obtained it, or he may elect to use the judgment, as an original cause of action, and bring suit thereon, and prosecute such suit to final judgment." Mandlebaum v. Gregovich, 50 P. 849, 851 (Nev. 1897); see also Leven v. Frey, 168 P.3d 712, 715 (Nev. 2007) ("An action on a judgment or its renewal must be commenced within six years." (emphasis added)). They suggest they are doing just this, "us[ing] the judgment, as an original cause of action," to recover from UAIC. But that precedent does not resolve whether a suit against an insurer who was not a party to the default judgment is, under Nevada law, an "action on" that judgment.

UAIC does no better. It also points to Leven for the proposition that the Nevada Supreme Court has strictly construed the requirements to renew a judgment. See Leven, 168 P.3d at 719. Be that as it may, Nalder and Lewis do not

rely on any laxity in the renewal requirements and argue instead that the instant suit is itself a timely action upon the judgment that obviates any need for renewal. UAIC also points to Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.010, which provides that "the party in whose favor judgment is given may, at any time before the judgment expires, obtain the issuance of a writ of execution for its enforcement as prescribed in this chapter. The writ ceases to be effective when the judgment expires:" That provision, however, does not resolve this case because Nalder and Lewis are not enforcing a writ of execution, which is a direction to a sheriff to satisfy a judgment. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.020.

Finally, apart from Nalder and Lewis's argument that it is inappropriate to address on appeal the effect of the statute of limitations on the size of damages they may collect, neither side squarely addresses whether the expiration of the judgment in fact reduces the consequential damages for UAIC's breach of the duty to defend. Does the judgment's expiration during the pendency of the suit reduce the consequential damages to zero as UAIC implies, or should the damages be calculated based on when the default judgment was still enforceable, as it was when the suit was initiated? Neither side provides Nevada law to answer the question, nor have we discovered it.

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It appears to this court that there is no controlling precedent of the Nevada Supreme Court or the Nevada Court of Appeals with regard to the issue of Nevada law raised by the motion to dismiss. We thus request the Nevada Supreme Court accept and decide the certified question. "The written opinion of the [Nevada] Supreme Court stating the law

governing the question[] certified . . . shall be res judicata as to the parties." Nev. R. App. P. 5(h).

If the Nevada Supreme Court accepts this additional certified question, it may resolve the two certified questions in any order it sees fit, because Nalder and Lewis must prevail on both questions in order to recover consequential damages based on the default judgment for breach of the duty to defend.

The clerk of this court shall forward a copy of this order, under official seal, to the Nevada Supreme Court, along with copies of all briefs and excerpts of record that have been filed with this court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Respectfully submitted, Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain and

William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.

Diamuid F. O'Scannlain

Circuit Judge

EXHIBIT "B"

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JAMES NALDER, GUARDIAN AD LITEM ON BEHALF OF CHEYANNE NALDER; AND GARY LEWIS, INDIVIDUALLY, Appellants, vs. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. No. 70504

FILED

FEB 23 2018

ELIZABETH A BIROWN
CLERK OF SUPPLEME COURT
BY S. YOUND

ORDER ACCEPTING SECOND CERTIFIED QUESTION AND DIRECTING SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

The United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals previously certified a legal question to this court under NRAP 5, asking us to answer the following question:

Whether, under Nevada law, the liability of an insurer that has breached its duty to defend, but has not acted in bad faith, is capped at the policy limit plus any costs incurred by the insured in mounting a defense, or is the insurer liable for all losses consequential to the insurer's breach?

Because no clearly controlling Nevada precedent answers that legal question and the answer could determine part of the federal case, we accepted that certified question and directed the parties to file briefs addressing that question. After briefing had been completed, respondent United Automobile Insurance Company informed this court that it had filed a motion to dismiss in the federal case. We then stayed our consideration of the certified question because a decision by the Ninth Circuit granting the motion to dismiss would render the question before this court advisory.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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The Ninth Circuit has now certified another legal question to this court under NRAP 5. The new question, which is related to the motion to dismiss pending in the Ninth Circuit, asks us to answer the following:

Under Nevada law, if a plaintiff has filed suit against an insurer seeking damages based on a separate judgment against its insured, does the insurer's liability expire when the statute of limitations on the judgment runs, notwithstanding that the suit was filed within the six-year life of the judgment?

That question is focused on the insurer's liability, but elsewhere in the Ninth Circuit's certification order, it makes clear that the court is concerned with whether the plaintiff in this scenario can continue to seek the amount of the separate judgment against the insured as consequential damages caused by the insurer's breach of the duty to defend its insured when the separate judgment was not renewed as contemplated by NRS 11.190(1)(a) and NRS 17.214 during the pendency of the action against the insurer. We therefore choose to accept the Ninth Circuit's invitation to "rephrase the question as [we] deem necessary." Consistent with language that appears elsewhere in the certification order, we rephrase the question as follows:

In an action against an insurer for breach of the duty to defend its insured, can the plaintiff continue to seek consequential damages in the amount of a default judgment obtained against the insured when the judgment against the insured was not renewed and the time for doing so expired while the action against the insurer was pending?

As no clearly controlling Nevada precedent answers this legal question and the answer may determine the federal case, we accept this certified question as rephrased. See NRAP 5(a); Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc. v. Ricci, 122 Nev. 746, 749-51, 137 P.3d 1161, 1163-64 (2006).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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Appellants shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file and serve a supplemental opening brief. Respondent shall have 30 days from the date the supplemental opening brief is served to file and serve a supplemental answering brief. Appellants shall then have 20 days from the date the supplemental answering brief is served to file and serve any supplemental reply brief. The supplemental briefs shall be limited to addressing the second certified question and shall comply with NRAP 28, 28.2, 31(c), and 32. See NRAP 5(g)(2). To the extent that there are portions of the record that have not already been provided to this court and are necessary for this court to resolve the second certified question, the parties may submit a joint appendix containing those additional documents. See NRAP 5(d). Given the relationship between the two certified questions, we lift the stay as to the first certified question.

It is so ORDERED.1

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The Honorable Ron D. Parraguirre, Justice, voluntarily recused himself from participation in the decision of this matter.

SUPHEME COURT OF NEVADA

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¹As the parties have already paid a filing fee when this court accepted the first certified question, no additional filing fee will be assessed at this time.

cc: Eglet Prince

Christensen Law Offices, LLC

Atkin Winner & Sherrod

Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A.

Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP/Las Vegas

Pursiano Barry Bruce Lavelle, LLP

Laura Anne Foggan

Mark Andrew Boyle

Matthew L. Sharp, Ltd.

Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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EXHIBIT "C"

Electronically Filed 3/22/2018 11:15 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT MTN 1 David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar Ño. 00902 STEPHENS, GOURLEY & BYWATER 3 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 07-A-549111 CASE NO.: -A549111 CHEYENNE NALDER, 9 10 DEPT NO .: XXIX Plaintiff, 11 vs. 12 GARY LEWIS. 13 Defendants. 14 EX PARTE MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT IN THE NAME OF 15 CHEYENNE NALDER, INDIVIDUALLY 16 Date: N/A 17 18 Time: N/A NOW COMES Cheyenne Nalder, by and through her attorneys at STEPHENS, GOURLEY 19 & BYWATER and moves this court to enter judgment against Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in her 20 21 name as she has now reached the age of majority. Judgment was entered in the name of the 22 guardian ad litem. (See Exhibit 1) Pursuant to NRS 11.280 and NRS 11.300, Cheyenne now moves this court to issue the judgment in her name alone (See Exhibit 2) so that she may pursue 23 collection of the same. Cheyenne turned 18 on April 4, 2016. In addition, Defendant Gary Lewis, 24 25 has been absent from the State of Nevada since at least February 2010. 26 27 28

APPX0242

Therefore, Cheyenne Nalder hereby moves this court to enter the judgment in her name of \$3,500,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full.

Dated this 19 day of March, 2018.

STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER

David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT "1"

JMT THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., Nevada Bar #2326 DAVID F. SAMPSON, ESO., 1 52 PM '08 Jüh 3 Nevada Bar #6811 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 FILED (702) 870-1000 Attorney for Plaintiff, 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA JAMES NALDER, as Guardian ad Litem for 10 CHEYENNE NALDER, a minor. 11 Plaintiffs, 12 CASE NO: A549111 vs. 13 DEPT. NO: VI GARY LEWIS, and DOES I 14 through V, inclusive 15 Defendants. 16 17 **JUDGMENT** 18 In this action the Defendant, GARY LEWIS, having been regularly served with the 19 Summons and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the 20 21 legal time for answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the 22 Default of said Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according 23 to law; upon application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as 24 follows: 25 26 27 28

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IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,444.63 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full.

DATED THIS ____ day of may, 2008.

DISTRICT JUDGE

Submitted by: CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC.

BY:
DAVID SAMPSON
Nevada Bar # 6811
1000 S. Valley View
Las Vegas, Nevada 89107
Attorney for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT "2"

1	JMT		
2	DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ.		
3	Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER		
4	3636 North Rancho Dr		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff		
6	T: (702) 656-2355		
	F: (702) 656-2776 E: dstephens@sbglawfirm.com		
7	Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder	•	
8	DISTRICT COURT		
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
10			
11	·		
12	CHEYENNE NALDER,	CASE NO: A549111 DEPT. NO: XXIX	
13	Plaintiff,		
14	VS.		
15	GARY LEWIS,		
16	Defendant.		
17	AMENDED	JUDGMENT	
18			
19	In this action the Defendant, Gary Lewis, hav	ing been regularly served with the Summons	
20	and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff	's complaint filed herein, the legal time for	
İ	and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the legal time for		
21	answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the Default of said		
22	Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according to law; upon		
23	application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as follows:		
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2	IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,4444.63		
(7) 4	in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9,		
5	2007, until paid in full.		
6	DATED this day of March, 2018.		
7			
8			
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10	District Judge		
11			
12	Submitted by: STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER		
13	2		
14	Day MA		
15	DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902		
16	STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr		
17	Las Vegas, Nevada 89130		
18	Attorneys for Plaintiff		
19			
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22	ta d -		
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EXHIBIT "D"

Electronically Filed 5/18/2018 3:37 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT NOE 1 David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 2 Stephens & Bywater 3636 North Rancho Drive 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355
Facsimile: (702) 656-2776
Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com 4 5 Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder 6 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 CHEYENNE NALDER, 10 Plaintiff, Case No. 07A549111 11 Dept. No. XXIX vs. 12 **GARY LEWIS** 13 Defendant. 14 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT 15 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 26th day of March, 2018, the Honorable David 16 17 M. Jones entered an AMENDED JUDGMENT, which was thereafter filed on March 28, 2018, in 18 the above entitled matter, a copy of which is attached to this Notice. 19 Dated this /7 day of May, 2018. 20 STEPHENS & BYWATER 21 22 David A. Stephens, Esq. 23 Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive 24 Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorney for Brittany Wilson 25 26 27 28

1	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING		
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the law office of STEPHENS & BYWATER		
3	and that on the 18th day of May, 2018, I served a true copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF		
4	ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT, by depositing the same in a sealed envelope upon		
5	which first class postage was fully prepaid, and addressed as follows:		
6	Gary Lewis		
7	733 S. Minnesota Ave. Glendora, California 91740		
8	m/M/15(0:0)		
9	An employee of Stephens & Bywater		
10	7th employee of stephens to 25 water		
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Electronically Filed 3/28/2018 3:05 PM Steven D. Grierson **JMT** CLERK OF THE COURT DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff 5 T: (702) 656-2355 F: (702) 656-2776 6 E: dstephens@sbglawfirm.com 7 Attorney for Chevenne Nalder 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 07A549111 CASE NO: A549111 CHEYENNE NALDER, 12 DEPT. NO: XXIX Plaintiff, 13 VS, 1: GARY LEWIS, 15 Defendant. 16 AMENDED JUDGMENT 17 18 In this action the Defendant, Gary Lewis, having been regularly served with the Summons 19 and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the legal time for 20 answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the Default of said 21 33 Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according to law; upon 23 application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as follows: 34 35 20

Case Number; 07A549111

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3 4 5 5	JMT DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff T: (702) 656-2355	
6	F: (702) 656-2776 E: dstephens@sbglawfirm.com Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder	
8	DISTRICT COURT	
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
11	CHEYENNE NALDER,	07A549111 CASE NO: A 549111
13	Plaintiff, vs.	DEPT. NO: XXIX
14	GARY LEWIS,	
16	Defendant.	
17	AMENDED JUDGMENT	
18 19	In this action the Defendant, Gary Lewis, having been regularly served with the Summons	
20	and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the legal time for	
21	answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the Default of said	
22	Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according to law; upon	
23	application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as follows:	
24		
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26		
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IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the 3,434,444.63 sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,4444.63 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full. DATED this day of March, 2018. District Judge Submitted by: STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT "E"

Electronically Filed 4/3/2018 3:07 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT COMP David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS, GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com 5 Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 CASE NO.: A5491+1 A-18-772220-C 9 CHEYENNE NALDER, DEPT NO.: XXIX Department 29 10 Plaintiff, 1.1 12 GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V, 13 inclusive, Defendants. 14 15 COMPLAINT 16 Date: n/a Time: n/a 17 COMES NOW the Plaintiff, CHEYENNE NALDER, by and through Plaintiff's attorney, 18 DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ., of STEPHENS & BYWATER, and for a cause of action against the 19 Defendants, and each of them, alleges as follows: 20 Upon information and belief, that at the time of the injury the Defendant, GARY 21 LEWIS, was a resident of Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, and that on or about December 2008 22 GARY LEWIS moved out of state and has not been present or resided in the jurisdiction since that 23 24 time. That Plaintiff, CHEYENNE NALDER, was at the time of the accident, a resident of 2. 25 the County of Clark, State of Nevada 26 27 That the true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or 3. otherwise, of Defendants names as DOES I through V, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiff, who 28

 therefore sues said Defendant by such fictitious names. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein as DOE is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings referred to and caused damages proximately to Plaintiff as herein alleged, and that Plaintiff will ask leave of this Court to amend this Complaint to insert the true names and capacities of DOES I through V, when the names have been ascertained, and to join such Defendants in this action.

- 4. Upon information and belief, Defendant, Gary Lewis, was the owner and operator of a certain 1996 Chevy Pickup (hereafter referred as "Defendant vehicle") at all times relevant to this action.
- 5. On the 8th day of July, 2007, Defendant, Gary Lewis, was operating the Defendant's vehicle on private property located in Lincoln County, Nevada; that Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, was playing on the private property; that Defendant, did carelessly and negligently operate Defendant's vehicle so to strike the Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, and that as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence of Defendant, Gary Lewis, and each of the Defendants, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, sustained the grievous and serious personal injuries and damages as hereinafter more particularly alleged.
- 6. At the time of the accident herein complained of, and immediately prior thereto, Defendant, Gary Lewis, in breaching a duty owed to Plaintiffs, was negligent and careless, inter alia, in the following particulars:
 - A. In failing to keep Defendant's vehicle under proper control;
 - B. In operating Defendant's vehicle without due care for the rights of the Plaintiff;
 - C. In failing to keep a proper lookout for plaintiffs
- D. The Defendant violated certain Nevada Revised Statutes and Clark County Ordinances, and the Plaintiff will pray leave of Court to insert the exact statutes or ordinances at the time of trial.
- 7. By reason of the premises, and as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence and carelessness of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, sustained a broken leg and was otherwise injured in and about her neck, back, legs, arms, organs, and

 systems, and was otherwise injured and caused to suffer great pain of body and mind, and all or some of the same is chronic and may be permanent and disabling, all to her damage in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00

- 8. By reason of the premises, and as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence and carelessness of the Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, has been caused to expend monies for medical and miscellaneous expenses as of this time in excess of \$41,851.89, and will in the future be caused to expend additional monies for medical expenses and miscellaneous expenses incidental thereto, in a sum not yet presently ascertainable, and leave of Court will be requested to include said additional damages when the same have been fully determined.
- 9. Prior to the injuries complained of herein, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, was an able-bodied female, capable of being gainfully employed and capable of engaging in all other activities for which Plaintiff was otherwise suited. By reason of the premises, and as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the said Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, was caused to be disabled and limited and restricted in her occupations and activities, and/or suffered a diminution of Plaintiff's earning capacity and future loss of wages, all to her damage in a sum not yet presently ascertainable, the allegations of which Plaintiff prays leave of Court to insert here when the same shall be fully determined.
- 10. That James Nalder as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, obtained judgment against Gary Lewis.
- 11. That the judgment is to bear interest at the legal rate from October 9, 2007 until paid in full.
- 12. That during Cheyenne Nalder's minority which ended on April 4, 2016 all statutes of limitations were tolled.
- 13. That during Gary Lewis' absence from the state of Nevada all statutes of limitations have been tolled and remain tolled.
- 14. That the only payment made on the judgment was \$15,000.00 paid by Lewis's insurer on February 5, 2015. This payment extends any statute of limitation.

1	6. For such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper in the
2	premises.
3	DATED this 3 rd day of April, 2018.
4	
5	STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER
6	
7	/s David A. Stephens David A. Stephens, Esq.
8	/s David A. Stephens David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff
9	Attorneys for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT "F"

STEPHENS & BYWATER, P.C.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

David A. Stephens email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com

Gordon E. Bywater email: gbywater@sgblawfirm.com

July 17, 2018

VIA REGULAR U.S. MAIL Thomas E. Winner, Esq. Atkin Winner & Sherrod 1117 S. Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

RE: Cheyenne Nalder vs. Gary Lewis

Dear Tom:

I am enclosing with this letter a Three Day Notice to Plead which I filed in the above entitled matter.

I recognize that you have not appeared in this matter. I served Mr. Lewis some time ago and he has never filed an answer. Thus, as a courtesy to you, who, I understand to be representing Mr. Lewis in related cases, I am providing this Three Day Notice to you in addition to Mr. Lewis.

I appreciate your consideration.

Sincerely,

STEPHENS & BYWATER

David A. Stephens, Esq.

DAS:mlg enclosure

3636 N. Rancho Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 | Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 Website: www.sgblawfirm.com





Electronically Filed 7/18/2018 3:54 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT TDNP (CIV) David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS, GOURLEY & BYWATER 3 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 CASE NO.: A-18-772220-C CHEYENNE NALDER, 9 10 DEPT NO.: XXIX Plaintiff, 11 12 GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V, inclusive, 13 Defendants. 14 15 THREE DAY NOTICE TO PLEAD 16 Date: n/a 17 Time: n/a To: Gary Lewis, Defendant 18 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Plaintiff intends to take a default and default judgment 19 against you if you have not answered or otherwise filed a response of pleading within three (3) days 20 of the date of this notice. 21 Dated this 12 day of July 2018. 22 23 24 David A. Stephens, Esq. 25 Nevada Bar No. 00902 Stephens Gourley & Bywater 26 3636 N. Rancho Drive Las Vegas, NV 89130 27 Attorney for Plaintiff 28

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that service of this THREE DAY NOTICE TO PLEAD was made this day of July, 2018, by depositing a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: Thomas E. Winner, Esq. Atkin Winner Shorrod 1117 S. Rancho Drive Las Vegas, NV 89102 Gary Lewis 733 Minnesota Avenue Glendora, CA 91740

Stephens Gourley & Bywater

EXHIBIT "G"

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

	ICT OF Nevada
Nalder et al.,	
Plaintiffs,	JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
V. United Automobile Insurance Company,	Case Number: 2:09-cv-01348-RCJ-GWF
Defendant.	
Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a triarendered its verdict.	al by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has
Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing be decision has been rendered.	efore the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a
Notice of Acceptance with Offer of Judgment. A notice case.	of acceptance with offer of judgment has been filed in this
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED	
The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Nalder and fi ambiguity and, thus, the statement is construed in favor of co summary judgment on Nalder's remaining bad-faith claims.	
The Court grants summary judgment on all extra-contractual The Court directs Defendant to pay Cheyanne Nalder the pol of the accident.	
October 30, 2013	/s/ Lance S. Wilson
Date	Clerk
	/s/ Summer Rivera
	(By) Deputy Clerk

EXHIBIT "H"



August 13, 2018

Stephen H. Rogers, Esq. ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL 700 S. Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Re: Gary Lewis

Dear Stephen:

I am in receipt of your letter dated Friday, August 10, 2018. I was disappointed that you have chosen to disregard my request that you communicate with me and not directly with my client. You say you have "been retained to defend Mr. Lewis with regard to Ms. Nalder's 2018 actions." Would you be so kind as to provide me with all communications written or verbal or notes of communications you have had with UAIC, their attorneys and/or Mr.

VIA Fax: (702)384-1460

Email: srogers@rmcmlaw.com

Lewis from your first contact regarding this matter to the present?

Please confirm that UAIC seeks now to honor the insurance contract with Mr. Lewis and provide a defense for him and pay any judgment that may result? This is the first indication I am aware of where UAIC seeks to defend Mr. Lewis. I repeat, please do not take any actions, including requesting more time or filing anything on behalf of Mr. Lewis without first getting authority from Mr. Lewis through me. Please only communicate through this office with Mr. Lewis. If you have already filed something or requested an extension without written authority from Mr. Lewis, he requests that you immediately reverse that action. Please also only communicate with UAIC that any attempt by them to hire any other attorneys to take action on behalf of Mr. Lewis must include notice to those attorneys that they must first get Mr. Lewis' consent through my office before taking any action including requesting extensions of time or filing any pleadings on his behalf.

Regarding your statement that Mr. Lewis would not be any worse off if you should lose your motions. That is not correct. We agree that the validity of the judgment is unimportant at this stage of the claims handling case. UAIC, however, is arguing that Mr. Lewis' claims handling case should be dismissed because they claim the judgment is not valid. If you interpose an insufficient improper defense that delays the inevitable entry of judgment against Mr. Lewis and the Ninth Circuit dismisses the appeal then Mr. Lewis will have a judgment against him and no claim against UAIC. In addition, you will cause additional damages and expense to both parties for which, ultimately, Mr. Lewis would be responsible.



Could you be mistaken about your statement that "the original Judgment expired and cannot be revived?" I will ask your comment on just one legal concept -- Mr. Lewis' absence from the state. There are others but this one is sufficient on its own. There are three statutes applicable to this narrow issue: NRS 11.190; NRS 11.300 and NRS 17.214.

NRS 11,190 Periods of limitation. ... actions .. may only be commenced as follows:

1. Within 6 years;

(a) ... an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States, or the renewal thereof.

NRS 11.300 Absence from State suspends running of statute. If, ... after the cause of action shall have accured the person (defendant) departs from the State, the time of the absence shall not be part of the time prescribed for the commencement of the action.

NRS 17.214 Filing and contents of affidavit; recording affidavit; notice to judgment debtor; successive affidavits.

- 1. A judgment creditor or a judgment creditor's successor in interest may renew a judgment which has not been paid by:
- (a) Filing an affidavit with the clerk of the court where the judgment is entered and docketed, within 90 days before the date the judgment expires by limitation.

These statutes make it clear that both an action on the judgment or an optional renewal is still available through today because Mr. Lewis has been in California since late 2008. If you have case law from Nevada contrary to the clear language of these statutes please share it with me so that I may review it and discuss it with my client.

Your prompt attention is appreciated. Mr. Lewis does not wish you to file any motions until and unless he is convinced that they will benefit Mr. Lewis -- not harm him and benefit UAIC. Mr. Lewis would like all your communications to go through my office. He does not wish to have you copy him on correspondence with my office. Please do not communicate directly with Mr. Lewis.

Very truly yours,

Tommy Christensen

CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICE, LLC



Altorneys At Law
Stephen H. Rogers
Rebecca L. Nastrangelo
Daniel E. Carvalho
Bert Mitchell*
Imran Anwas
Charles A. Michalek
Dawn L. Davis^
Marissa R. Temple
Will C. Mitchell
Kimberty C. Beal
"Of Caunsel
^Also admitted in AZ

August 10, 2018

Via Email: thomasc@injuryhelpnow.com

Tommy Christensen, Esq. Christensen Law Office, LLC 1000 South Valley View Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107

Re: Che

Chevenne Nalder v. Gary Lewis

Court Case Nos.: A-07-549111-C and A-18-772220-C

Dear Tommy:

In response to your recent correspondence, it is my understanding that you and Dennis represent Mr. Lewis with regard to his claims against UAIC. I have been retained to defend Mr. Lewis with regard to Ms. Nalder's 2018 actions. Please advise if you are now also acting as Mr. Lewis' personal counsel with regard to my defense of Ms. Nalder's 2018 actions. If so, I will include you on all correspondence and meetings with Mr. Lewis.

As for your question about the legal issues presented by Ms. Nalder's 2018 actions, and whether the defenses I propose would cause Mr. Lewis any "problems," I do not believe they would. Ms. Nalder moved to amend an expired \$3.5 million judgment against him, and also filed a complaint for damages for the personal injuries which were previously adjudicated and to add interest through April 8, 2018, increasing the amount of the judgment to nearly \$5.6 million. My advice as Mr. Lewis' defense counsel is that we should attempt to protect him by moving to void the Amended Judgment and Dismiss the new Complaint.

Regarding the motion to void the Amended Judgment, Ms. Nalder's proposition that her guardian ad litem's responsibility to renew the judgment was tolled while she was a minor, and while Mr. Lewis was out of state, is legally unsupported. Attached is a draft of our proposed Motion for Relief from Judgment which sets forth the legal arguments. Presumably, Mr. Lewis would prefer not having this judgment against him. This motion is supported by the law, and should prove successful. If not, Mr. Lewis would be in no worse position than he is now.

Regarding Ms. Nalder's 2018 Complaint, the personal injury claims appear to be subject to dismissal pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion, as judgment has already been entered on the claims. That Ms. Nalder's guardian ad litem did not take the appropriate steps to renew the judgment was not Mr. Lewis' responsibility. Mr. Lewis should not be placed in legal jeopardy because of the



Tommy Christensen, Esq. Cheyenne Nalder v. Gary Lewis Page 2 of 2

guardian ad litem's failure to act. Ms. Nalder's request for another amended judgment in her 2018 Complaint is procedurally inappropriate, since a request for an amended judgment is not a cause of action. Her request for declaratory relief does not meet the criteria. Overall, all of her claims regarding the validity of further amended judgments suffer from the same problems as the Amended Judgment - the original Judgment expired and cannot be revived. Attached is a copy of our proposed Motion to Dismiss the 2018 Complaint. Mr. Lewis' interests would be protected if the 2018 Complaint were dismissed, as, presumably, he would prefer not having to risk litigating Ms. Nalder's personal injury claims and potential exposure to an increased judgment. He would not be in any worse position than he is now if the Motion to Dismiss were denied.

In your letter, on Mr. Lewis' behalf, you instruct me not to file motions such as those attached. It is not clear to me why you have done so. I expect this letter and the attached motions answer any questions or concerns you may have. If you have specific concerns that I have not addressed, please advise. Otherwise, please confirm that Mr. Lewis will cooperate with his defense by agreeing to allow us to protect him by filing the attached motions, or, if not, why not.

Your prompt attention is appreciated. (Note: This letter is copied to Mr. Lewis so that he can participate with his counsel in our efforts to defend him his interests).

Sincerely,

ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL

Dictated by Stephen Hogers, Esq. Signed in his absence ()).

Stephen H. Rogers, Esq.

SHR:TLHK/cm Attachments

cc: Gary Lewis

M'Rogers Lewis adv. Nalder/Correspondence/Tommy Chirstensen letter 080918 3 wpd

MDSM STEPHEN H. ROGERS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5755 ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL 700 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Phone (702) 383-3400 Fax (702) 384-1460 Email: srogers@rmcmlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, A-18-772220-C CHEYENNE NALDER, DEPT. NO.: Plaintiff, GARY LEWIS and DOES I through Defendants DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ewis, by and through his counsel, Stephen H. Rogers, Esq., of the law firm of Rogers Mastrangelo, Carvalho & Mitchell, hereby brings his Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in the entirety. Plaintiff's personal injury claims have been previously litigated and judgment entered. Plaintiff's request for a second amended judgment should be dismissed because the original judgment expired in 2014, was not properly renewed, and cannot be revived via an amended judgment more than four years after it expired.

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1	This Motion is made and based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein, the Points and
2	Authorities attached hereto, and such oral argument as the Court may permit.
3	DATED this day of August, 2018.
4	ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL
5	
6	Stephen H. Rogers, Esq.
7	Nevada Bar No. 5755 700 South Third Street
8	Las Vegas, Nevara 89101 Attorneys for defendant
9	
10	NOTICE OF MOTION
11	TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
12	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
13	will come on for hearing before the above-entitled Court on the day of, 2018
14	ata.m. in Department 29 of the Eighth Tudioial District Court, Clark County, Nevada.
15	DATED this day of Angust 2018.
16	ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL
17	
18	Stephen H. Rogers, Esq.
19	Nevada Bar No. 5755 700 South Third Street
20	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Defendant
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

Cheyenne Nalder, ("Cheyenne") alleges in her Complaint that she was injured in an accident in 2007. Cheyenne was 11 years old at the time. She did not wait until she reached the age of majority to pursue her claim for damages against the alleged at-fault driver, Gary Lewis ("Lewis"). A guardian ad litem, James Nalder, was appointed to pursue her claim. He did so, filing a complaint on her behalf and obtaining a Judgment for \$3.5 million. For taknown reasons, no payments other than Lewis' \$15,000 auto insurance policy limit have been sought on the Judgment. It is unknown what efforts James Nalder made to enforce the Judgment, if any: What is known is that he did not renew the Judgment before it expired in 2014 while Cheyenne was still a minor.

Despite the fact that Lewis' liability for any injuries Cheyenne may have sustained in the 2007 accident have already been adjudicated and judgment entered, Cheyenne now re-asserts those claims in the instant Complaint. Those claims are subject to dismissal pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion.

Cheyenne also seeks a second amended judgment from the Court. Seeking an amended judgment is not a cause obasion; rather, it is a motion. Cheyenne's request for a second amended judgment should be dismissed and she should be directed to file a motion.

Ribally, Cheyenne seeks a declaration from the Court that the statute of limitations to enforce an Amended undgment and the second amended judgment she seeks in her Complaint) was tolled because she was a minor and Lewis resides in California. Declaratory relief is not appropriate in this matter because there is no justiciable controversy and the issues upon which Cheyenne requests declaratory relief are unripe. In addition, since the Amended Judgment should not have been issued. The original judgment expired in 2014 and was not subject to revival, there is nothing for Cheyenne to enforce.

In summary, the Court should dismiss the Complaint as there are no facts under which Cheyenne is entitled to relief.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case involves a July 8, 2007 accident. Cheyenne Nalder, ("Cheyenne") who was then a minor, alleged injuries. On October 9, 2007, Cheyenne's guardian ad litem, James Nalder, filed a Complaint against Gary Lewis ("Lewis"). See Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit "A."

Lewis did not respond to the Complaint and a default was taken against him. *Id.* On June 3, 2008, a judgment was entered against him in the amount of \$3.5 million. *See* Judgment, attached hereto as Exhibit "B." James Nalder as guardian ad litem for Cheyenne was the judgment creditor. *Id.* NRS 11.190(1)(a) provides that a judgment expires in start) years, unless it is timely renewed. As such, the Judgment expired on June 3, 2014.

On March 22, 2018, nearly 10 years after the Judgment was entered, and nearly four (4) years after it expired, Cheyenne filed an "Ex Parte Motionate Amend Judgment in the Name of Cheyenne Nalder, Individually" ("Ex Parte Motion") in her personal injury case, Case No. A-07-549111-C, which is also assigned to this Court. Her Motion did not advise the Court that the Judgment she sought to amend had expired. The Court granted Cheyenne's Ex Parte Motion and issued an Amended Judgment on March 28, 2018. See Exhibit "C." Contemporaneous with the filing of the instant motion, Lewis has fired a Motion for Relief from Judgment in Case No. A-07-549111-C, detailing the reasons the Court should void the Amended Judgment.

injury claim (but ten years after she already obtained a judgment), she filed a Complaint alleging identical injuries from the same accident. See Exhibit "A," the 2007 Complaint, and the 2018 Complaint, attached as Exhibit "D." In the 2018 Complaint, she does not explain why she believes she is entitled to damages for the same injuries for which she received a judgment in 2008. See Exhibit "D." However, the 2018 Complaint does acknowledge that she already received a judgment against Lewis. Id. at p. 3, 11. 10 - 11.

"Judem his are entered when filed, not when a Notice of Fatry is made. NRCP 58(c).

Finally, the 2018 Complaint seeks an amended judgment to add interest to the 2008 judgment, and declaratory relief that the statute of limitations to enforce the judgment was tolled because she was a minor and Lewis was a resident of California.

III.

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

A¹defendant is entitled to dismissal when a plaintiff fails "to state a claim up which relief can be granted." NRCP 12(b)(5). The Nevada Supreme Court has declared that the dismissal of a complaint is appropriate where "it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] could prove no set of facts which, if true, would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief. Bizz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008).

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, courts primarily focus on the allegations in the complaint. Id. As the Nevada Supreme Court held in Baxtery Dignity Health, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 76, 357 P.3d at 930 (2015) "the court is not limited to the four corners of the complaint." Citing 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Brocedure! Civil § 1357, at 376 (3d ed.2004). The Baxter Court also held that account "may also consider unattached evidence on which the complaint necessarily relies if: (15 the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff's claim; and (15 no party questions the authenticity of the document." Id., citing United States v. Capathian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir.2011) (internal quotation omitted). The Baxter Court continued while presentation of matters outside the pleadings will convert the motion to dismiss to annotion for summary judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); NRCP 12(b), such conversion is not triggered by a court's 'consideration of matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim," Id., citing 5B Wright & Miller, supra, § 1357, at 376.

While Defendant's Motion to Dismiss does rely on certain documents which were not attached to the Complaint, those documents are either incorporated by reference (the Judgment and Amended Judgment) or integral to the claim (the Complaint in the 2007 case). Therefore, this Court should consider this matter a motion to dismiss and not convert it to a motion for summary judgment. A direct sed I close the list o doubt that there are no facts pursuant to which Cheyenne is entitled to the relief her 012 Complaint seeks.

IV.

ARGUMENT

4. The Doctrine of Claim Preclusion Mandates Dismissal of Plaintiff's Claims Related to the July 8, 2007 Accident

The October 9, 2007 Complaint filed by Cheyenne's guardian ad litem, James Nalder, alleged personal injuries caused by the July 8, 2007 accident. See Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit "A." When Lewis did not respond to that Complaint, a Default was entered against him. On June 3, 2008, a Judgment in the amount of \$3.5 million was entered against Jawis. See Judgment, attached hereto as Exhibit "B." Plaintiff acknowledged this in Paragraph 10 of her 2018 Complaint. Because the personal injury claims in the 2018 Complaint have already been fitting act, it should be dismissed.

Cheyenne's claims should be dismissed persuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion. In 2008, the Nevada Supreme Court set forth a three spart rest to be applied to determine when claim preclusion applies. Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 424 Nev. 1048, 1054-55, 194 P.3d 709, 713 (2008), holding modified by Weddell's Shapp 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 28, 350 P.3d 80 (2015) (the modification is not applicable to this cast). According to the Five Star test, claim preclusion applies when: (1) the parties of their privres are the same; (2) the final judgment is valid; and (3) the new action is based on the same claims that were or could have been brought in the first action. Cheyenne's allows the personal injury in the instant (2018) suit clearly meet the Five Star factors for dismissal ander the doctrine of claim preclusion.

First, the parties are the same. The only difference between the 2007 suit and the 2018 suits is that Cheyenne Is now an adult, so her claims need not be litigated via a guardian ad litern.

Second, the final judgment is valid. There is no question that the Judgment issued in 2008 was valid until it expired in 2014. It could have been renewed, and, if so, would have still been valid today. However, it was not renewed. Cheyenne's (or rather her guardian ad litem's) failure to fully execute on the Judgment while it was valid does not open the door for her to re-litigate her claims.

Third, the same chains are involved in both actions. A review of the 2008 Complaint and the 2018 Complaint raveal that the personal injury claim —e i intical.

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As the Five Star Court noted, public policy supports claims preclusion in situations such as this. The Five Star Court cited Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 19, comment (a), noting that "the purposes of claim preclusion are 'based largely on the ground that fairness to the defendant, and sound judicial administration, require that at some point litigation over the particular controversy come to an end' and that such reasoning may apply 'even though the substantive issues have not been tried . . . "Id. at 1058, 194 P.3d at 715. These policy reasons are applicable here. Lewis is entitled to finality. A Judgment was already entered against him. Renewing the Judgment was not Lewis' responsibility – that was the responsibility of Cheyenne's guardian ad litem, James Nalder. Lewis should not be exposed to judgment being entered against him a second time due to Nalder's failure to act.

Cheyenne's personal injury claims are the very type to which claims preclusion applies. The public policy considerations supporting claims preclusion cited with approval by the Court in *Five Star* apply to this action. The claims for personal injuries alleged in the Complaint should be dismissed.

B. Plaintiff's Requestion A Second Amended Judgment Should Be Dismissed Because it is not a Cause of Action

Regarding Cheyenne's request that the Court enter another amended judgment, adding interest accomed through April 3, 2018, it is unclear why this was included in a Complaint. Seeking to amend a judgment is not a cause of action. Cheyenne has demonstrated that she knows how to properly petricia, the Court to amend a judgment, as she has already done so once. This claim is inappropriately included in the Complaint, and should be dismissed.

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Cheyenne does not ask for relief relative to enforcing an amended judgment, which is a cause of action. Rather, she asks the Court to declare that the statute of limitations on her original judgment was tolled because of she was a minor and because the judgment debtor lived in another State: California. Presumably, Plaintiff means the statute of limitations to enforce the judgment, but that is not clear.

Declaratory relief is only available if: "(1) a justiciable controversy exists between persons with adverse interests, (2) the party seeking declaratory relief has a legally protectable interest in the controversy, and (3) the issue is ripe for judicial determination." Cty. of Clark, ex rel. Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Upchurch, 114 Nev. 749, 752, 961 P.2d 734, 756 (1998), citing Knittle v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 112 Nev. 8, 10, 908 P.2d 724, 725 (1996). Here, declaratory relief is not available because the issue as to whether the Amended Judgment or any future amended judgment is enforceable, or whether the statute of limitations have spired, is not ripe.

Supreme Court in Kress & Corey, 65 Nev. 1, 189 P.2d 352 (1948), where the Court noted a justiciable controversy does not exist, where damage "... is merely apprehended or feared..." Id. at 28-29, 189 P.2d at 360. As the Court in Doe v. Bryan, 102 Nev. 523. 728 P.2d 443 (1986) noted, "the requirement of an actual controversy has been construed as requiring a concrete dispute admitting of an immediate and definite determination of the partes' rights." Id. at 526, 728 P.2d at 444. Cheyenne's concean that any effort to enforce the Amended Judgment will be thwarted by a determination that the applicable statute of limitations bars such action is "apprehended or feared" but not existing presently, because she has not taken any action to enforce the Amended Judgment.

Likewise, there is no "concrete dispute" that the statute of limitations would bar an attempt by Cheyenne to collect on the Amended Judgment because she has not tried. Unless and until Cheyenne actually tried to enforce the Amended Judgment, there is no "immediate" need for a "definite" determination of the parties rights. Therefore, there is no justiciable controversy regarding Cheyenne's ability to seek to enforce the Amended Judgment at this time.

"Ripeness focuses on the timing of the action rather than on the party bringing the action.

The factors to be weighed in deciding whether a case is ripe for judicial review include: (1) the hardship to the parties of withholding judicial review, and (2) the suitability of the issues for review." Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 122 Nev. 887, 887, 141 P.3d 1224, 1230-31 (2006)(alteration in original)(quoting In re T.R., 119 Nev. 646, 651, 80 P.3d 1276, 1279 (2003)). In the unpublished decision in Cassady v. Main, 2016 WL 412835, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "E," the Nevada Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff in that case would suffer no harm if declaratory relief were not considered, because he could file accomplaint seeking direct redress for complaints. Id. at *2. Similarly here, Cheyenne could seeking have a court address her statute of limitations concerns in an action to execute on the Amended Judiment. There is no need for such a determination at this time.

Regardless as to whether Cheyenne's request for declaratory relief is appropriate at this juncture, Cheyenne's request for declaratory relief should be dismissed because there is no valid judgment to enforce. The original Judgment issued on June 3, 2008 expired on June 3, 2014. No effort to renew the Judgment was undertaken prior to its expiration. Cheyenne obtained an Amended Judgment, entered on March 28, 2018. As demonstrated in Defendant's Motion for Relief From Judgment Pursuant to NRCF 60, the Court should not have entered and Amended Judgment, and no other amended Judgments should be entered. Nevada law does not permit renewal of expired judgments by amendments.

Nor is the deadline to file the appropriate documents to renew a judgment tolled by any statute or rule. The time limit to renew the Judgment was not tolled by Cheyenne's minority because her guardian ad litem, an adult, was the judgment creditor. The time limit to renew the Judgment was not tolled by the judgment creditor's absence from the state, because the requirement that a judgment be renewed is not a cause of action to which such tolling provisions might apply. Because no valid judgment exists, Cheyenne's request for declaratory relief regarding the tolling of the time to enforce a judgment the uld be dismissed as a matter of law.

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CONCLUSION

In her 2018 Complaint, Plaintiff sets forth no facts which, if true, would entitle her to the relief she seeks. Her Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.

DATED this ____ day of August, 2018.

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ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL



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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(a), E.D.C.R. 7.26(a), and Rule 9 of the N.E.F.C.R., I hereby certify that I am an employee of Rogers, Mastrangelo, Carvalho & Mitchell, and on the _____ day of August, 2018, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS was served upon the following counsel of record as indicated below:

David A. Stephens, Esq.
Stephens, Gourley & Bywater
3636 North Rancho Drive
Las Vegas, Nevada 89130
Telephone: (702) 656-2355
Facsimile: (702) 656-2776
Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Via First Class, U.S. Mail, Postage
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MREL 1 STEPHEN H. ROGERS, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 5755 ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL 3 700 South Third Street - ling 6 page 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 4 Phone (702) 383-3400 Fax (702) 384-1460 5 Email: srogers@rmcmlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant б 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEXADA 9 10 07A549111 CASE NO.: 11 CHEYENNE NALDER, DEPT. NO.: 12 Plaintiff, 13 GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V 14 15 Defendants 16 DEFENDANT'S MOLION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO NRCP 60 17 Defendent, Gary Lowis, by and through his counsel, Stephen H. Rogers, Esq., of the law firm 18 of Rogers, Mastraugelo, Carvalho & Mitchell, hereby brings his Motion for Relief from Judgment 19 Pursuant to NRCP 60, asking that this Court declare as void the Amended Judgment entered on 20 March 28, 2018, because the underlying Judgment expired in 2014 and is not capable of being 21 22 revived. 23 111 24 111 25 III26 27 III28 111

1	This Motion is made and based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein, the Points and
2	Authorities attached hereto, and such oral argument as the Court may permit.
3	DATED this day of August, 2018.
4	ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL
5	MICHELL
6	Stephen H. Rogers, Esq.
.7	Nevada Bar No. 5755 700 South Third Street
8	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Defendant
9	Actionicy's for Perendum
10	NOTICE OF MOTION
11	TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
12	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF
13	FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO NRCP to will come on for hearing before the above-
14	entitled Court on the day of a.m. in Department XXIX of the
15	Eighth Judicial District Court Clark County, Nevada.
16	DATED this day of August 2018
17	ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL
18	
19	Stephen H. Rogers, Esq.
20	Nevada Bar No. 5755 700 South Third Street
21	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Defendant
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Court made a mistake of law based on incomplete/incorrect facts presented in an Ex Parte Motion to Amended Judgment, when entering the Order granting the Motion on March 28, 2018. The Judgment which Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder ("Cheyenne") moved to amend was entered on June 3, 2008. The judgment creditor, Cheyenne's guardian ad litem, James Nalder, did not renew the Judgment as required by Nevada law before it expired on June 3, 2104, six years after it was entered.

The Amended Judgment ostensibly revived the expired Judgment, despite the fact that Cheyenne presented this Court with no legal support for such ravival. Cheyenne's Motion proposes that tolling provisions applicable to causes of action are also applicable to the deadlines to renew judgments. However, none of the authority citedrin her Motion supports misappropriating tolling provisions applicable to certain causes of action to extend the time to renew a judgment, nor does any other authority. Pursuant to NRCP of the Court should declare that the Amended Judgment is void and that the original audgment has expired, and therefore is not enforceable.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case involves an accident which occurred on July 8, 2007. Cheyenne, who was then a minor, claimed that she suffered injuries from the accident. On October 9, 2007, Cheyenne, through her guardian ad litem, James Nalder, presumably a relative, filed a Complaint against Gary Lewis ("Lewis"). See Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit "A."

Lewis did not respond to the Complaint and a default was taken against him. Id. Eventually, a judgment was entered against him in the amount of \$3.5 million. See Judgment, attached hereto

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 as Exhibit "B." The Judgment was entered on June 3, 2008. James Nalder as guardian ad litem for Cheyenne is the judgment creditor. *Id.* NRS 11.190(1)(a) provides that a judgment expires by limitation in six (6) years. As such, the Judgment expired on June 3, 2014.

On March 22, 2018, nearly 10 years after the judgment was entered, and nearly four (4) years after it expired, Cheyenne filed an "Ex Parte Motion to Amend Judgment in the Name of Cheyenne Nalder, Individually" ("Ex Parte Motion"). Her Motion did not advise the Court that the Judgment she sought to amend had expired. Rather, it cited two statutes, NRS 11.280 and 11.300, without explaining why they were applicable to her request, and asked the Court to amend the Judgment to be in her name alone. In short, the Court was not put on notice that it was being asked to ostensibly revive an expired judgment.

With an incomplete account of the issues presented, the Fourt granted Cheyenne's Ex Parte Motion and issued an Amended Judgment on March 28, 2018. See Exhibit "C."

As the Judgment had expired and an Amended Judgment could not be issued to revive it.

Lewis brings the instant Motion pursuant to NRCP 60(b), to void the Amended Judgment and declare that the original Judgment has expired.

III.

ARGUMENT

4. The Julyment Expired on June 3, 2014

Nevada law provides that the statute of limitations for execution upon a judgment is six (6) years. NRS 11.190(1)(a). The judgment creditor may renew a judgment (and therefore the statute of limitations), for an additional six years by following the procedure mandated by NRS 17.214. The mandated procedures were not followed. Therefore the Judgment expired.

NRS 17.214(1)(a) sets forth the procedure that must be followed to renew a judgment. A document tiled "Affidavit of Renewal" containing specific information outlined in the statute must be filed with the clerk of court where the judgment is filed within 90 days before the date the judgment expires. Here, the Affidavit of Renewal was required to be filed by March 5, 2014. No

¹Judgments are entered when filed, not when a Notice of Entry is made, NRCP 58(C).

such Affidavit of Renewal was filed by James Nalder, the judgment creditor. Cheyenne was still a minor on March 5, 2014. The Affidavit of Renewal must also be recorded if the original judgment was recorded, and the judgment debtor must be served. No evidence of recordation (if such was required) or service on Lewis is present in the record.

The Nevada Supreme Court, in Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 168 P.3d 712 (2007), held that judgment creditors must strictly comply with the procedure set forth in NRS 17.214 in order to validly renew a judgment. Id. at 405-408, 168 P.3d 717-719. There is no question that neither Cheyenne nor her guardian ad litem did so. Therefore the Judgment expired.

1. The deadline to renew the Judgment was portolled by any statute or rule

In her Ex Parte Motion, Cheyenne suggested that the deadlines mandated by NRS 17.214 were somehow extended because certain statutes of limitation can be tolled for causes of action under some circumstances. No such tolling applies to renewal of a judgment because renewal of a judgment is not a cause of action.

The introduction to NRS 11.090, the singute of limitation law, states that it applies to: "...

actions other than those for the recovered real property, unless further limited by specific statute

..." The list which fallows includes various causes of action for which suit can be brought.

Nowhere in the list renew of a judgment defined as or analogized to a cause of action.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that actions to enforce a judgment fall under the six-year "catch all" proxision of NRS 11.090(1)(a). Leven at 403, 168 P.3d at 715 ("An action on a judgment or its renewal must be commenced within six years under NRS 11.190(1)(a); thus a judgment expires by limitation in six years"). In summary, neither statute, NRS 11.190 nor NRS 17.214, provides for any tolling of the time period to renew a judgment.

2. The deadline to renew the Judgment was not tolled by Cheyenne's minority

Setting aside the fact that the deadline to renew a judgment is not an action to which statutes of limitation/tolling apply, Cheyenne's proposition that the deadlines set forth in NRS 17.214 were tolled by her minority are inapt for a few reasons. First, the tolling statute cited by Cheyenne, NRS 11.280, does not universally toll all statutes of limitations while a plaintiff is a minor. Rather, it is expressly limited to actions involving sales of probate estates.

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Legal disability prevents running of statute. NRS 11.260 and 11.270 shall not apply to minors or others under any legal disability to sue at the time when the right of action first accrues, but all such persons may commence an action at any time within 1 year after the removal of the disability.

Emphasis added. NRS 11.260 applies to actions to recover a estate sold by a guardian. NRS 11.270 applies to actions to recover estates sold by an executor or administrator. Neither of those causes of action are at issue here. Therefore, NRS 11.280 would not authorize tolling the deadline for the renewal of a judgment while a judgment creditor was a minor. This statute would not apply in any instance because the judgment creditor, James, was not a minor, and so did not have a legal disability.

On March 5, 2014, the deadline to file the Affidavitor Renewal, Cheyenne was still a minor. The judgment creditor was her guardian ad litem, James Nalder Jawas James Nalder, not Cheyenne, who had the responsibility to file the Affidavitor Renewal by the March 5, 2014 deadline. The fact that Cheyenne, the real party in interest, was a minor, is not legally relevant.

As Cheyenne was not the judgment creditor at any time prior to the date of the issuance of the Amended Judgment, anyone looking at the Judgment would believe that it expired on June 4, 2014, since there was not a ffidatin of Renewal filed. If Cheyenne's apparent argument were given credence, either the judgment never expired, because she was the real party in interest and was a minor at the time, the Judgment would have otherwise expired or the judgment did expire but was revived upon her reaching the age of majority. To adopt this proposition would frustrate the certainty NRS 17.214 was enacted to promote – the reliability of title to real property.

If tolling of deadlines to amend judgments were sanctioned, title to real property owned by anyone who had ever been a judgment debtor would be clouded, as a title examiner would not know whether a judgment issued more than six years prior had expired pursuant to statute, or was still valid, or could be revived when a real party in interest who was a minor reached the age of majority. As the Court held in *Leven*, one of the primary reasons for the need to strictly comply with NRS 17.214's recordation requirement is to "procure reliability of title searches for both creditors and debtors since any lien on real property created when a judgment is recorded continues upon that judgment's proper renewal." *Id.* At 408-409, 168 P.3d 712, 719. Compliance with the notice

requirement of NRS 17.124 is important to preserve the due process rights of the judgment debtor. *Id.* If a judgment debtor is not provided with notice of the renewal of a Judgment, he may believe that the judgment has expired and he need take no further action to defend himself against execution.

Lewis' residency in California did not toll the deadline to renew the Judgment

Cheyenne's Ex Parte Motion next cites NRS 11.300, which provides "if, when the cause of action shall accrue against a person, the person is out of the State, the action may be commenced within the time herein limited after the person's return to the State; and if after the cause of action shall have accrued the person departs from the State, the time of the absence shall not be part of the time prescribed for the commencement of the action." Cheyenne's argument that the deadline to renew the Judgment are tolled by NRS 11.300 fails because, again, renewing a judgment is not a cause of action. As the Supreme Court of North Dakota, a state with similar statutes to Nevada regarding judgments, held in F/S Manufactibing **Kensmore*, 798 N.W.2d 853 (N.D. 2011), "Because the statutory procedure for renewal by affidavit is not a separate action to renew the judgment, the specific time period [provided to new] cannot be tolled under [the equivalent to NRS 11.300] based on a judgment@ebjor's absence from the state." Id. at 858.

In addition, applying Chevenne's argument that the time to renew a judgment was tolled because of the judgment debron's absence from Nevada would have a similarly negative impact on the ability for property owners to obtain clear title to their property. Nothing on a judgment would reflect whether a judgment debtor was outside of the state and a facially expired judgment was still valid. Therefore, essentially, a responsible title examiner would have to list any judgment that had ever been entered against a property owner on the title insurance policy, because he could not be sure that judgments older than six years for which no affidavit of renewal had been filed were expired or the expiration was tolled.

3. The Court Made an Error of Law, Likely Based on Mistake of Fact, When it Granted the Ex Parte Motion to Amend Judgment

NRCP 60(b) allows this Court to relieve a party from a final judgment due to mistake (NRCP 60(b)(1)) or because a judgment is void (NRCP 60(b)(4)). Both of these provisions apply.

1. The Court made a mistake of law when it granted the Amended Judgment

Because the Ex Parte Motion was ex parte, it was not served on Lewis nor did he have an opportunity to make the Court aware that the Judgment had already expired on its own terms, and that Cheyenne's proposition that the deadline to renew the judgment was tolled was inapt. The Ex Parte Motion did not advise the Court that the Judgment had expired in 2014 and had not been properly renewed. Had the Court been fully apprised of the facts, it likely would not have granted the Ex Parte Motion. Since the Amended Judgment was entered on March 28, 2018, a motion to set aside the amended judgment on the basis of mistake is timely as it is made within six months of the entry of the judgment. This Court should rectify the mistake and void the Amended Judgment in accordance with NRCP 60(b)(1).

2. The Amended Judgment is void

As demonstrated above, the Judgment expired. It was not renewed. There is no legal or equitable basis for the Court to revive it. The six month deadline does not apply to requests for relief from a judgment because the judgment is void. Therefore, the instant motion is timely. The Amended Judgment is void and, pursuant to NRGP 60(b)(4) this Court should declare it void and unenforceable.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Since the Judgment expired in 2014, the Amended Judgment should not have been issued. It should be voided, and the Court should declare that the Judgment has expired.

DATED this ___ day of August, 2018.

ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL

Stephen H. Rogers, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 5755 700 South Third Street Las Vegas, Novada 89101 Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5(a), E.D.C.R. 7.26(a), and Rule 9 of the N.E.F.C.R., I hereby certify that I am an employee of Rogers, Mastrangelo, Carvalho & Mitchell, and on the _____ day of August, 2018, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO NRCP 60 was served upon the following counsel of record as indicated below: David A. Stephens, Esq. Stephens, Gourley & Bywater 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com Via First Class, U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid Via Facsimile Via Hand-Delivery Via Electronic Service Pursuant to Rule 9 of the N.E.F.C.R. (Administrative Order 14-2) Attorneys for Plaintiff An Employee of Rogers, Mastrangelo, Carvalho & Mitchell



August 13, 2018

Stephen H. Rogers, Esq. ROGERS, MASTRANGELO, CARVALHO & MITCHELL-700 S. Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 VIA Fax: (702)384-1460 Email: srogers@rmcmlaw.com

Re: Gary Lewis

Dear Stephen:

I am in receipt of your letter dated Friday, August 10, 2018. I was disappointed that you have chosen to disregard my request that you communicate with me and not directly with my client. You say you have "been retained to defend Mr. Lewis with regard to Ms. Nalder's 2018 actions." Would you be so kind as to provide me with all communications written or verbal or notes of communications you have had with UAIC, their attorneys and/or Mr. Lewis from your first contact regarding this matter to the present?

Please confirm that UAIC seeks now to honor the insurance contract with Mr. Lewis and provide a defense for him and pay any judgment that may result? This is the first indication I am aware of where UAIC seeks to defend Mr. Lewis. I repeat, please do not take any actions, including requesting more time or filing anything on behalf of Mr. Lewis without first getting authority from Mr. Lewis through me. Please only communicate through this office with Mr. Lewis. If you have already filed something or requested an extension without written authority from Mr. Lewis, he requests that you immediately reverse that action. Please also only communicate with UAIC that any attempt by them to hire any other attorneys to take action on behalf of Mr. Lewis must include notice to those attorneys that they must first get Mr. Lewis' consent through my office before taking any action including requesting extensions of time or filing any pleadings on his behalf.

Regarding your statement that Mr. Lewis would not be any worse off if you should lose your motions. That is not correct. We agree that the validity of the judgment is unimportant at this stage of the claims handling case. UAIC, however, is arguing that Mr. Lewis' claims handling case should be dismissed because they claim the judgment is not valid. If you interpose an insufficient improper defense that delays the inevitable entry of judgment against Mr. Lewis and the Ninth Circuit dismisses the appeal then Mr. Lewis will have a judgment against him and no claim against UAIC. In addition, you will cause additional damages and expense to both parties for which, ultimately, Mr. Lewis would be responsible.

Could you be mistaken about your statement that "the original Judgment expired and cannot be revived?" I will ask your comment on just one legal concept -- Mr. Lewis' absence from the state. There are others but this one is sufficient on its own. There are three statutes applicable to this narrow issue: NRS 11.190; NRS 11.300 and NRS 17.214.

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NRS 11.190 Periods of limitation. ... actions .. may only be commenced as follows:

1. Within 5 years:

(a) ... an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States, or the renewal discret.

NRS 11.300 Absence from State suspends running of statute. If, ... after the cause of action shall have accused the person (defendant) departs from the State, the time of the absence shall not be part of the time prescribed for the commencement of the action.

NRS 17.214 Filling and contents of affidavit; recording affidavit; notice to judgment debter; successive affidavits,

I. A judgment creditor or a judgment creditor's successor in interest may renew a judgment which has not been paid by:

(a) Filing an aftidavit with the clerk of the court where the judgment is entered and docketed, within 90 days before the date the judgment expires by limitation.

These statutes make it clear that both an action on the judgment or an optional renewal is still available through today because Mn Lewis has been in California since late 2008. If you have case law from Nevada contrary to the clear language of these statutes please share it with me so that I may review it and discuss it with my client.

Your prompt attention is appreciated. Mr. Lewis does not wish you to file any motions until and unless he is convinced that they will benefit Mr. Lewis — not harm him and benefit UAIC. Mr. Lewis would like all your communications to go through my office. He does not wish to have you copy him on correspondence with my office. Please do not communicate directly with Mr. Lewis.

Very truly yours,

Tommy Christensen

CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICE, LLC

Electronically Filed 9/13/2018 12:26 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURI I STPJ (CIV) David A. Stephens, Esq. 2 Nevada Bar No. 00902 Stephens & Bywater 3 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 5 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com Attorney for Chevenne Nalder 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 CHEYENNE NALDER, 9 Plaintiff, Case No. A-18-772220-C 10 Dept. No. XXIX VS. 11 GARY LEWIS, 12 Defendant. 13 14 STIPULATION TO ENTER JUDGMENT 15 Date: n/a Time: n/a 16 Gary Lewis, through his attorney, E. Breen Arntz, Esq., and Chevenne Nalder, through her 17 attorney, David A. Stephens, Esq., to hereby stipulate as follows: 18 1. Gary Lewis has been continuously absent from the State of Nevada since at least 2010. 19 2. Gary Lewis has not been subject to service of process in Nevada since at least 2010 to the 20 present. 21 3. Gary Lewis has been a resident and subject to service of process in California from 2010 22 to the present. 23 4. Plaintiff obtained a judgment against GARY LEWIS which was entered on August 26, 24 2008. Because the statute of limitations on the 2008 judgment had been tolled as a result of GARY 25 LEWIS' absence from the State of Nevada pursuant to NRS 11.300, Plaintiff obtained an amended 26 judgment that was entered on May 18, 2018. 27 5. Plaintiff filed an action on the judgment under Mandlebaum v. Gregovich, 50 P. 849, 851 28

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(Nev. 1897), in the alternative, with a personal injury action should the judgment be invalid.

- 6. Gary Lewis does not believe there is a valid statute of limitations defense and Gary Lewis does not want to incur greater fees or damages.
- 7. Cheyenne Nalder is willing to allow judgment to enter in the amount of the judgment plus interest minus the payment of \$15,000.00 and without additional damages, attorney fees or costs. Plaintiff is also willing to accept the judgment so calculated as the resulting judgment of the alternatively pled injury claim. Plaintiff will not seek additional attorney fees from Defendant.
- 8. The parties stipulate to a judgment in favor of Cheyenne Nalder in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, plus interest through September 4, 2018 of \$2,211,820.41 minus \$15,000.00 paid for a total judgment of \$5,696,820.41, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 4, 2018, until paid in full.
 - The attached judgment may be signed and entered by the Court.

Dated this 12-day of September, 2018

David A. Stephens, Esq.

Nevada Bar Ño. 00902

Stephens & Bywater

3636 North Rancho Drive

Las Vegas, Nevada 89130

Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder

Nevada Bar No. 03853 5545 Mountain Vista, #E Las Vegas, NV 89120

Attorney for Gary Lewis

1	JMT (CIV)			
2	David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902			
3	Stephens & Bywater, P.C. 3636 North Rancho Drive			
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355			
5	Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com			
6	Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder			
7	DISTRICT COURT			
8	CLARK COUNTY, NÉVADA			
9	CHEYENNE NALDER,			
10	Plaintiff, Case No. A-18-772220-C			
11	vs. Dept. No. XXIX			
12	GARY LEWIS,			
13	Defendant.			
14	JUDGMENT			
15	Date: n/a			
16	Time: n/a			
17	Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefore,			
18	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Plaintiff Cheyenne Nalder			
19	have and recover judgment from Defendant Gary Lewis in the sum of three million five hundred			
20	thousand dollars, (\$3,500,000.00), plus prejudgment interest through September 4, 2018 in the sum			
21	of two million two hundred eleven thousand eight hundred twenty and 41/100 dollars			
22	(\$2,211,820.41), minus fifteen thousand dollars ,(\$15,000.00), previously paid to Cheyenne Nalder			
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1	for a total judgment of five million six hundred ninety six thousand eight hundred twenty and 41/100
2	dollars, (\$5,696,820.41), with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 4, 2018, until paid in
3	full.
4	DATED this day of September, 2018.
5	
6	
7	DIOTRICT WIDOE
8	DISTRICT JUDGE
9	Submitted by:
10	STEPHENS & BYWATER, P.C.
11	
12	DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ.
13	DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive
14	Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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