1	IN THE SUPREME COURT O	F THE	STATE OF NEVADA	
2				
3	JAVIER RIGHETTI,	)	No. 70591	
4	Petitioner,	)	(District Ct. No. C276713) Electronically Filed	
5		ĺ	Sep 16 2016 11:03 a.m Tracie K. Lindeman	
6	V.	)	Clerk of Supreme Court	
7	THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, COUNTY OF	)		
	CLARK, THE HONORABLE MICHELLE	)		
8 .	LEAVITT, DISTRICT JUDGE,	)		
9	Respondents,	ý		
10		)		
11	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	į		
12	Real Party In Interest.	)		
13	MOTION FOR CTAV OF DICTI	) I CT (	COLURT DROCEEDINGS	
14	MOTION FOR STAY OF DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS			
15	COMES NOW, the Petitioner, JAVIER RIGHETTI, by and through his attorney			
16	Deputy Public Defender CHRISTY L. CRAIG, and respectfully moves this Honorable Court			
17	pursuant to NRAP 8(a) and NRS 34.160, for a	an Ord	er granting a stay so that the Writ for	
18	Prohibition/Mandamus filed on June 17, 2016 can be addressed.		dressed.	
19				
20	DATED this 16th day of September, 2016.			
21			KOHN	
22	CLA	ARK C	DUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER	
23				
24			/ Christy L. Craig	
	Ī	Deputy 1	TY L. CRAIG, ESQ. Public Defender	
25	•			
26				
27				
28	·			

#### AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTY L. CRAIG

STATE OF NEVADA	)
	) ss
COUNTY OF CLARK	)

CHRISTY L. CRAIG, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. That affiant is an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada and is the Deputy Clark County Public Defender assigned to represent the Defendant, Javier Righetti, in this matter.
- 2. That on June 17, 2016 Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition/Mandamus with the Nevada Supreme Court (No. 70591).
- 3. That on August 23, 2016 Petitioner filed in District Court, a Motion to Stay Trial (See Exhibit A, Motion to Stay Trial). Simultaneously, Petitioner also filed a Motion for Atkins Hearing as defense counsel is seeking to have the Petitioner declared developmentally disabled thereby requiring the court to strike the notice of intent to seek death penalty. (See Exhibit B, Motion for Atkins Hearing).
- 4. On September 6, 2016 the above referenced motions were heard. Instead of ruling on the Motion to Stay Trial, it appears the District Court granted a stay pursuant to NRS 174.098 (See Exhibit C, Transcript September 6, 2016, at 4:23-5:18). NRS 174.098(2)(a) requires the district court to "stay the proceedings pending a decision on the issue of intellectual disability." Id.
- 5. That the following facts satisfy the requirements of NRAP 8(a)(2)(A)(ii): First, a motion was made in the district court. Secondly, the district court "failed to afford the relief requested" because a stay was granted pursuant to NRS 174.098(2)(a) to address intellectual disability. While that stay is required by statute, it does not guarantee the resolution of the issues presented in the Writ for Prohibition/Mandamus prior to trial in the district court.

- 6. That the Petition for Writ of Prohibition/Mandamus springs from the District Court's granting of the State's Motion to Reject the Defendant's Guilty Plea. On February 11, 2016, the Petitioner pled guilty to all charges in the Indictment, including Count 10 Murder, without a negotiation. On that same date, the court found that the Petitioner's plea was made freely, voluntarily, and knowingly. The court accepted that plea. The court, at the request of the State, adjudicated the Petitioner of all counts.
- 7. That Count 10 of the Information alleged three *alternate* theories of culpability: (1) willful, deliberate and premeditated murder; (2) murder perpetrated by means of torture; and (3) murder committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of robbery and/or/kidnapping and/or sexual assault. The Petitioner provided a factual basis supporting the latter two theories of culpability. The Petitioner did not provide a factual basis supporting willful, deliberate and premeditated murder.
- 8. That on February 16, 2016, the Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Aggravating Circumstances and Evidence in Aggravation. At the crux of that motion, Petitioner argued that aggravators had to be struck as the result of the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. 1043 (2004). The McConnell Court "deemed it impermissible under the United States and Nevada Constitutions to base an aggravating circumstance in a capital prosecution on the felony upon which a felony murder is predicated." Id. at 1069.
- That the State filed on Opposition to the Motion to Strike Aggravators on February 23, 2016.
- 10. That at argument on the Motion to Strike Aggravators on February 25, 2016, the District Court asked that the State file a written pleading should it request a rejection of Petitioner's guilty plea after its previous acceptance and adjudication.
- 11. That on March 2, 2016, the State filed a Motion to Reject the Defendant's Guilty Plea to the Murder Count Entirely on in the Alternative to Set the Murder Count for Trial on the Theory of Willful, Deliberate, and Premeditated Murder. Petitioner filed an Opposition on March 11, 2016.

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** I hereby certify that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on the 16<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2016. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows: ADAM LAXALT CHRISTY CRAIG STEVEN B. WOLFSON HOWARD S. BROOKS I further certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing a true and correct copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to: Honorable Michelle Leavitt District Court, Department XII 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89101 BY /s/ Carrie M. Connolly Employee, Clark County Public Defender's Office

EXHIBIT A

1	MOT Atom & Christian & Christian		
2	PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 CLERK OF THE COURT		
3	CHRISTY L. CRAIG, DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 6262		
4.	PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 309 South Third Street, Suite 226		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Telephone: (702) 455-4685		
6	Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 craigel@clarkcountynv.gov		
7	Attorneys for Defendant DISTRICT COURT		
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
10	Plaintiff, CASE NO. C-11-276713-1		
.11	y, DEPT, NO, XII		
.12	JAVIER RIGHETTI, Sept. 6		
13	Defendant, TIME: 8:30 a.m.		
.14	,		
15	MOTION TO STAY TRIAL		
16	COMES NOW, the Defendant, JAVIER RIGHETTI, by and through CHRISTY L.		
17	CRAIG, Deputy Public Defender and hereby requests that this Honorable Court grant the defense		
18	request to stay the proceedings until the Nevada Supreme Court issues a response to defendant's		
19	writ.		
20	This Motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the		
21	attached Declaration of Counsel, and oral argument at the time set for hearing this Motion.		
22	DATED this 23rd day of August, 2016.		
23	PHILIP X KOHN CLARY COUNTY PUBLIC PEFENDER		
24			
25	By:		
26	GHRISPY L. CRAIG, #6262 Deputy Public Defender		
27			
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#### DECLARATION

CHRISTY L. CRAIG makes the following declaration:

- 1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada; I am one of the Deputy Public Defenders for the Clark County Public Defender's Office appointed to represent Defendant Javier Righetti in the present matter;
- 2. That on June 17, 2016 a Writ of Prohibition/Mandamus was filed with the Nevada Supreme Court ("NSC"). The Supreme Court has not yet responded. The trial date is currently set for October 3, 2016.
- 3. That on March 17, 2016 defense requested a stay. There was some discussion on the matter of the stay, however, the court's ruling is unclear as to whether it was granted, denied or simply deferred. (March 17, 2016 transcript pg. 27-30). As a result, defense counsel is requesting a ruling on the stay request.
- 4. That on March 17, 2016, the District Court requested that the State prepare an order commensurate with its ruling and to provide the proposed order to the defense. As of the filing of this Motion, no such order has been filed almost 5 months after the hearing and less than 40 days before trial is set to begin. (March 17, 2016 Hearing, pg. 30, 9-15).
- 5. That after waiting several months for the state to prepare an order, Righetti filed a Writ of Prohibition/Mandamus petition with the Nevada Supreme Court on June 17, 2016 sans order.
- 6. That Eighth Judicial District Court Rule ("EJDC") 7.21 requires that an order must be provided to the court within 10 days, unless additional time is allowed by the court.
- 7. That the state's failure to timely prepare the order led to a delay in the filing of Righetti's Writ of Prohibition/Mandamus petition impacting his ability to seek full appellate review. Additionally, litigation regarding the court's order and/or factual findings regarding the March 17th decision is dependent on an actual signed order. The inexplicable delay by the state in preparing the order is a barrier to effective and required pretrial litigation in this capital case.

53,045),

8. That the defense is requesting that this Honorable Court stay these proceedings and that to again order the state to prepare a proposed order based on the March 17, 2016 court hearing.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. (NRS

DATED this 23rd day of August, 2016.

PHILIP LECHN
CLANE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CHRISTY L. CRAIG #6262 Deputy Public Defender

#### NOTICE OF MOTION 1 2 TO: CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Attorney for Plaintiff: 3 YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Public Defender's Office will bring the 4 above and foregoing MOTION TO STAY TRIAL on for hearing before the Court on the Sept. \$. , 2016, at 8:30 a.m., District Court Department XII. 6 DATED this 23rd day of August, 2016. 7 PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 8 9 By: \(\langle \frac{\c'Christy L. Craig}{CHRISTY L. CRAIG, \(\pm 6262\) 10 Deputy Public Defender 11 12 13 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE 14 I hereby certify that service of MOTION TO STAY TRIAL, was made this 15 23KD day of August, 2016, by Electronic Filing to: 16 17 CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Motions@clarkcountyda.com 18 19 GIANCARLO PESCI, Chief Deputy District Attorney E-Mail: gianearlo.pesci@clarkcountyda.com 20 21. By: 22 Secretary for the Clark County Public Defender's Office 23 24 25 26 27

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EXHIBIT B

Electronically Filed 08/23/2016 11:16:43 AM

1	MOT	Dun S. Comm	
2	PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER	CLERK OF THE COURT	
	NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 CHRISTY L. CRAIG, DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER		
3	NEVADA BAR NO. 6262 PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE		
4	309 South Third Street, Suite 226		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Telephone: (702) 455-4685		
6	Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 orangel@clarkcountyny.gov		
7	Attorneys for Defendant DISTRICT COU	RT	
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA, )		
	Plaintiff.	CASE NO. C-11-276713-1	
(0)	)	DEPT. NO. XII	
И.	<b>v.</b>		
12	JAVIER RIGHETTI,	DATE: Sept. 6 ,2016	
13	Defendant,	TIME: 8:30 a.m.	
14	,		
15	MOTION FOR ATKINS	HEARING	
16	COMES NOW, the Defendant, JAVIER RIGHETTI, by and through CHRISTY L.		
17	CRAIG, Deputy Public Defender and hereby request that this court set a date for an Atkins		
18	Hearing to determine if the death penalty must be dismis	sed pursuant to Atkins v Virginia.	
19	This Motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the		
20	attached Declaration of Counsel, and oral argument at the time set for hearing this Motion.		
21	DATED this 1300 day of August, 2016.		
22	PHILIP	COHN DUNTY PUBLIC BEFENDER	
23	CLARGE	No. 11 Tobbie	
24		<u>~</u>	
25	By: CHRISI	YL. CRAIG, #6262 Publiq Defender	
26	Deputy 1	Ludité tyerender.	
27		Maria Commission of the Commis	
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This motion is made pursuant to the preliminary findings of Dr. George Woods, NRS 174.098 and controlling federal authority, specifically Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and its' progeny. This motion is filed in good faith based upon the findings and report of Dr. George Woods that Javier Righetti is in truth and in fact mildly intellectually disabled or mentally retarded as defined by the DSM V, NRS 174.098 and controlling federal authority. Dr. Woods report and all supporting documentation shall be filed under separate filing.

#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Javier Righetti is charged with First Degree Murder (as well as other charges) and the State has filed a "Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty." The defense respectfully submits that the defendant is mentally retarded and that the imposition of the death penalty would violate the Eight Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Based upon the foregoing, pursuant to NRS 178.098 and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the defense requests a hearing on the issue of mental retardation and seeks an order from this court striking the State's previously filed "Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty."

#### LAW

In Aikins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment precludes the execution of the mentally retarded. In short, under Atkins, if the defendant is mentally retarded his execution would be unconstitutional. In issuing its ruling, the high court did not provide a specific definition of mental retardation, or outline the procedures which must be followed to determine the issue. Subsequent to Atkins, the various states have come to their own individual conclusions, via legislation and/or case law, as to the procedure by which the issue of mental retardation should be raised and determined. Federal law on this issue appears to vary from circuit to circuit, but its clear that some minimum standard is required under the constitution.

In the wake of Atkins, Nevada adopted NRS 174.098 to provide both the procedural framework and standards by which Nevada courts are to resolve claims of mental retardation in a capital trial. While the current motion is tendered pursuant to the procedures and standards set forth in NRS 178.098, the defendant also seeks to avail himself of the protections set forth by the

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 United States Constitution, especially the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth amendments, and by any and all controlling federal law on the issue. By seeking a determination pursuant to NRS 174.098 the defense in no way concedes that the standards set forth therein necessarily control the issue of whether the defendant qualifies as being mentally retarded pursuant to federal authority.

Further the defendant does not waive any procedural protection which might be constitutionally afforded him on the issue of mental retardation; in particular he does not waive his right to have the issue factually decided by a jury if the court should somehow determine that the defendant is not mentally retarded. Finally the defense asks this court to issue its ruling under both NRS 174,098 and the federal constitution pursuant to Atkins. If the defendant is mentally retarded under either statutory definition or controlling federal authority then the notice of intent to seek death penalty must be stricken.

The defense respectfully submits that the defendant is mentally retarded pursuant to NRS 174.098(7) in that 1) he has significant subaverage general intellectual functioning, as evidenced by his low scores on various standardized tests and/or measures; 2) he has demonstrated and documented deficit(s) in his adaptive behavior as evidenced by the various norms upon which such functioning is based; and 3) the significant subaverage general intellectual functioning had manifested itself during the developmental period.

The defense further submits that the defendant is mentally retarded pursuant to Atkins and the prevailing definition of retardation set forth in the DSM V as well as US Supreme Court caselaw<sup>1</sup>.

Procedure Pursuant to NRS 174.098

Once a motion to declare the defendant mentally retarded has been filed the procedure is governed by NRS 174.098 which reads:

- 1. A defendant who is charged with murder of the first degree in a case in which the death penalty is sought may, not less than 10 days before the date set for trial, file a motion to declare that he is mentally retarded.
  - 2. If a defendant files a motion pursuant to this section, the court must:

Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986 (2014). There is not bright-line: IQ threshold requirement for determining whether someone has intellectual disability. "Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number." " A State that ignores the inherent imprecision of these tests risks executing a person who suffers from intellectual disability." "It is not sound to view a single factor as dispositive of a conjunctive and interrelated assessment." At 2001.

- (a) Stay the proceedings pending a decision on the issue of mental retardation; and
- (b) Hold a hearing within a reasonable time before the trial to determine whether the defendant is mentally retarded.
  - 3. The court shall order the defendant to:

(a) Provide evidence which demonstrates that the defendant is mentally retarded not less than 30 days before the date set for a hearing conducted pursuant to subsection 2; and

(b) Undergo an examination by an expert selected by the prosecution on the issue of whether the defendant is mentally retarded at least 15 days before the date set for a hearing pursuant to subsection 2.

- 4. For the purpose of the hearing conducted pursuant to subsection 2, there is no privilege for any information or evidence provided to the prosecution or obtained by the prosecution pursuant to subsection 3.
  - 5. At a hearing conducted pursuant to subsection 2:

(a) The court must allow the defendant and the prosecution to present evidence and conduct a cross-examination of any witness concerning whether the defendant is mentally retarded; and

(b) The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded.

- 6. If the court determines based on the evidence presented at a hearing conducted pursuant to subsection 2 that the defendant is mentally retarded, the court must make such a finding in the record and strike the notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Such a finding may be appealed to the Supreme Court pursuant to NRS 177.015.
- 7. For the purposes of this section, "mentally retarded" means significant subaverage general intellectual functioning which exists concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period.

Pursuant to NRS 174.098(2)(a), counsel requests this court to stay the proceeding pending a decision upon the issue of mental retardation. Counsel further request that pursuant to NRS 174.098 (2)(b) the court schedule and hold a hearing within a reasonable time before trial to determine whether the defendant is mentally retarded.

Counsel understands that under NRS 174.098(3) this court shall order the defendant to provide evidence demonstrating mental retardation not less than 30 days before the date set a hearing on the issue. In anticipation of said order, counsel will provide to the court and opposing counsel the report authored by Dr. George Woods which concludes that Javier meets the criteria.

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for Mild Intellectual Disability (formally mentally retarded) based upon accepted standards of psychological evaluation, said report constituting a prima facie showing of mental retardation pursuant to NRS 178.098 and/or Atkins.

Counsel anticipates that the State may seek to have defendant further examined by their own expert pursuant to NRS 178.098(3)(b). Should such a request be made defense counsel asks that pursuant to said statute the examination take place at least 15 days prior to the evidentiary hearing. The defense further requests that the State's expert be ordered to either provide a written report and/or meet with defense counsel prior to the date of the ultimate evidentiary hearing so that the basis of the State's experts opinion can be reviewed and/or considered by the defense.

Defense counsel also seeks an order from this court 1) limiting questioning and evaluation of the defendant by the state expert to those issues directly related to the defendant's claim of mental retardation; 2) that the said expert further be expressly prohibited from inquiring into the nature and specifics of the alleged crimes and 3) that defense counsel be present during the evaluation by state's expert. This request is necessitated by Nevada's statutory scheme concerning Atkins evaluations which, unlike the Federal statutory scheme, does not provide for any privilege whatsoever as to the use of information gained by the State during the course of a court-ordered Atkins evaluation by state experts. Under NRS 174.098(4), there is no privilege concerning "any information or evidence" provided or obtained during an examination by the State's mental health expert.

An order limiting the scope of inquiry by the State's expert is necessary to protect the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Absent such an order, the defendant will face the unconstitutional, precarious dilemma of having to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in order to assert his Eighth Amendment right to raise a claim under Atkins. Clearly the Fifth Amendment requires that such an examination should not become a fishing expedition by the State and must be limited to determining whether the defendant has a valid claim under Atkins, otherwise the mental health examination becomes a ruse for an unrestricted and unconstitutional interrogation.

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The absence of privilege concerning information gained by the State during the state's examination of the defendant, who is in State custody, mandates the availability of counsel during the defendant's examination by State expert mandated by the court and implicates the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951) the Supreme Court indicated that the selfincrimination component of the Fifth Amendment privilege should be given a "liberal construction" so as to include any verbal or nonverbal disclosure by the defendant that might "furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute. Such disclosures could easily result from an Aikins evaluation. The defendant cannot, consistent with Fifth Amendment principles, be forced to choose between obtaining an adequate Atkins evaluation and revealing information that could be used against him at trial or sentencing.

The defendant is of insufficient intellect and education to determine the appropriate scope of inquiry by the State's doctor. Based upon the foregoing the defense would submit that, absent defense counsel's presence, the procedure set forth under NRS 174.098 is unconstitutional in that it forces the defendant to waive his privileges under the Fifth Amendment to avail himself of the protections of the Eighth Amendment, and would therefore object to any testing by a State expert in defense counsel's absence.

#### CONCLUSION

The defendant is mentally retarded, and as a result, pursuant to Atkins and NRS 174.098 the death penalty cannot be constitutionally imposed. The defense seeks a hearing so that he may establish his condition to this court. At the conclusion of the requested hearing, the defense will be seeking to strike the State's "Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty".

DATED this 23rd day of August, 2016

PHILIP I. KOHN CLARE OUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CHRISTY L/CRAM, #6262 Deputy-Public Dylender

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## NOTICE OF MOTION

_ B	
2	TO: CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Attorney for Plaintiff:
3	YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Public Defender's Office will bring the
4	above and foregoing Motion For Atkins Hearing on for hearing before the Court on the
5	6th day of September, 2016, at 8:30 a.m., in District Court Department XII.
6	DATED this 23rd day of August, 2016.
7	PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
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10.	CHRISTY L. CRAIG, #6262 Deputy Public Defender
11	Deputy Public Detended
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13	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE
14	
15	I hereby certify that service of MOTION FOR ATKINS HEARING, was made this
16	2344 day of August, 2016, by Electronic Filing to:
17	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
18	Motions@clarkcountyda.com
19	GIANCARLO PESCI, Chief Deputy District Attorney
20	E-Mail: giancarlo.pesci@clarkcountyda.com
21	By: Thank
22	S. Rusno Secretary for the Clark County Public Defender's Office
23	Scoretary for the Characteristics
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EXHIBIT C

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1	RTRAN	Alm J. Burn	
2	KIIVAN	CLERK OF THE COURT	
3	DIOTENIA	T 00UDT	
4	DISTRICT COURT		
5	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	CASE NO. C-11-276713-1	
7	Plaintiff,	DEPT. XII	
8	vs.		
9	JAVIER RIGHETTI,		
10	Defendant.		
11			
12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE		
13	TUESDAY, SEP	TEMBER 6, 2016	
14			
15		RANSCRIPT RE: V FOR ATKINS HEARING	
16			
17	DEFENDANT'S MOT	TION TO STAY TRIAL	
18	APPEARANCES:		
19	For the State:	GIANCARLO PESCI, ESQ.	
20		Chief Deputy District Attorney	
21	For the Defendant:	CHRISTY L. CRAIG, ESQ.	
22		RYAN J. BASHOR, ESQ. Deputy Public Defenders	
23		Dopary I abile Defenders	
24			
	DECORDED BY ACCOUNT CORNEL WAS		
25	RECORDED BY: KRISTINE CORNELIUS,	COURT RECORDER	

# TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2016; 8:59 A.M.

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THE COURT: State versus Javier Righetti, C276713. He's present. He's in custody.

Good morning.

MS. CRAIG: Good morning, Christy Craig and Mr. Bashor on behalf of Mr. Righetti.

MR. PESCI: Giancarlo Pesci on behalf of the State.

THE COURT: Okay. It's your motion. The State doesn't have any objection to the hearing.

MS. CRAIG: That's correct.

THE COURT: So I'm going to grant the request. But now the State – has the State hired their expert?

MR. PESCI: We've made contact with an expert. That expert is not available until the week of October the 17<sup>th</sup>; therefore, our trial date is not going to be able to happen.

MS. CRAIG: And I would inquire — I filed with the Court, and I think Mr. Pesci got a copy of all the underlying documentation and I think we sent over —

THE COURT: Right. I have -

MS. CRAIG: - a binder as well, so that you have it all.

THE COURT: So the binder contains everything?

MS. CRAIG: Everything.

MR. PESCI: The State has received that.

THE COURT: Okay. So the motion is granted in part. The State is going to have an opportunity to interview the Defendant in order to, I guess, defend

the - it's a motion to strike the notice of the death penalty ultimately, so.

MS. CRAIG: Yes.

THE COURT: And it appears as though you won't be able to go to trial on October 3<sup>rd</sup>.

MR. PESCI: No. And, Judge, the State responded in its response, not opposition, to the positions the Defense took as far as saying that they should be present during the testing and that it should be presented to the jury as a question of fact as to the intellectual disability. We've opposed that and we're looking for your response as far as when the expert actually goes to meet with the Defendant.

MS. CRAIG: I'd just submit it on our pleadings.

THE COURT: Okay. That portion of the motion is going to be denied.

The State has – well, apparently your – your expert is not available to evaluate the Defendant –

MR. PESCI: That -

THE COURT: - until that time?

MR. PESCI: That's my understanding. I called as soon as we got this, Judge, and, unfortunately, the expert wasn't – didn't have this in the pipeline. So that's when she's available to come.

THE COURT: Okay. And so when do you want to set the hearing? How much time will your expert need?

MR. PESCI: I think it usually takes a couple of days. We could probably set a status check a week or two after that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PESCI: And then we'll have a better idea, I think, of all sides to be

able to set the hearing and then maybe a trial date. 2 THE COURT: And then a trial date. MS. CRAIG: I agree. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 [Colloquy between the Court and clerk] 5 THE CLERK: Okay, the 20th? 6 THE COURT: No. 7 MS. CRAIG: No, a couple weeks. 8 THE COURT: A couple weeks. 9 THE CLERK: Okay. It will be the week of the 27th. 10 THE COURT: Yeah. 11 THE CLERK: Okay. 12 THE COURT: Yeah, that's good. 13 THE CLERK: October 27th. 14 Do you want it at 10:30? 15 THE COURT: No. 16 THE CLERK: 10:30. 17 THE COURT: No. It can just be - no. It can be a regular -18 THE CLERK: Oh. 19 THE COURT: This is just a status check. 20 THE CLERK: I'm sorry. 21 October 27th, 8:30. 22 MR. PESCI: Judge, also I apologize. It's pretty much moot based on the 23 fact of the filing of this Atkins request as far as the stay. Defense counsel also 24

filed a motion for a stay. We've sent a proposed order denying their previous

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motion. I'm not sure if Defense counsel's reviewed it, if they've approved it. If they have, then I'll bring it to you for signature.

MS. CRAIG: We got it on Friday. I was off on Friday, so I printed it off.
I'll take a look at it today and respond in writing to Mr. Pesci. With regard to
the stay, I don't think it's moot. I'm going to ask the Court to — we ultimately
— we talked about it back in March.

THE COURT: Well, I think it's moot. You're not going to trial.

MS. CRAIG: Well, I still think that in order for us to be able to ask the Supreme Court for a stay, which frankly I'd like to do at this point, I think the Court needs to rule one way or another, so that we can approach the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PESCI: Judge, you can deny the stay. The stay has already occurred pursuant to statute, as soon as the Defense filed this motion seeking [indiscernible].

THE COURT: Right. It has to be stayed statutorily.

MR. PESCI: Correct.

THE COURT: So the stay is going to be granted pursuant to the statute.

MS. CRAIG: Okay.

MR. PESCI: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. CRAIG: I appreciate it.

THE COURT: Thank you.

THE CLERK: I'll vacate the trial date.

THE COURT: What?

THE CLERK: I'll vacate the trial date.