IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

			Mar 07 2017 08:32 a.m
DVONTAE RICHARD,)	Case No. 70542	Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court
Appellant,))		
VS.))		
THE STATE OF NEVADA,))		
Respondent.))		
	/		

APPENDIX TO APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF VOLUME IV

Appeal from Judgment of Conviction Eighth Judicial District Court

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Defendant's Exhibit A admitted during Jackson v. Denno Hearing on February 18, 2016	I AA 58-60
Defendant's Exhibit B admitted during Jackson v. Denno Hearing on February 18, 2016	I AA 61-74
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TRAN

CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

DEPT NO. C308258-1

DEPT NO. XXVIII

VS.

TRANSCRIPT OF

PROCEEDINGS

Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE RONALD J. ISRAEL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JURY TRIAL - DAY 4

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2016

APPEARANCES:

For the State: JOHN L. GIORDANI, III, ESQ.

Deputy District Attorney

CHAD N. LEXIS, ESQ.

Deputy District Attorney

For the Defendant: BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ.

RECORDED BY JUDY CHAPPELL, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: KARR Reporting, Inc.

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1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2016, 10:58 A.M.
2	* * * *
3	(Outside the presence of the jury.)
4	THE CLERK: Case C308258, State of Nevada versus
5	Dvontae Richard.
6	THE COURT: Okay. We're on the record. We're
7	outside the presence. I hope I have the final version.
8	MR. GIORDANI: You do, Your Honor. Mr. Percival and
9	I just went through and already numbered everything. We've
10	reviewed them and the verdict form. So that is the final
11	version that can be copied for the parties and the jury.
12	MR. LEXIS: And if you could, Judge, I'd like a copy
13	as well during my closing.
14	THE COURT: Certainly. Let's wait until the
15	defendant comes in.
16	(Off-record colloquy.)
17	THE COURT: All right. Let the record reflect the
18	defendant is now present. First of all, Mr. Richard, have
19	you had a chance to review the jury instructions with your
20	attorney?
21	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
22	THE COURT: Okay. And you also, just so it's clear,
23	had a chance to meet and talk with your attorney yesterday
24	afternoon.
25	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

1	THE COURT: Okay. Now let's do the verdict form
2	first. Has the State reviewed and approved of the verdict
3	form?
4	MR. GIORDANI: Yes, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Has the defense had a chance to review
6	and do you approve of the verdict form?
7	MR. PERCIVAL: I have had yes, Your Honor. This
8	is the one with the changes made.
9	THE COURT: Are you unsure of that?
10	MR. PERCIVAL: Actually, this one
11	MR. GIORDANI: Yeah, you don't have it yet. He has
12	it.
13	MR. PERCIVAL: Oh, that's right, the one that's
14	being copied.
15	THE COURT: Make sure I want this absolutely that
16	you've had the chance to review this. I don't want a mistake
17	that it goes back there and oh, it was the wrong one. So take
18	your time, review it. Are you going to go over it with him?
19	Then get rid of all the other ones so you don't mix it up.
20	That happens all the time.
21	MR. PERCIVAL: It looks fine to me, Judge.
22	THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Give it to the clerk.
23	We will make oh, I only give one verdict form to the jury.
24	The reason being, I'm sure you've either heard or maybe unfortunately, even seen, they will if they can make a
25	unfortunately, even seen, they will if they can make a

1	mistake and write on a different one, they do. We actually
2	had, even though we only give them one, they wrote something
3	and then crossed it out and had to change it. So we will give
4	them one verdict form and I tell them that. You can you'll
5	have the verdict form. You can put it up on the screen, you
6	can do whatever you want, but that way they only have one. If
7	they mess it up then we take the entire thing back and we give
8	them a clean copy, assuming they tell us that.
9	What else? Are we done with that? You'll all have
10	copies. We can make what do you want, four copies?
11	MR. GIORDANI: I think that's fair.
12	THE COURT: Okay. Jury instructions. Is the State
13	familiar with jury instructions 1 through 42?
14	MR. GIORDANI: Yes, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Does the State object to any of these
16	jury instructions?
17	MR. GIORDANI: No, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: Does the State wish to offer any
19	additional jury instructions?
20	MR. GIORDANI: No, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Is the defense familiar with jury
22	instructions 1 through 42?
23	MR. PERCIVAL: I am, Your Honor.
24	THE COURT: Is the defense agreeable to jury
25	instructions 1 through 42?

MR. PERCIVAL: I have no objections to jury 1 instructions 1 through 42. 2 3 THE COURT: I should have said it better. Does the defense object to any of the jury instructions 1 through 42? 4 5 MR. PERCIVAL: None. No objections. THE COURT: Does the defense wish to offer any 6 7 additional instructions? MR. PERCIVAL: No, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Okay. I think that's pretty much it in 9 regards to the jury instructions. We will what, 16 or 17 10 copies. The jury instructions I do give to each of them to 11 follow along. That's it on that. That will take some time. 12 While we're doing that, does the -- is the defendant 13 14 going to testify? MR. PERCIVAL: It is my understanding that Mr. 15 16 Richard is not going to testify. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Richard, is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. I don't see the need to re-read your rights regarding that. We went over that. Do you have 20 any questions regarding your rights to either testify or not 21 22 testify? 23 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Anything else before 24 25 I mean, it's going to take 20 minutes for them to copy all

Anything else before we --1 this. Judge, can I turn this on and put it 2 MR. LEXIS: right next to the corner where I'm going to be talking? I've 3 already been told that I yell at the jury and I have a mic on 4 5 I'm going to come across as a monster. me. MR. GIORDANI: You might anyway. 6 THE COURT: So what is it you want to do now? You 7 don't want to use the mobile --8 I'll put this thing right on the corner 9 MR. LEXIS: of where that TV screen is and move these other things there. 10 As long as Judy can hear you. 11 THE COURT: 12 I'll speak up, I promise. MR. LEXIS: 13 If she doesn't, then she will interrupt THE COURT: 14 you, which I'm sure you don't want. 15 No problem. MR. LEXIS: 16 MR. GIORDANI: Nothing else from the State, Your 17 Honor. 18 Anything from the defense? THE COURT: 19 MR. PERCIVAL: Nothing from the defense, Your Honor. 20 Okay. So here's how I hope it will go THE COURT: basically. All we're going to do -- before lunch I will be 21 22 reading them, I'm sure that's going to take 30 minutes to read 23 them all the instructions. I will then admonish them and then we'll go to lunch. I'm not going to put them -- have them 24 25 wait -- I hate to keep telling war stories but we actually

did. They said oh, I only have 20 minutes of closing. Well, an hour later when they actually did go back, one of the jurors after going through selecting alternates, et cetera, had some sort of maybe diabetic whatever and had to be taken away in an ambulance.

So history, we will not make them sit through until what may be two o'clock. We'll let them go at noon. I'll admonish them. They'll come back and you'll go right into closings.

MR. GIORDANI: Judge, if I may just make a suggestion. Can you guys order the food now? Because usually they wait until the jury goes back, order it, it takes 45 minutes to get up here at the lunch hour, then they're sitting back there for two hours, two and a half hours sometimes.

THE COURT: I --

MR. PERCIVAL: So you're going to read jury instructions and then have them break for lunch; is that what I understood?

THE COURT: Yeah. I was just thinking of just letting them go after I admonish them. You're suggesting that they be sequestered, so to speak?

MR. GIORDANI: Well, not necessarily. It's just usually when they're — when we get to this point you order it for them. But if you're just going to let them go, great. That resolves the problem right there.

THE COURT: I am thinking, assuming, let's say we 1 come back -- I don't know now, one o'clock or 1:30, depending 2 on how this, all this goes, you guys -- how long do you have, 3 estimating? Half hour for your --4 5 MR. LEXIS: Yeah. THE COURT: And how long? I'm just asking for an 6 7 estimate. 8 MR. PERCIVAL: I know. You know how verbose I am. Probably 30 to 45 minutes. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. So an hour, hour and a half, whatever. So they might get the case at 3:30, who knows. 11 12 certainly would be prepared to feed them dinner and that begs 13 the question how late do you want them, if they choose to 14 deliberate late or later. I'm of the mind that pretty much 15 eight o'clock is it. Not because I care but we don't want to have -- I don't know how old you guys are. I think it was now 16 17 five or more years ago where they went all night or something. 18 Oh, yeah. MR. GIORDANI: 19 MR. PERCIVAL: That was Judge Vega that had something to do with that. 20 21 THE COURT: We won't go there, but let's just say 22 I'm not going to, I don't see any reason for it. I think 23 eight o'clock is plenty late enough. We told them that

MR. PERCIVAL: Judge, if I may.

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Friday --

1 THE COURT:

MR. PERCIVAL: My junior high aged son has a basketball game starting at 7:15 that he would love to have dad at. So if I would — I would suggest that if they haven't made a decision by 6:30 we would let them go and reconvene tomorrow. Because after all, it is only Thursday.

MR. GIORDANI: I'm fine with that.

Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. That's certainly reasonable. I'm not — and if somebody, if any of them say hey, we've got to be done at five, then they're done at five. You know, if they have to come back tomorrow, they have to come back tomorrow. If they all say they want to go — do you want me to tell them ahead of time that — well, that's — I don't like, you know, saying okay, you can deliberate, the latest you can is 6:30. I think if they are deliberating at 6:30 I will just tell them you're done for the day and you have to come back. Is that okay with everybody?

MR. GIORDANI: That's fine with me.

MR. PERCIVAL: I think that's great because if you tell them they have to be done by 6:30 then they --

THE COURT: Right. I don't want to limit them.

MR. PERCIVAL: Right. You rush their decision.

THE COURT: And for all I know, who knows. I'm stalling, they're copying.

MR. GIORDANI: The only other thing, Judge, since we

have time to talk about it. If I could make a suggestion?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. GIORDANI: If we finish reading the instructions and Your Honor asks them do you guys just want a 15-minute break and go into closing or do you want a full lunch and let them make that decision, maybe we can speed the process along.

THE COURT: You know, I'm just assuming it's going to be noon already at least by that time. Like I said, you didn't have to see the guy taken away in the ambulance because he had some sort of — you know, he was middle aged and although I don't know for sure because obviously HIPAA and nobody called him up oh, what was the reason. I think it was because he didn't eat.

MR. GIORDANI: Okay. We don't want that.

THE COURT: We don't want that. And so we were lucky. It only happened literally about 15 minutes after. So we had the alternate able to come back. You know, it could have been much worse if the alternates aren't answering their phones and blah, blah, blah. We could have been another day or two.

MR. GIORDANI: Sure.

THE COURT: And I believe it was a criminal case.

And I got to tell you, I don't know how I remembered, but I told them to start at the very beginning, which is important, they have to redo that. You have to tell them you must start

1	deliberating from the beginning again and I remembered for
2	some odd reason. I'm the first one to tell you I have a
3	terrible memory anyway. That's not going to happen because
4	I'm letting them go.
5	MR. GIORDANI: Fine.
6	MR. PERCIVAL: They've got to have their blood sugar
7	up.
8	THE COURT: You know, the young ones or whatever,
9	oh, yeah, that's fine and then I don't know. We have some
10	seniors, don't we?
11	MR. GIORDANI: We've got a couple.
12	MR. PERCIVAL: A couple, yeah.
13	THE COURT: Okay. Take a break.
14	(Court recessed at 11:16 a.m. until 11:32 a.m.)
15	(Outside the presence of the jury.)
16	THE COURT: several things. I forgot and you
17	guys didn't we have a second trial.
18	MR. GIORDANI: Correct. I've sent that stuff, the
19	amended information and the instruction packet already to
20	Sandra, so that should be ready to go.
21	THE COURT: But still, what I'm saying is a half
22	hour, minimum, after they come back the first time.
23	MR. GIORDANI: Right.
24	THE COURT: So the other thing is you had said 6:30?
25	So I guess that's okay. So at 6:30 they're gone. And

according to whatever, there's something -- we can't even feed 1 them until supposedly 7:30. 2 3 MR. PERCIVAL: Okay. Well, Judge, I can --THE COURT: I mean, that's not in stone. If you 4 5 tell me, you know, to give them dinner at five o'clock, I will do that. But there's something from the county that 6 recommends it, so they would not get dinner. On the other 7 hand, I'm not sure -- I don't know. Any suggestions if they 8 get till five o'clock? 9 10 MR. PERCIVAL: The last part, any suggestions --They may want, by the way, they may want 11 THE COURT: 12 to go before five. If they have to go get their kids or 13 something else. So I'm just going to --14 Why don't we ask them? MR. PERCIVAL: MR. GIORDANI: Yeah, that's fine. 15 16 MR. PERCIVAL: I will tell you, Judge, that if you 17 want to keep them until eight or nine, I want to go to that --18 THE COURT: Or, here's another or. After you guys 19 or done I could just let them go and make them come back 20 tomorrow morning. 21 MR. GIORDANI: I'd rather we push through tonight 22 and give them the option to stay. If they want to, great; if

it done today.

not, then fine. But I think if we give them the option,

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usually they will say yeah, we'd like to at least try to get

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1	THE COURT: Okay.
2	MR. PERCIVAL: Well, if that's the case, you know,
3	if they're not
4	THE COURT: How long is your basketball game?
5	MR. PERCIVAL: It's an eighth-grade basketball game.
6	It's maybe an hour and it starts at 7:15, goes till 8:15.
7	It's four 10-minute quarters and
8	MR. GIORDANI: Let's just give them the option to
9	stay until 6:30 and if they want to, great; if not
10	MR. PERCIVAL: Or the other thing is if you want to
11	I can go out to the basketball game and if you
12	THE COURT: All right. I will just tell them that
13	we have to that we are done at 6:30 or earlier or I could
14	tell them that we're done at five unless but the latest you
15	can go is 6:30. That's sort of giving them you know, I
16	don't want to
17	MR. GIORDANI: I honestly think if you tell them we
18	can stay until 6:30, but it's your choice when you leave, that
19	covers it.
20	THE COURT: Okay. Any problem with that?
21	MR. PERCIVAL: Well, I don't think they even
22	THE COURT: Then you run into the problem
23	MR. PERCIVAL: I don't think here's what
24	THE COURT: they will go until 6:30 and tell you
25	oh, we have a verdict.

MR. PERCIVAL: Right. That's exactly what I'm 1 concerned with. So I think what we ask -- we ask the jury is 2 3 there anyone that needs to be out of here by five o'clock or before. If somebody says they do, that's what they need to 4 5 We let them go at five. If they want to stay -- and then say -- and honestly, Judge, I mean, if I'm --6 7 THE COURT: That still doesn't take into account the 30 minutes or so after they reach their first verdict. 8 MR. GIORDANI: That we can't even inform them of, 9 10 though, until after the verdict. 11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MR. GIORDANI: So when they come back with the 13 verdict, whatever it is, then we would have to say we need you to come back tomorrow morning, if it's tonight. 14 15 MR. PERCIVAL: I think that's probably what's going 16 to have to happen. 17 MR. GIORDANI: We just can't say anything about that 18 second phase until the verdict is returned. 19 THE COURT: Right. I hate to say, Mr. Percival, 20 that -- I mean, I want to accommodate you and your son and all that, but the only way --21 MR. PERCIVAL: Well, here's what I was going to say, 22 23 Judge. From here it takes me 20 minutes to get to the basketball game. I can be here until 6:50 or 6:55 and still 24

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make the start of the game. If they don't mind, if they reach

a — if you want to keep them past seven o'clock and they don't mind waiting 20 minutes for me to get back from the basketball game and a verdict comes in, I will leave the game and come back.

MR. LEXIS: They've got to come back anyway. If it's 6:30 and they reach a verdict, they've got to come back the next day anyway for the other one, so it doesn't really matter.

THE COURT: Right. They still have to go out and deliberate. It's at least 30 minutes, there's no way around that. And they could deliberate for an hour, I don't know. All right. I'll ask them if anyone needs to leave by five. If somebody does, that simplifies it, they will leave at five. We will be done at five. If they say no, then I'll let them go till 6:30. At 6:30 I will just call them back in.

MR. GIORDANI: Perfect.

THE COURT: If they come in at 6:30 and say, which I've seen before, if I bring them in and they say oh, now we have a verdict, then you're going to have to stay. I don't see any way around it.

MR. PERCIVAL: Stay and put on the second half of the — are we going to then, if they bring in a verdict and read the verdict, are we then going to put on the second phase of the trial?

MR. GIORDANI: Yeah. All it is is I stand up, I say

-	
1	I have a certified judgment of conviction from case blah,
2	blah, blah, State rests. That's it.
3	THE COURT: I think the jury would, especially after
4	that, would rather finish it up.
5	MR. PERCIVAL: Well, that's fine.
6	THE COURT: We'll just wait and see, but that's how
7	it goes. So, all right. Anything else?
8	MR. GIORDANI: No, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Bring them in. I will ask you on the
10	record does the defense rest?
11	MR. PERCIVAL: Yes.
12	THE COURT: If you wish to present any evidence,
13	then you'll say no, defense rests.
14	(Jury reconvened at 11:42 a.m.)
15	THE COURT: Please be seated. Good morning, ladies
16	and gentlemen. Call the roll.
17	(Roll called by clerk.)
18	THE COURT: The schedule is I'm going to well,
19	first, does the defendant wish to call any witnesses?
20	MR. PERCIVAL: No, Your Honor, the defense, we've
21	consulted with Mr. Richard, and we are not going to call any
22	witnesses. The defense rests.
23	THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. So I am going to in a
	second read the jury instructions, a copy of which you have.
2.5	Please don't look at them vet, just so vou're paving attention

to me. Once I read these, I will admonish you once again and you'll go to lunch because it will be about 12:15. I'll have you come back in an hour and we will go into closing arguments and then later deliberations.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm now going to read to you the jury instructions. Each of you has a copy. You may, if you choose to, follow along as I'm reading them or just listen to me. You will have copies, those copies to bring back with you when you deliberate. Additionally, I want you to see the verdict form. The parties may actually show you another copy. However, this is the original. We only allow one verdict form to go back because if you make a mistake we don't want several. It has created problems, fortunately not with us. If you make a mistake on it, no problem. Write a note, give it to the Marshal, we will give you a clean verdict form.

(Jury instructions read - not transcribed.)

THE COURT: Okay. It's now 12:30. I will once again read you the admonishment and it is equally important that you once again still do not discuss this case with your fellow jurors. You're only allowed to do that once you go back to deliberate. It's headed to 12:35, so 1:35 we will ask you to return.

During this recess you are once again admonished to not talk or converse amongst yourselves or with anyone else on

any subject connected with this trial, or read, watch or listen to any report of or commentary on the trial or any person connected with the this trial by any medium of information including, without limitation, newspapers, television, radio or Internet. Do not form or express any opinion on any subject connected with this trial until the case is finally submitted to you.

We will be in recess.

MR. PERCIVAL: Until what time, Judge?

THE COURT: 1:35.

(Jury recessed at 12:34 p.m.)

THE COURT: Okay. We're still on the record. We're outside the presence. That certainly took me longer than I expected. I don't know if there's more, but boy, there was a lot to read, plus I had morning calendar where I was talking and losing my voice.

1:35. I'm still somewhat reticent, gentlemen, in asking them if they can stay past five because then I will still, you know, I don't want to really, you know, discuss a deadline. I almost would rather at five o'clock — I don't know. All right. Think about it.

MR. PERCIVAL: Maybe at five just ask them if they want to keep going or if they want to come back tomorrow morning.

THE COURT: Then we've wasted more time because

every time we bring them in we've got to call you back. All 1 Take lunch and we'll decide. 2 right. 3 (Court recessed at 12:36 p.m. until 1:37 p.m.) (Outside the presence of the jury.) 4 THE COURT: We're on the record outside the Two things. One is, I mean, reading all that, the 6 7 Counts and whatever, do we have to read all the Counts again? MR. GIORDANI: Oh, you're talking about the second --9 10 THE COURT: The second trial, the instructions. I mean, this is 20 minutes. 11 MR. GIORDANI: I don't think so, Judge. I think the 12 13 one thing you could do is say all of the rules of law that were applied in the or read to you previously still apply. If 14 15 it would require a reading of those instructions again, I can do so. If not, I don't need to. The one that you would have 16 17 to read is, I think you got to it. There's one in there, I 18 think it's number eight or so that says -- it's eight. 19 one has to be read and then just the tenth charge and the 20 amended information on the second one. 21 THE CLERK: The second amended, it should be yes? I 22 also need a second amended. Also, do we have another verdict 23 Have all these been agreed to? form? 24 MR. GIORDANI: All that is back with Sandra. 25 THE CLERK: Okay. So we still need to go over them

1 | and agree.

MR. GIORDANI: We've done that, it should take two minutes. It's all in the back. We just wanted to keep it separate just in case papers get shuffled.

THE CLERK: Yes, good idea. What was your other issue?

THE COURT: Do I have to go — let's make sure Mr. Percival is paying attention. Mr. Percival, do you need to talk to your client?

MR. PERCIVAL: I just covered with him I think what I was going to discuss.

THE COURT: All right. Two things. One is I think because this is, as much as I would, you know, don't want to, this is a new trial on a new charge or an additional charge, which means he again has the right to testify in his defense, which means I have to go over that again with him after we're done with this part of the case.

Second of all or in addition, have you reviewed the jury instructions that the State is proposing and is there an issue regarding re-reading all of the instructions?

MR. PERCIVAL: Judge, in my --

THE COURT: At least the instructions that apply to reasonable doubt, et cetera.

MR. PERCIVAL: Well, in my opinion I don't think they have to be all re-read.

1	MR. GIORDANI: As long as the Court confers with the
2	jury and says all instructions from the prior reading still
3	apply. In addition to that set of instructions we have this
4	one instruction. If you require further or if you require me
5	to re-read those instructions, I can. Does anyone need that?
6	And they'll all, I guarantee they'll all shake their heads
7	violently no.
8	MR. PERCIVAL: Judge, can we approach the bench?
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	(Bench conference transcribed as follows.)
11	MR. PERCIVAL: [inaudible]
12	THE COURT: Okay. So, but for the
13	MR. PERCIVAL: [inaudible]

THE COURT: Right. But for appeal purposes I still need to at least, until then go over — unless he's pleading guilty now, I need to go over and have you on the record agree to the jury instructions. I mean, I guess we could do all that afterwards.

MR. PERCIVAL: [inaudible]

THE COURT: All right. Then that 20 minutes is going to be more than 20 minutes.

MR. PERCIVAL: [inaudible]

THE COURT: Oh, right. No, that's not even a question. The question is are we going to put on the record that you're agreeable to these. You have looked at these and

1	the jury verdict form?
2	MR. PERCIVAL: You want me to right now?
3	THE COURT: Yeah. Why not? We can get it out of
4	the way.
5	MR. GIORDANI: [inaudible]
6	MR. PERCIVAL: [inaudible]
7	THE COURT: All right. If he's pleading guilty then
8	we'll just hold off on that until afterwards. Okay. Anything
9	else outside the presence?
10	MR. PERCIVAL: No, Your Honor.
11	(End of bench conference.)
12	THE COURT: Bring them in.
13	(Jury reconvened at 1:44 p.m.)
14	THE COURT: Please be seated. Parties acknowledge
15	the presence of the jury?
16	MR. GIORDANI: Yes, Your Honor.
17	MR. PERCIVAL: So acknowledged, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: State, are you ready for closing?
19	MR. LEXIS: Yes, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Please proceed.
21	STATE'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
22	By MR. LEXIS: What does it take? What does it take
23	for a man to go up somebody and try to rob him at an ATM at
24	for a man to go up somebody and try to rob him at an ATM at three in the morning? What is the state of mind of a man who is willing to point a firearm at somebody else? What is the
25	is willing to point a firearm at somebody else? What is the

state of mind of somebody who is willing to try and rip off someone's chain in broad daylight? This is far beyond reckless conduct, far beyond zero disregard for the safety of others. This man can care less who he robs and how he goes about doing it.

Before we apply the law of the facts, there's a jury instruction on this. You heard the Judge read it. Don't get tunnel vision when you're applying the law to the facts. It tells you, "Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women." Long story short, use your common sense.

Now let's talk about what this case is not about. This is not a case about identification and who did it. It's not. This man right here is one of two suspects that was involved in the May 20th, 2015 incident at the Bank of America. This man is one of two suspects that was involved at the Terrible Herbst gas station on May 24, 2015. And we also know that he is the man on that day who went up to Kirsten and tried to yank off his chain.

You've heard from the lay witnesses. What did they tell you? First from Luis Ruiz, two black males, one of them had a hoodie on, mask on the face. He had his Glock 26 stolen. Kirsten, he initially told police one of two black

when he was in the hospital as that man who went up to him and tried to snatch his gold chain.

males wearing a red hoodie, identified the defendant right

You heard from Eric Black, one of the two black males were wearing red hoodie. The person in the red hoodie was the person that tried to take his cousin's chain. He told you that. He also told you the person that he shot was a man with the red hoodie.

Randy Combs told you one of the two black males was wearing a red hoodie. Horacio told you one of the two black males was wearing a red hoodie. This man was within feet of these people and he told you the man responsible for pulling the chain was the man who was wearing the red hoodie.

You then heard from Metro officers, CAN — excuse me, CSA analysts and detectives. What did they tell you? Well, they obtained video at the Terrible Herbst that saw the defendant stumbling through the bushes which just so happened to be the bushes where the Glock 26 was found. They went back to the May 20th event. That was Luis's firearm. What else did they do? They followed the blood trail which led to what? Right to the defendant and what was next to him? Sure enough, the red hoodie. And upon finding the defendant he had a gunshot wound to his right calf.

You've also heard from Metro forensic people. What did they tell you? Undoubtedly, without question, the spots

that were taken from the blood trail, that was his blood trail. That man. The red hoodie, who did it belong to? That man.

Defense counsel wants to come up and question these people well, you know, what about the Glock? There's no DNA on the Glock. It's not surprising to anybody. The man just had it for less than four days. Defense counsel wants to come up here and question her about well, what if he squeezed hard, he squeezed the thing. Well, the State's not alleging that he shot. He did not shoot that gun. There's still 10 bullets in there. He never shot it. He never had time to put his DNA all over it. Because it's Luis's gun, he got it less than four days ago.

If that wasn't enough, we heard from the detectives what the defendant himself told them. He tried to minimize all kinds of stuff. However, what did he tell Detective Miller? Well, he said he was one of two suspects at the Bank of America ATM incident. And then he proceeded to tell Detective Miller stuff that only one of the two suspects could have known, details. What kind of details? Driving down [indiscernible] and saw the victim outside the ATM. They parked across the street. The victim was in his car, held him at gunpoint, removed the victim from the car, described the victim as a Hispanic male in his twenties.

He told the Detective Miller I think the guy was

wearing — driving a SUV, an Expedition or a Tahoe. We know that's true. The man was in a Tahoe. He describes it as a light color. Well, that's correct too. He was driving a white Tahoe. He tells the detective the Glock 26 was taken and he admits to wearing none other than the red and gray hoodie.

How about to Detective Spiotto? Same thing. Tries to minimize certain aspects of it. What does Detective Spiotto get out of him? [indiscernible] gas station with the named suspect was the one who approached Kirsten. He tells him that. He was wearing a red and gray hoodie. Drops the 9mm in the bushes. He knew exactly how many rounds were in there, 10 rounds, which the crime scene analyst told you, there was 10 rounds in there. And refers to it as my gun. Says that's my gun. No, it's not. You know that's Luis's qun.

Why else does the State want to point that out?
Well, he also refers to that chain initially with Detective
Weirauch as my chain. I thought that was my chain. No, it
wasn't. Out of all the places to go, out of all the people in
this town, he just so happens to be walking down the street
and finds the most flamboyant, expensive, gaudy chain around
and it's his chain. Ridiculous. But then he comes around
with Detective Weirauch and says oh, yeah, you know, that's
not my chain. He also says that's not the guy who took my

chain. No kidding.

Let's talk about the witnesses and relevance. The District Attorney's Office does not get to pick and choose who gets victimized, who our victims are. You might not like Kirsten, he might not be someone you're going to invite over to your next barbecue. You might not like Luis. You might think that, you know, he's not the sharpest tool in the shed given the fact that he's at the ATM at three in the morning. Does any of that matter? No.

How about Eric? You might think this is the last guy who should have a CCW. The man is trigger happy and he is a bad shot, to say the least. Does that matter? No. It's not relevant.

You heard about a lot of evidence that took place after Kirsten's chain got ripped off or attempted to get ripped off. Some of it's relevant, some of it's not. What's some of the relevant aspects of it? Well, it goes to show that Metro took this very seriously. It goes to show that afterwards they came across the video which happened to then link the defendant going across that where the gun was found and then led to the blood trail. And then the blood trail led to the defendant himself and the red hoodie. Okay. That's relevant, yes.

What's not relevant? It doesn't matter whether Eric shot that gun afterwards four times, 50 times or when someone

would get an RPG. It doesn't matter. The crimes that the State has alleged against the defendant for that Terrible Herbst gas station incident were already done, complete once he went up to Kirsten and yanked the chain off of him.

Doesn't matter if someone's standing here or someone's standing there, the unidentified suspect is shooting his.40 there, this way, that way. Does not matter. The crimes that that man committed were already complete.

Let's first start with the May 20, 2015 incident at Bank of America. Jury instructions tell you there's two types of evidence, direct and circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either to direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all the evidence in this case, including circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.

What kind of direct evidence do you have of the May 20 incident? Well, you saw the video. Let's talk about the video for a second. Three seconds, four seconds long, looked like a clip from some crime movie or whatever you want to call it. Just by that clip alone you knew something bad was about to happen. Three o'clock in the morning, two men converging on this car in a very aggressive, stealthy type way and someone has no idea that they're there as he's getting back in his car from the ATM.

What other direct evidence do you have? Well, Luis

tells us two black males, both with guns, one with a bandanna, one with a surgical mask, they tell him give it all. They then take his wallet, open his car door, force him out, tell him to go stand in the back by the back driver's side area. And then proceeded, the other guy proceeds to go in and take the iPhone and Glock while he's being held at gunpoint.

What kind of circumstantial evidence do you have?
Well, the time, three o'clock in the morning, the place of the altercation, a bank. Obviously, someone's there and has some money on them or is about to get money. The combined approach, the element of surprise on how they approached this man, the choice of the victim. He's alone, no one else around. Choice of the weapon. Both of them had firearms on them, the fact that they took off right after they committed the crime. And you could also consider the fact that this man did a similar type occurrence four days later.

As far as flight goes, you actually have a jury instruction on flight that says, "The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime or after he's accused of a crime is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which if proved, may be considered by you in light of all the other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence."

Again, just another example of what you can take with you to determine the guilt, whether it's direct or

circumstantial evidence.

Let's talk about conspiracy. Before I talk about conspiracy, let me give you an example. Say you've got the medallion up there, thousand dollars or so. I've always thought that would look good in living room. So after court today, let's say me and John are left behind and I tell John you know what, I'm going to take that medallion, why don't you go out in this hallway right here and just give me a couple knocks on the wall if someone's coming. And he says okay, fine.

So he goes out there and I go up, take the medallion, take off. It was my idea, I'm the one that did it, it's in my house. But guess what? I'm guilty of grand larceny and so is he. It doesn't matter. When you're deliberating, it does not matter. You do not need to waste time thinking oh, was this man the one who initially approached him or did he approach from the left, from the right? Was he the one holding Luis at gunpoint while the other man went in the car or was it the other man holding Luis at gunpoint while he went in the car? It does not matter.

Conspiracy is an agreement or mutual understanding between two or more persons to commit a crime. To be guilty of conspiracy, a defendant must intend to commit or aid in the commission of the specific crime agreed to. It is not necessary in proving a conspiracy to show a meeting of the

alleged conspirators or the making of an express or formal agreement. The formation and existence may be inferred from all circumstances tending to show the common intent and may be proved by both direct and circumstantial evidence.

Another way. These are just all ways to describe pretty much the same thing. Conspiracy. All persons concerned in the commission of a crime who either directly or actively commit the act, constituting the offense or who knowingly and with criminal intent aid and abet in the commission or whether present or not, who advise and encourage its commission with the intent that the crime be committed, are regarded by the law as principals in the crime thus committed and are equally guilty thereof.

The quick one first. Whether you directly commit the crime, aid and abet in committing the crime or conspire to commit the crime, you are all equally responsible for that crime. Conspiracy. The State is not required to prove precisely which defendant actually commits the crime and which defendant aided and abetted. Does not matter. You should not be deliberating which one did which. Does not matter.

Theories of liability. Now, again, is a repeat of the last few slides. But what I want to get through is, ladies and gentlemen, in our charging document, which is in your packet, we have alleged certain crimes that the defendant has committed. One of them, flat out, for the May 20th event

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is conspiracy to commit robbery. And one of them, flat out, for the May 24th event is conspiracy to commit robbery. We're alleging that he formed an agreement or an understanding with his co-conspirator to commit robbery.

Now, there's other charges that we have alleged. You have heard the Judge read them to you. Underneath each one of those charges in our charging document we have alleged the defendant can be found liable for each one of those three different ways. Every one of them. This language is at the bottom of each one of those charges.

He can be found liable if you find him directly committing the crime, by aiding and abetting the commission of the crime, with the intent the crime be committed by entering into a course of conduct whereby the defendant did act as a lookout, carry away property and/or contribute to a show of force by providing counsel and/or encouragement to one another by actions and words and acting in consort throughout. The third way, pursuant to a conspiracy to commit the crime.

Notice the ors, the and/or, and/or, and/or, even among aiding and abetting, number two. We don't need all three, don't need all two. One of the three and he's guilty.

Robbery. What's robbery? Robbery is the unlawful taking of the personal property from the person of another or his presence against his will by means of force or violence or fear of injury. The evidence has shown, has made it easy for

you. This man, him and his co-conspirator, used force, violence, fear of injury. It couldn't have been any more aggressive.

Robbery. If you find the defendant guilty of robbery, you must also determine whether or not a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the crime. Well, what's a deadly weapon? You are instructed a firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, operable or inoperable, is a deadly weapon. A firearm includes any device [indiscernible] through a barrel by force or any explosion.

Look, folks, the evidence shows this man and his co-conspirator were using firearms. Bottom line. They weren't using squirt guns. Defense counsel on one of his cross-examinations [indiscernible] to Luis, it could have been a BB gun. Well, even if it was a BB gun, it still would have been a weapon as you see in subsection three. But that's contrary to your common sense and contrary to what the evidence shows. These men are using real guns.

Robbery with use of a deadly weapon. In order to use a deadly weapon, there need not be conduct which actually produces harm but only conduct which produces a fear of harm or force by means or display of the deadly weapon in aiding the commission of the crime. The defendant and his co-conspirator did not shoot Luis. However, they sure did display and they sure did use it by means of force.

Robbery with use of a deadly weapon. The State is not required to have recovered the deadly weapon used in the alleged crime or to produce the deadly weapon in court at trial, but must establish that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the crime. Long story short, they took the gun, both of them did. They had Luis's gun. We do not need to produce that.

Kidnapping. Every person who willfully seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any person by any means whatsoever with the intent to hold or detain or who holds or detains the person for the purpose of committing robbery upon or from the person is guilty of kidnapping in first degree.

First of all, this is not your typical movie definition of kidnapping, where someone has to come and throw someone in a trunk and drive them downtown. Kidnapping is much broader than that. The State has even highlighted the key words in which the defendant did use. Did he seize this man? You'd better believe it. He wasn't going anywhere. When they forced him out of that car and made him stand on the side, he was seized. Was he confined? Absolutely. He wasn't going anywhere with a gun pointed to him while the other man with the gun is in his vehicle.

Abducts? Did he voluntarily get out of that vehicle or was he forced to, told to, with the intent to detain?

Better believe it. That absolutely was their intent. For the purpose of committing a robbery. Absolutely.

The crime of kidnapping in the first degree is charged in this case is a specific intent crime. A specific intent crime, as the term implies, means more than the general intent to commit the act. To establish specific intent the State must prove that the defendant knowingly did and act what the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law. An act is normally done if done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reasons.

Look, specific intent. Well, there's general intent crimes too. If I take this clicker and I get upset and I chuck it and it hits John in the head, I didn't specifically intend to hit John. But it was my willful conduct which resulted in an unlawful touching. Specific intent crimes you need to actually specifically intend that specific crime to be committed which tells you must be knowingly. And here, knowingly done if voluntarily and intentionally. Two men approach, point a gun and say take it all. And then order him by opening up his car and forcing him to the side. That's about as knowingly as it gets.

Kidnapping and robbery. When associated with a charge of robbery, kidnapping does not occur if the movement is incidental to the robbery and does not increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the commission

of such offense.

Incidental. What about incidental conduct? This is when defense counsel had Luis up on the stand, he's telling him well, there's lighting, there was lighting outside, right? And there was cars that were coming by right there. That didn't change the equation. What's he getting at? He's getting at kidnapping and robbery. First of all, was the movement incidental? Did they have to move this man outside of his vehicle to the side of his vehicle to complete their robbery? No. Incidental movement is put your hand on the steering wheel, keep your head forward, give me what's in your glove box, give me your roll out of your back pocket, open up that middle console.

Forcing a man to get out of his vehicle to the side is not incidental. They did not need to do that to complete their robbery. Moreover, increase the risk of harm, does not increase the risk of harm. It absolutely increased his risk of harm. There's no question. What is the first thing police officers do across this country when they pull somebody over and they think he might pose a risk? Get him out of the car. It lessens their risk, it makes that person much more vulnerable.

How many people across this country when they drive down the street, their car breaks down, they're on the bad side of town, or they get involved in some road rage incident where some maniac wants to fight, whatever, and they don't want to put themselves in a bad position. Do they stay in their car or do they substantially increase their risk of harm by getting out? Luis was sitting in his car, he had the protection of the shell of his car, built—in barrier, he had his qun next to him, had his keys in the ignition.

Instead, what do they do? The defendant and his co-conspirator knew what they were doing. Less risk to them, more risk to Luis. Have him get out of the car where he has nothing. Is now at the total mercy of these men. Number one, it's not incidental. Number two, it absolutely increased his risk of harm.

Burglary. Every person who by day or night enters any vehicle with the intent to commit larceny, therein is guilty of burglary. It doesn't get much more clear-cut than take it all, guns, forcing him out while another man goes inside and takes the iPhone and his gun. That was absolutely their intent. The intention with which entry was made is a question of fact which may be inferred from the defendant's conduct and all other circumstances disclosed by the evidence.

Burglary. When two or more persons participate in the commission of a burglary and one or more of them enters the vehicle, it is not necessary to prove the other individual actually entered because one who aids and abets another in the commission of a burglary is equally guilty as a principal.

We threw this in there just as a reminder. I know we went over the three theories before, whether you directly commit, aiding and abetting or conspiracy, you're liable.

Burglary while in possession of a firearm. Every person who commits the crime of burglary who has in his possession or gains possession of any firearm or deadly weapon at the time during the commission of the crime, at any time before leaving the structure or upon leaving the structure, is guilty of burglary while in possession of a weapon.

Not only did these two men have a weapon when they first appeared, they then went in with — one of them went in with a weapon and gain another weapon on the way out.

Burglary. Every person who in the commission of a burglary commits any other crime may be prosecuted for each crime separately. Well, what other crimes did he commit while doing so?

Larceny is defined as the stealing, taking and carrying away of the personal goods or property of another with the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof. You heard why he went in there. After Luis already gave his wallet and the contents therein, one of them went in there and took his iPhone and his Glock. Grand larceny. What makes the larceny a grand larceny? Six hundred and fifty dollars. That's basically it, which is obviously a Glock plus the iPhone plus the contents and the wallet. I believe he said he

had a Louis Vuitton wallet. It's clearly more combined \$650.

Grand larceny of a firearm. Every person who shall steal, take and carry away a firearm with the specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of the firearm is guilty of grand larceny of a firearm. Overwhelming evidence. They took, either him or his co-conspirator, took Luis's firearm.

For the May 20th, 2015 event at the Bank of America the State asks you to find the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary while in possession of a firearm, grand larceny of a firearm, grand larceny, robbery with use of a deadly weapon and first degree kidnapping with use of a deadly weapon.

Now, the May 24, 2015 event at the Terrible Herbst. We'll start off the same way, direct and circumstantial evidence. What do we have? Ladies and gentlemen, you need to look at both. And the law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either to the direct or circumstantial evidence.

Kirsten Travon Kinard told us that he suddenly felt his chain being yanked. Eric Blake said he saw suspicious activity between the defendant and the unidentified suspect and he saw his cousin's chain being forcefully pulled.

Randy Combs sees Kirsten spin around at the corner of his eye. Why? Well, the evidence shows it's because he's getting his chain being tugged off of him.

And Horacio Hernandez-Lopez. You heard this man. He gave the demonstration. He was within feet of these people. He has no dog in this fight. And he gave you a demonstration on how he came up to me, made sure I was standing the right way and how he's coming from the opposite side of Kirsten and demonstrates as the defendant walked up, unannounced, did not say anything and then all of a sudden forcefully grabbed Kirsten's chain and violently tugged it to try to rip it off of him. He himself told you that he was in

shock as he thought oh, my gosh, this guy's getting robbed.

What other circumstantial evidence do you have?
Well, keep in mind this man just did what he did four days ago at the Bank of America. What else? You heard from Elizabeth Greer tell you what. She saw these two men conferring with one another before they approached. The combined approach, they arrived together. The element of surprise. Kirsten had no advance notice that he was about to get his chain ripped off.

What other circumstantial evidence? Again, just so happens that the man appears to be trying to rip off the most expensive item, the most [indiscernible] item that he could possibly see, the gold chain. What other circumstantial evidence? Well, we know they both had weapons. His co-conspirator had a .40 on him. He had Luis's Glock on him.

What do we mean by quick draw? Well, you're out

with a buddy and all of a sudden your buddy, unbeknown to you, decides to start causing trouble. He's shocked, what the heck are you doing, man, and it's going to take him a minute, at least more than a few seconds to pull out his gun. You heard how quick the man with the .40 was to draw his gun. Eric told you. He was keeping an eye on this man when he went up to Kirsten. And once he saw him rip Kirsten's, try to rip his chain off, he immediately grabbed his gun and pulled it out. And while he's grabbing his gun to immediately pull it out, the guy with the .40 is doing the same thing. Why? They knew exactly what they were trying to do.

And, of course, we have the flight again. Other circumstantial evidence you can use for the guilt. Yeah, I'm not going to go over conspiracy all over again. Again, there's an agreement between or mutual understanding between two or more persons to commit the crime. Use the direct and circumstantial evidence as you see fit.

The State has alleged that this man and his co-conspirator formed an agreement or understanding that on this particular day he was going to go up and try to rip that chain off Kirsten's neck.

We have a little more to the conspiracy than the the May 20th event. Why? Because he was unsuccessful. The crime is the agreement to do something unlawful. It does not matter whether it was successful or not. He can't get up here and

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say oh, [indiscernible] yeah. Defense counsel's going to come up here, as you heard from the testimony, and state that his chain wasn't ripped off. That's not in the facts.

Attempt robbery. We already went over robbery before, it's at the top. Robbery is the unlawful taking of a person's property from the person of another or in his presence against his will by means of force or violence or fear of injury to immediate or future to his person or property. We obviously know he tried to rob, but he was unsuccessful. So we have to go to the second one which makes it an attempt robbery. An attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements, a specific intent to commit a crime and a direct but ineffectual act done towards its commission.

The evidence has shown he tried to commit it but he was unsuccessful in doing so. Therefore, that's why the State has charged an attempt robbery and not a robbery. In addition, the State has used its discretion not to charge an attempt robbery with use of a deadly weapon.

Battery. Battery means any willful or unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. Evidence is overwhelming in that and it's easy. Once he went up and laid his hands on Kirsten, that was a battery. That is willful and unlawful force, unlawful contact of another. It's a battery. And when you do such a thing, when you commit a battery with the specific intent to commit the robbery, the crime is

battery with the intent to commit a crime.

For the May 24, 2015 events at the Terrible Herbst, the State asks you to find the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery, attempt robbery and battery with intent to commit a crime. Thank you.

THE COURT: Defense.

DEFENDANT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

MR. PERCIVAL: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, before I get started I'd like to take a couple seconds to say thank you for your patience and your attention during the trial this week. I notice that you've all been very attentive to what the witnesses had to say and probably, unfortunately, to what we lawyers have to say too. So thank you. It's almost certain in my mind that there's some place that each and every one of you would probably rather be than sitting in a courtroom four days in a row. But this is the country that I'm aware of where we have the ability to be judged by our peers at a trial by a jury instead of by some appointed magistrate or some royal appointee who has a person's guilt or innocence in his own hands and is a minion of the government. That's not the case here.

Without people like you who are willing to sacrifice your time and your attention and do your civic duty, this whole system of justice doesn't work. I dare say, it's probably the best one in the world. That being said, thank

you very much for your time and your attention.

There's one thing that Mr. Lexis said that I completely agree with. This isn't a whodunit. This trial has never been about a whodunit. We're not reading some Agatha Christie novel trying to figure out who was involved. Why? Because my client, Mr. Richard, told the police everything in the hospital at UMC on the 24th and the 25th and then again on June 3rd when he spoke with Detective Miller. He doesn't take the stand today to testify to you because he doesn't have anything different to say. He's always maintained that he told the detectives the truth and there's no point — and the detectives have regurgitated everything that he said to them to you, so there's no reason for him to take the stand.

And there is a jury instruction that says he doesn't have to take the stand. He doesn't have to prove a doggone thing. And it can't be held against him if he doesn't take the stand. That's not to be considered in his guilt or innocence. And Mr. Richard and I have conferred and from the beginning there have been things that he has been willing to concede.

There's a misconception in the general public, I don't know if any of you or if all of you or if only some of you hold it, but there's a misconception in the general public that the role of the defense attorney is to try and get a complete acquittal for his client in every case. And that's

not really the role of the defense attorney. The role of the defense attorney is to do — to give his best efforts to ensure that his client, if convicted, is only convicted of the crimes of which he is guilty under both the state of the law and the state of the facts as they are presented at trial. That is the role of the defense attorney.

Sure, you strive to get an acquittal for everything you can, but there are times when that is not possible. So your job is to make sure that your client is not unfairly convicted of anything. That's my role and that's what I'm here to try and do.

The first thing I'd like you to remember when you're considering this case is jury instruction number five. You've all got a set of jury instructions. And I'm going to be making reference to and quoting from a number of them. My arguments are not evidence, but these are the law. They are the law as it was presented to you by the Judge. And at the beginning — remember during voir dire I asked, you know, you're going to be asked to follow the law as it is presented to you by the jury instructions at the end of the case. Is there anyone that has a problem with that? Is there anyone that can't do that? And I didn't see one of you raise your hand and say no, I can't do it. And I don't think I would — if I asked the same question right now I don't think I'd get that response right now.

But jury instruction number five says, "The defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element," not just a few elements, "every element of the crimes charged and that the

6 defendant is the person who committed the crime."

What now? My client and I have conferred. When you've got nine charges and two separate incidents, it's always kind of difficult to decide where to start and where to go to. What I'm going to — the only thing I could think of in preparing for this case is to handle this chronologically. We'll deal with the incident of May 20th at the ATM first and we will deal with the incident of May 24th at Terrible Herbst in a minute.

My client is willing to concede and in fact told the police officers who told you he was riding around with some people at 2:30, 3:00 in the morning and the guy he was riding with saw this guy at the ATM, apparently getting money, or that's what we — I think that would be logical to assume that's what he's doing at an ATM at 2:30 in the morning. He's either getting money or depositing money, one of the two, and he says let's do this.

My client, for whatever reason, agreed. And his role was to go, as the defendant explained, he said his role was to go and watch his buddy's back. His buddy was going to

get money and he was going to watch his back. Okay. Is there a conspiracy to commit robbery there? Yes. He's conceding that. I'm authorized to concede that. He's not going to try and lie to you. Like I just got out to take a stroll around the block and my buddy decides to go rob this guy. No, he knew that he was going to rob the guy. There's no question about that.

Did a robbery occur? Yes, a robbery occurred.

According to Mr. Ruiz, his wallet was taken. Two men approached with guns, his wallet was taken, his iPhone was taken and \$30 was taken that was inside his wallet. And during the course of the robbery he says both of them were waving guns. My client said that, told the police that he did not have a gun, he was there watching to make sure that his buddy didn't have problems pulling this off.

That kind of makes sense because if he had had a gun on the evening of May 20th, why did he have the stolen gun on his person on May 24th? He's going to concede that to you. If he already had a gun, why would he be carrying around a stolen handgun? Everybody's smarter than that. But Mr. Ruiz testified that these two individuals approached and one of them opened the door and said get out or first said give it all and then opened the door and said get out. And he got out and he moved oh, four or five feet to the, roughly the back of the back door, between the back door and the back tire where

he was standing. He said this other guy had a gun.

But the guy that he picked out on a six-pack photo lineup, if you recall that, we were all shown the photo lineup, the guy that got into the car that he circled and wrote his name under and said this is the guy that got into the car and started searching the car was not my client. He said he considered my client, he looked at my client, all this, but no, he thinks this is the guy that did it and he was the one that got into his car and started searching his car and apparently took his gun and his [indiscernible].

Now, one of the charges that my client's facing today is burglary while in possession of a firearm. Burglary is defined by jury instruction number 17. "Burglary is the entry," in this case into a vehicle. But if you were to read the whole statute it would be entry into a vehicle, structure or enclosure with the intent to commit a crime therein. Burglary is complete when the entry is made. The crime of burglary has occurred when a person enters into a building, car or structure with the intent to commit a theft inside.

Did that gentleman do that? Yes. But did my client help him to enter into that car? No. He did aid or abet him. What he did was he stood by and he watched. And he stood by close enough that this guy wasn't going to get in trouble — get him in trouble. But did he help him to commit the act of burglary? No. He did not aid him and abet him in breaking in

-- in opening that car and getting into that car and committing a theft therein. He's not guilty of burglary.

Furthermore, the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the second leg of that, and that is while in possession of a firearm. Remember, it is the State's burden, no one else's burden, it's the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged.

Firearm is discussed in jury instruction number 16.

Jury instruction number 16 defines a firearm as including a device designed to be used as a weapon from which a projectile may be expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion. What we all think of as a gun.

Or, how about this one? This is a firearm. Any device that is used to mark the clothing of a person with paint or any other substance. So if you're out playing paintball wars with your friends, you're in possession of a firearm under this definition.

Third, any device from which a metallic projective, including any ball bearing or pellet, may be expelled by a means of spring, gas, air or other force. Was that proven in this case? No. What the State proved is that Luis Ruiz thought that these guys had guns. What they proved was that they looked like guns. What they did not prove is that they were designed to be a weapon and could propel a projectile down the barrel by force of explosion or combustion.

They did not prove that they were designed to mark somebody else's clothing with pain. And they did not prove that they were capable of expelling a metallic projectile down the barrel by the use of gas, spring, air or other force. And that has to be proved. That's their obligation to prove that

beyond a reasonable doubt to you. And that wasn't done.

My client is not guilty of the crime of burglary while in possession of a firearm, even under a co-conspirator theory. Mr. Lexis laid a lot of groundwork about how each conspiracy — each co-conspirator is responsible for the actions of all other co-conspirators in the commission of a crime. Well, under some circumstances, certain circumstances, that is true. However, it is not true of specific intent crimes.

Now, there are two — as the prosecution point out, there are two types of crimes. There are general intent crimes, which is — are crimes that are just basically the intent to do something that the law forbids. They just generally do something that the law forbids. A specific intent crime requires that you perform an act with a goal, a specific goal and that you intend to do the act to reach the goal.

Jury instruction number 12 talks about specific intent crime. And it says in the third paragraph, "A conspirator may be convicted of a specific intent crime, such

as burglary, only if he had the specific intent that that particular crime, "not the particular crime, that particular crime, "only if the co-conspirator had the intent that the crime of burglary be committed may he be found guilty of burglary." And it says, "A conspirator may be convicted of a specific intent crime only if he had the specific intent that that particular crime be committed. Burglary and kidnapping in the first degree are specific intent crimes."

So you would have to find that there was an agreement between two persons to specifically commit the crime of burglary, entry into a structure for the purpose of committing theft. That's not what he told the detectives. He said, this guy said I'm going to go get some money, I need you to help me out, come watch my back, make sure nothing happens to me. He thinks there's going to be a robbery. Has no—there was no discussion about I'm going to get him out of the car and break him out of the car and move him down the car five feet and we're going to commit—they're going to burglarize his car and kidnap him. That makes common sense. That's the kind of agreement that they make, not I know, you open the car door. They have to prove this.

You've got to open the car door and get into the car for the purpose of committing the crime. And the State has not proven that — even all the other flaws in that theory put aside, the State has not proven that there was a conspiracy to

commit this specific intent crime between Mr. Richard and his unidentified co-defendant or who would be a co-defendant had he been apprehended.

Let's talk for a minute about first degree kidnapping. Kidnapping is the seizure or movement or — I'll just do what the prosecution did and go through jury instruction 28. It says that, "A person who willfully seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any person by any means whatsoever with the intent to hold or detain or who holds or detains the person for the purpose of committing robbery upon or from the person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree."

"It is the fact, not the distance of the forcible movement that constitutes kidnapping. However, a charge of kidnapping and an associated offense will lie only where the movement of the victim is over and above that required to completely associated crime charged. On associated with the crime of robbery, kidnapping does not occur if the movement is incidental to the robbery and does not increase the risk of harm over and above the necessarily present — that necessary present in the commission of the crime."

The crime of kidnapping in the first degree is a specific intent crime, as we discussed earlier. You cannot find him guilty of kidnapping in the first degree because he entered into a conspiracy to commit a robbery. He has to

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specifically intend that a kidnapping occur pursuant to the conspiracy before you can find him guilty of kidnapping in the first degree n a conspiracy theory.

We have Mr. Ruiz telling you, telling the Court, telling the prosecution, telling me that the guy that he identified opened his door, told him to get out and he got in. This guy stood around, had him at gunpoint or what he thought was gunpoint. But there's no evidence whatsoever that the -and then the guy that got in the car stole, while inside the car, his iPhone and his gun, his Glock 19 -- no, Glock 26. But there's no -- they got him out of the car so he could search the car to commit the theft. The purpose of the movement was to complete the theft. And they didn't move him from here across the street, they didn't move him to some concealed area where they could bust a cap in him and nobody would see and increase his danger in that respect. They got him out of the car, a white car, they put him right up against his own car and he stood there as traffic is buzzing back and forth.

And you looked at the video and you saw the security video from Bank of America. There's traffic going by there. If anything, they decreased the risk of harm because A — and by the way, this is also why a police officer gets you out of your car when he pulls you over. By getting you out of your car he precludes you from grabbing some kind of weapon so that

he has to shoot you. He reduces the risk of harm to you when he pulls you over. And he also reduces the risk of harm to himself, so it's kind of a mutually beneficial movement to get you out of the car where you can't reach a concealed weapon and where he can see what's going on.

Now, what do you think is more dangerous? Someone sitting inside a car with dark tinted windows, with the window rolled down on the side where he's got this supposed gun and all they have to do is reach in and shoot him or when they get him outside where he's completely open and obvious to the public? He's probably safer in the well-lighted parking lot where the public can see and people are much less likely to shoot him under that circumstance. They didn't increase the risk of harm by moving him, not substantially.

Was a firearm stolen? Yes. My client will concede that. A firearm was taken. He ultimately wound up with the firearm, but a firearm was taken. Grand larceny of a firearm? We can concede that.

Now, with respect to the incident of May 24th. You saw video of a man in the red hoodie, which my client concedes was him, told the police that. The man in the red hoodie walking up the sidewalk, all the way around to the front door of the Terrible Herbst. He and the guy with the towel over his head entering the front door of the Terrible Herbst. My client turns toward that guy and then turns — they're not

inside two or three seconds, turns and walks out the door and he goes back to the man who he thought was wearing his chain. And he told the police officers. You heard, I believe it was Detective Spiotto testified that when he — when they got to the gas station, the convenience store gas station he said that's my chain and he turned around and went back.

Now, there's no -- Ms. Greer says they say isn't that Old Boy? I don't know where that came from. My client says he doesn't know this guy and has never seen him before in his life, but he thought he was wearing his chain and he went back to get it. There was no discussion. Weed Man, I'm going to change my nickname. Weed Man follows him down there and stands around and watches and when my client goes up and grabs the chain, which he told the detective he did. He said I went up and I grabbed and said let me see that, that's my chain. A struggle ensues, a fight ensues.

Did it handle it the wrong way? Yeah, probably. If he thought that that was his chain, he probably should have said where'd you get that? Where'd you get that chain?

Because that looks an awful lot like one that was stolen from me. Did he handle it improperly? Absolutely. And he even told the police officer that. He said you know, it was really more the way of my approach than anything else. I shouldn't have done that. And in retrospect, I don't think it was my chain. He told the police officer that and the police officer

told us that. Right?

So is he really trying to steal the chain or is he trying to identify this chain as his own when a fight breaks out? That's what he's told the police officers all along.

And this flight instruction? Flight being evidence of knowledge or consciousness of guilt. Let me tell you something. If somebody breaks out a 9mm and starts squeezing off 16 rounds in my direction, am I going to be in flight? You better believe it and it's going to have nothing to do with whether I think I'm guilty of something or not, it's going to have everything to do with whether I think I'm going to wind up full of bullet holes. And that is exactly what he does. When the bullets start flying he turns and runs. And I defy anyone to tell me that when the bullets start flying like that you're not going to do the same thing if you're unarmed. Or even if you're armed if you don't want to shoot somebody.

He was honest about about — he's honest to the police officers about he had the gun. He's honest to the police officers about I got hit, I tripped, I fell in the bushes and I hid my gun because I didn't want to be caught with a gun, and then I limped off down into the apartment complex. Has the State proven beyond a reasonable doubt that this was in fact an attempted robbery and not just him confronting somebody over what he thought was his own property? No, they have not.

Battery with intent to commit a crime. You know, the law in the State of Nevada is kind of weird. I've always thought so. But it's law. If you forcibly take property from another person, you actually take it, commit a robbery, it is a robbery. Even if the property that you take is your own. If they have possession of your property and you take it back through self-help, that is a robbery. Okay? But battery with intent to commit a crime, you have to commit a crime. You have to intend a crime when doing it.

Most people who think they are taking their own property back do not think they're committing a crime. They don't intend to commit a crime. They don't intend to commit a robbery. Is there a battery by virtue of him yanking on his chain? Yes, probably. Is there a battery with intent to commit a crime? No. The State has failed to prove that charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

I'm sorry that you had to sit here for four days and listen to all the hot air that we've thrown around the courtroom to get to this conclusion. Sometimes we're able to resolve cases without having to have a group of jurors in, sometimes we're not. As I told you before, my role is to do my best to make sure that my client, if convicted and when convicted, is convicted of only those charges which both the law and the facts support. I've told you what he concedes and it's my — I would submit to you that the State has failed to

carry the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the charges of burglary while in possession of a firearm, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, first degree kidnapping and attempt robbery and battery with intent to commit a crime.

Have they proven and has my client conceded to conspiracy to commit robbery and the robbery in the first event? Yes. Has my client conceded a battery, that by grabbing that chain and yanking on it, saying let me see that? His language probably wasn't quite that gentle. But yes. But the State simply has failed to carry the day with respect to the remaining charges.

Thank you very much for your attention. Sorry I took up so much of your time. Hope next time we meet it's under different circumstances.

THE COURT: Thank you. Does the State have rebuttal?

MR. GIORDANI: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Proceed.

MR. GIORDANI: Thank you.

STATE'S REBUTTAL CLOSING ARGUMENT

MR. GIORDANI: Admit what you can't deny and deny what you can't admit. That's what Mr. Percival just did, that's what Mr. Richard did when he spoke to the police on three separate occasions.

Now I'm not going to waste too much of your time

UNCERTIFIED ROUGH DRAFT

bogging down, getting into all the details of the offenses, but I'm going to tell you this. Mr. Percival's a good attorney, I respect him, he's done a hell of a job for his client. But unfortunately for him, he represents a client that's guilty as sin for every single crime that we charged. I'll tell you this. We did not overcharge in this case, as Mr. Percival would have you believe. He's trying to attack the little elements of a few offenses to try to get you to trim off some of the offenses. We didn't overcharge in this case.

Had we charged the defendant with all 22 rounds that were fired at that May 24th incident, that may have been overcharging. That's not using prosecutorial discretion as we're supposed to. We're supposed to do justice. We're not supposed to get convictions, we're supposed to do justice.

Now, I don't think, I honest don't believe, I don't think anyone in this room would argue that Mr. Richard went to the car wash that day with the intent that a gunfight was going to ensue. Right? I mean, who can presume that the guy you robbed is going to be a pimp or whatever the heck he is and have his bodyguard next to him with a loaded firearm and then a shootout? I mean, I don't think he intended that.

However, had I charged him with that I would have been legally fine because of that conspirator liability that Mr. Lexis explained to you initially. Now, Mr. Richard there

is guilty of every single crime that occurs that is a natural and probable consequence of his initial intent. That just means that when you are going out to a public place to rob a person of their property, you're in trouble if gunfight ensues and people get killed. That's on you. That's why robbery's illegal. That's why we don't let people rob other people in daylight because things like this happen. That's the reason we presented all that evidence to you, to show what happens when crimes, such as the ones the defendant committed, are committed.

I didn't have to show you the ballistics or the tool mark expert, that doesn't matter. Number one, she couldn't tell you whose bullet went into the people, which I assume you had questions about. But it wouldn't matter anyway. The gun charges aren't charged in this case. The gunfire isn't charged in this case.

I want to address a few points that Mr. Percival made during his argument and I want to start by kind of setting this groundwork. To believe or to go along with what Mr. Percival just argued and to drop a couple charges here and there, you would have to presume that when the defendant spoke to the detectives he was telling the truth about every single aspect of everything. I want to tell you why that isn't the case and why it's obvious that isn't the case.

You heard testimony, the statements, you didn't

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actually see them, but I'm going to remind you about a couple of things he said to show you that he admitted what he had to admit, but denied what he couldn't admit. Number one, he would have you believe that he was driving down the street on the May 20th incident and the guy he was with, it was his idea, it was an opportunistic crime where they saw someone in a parking lot, they chose to pull over and rob the guy. I admit that, I can't deny that because you've got surveillance video. But he minimized and he said the other guy planned it. The other guy had the gun. He robbed the guy. He went into the car, et cetera. So he minimized. He admitted what he had to admit. He denied what he couldn't admit or so he thought.

Think about this. Now he's found four days later with a firearm. Right? And his story to the detective was there's no phone taken, there's no wallet taken, there's no money taken. There's a firearm taken, I admit that because you caught me with it. Admit what you have to admit, deny what you can't admit.

Now, if you're to accept Mr. Richard's story as true, then you would have to logically accept that his buddy planned that robbery on May 20th, his buddy ran the show, his buddy had the firearm when it happened, his buddy obtained the firearm, but then somehow Mr. Richard, the guy who was just there to be a bodyguard, is the one that ends up with the only thing stolen in that robbery. So they did all that so he

could help out his buddy who was just there as a bodyguard. Absolutely does not make sense.

Along that same line, when Mr. Percival mentioned about the firearm charge and saying that we didn't prove the firearm charge, which we absolutely did. He stated portions of the law that benefit his side of the case, but he skipped a couple portions that clearly state that we've proven beyond a reasonable doubt that that was the case. And factually, if you'll recall the statements from the detective, Mr. Richard said on two separate occasions when we first walked up he caught the gun. Pointing the finger at the buddy, minimizing his conduct, making sure the other — the cops know the other guy did everything. He caught the gun.

Well, in making that statement he admitted to use of a deadly weapon during the commission of that robbery. You heard in the other instructions, it doesn't matter if he actually had a gun or if the other guy had a gun. So when that guy walked up and caught the gun, he himself accidentally admitted that he's guilty of robbery with use of a deadly weapon and kidnapping with use of a deadly weapon. There's no getting around that. Those were his words. They're not our words, they're his.

So whether or not he had a firearm doesn't matter. I would submit to you, though, that he did. And how do you know that? Mr. Ruiz. He told you clear as day both had

firearms. He said that multiple times. One guy had a firearm that went into the car, one guy had a firearm that held me at gunpoint by the side of my vehicle. When they ordered me out of the car, that was at gunpoint. That right there is a kidnapping with use of a deadly weapon. Ordering him out away from his keys, away from his protection, as Mr. Lexis told you.

But Mr. Percival kind of attacked that and I want to bring up a point that he must have missed. Don't forget that when the robbery was complete, when the items were already stolen, they ordered him at gunpoint back into the car. So if you want to accept Mr. Percival's argument that he was safer on the street because it's well-lit and there's cars driving by, fine, accept that. Because when they put him back in the car at gunpoint, that's a kidnapping too. That's not incidental movement. The robbery's done. It's not incidental, it's a new kidnapping. That's the charge.

A couple more points to address about Mr.

Percival's argument with regard to the burglary. He said, and I tried to quote, did he help him to commit the act of burglary, no. He said that he just stood there watched by so his buddy didn't get in trouble or so things didn't go wrong, whatever it was. That's absolutely not the case. He aided and abetted in the commission of the burglary because he held the owner of the vehicle that was just burgled at gunpoint

while his buddy went through the car. And that's assuming it's the friend, the unknown co-conspirator who the defendant never named, by the way, that's assuming that he's the one that went in the vehicle. But this is where your common sense comes in.

And I want to remind you about what Mr. Ruiz said when he talked about that photo lineup. Mr. Ruiz said to you that he looked at number one and number three for about 10 minutes, I think was his testimony, around 10 minutes. He focused on those two and he ultimately picked number one instead of number three. Remember that? But he also clearly said that's the guy that went into the car. Now Mr. Percival would have you believe that he identified someone else's going into the car, not his client number three. That doesn't make any logical sense.

Number one was picked from random, completely random. There's thousands if not millions of photos that they could have chosen from, and Mr. Percival would have you believe that number one is the guy that went in the car. No, no, no. Number one looks eerily similar to number three because number three is the guy that went into the car. Number one looks similar, so that's why he said that's the guy that went into the car. He just got the two wrong. He was 80 percent right or he was 80 percent certain that the person he identified was the person that went into the car.

Logically, if he's between one and three, then he's identifying the defendant as the one that went into the car and did all the stealing. Which would make sense again coming around to May 24th when he's the guy with the stolen firearm, the proceeds of the robbery which he would have you believe is the only thing stolen.

There are a couple of jury instructions that I want to draw your attention to. One of them is jury instruction number 13. The second paragraph says, "A co-conspirator and/or aider and abettor is guilty not only of the offense he intended to facilitate or encourage, but also of any reasonable foreseeable offense committed by the co-conspirator and/or the person he aids and abets."

I think the waters were a little muddied earlier, so I want to clarify this. When he conspired to commit the robbery on the 20th, he's on the hook for the natural and probable consequences of that action. Now, Mr. Percival, his quote was — I apologize here. "There was no discussion about I'm going to get him out of the car and move him a couple feet and enter the car." That was his argument as to why his client's not on the hook for the burglary and the kidnapping.

Well, that's why that law is in place. That's why that law was enacted by our legislature. Because when you plan to commit a robbery, agree to do so, conspire to do so, and then follow through with it, if your buddy with the gun

1	tells the guy to get out of the car and increases his risk of
2	harm and then enters the car to commit the robbery
3	MR. PERCIVAL: Objection, this is a misstatement of
4	the law.
5	MR. GIORDANI: I can read it directly from the
6	instruction.
7	THE COURT: Approach.
8	(Bench conference transcribed as follows.)
9	THE COURT: What are you saying?
LO	MR. PERCIVAL: The law says that you can't be found
L1	[indiscernible] co-conspirator theory [indiscernible] specific
L2	intent crime unless they have proven that a conspiracy was to
L3	commit that crime, kidnapping [indiscernible].
L4	MR. GIORDANI: [inaudible]
L5	MR. PERCIVAL: [inaudible]
L6	MR. GIORDANI: [inaudible]
L7	THE COURT: First of all, you can't object until he
L8	completes it because he hasn't not he hasn't said something
L9	wrong until
20	MR. PERCIVAL: He actually completed it once and was
21	starting to go through it again.
22	THE COURT: I don't think so. You understand what
23	his objection is regarding the, it's regarding the burglary,
24	correct?
25	MR. PERCIVAL: The burglary and the kidnapping.

THE COURT: That are specific intent crimes. Right, right. Okay. I don't think he —— I'm overruling the objection. If he does it again or if it does it, then certainly I'll strike it.

(End of bench conference.)

THE COURT: Objection overruled.

MR. GIORDANI: Thank you, Your Honor.

As I was saying, either way, if he is the person going into the car or the person standing outside of the car holding Mr. Ruiz at gunpoint, he had the specific intent that the crime be committed of kidnapping and the crime be committed of burglary. Because he's either number one, doing it himself so you know he has the intent, or number two, standing there holding the guy at gunpoint while it's done. So either way, no matter how you look at it, he's guilty of first degree kidnapping with use, burglary while in possession, robbery with use of a deadly weapon and conspiracy.

And I'll just note. I think Mr. Lexis hit this, but in case he didn't, you'll see in the charging document that Counts One and I believe Count Seven or Eight are conspiracy to commit robbery. The conspiracy in and of itself is the agreement to commit a crime. The agreement in and of itself is a crime and that's charged as a conspiracy. So when they conspired and agreed, so on the May 20th event when they

agreed yeah, let's go rob this guy, they park in the dark 1 parking lot across the street and put on masks and one of them 2 3 or both of them get firearms, conspiracy's done. They've taken over acts in furtherance, they're about to do the crime, 4 they've conspired and agreed. That's Count One and I believe 5 Seven or Eight. 6 7 MR. LEXIS: Seven. Seven. There's also conspiracy MR. GIORDANI: 9 10

liability that pursuant to that conspiracy, each and every one of the other Counts with Mr. Richard is guilty pursuant to conspiracy liability.

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MR. PERCIVAL: I'd have to object again. That's a misstatement of the law with respect to the specific intent crimes and that's discussed ad nauseam in Bolden versus State.

MR. GIORDANI: And I'm quoting directly from the jury instructions that we both signed.

> I'm overruling the objection. THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor. In any event, MR. GIORDANI: keep those in mind. Conspiracy in and of itself is a crime. Then there's conspiracy liability that's defined over and over in your instructions. Please just read those.

The other instruction I would like to point you to instruction number 18. This is with regard to the burglary again. And I don't mean to be repetitive, but it says specifically, "When two or more persons participate in the

commission of a burglary and one or more of them enters the vehicle, it is not necessary to prove the other individual actually entered because one who aids and abets another in the commission of a burglary is equally guilty as a principal."

The final point about the burglary and I'll move on is whether or not — well, our position and the evidence shows that both men had firearms during that incident. But even if you think only one did, whether or not they had that gun, the one person who didn't have the gun entered the vehicle, they stole a firearm. And the law says burglary while in possession of a firearm is if you enter with a gun or if you obtain one during the commission of a burglary or on the way out. So don't be confused with that.

I want to talk about jury instruction number 23. If you wouldn't mind looking at that. The attempt robbery charge. There is a line in instruction number 23 that I don't want you to miss when you're back in the jury deliberation room. The second paragraph says, "Robbery requires the intent to take property by fear or force. A good faith belief that the property at issue is once owned, does not nullify the intent to take property from another by force."

Mr. Percival challenged the attempt robbery on May 24th of Mr. Kinard and he said to an extent that it's because his client thought it was his own chain. We can dispute that all day. Doesn't matter what he thought because the law says

whether he thought it was his own or not, doesn't matter, it's a robbery. You don't go run up to somebody and try to take your own property back because things like this shooting happen.

I want you to remember the testimony of Horacio Lopez. He's the guy that, as Mr. Lexis pointed out, has no dog in this fight. He's a car wash worker, he's there and he did a demonstration, I want to say twice, of how Mr. Richard approached Mr. Kinard. Now you could accept Mr. Richard's statements to the police as true, blindly, and that he was walking up to just look at it. Or you could accept the statements of a person who has nothing to gain by telling 14 members of his community, his peers that he saw Mr. Richard walk up as if he's walking by and then snatch from the side. That's an attempt robbery. Now, because the chain weighs two kilos and didn't break, it wasn't a complete robbery. But in any event, it's an attempt and that's all they charged.

I want to thank you, as Mr. Percival did, for your time and attention. I appreciate that everyone was taking notes and there were several questions asked. At this point, I will submit to you that we have proved every single element of every single offense charged in that amended information that you'll have back there. Come back with a verdict of guilty on all those Counts and I'm going to guess that it's going to be the fastest verdict in the history of this

courthouse. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you. Joe is the Marshal, Sandy is my JEA. They'll be sworn in. Sandy, once this is done, Sandy will take the alternates. I want to thank everybody whose, the jurors who have participated. The alternates are not released. I had a trial several months ago where unfortunately, we needed an alternate right away. So it does happen. You're not released. You will go with Sandy, she'll take your phone numbers, et cetera, and we will, as long as you have a cell phone number, we'll allow you to go home but you're still under oath, you still cannot talk to anybody about the case until the matter is resolved. So go ahead and swear them in.

(Marshal sworn)

THE COURT: Kathy, read the names of the alternates.

THE CLERK: Juror number 13, Michael Shaw. Juror number 14, Lakendrick Nix.

THE COURT: The alternates will — Sandy, you going to meet them over there? — will go with you. Joe will take the rest of you back to the deliberation room. In a minute or so we will have all the exhibits taken back for you to review. You can take your notebooks, of course. The alternates, give your notebooks to Sandy and she will keep them safe. Go ahead.

(Jury recessed at 3:17 p.m.)

1	THE COURT: Okay. If you'll leave your cell phone
2	numbers.
3	MR. GIORDANI: Judge, we do need to make a quick
4	record.
5	THE COURT: Okay.
6	MR. GIORDANI: Mr. Percival conceded a few crimes
7	and points during his argument. I saw him conferring with his
8	client. I assume he ran it by and they agreed, but the
9	record's sake we always like to have that on the record that
LO	they conferred about that before he did that.
L1	MR. PERCIVAL: That's correct, is it not?
L2	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
L3	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Percival has confirmed that.
L4	As far as let's assume they come back somehow before six
L5	well, is the defendant going to concede the
L6	MR. PERCIVAL: $Ex-$ felon in possession of a firearm.
L7	THE COURT: Yes, thank you. Felon in possession of
L8	a firearm?
L9	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
20	THE COURT: Okay. Do I need to go over all the
21	instructions regarding plea just to make sure?
22	MR. GIORDANI: You have to canvass him but there's
23	no plea agreement.
24	THE COURT: No, but I'll canvass him. Okay.
25	MR. PERCIVAL: Do you want to do that right now?

THE COURT: You can have a seat if you want. 1 MR. GIORDANI: Depends on what happens. 3 Well, this is just a felon in THE COURT: possession. I don't see how, even if he was not guilty on all 4 the charges, if he is pleading guilty to felon in possession it's separate. Mr. Percival, is he willing to go ahead and 6 plead guilty to felon in possession or do you want to wait 7 8 until --MR. PERCIVAL: I don't think it matters, Judge. 9 Ιf we do it now or if we do it after the jury returns. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Although we don't have a -- wait, 11 12 I think the amended is here. Is the amended information 13 somewhere? MR. GIORDANI: Yes, but we can't -- I don't think we 14 15 can file it until after the jury returns a verdict. 16 THE COURT: Okay. So we can't do any of this. We're in recess. 17 Okay. 18 (Court recessed at 3:22 p.m. until 5:48 p.m.) 19 (Outside the presence of the jury.) -- Case Number C308258, State of Nevada 20 versus Dvontae Richard. 21 22 THE COURT: Let the record reflect we're doing a 23 conference call. We're outside the presence. It's 5:48. Mr. Percival is here in person and the State -- who's on the 24 25 telephone?

MR. GIORDANI: John Giordani.

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Okay. So we did have -- we had a call I THE COURT: guess from a relative wondering, you know, when they were going to be done or whatever. So in any event, it's now 11 to I'm going to bring them back in without anybody here, read the admonition and have them come back tomorrow.

MR. GIORDANI: Okay. A call from a relative of a juror asking where they were?

> THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GIORDANI: Okay.

I think said they were sitting outside THE COURT: waiting. I mean outside, outside. I think, just so it's clear, as long as no one's here and that means I will not allow Mr. Percival or the defendant, then I can just read them the admonition and send them home.

> MR. GIORDANI: I'm fine with that.

If one side's here, then the other side THE COURT: has to be here, correct?

MR. PERCIVAL: I'm being evicted.

Yes, you are. So you can go home. You THE COURT: can go to your game a few minutes early. But I don't know who's waiting outside, but I don't see any good to -- I assume they're -- well, I know they're still -- they're at least still in there so I can't imagine that they'll -- we could get this all done in 30 minutes which Mr. Percival has to leave.

1	So that's what I'm going to do. Okay?
2	MR. GIORDANI: Okay. What time will you be bringing
3	them back tomorrow?
4	THE COURT: Nine a.m.
5	MR. GIORDANI: Okay.
6	THE COURT: So we will call you as soon as we hear
7	something.
8	MR. GIORDANI: All right.
9	THE COURT: What I didn't want to do is say oh, you
10	have another 10 minutes. I'm just going to bring them in, end
11	of story. So there's no issue they're being rushed, it's just
12	okay, we're done for the day. Okay. That's it. Have a good
13	evening.
14	MR. GIORDANI: All right. You too.
15	THE COURT: You get to get some dinner.
16	MR. GIORDANI: Yeah.
17	THE COURT: Bye. Thank you.
18	MR. PERCIVAL: Thank you.
19	THE COURT: You can actually go to your game and
20	enjoy.
21	(Pause in proceedings.)
22	(Jury reconvened at 5:53 p.m.)
23	THE COURT: Be seated, wherever you want. We're on
24	the record. So the good news is you get Krispy Kremes. The bad news is you have to come back tomorrow. We'll see you
25	bad news is you have to come back tomorrow. We'll see you

tomorrow at nine a.m. I'm going to read you the admonition. I am sure you are more tempted since we are now — you're in the deliberation process, you cannot talk to your fellow jurors except when you're back there. So if you're out here tomorrow before everybody gets here, whatever, you still cannot talk until all of your fellow jurors are present to deliberate.

During this recess you're once again admonished do not talk or converse amongst yourselves or with anyone else on any subject connected with this trial, or read, watch or listen to any report of or commentary on the trial or any person connected with this trial by any medium of information including, without limitation, newspapers, television, radio or Internet. Do not form or express any opinion on any subject connected with the trial until the case — until you're back deliberating. The case has already been submitted to you.

Okay. So leave all your stuff, any notes, anything like that, you can leave it right there. We will lock the courtroom. I ask that you be back here tomorrow at nine a.m. to deliberate. Okay. Have a good evening.

(Court recessed for the evening at 5:56 p.m.)

ACKNOWLEDGMENT:

Pursuant to Rule 3C(d) of Nevada Rules of Appellate

Procedure, this is a rough draft transcript expeditiously prepared,

not proofread, corrected or certified to be an accurate transcript.

KIMBERLY LAWSON TRANSCRIBER

TRAN

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

THE STATE OF NEVADA,))
Plaintiff,) CASE NO. C308258-1) DEPT NO. XXVIII
VS.)
DVONTAE RICHARD,	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant.	,)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE RONALD J. ISRAEL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JURY TRIAL - DAY 5

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2016

APPEARANCES:

For the State: JOHN L. GIORDANI, III, ESQ.

Deputy District Attorney

CHAD N. LEXIS, ESQ.

Deputy District Attorney

For the Defendant: BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ.

RECORDED BY JUDY CHAPPELL, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: KARR Reporting, Inc.

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2016, 11:04 A.M.
2	* * * *
3	(Outside the presence of the jury.)
4	THE COURT: Please be seated. Good morning. Go
5	ahead and call it.
6	THE CLERK: Case Number C308258, the State of Nevada
7	versus Dvontae Richard.
8	THE COURT: Good morning. Let the record reflect
9	the defendant is present. We're outside the presence. I was
10	told that the jury has a verdict but now we need to talk
11	about, unless you want to bring them in and have the verdict,
12	the other Count that we don't have an amended
13	MR. GIORDANI: I have that here, Your Honor.
14	MR. PERCIVAL: He has that and I will go over the
15	guilty plea agreement with my client.
16	THE COURT: Is there a written guilty plea?
17	MR. PERCIVAL: There is a written guilty plea
18	isn't there?
19	MR. GIORDANI: No, there is no written guilty plea.
20	MR. PERCIVAL: Oh, I thought
21	MR. GIORDANI: I thought he was just going to plead.
22	We can't even file this, though, until the verdict comes back
23	so we might as well just get them out of here or get the
24	verdict read. I can't file this amended for Mr. Percival to
25	review with Mr. Richard until after the verdict.

1	THE COURT: I'm sure it's not going to happen;
2	however, if we dismiss the jury and he says oh, wait, I'm not
3	going to sign it.
4	MR. GIORDANI: Yeah, that's true.
5	THE COURT: So, okay. We will just send them back
6	for a few minutes and see what transpires. I certainly
7	wouldn't blame him if he did. I mean, he why would he do
8	that? Okay. Because it would be too late. Once the jury's
9	gone, that would be too late. Okay. Let's bring them back
10	in.
11	(Jury reconvened at 11:06 a.m.)
12	THE COURT: Please be seated. You didn't exactly
13	sit in the same places, but do the parties acknowledge the
14	presence of the jury?
15	MR. PERCIVAL: Yes, Your Honor.
16	MR. GIORDANI: Yes, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, have
18	you chosen a foreperson and if so, who is that foreperson?
19	JUROR NO. 8: I am.
20	THE COURT: Foreperson, please well, first of
21	all, have all 12 members of the jury reached a unanimous
22	verdict as to the charges presented to you?
23	JUROR NO. 8: Yes, Your Honor.
24	THE COURT: Please hand the Marshal the verdict
25	form

-	
1	THE CLERK: District Court, Clark County, Nevada,
2	Case Number C30828, Department 28. The State of Nevada,
3	plaintiff versus Dvontae Richard, defendant.
4	Verdict. We the jury in the above-entitled case,
5	find the defendant Dvontae Richard as follows:
6	Count One, conspiracy to commit robbery. Guilty of
7	conspiracy to commit robbery.
8	We the jury in the entitled case find the defendant
9	Dvontae Richard as follows:
10	Count Two, burglary while in possession of a
11	firearm. Guilty of burglary while in possession of a firearm.
12	Count Three, grand larceny of firearm. Guilty of
13	grand larceny of a firearm.
14	Count Four, grand larceny. Guilty of grand larceny.
15	Count Five, robbery with use of a deadly weapon.
16	Guilty of robbery with use of a deadly weapon.
17	Count Six, first degree kidnapping with use of a
18	deadly weapon. Not guilty.
19	Count Seven, conspiracy to commit robbery. Guilty
20	of conspiracy to commit robbery.
21	Count Eight, attempt robbery. Guilty of attempt
22	robbery.
23	Count Nine, battery with intent to commit a crime.
24	Guilty of battery with intent to commit a crime.
25	Dated this 26th day of February, 2016. Shawn Kish,

1 Foreperson.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, are these your verdicts as read?

JURY PANEL: Yes.

THE CLERK: So say you one so say you all?

JURY PANEL: Yes.

THE COURT: Does either party wish to have the jury individually polled?

MR. GIORDANI: No, Your Honor.

MR. PERCIVAL: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The verdict of the jury shall now be recorded in the minutes of the Court.

Ladies and gentlemen, we're not done; however, we should — it should not be that long before we are done. I'm going to ask the Marshal to take you back to the deliberation room. Hopefully, it will not be very long, but the parties and I have something that we need to discuss outside your presence. Go ahead.

(Jury recessed at 11:12 a.m.)

THE COURT: Okay. Just so it's clear in case I forget, Mr. Richard is remanded to custody. The bail is revoked, rescinded. This matter is referred to the Department of Parole and Probation for presentence report and set over for entry of judgment and imposition of sentence. Will you give us a date?

THE CLERK: It's 50 days out. We can do -- do you 1 2 want it early in the morning, 8:30? March 31st at 8:30? MR. PERCIVAL: That will be fine. 3 What's that? THE COURT: 4 MR. PERCIVAL: I -- what day of the week is that? That's a Thursday. 6 THE CLERK: MR. PERCIVAL: That's good. I couldn't remember if 7 I had a jury trial starting that day or if that was a calendar 8 call day and I believe it's a calendar call day for me. 9 If that's not good we can --THE COURT: 10 MR. PERCIVAL: No, that will be fine. And if it 11 12 turns out that there's something that is unavoidable for me to 13 miss, I will contact Mr. Giordani and we'll come up with a day and then we'll -- with days that are appropriate and then 14 15 we'll contact the Court to reschedule. 16 We'll do yours at 8:30. THE CLERK: 17 MR. GIORDANI: Thank you. And, Your Honor, at this time I do have a second amended information to file with the 18 19 Court which adds the additional Count of possession, ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person that was 20 bifurcated off of the prior information. May I approach? 21 22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 THE CLERK: Is this the same one you gave me 24 yesterday? 25 MR. GIORDANI: No, that one had a mistake.

THE CLERK: Counsel, did you need copies? 1 MR. PERCIVAL: I will certainly need a copy because I need to go over it with my client. 3 THE COURT: Right. Why don't you go ahead --4 MR. PERCIVAL: This shouldn't take more than five 6 minutes. 7 THE COURT: You want to do it in there or do you 8 want us to --MR. GIORDANI: I'll step out. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. You can step out. That's fine. We'll take a short recess. 11 12 (Court recessed at 11:15 a.m. until 11:26 a.m.) 13 (Outside the presence of the jury.) THE COURT: Okay. We're back on the record. We're 14 15 outside the presence. There's a second amended information 16 that was just filed that adds the Count of felon in possession of a firearm or Count Ten, ownership or possession of firearm 17 by prohibited person. Have you had a chance -- has the 18 defendant had a chance to review that? 19 20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 21 This is the State of Nevada versus THE COURT: 22 Dvontae Richard. Let the record reflect, just so it's clear, 23 defendant is present in custody. We're subsequent to the jury verdict on the other Counts. It's my understanding that the 24 25 defendant is going to plead guilty to Count Ten of the second

1	amended information; is that correct?
2	MR. PERCIVAL: That is correct, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: I think, just to be clear, I'm going to
4	go through the guilty plea canvass.
5	MR. GIORDANI: All the portions except for you
6	signed this on page and we have a guilty yeah.
7	THE COURT: Yeah. Defendant, will you stand up so
8	we can hear you? Please state your true, full name.
9	THE DEFENDANT: Dvontae Dshawn Richard.
10	THE COURT: And how old are you?
11	THE DEFENDANT: Twenty-three.
12	THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
13	THE DEFENDANT: Twelfth grade.
14	THE COURT: Do you read, write and understand the
15	English language?
16	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
17	THE COURT: Do you understand you're being charged
18	with ownership or possession of firearm prohibited by a
19	prohibited person?
20	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
21	THE COURT: And how do you plead to that charge?
22	THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
23	THE COURT: Is anybody forcing you to plead guilty?
24	THE DEFENDANT: No.
25	THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty of your own free

will? 1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 3 Do you understand that as a consequence THE COURT: of your plea that the Court can sentence you one to six years 4 in prison? 5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 6 Do you understand you'll be required to 7 THE COURT: pay an administrative fee and that will go along with the 8 other convictions? 9 10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Is this probational? THE COURT: 11 12 MR. GIORDANI: It is probational. 13 MR. PERCIVAL: Yes. That particular crime is 14 probational. 15 THE COURT: And we're only doing it regarding this. Do you understand this is a probational offense? 16 17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Do you understand sentencing is strictly 18 THE COURT: 19 up to the Court, so nobody can promise you probation, leniency 20 or special treatment? 21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 22 THE COURT: Do you also understand nobody can 23 promise you a particular sentence? So even if the -- you and 24 the State have stipulated, sentencing is completely up to me. 25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

1	THE COURT: Do you understand by pleading guilty
2	you're giving up the constitutional rights, the right to
3	remain silent, the right to trial what other on this
4	particular? Do I have to go through all of them?
5	MR. PERCIVAL: The right to against
6	self-incrimination.
7	THE COURT: Yeah.
8	MR. GIORDANI: The most important one is the right
9	to appeal except for on the four constitutional grounds.
10	THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand that?
11	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
12	THE COURT: Did you have a chance to discuss this
13	case and your rights with your attorney?
14	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
15	THE COURT: Do you have any questions regarding
16	those rights or this negotiation?
17	THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
18	THE COURT: Are you pleading I'm sorry, no?
19	THE DEFENDANT: I don't have any questions.
20	THE COURT: Oh, you don't have any questions.
21	Sorry. Are you pleading I'm going faster than are you
22	pleading guilty because in truth and fact that on or about May
23	20th and May 24th you willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
24 25	had in your possession or under your custody or control a
25	firearm to wit a Glock .26 9mm bearing serial number XCX346

1 3 4 6 THE COURT: 7 8 Counts. 10 THE CLERK: Yes, March 31st, 8:30. 11 12 13 14 15 16 to us or talk to me? Mr. Percival can talk to them. 17 18 19

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and that the defendant being convicted of a felony happening in 2012 and convicted of attempted burglary in Case Number C279444 in the Eighth Judicial District, Clark County, a felony under the laws of Nevada?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

The Court accepts that your plea is freely and voluntarily given. We'll have this included in the PSI report regarding the jury or the convictions on the other The Court return date is the same return date?

MR. GIORDANI: Thank you. And, Judge, if I could just make a request. Typically, we bring the jury in and tell them they can talk to the attorneys if they want, but I'm preparing for a murder trial that starts Monday and I'd like to just leave. Can you just not give them that option to talk

MR. PERCIVAL: I want to talk to them.

THE COURT: Yeah, absolutely. As long as -- did I cover everything? Obviously, I don't do a lot of canvassing.

MR. GIORDANI: I believe you did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Usually the guilty script is -- okay. So we're done. I will bring the jury back in, excuse them, let them talk to you. Because I'm only thanking them, I think we're done and he is going to be taken away.

> Okay. There's no further action MR. PERCIVAL:

required on their part except to hear us say thank you. 1 THE COURT: Absolutely. It will be on the record 2 that I'm excusing them and they're free to talk to anybody if 3 they choose. But other than that, the case is over. 4 5 MR. GIORDANI: Thank you. MR. PERCIVAL: Thank you, sir. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. PERCIVAL: Can you tell them that sometimes the 9 attorneys like to speak with the jury? THE COURT: Absolutely, I'll do that. 10 MR. PERCIVAL: May I briefly speak with the family 11 12 over here before we bring the jury in? It's not going to be 13 more than a minute or two. 14 THE COURT: That's fine. Tell them two minutes and 15 bring them in. 16 (Pause in proceedings.) 17 THE COURT: Okay. Tell him to bring them in. (Off-record colloquy.) 18 19 It was a pleasure. I know that every THE COURT: judge says that criminal cases are more civil than the civil 20 If you have ever sat in, they do everything but call 21 22 each other names, but they certainly -- they're not civil. 23 (Jury reconvened at 11:36 a.m.) 24 Please be seated. Counsel, approach THE COURT: 25 real quick.

(Bench conference transcribed as follows.)

THE COURT: I certainly — should I tell them why we kept them?

MR. PERCIVAL: Sure.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

(End of bench conference.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, you are now — well, I want to thank you for your service.

Obviously, it's important to all the parties and you definitely fulfilled your duty, you paid attention, you certainly took your time in deliberations. So all of the parties I'm sure want to thank you for participating in the process.

In one minute you're going to be free to talk to anybody you want about this case. Certainly, the attorneys generally want to discuss how they did, any pointers. It's a learning process. Unfortunately, the D.A. has told me that he must leave, so he will not be able to answer your questions. He has another trial right on the heels. But the defense counsel has indicated if you would like to, he certainly would like to talk to you and ask you some questions about the process. If you would like to, you certainly may do so. If you do not, don't worry. He's not going to bother you. Nobody is going to bother you. You're free to tell him you don't want to and just go down to the third floor, Jury

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Services, report in to get your checks.

Aside from that, although it's unusual, we sent you back because there was an additional Count that we could not disclose to you and that is a felon in possession of a But the defendant entered a plea on that while you firearm. were out. So otherwise, you would have to deliberate on that additional Count. It is unusual, but that's the way it goes.

Other than that, as I said, I want to thank you very much. You're excused. You can talk to anybody. I will take a minute and shake all your hands, but because every case can be appealed, there's not a lot certainly I can or will be able to talk to you about. But the defense counsel I'm sure can answer questions. With that, you're free to go.

Judge, I just got a text that my MR. GIORDANI: meeting was able to move so I'm going to come back if they'd like to talk to me as well.

Okay. If you'd like to do it in here? THE COURT: MR. PERCIVAL: Would you like to speak in here? have gone back to the jury deliberation room before. know if the Court would --

It's fine here because we're going to be THE COURT: cleaning out that -- okay. We're off the record.

(Court adjourned at 11:40 a.m.)

ACKNOWLEDGMENT:

Pursuant to Rule 3C(d) of Nevada Rules of Appellate

Procedure, this is a rough draft transcript expeditiously prepared,

not proofread, corrected or certified to be an accurate transcript.

KIMBERLY LAWSON TRANSCRIBER

1 2	VER	ORIGI	INAL	FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT
3				FEB 2 6 2016
4				V.H. VD : 11:12AM
5			ICT COURT	BY, KATHY KLEIN, DEPUTY
6	**	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA	
7	THE STATE OF N	EVADA,		
8		Plaintiff,		
9	-vs-		CASE NO:	C-15-308258-1
10	DVONTAE RICHA	ARD	DEPT NO:	XXVIII
11		Defendant.		
12			RDICT	
13	We, the jury			unt DVONTAE RICHARD, as
14	follows:		·, ·	
15	COUNT 1 - CONS	SPIRACY TO COMMIT	ROBBERY	
16	(Please chec	k the appropriate box, so	elect only one)	
17	×	Guilty of Conspiracy to	•	
18		Not Guilty	,	
19		,		
20	We, the jury	in the above entitled cas	e, find the Defenda	unt DVONTAE RICHARD, as
21	follows:	2		
22	COUNT 2 – BURG	GLARY WHILE IN POS	SESSION OF A F	REARM
23	(Please chec	k the appropriate box, s	elect only one)	
24	×	Guilty of Burglary whil	e in Possession of	a Firearm
25		Guilty of Burglary		
26		Not Guilty		C - 15 - 308258 - 1 VER
27				Verdict 4527239
28				

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1	We, the jury	y in the above entitled case, find the Defendant DVONTAE RICHARD, as
2	follows:	
3	COUNT 3 - GRAN	ND LARCENY OF FIREARM
4	(Please che	ck the appropriate box, select only one)
5	×	Guilty of Grand Larceny of Firearm
6		Not Guilty
7		
8	We, the jury	in the above entitled case, find the Defendant DVONTAE RICHARD, as
9	follows:	
10	COUNT 4 - GRAN	ND LARCENY
11	(Please ched	ck the appropriate box, select only one)
12	×	Guilty of Grand Larceny
13		Guilty of Larceny
14		Not Guilty
15		
16	We, the jury	in the above entitled case, find the Defendant DVONTAE RICHARD, as
17	follows:	
18	<u>COUNT 5</u> - ROBE	BERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON
19	(please chec	ck the appropriate box, select only one)
20	×	Guilty of Robbery with use of a Deadly Weapon
21		Guilty of Robbery
22		Not Guilty
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1	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant DVONTAE RICHARD, as
2	follows:
3	<u>COUNT 6</u> – FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON
4	(Please check the appropriate box, select only one)
5	☐ Guilty of First Degree Kidnapping with use of a Deadly Weapon
6	☐ Guilty of First Degree Kidnapping
7	Not Guilty
8	
9	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant DVONTAE RICHARD, as
10	follows:
11	<u>COUNT 7</u> - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY
12	(Please check the appropriate box, select only one)
13	Guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery
14	☐ Not Guilty
15	
16	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant DVONTAE RICHARD, as
17	follows:
18	COUNT 8 - ATTEMPT ROBBERY
19	(Please check the appropriate box, select only one)
20	Guilty of Attempt Robbery
21	□ Not Guilty
22	
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1	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant DVONTAE RICHARD, as
2	follows:
3	COUNT 9 - BATTERY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A CRIME
4	(please check the appropriate box, select only one)
5	Guilty of Battery with Intent to Commit a Crime
6	☐ Guilty of Battery
7	☐ Not Guilty
8	
9	DATED this <u>26</u> day of February, 2016
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11	Shann Kish
12	FOREPERSON
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1	RTRAN	Alun D. Elmin
2	KIKAN	CLERK OF THE COURT
3		
4	DICTRIC	AT COURT
	DISTRICT COURT	
5	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
) CASE NO. C308258)
8	Plaintiff,	DEPT. XXVIII
9	VS.	
10		
11	DVONTAE RICHARD,	
12	Defendant.	
13)
14) J. ISRAEL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ', MAY 25, 2016
15		F PROCEEDINGS
16		ENCING
17		
18	APPEARANCES:	
19	For the State:	JOHN L. GIORDANI III, ESQ.
20		Deputy District Attorney
21		CHAD N. LEXIS, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney
22	For the Defendant:	BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ.
23		BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ.
24		
25	RECORDED BY: JUDY CHAPPELL, CC	OURT RECORDER

1	WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 2016 AT 9:31 A.M.
2	
3	THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated.
4	MR. GIORDANI: Good morning.
5	THE COURT: Go ahead.
6	THE CLERK: Case Number C308258, the State of Nevada versus
7	Dvontae Richard.
8	THE COURT: Counsel, state your appearance for the record.
9	MR. LEXIS: Chad Lexis for the State.
10	MR. GIORDANI: John Giordani on behalf of the State.
11	MR. PERCIVAL: Brent Percival, Bar Number 3656, appearing for the
12	Defendant, Dvontae Richard, who is present, in person, in custody.
13	THE COURT: This is the time set for sentencing. Is there any legal reason
14	why we should not go forward with the judgment and sentencing now?
15	MR. PERCIVAL: None that I'm aware of, Your Honor.
16	MR. GIORDANI: No, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Was there – somebody mentioned there was yet another
18	problem with the PSI.
19	MR. PERCIVAL: No. What happened, Judge, was that when I was provided
20	with a – the most, what was supposed to be the most recent copy, they sent me ar
21	earlier copy. It was faxed to me on the 17 th of May, just a week ago yesterday and
22	didn't realize that it wasn't a – that they didn't have the revisions from the first
23	supplemental in it until this morning. But then I got the second supplemental from
24	Mr. Giordani this morning and it is – their – the problems that existed in the first two
25	have now been fixed.

THE COURT: Okay. And that's the May 9th report? MR. PERCIVAL: Yes. THE COURT: And for the record the problem was that initially it had said that the Defendant, I think, was shooting which was -MR. PERCIVAL: Correct. THE COURT: -- incorrect. And that the second issue was, I don't remember, what was the second issue? MR. PERCIVAL: Second issue was, Judge, that the -THE COURT: Oh, it left out the -MR. PERCIVAL: -- the description, the description of the Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon did not have the -THE COURT: Enhancement. MR. PERCIVAL: -- mandatory enhancement language. THE COURT: Thank you. And that's now included and everybody agrees that the PSI is correct. MR. GIORDANI: Yes, at this point, the second supplemental PSI is all correct. MR. PERCIVAL: Yes, I believe that to be the case, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So. By virtue of the jury's verdict, I hereby adjudge you guilty of Count 1, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery; Count 2, Burglary while in Possession of a Firearm; Count 3, Grand Larceny of a Firearm; Count 4, Grand Larceny; Count 5, Robbery with the Use of a Deadly Weapon; Count 7, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery; Count 8, Attempt Robbery; Count 9, Battery with Intent to Commit a Crime; and Count 10, Ownership or Possession of a Firearm by a

Prohibited Person. Count 10 was pursuant to a plea.

MR. GIORDANI: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Does State wish to argue?

MR. GIORDANI: Yes, Your Honor, briefly. I won't belabor the facts. You heard the entirety of the jury trial and testimony from the witnesses. I'll just remind the Court that this was two distinct instances. One was the robbery at the ATM machine and the other was attempted robbery which resulted in a shootout at the car wash.

Because these are two distinct instances, I am asking for consecutive sentences for the two instances. On Count 5, Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon, I'm asking for 6- to 15-year term. And Count 8, the Attempt Robbery, I'm asking for 4- to 10-year term, consecutive to Count 5, for a total of 10 to 25 years in Nevada Department of Corrections, with the remaining counts running concurrent. I do that for several reasons. One, based upon his limited record, but the serious nature of the offense and obviously what happened at the second incident could have resulted in many more injuries, fatalities to people like you and I driving down the street or who happen to be at the car wash that day.

So I believe a 10 to 25-year term is appropriate for Mr. Richard and I will submit it to the Court's discretion on that.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Richard, your attorney has the right to argue on your behalf. However, before he or she does so, is there anything you wish to tell me in mitigation of sentence? This is now the time to do so.

THE DEFENDANT: First of all, I apologize to every, you know, everybody that was hurt and who this affected. I apologize to my family for letting them down. And I'm ready to do what I got to do to make it back to my family.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Percival.

MR. PERCIVAL: Your Honor, I would ask the Court to sentence Mr. Richard to a total sentence of 6 to 15 years. I recognize that these were two separate instances. However, I'd also like the Court to know, you know, I know I've only known Dvontae for about, for slightly less than a year now, but it feels like a lot longer than that. And over the years – over the course of the year, I've come to know him to be a very bright, articulate young man who has, I believe, has a lot of potential to contribute to society when he gets back on track.

Court will recall that these two instances happened right at a time when he and his fiancée had separated, with his two children remaining with her. He was at a very, very low point in his life. He was – he took to associating with some unsavory people and as a result he allowed himself to be led into crimes that I believe would be uncharacteristic of him under any other circumstances. He's only 23 years old. We know medically that at that age, a young man's brain isn't even fully developed. You know, they do impulsive things. They do things not only impulsively but they seem to, and I can even recall being that age myself, not think of the possible consequences of their actions before they act it.

But in this particular case, Mr. Richard didn't injure anybody. Even though he acquired in the first incident possession of a firearm, he never attempted to shoot anyone. In fact, when gunfire erupted from the person whose chain he tried to take from that person's bodyguard or companion, instead of attempting to use the firearm that he did have, he turned and ran to try to get away from the situation. At least he showed the good judgment to not fire back.

He has been nothing but cooperative and truthful with police officers

from the time that he was first arrested. At his interview at the hospital, he confessed his involvement in one of the crimes and – well confessed his involvement in the car wash crime. And then later when interviewed by a second detective, he was completely truthful, completely forthcoming. He admitted his involvement, he admitted what he had done. He was as frank and straightforward as he could be about that stuff. From the very beginning of my association with him, he has expressed remorse and said that if he had to do it over, he would never do anything like this again. He's expressed a great deal of longing and a sense of missing his two – he has two young children, ages 4 and 2 –

Correct?

Five – 4 and 5 now. One of them just started school. And I think it would be a shame if those two young ladies were adults before they ever got to see their daddy again.

I know that – I know and he knows that the acts that he participated in were wrong. And he's always said, you know, I wish I – I really wish I hadn't done it. But he can't do anything about it now. I would suggest that the appropriate sentence would be on Count 1, a sentence of 12 to 30 months. On Count 2, a sentence of 24 to 60 months, concurrent with Count 1. On Count 3, a sentence of 24 to 60, concurrent with Count 1. On Count 4, a sentence of 12 to 30, I guess I should say concurrent to Count 3, 2 and 1. On Count 5, a sentence of 24 to 60 months with an enhancement of 12 to 30 months, which is the Court is well aware, must be run consecutive to the 24 to 60 months underlying. On Count 7, a 12- to 30- month sentence, concurrent to Counts 1 through 5. On Count 8, 24 to 60, concurrent to Counts 1 through 5 and 7. On Count 9, a sentence of 24 to 60 concurrent to Counts 1 through 8. And on Count 10, a sentence of 12 to 30 months.

I can tell you, Judge, that Mr. Richard has a very loving and supportive
amily. They have been communicative with me throughout this and have been
nelpful. I know that he's got a large number of family members here today in his
support. I'm certain that this is the type of incident that won't happen again. And I
would just ask the Court to minimize the pain and suffering that his family and his
children are going to go through in his absence by sentencing him to the minimum
sentences. And we know that, you know, this is a mandatory prison thing, that
probation isn't available. He's been well aware of that for some time. But I would
ask that the Court show some mercy.
THE COURT: Thank you. In accordance with the laws of the State of
Nevada, I assess the administrative fee of \$25, the DNA analysis of 150, and the

DNA administrative assessment of \$3.

I sentence you on Count 1, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, a minimum term of 12 months, maximum of 72.

Count 2, Burglary while in Possession of a Firearm, minimum term 36 months, maximum 180.

Count 3, Grand Larceny of a Firearm, minimum term of 24 months, maximum term 120.

Oh, Count 2 consecutive to Count 1. Count 3 consecutive to Count 2. Hopefully, sorry, that's clear.

Count 4, Grand Larceny, minimum term of 24 months, maximum of 60. Concurrent with Count 3.

Count 5, Robbery with the Use of a Deadly Weapon, a minimum term 72 months, maximum term 180 months, enhancement 48 months to 180 months. Consecutive to Counts 1, 2, and 3.

1	Count 7, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, minimum term of 28 months	
2	maximum term of 72 months. Concurrent with Count 5.	
3	Count 8, Attempted Robbery, a minimum of 48 months, a maximum of	
4	120. Concurrent with Count 7.	
5	Count 9, Battery with Intent to Commit a Crime, minimum term 48	
6	months, maximum term 120 months. Consecutive to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5.	
7	Count 10, Ownership or Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited	
8	Person, minimum 28, maximum 72. Concurrent with Count 9.	
9	MR. GIORDANI: And, Your Honor, I forgot to mention the restitution is 1,130	
10	to victim VC2234125 and \$201.24 to VC2234128.	
11	THE CLERK: That was two hundred and –	
12	MR. GIORDANI: \$201.24. And Mr. Richard has 367 days credit for time	
13	served.	
14	THE COURT: Okay. He'll be given credit for the time served and the	
15	restitution for the victims pursuant to – you said VC2234128 is 201.24?	
16	MR. GIORDANI: Correct.	
17	THE COURT: And the other victim which is –	
18	MR. GIORDANI: VC2234125, that's -	
19	THE COURT: Is 1331.24.	
20	MR. GIORDANI: No, is 1130.00.	
21	THE COURT: Oh, all right. That was the total. I see.	
22	MR. GIORDANI: Yes, correct.	
23	THE COURT: All right restitution in that amount. Okay.	
24	MR. GIORDANI: Thank you, Your Honor.	
25	THE COURT: Oh, one for the record, we received some letters in mitigation.	

I'll have them, hopefully they were given to the prosecutor, I'll have them marked as Court's exhibit.

MR. GIORDANI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And we're done.

MR. GIORDANI: All right.

[Proceeding concluded at 9:48 a.m.]

[Proceeding recalled at 11:20 a.m.]

THE COURT: Remain seated.

Go ahead, call it.

THE CLERK: Case Number C308258, the State of Nevada versus Dvontae Richard.

THE COURT: Let the record reflect the Defendant is present with counsel, Mr. Percival. And the DA, Mr. Giordani is present. Two things, one of which I tried to – I remembered as you guys were running out of the courtroom, but. Under NRS 176.035, I need to state the cumulative, the minimum maximum, on the record. I don't think you can just put it in the JOC. In any event, that's why because -- we called you back. I reviewed also, because I wanted to make sure it was correct, the additions and I, although I didn't play the tape, I want to make sure Count 9, Battery with Intent to Commit a Crime, 48 months to 120, I'm going to have that concurrent – concurrent to Counts 1, 2, 3 and 5.

MR. GIORDANI: Okay.

THE COURT: And that - because I had added it up and make sure - let me, I

THE CLERK: All other counts.

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THE COURT: All other counts. 1 2 THE CLERK: Okay. 3 THE COURT: And so under NRS 176, the minimum 16, the maximum of 61 years. 4 5 MR. GIORDANI: Correct. 6 THE COURT: And I apologize for having to – you know, it right away I knew but everybody had to run off to different departments so this is our fourth try. 7 8 Is there any questions? 9 MR. GIORDANI: None from the State, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Percival? Or Mr. Richard? Is it clear? 10 11 MR. PERCIVAL: I – just to be certain. 12 THE COURT: That's fine. 13 MR. PERCIVAL: On the bottom end of Count 1, we have 1 year. Bottom end 14 of Count 2, we have 3 years. Bottom end of Count 3, we have 2 years. Count 4 15 was run concurrently. 16 THE COURT: Correct. 17 MR. PERCIVAL: Count 5, the underlying robbery was a minimum of 6, 18 maximum I suppose 15. The enhancement was 4 years. And then Counts 7, 8, 9, 19 and 10 are running concurrent to all previously stated. 20 THE COURT: That's correct. 21 MR. PERCIVAL: Okay. 22 THE COURT: I apologize for having to bring you back, but I don't think, just 23 as I said, although it says you have to state it, maybe it would be adequate in the 24 JOC, but I wanted to make sure it was clear to everybody on the record. And then

25

Kathy, and I guess I had said 9 incorrectly. So I review all of these when we get the

1	JOC so I would have caught it then, but since I had to bring you back, we're here.			
2	Okay.			
3	MR. GIORDANI: That works, that's prudent. Thank you.			
4	THE COURT: Have a good day. I apologize for the – for bringing you back			
5	but we need to make it, cross our t's.			
6	MR. GIORDANI: Yeah, fair enough. Thank you, Your Honor.			
7	MR. PERCIVAL: Understood.			
8	THE COURT: All right. Have a good day.			
9				
10	[Proceeding concluded at 11:26 a.m.]			
11				
12				
13				
14	ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/visual recording in the above-entitled case.			
15	Judy Chappell			
16	Judy Chappell			
17	Court Recorder			
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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

DVONTAE RICHARD aka Dvontae Dshawn Richard #2806958

Defendant.

CASE NO. C308258-1

DEPT. NO. XXVIII

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
(JURY TRIAL)

The Defendant previously entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes of COUNTS 1 and 7 – CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 199.480; COUNT 2 – BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 205.060; COUNT 3 – GRAND LARCENY OF FIREARM (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 205.226; COUNT 4 – GRAND LARCENY (Category C Felony) in violation of NRS 205.220.1, 205.222.2; COUNT 5 – ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 193.165; COUNT 6 – FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING WITH

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Tr	artsferred (before/during trial)	☐ Conviction	Conviction
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USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165; COUNT 8 - ATTEMPT ROBBERY (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 193.330; COUNT 9 - BATTERY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A CRIME (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.400.2; and entered a plea of guilty to the crime of COUNT 10 - OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED PERSON (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 202.360; and the matter having been tried before a jury and the Defendant having been found guilty of the crimes of COUNTS 1 and 7 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 199.480; COUNT 2 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 205.060; COUNT 3 - GRAND LARCENY OF FIREARM (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 205.226; COUNT 4 - GRAND LARCENY (Category C Felony) in violation of NRS 205.220.1, 205.222.2; COUNT 5 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 193.165; COUNT 8 - ATTEMPT ROBBERY (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 193.330; and COUNT 9 -BATTERY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A CRIME (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.400.2; thereafter, on the 25th day of May, 2016, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with counsel BRENT PERCIVAL, ESQ., and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offense(s) and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, \$1,130.00 Restitution to VC2234125 and \$201.24 Restitution to VC2234128 and \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee

including testing to determine genetic markers plus \$3.00 DNA Collection Fee the Defendant is SENTENCED to the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) as follows: **COUNT 1** – a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWELVE (12) MONTHS: COUNT 2 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of THIRTY-SIX (36) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 1; COUNT 3 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 2; **COUNT 4** – a MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with COUNT 3; COUNT 5 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS plus a CONSECUTIVE term of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1, 3 and 3; COUNT 7 - a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with ALL OTHER COUNTS; COUNT 8 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with ALL OTHER COUNTS; COUNT 9 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with ALL OTHER COUNTS; and COUNT 10 - a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with ALL OTHER COUNTS; with THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN (367) DAYS credit for

time served. The AGGREGATE TOTAL sentence is SIXTY-ONE (61) YEARS

MAXIMUM with a MINIMUM PAROLE ELIGIBILITY OF SIXTEEN (16) YEARS.

DATED this _____ 26^{+h} ____ day of May, 2014

RONALD J. ISRAEL KK DISTRICT COURT JUDGE NOTC
BRENT D. PERCIVAL., ESQ
Nevada Bar No. 3656
BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ., P.C.
630 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 868-5650

THE STATE OF NEVADA

Alun & Lahring
CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Plaintiff,
vs.

DVONTAE DEALVONE RICHARD, a/k/a
Dvontae Dshawn Richard
#2806958

Defendant.

Case No. C308258-1 Dept. No. XXVIII

DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL

COMES NOW, Defendant, DVONTAE RICHARD, by and through his attorney of record, BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ., and the law office of BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ., P.C., and hereby gives notice of his taking a criminal appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court from that judgment of conviction entered the 27th day of May, 2016. The Judgment of Conviction was served upon counsel for the Defendant, via electronic filing and service on the 27th day of May, 2016.

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Law Office of Brent D. Percival, Esq.

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A copy of the Judgment of Conviction appealed from is attached to this Notice of Appeal as Exhibit 1 hereto.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _____ day of June, 2016.

BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ. P.C.

BRENT D. PERCIVAL, Nevada Bar No. 3656 630 South Third Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 868-5650 Attorney for Defendant DVONTAE RICHARD

Law Office of Brent D. Percival, Esq. 630 South Third Street

630 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 868-5650 · Fax (702) 385-3823

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Notice of Appeal by depositing a true and correct copy in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage affixed, addressed as follows:

Clark County District Attorney's Office STEVEN B. WOLFSON, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 001565 200 East Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 ATT'N: APPELLATE DIVISION

And by electronic filing and service upon the Clark County District Attorney's office.

An Employee of J Brent D. Percival, Esq., P.C.

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

CASE NO. C308258-1

DEPT. NO. XXVIII

DVONTAE RICHARD aka Dvontae Dshawn Richard #2806958

Defendant.

AMENDED JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
(JURY TRIAL)

The Defendant previously entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes of COUNTS 1 and 7 – CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 199.480; COUNT 2 – BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 205.060; COUNT 3 – GRAND LARCENY OF FIREARM (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 205.226; COUNT 4 – GRAND LARCENY (Category C Felony) in violation of NRS 205.220.1, 205.222.2; COUNT 5 – ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 193.165; COUNT 6 – FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING WITH

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USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165; COUNT 8 – ATTEMPT ROBBERY (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 193.330; COUNT 9 - BATTERY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A CRIME (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.400.2; and entered a plea of guilty to the crime of COUNT 10 - OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED PERSON (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 202.360; and the matter having been tried before a jury and the Defendant having been found guilty of the crimes of COUNTS 1 and 7 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (Category B) Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 199.480; COUNT 2 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 205.060; COUNT 3 – GRAND LARCENY OF FIREARM (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 205.226; COUNT 4 - GRAND LARCENY (Category C Felony) in violation of NRS 205.220.1, 205.222.2; COUNT 5 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 193.165; COUNT 8 – ATTEMPT ROBBERY (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.380, 193.330; and COUNT 9 -BATTERY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A CRIME (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.400.2; thereafter, on the 25th day of May, 2016, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with counsel BRENT PERCIVAL, ESQ., and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT WAS THEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offense(s) and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, \$1,130.00 Restitution to VC2234125 and \$201.24 Restitution to VC2234128 and \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee

including testing to determine genetic markers plus \$3.00 DNA Collection Fee the Defendant is SENTENCED to the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) as follows: **COUNT 1** – a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWELVE (12) MONTHS; COUNT 2 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of THIRTY-SIX (36) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 1; COUNT 3 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 2; COUNT 4 – a MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with COUNT 3; COUNT 5 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS plus a CONSECUTIVE term of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1, 2 and 3; COUNT 7 – a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with ALL OTHER COUNTS; COUNT 8 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with ALL OTHER COUNTS; COUNT 9 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with ALL OTHER COUNTS; and COUNT 10 – a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with ALL OTHER COUNTS; with THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN (367) DAYS credit for

time served. The AGGREGATE TOTAL sentence is SIXTY-ONE (61) YEARS

MAXIMUM with a MINIMUM PAROLE ELIGIBILITY OF SIXTEEN (16) YEARS.

THEREAFTER, a clerical error having been discovered, the Amended Judgment of Conviction reflects the following correction: COUNT 5 - CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1, 2 and 3 not COUNTS 1, 3 and 3.

DATED this _____ day of June, 2016

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Law Office of Brent D. Percival, Esq. 630 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 868-5650 · Fax (702) 385-3823

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NOTC BRENT D. PERCIVAL., ESQ **CLERK OF THE COURT** Nevada Bar No. 3656 BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ., P.C. 630 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 868-5650 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA THE STATE OF NEVADA Plaintiff, VS, Case No. C308258-1 Dept. No. DVONTAE DEALVONE RICHARD, a/k/a XXVIII **Dvontae Dshawn Richard** #2806958 Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM AMENDED JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION

COMES NOW, Defendant, DVONTAE RICHARD, by and through his attorney of record, BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ., and the law office of BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ., P.C., and hereby gives notice of his taking a criminal appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court from that Amended Judgment of Conviction entered the 7th day of June, 2016. The Judgment of Conviction was served upon counsel for the Defendant, via electronic filing and service on the 9th day of June, 2016.

Law Office of Brent D. Percival, Esq.

A copy of the Judgment of Conviction appealed from is attached to this Notice of Appeal as Exhibit 1 hereto.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of June, 2016.

BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESQ. P.C.

BRENT D. PERCIVAL, ESC Nevada Bar No. 3656 630 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 868-5650 Attorney for Defendant DVONTAE RICHARD

Law Office of Brent D. Percival, Esq. 630 South Third Street

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Notice of Appeal from Amended Judgment of Conviction by depositing a true and correct copy in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage affixed, addressed as follows:

Clark County District Attorney's Office STEVEN B. WOLFSON, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 001565 200 East Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 ATT'N: APPELLATE DIVISION

And by electronic filing and service upon the Clark County District Attorney's office.

An Employee of Brent D. Percival, Esq., P.C.

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

July 27, 2015

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

Dvontae Richard

July 27, 2015

10:00 AM

Initial Arraignment

HEARD BY: De La Garza, Melisa

COURTROOM: RJC Lower Level Arraignment

COURT CLERK: Roshonda Mayfield

RECORDER:

Kiara Schmidt

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Richard, Dvontae

Defendant

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Information FILED IN OPENC COURT.

DEFT. RICHARD ARRAIGNED, PLED NOT GUILTY, and INVOKED the 60-DAY RULE. COURT ORDERED, matter set for trial. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, counsel has 21 days from the filing of the preliminary transcript to file any writs. The discovery motion requested by defense is GRANTED pursuant to NRS 174.235.

CUSTODY

9/14/15 9:30 A.M. CALENDAR CALL (DEPT. 25)

9/21/15 10:30 A.M. JURY TRIAL (DEPT. 25)

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 1 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

00684

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 03, 2015

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

Dvontae Richard

August 03, 2015

9:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Barker, David

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15A

COURT CLERK: Dania Batiste

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

Sharon Howard

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Burns, J Patrick Attorney Richard, Dvontae Defendant State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL.....DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SETTING OF REASONABLE BAIL.....PUBLIC DEFENDER'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW DUE TO CONFLICT

Brent Percival, Esq., not present to accept appointment; therefore, COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED to the next criminal session.

CUSTODY

Continued to: 8/5/2015 9:00 am

CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this Minute Order was faxed to Mr. Percival. / db 8.3.2015

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 2 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 3 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 05, 2015

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

Dvontae Richard

August 05, 2015

9:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Delaney, Kathleen E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15A

COURT CLERK: Dania Batiste

RECORDER:

REPORTER: Sharon Howard

PARTIES

PRESENT: Burns, J Patrick

Percival, Brent D. **Attorney** Richard, Dvontae Defendant State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Attorney

- APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (B. PERCIVAL, ESQ.).....DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SETTING OF REASONABLE BAIL......PUBLIC DEFENDER'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW DUE TO CONFLICT

Deputy Public Defender Tyler Gaston provided Mr. Percival with discovery in open court. Mr. Percival advised the Court if he sees any conflicts, he will place the matter on calendar. COURT SO NOTED, and ORDERED, Public Defender's Motion to Withdraw Due to Conflict GRANTED; Mr. Percival APPOINTED as counsel for Defendant.

COURT FURTHER ORDERED, bail motion CONTINUED one (1) week to give Mr. Percival an opportunity to determine if any supplementation is necessary, or if the motion is well-founded. FURTHER ORDERED, Mr. Percival to provide enough time for the State to respond if he chooses to file a supplement to the motion; parties to discuss calendar call and trial date at the next hearing.

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 4 of 33 July 27, 2015 Minutes Date:

CUSTODY

8/12/2015 9:00 am Defendant's Motion for Reasonable Bail....Status Check: Trial Readiness

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 5 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 12, 2015

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

VS

Dvontae Richard

August 12, 2015

9:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Delaney, Kathleen E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15A

COURT CLERK: Dania Batiste

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

Brenda Schroeder

PARTIES

PRESENT: Overly, Sarah

Overly, Sarah Attorney
Percival, Brent D. Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SETTING OF REASONABLE BAIL.....STATUS CHECK: TRIAL READINESS

Defendant not present, hospitalized at University Medical Center (UMC).

Mr. Percival advised the Court that Defendant was shot in the leg at the scene of one the robberies; further, counsel has done a cursory review of the file and reviewed the bail motion. As to trial readiness, Mr. Percival stated it will be difficult for him to announce ready, as he recently obtained this case, and he has several other trials set that he does not anticipate resolving.

Upon the Court's inquiry, Mr. Percival requested a continuance to better familiarize himself Defendant's file and motion. COURT NOTED, Defendant invoked his right to a speedy trial; and ORDERED, matter CONTINUED one (1) week; Ms. Overly to advise assigned Deputy D.A. Patrick Burns.

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 6 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

CUSTODY

Continued to: 8/19/2015 9:00 am

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 7 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 19, 2015

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

 \mathbf{vs}

Dvontae Richard

August 19, 2015

9:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Delaney, Kathleen E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15A

COURT CLERK: Dania Batiste

RECORDER:

REPORTER: Sharon Howard

PARTIES

PRESENT: Moskal, Thomas J. Attorney

Percival, Brent D. Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SETTING OF REASONABLE BAIL.....STATUS CHECK: TRIAL READINESS

Mr. Percival advised the Court he unsuccessfully attempted to visit Defendant, who is still hospitalized at University Medical Center (UMC); however, counsel will try again this week. Mr. Percival further advised the Preliminary Hearing transcript was filed on Monday; additionally, he does not wish to argue the bail motion in Defendant's absence. No objection by the State.

COURT NOTED, no inclination to change the trial date at this time, as Defendant must be present, and this case needs more stability. COURT ORDERED, matters CONTINUED two (2) weeks.

CUSTODY

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 8 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

Continued to: 9/2/2015 9:00 am

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 9 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

September 02, 2015

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

VS

Dvontae Richard

September 02, 2015

9:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Delaney, Kathleen E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15A

COURT CLERK: Dania Batiste

RECORDER:

REPORTER: Sharon Howard

PARTIES

PRESENT: Overly, Sarah

Percival, Brent D. Attorney
Richard, Dvontae Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Attorney

- DEFENDNAT'S MOTION FOR SETTING OF REASONABLE BAIL.....STATUS CHECK: TRIAL READINESS

As to Defendant's Motion for Setting of Reasonable Bail:

Mr. Percival advised the Court that he was unable to visit Defendant last night, as his client was under a medical quarantine due to an infection from the gunshot wound; and argued that if Defendant is released from custody, he will have easier access to his client. Mr. Percival further argued that Defendant will receive medical attention if released, he is a lifetime resident of the area, he has family support and employment; and will not be a flight risk.

Opposition by Ms. Overly, requesting Defendant's bail be increased to \$350,000.00, arguing he received his gunshot wound will committing the crime, he is a confirmed gang member, and the likelihood of a conviction in this case is high.

COURT NOTED the totality of the circumstances, there is no basis to increase or reduce the bail at this time; and ORDERED, bail STANDS.

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 10 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

As to the Status Check: Trial Readiness:

Upon the Court's inquiry, and after conferring with Mr. Percival, Defendant advised he waives his right to a speedy trial. COURT ACCEPTED Defendant's waiver, and ORDERED, trial VACATED and RESET in the ordinary course.

CUSTODY

2/17/2016	9:30 am	Calendar Call
2/22/2016	10:30 am	Jury Trial

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 11 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

February 17, 2016

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

VS

Dvontae Richard

February 17, 2016

9:30 AM

Calendar Call

HEARD BY: Delaney, Kathleen E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15A

COURT CLERK: Dania Batiste

RECORDER:

REPORTER: Sharon Howard

PARTIES

PRESENT: Burns, J Patrick

Percival, Brent D. Attorney
Richard, Dvontae Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Attorney

- Defendant Dvontae Richard's Motion to Suppress Custodial Statements FILED IN OPEN COURT

Upon the Court's inquiry, Mr. Percival advised that he served the State with a copy of the Motion to Suppress. Mr. Burns agreed, and noted that he concedes to the need for a Jackson v. Denno hearing regarding the statements in question; additionally, the State will be calling 1 witness. Mr. Burns further advised that Deputy D.A. Mr. Giordani will be trying this case, and it is overflow eligible.

Mr Percival stated that he has been summoned for jury duty and must be present Thursday morning at Jury Services for further direction. COURT SO NOTED, and ORDERED, matter SET for hearing; and REFERRED to Overflow; trial

CUSTODY

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 12 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

2/18/2016 1:30 pm Jackson v. Denno Hearing 2/19/2016 8:30 am Overflow (Dept. 18)

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 13 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

February 18, 2016

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

 \mathbf{vs}

Dvontae Richard

February 18, 2016

1:30 PM

Jackson v Denno Hearing

HEARD BY: Delaney, Kathleen E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15A

COURT CLERK: Dania Batiste

RECORDER:

REPORTER: Sharon Howard

PARTIES

PRESENT: Giordani, John

Percival, Brent D. Attorney
Richard, Dvontae Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Attorney

- Opening remarks by the State. Upon the Court's inquiry, Mr. Percival advised he wishes to reserve his remarks to the end of this hearing. COURT SO NOTED.

Theodore Weirauch, Lance Spiotto, and Defendant Dvontae Dashawn Richard sworn and testified.

Mr. Giordani cited case law and argued that at the time the statements were made, Defendant was coherent, recounted the incident in two separate interviews, and he was able to recall the facts; therefore, the standard has been met, and both statements should be admitted.

Opposition by Mr. Percival, arguing that the detective had with him at the time of the interview, a department issued recorder intended to memorialize conversations with witnesses and suspects; additionally, the detective is aware of the importance of a person's rights being given up. Mr. Percival questioned why the detective did not record the Miranda Rights; and further argued that the State has failed to meet its burden to show Defendant knowingly and voluntarily surrendered those rights when he made statements that went against his own interests. Further argument by Mr.

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016

Page 14 of 33

Minutes Date:

July 27, 2015

Giordani.

COURT ORDERED, matter briefly taken UNDER ADVISEMENT; the Court will review the recordings, transcripts, case law, and argument before issuing its Minute Order by the end of today.

CUSTODY

2/19/2016 8:30 am Overflow (Dept. 18 - Courtroom 10C)

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 15 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

C-15-308258-1 State of Nevada vs
Dvontae Richard

February 18, 2016 5:01 PM Minute Order

HEARD BY: Delaney, Kathleen E. COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15A

COURT CLERK: Dania Batiste

RECORDER:

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- This matter, having come before the Court on February 18, 2016 for a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, and after review and consideration of the written motion, testimony elicited and arguments of counsel at the time of the hearing, and review of a recording and transcripts of the statements in question, as well as all relevant case law, the Court FINDS, for the reasons stated below, that the State has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the statements in question made by the Defendant were voluntary, and (2) the statements were given after the Defendant was properly Mirandized. Accordingly, Defendant s Motion to Suppress is DENIED, and the State may use the statements made by Defendant may be used at trial.

In the instant case, the evidence produced at the time of the hearing supports the State's contention that the Defendant was properly Mirandized by officers before being questioned on the two occasions at issue. Defendant testified he did not recall his interview with Detective Weirauch, but the audio recording reviewed by the Court, as well as Detective Weirauch's testimony, are sufficient for the State to meet its burden to show Defendant was properly Mirandized on the first occasion in the Emergency Room. As regards the second interview with Detective Spiotto in Defendant's hospital room, both the Defendant's testimony that he recalls being given warnings like those required by Miranda, and Detective Spiotto's testimony, even absent an audio recording of the

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 16 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

warnings being given, are also sufficient for the State to meet its burden to show Defendant was properly Mirandized.

Further in the instant case, under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements in question, there is not sufficient evidence to question the voluntariness of Defendant's statements to either Detective Weirauch or Detective Spiotto. While it is uncontested that Defendant was given medication to control his pain prior to both statements being given, the testimony of the Detectives, as well as the Defendant as regards the second interview in the hospital room, gives no indication that the Defendant was uncomfortable or incoherent, or unable to understand the meaning of the statements he made or the context in which he made them. Neither interview was of prolonged duration, and the substance of each interview was substantially similar. In light of these findings, and in the absence of any evidence that the statements were otherwise obtained by any physical or psychological coercion or improper inducement such that the will of the Defendant was overcome, the State has also met its burden to show the voluntariness of Defendant's statements by a preponderance of the evidence.

CUSTODY

2/19/2016 8:30 am Overflow (Dept. 18 - Courtroom 10C)

CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this Minute Order has been electronically mailed to Deputy D.A. John Giordani, Esq.; and faxed to Defendant's counsel, Brent Percival, Esq. / db 2.18.2016

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 17 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

February 19, 2016

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

Dvontae Richard

February 19, 2016

8:30 AM

Overflow

HEARD BY: Barker, David

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 10C

COURT CLERK: Billie Jo Craig

RECORDER: Cynthia Georgilas

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Giordani, John Attorney

Percival, Brent D. Richard, Dvontae State of Nevada

Attorney Defendant

Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- COURT ORDERED, matter REFERRED to Dept. 28, Judge Ron Israel, for a 5-day Jury Trial.

CUSTODY

2/22/16 9:00 AM JURY TRIAL - DEPT. 28

J. GIORDANI/B.. PERCIVAL

5 DAYS

11-13 WITNESSES

PRINT DATE: Page 18 of 33 06/03/2016 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

00701

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

February 22, 2016

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

VS

Dvontae Richard

February 22, 2016

9:00 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Israel, Ronald J.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15C

COURT CLERK: Kathy Klein

RECORDER: Judy

Judy Chappell

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Giordani, John

Giordani, John Attorney
Lexis, Chad N. Attorney
Percival, Brent D. Attorney
Richard, Dvontae Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURY: State submitted an Amended Information dropping the enhancement, with use of a deadly weapon in Count 8- Attempt Robbery (F) and for trial purposes, removed Count 10-, Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person, (F). Amended Information, FILED IN OPEN COURT. Colloquy regarding jury trial protocol. Mr. Percival noted there was an offer two weeks ago, Defendant would have plead guilty to one count with an 8 to 20 year sentence. Mr. Percival stated the offer on the record, to which Defendant rejected the offer. Mr. Percival further noted the State offered a second offer and the Defendant rejected this offer. State noted there are no longer any offers.

PROSPECTIVE JURY PANEL PRESENT: Voir Dire. Arguments by Counsel at the bench.

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURY: At the request of the Court, Ms. Witt, Jury Commissioner appeared, sworn and gave testimony regarding the summons of potential jurors. Mr. Percival argued the limited number of African Americans in the jury pool. Arguments by the State

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 19 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

regarding the case law. Court stated its findings and noted the jury selection system is random and ORDERED, Defendant's Motion, DENIED.

PROSPECTIVE JURY PANEL PRESENT: Voir Dire continued.

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURY: State Challenged for Cause Juror 145. Mr. Percival traversed Juror 145 outside the presence of the jury. Arguments by Counsel, Court GRANTED Challenge for cause pursuant to Jitnan.

PROSPECTIVE JURY PANEL PRESENT: Voir Dire continued. Counsel passed for cause. Jury and two secret alternates selected and sworn. The last two seats being the secret alternates.

Clerk read the Information to the jury and stated the Defendant's plea thereto. Opening statements by the state. Opening statement reserved by Mr. Percival.

EXCLUSIONARY RULE INVOKED.

Evening recess.

CUSTODY

02/23/16 10:00 AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 20 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

February 23, 2016

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

 \mathbf{vs}

Dvontae Richard

February 23, 2016

10:00 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Israel, Ronald J.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15C

COURT CLERK: Kathy Klein

RECORDER: Judy Chappell

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Giordani, John Attorney

Lexis, Chad N. Attorney
Percival, Brent D. Attorney
Richard, Dvontae Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Spanish Interpreter, Richardo Pico, present for State's witness, Horacio Herman Dez-Lopez.

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: EXCLUSIONARY RULE INVOKED. Defendant stated he was not ready for trial, stating he did not receive all the pictures or transcript and further had no time to speak with his counsel. Mr. Percival noted he was appointed in August and had given the Deft. everything he had except the pictures were on a CD and the Deft. told him he saw the photos at the preliminary injunction. Defendant requested new counsel. Court noted this is now in the middle of trial and Deft. could proceed with this matter post trial and ORDERED, Deft's Motion for New Counsel, DENIED. Court gave Defendant time to review the transcripts provided.

JURY PRESENT: Clerk took the roll of the Jury. Testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheets.)

Evening recess.

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 21 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

CUSTODY

 $02/24/16 \; 9{:}00 \; \mathrm{AM} \; \mathrm{JURY} \; \mathrm{TRIAL}$

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 22 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

February 24, 2016

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

Dvontae Richard

February 24, 2016

9:00 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Israel, Ronald J.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15C

COURT CLERK: Kathy Klein

RECORDER:

Judy Chappell

Sandra Pruchnic

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Giordani, John Attorney Lexis, Chad N. Attorney Percival, Brent D. Attorney Richard, Dvontae Defendant State of Nevada **Plaintiff**

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Colloquy regarding proposed jury instructions.

JURY PRESENT: Clerk took the roll of the jury. Testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheets.)

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Arguments regarding case U.S. America v. Larry Louscious 2:15-cr-00106-JAD-VCF. Court noted case noted was an unpublished Federal Court opinion overrule in Nevada. Mr. Percival requested the Court reconsider the Motion from last Wednesday, Motion to Suppress pursuant to Jackson V. Denno Hearing and not allow the State's witnesses, the Officers, to testify regarding the Deft's testimony in the hospital. Arguments by the State. Court noted it reviewed the decision and the minutes from the Jackson V. Denno Hearing conducted by Judge Delaney and the miranda warning was voluntary and appropriate, Judge Delaney ruled "Deft. was properly mirandized" and further noted this Court will not hold a second hearing based on Larry Louscious to overturn Judge Delaney's decision, Court DENIED, Motion to

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 23 of 33

Minutes Date:

July 27, 2015

reconsider.

JURY PRESENT: Further testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheets.)

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Mr. Percival stated arguments to preserve his right to challenge the miranda warning. Court noted the warning the Officer read to the Deft. regarding his rights was before questioning and not during questioning.

JURY PRESENT: Further testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheets.) State rests.

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Court advised Defendant of his/her right not to testify. Colloquy regarding jury instructions.

Evening recess.

CUSTODY

02/25/16 11:00 AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 24 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

February 25, 2016

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

VS

Dvontae Richard

February 25, 2016

11:30 AM Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Israel, Ronald J.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15C

COURT CLERK: Kathy Klein

RECORDER: Judy Chappell

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Giordani, John Attorney

Lexis, Chad N. Attorney
Percival, Brent D. Attorney
Richard, Dvontae Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Colloquy regarding scheduling issues. Counsel finalized instructions. Mr. Percival stated the Defendant will not be testifying. Upon Court's inquiry, Defendant stated he would not testify. Instructions settled. Colloquy regarding the State's 2nd Amended Information to be filed to include the 10th count that was removed prior to trial.

JURY PRESENT: Clerk took the roll of the Jury. Court instructed the jury. Closing arguments. Marshal and Judicial Executive Assistant (JEA) sworn and given charge of the jury. Court Thanked and released the two alternate jurors.

At the hour of 3:16 P.M. the jury retired to deliberate.

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Colloquy regarding scheduling issues. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the Count 10, Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person, within the 2nd Amended Information to be filed after the jury verdict. Amended Jury List, FILED IN OPEN

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 25 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

COURT.

Evening recess.

CUSTODY

02/26/16 9:00 AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 26 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

February 26, 2016

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

VS

Dvontae Richard

February 26, 2016

9:00 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Israel, Ronald J.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15C

COURT CLERK: Kathy Klein

RECORDER: Judy Chappell

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Giordani, John Attorney

Lexis, Chad N. Attorney
Percival, Brent D. Attorney
Richard, Dvontae Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- JURY PRESENT: 9:15 A.M. Jury returned to deliberation.

At the hour of 11:12 A.M. the jury returned with a Verdict:

COUNT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY - GUILTY

COUNT 2 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM - GUILTY

COUNT 3 - GRAND LARCENY OF FIREARM - GUILTY

COUNT 4 - GRAND LARCENY - GUILTY

COUNT 5 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON - GUILTY

COUNT 6 - NOT GUILTY

COUNT 7 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY - GUILTY

COUNT 8 - ATTEMPT ROBBERY - GUILTY

COUNT 9 - BATTERY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A CRIME

Counsel agreed not to poll the Jury. Verdict and Instructions, FILED IN OPEN COURT. Jury returned

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 27 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

to the deliberation room for a temporary break.

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: COURT ORDERED, Deft. remanded into custody, WITHOUT BAIL, and matter referred to the Division of Parole and Probation (P & P) and set for sentencing.

State provided the second amended information to include count 10. Second Amended Information FILED IN OPEN COURT. No Guilty Plea Agreement provided. Court and Counsel noted this charge carries a ONE (1) to SIX (6) Year sentence in the Nevada Department of Corrections, this charge is a probational offence and no one can stipulate or promise Deft. a particular sentence and the sentencing is up to the Court. Court further canvassed Deft of his rights. DEFT. RICHARD ARRAIGNED AND PLED GUILTY TO COUNT 10, OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED PERSON (F). Court ACCEPTED plea and, ORDERED, Matter referred to (P & P) to include this charge within the Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) Report and SET for sentencing.

JURY PRESENT: Court Thanked and excused the Jury.

Court adjourned.

CUSTODY

03/31/16 8:30 AM SENTENCING (CTS 1-5 & 7-10) DEPT. 28

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 28 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

COURT MINUTES

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

March 31, 2016

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

VS

Dvontae Richard

March 31, 2016 8:30 AM Sentencing Sentencing (Jury

Verdict/Counts 1-5, 7-9, Guilty Plea Count

10)

HEARD BY: Israel, Ronald J. COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15C

COURT CLERK: Kathy Klein

RECORDER: Judy Chappell

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Giordani, John Attorney

Percival, Brent D. Attorney
Richard, Dvontae Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Deft. present and in custody. Mr. Percival not present. State noted the Pre-Investigation (PSI) Report had errors and Counsel agreed it would be appropriate to correct the PSI and requested matter be continued. COURT ORDERED, Matter CONTINUED.

Mr. Percival present and was given the continued date.

CUSTODY

05/04/16 9:00 AM SENTENCING (JURY VERDICT COUNTS 1-5 7-9//GUILTY PLEA COUNT 10)

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 29 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

COURT MINUTES

May 04, 2016

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

 \mathbf{vs}

Dvontae Richard

May 04, 2016

9:00 AM

Sentencing

Sentencing (Jury

Verdict/Counts 1-5, 7-9, Guilty Plea Count

10)

HEARD BY: Israel, Ronald J.

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15C

COURT CLERK: Kathy Klein

RECORDER: Judy Chappell

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Giordani, John

Attorney Attorney Defendant Plaintiff

Percival, Brent D. Richard, Dvontae State of Nevada

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Deft. present and in custody. Mr. Percival noted the Pre-Investigation (PSI) Report had another error regarding count 5, the enhancement not listed. State noted the PSI listed the enhancement in their recommendations and the Court proceed and note it on the record. Court noted in the abundance of caution, it would be appropriate to correct the PSI and ORDERED, Matter CONTINUED for the PSI correction.

CUSTODY

05/25/16 9:00 AM SENTENCING (JURY VERDICT COUNTS 1-5 7-9//GUILTY PLEA COUNT 10)

PRINT DATE: 06/03/2016 Page 30 of 33 Minutes Date: July 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

May 25, 2016

C-15-308258-1

State of Nevada

Dvontae Richard

May 25, 2016

9:00 AM

Sentencing

Sentencing (Jury Verdict/Counts 1-5, 7-

9, Guilty Plea Count

10)

HEARD BY: Israel, Ronald J.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15C

COURT CLERK: Kathy Klein

RECORDER:

Judy Chappell

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Giordani, John Attornev Lexis, Chad N. Attorney Percival, Brent D. Attorney Richard, Dvontae Defendant State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- PURSUANT TO JURY VERDICTS, DEFT. RICHARD ADJUDGED GUILTY of COUNTS 1 & 7 -CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (F); COUNT 2 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM (F): COUNT 3 - GRAND LARCENY OF FIREARM (F); COUNT 4 - GRAND LARCENY (F); COUNT 5 - ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F); COUNT 8 - ATTEMPT ROBBERY (F); COUNT 9 - BATTERY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A CRIME (F). COUNT 6-FOUND NOT GUILTY AND DEFT. PLEAD GUILTY to COUNT 10 - OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED PERSON (F). Colloquy regarding the Second Supplemental Pre-Sentencing Report (PSI) and Court made record of changes received. Both the State and Counsel agreed the Second Supplemental PSI was correct and were ready to proceed with sentencing. Arguments by the State and Counsel. Statement by Deft. Letter provided to the Court, from Counsel, reviewed and marked as a Courts exhibit.

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COURT ORDERED, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment fee, a \$150.00 DNA Analysis fee including testing to determine genetic markers, and \$3.00 DNA Collection fee, and \$1130.00 to VC2234125 and \$201.24 to VC2234128 Restitution, Deft. SENTENCED as to;

COUNT 1 - To a MINIMUM of TWELVE (12) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC),

COUNT 2 - To a MINIMUM of THIRTY-SIX (36) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), CONSECUTIVE to Count 1;

COUNT 3 - To a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), CONSECUTIVE to Count 2;

COUNT 4 - To a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), CONCURRENT with Count 3;

COUNT 5 - To a MINIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), plus a CONSECUTIVE term of a MINIMUM of FORTY-EIGHT (48) and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180), for use of a deadly weapon, CONSECUTIVE to Counts, 2, 3, 3;

COUNT 7 - To a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), CONCURRENT with all other counts;

COUNT 8 - To a MINIMUM of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), CONCURRENT with all other counts;

COUNT 9 - To a MINIMUM of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), CONCURRENT with all other counts;

COUNT 10 - To a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), CONCURRENT with all other counts, with 367 DAYS credit for time served. The AGGREGATE TOTAL sentence is a MINIMUM of SIXTEEN (16) YEARS and MAXIMUM of FIFTEEN (15) YEARS.

BOND, if any, EXONERATED.

NDC

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